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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

WHAT IS INDUCTIVE DEMONSTRATION?

The terms deduction, induction, are very currently used, and they seem to be regarded as signifying two contrasted methods of ascertaining truths. The description usually given in popular statements is, that, while deduction is the drawing down of an inference from a more general truth, induction is the leading in of a general truth from individual facts. There has doubtless been much bandying of the terms, which was not more intelligent than the word-play with that other pair of ambiguous terms, "analysis and synthesis." It is customary to say that Aristotle first examined and formulated the deductive logic or syllogism, and Bacon the inductive method. While almost entire barrenness is imputed to the syllogism, the glory of great fruit and utility is claimed for the induction. Some, indeed, are perspicacious enough to see that neither Aristotle nor Bacon was the inventor of the one or the other method of reasoning, any more than the first anatomists of human limbs were the inventors of walking. Nature has enabled men to walk, and ensured their doing so, with at least imperfect accuracy, by fashioning the parts of their limbs, nerves, bones, tendons, and muscles. The anatomist has only described what he found in the limbs by his dissecting knife. Men virtually syllogised before

Aristotle, and found inductive truths before Bacon. Yet even these more accurate historians seem to think that the two are opposite methods of logical progression.

These vague opinions of what induction is, are obviously unsafe. They lead to much invalid and even perilous reasoning. No stronger testimony against the unauthorised character of much that now calls itself physical science, under the cover of sophistical inductions, need be cited than that of J. Stuart Mill.¹ "So real and practical is the need of a test for induction, similar to the syllogistic test of ratiocination, that inferences which bid defiance to the most elementary notions of inductive logic are put forth without misgiving by persons eminent in physical science, as soon as they are off the ground on which they are familiar with the facts, and not reduced to judge only by the arguments; and as for educated persons in general, it may be doubted if they are better judges of a good or bad induction than they were before Bacon wrote. . . While the thoughts of mankind have on many subjects worked themselves practically right, the thinking power remains as weak as ever; and on all subjects on which the facts which would check the result are not accessible, as in what relates to the invisible world, and even, as has been seen lately, to the visible world of the planetary regions, men of the greatest scientific acquirements argue as pitifully as the merest ignoramus." In these days, when the followers of physical research so often imagine the theologians to be in an active state of hostility against them and their sciences, it is well that we have this accusation from one as remote as possible from alliance with theology. This able witness proves at least so much: that every beam of light which can be thrown on the true nature of the inductive logic, though slender, is desirable; and will be useful both to purify the sciences of matter and to reconcile the conflict, if any such exists, between them and philosophy and theology.

We propose first to account for the vagueness which Mr. Mill has noted in the applications of this species of reasoning, by briefly displaying the uncertainties and discrepancies existing

¹ *Logic*, Vol. I., pp. 480, 481. 7th Edit., London, 1868.

among the logicians who have professed to treat of it. The modern admirers and expounders of Aristotle are found to deny that he did overlook the inductive method, and confine himself to the syllogistic; they claim that he formulated the one as really, if not as fully, as the other. But when they proceed to exhibit what they suppose to be the Aristotelian form of induction, they are not agreed. Thus, Grote's Aristotle (Vol. I., p. 268 etc., Murray, London) interprets him thus: "In syllogism as hitherto described, we concluded that A the major was predicable of C the minor, through B the middle. In the syllogism from induction we begin by affirming that A the major is predicable of C the minor; next we affirm that B the middle is also predicable of C the minor. The two premises, standing thus, correspond to the third figure of the syllogism (as explained in the preceding pages), and would not therefore justify anything more by themselves than a *particular* affirmative conclusion. But we reinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption that the minor C is co-extensive with the middle B, and comprises the entire aggregate of individuals of which B is the universal, or class term." The instance Mr. Grote gives from Aristotle to explain the above is:

- (1) Horse, mule, etc., etc., are long-lived.
- (2) Horse, mule, etc., etc., are bileless.
- (3) (Extraneous assumption.) The horse, mule, etc., etc., comprehend all the bileless animals—
- (4) (Conclusion.) Hence, all bileless animals are long-lived.

Now, it is obvious to remark on this: that without the extraneous assumption the fourth proposition would not hold good as a universal truth. The third proposition, or extraneous assumption, then, is not an accessory, but an essential part of the logical process. But if Aristotle correctly defined syllogism as a process including the proof and conclusion in three terms and three propositions, this inductive process here supposed, whether valid or invalid, is not syllogism. A still more formidable question remains: How do we see that the extraneous assumption is warrantable? Are we entitled to assume that horse, mule, etc., etc., (an incomplete enumeration,) do contain all the bileless ani-

mals? Evidently, nothing contained in this formula authorises us. The process, then, as a proof of a general proposition, is inconclusive. It does not give us the form of a valid inductive proof, and is not the correct analysis of that mental process.

But Mr. Grote himself states that the prior commentators on Aristotle understand him differently. Thus—

- (1) All horse, mule, etc., etc., is long-lived.
- (2) All bileless is horse, mule, etc., etc.
- (3) *Ergo*, all bileless is long-lived.

But Mr. Grote correctly remarks that, while, in form, this comes correctly under the first figure, it manifestly leaves the second proposition unwarranted, and authorises no universal conclusion. He also quotes M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire as explaining Aristotle thus: "Induction is, at bottom, but a syllogism, whose minor and middle are of equal extension. For the rest, there is but one sole way in which the minor and middle can be of equal extension: this is, that the minor shall be composed of *all* the individuals whose sum the middle represents. On the one part, *all* the individuals; on the other, the whole species which they form. The mind very readily makes the equation between these two equal terms." M. St. Hilaire is right, so far that, if this is the Aristotelian induction, it is perfectly valid. But it is equally clear that it is perfectly worthless, as we shall prove by the authority of Galileo. If we must ascertain the predicate to be true of each separate individual of the class, by a separate proof, before we can affirm that predicate of the class as a whole, then our general affirmation is certainly a safe one. But it can certainly teach us nothing, and authorise no progress in knowledge, because we have already learned in detail all it states, in our examination of the individuals. So Galileo. "Vincenzio di Grazia objected to a proof from induction which Galileo adduced, because *all* the particulars were not enumerated. To which the latter justly replied that if induction were required to pass through all the cases, it would be either useless or impossible: impossible when the cases are innumerable; useless when they have each already been verified; since, then, the general proposition adds nothing to our knowledge." (Quoted in Whewell's *Ind. Sciences*, Vol. 2, p. 219.)

Whewell himself explains Aristotle after that general method of the commentators which Grote reprehends. Thus the former: "Induction is when, by means of one extreme term, we infer the other extreme term to be true of the middle term." This Whewell explains thus:

- (1) Mercury, Venus, Mars, describe ellipses about the sun.
- (2) All planets do what Mercury, Venus, Mars, do.
- (3) *Ergo*, all planets describe ellipses about the sun. (Inductive Sciences, Vol. 2, p. 50.)

Again, we repeat, in our anxiety to have the reader see the real weak point in all these theories of induction, the fatal defect is in the second proposition. What authorises us to say that all planets do as Mercury, Venus, Mars, do? The theory of these authors gives us no answer; the assertion is not authorised; and the process, as a proof, worthless.

Ueberweg, *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. I., p. 156, represents Aristotle thus: "In induction (*ἐπαγωγή, ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς*) we conclude from the observation that a more general concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter. (*Analytics Prior. II., 23.*) Induction leads from the particular to the universal (*ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐφοδος. Topics, I., 10.*) The term *ἐπαγωγή*, for induction, suggests the ranging of particular cases together in files, like troops. The complete induction, according to Aristotle, is the only strictly scientific induction. The incomplete induction which, with a syllogism subjoined, constitutes the analogical inference (*παράδειγμα*), is principally of use to the orator."

We pass now from the Stagyrice logic to the method of Lord Bacon, which it is customary to represent as its antithesis. Bacon's claim to be the founder of modern physical science has been both asserted and contested. The verdict of Mill seems to be just: that he does deserve great credit, not so much for giving the real analysis of the inductive method, as for pointing us to the quarter where it lies. The very title of his *Novum Organum*, "Concerning the Interpretation of Nature," struck the correct key-note. The problem of all science, mental as well as physical (and it is

to be noted that Bacon claims, Book I., Aphorism 127, that his method is as applicable to mental and moral sciences as to material), is to interpret the facts given us by nature. The right method was doubtless pointed out when Bacon told the world, in the beginning of his *Novum Organum*, that instead of assuming general propositions, and then audaciously deducing from them, by syllogism, what causes and facts shall be, we are to begin in the opposite way, by the humble, patient, and accurate observations of facts, and then proceed, by legitimate inductions, to general and more general propositions concerning nature's laws.

Bacon says, Book II., Aph. 1, that as the work and design of human power is to induce upon a given body a new property or properties, so the work and design of human science is to discover the "form" of a given property. The whole tenor of his discussion shows that by "*natura*," he means any permanent property of a concrete individual thing. He himself has defined the sense in which he uses the word "form," with a clearness which admits of no debate. Thus, Book II., Aph. 17: "For when we speak of *forms*, we mean nothing else than those laws and determinations of pure activity which regulate and constitute some simple property (*naturam simplicem*), as caloric, light, weight, in every material thing and subject susceptible thereof." He admits that the old philosophy rightly declared, "*to know a thing truly, is to know it through its causes.*" These causes Aristotle had distinguished into four—the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause. In the investigation of nature, the inquiry after the final cause is out of place. He teaches elsewhere that it belongs to philosophy and natural theology. He also turns aside from inquiry into the material and the efficient causes, in their abstract senses. The problem of induction is to ascertain the regular law of the formal cause.

The directions for the interpretation of nature fall, then, under two general classes. The first show us how to derive general truths from experience; the second direct us how to apply these general truths to new experiments, which may further reveal nature. To deduce a general truth from experience, individual observations, there is, first, a task for the senses, that of accurate,

distinct observation of the individual facts of natural history; there is then a task for the memory, the tabulating of coördinate instances; and there is then the task of the intellect or reason, the real induction, which is the detection, among all the resembling and differing instances, of the universal law of cause. It is the last task in which the mind must have the aid of the proper canons of induction, by all attainable comparisons. Thus: let a muster, or array, be made of all the known individual instances in which the property which is the subject of inquiry is present. Then let another array be made of the known instances in which that property is absent. Then let another array be made of the known instances in which the property is present increased or diminished. When these sets of cases or arrays are carefully pondered and compared, the law (*forma*) of the property will begin to reveal itself by this principle: that whatever is always present with that property, or always absent when it is absent, or is found increased or diminished with it—that is the cause of the property. This inductive process is then illustrated at tedious length by an application to the inquiry, What is heat? First, a list is made of all known individual things in nature which exhibit heat, as solar rays, combustive masses, fermenting masses, quick-lime moistened, animal bodies, etc., etc. Then a list is made of bodies which exhibit no caloric, as the fixed stars, the moon, etc. Then lists are formed of objects more or less warm; and the *vindemiatio*, or induction to the true *forma*, or law of caloric, may be cautiously made. This is, that "*Caloric is an expansive motion*, repressed, and striving in the lesser parts of the warm body." (Book II., Aph. 18.) This first *vindemiatio* is then to be tested and confirmed by considering a number of *prerogative instances*; which are particular instances presenting the property under such circumstances as give them the prerogative of determining the law of the property. Of such instances, twenty-five are enumerated! and with a refinement and intricacy of distinction which must be utterly confusing to a practical investigator.

The disparaging verdict which Mill pronounces upon this technical part of the Baconian *Organum*, must be admitted to be

just. Yet it should be mitigated by the fact that, cumbersome as the proposed canon is, it seems to have led Bacon, centuries in advance of his age, in the direction of the latest theory as to what caloric is. That theory now is, that caloric is a mode of molecular motion. Bacon's conclusion was that it is "the striving of an expansive but restrained motion in the lesser parts of a body"! His method was not mere groping: it foreshadowed an imperfect truth. In the light of fuller inquiries, Bacon's errors seem to have been these: that his contempt for the abstract in metaphysics led him to neglect the fundamental notion of *power in the efficient cause*, discriminating it so vitally from the material, formal, and final causes, and thus to depreciate the inquiry into efficient cause; that he had not pondered and settled this other truth of metaphysics, the relation between power and properties in individual things; and that he applied his induction, in his favorite examples, to detect the *forma*, or law of a property, instead of the *laws of effects*. It is the latter inquiry in which inductive science is really concerned, and the solution of which extends man's powers over nature. The thing we wish inductive philosophy to teach us is, How may we be sure to produce, in the future, a given desired *effect*, which has been known in the past?

The illustrious Newton, who did more than any other to throw lustre on the new method by its successful application, presents us, in his four Rules (*Principia*, 3d Book), a substantive advance upon the rude beginnings of Bacon. These rules are far from being exhaustive; nor are they stated in an analytic order, but they are the sound dictates of the author's experience and profound sagacity.

"1. We are not to admit other causes of natural things than such as both are true (not merely imaginary) and suffice for explaining their phenomena.

"2. Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred to the same causes, as far as can be done.

"3. The qualities of bodies which cannot be increased or diminished in intensity, and which belong to all bodies in which we can institute experiments, are to be held for qualities of all bodies whatever.

“4. In experimental philosophy, propositions collected from *phenomena* by induction are to be held as true, either accurately or approximately, notwithstanding contrary hypotheses, till other phenomena occur, by which they may be rendered either more accurate or liable to exception.”

Sir William Hamilton, in his *Logic*, Lect 17th, describes his “inductive categorical syllogism” as “a reasoning in which we argue from the notion of all the constituent parts discretively, to the notion of the constituted whole collectively. Its general laws are identical with those of the deductive categorical syllogism; and it may be expressed, in like manner, either in the form of an intensive or of an extensive syllogism.” This he calls “logical or formal induction.” The process is precisely that which we have seen described by St Hilaire: When a given predication has been found true of every individual of a class, it is also true of the class as a whole. This is unquestionably true; but as unquestionably useless, as we have seen from the statement of Galileo. It gives us only a truism, and no new truth. But Hamilton proceeds to distinguish from this what he calls the “philosophical or real induction,” in which the argument is not from all of the individuals in a class to the class as a whole; but from a part of the individuals to the whole. He says that the validity which this induction may have, is not from the logical law of identity, but from a certain presumption of the objective philosopher, founded on the constancy of nature. This species of induction proceeds thus:

- (1) This, that, and the other magnet, attract iron.
- (2) But this, that, and the other magnet, represent all magnets.
- (3) *Ergo*, all magnets attract iron.

This doctrine he again enlarges in his 32d lecture, where he treats of modified logic, and deals with the “real or philosophical induction” expressly. He again makes it an inference from the many to the all. To the soundness of such an induction two things are requisite: that the cases colligated shall be of the same quality, and that they shall be of a number competent to ground the inference. But to the question, How many like cases are competent? he has no answer. This species of induction, he

admits, cannot give a categorical conclusion. It only raises a probability of truth, and leaves the conclusion a mere hypothesis, sustained by more or less of likelihood. That likelihood is, indeed, increased as a larger number of cases is compared, as the observation and comparison are made more accurate, as the agreement of cases is clear and precise, and as the existence of possible exceptions becomes less probable after thorough exploration. Hamilton concludes by quoting with approbation these words from Esser's Logic: "Induction and analogy guarantee no perfect certainty, but only a high degree of probability."

The objection against the Aristotelian syllogism of induction, which we urged on pages 3rd and 5th, had been stated by Archbishop Whately. Let it be put thus:

(1) This, that, and the other magnet, attract iron.

(2) But this, that, and the other magnet, etc., are conceived to constitute the genus magnet.

(3) *Ergo*, the genus magnet attracts iron.

Whately's objection is, that *the second proposition is manifestly false*. Hamilton pronounces this, which appears to us a fatal, "a very superficial objection." His reason is, that it is extra-logical; that logic is a formal science only; and that hence the correctness of its forms is not vitiated by the circumstance that some proposition expressed in them and correctly connected, so far as these forms go, with other propositions, is in fact untrue, and that the imaginary propositions with which the text-books of logic illustrate the logical forms answer just as well, whether they be really true or not. Hamilton is here clearly misled by a confusion of thought. Because an imaginary, or even a silly, proposition may serve to illustrate a rule of logic, when that rule is the subject of inquiry, it does not follow that, when the ascertainment of other truth by the use of the rules of logic is our object, that can be a good logic whose framework always and necessarily involves a false proposition. Blank cartridges may serve very well for the purposes of an artillery drill; it by no means follows that blank cartridges are adequate for actual artillery practice in war. Such artillery would be practically no artillery; for it would repulse absolutely no enemy. And such logic would be practically

no logic. Logic is a formal science. True. But it professes to give the general forms of elenctic thought, by which the truth of the propositions of all other sciences, besides logic, may be ascertained. Hence, if it proposes to us a given form of thought which is always and necessarily invalid in every real science to which logic offers its method, that form is incorrect as a logical form. We affirm Whately's objection, then, in order to call the reader's attention again to the fatal weak spot in these theories of induction.

What, then, is Whately's own explanation of the inductive syllogism? See his *Logic*, Book IV., Chap. 1. He begins by justly distinguishing two uses of the word induction, which are entirely different. The one process is not a process of argument to the conclusion, but is wholly preliminary thereto, the *ἐπαγωγή*, or bringing in of like instances; the collecting process; and this is, in fact, nearer to the literal meaning of the word. The other process called induction, is the argumentative one, leading in the conclusion, as to the whole class, from the instances. Now, of this logical induction, Whately remarks that, instead of being different from the syllogistic, it is the same with it. And, indeed, unless we assert its sameness, we must give up the theory of the syllogism; for that theory is, that syllogism expresses the one form in which the mind performs every valid reasoning step. The logical induction is, then, says Whately, a syllogism in the first mode and figure, with its major premise suppressed. That suppressed major is always substantially the same in all logical inductions: *that what belongs to the individual cases observed, belongs to their whole class*. The induction by which we predict, in advance of individual examination, that all magnets will attract iron, would then stand thus, according to Whately:

(1) What belongs to the observed magnets, belongs to all magnets.

(2) But these observed magnets attract iron.

(3) *Ergo*, all magnets attract iron.

Now the reader will observe that Whately's process only inverts the order of the first two propositions in Hamilton's. For Whately's first is only a different way of expressing Hamilton's second: that

(2) "This, that, and the other magnet, represent all magnets."

The order of propositions given by Whately seems obviously the simple and correct one. But the difficulty he had propounded as to the Aristotelian form of the induction, recurs as to his: How have we ascertained our major premise, that what belongs to the observed magnets belongs to the whole class? Are we entitled to hold it as a universal truth? The same difficulty virtually meets Whately. It is amusing to find him attempting to parry this fatal difficulty in a way similar to that which Hamilton uses to parry him: "Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an *argument*, may, of course, be stated syllogistically; but so far forth as it is a *process of inquiry*, with a view to obtain the premises of that argument, it is, of course, out of the province of logic." The evasion is as vain for Whately as it was for Hamilton. For that universal major premise, viz., that what belongs to the observed individual cases belongs to the whole class, can no more be the immediate non-logical result of a mere colligation of cases, than the conclusion itself of the inductive syllogism can be. Whately has himself admitted that if a premise used in a syllogism now in hand was a conclusion of any previous reasoning process, then our logic must concern itself about that premise also, and the mode by which we get it, as well as about the form of its relations to the other propositions in our present syllogism. Now, the universal major he claims, is not the mere expression of an extra-logical colligation—that is self-evident. Unless it is an original intuition, it must be the conclusion of a prior logical process. What is that process? Is this universal major valid? Whately gives us no sufficient answer; and thus his theory of inductive argument fails like the others. Yet, it presents us, as we shall see, one step in advance of the others, towards the right direction.

Dr. Whewell deserves mention also, by reason of his wide learning, extending into the domains of physics and metaphysics, and his authorship of a work, once a standard, devoted to this very subject. This is his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences." His view of induction may be seen in these citations (Vol. I., p. 22): Where "truths are obtained by beginning from observation

of external things, and by finding some notion in which the things, as observed, agree, the truths are said to be obtained by induction." Contrasting deduction with induction, he says, "Deductive truths are the results of relations among *our thoughts*. Inductive truths are relations which we perceive among existing *things*." And of the deductive process he thinks the geometrical demonstrations the best examples.

Now, the insufficiency of these descriptions is obvious from these remarks. Lines, angles, surfaces, solids, in geometry, are as truly *things* as any observed phenomena or effects in physics. Thus the distinction wholly fails. Again, Whewell has combined, in his description of induction, two processes of mind which are wholly distinct, and only one of which is a logical process. Both have, indeed, been called induction (in different senses), but the first is only a *colligation* of observed things or facts. This process only completes a general statement which gives correct expression to a series of individual observed facts, when taken as a whole. The instance given by another presents this process very simply: A navigator in unknown seas beholds land; he knows not whether it is continent or island. But he sails along its shores, noting its bays and headlands, and taking ocular evidence of the continuity of the whole coast, until he beholds again the same spot he first saw. He calls the land now an island. But he has made no *logical inference*; he has but colligated all his separate notes of the coasts, with their connecting continuity, into that general concept of which "island" is the correct name. Now, this is really what Kepler did when he performed what has so often been cited as a splendid instance of induction: from a number of observed angular motions of the sun in the ecliptic, he declared that the earth moved in an ellipse, with the sun at one of the *foci*. The real process was but to plot and colligate upon a plane surface, all the successive positions of the earth; whereupon inspection showed that the line she had pursued was elliptical. A still simpler and equally illustrious instance of this process was given when Maury enounced the general facts of his wind-and-current charts. His results were obtained by faithfully plotting, upon blank charts of the oceans,

the directions of the winds and currents, with the successive dates, from a multitude of actual observations in sailors' log-books. When this humble but noble work was patiently done, the general facts as to the directions of the winds and currents, at given seasons, revealed themselves to inspection. Here was a grand colligation, but, as yet, no inference. But we have a true instance of inductive inference when Newton derived the great law of the attraction of gravitation, as expressing the true cause of that elliptical circulation. Kepler had colligated only a general fact; Newton inducted a law of cause. Whewell seems, p. 23d, to confound them.

But on p. 48th he speaks, if still too indefinitely, yet more nearly to the truth. "Induction is familiarly spoken of as the process by which we collect a *general proposition* from a number of particular cases; and it appears to be frequently imagined that the general proposition results from a mere juxtaposition of the cases, or, at most, from merely conjoining and extending them." . . . "This is an inadequate account of the matter." .

. "There is a *conception of the mind* introduced into the general proposition, which did not exist in any of the observed facts." The phrase "conception of the mind" is indeed an inaccurate expression for the missing but all-important element of the logical induction. But Whewell had perceived so much: that this element of proof was not in the mere colligation of agreeing instances alone, but was to be furnished from another source. And he points our inquiries in the right direction, in seeking this vital premise among the intuitive judgments of the reason. It is to be found in that judgment which so many of these writers speak of as our *conviction of the uniformity of nature!* Thus, in substance, answer the most of them, as Hamilton and his great German authorities, Krug and Esser. But this is the question.

The comments of Lord Macaulay on the inductive method, in his famous Essay on Lord Bacon, justify the angry estimate of his comrade, Brougham, by their superficial character. But they may also serve to show how just the complaint of Mill is as to the confusion of the opinions of even educated men on this subject. Macaulay, with his usual plausible brilliancy, assures us that the

method of the *Novum Organum* was nothing more than the familiar experimental argument of the English squire as to the cause of his bodily ailments. The result of the squire's induction is to trace his sufferings to his indulgence in his favorite dainties. On the nights after free indulgence he suffered much. On nights when he had wholly abstained, he was free from pain. On nights when he had indulged sparingly, he suffered slightly. Here, intimates Macaulay, we have the whole Baconian process, the *comparentia instantiarum similium*, the *exclusiones instantiarum negativarum*; the *comparationes pluris aut minoris*. He seems to think that this embraces the inductive logic!

Fleming, in his "Vocabulary of Philosophy," after citing numerous definitions of induction, which exhibit the uncertainties and confusions criticised in these pages, gives his own statement thus: "By the principle of induction is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man, Eccles. i. 9: 'The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done.' In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason; all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Newton, *Effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem sunt causa*. The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of induction is an application of the principle of causality," etc. Of this description we may say what was said of Whewell's, but with more emphatic approval: that it points us in the right direction.

We now introduce the definitions of three contemporary American logicians. The Rev. Dr. McCosh says (Div. Gov., p. 289): "Induction is an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by analysis; or, as Bacon expresses it, the 'necessary exclusions' of things indifferent, and this followed by a process of generalisation, in which we seize on the points of agreement."

Professor Bowen, Logic, p. 380, teaches that induction is from some observed cases to the many not observed; and he passes this verdict on the process: "But just so far as they" (induc-

tions) "are means to these ends, they lose the character of pure or demonstrative reasonings, the syllogisms to which they are reducible are faulty, either in matter, as having a major premise the universality of which is merely *probable*; or in form, as containing an undistributed middle."

"Induction, properly so called, concerns the matter of thought, and concludes from *some to all*."

Dr. Porter, *Elements of Intellectual Science*, Abr. Ed., p. 393, says: "Judgments of induction differ from simple judgments in several important particulars. (In the simple judgments we bring the individuals under the appropriate common concept.) In induction we proceed farther: we add to those simple judgments yet another, viz., that what we have found to be true of these, may be received as true of all others like them. The ground of the first judgment is facts observed and compared. The ground of the second is what is called the *analogy of nature*. A judgment of induction is, then, a *judgment of comparing observation, enlarged by a judgment of analogy*. The judgment of observation is founded on an *observed similarity*; the judgment of induction on an *interpreted indication*."

We have postponed to the last the notice of two celebrated philosophers, Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill, because they both exhibit, as a common trait, the influence of their countryman, Hume, in wresting their views from the truth. Stewart (Vol. 3d, Chap. 4th, of the *Method of Inquiry* pointed out in the *Experimental, or Inductive, Logic*), amidst many elegant, but confused, digressions, reaches substantially the same view of inductive reasoning with his predecessors. P. 246. "When, by thus comparing a number of cases agreeing in some circumstances, but differing in others, and all attended with the same result, a philosopher connects, as a general law of nature, the event with its *physical cause*, he is said to proceed according to the method of *induction*." "In drawing a general physical conclusion from particular facts, we are guided merely by our instinctive expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature; an expectation which, implying little, if any, exercise of the reasoning powers, operates alike on the philosopher and on the savage." . . . "To

this belief in the permanent uniformity of physical laws, Dr. Reid long ago gave the name of the *inductive principle*."

Stewart seems to admit by implication what we have seen Hamilton and Bowen assert so plainly, that the physical induction can give only a probable evidence, and can never demonstrate absolutely a universal truth. For Stewart, in commenting on the interesting fact that the inductive method is applicable in mathematics, reminds us that it was only by this method Newton proved the binomial theorem; and then proceeds to argue, pp. 318, 319, that, had this theorem not really been sustained by some principle more valid than is found in any physical induction, mathematicians would not have accepted it as universally true for all exponents of the $(a+x)$. All the proof, says he, which Newton seemed to have of the binomial theorem, was to expand the products, by actual multiplication, of the $(a+x)$ to the 2d, the 3d, the 4th, and to such a number of powers, as satisfied him that the laws he found prevailing for the number of terms, and the exponents and coefficients in all the products actually inspected, might be trusted to prevail in all other powers, however high. Now, had this been really all, Stewart thinks we should have had, in this mathematical formula, a specimen of induction exactly like physical induction. And he evidently thinks it could not have been demonstrative of the universal truth, but only evidential of the probable truth of the *formula* for untried cases. He thinks there is really, latent in the process of Newton, a further evidence, which is demonstrative: that when the actual multiplications are pursued to several powers, the mind sees a reason why the coefficients and exponents not only do, but must, follow the law observed by inspection in the products expanded. Does not this imply that in the case of physical inductions, a similar *desideratum* is lacking? Surely. But Stewart does not supply it. Surely, he cannot think that he finds it in "permanent uniformity of physical laws," which he regards as the inductive principle; for he thinks it is instinctive, rather than rational. Thus he leaves his system of inductive logic as baseless of solid foundation as the others.

But the worst legacy of the philosophy of Hume he leaves us,
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is his distinction between the physical cause and the efficient cause. The physical cause is the invariable actual antecedent of the *phenomenon* regarded as effect. The efficient cause is the secret unseen power the mind imputes; and he declares the word *power* expresses an attribute of mind, not of matter. He expressly declares that the object of induction is to seek, not the efficient, but the physical cause. Pp. 230, 231. And his reasons are but the deceptive ones of the sensationalistic philosophy which misled, in part, even Brown and Stewart, and so much more sadly, Mill: that observation of physical sequences gives us nothing but a regular antecedent and consequent; so that physical science should have to do with nothing more. That this often repeated conclusion is utterly sophistical appears from these two tests: observation of physical phenomena gives us no general concepts; for all philosophers agree that nature presents to the eye nothing but *individual* things and *phenomena*. Shall physical science, therefore, have no business with general concepts and universal propositions? Again, nature presents to the eye no inference of any kind. Shall physical science then discard inference? Carry out this argument, and man's relation to nature must sink to that of the cunning brute, the ant or the beaver. Hence it appears that, if there is to be any science or any theory, elements must be contributed to it from the subjective powers of the mind, as well as from the outward observed facts and things. Stewart was the more unpardonable for making this concession against the inquiry for the efficient cause, for that he is not really a sensationalist, but admits the mind has intuitive notions and judgments. He should have remembered that, granting what the eyes observe in the rise of a *phenomenon* is only its regular antecedent, we rationally supply to the real causal antecedent, as its own property, the notion of *power*. Just as when by the senses we perceive a cluster of properties of a concrete thing, the law of the reason necessitates our supplying the notion of *substance*. It is impossible for us to think the antecedent which seems next the effect the real next antecedent, unless we judge it to emit the *power* efficient of the effect. In a word, the physical cause can, in truth, be none other than the efficient cause. If we do not know, by

sense-perception, what the power is, we rationally know that it is; if we do not know its $\tau\delta\ \pi\omega\varsigma$, we do know its $\tau\delta\ \delta\tau\iota$. Hence, its reality is as proper a ground for argument and inference as the reality of any concrete body. Do we know what the energy we call electricity is? Yet we construct a thousand experiments to seek it, and inferences from its power. Stewart ought to have affirmed, then, precisely what he denied; what Newton affirmed: that the real object of the inductive inference is to *find the efficient cause*.

We shall see that the chief, the only useful, problem of induction is, to ascertain the certain laws of given effects. *How can an antecedent bring the effect certainly after it, unless it be efficient thereof?* To limit induction, as Stewart and Mill do, to the ascertainment only of the physical antecedent, is to forbid induction from ever rising above the probabilities of mere enumerated sequences, whose worthlessness to science Bacon has so well exposed. Have we not the clue, in this refusal of the search after the efficient cause, to the imperfections and confusions of their treatment? We repeat, the reversal of this *dictum* of theirs is vital.

Mill is at once the best and the worst of all the English-speaking logicians, in his treatment of the inductive logic. His insight into its true nature is far the most profound and correct; and his technical canons of induction the most simple and accurate at once. But his error as to the rudimental doctrine, which underlies all his admirable discriminations, is the most obstinate. To him eminently belongs the credit of vindicating for the inductive logic the character of a true demonstration, and of showing where that demonstration is founded. Having set aside the inaccurate uses of the word induction, he defines as follows (Bk. III., Ch. II., § 1):

“*Induction*, then, is that operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects.” (Chap. III., Sec. 1.) “It consists in inferring from some individual instances in which a *phenomenon* is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain

class ; namely, in all which resemble the former in what are regarded as the material circumstances." But since the mere observation of a similarity of sequence in a number of instances does by no means authorise this expectation as to instances not observed—a truth which Mill here implicitly recognises, and elsewhere expressly acknowledges—the all-important question remains, What is it that authorises the mind to infer positively, in the case of the valid induction, that the unobserved instances will be like the observed? He answers (§ 1): "The proposition that the course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle or general axiom of induction." "If we throw the whole course of any inductive argument into a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive by more or fewer steps at an ultimate syllogism, which will have for its major premise the principle or axiom of the uniformity of the course of nature." Again (Chap. V., § 1), recognising the general law of logic, that only universal premises can yield universal conclusions in the mathematical reasonings, he admits that it must be so likewise in inductive reasonings. "This fundamental law must resemble the truths of geometry in their most remarkable peculiarity, that of never being, in any instance whatever, defeated or suspended by any change of circumstances." But where do we find such a universal principle? He answers: "*This law is the law of causation.*" (§ 2.) "On the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules." "The notion of *cause* is the root of the whole theory of induction." And most emphatically (in Chap. XXI., § 1) having expounded his canons of induction, for discriminating between the sequences which authorise, and those which do not authorise, expectation of the same *phenomena* recurring, he says: "The basis of all these logical operations is the law of causation. The validity of all the inductive methods depends on the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every *phenomenon*, must have some cause."

But this excellent doctrine he then fatally neutralises by the doctrine of the sensationalists concerning the notion of causation. This he declares to be of empirical origin (Chap. V., § 2): "The only notion of a cause which the theory of induction requires, is

such a notion as can be gained from experience." He deems that the tie of power, which we think the reason, but not the senses, sees between cause and effect, is "such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its *cause*." He distinguishes, with Reid and Stewart, between the physical and the efficient cause, and declares that induction concerns itself only about the physical cause. With him, causation is "*invariable, unconditional antecedence*;" nothing more.

Again (Chap. V., § 3), after referring to the truth that a sequent effect is not usually found to be the regular result of a sole antecedent, but of a cluster of several antecedent *phenomena* and states, he claims that all these regular antecedents are equally cause, and that the mind has no ground for assigning efficiency to one more than another. He seeks to abolish the distinction between the efficient causes and the conditions of an effect. If one eats of poisonous food and dies, we have no reason to call the poison the *cause* of the death, rather than the idiosyncrasy of the man's constitution, the accidental state of his health at the time, and the state of the atmosphere, for all had some concurrent influence to occasion the result. "The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others."

These *dicta*, as we shall show, are subversive of the author's own better doctrine, cited in the previous paragraph. For it is easy to see that, if they were true, they would be fatal to that certainty and universality which he has himself correctly demanded for the major premise of all inductions. Waiving, for the present, the discussion of the question, whether our notion of causation is empirical, we would point out that there is, obviously, no invariable, no certain connexion between the mere condition of an effect and its actual rise. This condition must be present, if it is a *conditio sine qua non*, in order to the rise of the effect; but it may be duly present, and yet the effect may not come. This simple remark shows that, were efficient cause no more in-

variably connected with effect than is a condition, then cause and effect would not have any of that uniformity and universal certainty of effect which, Mill admits, is essential to ground the inductive argument. But he asserts that the condition is part cause, and as much entitled to be viewed as real cause as any other part of the antecedents supposed to be more efficient. Thus he contradicts himself. This suggests the further argument, that our common sense is not mistaken in ascribing an efficiency or power to the cause such as it does not ascribe to the occasion; because we know, experimentally, that the true cause has a connexion with the effect more necessary than the occasion has. Oftentimes conditions may be changed, and yet the regular effect continue to occur; but if the truly causal antecedent be lacking, all the appointed conditions remain dumb and barren of effect, though duly present. For instance: in order that germination may result, there must be moisture, warmth, and vegetable vitality in the seed. Can any reasoning man believe that moisture or warmth is as essentially efficient of the growth as the vital energy is? No. For he sees that all the water in the sea and all the caloric in the sunbeams conjoined, would never produce growth until the vital germ is added. But as soon as this is present, in addition to the other two, the growth regularly takes place. They are conditions, this alone efficient cause of living, vegetable growth. Mill has evidently been unconsciously deceived by the fact that there are effects in which more than one *vera causa* concur as efficient, in addition to certain conditions. Thus, in the case of a moving body, driven by two forces in different lines, each force is *true cause* of the resulting diagonal motion, in addition to the other *conditions* of mobility.

But to us this appears to be the crowning proof of error in this doctrine of Mill, that often we find conditions of effects which are merely negative. Yet they may be conditions *sine qua non*. The burglar was enabled to effectuate his felonious purpose of burning the dwelling by reason of the absence of the fire-engine. How could an engine, *which was absent*, exert efficiency in the destruction of the house? The very amount of this condition was, that this engine exerted absolutely no efficiency, did nothing in the case.

The error of Mill's doctrine appears also when it is carried into psychology. Our author is, in a sense, a Necessitarian, or, at least, a Determinist, in his theory of volition. Now, when a given volition rose, the whole set of conditions attending its rise included a certain subjective motive, which was a complex of a certain judgment and appetency ; and a certain objective inducement, not to say other circumstances, conditioning the feasibility of the volition. According to Mill, this whole cluster of conditions, taken together, should be regarded as the cause of that volition ; and one element has as much right to be regarded as efficient thereof as another. Then, the objective inducement and the subjective motive were as really efficient, the one as the other ? Where, then, was the agent's rationality and free agency ? In the objective presentation of the inducement, the man's spontaneity had no concern, in any shape. To him, that presentation was as absolutely necessitated as the fall of a mass unsupported. Hence, if that objective inducement was as truly *cause* of his volition as his inward appetency was, his free-agency was a delusion, and his act of soul was absolutely necessitated. But of his exercise of these attributes in that volition, his consciousness assured him. We thus vindicate that philosophy of common sense which distinguishes the real efficient from the mere conditions of an effect. It is the presence of the former which determines and produces the effect ; the others are merely conditions *recipient* of that effect.

This review of the history of the inductive logic the reader will find to be not a useless expenditure of his time. It has not only traced the growth of the doctrine in its progress towards correctness ; but it has familiarised his mind to the terms and ideas with which he has to deal in the further study. It has given us opportunity to criticise and establish the proper views on some points, like the one last discussed, which will be found vital to the development. And above all, it has disclosed to us the true problem which yet remains to be solved, to complete that development. The most important points of this review to be resumed are these : that "induction" has been used to describe three distinct processes of the mind—of which the first is the colligating of many resem-

bling percepts into one general concept of the mind; the second is the inference to the truth of the predication concerning the whole from its ascertained truth concerning each and all of the individuals of that whole; and the third is, the inference from some observed instances to all the other unobserved instances of the class.

That the first of these processes the writers we have consulted declare to be no logical process at all, but only a preliminary thereto; that the second was found by us perfectly valid, but also perfectly useless, except as a compendious form for recording knowledge already ascertained; that the third is the useful process of the inductive inquiry, and the only one which really extends our knowledge or our power over the previously unknown. But the vital problem about this process is, *how* the ascertainment of only some of the resembling instances entitles us to infer a universal rule, which shall be held true of cases absent in space, or future in time, from the sphere of the actual observation? That the answer given is, our expectation of the "uniformity of nature" is what entitles us; and that the best of our teachers, as Newton, Fleming, and Mill, ground that expectation in the law of causation.

But that we may comprehend the difficulty and gravity of the main problem, we must inquire whether this expectation of the uniformity of nature is valid, and whence it is derived. Does nature, in fact, present an aspect of uniformity? Far from it. A very great part of her *phenomena* are unexpected and unintelligible to men. The unlikely and the unexpected is often that which occurs. Whole departments of nature refuse to disclose any orderly law to man's investigations, as the department of meteorology refused to our fathers; so that the results which arise are well described to our apprehension by the phrase, "as fickle as the winds." That the aspect of nature is to the popular and unscientific observer almost boundlessly variable and seemingly capricious, is shown by the sacrifices of the Romans to the goddess *Fortuna*, whom they supposed to rule a large part of the affairs of men, and whose throne they painted as a globe revolving with a perpetual but irregular lubricity. What else do we

mean by our emphatic confessions of our blindness to the future, than that the evolutions of nature are endlessly variable to our apprehension; and for that reason, baffle our foresight? See Mill, Chap. 21: "It is not true, as a matter of fact, that mankind have always believed that all the successions of events were uniform and according to fixed laws. The Greek philosophers, not even excepting Aristotle, recognised Chance and Spontaneity as among the agents in nature," etc., etc. So, Baden Powell, *Essay on the Inductive Phil.*, pp. 98-100. No writer has made more impressive statements of this uncertainty of the aspects of nature than that idolater of the inductive sciences, Auguste Comte. His *Philosophie Positive* says of her energies: "Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had failed to be subjected to any precise condition. It is only where natural causes work in their greatest simplicity and smallest number, that any appearance of invariable order is obvious to the common observer. As soon as the number of concurring or competing causes becomes larger, and the combinations more intricate, the resultant *phenomena* begin to wear to us the aspect of a disorder which obeys no regular law whatever." Such is Comte's confession. This suggests the question, What, then, authorised the observer to postulate this proposition, that "nature is uniform"? Shall it be said that he is authorised to do so because his inductions have led him to detect latent laws of order amidst nature's seeming confusions? But the postulate of nature's uniformity was, as it appears, necessary to his first inductions. Whence did he derive it at the beginning? Is his induction all reasoning in a circle? The same philosopher has also pointed out this general fact, that the departments of nature, in which her causes are few and simple, and her movements therefore uniform, are the very ones which are farthest from man and from his control; while in those departments which are nearest to him, which most concern him, and which it is most desirable for him to control, causations are most innumerable and complicated, and all principle of uniform order most latent. The heavenly bodies move in orbits, under the operation of two forces only; and hence their movements are manifestly regular, intel-

ligible, and capable of exact prediction. Astronomy is the most exact of the physical sciences. But these stars are the farthest bodies from us, and the ones over which we can have absolutely no control. As we approach nearer to our human interests and persons, natural causations become more numerous and intricate. The chemistry which governs in the composition of our food and medicines, presents us with physical energies much more numerous and subtile than the two forces, centrifugal and centripetal; and in that science results are far less regular and capable of prediction by us, just as they are nearer and more important to us. But when we come still nearer, to the vital energies which govern our health, disease, pain, or ease and death, there the appearance of uniformity is least, and the fortuity seemingly greatest. No man knoweth "what a day may bring forth." How, then, are we warranted to set out with this assumption of the "uniformity of nature"? How is it that we claim to account for her actual complications and apparent fortuities, thus embarrassing us at every turn, by our hypothesis of the inter-actings of *latent laws*; when the very question is, whether these irregularities do not refute the very idea of permanent law in her realm?

If it be urged that there are regularities amidst the seeming fortuities of nature, and that induction may proceed from these regularly recurrent instances, we shall be met with another difficulty. It is demonstrable that no amount of mere regularity in a recurring sequence can amount to demonstration that the same sequence will recur in the future. The customary apprehension of the inductive argument seems to be thus: that if a given *phenomenon* be actually observed to go immediately before another a *sufficient number of times*, this justifies the postulating of a regular law. And such, in fact, is the amount of most of the so-called scientific observation and argument. If one asks, *How many* observations of the same recurring sequence are sufficient to reveal, and thus to prove, a law; no consistent answer is given to us. And let it be supposed that any answer whatsoever were given us—as that fifty or five hundred entirely agreeing instances would be sufficient to establish a law—then we must ask, *What is there different* in the last crowning instance, say the

five-hundredth, which makes it conclusive of a law, when the four hundred and ninety-nine were not? The argument was begun on the assumption that they were to be all agreeing instances; for the disagreeing instances would rather cross and contradict the induction than strengthen it. And yet this five-hundredth must have something in it different from the four hundred and ninety-ninth, for that is conclusive where this was not. To this difficulty also we get no consistent answer.

In truth, the inquiry has proceeded far enough among the inductive logicians, to prove thus much, absolutely, that this species of induction, which does no more than count up agreeing instances of sequence, can never be a demonstration. Bacon calls it the "*Inductio per enumerationem simplicem*." His verdict against its validity may be found in the *Nov. Organum*, L. I., Apothegm 105: "Some other form of induction than has been hitherto in use, must be excogitated in establishing an axiom" (general principle). "And this is necessary, not only for discovering and proving what they call *first truths*, but also the lesser and the mediate axioms; in fine, all axioms. For an induction which proceedeth by simple enumeration, is a puerile affair, and gives a precarious conclusion, and is liable to peril from a contradictory instance; and oftentimes it pronounces from fewer instances than is meet, and only from such as lie readiest at hand." So Mill (Book III., Chap. III., § 2): "To an inhabitant of Central Africa, fifty years ago, no fact probably appeared to rest on more uniform experience than this, that all human beings are black. To Europeans, not many years ago, the proposition, all swans are white, appeared an equally unequivocal instance of uniformity in the course of nature. Further experience has proved to both that they were mistaken." (See also Chap. XXI., Vol. II., p. 101.) So speak all the thoughtful writers. The invalidity of such induction is also proved by familiar examples. Experience observes the invariable death of our fellow-men. We confidently expect all living men, including ourselves, will die. Experience has, with equal certainty, shown us night always preceding day within the limits of twenty-four hours; for we live between the arctic circles. But no man dreams that night or

darkness *causes the day*; and if he concluded that the sequence must hold as he has seen it, he would be refuted by the first winter within the arctic circle. Every man who rises early enough, hears the cock crow invariably before the dawn; no man infers that the cock's crowing causes dawn, or must necessarily precede it. Babbage's calculating machine presented a curious refutation of this species of induction. Its machinery could be so adjusted by the maker, as to present to the eye a certain series of numbers, increasing by a given law, and this was continued through instances so numerous as to weary the spectator. Did he now conclude that these numerous agreeing instances revealed to him the necessary law of the machine? He was speedily refuted by seeing it change the law of the series by its own automatic action.

But does not such an enumeration of agreeing instances teach anything? We reply that it does raise a probability of a law which may be found to regulate the future rise of similar instances. The more numerous the agreeing instances summed up, the more this probability will usually grow; and when, by our own observation and the testimony of our fellow-men, the agreeing instances become exceedingly numerous, and none of a contradictory character appear, the probability may mount towards a virtual certainty. The ground of this will appear when we have advanced farther into the discussion. It must also be conceded that inferences which have only probability, may be of much practical value in common life, and serve a certain purpose even in the proceedings of science. Bishop Butler has taught us that, to a great extent, probability is the guide of life. Junctures often arise when it is not only man's wisdom, but his clear duty, to act upon only probable anticipations of results. In science, also, these imperfect inductions have their use, which is this, to guide to some probable but only provisional hypothesis, which is taken only as a guide to experiments that are made for the conclusive investigation of nature. What we observe, then, of this induction by mere enumeration of agreeing instances is, that it is not useless; but it can never give demonstrated truths. But science requires, in its final results, complete demonstration.

Not a few logicians, among whom Hamilton is to be numbered, in view of this imperfection in the mere induction from the many to all, have roundly declared that induction can never give more than probable evidence of its laws. (Logic, Lecture 321, end.) He asserts that it is impossible for it to teach, like the deductive syllogism, any necessary laws of thought or of nature! Must we concede this? Is the problem, the gravity of which was indicated, indeed hopeless? Must we admit that all the sciences of induction, and all the practical rules of life, which are virtually also inductive, are forever uncertain, presenting us only probabilities, and remaining but plausible hypotheses which await the probable or possible refutation from wider investigations? This we cannot believe. We claim a demonstrative force for this species of evidence, when it is properly constructed. We must substantiate such a view, or else candidly surrender the proud claim and name of *science* for our opinions upon all the natural phenomena. Real demonstration cannot be grounded in uncertainties, however much they be multiplied. They can only be grounded, as Mill has most truly declared—however inconsistently for his own logic—in necessary truths. Moreover, the common sense of mankind rejects the conclusion that all its inductions are only probable. Some of them we know to be certain, and experience never fails to confirm their certainty. The question, then, recurs, which is the great problem of this species of logic, How does the inference seemingly made from the some or the many to the all, become valid for the all?

R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE II.

THE BIBLE, A DIVINE REVELATION.

The purpose of this article is not at all ambitious. Its aim is simply to present the recognised arguments in as plain a manner as possible. Its character may be judged from the fact that it is used with the class of young girls who come under the instruction of the writer.

The first point made is, that a revelation from God to man, concerning his religious interests, is *possible*. We say, concerning his religious interests, because such we take the Bible to be. While the book contains interesting matter to the geologist, the historian, the ethnologist, the linguist, the poet, the orator, the lawyer, the statesman, and the moralist, it is not designed as a treatise upon any one or all of these subjects. These are merely incidental features. Its purpose is to reveal to man the scheme of his redemption from sin.

Such a revelation from God to man is possible. The possibility of an intelligible revelation depends upon the intelligence of the two parties, and a medium of communication between them. Sir Isaac Newton could not tell the apple, when it fell, that its descent was due to the law of gravitation, for the reason that the apple was not a mind. Even Max Müller or Dr. Gildersleeve probably cannot tell the simplest abstract truth to the Hottentot or to the Corean. Because, while each is a mind, there is no medium of communication between them. The Hottentot does not understand English nor any other language with which Dr. G. may be familiar, and Dr. G. has probably not yet mastered the beauties of the Hottentot vernacular.

God and man are both intelligent spirits; and while man may not understand God's language, God does understand and can use man's. It is possible, therefore, for God to make a revelation to man.

Advancing a step, we say that a revelation from God to man, with regard to his religious interests, is not only possible, but *probable*. The point now is, that it is antecedently probable that

God would make a revelation to man. This will appear whether we look towards man or towards God. As far as man is concerned, the probability rests upon his need of such a revelation. This need is apparent from man's ignorance. He is in a state by nature of helpless ignorance as to the most important facts which concern his religious interests. He is ignorant of his origin. He is here a spirit embodied. His fathers were here before him. But his own unaided science teaches him that there was a time when he did not exist upon the earth. Some attempt to answer the question by affirming that man sprang from the lower orders of creation. This, however, does not settle the question, even if it be true. It only carries it farther back. If man came from the animals, and the animals from the vegetables, and the vegetables from the minerals, and the minerals from star dust, fire mist, or nebulæ, the problem is not solved; it is not even lessened. Whence came the star dust or the nebulæ? Were they eternal? This is incredible, for no finite being can possess infinite properties. If not eternal, they began to exist. If so, how? Ah, that is the question, and before it human science stands dumb in baffled impotence. It is just as easy to make a universe as it is an atom. No finite power, no chance, no spontaneity, can do either. Given the atoms, and the universe may be finitely possible. But the bringing of a molecule into being from absolute non-existence is not possible except by infinite power. Indeed, to a finite being it is unthinkable. Whence, then, came man, and the universe, of which he forms a part? Science cannot answer. He who made both alone can do so.

Man is ignorant of his destiny. His fathers have died. Generations have passed away. What has become of them? Apparently they have ceased to exist. But does man perish like the brutes? His moral nature is not satisfied with an existence here. Not only are there so many things left unfinished, but especially are there so many wrongs unrectified in this life, that there ought to be a future. But who can say that there is? Science cannot. She is as mute at the grave as she is at the cradle. God alone can tell, for man's future as well as man's present existence depends upon the will of God. No finite power can create an element;

no finite power can annihilate one; and yet no element possesses the power of independent self-existence even for a moment. It is all as God wills. God, therefore, must tell man whether he is to live beyond the grave; and if so, where, how long, and how.

Man is ignorant of his duty. Next to God, duty is the sublimest thought that enters human conception. Man may afford to be ignorant as to whence he came and whither he is going, but he must know what is his duty, what he ought to do. Better not to exist, either in this or the future life, than to live irresponsible to the claims of duty. Man cannot and ought not to be satisfied with a partial recognition of the obligations under which he rests. He must know his duty, his full duty, and know it clearly and unmistakably. The principles of duty, though far-reaching, are very few and simple. There are only two of them, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and, "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." These are all; and yet what human mind, untaught of God, ever conceived or promulgated them? They were divinely revealed to man.

As illustrative of man's religious ignorance, we adduce, as one more instance, the fact that man, by his wisdom, knew not God. All practical religion, whether reverential, as it looks towards God, or redemptive, as it looks towards man, depends upon a correct knowledge by man of God. All observation shows that man has no natural correct knowledge of God. It is not necessary here to settle the question whether man, by his own unaided powers, conceives the idea of God. We do not believe that he does. It is our conviction that the notion of a supernatural being or beings, entertained outside of Bible lands, is but a corrupted tradition handed down from Babel. But let it be true that these conceptions of divinity are natural; that they are the original results of man's own unaided thought; and still it is true that man needs a revelation to teach him the existence and character of God. What are these ideas of the Deity? Take them as you find them in the most enlightened of heathen writers. What was the Zeus of the Greeks and the Jupiter of the Romans? A character that would not be considered respectable in genteel Christian society. It is a miserable and blasphemous burlesque

upon the true God to assert that these creations of human thought and fancy are to be considered, in any true sense, representations of himself. Far more reasonable would it be to say that the soulless ape is a true representative of Socrates or Cicero. Man needs not only a knowledge that God is, but also that he is, as he is, "a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." No such knowledge has man outside of the Bible. Take but two of the divine attributes, unity and spirituality, and where do we find these conceived and set forth by any man who had never read the Bible? Man needs such a correct knowledge; for, as we have said, his religion will be determined by his conception of God. A false god, or a false idea of God, necessarily leads to a false religion, or to a correspondingly low and degraded form of the true religion. A true religion, based upon a correct conception of the true God, is the food, the very life, of the soul. A false religion, resulting from a false idea of the Deity, is the poison, the very death, of the soul.

The probability of a divine religious revelation to man appears thus from man's need, as ignorant of his own origin, destiny, and duty, and of the very existence and true character of God.

It is equally manifest from man's need as a sinful being. That man is a sinful being, no rational human mind, acquainted with itself, will deny. He who dares deny it, is the saddest proof and illustration of its truth; for such a mind must be lamentably ignorant of its own moral condition, and of any correct moral standard. That man is a sinner, is to him the most infinitely weighty and momentous of all truths. It involves two facts, either of which is of transcendent interest. If man is a sinner, he is under a penalty. What that penalty is, in its exact nature and extent, he may not know. But it requires no revelation to assure him that he is under condemnation. "Conscience makes cowards of us all," and conscience points her accusing finger at every soul, and says, Thou art a guilty criminal. If man is a sinner, he is morally polluted. It is a sad fact, and a sad proof of man's woful moral state, that he does not realise this as he does the dread of punishment for his sins. Yet this is

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far the worst feature of his sinfulness. Better far to suffer the tortures of the damned than to have the spirit of a devil. Aye, the latter is essential to, for it is the cause of, the former.

Man surely needs deliverance from this evil in both of its forms. In comparison, his ignorance is a trifle. Indeed, the ignorance would not exist but for the sin ; for it is but one of the results of sin. Man cannot save himself. He not only does not know how to do so, but it is impossible for him to know, until God shall reveal to him the mode. This is manifest ; for the terms upon which God is willing to save man must be fixed by God, who alone, therefore, can reveal them, or cause them to be officially and authentically promulgated.

For man's sake, then, a revelation of redemption is needed, and may be said to be probable.

The argument, however, is manifestly incomplete, should we stop here. A dove may need deliverance from the talons of an eagle, but that does not prove that the eagle will grant it. To use a much more apposite illustration, an ignorant and debased criminal doubtless needs pardon, enlightenment, and moral renovation. That, however, does not prove that his justly incensed sovereign and judge will grant these to him. It will depend upon the sovereign himself. This leads us to consider the probabilities of the case, as seen from the *divine* standpoint.

Here two thoughts are suggested. First, God's character and relations to man make it probable that he would interpose for his recovery. God is infinitely just and holy, but he is also infinitely gracious and loving. God is not only the Sovereign and Judge of man, but he is also his Father. Will not the love and grace of his fatherly heart lead him to deliver man from his estate of sin and misery ? Let any parent look into the longing eyes of his starving child and answer this question : If we, being evil, would give bread to our famishing children, how much more would our Father in heaven give knowledge and pardon and purity to us that need them for the very life of our souls ? If he be a Father, surely we cannot expect less than that he would reveal a mode of salvation to us.

The argument, is strengthened by the second thought, that

God's interests are identified with man's on this great question. Man, ignorant, condemned, polluted, can only be a blot in the universe. The world, built for man, would be a failure, and Satan would laugh in triumph as he dragged the race down to darkness. Is not God's honor involved? That is, would it not add to his glory to snatch man from ruin, pardon him, educate him, elevate him, sanctify him, fit him, as a redeemed, intelligent, and purified spirit, to praise the Lord that made him and rescued him from ignorance and sin?

Man's need, as an ignorant, sinful creature; God's fatherly interest in him, as his deluded and helpless child; the use which God can make of him, as a ransomed spirit, to glorify his own wondrous wisdom and grace—all taken together, make the probabilities mount up to a moral certainty that man will not be left to his natural and hopeless fate, but will have revealed to him a message from above, by which he can be pardoned and restored to the forfeited favor of his Maker. It is rational to believe and expect that God will make a revelation to man.

We are ready now for the third general step in the argument. A revelation from God to man has been shown to be possible and probable. We now affirm that such a revelation is *actual*, and is to be found in the Bible.

The proof is progressive, and is to be arranged under three heads. First, the EXTERNAL evidences. These are the lowest and least valuable.

I. The first of these is *miracles*. What is a miracle?

It is a supernatural or *superhuman* act. It is supernatural in that, though wrought by the God of nature, who is the God of the Bible, it is different from, and may be said in a loose way to be above, his ordinary natural workings.

For the purpose of our proof, we prefer to consider the miracle a superhuman act. There are two possible authors of the Bible: man and God. We affirm the divine as against the human origin. It is essential, therefore, that the evidence be such as cannot be offered for man's authorship. For our purpose, the miracle must be superhuman. If man can open instantaneously the eyes of

one born blind, or raise the dead, then such acts cannot be claimed as proving God's direct connexion with the Bible.

The act may be one of superhuman power. All prophecies may be considered to belong to the former class. The statement by the Saviour, that Peter would find the tribute money in the mouth of the first fish which he caught, is another example. Most of the Scripture miracles, however, are exhibitions of superhuman power.

A miracle must be wrought in proof of some important truth, or to attest the divine mission of one bearing an important message from God. It is altogether a low and mistaken view to consider God as a mere thaumaturgist, working these wonders that men may stare and exclaim. They were intended to be the signet of his royal seal to the revelation of his plan of human redemption. It was in effect God saying, I show that this Bible is my proclamation of salvation, by my causing these servants of mine to perform these acts which no mere man can do. If the message uttered be not the truth, and such truth as is worthy of a special divine revelation, then no miracle, or alleged miracle, can prove it to be so. The miracle is not the only nor the highest proof of the truth revealed. It calls attention to the truth revealed, and confirms it; but it must be the truth, else the miracle is no miracle.

These miracles, like the prophecies, are proofs outside of the Bible, and therefore are properly classed among the external evidences. For while the miracles and prophecies are recorded in the Scriptures, the mere record does not make them proofs. The working of the miracle is the evidence and the fulfilment of the prophecy; and these are outside of the Bible.

The miracles offered as proofs of the divinity of the Scriptures were actually wrought. Some such evidence as this was antecedently probable. The higher and stronger and more enduring proofs of the inspiration of the Scriptures, which we shall subsequently present, are not so well adapted to the important service of calling the attention of common people to the claims of a divine revelation. They require thought, consideration, time, for their proper influence. To a comparatively uncultivated

people the Bible was originally given ; and they must needs have something outward and striking to awaken their interest, and to lead them to consider the higher evidence which the Bible presents. There is nothing better adapted to this than the physical miracle.

It is as easy for God to work a miracle as it is for him to operate the ordinary laws of nature. To make this manifest, we need only postulate the being of God. If he exists, the infinite, spiritual, personal Creator, then he can do anything which is not a violation of his own perfect nature. If he created one atom of matter from nothing, then he is infinite in power and can control matter at his will. If he is the author of life, he can surely restore life to the body whence it has departed.

The so-called scientific objection to this is, that God has precluded the possibility of a miracle by the stamp of invariability which he has put upon all natural law. The same causes always produce the same effects. This no rational intelligent mind will deny. The laws of nature are just as constant as is the nature of their infinite Author. The laws of attraction and repulsion, of development, of life, are uniform. They are so; they ought to be so. There could be no progress; indeed, there could be no rational, healthful life in this world, were it otherwise. But so far from the constancy of law rendering a miracle impossible, it is one of the necessary conditions of a miracle. There could be no miracle, were the laws of nature fitful and capricious. This is easily seen. Take the greatest of the miracles, the raising of the dead. Suppose that the law of departed life not returning to the body once dead was not uniform; that, while living beings once dead generally remained so, they yet frequently revived and resumed their animate existence; would the restoring of a few dead people to life be miraculous? Would it not be properly regarded as but one of the frequent caprices of nature?

A miracle, to be a miracle, to accomplish the purpose of a miracle, must be something so extraordinary that no known human ordinary law of nature could effect it. It is not necessary that a law of nature should be violated. Perhaps it is not necessary that such should even be temporarily suspended. All of the phenom-

ena of the miracle can be explained upon the simple assumption of the temporary introduction of a new force within the province of nature. A man makes a clock to run for a thousand years, and he puts into it machinery which will strike the centuries. These strokes are extraordinary. They happen only once in a hundred years. They awaken the liveliest interest by their rarity. But they do not violate the ordinary movements of the machinery. They do not even suspend them. They are merely extraordinary additions to the mechanism. So it may be with the miracle, even if we take the low mechanical view of the universe.

The objection which many intelligent candid persons have to the miracle will be removed, if proper consideration is given to the purpose for which they were wrought. It must be admitted that the unvarying uniformity of the laws of nature is so beneficial, and the temporal good resulting from the miracle is so slight, that the presumption is decidedly against them, unless they can be shown to subserve some purpose commensurate with their importance. Such a purpose they have. While it is freely conceded that they are not the highest proof of a spiritual revelation, the point is made that the authentication of a revelation of redemption from God to man is of such transcendent interest as to justify God in using every variety of proof, so as to leave it beyond the range of rational doubt. If the miracle serves no higher end than merely to awaken the interest of ignorant, ruined man to the fact of a divine revelation, so that he will be led thereby to consider its higher and stronger evidences, then it is clearly necessary and justifiable. We may expect God to use every proper means to authenticate his revelation of salvation to man.

The benign and dignified character of the Scripture miracles is a proof of their divine character. In connexion with this, there is significance in the manner of their narration by the Evangelists. They are described or narrated, like any other historical fact, in plain unimpassioned language. The force of this will strike any competent critic who will read the record of them, in immediate connexion with those given in the spurious New Testament Apocrypha.

Finally, that these miracles were actually wrought, is shown by the fact that the historical testimony in their favor is greater than that of contemporaneous events which are not doubted.

While miracles never were the most important proofs of the divinity of the Scriptures, they are far less so now than in the age and among the people when and where they were wrought. As their office is mainly preparatory to the other evidences, since these have come into full view, miracles have been virtually superseded.

II. The second of the external evidences is *Prophecy*.

Prophecy is to be distinguished from mere human foresight, which foresees and foretells the future. Foresight is based upon experience and the uniformity of causation. A man foresees the future event in its present causes. Prophecy, on the other hand, is a direct prevision of the future, and is, therefore, superhuman.

The value of a prophecy as a proof depends: 1. Chiefly, of course, on its fulfilment. 2. On the number of its details. 3. On the length of time uttered before fulfilment. 4. On the probability of its fulfilment at the time of its utterance. 5. On the number, knowledge, and friendliness of the agents that fulfil it.

Some remarkable prophecies have been recorded in the Scriptures. Concerning Christ, we find his parentage of a virgin, Isa. vii. 14; the place of his birth, Mic. v. 2; the time of his birth, Dan. ix. 25, 26; his character, Isa. liii. 3; his entrance into Jerusalem, Zech. ix. 9; his betrayal for thirty pieces of silver, Zech. xi. 12, 13; his death-cry, Ps. xxii. 1; the non-breaking of his bones, Exod. xii. 46; the piercing of his side, Zech. xii. 10; the distribution of his clothing, Ps. xxii. 18; his association with criminals and with the rich in his death and burial, Isa. liii. 9., etc.

Concerning the four world-empires, Assyrian, Medo-Persian, Macedonian, and Roman, the prophecy is given twice—Dan. ii. 31–45; and vii. 1–14. Though couched in the figurative language of prophecy, it is so true to its historical fulfilment, that Porphyry declared it must have been written after the events had occurred.

Concerning Egypt, it is twice declared that it shall lose its in-

dependence, and no more be governed by its own princes. Ezek. xxx. 13; Zech. x. 11. This has been literally and strikingly fulfilled for over two thousand years.

But the prediction to which special attention is called, regards the Jews. Their leader and the founder of their nation, Moses, declared that, on account of their sins, they should be scattered among the nations, where they would be a hissing and a by-word, but should be preserved and finally restored to God's favor and their own land. Deut. xxviii. 37, 64, 65; and Lev. xxvi. 40-45. They have been scattered. Beginning with the first deportation in 741 B. C., then again in 721 B. C., again in 606 B. C., again in 588 B. C., and finally in 70 A. D., they were thoroughly extirpated from their native land and dispersed among the nations. To-day, go where you will, and you will find the Jew. In their exile, they have suffered all that the great lawgiver foresaw; they have everywhere been despised, oppressed, persecuted.

Though thus widely scattered, and mingling freely with the various peoples among whom they have lived, they have preserved to this day their separate existence and their physical peculiarities. This is a most interesting and important fact. It is nearly two thousand years since they became exiles. They have not kept themselves in a body, but have been scattered in small numbers all over the earth. They do not keep to themselves, but associate freely, especially in commerce, with the races with whom they live. Yet, with rare exceptions, they never marry a Gentile, and are now as distinct a people as when they first left their native soil. We, in this country, can appreciate this marvellous fact, as we look around us, and know that our community is composed of English, Scotch, Irish, Germans, and French. Though we have been here only a century or two, half of our families do not know their lineage; and the other half know it only by tradition. In not one instance in a hundred can it be told, by any physical marks, whether an individual is of English or French extraction, provided his family has been here one hundred years. This preservation of the Jewish race during these long centuries of exile and mingling with other peoples, may be illustrated. Let one go to the head waters of the Missouri, and there dye one

of the small streams, not three feet across, a scarlet red. Let that stream empty into the Missouri, go with it, past and through States, until it flows into the Mississippi and on to the Gulf. Let that scarlet stream, like a thread, preserve itself during all this journey of close union with the other waters, and you have a fact no more wonderful than the preservation of the race peculiarities of the Jews, scattered for hundreds of years amidst the ocean of humanity. Truly may it be said that the Jews are the miracle of providence and of history.

III. The third external evidence of the divinity of the Bible and of Christianity, the religion which it enshrines, is seen in *the success of the gospel under adversity.*

Success of itself is not necessarily a proof of merit, much less of divinity. Its conditions determine its value. If among the ignorant and the vicious, and by means of low and sensual arts, it evidences nothing that is laudable. If, however, it is without and despite adverse human agencies, it shows the working of an extra-human power.

That Christianity became the recognised religion of the Western civilised world, within three centuries of the death of its founder, is an historical fact. From a little handful of Jews in the thirtieth year of our era, its followers grew to be the ruling element of the Roman Empire in the first quarter of the fourth century.

The human, earthly, sensual influences were all adverse to this success. This fact may be viewed, first, negatively. It was without numbers. When Christ was crucified, his followers, all told, probably did not aggregate more than a thousand. They were without wealth, education, social or political influence. It has been said that Paul was the only educated Christian in the first century. They could and did offer no earthly nor sensual reward as an inducement to the reception of the new religion.

There were also positive adverse influences against which Christianity was compelled to contend. Its founder was a Jew, at that time a subjugated and despised race. See Juvenal for this. He was a Jew in lowly circumstances, without wealth, learning, so-

cial or political *prestige*. He was rejected by the ecclesiastical and secular authorities of his own people. He was condemned by them as a blasphemous impostor. Turned over to the dominant Roman power, he was given the form of a trial, and judicially condemned on the charge of sedition. He was publicly and ignominiously executed as a criminal by the Roman Governor.

His followers and early advocates, like him, were Jews, without any adventitious circumstances to recommend them or their message to the favor of the people. Not only so, they were frequently at strife among themselves, and were sometimes compromised by hypocrites and self-deceived professors and teachers of the novel doctrine of the cross.

The gospel preached, so far from catering to human passion or to earthly interests, called all who professed it to deny their ungodly lusts, to crucify their selfishness in every form, and to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this evil world. This fact gathers strength, when we learn from the Epistles to the Romans and to the Corinthians, from the writings of Juvenal and Martial, and from the excavations at Herculaneum and Pompeii, the extreme sensuality of this age of the Roman Empire. Such men were not likely to be moved by a call to the rigid morality of the Bible.

Finally, the sceptre of the Cæsars at that time was, in the Western world, practically omnipotent. Taxes were paid to the imperial government by one hundred and twenty millions of people, and the Roman eagles were the symbol of civil authority, undisputed everywhere. The Roman Senate decreed the religion of Jesus to be unlawful, and authorised and commanded the constabulary throughout the empire to suppress and eradicate it. Socially proscribed, Christians were now civilly prosecuted and popularly persecuted. No less than ten distinct efforts were made by the imperial government itself to burn Christianity out with the fires of martyrdom. It is said that Nero wrapped the bodies of its professors in tarred cloths, or other combustible materials, and, igniting them, set them as lamp-posts at the corners to illuminate the capital city.

Let us collect and combine these facts. We have here a Jew-

ish peasant, crucified as a criminal, preached by a handful of Jews as the Son of God and the Saviour of the world. By his authority they call men to a life of virtuous self-denial. They and their converts are bitterly and relentlessly persecuted by the supreme civil power. Despite all this, Christianity grows steadily, rapidly, and in less than three hundred years is the popular faith and the established religion of the empire.

There is no effect without an adequate cause. Here is a marvellous effect. What produced it? We look in vain to human agencies and to earthly causes. These were all adverse. Eliminating these, we are shut up to the conclusion that the power was superhuman, was divine.

IV. The last of the external evidences which will be presented is, the *results* of the Bible. If we go into an orchard, wishing to learn the character of the various trees that compose it, we examine the fruits which are to be found upon them. If a tree produces good fruit, we say that it is a good tree; if the fruit is bad, we pronounce it a worthless tree. The same common-sense principle can be applied to the Bible. If its results have been beneficial, it cannot be a lie. If they have been evil, it cannot be true.

An examination might be made of its influence in the formation and development of individual character. If the men in any community who take the Bible as their guide and whose lives are conformed to its teachings, are not made better by it, then it cannot be a revelation from the God of truth and righteousness. Without fear it can submit to this test and challenge the investigation.

But we prefer to apply this principle on a grander scale, by observing its influence on communities and nations. Let two maps of the world, as it is to-day, be made entirely independent of each other. Let the first be the map of civilisation. Let the nations which are the progressive ones in all the arts and sciences, in political liberty, in the general diffusion of education, in the advancement of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, where the masses are in the highest condition, be painted white upon this map. Let those whose civilisation is still in the twi-

light of its advancing dawn, be marked by neutral colors. Let those which are still in the night of ignorance, oppression, and thriftlessness, receive a positive black.

Let another hand, unprejudiced and intelligent, make a Bible map of the world. Let him put in white those countries where the Bible is not only known, but is in the possession of the masses, who believe it, love it, and practise it. Let the neutral shades indicate those lands where this book is known, but is held in the exclusive possession of the priestly few. Let the black designate the regions where the Bible is unknown or discarded.

Hold up the two maps and compare them. They are the same to a line. Every intelligent man will readily see that this is true. Is there no significance in this fact? The Bible and civilisation go hand in hand. Where the Bible is, there you find civilisation; where the Bible is not, civilisation is also wanting. The Bible goes before, and civilisation follows as its invariable attendant.

Such are the external proofs of the divinity of the Scriptures; superhuman miracles of beneficence; fulfilled prophecy of the most improbable kind, seen by eyes around us to-day; success in conquering the Western world, despite all earthly and human adverse influences; and the fruits of progress, prosperity, intelligence, freedom, and morality which it has produced. We might rest its claims here, and yet these are the lowest evidences on which its divinity rests.

We are now to look INTO THE BIBLE ITSELF, and see whether an examination of its contents will justify the claim made for its divine paternity. Every rational mind will at once see that this is a far more important part of the discussion than that which has been already given. However strong the external proofs may be, if they are not sustained by the book itself, they must be set down as false, or, at most, as illusory. If the Bible is God's child, it will surely bear the marks of its fatherhood, in no dim lines, on its very face. If it does not, no intelligent man will or ought to receive it.

The first thought suggested by a careful reading of the Scrip-

tures is a negative one: they contain nothing inconsistent with itself, nor that is unworthy of its divine origin. There is *nothing inconsistent* or contradictory in the book. On the presumption that it is a human composition, this is incredible. We know that it treats, incidentally, of a great variety of subjects; that its composition covers a period of at least sixteen hundred years; that its human penmen were more than thirty different persons, some of whom did not know of the writings of the others; that it was composed in three different languages; that the men who were chosen to write it, were of very varied degrees of human intelligence; and that it is a volume larger than any Greek or Latin classic which has come down to us. It is not to be believed that a book so composed, if it were a mere human composition, would not contain many statements that would be irreconcilable with each other, and with well-ascertained facts from other sources.

Of course, it is well known that there are and have been men who have asserted that the Bible is inconsistent with itself and with the facts of science and of history. But if this were true, how is it that the most logical and intelligent men of every age and country who have examined this book, have given their adhesion to it as the word of God? If it were self-contradictory, if it were inconsistent with scientific and historical truths, would these men have given their faith to it? Reference is not now made to theologians, but to scientists and historians. To-day, the great mass of the scientific and historical students of the civilised world believe the Bible to be divine.

Moreover, the book contains *nothing unworthy* of its heavenly origin. While this is a negative proof for its divinity, it is a positive proof against its human authorship. Let it be remembered here, in addition to what was said above, that large portions of the Bible were written in an unlettered age and by unlearned men. Can we believe that over thirty men, writing over a thousand years apart, could unite in composing a book on no page of which could be found a passage which God need refuse to own as written by himself? It is incredible.

We do not mean by this that the Bible contains nothing which is not sublime in its conception, and majestic in its utterance.

It has much that is neither. If it were spurious, a pretended revelation, it might have been throughout of a stilted style, using "great swelling words of vanity." Its language, however, is simple, human. Nearly every page and sentence is such that "he may run that readeth it." A father talking to his little child does not express himself in words of "learned length." He speaks plainly, simply, even when he discourses on the most important subjects. The Bible is our heavenly Father's revelation of salvation to his earth-born child, and so he speaks to him in tones that he can readily comprehend. But throughout all this simplicity of thought and expression, there runs an under-current of heavenly dignity and sweetness.

Turning to the positive side of this examination, we find within the Bible a superhuman revelation of truth. We have already learned that it was antecedently probable that God would make a religious revelation to man, because man was hopelessly ignorant of many important truths. We saw that he was ignorant of his own origin and destiny, and of the being and character of God. The book supplies this information. It tells him that, while his body is of humble origin, it was fashioned by the plastic power of the infinite Creator, and that his spirit is a direct exhalation of the Spirit of God. It tells him that he was made an immortal being; that his spirit never perishes; that, though his body crumble into dust, it shall live a new and deathless life. It tells him that God is the only self-existent, uncreated, eternal being; that there is but one God; that he is a "Spirit, infinite and unchangeable in his being" and perfections; that he made the universe; that he governs the universe; and that he will finally judge the universe. Thus his need is met. These are the truths which man wants to know. His own reason could not bring them to him. But his reason readily accepts them. They are elevating truths. They lead man to the noblest thoughts and feelings and aspirations. Such truths must have come from above. They did not originate from man. They could not have come from beneath.

The Bible, moreover, contains truths of a decidedly superhuman character; truths, which the human mind could not have

invented, because man's reason cannot comprehend them. The Trinity, for example. The Scriptures teach us plainly and repeatedly that God is one. Our reason assents that this is and must be so; there cannot be two infinite beings. But the Scriptures also teach that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. God exists as the Father, as the Son, as the Holy Spirit. The Father can and does address the Son. The Son speaks of going away, and of sending the Holy Spirit to take his place. This is an infinite mystery. We know that God is one, and yet he is three; not in the same sense one and three; and yet here human philosophy staggers and human imagination folds its wing, in utter inability to surmount the thought.

Take the two natures of Christ. He was manifestly a man. As such he ate, drank, slept, grew weary, wept, died. He was as manifestly God. His words and his works alike proclaim him such. This is another transcendent mystery. Who can comprehend the union of the divine and the human in the same being? It is incomprehensible. A distinguished United States Senator solves it by speaking of the Saviour as "part divine and part human." Ah, no! he was wholly God, and yet he was wholly man, "in two distinct natures, and one person for ever."

But still again, man is not only ignorant, he is also sinful. As sinful, he is both condemned and morally polluted. Here we have struck the heart of the whole matter. It is because of his sin, more than because of his ignorance, that man needs a revelation from God. It is of but little service that he should know his own immortality and God's infinite perfection, if his immortality is to be one of depravity and guilt; if the infinitude of God is merely to crush him. Man wants to know whether there is any way in which he can be saved from sin. It is to meet this want that the revelation has been made, that the Bible has been given. Everything else in it is but incidental, or contributory to this one main purpose. If it meets this want in a way that honors God and that saves man, it must be a message from above. If it does not, then, however much we may admire it for other reasons, we must conclude that it is not the religious revelation which we seek.

Manifestly, the book is a scheme of redemption. This is the key to all of its mysteries. This is the golden thread on which all its pearls are strung. This is the thought which gives unity to all its parts. Its burden is to relieve man from sin, and to restore him to the forfeited favor of his Father. The plan is simple. The guilt of sin requires the suffering of the penalty. The penalty is death: death temporal, spiritual, eternal. No man who sees sin in the light of God's infinite holiness can doubt this. There is no possibility of setting this penalty aside. Nature's laws, when violated, are invariably vindicated by the penalty. The laws of God, who is the God of nature, are as inexorable in their demands. The death of the sinner, of the whole sinful race, seems the inevitable result. Here the Bible reveals God's plan of redemption. He proposes that this penalty shall be exacted, that the law shall be fully vindicated, but in the person of a willing substitute, whose deity shall give infinite dignity to the sufferings he endures on man's behalf. So the Son of God becomes man, and endures for him the infinite penalty. Jesus Christ pays man's debt. In this way the condemnation of sin is removed.

But the power, the pollution, the habit, of sin is worse than its guilt. To throw off the habit of sin, man needs the renewal of his nature, the enlightenment of his mind, and the elevation of his motives. The Bible presents him with a perfect rule of life. The incentives which it presents are: fear of eternal punishment; the hope of an infinite blessedness; and, far transcending either or both of these, gratitude to a divine Saviour who has given his life for man's. But no perfect rule, and no motives, however strong and pure, will ever of themselves revive and restore the dead soul of man. Here is the final crowning work of the gospel. "The Spirit helpeth our infirmities." God's own Spirit renews, recreates, the soul. He makes and enables the mind to see the perfect rule; and bringing the love of Christ to bear, with its sweet constraining power, upon the heart, he both persuades and enables man to perfect holiness in the fear of God. Thus is he gradually transformed, and made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light.

The divinity of the Scriptures stands or falls with this scheme

of redemption. If, while it is superhuman and supernatural, it is rational and efficient, then it is divine, and the book which reveals it comes from God. That it is rational, is seen in its commending itself to the first intellects of the race, from Paul, the logician of Tarsus, to Hodge and Thornwell, the theologians of the nineteenth century. That it is efficient, is shown in its transforming power over the lives of cannibal islanders and cultured Englishmen, of the degraded negro and the Premier of the British Empire.

The Bible evinces its divinity in its revelation of a superhuman *morality*. Its code of morals is perfect. This appears from its neither commanding nor allowing anything that is wrong. It forbids every actual and possible sin, crime, and vice. The utter detestation which God has for every moral evil, is revealed in a variety of striking ways: in what it says of Satan, the arch enemy of God and man, of truth and righteousness; in the terrific providential protests against sin which it recounts: the flood, the destruction of Sodom, the doom of Babylon and Jerusalem; in the revelation which it makes of hell, an eternal, remediless, horrible retribution; and, above all, in the agonies of Gethsemane and Calvary, as endured by the sinless Sin-bearer of the race.

Its perfect morality is shown in its commending every actual and possible virtue. What a sublime and complete generalisation it makes, when it declares that "love is the fulfilling of the law"! This is duty in its highest unity. Then this duty is unfolded: in its length, beginning with our first conscious moral act, and binding us to love through time into eternity; in its breadth, covering every relation of every man with every being with whom he comes into moral contact; in its depth, reaching not only the outward act and the spoken word, but also, and especially, the inward state, disposition, thought, feeling, purpose.

Such a code, so flawless, so rounded, so complete, came not from the dwarfed mind and depraved heart of man; for "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?"

The crowning proof of the divinity of the Bible is its portraiture of the *life* and *character* of *Jesus Christ*. It is a super-

human picture. Where shall we find another similar character in the records of earth? The gifted minds of the race have, time and again, attempted to realise in thought, and to embody in some form of expression, an ideal man. It has been essayed in form, color, rhetoric, and poetry. History, romance, mythology, verse, all bear witness to these attempts. It is seen in the Zeus of the Greeks, and the corresponding Jupiter of the Romans, in the Confucius of the Chinese, the Buddha of the Hindoo, the Mohammed of the Mussulman. On a lower plane, you can behold it in the Achilles of Homer, the Cyrus of Xenophon, the Socrates of Plato, the Æneas of Virgil, the Hamlet of Shakespeare, and even in the Satan of Milton. The Apollo of the Vatican is an effort to realise it in marble and the Christs of the masters upon the canvas. But put all of these, or the best of them, by the side of Jesus of Nazareth, and it is at once seen that the one is "of the earth, earthy," while the other is "the Lord from heaven." Such a picture, so perfect, so divine, and yet so human, was never conceived by human fancy, nor sketched by human pencil. It is the embodiment of the true, the beautiful, the good.

To appreciate this more fully, let us institute a special comparison. The greatest of earthly characters, outside of the influence of the Bible, was perhaps that of Socrates. There is a simple sublimity, a combination of intellectual eminence and moral worth in this Grecian sage, which place him definitely above all the non-Christian men of the race. Moreover, he has been extremely fortunate in his biographers. Few such thinkers and writers have been known as Plato and Xenophon. The one gives us the esoteric, the other the exoteric Socrates. Both are masterly pictures, drawn in classic Greek. Jesus was not a philosopher. He was not even an educated man. His youth was passed, till thirty, probably, in his father's workshop. He had never associated with the cultured intellects of his age. He was an unlettered Jewish peasant. Amongst his followers there was no brilliant general and accomplished historian like Xenophon, nor astute philosopher like Plato, to appreciate and set forth the beauties of his character and the excellence of his teach-

ings. He is portrayed to us in the language of publicans and fishermen. Yet compare the two, the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon, and the Jesus of Matthew and John, and you decide with the sceptic, Rousseau, as he wrote: "I avow to you that the holiness of the gospel is an argument that speaks to my heart, and to which I should even regret to find any good reply. In the books of philosophers, with all their pomp, how little they are beside this! Is it possible that he, whose history it is, can be a man himself? Is this the tone of an enthusiast or of an ambitious sectary? What sweetness, what purity in his manner; what touching grace in his instructions; what elevation in his maxims; what profound wisdom in his discourses; what presence of mind, what delicacy and justness in his replies; what empire over his passions! Where is the man, where is the sage, who knows how to act, to suffer, and to die, without weakness and without ostentation? If the life and death of Socrates were those of a philosopher, the life and death of Jesus were those of a God."

Let us take another, slightly different, standpoint, and look upon the Nazarene. As we have already seen, he was an uncultured illiterate Jewish peasant. He remains in obscurity at the work-bench until he is fully thirty years of age. He then shows himself to the world, and claims to be the Son of God. Think of it—a Jewish carpenter posing before his fellow-men for more than three years, as the incarnate Deity! Arthur Orton attempted to palm himself off as Sir Roger Tichborne, and ended in a dismal, disgraceful failure. Here is a Jew pretending to be God! Now, one of two things must result. If this is a mere pretence, it must issue in a most pitiable and ignominious and blasphemous farce. If it does not so end, then there is no escaping the conclusion that he was what he claimed to be. No Jew, no man, can successfully personate the Deity. Jesus did it with the utmost dignity and simplicity, and Jesus was, therefore, no mere man, but the very Son of God. If Jesus was the Son of God, the Bible is the word of God.

The argument, as it is usually given, is now complete. Outside of the book itself, we have seen its claims sustained by

miracles, fulfilled prophecy, supernatural success, and the fruits of the highest order of civilisation. These have prepared the way for an examination of the Bible itself. Looking within its pages, we have found a consistent, dignified epic, containing superhuman truth, superhuman morality, and a superhuman Christ. Here we might stop, as others have done. The Bible is proved to be the word of God.

But here we are confronted with the fact that intelligent good men in Bible lands are still unconvinced, or, at best, are doubtful on this question. This may be explained on the ground that they have either failed to examine these proofs, or have done so with prejudiced minds. Such is doubtless the truth. The fact that the most intelligent and virtuous men, as well as the great masses, are convinced, shows that the argument is convincing. That others are not convinced, cannot, therefore, be attributed to the fault of the argument. The reason must be elsewhere.

But there is a general fact here, which is sometimes overlooked. It is this, that cases are found in which men assent to the divinity of the Scriptures, and yet practically are unbelievers. An instance of this is seen in the case of an intelligent lawyer who investigated the claims of Christianity as he would a case before a jury, and, at the conclusion, said: "I have examined this case as I would any case of evidence, and I am satisfied beyond all doubt that Christianity is true; and the evidence is stronger by far than that on which innumerable lives have been condemned to death in courts of law. But I wish you to understand distinctly that, while I am now a believer in Christianity, I am not any more a Christian than before, nor am I even an inquirer."

But more than this, every man of adult age and a reflective mind, who becomes a practical believer, observes that he was not finally led to the reception of Christianity, as a subjective trust and hope, by a consideration of the evidences already presented. These but prepared the way. They removed the barrier of intellectual scepticism; but the reception of Christ, as a personal Saviour, was due to a superadded influence. The subject is not exhausted until this additional testimony is presented and examined. It is the witness of the SPIRIT.

While we here tread upon high and holy ground, it must not be forgotten that this is a psychological fact, and is, therefore, a proper subject for scientific rational examination. It is the last link in the golden chain which unites the human soul, by an intelligent and assured conviction, to the Bible and the Saviour whom it reveals.

It is a fact, announced in the Scriptures, confirmed by observation, and realised in our experience, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The Saviour says: "If any man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself." Again: "When the Spirit of truth is come, he will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of a judgment to come; he will guide you into all truth; he shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you."

These passages teach that man needs some special help to make him a practical believer; that every man who wishes it, shall have it; that this need is spiritual discernment, the direct product of the influence of the Spirit of God upon the mind. Accordingly, every man who becomes a Christian, has his mind illumined to see the truth as it is in Jesus. He is brought to a conviction of his utter spiritual ignorance, depravity, and condemnation: and he is made to see that Jesus is the Saviour, appointed of God, for his redemption. He now accepts him as such, under the guidance of the Spirit, and he is made to say, in his heart, "Whereas I was blind, now I see. Now I *know* whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep my soul, which I have committed to him." He is now a believer, indeed. The Bible is God's message to him, and Christ has become to him a personal Friend, an accepted Saviour, and a revered Lord.

Reviewing the whole field, the first class of proofs may be called external; the second, internal; the third, supernal. The first is addressed to the outer intellect, and brings forward what may be seen with the eyes and heard with the ears. The second appeals to the higher intellectual and moral nature of man. The third addresses itself to the special power of spiritual discern-

ment. The first and second are patent to all men, even the unconverted and the sceptic, and are sufficient to convince every rational unprejudiced mind. The third is special and personal, and appreciable only by the renewed nature of the converted Christian. The first and second may fail to convince. Alas! they often do. The third never fails to bring its subject a willing captive to the feet of Jesus. In a loose sense, the first may be said to be the evidence of God the Father; the second, to be the testimony of God the Son; and the third, the witness of God the Spirit. Altogether, they leave no doubt that **THE BIBLE IS A DIVINE REVELATION.**

J. A. QUARLES.

ARTICLE III.

THE LORD'S DAY, AND NOT THE JEWISH SABBATH.

BY THE LATE REV. JOHN BEVERIDGE.

No. II.

THE JEWISH TYPE FULFILLED IN THE CHRISTIAN ANTITYPE.

We have observed that, if the Jewish Sabbath has been transferred into the Christian system, we are under obligations to keep Saturday instead of Sunday. But that the Jewish Sabbath is not binding upon us, is evident from Paul's language to the Colossians, "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holyday, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath days: which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is of Christ." (The body which produces the shadow is Christ.) (Col. ii. 16, 17.) Paul is speaking here of the Jewish observance which he terms "a shadow." He speaks of ceremonies and of the Jewish typical worship; but these have all passed away with the coming of Christ. The antitype has now taken the place of the type. Now, if we can prove that the Jewish Sabbath was a type

of Christ, who gives us the true rest of the soul, then it is evident that it passed away with the coming of Christ.

But they tell us that the "sabbath days" mentioned in the passage are "Jewish festivals and holydays" and have no reference to the "seventh day of rest." If this is the case, let us substitute "holydays" for *sabbaths* in the passage and see how it will read. "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holyday, or of the new moon, or of the *holydays*: which are a shadow of things to come." The tautology is too evident to need further refutation.

Then again, they tell us that the word is plural, *sabbaths*, and means the seventh year Sabbath and the Jubilee, whereas the seventh day is called by way of preëminence *The Sabbath*. (*The Holy Sabbath*, pages 36, 37.) This is certainly a strange way of reasoning. If we say that a man is diligent in business during the week days, do you understand by that that we exclude Mondays and Tuesdays because these are preëminently working days? If we say that a man observes the national holidays, do you understand us to say that he does not observe the Fourth of July, because that is preëminently the national holiday? The very fact that Paul made no exceptions is superabundant proof that he meant all the Jewish Sabbaths. When Paul says the Sabbath days, he means *all* the Sabbath days, and not one Sabbath day out of thirty, which would have been the case if every seventh day Sabbath had been excluded. What one Jewish Sabbath was, that all Jewish Sabbaths were. They were all types of the same anti-type, *shadows of the same body*, and unless there is clear and positive proof forthcoming that the seventh day Sabbath was a type of one thing, and the seventh year Sabbath and the Jubilee types of something entirely different, we must be pardoned if we believe that they were all fulfilled in the coming of Christ. No one who has not a pet theory to sustain would have ever thought that "sabbaths" in this passage meant monthly and yearly Sabbaths, and not *all* Jewish Sabbaths. When we see good men thus easily sliding unconsciously into error, we do well to search the Scriptures that we do not likewise depart from the truth.

The author of *The Holy Sabbath* says, "It is used in both

places in connexion with eating or feasting; and nothing is said about eating or feasting in the sabbatic law." Paul is not speaking of feasting, but of taking food in a ritual sense, contrary to our Lord's own teachings to his disciples, that it is that which cometh out of the man that defileth him. (Matt. xv. 17-20; Rom. xiv. 17.) But if he had turned to Lev. xxiii. 2, 3, he would there have found the Jewish Sabbath (seventh day) termed *a feast*, and one of the very "*feast days*" which, according to the writer, have been fulfilled in the coming of Christ.

But the "sabbaths" spoken of in Col. ii. 15, have no reference to the Lord's day. We understand that these Jewish Christians at this time were not only observing the Christian Lord's day, but also the Jewish Sabbath. This was the practice of many of the early Christians. The Ebionite Christians, who established themselves in Pella after the destruction of Jerusalem, continued to observe two days in the week—the Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Lord's day, for two or three centuries after the Christian era. It is this practice which Paul here condemns, and has no reference whatever to the Lord's day, which it was proper and right for them to observe.

We now come to a more important argument, and again quote from *The Holy Sabbath*, page 30: "That it was not abolished . . . appears from the fact that it *cannot comply with the terms of abolition*. There is absolutely but one way to abolish a typical ordinance, and that is to fulfil it. Christ broadly asserted the rule when he said, 'I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.' He arbitrarily and absolutely destroyed nothing. He only removed what was fulfilled, and because fulfilled. The shadow only gives place to the substance, the type to the antitype. Thus the sacrifices were not destroyed; they only gave place to the great atoning sacrifice of which they were shadows. The type is but another form of prophecy; and no prophecy can fall short of fulfilment. No type can vanish until it reaches the antitype. The Sabbath antedating the Mosaic economy, and being the prophecy and pledge of future rest, cannot be abolished until it merges into the everlasting rest of heaven."

That a type is a prophecy that cannot be abolished until ful-

filled in the antitype, is a truth which no one can question. But Paul declares that the Jewish shadows or types are fulfilled in the coming of Christ. The Jewish Sabbath, in memory of a rest from carnal bondage, is a type of that rest of the soul from the bondage of sin which our Saviour introduced into our world. The writer's great error here is that he supposes that "the everlasting rest in heaven" does not begin till after the death of the body. This is quite a prevalent error, and one which distorts many plain facts contained in the Scriptures. The court of the Jewish tabernacle was a type of childhood life under Christian training and example, until regeneration. The sanctuary was typical of a regenerated priesthood, and the holy of holies of heaven itself, and yet the division between the court and the "holy places" was much greater than that which separated the sanctuary from the holy of holies. And a careful student of the Scriptures cannot but observe that the whole tenor of Scripture indicates that regeneration, or the "new creation," as Paul styles it, is of ten-fold more importance than the transit of death. In fact, the great burden of prophecy relates to the former, while very little is said about the latter. Paul's declaration on this point is most emphatic: "There remaineth therefore a rest (literally, a keeping of the Sabbath) to the people of God." (Heb. iv. 9.) An examination of the context will show us that this passage refers to a rest beginning here upon earth, and not confined exclusively to heaven; and that we enter it by regeneration, and not by death as is usually supposed. It would almost appear that theologians had rent God's kingdom asunder by the awful chasm which they introduce in the transit of death, of which God's word says very little indeed. Prophecies and parables relative to God's spiritual kingdom on earth should not be applied to his kingdom in heaven. This is the great error that would deprive us of a Sabbath, unless we accept the Jewish typical Sabbath day rest of the body. The rest symbolised by the rest in Canaan, as well as of the seventh year Sabbath and Jubilee being fulfilled in the coming of Christ, we are left, according to their view, in a wide vacuum which reaches from the crucifixion of our Lord to the morning of the general resurrection, with no visible fulfilment of

the Jewish antitype this side of the grave. And yet they tell us that a part of the Jewish Sabbaths have been fulfilled. Fulfilled by what, pray?

“THERE REMAINETH THEREFORE A REST FOR THE PEOPLE OF GOD,” IS NOT ALONE A REST IN HEAVEN, BUT A REST OF GRACE HERE ON EARTH.

Without even making a critical examination of the third and fourth chapters of Hebrews, and especially of the passage, “There remaineth therefore a rest for the people of God,” one would suppose that it would be impossible for any person, even for a moment, to doubt that Paul is speaking here of a rest of the soul that remaineth for the people of God when the Jewish type has been fulfilled in the antitype—Christ, who giveth his people rest from the power of sin and from the fear of death. But let us examine the passage carefully, and we cannot but be convinced that Paul is speaking of the rest of the New Covenant here on earth. The third chapter commences with a comparison of the champions of the two covenants, Moses and Christ; one a carnal leader and the other a spiritual guide. Moses is presented to us as a servant over a visible temporal nation (house—family), and Christ as a Son over a spiritual kingdom. “Moses verily was faithful in all his house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be spoken after; but Christ as a Son over his own house; whose house are we, if we hold fast the confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end.” Then follows a quotation from the ninety-fifth Psalm, stating the reason why many of the Israelites were not permitted to enter the land of Canaan. Now, if we are willing to accept the idea that the Jordan which separates the desert from the land of Canaan is not so much a type of the Jordan of death as of the Jordan of regeneration, we will see at once who were symbolised by those whose corpses fell in the desert, and why they fell there. Unbelief, that mighty arm in the hands of Satan, destroys them in the desert of Satan’s kingdom, before they arrive at the point where regeneration takes place. Once having arrived safely in the spiritual kingdom of regeneration, they no longer fall by un-

belief in the desert, according to our Calvinistic view of the Perseverance of the Saints. We thus see where the shade of the Old Covenant, extending down into the New Testament Church, controls the lives and actions of those who have been trained under Christian influence from childhood, the leadership of Moses ceasing just where religion ceases to be felt binding as a duty, and Canaan commencing where service to God is felt to be a pleasure. The same reason may be given to-day why all who fall short of God's spiritual kingdom must perish outside of that kingdom. "They cannot enter in because of unbelief." But once safely in that kingdom here, they have entered into "that rest which remaineth for the people of God;" and they must first become the people of God by being drawn by his Spirit as were the children of Israel, and taught by the old schoolmaster Moses, and become members of his kingdom on earth, or they can never enter his kingdom hereafter. First under the law, then under grace.

Then in the fourth chapter the analogy is still continued, showing that that rest towards which Moses led ancient Israel was not the true rest, but only a type of that rest which Christ gives his people here in this world. The language here is very simple indeed: "Let us [us Hebrews, for Paul is here addressing his own nation] therefore fear, lest, a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. For unto us was the gospel preached, as well as unto them; but the word preached did not profit them, not being mixed with faith in them that heard it. For we which have believed do enter into rest." [We Christians which have believed *do now* enter the rest of the spiritual Canaan.] Will any one pretend to tell us that Paul has only in view the rest after death? By no means. This rest is here, *now*. Believers in Christ Jesus enter into the rest of his spiritual kingdom by a rest from sin. The Apostle Paul entered this rest when he became a believer, and thousands of others were entering it when he penned this Epistle, who did not enter heaven for many years after.

Then Paul quotes from David, whose Psalms were written long after the Israelites had entered the land of Canaan, to show that

the true rest did not come in Joshua's time, but was still in the future. "For if Jesus [Joshua] had given them rest, then would he not afterward have spoken of another day. *There remaineth therefore a rest for the people of God.*" Then he tells them that as God entered into a period of rest after he had completed the work of creation, so Christ has now entered upon a period of rest after the work of redemption. "For he that is entered into his rest, he also hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his." This passage, as can be clearly seen from the context, refers not only to Christ, but the believer in Christ, who has already entered into rest, having "ceased from *his own works*;" his *own* works being the works of the law, while Christ's *own* work, the work which the Father gave him to do, supplies, or gives efficacy to, the believer's works. The rest here, then, is a REST OF FAITH, the covenant of works being now fulfilled. Jesus, having finished the work of redemption, has now come into his spiritual kingdom. On the believer having ceased from the works of the law, he enters the spiritual priesthood; that is, he now no longer obeys the law through fear of punishment, but through love to its author, Christ.

Then follows an exhortation to the Hebrews, to strive to enter into that spiritual rest. "Let us [us Hebrews] labor therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same example of unbelief." If Paul here means the regenerated believing Christians, and not the doubting Jews, then he strikes a blow at the Calvinistic doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints, which we cannot admit, as the Scriptures everywhere teach that those who have fully entered upon this rest can no longer fall by unbelief in the desert. All falling from grace must be confined to the covenant of works and excluded from the covenant of faith. (I mean by "covenant of works" the covenant of Sinai, which I believe to include both typical Israel and its antitype the baptized children of the Church in the Christian dispensation, and not the covenant made with Adam. Salvation, however, is by grace, and not by works, under all dispensations. There can be no redemption without a Redeemer—"the only Redeemer of God's elect.")

Nor is this language alone to be found in the fourth chapter of the Hebrews. The Scriptures are full of similar expressions. "Strive to enter in at the strait gate," does not mean to enter the gate of heaven after death, but the gate of Christ's kingdom here on earth. When Christ says, "I am the door," he does not only mean that he is the door of the kingdom of glory after death, but he is the door by which the believer enters his kingdom of salvation here on earth; not the door of heaven; but the door of his spiritual fold. "I am the true vine," Christ says to those who were yet under the old covenant, some of which would yet be broken away on account of unbelief; but those who remained would be purged by the word (that is, regenerated), and then bear much fruit, not in heaven, but here on earth, in the conversion of the Gentiles.

This rest is a rest from the works of the law; a rest from sin; a rest of grace. As Moses led the Israelites to a rest in Canaan, so Christ leads us to the rest of his kingdom here. We must first labor in Moses' school, and then rest in Christ's kingdom on earth, or we can never rest in heaven unless we die in infancy, before having rebelled against known light; and even then our salvation is purchased by the blood of Christ. It is true that the Israelites never enjoyed a complete rest in Canaan. They were almost continually at war, either with the Philistines within their own land, or with foreign powers, or engaged in terrible combat with each other; nor do we enjoy a complete rest from sin under the New Covenant. Sin is in our members; and if he cannot control us with the authority of a master, he will show us at least that he only submits as an unruly slave to a power stronger than himself; therefore we see that the analogy drawn between our present rest and that of the Jews in Canaan is perfect in every particular. Nevertheless, the rest which Paul tells the Hebrews "remaineth for the people of God," is that rest which Christ promises to those who come to him by faith: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and *ye shall find rest unto your souls.* For my yoke is easy and my burden is light." Man must partake of the tree of

Life and he healed by the medicinal virtue of its leaves before he enters the portal of the tomb, or he can never enjoy its blessed fruits in "the power of an endless life."

WHAT RELATION DOES THE LORD'S DAY BEAR TO THE REST OF
THE NEW COVENANT?

The New Covenant rest bears the same relation to the Lord's day that the rest in Canaan bore to the Jewish Sabbath. It is the basis or foundation upon which the Lord's day is built. As God rested after the work of creation, so Christ rested after the work of redemption. Now, we maintain that the rest from the labor of creation was a long period, passing through several thousand years; so Christ's rest is a period commencing with the morn of his resurrection from Joseph's tomb, and ending with the consummation of all terrestrial affairs.

But God did not rest from work in the full sense of the term. He continued to sustain that which he had created. Christ says, "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." As the Father created the world and continued to sustain it, so Christ redeemed the world, and now comes in the form of the Holy Spirit to support and sustain all regenerated believers.

Now, if we wish to know what relation the Lord's day bears to the rest of grace which Christ has introduced, we must first learn what relation the Jewish Sabbath bears to the rest in Canaan, and then carry out the analogy, and the whole question will become perfectly plain.

The whole Jewish system consisted in a separation of a part, as a symbol that the whole should be consecrated to the Lord. One nation from among all the nations of the earth was chosen as a symbol of all nations. One son, the eldest of the family, was chosen as a priest, and to some extent the king or ruler of the whole family. (This rule in the case of Jacob's family, however, was set aside, most likely, on account of sins committed by the eldest son against his father, and the tribes of Judah and Levi were chosen instead to these offices.) The first fruits of their harvest were consecrated to God as a symbol of the whole harvest being his own property. Certain animals were considered by them

as holy, and certain vessels were supposed, by having been passed through a ceremonial purification, to have become more holy than others; while all implements used in the tabernacle and temple service were consecrated to God as holy. Their own land above all other lands, was in a typical and symbolical sense that which truly bore the inappropriate title applied to it to-day—“*The Holy Land.*” A certain city was to them “The Holy City,” being a symbol of all cities, as well as a type of “that Jerusalem which is from above” in the worship of true believers; but in her destruction by Titus, for apostacy, she became a type of the destruction of Satan’s empire—Great Babylon. We also find that the first-born of all cattle was also consecrated to God, as a symbol indicating that all the flocks of the field were at his service whenever he should demand them.

Now, in regard to time, one day in seven was consecrated to God as a first-fruits of all their time, in memory of that first day of the new period in which God rested from the creation of the world; this day being, if we may so express it, an outgrowth of that long period of rest. It was also a memory of the first day of freedom from Egyptian bondage, and, as might be expected, ended the last day of the Old Covenant; that day in which the world’s Creator, having now taken upon himself the work of becoming the world’s Redeemer, was laid away in the cold and silent grave. This Sabbath day was also a type of that “first day” of the more glorious rest which follows it—the first day of man’s redemption.

Now, if we follow up the same chain of evidences, we will learn from the Jewish law what day observed by the Jews was in the end to be developed into the Lord’s day, and by the manner in which they observed that day, together with the prophecies, we learn how the Lord’s day should be observed by us.

THE JEWISH PENTECOST A GERM OF THE LORD’S DAY.

As the giving of the manna in the desert was so intimately connected with the institution of the Jewish Sabbath, we naturally look to its cessation for at least one of the roots which in the end shall develop into the Lord’s day. From Joshua v. 10–12 we

learn that the Israelites kept the Passover in the plains of Jericho on the fourteenth day of the month Nisan, and that on the morrow, or Sabbath day, they ate of the old corn of the land, and that on the next day, corresponding with our Lord's day, the manna ceased. This was the day on which, in future years, the wave offering was to be presented. Just forty-nine days from that day was to be the day of Pentecost.

Now, as the Jewish Sabbath was instituted in commemoration of the exodus from Egyptian bondage, and at the giving of the manna, after the unleavened bread they brought with them out of Egypt had been exhausted; so we find the Pentecost established in the land of Canaan, which was but a type of the true rest which should come in the future, although the unbelieving Jews of Paul's time thought that it was that true rest, in commemoration of that rest which they had entered fifty days before. The Jewish Sabbath being the seventh day rest, the Pentecost could be observed only yearly; but even in this yearly observance we see it clearly indicated as an outgrowth of the rest which they now enjoyed in Canaan. Now, if we observe carefully the two days which form the feast of Pentecost, the sixteenth day of the month Nisan and the eighth of the month Sivan, we cannot fail to see their close relationship to the two covenants. (Lev. xxiii. 9-21.) The first was connected with the Passover, a day on which all leaven was excluded, and the first-fruits were consecrated to God, not in the loaf, but in the sheaf; but on the latter day, not one sheaf, but two loaves, were to be presented, baked with leaven, and consequently just the reverse of the feast of the Passover. Everything connected with the Passover indicates an unfinished work, while everything connected with the Pentecost denotes a complete work. Now, as the Jewish Sabbath belongs to the Mosaic system instituted in the desert, and the Pentecost falling not upon the last but the first day of the week, and foreshadowing the light or leavened bread of a better rest, we consider that this day could be none other than a foretaste of the Christian Lord's day. In the Pentecost we find the very opposite of the Passover. The latter was a day of exclusion, quiet, separation; and the other, it is true, a day of exclusion from servile work, but yet a day of

activity, of permeation. One bearing the sad remembrance of the death of the first-born in Egypt, the other of new life in the land of Canaan; one symbolising the unleavened bread of sorrow and affliction—of weariness and hunger in the desert, the other of the light bread of joy and peace in their own home in Canaan; one a symbol of death, the other a symbol of life.

Now, if our reasoning is correct, we can have no doubt that the day of Pentecost was a basis of the Christian Lord's day, rather than the Jewish Sabbath, just as the Jewish synagogue was the basis of the Christian church, rather than the temple at Jerusalem. In both these cases the shadow or type passed away, while the germs are retained in their full development in the Christian system. If such is the case, then the laws concerning the Pentecost have an intimate connexion with the Lord's day. We read: "And ye shall have an holy convocation; ye shall do no servile work therein." "And thou shalt keep a feast of weeks unto the Lord thy God with a tribute of a free will offering of thine hand, which thou shalt give unto the Lord thy God, according as the Lord thy God hath blessed thee. And thou shalt rejoice before the Lord thy God, thou and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man servant and thy maid servant, and the Levite that is within thy gates, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, that are among you, in the place which the Lord thy God hath chosen." (Lev. xxiii. 21; Num. xxviii. 26; Deut. xvi. 9-12.) Is it a strange thing, then, if we find similar precepts in the New Testament in regard to the Lord's day? Paul says: "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store as God hath prospered him." (1 Cor. xvi. 1-2.)

Most commentators suppose that the law was given from Sinai on the day of Pentecost. Even Mr. Atwater, in his admirable work on the Jewish tabernacle, says: "Fifty days after the exodus from Egypt, Moses received on Sinai the two tables of stone on which God had inscribed the Ten Commandments."—*The Sacred Tabernacle*, p. 2. Is there any proof of this? Does Exodus xix. 1 mean the first day of the third month, or does it mean the

same day of the month that the Israelites left Egypt? In either case it would be the first day of the week; but the former gives too little, and the latter too much. But no matter; the Pentecost was an outgrowth of the rest in Canaan, and was not observed in the desert, and had no other connexion with it than being given there in anticipation, as the law concerning cities of refuge, and similar laws, to be enforced only in their own land. Pentecost did not exist at the time the law was given. That people should confound the giving of the law in the desert, with the rejoicing over the first-fruits of Canaan, is so far out of place that we wonder that any one should ever have imagined such a thing.

As a temperance question, it has been maintained by the defenders of total abstinence that the Jewish law concerning the feast of the Passover required the entire expulsion of not only leavened bread, but of anything that partook of the nature of leaven; consequently of all fermented wine, and, therefore, Christ on the night of his betrayal partook with his disciples of the unfermented juice of the grape, and not of fermented wine; that the apostles must have followed his example, and only later ages have departed from it. On the other hand, it has been maintained by those who take a different view, that there can be no doubt that the early Corinthian church used fermented wine, and Paul does not censure them because they used fermented wine, but because they got drunk on it. Now the facts of the case are just these: that the Jews used no leaven or fermented wine at the Passover, but they used both on the day of Pentecost, and the apostles continued to do so. The present practice of using unleavened bread, then, at our communion table is unwarranted by the practice of the apostles. As the Passover lamb was the symbol of death, so now light bread is a symbol of life, Christ, the true Bread, giving us life by his resurrection from the grave. The unleavened bread brought out of Egypt by the Israelites could not give them life, even in the desert, but was soon exhausted, leaving them on the point of perishing of famine in the desert; therefore the Bread of Life, the true Bread from heaven, should be symbolised by something more palatable than that which Israel carried out of Egypt. In defence of the cause of temperance, let it be said that no harm can come

from a truthful statement of the case. If, on account of temptation, it be thought best to depart from the early practice of the apostles, there can be no harm in doing so, as long as we have the sanction of the apostles themselves. In 1 Cor. viii. and x. 19-33, we find Paul countermanding a decree given by the first council at Jerusalem, in regard to meats consecrated to idols, and yet he says: "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend." May God give us all strength of mind and will to use no intoxicating liquor, or anything else, that may cause a weak brother to stumble and fall!

Now, if we are correct thus far, that Pentecost was really a germ of the Lord's day, then we must expect to find in the first Pentecost which Christ's people held after his ascension, and after having brought them into the spiritual Canaan, a confirmation of the Lord's day, then and there instituted in all its plenitude, in commemoration of the morning of his resurrection, when he delivered them from the spiritual bondage of sin. As the day of Pentecost had been observed up to this time as a season of returning thanks to God for his bounties and for the deliverance of his ancient people from Egypt (Deut. xvi. 12), we may expect to find the apostles celebrating the day in its true spiritual sense. We find a full record of this event in the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and cannot doubt but it is an example for the members of God's spiritual kingdom through all coming time.

No consecrated temple was needed for this service, as the Jewish synagogue had now culminated in the Christian church. No chosen family like that of Levi officiated there, nor first-born anointed with consecrated oil and clothed with symbolical vestments, but the first-fruits of Christ's ministry, anointed with the Holy Spirit descending visibly upon them in the form of cloven (not single) tongues like as of fire, to show the world that they had a double mission to perform: 1st, to proclaim the law, whose end is death; and 2d, to present the remedy—the gospel, which gives life.

We behold here no flocks of cattle, sheep, or birds; no altar with its flames of fire and columns of black smoke; no costly ar-

ray of smoking incense; no wonderful ceremonies or peculiar forms of dress, but a powerful sermon backed up by proofs from the Old Testament Scriptures, converting three thousand Old Covenant Jews, not away from the Mosaic ritual, not into modern Christians free from all Jewish prejudices, but to faith in a risen Saviour who was undoubtedly the Messiah they had long been looking for.

This Lord's day was spent in God's service as no Jewish Sabbath had ever been. It was not so much a Sabbath of bodily observances, a rest from manual labor, as a Sabbath of the soul.

THE CHRISTIAN LORD'S DAY AN OUTGROWTH OF THE NEW COVENANT SYSTEM.

. In Christ's Sabbath of grace no costly temple or temple service is required. The blue dome of heaven is God's temple, while towering mountains and rolling hills are its arches; carpeted by the green sward, and lighted, not by seven golden candlesticks, but by the seven prismatic colors of light, streaming from the radiant face of the king of day; all nature rolls up one universal anthem of praise to the great Creator, proclaiming that not in temples made with hands, either in Mount Gerizim or at Jerusalem, do the true worshippers worship the Father in spirit and in truth. In the New Covenant no commands are given to any Solomon about the building of temples. God's spiritual temple is universal, and yet a synagogue or church is required where men can congregate for the study of God's word. We know this from the practice of the apostles and early Christians, although there are given no directions about building it. It is not the Jewish temple transferred into the New Covenant system, but the germ which existed in the Jewish synagogue that is now developed into the Christian church.

In the New Testament dispensation nothing is said about a chosen priesthood initiated into the duties of his office by a ceremonial purification and the anointing of oil, nevertheless Christ's spiritual kingdom is a priesthood, "a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices;" "a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people" (1 Pet. ii. 5-9), out of which, as

an outgrowth of the Christian system, has come the Christian ministry, corresponding with the Christian church and the Lord's day; and yet no one will pretend to say that the Christian ministry is nothing more than the Levitical priesthood transferred to the Christian system. Such an assumption would at once be met with ridicule. Nor will any one for a moment admit that the Christian ministry is less honorable, or the position less sacred, than that of the Jewish priest. In fact, the antitype is infinitely superior to the type. The very first-fruits of the "holy nation" should be consecrated to God for this purpose. Not the spiritually halt and maimed, but the man of firm character and noble purpose, in whose eye beams the fire of intellect, whose mind, thoroughly trained in the requisite institutions for imparting human knowledge, shall have obtained all the acquirements possessed by the apostles, and then profoundly imbued with God's Holy Spirit, and baptized with the living water of life—God's living word—he may be able to proclaim, with power from on high, the gospel plan of salvation to a ruined world. Oh, this mission is infinitely superior, and infinitely more holy, than that of a typical Jewish priest offering typical sacrifices on a typical altar in the temple of ancient Jerusalem!

As in the New Covenant all space is holy to God, and all regenerated believers are a spiritual priesthood, so all time should be consecrated to his service. All time is holy and should be considered a holy rest from sin, that true "sabbath which remaineth for the people of God" after the Jewish Sabbath and the rest in material Canaan have all been taken away. And yet, as an outgrowth of the Christian system, there is one day in seven, the Christian Lord's day, which is especially holy, a day to be observed above all others by his people, as consecrated to his service, and in which they are particularly required to engage in the duties pertaining to his Church and ministry. This day is not the Jewish Sabbath transferred to the New Covenant, but a new day chosen for the purpose, and in itself an outgrowth of the Christian system. This day is not so much a rest of the body as it is a rest of the soul. Now, just as the Christian church is not a transfer of the Jewish temple, but is peculiar to the New Cove-

nant; just as the Christian ministry is not a transfer of the Levitical priesthood, but is a part of the Christian dispensation; so the Lord's day is not a transfer of the Jewish Sabbath, but a day originating out of the necessities of the New Testament dispensation.

THE LORD'S DAY MORE HOLY THAN THE JEWISH SABBATH.

We would not detract one iota from the proper observance of the Lord's day. What the Scriptures demand, that is our duty to teach, and as far as possible to enforce. But the Lord's day is the Sabbath of the soul, and as such the soul of the believer should be so absorbed in the duties of the day, that the day will be observed and sanctified by him without the necessity of any outward command to obey it. In fact, there is no command in the New Testament to observe the day. Such a commandment would be out of place in the New Testament economy. (See Jer. xxxi. 33-34.) Let the State enforce what laws it sees proper to keep miscreant nominal Christians, Jews, and infidels out of mischief, but he whose soul is baptized in Christ needs no such laws. Let the State adhere to the morality of the Old Testament, but our duty as Christian believers is to the morality of the New Covenant. We live not under the fear of the law, but above the law. People who are under the law would run into anarchy were the law to be abolished, but the morality of the New Covenant Christian would undergo no change were all laws to be annihilated.

But the question may be asked, "If the Lord's day is to be observed with as much attention and respect as was the Jewish Sabbath, why defend the view that a new day has been chosen, and not the Jewish Sabbath transferred? What is to be gained?" We answer, We gain the truth. We present the teachings of the Bible. We destroy not only this error, but others that may grow out of it. We show more distinctly the relations existing between the two Covenants, and make it more difficult for men to confound the one with the other.

To the true believer, then, the Lord's day is a Sabbath of the soul. He becomes so absorbed in the gospel and its privileges and duties, that he is completely drawn away from all desire to

prosecute his own business or pleasure on that day. But the Church has not alone to deal with Pentecostal believers. Her influence extends over a large class, who, to a certain extent, yet belong to that shade of the Old Covenant which still exists along with the New. We mean children and young people, and perhaps some older persons, who, like the Hebrews that Paul wrote to, are still in the desert, travelling, it is true, towards Canaan, but who are nevertheless exposed to the danger of falling through unbelief and perishing in the desert. For all such, we need still to proclaim the 'aw written upon stone: "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy," not in its typical character as a remembrance of Israel's departure from the land of bondage, but in its prophetic character as a remembrance of Him who died and rose again for them, and that through belief in him they may enter into rest and be saved from their sins.

THE JEWISH SABBATH A SYMBOL OF DEATH; THE LORD'S DAY
A SYMBOL OF LIFE.

We now come to another aspect of the case. The Jewish Sabbath was a terrible memento of death—death in Egypt. The destroying angel was at work on that terrible night when Israel left Egypt, and the Jewish Sabbath was instituted as a monument of the sad events of that night. In every house there was a corpse, and that corpse was the first-born of every family; literally, the first-born of the nation. The Egyptians, doubtless observing the same rules which prevailed among the early Hebrews, considered the first-born as the consecrated priesthood of the nation, and a symbol of the entire nation itself. If such was the case, then Pharaoh saw in the death of the first-born the condemnation of the entire nation to death. And the language of Scripture would rather bear out this view: "And the Egyptians were urgent upon the people, that they might send them out of the land in haste: for they said, *We be all dead men.*" (Ex. xii. 33.) "In every house was a corpse," and that corpse spake louder than words could possibly do, of the doom of the nation. Friends and relatives gathered in awful sorrow around their dead, not so much, perhaps, in mourning for the dead, as in dread anticipation of

their own doom. The day which followed that terrible night indicated to the Hebrews an escape from death, but an escape that was not consummated until they had passed the Red Sea and were safe on their way to Canaan; and which is not spiritually confirmed to us until we have passed the red sea close by the cross of Christ.

The last Jewish Sabbath, consummating the period before the Christian era, was also a terrible memento of death. The First-born of Creation, the only begotten Son of God, lay in the cold embrace of death in the new tomb of Joseph of Arimathea. In his sad fate, his disciples read their own condemnation. If he were an impostor, as they now supposed, all their inheritance in Israel was destroyed; and all their expectations lay buried with Christ in his tomb. Nor was this sad night and day of mourning alone confined to the twelve disciples. All who had looked to him as their Messiah were in mourning. The fate of the carnal Jewish nation was sealed. The carnal first-born lay in the tomb in Egypt on that day which was the origin of the Jewish Sabbath, and on this last Sabbath day the carnal hope of Israel had perished for ever. During that long day, Christ's friends, if they met at all, only met to tell one another of their great sorrow. But as is natural to suppose, a Sabbath whose origin was in death, could but end in death. The first-born of the Egyptian was an appropriate symbol of the whole Adamic nature, and the First-born of God, having assumed that nature, dies in it.

But the history of that terrible night in Egypt is not an old story. It is a terrible reality whose solemn shadow falls upon us now. Egypt is all around us to-day. The solemn hover of the wings of the death angel is wafted to us by every breeze. The world is perishing around us. The mother, as she sits by the cradle of her dying first-born, watching for its last breath; the daughter soothing the fevered brow of a dear father while undergoing the agony of the last hour; the husband clinging with the grasp of despair to the loving wife as he sees her borne away in the jaws of the terrible monster; a sister in awful agony watching for the last gasp of a loved brother—are all passing through that solemn night of Egypt's profoundest darkness. And does not the fate of these

dear ones, as they are torn away from our embrace, reveal to us our own death sentence? Who can look upon the face of the dying, and not read there the sentence of his own condemnation? And who can stand among the dead in the midst of Egyptian darkness, and not repeat the echo, "We be all dead men"?

But the first Christian Lord's day, made glorious by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the grave, is a symbol of life. Life from God, through the grave on that day, and confirmed to the Church of the First-born on the day of Pentecost in the descent of God's Holy Spirit, gives to the world a day of spiritual rejoicing the exact counterpart of the Old Covenant Sabbath. The Jewish Sabbath belongs to the law, whose beginning and end are death. The Lord's day belongs to the gospel, whose beginning is life eternal. The Jewish Sabbath ends with the death of the Son of man. The Lord's day begins with the resurrection of the Son of God. The Jewish Sabbath ends with the Son of David, and in fact the last of David's carnal seed reposing in the tomb. The Lord's day begins with David's risen Lord, and the day of Pentecost confirms him upon his throne in the hearts of all true believers. Our Lord's day is not a feast of unleavened bread, eaten in hot haste and burning desire to escape from a carnal bondage; but a feast of light bread, in commemoration of eternal liberty through Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God. Our Lord's day is not a symbol of the gloom and terror of the grave; but of life—life eternal.

Judaism, from beginning to end, contained but the lifeless form of a carnal Christ. If any Jew, from Abraham to Christ, ever obtained eternal life, it was only through a risen and glorified Saviour, a reflection of whose image was carried back into the Old Covenant by the writings of the prophets and the images of the ceremonial law, just at the moon and planets reflect the light of the sun into the darkness of the night. But now the night has passed, and the day has come. "Awake, thou that sleepest, and Christ shall give thee light."

THE JEWISH SABBATH A SYMBOL OF DARKNESS; THE LORD'S DAY
A SYMBOL OF LIGHT.

It has been observed that the Jewish Sabbath commenced with the setting of the sun on Friday night, and ended with the setting of the sun on Saturday night. It is evident, then, that the Jewish Sabbath commenced with the night, the first half being night and the latter half day. If we turn to the history of creation, as recorded in the first chapter of Genesis, we will read that "the evening and the morning" were the "first day," "second day," etc. This idea corresponds beautifully with the Old and New Covenants. The dark tempestuous night of Egypt being illumined only by the angry flames of Sinai. After the dark clouds of Egypt and the desert have passed away, the bright stars of Canaan break forth in the light of its kings and prophets, reflecting back the image of the coming Sun of Righteousness; and even when the sun rises and the New Covenant comes in, there is still a shadow of the Old Covenant accompanying every object that intercepts the sun's rays. It was in memory of a dark and terrible night when Israel went out of Egypt, that resulted in the institution of the Jewish Sabbath. It was amid the wail of a nation mourning for its first-born, that they packed up their goods and hastened away, lest the avenging angel of death should overtake them also. And then the morning finds them wandering in the desert: homeless, sad, and dreary, not knowing whither they were going. It was also in the night time that they passed through the Red Sea, and on the morning they stood upon those barren shores and beheld the corpses of their enemies wafted to the shore by the impetuosity of the overwhelming waves; and many commentators suppose—from an inference to be derived from Deut. v. 15, when the Angel of the Covenant in the fiery pillar ceases to be their leader and now becomes their protector, they having been driven into the sea by Pharaoh's army, just as Christ was forced into his grave at the commencement of a Jewish Sabbath by his enemies—that Israel passed through the Red Sea on a Sabbath day also.

The Christian Lord's day commences with the morning. It was early morn when Mary came to the Saviour's tomb. It was early

in the morning when the news of a Saviour's resurrection broke upon the ears of his astonished disciples. Glorious morning, that gave the world a Saviour! A morning whose light reflected back into the depths of Old Testament prophecy, reveals the mystery hidden from the ages under shadow and symbol, and now clearly brought to view by the gospel; a morning revealing to our race the life and immortality which is the heritage of the righteous; a morning to be closed by no night to those who are sons of God by faith, but at the same time revealing to the wicked a night more terrible than the darkness of Egypt. Now, if the Old Testament night was a long period symbolised by the Jewish Sabbath, then the morning of the New Covenant is a long rest most appropriately symbolised by the Lord's day. Away back in the middle of the Jewish night, one of the disciples of Moses, groaning under the heavy burden of the law, exclaims: "Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the night?" (Isa. xxi. 11, 12) and then a voice comes back through the still darkness: "The morning cometh;" and then, as though echoing from the profoundest depths of Egyptian dungeons, to seal the destiny of those who love the "darkness rather than the light," and who "will not come to the light lest their deeds should be reprov'd," comes the solemn announcement, "*and also the night.*" Night of eternal wrath to all who reject him who is the light of the world.

But when the morning had come, and the Jewish nation, with all its ordinances, was about to crumble into dust, one of the "sons of the morning" cries, "Love is the fulfilling of the law; . . . awake out of sleep; . . . the night is far spent, the day is at hand." (Rom. xiii. 10-14.) And then he says to those who are in Christ, "Ye are all the children of light and the children of the day: we are not of the night nor of darkness." (1st Thess. v. 1-7.)

THE PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE LORD'S DAY MAY BE LEARNED
FROM THE PROPHETS AS WELL AS FROM THE MOSAIC LAW.

As has already been observed, in the gospel as presented to us in the New Testament we find no rules for the observance of the

Lord's day. Such rules would be out of place in the gospel. Christ, while teaching those who were still under the old dispensation, enjoined the most strict observance of the moral law, including the Fourth Commandment. This we observe in the answer given to the lawyer who came to him tempting him (Matt. xxii. 34-40) as well as elsewhere; and the plain inference is, that this commandment, made free from the typical, was to extend down into the new dispensation. Besides this, all we have in the New Testament relative to the matter is the example given us by the the apostles, and even this example is not always to be relied on, the apostles themselves varying as they were influenced more or less by Judaism, as we find in the case of Peter, as recorded in the tenth chapter of the Acts, refusing even at that late date to associate with Gentiles and partake of their food, giving as a reason that nothing unclean had ever passed his mouth, although his Lord had told him ten or twelve years before this, that it is not that which entereth the man that defileth him. Now we have already seen that the Mosaic economy, consisting of types and shadows, has been fulfilled in the New Covenant, and in it the Jewish Sabbath, as a type of the rest of grace "which remaineth for the people of God." But Moses and the New Testament do not comprise the whole of the Bible. There were *two* witnesses before the New Testament was in existence, which were often quoted by our Lord—"Moses and the prophets"—and as one of these has been fulfilled, we naturally turn to the other. The prophets, then, being an introduction to the gospel, must, if carefully examined, afford us all the rules we require to know on this subject; and as we are especially told that the New Covenant Church is "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself (in whom Moses is fulfilled) being the chief corner stone." (Eph. ii. 20-22.) But as these prophecies were given to the Jewish or typical kingdom, and, as their name (prophecies) indicates, refer to the spiritual kingdom of Christ, they must be taken in a spiritual and not a material sense. Let us, then, examine in detail the prophecies relative to the Lord's day. One of the most important of these is to be found in Jeremiah xvii. 19-27:

"Thus saith the Lord unto me, Go and stand in the gate of

the children of the people, whereby the kings of Judah come in, and by the which they go out, and in all the gates of Jerusalem: and say unto them, Hear ye the word of the Lord, ye kings of Judah, and all Judah and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem, that enter in by these gates; thus saith the Lord, Take heed to yourselves, and bear no burden on the sabbath day, nor bring it in by the gates of Jerusalem; neither carry forth a burden out of your houses on the sabbath day, neither do ye any work, but hallow ye the sabbath day, as I commanded your fathers. But they obeyed not, neither inclined their ear, but made their necks stiff, that they might not hear, nor receive instruction. And it shall come to pass, if ye diligently hearken unto me, saith the Lord, to bring in no burden through the gates of this city on the sabbath day, but hallow the sabbath day to do no work therein; then shall there enter into the gates of this city kings and princes sitting upon the throne of David, riding in chariots and on horses, they and their princes, the men of Judah, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem: and this city shall remain for ever. And they shall come from the cities of Judah, and from the places about Jerusalem, and from the land of Benjamin, and from the plain, and from the mountains, and from the south, bringing burnt offerings, and sacrifices, and meat offerings, and incense, and bringing sacrifices of praise, unto the house of the Lord. But if ye will not hearken unto me to hallow the sabbath day, and not to bear a burden, even entering in at the gates of Jerusalem on the sabbath day; then will I kindle a fire in the gates thereof, and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be quenched."

Now here let us note several things which do not appear on the surface of this passage to a superficial reader:

- 1st. This is not merely an historical sketch of events transpiring in the days of Josiah and Jehoiakim, kings of Judah. If it were, it would be of but little value to us. In fact, it would not be what God's word claims to be, a communication from God to fallen man concerning his soul's salvation, and which deeply concerns every member of the human family throughout all ages.
- 2d. It is a *prophecy*, and, as a prophecy, given ostensibly to a

typical nation is virtually to be fulfilled in all the nations of the world, of which that nation is a type, according to God's own words to Jeremiah: "I ordained thee a prophet unto *the nations*." "See, I have this day set thee over *the nations* and over the *kingdoms*, to root out and to destroy, and to throw down, to build, and to plant." (Jer. i. 5 and 10.) This prophecy, then, has its fulfilment in the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and not in the material type. 3d. As the language is addressed to the type to be fulfilled in the antitype, the Jerusalem spoken of is "that Jerusalem which is from above" and not the material Jerusalem, and the "sabbath day" referred to is the Lord's day, and the "burdens" which are not to be carried into the spiritual Jerusalem on the Lord's day are not packages of rice and sugar, but mental burdens—worldly affairs—all thoughts of worldly business and worldly cares. 4th. That view which would make this prophecy to be fulfilled literally in the future in the restoration of ancient Jerusalem, betrays such ignorance of the prophecies that it requires no refutation. Ancient Jerusalem is not to be rebuilt. The type having been fulfilled in the antitype, has accomplished its purpose and has passed away for ever. 5th. This prophecy is having its fulfilment to-day. The "princes sitting upon the throne of David" are those who occupy high positions in the gospel kingdom; Jerusalem being none other than the gospel Church.

A similar passage is to be found in Isaiah lvi. 1-8: "Thus saith the Lord, Keep ye judgment, and do justice; for my salvation is near to come, and my righteousness to be revealed. Blessed is the man that doeth this, and the son of man that layeth hold on it; that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, and keepeth his hand from doing any evil. Neither let the son of the stranger, that hath joined himself to the Lord, speak, saying, The Lord hath utterly separated me from his people: neither let the eunuch say, Behold I am a dry tree. For thus saith the Lord unto the eunuchs that keep my sabbaths, and choose the things that please me, and take hold of my covenant, Even unto them will I give in mine house and within my walls a place and a name better than of sons and of daughters: I will give them an everlasting name, that shall not be cut off. Also the sons of the

stranger, that join themselves to the Lord, to serve him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants, every one that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, and taketh hold of my covenant; even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer: their burnt offerings and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar: for mine house shall be called a house of prayer for *all people*."

Isaiah above all other prophets has been most appropriately termed the evangelical prophet; the latter portion of his prophecies, especially, referring to the gathering of the spiritual seed of Abraham (not the carnal Jews) from among all nations. This passage, then, like the former from Jeremiah, is to be interpreted as referring to the proper observance of the Lord's day, although ostensibly addressed to the type, as are a majority of the prophecies, to be fulfilled in the antitype. This view is still more clearly seen in the following passage: "For as the new heavens and the new earth (the gospel kingdom) which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord." (Isa. lxvi. 22-23.)

And still more decisive is the following: "If thou turn away thy foot from the sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day: and call the sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words; then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." (Isa. lviii. 13-14.) Here, then, we have in the prophecies of the Old Testament, being an introduction to the gospel, all the commands necessary for the observance of the Lord's day; commands which would not be proper in the gospel itself, which deals with a purely spiritual kingdom. Not discarding Moses, but considering him as purely typical of the gospel, we will find in the prophecies all that we need to know concerning the dedication of one-seventh of our time to the Lord, and just how this time should be observed.

We have, then, as a guide to the proper observance of the Lord's day:

1st. *The Fourth Commandment*; not to be taken in its material typical sense as given to the Jews through Moses, but in its application to the antitype as given through Christ to the world.

2d. *The Commands given to the Jews in regard to the observance of the Pentecost*; also to be taken in a spiritual and not material sense.

3d. *All Commands given by the Prophets concerning the Jewish Sabbath*, having passed through the prism of the cross, and applied to the Lord's day in the light of the New Covenant.

4th. The practice of the apostles.

All scripture prophecies become perfectly plain, if we remember the simple rule of substituting the name of the antitype in the place of the type. Let us try that rule on some of the prophecies relative to the Lord's day and witness the result. Take, for instance, the passage in Isaiah just referred to: Isa. lviii. 13.

THE PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE LORD'S DAY.

1st. *We are not to turn from the day by seeking our own pleasure.*

All our business affairs are to be laid aside on this day. We may legitimately occupy the six intervening days in the pursuit of worldly treasure necessary for our own comfort and that of our families, but this day is especially to be dedicated to God's work and not to our own. On this day our own fortunes, or in other words our own petty kingdoms, are at rest. We are not to think of them this day, but to spend the day in laboring for the advancement of God's kingdom, and the building up of his cause in the world. On the Lord's day the merchant should be as faithful in the Lord's field of labor as he has been in his store or counting-room during the other six days of the week, and the clerk must be as diligently engaged in the Lord's service as he has been during the six days in his employer's business. It is not to be a day of idleness, but of intense activity; in fact, we should be more active on this day than on others, for we serve a higher master, and engage in a far more noble employment. We

well know that if a book-keeper or clerk were engaged during five days of the week in the employ of an ordinary merchant, and on the sixth in the employ of some rich nobleman, he at least would be as faithful on the sixth day as he would on any of the five, and the probability is that he would be even more industrious on that day; but the reverse is almost the general custom in regard to the Lord's day. Even the great mass of professing Christians rise late on the Lord's day; and with the exception of spending an hour or so in the Sunday-school and listening to one or two sermons, they spend the day in idleness, looking upon it as a rest day for the body, while many use the day as a time for making a sort of review of their own personal duties during the week that has passed, or in laying plans for the coming week, none of which are in accordance with the requirements of these prophecies.

The Mosaic law required that no beast should be compelled to labor on the Jewish Sabbath; but nothing in these prophecies indicates any such prohibition in regard to the Lord's day. Not only every beast, but every successful instrument that can be brought to do faithful service for God's kingdom, is to be used for that purpose. There is nothing said here about remaining stationary in one place, as was the case in the wilderness, but we can go in and out of the gates of Jerusalem on that day, provided we carry no worldly mental burdens. Nothing is said about a Sabbath day's journey, which it appears was permitted at a later age in the history of Judah, but we may go ten Sabbath days' journeys, or even twenty, if by so doing we can "visit the fatherless and the widow in their affliction," or aid some erring brother in an effort to keep himself "unspotted from the world," or to bring a lost soul to Christ. The prophecy is not to be understood in the typical as a prohibition to bear material burdens through the material gates of the typical Jerusalem, but in the New Covenant rest we are to "bear one another's burdens and so fulfil the law [not of Moses, but] of Christ." On this day our pleasure is not to be in doing our "own ways" or speaking our "own words," but in delighting ourselves in the Lord.

But the bearing of burdens on the Lord's day through the

gates of the antitypical Jerusalem, has a deeper significance still. It means that no mental worldly burdens are to be carried into the Lord's house on that day. It means that on the morn of that day we are to so consecrate our hearts to God by prayer, that we shall go to his house fully prepared to perform the duties which he requires of us ; for we cannot do his work and carry our own baskets full of provisions too. And oh, how many burdens are carried every Lord's day through the church door into God's presence. Here is a man with a big roll under his arm. He arranged with his architect on Saturday to build him a new house, and he has brought the plan with him, and as soon as seated he unrolls it and commences making changes and improvements. He does not hear a single word of the sermon. Here comes another with a whole wheel-barrow full of troubles. And a lady, too. Her mother-in-law has slandered her, and she can think of nothing else. The minister's labor is in vain, as far as she is concerned. Several young men and young women carry heavy parcels, labelled "love affairs," and the water of life flows all around them, but they catch none of it, for their vessels are already filled. A medical student has brought a patient with him, and is trying hard to study the nature of his disease, but learns nothing about the nature and cure of that terrible malady—the leprosy of sin. This man has brought his farm with him, but learns nothing about the "inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away." A judge is busy with a case—a peculiar case—and is busy in considering what decision he should render, and although having an ear on each side of his head, he hears not the text, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." There are some, strange to say, come empty-handed and go away heavily loaded. One has a great bundle of criticisms. He has caught up what he supposes to be the weak points in his minister's sermon, but he has allowed all the rest to pass by like the waters of the Jordan on their way to the Dead Sea. How truly Christ said of such, "Having ears ye hear not." And another boasts as he passes out of the church door, that he came to hear the gospel, but heard nothing but the minister eulogising himself.

What a bundle he carries ; and how different the case would have been if he had closed his eyes to the carnal and opened his eyes to the spiritual ! The Jews saw a Samaritan with a devil where others saw the Son of God. "Having ears they hear not ; eyes, they see not." One carries away the choir, but has left the spirit of the hymns that were sung ; another rejoices in an impression of the costumes, the hats and ornaments ; while one youth bears away an album of portraits. Only here and there one who came in "the spirit on the Lord's day" has done the Lord's work and received the Lord's reward—an enlightened understanding and a purified conscience. These, having washed themselves at the fountain of gospel grace, are now prepared to carry the water of life to the perishing.

2d. *We are not to speak our own words.* We do not find any prohibition in the Mosaic law for restraining a man to the use of certain words on the Jewish Sabbath day. But here we find a restriction as to what language we are to use on the Lord's day. In this, the Christian Lord's day is more strict than the Jewish Sabbath. Our language on this day is to be that of prayer and praise ; or, in other words, to be employed strictly in God's service, in whatever way we can make ourselves instrumental in building up his kingdom, whether by reading and expounding his word, or by our conversation leading sinners to Christ, and making his merits and beauties known to others. As our whole time on this day belongs to the Lord, so our whole conversation should be about his business. What would we say of a clerk who should employ the whole or even a part of his employer's time, in talking to his employer's customers about some private business of his own ? Would not his employer soon begin to suspect him to be a rival, and dismiss him from his employment ? The clerk's conversation with his employer's customers must be about his employer's business. In the history of Israel, we read of a prince who stood by the side of the gate of Jerusalem, and whenever any one came in with any important business for his father, the king, he commenced talking to them "*his own words,*" instead of delighting himself with that which was to the king's interest : and we are told that "Absalom stole the hearts of the

men of Israel;" and not long after this, we learn that he excited the people and raised a rebellion, placing himself at the head of it, where he ignominiously lost his life.

3d. *We are to call the Lord's day a delight.* We all know the pleasure we experience when we are successful in some business enterprise. How cheering it is to shake hands with some old friend who is engaged in some business enterprise, and hear him exclaim in response to our inquiry in regard to his worldly success, "Oh, my business is very good now. I have all I can do." How happy he appears. Even his health appears to be benefited by his success, and no doubt his wife and children are joyful partakers of his prosperity. But on the other hand, how often do we hear in answer to some interrogatory touching a man who looks sad and troubled, "Oh, business is so dull—times are so hard." How sad and dejected he appears. Even his health fails in consequence, and dyspepsia and nervousness seize upon him. His wife and children also bear the same haggard look. But let business revive. Let the times become easy and money plenty, and he is filled with life and contentment. Joy over-spreads his countenance, and he becomes happy. Every day we have evidence of the interest men take in the success of their own affairs.

Now, if we love our friends, we cannot but be interested in their welfare. If they are successful, we rejoice with them, and if they are unfortunate, we feel that their misfortunes concern us. But suppose that we are in the employ of one of these friends; that we are engaged by him as a clerk, for instance; would we not take a much deeper interest in his success? If a clerk is honest, loves his employer, and becomes deeply interested in his employer's success in business, he will sympathise with him in his trials, and participate in his joys. But suppose we find a merchant looking sad and troubled, and we inquire the cause of his affliction and he should answer, "Business is good, times are easy, but my men do not attend to my business. They do not care anything about it. They neglect my customers. They take no interest in my success." "Why, how is this?" we inquire. "Do you not pay them regular salaries for attending to your business?"

He answers, "Yes, I pay them every week, but they have so many little private affairs of their own to attend to, and that occupy their whole attention, that they actually have no time or inclination to attend to my affairs. When a customer comes in, they at once seize upon him, and draw his attention away from the purchase of my goods to their own private affairs, and then they appear to be vexed when I suggest to them that my business is going to ruin." What would we think of such a lot of employees as these? Would we not say that they were a lot of knaves and should be harshly dealt with? But do we not too often do the same thing when we allow our thoughts and perhaps our conversation to be centred on our own petty affairs on the Lord's day, and not upon the Lord's important transactions on his own day, chosen above all others to be spent in his own service? God's world is going to ruin. He has placed us here to attend to it. He has given us this day to be employed in bringing the world to a knowledge of a Saviour. He pays us for our services, and if we occupy this precious time in thinking our own thoughts, speaking our own words, and attending to our own dolls and tops and other mundane playthings, are we not robbing God just as much as the clerk who occupies his employer's time in attending to business of his own?

4th. *We are to esteem it as a holy day.* Holy means sacred. We are to value it as a sacred day, a rich treasure; more valuable than all other days. A day to be devoted to the Lord by reading his word, making ourselves acquainted with his law and gospel, and holding spiritual communion with him. We know what interest a son or daughter, who is away from home, takes in the day that he is permitted to visit his father's house, and converse with his brothers and sisters, and especially with his beloved parents, about those things which are of mutual interest to both. This, to him, is a sacred day. He looks forward to it with deep interest, and longs for its coming. How much more, then, should we long for the coming of the Lord's day, a day exclusively devoted to spiritual communion with our heavenly Father, and to be occupied in his service?

5th. *We are to call it honorable.* That is, we are to honor

the day; respect it as a binding obligation. Wherever you find a man who has no respect for the Lord's day, *mark that man*. Brand him as you would a thief. If that man can get his hand into your till unknown to you, he will steal your money. We repeat, that he is already a thief, and worse than a thief. He robs God. God has placed him in this beautiful world and given him a home and food and clothing, and he exacts one-seventh of his time in pay, and he refuses to pay it. He is living in God's world and refuses to pay his rent. If he will rob God, he will rob you. If he will steal God's time, he will steal your money. Watch that man. Beware of the Sabbath-breaker. There is no crime in the decalogue that a Sabbath-breaker will not commit, if he has an opportunity and imagines that it will not be known to men. Trust no habitual Sabbath-breaker. It is an unfailing test of character. If he refuses to congregate where God's law is studied, he will most certainly trample that law under his feet. The man who will not recognise the laws of his country, is a traitor, and only wants the opportunity to engage in open rebellion. The man who will not give that portion of time which God requires to the study and teaching of his laws, will most assuredly betray you if you trust him. The man who will not devote a portion of his time to the interests of God's kingdom, imperfect as the service may be, is a villain. He is destitute of all true morality. Shun him as you would the plague.

God demands one-seventh of our time: not as a gift, but as a right; he being our landlord and we the tenants. We owe it to God just as much as we owe to our neighbor the money we borrowed from him: and we owe it until it is paid. "Remember the Sabbath day" is a due bill for value received, and no man who refuses to pay it can be an honest man. During the six days before, we received from our heavenly Father the manna, and our shoes and clothing are not waxen old; and now, on the Lord's day morning, God asks us to pay the bill by employing the day in his service. If any one refuses to pay, we again say, Brand him as a thief and a robber. Should any Sabbath-breaker complain that this is harsh language, we answer him, Pay your honest debts, and then we will recognise you as an honest

man. You owe God one-seventh of all your time; pay it by hallowing this day.

6th. Then, in these prophecies we find rich promises to all those who hallow the Lord's day. "*Thou shalt delight thyself in the Lord.*" See that miserable, cowardly, sneaking debtor who will not pay his honest debts, as he hides around the corner to avoid meeting his creditor in the street. He takes no delight in his creditor. How can he? His creditor's presence is odious to him. His own conscience convicts him of robbery. We cannot delight ourselves in the Lord, if we rob him of that which is his just due. But the man who pays his debts can face his creditor with a smile, and enjoy his company; and just so, the man who promptly pays to God what he owes him, can rejoice in the Lord his God with a clean conscience and a pure heart. Pay the Lord what thou owest him, and then thou shalt delight thyself in him. This is what is meant when the Scriptures say, "The pure in heart shall see God."

Then, the Lord's promise comes to him who fulfils this obligation. "I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father." He that has been faithful over a few things shall be made ruler over many things. Our time on earth is but a state of probation to test our character as to the destinies of eternity. If we are honest before God and pay him all our just dues, then he will take us into his employment in that world of which Christ's Sabbath of rest here on earth is but a foretaste. "The heritage of Jacob" includes all the blessings of the New Covenant. This is to be our food for ever, even the fulness of God in Christ.

THE LORD'S DAY A DAY OF INTENSE ACTIVITY.

The Lord's day is not a day to be spent in idleness and sloth. Some people imagine that if they abstain from all manual labor on this day, they have complied with all that the day demands. They sleep a part of the day, and a part of it they occupy in telling idle tales or reading works of fiction, and the result is that the day is completely squandered, and no good results from it.

The Lord's day was given by Christ to the world, and is intimately connected with the world's redemption. It is not a day of idleness, but a day of work, of busy, active life. It is the symbol of the dawning of a new era in the history of our race. The old Jewish Sabbath was but a shadow of the Lord's day, and was given by Moses to the Jews, and not to the world. It was a day that God hallowed in remembrance of the creation of the world, and was given to the Jews as a rest from bondage, and was but a carnal rest; the last day of which, the carnal nature of Christ rested in the grave. The dawn of the resurrection morning was a new era in the history of our world. When Christ was laid in the grave, the redemption of the world was complete as far as Christ's atonement was concerned; but now the world was to be saved by the preaching of that atonement. The foundation had been laid, and now the building was to be erected. When God laid the foundations of the earth, "the morning stars sang together," and is it reasonable to suppose that they were silent when Christ laid the foundation for man's redemption? Oh, that first Lord's day was a busy day, both in heaven and upon earth. It was certainly a busy day among the angels, nor was it a less busy day among the disciples. Christ's friends did not by any means spend that day on which he arose from the dead in idleness. We read that certain women came "early in the morning," "as it began to dawn;" and then, they were commanded to "go *quickly*" and tell the disciples that he was risen from the dead. "And they departed *quickly* from the sepulchre;" and Peter came *running*, and then we read of two of them who went into the country where they meet with their risen Lord, and that same night they return to inform the other disciples. From early dawn to late that night we find them busy. Most assuredly that was not an idle day to the disciples, whatever it may have been to others.

Nor was the day of Pentecost one of less activity. Peter preached a thrilling sermon on that day, that resulted in the conversion of three thousand persons. This was no mean day's work; and if there is any truth in the views of our Baptist friends, that these converts on that day received an immersion of

their bodies in water at the hands of the disciples, we may rest assured that those disciples were excessively tired when night came. That was anything but a Jewish Sabbath to them.

The Lord's day is not a day of bodily rest. A world is to be saved by the preaching of the gospel, and God has appointed this day as the day on which it is to be done, and it is not going to be done by *resting* on this day. The word Sabbath applied to this day is a misnomer. It is a day of work—hard work, and of intense activity. If every professing Christian would work as hard on the Lord's day for God's kingdom, as he does on other days for himself, within ten years the world would be turned upside down. It is a grievous error into which many Christians have fallen, of supposing that they keep the day holy when they spend it in idleness. There is work—a world of work—to be done on this day, and not an hour of it can be lost without committing sin. We repeat that it is not *a Sabbath* in the sense of bodily rest. The apostles never called it by that name. They ever designated it as the "Lord's day" or the "First day of the week," either of which indicates the very reverse of the Jewish Sabbath. It is not a Jewish Sabbath, but a Lord's day of busy, active work. The early Christians did not call it *the Sabbath*. It is a modern error that has given the name to a day just the reverse of what the etymology of the word means. We do not approve of changing the name given to the day by the apostles to one belonging to another day pertaining to the system of Moses. If any change is made, let it be one that is appropriate, introduced by usage, and not by a false taste.

"SUNDAY" AN APPROPRIATE NAME FOR THE LORD'S DAY.

We observe that many good men, especially ministers of the gospel and officers of churches, are careful to call the Lord's day "the Sabbath." Ask them why they do so, and they will answer you that the name *Lord's day* is more appropriate, but less convenient and but little used; that *Sunday* is a pagan name, the day formerly being dedicated by heathen nations to the worship of the sun, and consequently to call the day *Sunday* favors pagan idolatry.

This reasoning would be valid, did we still consider the day as consecrated to the sun. But Paul's reasoning in regard to consecrated meats (Rom. xiv. ; 1st Cor. viii.) utterly annihilates this argument. Meat consecrated to an idol may be eaten by a Christian with perfect impunity, if eaten to satisfy hunger and not to worship the idol ; unless some weak brother (and alas, how many weak brothers there are, who persist in being weak and puny, rather than drink deep of the gospel medicine !) should through his ignorance be caused to stumble.

Sunday, we say, is a proper name. We care nothing about the origin of the word. It may have been pagan before it was baptized by Christian usage. Cornelius was a pagan, yet when he was baptized a Christian, no one ever thought of changing his name. The changing of names in religious rites is a practice of the Roman Catholic Church, and is practised on all ecclesiastics from Pope Leo XIII. down to Fra Benito and Sister Agnes, who sweep the floor and whip the dogs out of the most humble convent. Why, then, should we ape the Romish Church in this ? We honor no idol by eating consecrated meat when we are hungry, and we do no dishonor by calling the Lord's day *Sunday*, unless we entertain in our minds the pagan superstition of consecrating the day to the worship of the sun-god.

The Jewish Sabbath was in memory of a night—of the hours consecrated to rest. The period to which it most appropriately belongs is that period commencing with the night on which the pascal lamb was slain in Egypt, and it ended with the rising sun on the morning of our Saviour's resurrection. The Christian Sunday begins with the rising sun—most appropriate symbol of light. It commenced on the morning when the "Sun of Righteousness" arose from the grave, and, scattering the dark shadows of the long Jewish night, ascended triumphant in the full splendor of the New Covenant, to give light not only to the Jew, but to all who sit in heathen darkness. Sunday, then, is a proper name to designate a day whose refulgent light already encircles the globe, and before whose dissolving beams the ruins of Judaism and Paganism are fast crumbling back to dust.

Sunday, a day whose *morning light* found in the sepulchre of

a risen Saviour nothing but his grave clothes, appropriate symbols of all carnal shadows, to be for ever buried in the grave of the Old Covenant, while the kingdom of light, illumined by the celestial Sun, fears no night and no grave.

Sunday, a day whose *noonday splendors* cheer the pilgrim in his onward march towards the celestial world, undimmed by any cloud of sin, unwearied by any labor in the Lord's service, as he presses forward "toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

Sunday, a day whose *evening shadows* entrance the believer's eye as he beholds the golden towers and battlements and pearly gates of the New Jerusalem, all aglow with the refulgent splendors of the Sun of Righteousness. May we all spend an eternity in his light!

Sunday, a day of active Christian effort here, whose evening glories will fade into the eternal day when all the people of God shall be gathered home to enjoy the blessings of his kingdom for ever. "And in the city of the living God we shall behold with the eyes of the immortal nature, the light which beams forth from the eternal throne." "And the city had no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it; for the glory of God did lighten it, and the Lamb is the light thereof. And the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light of it." "And there shall be no night there; and they need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God giveth them light; and they shall reign for ever and ever."

REVIEW AND CONCLUSION.

The foregoing article was prepared for publication over four years ago (being intended as part of a larger work), and has been given to the REVIEW with but few unimportant changes. Of all the works on this subject, defending the views here opposed, that which appears to contain the most solid reasoning is by Prof. Fairbairn of Glasgow.—*Fairbairn's Typology*, Vol. II., Sec. 3. But the defects of his system are so evident, that a few quotations will serve to show, we think, beyond the shadow of a doubt that the plan we have presented is the right one.

Dr. Fairbairn maintains that a seventh day of rest was given to the world at the creation, and that it was "engrafted" into the Jewish system, which gave it a "symbolical and typical value," and that from thence "the original ordinance" was *transferred* to the Christian system, with a new day and a new name, and yet he contends for "a strict and literal obligation of the Fourth Commandment."

We have nowhere maintained that God gave the world no weekly rest until he gave the manna to the Israelites in the desert. We have admitted that from inference we understand that God's preachers of righteousness did teach the people to observe a weekly rest. We think there can be no doubt about this, and we should consider it a great error to say that the antediluvian world had no seventh day rest. We can form no idea of the vast amount of knowledge that some of these preachers may have possessed, when we consider that father and son associated with each other through a period of several hundred years, and imparted their wisdom and knowledge to each other; while the Angel of the Covenant walked with them as their Teacher and Guide, instructing them in divine truths much as he did with his disciples at a later period on the hills of Galilee. To preach righteousness was to preach the moral law, and that law includes the Fourth Commandment—the dedication of one-seventh of our time to God's service. But what we contend for is, that the JEWISH TYPE was *not* given to the world. The Jewish type was given to the Jew, and to the Jew only, with the exception of the proselyte or stranger within his gate. It was never given to the Gentile world. Dr. Fairbairn says of the Sabbath: "Having been engrafted into a religion so purely symbolical as the Mosaic, it was unavoidable that the bodily rest enjoined in it should acquire, like all the other outward things belonging to the religion, a symbolical and typical value." *Typology*, Vol. II., p. 126. Until this engrafting process was accomplished, it was neither type nor symbol to any Gentile nation. Dr. Fairbairn also confirms this when he admits (p. 129), "so little depended upon the exact day, that on the occasion of renewing the sabbatical institution in the wilderness, the Lord seems to have made the

weekly series run from the first giving of the manna. His example, therefore, in the work of creation, was intended merely to fix the relative proportion between the days of ordinary labor and those of sacred rest, and with that view is appealed to in the law." In this we believe Dr. Fairbairn to be right. We certainly can obtain no inference from Gen. ii. 3, that bears the faintest shadow of a command. The only inference we derive from this passage is, that God blessed and sanctified the seventh period of creation by making it the period in which the great drama of man's earthly career was to be enacted—his fall and redemption; otherwise it would have been stated as it was of the other six days: "the evening and the morning" were the seventh day; but the "evening" was yet to come in the Old Testament dispensation, and the "morning" of the New Covenant was far away in the distance of future ages. Nor is the seventh day anywhere called a Sabbath until the Jewish type was given to the Israelites. Until a written law was given, God's commands were taught by word of mouth, by men whom he called for this purpose as he did Abraham. The Patriarchal age was probably to some extent typical of that work which is now in progress in missionary fields, where Christian ministers (preachers of righteousness) are busily engaged in instructing unlettered men by word of mouth—imparting an imperfect knowledge of that law which their children will be able at some future time to read for themselves. Those who have labored as missionaries in the foreign field can understand this perfectly well.

In regard to Col. ii. 16, Dr. Fairbairn presents precisely the same view that we have given, which is undoubtedly the correct one. He says: "The apostle discharges Christians from the observance of Sabbath days, not in a false and improper sense, but in that very sense in which they were shadows of good things to come, placing them on a footing, in this respect, with distinctions of meat and drink. It is needless to say here that certain feast days of the Jews, being withdrawn from a common to a sacred use, were called Sabbaths, and that the apostle alludes exclusively to these. There can be no doubt, indeed, that they were so called and are also included here; but not to the exclusion of the seventh

day Sabbath, which, from the very nature of the case, was the one most likely to be thought of by the Colossians. Unless it had been expressly excepted, we must in fairness suppose it to have been at least equally intended with the others."—*Typology*, Vol. II., p. 125. Can anything be plainer than this? The Jewish Sabbath was abolished, and could by no manner of means be *transferred* to the Christian system. Again, Dr. Fairbairn says: "When another state of things was introduced, it became necessary to assign to such Sabbath—the Jewish seventh day of rest—a place among the things that were done away, and so far to change the ordinance itself as to transfer it to a different day, and even call it by a new name. But as baptism in the Spirit is Christ's circumcision, so the Lord's day is his Sabbath; and to be in the Spirit on that day, worshipping and serving him in the truth of his gospel, is to take up the yoke of the Fourth Commandment."—*Typology*, p. 127. Here in a nut-shell we have precisely the ground we advocate. The Jewish Sabbath is abolished. The "ordinance itself" becomes a new day—the Christian Lord's day. No one will for a moment pretend to say that Christ's circumcision by the Spirit is a transfer of Jewish carnal circumcision into the New Covenant system. Then, why contend that the Lord's day is a transfer of the Jewish Sabbath? There is no transfer about it. The one is a type of the other, and as such cannot be *transferred*. And yet Dr. Fairbairn maintains that the Fourth Commandment is to be observed literally. Why, we doubt very much if the good Doctor ever observed it literally himself—keeping Saturday instead of Sunday. The Fourth Commandment is no more to be understood literally than is the preface to the Ten Commandments, or the promise affixed to the Fifth, to be understood literally. "I am the Lord thy God which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt," is applicable to every baptized child whom God has chosen from the bondage of the great heathen world (the true Egypt), by giving him his birth in a Christian land, of Christian parents, and with Christian privileges, in accordance with the covenant made with Abraham, that he would bless the infants of his spiritual seed. This is an election by birthright which no man can deny, and yet not the

election to eternal life in Christ from before the foundation of the world. "That thy days may be long in the land (Canaan) which the Lord thy God giveth thee," does not mean that every child who is obedient to his Christian parents shall be entitled to a homestead in modern Palestine, but that he shall be entitled to a long life of blessing and usefulness in the Christian Church, comparatively free from the vices and temptations to which his neighbors' children are continually exposed, hastening them on to an untimely grave.

Those who contend that the Fourth Commandment was literally given to the world from the beginning, would do well to stop and think a moment. If the Fourth Commandment, as it stands in the Decalogue, was literally given to the world, then the preface to the Ten Commandments was given literally also. Now, we know of no sense in which it can be said that God brought every child of Adam born into the world out of Egypt before he had learned the first table of the law, or even the First Commandment; unless the atonement of Christ was universal: that is, that Christ made atonement for Adam's sin for the whole race. Now this is a measure of New School doctrine which none of our Old School friends are going to accept. Nor is it literally true. Pharaoh and his hosts were not "brought up out of Egypt." The Canaanites destroyed by Joshua were never "brought up out of Egypt." The facts of the case are, that God brought his Church out of Egypt, including their infant children. Christ died for his Church, including the children of believers. The latter are redeemed from Egypt, or the pagan world, by birthright, inheriting the promises made to the fathers. If we are wrong on this point, we would thank any one who would put us right.

The Lord's day is a new day, in memory of Christ's resurrection; a day in which we are not to worship God by carnal ceremonies, but in spirit and in truth. The State can only enforce the outward observance of the Ten Commandments, but the gospel requires of its adherents their spiritual observance as well. The Jews observe the day in which Christ lay in the tomb, and rightly, too, as they reject the Saviour. We observe the day he arose. The Jewish system enjoined not only rest of the body on

the Sabbath, but also strict meditation in the law—a state of discipleship: but the Christian system requires the teaching of the gospel—a state of apostleship. Herein consists the great difference between the two days; hence the Christian Church cannot be too strict in the observance of the Lord's day, "spending the whole time in the public and private exercise of God's worship, except so much as is to be taken up in works of necessity and mercy." We repeat, then, that we cannot be too strict in its observance. It is better for us to err on the right side, if we err at all, doing too much than too little; and when our summons comes to call us into the next period of rest—the rest in the New Jerusalem—may we hear with it the welcome reception, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant, enter thou into the joy of thy Lord."

ARTICLE IV.

THE EVANGELIST AND CHURCH WORK.

In the present circumstances of our Church there are few matters of more interest, and which deserve to be more prayerfully considered, than those indicated in the title of this article. Doubtless, each one has some general idea as to what "the evangelist" is, and what his work should be. But have we the right idea? The writer does not pretend to be better informed nor more capable of correct judgment than others. Here is simply an expression of belief that in many cases wrong ideas are held as to evangelistic work; or if the *theory* is right, that the *practice* is wrong. Thank God for every conviction that the time has come when the evangelist is a much needed, if not an essential, factor in Church work. We are realising that we cannot keep pace with the work as it opens rapidly and widely on every side of us. The means used hitherto do not, as we are finding, suffice for meeting the demands made upon us. Our destitute regions seem to be enlarging rather than growing less. And now we are awaking to see that some extraordinary efforts and plans must be

made in order to keep the world from outrunning Christianity. For this purpose there is a hope which will not make us ashamed in the evangelist. He is a scriptural officer (Acts xxi. 8; Eph. iv. 11), and his work is scriptural (2 Tim. iv. 5). It is well, therefore, that the mind of the Church is turning so fully in this direction. But who is the evangelist? What is his work? Our Form of Government says (Chap. IV., Sec. II., Par. VI.): "When a minister is appointed to the work of an evangelist, he is commissioned to preach the word and administer the sacraments in foreign countries, frontier settlements, or the destitute parts of the Church; and to him may be intrusted power to organise churches and ordain ruling elders and deacons therein."

Webster says: "2. A preacher or publisher of the gospel of Jesus Christ, licensed to preach, but not having charge of a particular church." Our doctrine, as expressed above, is more nearly right; but our *practice* is, generally, more in accordance with Webster's definition. We practically regard the evangelist, not so much as a worker in *really destitute fields*, as a worker among the feeble and destitute *churches*. Now, it is true that we do need such a worker as the latter. Great results would be gained if we could so arrange as to have a few men, with the proper gifts for the work, licensed to preach but having charge of no particular church, who can go freely among the churches and hold special protracted services. Very great good and larger progress would undoubtedly result from such work rightly conducted. The fact should be recognised and utilised, that some are gifted of God for reaping the harvests which others have sowed. The holding of protracted services is beneficial. Experience says so. The Church needs them. When we ask, Why do other denominations grow and spread through the land more rapidly than our own?—the answer is found just here. The wisdom of protracted services is that the church is revived, and souls are converted to God by, as it were, *compelling* men to listen to and think upon the great gospel matters day after day without the undoing influences of the world working to dissipate religious thought, as when the services are held only Sabbath after Sabbath, leaving a week between each. "My people doth not consider," said God. But

the protracted service *compels* them to think, by holding them down to the subject through a series of days. The people also must and will love the Church which thus works to win them. Our policy has been too much confined to the simple work of sowing and cultivating the seed (and none sow purer or better seed), and too little attention is given to the *gathering work*. We sow faithfully, and then allow others to enter into our labors by gathering the harvests, while we keep on sowing. In agriculture the harvesting is a *special work*, and a time of activity, full of enthusiasm and joy. Does not God preach sermons in nature? Would not our Church do well to hear what others hear, and thus share in the profits?

God's money, held in trust by his people, would be well spent if some of it were consecrated to this end. Let it not be thought that here is a wandering from our subject. For the object in this seeming digression is to call attention to the fact that the evangelist is supposed, often, to be the man for such work; and to protest against this idea. This worker, of whom mention has thus been made, would be a helper of pastors and visitor to destitute churches. He would work with pastors as needful, and especially among organised, but destitute, churches. *This is not the sphere for the evangelist.* True, our Book sends him to "destitute parts of the Church." But would it not be better to say, "destitute districts or *sections* of our land," thereby meaning the places where we have not, but should have, organised churches? This would exactly indicate the true and proper field for evangelistic labor, and express the character of the work. Perhaps there would be no objection, but rather advantage, should he assist pastors and help destitute churches, when he could find time from his special occupation. This, however, would rarely occur, for the fields are wide, and white for the harvest, where there are no reapers. But to confine himself to that helping work, or even give it any large part of his attention, would be to miss and leave undone his own peculiar work. His mission should be where we have no pastors and no organised churches; but some of our scattered sheep, and many others who need to be gathered into the fold. There let him call people to hear the gospel, organise churches,

and do pastoral and ministerial work, until the things thus built can stand and be regularly possessed by the Church. This is to "do the work of an evangelist." In one sense, every preacher of the gospel is an evangelist. But the worker contemplated in our Book and here, should go to points not reached by the ordinary ministry and work of the Church. Were this recognised as the true doctrine as to the evangelist, there would be a new state of things, and a better history for our Church, as a part of the great army of Jesus the King. But if we regard the evangelist as a mere visitor to the churches already organised, or as chiefly this, we shall have only a second or third-rate place in the work of reclaiming the wilderness.

From what has now been said, it is evident that the doctrine advocated contemplates the evangelist as a *missionary*. If we send him to foreign fields, we say his work is *there*, and not among our organised churches. Should he forsake that sphere, it would be a breach of duty. Is it less so when the missionary to the home fields confines his labors chiefly to the places where churches are already organised? The Presbytery should send him out to open and prepare the way for regular church work. When he has gained and established a good footing in any neighborhood, planted churches, etc., it is not his duty to settle there, unless he means to abandon evangelistic work. Let him push on, therefore, after committing the results of his work to the care of his Presbytery. Can it be right to fill even a scriptural office, and then fetter the incumbent so that he cannot perform his duties? This is done by regarding the evangelist as, let us say, a sort of *extra* minister to churches already established. In order that he may be *literally* a "home missionary," if employed within our own land, it is absolutely necessary that we provide for holding and cultivating the fields which he clears and plants with churches. Surely there is a felt need, great and urgent, calling for evangelistic work. Our response should be,

- (1) To appoint men to this work.
- (2) To assure to them freedom of time and effort in discharging their mission.
- (3) To hold faithfully and fully the points which they gain for us.

The matter is growing serious. Destitute fields are crying loudly to us from all directions. There is no time for trifling or "red-tape."

And now, in order to a full discussion of our subject, certain matters must be touched of very grave importance. In venturing the remarks which follow, it is not with more than a very faint hope that they will be entirely acceptable to the Church. But while speaking earnest opinions without fear, nothing more is asked than a sincere examination of what may be said, followed by action which, putting self aside, may be for the greatest good to souls, and most conducive to God's glory in the advance of his kingdom. Questions must arise as we seek to prosecute our work; and these questions must be met.

(1) How can we properly care for our destitute churches, if the evangelist may not dwell among them?

Let the Presbytery, observing the needy points, direct its settled pastors to take from their own charges some time for such churches. In many cases a whole or a part of a Sabbath monthly, can be devoted thus. By this plan there are few, if any, of our destitute churches which will not be reached and cared for. Just here, a suggestion: ought not the *churches* which have pastors to consider the wants of their less privileged brethren, and send them assistance, though at the price of self-denial? It would be a grand thing should these, without waiting the action of Presbytery calling for the temporary use of their pastors, proceed, out of their own thoughtfulness, to contribute a part of their time to the relief of the needy—sending their pastors to them now and then. Is there one of our churches which does this? How many have ever thought of it? Aside from the hope of praise, *is not this duty?*

It is not essential to the life of any church that it shall have a sermon or sermons *every* Sabbath. Else had many of our country churches perished long since. But it is selfishness to demand all of a minister's time at one point, because (and is there other reason?) the people there are able to pay him a living salary. Here is a matter to be well weighed; for not the minister alone, but the churches also, are to see that the gospel is preached to every creature.

Further, an organised church, though it have no pastor, is in a position of great advantage, as compared with people who are churchless, scattered, and having no bonds drawing them together. There is somewhat here that should not be cast away without serious thought. The organised church *has a ministry* which God has provided for its necessities, and which we recognise, but do not use. There may not be an "ordained minister," as we usually understand that term. But there *is the eldership*. With this power in hand, it is robbery to take the evangelist for organised churches. We have much *unused material*—dead power. Can it not be utilised? No disparagement of others is intended in the assertion that, in most cases, our eldership is able to give as good service as the majority of ministers ordained in other denominations, and accepted by the people. This is no boast, but thanksgiving before God. Now, our need here is, not the evangelist, but a recognition of the elders on the part of the people; of the people on the part of the elders; and of our repressed powers on the part of Presbytery. Why not call and appoint our elders for our unsupplied wants? Why not make special appointments where elders shall be more positively required to hold the helm which there is no other hand to take. Has not the Holy Spirit made these elders "overseers of the flock"? Having them, the want of "ordained ministers" should never cause the cessation of services in God's house. Instead of sending the evangelist to "destitute churches," it were better to license an elder, where other arrangements cannot be made. Paul said to Timothy: "The things which thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men who shall be able to teach others also." Is it true that no such men are possible until we have carried them through our course? They are to "be able to teach others"—what? The gospel. And we have unused men in abundance, who can fill this requirement. A house is not built of only one kind of timber. Let us utilise the rough, as well as the "dressed" pieces. But under present circumstances the elder stands aloof. For he and the people both feel that he is not really an authorised teacher. Let this be corrected by the voice of our courts, calling them authoritatively to this work, which we

have none others to do, yet which ought to be done. We have men in and out of our eldership who would "adorn the gospel" by their ministration, as fully, to say the least, as many whom we now recognise as "ordained ministers" in other denominations. Are any of our rules so much cast iron as to be in danger of breaking, by this plan?

We may think of our law in Chap. VI., Sec. VI., Par. IV.; but why not also give thought to Par. VI?

Let the inquiry also be raised, whether this exceptional service need be limited to elders. Some of our congregations embrace intelligent and zealous laymen, who might be found to have the "gift of utterance." Why may not a Session use its pastoral authority to call such a layman, for the nonce, to edify the brethren by religious discourse in the presence of and under the inspection and restraint, as by the authority, of the Session? We do not mean that a Session should assume to license a lay preacher, or that this layman should presume, by virtue of such authority, to speak habitually and of his own appointment; least of all, that he should minister generally, outside of that Session's jurisdiction. But only that where a Session perceives such gift, it may employ it, in its own presence, as its own channel of expression, holding itself responsible for the orthodoxy of the things uttered, and withdrawing its sanction whenever that was uttered which does not edify.

In favor of such resorts may be pleaded: 1. Such was evidently the usage of the synagogue, on whose model our congregational order is framed. Thus, when Jesus spoke in the synagogue of Nazareth, he was invited *as a layman*, supposed to have a gift, and under the sanction of the bench of elders. 2. Such seems to have been the usage of the primitive presbyters in the Church of the apostles. 3. Such public speech of laymen would be free from the main objection to the kind of lay preaching abroad, pursued by Mr. Moody, viz., that no church court having ordained him, he goes to the church abroad without any sufficient guarantee of his soundness or character. For this lay-speaker would not go abroad, but speak only in the presence and by the sanction of that pastoral church court which knows him and can

endorse him. 4. The question of what a call to the ministry is, would be wonderfully simplified to young inquiring Christians; for as young men were thus summoned to make actual trial of their gifts, both they and the people would find out experimentally whether they were "apt to teach."

When we have "extraordinary" demands, then is the time for acting as in "extraordinary cases." The *demands* of law ought not to prevail to the exclusion of its *permissions*. The evangelist is not what we want in these destitute churches, but the use of the material given us of God and recognised in our Constitution.

We talk of thin and thinning ministerial ranks, and with good reason. We fall back upon the evangelist as our remedy for the present distress, while we pray and wait for more laborers. May we hope for help while we refuse to use the material we actually have? Let us look more closely about us, and see if we have not some unapplied power which can be adapted to our wants. If we insist upon the evangelist to fill the breach, we insist that one shall be as many. True, "one shall chase a thousand." But here the chase is too slow, and over too much ground. Before the evangelist catches up with the dispersing flocks, they will find shelter in other folds. His will may be good, but the work far outstrips his best efforts. So our flocks get discouraged and hungry; become and remain scattered—then we lose them! And note this: *habits are governors!* Our people need to be prevented from forming wandering habits. They form habits apart from our "faith and manners." Next, they *forsake* our "faith and manners." Not only so, but we remember what comes from the "bent twig"—a tree grown crooked, or out of line. The children of our people in destitute churches are getting more church-training from other denominations than from our own. Is it any marvel that other denominations get so many of them? See the mixed families—parents Presbyterian, children something else. Now and then, whole families are lost to us. Parents cannot always be faithfully kept, nor keep their "lambs" from flocking with the "sheep" in whose fold they get food and attention most plentifully and regularly. For nature is nature, whether in people or

sheep. We cannot dethrone it. We may control and guide it. We may say, Elders ought to hold religious services. A chapter read; a sermon read; a hymn sung; a prayer offered. Yes, but nature is nature. It is not the nature of people to give contented attendance upon "lay services" in one place, when in another place, near by, they may attend services conducted by an authorised minister of the gospel. Will any "pooh, pooh!" at this as folly? So be it; but the people go elsewhere, all the same. Our policy should be to meet their wants and reasonable desires—yea, and the *unreasonable* desires, if we cannot better them. This, rather than lose ground. We cannot bring people (unreasonable beings that they are, having so much human nature) to accept with satisfaction any substitute for the authorised preaching of the word. Point to former days we may, when laymen gathered to worship God. But ere long one of those laymen grows out from and stands above the others as the "preacher."

We cannot, as the hard fact stands, find enough men, in the ordinary way, for our work. Shall our flocks go unfed, wander elsewhere, and be lost to us? What is wisdom? If we cannot do as we would, let us do as we best can. This will be well-pleasing to God always. If we have prejudices, it is time that they were crucified for the sake of dying churches and perishing souls. As extraordinary provision, we can give to our people as good as others give them (to say no more), who are not of our "household of faith." And what if, after a while, some destitute church "falls in love" with its *improvised* minister, then demands him to be given to them as pastor and preacher in full orders? Let it be done. It will be of the Lord. When a man, under watch of Presbytery, has proved faithful and apt to teach, let him be accepted. Better deed will not be done by all our wisdom.

The physician may not always shun "heroic practice." In a desperate case, inaction or refusal to act out of the usual way, from fear of doing harm, may prevent the doing of saving good. As the matter now is, many of our destitute churches are cold and dead in waiting for the evangelist or some one else. Waiting and dying, instead of stirring up the gifts in themselves! If a "spark" is laid upon God's altar, will he not make up a fire

from it? If we have only "sparks" here and there, let us use them so far as they will go. The use will be the increase. But if we sit idle and ask for the "flame," God may say, "Why do you not use the spark?" Do we not read that a little fire kindleth a great matter? Here is the way in which the evangelist may be freed for his proper work, and our destitute churches cared for. So, too—

(2) We meet the objection of inability to care for the churches planted by the evangelist. We may not keep them supplied with the "regulation pastor." But may we not do as well as our Methodist and other brethren? Is not our duty to the Master and souls as clear and full as theirs? One may be pardoned for a little impatient feeling at the idea that any others may or can obey the Lord's command better than ourselves, when he says, "Preach the gospel to every creature." And no marvel if, when our system fails under testing at such points, a doubt assails a most loyal heart as to whether this system is right, or is being rightly worked.

If there is anything to be learned in this matter, are we too proud to be pupils? Better, if needs be, adopt the "circuit rider," and send out men who must "study in the saddle," instead of in colleges and seminaries, rather than fail to occupy and hold territory which ought to be won for Jesus. It is true that, if we accept and send the evangelist in the right idea of his mission, we shall not be able to furnish ministers rapidly enough by the present working of our system. So the question must be met: Shall we gain, but abandon our gains? We may not do this *actively*. But *passive* loss is as bad. We may throw results away by simply refusing to occupy ground with any men, because we cannot occupy with the fully trained preachers. The writer of these lines does not and never can believe that such a course is really duty to God and to our Church. But not for one moment let any one suppose that this is a plea for lowering our standard of education. It is a plea for the *permissions* of our law, while holding that its *demands* must also be respected. Act as we may, there will always be applicants seeking admission to our ministry with diplomas in their hands. It has been so in other Churches,

and will be so in ours. None dare say that in other Churches there are no scholars, or not enough to keep the streams of learning clear. The devil never was beaten with worldly wisdom, but it is his weapon. Dare we adopt it as our chief defence? Is there not a better? And may not many who never had "*alma mater*" on earth, be graduates in that wisdom which cometh down from above? Must one always hold a *straight stick* in order to strike a straight blow? If so, is the Holy Spirit or are we to bring every stick to due straightness? Again: What is wisdom? If we see work needed, and cannot put a perfect instrument to its doing, let us quickly and gladly accept and use the best within reach. It is not sound spiritual policy to be too fastidious while hell is yawning for the souls which can be saved by an *earnest*, if it be not a *polished* effort.

HERBERT H. HAWES.

ARTICLE V.

THE FOREIGN EVANGELIST AS VIEWED BY ONE
IN THE FOREIGN FIELD.¹

- I. *Editorial in the Missionary*, May, 1874.
- II. *The Ecclesiastical Status of Foreign Missionaries*. A pamphlet. Anon. Republished in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, April, 1876.
- III. *Report of the Assembly's Special Committee on the Evangelist*. Appendix to the Minutes of the Assembly of 1876.
- IV. *The Evangelist and the Presbytery*, Anon. SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, April, 1877.
- V. *A Manual for the use of Missionaries, etc.* Pamphlet, published by the Executive Committee in April, 1877. Republished in the *Missionary*, January, 1880.

¹This article, to be followed by another in April (discussing the *Home Relations* of the Foreign Evangelist), comes to us from the Rev. John Boyle of our Mission in Brazil. As being in the foreign field, he is, for every reason, entitled to be heard.—EDITORS SO. PRES. REVIEW.

- VI. *The Jurisdiction of the Evangelist.* Rev. J. A. Lefevre, D. D. SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, October, 1879.
- VII. *The Recent Ordination at Hangchow.* Rev. J. B. Adger, D. D. *Idem.*
- VIII. *Report of the Assembly's Special Committee on the Evangelist.* Minutes of the Assembly of 1881, pp. 387-8.

The most casual perusal of the above papers, together with the debates and actions of our Assemblies, will convince any one that the foreign evangelist is a veritable *ignis fatuus*—a real or unreal will-o'-the-wisp—that has been luring our Church a merry chase over bogs and quagmires for the past decade. After ten years of discussion the Assembly appointed a Committee, consisting of seven of the ablest ecclesiastics in our Church, to report upon the subject. This they did in 1881, but confessed that, upon some points, and points of vital importance, they were unable to agree, and end by recommending the Church to pursue the *ignis fatuus* no farther, expressing the hope that he will capture himself.

Upon one point there is a wonderful unanimity of opinion in all these papers and reports: they all concur that the evangelist is a most *extraordinary being*. Doubtless in the field where he has hitherto been studied, nothing new could be said. The brethren who have hitherto written upon the office, functions, and relations of the evangelist, have studied him where they found him, among the marshes and quagmires of human traditions and human schemes, where they see him enveloped in a certain undefinable mist and halo of glory with which he has been invested by modern sentimentalism. Let the Church bring him out upon *terra firma*. Let him be studied upon the solid ground of the word of God and our Constitution.

One would think that to charge the Presbyterian Church of the South with having studied him any where else would be an insult. Yet not only has she not done so, but we shall see that the Baltimore brethren, who have in charge the great work of foreign missions, distinctly and emphatically discard and set aside both the Constitution and the Holy Scriptures in discussing the evangelist.

We propose to give the whole subject of the office, functions, and relations of the evangelist a thorough discussion on constitutional and scriptural grounds.

I.

HIS OFFICE AND FUNCTIONS.

Office.

“The officers of the Church, by whom all its powers are administered, are according to Scripture, Ministers of the word, Ruling Elders, and Deacons.

“This office [that of the minister] is the first in the Church both for dignity and usefulness. The person who fills it has in Scripture different titles *expressive of his various duties*. . . . *As he bears the glad tidings to the ignorant and perishing*, he is termed Evangelist.

“These titles [bishop, pastor, evangelist, etc.] *do not indicate different grades of office, but all describe one and the same office.*”

[BOOK OF CHURCH ORDER.]

The first thing that impresses one upon reading this extract from our Constitution is, that the evangelist, as an officer, differs in no respect from the pastor. They do not fill different offices, nor yet different grades of office, but absolutely “one and the same office.” They are both ministers of the word or teaching elders, and these titles are simply “*expressive of various duties*” pertaining to that office. This is a most important and very significant point. It would seem that the framers of the Constitution foresaw and forestalled a dangerous tendency in the Church, the tendency to create a new officer by exalting one of the many titles of the minister over the others. And our Book is consistent throughout. The form of ordination is in harmony with the above definition, being the same for all ministers, whatever their duties or titles, whether pastors, teachers, bishops, or evangelists. The preparatory studies, examinations, and trials are the same for all. The ordination vows are the same; the first seven questions are put to all alike; in response to the fifth they all declare that they seek the *office* of the holy ministry; in reply to the eighth the one promises to discharge the *duties* of the pastor, while the other undertakes the *work* of an evangelist. We have

in the case of all the same imposition of hands, and the same giving of the right hand of fellowship. The very phraseology of the Book is in harmony with its definition and form of ordination. Never, in a single instance, does it speak of the office of pastor or evangelist, but always, without exception, of the office of the minister, the duties of the pastor, and the work of an evangelist.

Now, when we consider this language of our Constitution and compare it with the definitions and phraseology of all who write upon the subject, including our ablest ecclesiastics, the contrast is so striking that no one will fail to be impressed by it. Dr. Lefevre, the honored Chairman of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, says: "The evangelist may be defined as a temporary officer of the Church, with an extraordinary mission and authority to wield ecclesiastical power in an extraordinary way." In this definition, as well as in the language throughout the entire article, he makes the evangelist, in his character of evangelist, an officer of the Church. Not only so, he pointedly distinguishes him as an officer from the pastor. "This is the *differentiating* character of his *office*." The difference, as it seems to us, between our Constitution and Dr. Lefevre is this: the Book sets forth the evangelist of Scripture, while Dr. Lefevre gives shape to popular ideas on the subject. He makes a very damaging admission when he says: "At the outset it must be premised that the whole question can find the materials of its solution only in the general principles that underlie and inform Presbyterianism." But we dare not have in the Church an officer that was not *unmistakably* given her by the Saviour and his apostles, and his powers and duties must be clearly indicated in the word of God. Can we afford to create Church officers and clothe them with powers upon "general principles"? The framers of our Book set forth the evangelist "according to Scripture." Dr. Lefevre sets forth the same officer developed from "the general principles of Presbyterianism," and with what different results we have seen, and shall see again further on. He confesses that he has no countenance in the Constitution, when he says, "The Form of Government in its distribution of ecclesiastical power and in the constitution of its courts, barely recognised

(Chap. IV., Sec. II., Par. 7) the evangelistic office, and then leaves it to be administered without the help of constitutional enactments." And again, "The Presbyterian evangelist appears to be the only one that our Book contemplates in its incidental note of the office." In this he agrees with Dr. J. L. Wilson, who says, in the Paper entitled *Ecclesiastical Status of Foreign Missionaries*, "Our Form of Church Government was drawn up at a period when the cause of Foreign Missions was little understood and appreciated, and hence its principles can be applied only by inference to many of the details of this work." It is a bad omen when the leaders of the great work of foreign missions speak thus of our Constitution. How comes it that the fathers did not understand the cause of foreign missions? Had they not studied the Acts and Epistles of the Apostles? And what about our New Book? It is surely modern enough. It sets forth the foreign evangelist as well as the "Presbyterial;" for it sends him into "foreign countries." Why, then, is it so brief and simple? Why does it not recognise the evangelist as an officer? The reason is self-evident: our Constitution is, as it declares, "according to Scripture." We recommend to the Church the following eloquent passage bearing upon this point:

"It is in vain to urge that our fathers never contemplated the extended scale of benevolent operations which God in his providence has enabled us to carry forward. They were men deeply imbued with the Spirit of all grace. They understood well, for they had faithfully studied the appropriate functions of the Church; they looked narrowly and closely into the nature, arrangements, and powers of the system of ecclesiastical action which Christ and his apostles had established; they felt it to be adequate to all the exigencies of any age and any part of the world; and in the fear of God they endeavored to construct all things according to the pattern shown them in the mount. We, however, in the fulness of our wisdom and the enlargement of our views, have constructed a different system; and the question is now forced upon all sound and conscientious Presbyterians, whether they will abide by their ancient and venerable and scriptural standards, or swear allegiance to the new order of things which has imperceptibly grown up and silently stolen upon us."—THORNWELL, Vol. IV., pp. 155, 156.

A new officer, and, as we shall see, new courts, have silently and imperceptibly crept into the practical operations of our

Church, and the startling question has been forced upon us, Shall we add a new chapter to our Form of Government, to legalise these innovations? It is true, the Committee of Seven reported to the Assembly of 1881 that a new chapter was not necessary; but who will guarantee that a future Committee will be so wise? The question is not settled, and the Committee acknowledge that it is not; they confess that they were unable to agree upon the very points that caused their appointment, and which the Standing Committee of the Assembly of 1879 said was "causing a great deal of trouble to our missionaries." If they have caused trouble in the past, they will, for the same reasons, continue to cause trouble until settled. We believe it will be found impossible to settle these troublesome questions until we take our eyes off the superstructure which the Church has reared, and examine the foundations. Let us "to the law." We have seen that the evangelist, as he is popularly regarded and written about, does not exist in our Constitution; and the chairman of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions has the frankness to admit it. Let us, then, examine the Scriptures, and see if our Book is defective on so important a subject.

(1) In the first place, the Book declares that evangelist does not indicate an office, nor yet a grade of office, but is merely a title indicative of a work, or one of the many duties of the minister. Now, when we turn to the Scriptures, where is the evidence of a special class of officers called evangelists?

Calvin takes the view that all the travelling companions and fellow-laborers of the apostles formed a special class, and that to them should be applied the title evangelist. This seems to be the generally received theory in the Church. Dr. Schaff says that Philip, Timothy, Titus, Silas, John, Mark, Epaphras, Epaphroditas, Tychicus (perhaps), Trophimus, Demas, Apollos, and other co-laborers of the apostles, were evangelists; and adds in a foot note: "Rothe not improperly styles them *apostolical delegates*. We prefer, however, the title evangelists, as it is used by Paul himself." The last clause contains a most extraordinary statement, for no where does Paul apply the title to any one of the above named men, or to any other man. In all of his writings,

the word drops from his pen twice only, and in those two places he does not apply it to any individual. In 2 Tim. iv. 5, it is used in the genitive case as an adjective to qualify "work." "The work of an evangelist" simply means "evangelistic work." In Ephesians, the word is applied to no one, but is used in a general way. Dr. Schaff cites an array of texts referring to those men; but, with the exception of Philip, not one has any bearing upon the subject of the evangelist. They only show that Paul had a good many friends whom he chose, at various times, to travel with him and help him in his evangelistic tours; just as foreign missionaries travel with native helpers. Paul has left us a number of epistles in which he is constantly speaking of his companions, and applying titles to them. Now, if they were evangelists, how comes it that they are never so called by him? He spoke of them as "the beloved physician," "my fellow-laborers," "my fellow-prisoner," etc. Why does he never say, "the evangelist," or "my evangelist"? The truth is, that of Paul's companions and helpers, some held one office in the church, some another, and some even were not church officers at all. Silas was a prophet (Acts xv. 32); Timothy, Titus, and Epaphras were ministers of the word, or teaching elders (1 Tim. iv. 6, 14; 2 Tim. iv. 5; Titus ii. 1, 8, 15; Col. i. 7, and iv. 12); of all the others, we have no hint that any of them exercised any ecclesiastical power whatever; there is no indication that any of them ever preached or ordained or organized. Luke is popularly styled evangelist, which comes not from Scripture, but, no doubt, from the Patristic custom of applying the title to those who had written an *evangel* or Gospel. All the active service that Luke rendered in the spread of the gospel, and all that John, Mark, Epaphroditus, Clement, Tychicus, Trophimus, and Demas did, was simply to wait upon Paul as his friends, and act as his messengers. If this made them evangelists, then Zenas the lawyer should be included in this class of extraordinary "vicegerents of the apostles;" and we see no reason for excluding Priscilla and "those women that labored with" him. The only man who is called evangelist in Scripture is Philip; and Philip did not wait upon the apostles; he appears not to

have been directed by them, although he was inferior to them. He was sent by the angel of the Lord; he was moved by the Holy Ghost; he wrought miracles and travelled alone, evangelising many cities. A very different character, indeed, from those who surrounded Paul! We believe that Philip was called evangelist because of a work that he had done, and not because, as a church officer, he was an evangelist. We shall see that he did more than the work of an evangelist—that his powers and functions were more extended. It would be illogical and unreasonable to call him, as an officer, by a name which indicated only a part of his functions. He is evidently called evangelist in Acts xxi. 8, because, until then, he had been principally engaged in evangelistic work. Paul, as we have seen, never calls any of his helpers and co-laborers evangelists; nor does he ever hint that they were doing evangelistic work while waiting upon him. Of all his company, the only one whom we have scriptural authority for calling an evangelist is *the Apostle Paul himself*. Of himself he says, most emphatically: “For though I *evangelise*, I have nothing to glory of; for necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me if I *evangelise* not” (1 Cor. ix. 16). Our Saviour also did the work of an evangelist. “He hath anointed me to *evangelise* the poor” (Luke iv. 18). Isaiah was a prophet, but *evangelised* (Rom. x. 15, 16). The twelve apostles “went through all the towns, *evangelising*” (Luke ix. 6).

We see, then, that our Book is strictly scriptural when it teaches that there was no special class called evangelists, but that the title is descriptive of a work performed by all who ministered in the word, irrespective of their office. Ephesians iv. 11, is thought by many, however, to be conclusive proof that evangelists form a special class of church officers. When we attentively examine the entire passage, however, and examine it in connexion with the parallel passages in Rom. xii. 4–8, and 1 Cor. xii. 4–11, 28–30, it appears plain enough that what is uppermost in the mind of the writer are the gifts and graces shed down by the ascending Saviour upon all those who would be called to minister in the word and doctrine. He has his mind fixed upon those who should be called to preach, and contemplates these titles, not as so

many distinct offices, but as some of the various phases of "the work of the *ministry*" (v. 12). For this reason, he does not refer to presbyters and deacons. Christ gives one gift to one minister, and to another a different gift; or he may bestow more than one gift upon the same man. Paul was an apostle, but he also evangelised and taught. So a man may be a pastor and teacher, or an evangelist and teacher, or even a pastor and evangelist; in fact, all foreign missionaries who do the work of an evangelist, are compelled, necessarily, also to do the work of pastors, though they should not be formally installed pastors of one particular church. The passage, therefore, does not establish officers, but refers simply to men as they are engaged in the various duties and functions pertaining to the "ministry." This entire absence of any notice of a distinct class of officers in the Scriptures bearing this title, and the fact that all who preached evangelised, whether apostles, prophets, or ordinary ministers, establishes the scripturalness of our Book upon this point.

(2.) But the all-absorbing question is, What is the work that is particularly termed "the work of an evangelist"? Here, again, we believe the Book is scriptural when it says: "As he [the minister] *bears the glad tidings of salvation to the ignorant and perishing*, he is termed evangelist."

There is no place in Scripture where the work is defined. The title is used in three places only (Acts xxi. 8; Eph. iv. 11; and 2 Tim. iv. 5); and in neither of these verses do we get any clue to the character of the work. We are left, therefore, to determine the question from the etymological meaning of the title, and the use of its cognates.

We have in Scripture the three cognates, *evangelion*, *evangelisthai*, *evangelisthes*. The first is derived from *εὖ*, good, and *ἄγγελος*, messenger. It means, therefore, a good message or glad tidings. The second means to announce a good message; and the third, one who announces a good message or glad tidings. Such is the etymological meaning of the word. And this is the idea that always prevails in the use of the cognates. It is, perhaps, true that the cognate noun *evangelion* is sometimes used in a wider sense, to embrace the whole body of doctrine preached

by Paul; but the idea, nevertheless, is always of something *preached*. In regard to the verb, however, we are not aware that there is an instance of its being used in any other sense than that of preaching good news. "How beautiful are the feet of those *evangelising* peace, of those *evangelising* good things" (Rom. x. 15); "The poor are *evangelised*" (Matt. xi. 5); "Anointed to *evangelise* the poor" (Luke iv. 18); "Go ye into all the world and preach the *evangel*" (Mark xvi. 15). There is not the least hint anywhere that the *power of jurisdiction* was exercised in the work of an evangelist.

It does not even appear that the administration of the sacraments pertained to this work; on the contrary, Paul distinctly excludes the administration of baptism when he says that Christ sent him *not to baptize*, but *to evangelise* (1 Cor. i. 17). Now, baptism being thus expressly excluded, much more is the organisation of churches, the ordination of officers, the administration of government, and the like, all of which follow baptism.

If we examine 2 Tim. iv. 2-5, it will be found that while the fifth verse gives no clue to what is "the work of an evangelist," the context shows that it is to preach the word. In verses three and four, the apostle predicts a time when people should have itching ears and heap to themselves teachers who would scratch and tickle their ears with nonsensical "fables," and turn away from the truth and sound doctrine. To this tendency Timothy was exhorted to oppose, not the power of jurisdiction, nor yet service to the persons of the apostles, but the work of an evangelist; that is, to "*preach the word*; be instant in season and out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long suffering and *doctrine*" (verse 2). Timothy and Titus are always cited as evangelists, and, we think, very properly; but it is strangely argued that, as they exercised the power of jurisdiction, therefore *that* is the proper and even distinguishing work of an evangelist. To take this position, as Dr. Lefevre does, is, it seems to us, a mere assumption, not only gratuitous, but directly contrary to the plain teaching of the very passage which proves them evangelists; and in the teeth of the meaning of the title and the use of its cognates. We might with just as much propriety say that

because Philip wrought miracles, therefore that is the distinctive work of an evangelist. We see also, that while these two young men were in the company of Paul, travelling with him, and waiting upon him, they were not doing the work of evangelists, for there is no instance of their *evangelising* or preaching while in his company. The history of Philip confirms our view of the work of an evangelist. Let us inquire what was the "work" that he did which caused him to be called evangelist. In Acts viii. 1, we are told that, because of a persecution, all the disciples in Jerusalem, except the apostles, were scattered and "went every where, *evangelising* the word." Among these was Philip, who went down to the city of Samaria and "*preached Christ* unto them. And the people with one accord gave heed unto those things which Philip spake, hearing and seeing the miracles which he did" (chap. viii. verses 5, 6). When the apostles who had remained in Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and John, who, when they were come down, prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost. The apostles then "returned to Jerusalem, *evangelising* many villages of the Samaritans." From this passage, it appears that the apostles evangelised just like Philip; but as apostles they perfected and completed the work of their uninspired brother, though they do not seem to have directed him personally. Philip was then directed by the angel of the Lord to go towards the south of Jerusalem, where he met the eunuch and "*evangelised* Jesus to him." He was afterwards caught away by the Holy Ghost, and was found at Azotus; "and passing through, he *evangelised* all the cities till he came to Cesarea," the place of his residence; just as Peter and John had done on their return to Jerusalem. Now, when he is afterwards called *evangelist*, it is evidently because he had *evangelised*; and we see that the "work" that he did was solely to preach the gospel. There is not a solitary act of his recorded that involved the exercise of any power of jurisdiction. He organised no church, he ordained no officer, he disciplined no one, he administered no government. And yet the popular opinion is that the distinguishing characteristic of the evangelist lies in his exercise of the power of juris-

diction! It is true that Philip baptized, but that is not an act of jurisdiction, but of order; moreover, as we have seen, baptism is not an evangelistic work, Paul most emphatically excluding it from the work of an evangelist.

The fact that Philip baptized, therefore, shows that he was more than a mere evangelist. He was a full minister of the word, and had the power not only to evangelise, but to administer the sacraments. The fact that he had previously been ordained a deacon, by no means prevented his being afterwards made a minister. True, we have no evidence that he was ordained a minister; but we have, if possible, still better evidence of his being such; he was sent by the supernatural agency of the angel of the Lord (Acts viii. 26), was moved and directed by the Holy Spirit (verses 29, 39), and the miracles which he wrought (verses 6, 8) confirmed his call. When lay evangelists of our day give such evidence of a call to preach as Philip gave, and confirm their call by working miracles, they may cite his example and dispense with ordination; but it will be a misnomer to call them *lay* evangelists; they will have the best possible evidence of their being ministers.

We find, then, upon a thorough and minute examination of Scripture, that our Book is rigorously exact and faithful to the etymological meaning of the word, to the scriptural use of its cognates, and to the history of the work of the only man who is called an evangelist in the New Testament, where it says: "As he [the minister] bears the glad tidings of salvation to the ignorant and perishing, he is termed evangelist."

The Church should be careful to apply scriptural titles exactly as they are applied in the word of God. It is unfortunate that evangelist should have been so extended as to designate those ministers who are sent into destitute places at home and abroad, considered in their *twofold character* of preachers and organisers; it is unscriptural, and, consequently, unwise and dangerous.

But the reader will ask, What shall we call the man in his twofold character of preacher and organiser? What name shall be given to the officers that we are accustomed to call evangelists? We reply, Call them ministers of Jesus Christ; or, bet-

ter still, perhaps, teaching elders. Timothy and Titus bore this twofold character—they evangelised and they organised—yet we no where find any special name given them in the Scriptures. Now, if the extended missionary operations of the Apostolic Church were carried on, and a pretty full history given of them, and long letters written by those engaged in the work to others who were also extensively engaged in it, and yet we find no special name applied to them, where is the need of our inventing a name, or using one of the scriptural titles in an unscriptural sense?

If writers in that time found no difficulty in expressing themselves without giving them a peculiar title, why need we? As teachers we evangelise, and *as elders we organise and ordain*. In this respect, we are just like pastors at home. As pastors they exercise their power of order, and as elders they sit in courts and exercise their power of jurisdiction; yet in their twofold character they are simply termed ministers or teaching elders. That is just what we are, and that should be our title.

“But are you not engaged in an *extraordinary* work, and are not your methods very *extraordinary*, and are you not therefore an *extraordinary* officer, very different from all other teaching elders?” Well, we used to think so; but since we have studied our work and methods in our every-day experience on the field, we fail to see anything very *extraordinary* about it, except all those extra-constitutional and unscriptural characteristics that have been fastened upon us by unwise legislation.

The truth is, our present system of conducting missions has inculcated, and continues to foster in the minds of the people, false and romantic notions of “foreign missionaries” and their work. This system practically exalts us above and differentiates us from our brethren at home. We are not to be directed and controlled by our Presbyteries, but we belong exclusively to the General Assembly, and are controlled entirely by the Mission and the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions. This, of course, makes us practically very extraordinary, very different from our brethren at home.

But let us examine the popular notions of “foreign missionaries,” and their work and methods in foreign fields, and see if these ideas are not the “baseless fabrics of a vision.”

The following extract from Dr. Lefevre's article expresses fully his own view, and no doubt represents, more or less, the generally received opinion on the subject :

"3. The mission of the evangelist is *extraordinary*; the chief end of his governmental power is to bring into being the regularly organised church *where* it does not now exist, and *cannot* go in its ordinary courts. The Church has her regular methods of increase and multiplication for all places where she *can* go in her complete and proper form; but her commission (Matt. xxviii. 18-20) requires her to multiply and increase also where she cannot go in her full organism; and this is the work that distinctively belongs to the evangelist. It may be said that he is appointed to a *quasi-creative* work, rather than the administration of an established order. This is the differentiating characteristic of the office, marking it out as at once temporary and extraordinary. Hence (4) ecclesiastical power must reside in the evangelist in an extraordinary mode until the appropriate body is prepared for its permanent habitation."

Now, we do most seriously object to this presentation of the matter. It not only inculcates error, but there is a want of explicitness about the whole passage that is calculated to mystify and confuse.

1. In the *first* place, it misconceives entirely the distinctive work of the evangelist. We are told that "the work that distinctively pertains to" him, and which is his "differentiating characteristic," is to "bring into being the regularly organised church." But we have seen that what distinctively pertains to him according to Scripture and our Book, is to preach the gospel; and that, as an officer, he is not differentiated from his brethren at all. Dr. Lefevre says the chief end of his governmental power is to create, and this makes him an evangelist. But etymology and Scripture usage do not give him, as an evangelist, any governmental power at all. The men whom the Church sends forth to do evangelistic work, have this power, but not in virtue of their being evangelists. The governmental power in the Church belongs to and is exercised exclusively and *only by elders*. There is not the least evidence in Scripture that Timothy and Titus exercised their governmental power in any other character than as elders; there is evidence, as we have clearly established, that they did *not* do so as evangelists. The men who evangelise in foreign fields, must have the power to organise also, since the result of their preach-

ing the glad tidings will surely be the conversion of souls, and these souls must be organised into churches. The exercise of the governmental power is consequent upon the faithful discharge of the duties of evangelist. Our Book says, that "when a minister is appointed to the work of an evangelist, . . . to him [the minister or teaching elder] may be intrusted the power to organise churches and ordain ruling elders and deacons therein." The court may or may not intrust him with governmental power; if it does not, he is none the less an evangelist; if it does, he must exercise this extra power *as an elder*, and he then bears the two-fold character of bearer of glad tidings or evangelist, and of an elder.

2. In the *second* place, an unfounded distinction is made between the kind of work done at home and that done abroad. The work done abroad is "a *quasi-creative* work, rather than the administration of an established order." Quasi-creative of course means organisation and ordination. But is not the Church at home constantly creating? She will not long survive the day she ceases to do so. But we are told that abroad the Church is brought into existence *where* it never existed, while at home it already exists, and therefore cannot be created. The distinction is based upon a mere conventionality. Our Church, it is true, has her boundaries, but they are merely nominal and conventional; they exist for the sake of convenience, to prevent conflict of jurisdiction. Now, within those conventional boundaries there may be a vast amount of territory where the Church does not really exist. The Church is not "created" by throwing imaginary lines around a territory. The boundaries of the Sao Paulo Presbytery are coextensive with those of Brazil. Will any one say that the Church exists in the whole of this empire? The organisation of any new church, either at home or abroad, is the "creation" of the Church where it never existed before. The Church is created in any place by the conversion of souls and their organisation into a corporate body. Now, is it wise, is it justifiable, to elevate a scriptural title to the category of an extraordinary officer, clothed with extraordinary powers, and all founded upon a mere conventionality?

There is an error also in the statement that the work abroad is "quasi-creative rather than the administration of an established order." It is true that there are no Classical Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies to administer; but the work, so far as it goes, is both creative and administrative, as the experience of all who are engaged in the work abroad proves. And the administration abroad is the same both in kind and amount as that at home, up to the point that the work is carried—the only difference being that the work abroad is stopped at a certain point, and is, therefore, more limited.

3. But the fundamental error, the fruitful source of the whole difficulty on this subject, lies in the distinction made in the *methods* of doing the work at home and abroad. The Church, we are told, has her "regular methods" at home, but her increase abroad "pertains distinctively to the evangelist. . . . Hence ecclesiastical power must reside in the evangelist in an extraordinary mode," etc. The conclusion by no means follows. There is, as we conceive, a most fatal error in Dr. Lefevre's logic. It seems to us that he takes for granted the very thing he should prove. He fails to show in what respect the mode in which power resides in the evangelist differs from the mode in which it resides in Church officers at home. Inasmuch as just here lies the pith and marrow of the whole question, it behooves us to be explicit. Now, there are only two ways in which power may reside in a Church officer. It may reside in him as an individual, or it may reside in him as one of the members of a body. In the former case he exercises it *severally*, or individually; in the latter *jointly*, or in connexion with the other members of the body. We take it for granted that when Dr. Lefevre says that the ecclesiastical *power* of the evangelist resides in him in an extraordinary mode, he means to say ecclesiastical *jurisdiction*; and when he says that this power resides in the evangelist in an *extraordinary* mode, he, of course, means that in him it is a *several* power; for the ordinary mode is that of our Book, which says, "Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is not a several but a joint power to be exercised by presbyters in courts." This, we are all aware, is the almost universal opinion, and is the natural consequence of exalting the title evan-

gelist to the place of a distinct office. A writer in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, for April, 1877, says that, according to the opinion of the Committee that reported to the Assembly of 1876 on the subject of the evangelist, "he is invested not merely with the 'several power' of the word and sacraments, but carries in his hand what belongs to no minister at home, but only to the courts of the Church: he has the 'power of jurisdiction.' . . . The solitary evangelist precedes the elderships. . . . If he becomes associated with native pastors, he rules thenceforward jointly with other brethren, instead of exercising severally, as heretofore, his proper evangelistic powers." This teaches, contrary to Scripture and the Constitution, that the proper evangelistic power is that of rule. It teaches also that so long as he is at home he rules as an elder; but as soon as he sets foot on foreign shores he has the power of jurisdiction *as a minister* and wields it as an evangelist. This makes him very *extraordinary* indeed; in fact, very near akin to the apostles. This, the same writer consistently admits and maintains, "We call him, and rightly, an *extraordinary officer*; one of three such, the other two being apostles and prophets. But these other two were both inspired, while inspiration does not form any necessary feature in the evangelist's office."

But our Constitution not only gives no support to this theory, but pointedly contradicts it, when it declares that the extraordinary offices "have long since ceased;" and makes the power of jurisdiction *joint* and places it in the hands only of *presbyters*. No one can exercise this power on his individual responsibility. But we see the "solitary evangelist" in a far distant country wielding it alone. What are we to conclude? That he is exercising it severally? When he organises, ordains, and administers alone, is he therefore a prelatie bishop? By no means.

"'Tis distance lends enchantment to the view,
And robes the evangelist in scarlet hue."

The writer was chasing his will-o'-the-wisp over the marshes. Our Book is very plain on this point, and is consistent throughout. "When a minister is appointed to the work of the evangelist, . . . to him *may be intrusted* power to organise churches, and ordain ruling elders and deacons therein." From this it is

clear that he wields his power of jurisdiction *as the delegate of the Presbytery*. The Book does not say that he has the power as a several power in virtue of his being an evangelist, and may be trusted to wield it; but the power is joint and to be wielded by presbyters in courts. The power belongs to the court, and she may intrust her power to him as her delegate. Every act of jurisdiction that he performs is an act of the Presbytery that appointed him to do that work. He acts in the name and by the authority of the body that *intrusted* its power to him. On this point, again, the Book is scriptural. "For this cause *I left thee in Crete*, that thou shouldst set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, *as I had appointed thee*." (Titus i. 5.) But the court can appoint no one to do this work except an elder, one who is a participant of the power, and called by the Lord to rule in his Church. We do not rule as an evangelist, nor as a minister of the word, but as an elder. But it is a joint power; we must merge it with the power of our brethren in a court. Every exercise of the power of jurisdiction is, therefore, the exercise of the combined power of all the members of the court. This combined or joint power "may be intrusted" to any member of the court. When, therefore, we wield the power of jurisdiction, we do so because we are an elder; and when we do so, solitary and alone, we wield the combined power of our Presbytery, which was intrusted to us. We first evangelise, exercising our *several* power of order; we then turn back upon our evangelist track and, in our capacity of elder commissioned by our Presbytery, we organise and rule. It is, then, true that the solitary evangelist precedes the elderships, but not in the sense in which the expression is used by the above writer. This, then, is the mode in which ecclesiastical jurisdiction resides in us. This is the method by which the work is accomplished in foreign lands.

Now, in what respect does this method differ from the "regular methods"? Dr. Lefevre tells us that the regular methods at home are her "ordinary courts;" her "complete and proper form" and her "full organism." With great deference to the honored Chairman, we think he is not sufficiently explicit. The ordinary courts of the Church are by no means synonymous with

her complete and proper form and her full organism; they are only a part of her full organism. Now, we have not the full organism abroad because we have not *the full work*. As the difference in work is only a difference in degree, so the difference in method is not in kind but in degree. The method for doing the work abroad is the same as the method *for doing the same work* at home. Nor do we refer to the home evangelist, so called; that would be begging the question. Within the bounds of those Presbyteries where there are no evangelists, the methods are the same as in foreign fields. Courts do their work either *immediately* in their sessions, or *mediately* by means of committees. All those acts that cannot be conveniently done by the whole body in session are, and always have been, done by committees delegated or appointed to do them. Any act so performed is just as regular, legal, and ordinary, as if done by the whole body in session. This is just the method employed abroad: the joint power of the Presbytery is exercised in foreign or destitute fields *mediately* through her commissioner.

Now, when we examine the work always done at home through committees, we find that it corresponds almost entirely with the work done in heathen lands. Presbyteries must see to it that vacant churches and destitute points enjoy the administrations of the word and sacraments. The regular and ordinary method is to appoint members of the body to visit such places in rotation. But if it appoints just one member to visit them all, is the method thereby changed? Will the doing it all make the man any more extraordinary a personage than if he alternated with his brethren? Presbytery organises churches by means of a committee of two or three. But if it only appoints one, is his office thereby changed? Is his power different? Does it reside in him in a different mode from what it would if one or two brethren were with him? If it appoints two to do it, we are to believe that it is the court doing it by means of its commissioners; this, according to Dr. Lefevre, is according to the ordinary and regular operation of Church power. But if it appoints only one, lo and behold, it is no longer done by the court through a commissioner, but the one man is doing it by an extraordinary several power that resides in him in

an extraordinary mode. We do not understand this hocus-pocus *modus operandi* of metamorphosing an ordinary commissioner into an *extraordinary officer*, and of changing a delegated joint power into a several. We fail entirely to see anything more unusual and irregular and extraordinary about the method, and the mode in which the power resides in the man, in the case of one commissioner than in the case two or three.

We confess that we have no sympathy whatever with this ecclesiastical Darwinianism in our Presbyterian Church that has developed the simplicity of the evangelist of Scripture and the Constitution into its "fullest and highest modern form" (as Dr. J. L. Wilson expresses it), so near akin to the apostles and prophets. The idea has taken possession of the Church that, because the man is far off and alone, there must be something extraordinary about him; that he must be in some way or other different from and superior to his brethren. Hence this unsatisfactory search after an *office*. It is a chase after an *ignis fatuus*. His ecclesiastical relations are, unfortunately, practically different, and to have a theory in harmony with our practice we must make him a different officer; and hence,

"Every form that *fancy* can repair,
From dark oblivion glows *divinely* there."

This jack-o'-the-lantern may yet lead the Church, as a whole, into bogs and quagmires, from which it may be difficult to extricate herself, if it has not already done so. We have studied the evangelist of Scripture, and compared him with the evangelist of our Constitution, and find that they are the same. We have studied the modern evangelist in his every-day life and work, and find that when stripped of the false halo of glory—the undefined and undefinable mysterious extraordinary character—with which modern thought and modern schemes have invested him, he corresponds exactly with the evangelist of the word and Book. He is simply a plain, matter-of-fact, ordinary teaching elder, commissioned by his Presbytery to go into foreign countries and destitute districts to evangelise, or preach the gospel to the ignorant and perishing; and to him, *as an elder*, is intrusted the power to organise churches and ordain officers over them.

FUNCTIONS.

But let us inquire more particularly as to the extent of his duties. What are the functions that are delegated to him? If the foregoing views be correct, this becomes a comparatively easy question to determine.

In the *first* place, he is a teaching elder, and as such possesses the power of order. This is a several power, and he may therefore exercise it to its fullest extent. He possesses, and may exercise, all the functions of a minister of the word. This, as we have seen, is the distinctive work that distinguishes him as an *evangelist*.

But, in the *second* place, the faithful discharge of his proper evangelistic functions will surely result in the conversion of souls, and these believers must be organised into churches. The Presbytery intrusts this power also to her commissioner; but the question arises, How far is he to carry this work of organisation? Dr. Lefevre maintains that he has all the functions of the Presbytery, and that of the Synod in one respect. Dr. J. L. Wilson says he carries with him, and exercises, all the functions of the Presbytery.

Now, by what *norma* are we to determine the question? Dr. Lefevre replies, "The work to be done is the measure of his power;" and this seems to be the *norma* by which all decide the point. It is true the work *was* the measure by which the Lord Jesus and the inspired apostles determined the extent of the power of the necessary church officers, for they knew infallibly the extent of the work. But if the uninspired, fallible Church is, in this late age, to sit in judgment upon the amount of work, and then exalt one of the scriptural titles of the minister to the category of an extraordinary office, and clothe this officer with powers sufficient to do the work that we *may think* should be done, where will it land us? We shall see to what an extremity it has led so wise an ecclesiastic as Dr. Lefevre (not to say the whole Church), to the creation of what Dr. Adger justly terms "a mere hybrid court—the mongrel offspring of Congregationalism and Prelacy." No; for those who hold that the evangelist, as such, is an officer, and an extraordinary officer, and that he holds the power of jurisdiction as a *several* power, the above *norma* will not do. An un-

wise zeal has already developed him into his "fullest and highest modern form," in which we find him practically. A little more zeal on the part of the honored Chairman leads him to theoretically develop his evangelist into a form still fuller and higher, and to recommend that this development be legalised. "It would, perhaps, be more decent and orderly that *some one* be formally appointed to the exercise of the power of final judgment to decide only such questions as are lost by a tie vote in the convention of the general evangelists of a particular mission." Still a little more unwise zeal for "decency and order" will lead to extending this "power" to *all* questions; and not only to deciding questions, but to the oversight of all the work done by all the "evangelists," so-called, in a country or province. In fact, the Northern Presbyterian Church lately appointed a man to have the oversight of all the missionary work in Mexico. It was, no doubt, thought by those in authority that this was a necessary work, and they clothed the man with the necessary power to do it. Now, suppose that during the next few generations this zeal for decency and order should be developed into an unscrupulous ambition, and who will guarantee that at the end of two more centuries "the fullest and highest modern form" of the evangelist will not be of a character to satisfy the pretensions of even the Pope himself?

We believe the Constitution is reasonable and scriptural when it puts all rule in the hands of presbyters and declares it joint, and to be administered in courts. We believe it is also scriptural when it gives the courts the liberty to exercise their power, when more convenient, by means of commissioners or delegates. "I left thee in Crete . . . to ordain elders in every city, *as I had appointed thee.*" Here, then, upon our constitutional and scriptural theory, we have a wholesome limit to the powers of jurisdiction delegated to the minister who is sent out to evangelise. All will, no doubt, agree that no court can delegate powers which it not only does not possess, but which are peculiar to another court. Now, according to our Constitution, the Presbytery commissions the minister to evangelise, and delegates to him his power of jurisdiction; his functions, therefore, cannot exceed those of the Presbytery. We cannot, therefore, agree with Dr. Lefevre that he

can exercise the function of Synod in one respect, viz., to organise Presbyteries. It would be an unconstitutional usurpation on the part of the Presbytery. There are only two possible ways of avoiding this logical and constitutional limitation of the exercise of the power of jurisdiction on his part: (a) By assuming that he is the delegate or commissioner of the Assembly, and that to this body pertains the power to organise Presbyteries in foreign lands, and it may delegate this function to its commissioner. But, according to the Book, it is the Presbytery and not the Assembly that commissions him. Moreover, the Assembly of 1876 emphatically denied this right to the Assembly, and for reasons given in the Appendix to the Minutes of the Assembly of the same year. We suppose there are few, if any, in our Church who do not agree in this position. (b) By taking the view combated by us, viz., that he possesses his power of jurisdiction in virtue of his being an evangelist, and does not receive it from any court. To dwell upon this point would be to repeat all that we have already said.

But is it true that the organisation of Presbyteries is a part of the work to be done? Let us examine and see. All will agree that the work to be done is to plant the seed of Christ's spiritual kingdom among the nations. It is not to plant a full-grown tree, nor yet a sapling, but simply the seed. And what is the seed? We reply, the seed of the *law* of the kingdom is the word sown in the hearts of the people. The seed of the government is evidently that court which contains all the power and all the officers of the kingdom. This we find in the Parochial Presbytery or Session of a particular church. In the Session we find all the officers—teaching and ruling elders and deacons, and all the power: in the minister, the power of order; in the elders, the power of jurisdiction; and in the deacons, the power of distribution. Such a church is not Congregational, since it is governed by presbyters; nor is it Prelatic, since there is no one-man power; nor yet is it Independent, since it is governed according to Presbyterian law sown in the hearts of the people and sworn to by the officers. Several such churches planted in any district will as surely grow into a Classical Presbytery as the many roots that shoot downwards from the seed will push above ground one

single stem, destined to grow into a full-grown tree. All that is wanting is the vivifying influence of the Spirit, to give the increase. There are no more powers and no more officers in the Presbytery than in the Session. There are more duties; but to perform the extra duties, there is no increase of powers, but simply a further exercise of the same powers. Dr. Lefevre is led to confer this power upon his evangelist, not, as we understand him, from a denial of our position that the whole Church resides in the Session, but from an erroneous view of the ecclesiastical status of the new church. He maintains that the native Presbytery "becomes immediately a member and constituent of the General Assembly whose evangelist brought it into existence." Admitting this theory, we cannot see why a particular church may not become a constituent part of the home Church as well as the Presbytery. According to our Constitution, the General Assembly has no more right to organise Presbyteries and receive them into connexion with itself, than it has to organise and receive churches. If it can violate our Constitution upon "Presbyterian principles" in the case of the Presbytery, why may it not do so in the other? If he replies that the new Presbytery is on foreign soil, and not within the bounds of any Synod, so is the particular church without the bounds of any Presbytery. But we cannot understand why Dr. Lefevre limits the work to the formation of a Presbytery. Upon his principles, he should carry the work of *creation* on to the formation of Synods and General Assemblies. He says the Church is present (in her evangelist, of course) "for the very purpose of *starting* the regular organism, which of course is that of the existing Constitution." True; but the question at issue is, What is the regular organism? In what sense is the Presbytery any more the regular organism than the Session? Would not the same arguments that would lead him to consider the Session a less regular organism than the Presbytery lead him to consider the Presbytery less so than the Synod, and the Synod than the General Assembly?

But we cannot admit that the foreign church becomes a constituent part of the home Church. It is not an independent church; for the *law* that has been accepted and the Constitution

that has been sworn to, are Presbyterian. This is the position taken by our Assembly of 1876, and we think it is the true and wise position. Dr. Lefevre would have us plant young peach trees, lest the peach seed planted on foreign soil should spring up as orange or mango trees.

When we consider, then, the agent who is sent out to plant the seed, we find that, according to our Book, he is ordained and commissioned by the Presbytery, and that body cannot delegate to an agent functions which it does not possess itself. And when we examine the work to be done, we find that it corresponds with this idea; it does not surpass the powers of the Presbytery.

But can he, as a commissioner of the Presbytery, wield all the powers of that body? It cannot delegate to him the powers of another court; but does it, in virtue of its commission, invest him with all its own powers? Dr. Wilson answers, Yes; he "carries with him and exercises *all the functions of the Presbytery.*" We by no means think so. He is not a Presbytery, but only its commissioner, and commissioners do not carry the full power of the appointing body, but only so much as the body may choose to delegate to them. Titus was appointed by Paul, but he did not carry all the functions of the apostle; a specific duty was assigned to him. It appertains to the Presbytery to decide in each individual case how much power of jurisdiction she will delegate to her commissioner. If the work to be done lies within its bounds, the court may intrust to him the same functions that she intrusts to those whom she sends abroad, or she may not do so, inasmuch as the court itself may conveniently do a part of the work immediately, such as ordaining officers, directing colportage work, taking the oversight of vacant churches, and the like.

But when a Presbytery sends one of its members into a foreign field to plant the seed, which of its functions can he discharge?

It is only by examining the constitutional functions of the Presbytery, and comparing them with the functions discharged by those who, in apostolic times, were sent abroad to plant the kingdom, that we can determine this question. Does any one object that those who set up the kingdom at first were the apostles themselves, and we cannot follow their example? We think we can.

In fact, we doubt if there is a brother within our bounds who does not constantly appeal, not only to the precept, but to the example, of the apostles; and if any one proceeds according to their example, he feels that he is on *terra firma*. But were they not extraordinary officers endowed with extraordinary powers? And if we liken ourselves to them, are we not doing exactly what we have already censured in another writer? We reply, that we look upon the apostles as we look upon the teaching elder. The latter possesses a twofold character; the apostle a threefold character. No ruling elder can go into the pulpit to administer the word and sacraments on the plea that his pastor does it, and they are both elders. But when his pastor does anything *in a court*, his elders can do the same, and with perfect propriety plead his example, because they are all elders. So we cannot attempt to work miracles, speak with tongues, confer the Holy Spirit, or write inspired epistles, pleading the example of the apostles. But when we evangelise, administer the sacraments, and exercise the power of jurisdiction, we can with propriety plead their example, since they were ministers of the word (Acts xvi. 16; 1 Cor. iii. 5), evangelists (Acts xvi. 10; Rom. xv. 16), and elders (1 Pet. v. 1). We regard them as teaching elders, who possessed certain *additional* powers and functions, which were extraordinary, and necessary to confirm their message and prove that they were divinely sent, and that their religion was divine. Considering them in their *ordinary* character of teaching elders, church officers now, both at home and abroad, not only may, but should, proceed in all things according to the *example* as well as precept of the apostles. Our brethren at home, when assembled in the highest church court, are wont to claim that they have scriptural authority for being thus assembled, not so much from precept as from the example of the apostles in the Jerusalem Assembly.

The truth is, when Paul was set apart to his missionary work by the church in Antioch, Barnabas, who was not an apostle, was set apart with him by the imposition of hands. They travelled together and preached (Acts xiii. 5) and ordained elders over their churches (Acts xiv. 23), apparently on a footing of perfect equality. Now, Barnabas bore no analogy whatever to Paul as

an apostle, but it seems he did bear a very decided analogy to him as a minister sent out to preach and establish the Church "in the regions beyond."

So we have nothing extraordinary about us, are in no way similar "to the apostles *as such*," that is, to their extraordinary character; but we all bear a very decided analogy to them in their ordinary character of teaching elders. They were inspired; so much greater the reason why we should imitate their example, not of their *inspiration*, but of their *acts*.

Let us, then, examine the functions of the Presbytery as laid down in our Book, and see which of these may and should be intrusted to her delegate.

1. He may organise churches. No one will question the scripturalness of this function.

2. He may receive churches previously organised on Presbyterian principles desiring to be taken under his oversight, *if they are vacant*, according to the rules observed by Presbyteries at home. If they have pastors, they are perfect seed, and must be let alone.

3. He may ordain ruling elders and deacons, duly chosen by the congregation. No one will call this in question.

4. He may examine, license, and ordain ministers of the gospel. Strangely enough, our Book denies him this power when it inserts the word "ruling." Whatever be the reason of this strange position of our Book (which should be remedied by a vote of the Presbyteries), we suppose no one will deny that he should be intrusted with this power: for (*a*) without this office there is wanting the *teaching* elder and the *power of order*, and hence the seed is imperfect to that extent; (*b*) Paul and Barnabas and Titus ordained "elders" without any limiting word, and Timothy was instructed to ordain "bishops" "apt to teach;" (*c*) and, finally, this function pertains to the Presbytery, and may be intrusted to her commissioner.

5. He may instal these ministers over churches, or commission them to evangelise and look after the newly formed churches, as Paul did Timothy and Titus.

6. He must take the oversight of vacant churches adhering in

all things to the rules prescribed in the Constitution for Presbyteries. (a) He must preach and administer the sacraments, reprove, rebuke, and comfort, because Presbyteries appoint members of their body to do this work in vacant churches. (b) If there are no ruling elders, he must administer discipline. (c) If there are elders, he must moderate the Session; should he be absent, the Session may proceed to business without him, or a native minister may be invited to moderate the Session. (d) If there is only one ruling elder, he must be disciplined by the commissioner of the Presbytery.

Such are the functions that are to be discharged by the man who is sent forth by the Presbytery to plant the seed of Christ's spiritual kingdom among the nations.

Let us see now which of the functions of the Presbytery are not intrusted to him. These become almost self-evident upon reading the functions of Presbytery as laid down in the Book.

We have already seen that when a pastor is installed over a church, the perfect germ has been planted, and the authority of the commissioner over it ceases. The seed has been planted, and must be left to the care of Him who will administer all needed grace and wisdom to the Session. He cannot, therefore, visit such churches to redress evils; he cannot review its records; he cannot oblige it to observe the Constitution; he cannot unite or divide it; he cannot concert measures to improve it; he cannot see that the injunctions of higher courts are obeyed; and, finally, he cannot receive and issue appeals. Does any one say that the church is weak and needs the fostering care of the hand that brought it into existence? We reply, the objection is of the essence of unbelief. God will foster it by his almighty grace, which is far better. The "fostering care" of an *extraordinary* officer, with a poor fallible heart, will surely transform itself, in the course of time, into inconvenient proportions. We may not approve of all that is done by the Session, but our disapprobation is no justifiable ground for interference on our part. Nor are we to suppose that, as a matter of course, our judgment is always correct and theirs always wrong, when a conflict of judgment occurs. Cases have occurred in which the opposite was

true, and for the reason that in questions of fact the natives generally have the advantage over foreigners, and for obvious reasons.

Does any one say that the churches appealed to the apostles? Certainly they did. And they may appeal to them now; they have the inspired views of the apostles in writing, which the churches did not then have; moreover, when they appealed, the apostles carried the knotty question before *the home Church*, and assembled *the elders* in a General Assembly at Jerusalem to decide it. On all questions relating to the discipline of vice and immorality the new churches now have the commands of the Lord given through the inspired apostles. There is no place now for appeal except on technical points of ecclesiastical order, and the native Sessions have the Book and common sense and the Holy Spirit. If they still cannot agree, then let them agree to disagree, just as the General Assembly at home is obliged to remand the dancing question, at last, to each Session.

There are two more functions which belong to the Presbytery and which, from the very nature of the case, are not delegated to her commissioner, to wit, appointing commissioners to the Assembly, and proposing measures to the Synod and the Assembly.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the venerable Secretary that "he carries with him and exercises *all the functions of the Presbytery.*"

II.

HIS FOREIGN RELATIONS.

To the Native Church.

The year 1874 marks the beginning of a new era in our Church on the question of the relations that exist between the native churches and the minister who brings them into being. Until that time she held, along with other Churches, to the theory of mixed Presbyteries; that is, that the ministers from home should be formed into Presbyteries along with the native ministers, said Presbyteries to be in organic connexion with the home Church.

In accordance with this principle, the Assembly of 1871 organised the Presbytery of Sao Paulo, and, so far as we are aware, no opposition was made. In May, 1874, the editorial, cited at the beginning of our paper, was published in the *Missionary*, in which this theory is distinctly avowed to be the true one. This editorial was approved by the Assembly that met the same month. (See *Minutes* of the Assembly, 1874, p. 598.) In harmony with this theory the same Assembly organised the Hangchow Presbytery. (P. 488.)

Opposition, however, was now made. The first man to raise his voice against this unconstitutional usurpation of the Synod's power was the Rev. R. L. Breck, D. D., then of Richmond, Ky. He was supported by others, but they were overruled, and our Church settled down, wedded to what all now believe to be a false theory.

The considerations which influenced the Kentucky brethren, however, had no reference to the foreign minister. If we mistake not, so far as concerns our own Church, the honor of first setting forth our true relations to the native church belongs to the Rev. M. H. Houston, of China. In the paper styled, *The Ecclesiastical Status of the Foreign Missionary*, the theory was first publicly announced that "the evangelist is never to become a *de facto* member of any Presbytery that he may form; he is to continue to be a member of the Presbytery in this country which clothed him with the powers and functions of evangelist." (P. 9.) In accordance with this principle, members of the Hangchow Presbytery overtured the Assembly of 1875, at St. Louis, to dissolve said Presbytery. The Assembly appointed a Committee, consisting of Drs. Adger, Peck, and Wilson, to report to the succeeding Assembly upon the subject. In their Report to the Savannah Assembly, 1876, the Committee declared that the Assembly has no power to organise Presbyteries, and also that the evangelist should not become a member of a foreign Presbytery. The ministers in China were accordingly declared to be members of their respective Presbyteries at home. A member of the Assembly asked if the same principle would not apply to the Sao Paulo Presbytery. Dr. Wilson said it would, but asked that no

action be taken until the Presbytery be heard from. He accordingly addressed a letter to the Sao Paulo brethren on the subject, and the question was thoroughly discussed in Presbytery, and action taken in harmony with the views of the China brethren, but referring the matter to the Synod of Virginia, as it was thought that the Synod alone has power to dissolve Presbyteries. This action was forwarded to Dr. Wilson, through whom action was requested, with the request that it be laid before the Synod. It was admitted in Baltimore that the positions taken were "invulnerable," but, for some reason not given, it was thought best not to carry the matter further, so the matter stopped in Baltimore.¹

The principles of the Assembly of 1876 were reaffirmed by the succeeding Assembly which met at New Orleans, when it approved the *Manual of Missions*, cited at the head of our paper. The Manual clearly and explicitly takes the same stand so ably enunciated and defended by the Report published as an Appendix to the Minutes of the Assembly of 1876. It is unnecessary to rehearse here the arguments presented in that Report. Our Church is committed to that theory; we believe it is the true one, and that she should stand by it.

It being, then, the doctrine of the Church that the evangelist cannot unite, as such, with the native Presbytery, it follows that when a Presbytery is organised, he must do one of three things. He must return home, or move into destitute regions without the bounds of the new Presbytery, since he cannot remain within its bounds, while a member of another Presbytery, without violating the Constitution. Or he may dissolve his connexion with the home Church and unite with the native Presbytery on a footing of perfect equality with the native brethren; the new Presbytery may then commission him, if it chooses, to labor as an evangelist either within or without its bounds.

¹ Since the above was written the Synod of Virginia dissolved the Presbytery, we suppose at the request of Rev. E. Lane, who was present at the meeting of the Synod.

Relations to his Fellow-workers.

We propose, under this head, to discuss the relations that exist between the foreign minister and his fellow-workers, according to our present system of conducting missions, presenting our own views as we proceed with the discussion. These relations are determined by the *MANUAL FOR THE USE OF MISSIONARIES*, already cited. This Manual is a small tract or pamphlet, which was neatly printed in Baltimore, and submitted to the Standing Committee on Foreign Missions of the New Orleans Assembly, 1877. The Standing Committee recommended, in the body of their Report, that it be approved. The Assembly, in voting the adoption of the Report of the Committee, of course approved the Manual. Copies were accordingly forwarded to the missionaries, with the information that by this approval of the Assembly it had become "law," and has since been enforced as such. It was given again to the Church in the *Missionary* for January, 1880. Upon examining the *Manual*, we find that we can only understand our relations to our fellow-workers by considering *The Mission*. Let us, then, inquire: 1. What is the mission? 2. Who compose it? 3. What are its powers? The Manual says, in answer to the first question:

"At every central station there is a *mission*, technically so-called—a sub-committee—acting in direct and constant communication with the Executive Committee of Missions. The mission shall be organised with Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer, and shall transact its business according to the ordinary rules of all organised bodies of the kind. It shall meet once a year, or oftener, if necessary, at the call of the Chairman."

The mission, then, is an *organic body*, having its by-laws and officers. Dr. Adger seems to confound the station with mission. They are quite distinct. The station is simply the place where the ministers and other missionaries reside; or it may be applied to the company of missionaries living at any one place, considered in their general character of missionaries laboring together in the same field, but having no reference to any organisation. The mission, however, is an *organic body* for the transaction of business. This becomes apparent in the next sentence, where, in answer to the second question, it says: "It is composed of all the

missionaries [ministers] and male assistant missionaries." We are told that the term "assistant missionary is indifferently applied to laymen sent out as *teachers*; to missionary *physicians*; to *unmarried ladies*, and to the *wives of missionaries* [ministers]."

The mission, then, is an organic, official body, composed of the ministers and laymen sent out as teachers and physicians.

And what are the powers of the mission, according to the "law"? The Manual says:

"All members of the mission are expected to correspond freely with the home office [in Baltimore]; but in relation to business matters, such as the appropriation of funds, the establishment of schools, the formation of new stations, the return of missionaries, and the like, the correspondence shall be between the mission, as such, and the Executive Committee. The mission, at its regular meetings, shall designate the particular work of each missionary laborer, and shall send up, at the close of each year, a report of the condition of the whole work."

Such, then, is the mission, according to the code of law enacted by the New Orleans Assembly of 1877.

Now, with all deference for the superior wisdom of the brethren in Baltimore who drew up this Manual, as well as for the Standing Committee that recommended its approval, and for the supreme court that voted the adoption of the Report of their Committee with that clause in it, we must say that the creation of such an *organic body, so composed, and with such powers*, was both unwise and unconstitutional. For what is the mission of the Manual but a veritable *Church court*? According to our Constitution, a Church court is an organised body in which rulers of the Church wield jointly ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The mission is an organised body. It has its Chairman and Secretary; it transacts its business according to the ordinary rules of all organised bodies of the kind; it meets once a year, or oftener, if necessary, at the call of the Chairman; it keeps a full and regular record of its proceedings; any portion of its records (or all of them) being subject to review by the Executive Committee. Is there any difference between the organisation of the mission and that of the Presbytery or Synod? There are the Chairman, or Moderator, and Secretary; there are the stated and called meetings; there are the full records, and there is the review and control; in fine,

there is as complete and perfect an organised body as it is possible to form, and as like a Presbytery, in its organisation, as one egg is like another.

In this body we find the presbyters who are rulers of the Church. And in this body these rulers of the Church exercise jointly their ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The business transacted by the mission is not worldly business, not yet the mere secular business of the Church. It is not confined to the auditing of the treasurer's books, nor yet to the receiving of funds from Baltimore and disbursement of the same. It is not limited to the fixing of the salaries of teachers and other employés of the mission, nor to the erection of buildings. It includes all this, but its powers stretch far beyond, including functions purely and properly ecclesiastical.

(1) The mission directs and controls the work of the Church within its field, in all its departments. Only the mission, in its organised capacity, can inaugurate and direct any plan for the propagation of the gospel in new districts, or the building up of vacant churches. The Manual does not declare this in so many words, but its provisions are such as to necessitate it. It says that "in relation to business matters—such as the appropriation of funds, the establishment of schools, *the formation of new stations*, the return of missionaries, and the like—the correspondence shall be between the mission, as such, and the Executive Committee. The mission shall send up, before the end of each year a carefully prepared schedule of all the funds that will be needed the ensuing year, for salaries, for the support of schools, *for expenses of colporteurs*, for native teachers, *and for whatever else may be necessary to the promotion of the general work*. Each item shall be accompanied with reasons for and explanations of same."

The last phrase, which we have italicised, includes, of course, the translation and publication of religious literature, the scattering of the Scriptures, the amount of evangelistic work to be done by the ministers, the aid and encouragement given to feeble churches, and the education of candidates for the ministry. Now, this schedule of estimates, in order to be sent up, must be made

out, and in order to be made out, each item must be discussed and officially determined; and *the reasons* for each item must be given by *the mission, as such*, and be sent along with the schedule. Here, then, we have this body, in its regular yearly meeting, deliberating upon the formation of new stations; the amount of Bible and colporteur work to be done; the number and character of books to be published; the amount of aid, both pecuniary and ministerial, to be given to vacant churches within its bounds; the amount of evangelistic work to be done, and the spiritual qualifications of candidates for the holy ministry; in a word, it cannot do what the Manual provides for, without authoritatively and officially determining all questions involving every branch of the work of the Church in that district. Let the reader now judge whether, in doing all this, these rulers of the Church are not exercising functions that are purely and properly ecclesiastical? Do or do not *Church courts* decide such questions at home?

(2) But the mission not only decides what and how much work is to be done. It must determine the special work of each individual minister, and report upon his work. "The mission, at its regular meetings, *shall designate the particular work of each missionary laborer*, provided this has not previously been done by the Executive Committee, and shall send up, at the close of each year, a report of the condition of the whole work." This, of course, puts ministers, as such, completely under the control of the mission. It may practically instal him pastor, by confining him altogether to one church; or it may make him a school teacher, by confining him altogether to the class-room; or it may give him a school and a church; or it may remove him from the school and graciously appoint him to the work to which the Presbytery appointed him at his ordination; or it may remove him from one field to another. If there are native ministers, they, too, must go at the beck of *the mission*, until the native Church becomes entirely self-supporting and independent of the home Church.

Now, what is the body at home that appoints ministers to their special work? What is the body that removes and settles pastors? What say the Presbyteries? And what kind of functions

do these rulers exercise in the mission, when they remove and settle pastors and appoint evangelists? Are they not wielding their joint power of jurisdiction? If, in doing all the Manual directs the mission to do, it does not exercise ecclesiastical powers, if it is not clothed with the functions of Presbytery, then we read amiss either the Manual or the Constitution.

It is true, we do not call the mission by the name *Presbytery*, *Synod*, or *General Assembly*; neither do its powers tally exactly with those of any one of the courts of the Book; but to constitute any body a Church court, it is not necessary that it should have the same name or the exact powers of either of those courts. It is only necessary that in its officers of the Church wield jointly ecclesiastical powers. This is what presbyters do in the mission.

In support of our view, that the mission is a court, we have the explicit and emphatic testimony of the honored chairman of the body that formed the Manual. Dr. Lefevre says:

"The actual facts of the Foreign Missionary work, however, generally present a still more complex problem. A mission is usually composed of more than one general evangelist, and there arises the question, What is the relation of these evangelists of the same mission to each other as to the exercise of extraordinary power? Is it joint or several? According to the principles of this paper, we must answer, *that the power is joint and not several*, and must be administered by the mission as a body, or a temporary distribution must be made according to the exigencies of the case, and after the analogy of the existing Constitution. The evangelists are each parts, in which is the power of the whole; but this common power is over the power of every part, and must be exercised by the whole body, or a system of evangelistic courts. It is no matter of expediency, but of vital Presbyterian principle, that is here insisted upon. The same principles that lie back of our Book, lie back of our evangelists, without which they have no authorised existence. . . . We have here, therefore, a clear case of joint power. What, then, is the proper way of its exercise? Evidently, it is substantially, though not formally, the method of the Church at home. It must be exercised jointly by these officers, either in convention or by a distribution of power." (See SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, Oct., 1879, pp. 669, 670.)

Nothing could be clearer. The mission, which "is composed" according to the "actual facts" (that is, the mission of the Manual), is an *evangelistic court*, in which the evangelists must wield their power jointly, according to "the method at home;" *i. e.*, in

courts. And this, Dr. Lefevre affirms, is no matter of expediency, but of *vital Presbyterian principle*. And what are the vital Presbyterian principles of his article? On page 660, he says :

“By common consent, however, we have for our guide the following *a priori* laws, which must give shape to every Presbyterian structure : (1) That the power of the whole is *in every part* and *over the power* of every part. (2) That whenever two or more parts in which is the power of the whole, coexist in time and space, they become *joint possessors* of this one common power, and must provide by courts and distribution of power, for the realisation of the Church's unity. (3) That this distribution must be made (1 Cor. xiv. 14) according to decency and order. . . . (4) That the most unbecoming and paralysing disorder of all, is the co-existence of two jurisdictions in the same matter at the same time over the same subjects.”

We suppose no one will deny these principles for a moment. We may formulate this ratiocination into a syllogism, as follows :

Major premise : Whenever two or more parts coexist in time and space over the same subjects, their power becomes joint, and must be administered jointly, *in a court*, to prevent disorder.

Minor premise : A mission being formed, the evangelists co-exist in time and space, and over the same subjects.

Conclusion : Hence, to prevent disorder, their power becomes joint, and must be administered in the mission, which thus becomes a court.

We thus have not only the unequivocal testimony of Dr. Lefevre, that in his opinion the mission is a court, but he arrays the irresistible force of logic to *prove* that, according to vital Presbyterian principles, it *must be a court*.

We have no explicit testimony from the Secretaries of the Executive Committee ; that is, they have never said, in so many words, that the mission is a court. But the general tenor of their official correspondence, and the comparison made between the way of doing things through the mission and Executive Committee, and the way of doing things through courts, is such as to make the mission differ from a court only in name. One of the Secretaries says that for a foreign minister not to be subject to the control and oversight of the mission “is contrary to *Presby-*

terian ideas and usages. We all need oversight and control. *No member of a Presbytery* could plead exemption from such control. Besides, the Manual of Missions is *law*, and we have no right to deviate from it." But it is clearly contrary to Presbyterian ideas and usages for any body to have the oversight and control of the minister of the gospel and his work, *except a court.* Of this the venerable Secretary seems to be conscious. He is well aware of what Presbyterian *usage* is, and therefore consistently says that no member of Presbytery could claim exemption from such control. It will be noticed that Dr. Wilson confirms our interpretation of the Manual as to the power of the mission: that it is over the minister of the gospel, as such. We do not, however, attribute to him the opinion that the mission has as much power over the minister as the Presbytery has, according to the Book. He does not hold that the mission has judicial power to try the minister for heresy and immorality; but he holds that it controls and directs him in his ministerial work and character.

Dr. Adger, in combating Dr. Lefevre's mission in the same number of the REVIEW, makes the point against it that it is a *court.* But Dr. Lefevre's mission is the mission which "is composed" according to the "actual facts.." It is the mission of the Manual. He strangely enough supposes that Dr. Lefevre *proposes* to create this court, not seeming to be aware that it has existed according to *law* since May, 1877. What Dr. Lefevre proposes is, not to create what had already been created by the New Orleans Assembly, but simply to confer upon this mission more powers than is conferred by the Manual. He wishes it to have not only the control and direction of all the Church work in all its departments, and power to direct and control the ministers in their work, all of which the Manual gives it; but he wishes its powers to be extended over the native Christians; to admit and try church members, to ordain officers and to pronounce certain customs a bar to communion. In a word, he declares that his "principle applies *only with greater force* to the higher governmental powers." To this we most heartily agree. Once admit the principle that our power of jurisdiction is joint, and must be

wielded jointly in the mission, as it is admitted in the Manual, and enforced with all the authority of *law*, and we see no logical reason for limiting its power.

Now, let the Church contemplate this new creation in our system of courts. Let our Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies look at their young sister on foreign soil; let them examine her closely and decide whether or not she is worthy the dignity to which she is already exalted by the Manual, and of the still higher aspirations which the honored Chairman entertains for her.

In the *first* place, was the manner of her introduction into our polity constitutional? We always supposed that any fundamental change in our polity could only be made by a vote of the Presbyteries. We have seen, however, that this "evangelistic court," called the *mission*, was created and legalised by a mere vote of the Assembly of 1877. And this vote was not direct upon the merits of the question, but in the most indirect manner possible. The Standing Committee on Foreign Missions recommended in the body of their Report that the Manual be approved. When the Assembly voted the adoption of the Report, the Manual became "law, and we have no right to deviate from it."

Now, we believe the Assembly may adopt Reports approving of work that has been done, and recommending what it pleases to the churches. But we submit that it has no power to make changes in the organic law of our Church. We submit that the Assembly surpassed its prerogatives when it legislated upon and legalised the formation of a new Church court, and especially one entirely foreign to Presbyterian principles, as we shall see the mission is. The Assembly may interpret law, but she has no power to make law. When she takes the general oversight of the work of evangelising the world, she is not thereby empowered to create new courts unknown to our Church polity on the plea that they are necessary for the proper prosecution of the work.

But, in the *second* place, we may justly demand the scriptural warrant for a mission. Dr. Lefevre says that "It may safely be assumed that no one holds that the particular distribution of Church power made in our Form of Government is *jure divino*."

That may be; but can we therefore introduce radical and fundamental changes into our system with the specious plea that what we have is not *jure divino* in all its *minutiæ*?

Our Book declares that Christ as King has ordained in his Church a system of government which is "expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced therefrom." Now, we have the right to demand the authority in Scripture for any court composed only of teaching elders, as Dr. Lefevre evidently regards it; or of ministers *and laymen*, according to the Manual; and we may demand the proof that there was *any* court in the regions beyond. Surely, if it existed in the Apostolic Church, the very full history we have of their missionary operations would make some mention of it. It cannot be said of the Scriptures, as has been said of our old Book, that they were "drawn up at a period when the cause of Foreign Missions was little understood and appreciated, and hence their principles can be applied only by inference to many of the details of the work."¹ The Apostolic Church was preëminently *the* missionary Church, and it is incredible that no mention should be made of an evangelistic court if it existed. Moreover, the apostles were inspired not only to determine questions of doctrine, but to inaugurate a system of government that should meet the exigencies of the Church in all ages and in every country. Now, we read in the New Testament of ecclesiastical courts in the home Church, but not one syllable about evangelistic courts—"Missions technically so called—sub-committees," in the regions beyond, with chairmen and secretaries, to control the minister and designate his particular field of labor, or his special work, and whose commands he *must obey*, or lay himself liable to be recalled for disobedience to instructions. There is no passage in Scripture that even contains the idea of such a thing as a mission. This entire silence of Scripture condemns it, even if we had no positive proof against it. Paul and Barnabas were set apart by the

¹ Since writing the above we were surprised to see that in his article on Our Schemes of Benevolence, Dr. Wilson takes the same position in regard to the word of God that he here takes in regard to our Constitution, as we may see hereafter.

church at Antioch, and they reported to the same body that set them apart (Acts xiii. 3, and xiv. 26, 27). They travelled together, they preached together, they even ordained together. But we have no hint of any "mission meetings" in which Paul was elected chairman or moderator, and Barnabas secretary, for the transaction of business "according to the rules observed by all organised bodies [courts] of the kind." When any knotty questions arose, the missionaries carried them for decision *to the courts at home*.

But not only is the thing unscriptural, it is unconstitutional. The only courts recognised in our Constitution are the Session, Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The evangelist is set apart by the Presbytery, and as its delegate he exercises his power of jurisdiction, and constitutionally he is responsible to that home court. Here, again, Dr. Lefevre confesses the weakness of his cause, by acknowledging that it has no countenance in the Constitution; he pleads in favor of the intruder into our system, that no one can venture to say that the particular distribution in our Constitution is *jure divino*. As they set aside our Book in the case of the evangelist, on the ground of its being old, so in the case of the mission the Constitution is ignored, and its testimony thrown out, on the ground that in its particular distribution of power it is not *jure divino*. Of one thing we are very sure, that the mission is not *jure divino*. But this court, even were it composed of ministers only, would be utterly unpresbyterian. We feel content to push this point in the forcible language of Dr. Adger: "But it appears to us that the overwhelming objection to this view is its making the 'mission' to be a court of the Church, and a new kind of court at that. It is made to be a representative body with no churches to represent. It is made to be a Presbytery with no ruling elders present. It is made to be a government ruling through *clergy*. Each of these objections, it seems to us, has immense weight. . . . They [the evangelists] must not undertake to make a new kind of Presbyterian court essentially different from those set before us in Scripture. To do anything of that kind would not be 'to create the Presbyterian Church where never was one before.' This new kind of court

proposed to be created thus, it seems to us, would be a mere hybrid—the mongrel offspring of Congregationalism and Prelacy.”

But let us examine the reasons urged for the formation of this evangelistic court. The Chairman and senior Secretary of the Executive Committee each gives us a reason.

Dr. Lefevre thinks it necessary in order that we may govern properly. Dr. Wilson thinks it necessary in order that we may be properly governed. We will consider them separately. Dr. Lefevre says:

“When co-evangelists preach the gospel in the same field, . . . if their power is not to be wielded jointly in the same particular mission, then each evangelist’s private opinion is authoritative judgment, and, as is well known, these judgments are often contradictory. . . . This would be disorder of the deadliest sort. . . . The Church has no liberty to do her work on principles that would make such *extraordinary confusion*. We have here, then, a clear case of joint power. . . . It seems necessary to hold that evangelists must exercise their power jointly, and not severally, when they coexist in time and space.”

According, then, to Dr. Lefevre, a mission must be formed and clothed with Presbyterial power to prevent clashing of judgments and jurisdictions in the conduct of the work. But these judgments and this jurisdiction extend not only to the general conduct and oversight of the work in all its branches, and the oversight and control of the ministers who compose the mission, as the Manual provides for, but also to the members of the native churches. This Dr. Lefevre contends for.

“It cannot be allowed, says he, that in the same church, whether forming or formed, there is a power to admit and reject the same person at the same time, or to declare an accused both guilty and not guilty. . . . It cannot be that the same man, at the same time and place, is eligible and ineligible to ordination, or liable to be ordained by one at one moment and deposed by another at the next, or be recognised by one evangelist as a Presbyterian minister and discounted by another at his side.”

Now, we wonder what our native elders would say to this theory. We have in South Brazil several churches, some forming and others formed. Suppose the “evangelistic court” should attempt some fine day to put this theory into practice, what would be the inevitable consequence? Dr. Lefevre thinks it would pre-

vent "disorder of the deadliest sort," since applicants for church membership would be no longer "subject to two jurisdictions." We think just the reverse.

What would our native *Session* in Penha say if the mission should march in, in a body, and say that, according to vital Presbyterian principles that lie back of our Book, the power of admitting these applicants belongs to and must be administered by the "evangelistic court," and the Session may, therefore, step aside! If they are worthy the name of elders, and we believe they are, they would likely refer the "evangelistic court" to certain vital Presbyterian principles that lie upon the face of the Book and the word of God.

We therefore retort Dr. Lefevre's most telling statement upon himself: "The Church has no liberty to do her work upon principles that make such extraordinary confusion." The opinion of the mission and the Session would each be an authoritative judgment and might be contradictory; this would be disorder of the deadliest sort. The two courts cannot wield their power jointly; the native elders do not enjoy the poor privilege of merging their power with that of the mission, for according to the Manual no one can become a member of the mission unless appointed by the Executive Committee in Baltimore. We are surprised that Dr. Lefevre should have allowed his will-o'-the-wisp to lead him into such a dilemma. There is, moreover, a very serious practical difficulty in the way of the realisation of his ideal. He seems to forget that the field of which he treats may be very large. Supposing that none of our native churches had elders, it would still be a physical impossibility for the mission to admit church members and try those guilty of offences, because of the wide extent of territory over which the churches are scattered. There may be, moreover, several stations composing the mission, and these stations may be fifty, sixty, or one hundred miles apart. On Dr. Lefevre's theory, every time any one may wish to join the Church in any congregation belonging to any of the various stations, the members of all the other stations must drop their work, or leave it to the "female assistant missionaries," and go off to exercise their joint power in a mission meeting; for we

must remember that *The Mission* is composed of all the male members of all the different stations. Dr. Lefevre will doubtless remind us that he has provided for this dilemma by saying that this court could make a distribution of power analogous to that made at home. That is, the mission must appoint the men to do these various things just as a Presbytery would do at home.

The upshot of the whole matter, then, is, that the appointment by our Presbyteries is all a farcical show.

And let it be remembered that in combating this thing we are not combating a mere theory of Dr. Lefevre. We have simply referred to the extra powers that he would confer upon the mission court. *According to the Manual*, our power of jurisdiction is joint, as we have already clearly shown; the mission must appoint each minister to his particular work, and direct and control him in it.

Now, we put the question seriously to the Church: Why oblige our Presbyteries to go through the empty formality of appointing our evangelists? The Presbytery appoints the minister to preach, organise churches, and moderate all native Sessions, and ordain church officers in foreign countries, and then turns him over to the Executive Committee. He then has no power to do anything until the Committee sees fit to reappoint him to do the same things. But the Committee sends him out to fall into the hands of the mission, and then, "according to the vital principles of Presbyterianism," he cannot strike a blow, he has no power whatever (notwithstanding his two previous appointments), until the mission grants him a third appointment. But stop; we are mistaken. The Manual does say that the mission shall appoint him, *unless* the Committee has already done it. It forgets, however, to make the appointment by the Committee conditional upon his having been or not having been previously appointed by the Presbytery. What has value is the appointment by the Executive Committee. But if by chance the Committee appoint two men pastors of the same church or directors of the same college, what then? We have not that "common inspiration" which Dr. Lefevre tells us prevented confusion among the apostles. Might not "disorder of the deadliest sort" result even when the Baltimore ideal is realised?

But seriously, what is gained by this triple crown—this three-fold appointment? Dr. Lefevre is sure that things will be done decently and in order; that there will be no confusion whatever; for all the ministers must respect what might be done in the name of the mission by their own representative.

Well, if ministers of the gospel can so readily recognise and respect the acts of their brethren when acting as the delegates of the mission, why can they not do so when they act as the delegates of a Presbytery? The mission is made to be worthy of more respect than the Presbytery! The truth is, if these ministers would consider each other as representatives of their Presbyteries, and observe the respect and courtesy observed by Presbyteries towards each other, there could be no difficulty. Dr. Lefevre says, "It cannot be that the same man at the same time and place is eligible and ineligible to ordination, or liable to be ordained by one at one moment and deposed by another at the next, or to be recognised by one evangelist as a Presbyterian minister and discounted by another at his side."

Why, of course not. But does it follow that therefore "we have a clear case of joint power"? Certainly not. The passage could be applied as pertinently to any two Presbyteries at home. We may safely affirm that no candidate at home is liable to be ordained and recognised as a minister by one Presbytery and discounted and deposed by the adjoining or any other Presbytery. Are we, therefore, to conclude that only the General Assembly can ordain? We think not. We are just to conclude that when one Presbytery ordains a man, the other Presbyteries cannot discount him; they *must recognise* him as a minister. Let the same rules that govern Presbyteries in their mutual relations govern their representatives abroad, and there cannot possibly result confusion and disorder. But we shall be told that Presbyteries do not have jurisdiction over the same person at the same time and in the same matter, while the ministers in foreign lands do. But why do they? Why are we confronted with this anomalous condition of things so different from and foreign to anything to be found in any Presbyterian Form of Government? Why are we compelled to solve so complex a problem? "But whatever be the way out

of this particular difficulty, it seems necessary to hold that evangelists must exercise their power jointly and not severally when they coexist in time and space." So says Dr. Lefevre. And how comes it that the Church has gotten herself into a "difficulty" that she cannot escape from without abandoning Presbyterianism? How comes the Church to fall into such a quagmire as this, that the only possible outlet is on the other side, on Papal and Congregational territory? Dr. Lefevre may answer: "The actual facts of the Foreign Missionary work, however, generally present a still more complex problem. A mission is usually composed of more than one general evangelist, and there arises the question, What is the relation of these evangelists of the same mission to each other as to the exercise of extraordinary power?" Just so. "The actual facts" (that is, the formation of a mission) create the whole difficulty. We cannot conceive of a stronger practical argument against the formation of "missions" than the Chairman of the Executive Committee gives us. Had he been a member of the New Orleans Assembly to oppose with such arguments the approval of the Manual presented by the senior Secretary, he would have saved our Church the shame of the creation of such a "complex problem."

But we are told that "when co-evangelists preach the gospel in the same field," they necessarily have jurisdiction over the same subjects, and this *necessitates* their exercising their power jointly. Well, we do not hesitate to say that if sending more than one minister to the same place leads the Church into such difficulties as she has gotten herself into, then *send but one to a place*. And, in truth, we are not so sure but this is just what the Church should do, as a general rule. We may very pertinently inquire, why so many are sent out and herded together at the same place, unless it be in large cities where each can have a distinct district to himself. We think the wise ones would be put to it to find any countenance in the word of God for such a custom. *Concentration* is the law of this world, but it is contrary to the law of Christ's kingdom. It is worldly and essentially infidel. The command was, "Go ye *into all the world* and preach the gospel *to every creature*." The apostles obeyed, and as a

consequence, before their death the gospel was preached in all the world. If the Church would spend all her money now in sending out *only ministers*, and *scatter them*, we believe the same result would follow before our death. The seventy were sent out two and two *to make a journey*; not to settle down at central points and organise missions.

Since writing the foregoing, the *Missionary* for November, 1881, has been received, in which Dr. Wilson tells us that "The Saviour's direction to his servants to go two and two embodies the profoundest wisdom." The reason why he thinks so is, that "we need brotherly advice and counsel, and it is a matter of great importance to exchange views in all new and intricate questions that arise, leaving all matters of moment to be decided by the collected wisdom of the whole." He fails, however, to show us what were some of the difficult and intricate questions that the Saviour knew would arise before those servants; nor does he name the place where they met to solve "all matters of moment by their collective wisdom." He wishes the Church to be impressed with the "profoundest wisdom" of carrying on the work by Committees and missions. Unfortunately for him, however, the Saviour did not seem to send those servants two and two for exchange of views on intricate questions, and to decide matters of moment by their collective wisdom. He evidently sent them two and two because he was acting under the old dispensation; he sent them *as witnesses*, and therefore sent them two and two in order to establish their testimony, as the Mosaic law required, "by the mouth of two or three witnesses." We find in this action of our Saviour the profoundest respect for the pattern given in the mount centuries previously. If Dr. Wilson finds his pattern in the Saviour's action, then he should conform to it, and "provide neither gold nor silver nor brass in our purses," and send us "not into the way of the Gentiles." If he really desires a scriptural pattern for missions to the Gentiles, (we shall see further on that he distinctly and emphatically declares that we *cannot* follow apostolic example, and that there is *no* plan in Scripture for conducting missions,) he should hunt for it, not under the old dispensation, but after the sheet full of unclean animals was let down to Peter.

Paul and Barnabas were sent together *on a journey*; not to form themselves into missions, technically so-called. They afterwards found it advisable to separate and work apart. Concentration for the purpose of building brick-yards and making towers, reminds one of the confusion of tongues.

But since a "faithless and perverse generation," "in the fulness of our wisdom and enlargement of our views," must deviate from the commands of our King and the example of his apostles; since the Church will have it that concentration is the best policy, is there still no way to prevent the confusion of two separate jurisdictions over the same subjects, except by combining the ministers into the organic mission of the Manual? We think there is an easy, natural, common-sense way, that will not force "difficulties" and "complex problems" upon the Church. *Let each one have sole jurisdiction over a distinct part of the field.* Any one might invite his brethren to travel with him, preach with him, and even ordain with him, while only he would have authority and jurisdiction in that particular district. This, in fact, is the only possible way it can be done, mission or no mission. Even when a mission is organised, we have seen that it is compelled to delegate each member to do a special part of the work; in other words, as Dr. Lefevre says, there must be a distribution of power. So, the only thing gained by its formation, is a mongrel hybrid court, a vast amount of red tape, and a countless number of bones of contention, to cause confusion and disorder.

But there is the vexed question of foot-binding. Oh, yes! But we retort, there is the vexed question of dancing at home. Cannot the foreign ministers agree to disagree as their brethren at home do? If not, let them follow the apostolic example: when the contention becomes very sharp, let them separate, or take the question home to the Assembly, unless, indeed, the mission is a St. Peter's chair, in which the triple-crowned bishops become infallible.

But, says the senior Secretary, "we all need to be controlled; no member of a Presbytery could plead exemption from such control." To this we suppose no one will take the least exception.

We certainly do not. But there is a wide chasm between Dr. Wilson's proposition and his conclusion. "We all need control; therefore the mission must control you." It behooves him to bridge the gulf. He gives the major premise and the conclusion, but the minor premise is wanting. Before we can accept the conclusion, he must prove that there is no other court in Christ's kingdom that is competent to control us. According to Scripture and our Constitution, the minister is controlled by and responsible to the court that set him apart to the work. We believe in law; we believe in review and control. We believe in authority and obedience which is not sinful. We believe that the power of the whole is over our power. But the question is, Where is the whole? Scripture and the Constitution place it *at home*, in the already organised Church. The Manual and the Baltimore brethren create the whole in the regions beyond. This control on the part of the mission is *unnecessary*. Rev. A. T. Graybill labored alone for years in Matamoras, and Rev. J. Rockwell Smith in Pernambuco. Neither was controlled by missions, and yet they were unusually blessed and prospered in their work, and, so far as the outside world is aware, neither of them felt embarrassment from the want of control.

We believe in the apostolical mode of conducting missions. It is divine; it is feasible and sensible; it leaves the foreign minister as free as his brethren at home. If they must attend personally the meetings of the courts, so he should be required to report to his court at every meeting. It scatters the sowers, and thereby scatters the seed. It frees the cause of the gospel among the heathen from complications, as well as from "difficulties" and "complex problems."

Paul was at liberty to travel when and where he chose, to stay as long as he chose at any one place, and move from one city to another, to establish new stations without a vast amount of formal recommendations of missions and approvals of Executive Committees. He was also at liberty to choose his own native assistants, and make tents to support himself, or call upon the churches to support him. We will, of course, be met with the objection that Paul was an inspired apostle, with independent, irresponsible

authority, and hence no precedent for us. Dr. Lefevre says, on this point:

“The opinion is sometimes met with that the evangelist is an extraordinary, irresponsible officer, bearing some true analogy to an apostle as such, so that the Church cannot control his work or review and reverse his decisions. . . . To be irresponsible to the Church, the officer must be inspired and immediately appointed by Christ. . . . Apostles had, indeed, independent, several, and irresponsible jurisdiction under all circumstances; and their common inspiration—that indispensable qualification of an apostle—justified the fact, made it becoming, and excluded confusion.”

Well, in the first place, we lay no claim to independent, irresponsible authority, and we have no fear that any one will accuse us of such a position, after reading what we have already written. We believe that we are the commissioner of the Presbytery, and that it should have the power to direct and control us, just as it does any pastor or any commissioner appointed at home to exercise the power of jurisdiction. It should have the power to direct and control us, and review and reverse our decisions.

But is Dr. Lefevre so very sure that the apostles had independent and irresponsible authority? It is true they were appointed to the apostolate directly by the Lord. As Paul says, they were apostles, “not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead” (Gal. i. 1). But after they were thus made apostles, were they independent and irresponsible? Paul would not give place by subjection to *false* brethren who desired to bring him into bondage to Jewish ceremonies; but that is far removed, indeed, from asserting that he was not responsible to *his* brethren. He asserts also that “when James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars, perceived the grace that was given” him, they received him, giving him the right hand of fellowship. But all this can be made to mean nothing more than that they acknowledged his call to the apostolate, and by no means implies that they looked upon him as irresponsible. On the contrary, it seems to us pretty clear that the apostles were directed and responsible. We are told that “when the apostles that were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and

John," which clearly shows that those two inspired apostles *were directed* by their brethren, and *obeyed* them. Paul and Barnabas also *were sent* away to their work by the Church, and when they returned, they *reported their work* to the Church, both at Antioch and Jerusalem. (Acts xiii. 3; xiv. 26, 27; xv. 4, 40.) Again, Paul was sent, together with Barnabas and others, by the church at Antioch, to Jerusalem, "*to the apostles and elders,*" about a doctrinal question: "And the apostles and elders came together for to consider this matter" (Acts xv. 2, 6).

Again, we learn in Acts xi. 2, that the brethren in Jerusalem by no means supposed that Peter was free from error or irresponsible. When he admitted the people of Cornelius to the Church, he was called to account for it by those of the circumcision. He did not reply that he was independent and irresponsible to them. On the contrary, he gave an account of his conduct by rehearsing the whole matter. He pleaded in his justification that it was the Lord's doings, which he could not resist. So that even when acting under the direct guidance of the Lord, he still recognised and respected an authority which was over him in the Church. When he afterwards erred, he was rebuked in the presence of the Church (Gal. ii. 11).

All this seems to indicate clearly that the apostles were not independent and irresponsible. The Presidents of the Provinces are appointed directly by the Emperor, but they are by no means irresponsible. If they violate the law of the Empire in the administration of their office, they are tried by the courts like other men. With such evidence before us in Scripture, we cannot agree that the apostles were *independent, irresponsible* officers. But they will tell us that Paul was not controlled *in his missionary work*. True, he was not under the direct supervision and inspection of a court in his mission field; and *that is the very point we make*. He was a responsible officer, responsible to his brethren; yet while he was set apart and sent out by them and was responsible to them, he was left free to conduct and develop his work as its exigencies required, without the constant oversight, inspection, and interference of a mission. Had he erred as Peter erred (Gal. ii. 11), he would have been reminded that,

while free in his work, he was subject to control, and his opinions liable to be reversed in the presence of all the brethren, as Peter's were. We maintain that when the Holy Spirit sent forth those apostolic ministers to do their work and travel every where, untrammelled by missions, it was because the Saviour saw that it would be best to have it that way in his Church in all times; and it must have been because he thought that such interference and *such* control and oversight would produce harm. That is the scriptural apostolic plan. Now, let the friends of these organic missions or "evangelistic courts" show some scriptural grounds for their plan.

Dr. Lefevre affirms that the inspiration of the apostles "excluded confusion." We challenge him to produce the proof from Scripture. His article is written to show that two courts or two evangelists cannot have independent jurisdiction over the same subjects at the same time and in the same matter, for that would produce disorder and confusion of the deadliest sort. He means, then, of course, to teach that the apostles *could* have independent and several jurisdiction over the same person at the same time and in the same matter, and their common inspiration would prevent disorder and confusion. Let him present the proof. Can he refer to a single instance where this was true? We doubt it. The apostles do not seem to have been inspired at all times, under all circumstances, for all purposes, and in all their relations to each other.

On the contrary, we have at least two very memorable instances in which their common inspiration did *not* prevent confusion. Peter acted very *erroneously*, although an inspired apostle, and Paul withstood him to the face, before the whole Church. There was disorder and confusion among the apostles. On another occasion Barnabas wanted to take his nephew John Mark along on a trip; but Paul was so opposed to it that there arose "a contention so sharp between them, that they departed asunder one from the other." It seems that in this notable case each one's private opinion was an authoritative judgment. We are inclined to think that Barnabas, the uninspired brother, was in the right, for Paul afterwards confesses that the same young man, John

Mark, was profitable to him for the ministry. While the apostles attempted to *concentrate* and work together, there was confusion and disorder; for, like the prophets, they were men "subject to like passions with us." What prevented confusion among them was, not their "common inspiration," but their "departing asunder one from the other," after which we hear of no more confusion and disorder.

It is no wonder the Standing Committee of the Louisville Assembly, in recommending the appointment of a Committee to report upon the evangelist's office and relations, should say: "We felt it very important to have these questions settled, as *they are causing a great deal of trouble to our foreign missionaries.*" It is to be regretted that the Committee then appointed should finally be compelled to report as follows:

"Upon the two remaining topics, viz., 'The Evangelist's Relation to the Church gathered among the heathen, and his Relation to his Fellow Evangelists in the same field, your Committee find themselves, after two years' of conference, unable to agree. It would be easy to bring in two reports, running counter to each other, which would only involve the Church in the abstract discussion of points which must, at last, find practical solution in the foreign field. Your Committee can therefore agree only in recommending to the Assembly to drop for the present the consideration of these topics, and to wait for their practical solution in the future history of our missionary operations.'—Minutes of the Assembly of 1881, p. 388.

With all respect for that able Committee, we believe the Church has as much light before her now as she ever will have in the future. Let the Church study thoroughly the "actual facts"—the actual relations as they are set forth in the Manual—and compare them with the Scriptures, and see whether or not they are according to the divine pattern. They force us into an "evangelistic court," and, according to the Manual, this court has the direction of the whole work. The Manual explicitly declares that no individual missionary has the right to be heard in Baltimore, in regard to his work, except as he is heard through the mission. Now, each minister, layman, and woman is naturally interested in his or her special work. One wants more money for colporteurs, or travelling expenses; another wants

more aid for students for the ministry ; another wants an increased allowance for the boys' boarding school ; another thinks the prosperity of the girls' school depends upon more aid in the way of money or an assistant teacher ; another wants a dwelling house ; another wants to build a chapel—and so on to the end of the list. According to the Manual, all these things must be discussed in a mission meeting ; and the estimates must be sent up to the Committee, with reasons for all these wants. Now, the Committee can hardly ever grant all. They must necessarily refuse the request of one and grant that of another. Here, then, we have, as all may readily imagine, a fruitful source of a thousand heart-burnings and jealousies, and “a great deal of trouble to our foreign missionaries.”

Again, the mission controls all the individual members. If one man wants to preach, the others may think he has special qualifications for teaching, either the boys or girls, as the case may be. He is induced, against his inclinations, to undertake what he thinks does not pertain to him as a minister of the gospel. At the end of a few years, when he gets thoroughly interested in his special work, the mission may think it better for him to do something else. In deference to his brethren (and sisters, perhaps) he again accedes. Here, in this personal “control,” we have another fruitful source of “trouble to our foreign missionaries.” And all the while the Church at home wonders how it is that anything can “cause trouble to our foreign missionaries,” seeing they are so holy, and are not expected to be men and women of like passions with other ordinary mortals.

It must be remembered, that while the mission is an “evangelistic court,” clothed with these large Presbyterian powers, it can never inspire respect and obedience like a Presbytery, since it is composed of only three or four members, and each is at the head of a special work, and all these works must appear in the mission and before the Executive Committee as *rivals*.

Let the evangelists be free and independent of each other, and directly responsible to the Church at home, either to the Presbytery or to the Executive Committee. Let each man take hold of the special work to which he feels called, and be free to develop

it, without interference on the part of his brethren. If it be a college, let it be under a close corporation, composed of intelligent Christian men in the field. If it is direct ecclesiastical work, let him have his own field and place of residence, and gather around him his native assistants, as Paul did. Let him organise his churches, and let him report to the home Church, as did Paul and Barnabas. Let him send up his own estimates to the Committee, presenting his own reasons for his applications.

There should be no more mutual control and oversight among evangelists in heathen lands than there is between pastors at home. The fact that two, three, or four pastors live and labor in the same city at home, does not necessitate their forming a mission to control and direct each other in their work.

We have hitherto considered the mission in the same light with Dr. Lefevre; that is, as an "*evangelistic court*;" as if it were composed only of the evangelists or ministers belonging to the mission. In order, however, that we may form an intelligent judgment of this mission court, let us look again at its composition. The Manual says that it "is composed of all the *missionaries* [ministers] and *male assistant missionaries*, which term is applied to *laymen* sent out as *teachers and physicians*." This court is composed, then, of *ministers and laymen*! Let our Presbyteries, then, know that the men whom they ordain as ministers of the word and rulers in Christ's kingdom, and send out as their representatives, to exercise their ecclesiastical powers in foreign lands, are compelled by *Presbyterian law* to wield those powers jointly with laymen! They must meekly lay down their work at the feet of teachers and physicians, and go at the beck of those who were never called by the Spirit to rule in the Church, never set apart by the Church to do such work, and dare not appear in Church courts at home. Did the New Orleans Assembly really know what it was doing when it adopted the Report of the Standing Committee? Did the members of that Assembly, at the time, or has the Church since then, calmly studied this Manual? Is she satisfied with this *law* and this *evangelistic court*? Would she tolerate such a thing at home? In view of the composition of this *evangelistic court*, Dr. Le-

fevre's definition of the evangelist is exceedingly pertinent; he does, indeed, "wield ecclesiastical power *in an extraordinary way*"! Surely he could wield it in no more extraordinary way than jointly with laymen! Even if this court were composed only of the ministers, without the laymen sent out as teachers and physicians, it would still be, as we have clearly shown, utterly unscriptural, unconstitutional, and unpresbyterian. We suppose it is in that light only that Dr. Lefevre regards it. But how he can speak of the "actual facts" of "a mission that is composed" and still not be aware that, according to the law which governs the Executive Committee, of which he is chairman, the mission is composed of ministers and *laymen*, we cannot comprehend, and we leave it to him to escape from the dilemma into which he has been led.

A strange court, truly, is this new mission court. We confess we can see nothing in the thing but Congregationalism bedecked with Presbyterian garments—a mongrel ecclesiastical combination, legalised by Presbyterian *law*. It is well Dr. Lefevre divides the evangelist into two classes. He thereby spares the Church the necessity of establishing, for consistency's sake, such *evangelistic courts* at home, for the decent and orderly exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. We propose, however, in order that the Church may not be compelled to await future developments from the foreign fields, that she instruct the Home Mission Committee to create missions for the home evangelists such as we have for the foreign. Let them appoint teachers and physicians to labor in connexion with our home evangelists. And why should they not? If the souls of the poor heathen are to be saved by teaching them the multiplication table and dosing their stomachs with quinine and castor oil, cannot the backwoods-men and city roughs at home be saved by the same modern inventions for regenerating bad hearts? After these "male assistant" evangelists have been duly appointed, let the Executive Committee of Home Missions prepare *their* manual, to be laid before the Standing Committee of the Assembly, to be approved and made *law*. Let it be argued that, inasmuch as these evangelists and teachers and physicians are all paid by the same Ex-

ecutive Committee, therefore they must organise themselves into a "mission technically so-called—a sub-committee," and these evangelists must wield their power of jurisdiction jointly with these laymen. We venture the opinion it would be a serious undertaking, and it would not require a Committee of seven able ecclesiastics to decide what are the relations of the evangelists to their fellow-laborers.

Would our Presbyteries at home consent to admit laymen to *their* councils? Would they submit for one moment to a *law* requiring them to do so? And yet this is the "law" that binds their brethren on foreign soil. We do not believe the Church would tolerate this mongrel hybrid in her own bosom for one moment. This is the quagmire into which this will-o'-the-wisp has led our Church. We do not hesitate to affirm that no "complex problem," requiring such a solution, should ever have been created; and we believe the Church will agree with us. If this monstrous excrescence is to be fastened upon our Church polity, then, in the name of Presbyterianism, "blow up the mission." Let the Church stamp out of existence this creature that crawls forth into open day and demands that its nakedness be covered with Presbyterian robes.

Will not the reader agree with us, that the relations which we teaching elders, we ministers of the gospel on foreign soil, are compelled, according to the Manual, to sustain towards our fellow-laborers, are unconstitutional, unscriptural, and unwise?

But what should be our relations to the teachers and physicians who are sent out by the Executive Committee? If they are not to have the privilege of controlling us and directing our work, what are our mutual relations? We reply, just the same that exist between pastors and Christian gentlemen in their congregations at home. Each should have his special work to do; and if the Church sends them out in obedience to the Great Commission, they should be sent out after being set apart by "the laying on of the hands" of the Executive Committee; and the Church has no more right to subject them to our control or us to theirs, than she has to subject city pastors at home to the control of the laymen in their congregation, or *vice versa*. Our teachers and physicians

on foreign soil should be members of the native churches where they reside, and be subject to the authority of the Sessions, just as any other private Christian would be. They have no right to a seat in a court along with their pastors, unless they have been ordained and take their seat in a constitutional way.

But we have other fellow-laborers besides our brother-ministers and the teachers and physicians. In order that the Church may appreciate thoroughly the discussion on all these important questions, we make the following extract from the Manual :

"ASSISTANT MISSIONARIES.

"This term is indifferently applied to laymen sent out as teachers, to missionary physicians, to *unmarried ladies*, and to *the wives of missionaries*. The labor of these different classes, with the exception of the wives of the missionaries, is prosecuted under the general direction of the *mission*, whose powers are defined hereinafter. The wives of missionaries being provided with outfit and other general expenses, are expected to do what they can to promote the general work ; but in view of their necessary domestic cares, their labors must be of a somewhat desultory character."

It is to be regretted that the Manual is not more explicit on so important and interesting a question as our relations to the "unmarried ladies" and our "wives."

As to the "unmarried ladies," it is plain enough that their labors are to be prosecuted under the general direction of the *mission*. Here, again, we invite the authors of the Manual to come upon scriptural and constitutional grounds, and show us a reason for subjecting the unmarried ladies to our control. We maintain that it is a grievous yoke that Scripture no where puts upon them, and that is certainly contrary to the nobler sentiments of the nineteenth century. Inasmuch as the known modesty of our Southern unmarried ladies would forbid their coming before the public to demand their liberty, we will assume the responsibility of doing so in their name, though we have not been invited to do so, and may be considered by some as somewhat Quixotic. We maintain, however, that there is not the least indication any where in Scripture that the unmarried ladies were subjected to the "control" of missions. On the contrary, we think we can show very clearly that they were not. Paul says to Timothy :

"I will therefore that the younger women *marry*," etc. (1 Tim. v. 14). Then, after he gets them married, he says they must be "discreet, chaste, keepers *at home, good, obedient to their own husbands*" (Titus ii. 5); and "if they will learn anything, let them ask their *husbands at home*" (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35). Now, we think that the "younger women" spoken of by Paul are the same class as the "unmarried ladies" of the Manual; and Paul is very bold, and says, "*I will that they marry.*" Before they marry, the command is very positive: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for that is right" (Eph. vi. 1). After they marry, the command is equally positive: "Wives, submit yourselves to *your own husbands*" (Eph. v. 22; Col. iii. 18). As "ladies" must obey their *parents* until married, and their *husbands* afterwards, any "control" by the mission is proved unscriptural, by the rule of exclusion, inasmuch as there cannot be two jurisdictions over the same subject, at the same time and in the same matter. The ladies must be controlled, like every one else, according to "decency and order" (1 Cor. xiv. 40). But the "ladies" can protest against any "control" by the mission on principles of exegesis. In all three passages (Eph. v. 22; Col. iii. 18; and Titus ii. 5) Paul uses the word *ἰδῶν*, *your own* husbands, which excludes any control on the part of the husbands of *other* ladies.

Now, therefore, why do our Baltimore brethren attempt to put a yoke upon the necks of the unmarried ladies which neither they nor their mothers were able to bear?

But they will no doubt tell us that we carry the principles of exegesis too far; for Paul said, "Help those women who labored with me in the gospel." Now, they will say, inasmuch as married ladies had to be "keepers *at home*," it is plain that those women who labored in the gospel must have been unmarried ladies. But, in the *first* place, had they been unmarried ladies, the chivalric Paul would not have used so vulgar a phrase as *those women*. In the *second* place, he does not intimate that he controlled them; on the contrary, he says they labored *with* him in the gospel. Now *with* is very different from *under the control of*. In the *third* place, Paul was not a mission composed of several

husbands of other ladies. It is generally supposed that he was a bachelor, which *changes the figure*, as the Brazilians say. In the *fourth* place, correct principles of interpretation forbid our giving to a doubtful passage an interpretation that is contradictory to the plain teaching of several other passages, when the doubtful passage may fairly be interpreted in harmony with the rest of Scripture. Now, Paul is very positive on the marriage question. "*I will that the younger ladies marry.*" If those women were unmarried ladies, we can only suppose that his experience in attempting to control them in the first years of his missionary labors was such as to induce him afterwards to order them all to marry. But according to Dr. Lefevre, Paul's common inspiration would exclude any sort of confusion in his management of his missionary work, so we cannot suppose there was any difficulty on this score; moreover, he was inspired, and could not change. When those women, therefore, labored with him, he must have held the same opinions that he did when he afterwards wrote his Epistle to Titus. Those women, therefore, could not have been unmarried ladies. We are confirmed in this view when we examine particularly into the question of "those women." The exhortation in regard to them is found in the letter that the apostle wrote to the church at Philippi. Now, when we turn to the Acts and read the history of Paul's labors at Philippi, we do not find that those women bore any resemblance to the unmarried ladies of the Manual. It is said that when they arrived there, "on the sabbath day we went out of the city by a riverside where prayer was wont to be made, and we sat down, and spake unto the women who resorted thither" (Acts xvi. 13). One of these was Lydia, who was converted, and then constrained Paul to lodge in her house, which he did. Now, there is no hint given us in the history that any unmarried ladies were sent out by the home church at Antioch or Jerusalem. "Those women," therefore, that Paul mentions in his letter to Philippi must have been women converted through his preaching. They were *native Christian women*. And Lydia, who is the only one mentioned in the history, was a married woman, for she had a "household" to occupy her which she had baptized; and the word in the Greek is *οικος*, which Dr. Dabney clearly shows was ap-

plied only to parents and children. (Theology, page 790, 2d Ed.) Moreover, the service rendered by those Pauline "female assistant missionaries" seems to have been very different from the work of the "unmarried ladies" of the Manual. They did not teach mission schools to bring the little heathen girls "under the influence of the gospel," as the pet phrase goes; nor did they stand on the sidewalk to preach the gospel to crowds of admiring and wondering heathen. They labored with Paul in the gospel as all native Christian women are ready to do, by receiving him into their houses, by encouraging him and sympathising with him when beaten and cast into prison. The only "unmarried lady" in Philippi who labored with Paul in the gospel, as the phrase is understood and acted upon in the nineteenth century, was "a certain damsel possessed with a spirit of divination." She followed them; she preached publicly, or rather recommended the preaching of the missionaries, "saying, These men are the servants of the most high God which show unto us the way of salvation." But the history shows that Paul did not attempt to "control" that unmarried lady, but simply cast out the spirit of which she was possessed, and suffered the consequences of his rashness.

The truth is, in all seriousness, we can see no possible reason why ministers abroad should have any more control over unmarried ladies than pastors of churches at home. The Church practically interprets the great commission, "Make disciples of all nations," to mean, "Gather the children of all nations into mission schools," and very consistently, therefore, gives her best energies to the school work, wherever the Adversary disposes the people to encourage the missionaries to waste their energies in that way. The Church, however, should be consistent, and set apart by the solemn imposition of hands all who are called by the Holy Ghost to the school work, be they male "teachers" or "unmarried ladies." The girls' schools and the ladies will then bear the same relations to the Church's sympathies and charities, and to the ecclesiastical courts, as the ministers of the gospel and the work of the ministry. Since the Church has decided that, in maintaining mission schools, she is obeying the great command, the wants of these schools of course appear before the mission and

the Executive Committee along with, and as rivals of, the work of the ministry in spreading the gospel. The Manual is therefore consistent, to say the least, when it gives the male teachers the same standing in the mission as the ministers; but we must protest against not allowing the "unmarried ladies" who have charge of the girls' school to vote on all questions that arise in the mission. It is their right, and they should assert it. If it is denied them, who could complain if they should freely use that privilege that the Manual gives them when it says, "All members of the mission are expected to *correspond freely* with the home office [in Baltimore]". Since the Manual declares that "in relation to business matters, however, such as appropriation of funds, the establishment of schools, etc., . . . the correspondence shall be between the mission as such and the Executive Committee," and denies the unmarried ladies a vote upon these matters in which they are so intimately concerned, the *free correspondence* rule should be extended in their case to the direct presentation of their special work to the Executive Committee, and its merits and its claims on the Church's charities, as compared with what the various ministers may be doing.

In any case, when the Committee of Home Missions write out their Manual, they should not forget to put charity schools conducted by unmarried ladies along with the evangelistic work. We recommend, however, one improvement that they should by all means make. *Give the ladies a seat and a vote in the EVANGELISTIC COURT, and leave out the free correspondence rule.*

We wish it to be clearly understood that we do not object to the heathen girls, and boys, too, being taught. We have not one word to say against the devoted zeal of those women who have gone forth to labor in the cause of Christ for the salvation of fellow human beings. What we maintain is, that it is a zeal without knowledge, that inevitably draws them into the vortex of that defiant spirit of rebellion against the Holy Ghost, which has led many in these last years to harangue the vulgar immoral crowds in the streets and along the canals of China, and to mount the platforms of public halls, and enter the pulpits of Presbyterian churches at home. We believe that when our beloved Church,

in her corporate capacity, sends her daughters to carry the gospel to the heathen, she is false to her adorable Redeemer, and, under the specious plea of love to the heathen, she leaves her Lord and yields to the enticements of an infidel age. In yielding to the pressure of *the age*, we are committing a great wrong that will roll its baleful consequences upon the succeeding generations of our children.

JOHN BOYLE.

ARTICLE VI.

A PERSONAL GOD THE POSTULATE OF REASON;
FAITH THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE.

The theory of cognition, the nature and the limits of human knowledge, the validity of knowledge founded on belief, as compared with knowledge originating in the empirical sense, and more especially such philosophical problems as they relate to the sphere of thought described by the term Theism, are the living questions of the day. What can I know? is the problem whose solution underlies all thought-values.

Does physical antecedence exhaust the notion of causality as a principle of knowledge, or does the judgment signify efficient power?

Is the finality which the order and adjustments of nature present immanent and unconscious, or does it betoken the creative power and superintending providence of a personal God? Can science so coördinate physical force as to construct the universe; and so explain the Cosmos as to lift us above the "need of the hypothesis of a God"?

If science may dispense with the knowledge of God, it is because ultimately it disallows all spiritual being. The hypothesis of mind in man is equally untenable, and he becomes a mere "sentient automaton," and the last term of a series of developments beginning with "cosmic gas," and effected by a mechanical "tyranny of organisation."

When stripped of its euphemism there is an incoherence in the utterance of these dogmas, and an essential incongruity which demonstrates their falsity. On the other hand, the concatenation of the truth, in its subjective apprehension, from the very nature of mind as a cognitive agent, contributes largely to the certitude which differentiates knowledge. Hence the great power of clear consecutive statement in the presentation of truth.

The science of man as an embodied spirit furnishes a clew to the interpretation not only of nature external to him, but of revelation as it bears upon him. There is a unity and mutual dependence of all the manifestations God has given of himself in his works and in his word.

In the natural endowment of intelligence and moral agency that God gave man, he made a revelation which is not antiquated nor superseded by the revelation of his word. The Bible accepts and assumes the truths which arise in the mind as intuitive beliefs, and other things being equal, opens its treasures of wisdom and knowledge and grace in richest profusion to the man who knows himself—who knows himself as God made him.

In the revealed Scriptures God does not disregard the logical relations of truth, nor the laws according to which our minds get knowledge. In making known his gracious will by direct communication in man's language, he did not ignore nor degrade the previous revelations of himself in the creation of the world, and in the constitution of man's nature. Natural religion supplies the postulates on which revealed religion rests.

It is not necessary to the bare fact of salvation that the Christian should be able to reduce to unity the thoughts of God in the natural and the supernatural, but it is essential to the highest edification of the believer in Christ, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things." On the universal headship of Christ the Scriptures give promise of the recapitulation of all things in him. As a partial result in this direction—as a particular bearing the type of the complete and ultimate fact—all that belonged originally to man, the constitutive attributes of his nature as he came from the hands of his Creator, shall be rebuilt in the workmanship of grace created in Christ Jesus. The end

which grace seeks presupposes the mind that God gave man; and the consummation of the gospel in the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus, as God works, could not be realised upon a plan that should overlook the elements distinctive of his rational and moral being, the laws according to which his mind attains knowledge and assimilates to itself its acquisitions. In the progress towards the glorious result there must be the growth of a true manhood; the development into distinct consciousness of the fundamental principles of the true and the right; the enshrining of these principles as motive powers in the affections of the soul; and the engrafting of the activities of thought occupied with the practical problems of life upon those primary beliefs, which in the constitution of the mind have been implanted as the perennial roots—sources of vitality out of which shall be evolved all its growth and its fruitage. And the man does not reach the culmination of his maturity until the process of unfolding is complete in the coalescence of the ultimate in his development with the primary in his constitution; until the last achievement in the formulation of his thought coincides with the first principles of the metaphysic of his nature; until the circle completely returns upon itself, so that the last acquisition of his activity is identical with the starting point of his rational career. It is thus that the first truth is also the ultimate truth.

The mind thus developed, whose reflective consciousness reads aright what God has written by creative fiat in the nature of man as a rational and moral intelligence, has a vantage ground supremely favorable for searching the Scriptures, and for learning the higher lessons of revealed wisdom.

In thus representing the importance of natural knowledge as a propædeutic of high spiritual attainment—as a knowledge preparatory and disciplinary—the reference is not to the knowledge possessed or attainable by the natural man as he is described in the Scriptures. Degraded by sin he holds the truth in unrighteousness; his perverted mind turns the truth of God into a lie; his depraved heart darkens the understanding, and as he does not like to retain God in his knowledge, he is judicially abandoned to a reprobate mind to believe what is false and to do things unsuitable to his nature. In consequence of this depravity men

may neglect what God shows them in the things which he has made, and may dogmatically contradict what, notwithstanding their denial, is to their own mind a primary belief. A belief may be metaphysically necessary—that is, essential to our nature—and yet be rejected by the logical understanding. These metaphysical principles do not regulate the processes of mind mechanically. They arise in the mind on their proper occasion. It is possible to adopt principles which are to thought subversive of them; and the understanding starting from false premises reasons with formal accuracy to false conclusions. The human personality, the existence of the external world, have been denied; but neither the sensationalist nor the subjective idealist has been able to live in harmony with his theory.

Men have denied the existence of God, the personality of God, and the possibility of man's knowledge of God; but the monitions of conscience are not silenced by the most insolent atheism. The primary belief, though dogmatically contradicted and stifled by the enmity of the carnal heart, still asserts its character and authority as an original conviction by casting up inquiries and suggesting apprehensions that would not arise, if the theory that rejects God or denies him to human knowledge were true. An unwillingness to receive truth operates to bias the perception and disables the judgment. Göthe has said: "As are the inclinations, so are the opinions;" and Fichte, that "our system of thought is often only the history of our heart," and that "men do not will according to their reason, but reason according to their will."

None but the renewed mind, which has been restored from its depravity in sin, and freed from the thralldom of a deceitful and wicked heart; none but the believer, who has been brought back into harmony with himself as God made him; none but the Christian, whose delight is to find God, and the window of whose soul is ever open towards the source of light, can have an unrefracted discernment of those truths which present themselves as postulates of human knowledge; truths which have no premises; which depend for their attestation on no inferential relation to other truth; truths which spontaneously arise as primary beliefs,

whenever the mind turns to inquire in the relations where these truths belong; truths so radically incorporated with the power to know, and constituting so essentially the integrity of the mind, and the basis of confidence in knowledge, that in virtue of them, and on their unsupported *dictum*, we may promptly repudiate as spiritually false that which philosophical ingenuity may offer as logically impregnable.

The gospel does not divorce itself from these principles of the intuitive reason. On the contrary, it is in the truths of the higher reason that it finds its closest affiliations in man's nature. "Ye believe in God, believe also in me," says Christ. Ultimately, the belief of both rests on the same ground. The truths of the gospel and the truths which express the revelation of God in man's nature, are both attested by their unborrowed light to the faith of the human heart. It is not necessary to theorise the life from Christianity and reduce it to a barren religious theosophy, in order to blend the lights of the natural and the supernatural. Christianity appeals to a sense of obligation original in man, and submits its claims at the bar of right reason—reason regulated by the intuitive truth.

When human thought, the forge of all activities, is analysed in its relation to human life; when civilisation, which is the fruit of these activities, is resolved, it is found that the practical truths, the truths which affect our hearts and our lives, are always ultimate truths. It is the primary belief infiltrating, as it were, all thought, that gives to every question its real significance and its power over the human mind. It is not necessary to the office of these fundamental principles of the reason, that they be distinctly recognised, and that the philosophical propositions in which they are formulated be assented to. In relation to the movements of mind, they are not premises in reasoning, but conditions of knowledge. As first truths, given in the constitution of the mind, they are called beliefs of the reason, in contradistinction from the forms of thought elaborated by the understanding. They are innate, in the sense that the mind has the power to be the source of them. But they do not arise in the mind independently of experience. They appear in the mental phenomena only in relation to some form of

being, and in connexion with the concrete reality. Patricius, as quoted by Hamilton, has most happily stated the distinction : "*Cognitio omnis a mente primam originem, a sensibus exordium habet primum.*"

When spoken of as ultimate truths, reference is had to their chronological relation in the order of knowledge. The speculative knowledge of these principles is possible only to few. The discrimination of them as elements of mind, the discovery of their relation to the activities of mind, the explanation of them as laws of intelligence, the statement of them in formulæ as the dicta of a rational nature, require the profoundest habit of the philosophic consciousness and the most highly developed and trained power of abstract thought.

The faculty of faith by which the mind rests in these principles is, from its correlation with the principles themselves, the strongest, most fruitful, force in the world of human nature. Whenever the appeals of men have penetrated to these depths of the spiritual being, and been connected with these principles as the concrete occasions of their rise in consciousness, the most irresistible and lasting influences that can be wielded are obtained. The sinews of men's souls are linked in vital accord with the proposals of those who lead them.

Professor Wace, lecturing on the Bampton foundation, has said : "It is upon *faith* that every civilisation has been based ; and in proportion as such faith has been weakened, has every civilisation tottered to its fall. A universal instinct has taught statesmen to recognise in the maintenance of this principle the indispensable basis of the social and political organisations over which they have presided."

Göthe has written : "All epochs in which faith, under whatever form, has prevailed, have been brilliant, heart-elevating, and fruitful, both to contemporaries and posterity. All epochs, on the contrary, in which unbelief, under whatever form, has maintained a sad supremacy, even if for the moment they glitter with a false splendor, vanish from the memory of posterity, because none care to torment themselves with the knowledge of that which has been barren."

The principle of authority is the correlative of the principle of faith; and the universal trustfulness of human nature, where the race has possessed any organic life or moral vigor, its willingness to accept, and to hazard its interests upon, some sort of guidance, has its explanation in the fact that God constituted the human mind to repose on the manifestations of his own mind. It is therefore ultimately to the voice of God in the soul that men appeal whenever they call to their aid the principle of faith.

Christianity redeems from its abuses and perversions, and restores to its normal action in vitally new relations, the principle which God implanted originally in man's nature for his guidance and government. "Modern thought," as the sceptical speculation of the day styles itself, discloses as its characteristic a temper of mind that repudiates the chief lesson of history, and spurns the essential principle on which the race has advanced to its present civilisation. The science of sensible things has so predominated in the achievements of thought in our day, that its processes and its habits of mind have asserted a disproportionate sway, and disturbed the balances of truth. Science so restricted, admits the validity of no conviction that cannot be verified by the practical test of the senses; and we must therefore limit our beliefs to those things which allow the application of the test. This claim remands to the abysmal unknown all questions respecting the spirituality and personality of man and of God, and obliterates all the distinctions that make life worth living. The sensationalist vitiates even the limited and unimportant knowledge that he allows to be possible. The universe he would construct is "the baseless fabric of a vision." As Prof. Diman wrote, "I hold that any satisfactory conception which we can form of nature or life, involves inferences that go beyond phenomena, and that the whole structure of human knowledge rests on assumptions that science is not competent to establish. Science calls on us to exercise faith in many things not demonstrable by reason. In fact, we transcend phenomena, and put faith in the unseen, when we infer the existence of a material world, just as much as when we infer the presence of a supernatural agency." Mere sensible experience can give no knowledge beyond the limit of simple

enumeration. Generalisation is impossible, except on the authority of primary beliefs which are independent of experience.

But there are spiritual phenomena presenting themselves to our consciousness, forcing themselves on our attention, and occasioning inquiries which we cannot but recognise as concerning us far more than any questions about things of which we have information by sense. These are phenomena not of sense, but of consciousness, essentially diverse from the facts of physical nature. They will not submit to any sensible test; they cannot be interpreted in terms of physical force. We cannot study the operations of mind by investigating the structure and functions of the brain. So far as the method of science is concerned with the assertion, it is out of the reach of man to determine that thought has its correlative in the physics of the brain, in the sense that there are peculiar and distinct molecular groupings and molecular motions corresponding to the individual phases of psychic activity. We believe that, owing to the mysterious union of spirit and physical substance in the constitution of man, there are mutual reactions of the dual parts of his nature, so that there is truth in the aphorism, "*mens sana in sano corpore.*" But that there is any such organic dependence of thought on physical process as to legitimate the conclusion that "a right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain" is the physical antecedent of the consciousness of love; and that a left-handed spiral motion in like manner conditions hate—makes a large demand on human credulity. To justify this physico-psychological method of investigating pure spiritualities, the allegation is made that consciousness is untrustworthy, and that the term *science* cannot be allowed to the uncertain conclusions founded on the ephemeral data of consciousness.

The explanation of the partisan disparagement of the testimony of consciousness is not far to seek. If personal consciousness is accepted as trustworthy, the principle of *faith* must be admitted, and the experientialist's theory of knowledge is proved untenable.

The "*sensus communis hominum,*" as well as the trend and effort of philosophy in all ages, leaves no room to question that in the estimate of the mind itself the problems which those theo-

rists who call themselves *par excellence* scientists exclude from the domain of human research, are the very problems which explain the finality of our powers of knowledge. Reason is stultified by the assumption that in matters of highest import to us, our rational nature mocks us with insoluble enigmas. Why should I concern myself to study the forces and phenomena of physical nature, if the questions concerning my own nature and relations and destiny, which haunt me at every point of contact, are beyond the limit of legitimate inquiry?

These questions of the nature and limits of human knowledge are as old as the first essays of the human mind in philosophy. And while they are questions in metaphysics, they do not concern the metaphysician alone, but present themselves to every man as underlying all other questions of his life. Locke said: "Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct." Kant said: "The business of philosophy is to answer three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? For what may I hope?" An eminent poet and sceptical philosopher, obeying the spontaneous yearnings of his nature, has said: "Man is born, not to solve the problems of the universe, but to find where the problem for himself begins." And Paul, on Mars' Hill, confronting the Athenian agnostics, has, under the guidance of divine wisdom, worded for us the problem which the philosopher, under the impulse of a primary conviction, groped after: "God that made the world and all things therein, . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us."

Rational existence is the phenomenon which crowns the creative work of God. The end of rational existence—the *τέλειον τέλος*—is to know God; and the history of humanity is the manifestation of God's providence inspiring, guiding, and disciplining man towards this end.

In the original constitution of the mind, man was specially endowed with the power to know God. It is not meant that the

knowledge of God is innate in the sense that men are born with this knowledge already formulated in their understandings. We do not come into the world having our minds stored with propositions; but we are constituted to know some truths on their presentation, as credible in themselves; as independent of any other truth for verification; as postulates of the understanding. All thinking, all rational procedure, must, from the finiteness of the human mind, have some starting-point, some assumed truth, from which its process begins; some truth accredited by the laws of intelligence, and believed as self-evident. And it is upon this foundation of primary belief, of intuitive truth, that the mind builds the superstructure of all its acquisitions, and behind these first principles the discursive reason cannot adventure.

This function to know God supplies the *rationale* of the human intelligence; all thought implies a spontaneous faith in God. The nature of human knowledge, as conditioned by necessary intuitive truth, points to the *nexus* of dependence by which the human mind has its source, and not in the eternal reason. Truth is no abstraction; it cannot exist apart from mind. Whatever is true, even the phenomenal truth, derives its validity from the eternal truth; and truth can be said to be eternal only as it exists in the eternal mind. So that truth is incomprehensible without God, and "God is the light of all our seeing." The principles on which we know anything, are the principles of truth as that truth eternally inheres in God. So that we cannot be said to have attained any real knowledge except as we know things in their relation to God as the manifestations of his glorious name. Our capacity to know anything realises its highest purpose in the duty patent to every moral nature to search the manifestations which God has given in his works and in his word of his attributes and will, of his infinite excellence and glory. The laws of intelligence impressed on our minds as rational and moral beings, the constitutive powers which make the mind what it is, are designed, in their unperverted and free action, to lead us immediately to this knowledge of God. All other knowledge is ancillary to this.

In the explanation of the phenomena of nature, or in the
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analysis of human knowledge, the purpose in view does not always require us to go back to the ultimate principle of faith in God. It is generally sufficient to find a proximate support in a proposition that is conceded as established, and that expresses a more general fact than the one thought under it. These more general facts we call "laws." The higher the generalisation, the more adequate and satisfactory the explanation which it affords. This adequacy is not due to the multiplicity of phenomena which the generalisation colligates. A logical universal can never arise out of simple enumeration. The only mental sequence of any number of observed recurrences is an expectation. Simple enumeration may be contradicted by a single instance. Unless the mind furnishes some principle from its powers of knowledge which may bind the phenomena together, the product of simple enumeration is a mere rope of sand.

The devotees of scientific culture as a substitute for religion, felicitate themselves over some proximate explanation by natural law of physical phenomena which, in less advanced stages of scientific progress, had been referred to the immediate agency of God. Their exultation recalls the story which Herodotus relates of the Egyptians who thought and congratulated themselves that they were less in the power of the gods than were the Greeks, because the fertility of their soil did not depend on the capricious rains, but was secured by the annual inundation of the Nile. If they had pursued this investigation only one step back of their conclusion, they would have discovered that the rains in the remote interior of Africa explained the overflow of their river.

The vaunted conflict of science and religion is precisely of this kind. Sometimes those who find God in his works, make too short the sequence between the First Cause and the observed fact; but the discovery of a new link, or of many new links, does not prove that there is no such causal sequence. Sometimes science, and especially in the hands of theorists who do not like to retain God in their knowledge, stops short in its regressive movement towards the First Cause, and proposes its intermediate conclusions as ultimate truths.

The universe, in all its departments as laid before man for his

investigation, is not a *thing*, but a *thought*. The mind of man is the centre of this realm of earthly being, which, as has been well said, "exists only in reason, and by reason, and for reason." The invariable laws of nature, the correlation of its forces, its attractions and repulsions, the whole procession of its phenomena, would be a shallow pageant, void and vain, were not the whole system, in its grand unity and manifold diversities, a revelation of the creative mind to derived intelligence. "The act of knowledge, in so far as it is the copying in the human consciousness of the essence of the thing, is the after-thinking of the thoughts which the divine creative thinking has built into things." The spirit of a true philosophy, as it comes to the interpretation of the book of nature, has been exemplified in Kepler, when he exclaimed, "O God! I think thy thoughts after thee." And the true method of the study of nature has been reduced to its scientific statement by Agassiz, when he says that "all true and thorough classification is but the interpretation of the thoughts of the Creator."

To a certain degree, our minds are correlative; or, to speak perhaps more correctly, are responsive to the mind of God. There is a preëstablished harmony between the world of thought within and the world of material order and adjustment without. Man's powers of knowledge furnish the key to the mysteries of nature, so that man, by the mere workings of his spirit, may be able to penetrate the system of nature as the workmanship of God.

By this correspondence of mind in man with the material world, no logical support is given to the theory of constructive idealism, which, by a process of dialectic, unfolds from the subjective self all existence; which makes the *ego* the generating principle of all things; so that the world is but a shadow projected by the laws of the thinking subject, and nothing is real but the logical evolution of ideas in the mind. Nature is a revelation, not of man, but of God; but it is a revelation to man's intelligence. Man is himself a part of nature, and the responsiveness of his mind to nature as a revelation of God, is a principle of the unity of nature, and is just as essential to the knowledge of self as to his knowledge of the world external to him. The harmony of mind in man and mind in nature makes it pos-

sible for man to interpret the phenomena of nature, but furnishes no *terminus a quo* for the ideal process of an *a priori* construction of the universe. It enables him to ascertain the truth of *what is*, but does not enable him to determine *what must be*. Science is the coördination of the facts of nature under general concepts ; it is the reduction of the order of phenomena to the order of thought ; and the test of the syntheses of science that commends them at last to acceptance, is their conformability to the laws of thought. This power of coördination in thought is responsive, not creative ; it is not an absolute power, but a power that man possesses in his relation to the universe around him.

Positivists regard this power of abstract conception as "one of the artifices of research which our infirmity renders indispensable." On the contrary, it is a method of research which manifests the power of the human mind as the image of the mind of God.

The correspondence is between mind in man and mind in nature, not between mind in man and observed phenomena. The scientific concept may have no actual exemplification in phenomena, and yet may be essential to the understanding of phenomena. The definitions of pure mathematics afford illustration. So in the science of mechanics, the first law of motion has never been realised in any phenomena of motion, and yet any motion that is seen is inexplicable without it. This law is a "purely abstract idea." The Duke of Argyll says of it: "Like many other laws of the same class, it was discovered, not by looking outwards, but by looking inwards ; not by observing, but by thinking. The human mind, in the exercise of its own faculties and powers, sometimes by careful reasoning, sometimes by the intuitions of genius unconscious of any process, is able, from time to time, to reach now one, now another, of those purely intellectual conceptions which are the basis of all that is intelligible to us in the order of the material world."

"Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo were all guided in their profound interpretations of visible phenomena by those intuitions which arise in minds finely organised, brought into close relations with the mind of Nature, and highly trained in the exercise of

speculative thought. They guessed the truth before they proved it to be true; and those guesses had their origin in abstract ideas of the mind which turned out to be ideas really embodied in the order of the universe."

And so constant has this been in the history of science, Dr. Whewell says it is to be considered, not as an exception, but as the rule.

This responsiveness of man's mind to the thought of God might be abundantly exemplified from the history of scientific discovery and of the mechanical arts. Sir John Herschel has said: "Almost all the great combinations of modern mechanism, and many of its refinements and nicer improvements, are creations of pure intellect, grounding its exertion upon a very moderate number of elementary propositions in theoretical mechanics and geometry." The discovery of the principle of the achromatic telescope is mentioned by him as "a memorable case in science, though not a singular one, where the speculative geometer in his chamber, apart from the world, and existing among abstractions, has originated views of the noblest practical application."

Max Müller remarks that "Copernicus, in the dedication of his work to Pope Paul III., confesses that he was brought to the discovery of the sun's central position, and of the diurnal motion of the earth, not by observation or analysis, but by what he calls the feeling of a want of symmetry in the Ptolemaic system. But what had told him that there must be symmetry in all the movements of the celestial bodies, or that complication was not more sublime than simplicity? Symmetry and simplicity, before they were discovered by the observer, were postulated by the philosopher. From out of the congruities of thought man always adopts an hypothesis as a "working" synthesis before he establishes a theory.

It is the Christian philosopher—the right-minded theorist—the man whose intellectual and moral nature has been restored to harmony with his nature's God, and who accepts the science of man as furnishing the true method of investigating the phenomena of external nature:—it is the man of this character who has done the most to advance science, and whose contributions abide as

lasting acquisitions of human knowledge. And this is so, because in him mind in man responds to mind in God, and the truth and accuracy of his discovery are assured by the similitude of his understanding to the understanding of God who contrived and ordained the universe.

So we find it indicated in the structure of man's rational and moral nature, and in the scheme of the universe in which he is placed, not only that the highest function of intelligence is to know God, but also that all real knowledge must have its centre and its completion in him. "It is true," says Bacon, "a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion; for while the mind of man looketh upon the second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no farther; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity."

But further, not only is the final cause of rational existence to know God, but we are constituted to know him as he is, the true, living, personal God. "Our highest conception of existence is bound up with personality." It does not satisfy our inquest to be told that mind is only "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling," nor that it is "a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." Nothing is explained by such a "paltering with us in a double sense." The individuality of which the mind is conscious, is not a mere continuity, or succession of states. Beneath the sequence of phenomena is the self-conscious agent, the "*suppositum intelligens*," who can say "I." This conscious individuality is not recognised as a defect, but as an excellence essential to spiritual being. It is in the highest distinctive attributes and functions of our being that we stand out thus in individual subsistence from the category of things. Our strength and dignity are in our personality. It is objected that the ascription of such a mode of being to God is incompatible with his infinity; that the attribution is of the nature of definition, and that all definition is limitation; if, therefore, God be a person, he cannot be infinite; if he be infinite, he cannot be a person. But if personality be a perfection of spiritual

being, the ascription of such perfection is no more a limitation of his infinity than the ascription of holiness. We are limited not in possessing the attributes of personality, but in possessing those attributes in finite measure. God made man in his own image; and reason demands that the efficient cause of finite personality shall be himself a person. "Consciousness cannot arise out of unconsciousness; personality cannot have its birth from impersonality."

Our rational and moral nature will not own allegiance to a mere metaphysical abstraction, or impersonal principle. The apostles of "Culture" insist that modern research and the refinement of the nineteenth century require us to renounce for ever the delusion that "God is a person who thinks and loves;" that we must substitute for this relic of effete thought the idea of a "stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being." We are exhorted to give up our anthropomorphism, to erect ourselves above the habit of a masked self-adoration in representing the Supreme in the attributes of personality, and to content ourselves in the conclusion of Positivism that the highest attainment of the human mind is to ascertain the laws of phenomena, and then bow down in humble acknowledgement of the "Infinite Unknown."

But our intelligence, and, much more, our moral and religious nature, revolts from this conclusion. We feel that we should degrade God beneath ourselves were we to express his being in terms of physical force, while we express our own being in terms of spiritual action. There is an involuntary universal tendency in man to look upon his God as a personal existence. It is not a tendency that waits upon any dogmatic system of philosophy or of theology. It is a spontaneous development of mind in its normal activity. It may be imperfectly manifested. Man's spiritual nature may be wrecked so that his highest and best intuitions are dead, and his religious powers and impulses may then be so misguided and perverted as to be almost past recognition. But when unrestrained by sin, or when not overlaid by the ignorance of degradation, man's nature, by its own essential activity, clearly postulates a personal God. Indications of this religious

feature are found in both ancient and modern systems of heathenism. Even in the religions whose objects of worship are the forces or elements of nature, the deified objects are invariably personified. The hymns and prayers addressed, the propitiations and offerings made, presuppose the personality of deity. All mythologies are based upon the idea of personal, historical intercourse between the gods and men. There is a universal intuitive principle of man's being as a derived nature, by which he is impelled to think of his God as a personal existence.

This spiritual phenomenon, so universal to man, is not explained by the assumption that in personifying deity, we are only projecting outside of ourselves the facts of our own finite consciousness. That man does so know the personality of God on occasion of his own conscious personality, is a fact which itself needs to be explained, and the word of God furnishes us the only rational explanation. Man was created in the image of God, and this image is expressed in the attributes of intelligence and will, which constitute personality. We know the personality of God through, or upon occasion of, our own conscious personality, because God has so constituted us in our natures responsive to his nature, that in obeying the laws of our rational and moral intelligence, we are inevitably brought to this conclusion. And by this law of our being as in the image of God, we are protected against the loss of the true conception of God, so long as we read aright our own consciousness.

But, again, we are created with the need thus to know God.

If we contemplate man as a moral being, we discover in him a conscience which admonishes him of his personal responsibility. Whence are the power and the effect of the ideas which man detects in his conscience? How does the "*oughtness*" that enforces the judgments of conscience originate? On what authority do the decisions of conscience rest? To what does man's free will pay deference in acknowledging his responsibility? Some would refer all the facts of man's moral consciousness to a spontaneous self-supporting moral order. And they have deceived themselves by "the fatal imposture of words" until they are persuaded something is explained by such mere phrase.

Let us inquire again of man's primary teacher—his own consciousness. Does the soul acknowledge any authority that is not realised in some mode of personal being? Does man's will consent to be in subjection except to some higher personal will? The right is addressed to man's conscience, not simply as a distinction from the wrong; not merely as a proposition, but as a command; as Kant styles it, the "Categorical Imperative." It is known in consciousness as *duty*, and accompanying the recognition of its obligation is the distinction of merit and demerit, and of rewards and punishments, to be administered on the principle of distributive justice.

What does all this imply except that the moral order which is discerned, and the moral ideas which are the phenomena of conscience, have their origin and support and end in a Supreme Intelligence and Holy Will?

The connexion between belief in God and belief in duty is illustrated in the fact that "generally the step from doubt is a reckless plunge into sensuality."

The conscience appears in man as the representative of an authority which is not its own. The data of ethics are given in the intuitions of the mind, but the authority of ethical truth is not based on the intuitional consciousness. We must observe the distinction between the basis of morals and the basis of a theory of morals. The consciousness is a source of knowledge, and a knowledge of dictations which imperatively command the assent of the reason and the acquiescence of the moral nature; but the authority on which these dictations rest is not in the consciousness, but in God.

This peculiarity of ethical truth furnishes one most unanswerable argument against the doctrine of evolution as applied to spiritual phenomena. If the facts of man's moral consciousness were capable of such a naturalistic explanation, being the last and highest stage of the evolutionary process, they would have in themselves their complete justification. There would be nothing higher to which they might be referred, and the spontaneity of the process would effectually exclude the intrusion of any foreign reason for its products. If evolution afforded the reason for all phenomena

so as to render the hypothesis of a God superfluous, evolution would not universally falsify itself by owning an extraneous God in support of the dictations of conscience.

As a matter of fact, whenever God has been excluded from the moral or the natural world, it has not been by any such spontaneous process as evolution is claimed to be, but by the specious reasoning of men to whom the hypothesis of a God is not convenient. All man's moral spontaneities are in the opposite direction, and conscience in its normal exercise, fulfilling its proper function, is interpreted as the voice of God in the human soul.

And this fact indicates the only sure and solid basis and guaranty of a true, a safe, a permanent, and an ennobling morality. Neither the individual man, nor public opinion, nor what is termed the social man, can be held in subjection to a mere metaphysical distinction, or an abstract principle. If men are to be preserved from individual corruption and vice; if society is to be saved from degeneracy and moral ruin, the knowledge of the true God must be disseminated, and men be brought to realise that they live and move in his personal presence; that his omniscient eye discerns their thoughts and feelings, and that all their words are spoken in his ear.

Human administration of law, in distinguishing too widely between crimes and sins, loses the support of the highest moral sanctions, and the aid of the strongest restraints from evil. The laws which men enact do not lay the foundation of obligations, but presume them. The proper protection of human rights and liberties does not require the social man to be atheistic, nor social morals to be pagan.

But man is not only a rational and moral being; he is by nature also a religious being. Systems of superstition and idolatry illustrate this fact; the temple, the altar, the sacrifice, give it manifestation. Man must have a God to worship. He may degrade himself to the level of the brute, and render homage to the deified passions of his own fallen nature. He may bow down to stocks and stones, the idols which his own hands have fashioned; but these depraved practices only illustrate with emphasis the survival of the imperative indestructible fact and law that he must have a God.

If man is essentially a religious being, the existence of God is a necessary truth, and, therefore, not susceptible of proof. Any attempt to establish such a truth by a process of reasoning, in the ultimate analysis will be found to assume the truth to be proved. The existence of God is implied in every act of knowledge, and implied not merely as a part of all knowledge, but as a condition. Our resolution of the forms of thought usually ends with the categories; these are taken as the fundamental, *a priori* conceptions of the understanding. But these categories, though few, do not express the unity towards which all thought tends. These categories must be related to each other, and systematised in some postulate that comprehends them all. In Prof. Flint's concise statement: "In the idea of God all the categories of thought are comprehended and realised in their perfection. They constitute a complete system, and the whole system issues into, and is rendered organic by, the idea of God."

Hamilton failed to distinguish between the data of knowledge and the starting point of a theory, when he enunciated the doctrine that "the affirmation of a God" is "a regressive inference from the existence of a certain class of effects to the existence of a special character of cause."

The assumption of the existence of God is necessary to the complete explanation of any effect. From special classes of effects we may reason to the special character of God; we may reason from "a certain state of things" to certain attributes in God. By inference and through revelation our knowledge of God may be corrected and extended. The content of the idea of God may be changed and increased by all the difference between a fetic and the God of Christianity. But at these two poles of religious thought there is the same assumption of the existence of Deity. The Scriptures embody a revelation adapted to man in his lowest degradation. In sublime simplicity they open their communication with a statement involving this assumption.

Must the missionary begin with Hamilton's "regressive inference," and from "a special class of effects" "exclusively given in the phenomena of mind" ascend to the existence of God, in order to prepare the ground for the proclamation of the gospel? Must

he prove the existence of God before he announces himself to the Hottentot as the messenger of God?

The telic force of all argument concerning God is to show *what he is*; and as exhibitions of his character inferential conclusions incidentally and secondarily confirm the conviction *that he is*. But the proof is not original; the idea of God is not derived from the proof.

The man in sin whose reason is developed to exercise its powers under the categories of thought, and whose conscience is capable of its function of moral dictation, is compelled to acknowledge a personal God. It is not a welcomed conviction. He employs every artifice to suppress it. He would gladly exchange such a conception of Deity for some "æsthetic, benevolent principle," some impersonal pervading "stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being." Calling himself a "scientist," he would substitute "the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter." The Epicurean culturist, to whom the idea of duty is odious, would elevate beauty in nature and art to the place of God, and expend his romantic sentiment on a cold abstraction that would leave him undisturbed by troubles of conscience. The holiness of a personal God is embarrassing, and the unconverted man is at enmity with it. He has all to fear and nothing to hope from such a God.

But there could be no calamity to be compared with the bereavement of the Christian, should unbelieving thought succeed in robbing him of his Lord and Master. He would go through the earth with an orphaned heart and a desolate life. Let him be persuaded that his privilege to call upon God as his Father is a superstitious delusion and a snare; that he is playing "the game of life upon the chess-board of the world" with one who "never overlooks a mistake nor makes the smallest allowance for ignorance;" that "to the man who plays well the highest stakes are paid with that sort of overflowing generosity with which the strong shows delight in strength; and that one who plays ill is check-mated, without haste, but without remorse." Let him feel that there is no love with the power that holds his destiny, no compassion for his misery, no sympathy with his suffering; no

helps, no deliverances for him; that there is no strong tower to which he may flee, no covert from the storm; no listening ear into which he may breathe his consuming griefs; no strong helpful heart upon which he may lean in his weakness and trial; let him feel there is nothing in the universe but mechanical force and necessary law; that he is held only in the relentless embrace of an inexorable cold eternity, which "wears always to him a feelingless expressionless iron mask," and he is doomed to an "eclipse of the soul and a blight of the heart," for which he would gladly exchange the nothingness of annihilation. A Christian without his God—what would he be? An empty pageant, a moral burlesque, a cruel mockery.

Says Dr. Thornwell: "The belief of a superintending Providence is the guardian of society, the security of the state, the safeguard of the family. Its influence pervades every interest, and sanctifies every office of man; it ennobles his actions, sweetens his affections, animates his hopes, gives courage in the hour of danger, serenity in time of trouble, and victory in death. If there be a God, it is a great thing to be a man; if there be none, and men should universally act on the belief that there were none, we had rather be anything than a member of the human race. Hell and earth would differ only in topography."

A candid devotee or a keen satirist of evolution as the explanation of all existence, states the conclusion thus: "If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human mind can soar, it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the varied phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the measure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his soundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and time by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble capacities for love and adoration, is yet alone—destitute of kith or kin in all this universe of being." "If it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I should certainly have rested in these 'sublime conceptions' (of theism) as in an argument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of physical knowledge could never exert any other influence on theism than that of ever tending more

and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by continuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing conceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous origin of things—the mind of God. Such would have been my hope; such would have been my prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile we thought a very angel of God; pointing to that great barrier of law, and proclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed’—even science has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gates of infidelity are open, and atheism overwhelming is upon us.”

The instincts of the human heart are stronger than the logic of the understanding, and a mind lost in the mazes of its thought and manacled by a rigorous dialectic, turns itself by a spontaneous motion in the direction where the truth lies. A man cannot carry his convictions with him in giving up that which he knows to be light, and a benign influence for that which he knows to be darkness and a demon of destruction.

What a contrast, as a satisfying solution, is the explanation which Christ gives of the phenomena of existence: “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.” Ages before the appearance of man on the earth, God was treasuring in its bosom an inexhaustible provision for the wants of his creature, and adapting this provision in form for the development of his genius and skill, and for his education in the thoughts of God. God had proposed to his own mind the ideal of man, and during the long cycles in which the earth was forming, he prepared the physical conditions which were suitable for the development of man according to this ideal. And when the fulness of time was come—when the earth was prepared, according to God’s plan, for inhabitation—he called man into being, and placed him in a physical world and in a moral

system suited to train and discipline him for his destiny. When he had completed his work and established the harmonies between man and nature, he did not withdraw himself beyond the utmost confines of creation, and retire within the solitude of his own being. There has been no evolution of law into supremacy over God; there has been no abdication of God in favor of the "phantom of succession." Mere recurrence, nor a colligation of observed recurrences, does not satisfy the mind when it asks an explanation of the phenomena of nature or of life. The God whom man was made to know, and with whom he finds himself related, is not a "*Deus unicus, solitarius, destitutus.*" The work of God in creation was only the ground on which he would project the wonders of his mind in providence and government. God in creation is only preliminary to God in human history.

The fact that man is organically connected with nature, and that the history of man takes up into itself the history of the inferior creation, is evidenced by the disorder in nature consequent on and corresponding to the moral disorder in man, introduced by sin. And this correspondence appearing subsequent to the transgression by which man fell, and adapting the world to his probation and recovery, clearly illustrates a perpetual superintending providence. Miracle and special providence are not the occasional interferences of a wisdom enlarged by experience, seeking to rectify the motions of an established order. They are the proper manifestations of divine superintendence, direction, and discipline, conducting man in the exigencies of his freedom to his destiny. If we accept the doctrine of a personal God, and of man as the "offspring of God," there is no antecedent incredibility of a miracle. On the contrary, the history of religion shows that the occurrence of a miracle conforms to the laws of thought, and is held to be the proper attestation of a message from God. So that, in its proper relations, in the realm of providence to which it belongs, above the level of material causes, there is no more incongruity in the miracle than in an experiment in physics. Aside from its testimonial value accrediting to man a message from God, the miracle serves to dispel the delusion to which the fallen mind seems so prone in thinking that the

uniformity of method according to which God conserves his creative work—the uniformity of nature's laws, as we are accustomed to call it—expels God from his universe. For the miracle, illustrating as it does the supremacy of a Personal Will, rends for the moment the veil between the seen and the unseen, and discloses the hand of God at the helm of affairs. "God who made the world and all things therein, hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation." He has directed the dispersions, the migrations, the irruptions, the conquests, the absorptions, the fusions of nations. He has provided the physical conditions, the historical associations, the political influences, the civil politics, the moral and religious agencies, the peculiarities of language, the habits of thought, the varieties of occupation, the modes of life, the manners and customs necessary to develop and to characterise the "covenant, educating, and missionary nations."

Prof. Arnold Guyot, as a geographical historian, has most beautifully interpreted the plan of God: "Asia, Europe, and North America are the three grand stages of humanity in its march through the ages. Asia is the cradle where man passed his infancy under the authority of law, and where he learned his dependence on a sovereign Master. Europe is the school where his youth was trained, where he waxed in strength and knowledge, grew to manhood, and learned at once his liberty and his moral responsibility. America is the theatre of his activity during the period of his manhood; the land where he applies and practises all he has learned, brings into action all the forces he has acquired, and where he is still to learn that the entire development of his being and his own happiness are possible only by willing obedience to the laws of his Maker." "Luther drew the Bible forth from the dust of libraries, where it lay forgotten, at the moment when Columbus discovered the new world." "The founders of social order in America are, indeed, the true offspring of the Reformation."

The inference is direct and obvious that the American people, with their social order thus ordained of God, with their wide

area, varieties of climate, and favoring conditions of development, with their mixed population, their composite language with its idiosyncrasies of growth and adaptation, sustain a peculiar relation, and that American Christianity has a peculiar and an advanced mission, in reference to the ultimate purpose of God in peopling and governing the earth.

But the general providence of God, in which he governs nature and the nations, is to subserve the transcendent scheme of love revealed in the gospel. God's ultimate purpose is to "gather together in one all things in Christ." He has made him to be "head over all things to his Church." He has invested him with authority and dominion, that every knee should bow unto him, and every tongue confess, and that the kingdoms of the world may become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. The salvation of the individual man—his training and discipline for the destiny which God in Christ proposes; the gathering of the elect; the edification of the Church; the Christianisation of the nations; the spiritual elevation of the civilised life—such are the earthly aims of the kingdom which the Father has given the Son.

The distinguishing principle of this kingdom is the doctrine of grace; the subject of it is redeemed and renovated man. It is a kingdom of objective truth and subjective knowledge. Through the truth all its stupendous results in quickening humanity are to be accomplished; and this distinguishing, vitalising truth is "the truth as it is in Jesus."

The method by which the King in Zion proposes to effectuate his great work is intimated by himself: "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter." He gives no account of his actions. His way is in the sea and his path in the great waters. He has so disposed affairs, that man's sagacity and science have attained the completest results in those things which are "at the farthest distance from him," and "farthest removed from humanity." Man can construct a calendar predicting astronomical movements, determining transits and eclipses to the exact moment of occurrence, but he cannot tell what a day or an hour may bring forth in those things which most nearly concern him.

Christ seizes, revitalises, and calls into new activity, the prin-

ciple originally implanted in man for his guidance and government.

The ancient philosopher recommended the contemplation of the ideas of the holy and the beautiful as an instrument of spiritual elevation. But Christ presented himself as the archetype of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and announced faith in his own divine person as the sovereign method and instrument of spiritual deliverance and spiritual life. He came forth from God and spake with authority, as being the original source of truth; and in relation to the ends of his kingdom as subjectively realised by men, he proclaimed himself the truth. So that the faith he demanded was twofold: a trustful, loyal acquiescence in his divine person and character, and an unconditional surrender of the heart to the great truths embodied in him and manifested by his gospel. It was enough with him that belief rested on his own authority. "He that is willing to do the will of God, shall know of the doctrine."

Paul, as he approached the goal, presents the ripening effects of these divine truths resting on divine authority, as they are transformed through faith into the Christian experience, and become the stay of the trustful heart. "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day." Whatever else the Saviour may in his wisdom withhold from his disciple, he makes himself known. This suffices. And this is the gate to the knowledge of all things as they shall be recapitulated in Christ.

In accepting Christ, Paul did not renounce his reason, nor repose on any illusive sentiment, nor indulge in any emotional phrensy. His faith was no wild enthusiasm. If ever man was competent to determine the validity of evidence, and to discriminate a rational conclusion, Paul possessed such strength of reason. His was not a blind devotion. The reasonableness of the faith held his mind through all vicissitude in unshaken allegiance, and when the end came, having endured all, he could say without a shadow of weakening doubt, "I know whom I have believed." These words were uttered when the shades of the dark valley were already beginning to gather about him, and he felt himself to be standing almost before the assizes of eternity. The

circumstances were such as to bring to the most decisive test the validity of faith and the sufficiency of a religion so founded.

Thomas Paine, if left alone during his last illness, would scream and call until some one came to him ; and in his paroxysms of distress, as he consciously confronted a future without a hope, he would cry out: "O Lord, help me ! God, help me ! Jesus Christ, help me !"

Richard Cecil, when told that a young man, for whom he had felt a deep interest, had "embraced the notions of the free thinkers, and was prepared to live by them," responded quickly : "Aye, aye ; but will he die by them ?"

Monsieur Littré, one of the most learned and famous men in France, the great champion of "free thought," associated with Auguste Comte in founding the Positive Philosophy, when on his death-bed received the sacrament according to the rites of the Romish Church. The opinions which he had advocated in his lifetime, which had been his pride, which had brought him his fame among men, did not support him when he came to die. These opinions might answer for him to live by, as he had accounted life ; but when the end came, and things earthly were fading to his sense and palling upon his heart, these opinions would not suffice for him to die by.

The dying apostle presents a strong contrast as he begins to "brush the dews on Jordan's banks," and knows that the "crossing is near." His faith gives more vividly than ever "a substantial reality to the objects of his hope, and a verification in his heart to the invisible." It is the Beulah hour when the light streams from the eternal city, and casts the glow of heaven around him. He can almost see "the friends and kindred dear," who stand on the other shore. A rapturous gladness seizes his soul, a joy unspeakable and full of glory. Amidst this glorious scene and high anticipation there appears to his enraptured view One in whose fellowship he has been disciplined by the sorrows and trials of the pilgrimage, and towards whom his heart goes out in the fulness of its chastened affection and trust: "I know him whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day."

J. V. LOGAN.

ARTICLE VII.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF
PRESBYTERIANISM.[*Concluded.*]

A CONCIO AD CLERUM.

According to promise, we resume "inquiry" into this important matter, regretting most sincerely that even in the treatment of this, which certainly is worthy of patience, we are liable to the charge of prolixity. Is it too much to aspire to be long without being dull?

We divided the subject into three heads:

I. The theory of the ministry, as affecting the regulation of supply and demand.

II. The working of Church courts in the exercise of the power of review and control.

III. Aggressiveness in the limited department of congregational work.

The preceding paper was concerned with the first division alone. This, owing to the "aggressiveness" of our views, threw us so much on the defensive as to call for more space than both of the others. We hope that we are now, in every sense, through the deepest water, and that the reader may from this point *wade* comfortably through to the end.

II. THE WORKING OF CHURCH COURTS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF REVIEW AND CONTROL.

There can be little doubt in the mind of any experienced presbyter, that a very serious defect in practical Presbyterianism lies in the *non-exercise* of the power of review and control on the part of our Church courts. In this matter we are Presbyterian in theory, and Congregational or Independent in practice. Our theory is, that the power of the whole is over the power of every part; the Presbytery is the Bishop, possessed with episcopal power.

"The Presbytery has power . . . to establish the pastoral relation, and to dissolve it at the request of one or of both parties, or where the interests of religion imperatively demand it ; . . . to visit churches for the purpose of inquiring into and redressing the evils that may have arisen in them ; . . . to take special oversight of vacant churches ; to concert measures for the enlargement of the Church within its bounds ; in general, to ordain whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under its care."¹

The Presbytery notoriously fails to exercise the authority with which the foregoing paragraphs invest it. It leaves pastors and churches virtually supreme, only interfering at the solicitation of one or both parties. The pastoral relation is instituted upon the presentation and acceptance of a call ; but the Book evidently contemplates this action as the result of a careful and deliberate process,² wherein the Presbytery, with full information before it, examines and decides each case upon its merits with reference to the pastor elect, the congregation calling, and the Church at large ; and arbitrates between conflicting claims, whether such claims be represented by the commissioners of two competing congregations, or one party be the unrepresented interests of the Church at large, which *always* presents the silent yet powerful plea of her need and her claim upon the Presbytery as her only and her responsible guardian.

In this matter, however, only two things generally receive any very careful consideration at the hands of the Presbytery : 1st. Whether the salary is reasonable. 2d. Whether the call is made out in due form ; *i. e.*, whether the *i*'s are all dotted and the *t*'s crossed aright, and the chairman of the congregational meeting has signed and attested the document properly ; if not, they will strain out every gnat of technical irregularity, if it takes a year to do it ; but when it comes to such a course as just outlined above, the camel is swallowed, hoofs, hump, and all. We always pay tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, but we do undoubtedly sometimes omit the weightier matters of the law.

The Book demands equal deliberation and caution in dissolving the pastoral relation : the pastor is to tender his resignation

¹ Form of Government, V., 4, Par. 6.

² Form of Government, VI., 5, Par. 11.

to the *Presbytery*, and the church then cited to show cause, if any it has, why the *Presbytery* should not accept the resignation. This is evidently a provision against the hasty dissolution of the relation under transient despondency, mistaken views of usefulness, temporary dissatisfaction, etc.; and in all these matters *Presbytery* is to be the ultimate judge.¹ According to our almost universal custom, however, the pastoral relation is dissolved "at the request of the pastor, the church concurring;" *i. e.*, the pastor gets dissatisfied, receives an invitation to "visit;" a call follows; he assembles the congregation; tenders to *them* his resignation; they accept and appoint a committee of correspondence, which secures at once a successor; and the whole matter comes before the *Presbytery*, cut and dried, and nothing is left for that venerable body to do but to ratify.

If it is to be presumed that all choices made are the wisest and best; that individual churches, each blind to everything but its own interests, are to be left to compete with each other upon the every-man-for-himself principle; that pastors and congregations are to be left entirely to their own discretion as to when the relation is to be instituted and when dissolved; that there is no call for closer oversight—then *Presbyterianism* stands condemned in her polity, for *this is not Presbyterianism*. That in such a presumption, one would be reckoning without his host, observation most clearly demonstrates. The independent denominations are recognising this every year, and providing for closer oversight. That *Presbytery* often fails to exercise the right with which it is invested by the Constitution, in many cases from a delicacy and kindly regard which consult the feelings of a pastor or congregation at the expense of the general cause, is too notorious to be questioned, and may be illustrated *ex abundanti*.

Presbytery has under its ostensible government two fields of labor, both vacant; one offers a salary of \$1,200, the other can pay only \$600. There are two ministers at the disposal of the *Presbytery*; one a young man recently from the Seminary, promising and popular; the other a good sound preacher of some years' experience, with an expensive family. The \$1,200 church

¹ Form of Government, VI., 5, Par. 13.

calls the young preacher ; the \$600 one says, How happy would *I* be with either ! The young man could be comfortably supported on \$600 ; the older man could not *live* on it. But the larger salary gets the inexpensive man, the other church remains without a pastor, and the older preacher without a field ; and in nine cases out of ten, the older man would have served the stronger church just as well and as acceptably as the younger, if they would only give him a trial ; perhaps more so. Presbytery has the undoubted right to advise at least in these matters ; and when the interests of the Church at large are at stake, this right becomes duty. A certain Methodist field of labor in the writer's vicinity once made strong efforts to secure a certain pastor, offering for him a fine salary. The Bishop declined to "appoint" him. The man whom he did send was a sore disappointment. A member of the charge in question told the writer that he did not think the people would pay *him* even a living. The result was, that the unwelcome pastor remained with them to the extreme limit of the itinerant system, and at the end of the four years the people sent up a petition to have him sent back again for the fifth time. Under his work the field had prospered to such an extent that it had been divided into two pastoral charges, and in addition to paying his salary, the people had built two new churches. Suppose, in the instance above cited, the Presbytery, as *bishop* of the two churches and the two preachers, were to recommend the stronger church to take the older pastor, and the weaker one the younger, and that a trial be made for one year, and let the results decide the case, would not this be better than to stand silently by and leave the churches to fight the matter out, and the issue of progress or decline, life or death, to be decided by "the survival of the fittest" ?

Again, here is a man of first-rate *organising* ability ; energetic, a good pioneer builder, a man of small family too. He has charge of a good church, but one where Presbyterianism is rooted and grounded, in a community Presbyterian from time immemorial, where the children inherit the accumulated *blue* blood of generations ; or he is in a town stereotyped by having been finished half a century before, where there is no prospect of any

new or floating element to be gathered into the congregation; such a charge, in a word, as requires only conservative ability, in which there is no call for the exercise of his peculiar gifts. His charge is well supplied, his labors are entirely satisfactory and acceptable to his people; he baptizes the infants, and as they grow up and come forward, receives them into full communion, performs the marriage ceremony, and buries the dead; his congregation loses nothing, and the general cause *gains nothing*.

In the same Presbytery there are oftentimes several young and growing business centres, giving great promise, by their rapid increase, of becoming in a few years large towns or respectable cities. They have preaching once a month by some settled pastor who lives within striking distance, who comes in on Saturday night and leaves on Monday morning. Or they are supplied by a pastor of excellent pulpit ability, but with no gift whatever for organisation. Here is manifest waste of resources, the aggressive man wedded to the conservative field, and the conservative man fixed in the place which exactly suits the other. Each church is ignorant of the other's circumstances, and the Presbytery, *the pastor of both*, well acquainted with the situation, but having allowed them to drift into this hap-hazard, ill-assorted marriage, leaves the matter to right itself in process of time, with the following issue: our people struggle along, discouraged by the neglect of the Presbytery, and sick at heart at seeing the opportunity pass unimproved, and the flood-tide for Presbyterianism ebbs and leaves our cause stranded high and dry, while other denominations, by the prudent prevision and careful oversight of their authorities, grow with the town into strong, influential organisations. Twenty years afterward people will wonder why, in such a large and prosperous town, Presbyterianism is so far behind the other denominations, especially since our Church has (*now*) such a conspicuously able man there.

Let us take another instance. A pastor is called and installed. In process of time, long or short, as the case may be, it becomes evident that a mistake was made in the first instance, or else that the pastor's work in that field is *finished*. Dissatisfaction is felt, and gradually widens and deepens until it is apparent to many, if

not to most, of the Presbytery. The subject is canvassed *sub rosa*. The situation is discussed informally at every meeting by the ministers; sometimes the elders of the church in question will tell their troubles to one and another of their most intimate acquaintances among the preachers. Together they deplore the sad situation, but nothing is done, and all concur in leaving the unacceptable pastor in utter ignorance of the state of affairs until at last the thread that binds him to his charge, eaten through by the constant but smothered fire of discontent, parts finally asunder, and leaves both ends burning. Oftentimes nobody's feelings are spared in the long run, and the only thing gained by this failure in Presbyterian duty is the damage inuring to the church through the long neglect. Perhaps such a case will be considered extreme or rare, though we fear there are many Presbyteries which could furnish a parallel. Were our theory carried out fairly and squarely, the remedy would be at hand. Our custom gives easy escape to the dissatisfied pastor, but the dissatisfied church yet groans within itself. This evil is of such magnitude as to lead to the suggestion numbered 19, in the preparatory list prefixed to the first paper,¹ which suggestion was derived from a published address delivered by a prominent and influential elder before a "church union." We quote a few paragraphs as a sample of what is thought, felt, spoken, and published by intelligent "laymen" on this topic. From the extract the reader will see that we are not yet in the vanguard, though he may ere this have voted us as quite "advanced":

"It is a very important and suggestive fact, that there is a growing disinclination on the part of the churches to entering this most useful relation. In my narrow acquaintance, I can name churches that have lost the services of useful and acceptable ministers from this cause alone, and all over the land you find pulpits filled by the anomalous 'stated supply.' On inquiry, I think it will be found that the true and only cause of this lies in the tenure of the pastoral office and the unpleasant difficulties which attend the dissolution of the relation. If the motion comes from the one side, but little harm results, for few churches would be so ungenerous as to take serious offence because a beloved pastor yields to solicitations to enter a wider field of usefulness, with better

¹ SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, October, 1882, p. 654.

worldly advantages; but if the motion starts on the other side, the end is seldom reached short of divisions and dissensions and heart-burnings, the development of feelings little different in kind or degree from what attends the divorce of the marriage tie with our more cultured brethren of the North. No matter which side is to blame, the church bleeds, and a legacy of discord is handed down by the incumbent to his successor. You know, Mr. President, this is no fancy sketch. A good man, sincerely desirous of being spent in his Master's service, may outlive his usefulness in his field from no serious fault of his own. It is often difficult for the church to deal frankly and candidly in so delicate a matter. An earnest worker may soon find himself misplaced, but labors on, with the hope, like Mr. Micawber, that 'something will turn up,' and still labors on with the growing conviction of the mistake made in his settlement. Perhaps his restless eye casts furtive glances at other fields, and rumors come of invitations to other portions of the vineyard, but they prove to be rumors only, with no fruit except, perhaps, the discovery to his people that he is only holding on to them until he can get a better place, and this adds nothing to the appreciation in which his service is held. The poor man is environed by difficulties. His only support is the laborer's hire. He dare not overlook the claims, which would make him worse than an infidel, and he limps on to the crutch of engrossing secular pursuits. Langor, barrenness, inefficiency, in all church work, are the inevitable results. Am I answered, that this is all wrong, and constitutes no real objection to our present usage; that pastors are constantly, sometimes even capriciously, dissolving this relation, and churches have the same right unchallenged? But the case being altered, alters the case. Let one of a bench of elders screw himself up to the rashness of moving for a dissolution, and the discovery is soon made, that he is not as good as he ought to be, destitute of personal piety, actuated by 'old grudges,' etc. . . .

"But what is the remedy for these supposed evils? I answer, it is ready and at hand, and would be effectual. Presbytery alone can make and break the alliance. Let Presbytery only authorise it for specific periods, and on the arrival of these periods, let churches and pastors be required to show *why* the relation should continue. Thus only can Presbytery effectually oversee her churches and meet the duty imposed by our Book 'to visit particular churches for the purpose of inquiring into their state.' Presbytery cannot locate pastors of its own motion, but it can limit the pastorates, leaving churches and pastors to a fresh exercise of their elective affinities. Is it objected that good men might be unsettled and thrown out of occupation? I answer, there is a place for every such one somewhere in the Master's vineyard. Let him search for it. If he has aspired too high, let him be content with an humbler sphere. The cultivation of the vineyard is not for the purpose of giving

bread to workers. The ark of the Lord must move on, though men perish by the wayside. Private Christians, in every sphere of life, find it frequently necessary to change their field of labor. The veteran soldier only, *invalided in the service*, is entitled to a pension from the first-fruits of the treasury.

"But would the change proposed conflict with any law of the Church, or in any degree jeopard her characteristic conservatism ?

"Pastors are but men, and the most efficient and successful would hardly be less so, in view of a more searching account of their stewardships. The slothful might be stimulated to greater faithfulness. Does any one suggest, I would ape the itinerancy? I answer, it would be an itinerancy without an earthly hierarch and the tyranny of an arbitrary law ; an itinerancy which would overcome stagnation by free, healthful circulation, and impart life and progress to our Church mechanism. If our Church desires to hold its own, if it aspires to aggressive work, it must get out of the ruts of usage and tradition. The time is past for a *quasi* chaplaincy."

One of the most difficult problems which tax the administrative skill of the Presbytery is the maintenance of its feeble churches. A large number can only raise from \$75.00 to \$150.00 per annum for the support of a minister. They cannot possibly supply themselves with the gospel, and they constantly send up to the Presbytery petitions praying relief. When such letters, sometimes very touching in the description of spiritual destitution and powerful in their appeal to Christian sympathy, are read, a sad silence follows, and then some brother, with a deep and heartfelt sigh, rises to apply the patent-right process, *i. e.*, he moves "that the request be referred to the agent of Sustentation." This much-enduring brother racks his bewildered brain, and at last groups a number of these churches into possible pastorates, and recommends to each group some preacher whom he has reason to think within its reach. But as often as otherwise certain churches in these groups "kick out of the traces," and all his plans go for naught; two congregations in the group are satisfied, but a third has "been used to better preaching," etc., etc. The two cannot do without the third, and the latter wants "a whole loaf or no bread." The result is, that the next year the same difficulty presents itself. In view of this not uncommon nullification of the only feasible plan for the remedy of this great evil, is it not well to ask whether there be not some

point at which Presbyterial authority and congregational liberty, by the thickening of the one and the thinning of the other, do coalesce? And is not the point where the former thickens somewhere in the immediate neighborhood of the place where the recalcitrating sister has to depend on outside help for *four-fifths* of the salary?

If the reader will consult the Assembly Minutes for 1882, he will find in the territory embraced in this discussion (the Synods of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, including the Presbytery of Savannah) *two hundred and twenty-four* churches reporting a membership of *less than thirty*, and these constitute more than one-fourth of the whole number of churches in these old Synods. Now, when we remember that it is rare for a church of twice this membership to be self-supporting, we can imagine the proportions of the problem. No one but a Presbyterial agent, however, can appreciate the anxiety and trouble that one or two helpless but querulous churches can occasion, and how much careful planning they may render null and void. Ah! how often have we seen this brother rise in Presbytery and stay a motion to put a call into somebody's hands while it is yet trembling on the Moderator's lips, and beg the Presbytery to consider the effect of that motion upon one or more struggling churches. The body listens to him respectfully and feelingly, and appreciates the difficulties of the situation; but being unwilling to wrestle with the responsibilities of so delicate a business, they make him their scape-goat, and "refer the whole matter to the agent of Sustentation." He sometimes asks for "instructions," and he sometimes finds that the Presbytery has none to give.

These are no fancy pictures, but *portraits*; and while they may look somewhat unfamiliar, painted in the homely colors of truth, unvarnished by the euphemisms which oftentimes throw a glamour over the features of fact, yet the more you study them, the more you will be inclined to admit the likeness, though you will still say that the artist does not flatter his subject. That must be a very lax construction of language indeed which decides that in such instances as these the Presbytery is "ordering whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under its

care." Does such a course of non-interference as this exhaust Presbyterian oversight? *Credat Judæus Apella!* Congregationalism does as much; the Independent Baptist denomination does as much through its *pro tem.* Presbyteries. Presbyterian oversight means far more than this; and what it does mean is exactly what we need most sorely in our aggressive work, in order to avoid the natural drift towards the strengthening of the strong, the ignoring of the weak, and the neglect of the unoccupied territory within our bounds. It means a system which combines for purposes of perfect organisation all the advantages of the one-man power of Prelacy without its disadvantages and limitations; a system in which not the wisdom and piety and providence of one man, however excellent, consult for the interests of the united Church, but the resources of many men combined for the prosperity and progress of the whole cause. In order to this, however, *the power of the Presbytery must come into close contact with all the churches, and its united eye must be on the whole field.* In every portion of the Church it must be felt that the power of the whole is over the power of every part, and every section of the territory must feel that its claims and needs are on the heart of this episcopal body.

Let us learn a lesson from the organisation of the Methodist Church. In their Annual Conference every part of their territory is represented through the "presiding elders" of the various "districts." They travel each over his district repeatedly during the year, and go to the Conference well acquainted with the character and circumstances of every charge in its bounds. These men form the bishop's advisory board, and through their recommendations the preachers of the Conference are assigned to the various fields, and the effort is thus systematically made to put the right man in the right place. Of course, their decisions are not always wise, but there are three enviable results: (1) They have no vacant charges; (2) No church languishes long under the ministrations of an unsuitable man; if it suffers for twelve months, relief comes at the end of that period, and the presiding elder has the minister assigned to a field for which he is better suited; (3) They have no W. C.'s among their ministers except the "super-

annuated," *i. e.*, the invalided, and the "supernumeraries," which is a delicate description of a man who, in the judgment of his brethren, heard the Lord "call" some one else and answered by mistake.

While we do not admire the itinerant system, yet we do like its results in the matter of episcopal oversight, and we are free to say that these results are a *desideratum* in our Church. Our pastorates are formed too much at hap-hazard, and the supervision of the Presbytery over this matter is entirely too nominal. This court has the undoubted right at its own motion to dissolve a pastoral relation;¹ to decline to institute it in the first instance; or to put the call into the hands of the pastor-elect with advice; or to recommend the church to desist from prosecuting the call. And while it has never claimed the right to "locate" a pastor, it is certainly within its province to recommend such a choice to a church as it believes will be best for it and other churches under the care of the court. Moreover, Presbyterianism is not a government by delegates, but by *representatives*, and there is a vast difference between the two.²

We think it would be well for every Presbytery which has many vacant and feeble charges, to keep one of its body constantly employed to travel regularly among them, giving them pastoral care and attention, providing them, as far as possible, with the means of grace, and endeavoring to keep them encouraged and alive to their own needs and the interests of the general cause. Many of these churches do nothing towards any Christian work at all, have no services, make no contribution to the support of the gospel anywhere, and this condition of collapse begins as soon as a church becomes vacant. But the Book makes it the duty of the Presbytery "to take *special oversight*" over such churches, whereas really these are the very congregations over which Presbytery takes no oversight whatever.

For the relief of discontented pastors and disaffected churches, the Presbytery might appoint a standing committee of experienced

¹ Answer of General Assembly to Dr. Dana's letter, Minutes, 1880, p. 196.

² Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. IV., p. 101.

and discreet presbyters to have this special business in charge, with whom all ministers or congregations desiring a change might correspond (confidentially, if they prefer to do so,) stating difficulties, grievances, etc., and this committee could take such steps as its wisdom suggests as best in the premises. They could recommend certain ministers desiring a change to congregations in the same condition, and oftentimes arrest discontent or smooth over difficulties before any actual breach arises, or bring the matter before the Presbytery, if the good of the cause demanded it. This would tend to remedy the difficulty complained of in the extract on pp. 201-203. The trouble now is, that this business belongs to the whole Presbytery, and no one likes to take the first step in so delicate a matter.

But we think we have both law and machinery abundantly sufficient for every need, provided only we employ both to the best advantage. In making it the duty of the Presbytery "to concert measures for the enlargement of the Church within its bounds," and "to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under its care," the law grants power to do whatever is necessary to accomplish this end. We conclude this branch of the discussion with another citation from *The Form of Government*, (V., 2, Par. 2.):

"*Secondly*, They have power to establish rules for the government, discipline, worship, and extension of the Church, which must be agreeable to the doctrines relating thereto contained in the Scriptures, the circumstantial details only of the matters being left to the Christian prudence and wisdom of church officers and courts. . . . *Moreover*, they possess all the administrative authority necessary to give effect to these powers."

In these words there is ample grant for all the necessities of Presbyterian oversight; only two things are needed: *first*, an appreciation of its need; and *secondly*, the nerve necessary to use the power vested by the Constitution in the Presbytery.

III. AGGRESSIVENESS IN THE LIMITED DEPARTMENT OF CONGREGATIONAL WORK.

And here there opens before us the whole department of congregational work, for under the wide sense of aggressiveness all such

work may claim consideration. In so broad a field severe selection is necessary to avoid transgressing limits of space and patience by descending into wearisome details on the one hand, or evaporating into nebulous generalisation on the other. Hence we advertise our purpose to consider congregational work from a limited standpoint, viz., as concerned chiefly with the gathering in of outside element, floating material, rather than the natural normal increase of the congregation from within itself by the multiplication of its own families, or the additions by certificate from the Church at large. In this, as in the general evangelistic work of the Church, there is reason to fear that Presbyterianism is rather conservative than aggressive. We believe she loses as few who are distinctively her own as any other denomination, but in the competition for outside element we think she is not as formidable a rival as she might be. Possibly a proper self-respect and superiority to all the chicane of proselytism have degenerated into something having too much the semblance and effect of indifference. The pulpit is well supplied, perhaps better than that of any other denomination in the town; and while all show and *shoddy* are despised with a commendable scorn, the congregational expenses are more liberal than those of any rival. The church is comfortable and attractive, and provision is made for the courteous reception of strangers who present themselves. In this species of *negative* rivalry, let it be said to her honor that she holds a royal place; but having gone thus far, she waits for the mountain to come to Mahomet, while among the Methodists and Baptists Mahomet goes persistently and perseveringly to the mountain.

Moreover, the remarks made in the first part of our discussion (SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, October, 1882, pp. 667, ff.) are applicable to individual congregations. If the allegation concerning the middle position occupied by our Church, between the upper and nether social millstones, is true, then we are virtually shut off from a very large (in many towns the largest) class of the population. If the standard of our pulpit and the social position of our congregation are such as we have asserted, then in towns like Richmond, Norfolk, Wilmington, Raleigh, Charleston, At-

lanta, Macon, etc., etc., there will be more gathered into the Methodist or Baptist Church than into the Presbyterian, for the very same reason that there is more wool on white sheep than on black. The area from which these denominations draw their supplies is so much larger. This difficulty, in our judgment, is insurmountable, except by some such provision as we have already suggested in that part of our discussion referred to above. Without reopening this point here, however, we pass on to remark that for congregational aggressiveness there is needed:

1. *Something to call out, develop, and unify latent elements of strength in every congregation.*

That there must be a vast amount of latent strength in the average congregation will be made evident by a comparison between an ideal church and the church as we see it. The ideal of an active church is one in which every member asks Paul's question, What wilt thou have *me* to do? where individual personal responsibility is felt, and every application for membership is understood to be an application for employment. It is stated that Mr. Spurgeon addresses to every person seeking admission to membership in his church this question: "Well, if you are received, what individual work are you going to take up and carry on for the Lord?" and the result is said to be that of his 5,750 communicants each one represents a willing worker under his leadership, and that he saves his own strength by doing nothing that his parishioners can do equally well. If this be true, no one need be surprised at the phenomenal growth of the Tabernacle, nor the amazing amount of *extra-parochial* work Mr. Spurgeon accomplishes. His great congregation exhibits one of the most essential, as it is one of the rarest, elements of an ideal church: every member of the spiritual body performing its proper function, and "all the body fitly framed and knit together through that which *every joint* supplieth, according to the working in due measure of *each several part*, maketh the increase of the body." How life is marred by the congestion or paralysis of even a single member of the body! And yet in reality we find the greater portion of every congregational body in our Church suffering complete congestion or partial paralysis; the working element form-

ing a very small coterie, the members of which could be counted on the fingers, and all the rest of the congregation perfectly passive and inert. There is no organisation on earth that carries as much *dead weight* as the ordinary average congregation. Its progress is made like that of the scotched snake, under the terrible disadvantage of having motive power turned into freight. The active percentage is composed of the pastor, the Session, the board of deacons, and several godly women; and blessed is that congregation which hath even so large a force of workers. Too often is it the case that the Session delegates its work to one active elder, the body only meeting upon occasion or often enough to fulfil the requirements of the Book; the board of deacons forming a corporation of "silent partners" in church work, who exhaust their duty in passing the plate during public worship; and the congregation at large discharging its conscience by the regular attendance upon one service a week—that at 11 a. m. on Sabbath, which reminds us of *The Parson's Dream*:

"The pastor of one of the up-town churches in New York," says the *Working Church*, "relates the following singular dream: 'Some time ago I dreamed that I was hitched to a carriage, attempting to draw it through the mud which covered the street in front of my house. How or why I had been assigned that position, I could not explain, but there I was, pulling with all my might, as though I had been the best carriage horse in the town. I had reached a point not far from the church, when the mud seemed to get deeper and deeper, and the carriage to draw so heavily that I gasped for breath and almost sank down exhausted. This seemed the more inexplicable, when, looking back, I saw the entire congregation behind the carriage, apparently pushing it along. But the more I tried, the harder it became, till finally I was forced to stop and examine the difficulty. I went to the rear, where I supposed was the congregation, but nobody could be found. I called, but no answer. I repeated the call several times, but still no reply. By-and-bye a voice called out, "Hallo!" and looking up, whom should I see but one of the deacons looking complacently out of the window, and upon going to the door of the carriage, what was my astonishment to behold the whole congregation quietly sitting inside.'"

When we remember how much is actually accomplished by congregations which "live at this poor dying rate," we may imagine what the ordinary church of one hundred and fifty or two hundred communicants *could* do if every member were alive, thorough-

ly and actively in earnest. Consider, for example, the zeal exhibited by the members of a small struggling church. Every one feels that something is expected of him individually. Whenever two or three meet, they discuss church work invariably, and they try to "make everything count," as the saying is. If the membership of a church of two hundred displayed the same activity as that of one of twenty, the whole town would feel its influence; but generally there are more active workers among the twenty than the two hundred. *The problem for pastors is to awaken this sense of personal individual responsibility to God.* He is to do this by perpetually reminding them that they do not stand before God in the aggregate, but in his sight as individuals; that they can no more delegate their Christian work to certain active members of the congregation than they can their prayers; and also by bringing them to face and appreciate the monstrous absurdity of virtually believing that God requires no more service from two hundred believers than from twenty; that of that congregation unto which God commits the more he requires the less.

Not only ought this latent strength to be called into exercise, but into *united* exercise; to accomplish the best results there must be consolidation or unification. In union there is strength. It is a necessity of perfect organisation; the resultant strength increases by a species of geometrical progression. One hundred men dominated by one purpose and acting in concert are more than a hundred times as influential as one man. There is a sort of electric enthusiasm generated by moving masses of men, which intensifies the strength of each while fusing it into the common force. A thousand men might each in turn strike a blow with all his strength against the iron gateway of some citadel without making the slightest impression, whereas a battering-ram by uniting just this very strength into one blow might shiver the gate to atoms. This is the difference between a mob and an army. The Scripture illustrations of the Church set forth the most perfect unity, the most complete organisation: members of the same family, disciples in a school, stones in a building, limbs of a body. The Bible emphasises and enlarges upon the peculiar intimacy, the perfect sympathy, that should exist. Practi-

cally, all this unity is exhausted in the statement: *οι πάντες εκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν*, and the symbolical "one loaf" is at once both symbol and thing signified. Let the reader pause and ask himself wherein consists the practical union of the congregation. It is not social, for as a congregation there is no social mingling; it is not friendship, for oftentimes they are scarcely acquaintances; it is not in church work, for the congregation at large does nothing; if in anything, it must be in adherence to the same standards, and, of course, this union is more intellectual than anything else, and this is one of the most barren of all bonds. Congregational union is practically that of the sand-heap, disintegrated particles raked together into a pile on the Sabbath, and at all other times scattered. It ought to be something like the unity of machinery, wheels great and small turning in different directions with different degrees of velocity and with varying power, representing at once the greatest diversity and the most perfect unity, each contributing its individual share to the one common purpose of the whole. Or, to return to the scriptural figure: "The body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, and the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you." Here is organisation and co-operation, the same idea so forcibly expressed in the passage before quoted by the words, "all the body fitly framed and knit together."

There may be much work with little coöperation, and sometimes there is. The wheels within wheels may be all whirling; each little *imperium in imperio* may be busily exercised without enjoying the aid and accomplishing the results of united effort. The Session is one, the board of deacons is one, the ladies' societies are one, the young men's prayer-meeting is one, and each is a little separate world in itself, and the pastor is the only connecting link. Supposing each to be active, we have the picture of a working non-coöperative church, and rather a rarity too, we fear. If it were not so very rare, we would not emphasise so much this idea of unification. The lack of the latter goes far towards accounting for the rarity of the former.

In what manner is congregational unity manifested before the world? We need something to make the congregation recognise its *oneness*; some plane upon which they may meet together and feel that the bond of union and association is that they are all members of the same congregation. This bond, and this only. When this is done, one great step in advance is taken. A few paragraphs back, the activity of a small church was spoken of. Any one familiar with such a church is aware of the fact that the bond of union between the members is tenfold stronger than that in a large church. The writer has frequently visited just such a church, and on every visit this fact is impressed upon him. At every little gathering, whether for dinner or tea or an evening chat, sooner or later some member of the little knot invariably introduces some phase of church work; a new arrival in the community is discussed, and his probable ecclesiastical affiliations are surmised; any new attendants upon church are spoken of; any person in the town who has given any indications of Presbyterian "leanings" is mentioned, etc., etc. Now, we think that it would be indeed a very great advance in aggressiveness if this spirit of united coöperative interest and interchange of news, views, opinions, etc., etc., could be aroused in the larger churches. And we think, if the congregation could be brought to meet together occasionally as a congregation, an assembly to which the only title of entrance was the sole and simple fact of being identified with the congregation, irrespective of all social position, wealth, or intelligence, age, or sex, this result would follow: *church work would be discussed*—being confessedly the sole connecting link and bond of union, it would inevitably furnish a predominant topic for conversation; the members of the church would become acquainted with each other; absent members would be inquired after and sickness learned of; certain persons would invite their friends to accompany them; the congregation would feel that its organisation was for a purpose, and the community would soon discover that the church was *alive*.

An appreciation of this need is doubtless that which has in the last few years made church parlors an item in modern ecclesiastical architecture. Whatever may be thought of the means used,

the end aimed at will commend itself to every reflecting mind. No reader will underrate the importance of enlisting the interest and activity of the whole congregation in aggressive work; and in order to this, the organisation, as such, must know itself, appreciate its own power now dormant, and recognise the fact that they are a spiritual corporation, a coöperative society for religious work. How this first step is ever to be reached, so long as the only occasion of assembly is for the worship of God in the hearing of the word, is a mystery. Why, we suspect it is rare that the Session takes the trouble to acquaint the congregation with the reports it sends up to Presbytery; many churches are ignorant even of the sum contributed during the year towards benevolent operations, each member knowing only how much he contributes, utterly uninformed as to the work of the congregation as a whole! As long as this kind of isolation is encouraged, there cannot be coöperation, and without it the greatest part of the strength will lie latent.

2. *A second need for congregational aggressiveness is more preaching.* While there is call for consolidation of congregational strength, there is needed also something like a diffusion of ministerial force. Our preachers must do more work, not in the study, but in the pulpit. We have several times alluded to the very great numerical excess of the Methodist and Baptist ministry over ours. Not only have they more preachers, but they arrange them with reference to their work in such a way that they accomplish much more than we. The country preacher among the Methodists does virtually twice as much as his Presbyterian brother; he supplies six, eight, or possibly a dozen churches, whereas our country pastor has generally only two. The Methodist is a "circuit rider;" he preaches Sunday at 11 a. m. at one point, rides ten or twelve miles and preaches at another in the afternoon of the same day, and on some day in the week he fills a third appointment. Thus, in the course of the month, he supplies twelve churches, giving each a sermon once a month, or six, giving each two sermons.

It has been intimated more than once, that our country pastors are doing much less preaching than they might do. This inti-

mation we were slow to receive, until we saw it stated in the Minutes of the Synod of North Carolina for 1881 (p. 260), that after some discussion the following paper was adopted and ordered to be sent down to the Presbyteries for their consideration :

"In order to secure greater faithfulness and efficiency in the discharge of our duty as laborers in the vineyard of the Lord, and especially in view of the deficiency of laborers and means to sustain them, and with a view to obviate these evils, the Synod of North Carolina hereby resolves :

"1. To recommend to the Presbyteries under its care to use all proper means to secure that every minister within their bounds, not incapacitated by age or feeble health (and who is not already doing so), shall preach twice on every Sabbath.

"2. That, unless in case of congregations so situated as to be so profited by a second service as to warrant this expenditure of labor, these services be held at two different points.

"That the Presbyteries, in so far as the way is clear, so group the churches and arrange the fields of labor as to facilitate this object."

The obvious implication of this paper is, that there are ministers (and a sufficient number of them to call for formal, serious action) who are only preaching once a week. This, in many cases, would only require the preparation of two sermons a month, for in such cases the two congregations are entirely different, and the pastor preaches the same sermon on two successive Sabbaths. The impression seems generally to prevail that the town pastor has the soft place. Let us see: he faces the same congregation twice on Sabbath and once during the week, besides the extra ante-communion services and special days of thanksgiving, of prayer, funerals, etc., so that his year's work will not fall below a hundred and seventy different sermons to the same congregation; while his country brother, even if he preaches twice every Sabbath, gets along with only about one-third as many pulpit preparations. For there are few men who, preaching to a church ten or fifteen miles distant from the one in which he preached the preceding Sabbath, will not repeat the sermons. The labor of sermonising is ordinarily in inverse proportion to the number of churches supplied.

The paper contemplates two very important things: 1st. That there should be outposts wherever possible in every congregation, occupied as preaching points, to form the *nuclei* of new congre-

gations. *E. g.*, a pastor has two charges in a territory embracing a whole county. Instead of preaching only once on a Sabbath, because, perhaps, the churches are too far apart to allow him to go from one to the other on the same day, or because it is inconvenient for the congregation to attend an all-day service, and impossible for them to return home and assemble again in the afternoon, let him select some convenient point on the outskirts of the congregation and preach in the afternoon at a school-house or some such building, and gather a congregation there, many of whom would not attend at the church. Thus he would have two missionary points in his territory, and be doing very valuable evangelistic work along with his regular charges, and even then do less (physical exercise excepted) than the average town pastor.

The paper contemplates, 2d, the grouping of churches; but this important and perplexing difficulty has been already treated under the head of episcopal oversight. Nothing can be accomplished by the grouping, unless the churches stay grouped; the agent of Sustentation builds his card castles, and some little sister knocks them down.

Let all our pastors in town and country do just as much towards the occupancy of the outlying territory as possible. The town pastor might occasionally preach on a Sabbath afternoon or a week-night at some point in the country accessible to him. We know of one Presbyterian church whose organisation is traceable to the fifth-Sunday preaching of a man who lived in a town fifty miles distant, and it in turn became the centre of a circle which now embraces four churches. In many towns such a course might be pursued, and in our large and scattered country fields it is much more feasible. Our ministers must spread out over more territory. The paucity of our supply makes it far more essential for us than for our Methodist brethren, and yet one of their preachers, though they have so many more than we, supplies a territory oftentimes in which we would have three or four pastors. This is another reason why vacant churches are unknown among them.

3. *A very potent instrumentality for aggressiveness is to be found in "protracted meetings."* By this phrase we mean simply

and solely the repeated presentation of the gospel, day after day and night after night, in consecutive services, preaching, and prayer-meeting. We are not an advocate of new measures, machinery, or hot-bed forcing apparatus of any kind, or any systematic "getting up" of a revival (we do not believe that revivals come from that direction), but we do most heartily favor the continued persistent presentation of the truth, and the pressing perseveringly of its claims upon the hearts and consciences of men. The Spirit of God is sovereign, and he alone "opens the heart" of men that they may "attend unto the things" which are spoken; but no Presbyterian holds that the sovereignty of God precludes the use of means on the part of man. The difficulty attending the ordinary stated preaching of the word is, that a week of distracting cares and worldly business or pleasure intervenes between these services to dissipate whatever impression has been made. Ordinary wisdom and practical common sense would suggest some means whereby to obviate this difficulty, to overcome this manifest disadvantage, to retain, perpetuate, and intensify the impressions made by the preaching. Can there be any reasonable objection to this? You wish the heart to *melt* under the gospel, and the plan is to get it warm to a certain point, and then allow it to cool down to its normal temperature, and to repeat this process stately at intervals of a week!

"Ah! but the excitement of these protracted meetings!" Our people are so straight on this subject that they lean backwards, and our preachers feel it incumbent to add to every account of a revival that there was "no excitement whatever attending the meeting." Fancy Peter publishing an account of the day of Pentecost in the *Jerusalem Presbyterian*, and concluding with the statement, "everything was calm and quiet, and the meeting was not attended with any excitement whatever"!

Of course, mere animal excitement cannot be too seriously deprecated; but on this account to oppose all protracted meetings, is about on a par with condemning a sound wholesome dinner because gluttony issues in the pains and penalties of gout. Is there not such a thing as legitimate religious excitement? When the Holy Ghost convicts a man of personal sin, and reveals

to his awakened gaze the yawning of an eternal hell, it is but natural that there should be some excitement in that man's breast. An appreciation of imminent danger generally arouses the feelings to a high pitch. True, the effect is different upon different constitutions and temperaments. Some are calm, cool, and collected, even in the greatest peril; some lose all presence of mind, and are overwhelmed by the intensity of their emotions; some receive the saddest tidings without the change of a single feature or the quiver of a muscle to indicate the grief at heart; others are overcome with sorrow and yield to a perfect abandon of grief. So it is with religious feeling. Shall we expect a man whose very nature impels him to give vent to his feelings in all other dangers and griefs, to be perfectly cool and collected when God shows him the greatest danger that can threaten mortal man? The Scriptures do not countenance this indiscriminate condemnation of all religious excitement. Judging from the narratives therein contained, no inconsiderable amount of it seems to have attended the first preaching of the gospel. While we are violently opposed to all emotional frenzy, and abhor all the abuse of human susceptibility to the impressions of the awful and the terrible, yet we are heartily rejoiced when, under the faithful and fervent prayers of God's people and the pointed, practical, personal preaching of the gospel, a revival of religion comes *down*, and men's hearts are stirred to their profoundest depths, and numbers begin to lose their coolness, quietness, and collectedness, and ask in unmistakable earnestness and anxiety, "Men and brethren, what must I do to be saved?" And we pity the pastor who would not be rejoiced at it, and we pity still more his congregation. We have known such instances, and invariably, "while other fleeces were wet, theirs were dry." True, this may have been a mere coincidence, but the regularity of it deserves attention. We have yet to know of an aggressive, growing church, whose pastor did not "believe in revivals." The tendency of this recoil from excitement is towards the dry rot. In Professor Phelps's late exhaustive treatise on *The Theory of Preaching*, the following paragraphs occur in discussing the morbid fear of fanaticism:

“The religious weaknesses are very few which sap the strength of the pulpit more insidiously, yet more fatally, than this. It is not easy to decide which is the more disastrous to a preacher's power over the consciences of men—to be a fanatic, or to preach in servile fear of being one. The following points deserve especial mention :

“(1) The perils of the large majority of educated preachers are not in the direction of fanaticism, but in that of a servile fear of fanaticism. Culture itself is a break-water against fanatical surges. Its danger is that of becoming a barrier to the inflow of rational enthusiasm. History shows that genuine fanatics in the pulpit have been comparatively few—not so many, by a vast reckoning, as those who have been ferocious denouncers of fanaticism. The weaklings who have succumbed to their dread of an intemperate pulpit by making their own pulpit stupid, have been as the stars in multitude.

“(2) Every revival of religion which has been extensive and powerful enough to become a landmark in history, has formed a certain proportion of the clergy in opposition to it, through their fear of fanatical distortions. Good men have been swept, by their antipathy to fanaticism, into the ranks of worldly hostility to every ‘great awakening,’” etc.¹

We have heard of some cases which show to what extreme this feeling may be carried. A brother told the writer that he was once preaching in such a minister's church, having persuaded him to have a series of services in connexion with his communion. During the preaching there were indications of religious feeling in the congregation, and he suggested to the pastor the propriety of visiting certain persons in the privacy of their homes, to talk with them about their personal salvation, to press the claims of the Saviour upon them individually, and to pray with them privately. This the pastor declined to do, saying that he had never done so, and that he did not consider it Presbyterian !

We heard another minister of our Church quoted as saying that if he saw signs of religious feeling in his congregation on Sabbath morning, he would close the church and have no preaching that night ! This we would not have believed possible, had we not heard the former incident from a brother's own experience. We cannot doubt *its* truth, and the two cases seem to be about on a par. Such men handle the gospel as a child does a fire-arm, fearfully, too timid to discharge it, because they are afraid of the report and the rebound.

¹ Theory of Preaching, p. 472.

In connexion with this, let us quote another extract, from the pen of a minister whose wide and close observation gives him ample data for his conclusions; whose unusual acuteness of mind qualifies him to discern the just relation between principle and practice, cause and effect; and whose prominence for twenty years in the aggressive work of his Presbytery, gives his opinions an enviable weight wherever their source is known. The reader will see that our brother has exactly anticipated Professor Phelps, as quoted above:

“Many of our people, and perhaps all of our pastors, have been troubled with cases of spurious conversion, and have at least *seen* what they regarded as spurious revivals. We suppose there will be no question raised as to the injury done by these counterfeits wherever they appear. But one form of the injury is so striking that it deserves a special notice. It comes from a natural reaction against the evils noted, and may be described as caution degenerated into suspiciousness. Unquestionably there has been produced in the minds of many a distrust of revivals, which has not failed to do mischief. It is not a little singular that such distrust ever obtained a foothold in a Church which makes the divine sovereignty a cardinal point of its doctrine. And it is still more singular that it should ever have been able even for an instant to obtain rest for the sole of its foot in a Church with a history such as ours has. And yet more is it remarkable that any Christian should ever seem to be less alive to the dangers of stagnation, than to the fancied perils of revival.

“We use the expression ‘fancied perils,’ because we are sure that the very caution which produces the fear would avoid the dangers which, under other circumstances, become real. Now, what is the effect of this distrust? In some cases, at least, it has led to a careful repression of any unusual manifestation of interest, lest an outbreak of ‘wild-fire’ should occur; and this repression has too often repressed the interest as well as the expression thereof. There is a terror resulting from over-caution that is as dangerous as that which is the child of over-confidence. And we earnestly ask our brethren to consider whether in avoiding the one they have not fallen upon the other.”

Just so far as this tendency prevails, to that extent will congregational aggressiveness be hindered. Believing this, we protest most earnestly against this tendency in our beloved Church.

Let it be understood, however, that we take no stock in the peripatetic, professional revivalist, with his little tricks like silent prayer (which suggests to us the slow music and turned-down

lights of a sleight-of-hand performance), and his serio-comic religious ditties, wedding sanctified slang to cornfield music; the irresponsible ecclesiastical tramp, who, under the misnomer of *evangelist*, perambulates the country, encouraging the idea that he holds the string to a sort of heavenly shower-bath; who, when a pastor, from "the conscience of" his pastoral vows, objects to some of his sensational clap-trap, has the impudence to ask him if he *assumes the responsibility* (!) of opposing "the work," and intimates, not very obscurely, that all objection to his methods is opposition to the Holy Ghost, instigated by the devil.

Such men may be very good in their way; but as we do not like that way, we would give them a wide berth. Let the pastor by suitable sermons on the several Sabbaths preceding the time when he wishes to begin his meeting, and by constant prayer for God's special presence, endeavor "to make straight the way of the Lord," and then, if the attendance and attention of the congregation are encouraging, let him announce the meeting and notify the brother, who has previously promised his assistance, to come; and let this assisting brother be some co-presbyter well and favorably known, a pastor who has the *cure* of souls and appreciates its responsibility, whom the pastor and his congregation can implicitly trust. Let these two brethren and the congregation labor and pray together day by day. Let the preaching be plain, practical, and pointed, and endeavors be made to utilise the impressions made by each discourse. While the visiting brother does the preaching, let the pastor conduct the daily prayer-meeting, and by this and visiting from house to house for private admonition and prayer seek to apply the truth to special cases whose characters, needs, difficulties, etc., are known to him. If he sees indications of feeling in any member of the congregation during a sermon, let him, by all means, in some way have an interview with that person before the next sermon. The best means for this is to be left to the wisdom and prudence of the pastor in charge; *the pastoral work is distinctively his*, the responsibility of it is laid upon him by God, by the Presbytery, by his own conscience, and by the congregation. Into this sphere no man has a right to venture farther than the pastor himself welcomes him.

This is what we mean by *protracted meetings*. After all, it is simply the preaching of the gospel in such a way as to bring it home to individual hearts and consciences, in such a way as to follow the sowing with some attempt at least at a harvest, in such a way as to convince the hearers that you are definite and personal, and are striving for the salvation, not of mankind, but of *men*. It is but the gospel weapon wielded with that downright earnestness which in all the affairs of life is so apt to develop the resources of skill, tact, and energy, and which carries into work for God some of that wisdom which the children of this world so constantly and successfully exhibit in their generation (and the "children of light," too, when they are concerned with secular matters). It is preaching the gospel as if we believed it, and then acting towards our hearers out of the pulpit as if we really meant what we said while in it.

Every hunter knows that it will never do to fire at birds by the flock, he must fire at *a* bird. We have no particular *penchant* for protracted meetings as such, and if any pastor can so conduct his regular Sabbath services as to supersede the necessity for special provision as above indicated, we bid him hearty God-speed; but so far as our personal observation extends, this is generally firing at the flock.

We would not recommend periodic protracted meetings; we would have them whenever, and as often as, and as seldom as, the congregation seems ripe for the work. While deprecating all periodic regularity, mechanical arrangement, and public advertisement (by way of stirring up an arousement), yet we would never let pass an opportunity for such services, if the way seemed open, and would always try to keep the way open. *Above all things, we would never sacrifice such an opportunity to pride in a high standard of preaching.* If there seems to be religious interest in the congregation, let the pastor go into the pulpit every night with the best preparation his circumstances allow, and if in the providence of God he can make no special preparation, let him go without it, and, casting to the winds (or the devil?) all anxiety about the standard of his pulpit, let him urge over and over the same trite old arguments. It matters not how *rusty* they may be; put them to the people *red-hot*, and the rust

will not appear. Men will forget to criticise, and he himself will be astonished at the effectiveness of his preaching. Several years ago we received a very interesting letter from one of our most active and successful pastors, giving some account of such a series of services; after mentioning that nineteen had united with the church at the communion which introduced the services, he goes on to say:

“About fifty (omitting these nineteen) have been to the study to be talked and prayed with, and about twenty-five of them are indulging a hope. I have written to —, to come to-day and be with me to-morrow and for several days. I wrote yesterday and have not heard from him. I am sound in wind and limb, never felt better. I think I can go on for a *month* longer at least, and will do so whether I get help or not, if the Lord still continues to manifest so powerfully his gracious presence. Is it not wonderful? I go back and take up old sermons and fire away and the Lord blesses. I have preached and given talks at church (to say nothing of daily talks and prayer at the study at about four or six *per diem*) about twenty times since we started, and I think I am good for twenty more. Help us with your prayers.”

Does some non-believer in “revivals” ask, But how many *stuck*? For the sake of such a questioner we have paused and made a little statistical digression, with which we will favor him, with the prayer that *it* will stick and afford food for reflection. Having examined the growth of this pastor’s church, as represented by a period of ten years ending with 1882, we discover that if the Church at large had only gathered and *held* as many proportionally, we would now have, *in addition to our present gains*, enough strength to form nearly *four* more Synods as strong as that of Georgia.

Oh that our beloved Church, with her wonderful capacities, capabilities, and adaptability for unlimited aggressiveness, would “break up her fallow ground;” her theory, polity, constitution, structure, etc., are as nearly perfect as anything this imperfect world contains. Would she but put her varied resources into active and consistent operation, her tabernacle, like the fabled Arabian tent, would spread till it sheltered and housed the destitutions of the world, and she herself would look forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The book market is as rich as ever in the line of biblical exegesis. The fourth volume of "The Speaker's Commentary" ¹ brings the great work to a conclusion. It is chiefly notable for a new and extended exposition of the Apocalypse. We may say once more that whilst not absolutely free from the subtle and insidious taint of the refined modern rationalism, the Bible Commentary is in the main sound in theology as well as in scholarship. It is, besides, the nearest approach that the unprofessional and merely English reader can make to the posture of the skilled evangelical interpreter in other lands. Dr. Marcus Dods is the able editor of Augustine, but has been taken to task (if our memory serves us aright) by the Free Church for certain alleged errors of doctrine. Professor Davidson is justly famed as an Hebraist, but is ambiguous, if not lax, in some of his theological statements. Otherwise, these valuable handbooks for Bible classes ^{2 3} might receive more unstinted commendation.

A new volume of the so-called "Meyer's Commentaries" ⁴ has appeared, by Dr. Huther. The evidence for and against Second Peter is held to be equally balanced. Such grave mistakes in nearly all German books are much to be deplored. There is no

¹The Bible Commentary. By Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M. A., Canon of Exeter. New Testament, Vol. IV., Hebrews-Revelation, pp. 844. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

²Handbook for Bible Classes. Edited by the Rev. Marcus Dods, D. D., and the Rev. Alexander Whyte, D. D. The Epistle to the Hebrews, with Introduction and Notes, by A. B. Davidson, M. A., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew in the New College, Edinburgh. Pp. 260. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1882. Scribner & Welford, New York.

³Handbooks for Bible Classes. Edited by the Rev. Marcus Dods, D. D., and the Rev. Alexander Whyte, D. D. The Book of Joshua, by George C. M. Douglas, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow. Pp. 122. *Ibid.*

⁴Meyer's Commentaries. The Pastoral Epistles. By J. E. Huther, Ph.D. Translated by David Hunter, B. D. 8vo, pp. 370. *Ibid.*

objection to having "The Words of Jesus" embodied in a separate record, any more than to having volumes made up simply of the Pentateuch or of "Scripture Promises." On the contrary, there is a manifest propriety and advantage in such an arrangement. This exclusion of all other matter should, however, be but temporary; and care should be taken to avoid the gross and unpardonable error (which seems to be suggested by this title) that the Christianity of Luke and Paul and James and Peter and Jude and John is not just as truly the Christianity also of *Christ* as "Christ's Christianity" ¹ itself.

Pastor Tophel's discourses on the Holy Spirit ² are said to be excellent and original. The finest part of the book is on the crowning of all by the resurrection body. The great work on this subject is, of course, John Owen's; and Dr. Octavius Winslow, of Bath, has written with much wisdom and evangelical unction on the same profoundly interesting topic. Dr. Dorner, the famous theological professor of Berlin, is undoubtedly one of the most honored names amongst contemporary authors in the department of dogmatics. The first and second of his translated volumes (which appeared some time ago) are now followed up by the third and fourth. ³ The method is a novel one (especially to English readers), and the treatment must be conceded to be masterly. In general, the work is, we are rejoiced to say, emphatically orthodox; and this is especially true of what is said concerning the proper deity and substitutionary mediation of Christ. The distinguished author's views are far from satisfactory on all points. The theory as to the triune modification of the divine being is appar-

¹Christ's Christianity: Being the Precepts and Doctrines recorded in Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as taught by Jesus Christ. Analysed and arranged according to subjects. By Albert H. Walker. 12mo, \$1.25.

²The Work of the Holy Spirit in Man. Discourses by G. Tophel, Pastor of the Evangelical Church, Geneva. Translated by the Rev. Thos. J. Despres. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner & Welford.

³A System of Christian Doctrine. By Dr. J. A. Dorner, Oberconsistorialrath and Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated by the Rev. Alfred Cave, B. A., Principal and Professor of Theology, Hackney College, London; and the Rev. J. S. Banks, Professor of Theology, Wesleyan College, Leeds. Vols. III. and IV. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark & Co. 1882. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3 a volume.

ently more nearly akin to the Patripassian or Sabellian scheme than to that of the Nicene Council. There is also a qualified assent given to the doctrine of the Restorationists. Dr. Kinns's new book on the thread-bare subject of the Bible and Science¹ is able and interesting.

Symbolics is the subject-matter of the theological professor of Upsala, Doctor Scheele's, learned and valued work, of which the third volume has just appeared in Leipzig.² It is fair in its statements, but the range of view is from the standing-point of the modern semi-Pelagian and semi-mystical German Lutheranism. It is refreshing to meet so soon again with the name of that genuine scholar and sterling apologist, Dr. Uhlhorn. The theme (and a truly captivating one it is) of his present disquisition is that of Christian Love as seen at work in the early Christian centuries.³ This brilliant defender of the faith, unlike most of his countrymen, knows the power that lies in the word *style*, and leaves scarcely anything to be desired, either as to the matter or manner. Professor Lippert is engaged in a series of studies respecting the origin of religious beliefs and observances. In the present volume we have the fruits of the third of these successive studies. His hopeless attempt in this volume is to derive the *cultus* of the Christian system from the so-called prior forms of faith and service, which Christianity has displaced. His effort in all his books is to make out that everything else and later has grown out of one original idea of soul-worship.⁴ The impressions of the Tractarian movement in the English Church, which Mr. Mozley has to give us, as well his recollections of such men as Newman and Pusey,

¹The Harmony of the Bible with Science. By Samuel Kinns, Ph.D., F.R.A.S. With 110 illustrations. One volume large 8vo, over 530 pp.; extra cloth, bevelled, gilt top, price \$3. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., 739 and 741 Broadway, New York.

²Theologische Symbolik. Von Professor und Dokt. von Scheele. Dritter Theil. Leipzig: J. Lehmann; New York; B. Westermann & Co. 1882.

³Die Christliche Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche. Von G. Uhlhorn, Dr. Theol. 12mo, pp. 421. Stuttgart: D. Gundert. 1882. New York: B. W. Westermann.

⁴Christenthum, Volksglaube, und Volksbrauch. Geschichtliche Entwicklung ihres Vorstellungsinhaltes. Von Julius Lippert. Berlin: Hofmann. 1882.

are embodied in two entertaining but disappointing volumes,¹ which have recently been issued from the press of the Longmans. Mr. Mozley, it would appear, shrank from being a Romanist, very much as Erasmus shrank from being a Reformer.

The latest contribution to Biblical Hermeneutics² comes to us well recommended in more ways than one. *Apropos*, why does not some one say a kind word sometimes for the brief but admirable treatise on this matter that forms the concluding chapters of Barrows's Companion to the Bible? The outline plan which comprehends the whole field to be investigated under two aspects, one human and one divine, could not be essentially bettered. The so-called *science* of comparative cult-philosophy is getting to be almost amusingly popular among infidel scholars. "The Faiths of the World"³ may, nevertheless, be discussed from an entirely Christian, as well as rational, point of view. In this instance it is from the Neo-Hegelian position taken by Dr. Caird, one of the leading authors. Dr. Tiele is a learned Hollander who has written a valuable history of the religion of Egypt.⁴ Much of it, however, is guess work. He scouts the old-fashioned idea of an esoteric and an exoteric system. The paradox of the joint and synchronous existence of a spiritual monotheism and a grossly material polytheism, he explains in another way. He thinks the minor deities were looked upon as symbols. The adventurous Robertson Smith⁵ comes up again smiling after every knock-down overthrow, and reconstructs the entire fabric of the ancient Jewish history in the

¹Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement. By the Rev. T. Mozley, M. A., formerly Fellow of Oriel, etc. 2 volumes. London: Longmans; Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

²Biblical Hermeneutics. By C. Elliott, D. D., and the Rev. W. J. Harsha. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

³The Faiths of the World. St. Giles's Lectures. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

⁴History of the Egyptian Religion. By Dr. C. P. Tiele. Translated from the Dutch, with the co-operation of the Author, by James Ballingal. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1882. 16mo, pp. xxiii., 230.

⁵The Prophets of Israel and Their Place in History to the Close of the 8th Century B. C. Eight Lectures by W. Robertson Smith, LL.D. Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. 1882. 8vo, pp. 444. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

approved continental fashion in which the German idealist excogitated the camel, to wit, out of the bowels of his own inner consciousness. The adroit professor is very agile and versatile and fascinating, and puts his case capitally well; yet it is diverting to think how many of his enthusiastic admirers never find out that their accomplished conjurer got all (or nearly all) his tricks from Kuenen and Wellhausen. It is as if some boyish assistant of a prestidigitateur like Hermann were to run away with the chief's apparatus, set up on his own account, and palm off all the master's feats of jugglery and legerdemain upon distant audiences as *bonâ fide* his own.

The records of the Roman Catacombs¹ strangely confirm and piece out the chronicle afforded by the other historic and literary remains of a coeval antiquity. They have, notwithstanding, a rude but graphic charm, a homely and at the same time an engaging pathos, that do not attach to other monuments of the primitive Christian age. Canon Farrar's prose confectionery is not always wholly free from foreign poisons, and even when in a pure state needs to be taken in judicious moderation. His scholarship and fancy are alike admirable.² The philosophic romance of John Inglesant has brought many readers acquainted with that Romish, mystic Molinos,³ the founder of Quietism. It seems a remarkable movement to have sprung up in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and in the very bosom of the corrupt Church that had as yet refused to rid itself of the slough of the Middle Ages. Mr. Shorthouse works in his fine portrait of Molinos at the end of his marvellous processional canvas. Dr. Shields is a lover of the

¹Les Catacombes de Rome. Histoire de L'Art et des Croyances Religieuses pendant les Premiers Siècles du Christianisme. Par Theophile Roller. Paris: Vve. A. Morel et Cie., Libraires-Éditeurs. MDCCCLXXIX. Premier Volume, 304 pp.; Deuxieme Volume, 391 pp. (Royal 8vo.)

²The Early Days of Christianity. By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Canon of Westminster, Author of "The Life of Christ," "The Life and Work of St. Paul," etc. 2 vols., 8vo, with Notes, Appendix, Index, etc., price, per set, \$5; a cheaper edition in 1 vol., with Notes, etc., \$2. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., 739 and 741 Broadway, New York.

³Molinos, The Quietist. By John Bigelow. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

difficult art of generalisation.¹ The Italy of King Humbert is burgeoning out, as it would seem, in the way of metaphysics and exact science, as well as into the more charming exhibition of poetic and other literary efflorescence. Rosmini² speculates after the general manner of the Germans in regard to what Coleridge in his endless monologues used to style the "*omject*"; and appears to have succeeded in striking out a new path. His *Standpunkt* is at the very opposite remove from idealistic nihilism. Professor Cunningham, of Cambridge, has given us a vigorous and readable account of the rise and development of England's material pursuits.³ He has been thought to have done better in his relation of facts than in his exposition of principles; but the question is still an open one.

The Book of Enoch⁴ is here presented in English. As it has come down to us, it is an Ethiopic translation of a Greek translation of a Hebrew (or Aramaic) original. Apocryphal as it is, there is some curious interest attaching to it, and it is looked upon by the Swedenborgians as having preceded and moulded the canonical Epistle of Second Peter. The labors of Laurence, Dillman, and Rödiger are happily succeeded (and utilised) by Dr. Schodde. The late Dean of Westminster was a far better biographer and *littérateur* than Church historian, biblical antiquarian, or gospel herald. These Sermons⁵ preached on special occasions show him when at his best. He was not a great thinker; and his Christianity, after having been winnowed of all that was narrow and repulsive, had in the same process been winnowed, too, of

¹The Older of the Sciences. By Prof. Chas. W. Shields. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

²The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Translated, with a Sketch of the Author's Life, Bibliography, Introduction, and Notes, by Thomas Davidson. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

³The Growth of English Industry and Commerce. By W. Cunningham, M. A., late Deputy to the Knightsbridge Professor in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1882.

⁴The Book of Enoch: Translated from the Ethiopic, with Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. George H. Schodde, Ph.D. 12mo, pp. 278. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1882.

⁵Westminster Sermons. Sermons on Special Occasions preached in Westminster Abbey. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

nearly all that is distinctive and precious. Funeral discourses will be found here upon such men as Frederick Maurice, David Livingstone, Lord Palmerston, Charles Dickens, Charles Kingsley, the Earl of Beaconsfield, Sir John Herschel, Thomas Carlyle, Grote, and Lyell. They are all superficial and inadequate, but written in alluring English.

The lamented Professor Diman, of Brown University, was as gifted and acute in the departments of history and literature as in that of apologetics. He seems to have been fitted, however, to shine in the lecture-room rather than in the pulpit. As might have been anticipated, therefore, the orations and even the essays in this volume¹ take the palm over the parish sermons, although every one of these productions has traits of excellence. The sermons are too technical in their phraseology. Dr. Diman must have been a magnetic man personally, as well by reason of his ingenuous enthusiasm as of his amiable character.

The Quaker statesman and orator, Mr. John Bright, is certainly one of the most well marked and reputable figures of the present age.² His method is not that of concatenated reasoning, but of direct impression. He knows the people and speaks their dialect. His speeches appear to have been partly committed to memory, but largely unpremeditated as to the language. Often, he says, he has written nothing beforehand but the bare outline of his address on an ordinary visiting card; but even in such cases it is his habit to fix certain passages in his mind in the very words in which he means to clothe them when he appears before his audience, and as a rule he pays the strictest attention in advance to his peroration. The view of "The Prince" that was generally accepted before Macaulay wrote his famous essay, has now come in vogue again. In other words, it is again the correct thing to regard the work as intended *au grand serieux*, and its author (in theory, at

¹Orations and Essays; with Selected Parish Sermons. By the Rev. J. Lewis Diman, D. D. Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

²The Life and Speeches of the Right Honorable John Bright, M. P. By George Barrett Smith, Author of the "Life of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P.," with Portraits. Two volumes in one. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Co. 1881.

least) as the Iago of the refined system of modern statecraft.¹ What a pleasing task Mr. Ashton set himself when he undertook the labor of investigating the social life of England in the days of Bolingbroke and Marlborough, of Pope and Swift and Steele and Addison and Lady Mary Wortley Montague!² The social life itself in those days, as depicted even in the charming literature of that era, was far below the standard which is now recognised by custom. Mr. Eidlitz is favorably known as having drawn the plans of a number of handsome buildings, including churches. His treatise on Art³ is intelligent, but denunciatory, and to a certain extent (if we are not in error) pragmatical. The book is not wholly free from the presence of that Agnostic blindness on religious matters that pervades so much of the current writing of the day. De Bacourt has contributed a deeply interesting chapter to the history of American politics and social manners.⁴ He is, for the most part, fair, and in some cases even goes out of his way to be kind; but he has his bitter prejudices and violent antipathies. There is a droll caricature in the book of Mr. Webster and the American Court. Professor Wilhelm Müller's "Political History of Recent Times" is an able and thoughtfully digested work.⁵ Signor Fornelli strongly advocates state control in education.⁶

¹The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli. Translated from the Italian by C. E. Detmold. 4 vols., 8vo. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co.

²Social Life in the Reign of Queen Anne. Taken from the Original Sources. By John Ashton, author of the "Chap-Books of the Eighteenth Century," etc. With 84 illustrations by the author from Contemporary Prints. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$9.

³The Nature and Function of Art, more especially of Architecture. By Leopold Eidlitz. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Co.

⁴De Bacourt. Souvenirs d'un Diplomate. Lettres intimes sur l'Amérique. Paris: Calmann Lévy; New York: F. W. Ch ristern.

⁵Political History of Recent Times, 1816-1875, with Special Reference to Germany. By Wilhelm Müller, Professor in Tübingen. Revised and enlarged by the author. Translated, with an Appendix covering the period from 1876 to 1881, by the Rev. John P. Peters, Ph.D. Harper & Bros. 1882.

⁶L'Insegnamento Pubblico ai Tempi Nostri. N. Fornelli. Rome: Forzani.

The late Professor Hodgson's work on the blunders in our daily speech¹ has already been barely mentioned in these columns. It is pronounced to be a work of decided merit. Mr. Morley's recent withdrawal from the *Fortnightly Review* has for the nonce concentrated many eyes upon him. His account of English literature under Victoria² had been only in part forestalled by Mr. Edmund Clarence Stedman's "Victorian Poets," and is marked by his known characteristics as a man of wide reading, and an attractive but rather heavy writer of sceptical tendencies and affiliations. The Essays³ on a kindred but more extensive subject, which we owe to the late Professor Brewer, of King's College, London, may be safely commended for those qualities which seem to be as inseparable from English scholarship as is verdure from the English parks and lawns. English metre has found an enthusiastic and successful expounder in the person of a very learned and scientific German by the name of Schipper.⁴ Such an account as Mr. Welsh has given in the two volumes just issued simultaneously in Chicago and London, of the growth of the most precious of modern literatures, and of that most wonderful of modern tongues which not only contains but embodies it, is richly worth having and keeping.⁵ The chronicle and philosophic analysis of English prose fiction⁶ is on certain accounts more profitable read-

¹Errors in the Use of English. By the late W. B. Hodgson, LL.D. American revised edition. 12mo. pp. 246. 1882. D. Appleton & Co. New York.

²English Literature in the Reign of Victoria. By Henry Morley. G. P. Putnam, New York.

³English Studies; or, Essays in English History and Literature. By the late J. S. Brewer, M. A., Preacher at the Rolls, Professor of English Literature and Modern History in King's College, London. London: John Murray.

⁴Englische Metrik in Historischer und Systematischer Entwicklung Dargestellt. Von Dr. J. Schipper. Erster Theil. Altenenglische Metrik. Bonn: Strauss. Pp. xxvii., 565. New York: Westermann.

⁵The Development of English Literature and Language. By Alfred H. Welsh, A. M. 2 vols. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co.; London: Trübner & Co. 1882.

⁶A History of English Prose Fiction, from Sir Thomas Malory to George Eliot. By Bayard Tuckerman. 8vo, uniform with Taylor's German Literature, \$1.75. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

ing than the English prose fiction itself. Yet we do not hesitate to say that, if prose fiction is to be read at all, English prose fiction (that is, prose fiction that was composed in English) is, as a whole, more deserving of perusal than any other.

Daniel Macmillan¹ was one of the founders of the Macmillan Publishing House, and his name is another added to the catalogue of remarkable Scottish booksellers, to which belong such names as those of Constable, Blackwood, and the brothers Chambers. He was shrewd, sagacious, well informed, literary, genial, and pious. Mrs. Fanny Kemble² was in more senses than one born an actress; but she is an actress no more, and throws all her weighty and still charming influence in the other scale. The most telling blows against the stage that have rung in our time are those which have been delivered by this estimable, gifted, and accomplished woman. Her autobiography is admirably executed and full of virtuous grace, as also of personal and literary attractiveness, not to refer to other and varied grounds of merit on which these memorials make their silent appeal to the discerning reader. Two parts of Mr. Cory's "Guide to Modern English History" are now offered on Mr. Holt's counters (if, indeed, Mr. Holt has ever introduced such a thing as a counter into his place of business), and are marked by freshness and suggestiveness, and by knowledge and self-reliant force, rather than by caution, discretion, and other sober and humdrum qualities which are indispensable in the case of one whose claim is that he is competent to lead the unwary and the ignorant.³ So interesting a field as that of the literature of Italy can now be traversed under very beguiling auspices, for it will be in company with so great an expert in English style as Mr. Symonds, some of whose review-essays are amongst the finest extant.⁴ The book on Heine and his romantic

¹The Memoir of Daniel Macmillan. By Thomas Hughes. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1882.

²Fanny Kemble's Records of Later Life. 12mo, (uniform with "Records of a Girlhood"), \$2.50. Henry Holt & Co.

³A Guide to Modern English History. By Wm. Cory. Part II. MDCCCXXX-MDCCCXXXV. 8vo, cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Italian Literature. By J. A. Symonds. 2 vols., 8vo, with portrait of the author, \$7. *Ibid.*

school is said to reward the man who cuts the leaves.¹ The great city of New York commonly boasts of its population, its industries, its millionaires. It has greater reason to be proud of its churches, its mission-schools, its hospitals, its asylums, its immense organised charities. All these things are found elsewhere. There is one thing not yet mentioned to which New York can point with exultation and cry, without fear of a response from any quarter, "Match *that*, if you can!" It is the Volunteer Fire Department,² that had its beginning apparently under Stuyvesant, but was created by legislative enactment in the next century, and flourished at its highest point of efficiency and honor between the years 1830 and 1850. The memorable fires of 1835 and 1845 were a great stimulant to organised exertion. All classes, especially the best, followed the engines; millionaires were not wholly wanting, and were elbowed by the sturdy yeomanry. The war put an end to all this, as to many other forms of good.

¹Heine's *Romantic School*. Translated by S. L. Fleischman. 12mo, \$1.50. Henry Holt & Co.

²*The Story of the Volunteer Fire Department of the City of New York*. By Geo. W. Sheldon. With 145 illustrations. 8vo, cloth, \$4.50. Harper & Bros., New York.

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ARTICLE I.

THE FOREIGN EVANGELIST AS VIEWED BY ONE IN THE FOREIGN FIELD.

III.

HIS HOME RELATIONS.

To the Presbytery.

The editorial published in the *Missionary* for May, 1874, was written "to present the views of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions" upon the subject of the foreign evangelist's home relations. About two weeks after its publication, it was indirectly approved by the Columbus Assembly, as we have seen. Within a year thereafter, the pamphlet entitled *Ecclesiastical Status of Foreign Missionaries* was published. This paper, however, is confined entirely to the question of his relation to the native Church, alluding only incidentally, on page 9, to his home relations. The *Manual* was published and approved, as we have already seen, in 1877, in which the same theories are announced, on this point, as in the two papers just cited.

Now, it is a very curious fact that the views of the Executive Committee on our home relations, as thus presented from time to time, have never been discussed. So far as is known, not one syllable, *pro* or *con*, has ever been elicited from the Church. Not

only have the great body of our Christian people silently acquiesced, but even their rulers, assembled in our highest church court, have adopted those views *without one word of discussion!* Why this strange anomaly? When questions of ecclesiastical law and authority arise, our Church always shows herself ready enough to give them a thorough discussion. The foreign evangelist's home relations is a strange exception. We will venture to give two or three reasons for this. In the first place, these evangelists and their work are in distant countries, far removed from the Church. Our system of conducting Foreign Missions practically cuts them off from the Church, so that any question that is personal to them is not a living practical question to the Church. The Assembly's power to create Presbyteries in foreign countries would not have been questioned by the Church at home, but for the fact that our Kentucky brethren had personally experienced the effects of the unconstitutional usurpation of the Synod's prerogative by the Northern Assembly; and the matter even then would, no doubt, have been dropped by the Church before it was settled, had not *the missionaries themselves* overtured the Assembly on the subject. And after all her discussion, and even legislation, on the subject of his foreign relations, the fact that the Sao Paulo Presbytery still exists after a lapse of six years, and will continue to exist, unless the missionaries send up another overture,¹ proves that the Church has no living interest in anything that relates to the evangelist's status.

In the second place, these questions have unfortunately been acted upon in such a way as not to elicit discussion. On both occasions the views of the Executive Committee on these points of ecclesiastical law were submitted, not to the Presbyteries, nor even to the Assembly directly, but, as we have already shown, to the Standing Committee on Foreign Missions; these Committees, again, recommended their approval in the body of their reports, and not directly on their individual merits. Now, of course the Assembly has the right to discuss any point in these

¹ Our prediction has been verified. The Sao Paulo Presbytery was not dissolved until one of the missionaries, the Rev. E. Lane, was present at the meeting of the Synod of Virginia in 1881.

reports; but they are usually read, if we mistake not, when the subject of carrying the gospel to the heathen is the order of the day; when a large congregation is assembled to hear glowing addresses; when the programme and speakers are arranged beforehand, and in the enthusiasm of the occasion the reports are read, commending the manner in which the work has been carried on; that a certain number of thousand dollars be raised the ensuing year; that the views of the Executive Committee in regard to the evangelist be approved; that the circulation of the *Missionary* be extended, and that the Monthly Concert be more generally observed, etc., etc.—all of which is reasonable and pretty, and the report is adopted unanimously, and *presto*, the views of the Executive Committee on the grave questions of the relations of the evangelist become “law,” without being referred to the Presbyteries, and without discussion even in the Assembly. We are persuaded that this failure on the part of the Church and the Assembly to discuss the views of the Committee is not due to the fact that the views of the Church coincide with those of the Committee. The *Missionary* for May, 1874, takes the view that missionaries should belong to native Presbyteries, and when presented to the Assembly through its Standing Committee, the Church indirectly agreed. When, however, the question was presented directly to the next Assembly by an overture from the missionaries, it elicited no small discussion, and resulted in *the adoption of the contrary view*.

Again, the Assembly of 1877 approved the Manual in precisely the same manner as the paper in the *Missionary* had been; yet six months afterwards, the Synod of Kentucky unanimously adopted a paper which set forth a principle the very reverse of the Manual on the question of the missionary's relations to the home Church. We venture the assertion that not one in twenty of the members of the Assemblies of 1874 and 1877 were aware that when they voted the adoption of the reports of their Standing Committees, they were legislating upon the subject of the foreign evangelist's ecclesiastical relations. Is it to be wondered at that doctors of ecclesiastical law in our Church do not know where a certain Presbyterian dictum in regard to evangelists is

to be found, nor are aware what there is in our Constitution to enforce such a dictum so rigorously?

Let us examine, then, the views of the Executive Committee which have become "law" in our Church, on the evangelist's relations to the home Presbytery.

According to the *Missionary* for May, 1874, the foreign minister is to become a member of the native Presbytery, and hence all connexion with the home Presbytery is severed. But it says:

"He is directly and immediately under the control of the Assembly. . . . He is a member of the [foreign] Presbytery, but at the same time he is, as a missionary or evangelist, under the direction of the Assembly. . . . While he will feel himself bound to obey the [foreign] Presbytery in all matters relating to the general welfare of the churches under its care, yet that Presbytery cannot undertake to control his labors in such a sense as to nullify the authority of the Assembly over him. . . . The Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, as the agent of the General Assembly, exercises full control over the whole work."

The Ecclesiastical Status of Foreign Missionaries, published within a year after the above, says:

"The evangelist is never to become a *de facto* member of any Presbytery he may form. . . . He is to continue a member of the Presbytery in this country which clothed him with the powers and functions of an evangelist, with this understanding, however, that when he is ordained to the work of a foreign missionary, he is transferred by his Presbytery to the control and direction of the Assembly, so far as his missionary labors in a foreign land are concerned. There is no incompatibility in this between the authority of the Presbytery and that of the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical power of the Presbytery remains unimpaired. It supervises his conduct, though in an imperfect way, as a minister of the gospel. It can summon him, no matter where he lives or labors, before its bar, and try him for immorality or heresy; it can defend and protect his good name, if he is assailed; and it can appoint him, whenever it chooses, as a commissioner to the General Assembly. On the other hand, the Assembly can exercise no immediate ecclesiastical control over the missionary. It cannot try or depose him for immorality or heresy, unless the case comes up in the form of appeal and complaint from the Presbytery. The Assembly simply claims the right to direct his labors, and may dismiss him from its service for incompetency, for disobedience, or for the want of fidelity in the discharge of his duties."

The Manual, which is law *at present*, being the latest theory on the subject, says on this point:

"He receives ordination as such from his Presbytery and retains his ecclesiastical connexion with that Presbytery, though laboring in a foreign land. So far, however, as his work in the foreign field is concerned, he is a missionary of the General Assembly and acts under the general direction of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions." Again: "The Committee may recall a missionary for incompetency, for neglect of duty, for disobedience to instructions, or for disorderly conduct. The missionary, however, in case he feels aggrieved, has the right to appeal to the General Assembly, to which the missionary and the Executive Committee are alike responsible."

We may now ask of our will-o'-the-wisp, "Where is he?" He is ordained by and retains his ecclesiastical connexion with his Presbytery. He is transferred, however, to the Assembly. He is then put under the "general direction" of the Committee, which then turns him over to the *particular* direction and control of the mission. No wonder the Standing Committee of 1874 recommended: "6. That the view of the complex relations of our missionaries as being partly under the control of their Presbyteries, and partly under that of the Assembly through its Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, as that view is presented in the leading paper of the *Missionary* for May, 1874, meets with the approval of the Assembly, as indicating the only policy possible in the anomalous circumstances in which the foreign missionary is placed."

"Complex problems" abroad, and "complex relations" at home. "Difficulties" abroad, and "anomalous circumstances" at home! No wonder the Chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures in 1879 said: "We felt it important to have these questions settled, as they *are giving a great deal of trouble to our missionaries.*" How could it be otherwise? In 1874 the Committee admit that "the position of the foreign missionary is somewhat peculiar" in that two bodies, the Assembly and the Presbytery, direct him at the same time; yet they assure the Church that "no practical difficulties of the kind have ever arisen, so far as is known, in the prosecution of the work; and under a prudent administration of affairs they are not likely to arise." But it seems that even prudent management cannot prevent difficulties. It is not wise to introduce a system that presents such com-

plex problems and relations that it requires the greatest prudence to avoid practical difficulties.

If the Church would but be content with the simplicity of the Scriptures and of her Constitution, clashing of authority would be impossible. We maintain that the Presbytery at home should have sole charge and direction of her foreign evangelist.

1. In the first place, it is her bounden duty to do so because she ordained him and set him apart to the work. It is admitted by the author of "Ecclesiastical Status" that the Presbytery "clothed him with the powers and functions of an evangelist," and this no one will deny. It gave birth to him as an evangelist, and she is unfaithful to her duty if she does not take a direct oversight of him and his work. It is the solemn duty of the body that sets him apart to see to it that he is faithful to the work to which she appointed him. It is her bounden duty to see that the work is well done. We have seen that according to our Constitution, "when a minister is appointed to the work of an evangelist, he is *commissioned* to preach the gospel, and to him may be intrusted [by the Presbytery] the power to organise churches, etc." Now, for a body to appoint a commissioner to do a work and never more take any particular concern in him or the work is, to say the least, an anomaly. Nor does the Presbytery commission him to do the work of the Assembly or Executive Committee. She would have no right to send him out to do another body's work. The work he is to do is the very work that, according to our Constitution, belongs to the Presbytery. Our Book is consistent on this point. It is the Presbytery's work, and it is her bounden duty to see that the work is well done. The minister is *her* commissioner, and if she transfers him and the work to another court, she shirks a solemn responsibility. Our Constitution does not recognise sponsors at ordination. If it did, the sponsors could not take the child from its natural parent until the latter proves herself incompetent; this she has never done.

2. Our second argument is, that *she is competent*. We see no reason in the world why such men as compose the Presbyteries of Roanoke, East Hanover, West Lexington, and Transylvania

are not competent to receive letters and reports from their representatives in Brazil. In what respect are they incompetent? Have they not the natural and acquired qualifications? Have they not the promise of the Holy Spirit to guide them? No one will deny them all these qualifications. What more is needed? They have wisdom, ability, and zeal. What is lacking? Is it a knowledge of Brazil? This they can get; the same sources of information are open to them as to their brethren in Baltimore. Is it a personal acquaintance with their commissioners? They have had the men under their care usually for years; they examined and have a personal and thorough knowledge of them. More than this, they solemnly lay their hands upon them, invoking the blessing of God upon them and their work, recommending them to the grace of God for the work which is to be done. The personal and comparatively intimate relations that exist for years between the Presbytery and her candidate, and which continue to exist up to the time of his ordination, show that she is the most competent body to direct him in his work. The paper unanimously adopted by the Synod of Kentucky, referred to heretofore, sustains us in the two points just made:

“It is the view of the Synod that our judicatories are not taking that oversight of and interest in our missionaries and their work in a foreign field which is warranted by the relations they sustain to our Church courts, and to our Christian sympathies; be it therefore

“Resolved, 1st. That the Synod recommend to all its constituent Presbyteries who have in their connexion members in the foreign field, that through the Moderator or a Committee appointed for the purpose, they invite a recurrence to the rule of giving to these bodies an account of their welfare and their work.”

It will be seen at a glance that the Synod was of the opinion that the Presbyteries should take an oversight of “our missionaries and their work in a foreign field.” The *Manual* and *Ecclesiastical Status*, however, think that “he is transferred by his Presbytery to the control and direction of the Assembly so far as his work in a foreign field is concerned, and acts under the general direction of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions.” The Synod thinks, too, that the “relations” existing between the Presbytery and the evangelist justifies her taking an oversight of him.

But we shall be told that the Presbyteries removed from the seaboard are for that reason incompetent to remit the necessary funds to foreign fields. With our knowledge of Western deacons, we cannot think so. As the ministers and ruling elders are competent to direct him in his work, so we maintain that the deacons in any Presbytery are competent to remit the necessary funds to the foreign field. With all the facilities which are offered by modern commerce and banking systems, it would be forming a very low estimate of the intelligence of the business men of the West to suppose that they are incompetent to remit money to any foreign country. Are there not banks in all our Western towns? Cannot these banks remit funds to Brown Brothers of New York, or any other large banking-house of the East, to be sent in the form of bills of exchange to any part of the world? The tendency in the Church at present is to put the diaconate practically upon its scriptural and constitutional footing. Let the Presbyteries take the glorious work of Foreign Missions into their own hands, and the natural result will be to magnify and honor this divine office that has fallen into such disuse through the introduction of unscriptural "schemes."

3. In the third place, a direct oversight by the Presbyteries would secure a most important object aimed at by the Synod of Kentucky, when it said: "The Synod is also anxious to enhance the interest of our people in the great work of sending the gospel into the regions beyond; and in order thereto, desires to put them in communication with the brethren who have gone out from the bosom of our churches." We do not think this point could be too much emphasised. Direct and immediate communication, we are persuaded, would increase the interest in our Church more than a hundredfold. We all know that we are infinitely more interested in a work for which we are personally responsible. As long as the Committee is responsible, the Presbyteries will not, and *cannot*, feel *personally* interested in it. This is a principle in our nature that cannot be overcome by homilies and exhortations. Their interest will always be that *general* interest which every Christian should feel in the spread of Christ's kingdom. The Saviour, instead of changing this principle in our nature (which

is not sinful), accommodated the polity of his Church to harmonise with it. He availed himself of it, and made it subservient to the furtherance of the cause of his gospel. We believe he intentionally brought the Apostles back to report to *the very brethren* by whom they had been set apart by the imposition of hands and recommended to the grace of God. If the Presbyteries received semi-annual reports from their brethren abroad, to be read and discussed at their regular meetings, every part of the Church would be put into personal, immediate, and constant communication with its own work and laborer. The minister would be reporting to his old associates, friends, and acquaintances who have a personal interest in him. He could then present his individual work in all its aspects to his brethren. Instead of having one body to receive and read these communications from all the missionaries, there would be a separate body for each individual minister. The information being immediate and scattered over the whole Church, the interest would be personal and universal. Not only so: it would be an *enlightened* interest. The Presbyteries and people would learn through communications, sent *directly to them*, the views of their commissioners in regard to the work. We have been told that the Church wants to know what the missionary has done, and not what he thinks. We have not formed so low an estimate of our Presbyteries, that they would ordain men whose opinions about their work are not worth knowing. The evangelist is a minister and an elder in the Church, and the Church is entitled to know his views; and if she knew them, we maintain that her interest and zeal would be "according to knowledge." Nor can it be objected that the knowledge and interest of any one Presbytery would be confined to one particular mission field. Let the action of the Synod of Kentucky be carried out; let "the correspondence be so conducted that the communications from our brethren be presented in a Synodical service, to be held at each meeting of the Synod when suitable, for the benefit of the cause and the encouragement of our people." Let the same thing be repeated at the Assembly; or let the Presbyteries report to that body. Besides this, these communications could be published, together with the gifts of all the churches, in our weekly Church

papers, or in a monthly conducted as a private enterprise. Each Presbytery would thus be personally and immediately engaged in the work, and yet be thoroughly acquainted with the work of its sister Presbyteries.

4. It would have another very desirable effect, which the Synod wished to bring about when it said: "It is the wish of the Synod to extend to these brethren all the encouragement and support received by our ministry in the home field, and to enable them to feel that the ties which bind us together in the service of our common Master are as close and as strong."

It was our privilege to meet the author of that paper, and we esteem him as a Christian brother. We know and love a large number of the ministry and eldership of that Synod, as well as of the people of our native State, with whom we worshipped and at whose firesides we were at home. We confess that the above language touched a sympathetic chord in our heart. But the resolutions were futile. Our present system effectually sunders the cord that binds the foreign minister to his Christian brethren at home; and that cord cannot be mended by resolutions. Were we not transferred by our Presbytery to the control and supervision of the Executive Committee? Ten years have passed since we landed on these foreign shores, and *not one word has passed between us and our Presbytery*. "The ecclesiastical power of the Presbytery remains unimpaired. It supervises his conduct, though in an imperfect way, as a minister of the gospel; it can summon him, no matter where he lives or labors, before its bar, and try him for immorality and heresy; it can defend his good name, if he is assailed, and it can appoint him, whenever it chooses, as a commissioner to the General Assembly." Now, the foreign evangelist of all others needs the sympathy and encouragement of his brethren at home, as well as the exercise of their "power." There is no romance in his real every-day life-work. It is a blessed work that we would not, of our own accord, exchange for any work on earth; but the blessedness consists in the pleasure of sowing the seed in new soil. Over the cold, freezing materialism and atheism, as well as over the filth and immorality, whose fumes fill the social atmosphere, we must throw a covering. The

hand of Christian sympathy should be held out by our *Presbyteries* to those who labor in the dark corners of the earth alone.

5. The labor of conducting missions being thus distributed among the *Presbyteries*, the gifts of the Church which now go to pay the salaries and travelling and office expenses of the Secretaries of the Committee would go to the foreign field, to be employed in the work there. The funds expended in these ways would support an extra mission station; besides this, the devolving the work upon the *Presbyteries* would leave the Secretary and Treasurer free to become pastors or evangelists; to say nothing of the increase of funds contributed by the people when brought into immediate and personal communication with the men and the work.

6. It is scriptural and constitutional. In the New Testament, the body that ordained them sent them out and received their reports, as in the case of Paul and Barnabas (Acts xiii. 2, 3; and xiv. 26, 27). Timothy and Titus were native evangelists, and were under the direction of Paul, who chose and ordained them (Acts xvi. 1-3; Gal. ii. 1, 3; 2 Tim. i. 6, with 1 Tim. 1-3, and Titus i. 5). According to our Book, the only body that can ordain and set apart a minister to the work of an evangelist is the *Presbytery*. According, therefore, to the "pattern shown in the Mount," she is the only body that can direct him and have the oversight of him. We, therefore, not only fail to find any allusion in our Constitution to any other body with the power to ordain, but we find that the *Presbytery* is the only body that has the function to do what is done on foreign fields, and that she may appoint a commissioner to do these things; and being responsible to her, he should report to her upon the work done.

Dr. Wilson, in the *Missionary* for October, 1881, objects that no *Presbytery* within our bounds has as yet developed the means to support one single missionary and his work. Granted; but have they ever been allowed the privilege of trying—of seeing whether they could do so? It is the most natural thing in the world that a body, in no way whatever responsible for the work, should not furnish the means to carry it on. Let the *Presbytery* as such feel the weight of a personal responsibility, and it would

quickly set about raising the necessary means. The Church should ponder well the advantage that would accrue by throwing upon the shoulders of every minister, elder, and deacon in our Church an individual, personal responsibility in the work. It is in vain to moralise about it being the duty of every Christian to contribute to the extent of his or her ability. But if one particular Presbytery alone should be unable to sustain its man and his work, would there be any incongruity or insurmountable obstacle in the way of an adjoining Presbytery or Presbyteries, that may not have a man in the field, aiding her? It by no means follows that if the Presbyteries do the work, there could be no understanding among them. Our Constitution beautifully provides for concert of action in the superior courts, while at the same time it provides for a wholesome distribution instead of centralisation. The Presbyteries meet in the Synods and again in the Assembly, which certainly gives them ample opportunity for concert of action. The work would still be distributed among all the Presbyteries, just as it is at present. And pray, what would hinder their sustaining as many missionaries as they actually do sustain? If they unitedly contribute fifty thousand dollars now, could they not contribute the same on the scriptural plan? But Dr. Wilson says that no *one man* could maintain a mission by himself. But did not Paul sustain a mission alone? And he pushed his work very vigorously and successfully, too. "But he had his helpers." Of course he had; and so will any missionary, who is alone, gather around him his native helpers, just as he did. But how comes it that one single missionary sometimes maintains a mission even under our present plan? And we are inclined to the opinion that when this has been the case, the results have been as great or greater than when a "mission" has been organised.

Dr. Wilson thinks that for a mission to "be permanent and far-reaching in its influence, there must be preaching, teaching, translating, managing schools, and various other duties, all carried on at the same time, to which no one man is competent." But the facts are against him. The mission which was the most permanent and far-reaching in its influence, of which we have any account in history, was conducted by one man. We challenge

Dr. Wilson to establish any mission that will beat Paul. He need not remind us that Paul was inspired. His inspiration did not give him any additional strength to travel or speak or write. The fact that he was inspired is the very reason why we should follow his example. We do not hesitate to join issue with our venerable and respected brother when he includes "teaching and managing of schools" as a necessary element in a successful mission. Schools are a very good thing. We are not opposed to schools. But we claim that the Church has no commission to engage in the school work. All money, therefore, that the Church contributes towards the extension of the Saviour's kingdom in the world, and which is used in the maintenance of mission schools, is a misappropriation of the Lord's money. In the second place, we claim that *mission* schools are a snare of the devil to hinder the progress of the gospel. When Dr. Wilson, or any other advocate of mission schools *conducted by the Church*, condescends to offer any proof that they are necessary to a successful mission, we will return to the question and establish the two points we make. Let it be clearly understood, however, that we have no objection to schools. Christians may engage in them if they wish; but *the Church, in her corporate capacity*, cannot do so. Nor do we affirm that mission schools do no good; the devil allows them to do some good, in order not to allow the Church to abandon them; but we affirm that they are heavy clogs upon the chariot wheels to retard the progress of the Redeemer's victorious march.

Taking away, therefore, the "teaching" and "managing of schools," which are the most arduous and multifarious duties of the *mission*, we respectfully ask, concerning what remains, what is there that one man cannot maintain who surrounds himself with native helpers? Preaching, contributing to the religious literature of the country, training native candidates for the ministry, directing the native workers, looking after the churches. Paul did all this, and so can any other man. The labor will be "arduous," as Paul's seems to have been; but no man is fit to enter the ministry either at home or abroad who is afraid of arduous labor. And if any man finds himself in a large city where there is more ground than he can occupy, another can very easily be sent out

to occupy it. Nor do we see that the ocean would be any broader or deeper, or the mountains any higher, when the Presbyteries send the men than at present while the Executive Committee sends them.

But Dr. Wilson assures us that "confusion and disorder must necessarily arise where half a dozen or more Presbyteries are carrying on missionary work in the same field." Why this should be, he does not inform us. If the Presbyteries should herd them together and adopt the mongrel, hybrid ecclesiastical court, composed of ministers and laymen, and invite free correspondence from the unmarried ladies, and instruct the wives of missionaries to engage in "the general work" in a "desultory" manner, we can easily imagine how "confusion and disorder must necessarily arise," just as we can readily see how it might possibly arise under the conduct of an Executive Committee. But if each minister has sole jurisdiction over a particular field or church or work, and is individually and directly responsible to his Presbytery, we fail entirely to see the great necessity of confusion. Several evangelists could labor in this way in the same province or country with no more liability to disorder and confusion than when several Presbyteries belonging to the same Synod have evangelists laboring in the same State at home.

As Dr. Lefevre has shown, what causes disorder is two separate jurisdictions over the same subject at the same time and in the same matter; and we do not propose by any means that two or more Presbyteries should have such jurisdiction.

Dr. Wilson, however, assures us that if the health of one laborer should fail, or if he should die, "the whole undertaking would fall to the ground." Well, it is a great pity the Saviour and his inspired apostles did not think of that fatal contingency. Just think of it! If Paul had died, or if his health had failed under his "arduous and multifarious" duties, his whole work would have fallen to the ground! If there had only been a mission with more than one Apostle, this contingency would have been provided for. "But he had his helpers, and there were other apostles like John who could take up his work." And cannot the one missionary have his helpers, and could not some brother minister take up his

work? And could not the Presbytery send out a substitute as easily as the Executive Committee?

We confess that in our views upon this subject, we are the follower of Dr. Thornwell. We are not ashamed of our views, as we are not ashamed of our master. Nor are we a blind follower; if we were, we would as soon follow Thornwell as any master we know. We were convinced, when we first read his plan of conducting missions, that he was right. Our experience and studies upon the question since have only confirmed us in those views. The power of his name is felt to be so great in our Church, that the advocates of "Our Schemes" attempt to break its force by the assurance that he was not opposed to Committees on principle, and, moreover, that his hand had a large share in their organisation. Grant it. Still that is far from proving that his ideal was Committees, or that he preferred them. It does not prove that he did not believe the Presbyteries were the proper and competent bodies to direct missions, nor that he had abandoned a plan which he found in Scripture. It is simply an illustration of his willingness to harmonise with his brethren. Had he alone started our foreign missionary operations, he would, no doubt, have put his own ideal scriptural plan into practice. But there were others who did not agree with him. What was he to do? Just what he did: harmonise and aid his brethren by giving "his hand to have a large share in the organisation of our Committees." The following extracts from his famous discussion on the subject are sufficiently clear and explicit. The reader will pardon so extended a quotation in view of the fact that those who attempt to interfere in the present management of the "Schemes" of the Church are called radicals, innovators, communists, etc.

"There are two great departments of the missionary work—spiritual and temporal; and the provisions for each of these are made in our Book. The power of ordaining the evangelist belongs exclusively to the Presbytery; so does the oversight of him and his charge if he should succeed in gathering a people to the Lord from among the outcasts of ignorance and sin. To the Presbytery, according to our Constitution, and to that alone, he is immediately responsible. To it he must give an account of his

labors; from it he must seek counsel and direction; and in conformity with its requirements he is expected to walk." (Vol. IV., p. 152.)

"The other department of duty connected with the missionary work respects the making adequate provision for the temporal support of the evangelists and their families. For this business it is supposed that the Presbyteries are wholly unqualified. It has been frequently admitted that while everything connected with the spiritual aspects of Domestic and Foreign Missions falls appropriately within the province of the Presbytery, there is no adequate arrangement in our Book for conducting the pecuniary matters of the various stations with efficiency and success. This, we apprehend, is a great mistake. In the first place, the Constitution expressly provides that the judicatory sending out any missionary must support him. In the second place, the Book provides that our churches should be furnished with a class of officers for the express purpose of attending to the temporal matters of the Church; and these deacons might be made the collecting agents of the Presbytery in every congregation, and through them the necessary funds could be easily obtained and without expense. For transmission to foreign parts, nothing more would be necessary than simply to employ either some extensive merchant in any of our large cities, who for the usual percentage would attend to the whole matter, or a committee of deacons appointed by the Assembly for the purpose. So far, then, as the collection and disbursement of funds are concerned, our Constitution has made the most abundant provision." (P. 154.)

"The people should know the character and sentiments of the missionaries sustained by their liberality. . . . The Presbytery that sends a man *would know him* [italics his], the churches within its bounds would know him, and, consequently, would know what they are supporting. If the Presbytery that sends him should be unable to support him, it can call upon a neighboring Presbytery, to which it is perfectly well known, for assistance; and that Presbytery would have full security from its position for the soundness of the man whom it is called upon to assist. Such is the spirit and provisions in the eighteenth chapter of our Form of

Government. The funds thus raised could either be transmitted by mercantile agents of the Presbytery, or by a central committee of the Assembly, consisting of business men, charged only with *executive duties* [italics his], and not intrusted with discretionary power." (Pp. 165, 166). "Our own impression is, that, on the score of diffusing religious intelligence among all classes of our church members, a special organisation is not so efficient as the regular action of our church courts promises to be. If these benevolent operations were treated by the Presbytery as a part of their ordinary ecclesiastical business; if the communications of their ministers from abroad were read and discussed as the documents sent from the churches at home usually are, and the necessities of a dying world which they disclose made the subjects of special consideration and earnest prayer, the effect upon the Church at large would be incalculably greater than under the existing arrangement in which these things pass in the solemn conclave of a chosen few, and are known no farther than the circulation of a meagre monthly periodical can make them known." (P. 170.)

It is as clear as the noonday sun that Dr. Thornwell believed that *the Presbytery* should have immediate and sole direction and oversight of its evangelists, and raise the funds necessary for him by means of the deacons in its various churches. This was his ideal plan, because he found it in the word and our Book. This paper was reviewed by Dr. Smyth, who understood Dr. Thornwell's plan as we do, but who says of it: "I fearlessly stake the issue of this controversy upon the single question, Is this system of means adequate to the wants, or does it in any measure meet the difficulties of the case? . . . There is to our minds no adaptation in the system here proposed of the means to the end. It is perfectly chimerical. The whole scheme is built upon hypothesis and the most Utopian and gratuitous assumptions. . . . I confess that the whole scheme appears to my mind preposterous in the extreme. It is, as I view it, altogether visionary, and in no degree adapted to the necessities of the case." Dr. Thornwell replied to this review the following year. In this reply he reaffirms and sets forth even more explicitly his former plan.

He says: "Now, what is required that our church courts are
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not qualified to do, in order that the gospel can be preached either at home or abroad? Men must be called into the ministry and qualified by a special unction from on high, as well as by the subordinate teaching of man, for its solemn and responsible duties. When men give satisfactory evidence to the Church that they are called of God and duly prepared to preach the glorious gospel, this fact is declared by the imposition of hands, which the Presbytery alone can do. We have now the preachers. The next business is to send them; that is, to support them by supplying their daily wants in their respective fields of labor. The money must be raised by the separate congregations; and the Scriptures have appointed a set of officers who are ordained for the very purpose of attending to the secular affairs of the Church. When you have raised the money, the next step is to *send it* to the preachers, which, with the commercial facilities afforded by the present condition of the civilised world, can surely be no hard matter. The Holy Spirit, then, supplies us with preachers, the Presbytery ordains them, and the deacons of the Church support them. What more is required? In what respects is this arrangement defective or inadequate? The character, qualifications, and control of the minister belong, of right, to the Presbytery; and when they send him out, they are furnished in every congregation with the necessary organisation for supplying his wants. This is a plain and simple matter, and evidently requires none of the cumbersome and circuitous arrangements which characterise the Boards. The Presbyteries are courts acknowledged by our Constitution; . . . if one Presbytery should be too feeble to support its missionaries, provision is made in our Book for its obtaining assistance from neighboring Presbyteries. This is certainly the plan, and the only plan, contemplated by the framers of our Form of Government. Yet the reviewer, though he has solemnly received it as 'agreeable to the word of God,' has pronounced it to be preposterous and utterly inadequate to meet the wants of a dying world. The pith of his whole argument—if argument that may be called which arrives at a conclusion without any premises at all—is contained in the following extract." Here he quotes from Dr. Smyth, who gives a long catalogue of duties or work which

the Church has to do, and asserts that the Presbyteries are inadequate. Dr. Thornwell then continues: "Now, this whole paragraph, which was intended to show the insufficiency of the plan proposed in our Book, contains nothing but a statement of the various details of the work to be done. The question still returns, Why cannot the Presbyteries accomplish this work just as efficiently as the Boards? Is there anything in this [the education of candidates] too hard or too mysterious for a Presbytery to perform? The money must be collected from particular congregations, and I do not see why the demands of a Presbytery should be less respected than the authority of a Board. . . . These ministers, having been ordained, must next be sent to their various fields of labor: that is to say, they must be sustained. But what is to hinder the Presbyteries from supplying them with the means of going wherever God, in his providence, may call them? Give them the money, and they can easily procure their own conveyances and the comforts which their situations require. But the reviewer begs us to consider the extent of the field. What of that? It is confessedly extensive, being no less than the world; but cannot fifty or a hundred Presbyteries survey it just as well as a single Board? We are next to consider the number of ministers to be sent forth. Why cannot the Presbyteries count them just as well as a Board? And why cannot the Presbyteries support them just as comfortably? The money, after all, must be collected from the various churches under the care of the different Presbyteries, and, for aught that I can see, this matter can be attended to just as well by those who have the immediate care of those churches as by a body five hundred miles off. . . . The reviewer's proposition was, that the Presbyteries are inadequate to send the gospel to the heathen; the proof is, that sending the gospel to the heathen includes a great many particulars; and not a solitary reason is given why these particulars, so elaborately detailed, are beyond the capacity of the Presbyteries to manage or conduct. . . . The plan there insisted on [his own plan insisted on in the paper first quoted from] is, that the courts of the Church, the *Presbyteries* [italics his], are to do the business now done by the Boards, and to employ these deacons, according to God's ap-

pointment, as their financial agents. And why are not the Presbyteries just as trustworthy, just as faithful, just as able, and just as efficient as the Boards that have been named? We ask the reviewer to give a sufficient and satisfactory reason; and until he does this, all his declamation, however pompous, how full soever of 'sound and fury,' must still be taken as signifying nothing. He must show us why it is that the '*supervision, direction, and control*' [italics ours] . . . cannot just as safely be committed to the Presbyteries of the Church as to ecclesiastical corporations. I ask, triumphantly, Why? and echo answers Why?" (Pp. 193-199.) He finally closes his answer to the review by additional arguments in favor of his plan. "Before closing this article, I wish to present a few additional considerations, showing that *the Presbyteries ought to take the whole business of Missions into their own hands* [italics ours]: 1. The first is, that *the Constitution of the Church absolutely requires it* [italics ours]. . . . 2. Another reason . . . is, that in this way the churches will know what they are actually sending to the heathen, whether the gospel of Christ or the traditions of men. . . . 3. Another reason is, that the undivided energies of our churches might be called into action. The whole body would be reached. Let it be made a part of the ordinary business of our Presbyteries to pray and provide for the wants of a perishing world, and a new and glorious order of things will speedily arise."

We have quoted largely from Dr. Thornwell for several reasons. In the first place, we wish the Church to see that what he wished was that individual Presbyteries should have the immediate and sole supervision of the foreign missionary work; and we wish her to see that it is not in stray sentences here and there that he hints at such a plan, as though it were a mere notion on his part that the Presbyteries *might possibly* direct the work. He discusses it at length, proving by extended arguments that it is the scriptural and constitutional plan, as well as the plan best calculated to enlist the sympathies and develop the energies of the whole Church. In a second paper, a year later, written in answer to a reviewer, he restates and reaffirms his position, defending it against the objections and criticism of his opponent, showing that not only

are the Presbyteries *competent* to do the work, but that they are the very bodies which, according to our Constitution, *should of right and obligation* do this.

Nor is there any proof that he afterwards abandoned his ground in regard to the Presbyteries. There is nothing in his memorable debate on Boards to indicate that he did so. That was a discussion simply as to the propriety of making any organic change in the Board of Domestic Missions. Dr. Thornwell took the ground that the Board should be abolished; that instead of having an Executive Committee appointed by and responsible to the Board, there should be the same Executive Committee, but appointed by and directly responsible to the Assembly. His great argument was, that Christ appointed the Church in her organised capacity to do the work, and on strict construction principles the Assembly could not delegate her work to a vicar; she must do her own work, and doing it she could introduce nothing into the government of the Church except such "circumstances" as might be necessary to enable her to do her work. He maintained that the Board was not a circumstance, while the Executive Committee was. As a strict constructionist, he could agree to courts employing Committees that might be *strictly executive*—mere hands of the courts. Dr. Hodge opposed strict construction principles, so that the debate naturally ran into a discussion of Presbyterianism. The question at issue was not by any means, What is the best way to conduct the foreign missionary work? but, Are Boards allowable?

The editors of Dr. Thornwell's works say upon this point: "Touching the conduct of missions by Presbyteries, . . . Dr. Thornwell was content with urging his views earnestly, but he made it a principle through life always to submit to his brethren in matters of established and organised policy; his temper had in it no spice whatever of the seditious or the radical. . . . As to the conduct of missions, while insisting on the competency of the Presbyteries, and preferring their control to that of Boards, he did not object on principle to the Assembly's undertaking the management of that work, provided that its control was *direct* through a mere Executive Committee." This agrees with Dr.

Thornwell's own reply to Dr. Hodge: "Again, my brother twits me with supporting the Board while professing to be conscientiously opposed to the principles of their constitution. Would he have us to be factious? Moderator, I have never said to my brethren, to whom I promised submission in the Lord, 'I cannot submit, I will not submit.' I will submit to my brethren, even when I think they are mistaken, if the submission be not sinful."

And thus it happens, that while no one had a larger share than Dr. Thornwell in the organisation of our Executive Committees, still the conduct of missions *by the Presbyteries* was his ideal, his predilected plan; and no one can doubt that, had he alone started the foreign missionary work of our Church, he would have committed it to the Presbyteries.

Dr. Wilson says in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, April, 1881, page 249:

"Dr. Thornwell, then fresh from a sharp controversy in the old Church about the abuse of Boards, had a share in constructing this constitution [of our Executive Committee], and said at the time, as the writer personally testifies, that he was not only satisfied with it, but that everything had been secured in this constitution which he had ever contended for in the united Church."

After reading the copious extracts that we have made from Dr. Thornwell, the reader will no doubt coincide with us in the opinion that either Dr. Wilson's memory failed him as to the exact language used by Dr. Thornwell, or that the latter did not remember at the moment his controversy with Dr. Smyth. Had he said that in the constitution of our Executive Committees everything was secured that he had contended for in *his sharp controversy with Dr. Hodge* about the abuse of Boards, it would have been strictly correct; but that Executive Committees secures everything that he "had ever contended for in the united Church," is far, indeed, from harmonising with what he left behind him in writing.

An able debater in the General Assembly in 1881, assured his hearers that if Dr. Thornwell were alive now, he would be in favor of continuing everything just as it is in the Church. And Dr. Wilson thinks if he had edited his own works, he would not have published his discussion with Dr. Smyth. That is a cheap way,

indeed, to break the force of the testimony of great men, and bring them in to prove the opposite of what they taught while on earth. We recommend the stratagem to our Arminian brethren who may want the weight of Paul's testimony against the doctrine of predestination. All they have to do is simply to assure the world that the Apostle changed his mind after he got to heaven, and if he were alive now he would be on their side of the question, and would not write certain things in his Epistle to the Romans.

We offer no apology for closing our discussion under this head with the closing words of Dr. Thornwell: "Let all our Presbyteries, marshalled under their glorious Leader, go out like the tribes of Israel under the conduct of Joshua; let them all come up in unbroken phalanx to the help of the Lord, the help of the Lord against the mighty, and they will soon have as signal wonders to celebrate as the ancient people of God. What we want is *faith*—faith in the divine promises; faith in the divine appointments—and when this faith is imparted, earthen pitchers and lamps will be strong and resistless in our hands. To this faith our Church is returning. God grant that she may be fully established upon the foundation of the Prophets and Apostles, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone."

Relations to the General Assembly.

The *Manual of Missions* says of the foreign minister: "So far as his work in the foreign field is concerned, he is a missionary of the General Assembly." The *Ecclesiastical Status* says: "He is to continue to be a member of the Presbytery . . . with this understanding, that when he is ordained to the work of a foreign missionary, he is transferred by his Presbytery to *the control and direction* of the Assembly, so far as his missionary labors in a foreign field are concerned. . . . The Assembly simply claims the right to direct his labors."

After our discussion under the preceding head, it is, of course, unnecessary to say that we cannot agree with this view. We do not think the Assembly should *control and direct* him in his work. He should not be the Assembly's evangelist.

1. In the *first* place, he is, according to Scripture and our Constitution, the Presbytery's commissioner. The Presbytery prepares him for work, she ordains him a minister of the gospel, and she solemnly sets him apart to his special work, and consequently she is solemnly bound to control and direct him in that work. The man and the work are hers, and when the Assembly appropriates him and the work, she commits a species of *ecclesiastical piracy*. What right has she to thus rob the Presbyteries of the most precious, the most glorious part of the work with which the Constitution endows them? She has no right to deprive them of their birth-right—the privilege and high honor of sending the gospel to the nations. She has no right to deprive them of this means of grace, this precious heritage, and this solemn trust.

2. The effect upon the Church and the cause of missions is evil. The wrong done the Presbyteries by the Assembly, by an inevitable law of nature, reacts upon herself and does violence to the whole body. If the life-giving blood that should flow through one limb is appropriated by the head, the inevitable result will be not only the decay of the limb, but the disease of the whole body. It is just as unwise and dangerous to confer upon the Assembly the most exalted function of the Presbytery as it would be to confer upon the deacon, as such, a large part of the peculiar functions of the minister of the word. The natural result of taking the work of missions from the Presbyteries and giving it to the Assembly, must needs be evil, and it is so in point of fact. The work of the Presbyteries is confined to the small territory circumscribed by their own narrow limits. Is it to be expected that these bodies should take an active interest in what belongs to another court? The fact is, they meet from year to year, and, receiving no report or communication of any kind from their commissioners, and having no connexion whatever with them and their work, there is nothing to call forth their energies, their sympathies, and an active interest in the work. The voice of the Presbyteries is silenced, their energies are paralysed, their sympathies are not enlisted, because the incentives have all been taken away by the Assembly.

The Presbyteries are the courts nearest to the churches, and have immediate control over them. They cannot, of course, communicate to their churches an interest which they do not feel, and sympathy which they themselves do not have. By removing the work, the men, and the responsibility, the farthest possible from the churches, the Assembly has thereby diminished to that extent their personal and active interest in the work. Not the hundredth part of the evil thus done can be compensated by circulars from Executive Committees and visits to Synods by Secretaries, however touching the circulars and however stirring the visits. If the Presbyteries profanely sell their birth-right, they can only sit down and eat their mess of red pottage that they have received in exchange, and afterwards bewail the want of interest in missions on the part of the churches, and wonder and wonder why it is that Christians do not love the heathen.

3. In the third place, the Assembly should not assume the direct work of missions, because *she is incompetent*. Let her undertake it but once; it would consume more time and patience and more study on the part of each individual member than could possibly be given. All are supposed to have a certain amount of general knowledge in regard to our missionaries and their work, and the people among whom they labor. But there are a thousand questions involved in the minutiae that each member would have to know in order to enable him to discuss and vote intelligently. These questions relate to the establishment and management of schools and new stations, or aid to be given to those already in operation. No Assembly could possibly undertake to decide all the multifarious and intricate questions involved in the conduct of all our missions in the various parts of the world during one year. The same amount of labor and time must be given by each Assembly, since each is composed of entirely new material. The Assembly is, from the composition of the court, as well as from the amount and intricacy of the work to be done, incompetent to do it directly. She does not pretend to do it; and we very much doubt if any man would have the courage to affirm that she is competent to the task.

Since writing the above we received the *Missionary* for October,

1881, in which our view is emphatically confirmed. An editorial says :

“It is obvious to common observation that she [the Assembly] cannot manage all its endless details [the work of Foreign Missions] in her assembled collective capacity. It would require at least a month’s session, even if it were otherwise practicable, to consider the multifarious questions that would be brought up for discussion. More than this, every member of the Assembly, before he could vote intelligently on many of these questions, would have to acquaint himself thoroughly with the whole scope of the work. . . . Of course there is no way for the Assembly to act in relation to this matter, except to follow the line mapped out for her in our Constitution. In other words, she must prosecute the work through the agency of an *ecclesiastical commission*.”

Thus the incompetency of the Assembly to do the work herself is frankly acknowledged; but then she can appoint an “agency.” Oh yes; she lays violent hands upon the commissioner and the work of the Presbytery, and then finds that she has got an elephant. Not knowing what to do with him, instead of honestly returning him to his rightful owner, she appoints an “agency” to feed him, clothe him, harness him, put him to work, and control him in his work.

Now, this confessed incompetency of the Assembly, and the entire competency of the Presbyteries to do the work without introducing or employing *any* agency at all, is a most powerful argument that the work should be done by the Presbyteries. The Presbyteries meet semi-annually; each one has charge of only one field, and one or two men; they are composed always of the same members who can easily keep abreast of their work. Simplicity is one of the crowning glories of the Saviour’s kingdom, and the Church is bound to conduct her work in the way that will secure the greatest possible simplicity.

After all, what does the Assembly do towards controlling and directing the evangelist and his work more than she would do if the whole work were left with the Presbyteries? As it is, she appoints a Standing Committee to examine the Minutes of the Executive Committee and the accounts of the Treasurer. On the other plan, she would still appoint the same Standing Committee to examine the Reports of the Presbyteries, and make the

same recommendations that they now make. Her Standing Committee now examines the work done during the previous year, and reports upon the same, approving, or else disapproving, the way it has been done, recommending to the Assembly whatever the Executive Committee may think of importance to the work for the year to come. The Assembly then simply votes the adoption of the Report of the Standing Committee. The only thing done in point of fact by the Assembly is the appointment of the Standing Committee by the Moderator, and voting the adoption of its Report when presented. All this could and should be done, if the work were directly under the direction of the Presbyteries. And it would be done far more intelligently than it now is, inasmuch as a large number in the body would be delegates from Presbyteries engaged in the work, who would come with a full personal knowledge of the wants of their respective fields. These delegates could exchange views, and also enlighten their brethren in regard to their work. The Assembly could do more than it now does. It could, as the old Book prescribed, instruct any Presbytery to send a commissioner to occupy any field it might wish to have occupied. It could and would be the medium for equalising and distributing the work. If any Presbytery is unable to sustain its station, the Synod should indicate the neighboring Presbytery or Presbyteries that could most conveniently aid it. If the work of any Synod develops beyond its ability to sustain it, the General Assembly could indicate the Presbyteries within the bounds of an adjoining Synod that could aid the Presbyteries nearest to them. If the work of the whole Church should develop beyond her ability to sustain it, she could either do as is done under our present system, namely, break up whole missions, recall the missionaries, and abandon the work in some parts of the heathen world, and curtail the work in all the other fields, by cutting down the appropriations for them; or she could appoint a day of thanksgiving and prayer.

The relations, then, that actually exist between the evangelist and the Assembly are just the relations that we maintain should exist. There are not, should not, and cannot be, direct and immediate relations. The Assembly should not, as in point of fact

it does not, and, from the nature of the case, cannot, immediately direct and supervise the man and his work. Its functions should be limited to the review and control of the bodies that have, or should have, the direct oversight of him; that is, the Synod and Presbytery; as in fact they are limited to the review and control of the work of the Committee and Mission.

To the Executive Committee.

“The most unbecoming and paralysing disorder of all is the coexistence of two jurisdictions on the same matter, at the same time, and over the same subject.” So says Dr. Lefevre, and so say we.

And what becomes of the jurisdiction of the Presbytery over the foreign minister while the Committee are exercising full control over him? The Committee have entire control over him and his work, and any attempted “oversight” on the part of the Presbytery, as the Synod of Kentucky contemplated, would be disorder of the deadliest sort; it would be regarded by the Committee as an infringement of their rights. The mission, in its organised capacity, is obliged to send up to Baltimore, at the close of the year, a full report of the whole work. Now, if the individual missionary is allowed to communicate with his Presbytery directly, telling all about what he has done and what he *wants* to do, his Presbytery might possibly become interested in his special plans, and want to aid him in his work with their prayers and money. But according to the *Manual*, “special appeals” are forbidden. Only the Committee, it is said, can know the wants of the whole field and the resources of the home Church; so that only they can be consulted and communicated with about special works. The Presbyteries must content themselves with generalities, and even the generalities as the Committee may see them, and be pleased to present them to the public.

Lest the brethren of the Committee should think that we are directing what we may have to say to them personally, we must be allowed to assure them and the Church that we are discussing the principles of the *Manual*, and the natural and inevitable consequences of our present plan. The foreign ministers cannot

communicate with the home Church, except through the Committee. Now, we submit to the judgment of the Church, is it wise to cut her missionaries off from their brethren? Is it wise to silence their voices? Is it wise to forbid their laying their opinions and their individual plans and work before the Church, in their own language, and as they see it? The whole work and the views of all the missionaries must go to the Church through the same mould. Now we by no means call in question the wisdom of the Secretaries who edit the *Missionary*, and have to present the views and work of the missionaries to the Church; we by no means say that the missionaries are necessarily correct. They often differ among themselves in their views. But we do say that the proper judges of their views and work are the ministers and elders and members of the whole Church. It is idle to speak of the *Missionary* being a medium of communication. The *Missionary* has its editors, who are the Secretaries of the Committee. They *could* not publish all that is written for publication; nor can they be expected to publish views that would controvert their views and plans. There is no man in Christendom who would do it. When, therefore, the Secretaries publish private letters not intended for publication, but which they think should be published, and when they fail to publish communications, or parts of communications, which they think unnecessary or prejudicial, or not in harmony with their ideas, they are simply exercising their right. But is it best for the Church to establish a foundry for casting the views and work of those she sends to evangelise the world, and, as a necessary consequence, moulding the views of the home Church? The Church would do well to reflect seriously upon the tremendous power that she puts into the hands of the Secretary, by making him the sole medium of communication between the Church and the missionaries.

But they tell us that the Committee, as its name indicates, is only *executive*; it simply executes the orders of the General Assembly (as a hand executes the orders of the head), and is directly responsible to it; and is appointed each year, and may be changed by any Assembly. Well, it does *executive* business; we

do not gainsay that. It is appointed each year; no one can dispute that. But would any Assembly dare to appoint a new Secretary or a different Committee from what is appointed each year? It *could* not be done. Not that those brethren have the power to prevent it. But let the Church make the experiment a few years. Let the Baltimore brethren heartily agree to it and *urge* it upon the Church to try for a few years the experiment of appointing a new Committee each year? Where would it land the missionary work? One of the most powerful motives urged in the St. Louis Assembly for keeping the two Committees together at Baltimore was, that Dr. McIlwaine might be trained as Dr. Wilson's successor. Everybody knows that the Secretary must have large *experience* and *practice*, and the Committee-men must also be trained, as has been urged by the friends of Committees. Now, is all this consistent with a yearly change? If, then, a yearly change is utterly impossible, why do the advocates of Committees make so much of a yearly appointment? What virtue is there in the mere formality, when every one knows that the same men have to serve again? It does not make them a particle more responsible. The Church cannot appoint others without prejudicing the work, and this she would not do unless the actual incumbent should be incompetent or guilty of malfeasance, in which case the Assembly could very easily substitute him. This practice of a yearly appointment is a mere useless formality, that serves only to deceive the unthinking.

But is the Committee directly responsible to the Assembly? Let the Church reflect one moment upon what takes place annually at the Assembly. The Constitution of the Committee requires it "to lay before the General Assembly from year to year a full report of the whole work, and of their receipts and expenditures, together with their books of minutes, for examination." But how is this done? The first thing done always is the appointment of *Standing Committees* by the Moderator. The Secretary of the Executive Committee, who, according to the provisions of the Constitution of the Committee, is the medium of communication between the Committee and the Assembly, lays everything before the Standing Committee, and by this body it

is presented to the Assembly. The Report is, however, read to the Assembly. Now, they will say, as Dr. Wilson says in the REVIEW for April, 1881, that it is hard to see how there could be a more direct responsibility. We agree with him. But even this responsibility, which is the nearest and most direct possible, leaves the Committee to a dangerous degree irresponsible, and enables it to do anything it pleases. If the Board in the old Church stood between the Committee and the Assembly, the Standing Committee stands between our Assembly and the Committee. We do not mean to say that any Standing Committee of our Church would stand between the Assembly and malfeasance on the part of the Executive Committee or its officers. Neither would the old Boards have shielded any offender or criminal. If, however, there is any matter that the Secretary might not wish to go before the Assembly, he could simply leave it out of his Report, and not mention it to the Standing Committee. If it is of a nature that requires it to be presented, he has weeks or it may be months to write a report so skilfully worded as to prevent any improper or untoward action on the part of the court. Dr. Wilson, in his article on *Our Schemes of Benevolence* (SO. PRES. REVIEW, April, 1881, pp. 267-271), shows far more clearly than any one else could possibly have done, what are the duties, and hence the powers, of the Secretary. Now, he can first present all matters connected with the various missions in the manner he may think most prudent, to the Executive Committee. Getting their concurrence, he goes with the weight of their judgment before the Standing Committee; having obtained their consent, the matter comes before the Assembly with such weighty judgments that it would almost be presumption on the part of the court not to agree. In this way anything may be carried in the Assembly. In this way the editorial in the *Missionary* for May, 1874, was approved by the Assembly; in the same way the *Manual* became law; and in this way the notion of an African mission was approved, and the Committee was instructed to do just what the venerable and zealous Secretary was longing to do. *And it could not be otherwise.* An inexperienced Assembly could not give instructions about what it knows comparatively

nothing. She must confide in the wisdom of those who have had large experience and are engaged in the work. So it turns out that the "hand" really executes just what it has already conceived, planned, and resolved. The only thing the Assembly can do is to "approve" of what the Committee, or rather the Secretary, suggests. It is no disparagement of the Assemblies to say this: the members may be as wise as Solons or Solomons, but they have not and cannot have the information necessary to decide intelligently, because they are not engaged in the work. If the Committee is the Assembly's hand, the Secretary is its brain. Dr. Wilson, in the passage referred to above on the duties of the Secretary, unintentionally sets forth in a very strong and startling light the tremendous power that has been concentrated in the hands of the Secretary, and shows how this is the necessary consequence of doing the work by Committees. He shows how the Secretary stands between the missionaries and the Committee. His business is "to keep the Committee informed of its condition and wants, that is, of the missionary work."

"They expect him, as a necessary qualification for his office, to be thoroughly acquainted with the missionary work in all its varied bearings, and to be able to lay before them all the information they may need in reference to any particular matter that may be brought before them for their action. It is impossible for a Committee, except to a limited extent, to know all the facts bearing upon any particular case that may be brought under their notice, and hence the necessity of *some one* [italics ours] to impart this information, whose special business it is to study out such matters. . . . How will it be possible for the Committee to apportion out the funds under their control in a just and equitable manner and so as to promote the highest interests of all the different missions under their care, unless there is *some one* in that Committee who has a minute knowledge of all the affairs and surroundings of each of these different missions?"

We first take the work from the Presbyteries, where the power and work would be distributed, and carried on by the wisdom of the whole Church, and concentrate it in the Assembly that is utterly incompetent to the task; we then turn it over to a body that cannot possibly keep abreast of the whole work. So it finally resolves itself into concentrating the whole work in *some one*. Now we appeal to the good sense of the whole Church, Is this

wise? Is it possible for any one man to do the work as it should be done—as it would be done if each Presbytery should do its own work? On our plan the collected wisdom of one Presbytery would be brought to bear upon one particular man and his work. There would be no rival interests; there would be no reason for partiality towards any special person or branch of the work, or in favor of one field. We by no means charge our Secretary with having intentionally or consciously shown any partiality; but the present plan puts it in the Secretary's power to do so. The Presbyteries could not do so.

The whole problem resolves itself into the simple question of a comparison between *one man* and the *Presbyteries*. But concentration of power always and inevitably results in a gradual, imperceptible, and almost unconscious increase of power on the part of the body in which the work is centralised. No one who studies the subject can fail to notice this fact. The history of all governments, both ecclesiastical and civil, shows that this is an inevitable and natural consequence of centralisation. As the work grows and expands, the duties of the Committee grow, and their powers must grow accordingly. Not that the individual members are grasping or ambitious; but if the power at first conferred in their constitution was insufficient to enable them to discharge the work, they must, of course, have more power. Now their constitution makes it their duty "to take direction and control of the foreign missionary work." But, for some reason, it only gives them the power "to appoint missionaries and assistant missionaries, to designate their fields of labor, and provide for their support." This, however, is not sufficient, and sixteen years afterwards the Manual gives them the power not only to designate the field of labor of the missionaries, but to "determine their particular employments, and may transfer a missionary from one department of labor to another." It also becomes necessary to establish an inferior court on the foreign field to direct and control the work and the men, and it is only with this inferior body that the Committee can communicate officially. In order to appoint missionaries also, it is found by a long experience that it is necessary to confer upon the Committee not only the power

to determine the financial questions, and the fields of labor, but the power to go back of the ordination of the Presbytery, and inquire into "the reasons that have influenced him to wish to engage in the work." Not only so, but in order to know him, a written testimonial is required of one or more of the Seminary Professors as to his fitness to engage in the work; a similar testimonial is also expected, *if practicable*, from the Presbytery. But the Manual makes the strange statement that the Committee exercise *no ecclesiastical power*. We have endeavored in vain to conceive what it means by this assertion. The Committee directs and controls the work of missions in all its departments; it inquires into the physical, mental, and spiritual qualifications of ministers for their work; appoints ministers to their particular employments; removes them from one field or work to another, controls them in their work; may prefer specific charges of incompetency or disorderly conduct against them; and, finally, receive testimony, and recall them from the work to which they were solemnly set apart by their Presbyteries; and yet, *mirabile dictu*, in doing all this, they exercise no ecclesiastical functions! They visit Synods; they address memorials and present reports of their work to the Assemblies; they send circulars to Presbyteries and the Church at large, exhorting them to their duties; in a word, they are said to be the hand that executes the work of our highest ecclesiastical court, and still have no ecclesiastical function!

We had always imagined that when we were ordained, it was to an office and work in the *Ecclesia*. We supposed that the body that executes the great commission was an ecclesiastical body. It seems we were mistaken. The *Manual*, unfortunately, gives us no clue to the exact nature of the functions of the Committee; it only affirms that they are not ecclesiastical. They do not pertain to the Church. Inasmuch as they are the same functions that are exercised by Presbyteries at home, we can only conceive of one possible explanation of this difference. Ecclesiastical functions are exercised only over persons and work in the Church; and in getting out of those mysterious boundaries thrown around the Presbyteries and Synods (*but not around the Assembly*), we get out of the Church; the power exercised over us and our work

is, therefore, not ecclesiastical. We are confirmed in this supposition by the following luminous explanations which occur in the paper entitled *Ecclesiastical Status of Missionaries*: "He is transferred by his Presbytery to the control and direction of the Assembly, so far as his missionary labors in a foreign land are concerned. The ecclesiastical power of the Presbytery remains unimpaired. It supervises his conduct, though in an imperfect way, *as a minister of the gospel.*" Here, then, is the difference: the minister of the gospel, A B, belongs to the Presbytery; the evangelist, A B, belongs to the Committee. As the evangelist's work is *in a foreign land*, nothing that relates to him is ecclesiastical. The Committee lay upon their own child, and now claim the Presbytery's; feeling sure the Church would not consent to an out-and-out injustice, the Committee will be content with only the half. But the Presbytery, poor soul, with all the yearning of a fond mother's heart, is not willing to see her offspring divided, so yields up all. We live, however, in an age of development. Notwithstanding Dr. Wilson asserts that "the *Manual of Missions* is 'law,' and we have no right to deviate from it," he himself takes a step forward, and declares in THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, April, 1881, page 255, in opposition to the *Manual*, that the Committee "is necessarily clothed with ecclesiastical powers." This is an advance upon the *Manual*, and puts our theory in harmony with our practice. He apologises, however, for this increase in the pretensions for the Committee by assuring the Church that "these powers or functions, however, are strictly defined and are limited in their nature," in which respect they differ in no way from the functions of the other courts of the Church. He also says they "are temporary in duration, inasmuch as they are conferred from year to year." In this he is in error: the *powers* of the Committee are permanent, being conferred by the Constitution adopted in 1861. The individual members of the Committee are appointed from year to year, which is a very different thing; and even this yearly appointment of *the men* is, as we have seen, a delusive formality.

We have said that no one could say of the Scriptures what has been said of the Constitution, that it "was drawn up at a period

when the cause of Foreign Missions was little understood, and hence its principles can be applied only by inference to many of the details of the work." It is now our painful duty to confess that this has been said. Since we wrote that, we have read Dr. Wilson's article in the REVIEW for April, 1881, in which he maintains that there is no plan given us in Scripture, and the Church is left to develop her own plan. We do not wish to be charged with misrepresenting Dr. Wilson, especially on so serious a point as the authority of Scripture; we will, therefore, give his own language:

"Now, what is that Pattern shown in the Mount? Who can tell us what was the Apostolic plan for carrying on the great work of evangelising the world? or whether they had anything that could properly be called a plan or pattern for carrying on that work? But many of the powers and functions involved in that Constitution [of the Church] were not carried into effect in the days of the Apostles. They were left to be developed by the Church under the guidance of the Holy Ghost as their situation and circumstances would seem to demand. . . . And so no particular plan was adopted by which all the energies of the Church could be concentrated on the great work of evangelising the world."

Notwithstanding all this, Dr. Wilson says: "So far as we are informed, the Apostles prosecuted their work of evangelisation under the immediate direction and inspiration of the Holy Ghost." But did the Holy Ghost direct them in an aimless, shiftless, desultory way, without any plan or method or order? The most orderly and methodical of all works are God's works. We cannot conceive of the Holy Ghost working without a plan. The Apostles were directed by him. Granted; then for that very reason we should follow their plan. Says Dr. Wilson: "The Apostles acted under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost." Was Peter inspired to act a falsehood at Antioch? Were Paul and Barnabas both directed and inspired by the Holy Ghost when they disagreed and quarrelled? The Apostles were not "controlled" by "missions"; and Dr. Wilson feels very keenly the absence of anything in the New Testament that resembles Committees, and when scriptural authority is called for, is forced to confess that there is none. But to escape the damaging effect of such an admission, he claims that there is no plan at all. Strange

to say, however, after affirming that there was no plan among the Apostles, he goes to work on page 273 to show us what the Apostolic plan was. Anxious to say as little as possible about it, he only occupies one page in developing it. Still he gives some of the essential points. He shows how "Paul and Barnabas were set apart for their work by the church at Antioch." Had he chosen to dwell upon this point, he would have shown us how they were sent forth by the same body that laid their hands upon them, and afterwards reported their labors to the same body. It is important, however, for the apologists and advocates of Committees to pass over this part of the "pattern." Again: "But in going from place to place, they were not guided by that church." Exactly; so missionaries now should be free to travel and move from place to place without special instructions. But for the authors of the *Manual*, who hold that no foreign missionary can move from one town or city to another without a formal recommendation by the mission and the consent and approval of a Committee five or ten thousand miles distant, who hold that he must be directed by some body at every step, at every move, in every action, it is necessary to hold that the Apostles were guided "by the special direction of the divine Spirit." Unfortunately, however, inspired history is against the Baltimore brethren. When the Saviour gave this great commission to the Apostles, he gave it to the Church of all ages, and hence said, "Lo, I am with you always, even *unto the end of the world.*" If the Apostles enjoyed the presence of the Saviour, so do we; if they had the divine Spirit, so have we. If we are not immediately directed and inspired by the Holy Ghost, neither were they, at every step, but only on certain special occasions. What led Paul to leave one city to go to another was not an *afflatus* of the Spirit on each occasion, but the fact that he was persecuted and compelled by his enemies to flee; and sometimes the brethren led and directed him. "Timothy and Titus were directed in their plans and measures by Paul." Very good; Paul in his travels found those two young men and would have them go and labor with him; and that should be our "pattern": any foreign missionary who finds young men who are worthy of being ministers, and are called by the

Spirit, may "leave them in Crete to set in order the things that are wanting, as *he may appoint* them."

Although Dr. Wilson speaks so slightly of the "pattern shown in the Mount," and doubts whether there was any plan, he is at least compelled to see that there was. He is finally driven to the dire dilemma of asserting that their plan cannot be followed by us, *because the times have changed!*

And this from Dr. J. Leighton Wilson! And this in THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW! Tell it not in Gath, and publish it not in the streets of Askelon!

"The altered condition of the world, the wonderful changes that have been brought about in human affairs by the providence of God, the greatly increased resources and power of the Church herself, all call for some plan of conducting the work suited to the circumstances and demands of the case." Again: "Certain it is that Apostolic methods [after asserting that they had no plans] cannot be divorced from Apostolic men. The two must go together." Very well; but on page 274 he tells us that, "as the primitive Church had no Confession of Faith and Catechisms, no Book of Church Order, so, also, it had no plan of carrying on the foreign missionary work." Exactly so. Our Confession of Faith and Form of Government stand upon the same footing. They are both found in the word of God, which cannot change. Dr. Wilson acknowledges this; yet he would not dare to assert of our Confession of Faith what he asserts in regard to that part of our Form of Government that relates to the work of Foreign Missions. Will he assert that Apostolic *doctrines* cannot be divorced from Apostolic men? That it would have been utterly impossible for the primitive Church to *believe* as we do, or for us to believe as they did? This is what many do hold. And we confess that we are now prepared for anything. Dr. Wilson says: "Now, if the Church has power to formulate her creed, which no one denies; if she may establish a system of discipline; if she may institute a Book of Church Order; and if she may adopt a Directory for Public Worship, all of these being founded upon the authority of God's word, why may she not adopt some general plan for evangelising the world, provided that plan is also con-

sonant with the teachings of God's word?" Why, she may; and we hold that she *must*. It is Dr. Wilson himself, who, immediately after the above orthodox principle, proceeds to show that this plan must be "suited to the *circumstances and demands of the case*," which is a very different proposition indeed.

Dr. Wilson, however, in order to show the great efficiency of "Our Schemes" as contrasted with the inefficiency of the "Apostolic methods," goes into a very lengthy calculation of the number of converts now as compared with the few that were converted during the first century. We do not feel ourselves called upon to defend the efficiency of the methods adopted by the Apostles. We take it for granted, that, being divine, they were the most efficient that could possibly be devised. We have simply to say that such a comparison is about as just as if we should compare the number of births of Israelites during the first decade after Jacob married and the number of births of Israelites during the decade immediately previous to the Exodus, or during the glorious reign of Solomon. It is simply absurd to compare the efforts of the Protestant world in the last half of the nineteenth century with the efforts of a few poor, despised, persecuted men and women in Jerusalem eighteen hundred years ago. We do not know what authority Dr. Wilson or any one else has for *supposing* that the converts at the end of the first century did not exceed 100,000 or 200,000. The Apostles do not seem to have been so fond of statistics and of parading dollars and cents and numbers of converts before the world, as Boards and Committees and Societies now are. They received the command of their divine Master, "Go ye into all the world and *preach the gospel to every creature*;" and their method was so well adapted to the end in view, that before Paul's death he could say that the gospel had been preached "*in all the world*" and "*to every creature which is under heaven*." Dr. Wilson cannot beat Paul. The latter puts into one line infinitely more than the former was able to put into three pages. Dr. Wilson bristles with figures and names, and at last is only able to touch *upon the shores* of great continents and *along the banks* of the principal rivers and lakes. The interior of these continents remain in darkness. Let this fact be duly

noted, and what we find on the larger part of page 280 dwindles down wonderfully. Let it also be remembered that the 150,000,000 copies of the Bible in 250 different languages and dialects, of which he makes so much, has been done by *voluntary societies* that have no connexion with church organisation, and, therefore, have no relevancy whatever to the discussion as to the methods to be adopted by the Church. All that work would have been done had Boards and Committees never been heard of; these Bible and Tract Societies would continue their work just the same if the Presbyteries had the direction and oversight of the missionaries. We believe in Bible and Tract Societies outside of any Church organisation; we need not, therefore, expect to find a "pattern" for them in the Scriptures.

There is another consideration of great moment which takes much of the wind out of those wide-spread sails in the latter part of Dr. Wilson's article. We must know something more about those figures on the top of page 280 before we can give implicit credence to them. There is at least one, and the largest of all, that bears upon the very face of it the marks of utter improbability: "In all institutions of learning connected with the various missions, there are at the present time 400,000 native youths being specially trained for the same work." Upon this astounding statement, Dr. Wilson bases a calculation that at the close of the present century there will be "an army of 500,000 workers." No wonder that after such statistics he exclaims: "Here is success, both present and prospective, that has no parallel in the history of Christianity." Now, it may be that in all schools and colleges conducted by Christian people in heathen lands there are 400,000 youths. But is it fair, to say the least, for Dr. Wilson to represent all this vast number as being trained "*for the same work*"? Take, for example, the school work at Campinas. We had in 1878 more than two hundred youths in the schools. Yet, of all these, and of all the others who frequented those schools during six or eight years, how many were being trained "*for the same work*," *i. e.*, the work of the gospel? Can Dr. Wilson say that one-sixteenth part of the pupils that have frequented the Campinas schools have been "found worthy to take part in the work"? There

is another thought to be offered in this matter of schools in operation at present of which Dr. Wilson speaks so much. He represents them as being "connected with the various missions." Now, the most flourishing institutions of learning among the heathen are *not* connected with Boards or Committees. We have seen it stated frequently that Roberts and Beirut and other colleges, both male and female, in Turkey and Syria, are not under the direction of home boards. We have no fault to find with schools and colleges; they are very good in their place, and would be carried on, and we believe *far more effectively*, if our Presbyteries would direct foreign missions and turn schools and colleges over to private Christian liberality, and to be controlled by corporations on the ground. And what about those 25,000 native helpers? Does Dr. Wilson include the teachers in all the schools and colleges, and all who are in any way employed in the service of the missionaries? It is the custom of our Committee to report to the Assembly the teachers in the schools as native helpers. Yet among these native helpers have been Roman Catholics, infidels, and professed atheists! If the 25,000 are composed to any considerable extent of such native helpers, it is not much of a glory to "our Schemes of Benevolence." The Apostolic custom of giving no statistics was much better, in our humble judgment.

This praise of the great efficiency of Committees as compared with the apostolic methods is very different from the lamentations that go forth periodically from the Mission Rooms in Baltimore. Four months previous to publishing his eulogy on the great efficiency of Committees and Boards, Dr. Wilson published to the Church "that the services of eighteen or twenty young men, all of whom seem to have been called by the Holy Ghost to engage in the work, have been declined for the want of means to send them. Three promising missions have been cast adrift, probably never to be resumed by our Church, for the want of means to support them. . . . Several of our missions—missions that are yielding at the present time the richest spiritual fruits—are really threatened with dissolution from the want of reinforcement." Do we read of anything like that happening in the days of the Apostles? Yet Dr. Wilson presents the Apos-

tles and their methods in a very disadvantageous light, as compared with the wonderful efficiency and success of Committees. Nor was that a solitary or temporary emergency. It was stated at the same time that "*for five years* the work has been in a *painfully languishing condition*, mainly for want of funds to carry it on." Large debts are contracted from time to time, not only by our own Church, but by other Churches, and these debts must be paid, not by an increase of contributions, but by a retraction of the work at the various mission stations. The officers of the Committee have even been obliged to pledge their personal property to carry the Church's burden.

If the work was distributed among the Presbyteries; if a whole Presbytery, or two or three combined, were directly and personally responsible for the support of the work in a certain field; if the pastors and elders were in a position to feel that a given part of the whole burden lay upon their individual shoulders; if the deacons felt that upon them devolved the responsibility of raising the necessary means; if each individual church was made as responsible for her share of the necessary funds as she is for the salary of her pastor; above all, if there was direct communication between the Presbyteries and their men and work; if they were called upon to direct and take the oversight of the work abroad as they do of the work within their own bounds, there would be no possibility of disgraceful retreats in the face of the enemy.

Instead of bewailing the want of piety and missionary zeal on the part of God's people, instead of finding fault with the Lord for not pouring out upon the Church the spirit of missions, let the means that he appointed for keeping alive this spirit be employed; let the Presbyteries be brought face to face with the work; let the people be brought into communication with the men and the work; let the Assembly disband the Central Committee and in its place appoint the Presbyteries as its Executive Committees; let our schemes of benevolence be the divinely appointed methods of apostolic days, and the doleful jeremiads that from time to time fill the *Missionary* and other Church papers, and chill the heart of the Church, will be changed to joyful doxologies and songs of victory.

JOHN BOYLE.

ARTICLE II.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE EVANGELIST.

The fifth article of the last number of the REVIEW, entitled "*The Foreign Evangelist as viewed by One in the Foreign Field,*" lays upon us the disagreeable task of making a reply. When we first turned over the pages of the article and saw our own name *passim*, we thought of a certain famous Anglican clergyman, who, on entering a room whose walls were covered with mirrors and seeing himself reflected wherever he looked, said that he thought he was in a convocation of the clergy, and, of course, *was delighted*. But only a few pages of the argument had been read before we had a distinct consciousness of recollecting the story of an American backwoodsman, who happened to be dining for the first time in a first class hotel, and, when the waiter, after bringing the viands, laid a napkin by the plate, said: "I wish you, sir, to understand that I know when to use my handkerchief without having any hints thrown out to me." If ever any author for sixty pages pursued, to use his own oft-recurring phrase, "*an ignis fatuus,*" the writer of that article is the man.

1. He argues in vigorous terms, that, according to "the Scriptures and the Constitution," there is no such office as the evangelistic office and no such officer as the evangelist; and severely criticises the present writer for using such language. Now, it appears to us that the subject-matter of the discussion is too serious to allow us to make a point of a *word*. The terms were used just as we found them, and as the Assembly used them in their directions to "*the Committee on the Evangelist,*" of which we were a member for the two years of its existence. If, however, it will help to keep the peace, we give our brother hearty permission to substitute for the offending words any others that he pleases; for instance, "the office of the minister of the word, who is appointed to do the work of a missionary;" or, "the missionary or evangelist, as a minister of the word," is an officer appointed to do so and so. By this arrangement *we* shall get all we contend for, and *he* can settle the terminology to suit himself, and confine

the *words* (office and officer) to the minister of the word: all which would be according to *his argument*, but not according to the Constitution and the Scriptures, as we now proceed to show.

2. The brother says: "Never, in a single instance, does the Book speak of the office of pastor or evangelist, but always, without exception, of the office of the minister, the duties of the pastor, and the work of an evangelist." Now, our previous article of October, 1879, was written, though not published, as was stated at the time, before the new Book was adopted, and may well allow the merits of the above quotation to be decided by the words of the old Book, Chap. III., Sec. 2, which are as follows: "The ordinary and perpetual officers in the Church are bishops or pastors; the representatives of the people, usually styled ruling elders; and deacons." "The very phraseology" of what was the Book from 1729 to 1879 thus freely and formally predicated *officer* of the bishop or pastor. More than this: both the old and the new Book, in one of the most solemn and formal of its provisions, that for the call of a pastor, makes the church say to the minister or probationer whom they call: "The congregation (or church) of — do earnestly call and desire you to undertake the *pastoral office* in said congregation." (Old Book, XV., 6; New Book, VI., III., 6.) Add to these extracts from our standards one from the Scriptures, 1 Timothy iii. 1: "This is a true saying, if a man desire *the office of a bishop*, he desireth a good work." The old and the new versions agree in the italicised words. The same Greek word, *ἐπισκοπή*, occurs in Acts i. 20, where the authorized version renders it "bishopric," and the new version simply office. The meaning in this place, too, is *the office of a bishop*.

"Now, when we consider this language of our" present and our former "Constitution," and of the old and the new version of the Scriptures, "and compare it with the definitions and phraseology" of our brother, "the contrast is so striking that no one will fail to be impressed by it!"

3. Now, that it has been shown that our brother's conclusion is a mistake, let us expose the error in his argument. He founds his argument on Chap. IV., Sec. II., Par. I., of the present Book, which is as follows:

"Of the Minister of the Word.

"This office is the first in the Church, both for dignity and usefulness. The person who fills it has in Scripture different titles expressive of his various duties. As he has the oversight of the flock of Christ, he is termed bishop. As he feeds them with spiritual food, he is termed pastor. As he serves Christ in his Church, he is termed minister. As it is his duty to be grave and prudent, and an example to the flock, and to govern well in the house and kingdom of Christ, he is termed presbyter or elder. As he is the messenger of God, he is termed angel of the Church. As he is sent to declare the will of God to sinners and to beseech them to be reconciled to God through Christ, he is termed ambassador. As he bears the glad tidings of salvation to the ignorant and perishing, he is termed evangelist. As he stands to proclaim the gospel, he is termed preacher. As he expounds the word, and by sound doctrine both exhorts and convinces the gainsayer, he is termed teacher. And as he dispenses the manifold grace of God and the ordinances instituted by Christ, he is termed steward of the mysteries of God. These titles do not indicate different grades of office, but all describe one and the same officer."

Now, the first thing that impresses one upon reading this extract from our Constitution, is, that "the highest officer" of the Church has many *names* or titles, whilst the lower officers have each a single *name*, to wit, ruling elder or deacon. The second impression, justly received, is that the official work or duties of this highest officer are so numerous and varied that no one name, by its material signification, can possibly be an adequate description. The third impression is, that in discourse we may *logically* predicate of him under *every* name, whatever may be predicated of him under *any* name. This is simply saying that the language of the Book and the Bible conforms to the law of all language. The *name* may never be confounded with the *thing*. The inference from all these premises is that it is good Presbyterian speech to say that either the bishop or the pastor or the minister or the presbyter or the angel of the Church or the ambassador or the *evangelist* or the preacher or the teacher or the steward of the mysteries of God, *is an officer of the Church*, and is invested with an *office* of the Church. It is difficult to imagine the state of mind of that man who will select one of these scriptural titles, and that, too, one out of the middle of the list, and then argue that the Constitution and the word of God and the very safety of the

Presbyterian Church allow us to ascribe *an office* to him *only* under that one title, or describe him as an *officer only* under that one name. This is certainly a specimen of "extraordinary confusion," *logically considered*. At any rate, the inference is as far from validity as his former statement, about the "very phraseology of the Book" and Scripture, is from fact.

4. Our Form of Government, Chap. VI., Sec. II., says:

"Of the Doctrine of Ordination.

"1. Those who have been lawfully called are to be inducted into their respective offices by the ordination of a court.

"2. Ordination is the authoritative admission of one duly called to an office in the Church of God, accompanied with prayer and the imposition of hands.

"3. As every ecclesiastical office, according to the Scriptures, is a special charge, no man shall be ordained unless it be to the performance of a definite work."

In Section V., Par. VIII., of the same Chapter, it is said: "In the *ordination* of probationers as evangelists, the eighth of the preceding questions shall be omitted and the following substituted for it." Here, again, we find the same conclusion necessarily flowing from the very words of our Book. Those who are lawfully called to office, must be inducted into their respective offices by *ordination*. Ordination is the authoritative admission of one duly called to office. Presbytery *ordains probationers, as evangelists*, to their proper work. If this is not saying of the qualified probationer that he is called to office, and by ordination *as an evangelist* authoritatively admitted to office, then no possible premises can ever give a conclusion. The syllogism stands thus: all ordained men are inducted by their ordination into their *respective* offices; J. B. is a man ordained *as an evangelist*; therefore J. B. is inducted into the office of an evangelist.

We thus reach the same conclusion reached before, viz., that it is sound orthodox Presbyterian language to speak of *the office of the evangelist* and the evangelist as an *officer* of the Church. If a man is ordained *to the work* of an evangelist, then he is inducted into the office of an evangelist; if to the work of a pastor, then *into the office of a pastor*, etc., etc. By one act he is at once and

inseparably ordained to a work and installed in an office. True Presbyterianism knows no ordinations *sine titulo*.

5. But common sense will also conduct us to the same result. Now, we do not in the least mean that reason is in any sense superior to, or the measure of revelation. But we do mean that revelation is given *to* reason, and will not outrage it. In the use of human discourse, it conforms to the laws of language, that most wonderful product of *reason*. Now, the word *officer* designates one that is invested with an *office*; and the word *office* means simply a charge or trust conferred by public authority and for a public purpose. Whoever does an act *in the name and by the authority of the church*, is a church officer and is invested with an ecclesiastical office, and his act is an official act of the church. If the world is not evangelised before men and books, inspired and uninspired, speak under other laws, the present dispensation will continue *in secula seculorum*. One might as well point out to a child the impropriety and dangerous tendency of saying, "My father is sick," and teach the poor creature that his father, *as such*, is not and cannot be sick, and insist on his using before that predicate a subject that better suits the "constitution" of the universe.

6. The author of the article under review plainly takes for granted that the writer holds and teaches that the evangelist's office is not one and the same with that of the pastor or bishop or teaching elder, etc. The "Baltimore brethren," that is to say, the Secretary and the Chairman of the Executive Committee, are soundly castigated for this dangerous heresy. But our critic may rest assured that what the "Baltimore brethren" contended for in the conferences of "the Committee on the Evangelist," was that the evangelist, *as an officer*, was simply a minister or teaching elder; and that, when he was set apart to that special work, which the Assembly and the Book described as "the work of an evangelist," it was necessary to intrust or delegate to him authority to perform certain governmental acts which the pastor is not authorised to do *in the same way*; that is, *severally*. Of the Chairman of the Executive Committee, he says: "In this definition, as well as in the language throughout the entire article, he

makes the evangelist, *in the character of evangelist*, an officer of the church." (The italics are our own.) Now, we deny it. We have *not*, in the definition or in any passage of that article of 1879, or anywhere else, said either that or anything that fairly implies it. Our opponent, in the character of opponent, has inserted the italicised words. The language of the definition, and he had just quoted it, is: "The evangelist may be defined as a temporary officer of the Church, with an extraordinary mission and authority to wield ecclesiastical power in an extraordinary way." If one should have occasion to describe his father as an officer of the Church, would that affirm or imply that his father, *in the character of father*, was an ecclesiastical officer? But our critic follows up this unjust charge with what he supposes to be a corroboration, saying, "he pointedly distinguishes him as an officer from the pastor." Well, what of it? We certainly do distinguish one *officer* from another, just as we distinguish one drop of water from another, because they are perfectly distinct, though in the good and exact logical sense of the words, *it is a distinction that makes no difference*. Then, to clinch his grave charge, our brother cites our words with his own italics: "This is the *differentiating* characteristic of his *office*." The whole paragraph from which the citation is made is here given, that the reference of the subject may be seen and the *differential* difference understood:

"The Church has her regular method of 'increase and multiplication' for all places to which she *can go* in her complete and proper form; but her commission (Matt. xxviii. 18) requires her 'to increase and multiply' also where she cannot go in her full organism, and this is the work that distinctively pertains to the evangelist. It may be said that he is appointed to a *quasi-creative* work rather than the administration of an established order. This is the differentiating characteristic of the office, marking it out at once as temporary and extraordinary."

The reader will at once see that the quoted sentence means "this *work* is the differentiating characteristic." Now, upon our brother's mistake, we remark, (*a*) that our statement makes the differentiating characteristic reside in the *work* of the evangelist. If any one can define an office without reference to its object-matter, we will be delighted to witness the exploit. But (*b*) it does not appear that it was a misconstruction of the sentence that

was the quasi-creator of this *ignis fatuus*. It seems rather to have been a misapprehension of the force of the expression "*differentiating characteristic*," which means, not characteristic difference, but characteristic *differential*. The figure is mathematical, and denotes a value that by an inherent law regularly diminishes to zero. It means the same as "*distinguishing characteristic*," with the additional qualification that the distinction happily grows less and less until it vanishes. And this is precisely what we believe and what we wrote about this extraordinary and temporary work of the evangelist. He first receives members into the church; then he ordains and installs ruling elders, and by that act loses his power to receive members. He then ordains a pastor, and parts in like manner with his own pastoral power. And so on, until he reaches the zero of extraordinary power.

7. The article under review sharply rebukes the writer for avowing that the problem can be solved only by "the general principles that underlie and inform Presbyterianism," because "the (old) Form of Government barely recognises the evangelistic office and then leaves it to be administered without the help of constitutional enactments." It is unnecessary to spend many words in reply. Scarcely any one will be alarmed by the warning. It is too well known and believed that no ecclesiastical or civil constitution can foresee and provide formally for all the duties to which its officers may be called; and that in all such cases the officers and courts must be guided by the *informing* and *underlying* principles of the written code. Indeed, no *written* law can be safely interpreted or applied without constant reference to these very unwritten laws. Some of the best improvements of the new Book over the old are simply the formal enactment of what had been received and practised for years according to the essential principles of Presbyterianism. Such is the history of all our written laws concerning foreign missions.

8. A few words are, perhaps, due to our opponent's exegetical treatment of the Greek words rendered *evangelise*, (*evangel* or *gospel*), and *evangelist*. He makes much of the conclusion he reaches, that *evangelise* always means to preach, and hence, that the evangelist, *as such*, is only a preacher of the word. Now, it

must be remembered that the signification of a word in discourse is very rarely its unmodified etymological meaning. It is freely admitted, that "to evangelise," either with or without an inner object (the object *effected*), means simply to *preach* the gospel. This being the primary sense of the word in Scripture, it abundantly justifies the Book in its statement of the reason why the minister of the word is *termed* evangelist. But has not the verb a larger meaning? And has it not a larger sense when it takes an outer object, or the object *affected*? All other verbs have. In Acts viii. 25, it is said the Apostles "evangelised many villages of the Samaritans." Now, it is not at all impossible that the verb here has the meaning which it conveys to us when we speak of "evangelising the world," *i. e.*, spreading the gospel and establishing the Church throughout the world. This is what King James's translators understood Philip to have done. In their heading to this chapter, they say, "The disciples being dispersed by reason of a great persecution at Jerusalem, a church is planted by Philip in Samaria." In Robinson's Greek Dictionary of the New Testament, certainly very good authority, an *evangelist* is defined as being "a preacher of the gospel, not fixed in any place, but travelling as a missionary to preach the gospel and establish churches." This meaning Dr. Robinson assigns to the word in all the three passages in which it occurs, and refers to Neander, Theodoret, and Eusebius as authorities. On this question these authorities, especially Eusebius and the translators of the authorised version, could not have been biassed by modern notions concerning the evangelist. Besides all this, it is unquestioned that the word "gospel" (*evangel*) is sometimes used in the Gospels, and often in the Acts and the Epistles, in the same wide sense, as denoting the whole gospel scheme, including the Church. And every time the expression "the gospel of the *kingdom*" is used, it is explicitly declared that a kingdom or church is connected with the good news or system of truth. Indeed, the first preaching of the gospel was in the words, "The kingdom of heaven (or God) is at hand." It is well known how intensely real and visible "the kingdom of God" was to the hearers of the Baptist, Christ, and the Seventy. The new Book also twice uses the word

evangelisation in this wide sense of planting the gospel Church: "The General Assembly shall have power to commit the various interests pertaining to the general work of *evangelisation* to one or more commissions." And again: "The General Assembly shall have power to institute the agencies necessary in the general work of *evangelisation*." When, now, we remember that, for some reason, it is a very ancient opinion that the *work* of the evangelist, *distinctively considered*, is to *evangelise* the world; not only to *preach about* the kingdom, but to *plant and establish* the kingdom in its doctrine and government; and that such has ever been and is now the received doctrine of the Presbyterian Church throughout the world; and that her standards and her courts and her teachers, whenever they speak at all on the subject, use the *terms* in this sense; and that the evangelists of Scripture, whether as such or otherwise, *uniformly did so act*; we do not feel, when we follow their example, disturbed in the least degree by the inferences of "*one in the foreign field*" from the primary sense of the term.

9. Besides all this, the other specimens of exegesis to which we are treated, are not at all favorable to arouse a spirit of revolt against the old authorities and of submission to the new leader. His exegetical remark (on Phil. iv. 3), that "the chivalric Paul used so vulgar a phrase as '*those women*,'" when the Apostle did not say *women* at all, and, if he had said it, would have used a most honorable appellation, even the one by which he addressed his mother from the cross, is *extraordinary*. The Apostle simply says: "Help *them* who labored with me in the gospel." In the previous verse is found the antecedent of the pronoun, with which it agrees in gender and number, and thus we discover that they were *women*. We commend to our brother the *ordinary* interpretation of the aforesaid passage, in which Paul is commending the not faultless Euodia and Syntyche to a male fellow-laborer who would not work with them. Paul, in effect, says: "I beseech Euodia and I beseech Syntyche that they be of the same mind in the Lord; and I request you, true yoke-fellow—a request (*vai*) which you will surely grant—to lay hold on the work with them, whoever and whatever (*αιτινες*) they are, seeing that they labored

in the gospel with me and Clement and the rest of my fellow-laborers, whose names, though I write them not, are written in the book of life." The *argument* of the passage, stripped of its charming form, is from the greater to the less: "If these women were good enough to work with me and Clement and other ministers of the word, though they have their imperfections and sinful infirmities, they are good enough to work with you, and you will, therefore, *please* work with *them*." In like manner, our critic, in his remarks on 1 Tim. v. 14, where Paul gives counsel (*βοιδομαι*), but does not express his *will*, has given us an equally *extraordinary* interpretation. The *ordinary* one, that Paul expresses his *wish* that the *younger widows* of his day—that is, all under *sixty* years of age—*should marry*, ought to satisfy any man, even "one in the foreign field," notwithstanding his hesitation to work with female assistants, whoever they are.

10. Our brother does "most seriously object" to our taking the extraordinary work of the evangelist as the differentiating characteristic of his charge or office. He has proved to his own satisfaction that preaching is the only work that is ascribed by the *term* to the evangelist. He excludes the administration of the sacraments, and, by an extraordinary interpretation of 1 Cor. i. 17, claims to have distinct authority for the exclusion of the administration of *baptism*. "We have seen," says he, "that what distinctively pertains to him according to Scripture and our Book, is to preach the gospel; and that, as an officer, he is not differentiated from his brethren at all; . . . (and) must exercise this extra power (of government) *as an elder*." If this passage says anything, it says: *The evangelist, as a preacher, is differentiated from his brother preachers by the distinctive characteristic of preaching; as an officer, he is not differentiated at all from his brethren; but as an elder intrusted with extraordinary power, he is neither differentiated nor not differentiated!!* On this explicit, clear, and logical deliverance, the following remarks are submitted: We (*a*) do not know what it *distinctively* means, and have no *means* of ascertaining its sense. We (*b*) do not perceive how that which is *common* to all can be *distinctive* of any. And (*c*) we have a serious objection to the *underlying* principles

thereof. We used the term "evangelist" in the sense in which we formally defined it; a sense which our antagonist perfectly understood, for he tries to prove that it is incorrect. He then puts *his* sense into the word in *our* article, and complains that "there is a want of explicitness about the whole passage that is calculated to mystify and confuse!! There would be the same trouble with any other passage of our article or of our *Book*, which does *not* use the *term* in its naked and primary etymological sense. Let us try it in the passage which he quotes in this connexion, substituting his *distinctive* terms, and it will read thus: "When a minister is appointed to the work of the 'minister of the word, distinctively considered,' *he is commissioned* to preach the word, and, 'what does not pertain to him, distinctively considered,' to administer the sacraments, . . . and to him, 'not *distinctively considered*, but *as an elder*,' may be intrusted power to organise, etc." Furthermore, the whole question concerns "*the power of jurisdiction*" and not "the power of order." Such was the title and subject of the former article. On the principle that public appointment to a work carried with it the delegation of the needed authority to accomplish that work, we seriously asked, and answered as well as we could, the question, "What powers must the Church delegate to its evangelist?" This, of course, raised the preliminary question, "What is the distinctive work of the evangelist?" We took the term in the sense in which it was given to us, and used "evangelist" and "missionary" interchangeably. Permission is freely given to all and every one to qualify the terms, *ad libitum*, with "*as elder*" or any other *secundum quid*. It will not change the bearing of a single sentence on the question discussed, but will, perhaps, show "*one in the foreign field*" that he has been chasing an "*ignis fatuus*." Whilst, however, we feel free to grant this large liberty to the reader, it must be understood that it is done only because it makes no difference as far as this discussion is concerned. We do not wish to turn aside to an irrelevant matter. But we do not believe that the minister of the word preaches as one thing and rules as another. We believe that he preaches as a teaching elder and rules as a teaching elder; that he has one office and not two. He

does not exercise *potestas ordinis* as a teacher, and *potestas jurisdictionis* as an elder, but both as a *bishop*. If ever there be occasion, we feel prepared to defend this position by Scripture, the standards, common sense, and authorities.

11. We now inform our reviewer that there is one quite vulnerable point in our "definition," upon which he might have founded a *just* criticism, if he had been as keen for *things* as he is for *words*. As our object is not victory, but the service of the Church in a matter of vast importance, in which there are most serious difficulties, however lightly and cavalierly our brother may regard and handle them, we are glad of a suitable opportunity to correct our error. We therefore give the definition of an evangelist, which, with our present light, we feel prepared to defend and teach. We now say: "The evangelist is an officer of the Church, with a temporary and extraordinary mission and authority to wield ecclesiastical power in an extraordinary way." His *work* is temporary; *i. e.*, there will be no occasion to plant and establish the Church during the last part of the gospel age; for then the evangelisation of the world will have been an accomplished fact, and "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." The occasion of the mistake is the fact that there is no *material* difference between the work and the office. The work, taken subjectively as a duty or charge, is the office. Every minister is authorised to do any ministerial work, but each one receives a special charge. The special charge characterises each minister's work. Thus speaks the Book, Chap. IV., Secs. 3-6. Another correction of our former article is also necessary. The error, however, was not ours, but the copyist's, and escaped our notice at the time of sending off the manuscript. On page 699, the expression "evangelistic courts" is printed, where we had written "evangelistic committees," the latter word in an abbreviated form, which, we suppose, occasioned the mistake. It is so plainly a mistake, that the proper word can be substituted without calling for any other change, even the least. The former error, corrected above, calls for the total change of the next sentence, and then the transposition of 2d and 1st. If we had meant "courts," we could not

possibly have used the alternative expressions which we employed; but, meaning "*committees*," those expressions are natural, and require no change. The writer is just as much opposed to *extraordinary courts* as his critic. With this explanation, we resume our reply.

12. Our critic severely censures our use of the word *extraordinary*, as applied to the *way* in which the evangelist wields his power of jurisdiction. The acknowledged fact that the foreign missionary often wields the power of church-government *severally* and not jointly, we characterised as an exercise of the power of jurisdiction "*in an extraordinary way*." We call the attention of the reviewer and the reader to the fact that the ordinary several power (*potestas ordinis*) is outside of this discussion, and not to be named. We are discussing the evangelist's power of jurisdiction, a power which is exercised *jointly*, by *courts*, when administered in the ordinary way. On this point we used *several* and *extraordinary* interchangeably, just as we used evangelist and missionary. This ought to have protected us from the charges laid at our door, for the reviewer *understood us*. He, referring expressly to the power of jurisdiction, says of us: "When he says that this power resides in the evangelist, in an *extraordinary* mode, he, of course, means that in him it is a *several* power; for the ordinary mode is that of our Book, which says: 'ecclesiastical jurisdiction is not a several but a joint power, to be exercised by presbyters in courts.' This, we are all aware, is the almost universal opinion." And this almost universal opinion he stigmatises as "the *fundamental error*, the *fruitful source* of the whole difficulty," and "the *natural consequence* (!) of exalting the title evangelist to the place of a distinct office." (The last three italics are our own.) He then goes on to prove the opinion of "*one* in the foreign field," and thus overthrow the "almost universal opinion" on the subject. We need not follow the argument. It is founded on the fact that courts may in an ordinary way exercise their power through commissions, and that the foreign missionary is a commissioner of a court, and therefore the court through him exercises her power in an ordinary way; the difference between a board of commissioners and one commis-

sioner duly appointed, being a difference of degree, and not of kind. Thus he seeks to prove that "the method for doing the work abroad is the same as the method *for doing the same work* at home." Now, to a man who looks at *things* and not at *words*, this puzzle is easily solved.

(a) Admitting for a moment that the difference between a commissioner and an organised body of commissioners is not one of kind, we may ask whether there is not a difference of kind between such a "commission" as our Book authorises its courts to raise and such a "commission" as the evangelist receives from Presbytery. The word is plainly used in two different senses. The chapters which authorise the one and the other, are treating of widely different subjects. There is no objection to the evangelist terming himself a commissioner of Presbytery; but then he must not claim analogy, much less identity of kind, with the members of such a commission as the Book provides for in its Section on "Ecclesiastical Commissions." He is not *such* a commissioner. (b) An ecclesiastical commission is always appointed *to a specific work*. It is not appointed to ordain *any one* under the jurisdiction of the court, or organise churches *anywhere* within its bounds, etc., etc. It is appointed to ordain A B, to organise a church in C, and so on. Here, again, is a difference of kind between the commission of an evangelist and the commission of an "ecclesiastical commission." It is thus self-evident that the evangelist is not an *ecclesiastical* commission of "one," instead of "two or three." (c) There is, however, a difference of kind between that method which *requires* a body of co-commissioners and directs them to ordain a particular man, and then dissolve, *ipso facto*; and that method which commissions *one* man to ordain any man he judges qualified in a foreign field, and to continue to do so indefinitely. *What is committed* to the one is vastly different from *what is committed* to the other, and the repositories of the different trusts are commissioners of a specifically different kind. Our critic says more than once, that "the ordinary and regular method" of Presbytery for doing certain things, is "by means of a Committee of two or three," and then asks, "But if it appoints only one, is his office thereby changed?"

Certainly not, but, *ex vi terminorum*, the "ordinary and regular method" is changed. Of course, whatever is done at all, must be done in some way; and, whatever is not done in the ordinary way, is done in an extraordinary way. It will be hard to convince the Southern Presbyterian Church to reject the almost "universal opinion" for this substitute. By mere inspection, without conscious argument, people will perceive at once that the foreign missionary wields the power of jurisdiction in a way that is *extra ordinem*, and not in the way in which that power is ever wielded within the established Church. If, however, it will help to keep the peace, we are perfectly willing to substitute *severally* for "extraordinary way."

13. The reviewer likewise criticises brethren for saying that the evangelist is an "extraordinary officer," and that he is invested with an "extraordinary office." The present writer has never used those expressions, and thinks that they are quite objectionable in this discussion. It is always desirable to use a test word in the same sense throughout one and the same discussion. And certainly neither the officer nor the office is *extra ordinem*. They are both within the established order, and duly provided for. It is the *work*, taken objectively, that is out of the reach of the courts as such, or their ordinary commissions. Every minister of the word receives, by ordination, the same office. The pastor may become evangelist, or the evangelist pastor, without reordination. But we assure our alarmed brother that the brethren who use this objectionable expression, hold the same doctrine as himself on this point. They use the phrase not in its strict sense, but as an abridgment and symbol of a larger formula; just as the writer used (and was perfectly understood) the phrase "extraordinary power" interchangeably with the more cumbrous but exact language of his definition. In official communications and conferences spreading over two years, with men of every shade of opinion, and among them the man who is (if we mistake not) the author of the anonymous article quoted from, we have never heard any other doctrine broached. All have agreed that the evangelist is simply a minister of the word, to whom is intrusted, from the necessity of the case, extraordinary or several

power of jurisdiction. The disagreement has been on other and far more serious points—difficulties that cannot be removed by stating one or the other side more correctly and moderately. And these difficulties, too, are of such a nature that they cannot be solved by any possible doctrine as to the *way* in which the evangelist exercises ecclesiastical power. And, unless some of our missionaries in the foreign field, with a discriminating head and a truth-loving heart and a single eye to the welfare of the Church, can suggest a solution from that wisdom which can come only from practice and experience, the instruction will have to be given in the form of chastising providences—either upon our own Church, or upon some other.

14. Our brother is very sure that the foreign missionary, in his exercise of power of jurisdiction, is the delegate of *Presbytery*. *Perhaps he is*; and if this become the settled doctrine of the Church, then there will necessarily be a corresponding limit placed upon the evangelist's powers. In our former article we considered him the delegate of *the General Assembly*; and if this become the settled faith of the Church, then there will necessarily be larger powers put into his hand. The question concerns a matter of fact, and the fact must be discovered by inspection. That he is the delegate of the court which appoints him, may be assumed as a general truth until it is denied. Of course, then, the home missionary is the delegate of the Presbytery, for he has no appointment from any other source. But the foreign missionary, whilst he is undoubtedly appointed by the Presbytery, is, as a matter of fact, and *now* in accordance with written law, appointed by the General Assembly also. Now, which of these appointments is the one that determines his status as a delegate? He cannot be the appointee or commissioner of both *in the same respect*. We remain impressed with the conviction that he is, in this respect, the delegate of the Assembly, though we freely confess our inability to frame a syllogism from which that conclusion will necessarily flow. The following considerations lead us to this view:

(a) As before the work of general evangelisation was formally, by a constitutional provision, committed to the General Assem-

bly, it was actually so committed, according to the underlying principle of Presbyterianism, that a work which is common to the whole Church properly pertains to that Presbytery which is also common to the whole Church; so now, though there is no written law declaring it to be so, the general evangelist is actually regarded and treated as speaking and acting in the name and by the authority of the Assembly, according to the general principle that an officer is doing the work of that court to which the work properly pertains.

(b) The General Assembly is responsible for the support of the foreign missionary, and requires from him a report of his work, and approves his diligence or disapproves his neglect. A delegate most naturally reports to the court whose delegate he is.

(c) The Presbyteries, according to the new Book, may be regarded as having, since 1879, given up their powers over the foreign *work* into the hands of the Assembly, and having reserved to themselves only the right of ordination and judicial procedures.

(d) The ordination by Presbytery may be regarded as the induction into office, and the commission of the General Assembly as the call to the work. Thus the call authorises the ordination and the ordination gives effect to the call, and the commission is one and joint, and the responsibility is to both: to the Presbytery in one respect and to the Assembly in another, all which accords with the *facts of the case*. Now, whilst we would not find it a difficult task to pick flaws in the above statements, we are unable to make a statement on the other side that is not beset with still more serious faults. It is easy, indeed, to cut the knot by dogmatically affirming that, of course, the evangelist acts in the name of his Presbytery *only*, or in the name of the Assembly *only*, but this procedure does not commend itself to the general good sense of the Lord's people, and blindly refuses to *untie* the real knot, which is "*the actual facts of the case.*"

15. This brings us to the severe and scornful treatment of that part of our former article which discussed "the complex problem presented by the actual facts of the case." Now, we say frankly to our brother that we feel great reverence for the *facts* of God's

providence, whether complex or simple, always receiving them as the revelation and execution of his eternal decrees. And when those facts are not contrary to aught that is expressly set down in Scripture or to a good and necessary inference therefrom, we accept them as the execution of his *positive* decrees. But, to our brother, this complex fact of an organised "mission" is everything that is bad, a veritable Pandora's box, but without "*hope*" at the bottom to follow and ameliorate the innumerable and unmitigated evils that fly abroad and infect the whole Church. Well, there is left *one* in the home field that feels undisturbed and serene! *We* never wove that complex fact. It was put into our hands—*jointly* with the other Baltimore brethren—just as the words "evangelist" and "evangelisation." We studied it as best we could, with the Scriptures and the Book before us, especially the Acts of the Apostles, which our brother interprets so extraordinarily. The ordinary interpretation, which makes the church at Jerusalem the home-church, and the Gentile churches as "missionary" churches in the very process of formation and union with the mother church, taking away from them, of course, the distinctive and differential modification made by the presence of apostles and prophets is altogether on our side. But the brother mistakes us when he supposes that we were trying to present a theory that would prevent, in the foreign field, those difficulties and confusions which arise from the sinful infirmities of men, even the best. It was such confusion as necessarily results from the theory itself that we were arguing against, or rather, used as a *reductio ad absurdum*. No system, however coherent in its subject-matter, alas, can relieve the Church, either at home or abroad, from this the saddest of all confusions—conduct which the acknowledged theory forbids. And our critic perceived very plainly the object of the paper, for he expressly argues against "the theory," and then, as he thinks, clinches the argument by examples of confusion arising from a *disregard* of "theory." The trouble between Paul and Peter at Antioch was not one of doctrine, and did not arise from antagonistic principles. Peter was the first of all the Apostles to receive and practise and defend "the theory" that was common to him

and Paul as the *law* on the subject. He had also in Antioch previously conformed thereto in his practice as well as his teaching. Paul rebuked him for his *inconsistency*. In like manner, the strife between Paul and Barnabas was with reference to the fitness of John-Mark for the work, not with reference to "the theory" that the agent of the work should be a *fit* person. And in the solution of the difficulty, too, they both acted on the same "theory," to wit, that each should follow his own conscience and *leave the judgment to God*. On the contrary, neither one charged the other with "distinctly and emphatically discarding and setting aside both the Constitution and the Holy Scriptures in discussing the evangelist" John-Mark. It is not our purpose in this communication to defend the positions of our former article—which we leave to the future—but to defend ourselves against the charge of publishing principles that are "unscriptural," "unconstitutional," "unwise," "dangerous." Once, in a time of great confusion and unpleasantness, we were officially declared to be a dangerous citizen. Now we are charged, in a tone of decided authority, with being a dangerous "ecclesiastic." It seems that Adam and Eve, as hand in hand they go forth from Eden for their sin, can be the only *scriptural* example that is left for us now to follow.

"Some natural tears they dropt, but wiped them soon:
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide."

16. The brother bitterly attacks the "organised mission" as an unconstitutional "*court*." Now, if his censures were due to the unfortunate appearance of that word *once*, in our discussion of the "mission," or if he had drawn from the use of the *word*, as he did in reference to the other *words*, the bad inferences which would, in that case, justly flow, we would say no more than we have said and leave the subject for future impersonal discussion. Certainly, if the word *court*, in its proper sense, were applied seriously and intentionally to the "mission" as an actual fact, its well known and accepted ecclesiastical use would tend to exalt the "mission" to an unconstitutional place in our agencies for the evangelisation of the world. But here the brother attacks, not

so much the word as the thing. He cordially endorses the general principles, laid down in the beginning of our article, *which are inductions from the ordinary and perpetual FORM* of the Presbyterian Church as our guide in the discussion. Would our critic have us make inductions of general principles from any other particulars than complete ones? Certainly not, for that would be to make genus equal species; nay, in the way he argues, *individual* would equal genus, and would have in it mere matter, no essence, and no distinctive individual traits. Now when these principles of the ordinary state are applied to an extraordinary state of things every important word must be qualified by *quasi* or *quoad hoc*, for the change in the *status* and relation of the things necessitates a corresponding change in the symbols. *The very problem proposed to be solved was:* Given, these acknowledged principles of a *regularly organised* Presbyterianism, how far can they be applied to an *organising* Presbyterianism, where there are no "parts," that is, no proper courts? The only thing assumed by our statement of the question was, that they must be applied as far as they can. Co-evangelists are individually "quasi-parts," that is, "quasi-courts," a temporary expedient to do the work of courts; and collectively, they are to exercise the power of the whole *in an extraordinary way, i. e., as a quasi-court of evangelists to do the work of the highest court.* We used these inductions in the words in which we found them ready-made by Presbyterian authorities. It does not alter the sense a whit to write: "The whole ecclesiastical power is *in* every court and *over* the power of every court." In its application to the question it means, as we contended, "The whole evangelistic power is *in* every evangelist and *over* the power of every evangelist." The first our brother admits and claims. The second he denies. In the foreign field, according to *him*, the power of the whole is *not* over the power of every part. We will see the results of this denial presently. We stated the question, as raised by the application of these principles thus: "What is the relation of co-evangelists to each other *as to the exercise of extraordinary power? Is it joint or several?*" The inference drawn from these general principles was in the following words: "According to the prin-

ciples of this paper we must answer that *the power is joint and not several*; and must be administered by the 'mission' as a body, or a temporary distribution must be made according to the exigencies of the case and after the *analogy* of the existing Constitution. The evangelists are each 'parts' *in* which is the power of the whole, but this common power is *over* the power of every part, and must be exercised by the whole body, or a system of evangelistic courts." It is plain that if we had used the word *courts*, it was with the same limitation as "parts," not real courts, but "bodies" or "conventions" of those in each of whom there is the whole delegated power. We confess freely, however, that the *word* is inappropriate, and, by our own misfortune, tends to misrepresent us; for, in our last words, embodying the naked principle to be conserved, we say: "It seems necessary to hold that evangelists *must exercise their power jointly* when they co-exist in time and space." This is all we ever contended for; this we abide by—and this does not make them a court in any proper sense of the word. The Faculty of a Theological Seminary, or the Board of Directors, have just as many general marks of an ecclesiastical court as the "mission," and in one respect *more*; that is to say, many of their decisions are final and without review or appeal. Every act of this "mission" is not final, until confirmed by the General Assembly. This robs it of one *essential* mark of a court. What is it, then? It is, ecclesiastically considered, just what the "Baltimore brethren" are. If we are an Executive Committee, so are they. If we are an ecclesiastical commission, so are they. In one respect we are superior in committed authority, and they are a sub-committee or sub-commission. In another respect they are superior and we are nothing, for they can open and shut the doors of the Church and its ministry, and appeal must be taken, if taken at all, to the Assembly; and it was in this aspect alone that we discussed it. But does not the "mission" in this latter aspect look like a court? Undoubtedly—to the superficial observer; for it is doing the work of a court. It must be *understood* that the power is wielded in an extraordinary mode by a temporary and vanishing expedient. Substitute for the "mission" our brother's plan. He says, in his own italics: "*Let each*

one (each evangelist) have sole jurisdiction over a distinct part of the field. Any one might invite his brethren to travel with him, preach with him, and even ordain with him, while only he would have authority and jurisdiction in that particular district. This is, in fact, the only possible way in which it can be done." Taking Paul, as an evangelist, for a "precedent" and "authority" to himself, he says, with charming *naïveté*, "Paul was at liberty to travel when and where he chose, to stay as long as he chose at any one place, and move from one city to another, to establish new stations without a vast amount of formal recommendations of missions and approval of Executive Committees. He was also at liberty to choose his own native assistants, and make tents (bricks?) to support himself, or call upon the churches to support him. . . . Let the evangelists be free and independent of each other and directly responsible to the Church at home. . . . Let each man take hold of the special work to which he feels called, and be free to develop it without interference on the part of his brethren. If it be a college, let it be under a close corporation, composed of intelligent Christian men in the field. If it is direct ecclesiastical work, let him have his own field and place of residence, and gather round him his native assistants, as Paul did." Such is the way, according to "one in the foreign field," in which the evangelist should have the liberty to do his own sweet will in his own "district." This claim and theory is undoubtedly extraordinary to the last degree. But does not the evangelist, in this view, look like a *Prelate in his See*? Undoubtedly, to the superficial observer, for he is doing the work of a prelate. The same *understanding* is necessary here. Which, then, looks the more anti-Presbyterian? a quasi-court or a quasi-prelate? And now suppose a *coup d'état* were performed just in these respective states of affairs—then the quasi-court would become a real Presbyterian court, and the quasi-prelate a real prelatical bishop with a see. Which is the contingency we are providing for? Exactly the former. Which against? Exactly the latter. *Our* principles provide for the vanishing away, as fast as possible, of all that is temporary and extraordinary and "quasi" and "quoad hoc;" so that, whenever the cord

that binds the foreign Church to the mother Church is cut or breaks, that sundering may leave a regular Presbyterian Church, *with its real courts*, in which the evangelists, thus carried off from the home Church, will appear as simple ministers without any extraordinary differentiations from their brethren.

17. Our brother (as usual when he puts a meaning into our words which he sees we did not intend or imply) grows especially severe and sarcastic in further handling this "*evangelistic court.*" Using the word "mission" to denote collectively a number of evangelists, we said: "The actual facts of the Foreign Missionary work, however, generally present a still more complex problem. A 'mission' is usually composed of more than one general *evangelist*, and there arises the question, What is the relation of these *evangelists* of the same *mission* to each other as to the exercise of extraordinary power? Is it joint or several?" As an alternative expression, we speak of "co-evangelists preaching the gospel in the same field." By actual "facts" we meant the common *policy* of sending two or more evangelists to one place *to work together*, or, if one be sent alone or is providentially left alone, to send, as soon as possible, another to reinforce him. Besides, our critic mistakes the exact meaning of the word actual, which (we quote from a dictionary of logical terms before us) means (a) "what is opposed to *potential*, . . . (b) what is opposed to *real*." The same authority says that "the term *real* always imports the *existent*." We were discussing *actual* facts without reference in the least to the question whether they were *real* or not. Therefore we first postulated *one* evangelist in the field, and drew certain inferences from that hypothesis. Then, co-evangelists, and did the same, and the inference was that their power is joint and not several; and that is all. And these two are its *only* senses in logic. *And the brother understood us.* He says: "We have hitherto considered the mission in the same light as Dr. Lefevre, that is, as an '*evangelistic court.*'" "We suppose it is in that light only that he regards it" in. He then substitutes for *our* "mission" the "mission of the Manual." Of course, by "this hocus-pocus *modus operandi*" we are put into a painful dilemma. But the reader's attention is called to the *real*

fact that the subject of discussion was the *actual* "jurisdiction of the evangelist," and was applied only to one *historical* fact, a then recent ordination in China, which was a *real* jurisdiction that was not *actual*. The "mission of the Manual" regards the missionaries in the only light in which the Executive Committee could regard them, that is, the light in which the missionaries are responsible, *ad interim*, to that Committee. In writing our article, by a habit which we have contracted of sticking to the point, we did not even think of "the mission of the Manual." Certain things were committed to the Executive Committee by the action of the Assembly, whose commission it is. Some, or all, no matter which, of these things were sub-committed to the body of the missionaries of each given field. But the Executive Committee have not one jot of "the power of jurisdiction," in the sense of our article. Our article discussed the mission under a different aspect, which altogether left out *lay* missionaries, who are *never* called evangelists or co-evangelists, and who are never ordained by Presbyteries and who have no "powers of jurisdiction" at all. The venerable brother who criticised our article "in the same number of the REVIEW," and who, our present critic declares, "strangely enough supposes that Dr. Lefevre *proposes* to create this court," *was right in his supposition*, only instead of court there should be put some term that would unequivocally designate an agency for the co-exercise of the power of jurisdiction in an extraordinary way. Never before had we seen or heard a logical discussion of the subject of our paper, and we are agreeably surprised to find that the venerable and the younger critic have not compelled any withdrawal from the actual facts of that article, which we hope some day to see *realised*. This proposed "body" or "convention," or whatever it *actually* is and is to be called, would then be the agency for the exercise of the joint-power of jurisdiction of *co-evangelists*. There would be no "mongrel" or "hybrid" characteristic about it; it certainly would be *extra ordinem*, as all else that is involved in the discussion, and, like the scaffolding of a building, to be taken away when the building is finished. Over this proposed body and its proposed functions, the Executive Committee would have no control; and

its members could "freely correspond" and confer with each other as under their own vine and fig-tree. The only thing it would secure would be the *joint exercise of the key of government*; and, surely, this appears to be according to the Constitution. Any possible improvements, by addition or subtraction or reconstruction, in the Executive Committee, or the "mission of the Manual," would not touch it. We again submit the result of our study to the Church, without further defence at this time, and ask our brethren to look at it patiently. Something ought to be done in this matter. Is the Church ready to adopt the principle that co-evangelists must *not* exercise their power of jurisdiction jointly? Or, admitting that "principles" require a joint exercise thereof, is she willing to adopt the method of escape proposed by our brother—"send but one to a place?" Because of difficulties created in one mission by brethren of differing judgments, are we to set aside the guidance of principles, or the policy which is dictated by the experience of all missionary agencies in the world?

18. If our brother will re-read pages 644-5 of our previous article, he will see that he has totally misstated our position in the following language which he uses in reference to us. "He maintains that the native Presbytery 'becomes immediately a member and constituent of the General Assembly whose evangelist brought it into existence.' Admitting this theory, we cannot see why a particular church may not become a constituent part of the home Church as well as the Presbytery." Now, that is the very thing we contended for. We insisted that the church, organised by our evangelist in a foreign land, is in true and real connexion with our home Church; that it is just precisely the particular church of our Book; and that the evangelist is the connecting link that binds it temporarily to the Assembly. We hold that, first by unwritten law, now by the new Book, the other courts have given up by distribution their rights in the foreign field to the General Assembly, just as the States gave up their public domains to the federal government at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution. This is the only one of our missionary principles that has passed into *written* law, but it logically carries all the rest.

19. Again, our critic says that he "cannot understand why" we "limit the work to the formation of a Presbytery." Well, *we* understand it. It is because it is not *necessary* to the work of an evangelist that he should have any further extraordinary powers. We are opposed to delegating powers one single step further than actually necessary. A native Presbytery, when it has been formed, must be reported to the General Assembly, which will assign it to a Synod, and give its commissioners seats in its own body; and, when there is a sufficient number of contiguous native Presbyteries, the General Assembly will set them off into a native Synod. This is as far as the native Church can go as long as it remains under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

20. Our brother argues, and with considerable force, for the theory which antagonises ours as to the ecclesiastical *status* of the native church. We had stated it thus: "It has been maintained that, after a body of believers have been admitted to sealing ordinances by the foreign missionary, and have had ruling elders and a pastor ordained and installed, this primary court possesses all church-power, and may perform all the functions of the whole Church . . . and is a germ which develops by a force *ab intra* into the full grown tree. . . Indeed, the writer is aware of no Presbyterian doctrine antagonistic to his own, whose truth would not depend on and flow from that very pre-supposition." We freely admitted that there might be such a church, but claimed that a church organised by an evangelist was not such, but one whose FORM was that of the evangelist's own church. Our position was that "at *every* stage the organic product was of the evangelist's own kind—genus, species, and even variety." *Who* could give him *authority* to organise a church in any other *form*? The evangelist, whose criticisms we are answering, contends that the particular church which he organises and over which he ordains and installs elders and a pastor, is such a germinal church. We reply: then (a) he is, contrary to his own as well as our expressed teaching, an evangelist of a different kind from the domestic evangelist; or, (b) that he has the super-ecclesiastical fac-

ulty of producing what is not after his own kind. And, if so, whence did he get it? Not from his Presbytery, for the Presbytery had it not to give; and *where* is the evidence that *he* is an evangelist, like Philip, "not from (*ἀπὸ*) men, neither through (*διὰ*) man, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father" (Gal. i. 1). In describing the church which it is part of the evangelist's work to organise and equip, he declares, "Such a church is not Congregational . . . ; nor is it Prelatic . . . ; nor yet is it *Independent*, since it is governed according to Presbyterian law sown in the hearts of the people and sworn to by the officers." The reply is easy. Such a church is saved from Independency only by the fact that it is, through the evangelist, under the care and government of the home Church. Surely it is not in connexion with any other Church than the evangelist's; and if not with *his* either, then it is an Independent Presbyterian church. But there is the "Presbyterian law" in the hearts of its members and officers, and therefore, he continues, "several such churches planted in any district will as surely grow into a Classical Presbytery as the many roots that shoot downwards from the seed will push above ground one single stem, destined to grow into a full-grown tree." Such, indeed, would be the result, if there were nothing else than that good law in their hearts. But, since "another law" is there also, even the "law of sin," we cannot be so sure beforehand that the germ will grow properly or make any growth at all. The surer way is to plant those "saplings" in an orchard, and cultivate them on general principles. Besides, it may be added that there are just such Independent Presbyterian churches at home, which, with all their opportunities and all their piety, and all the outside pressure, remain Independent still. Is it actually the work of the Presbyterian evangelist to establish such churches? Do not our principles require that we plant the regular organism, as it is described in the Book, and cultivate the field accordingly? This is to be done, of course, not through fear "lest the peach-seed planted on foreign soil should spring up as orange or mango trees"—which would not be so very bad—but lest, for want of proper cultivation, it grow not at all, or make a wild growth and produce degenerate fruit, with

bitter poison in the kernel and no luscious meat on the hard shell. The reader is asked just here to recall the former picture of the foreign field, divided into districts, in each of which *one* foreign evangelist has his residence, his native ministers, his lay co-workers, the sole direction of the work, and the sole ecclesiastical jurisdiction; a picture that beats that of the evangelist Paul, as drawn in the Acts of the Apostles! Now, let this picture be filled out with sprinkling Independent Presbyterian churches over each district, and what does it look like? A *quasi* prelate over independent churches, which have no bond of union except that clergyman's care and government! Let that one man, for any reason; good, bad, or mixed, renounce his allegiance to the home Church, and we have a complete Prelatical Church. We acknowledge that our principles make us prefer some actual state of things that looks more like Presbyterianism—even if it be not the regular thing—only capable of becoming such by the withdrawal of the foreign from the home Church, as the ripened fruit falls from the tree that bore it.

21. But again: it does not appear, on our brother's principles, that there is need for the evangelist's having any power of jurisdiction at all. This, indeed, would solve one difficult problem, but would create a greater—a minister of the word, placed where he could *in no way whatever* use the power of jurisdiction. If these aforesaid churches, without the exercise of any power *over* them, will and must unite of their own motion into a Presbytery, why may not and must not the native converts, in like manner, self-moved, unite into a church, thus organising themselves as a particular church, and letting the foreign evangelist confine himself, as the term denotes, to preaching to them "to do all things whatsoever Christ has commanded." Their *right* to do so cannot be denied, except on the principles of Prelacy. The brother is, in fact, making a mistake about his *seed* both ways. The Book says: "The power which *Christ* has committed to his Church, rests in the *whole body*, the rulers and the ruled, constituting it a spiritual commonwealth. This power, as exercised by the people, extends to the choice of those officers whom he has appointed in his Church." Such is the underlying prin-

principle of the organised Church. Now apply it to an organising Church. Postulate a small company of God's people, separated in the divine providence from all others. Having the right to choose the officers of the church, irrespective of the distinction between rulers and ruled, suppose they make that selection. Now, who will dare to say that they have the greater right of creating their officers, and deny them the lesser right of setting them apart to their respective offices in an extraordinary way under these extraordinary circumstances? *This is the starting point of a germinating church, working from within; and thus she creates and puts on the organised form.* Christ's own interpretation of his first parable of the kingdom of heaven as a visible Church, that of the tares and wheat, says: "*The good SEED are the CHILDREN of the kingdom;*" and these "children" are those who, in the language of the previous parable, have received "the seed of the word" "*into good and honest hearts.*" From all which it appears that church power resides germinally, not in the parochial presbytery, but in the Lord's people *as such.*

22. One word more, and that about "The Mission of the Manual." From our former article no one could have known that there was such a thing as the Executive Committee or its sub-committee, the Mission of the Manual. We were discussing a thing over which neither the one nor the other has any control. We do not suppose that improvements cannot be made in the agencies which the Assembly has established. Our paper proposes one. Of course there may be one or two things, about the oversight and division of the work, which are now committed to the Committee, but actually belong to this proposed agency. One thing is certain: if there be an Executive Committee at all, it must have these sub-committees for advice, and, in urgent cases, action *ad interim.* Another thing is also certain, that no man has as yet clearly drawn a line of division between purely executive matters and jurisdictional matters. Some things are border matters, which have the nature of both. The best illustration of these border matters is that given by the sacraments of the Church. They at once belong to both the *potestas ordinis* and the *potestas jurisdictionis.* The Book *classes* them under the former head;

but *treats* them as belonging to the latter. They are both. Their administration is at once an act of teaching and an act of government.

We wish to add, that the venerable Secretary of Foreign Missions has not seen or heard a word of this paper; nor will he, until it appears in the REVIEW; nor has there been a word of conference with him or any other of "the Baltimore brethren" as to its subject-matter. The writer alone is responsible. It would be almost a miracle, if, in discussing so new and difficult a subject, he had not employed both terms and concepts which his brethren of a different opinion will not compel him to modify. He expects it; and may Christ give triumph to the truth, whatever it is.

J. A. LEFEVRE.

ARTICLE III.

FRATERNAL RELATIONS.

The subject at the head of this article has been so fully discussed in the religious newspapers and in the courts of the Church as to be well nigh threadbare. Still, it may not be amiss, before the last act of the drama is concluded, to review its history from the beginning, and to trace the successive stages of its development. Such a survey will throw some light upon the present attitude of the Southern Church; and may perhaps determine whether she is adhering to her declared principles, or is receding from them. It may not affect the final result, which many regard as substantially reached, and as only needing the outward ceremonies expressing it to the world. Should no change be wrought in a single mind, it will nevertheless be of advantage to put on permanent record a connected history of the case; as it will certainly relieve the conscience to make a last effort towards extricating the Church so dearly loved from the peril of a great mistake.

The original policy of the Northern Church towards the South-

ern was not that of *conciliation*, but of *conquest*. When their Assembly convened at Pittsburg in May, 1865, the war had terminated in the surrender at Appomattox, and the South lay prostrate under the heel of the conqueror. Not a tear of pity was shed over her alleged errors, such as a suffering Saviour wept over sinning Jerusalem. It was not the hour for mercy, but for unrelenting justice; and with a firm hand was it meted out by that haughty council. It began by declaring the secession of those Presbyteries and Synods which now constitute the Southern General Assembly to be "unwarranted, schismatical, and unconstitutional." It announced its purpose "not to abandon the territory in which those churches are formed, or to compromise the rights of any of the church courts, or ministers, ruling elders, and private members belonging to them, who are loyal to the Government of the United States and to the Presbyterian Church." On the contrary, it determined to "recognise, *as the church*, the members of any church within the bounds of the schism, who are loyal," etc., etc. To give effect to these declarations, "the Board of Domestic Missions was directed to take prompt and efficient measures to restore and build up the Presbyterian congregations in the Southern States of this Union, by the appointment and support of prudent and devoted missionaries," care being taken that "none be appointed but those who give satisfactory evidence of their loyalty," and the like.

It is not necessary to draw the reader's attention to this unchristian attempt to sow the seeds of discord and strife amongst a people sufficiently burdened with sorrows of another kind. Nor will we dwell upon particular illustrations of the zeal with which these measures were carried out, in cases which can easily enough be cited. All this is past now, and let it be remembered only so far as it reveals the spirit in which the Southern Church was first approached by those who soon became so anxious for the Fraternal embrace. Fidelity to history requires, however, one further illustration of this domineering spirit to be given. Lest the eight hundred ministers of the South, together with their churches, should rush too suddenly into her bosom, this cautious Assembly duly enacts that every minister from any Presbytery in the South,

and every private member from any Southern church, seeking admission into their fold, shall be examined as to his opinions and conduct during the rebellion; and if a participant therein, shall "be required to confess and forsake his sin in this regard." Flushed with the triumph of their arms, the Northern Church had no other thought than to dragoon their brethren at the South into abject ecclesiastical submission.

It gives us no pleasure to recur to this period of intense sectional bitterness; nor would we do so except to point a warning. The Northern Church purposed nothing then but to *absorb* the Southern; it proposes to itself nothing but that now. Whatever may be the faults of that people, they possess one quality of the virtuous man which Horace describes in the words: "*Tenax propositi.*" They never give up what they once undertake. If it cannot be accomplished in one way, it will be in another. In our negotiations with them on this subject of Fraternal Relations, if we recede from our testimony by the breadth of a hair, their purpose of absorption will be accomplished finally, and it will be the absorption of conquest.

This condition of things continued three years, from 1865 to 1868; during which time it became apparent that force accomplished nothing. With all their efforts at disintegration the wedge could be driven in nowhere, and the Southern Church became more and more compact under the pressure. Whether the failure of this coercive policy led to its abandonment, or whether in the interval passion had subsided and Christian sentiments began to resume their sway, in 1868 more gentle measures were inaugurated. The knowledge of this change was communicated to us through a paper adopted in 1869, the preamble of which reads thus: "Whereas the last General Assembly" (of course, that of 1868) "acknowledged the separate and independent existence of the Presbyterian Church in the Southern States, and enjoined upon all subordinate courts so to treat it; thus according to its ministers and members the privilege of admission to our body upon the same terms which are extended to ministers and members of other branches of the Presbyterian Church in this country," etc.

The two bodies were, by this action, put upon a more friendly footing than before, and the way was now open for a more perfect adjustment of differences. Accordingly the Resolution following the above recited preamble proceeds to convey to our body the Christian salutations of the Assembly of 1869, and to "give expression to its sentiments of fraternity and fellowship;" and, after a compact argument addressed to that point, expressed "the desire that the day may not be distant when we may be united in one great organisation that shall cover our whole land and embrace all branches of the Presbyterian Church." The reader will not fail to notice the distinctness with which the absorption of the Southern Church is here proposed, in the most blissful forgetfulness that their entire record, bristling with accusations and slanders, formed a *chevaux de frise* from which the most impetuous cavalry charge would be repulsed.

This paper did not reach the Southern Assembly until 1870, during the sessions at Louisville. It was accompanied with another overture adopted at Philadelphia in 1870, which was borne to us by a délégation appointed for the purpose. The latter paper, after reaffirming the pacific sentiments of its predecessor, goes beyond it in the recognition of difficulties in the way of reconciliation, and proposing a practical method for their removal. It will be remembered that in the negotiations which resulted in bringing the Old and New School bodies together at the North, the most troublesome obstruction was found to exist in certain testimonies and deliverances fulminated in the past by the one against the other. The problem was how to get these out of the way without a flat retraction. They were at length simply dead-lettered in the following concurrent declaration from both the parties: "That no rule or precedent which does not stand approved by both bodies shall be of any authority in the reunited body, except in so far as such rule or precedent may affect the rights of property founded thereon." It is reported that when this cunning declaration was framed, an astute ecclesiastic pointed out the use to which it might be put in healing the breach with the South. At any rate, it was gravely proposed by the Northern Assembly at Philadelphia, and elaborately pressed by the worthy delegates

at Louisville, that we should come in through this hole in the wall, through which, like Ezekiel of old, they had brought out so much of the stuff in their house; and among the rest, why not constructively all the utterances so offensive to the Southern Church.

We have noted the change of base in the Northern Church from 1865 to 1870; what, in the meantime, has been the attitude of the Southern body on this question of fraternity? In 1861, when the Southern Assembly was first organized, its position was defined in these words: "We desire to cultivate peace and charity with our fellow-Christians throughout the world—we invite to ecclesiastical communion all who maintain our principles of faith and order." In 1865, at the close of the war, the following language is used, and the spirit of which should be placed in contrast with that of the Northern Assembly in the same year: "It may be proper at this point to declare concerning other Churches in the most explicit manner, that in the true idea of 'the communion of saints,' we would willingly hold fellowship with all who love our Lord Jesus in sincerity; and especially do we signify to all bodies, ministers, and people of the Presbyterian Church, struggling to maintain the true principles of the same time-honored Confession, our desire to establish the most intimate relations with them which may be found mutually edifying and for the glory of God."

The active hostility of the Northern Church in this very year 1865, which has been already described, imposed upon the Southern body the duty of preserving a calm and dignified silence. This remained unbroken until she was approached by the other party in 1870 with an overture of peace. The following bold proclamation was made in that year: "The Southern Presbyterian Church can confidently appeal to all the acts and declarations of all their Assemblies, that no attitude of aggression or hostility has been, or is now, assumed by it towards the Northern Church. And this General Assembly distinctly avows that no grievances experienced by us, however real, would justify us in acts of aggression, or a spirit of malice or retaliation, against any branch of Christ's visible kingdom. We are prepared, therefore, in advance of all discussion, to exercise towards the General As-

sembly North, and the churches represented therein, such amity as fidelity to our principles could, under any possible circumstances, permit." It must not be allowed to escape notice that from the time of her organisation in 1861 to the first advance made to her in 1870, a period of nine years, the Southern Church remained quiet and passive under grievous wrongs. She would indulge in no recriminations; but as the party aggrieved, she was restrained by a sense of self-respect from any approach to the other side. This is emphasised here, as indicating a fixed policy marked out on principle for herself by the Southern Church.

To the proposition for appointing a Committee of Conference to meet a similar Committee from the Northern side, a favorable answer was returned. Such a Committee was raised, "with instructions that the difficulties in the way of cordial correspondence between the two bodies must be distinctly met and removed." To leave no doubt as to the nature of these difficulties, they were articulately stated under four heads: 1. The political deliverances of both wings of the Northern Assembly, against which the Southern Church felt constrained to bear testimony; 2. The union between the Old and New School organisations North, effected by methods which involved the surrender of past testimonies for the truth; 3. The unconstitutional legislation by which the Declaration and Testimony men of Missouri and Kentucky had been expelled from the Northern Church; 4. The injurious accusations against the Southern Church, which had filled the ears of the world. It only remains to be added, that when this action was reported to the Assembly at Philadelphia, "the further consideration of the subject was postponed, and their Committee discharged," on the alleged ground that all the questions at issue had been prejudged by us. Thus ended the first chapter of this diplomatic history.

Negotiations were not resumed until 1874, and then simultaneously by both the estranged parties. The Southern Assembly of that year was overtured on the subject by two of its Presbyteries; one of which specially desired the appointment of a Committee of Conference, without instructions of any kind. A paper was also received from the Northern Assembly, adopted

in 1873, deploring the existing divisions, and announcing the appointment of a Conference Committee on their part. To this the Southern Assembly made response by raising a Committee untrammelled by instructions; and the two Committees met shortly after, in the famous Baltimore Conference. This overture of the Northern Assembly should not be dismissed without a brief statement of its contents, which were somewhat remarkable. It declared all former action of the Old and New School wings of their body, touching the Southern Church, to be null and void since their reunion, and of no effect as a precedent in the future. It expressed confidence in the orthodoxy and piety of the Southern Church, and, as an offset to their political deliverances, made liberal quotations from the standards as to the relation which the Church sustains to the State. It is not probable that these general protestations had much influence in determining the action of our own body; for, in a vigorous protest against this action, it was shown (1) that the measures declared null and void had been enforced only the year before in the Walnut Street church case; (2) that the slanderous charges against the character and motives of our ministers and people remained still without retraction; and (3) that the Northern Assembly had always professed to acknowledge the spirituality and independence of the Church during the very period they were trampling these sacred principles in the dust.

We are brought now to the Conference of the two Committees in the city of Baltimore, in January, 1875, and reported in May following to the respective Assemblies. It was opened with a proposal from the Northern side, to "recommend the interchange of delegates, thus recognising each other as corresponding bodies." To which it was replied by the Southern Committee, that they had been appointed to confer about the removal of the causes which had hitherto prevented such interchange; which were then distinctly stated under two general heads—*unjust and injurious accusations, and the course pursued in regard to Church property.* The second of these topics was never reached, the Conference having broken down upon the first. The failure is easily explained. The Northern Committee insisted that all the accusa-

tions and imputations complained of had been cancelled in the concurrent declaration which has been already quoted, "that no rule or precedent which does not stand approved by both bodies, shall be of any authority in the reunited body," etc. The Southern side objected that this was an arrangement to facilitate the union of the Old and New School bodies North, and had originally no reference to the Southern Church; that it was an indirection at best, and failed to meet the issue betwixt themselves and us in an honest and manly way; and that it could not, by its own terms, go back of the year in which it was adopted, and did not therefore touch our grievances at all. In declining this settlement of the case, the Southern Committee proceeded to say: "If your Assembly could see its way clear to say in a few plain words to this effect, that these obnoxious things were said and done in times of great excitement, that they are to be regretted, and that now, in a calm review, the imputations cast upon the Southern Church are disapproved, that would end the difficulty at once." This suggestion was peremptorily declined, and the Conference was dissolved without coming to any agreement.

The only matter of any present importance in the proceedings of the Baltimore Conference is the alleged elimination of the political utterances by the Northern Assembly from the grounds of offence and complaint. With reference, therefore, to what we shall hereafter say upon this point, it is necessary to give here the text of their action: "It is suitable to represent freely and fully to the brethren of your Committee that this kind of political action, begun in 1861 and carried on in successive Assemblies through 1866, constitutes at once a most weighty grievance to us, because much of it was aimed at our people; and constitutes also a serious hindrance to establishing fraternal relations, because they are lamentable departures from some of the fundamental principles laid down in those noble standards which, as you truly observe, we hold in common." Then follow a few specifications in which this offence was committed. A little later, these additional words were employed: "It is at this point that reference is made to your political enactments and opinions, partly because much of it was aimed at our own people, and all of it was en-

acted while that Assembly still held us on their roll as a part of their own body. But we have not said that we refuse fraternal relations for these causes, or that they are an insuperable obstacle. We say they constitute a serious hindrance. By this statement we abide." The reader will please to note the form and the extent to which this grievous politicization of the Northern Church is waived as a barrier to fraternal intercourse. We shall have use for it in the sequel.

The records of the Southern Assembly for the year 1876, contain but two references to this particular subject. The Presbytery of St. Louis having sent up an overture requesting "some action in regard to fraternal relations with the Northern General Assembly, in order to remove misapprehensions as to the true position of our Church," the following resolution was adopted: "That the action of the Baltimore Conference, approved by the Assembly at St. Louis, explains with sufficient clearness the position of our Church. But inasmuch as it is represented by the overture, misapprehension exists in the minds of some of our people as to the spirit of this action, in order to show our disposition to remove on our part real or seeming hindrances to friendly feeling, the Assembly explicitly declares, that while condemning certain acts and deliverances of the Northern General Assembly, no acts or deliverances of the Southern General Assemblies are to be construed or admitted as impugning in any way the Christian character of the Northern General Assembly, or of the historical bodies of which it is the successor." A double use was made of this resolution, in sending it to the Northern Assembly at Brooklyn, N. Y., in answer to a telegram received from that body "expressing its hearty and united wishes for the establishment of cordial correspondence," and "reiterating its cordial desire to establish fraternal relations on terms of perfect equality and reciprocity, as soon as it is agreeable to their brethren to respond to this assurance by a similar expression."

It will be observed, that with all these reiterated proffers of amity and intercourse, not a word is said, nor a step taken, to remove the causes of alienation so distinctly brought to view in the Baltimore Conference. Nothing remained, therefore, for the

Southern Assembly but to reply: "We are ready most cordially to enter on fraternal relations with your body on any terms honorable to both parties;" and with this was sent, in further explanation, the answer to the overture from the St. Louis Presbytery, which has already been recited.

In 1877 the subject was brought up in the Southern Assembly by a communication from the Northern, which returned, *in ipsissimis verbis*, the declaration sent to them by us the preceding year, as taken from the answer to the St. Louis Presbytery. The reply to this equivocal trifling was conveyed in the following language: "That we cannot regard this communication as satisfactory, because we can discover in it no reference whatever to the first and main part of the paper adopted by our Assembly at Savannah, and communicated to the Brooklyn Assembly. This Assembly can add nothing on this subject to the action of the Assembly at St. Louis adopting the basis proposed by our Committee of Conference at Baltimore, and reaffirmed by the Assembly at Savannah. If our Northern brethren can meet us on these terms, which truth and righteousness seem to us to require, then we are ready to establish such relations with them during the present sessions of the Assembly."

Thus far in these negotiations, so persistent had been the refusal of the Northern body to consider the basis of the Baltimore platform, that a protest was entered against the action of the New Orleans Assembly, on the ground that "it is inconsistent with self-respect to press this ultimatum after its distinct and repeated declinatures by the Northern Assembly."

During the years 1878, 1879, 1880, and 1881, the discussion was revived in no form; but Christian salutations were exchanged between the two bodies in their annual convocations. In 1882 the subject was reopened, with perhaps greater vigor from having slept so long and peacefully. It was brought up before the Assembly at Atlanta, by overtures from four Presbyteries, desiring the establishment of fraternal relations with the Northern Assembly, by sending forthwith a delegation to that body, in session at Springfield, Ill. A proposition so definite and conclusive, was bound to excite a lively discussion; and after a

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tangled debate, the following paper was adopted: "In order to remove all difficulties in the way of that full and formal correspondence which, on our part, we are prepared to accept, we adopt the following minute: That while receding from no principle, we do hereby declare our regret for, and withdrawal of, all expressions of our Assembly which may be regarded as reflecting upon, or offensive to, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

"*Resolved*, That a copy of this paper be sent by telegraph to the General Assembly now in session at Springfield, Ill., for their prayerful consideration, and, *mutatis mutandis*, for their reciprocal concurrence, as affording a basis for the exchange of delegates forthwith."

The Northern Assembly, upon receiving this message, immediately telegraphed back their adoption of this paper, without the alteration of a letter or a point; and by this identity of action, the two bodies were permitted to rejoice in the supposed termination of this unhappy dispute. Alas, that so brilliant a prospect should be again darkened with clouds! In a short time came a private telegram from the Moderator of the Northern council, conveying a resolution adopted to this effect: "That in the action now being taken, we disclaim any reference to the action of preceding Assemblies concerning loyalty and rebellion, but we refer only to those concerning schism, heresy, and blasphemy." Whereupon a telegram of inquiry is sent from Atlanta, couched in these rather undiplomatic words: "If the action of your Assembly, telegraphed by your Moderator to our Moderator, does not modify the concurrent resolution adopted by your Assembly and ours, we are prepared to send delegates forthwith." To which the following answer was received: "The action referred to does not modify, but it explains, the concurrent resolution; and the explanation is on the face of the action. There is nothing behind it or between the lines." The final action of the Atlanta Assembly was to "declare its entire satisfaction with the full and explicit terms in which the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America has expressed its 'reciprocal concurrence' in the paper transmitted to said Assembly

on fraternal correspondence." Delegates were accordingly appointed to bear the greetings of our body to the other at their meeting in May, 1883.

From this history briefly, but sufficiently, sketched, we deduce the points to which the attention of the reader is respectfully solicited.

1. The conciliatory and Christian attitude of the Southern Presbyterian Church throughout this painful controversy, is most conspicuous. At the period of organisation in 1861, amidst the agonies of a civil war, she stretched forth her hand in "peace and charity" to the whole Christian world. In 1865, at the very moment when excommunication and proscription were decreed as 'the portion of her cup,' she desired "fellowship with all who love the Lord Jesus," and to "establish the most intimate relations with all the branches of the Presbyterian Church." In 1870 she responded to the first request for a conference with the other side, and made a frank statement of the difficulties to be removed. In 1874 she consented to renew negotiations for peace, after they had been abruptly broken off by the other side, and withheld instructions to her agents which, in the former instance, had given offence. In 1875, reducing the causes of estrangement to their minimum, that is, to the injurious accusations against her good name, so considerate was she of the feelings of the other party, as to make allowance for the excitement and heat of the times when these things were said and done, and to suggest this as a ground upon which they might, without humiliation, be withdrawn. In 1876, she not only reiterated her "desire for fraternal relations upon terms honorable to both parties," but actually led the way in removing all obstacles by purging her own records of what had been excepted against by the opposition. We have reserved the statement of this interesting fact for insertion here. Whilst the pride and dignity of the Northern Church refused even to look upon the blots which defaced their legislation during four years, the Southern Church, upon a simple intimation that one of her utterances had excited unfavorable criticism, appointed in 1875 a Committee to examine her entire records, with the view of discovering and correcting anything inconsistent with her

declared principles or with the standards. This Committee reported in 1876 the following, which was adopted: "Inasmuch as some incidental expressions, uttered in times of great public excitement, are found upon our records, and have been pointed out in the report of the Committee, which seem to be ambiguous or inconsistent with the above declarations and others of like import, this Assembly does hereby disavow them wherever found, and does not recognise such as forming any part of the well-considered authoritative teaching or testimony of our Church." Through consecutive years, down to 1882, the same attitude of Christian readiness to adjust all differences is consistently maintained; until wearied out with the unwillingness of the other side to attempt the solution of the difficulty, she herself, at the last Assembly in Atlanta, takes the initiative, and proposes a resolution, which, if adopted by both the parties, will cut the knot and let them both out of the trouble. •

All this is in brilliant contrast with the course of the Northern Church, which commenced with open hostility and acts of aggression, then proposed a conference for the adjustment of differences, from which she backed down as soon as those differences were honestly stated. When the conference was finally held, she peremptorily declined the mildest terms of reconciliation which honor and truth would allow to be offered—proposing on her part only to dead-letter, and that by an obscure indirection, charges which honesty and candor required her openly to withdraw; and finally allowed herself to be outstripped in magnanimity, by receiving the tender of reconciliation which she ought to have made; the acceptance of which is traversed by a back-handed retraction of one-half of what was professedly conceded. We present this contrast in no boastful or self-righteous spirit, as though we had not much ourselves to confess and bewail before Almighty God; but because the strong inclination, manifested in some quarters to close this dispute on any terms, springs possibly from the apprehension that we are held guilty before the world of an unamiable and unforgiving spirit. If our record could be placed fully before the Christian public, we should be sure of a hearty acquittal of this charge. It is a comfort to know that the records of both

the parties lie open before the omniscient Judge, by whose verdict of unerring justice we are willing to abide. Meanwhile, we would be glad to have our own people so familiar with their own history as to be led by no maudlin sentiment to overthrow truth in the attempt to secure peace.

2. It is apparent, from the preceding history, that the Atlanta Assembly has not only departed from, but has reversed, the position of the Southern Church, upon this subject of fraternal relations. From the beginning the attitude of the Southern Church has been that of quiet expectation of approach from the other side. It was the only attitude consistent with self-respect. At two epochs, at her organisation and again at the close of the war, she had extended the hand of fellowship especially to the Presbyterian household of faith. She was met from the Northern Church by a decree of outlawry and confiscation. What could she do but retire within her own borders, and preserve her dignity by entire silence and reserve? She was thus quiet and passive from 1865 to 1870. When delegates appeared from the other side with a proposal for conference, they were received with marked courtesy; but at the same time the difficulties in the way of perfect amity were fully disclosed. The attitude was that of a party which was sought, and which responded to overtures made by another. So that for four years longer, from 1870 to 1874, the Southern Church still felt "her strength was to sit still." After the conference at Baltimore, she put forth her ultimatum, and stood by it from 1875 to 1882, to this effect: "As soon as, by a few plain words, these hard accusations, uttered in times of great excitement, are withdrawn, we are ready to establish a cordial correspondence." We are not discussing the wisdom or the propriety of this position. The only object is to show, from the form of the proposition, that the responsibility was thrown upon the Northern Church to take the next step. The language of our Church has always been, "Whatever obstructions may be in the way of ecclesiastical fellowship, were not created by us; we cannot allow ourselves to be placed in the false position before the world of parties who had been guilty of wrong to the Northern Church. Having placed nothing in the way of Christian

fraternity, there is nothing for us to remove." Such was her language in 1870; and her practice, through all the years from 1865 to 1882, has been consistent with it. From first to last, her attitude has been that of anxiety to be at peace, but waiting for the offender to remove the obstructions which he had put in the way.

From this fixed policy, adopted deliberately and upon principle, there is not a single deviation until the last Atlanta Assembly reversed the position of the parties and made the Southern Church the suitor of the Northern. By taking the initiative, and hypothetically placing herself by the side of the aggressor, and making the same confession, she hoped to coax the apology from the other side which would fulfil the conditions which her honor required. Nothing is presented here to the reader but the historical fact that the action at Atlanta was revolutionary. The carefully considered policy adhered to through seventeen years, and sanctioned by the endorsement of seventeen consecutive Assemblies, is suddenly abandoned and reversed. The Church is no longer standing upon the ground she had deliberately chosen, but is drifting at sea, upon an expedient which may prove to have neither rudder nor keel. It was a very grave responsibility for any Assembly to assume—a responsibility more clearly seen and more deeply felt by the members of that venerable court since its adjournment, than during the confusion and darkness of an excited debate. We will not perplex this issue by discussing the constitutional right of the Assembly to assume this power; but was it safe to encounter the risks which have been subsequently shown to be involved? It may be replied, that four Presbyteries clamored for a change in our relations with the Northern Church. There were sixty-two Presbyteries which were silent; and the overwhelming presumption was that the policy of seventeen years and of seventeen Assemblies, was the policy which the Church would prefer. Was it therefore morally right for one Assembly, in the hurry of a few days, to unsettle the established policy of our entire previous history, without first ascertaining the mind of the Church? Was it fraternal, nay, was it in any sense fair, to spring such a movement upon the Assem-

bly, carry it through with a rush, and commit the whole Church to a policy which cannot afterwards be discussed upon its merits? As the case now stands, the question comes up in the form, Can the Atlanta action be arrested? Many, who deplore that action as unwise, feel that the thing is done, and cannot be undone. Others, who equally bewail the mistake which has been made, are unwilling to antagonise the highest Church court, and thus to weaken all Church authority. Others, again, weary of the continual agitation, have withheld from further participation in it, leaving matters to take whatever shape others may determine. Thus, by different routes, men reach the same conclusion, and an accidental majority is created, which does not reflect the true mind of the Church. Is any course fair which leads to such complications? Is it strange that a deep dissatisfaction is pervading the Church, and setting not a few to think what further limitations can be placed upon the power of a court which enable a single Assembly by a *coup d'état* to capture the Church? But this is rather more than we undertook to say under this head. Our only object was to show that the Atlanta Assembly has changed the entire policy of the Church and reversed the position of the parties in this controversy, and that we no longer stand upon the ground occupied through the whole of our previous career.

This is not all. The Atlanta Assembly has, in the resolution adopted by it and sent to the Northern Assembly for its concurrent adoption, conceded what we have hitherto steadfastly refused to acknowledge as true. Our declaration in 1870 was, "Our records may be searched in vain for a single act of aggression, or a single unfriendly declaration against the Northern Church." Still later, in 1876, lest any accidental word of asperity should have crept in since, it was declared that in condemning certain acts and deliverances of the Northern Assembly, nothing was to be construed as reflecting upon the religious character of that body. Special pains were taken, therefore, to cancel voluntarily and beforehand any chance expression that might be offensive. In view of these well known facts, what right had the Assembly of 1882 to "declare their regret for and withdrawal

of all expressions of our Assembly which may be regarded as reflecting upon, or offensive to, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America"? We anticipate the reply: This statement was drawn in accordance with the code of honor acknowledged even by worldly men, in order to save the *amour propre* of the other party, and render it easier for him to make an acknowledgment which means more from him than from us. Is it strange, then, that the other party, finding themselves caught in a diplomatic snare, should retort severely as they did, by a recalcitrant resolution, which in turn put the sting upon us? Human nature being open to just such resentments, it was most natural for a wary antagonist to take this sort of reprisal; and we are not sure but the Atlanta Assembly richly deserved to feel the recoil of their own gun. We are of those who do not believe much in diplomacy in the affairs of Christ's kingdom and amongst his people. But the question for the reader to ask in this connexion is, Who gave the Atlanta Assembly the right to confess to the Northern Church what the Southern Church had over and again denied to be true? With all our veneration for the courts of the Church, we feel that this august body will find it difficult to withdraw its shoulders from a responsibility to which it will be held by the verdict of time.

3. We proceed to show that the treaty of peace concluded between the two Assemblies in May last violates the conditions laid down in the Baltimore Conference—in substance, if not absolutely in form. In this utterance, we grapple with the position deemed impregnable by the advocates of this pacification. Their line of defence is, that the Northern Assembly, having conceded all that the Southern Church laid down in its ultimatum when it sanctioned the proceedings of the Baltimore Conference, no alternative is left us but to accept the disclaimer which is made, and to put the offence out of sight forever. This would certainly be true, if the action of the Springfield Assembly had terminated with the adoption, *simpliciter*, of what is designated as the "concurrent resolution." We have criticised the Atlanta Assembly for thus formulating the terms by which our grievances should be redressed, and thereby reversing the position in which the two

parties stood. But it cannot be denied that the proposed action went to the bottom of all the accusations against us, and made an honorable and satisfactory adjustment of the dispute. Had the "concurrent resolution" been adopted alone, not a whisper of objection would have been heard throughout the South. The reconciliation would have been accepted as frank, manly, and Christian—obliterating every trace of the old feud, and rendering the sentiment of our people towards their brethren at the North cordial and grateful. But, as the reader well knows, this was not the action taken by the Assembly at Springfield. The "concurrent resolution" was not adopted until a rider was fastened upon it which changed its whole aspect as a measure of pacification. The Herrick Johnson resolution, as it is commonly distinguished—which was deemed of such importance that it was passed by the body before the main resolution, which it was intended to qualify—formally sets forth that, in declaring "their regret for, and withdrawal of, all expressions of their Assembly which may be regarded as reflecting upon or offensive to the Southern Assembly," no reference is made to "the acts concerning loyalty and rebellion, but only to those concerning schism, heresy, and blasphemy." This is not the action proposed by our Assembly to theirs for concurrent adoption, but one wholly different.

But, it is replied, the Northern Assembly has explicitly affirmed that this rider fastened upon the main resolution, "does not modify it, but only explains it;" and that we are obliged, by common courtesy, to accept the interpretation they put upon their own act, and of course the disclaimer which this includes. It is impossible for us, however, to abdicate the exercise of our own judgment and reason, and believe that a paper is not modified when it *is* modified. Men of the world may accept a disclaimer which they know to be false and absurd, since the code of honor is framed only to stop a quarrel, and not to regulate the subsequent intercourse of the parties. But Christians profess to base their action upon truth and righteousness; this pacification is intended to bring the parties into bonds of amity and fellowship. How, then, can we ground a reconciliation upon an equivocal agreement which is construed differently between the parties? Is

it satisfactory to say to the one litigant, You must in courtesy accept the interpretation of your contestant, though your own judgment is clear that he is mistaken? For our part, we are heartily tired of all this legislation which "palters in a double sense;" which blows hot and cold with the same breath; which says and doesn't say, in the same word; which dead-letters where it ought to retract; which seeks its end by indirection, rather than by open declarations; which is diplomatic, when it should be candid. A reconciliation which rests upon subtle constructions and hair-line discriminations is not worth the paper upon which the agreement is executed. The friendship which deserves the name, must be frank, open, and sincere. Everything short of this is hypocrisy before God.

But the Herrick Johnson Resolution, it is rejoined, did nothing more than take out of the category of things withdrawn the original political deliverances of the Northern Assembly during and immediately after the war. And since all this political legislation is waived by the Baltimore Conference as a barrier to fraternal relations, the action taken by both Assemblies is in agreement with the terms we ourselves have offered, and we are bound by our antecedent pledge to abide by the treaty thus made. Grant, say the Atlanta advocates, that the rider does modify "the Concurrent Resolution" to which it was attached, it does not contravene the platform upon which the Southern Church has stood since 1875; and therefore should not arrest the correspondence between the two bodies. The Northern Assembly, say they, may not have done the beautiful and clean thing by us, and we may mourn that they have shown themselves incapable of a grand magnanimity; still, as they have come up to our proffered ultimatum, our own truth and honor are involved in the acceptance of the result. Of course, if all this be so, there is not a word further to be said; we have simply "sworn to our own hurt," and must keep the oath.

Is it true, however, that peace has been concluded upon the terms embraced in the Baltimore platform? Let us look again at the text which we have already engrossed, and see what the Committee did actually say: "This kind of political action, be-

gun in 1861 and carried on in successive Assemblies through 1866, constitutes at once *a most weighty grievance to us*, because much of it was aimed at our people; and constitutes also *a serious hindrance to establishing fraternal relations*, because they are lamentable departures from some of the principles laid down in those noble standards" etc. "But *we have not said that we refuse fraternal relations for these causes, or that they are an insuperable obstacle; we say they constitute a serious hindrance, and by this statement we abide.*" We have italicised the points in this declaration to which we wish to give emphasis. It is admitted freely that the past politicisation of the Northern Church is not interposed, since the Baltimore Conference, as a bar to intercourse. It was "a weighty grievance" and "a serious hindrance to fraternal relations," which the Southern Committee at Baltimore found it difficult to surmount; but on the ground that we are not held as endorsing the errors of those religious bodies with which correspondence is held, this politicisation in the past was not construed as "an insuperable obstacle." To the same effect, the Atlanta Assembly inserted in their "Concurrent Resolution" a limiting clause—"without receding from any principle"—which was intended to reserve to both the parties their conscientious convictions of truth and duty, so that neither the one nor the other should be called to the surrender of any principle. But if "a serious hindrance" in the past is waived by us, does this give the offender the right to dig up that "hindrance" out of the past and put it into the very articles of agreement upon which the reconciliation is to rest? We ask the reader to mark the distinction which we draw. The political deliverances from 1861 to 1866 are not urged as a bar to peace; but it is another thing to put forward the right thus to politicise as a claim, the recognition of which is made the condition precedent of the reconciliation. Is this an exaggerated statement of the case? The South says to the North, "Will you, without receding from any principle, withdraw what in your records reflects upon us?" "Yes," replies the North, "everything except what we said against you as rebels and traitors; we cannot touch those utterances without giving up our right to have made them." If peace is concluded

upon these terms, is not this right acknowledged? And was this the thing which was waived by the Baltimore Conference? The South says to the North, "Hold what political opinions you please, and bind your testimonies upon your head as a crown of glory, so far as we are concerned; for we ask you to recede from no principle." "Ah, yes," replies the North, "but that is not enough; it must be entered into the bond between us that these political utterances should have been made, without the recognition of which we will take back nothing." This is the significance of the Herrick Johnson Resolution; and it is a new offence against the Southern Church, reënacting in cold blood all the violences and maledictions of years of intense excitement, rolling them up in one bolus which must be swallowed and inwardly digested as the condition of fraternity. Has the Southern Church since 1875 interpreted the Baltimore ultimatum as meaning this? The Herrick Johnson Resolution unquestionably means something. It was not needed as a protection against the surrender of any of their honest convictions, the Concurrent Resolution itself affording the necessary guarantee in the reservation of every principle held sacred by both the parties. In the way of explanatory legislation it is wholly supererogatory, as much so as would be a duplicate nose upon a man's face. What, then, was its purport and design? We can see no other end than to insert in the body of the treaty between the two parties a recognition of the propriety of all the political affirmations of the Northern Church during the war. We may be willing to waive those utterances in the past as a bar to fellowship, when we are not willing to acknowledge their fitness and propriety, or to embody them in our articles of agreement as one of the conditions of reconciliation. It is insisted, therefore, that the late pacification is not based upon the Baltimore platform; but, on the contrary, in spirit, if not in the letter itself, contravenes all its provisions.

To condense the argument in a nutshell: the Concurrent Resolution, on which it was proposed to base the reconciliation, exactly embodied the Baltimore proposition. It may be paraphrased thus: While receding from no principle, we will not urge your past politicking as "an insuperable obstacle" to fra-

ternal intercourse, "serious hindrance" though it be; and we will withdraw any offensive language we may have employed in relation to it. The Northern Assembly, in its rider to this Concurrent Resolution, palpably spurns the Baltimore platform and practically says, We will do all in our power to make the obstacle insuperable by reaffirming the grievances and compelling your recognition and assent.

4. In establishing official correspondence (we like this term better as being more discriminating than fraternal relations, which really have existed ever since 1868)—in establishing official correspondence upon the present basis, we have taken a position which will in due time necessitate organic union. The Southern brethren who oppose our views say constantly, "Your contention against the political action of the Northern Church is perfectly valid as against all incorporation with that body, but is not valid against formal intercourse with them as a separate organisation." They say further, "Whilst we favor the latter, we are at one with you when it comes to the defeat of the former." But what, dear brethren, if it should then be too late? What if the waters, trickling through the concession we have made in establishing fraternity, should have swept away our entire embankment, and we find ourselves at the mercy of the flood? What, in short, if the very ground beneath our feet should have dropped away, and left us standing upon nothing? When our brethren declare they are as much opposed as ourselves to union with the Northern Church, we believe it fully as to the vast majority of them. Otherwise, we would not take the trouble to pen these lines. But there is a logic in history quite as compulsory as that of the subtlest dialectic. A false step in action, as well as in reasoning, will lead to consequences, however remote, which are inevitable. Our brethren may not wish to go into union; but into union they will go by a fatal necessity, because they have unwittingly given away the only ground upon which resistance could be successfully made.

What, then, is the distinctive feature which separates us from the Northern Church? We profess to hold the same symbols of faith and order; our creed, our government, our worship is the

same; why, then, should we not be brought under the same ecclesiastical jurisdiction? It is only partially satisfactory to reply that such an arrangement would be inconvenient, as making the body too large to be handled. The Presbyterian system is too elastic, in its gradation of courts, to succumb under any practical difficulty of this sort. The true and sufficient answer is, that the two bodies are not at one as to the relations subsisting between the Church and the State. This is the differentiating feature which compels the one to be separate from the other. Observe, too, that it does not come up an abstract dogma, a merely speculative truth. In the providence of God, the Southern wing of the Presbyterian Church was compelled to take issue with the Northern upon this question. It was the wedge driven in by other hands than ours to divide the Church. Without any will or wish of our own, we were forced into an attitude of protest against this defection from our common standards. Of all things on earth, the Northern Church is most anxious to rid themselves of this protest. They would rather do it by absorbing us, since our mere existence, as a separate Church, is an outstanding and visible testimony against them. But if this cannot be accomplished, the next expedient will be to muzzle the protest which they cannot suppress—to spike the cannon which they have not been able to capture.

The Baltimore Conference went very far in weakening that protest, when it consented to waive the past politicization of the Northern Church as a bar to official correspondence. But when we have gone a great deal beyond this, in allowing these political declarations to be imported into the treaty between us, as in part the basis of the reconciliation, what then becomes of our testimony against these political utterances? When organic union becomes the subject of discussion, as it surely must, will we be able to urge their past political action as an objection? The immediate answer will be, "Your plea is barred by the treaty of 1882; in express terms we affirmed our right to have uttered those decrees; and you responded by a resolution declaring 'entire satisfaction with the full and explicit terms in which we expressed our reciprocal concurrence.'" What can we reply to

this? In establishing fraternal relations, the Northern Assembly openly placed her whole political action in our path, as the steps by which we might ascend and stand with them on their platform. In recognising these deliverances on loyalty and rebellion, imported bodily into the treaty of peace by the Herrick Johnson Resolution, we have abandoned our testimony against politics in the church courts, and have forfeited the right to plead it as a bar to organic union. The historic ground upon which the Southern Church was organised in 1861, and upon which she has stood ever since, was ceded by treaty in 1882, and she will find it difficult to show cause to the world why she should longer exist. This is the logic of fraternal relations upon the Atlanta basis. Upon the line of this policy, we must as certainly crumble into the Northern Church at last, as a bank of sand is washed away by the constant action of water. When we become weary of this friction, then, just as we have become weary of the friction now, the Northern Assembly will resume its action of 1874 in some grand affirmation of the spiritual nature of the Church as the kingdom of Christ, and in its entire separation from, and independence of, the State; and will then turn to us and ask, "What do you want more orthodox than this new proclamation of Christ's supremacy?" Will we point to the blemishes upon their records from 1861 to 1866? The withering response will be, You disabled your own testimony by the written agreement of 1882, and it is beyond your power to enable it any more. Having admitted the claim set up in the Herrick Johnson Resolution, by which the "Concurrent Resolution" was "EXPLAINED" to us, we have no longer the right to take issue with the Northern Church upon its mingling of politics with religion. This ground of separation being swept away from our feet, nothing will remain to us but to settle down quietly into her bosom. We are thus emphatic in setting forth the logical consequences of our present position, in the hope our Church will retrace her steps before it is too late and find her anchorage upon her historic testimony as before.

It is greatly to be wished that the Southern Presbyterian Church would gravely consider the danger of her present situa-

tion. Very many of her ministers and members are deeply wounded and grieved. They find the Northern Assembly rising up in cold blood, and absolutely without provocation, to throw anew into their face the taunt of disloyalty and rebellion. The charge is simply absurd in view of the fact that the Federal Government abandoned it with the acknowledgment that the indictment could not be sustained in any Court under the Constitution. We would not, therefore, care for the silly allegation of it in the Herrick Johnson Resolution as passed by the Springfield Assembly, if it had not been accepted by our own supreme court in Atlanta. It is this which has driven the iron so deep into the soul, and bowed down so many with humiliation and sorrow. We are of those who think rebellion is a crime; and could we believe ourselves guilty of it, we would repent in sackcloth and ashes all our days; and to have the charge even constructively recognised by our own Mother, this pains like the killing of a nerve. What lasting injury this unwise attempt at pacification has inflicted upon the Southern Church, time only can disclose. Even though it should not lead to the absorption so much dreaded, its present effect has been to sow distrust and alienation between brethren who honored each other with a supreme affection, and to weaken confidence in the stability of the Church herself and of the principles which she avows. The hollow fraternity with outside parties is dearly purchased with the uneasiness and sorrow and pain it has produced within.¹ In view of all which we think it incumbent upon the next Assembly to represent frankly to the Assembly North that the present settlement is unsatisfactory from the failure on their part to return an untrammelled adoption of the Concurrent Resolution.

B. M. PALMER.

¹ What is more disastrous still, by an arbitrary and ruthless exercise of power the Assembly has already antagonised the Presbyteries to itself—a conflict between the courts of the Church which has only to become chronic to issue in entire disintegration. Yet the fearful peril must be encountered, in order to escape the opposite danger of an oppressive despotism.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CHURCH'S METHOD OF CONDUCTING THE
FOREIGN MISSIONARY WORK.

Questions have been started of late whether our present mode of conducting the foreign missionary work is either wise or scriptural. The method authorised and pursued by the Church at the present time has been publicly denounced as "unconstitutional," "unpresbyterian," "unscriptural," and "newly invented." In view of these and other statements of a similar character, it is deemed necessary to the interests of Missions that a simple statement be laid before the readers of the REVIEW in relation to this matter.

It is obvious, we think, to every reflecting mind, that if the work of Foreign Missions is carried on at all by a General Assembly, by a Synod, by a Presbytery, or even by a church Session, it must be done through the agency of a commission. The universal practice of the evangelical Church, ever since it has had a full and complete organisation, shows the indispensable necessity of employing such commissions (or Committees, as they are more frequently called) to carry on the work of evangelisation, not only within their own bounds, but in the regions beyond. To say, therefore, that it is a "newly invented scheme" argues ignorance or forgetfulness of the universal usage of all branches of the evangelical Church. Our own Church, at the time of its organisation, adopted this plan for conveying the knowledge of the gospel to the benighted nations of the earth, not simply because it was the plan in use among other evangelical denominations, but because they could not conceive of any simpler or more scriptural method of accomplishing the proposed object. And here is our ground of complaint against those who find fault with the present plan: it is that they do not offer any other that is wiser, more scriptural, or more constitutional. Two agencies are mainly employed in directing the foreign missionary work of our own Church, viz., the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, and the missions, or sub-committees, that are employed in the different fields of

missionary labor to aid the Executive Committee in the proper discharge of its duties and responsibilities. We propose to examine the constitution and functions of both of these, to see if there is anything in either inconsistent with the Scriptures or with the Constitution of the Church.

The Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, as is generally admitted, is an ecclesiastical commission, though commonly called an Executive Committee, appointed by the General Assembly from year to year to prosecute the work of Foreign Missions. The Assembly delegates to it all the powers that are necessary, but only such as are necessary, to carry on the work; the Committee being always responsible to the Assembly for the faithful discharge of its duties. Its powers are fully defined in the Constitution and in the Manual of Missions, which bears the stamp of the Assembly's approval. Its powers are of a twofold character: 1st. Ecclesiastical powers, but only those of a more general character; 2d. Executive, financial, and administrative powers. In the exercise of its general ecclesiastical powers, "it appoints missionaries and assistant missionaries; designates their fields of labor; fixes their salaries; determines their particular employment, and may transfer a missionary from one field of labor, or from one department of work, to another, having due regard, however, to the views and feelings of the missionary himself in all these matters." And "the missionary, in case he feels aggrieved, has the right of appeal to the General Assembly, to which the missionary and the Executive Committee are alike responsible." It should be stated in this connexion, that the Committee in appointing missionaries always acts in concurrence with the Presbyteries to which they belong, the concurrence of the Presbyteries being expressed by the act of ordination. The Committee never undertakes to determine the question whether a man is suited or is called to preach the gospel, that being the peculiar province of the Presbytery. But it does inquire whether an applicant for the missionary work has the physical, the mental, and the linguistic and other qualifications to make a successful laborer in the foreign field. More than this: in order to maintain anything like an extended or systematic plan of missionary labor, it

is necessary that the Committee have the power of distributing the laborers and of assigning them their proper work, of course general regard being had to the preferences as well as the individual qualifications of the missionary.

But whilst the Committee, in virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly, may exercise control in these matters of a more general nature, it has no right, and never attempts, to interfere with what may be denominated the spiritual or *churchly* functions of the missionary. It cannot, for example, tell the missionary when a church should be organised among the people to whom he preaches; who should be received into that church; who should be appointed elders or deacons; when and how discipline should be exercised. In all such matters the missionary's responsibility is to his Presbytery and not to the Executive Committee. Furthermore, the Committee may recall a missionary for incompetency, for neglect of duty, for irregularity of conduct, or for disobedience to instructions, but it has no judicial powers to try him as a minister. The moral and ministerial character of the missionary is entirely in the keeping of his Presbytery. The Committee can report to the Presbytery any irregularity, immorality, or heresy, on the part of a minister, that may be known to them, and they may also furnish testimony, if required to do so, in any judicial proceedings that may be instituted by the Presbytery, but they can go no further.

As to the general or administrative powers intrusted to the Executive Committee, there is, so far as is known to the writer, no serious diversity of views. It is pretty well understood now, that the work of Foreign Missions involves more than the simple public preaching of the gospel. This is undoubtedly the first and most important department of the work. But the command of the Saviour himself to evangelise all the nations of the earth, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever he had commanded them, shows that more than simple public preaching of the gospel is necessary to the completion of the work of evangelisation. The word of God, if it has not already been done, must be translated, printed, and circulated in all the dialects and languages of the world, and this necessarily involves a great deal of secular

care and labor. A native ministry must be trained before the knowledge of salvation can be communicated to every creature in the world, and this involves the necessity of establishing and maintaining schools, colleges, and theological seminaries, all of which also involves much secular care.

Furthermore, such is the condition of society in most of the great heathen nations of the earth, that it is almost impossible to convey the knowledge of salvation to the female portion of the population of those countries without sending out Christian women, who alone can have access to them. But this again involves care, labor, expense, and much executive skill on the part of the Executive Committee. Now, in relation to all of these and various other matters of a similar nature, which it is scarcely necessary to mention, no ecclesiastical principles, strictly speaking, are involved, and, we suppose, by common consent all matters of the kind are left to the wisdom and discretion of such an Executive Committee as the Church might approve; that Committee rendering to the Assembly from year to year a strict account of all its proceedings. We would simply remark, in passing from this part of our subject, which does not require prolonged discussion, that in view of this brief exposition of the constitution and functions of the Executive Committee, we do not see how any simpler, more effective, more scriptural agency, or one less liable to abuse, could possibly be employed by the Church for the execution of her great commission.

We now turn to the Mission, technically so-called, as the second agency employed in the prosecution of the missionary enterprise. It is regarded as a sub-committee, and is composed of all the missionaries and male assistant missionaries in any particular mission field. It is not distinctly mentioned in the Constitution, but it is very plainly set forth in the Manual of Missions, which has the sanction of the Assembly. It bears, in most respects, the same relationship to the Executive Committee that the Executive Committee bears to the General Assembly, and is found to be almost indispensable to a wise and judicious management of the general work.

But there has recently been developed in certain parts of the

foreign missionary field a peculiarly bitter opposition to the Mission as an organised body. It has been caricatured and misrepresented in the public prints. It has been openly denounced before one of our Church courts as an unpresbyterian, unconstitutional, and newly invented form of Church government; that it has usurped ecclesiastical functions, and ought not, therefore, to be respected or obeyed by any foreign missionary. Furthermore, it has been characterised as a sort of "hybrid of Prelacy and Congregationalism." Now, we propose to examine into the constitution and functions of the Mission, to see if it is at variance with general Presbyterian usage, or deserves the vehement denunciations that have been so profusely heaped upon it. We remark, then, in the first place, that the Mission is an organised body, but has no ecclesiastical powers whatever, and never pretends to exercise any of the functions of a church court.¹ The functions of the Mission are mainly advisory, and have reference almost entirely to secular and general matters. It recommends what salaries shall be given, but it never undertakes to fix those salaries. In its collective capacity, it prepares estimates of the funds that will be needed from year to year, but this is simply a recommendation to aid the Executive Committee in determining its appropriations. It recommends schools to be established and colporteurs to be employed, but it cannot establish the one or employ the other without the sanction of the Executive Committee. It may recommend the establishment of new mission stations, but no step can be taken in that direction until the approval of the Executive Committee is secured. It may sanction the return of one of its own members to this country on account of the failure of health,

¹ An unguarded phrase in the Manual to the effect that "at its regular meetings it shall designate the particular work of each missionary laborer, provided this has not been previously done by the Executive Committee," has been adduced to establish this charge. But even this, it should be remembered, is qualified by three conditions: 1st. If the thing has not already been done by the Executive Committee, which it seldom fails to do in the case of an ordained missionary; 2d. Such designation is always temporary, and is subject to the approval of the laborer himself; 3d. It must have the approval of the Executive Committee, and, before it can become permanently binding, it must have the sanction of the Assembly also.

but this can be done only when the case is too urgent to wait for the action of the Executive Committee. But it has positive duties to perform also. It is expected to see that all funds granted by the Executive Committee for public purposes are properly applied. It acts as a body of trustees, to hold property belonging to the Church at any particular mission station. It acts, though not formally so, as the board of directors to manage and control all the educational operations of the Mission. It has a voice in the direction of colporteurs, the circulation of religious literature, and in all matters of general interest. But whilst it has this general supervision of the work, it never interferes in an annoying way with the details of work committed to the care of any particular laborer. The fact is, and it is one of the remarkable features of the foreign missionary work, that every individual member finds himself so fully occupied with his own labors, that he has very little time, and, perhaps, equally as little inclination, to interfere with the duties of others. It is only when the annual estimates are to be made out, or the annual report is to be prepared, that the attention of the Mission is particularly called to the condition and wants of the general work.

Now, while we agree with those who hold that the Mission, as such, has no ecclesiastical powers, and that it ought to be resisted if it attempts to exercise the functions of a church court, we do not agree with them that the Mission, as defined above, is unconstitutional, unpresbyterian, and is not to be obeyed in those things in which it has a rightful control. It may not have the right to interfere with the spiritual or more strictly ecclesiastical functions of the ordained minister, as has already been shown; yet, if that minister undertakes the care of a seminary of learning, where no ecclesiastical principles are involved, it is simply absurd for him to claim exemption from all oversight in its management. The virtual position assumed by a minister who takes this ground, is, that he is a minister and a missionary, that this makes him a sacred and privileged character, and that whatever may be his avocation, whether ecclesiastical or secular, he is to be touched only with ecclesiastical hands. Now, let this matter be brought to a simple test. Here is Dr. ———, a professor in ——— Theo-

logical Seminary. He has been appointed to this position, and maintains it under the control of a Board of Directors. Furthermore, he becomes a member of an organised body called the Faculty, and in connexion with his associates agrees to be controlled by a certain code of rules or laws which are necessary and which have been adopted for their mutual government. Still further, Dr. —— may be the pastor of a church without impairing his relationship either to the Faculty or the Board of Directors. In fact he has got into a position where his relationship is threefold, viz., to the Board of Directors, the Faculty, and his Presbytery, and he is amenable to each one of these only in their respective spheres. Now, suppose Dr. —— comes to the conclusion that the power conferred upon him by the Presbytery is much higher than that of either of the others, and that, in fact, it exempts him from all obligation to obey them; suppose further, that he comes to the conclusion that neither the Board of Directors nor the Faculty have a *jure divino* stamp, that, therefore, he will in no sense whatever be governed by them. Now, need it be asked how such a case would be regarded and treated in this Christian land? And why should the matter be treated differently in a foreign and heathen country? The Board of Directors of a theological seminary or of a Synodical college are appointed by an ecclesiastical body, but they have no ecclesiastical character or powers of their own; and yet no good Presbyterian, even though he be a minister of the gospel, would hesitate to obey them in matters that properly belong to their control. The Faculty of a theological seminary, though it has its own organic form, is not a church court, and, from the nature of the case, could not be made one. And yet it would be a very anomalous attitude for one of the professors to undertake to say, he would not observe its rules and regulations simply because it is not a court. What would be the condition of a seminary if there could be no harmony or concert of action among its teachers? If the professor supposed had the care of a church in addition to his professorship, he would be amenable for its proper management to his Presbytery, and not, of course, either to the Board of Directors or to the Faculty, and so *vice versa*. And here lies the mistake of those who revolt

against the authority of a Mission, because it is not an authorised or acknowledged church court. May it not have claims to be respected and obeyed, even though it has not the power of a church court? Let this matter be looked into.

We ask if it is not a universal custom with all church courts to assign duties to certain members, in the discharge of which it is expected that they will be respected and obeyed, without being constituted a church court? Is this not done by church Sessions in the appointments and regulations that are made for the government of Sabbath-schools? Does the Presbytery not do the same thing when it appoints a committee to watch over and control its own missionary operations, or when it appoints committees to assess its churches? Does not a Synod or a General Assembly, when it establishes a college or theological seminary, appoint a Board of Directors to govern and control those institutions without constituting that Board a church court? Why, then, would it not be proper and consistent with Presbyterian usage for the General Assembly to regard the Mission, as above defined, as a supervisory agency in the missionary work, especially as no ecclesiastical powers, strictly speaking, are coupled therewith? How is it that our theological professors can cheerfully submit to the authority of a Board of Directors when it is not, and lays no claim to be, a church court? And why, it may well be asked, is the missionary so much opposed to the idea of acknowledging the authority of a Mission, when all of its powers are purely administrative, and when it is composed entirely of his own missionary associates?

But let us take a step in advance. What must be the condition of that Mission where all superintending agency is eschewed? Six or eight missionary laborers, all of them, perhaps, good and pious men, are set down in the same heathen community for the purpose of promoting its evangelisation. There is to be no concert of action among them, but every one is to carry out his own convictions in his own peculiar way. Now, it requires very little sagacity to see that this must result not only in a waste of the Church's resources, but in the end could result in nothing but confusion. It might result in all of these brethren devoting them-

selves to the one work of translating, because each thinks himself specially qualified for that particular kind of work; and hence we might have a half dozen different translations of the Bible, varying in many important respects from each other. Or it might turn out that every member felt himself called upon to preach only, and no one would be left to train a native agency, without which no missionary work could be thorough or permanent, and so *vice versa*. In consequence of this, the work would not only become lopsided, but its different parts might become fiercely antagonistic. Two colleges, for example, located in adjoining neighborhoods, and conducted on different plans, might become rivals for public patronage, and thus lead, as would be very likely to be the case in a heathen community, to disgraceful dissensions.

But we cannot, in the prosecution of the foreign missionary work, afford to dispense with the great value of harmonious and concerted action among missionary brethren. It cannot be dispensed with in this Christian land, much less in foreign fields. Our whole Church system is based on this well-known and almost universally acknowledged want of human nature. Mutual cooperation and oversight are not only necessary to the perfection of our characters as Christian men, but are equally essential to the preservation of the truth and the purity and permanency of the Church itself, and a fundamental idea of the Presbyterian Church polity. Our Saviour saw the necessity of this when he sent out disciples two and two. They did not go thus simply that they might be witnesses, as has been assumed without proof, but that they might be mutual helps to each other. Paul, even though an Apostle and endowed with the power of working miracles, never travelled without missionary companions. But this need of cooperation and companionship is specially felt in a heathen land. Here the missionary is thrown among a people of an entirely different character from any that he has previously known; he finds himself confronted with questions of a moral, social, and religious nature, which it is almost impossible for human wisdom to solve; he finds himself surrounded by trials and perplexities of which he never before dreamed. In short, he is placed in just that situation where he preëminently needs the sympathy, the counsel, and the

oversight of Christian brethren. How the foreign missionary can afford to cast all these behind his back, cannot easily be understood. If he were a wise man, he would covet that very aid which his missionary associates can afford him. Nor is this aid less to be valued because he and his associates are formed into an organic body, with certain well-known rules and regulations for their government. Indeed, their advice and oversight is rendered the more valuable on this very account. Nor does strong profession of loyalty to the Presbytery materially modify the matter. That is all right. Every minister feels it a privilege to be connected with a Presbytery, whose advice he can seek, and upon whose protection he can throw himself if he is unjustly assailed. But the Presbytery is too far off from the foreign missionary, and too little acquainted with his circumstances and surroundings, to give much sound advice or to exercise any necessary oversight. At the same time, the oversight of the Presbytery and the Mission do not at all come in conflict. The two occupy entirely different spheres. The Mission, as has already been shown, cannot, and does not, interfere with any of the ecclesiastical rights or functions of the missionary. So the Presbytery, having surrendered to the Assembly the general control of the foreign missionary work, has no right to interfere with the administrative functions that have been committed to the Mission.

But what is the real ground of this opposition to the Mission as a superintending agency? One would naturally expect just the opposite state of feeling. And if time allowed, it would be easy to show that in those of our Foreign Missions where the right of mutual oversight and control is acknowledged and practised, there is always peace and harmony among its members, and the general work is carried on with more than usual efficiency, and so *vice versa*. The views of those who participate in opposition to the agency of the Mission, if we rightly understand them, are, that the ordained missionary, when he enters upon the missionary work, should be left entirely to himself; that he ought to be allowed to pursue his work of every kind in his own way; that he ought to have complete and undivided control over the churches he may establish and the officers he may ordain, but subject to

no control whatever except that of his Presbytery, which, from the nature of the case, must, in a great measure, be merely nominal. Now, we do not pretend to say that these brethren distinctly foresee to what their speculations lead, or that they aspire to the exercise of powers that are unknown to the Presbyterian Church; but if we have not in the above views, as we understand them, the essence of Independency and Prelacy at the same time, then it is hard to say where they are to be found conjoined—Independency, so far as outward control is concerned, and Prelacy, so far as churches and church officers are to be governed by one man. It will be said that this prelatical power is to be maintained only until such time as the regular church courts are established. But who is to determine when and how those church courts are to be established? And is it not more than probable, after such training, that such churches will become either Independent or Episcopal, instead of Presbyterian? Whilst we adhere strictly to the principle that the Mission, as such, is not to interfere with the strictly ecclesiastical functions of any one of its ordained ministers, nevertheless, when a church is to be organised, or an officer to be ordained, it would be expected, as a matter of *ecclesiastical propriety*, that all the ordained ministers of the Mission would take part in the same. This is done when a neighboring minister or ruling elder happens to be present at the ordination of a ruling elder in a different church. It is also done when a minister from another Presbytery is present at the ordination of a minister of the gospel. But we are not sure that this would be done by a missionary who is under the influence of either Independency or Prelacy. After separating himself from the brethren of his mission, and conducting his work on independent principles, he would scarcely want one of those brethren to be present and assist at an ordination, when such would only falsify his own position.

We do not suppose that the Church will be likely to sympathise with these views, either in their Independent or Prelatical bearing. We do not look upon matters here at home in this light. Trust and accountability always go hand in hand. Christian people are not willing to give their money for religious purposes to any one who is not willing to render a strict account of the manner in

which that money is spent. So in relation to every important trust connected with the interests of religion. A college is not endowed and equipped to be placed under the absolute control of any one man. Oversight and control are regarded as necessary to its proper administration; and why should the missionary regard himself as an exception to this general rule? Is he, in consequence of his calling, noble as it is, endowed with higher wisdom than other men? Are his surroundings not of the very kind to make him feel the greater need of the counsel and advice of his missionary associates? Is that man not in danger of falling into grievous error, who undervalues or despises those guides and checks and restraints which have been appointed by the great Head of the Church for the government of his people?

• J. LEIGHTON WILSON.

ARTICLE V.

A THOROUGHLY EDUCATED MINISTRY.

At first thought we are surprised to find that the best established principles should need reconsideration and resettling in every age. Yet the explanation is not difficult. Some new pressure of circumstances, or some trait of mind in a part of the new generation, give renewed prominence to the old objections against the settled principle, and temporarily overshadow the more weighty reasons for it. For every practical question has two sides, *contras* as well as *pros*. Then, it is forgotten that those objections were as maturely considered as they now are by us, when our fathers determined the system for us, and were properly overborne by the affirmative considerations. We are tempted to think that the contrary reasons have never been regarded as they deserve to be, and that we have a new light on the subject, until our innovating experiments, by their failure, teach us again that our predecessors had really looked more

thoroughly around the subject than we had. Such a process has been for some months engaging a part of our Church, as to the general requirement of a thorough and classical education of our ministers. The two awakening essays which appeared in the October and January numbers of this REVIEW, entitled "An Inquiry into the Aggressiveness of Presbyterianism," are not the only outgivings of this movement. The overture of the Bethel Presbytery, pleading for a ministry without any classical acquirements, and other declarations, evince the unsettled mind of many. Our discussion, therefore, does not derive its whole importance from the wide attention which the brilliancy, force, and plausibility of those essays are exciting.

The most of the points, so well made in them, we concede. Aggressiveness ought to be a prime trait of every Church, and test of its fidelity; for what else is her great commission from her Lord, except a command to be aggressive until she has conquered the whole world? She ought to be able to reach the poorest and lowest. Presbyterial supervision ought to be wiser and more effective. There is a startling lack of ministers, calling in trumpet tones upon Christian men. Looseness in examining candidates, false and deceptive verdicts of a scholarship which does not exist, and literary indolence in the applicants, are painfully inconsistent with our rules and professions. The practical relations of our Seminaries to our Presbyteries are most anomalous and mischievous. Our Constitution, though of well proved wisdom, is not inspired, and therefore its betterment is not impossible. In our author's pungent presentation of these points, we heartily rejoice. The one point on which we take issue with him is his proposal to revolutionise our system of training ministers, in order to overtake our aggressive work more rapidly.

The argument for this proposal is drawn from a comparison of our numbers in the four Southern Atlantic States, with the numbers of the Baptist and Methodist Churches in the same regions. The allegation is that they, no older than we on this ground, have each made fivefold progress over us, in number of ministers and members. This fivefold growth is ascribed mainly to the facility and speed with which they multiply ministers and cheapen their

labor, by reason of their not requiring classical education of them. The inference is, that we must imitate those denominations, so far as to cease to require—though we shall still invite—such training of our candidates. The author thinks that we need ministers whose grades shall differ in this sense, to perform the different kinds of missionary and pastoral work.

First, the fact assumed needs inquiry. Is it true that each of these denominations has done five times as much real work for Christ and souls as our own? Our author claims this, and rather dogmatically forbids us to go behind their statistics, or to deduct any more from them than from our own, for inaccuracies. It is impossible for sensible men, acquainted with stubborn facts, to submit here. Our own statistics may be loose; but theirs are doubtless far looser. This could not but result from the Independency of the Immersionist churches, and from the notorious facility with which the Methodists demit or resume their church membership. Are all the hundreds of their "local preachers," in any continuous sense, laboring in the ministry? Is not the country notoriously sprinkled over with members who have not been to the Lord's table for years, whose families frequent no church or Sabbath-school?

But both denominations have become far more numerous than ours. We freely admit it; yet we do not admit that this has been the result of the inferiority of our system of rearing our ministry. Twenty other solutions of their success are listed; and but little influence seems to be assigned to any of them—none at all to the most—by our author. The really influential causes of their comparative numerical growth do not appear in his list.

One is, the broad scriptural catholicity of the Presbyterian Church. It is the most liberal of all Churches, receiving all true penitents to membership, of all shades of doctrinal opinion, having no *shibboleth*, communing with all, unchurching none, who teach the essential rudiments of salvation. Now, everybody condemns other people's *bigotry*; yet every carnal man is naturally a bigot as soon as he ceases to be a mere indifferentist. Hence, this wide catholicity of our Church is an obstacle to her popularity with the carnal, because she firmly refuses to give

them this gratification of pride and dogmatism, or to allure them by any partisan bait ; but holds out only the pure and enlightened love of the holy truth of the gospel. It is well known, indeed, that this adverse world is in the habit of calling the Presbyterian the most bigoted Church, at least next to the Popish. People think so, because she sternly refuses to cater to their secret bigotry.

But a second influence is more potent : our Church presents to the world the humbling doctrines of the gospel with faithful candor : man's death in sin and inability for all spiritual good ; his entire dependence on efficacious grace ; the demands of a perfect law ; God's eternal and essential punitive justice ; the worthlessness of man's works and sentiments for his justification ; the everlasting doom of contumacious sin. These are the doctrines which carnal man hates. He also dreads perdition. Yes, with a selfish dread. And therefore is he charmed with any theory of redemption which takes off any part of the edge of these hated truths, and yet makes plausible promise of escape. The Methodist Church is avowedly Arminian, and the Immersionists are partially so ; the Independency of the latter has borne its usual fruit, the partial relaxation of the old Calvinism of the denomination. Arminianism is semi-Pelagianism, repolished and reconstructed. There are a few modern improvements. These were probably intended by Mr. Wesley to make a compromise between the Arminianism of Episcopius, Grotius, and Whitby, and Calvinism. But there is no compromise. The attempt to patch the old garment with new cloth only results in a lack of consistent juncture in the Wesleyan theology, which gives occasion, in that Church, for all the shades of preaching, from moderate Calvinism down to almost blank Pelagianism, according to the personal impulses of the ministers.

Again, in competition with the Immersionist churches, Presbyterianism meets a capital disadvantage in scripturally refusing to countenance any shade of ritualism. She does not permit her sacraments to be misunderstood on that point by any one. Everybody comprehends, as to her, that she sternly rejects every plan for manipulating sinners into a state of salvation by a ceremony ;

that she refuses to allow any process less arduous than that of a living faith, a deep repentance, including "the full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience," and a holy striving in duty and life-long watchfulness. It is true that all better Immersionists profess to discard ritualism also in their dipping; but in spite of their disclaimers, the inordinate importance given to that form, with their close communion, practically encourage both a ritualistic and an exclusive temper. To the carnal, and even the partially sanctified heart, it is very seductive to find one's self exalted by a *shibboleth* and a ceremony into a spiritual aristocracy, sitting nearer God's throne than other Christians. This powerful attraction Presbyterianism will not and cannot use.

But doubtless the chief cause of the numerical spread of the other Churches, and especially among the ruder classes, is the employment of "new measures." These, the anxious-seat, the altar of penitents, and others, known as "revival measures," have hitherto been almost universally used by Methodists, and generally by Immersionists. They are as influential as they are deleterious. They cater to the strongest passions of the sinful heart. By parading in public the vivid, and often the hysterical, emotions of penitents, and especially of females, they offer to the populace that spectacular excitement which is as fascinating to them as bodily intoxication, and draws the gaping crowd as powerfully as a hanging, a horse-race, or a pugilistic battle. These measures also engage the passion of sympathy, a passion as universal as it is misunderstood. They allure the awakened carnal mind, by flattering it with the permission, yea, the direct encouragement, to adopt a gust of sympathetic excitement, a fit of carnal remorse, with the calm of the natural collapse which succeeds it, and a shallow, spurious hope, in lieu of that thorough work of mortifying sin, and crucifying self along with Christ, which, we teach, alone evidences a title to heaven. No wonder that these "measures" have been found a prime enginery for religious self-deception; the patent process for building wood, hay, and stubble into the fabric of the visible Church, instead of precious metals and stones. If our consciences would permit us to resort to these measures, we could burn over wide surfaces, as

others do, leaving them, as they do, blighted and barren for all more scriptural methods. Thus, this unhealthy system works against us, not only by sweeping the multitudes, by unsound means, into these other communions, but by searing and hardening what is left, so as to unfit them for our soberer but safer methods.

These are the differences which account, so far as merely natural means are concerned, for the greater facility with which these denominations gain popular accessions. It may be said that, in urging these points, we are guilty of making "odious comparisons," and of insinuating, at least, disparagement of sister Churches. If out reasonings on these points are untrue, then we are thus guilty. But if we are correct, then loyalty to truth requires us, in studying the comparison of results to which we are challenged, to state the true solutions. But we state them in no spirit of arrogance or insolence towards others; for we accompany these points with deep and sorrowful confessions of the imperfections of our own household. The nominal membership of all the Churches, including our own, is, doubtless, deplorably mixed. Witness the prevalent worldly conformities, the incursions of dissipated amusements; the decline of family religion and discipline; the Sabbath-breaking by communicants, and even ministers; the loose and unscrupulous methods of "making money;" the indifference of multitudes to the obligations of old debts; the practical prayerlessness of countless families and individuals. The correct inferences to draw from all these corruptions are: that any conclusions whatever from these hollow numbers, as to the methods of a real and spiritual efficiency in God's work, are mainly out of place, and untrustworthy; that the numbers of counterfeit coins among our supposed gains, are too large to leave much place for prudent counting up; that the Church of Christ at this time is called to study *genuineness* much more than numerical increase.

If the question be raised, Why the Church does not grow faster? we are persuaded that the real answer, which most needs looking at, is the one which our author dismisses most hastily: That the fault is not ecclesiastical, but spiritual. The real *desid-*

eratum is not new methods, but fidelity to the old, a true revival in the hearts of ministers and Christians themselves, a faith that "feels the powers of the world to come," a solemn and deep love for souls. What we most need is repentance, and not innovation.

We are persuaded, however, that the Southern Presbyterian Church is contributing to the general advancement of Christ's cause, along with sister denominations, in ways of her own, which are not to be measured by numerical results; and it is not arrogance, but truth, to view these contributions. In the natural "body there are many members, yet one body, but all the members have not the same office;" and it is so in the ecclesiastical body of the visible Church-catholic. Presbyterianism is providentially fashioned and employed to do for Christendom her own peculiar part. It is the conservative branch of the family of Churches, checking the departures of all the others from sound doctrine. It is the exemplar of scriptural organisation. It is the sustainer of the more thorough education of both ministry and laity. And we assert that, constituted as poor human nature now is, it is entirely reasonable to expect that Presbyterianism cannot, in the nature of the case, both perform all these her peculiar and precious functions, and also compete successfully for the largest and most promiscuous numbers. The two results may be now incompatibles. And hence it may be justifiable that Presbyterianism should make the practical election, and pursue these vital results which are peculiarly assigned to her in providence, though at the cost of resigning the more promiscuous numerical greatness. The normal school cannot have as many pupils as the popular school; to do so it must cease to be normal.

The issue raised, then, is this: whether it is not now our duty to give up our constitutional requirement of a classically learned ministry, and to provide another grade of ministers, equipped only with piety, zeal, and an English training, in order to gain these numerical accessions, like our Immersionist and Methodist neighbors. It is not proposed that we shall lower the standard of learning in our Seminaries, or discourage such as have taste for it from acquiring classical training; but that there shall be another wide door into our ministry, by which a large number of ministers

of another grade shall be permitted to enter, with only an English education. On the other hand, we hold that our present theory of preparation should be left unchanged, and only more faithfully executed. The extent of this is, not to make classical learning so essential to the being of a ministry as to refuse the character of valid ministers to those who are without our training, but to assert that *it is a true source of increased efficiency*; and, hence, inasmuch as every one who avouches the obligation to serve Christ, ought to feel obliged to serve him the most and the best possible, we conclude it to be our duty to gain that increase of capacity for service.

The first reason we urge against innovation is, that it opposes the deliberate judgment of the wisest and best of our fathers, when viewing and deciding the very same problem. Is it said that the tremendous emergency arising out of our growth of population has put a new face on the question, in the presence of which they would have decided otherwise? No. Dr. John H. Rice, for instance, foresaw precisely this increase and this emergency. He looked full in the face the figures disclosing the slow relative growth of the Virginia Presbyteries. And in the presence of these express facts, this is what he did in 1825: he devoted his great powers to pressing these two points: the evils of an uneducated ministry, and the equipment of Union Seminary. Never, for one moment, did the facts sway him and his co-workers to favor the hurrying of a single partially educated man into the field; their only idea of the remedy was, to provide means as speedily as possible to give the most thorough education to the largest number of ministers. The same thing was true of the fathers who began the creation of Princeton Seminary in 1811, Ashbel Green, Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller, and their comrades. The same was true also of Moses Stuart in New England, and the men who created the Congregational (American) Education Society. They saw the solemn emergency; they appreciated the Church's slow progress in overtaking it; they refused all other remedy for it than the one to which they devoted their energies: means for the thorough education of more numerous men to reap the perishing harvest.

But it is suggested that there is substantial difference in the case now, because we now have a rich and profuse literature in English, covering all the departments of theological learning, whereas, when the Presbyterian Constitution was first devised (say 1649-1651), all was locked up in Latin. We are told that, even at the day of Albert Barnes, he had nothing in English to begin with, save Doddridge's Family Expositor.

This greatly misrepresents the facts. We must remind readers, first, that the dates of the creation of our Constitution, as an American Church, are not those of the Westminster Assembly, but are 1729, 1758, 1789, and especially 1820. At the last date, which marks the real establishment of our polity, the English works on all the branches of divinity bore as large a ratio to the Latin then accessible to American scholars, both in quantity and value, as at this day. To make it much otherwise, indeed, at the epoch of the Westminster Assembly, one must strangely forget the works of the great English Reformers a century before, from Cranmer onward, many of which were in English. He must forget that the age of the Westminster Assembly was adorned by such writers as Lightfoot, Richard Baxter, Manton, John Owen, the prince of expositors, Joseph Caryl, Sir Robert Boyle, Bishop Hall, Matthew Poole, the Scotchmen Baillie, Henderson, and Rutherford, the evangelical prelates Usher and Leighton, the poet and divine John Milton, and a multitude of others. These men illustrated every part of biblical learning by works which, to this day, are mines of knowledge for the more pretentious moderns, and that, not only in Latin dress, as Poole's "*Synopsis Criticorum*," but also in English, as the same author's "*Annotations*."

Now, when we add to this noble catalogue of English Biblical lore of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the yet more profuse works of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth, how much is the trivial assertion of Barnes worth? Not to dwell on the profound works of the scholars of the Anglican Church, such as Dean Prideaux, Bishops Hammond, Bull, Stillingfleet, Warburton, Waterland, Pearson, we remember that age witnessed the critical labors of a Bentley and a Mill, the Hebrew

Grammars (in English) of Bayley, Fitzgerald, Joseph Frey; the Lexicons of Parkhurst and Frey, the publication of Dr. George Campbell's Gospels, the vast and unsurpassed work of Dr. Lardner ("Credibility"), the prophetic studies of Sir Isaac Newton and of Bishop Newton and Dr. Faber. Ministers had possessed Doddridge from 1740; McKnight from 1756; Dr. Benson, 1735; Paley's *Horae Paulinae*, 1790; Blair on the Canon, 1785; Lowth's critical works from 1787; Whitby from 1761; Dr. Gill from 1763 (unsurpassed, perhaps unequalled by any commentator since, who wrote on the whole Bible); Matthew Henry from 1706; Scott from 1790; not to dwell on the long line of American divines from Drs. John Cotton and Cotton Mather down to Jonathan Edwards. No, the framers of our Constitution did not require learning of their ministry because the stores of information were then locked up in Latin; but because they knew that knowledge of the originals of the Bible was essential to make a competent teacher in the Church. Nor are the English books of this age on divinity more learned, or accurate, or useful, than the former; they are more frequently feebler rehashes of the very materials already gathered by those admirable old scholars.

We have, then, the battle to fight over again for the utility of thorough education, and a knowledge of the "dead languages," to the pastor. Let us again define the ground we assume. It is not that the Christian ignorant of the classics may not get the rudiments of redemption out of English books, or may not so teach them to another as to save his soul. It is not that this plain man's ministry is invalid, because he is no classic. It is not that such a man, if greatly gifted by nature and grace, may not do more good than many weaker good men with their classical training. But we assert that this training will be, to any man, gifted above his fellows or not, an important *means of still greater efficiency, correctness, authority, and wisdom*, in saving souls, and that the lack of it will entail on any pastor a considerable (comparative) liability to partial error, mistakes, and injury of the Church and of souls. Now it is each minister's duty to love God, not with a part, but with all of his heart; and to serve him, not only as well as some weaker brother is doing, but with

the fullest effectiveness possible for him, he being such a man and in such circumstances as he is. It should be with each minister, as with the faithful and devoted bondsman. He may be gifted by nature with a giant frame, so that with a dull and inferior axe he cuts more wood for the Master in the day than another with his natural feebleness who has the keenest axe. By "putting to more strength," he may even cut the average day's task. But if, by grinding his axe thoroughly, he is enabled to cut even two days' tasks in one, if he loves the Master he will grind it. And even if his day is advanced towards the middle of the forenoon, if he finds that an hour devoted even then to a thorough grinding, will result in a larger heap of wood well cut by nightfall, he will stop at that late hour to grind.

Now, as to the high utility of classic culture to the educated man, the arguments which have convinced the majority of well-informed men for three centuries, have by no means been refuted by the multiplication of books in English. Latin and Greek are large sources of our mother tongue. No man has full mastery of it until he knows the sources. Translation from language to language is the prime means for training men to discrimination in using words, and thus, in thought. There is no discipline in practical logic, so suitable for a pupil, as those reasonings from principles of syntax, by processes of logical exclusion and synthesis, to the correct way of construing sentences. As a mental discipline, this construing of a language other than our vernacular, has no rival and no substitute in any other study. And if the language to be construed is idiomatically different from the vernacular, with its own genius, collocating thoughts and words in its own peculiar order, as is the case with the "dead languages," this fits them best of all to be implements of this discipline. It is the best way for teaching the young mind to think. We do not dwell on the culture of true taste, and the value of the fine models presented in the classics. It may be retorted that there is fine writing in English too; why may not this cultivate the taste? We reply: these English models are moulded after the classic, if they are really fine. Is it not better to take our inspiration from the prime source than the secondary? More-

over, they are usually so imbued with classic allusion and imagery that only a classic scholar can understand them. True, Milton wrote in English; but the reader needs to be as much a Latin and Greek scholar fully to comprehend him as to read Virgil and Sophocles.

But the prime fact which determines the question is, that the Bible was given by God in Greek and Hebrew. The Greek New Testament and Hebrew Old Testament alone are God's word. No translation or commentary is infallible. No man who must needs "pin his faith" as to the interpretation of a given phrase upon the "say so" of an expositor that "this is just what the Greek means," can be always certain that he is not deceived. Does one say, This is all the laity have? Just so; and therefore no such layman is entitled to become the authorised teacher of others. "The analogy of the faith" may give the intelligent English reader a practical certainty that his translators and expositors do give him the more fundamental and obvious truths of redemption without any substantial error, and that he may be sure of his own salvation. But it ought to be the aim of the religious teacher, who undertakes to lead others, to attain accuracy also on the lesser points. No atom of revealed truth is useless to souls. The lesser error may perchance be the means of leading some soul to the greater, even to the destructive, mistake. The duty of the pastor to go himself to the fountain head of the exposition may be illustrated thus: an author offers to him his English commentary on Scripture designed for the English reader. The pastor receives it and says, "That is well. But, Mr. Expositor, you yourself tested your own expositions by the light of the original Greek?" "No," he answers, "writing only for English readers, I myself stopped at the English version!" That pastor would throw the commentary from him with indignation. But the pastor is the commentary of his charge; they have the same right to require of him that he shall not stop short of testing his expositions to them, until he gets to the infallible standard.

Again, it is often the pastor's duty to defend the correct exposition of the truth against impugners. How can he do this successfully unless he is able to argue for the translation he assumes,

when he is always liable to be assailed with the assertion: "I deny that the original means what you say." Shall he meet assertion only with bald assertion while confessing that he himself is not qualified to judge whereof he affirms? This would be a sorry polemic indeed. For instance, the pastor ignorant of Greek has declared that the word rendered in the Scripture "*justify*," does not signify an inward and spiritual change, but only a forensic and declarative act of God in favor of the believing sinner. The Romish priest rises and says: "Holy Mother Church teaches the opposite; how do you know what the word signifies?" "I read what I asserted in Dr. Hodge's English Commentary on Romans. He says so." "But Holy Mother Church is inspired. Is your Dr. Hodge inspired?" "No." "Do you know Greek, so as to assure us, yourself, that he may not be mistaken?" "No." "But," the priest adds, "the Church is not only infallible, but knows Greek perfectly; and she asserts, of her knowledge, that you and your Dr. Hodge are mistaken." In what a pitiful attitude is this "defender of the faith" left, although he is, in fact, on the right side, with nothing but an assertion and a confession of ignorance, to offset a more confident assertion.

It is worth remarking also, that an incomplete knowledge of the original languages is not to be despised in the pastor. A tolerable knowledge of the rudiments, which would not suffice him to originate independent criticisms, may enable him to judge intelligently of another's criticism of the original. Or it may furnish him with the weapons to overthrow completely the arrogant assailant who knows no more than he does and yet boasts much. A young pastor in Virginia was once debating, during a series of days, the "Thomasite" creed with its founder, a man of boundless dogmatism and pretension. He, like the Anabaptists of Luther's age, denied the conscious existence of the soul apart from the body after death. He boldly asserted that he knew Hebrew; that the Hebrew Scriptures gave no countenance to the idea of separate spirit in man; for that the word currently translated soul in the English version meant only *a smelling bottle*! The young pastor related that when Dr. Thomas began to parade his Hebrew he began to tremble, for he had the guilty conscious-

ness that the dust had been gathering on his own Hebrew books ever since he left the Seminary. But the intervening night gave him an opportunity to examine them, and his Lexicon at once cleared up the source of the impudent assertion, by giving him under שָׁפָן ("breath," "soul") the phrase from Isa. iii.20: שָׁפָן בְּתֵיבֵי "smelling bottles" (bottles of odors). All, therefore, that was necessary was to take this Lexicon to the church next morning, read the extract, challenge all competent persons (of whom there happened to be none present) to inspect his citation, and show the absurdity of reading "smelling bottle" wherever שָׁפָן occurred. Thus, as he humorously stated, he hewed Dr. Thomas to pieces with his own smelling bottle. Here, a small tincture of Hebrew answered a valuable purpose; without it, our advocate would have had nothing but assertion to oppose to assertion. It should also be admitted that a critical knowledge of the Hebrew tongue is less essential to the pastor than of the Greek, and its lack less blameable. For the New Testament resumes and restates all the doctrines of redemption contained in the Old Testament. Hence, he who can be sure that he construes all the declarations of the New Testament aright, cannot go amiss as to any of the doctrinal statements of the Old Testament, though he has only the English version. But even this admission cannot be extended to the historical statements of the Old Testament; and as they have an interesting, though subordinate, value for illustrating the plan of redemption, the minister who knows Greek but not Hebrew cannot be fully on the level of him who knows both. For, in general, there is a sense in which the best translation cannot fully represent its original. Pope's Homer shows us Pope rather than Homer; Dryden's Virgil, Dryden fully as much as Virgil. There are shades of thought, connexions of words and ideas, idiomatic beauties and aptitudes of expression, which a mere translation does not reproduce. These points, lost in any modern version, are not essential to the getting of the fundamentals of redemption; but they clothe the teachings of revelation in a light and consistency which he that undertakes to teach others ought not to slight.

There is a practical testimony to this argument. It is found in the example of some of the best of those excellent and useful men who have found themselves in the Baptist or Methodist ministry without classical knowledge. They, seeing its vital necessity to the guide of souls, have given themselves no rest until they have acquired, often by unassisted study, a competent knowledge of the New Testament Greek at least; many also of the Hebrew. Their consciences would not suffer them to remain without it.

This position is also sustained by this very simple and natural view. 1 Tim. iii. 2, requires of the presbyter-bishop "aptness to teach." This cannot mean less than didactic ability to explain the gospel correctly; and we may grant that this would be sufficiently conferred by fair general intelligence, perspicuous good sense, the gift of utterance, familiarity with the Scriptures of the New Testament, and a personal experience of gospel grace. The intelligent tradesman or mechanic in Ephesus might possess these. But ought not the modern pastor to possess this *minimum* qualification? Should he not be abreast, at least, of the Ephesian mechanic? Let it be remembered that this Greek, now the classic "dead" language, was then the vernacular. The educated Englishman must be no mean Greek scholar to have that practical mastery of the idiom which this mechanic had, granting that the mechanic had not the knowledge of the elegancies of Greek which the modern student may have sought out. But more than this: the events, the history, the geography, the usages, the modes of thought, the opinions, which constituted the human environment of the New Testament writers, the accurate understanding of which is so necessary to grasp the real scope of what they wrote, all these were the familiar, popular, contemporaneous knowledge of that intelligent mechanic in Ephesus. He had imbibed it in his daily observation, reading, and talk, as easily and naturally as the mechanic in Charleston has imbibed the daily facts about current politics, cotton shipments, familiar modern machinery, or domestic usages. But to us now all this expository knowledge is archæologic! It is gained accurately only by learned researches into antiquity. This imaginary picture may help to put us in the point of view for understanding

our argument. We may suppose that the chasm of eighteen centuries is crossed, so that an Ephesine scholar (not mere mechanic) appears in Charleston now, and it is made his duty to instruct his Greek fellow-colonists in the municipal and state laws. But they are printed in English, a tongue strange to him, antipodal to Greek in idiom. Well, this difficulty may be surmounted by learning English, or, as our opponents think, simply by purchasing a translation of South Carolina laws into Greek; though how this translation is to enable him to *guarantee* his clients against error in their legal steps passes our wit to see. But this obstruction out of the way, he begins to read. He finds enactments about property in "cotton"! What is cotton? The wool which old Herodotus reported grew on trees in Nubia? And property in steam engines! And in steamships! And in steam-cotton-compress engines; and in stocks of railroads, and in banks, and in government securities! And of buying and selling cotton futures! And of valuable phosphate works, etc., etc. What a crowd of surprises, of mysteries, of astonishments! How much to be learned, after the knotty, sibilant, guttural English is learned, before the book has any light to his mind!

We thus see that the plain Ephesine mechanic elder had immense advantages over us, enuring directly from his epoch, contemporary with the events of redemption, from his vernacular, from his providential position for understanding the sacred books. But we again urge the question, Are we "apt to teach," unless we make up our deficiencies to a level somewhere near his? The modern who has become a learned Greek scholar and archæologist, has not done more than reach the level of this Ephesine elder. It were well for us if we had reached it.

Only one other point in this wide field of argument can be touched. The great apostasy of Prelacy and Popery was wrought precisely on that plan of a partially educated ministry which is now urged on us. As time rolled on, antiquating the language and the facts and opinions of the Apostolic age, the Church forgot the argument illustrated above, and vainly fancied that she would find the requisite "aptness to teach" as Timothy found it, in pious men taken from the mass of society. Men read Church

history now under an illusion. When they hear of the pastors and fathers of the early Church as writing and preaching in Latin or Greek, because these are the learned languages now, these must have been learned men! But it was not so; these languages were their vernaculars. True learning was not the requisite for the ministerial office in the patristic ages. A few, like Jerome, had biblical learning; the most were chosen without it, precisely on the plan now recommended to us. The Latin pastor knew no Greek nor Hebrew, but read his Bible from a translation, precisely as our author wishes his new evangelists to do now. The Greek pastor knew no Latin or Hebrew. The result of that experiment is indelibly written in Church history; the result was the gradual development of Popery; the "dark ages;" the re-introduction of idolatry; the mass, bloody persecutions, and the corruption of Christianity. This lesson is enough for us; we do not desire to witness the repetition of the experiment. It was by just such expositions, founded on a translation, for instance, that the great Augustine, ignorant of Hebrew, and nearly ignorant of Greek, but energetic, eloquent, and confident, introduced into the theology of the Latin Church those definitions which it took all the throes and labors of the Reformation to expunge; which made *μετάνοια* mean penance (*pœnitentia*); *δικαίωσις* mean conversion, and faith (*fides*) a derivative of the verb *fit*, "it is done," thus representing faith as a work. Shall we be told that Protestants have now learned that lesson so well that there will be no danger of their being again misled on those points, even by uneducated guides? Perhaps not on those points. But who can foresee on what other unexpected points? The ingenuity of error is abounding.

Reference is made to a literary revolution which is to extrude the study of the classics from their place, and substitute other (modern) languages for them, or modern sciences; and it is claimed that this revolution has gone so far, and is so irrevocable, that in making the classics a requisite for preaching, we narrow our field of choice to one-fifth of the fully educated young men of the country. We see no evidences of such a revolution as permanent. We see, indeed, a plenty of rash innovation; but there

is no sign that the educated mind of Christendom will submit to such a change in the methods of liberal culture. The business school is relied on, indeed, to make architects, engineers, and clerks; but real education, in its higher sense, still resorts to the classics as the foundation. Germany, for instance, "the school-mistress of the nations," has her "*real-schulen*" for the training of the men who are expected to devote themselves to the "bread and butter sciences;" but her *gymnasias*, where her youth are prepared for the professions, hold fast to the most thorough teaching of the dead languages. The plea that we limit ourselves away from four-fifths of our young men by requiring classical training, is refuted by this simple view. The educated, in any mode or form, are a small fraction of any population. Suppose, now, we retort, that by requiring that sound English education in divinity, which is described to us as so desirable and sufficient, we preclude ourselves from the whole field of choice, except that small fraction; wherefore we should require no education, classical or English, but ordain the common mass-ignorance. The reply to this our sophism would be patent: that while the Church will not ordain ignorance, she does not preclude even the most ignorant, because she proposes to educate (in English) and then ordain, all worthy applicants. But if classical training is essential to the minister's best usefulness, as we have shown, the very same reply avails for us. The Church does not exclude the four-fifths of the cultivated English scholars, by requiring of all classical knowledge; because her call is to come forward and accept a classical education, and then be ordained. The man who is fit for a minister will not refuse the additional labor for Christ, when he learns that it is requisite for his more efficient service of Christ. But it is said, the man whose heart God hath touched, may have no Latin, and may be middle-aged, and may have, moreover, a family on his hands. The classical process is too long for him to attempt. To this the answers are two. Very few men at middle age ought to be encouraged to take up the clerical profession. They must be men of peculiarly good endowments of nature and grace, or both they and the Church will have to repent the unseasonable change of profession. And second, for those peculiar

cases our system already makes full provision. To any fit man's plea, that the preparation required of him by the Church is hopelessly long, she has this answer: No such man, however behind-hand in his training, ever fails to receive, among us, the aid and encouragement to carry him through the desirable training. Her answer is, to point to that noble and honored class of her ministers represented by the ex-planter, James Turner of Bedford; the ex-carpenter, Dr. J. D. Matthews; the ex-ship captain, Dr. Harding; and to say to all like-minded men, If Christ gives you the *will*, we pledge ourselves to give the *way*.

It is urged that, by our requirements, we actually limit God's sovereignty. He may have elected the devout man without Latin, while we practically refuse to have him. That this is a "begging of the question," appears from one remark: Suppose it should be that God's election and call are to a thorough education, and then to preaching. But whether this is God's purpose, is the very question in debate. To assume the negative, is to beg that question. Should the affirmative be true, then our requirements are not across, but in the very line of God's purposes.

We are pointed to the inconsistent execution of our system, to the perfunctory examinations of Presbyteries, the shameful ignorance of some candidates, the practical setting at naught of our own Constitution; and we are told that we have just enough of the old system, in name, to drive off from us the good men who make no pretence of classical knowledge, and yet not enough to keep out other men as ignorant, and less honest. Now, on this we remark, first, that this charge is not brought by us, but by others; and it is not our mission at this time to affirm it. But, secondly, if it be true, the inference drawn from it, that our slow growth and small success mainly are caused by a lack of this class of less educated ministers, will find its complete refutation in the facts charged. For surely no other solution of our scanty success need be sought, if those discreditable facts are true. If courts of Christ's Church thus trample on their own profession and their own rules; if they thus dishonestly certificate ignorance as scholarship, assisting such impositions on society; if the young

men who become our pastors have no more conscience than to contemn and waste the precious opportunities for learning provided them by the Church, so as to come forth from them pretentious dunces ; if such grovelling laziness in the season of preparation is the measure of these young men's energy and devotion in their ministry, *there* is a mass of sin, at once, abundantly sufficient to insult our God, grieve his Spirit, and effectually alienate his help. Our quest is ended. There is no need for our looking one step farther to find out what is the matter. Such a ministry cannot be blessed of a truthful God, and cannot succeed. The one work which remains for us is, not to change our Constitution, but, with deep repentance and loathing of delinquencies so shameful, to return to it, and live up to it. Let us try that first. If these charges are true—which it is no task of ours to affirm—let us execute our righteous rules in examining and licensing in such a way that God's truth shall be honored, real merit recognised, and dishonest indolence shamed and banished from among us. Then, perhaps, we shall find that our ministry will be efficient, without innovating on the wisdom of our laws, approved by the experience of centuries.

It is argued that since society includes various grades of taste, culture, and possessions, our Church is suffering for the lack of different grades of ministers. But we thought that the *parity of the ministry* was one of the corner-stones of our Constitution. Methodists, or Prelatists, can consistently have different grades ; for they retain some features of hierarchy. Our Church, in its very essence, is not a hierarchy, but a republic. Now, there is one sense in which, with an equally thorough education, we shall have, not grades, but sorts, of ministers endlessly various, and adapted to all the various parts of our work. No two minds are exactly alike ; no two temperaments. God, who bestows the different shades of nature, provides for this variety ; that is enough. All we need is to do as our author so well inculcates in his January number—allot the right man to the right work by our Presbyterial supervision. This is entirely compatible with parity. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." But when we begin to make a substantive difference in the educational priv-

ileges of ministers, to train them for different grades, these will soon be virtually marked as higher and lower grades. Ultimately, the forms will be moulded to the virtual facts, and we shall have, like the Methodists, the beginnings of a hierarchy. And whereas it is supposed that the more cheaply trained preachers will be specially adapted to the plainer and poorer congregations, our knowledge of Presbyterian human nature makes us surmise that these will be the very charges to insist most upon having the fully trained minister, and to resent the allotment of the less learned to them, as a stigma and a disparagement. It is much to be feared that the new grade will be obstinately rejected by the very grade of hearers for whom they will have been devised.

The *desideratum* claimed is, that there shall be a way, like the Methodist mode, for giving many ministers their adequate training without the expense and delay of segregating them for years in scholastic institutions, along with a useful occupation in parochial labors. Now, we are struck with the thought that our Constitution provides expressly for just this way. It nowhere makes a college or seminary an essential. All that it stipulates for, in the way of means, is a two years' training under "some approved divine." This, of course, throws the door wide open to the incoming of the very ideal painted. The young man may join any experienced pastor, assist him within or without his field of labor, pursue his studies under his guidance, in connexion with these evangelistic labors, present himself before Presbytery, and, if his "parts of trial" are adequate, demand his licensure with the full sanction of the present Constitution. Now, if such a mode of training is so desirable, is so strongly a "felt want," how comes it that none enter into this open door? Why has there been such a rarity of such cases in our Church since 1825? Why are not many learned and wise pastors—of whom we have so many—thus bringing on many godly candidates? The obvious reply is, that the good sense of the Church tacitly perceives this training unsuited to the times. Pastors practically feel this, churches feel it, and the young men feel it. It is the same feeling which is to-day operating in the Methodist Church to make them substitute this method of training, long so peculiarly their own, by one

more nearly like ours. In a word, the door is already open. If the Christian community felt its need of this way, it would use it. It does not use it; and the inference is that really it does not want it.

We have been told that by this way we should get a cheaper ministry for our new fields. Men thus trained, not having spent so much in their training, would work on smaller salaries. Now, the only experience we have, does not support this hope. Most of the Methodist evangelists were trained thus; but they really receive better salaries than the Presbyterian. When the various allowances are added up, theirs is found a better paid ministry than ours.

The urgent comparisons made between our method and that of Methodists and Baptists cannot but suggest another thought: that we, if we make the proposed change, shall be in danger of "putting on their old shoes just when they are throwing them away." If these denominations are good exemplars for us, then it is to be presumed that they understand their own interests; their fine results indicate wise management. Now, it is significant that both these denominations are now expending great effort in making certain changes in their methods of rearing ministers, and that these changes are in the direction of the way we are now advised to forsake. They have tried, and are trying, two different ways. They are in a transition state. Before we make their way our guide, it will be well to wait and see which of their two ways they are going to approve finally for themselves. If we are correctly informed by those who are in closest intelligence with their influential men, these are yearly less and less satisfied with their old species of training, and more and more desirous to have all their ministry improve the advantages of the excellent seminaries of theology which they have founded. Hear, for instance, the testimony of Mr. Price in the *Southern Presbyterian*:

"And, in proof of this view, it is a remarkable fact, that those very causes to which this writer ascribes their more rapid growth, are becoming more unpopular every day with these denominations. While he and others in our Church are advocating a lower standard of ministerial qualification, that we may keep pace with the Baptists and Methodists,

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these denominations are directing the most intelligent energies of their respective Churches to raising their grade of scholarship; their uneducated men are losing caste and influence; the ministers coming forth from their theological schools are establishing a public sentiment and a more rigid rule of systematic theology, and of clear and accurate statement in doctrine, before which the loose and extravagant discourses of a class of preachers that once exercised a powerful influence fall under sharp censure, and are even occasionally exposed to ridicule.

"There are unlearned men in these Churches, and such may be licensed and ordained in ours, under our provision for extraordinary cases, whom the most intelligent are bound to respect as called of God, and whose usefulness none can deny; but when our Baptist and Methodist brethren are casting off certain methods, which they have weighed in the balance and found wanting, it becomes us to consider well before we take up that which they throw away; especially when they are free to confess that our example, and the evident fruits of our more thorough training, have powerfully impelled them toward the change.

"The writer in the REVIEW has heard of the Cumberland Presbyterians. If he has been correctly informed, he will find that no branch of the Presbyterian Church has, in proportion to its numbers and resources, more colleges, universities, and theological schools. If he attends their General Assembly, he will be impressed by the distinct and painful line of demarcation between their learned and their unlearned men. And when he sees and hears some of the latter, though he may find much to admire in the vigor of their speech and the vigor of their labors, he will not wonder that, as a people, our Cumberland brethren are making, perhaps, more vigorous efforts than any other Presbyterian body to educate their ministry, and thus obliterate one of the distinctive features upon which they went out from us. When the Rev. Dr. Lyon brought into our General Assembly, some years ago, a report against certain proposals of union with the Cumberland Presbyterians, he did not hesitate to present, as one of the arguments of the Committee that he represented, that, by such a union, our Church will be brought under the control of an overwhelming majority of uneducated men. If some of the theories now in vogue among us are put into practice, we may reach this alternative without uniting with the Cumberlands; and they, in turn, by raising their standard, as they now seem determined to do, may be in a position, by and by, to raise the same objection to a union with us.

We are reminded that our system now requires a longer and more expensive preparation than the other liberal professions. And why should it not, when our professional tasks are infinitely more responsible? But facts here argue on our side, again, in that society is steadily demanding a raised standard of preparation

from lawyers and physicians. Is this a time to lower ours? The well-furnished young physician, for instance, gets, in his youth, a pretty fair classical education; then he reads medicine a year with some doctor; then, if he graduates in one year (most have to spend two) in a good school of theoretic medicine, like that in the University of Virginia, he does remarkably well; then he goes into a New York or Baltimore hospital, one or two years, to get the clinic instruction. And even the plainer country neighborhoods are now requiring so much of training of their doctors! The other professions are advancing largely; it is no time for ours to go back.

It has been often and justly remarked that it requires more mature training and ability to teach unenlightened minds accurately than cultivated ones. It was considered by discerning persons the crowning manifestation of Dr. John H. Rice's trained capacity, that he could not only preach to the edification of General Assemblies in Philadelphia, but could go then to the Bethel Seaman's chapel and preach with equal effect to the rough sailors. If we are to bring poor and rude communities into our denomination, then they will need the best trained, not the inferior, minds, to inculcate on them our logical and profound system. And as regards the frontier communities, there is no greater mistake than that of concluding that, because their exteriors are rough, the ill-furnished minister will suffice to instruct them. The testimony of Dr. N. L. Rice, for instance, in the Assembly of 1857, was wholly the opposite; and he spoke of his own knowledge. Said he: "The garb of the frontiersmen may be rough; their dwellings may be cabins; but they include the very most independent, active, inquiring minds anywhere to be found in America. It is the fact that their minds and temperaments are such, which has made them emigrants; the plodding, the slow, the minds that like to lean on precedent and prescription, and are content to be led—these stay in the old neighborhoods. It is the adventurous minds who seek new fortunes. A very large portion of them are men of thorough education. The educated emigrant is most often a 'free-thinker' (so-called); for one main impulse which pushes the man of culture to brave the roughnesses

of the frontier is, that he has broken all intellectual trammels, if not all sound restraints of orthodox thinking. Hence we find these frontier societies seething with most eager speculation, questioning all old foundations. To suppose that the good man of slim intellectual resources can control these minds, is the most fatal mistake. The man who is to command them needs to have the most mature resources of learning at the readiest possible command. He needs to be a walking library, of the most advanced learning, not only in divinity, but in all connected studies." This witness is also true of our Southern frontiers. You shall see the "cow-boy" of Western Texas, sometimes reclining on his greasy blanket to read a pocket edition of Horace or Molière. In their "shanties," alongside of the whiskey-jug, will be found the writings of Huxley, Bradlaugh, and Büchner, with the *Westminster Review*, and the works of Renan. Our evangelists confirm Dr. Rice's testimony, and tell us to send none but thoroughly furnished men to the frontiers.

It has been supposed that great gain would result from the alternative of an "English course" in our seminaries for such candidates for the ministry as could not find time or means for mastering the original languages of Scripture. A manual of Church history might be taught, it is supposed, without involving Latin or Greek: and the exegetical and doctrinal studies would be founded on the English version alone. Were the teachers in these seminaries entitled to any consideration in this discussion, their friends might perhaps raise an embarrassing question on their behalf. Their time seems to be already fully occupied in the teaching of the fuller course to their classical students and the exposition of the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures, which alone are the *ipsissima verba* of God. Shall they cease to give this course, in order to do justice to the other class of their students? Or shall they give the latter class a light, perfunctory, Sabbath-school course, such as they will have time for? Would such a little sketch be a worthy training for a Presbyterian minister?

It will behoove the advocates of this system to consider three consequences, which are very distinctly involved in it.

One is, that it will admit the imperfect education of a great

many more men than should be entitled, according to the new plan itself, to enter the ministry upon it. Men's over-haste, or indolence, or ill-considered zeal, or self-confidence, will prompt many of the candidates to plead that they also are poor enough, or old enough, or gifted enough, or married enough, to claim to enter through the English door, of whom the judgment of our innovators themselves would be, that they had no grounds for claiming that easier way. The pressure of churches and Presbyteries for more laborers to be speedily gotten, will assuredly second their pleas. The result will be the general breaking down of our standard. The majority of our ministry will be the uneducated; the minority the educated, as it was in the other denominations in those old ways from which they are striving so hard to escape.

The second will be, that the students of the English course will be much at the mercy of the Professor for their doctrinal and exegetical opinions. When the teacher gives his construction of the text, if the English pupils attempt to say that the English version, or the commentaries thereon, seem to sustain another meaning, he has only to reply: "I assure you, young gentlemen, that the original supports only my construction; and if you understood that language, you would see it to be so." That is, to those students, an end of debate. Or else they must learn to hold their teacher in suspicion and disesteem, as a man capable of imposing on their ignorance. There will be one caste of minds which will resent this mental domination, the self-sufficient and crotchety. The consequence will be, that to this class their teacher will be no guide; but this is the class to whom influential guidance will be most necessary. Now, we surmise that this sweeping power in the Professors of our Seminaries will not be very agreeable to that large class of our Presbyters who cherish along with us a well-grounded jealousy of seminary dictation, and all other forms of centralisation. It may be said, our present Professors may all be trusted. But they cannot remain always. Unhappily, such things have been known in Seminaries as heretical Professors; and yet oftener, as crotchety Professors, fond of riding exegetical hobbies. Shall we arm these with this dangerous power of leading off the English students after their errors?

The third consideration is, that if the new plan of training is to be carried on to any successful extent, we must reconcile our minds to become a "Broad Church." We must lose our doctrinal unity. Again, we advance the experimental evidence as the most solid. All the denominations which practise the methods of training ministers proposed, become Broad Churches. The Immersionists are a Broad Church; we have ourselves heard Calvinism and Arminianism preached in it from the same pulpit. The Cumberland Presbyterian is a Broad Church. The Methodist is a Broad Church. As we remarked, the Wesleyan theology receives from Methodist ministers various interpretations, from moderate Calvinism down to Pelagianism. There are ministers and presiding elders who hold the perseverance of the saints just as we do. The Church of Alexander Campbell is a Broad Church; he himself declared that in it "all sorts of doctrine were preached by all sorts of men." In this we are not reproaching these denominations. We use the phrase "Broad Church" in no sense offensive to them, but as a ready and familiar phrase to describe a condition of things among them on which they congratulate themselves, namely, a tolerance in the ministry of the same body of different schools of theological opinion, within the scope of the fundamental doctrines of salvation. But we only point to the fact that it has been the conscientious fixed policy of us Presbyterians not to have these doctrinal diversities and contrarieties among our official teachers. We receive all shades of opinion, compatible with true repentance, to our communion; but we require the voice of our official body to give one sound as to revealed theology.

Now, the experience cited above proves that if we are willing to lose this doctrinal harmony and unity, the chief glory of a Church of Christ, we have only to imitate these other denominations in their method of training ministers. The explanation of the result is easy. Human minds are imperfect instruments of thought, and their opinions naturally tend to variety and diversity. Again, the religious world teems with competing clashing doctrines, each striving for recognition and pressing itself on others with its utmost ingenuity of argument. The proposed

method of training, by reason of its comparative brevity and imperfection, must leave its pupils more pervious to the injurious religious errors which obtrusively meet them. These different "grades" of preachers will not have the unifying bond with each other of a complete *esprit de corps*. The result will be doctrinal divergence; and our Church must either submit to become a "Broad" one, or be again rent by schism. We are aware that there is no patent infallible process, in fallible men's hands, for transmitting a doctrinal homogeneity from age to age. But the means which comes nearest, the only means of any tolerable efficiency is, under the grace and light of God's Spirit, the thorough education of ministers in an orthodox theology, and that by similar methods for all. Thus not only is the competent knowledge of the divine science acquired by all, and the practical skill in moral reasoning and exposition, which detect error and sophism in false doctrines, but all imbibe, so to speak, the Presbyterian and orthodox idiosyncrasy of mind. The doctrinal affinity in the correct creed is propagated through the whole body. Now, he who really doubts whether the Presbyterian theology is right, may also doubt whether it is proper to employ these influences for unifying and stereotyping men's belief in it. But those who, with us, are sure that our theology is right, will also feel that it is not only allowable, but our duty, to wield those influences for making our theology permanent in our ministers' minds. It is the only human way to avoid the tendencies to "Broad Churchism."

In conclusion, we most emphatically affirm all the regrets expressed at our lack of a holy aggressiveness, and every ardent aspiration for a remedy. But this remedy is not to be found by innovation upon our system, but in the reformation of the persons who work the system. What we need is not a class of imperfectly educated ministers, but repentance, holy yearnings for souls, prayer, and more abounding labor by educated ministers; more family religion and true Christian training in households, which is, after all, the Presbyterian's main lever; more self-consecration in our laymen; and especially our employment of the "dead capital" now lying unused in our eldership. The elder

need not be a "local preacher," after the pattern of the Methodist "local," but the intelligent elder ought to be something much better; active in spheres of work which the Church needs much more than sermonising or formal "preachments," viz., catechetical instruction, teaching the gospel from house to house, oversight, social meetings, exhortations, Sabbath-schools. Do we feel a "crying need" in our outlying destitutions for such work as this, and for laborers to do it more cheaply than the educated evangelists? This is precisely the work which intelligent ruling elders ought to do. All the elders in Scripture, ruling and teaching, were required to be "apt to teach." Our conception of the New Testament organisation of the congregation would not *pull down* a part of the ministers to an uneducated level, but *lift up* all the elders, including the ruling elders, to the level of *official teachers*. Each congregation was governed *and taught*, not by a one-man power, a sort of local prelate, but by a board, a plurality of elders, all of whom were teachers, though not all of equal teaching authority, learning, or gifts. But, to ensure full intelligence and permanent orthodoxy, we should require the presiding elder in this board to have the full equipment of well attested theological learning. One such man, thoroughly furnished, presiding over the board, and regulating and harmonising their joint instructions, would give a sufficient guarantee of soundness in the faith. The others under him, in their less authoritative teaching sphere, would safely fill in the details of the work. The ruling elder would not act as catechist as though he were an independent integer, but as a member of the board, under its direction, and especially under the direction of the president, who is fully trained and tried; even as he, in his public work as authoritative herald of salvation, does not act independently, but under the control of *his* presbyterial board, the Presbytery. Thus the didactic work of each congregation would assume a largeness, occupying several men's hands; while the thorough theological furniture of the one man at the head would guarantee doctrinal safety in the whole. Such was evidently the Apostle's conception in the Pastoral Epistles.

ARTICLE VI.
POLITICAL RELIGION.

The inconclusiveness of the controversy that has agitated our Church on the subject of fraternity, is apparent to all except those superficial thinkers who rush to those conclusions which their own wishes have dictated with precipitate haste. Deliberate men, who are in the habit of regulating their impulses by careful reflection, are not fully satisfied with the present *status* of the question, and have an impression, more or less distinct, that the bottom of the difficulty has not yet been reached. It is easy enough, in time of war, to allow political passions to override the plainest requirements of Christian charity; and it is equally easy, when these passions have subsided, to embrace one another in a paroxysm of sentimental reconciliation. But it is far more difficult to adjust the present consistently with the past, and to establish kindly feeling between alienated parties without abandoning positions once solemnly taken. This is the principal source of all our trouble, in endeavoring to bring into harmony the two branches of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

We regret that we cannot discover, in the transactions of the Assemblies of 1882, that success in the effort to remove existing barriers which the Christian sentiment of the two constituencies so earnestly requires. We propose, in the first place, to examine the action which was taken by the parties, and then to point out, as far as possible, the *principles* that must be adjusted before a genuine understanding can possibly be reached. For it is evident that, if principle separated the two bodies during the war, that separation, both in letter and spirit, must continue so long as the reasons for it are adhered to.

The Southern General Assembly, at Atlanta, has the credit of initiating the measure by which the proposed reconciliation was expected to be consummated. Under the influence of a generous impulse from the heart of the people, and of a suggestion of policy from brethren on the border, the Concurrent Resolution was adopted and transmitted. Had this resolution been simply adopted by

the other Assembly, without explanation or attachment, the object would have been secured, and general satisfaction would have followed. But let us not be deceived in regard to the object itself, which, in the very words of the resolution, was to establish fraternal relations without any abandonment of avowed principles by either party. Nothing was to be recalled but "offensive expressions." The *substance* of every ecclesiastical, or political, difference, was to be left untouched by the action. In other words, the formal posture of antagonism must be abandoned, and the two bodies assume towards each other the semblance of peace; but the different views of duty held by each might be still entertained, on both sides, without offence. This was, beyond question, the proposition of our Assembly, and it was conceived with the purest motives, as a measure well calculated to satisfy the demands of the people for the restoration of fraternal sentiments. With deep respect for the Assembly, and unabated confidence in the ability and rectitude of those who, under the impulses of the occasion, resorted to this form of procedure, we are, nevertheless, constrained, in the light of subsequent developments, to question the wisdom, and even the propriety, of the proposition. We do not doubt that, under the circumstances, almost any of us, who now dissent, would have concurred in the adoption of the resolution, which was as explicit as language could make it, and appeared, at the time, the precise thing which the occasion demanded. But reflection leads us to doubt the effect of the measure, because, in reality, the resolution amounted to a mere formality—a restoration of courteous intercourse, without removing the substance of those causes which have divided us into two distinct denominations, widely separated by conflicting principles. The restoration of courtesy was, indeed, not all that was aimed at, because telegrams expressing it had already been exchanged. It was further designed to bring the two bodies together in so emphatic a manner that the world should know their mutual confidence. It was intended to proclaim that the principles by which we are separated are of little importance compared with those held in common by the two bodies. And we have no disposition to dissent from this view of the object. But, just here is our objection, that, by such

an act, without other statement, we are in danger of subordinating matters of principle to a formal interchange of courtesy. The errors of the Northern Presbyterian Church, in its political relations, may not be so grave as other conceivable errors of an ecclesiastical or doctrinal nature; but it does not follow that they are not so important as to require our continuous protest. But, in fact, the errors of that body, against which we protest, are *ecclesiastical*, not simply political. They have affirmed, or assumed, certain principles, which, if carried into action, would entirely destroy the religious liberties of the people. They have claimed the right of their courts to determine, by the force of conscience, the political *status* of every communicant. They have adjudicated for the people, in contempt of the right of private judgment, the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, and virtually required their members to subscribe to the opinions of one class of politicians, and repudiate those of another class. By these assumptions they have converted their Church into a political machine, to propagate political dogmas. That they are conscious of all this, we do not affirm; but that such is the attitude they occupy, we do maintain; and we would long hesitate before we would say to them that such principles are insignificant, and shall not interrupt our cordial intercourse, provided all offensive language on certain other subjects is withdrawn.

We are not discussing the propriety of a delegation, but the propriety of such a declaration as a *sine qua non*. The interchange of delegates does not differ, except in form, from salutation by letter or telegram. But the character of the condition adopted, is the special point of interest. And, in this, our Assembly appears to say that Christian intercourse ought to be governed by the same rules which obtain in the parlor or at the dinner table. We care little for your principles, provided your manners are unexceptionable. Retract your offensive language on certain topics, and you may retain these errors as long as you please. This was not the actual message, but it was, as far as it went, the purport of the Concurrent Resolution. It was not so intended, but such is a natural interpretation of its language. It insists upon nothing but the withdrawal of offensive expressions. Its only reference

to *principles* is, that they may be adhered to in the future, as in the past, without constituting a bar to the most friendly association. And thus the *language* of the deliverances of the Northern Assemblies is emphasised, and the *substance* of their ecclesiastical errors during the war is treated as comparatively unimportant.

This view of the Concurrent Resolution throws into the strongest light the absurdity of the "explanatory action" of the Springfield Assembly, that accompanied its adoption. The necessity for an explanation always depends upon the doubtful nature of the thing explained; and every apology for the explanatory resolution assumes that the Concurrent Resolution was liable to a variety of constructions. This is what the Rev. Dr. Herrick Johnson, the Moderator of the Springfield Assembly, and mover of the explanatory resolution, puts forth as the justification of that action. He uses the following language, in his letter in the *Christian Observer*, December 27th, 1882: "It is said we kept our consistency by the clause, 'while receding from no principle.' But what is a principle worth, the expression of which we must 'regret' and 'withdraw'? Did the framers of the Concurrent Resolution mean that we could retain our principle as to the duty of loyalty to the Government, but we must be sorry that we ever said anything about it? The Concurrent Resolution, on its face, and in the literal and exact letter of it, seems to demand just that absurdity." Now, we affirm with confidence, that the Concurrent Resolution is one of the clearest and least equivocal statements ever conveyed in words. Dr. Johnson, and every other apologist, ignores the distinction between the *form* of a statement and the *substance* it conveys. Dr. Nelson, in one of his letters to Dr. Palmer, recognises this distinction, and expresses the hope that his opinion was correct. Dr. Palmer, in reply, confirms his view; and whilst assuring him that the loyal deliverances were "waived bodily," yet offensive expressions bound up in them, "warp and woof," must be withdrawn. It is thus evident that our Church did not demand a retraction of any expression of loyalty, but any expression offensive to our Assembly that was contained in the same resolutions. It is assumed by Dr. Johnson, that loyalty *could not* be expressed without censure of rebellion;

and with this question we shall deal in the sequel. But for the present, we contend that he has answered himself. In the very letter from which we quote, he puts the pregnant question: "Does any sane man suppose the Northern Church could ever, by any possibility, be led consciously to do that?" Do what? Why, withdraw all its political deliverances. And we agree with him, that no *sane* man could imagine such a thing. Where, then, was any call for an explanation of our Concurrent Resolution, if all *sane* men must agree that it clearly meant the retention of loyal principle on the records of the Assembly, and the withdrawal of all expressions conveying reproach against others? If, as Dr. Palmer said, the injurious expressions were so bound up with the loyal expressions as to be inseparable, farewell to fraternal relations. If one brother cannot disapprove of the conduct of another, without holding him up to the odium of the world as a miscreant and a traitor, Christian charity must perish from among mankind. Every sane man knows that the Southern Assembly referred, in its Concurrent Resolution, to *principles* held by organised bodies, and not those of individuals. But the principles of a Church, or a court, are expressed in its *records*, and cannot exist in secret; and Dr. Johnson has gone a great distance out of the way in his attempt to explain his explanation. The Concurrent Resolution is unequivocal. No *sane* man can misunderstand it, and the added resolution was entirely uncalled for, *except* as a means of reaffirming, without provocation or justification, the deep-seated hatred of its authors for what they call rebellion. Dr. Johnson endeavors to fix the blame of reopening that issue upon the Atlanta Assembly. But there is not a whisper of allusion to anything of the kind in the Concurrent Resolution; and all his ingenuity to fasten such a reference upon it is altogether futile. None but lunatics could be in doubt.

But we have more to do with his argument, that the whole body of the loyal deliverances *must* be "offensive" to the Southern Church. As the Northern Assembly adopted his explanation, we have thus exposed clearly to view the fact, never developed before, that, in adopting the Concurrent Resolution, the Springfield Assembly did not mean to retract *all* of its offensive

language. *Some* of its offensive expressions remain uncanceled. Dr. Johnson makes this evident, and leaves the Atlanta Assembly committed to a retraction of *all*, whilst the other Assembly has declined to reciprocate. This relative attitude of the parties is now so fully admitted by the man who is best qualified to explain the explanation, that it may be accepted as historical and final. But we cannot, with our Assembly, express ourselves as fully satisfied.

It must, however, be remembered that the subject which has been so much discussed during the past year, was not fraternal relations between the two Churches, so much as between two ecclesiastical bodies. It had no reference to individual communicants, or even to individual members of the Assembly. The object of the correspondence was to remove obstacles out of the way of an annual interchange of friendly sentiments between the two bodies of representative men in actual session. It was not supposed that the action taken would directly affect the people at large. We may imagine the adjustment complete, without any closer affinity of the Churches; and, on the other hand, the most cordial relations might exist among the members without any correspondence whatever. The moral effect of such a formal adjustment of differences might be very favorable, but it depends altogether upon the significance of the steps taken in accomplishing it.

And here we are brought to inquire into the extent to which the proposed reciprocal action of the two late Assemblies is calculated to reconcile the alienated *membership* of the two Churches. We understand the reproach of complicity in "a wicked rebellion" to be still retained as an unretracted record of the Northern Assembly, applicable to all *ministers* and *members* of the Southern Church who took a willing part in our civil war. The charges of heresy, blasphemy, and schism, made against our Assembly, are formally withdrawn; but those expressions which referred to the political and military actions of individuals, however injurious, are especially reaffirmed, and are permanent testimonies against the good character of our people. We understand that even the members of the Atlanta Assembly, who glory in the

services they rendered to the Confederacy, are yet under the ban of ecclesiastical denunciation, issued by so many courts of the Northern Church during the war. If so, it is fair to ask, What has been gained by a return of the two Assemblies to mutual recognition and courtesy? If the ministers and private members of our Church are still unrepentant for a hideous crime, we are at a loss to know how their representatives can be satisfied with the withdrawal of insult from the temporary body to which they belonged.

The use of the probe is painful, it is true, but sometimes very necessary, and we desire to explain this matter with all fidelity. The attitude of the Northern Assembly towards the "sin of rebellion," is, we are assured, unchanged and unchangeable. Now, these various loyal resolutions, as Dr. Johnson truly insists, do reflect with unabated force upon the Christian character of most of our people. They are necessarily "offensive," as between man and man, and no amount of bowing and scraping between the two Assemblies can obliterate the record. If Dr. Johnson is correct in stating that all these expressions of loyalty and denunciation for rebellion are now reaffirmed, by a refusal to retract, we are compelled to conclude that the restoration of fraternal relations is to be confined to the Assemblies, and the members of the two Churches are to be left in their original antagonism. The mutual epithets of "traitor" and "tyrant" are to remain applicable in the intercourse of individuals, whilst their representatives are gushing with fraternity on the floors of the bodies at Lexington and Saratoga.

It is not an answer to all this that time heals the wounds of war. Consistency requires an *unchangeable* record to mean the same now that it did twenty-five years ago. If the so-called rebellion was a great crime of the individual citizen then, it is still a stain upon his character, partially obliterated if repented of, but glaring in all its heinous turpitude if no repentance has been manifested. Arson or burglary, committed in early years, never cease to affect the standing in society of the culprit in after-life; and treason and wicked rebellion must descend as a badge of infamy to children's children. If this is the true relation of the

two Churches, fraternity between their members will be of slow growth. Mere resolutions of politeness, the hollow courtesy of diplomacy, will not reconcile our people to a permanent reproach. Such formality did not constitute the mutual love and confidence of the primitive disciples. It was not understood between Peter and Paul that they were to be courteous as members of the council of Jerusalem, but might reproach each other in private as a minion of Rome, on the one hand, and an obstinate, rebellious Jew, on the other.

Nothing is more evident, on a calm survey of the field, than this, that Christian confidence, in complete reciprocity, is the true *desideratum* between the Churches. Has this point been reached by recent negotiation, or not? By no means. The Southern Assembly recedes from no avowed principle, but retracts *all* expressions implying reproach against the Northern Assemblies. The Northern Assembly recedes from no avowed principle and retracts three specific charges, expressly reserving against the constituents of the other Assembly all implied charges of wicked complicity in rebellion. On the other hand, the *spirit* of the two concurrent resolutions is one of love and confidence. They *seem* to declare that the barriers of the war are broken down, and that a new era of cordial intercourse has dawned upon the Churches. There is a wide difference, apparently, between the relations now supposed to be established, and those which subsisted during and long after the conflict. The spirit of the two Churches is supposed to be revolutionised, and yet there is nothing to correspond with it on the records of the Assemblies, except the concurrent resolutions, which, as explained, do not retract, but reaffirm, the original reproach. It is too plain to require repetition, that the posture of the Northern Church, as taken by its General Assembly, is inconsistent with its own professed spirit; and, if so, the thing needed is a confession that the language put upon record during the war was the result of political excitement, and is now repudiated. It is a mere fiction that resolutions of loyalty, involving reproach upon the Christian character of our people, were *necessarily* adopted. If adopted at all, it was easy to put them in a form consistent with fraternal sentiments towards others.

It is not to be disguised that much of the dissatisfaction of a portion of our membership with the correspondence of the Assemblies of last year arises from a sense of wrong in the *political* action of the Northern Church, and we are impelled by convictions of justice to examine into the *right* of an ecclesiastical body to entertain such action.

From the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, two interpretations of that instrument have divided the statesmen and citizens of the United States into two parties, the majority of the one being north, and the majority of the other being south, of Mason and Dixon's line. Extremists on both sides held views of the nature of the Government directly opposite. On one side, it was contended that the Union was sacred, although the Constitution should perish. On the other, it was maintained that any State might secede, if it judged the compact to be broken by the Government. It was never imagined by any portion of the public that the advocates of these opposite views were guilty of any *moral* error in holding them. They held equal positions in the Government, and were equally respected by their countrymen. The Churches never adopted the principles of either party, and no one ever dreamed of making party dogmas a test of Christian character. The *secessionist* and the *coercionist* sat side by side in ecclesiastical councils, and the taunt of wickedness was never hurled from the one to the other. Such were their relations until the political crisis came. None but a few wild fanatics imagined that a man was *wicked* in being a Monarchist, like Alexander Hamilton, or a State Rights man, like John C. Calhoun. This shows a clear distinction, everywhere apprehended, between such opinions and bad moral principles. The mere fact that the opinions were held in the abstract, and not carried into execution, does not account for this distinction; for, in morals, the approval of crime in the abstract, is itself universally regarded by good men as criminal. A polygamist is condemned, whether he practises according to his principles or not.

The precepts and example of our Lord are the safest of all guides in all such matters. It is true that we are exhorted by

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inspired apostles to submit to and pray for "the powers that be." It is true that history furnishes countless precedents for the legitimate action of ecclesiastical authority in reference to the obligations of subjects to the sovereign and of citizens to the state. It is also true that, even during our revolutionary war, the councils of the Church sometimes pronounced decisions upon the merits of the contest. How far these latter deliverances were justifiable is a question with which we do not meddle, because they are no precedents for us, who were called to pass through a conflict of entirely different conditions. The issue in our case was between two interpretations of a written compact, both of which had been treated as legitimate and honorable from the first. And we contend that the Presbyterian Church proceeded upon sound scriptural principles in its policy of silence through so many years of political agitation previous to the war. The precepts and conduct of the Divine Master were clearly indicated in his word, and conservative Christians recognised their obligation to follow his example.

We know that the government of Judea was, in his day, in the hands of the Romans, by some sort of compact resulting from a state of war. We know that there were two parties in the state, the one favorable, and the other opposed to the Roman ascendancy. We know that Christ never, by word or deed, committed himself to either of these parties. He emphatically taught that his kingdom was a spiritual kingdom, and had nothing to do with the political issues of the times. He exhorted the people to "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's," and thus distinctly affirmed that the temporal and spiritual spheres are wide apart in their nature, and that the duties and obligations of the two do not necessarily conflict. There may have been a difference between the parties in reference to the terms of the treaty, and a fundamental principle may have been involved in the controversy. Yet no word escaped his lips that could, in the least degree, be understood as committing him to either side. On *moral* questions he was never silent or equivocal. He probed them to the very bottom. And, therefore, we have a right to say that his reserve, in reference to the

question of Jewish independence, conveys a lesson which our Church was wise in following until the immediate causes of the late war began to operate.

Here then was a great fundamental question in American politics, honestly and honorably entertained on both sides, and about to be referred, practically, not theoretically, to the arbitrament of physical force. Every citizen was called upon to decide upon his duty in the temporal sphere, according to the best light he could obtain. The Church was expected to act in its spiritual sphere as it was taught to act by its Head. The great question was, Did the Lord lay down any rule or principle by which it could be guided? If he did, the Church might be justified in its action proclaiming loyalty to the General Government to be the religious duty of the citizens of the seceded States, and denouncing resistance as a crime in the sight of Heaven. If he did not, this action was a usurpation, violative of the rights of the citizen. When the Northern Church is challenged to point out its authority to take the action it adopted, it is compelled to do what the Lord ever declined to do himself in reference to Jewish politics. It is driven to the necessity of undertaking an interpretation, not only of the Scriptures, but of the terms of the political compact which defines the Union. For it is obvious that no scripture can be available until the actual case is fully stated. It was necessary therefore that the Church should weigh thoroughly all the *pros* and *cons*, which, for two generations, had divided the people of the Union into two honestly differing parties. It is historical that, without deliberation, and without reference to the terms of compact, with a blind infatuation which nothing but the excitement of the hour can excuse, the Church proceeded to decide for its members in all the seceding States, the most momentous and difficult political question that ever agitated a nation. The decision was, that secession was "*wicked rebellion*" against a Government recognised as sacred by the Holy Scriptures. For, unless the Northern interpretation of the compact was *scripturally* true, and the Northern theory of the Government made it a *religiously* sacred object, it is impossible to construct a plea for the position the Church assumed.

It cannot therefore be denied that the Northern General Assembly did, during the war, positively adjudicate the question of primary allegiance, and decided that some of the wisest statesmen and jurists our country ever produced, including some of the very framers of the Government, were altogether wrong in their interpretation of its character; and then, in the light of that infallible conclusion, pronounced it immoral to carry into action the errors it had never before condemned. The justification of these proceedings depends, of course, upon the two conditions, that the judgment was by *competent authority*, and that it was *just* in the light of the word of God.

No proposition can be clearer than this, that, even supposing the Church to be a competent judge in the premises, the decision was unjust in holding the individual citizen responsible, in a moral sense, for his view of his duty. His right to entertain the very principle upon which he acted had been all along recognised without a whisper of instruction as to its immoral aspect. There was no scriptural precept that could possibly guide an inquirer in his interpretation of a political compact. It was like the construction to be put upon a will or a deed. The Scriptures never afford any assistance in such an undertaking, and the inquiry is, from beginning to end, an inquiry for facts. How then could any immoral quality attach to such an investigation, except such common human infirmity as is liable to impair all the exercises of the mind? The mere ecclesiastic, in his ignorance of the political history of the country, is in the habit of reasoning from *assumed* premises directly to the point. To him, it is as plain as the nose on his face, that allegiance to the Federal Government is always a religious duty, and resistance to its power a flagrant crime. He derives this from the plain statement that the Constitution is "the supreme law of the land," and he does not know that he has assumed the very premises upon which his conclusion is reached without sufficient knowledge of the nature of the question, the solution of which was a puzzle to our ablest statesmen. He does not know that one party in the Convention that framed the Constitution regarded the allegiance of the citizen as due to the supreme law *through* his allegiance to the State, and obligatory only

so long as the State continues to be a member of the Union. He does not know that some of the States entered the Union, as understood by one of the parties, with reservation of the right to re-assume an independent position, if in its judgment the compact should not be fulfilled. He does not know that according to the same interpretation, the secession of the States was a valid act, necessarily withdrawing the allegiance of the citizen from the General Government, in virtue of the *primary* allegiance due to the State itself. In consequence of this ignorance he was prepared to assume as unquestionable that which many patriotic statesmen had altogether denied, that the Government was clothed with power to coerce the citizens of a State into rebellion against it. It was easy to infer from such premises that acquiescence in secession was "wicked rebellion" against the Union, and that such citizens were guilty of a degree of crime which warranted their subjugation by arms. But it is manifest that whatever motives of policy, or even of self-preservation, the North may have felt, impelling it to such a war as was waged against the South, the charge of a "wicked rebellion" is not sustained by anything approaching a demonstration. The South regarded the Union as a compact between States which had been grossly violated, and the seceding States acted on the conscientious belief of their people that a withdrawal was the only remedy left. They honestly believed that the Constitution was the bond that constituted the Union, and that a violation of the connecting link was a dissolution of that Union. Successful war might be employed to compel them to return, but the obedience of the citizen to the requirements of his State could not be construed as rebellion, which is an individual act. Right or wrong, this was the political faith which our people derived from the framers of the Constitution, and which had been fearlessly advocated, on the hustings and in the Senate, from the very foundation of the Government. Rebellion against an undivided sovereignty is easily defined. But when the sovereignty is subdivided as in our system, and the citizen owes allegiance to two distinct powers, the definition fails. He may be in a situation where obedience to the one implies resistance to the other. The question then arises, not only which

is supreme, but which is primary. The secondary and derivative may be supreme, as under the American Union, and yet the primary sovereignty may be regarded as the more sacred of the two. State sovereignty being the *original* source of Federal sovereignty may, for definite purposes, relinquish the supremacy to its creature, and, being disappointed in its aim, may resume its former dignity. Such, at least, was the view taken by the seceding States, and, so far as the individual citizen is concerned, it reduces his crime to a mere shadow. If his act was rebellion, his refusal would also have been rebellion against the authority of his own commonwealth. In making his choice between these alternatives, he had a task which to many was trying alike to the head and the heart. Who will undertake to demonstrate that such a choice lay between *loyalty* and *treason*? In the sight of heaven it was generally decided on both sides under an honest conviction of duty, and thousands attested their conscientiousness in heroic death. One Christian brother had no right whatever, in such a controversy, to brand another with a tyrant's or a traitor's infamy. Much less had a grave Assembly of ministers and elders any justification for a decision which pronounced one interpretation holy and just, and the other false and treacherous.

But we most earnestly deny the *competency* of an ecclesiastical council to entertain such a question. We have shown that the Lord himself declined to commit himself and followers to either political faction among the Jews. The whole tenor of his life combines to indicate that had a revolution been attempted in his day, he would have kept himself aloof from all complicity in it. He would not have commended the spirit of loyalty to Cæsar, nor denounced the struggles of his countrymen as "a wicked rebellion." The Church which he has founded is an institution for all nations, and cannot, consistently with his example, devote itself to the interests of any party in peace or war. There is a right and also a wrong side to every controversy of a political nature. But it would be fatal to the Church if she were tempted to intervene as a party on such occasions, however plain the case might be. When, in international strife, ecclesiastical authorities declare their judgment of the merits of the contest, they to that extent

sacrifice their catholicity to national feeling. And in a civil conflict it is obvious that a partisan spirit in a Church betrays more of the influence of the world than of that of the gospel.

In a Presbyterian Assembly, the members are both Christians and citizens. Their individual feelings and opinions on political questions have their proper sphere in the outside world. With them they have nothing to do whilst engaged in their spiritual offices. They transcend their commission whenever they undertake to decide questions that belong to political life. But never in the history of the Church was there an occasion when such a course was more contrary to the example of Christ, than that presented in our late civil war. It was undertaken by the Church, not only to urge the duty of loyalty to constituted government, but when the great question was, which was the true object of loyalty, to determine for the people the very point which they claimed a right to settle themselves. That question was narrowed down to the simplest terms. Each State, on acceding to the Union, had established a dual government within its bounds. Did it retain the right to abrogate both at discretion, or only one? The overthrow of the Federal authority might have been a violation of the compact, and even an act of war; but was it *rebellion*? And if so, was it *wicked rebellion*? We do not discuss these questions, but we contend that they were *open* questions, which no tribunal on earth was competent to decide—not even the Supreme Court of the United States, which was created for well defined purposes, excluding such an issue. And this is fully confirmed by the undisputed fact, that several of the States expressly reserved the right of judgment to themselves.

The competency of a Church Council to review the action of a State Convention, to absolve its citizens from the paramount allegiance which it claimed, and to pronounce obedience to its mandates a crime against heaven, is hardly worthy of argument. There is not a shadow of support for it in the word of God. "The powers that be are ordained of God," is the statement of that word. But this was never understood in a free country to teach the duty of a tame submission to any government, merely because it has heretofore existed. It was not written to recognise the

legitimacy of the Roman Cæsars. It was simply a warning against turbulent individuals to respect the civil power in actual exercise. Anarchy is crime. Law and order must be maintained. But no one except a mere sciolist would conclude that an orderly change of the form of government in a state, accomplished without a jar to the constitution of society, was forbidden by the Apostle, who well knew that the Church was destined to live under every system of government.

It may therefore be asked, from what part of its commission did the Presbyterian General Assembly derive its authority to pronounce the Christian citizens of the seceding States guilty of rebellion at all, much less of a wicked rebellion? The absurdity of the assumption might be exposed by a multitude of arguments and illustrations, if it were necessary. But, fortunately, the day has gone by when such a claim could be decently defended. Among the great mass of citizens of the United States, although the term of "rebellion" is retained, and has not lost its opprobrious significance, men in their ordinary business and social intercourse are careful to abstain from its use. It is implied in all the reviving amenities of daily life, that the late war had its origin in an honest difference of opinion, and the mere act of participation is no longer regarded as a matter of reproach. The Northern General Assembly would be chargeable with gross hypocrisy if it did not sincerely adopt this sentiment in its Concurrent Resolution. If it adheres to the phraseology used during the war, it cannot adhere to the *significance* of the language employed. And yet it insists that this language must be perpetuated as its recorded testimony against the sin of secession. We have shown its departure from its commission in adopting such deliverances, and now we would like to know some good reason for adhering to them when the significance of their phraseology is lost. No one has ever been tried and convicted, in a civil or ecclesiastical court, of the alleged crime of "rebellion." What has become of the *criminality* implied in all their political and religious denunciations? The "traitor" is now embraced with a gush of cordiality in all assemblies of Church and State. It is, to a large extent, sincere. But if sincere, ought an injurious and unwar-

ranted form of testimony to be retained upon the records of the Church, which fastens, for all time, the stigma of wickedness upon all Southern Presbyterians who took part in the political act of secession? Even among the members of our General Assembly, to meet in Lexington, Kentucky, in May, there will be many in whose faces these records will be flung, with the uncanceled charge that they were once involved in "a wicked rebellion," of which they have given no sign of repentance. Perhaps some of our delegates accredited to the Northern Assembly with our warm salutations, will be under the same ban as individuals. They will doubtless be received with much politeness and cordiality. And yet Dr. Herrick Johnson assures us that the phraseology of the testimony which proclaimed them "wicked rebels" cannot possibly be retracted. We do not understand such a transaction! No wonder it requires a series of resolutions, each explanatory of its predecessor. But explanation is impossible. The case requires the retraction of reproach, the withdrawal of stigma from the past Christian character, not only of our Assembly, but of its *personnel*, and of our membership at large. It is substantially done in the Concurrent Resolution, and in the whole tone of society. Why should it not be done on the records? We feel confident that a majority of their Assembly would have adopted the Concurrent Resolution without explanation or limitation. A fair criticism, in the light of Dr. Johnson's letter, leaves no doubt that the explanation did modify the sense of the original, so as to render it more acceptable to a hesitating minority. It purported to make it more explicit, and this implied dissatisfaction with the terms of the message. If it was susceptible, as assumed, of two different interpretations, it was adapted in one sense to the exclusion of the other, and this without knowing positively in what sense it was meant by the other party. This seems to us a clear case of modification; for the Concurrent Resolution was not adopted in its own terms, but in a sense conveyed more explicitly by the terms of the other. The explanatory resolution was a condition, a *sine qua non*, in the transaction, and "modified" the phraseology of the original, so as to give to it an explicitness which it did not of itself convey.¹

¹NOTE.—It is of comparatively little importance whether Dr. John-

But, independently of all verbal criticism, we hold that it is due to our people, as well as to the General Assembly, that language importing crime, unauthorised by the Scriptures, unnecessarily used, incompatible with historical facts, and now generally repudiated in polite circles, should no longer be adhered to in the records of religious bodies, merely on the ground of preserving an appearance of consistency. Some of our ministers, it is true, declare that they have no objection to the epithets employed. They may be ever so harmless in themselves; but when we demand reparation, we ought not to be satisfied with a partial one. We cannot consistently receive a withdrawal from the Assembly of certain specific charges, when in the same breath we are notified that another charge that applies alike to ministers and members, is not, and cannot be, withdrawn. But for the pride of consistency, it certainly would not be difficult for the Northern General Assembly to declare that, whilst the sentiments and principles of its branch of the Church on the subject of duty to the General Government remain unaltered, it is willing to acknowledge that, during the late war, it was led, by the very form of these sentiments, to make political decisions which the Bible and its Constitution did not authorise, and which it now repudiates, at least so far as its records import censure upon the Christian character of their Southern brethren.

We make no demand upon our Northern brethren. Our position is plain. We simply indicate what is needed, if true, heartfelt fraternity between the two denominations is the object. We hope the spirit of reconciliation is progressing, and that the people on both sides are ready to drop the language of partisans and belligerents. But common sense and common decency require

son's Resolution "modified" or only "explained" the Concurrent Resolution. He knows his own purpose better than others. But that he is in error concerning the matter is easily illustrated. If he had put his explanation, as a *parenthesis*, in the Concurrent Resolution, instead of attaching it, it would have modified it by limiting its meaning. It was adopted with the parenthesis *virtually* included, but sent back without it. Who, then, can deny that the Concurrent Resolution was adopted by his Assembly in a *modified form*? He insists that it did not change its meaning, but it is certain that it sought to *amend* its language.

that such language shall not be sacredly preserved, as embalming for the admiration of future generations those political aversions, resentments, and passions which the Church of Jesus Christ was designed to cover with the mantle of charity, and finally to extinguish for ever.

To sum up as briefly and clearly as possible, we are not satisfied, because complete reciprocity has not been attained, and complete justice has not been done. If Dr. Johnson is correct, our Assembly has received clean papers on three specific points; but so far as the loyalty resolutions of the other body have affected the Christian character of our Church, in its ministry and membership, in reference to political and military transactions, we are told that no reparation can be made, and the children of the Church must continue to be exposed to an inheritance of shame. It was *necessary* for the Northern Assemblies to testify against the wickedness of the rebellion, and this testimony, however "offensive" in its form, is like a law of the Medes and Persians that changeth not. If the records of our Assembly contained any corresponding imputations upon the Northern Presbyterians as guilty of "a wicked war of conquest," we have not seen them, and therefore we maintain that full reciprocity between the two constituencies has not been attained. And this, notwithstanding the ease with which the *substance* of the loyal resolutions might have been preserved, whilst their offensive phraseology might have been disowned.

We are not satisfied, because, as Dr. Johnson has shown, there was no occasion whatever to assure "sane" men that the posture of loyalty was not abandoned by adopting the Concurrent Resolution; and therefore the reaffirmation of the loyal and denunciatory deliverances, with all their liberal offers of *blood* and *treasure*, was entirely gratuitous and necessarily offensive.

We are not satisfied, because the transaction reopened the main issue between the two Churches, when the aim of our Assembly was to consign it, as far as it could, to oblivion. That issue, all men know, is in reference to the right of a church court to resolve itself virtually into a self-appointed political convention, decide

for the conscience a fundamental question of constitutional law, and urge upon the citizen the sacred duty of a bloody crusade against those who honestly differed from them. It is not objected to, as a mere political exhibition, but because it assumed an ecclesiastical sanctity, and was intended to convince the world that Southern Christians were guilty of a crime which the Christian religion clearly reprobated. Those resolutions, adopted by religious bodies, were conceived in the very spirit of brutal conquest, and contributed their share to the consummation of ruin in fire and blood. The cloak of ecclesiastical authority is too thin a disguise to prevent all sober minds from now perceiving that it was political madness that inspired them. Their reassertion implies a stubborn adherence, on the part of a few, to those errors and passions which the many on both sides ardently desire to bury and forget.

JAMES A. WADDELL.

ARTICLE VII.

DR. EDWIN A. ABBOTT ON THE GENUINENESS OF
SECOND PETER.

In the great revival of interest in all branches of Biblical Criticism which is at present in progress, it cannot seem strange that such a book as 2 Peter has received a great deal of attention. The fact is, at all events, illustrated by the appearance from English presses, during the course of the "publishers' year," extending from the autumn of 1881 to the autumn of 1882, of at least four important (*inter alia minora*) discussions of the genuineness of that Epistle. It may also be a significant mark of the temper of the times that no two of these discussions reach the same conclusion. Dr. Huther,¹ who examines the question with the painstaking care that behoved a German scholar and a con-

¹ *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the General Epistles of Peter and Jude*. By Joh. Ed. Huther, Ph. D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. See p. 284.

tinuer of Meyer's Commentary, but who does not succeed in preventing our missing the master's own hand, comes simply to a verdict of *non liquet*. "If, then," he says, "the grounds for and against the authenticity are thus evenly balanced, there is here presented a problem which is not yet solved, and which perhaps cannot be solved." Canon Farrar, after a discussion in which he has, as is his wont, smelted rhetoric and argument into one glowing mass, finally follows a hint of Jerome's,¹ and asserts for the Epistle a modified genuineness. He cannot find in it either Peter's individual style or characteristic expressions; he recognises in it a different mode of workmanship from his. Yet it seems to him "impossible to read it without recognising in it an accent of inspiration, and without seeing a 'grace of superintendence' at work in the decision by which it was finally allowed to take its place among the canonical books."² He thinks "that St. Peter may have lent his name and the weight of his authority to thoughts expressed in the language of another;"³ "that we have not here the words and style of the great Apostle, but that he lent to this Epistle the sanction of his name and the assistance of his advice."⁴ Professor Lumby, after an examination of the internal evidences for the Epistle which cannot be characterised by any lower term than brilliant, concludes that it points clearly to St. Peter as its author, and that "it bears its witness in itself."⁵ Dr. Edwin A. Abbott, who investigates the difficulties in the way of assigning the Epistle to Peter, in a paper at once learned, acute, and intensely interesting, which runs through three numbers of a critical journal, concludes that it cannot be by Peter, is unworthy in style, barren in thought, a plagiarism from first to last, and depends on writings which were not published until a quarter of a century after Peter's death.⁶ If the careful

¹ *Ep. ad. Hedib.*, 120, 11.

² "*The Expositor*," Second Series, Vol. III., p. 423.

³ "*The Expositor*," etc., p. 409.

⁴ *The Early Days of Christianity*. By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., etc. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Vol. I., p. 207.

⁵ *The Holy Bible, etc. Commentary and a Revision of the Translation*. By Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M. A., etc. Vol. IV., p. 234.

⁶ "*The Expositor*," as above, Vol. III., pp. 49-63, 139-153, and 204-219.

Huther cannot reach any conclusion, and Drs. Farrar and Lumby attain theirs only with difficulty, and express them with modest over-hesitancy, Dr. Abbott at least feels no hesitancy and exhibits no doubt. His decision and language alike are strong. If we may venture to compare the discussion with another, to which it has many points of likeness (although certainly not in its issue)—that which has arisen over the genuineness of the Chronicle of Dino Campagni—we may say that Dr. Abbott uses the method of Sheffer-Boichorst in the spirit of Fanfani.

It will go without saying that Dr. Abbott's argument is attractively and plausibly presented. It constitutes, indeed, the most considerable arraignment of the Epistle that has been put forth since the days of the giants of a half century ago. It is, moreover, in its main points, quite fresh and new. It certainly demands close attention, careful examination and sifting. And it is to be sincerely hoped that it will not continue to be met only by "a conspiracy of silence." Canon Farrar expressed this hope so long ago as last June; but, so far as we are aware, his own brief criticism is as yet the only one that has seen the light.¹ It is only thus because more experienced students have not seen fit or found time and opportunity to publicly examine the new questions raised, that we have felt driven to undertake the task. Whatever may be the final result of discussion, it certainly cannot but be a help towards a proper appreciation of the facts of the case and the attainment of truth, for one and another to set down frankly, in due honesty, the impression which Dr. Abbott's arguments have made upon them. Such is our purpose in this paper.

It would be both impossible in reasonable space and tedious to the reader for us to attempt to detail all the processes of the investigations into which a study of Dr. Abbott's arguments necessarily carries one. It is well to advertise beforehand, therefore, that this paper does not profess to *make* these investigations, but only to

¹ Prof. Robert B. Drummond ("The Academy," for October 14, 1882), in reviewing Canon Farrar's work on *The Early Days of Christianity*, seems to accept Dr. Abbott's "discovery" of dependence of 2 Peter on Josephus. This is, however, only a chance remark, not a criticism.

present, as clearly as may be, support, and commend, the conclusions to which we have, after investigation, arrived. It would be pure affectation to preserve the form of investigation merely for effect; and we cherish the hope that our cause will not be prejudiced by the frank confession that we have not ventured to write upon this subject until after we had reached our conclusions upon it. We trust our *study* has been carried through with open and tractable mind; we confess that we *write* with a foregone conclusion. The purpose of this paper becomes thus a defence of the genuineness of 2 Peter against Dr. Abbott's strictures.

The same necessity for shunning inordinate length and tediousness forbids us, again, to attempt to supply an answer to every specification which Dr. Abbott has made in the course of his three articles. Fortunately, however, a selection may be made among them, without great prejudice to our cause. Only certain portions of his argument are new, and we may fitly confine ourselves to these new portions, especially as they happen to be also both the most forcible in themselves and the most relied upon by Dr. Abbott. The older arguments, although consummately marshalled, are not essentially altered by his treatment of them; and we may content ourselves in dealing with them with referring only to their character and indicating that they have been answered fully in advance.

DR. ABBOTT'S SCHEME OF ARGUMENT.

If, at the outset, we take a general glance over Dr. Abbott's argument against the Epistle, as a whole, we will find that it may be summed up under the following heads: 1. The external evidence for the Epistle is altogether insufficient. 2. It is dependent, in a literary way, on books which were published only after Peter's death—such as the Epistle of Clement of Rome, and notably the Antiquities of Josephus. 3. It not only borrows from Acts, 1 Peter, and especially Jude, and that in such a way as to exhibit its writer as a barren plagiarist, but, in borrowing, bungles and blurs everything it touches. 4. Its style is wholly unworthy of an Apostle—being, in fact, no style at all, but only a barbarous medley of words, such as a vain, half-taught Hindoo

puts together in trying to write "fine" English. 5. It cannot be by the same writer who wrote 1 Peter, as, indeed, this unworthy style, which is not found in 1 Peter, sufficiently witnesses, and as is further proved by other important differences between the two Epistles, such as, for example, their divergent use of such particles as express the manner of thought, their divergent degree of dependence on the Old Testament, etc. 6. Other internal evidences of the spuriousness of the Epistle, are not lacking; such as the statement in iii. 1, implying a very close connexion, both in its readers and in time, with the first Epistle; whereas, the implication of the contents of the Epistles separate them vastly—the use of the term "Holy Mount"—the authorisation of the whole body of Paul's Epistles, etc.

The reader who is familiar with the literature of the subject, will observe immediately that the new matter advanced by Dr. Abbott falls under the second and fourth of these heads; the second is, indeed, Dr. Abbott's own discovery, while the fourth, although old in essence, is treated in so fresh a way as to make it practically new. The other heads of argument only state anew old and well known objections, often urged and often rebutted, and will not demand from us a renewed treatment. A word or two only concerning them seems called for. Only one of them is urged by Dr. Abbot with any fulness—the second paper of his series being devoted to the discussion and illustration of the "plagiarism" from Jude. The specialty of the treatment of the subject lies, not in an assertion of a post-apostolic origin for Jude, and consequently *a fortiori* for 2 Peter, nor in a contention that it is unworthy of an Apostle to borrow so freely from another writer, but in an attempt to prove that the borrowing has proceeded after a dull, unintelligent, distorting, ignoble manner, such as is totally unworthy of any reputable writer. That Dr. Abbott has made out the fact that 2 Peter does borrow from Jude, we freely confess; the fact itself is well-nigh patent, and has been repeatedly much more fully and convincingly proved than Dr. Abbott has proved it. But that it has been shown that the borrowing has been done in a confused, distorted, or unintelligent manner, we can think as little in his case as in the case of

his predecessors who have plied the same arguments, and have been repeatedly satisfactorily replied to.¹ We are unable to discover that Dr. Abbott adduces anything new in this connexion, or adds at all to the force of the old arguments; we feel, therefore, perfectly safe in leaving his refutation to the by no means worn out considerations which have refuted the same arguments in the mouths of a DeWette and a Schwegler.² On the other internal arguments which he adduces against the Epistle, Dr. Abbott only touches, as it were, by the way. They have been superabundantly answered in advance, and Dr. Lumby, for instance, has opposed to them counter internal considerations,³ which hopelessly overshadow them. It would be almost an impertinence in us to mar the strength of his admirable presentation of the subject, by adding a single additional word to it here.

Dr. Abbott does not even state the external evidence, but contents himself with a reference to the admissions of Drs. Lightfoot and Westcott, and the broad assertion that no trace of the existence of the letter can be found earlier than the late second century (Clement of Alexandria). It would be uncalled for, therefore, to turn aside from the discussion of the arguments which he does develop in detail, to enter upon one to which he gives only this one passing word more fully than merely to set opposite to his assertion our counter assertion that Second Peter is quoted by many writers before Clement of Alexandria,⁴ and to call attention to the fact that the "trace" of the Epistle found in Clement of

¹ What the opinion of the critics mentioned above is as to the question of the *manner* of borrowing, may be gleaned from the following. Huther, p. 279, says: "The firmness of 2 Peter's line of thought does not in any way suffer thereby." Cf. p. 256: "In neither have we a slavish dependence or a mere copy, but the correspondence is carried out with literary freedom and license." Farrar, I., p. 196, *seq.*: "St. Peter deals with his materials in a wise and independent manner." Prof. Lumby thinks Jude was the borrower.

² Compare, for instance, the treatment of the subject by Huther, Brückner, Weiss, Alford, and Frederic Gardiner. (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, XI. p. 114.)

³ In the fourth volume of the Speaker's Commentary, as above.

⁴ The proof of this may be read in the *SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW* for January, 1882, pp. 48, *seq.*

Alexandria is of a kind, by itself, to prove much about the Epistle—being nothing less than this: that Clement wrote a Commentary on it as a part of a series of “concise explanations of all the Canonical Scriptures.”¹ This certainly has more evidential value than is brought out in the mere statement that the first trace of the existence of the Epistle is found in Clement of Alexandria. One other fact in Dr. Abbott’s attitude towards the external evidences needs notice. And this is of no less moment than this: the admission that literary connexion has been made out between Second Peter and Clement of Rome. The admission is made, indeed, only to prepare the way for arguing that the borrowing has been done *by* not *from* Second Peter. On this point, however, the mass of scholars may be expected to hold a different opinion. Dr. Abbott pleads that Second Peter has an established character as a borrower and hence probably did this borrowing; and that if Second Peter borrowed from a work of Josephus’ published in A. D. 93, it is not likely that it was borrowed from by Clement as early as 95. If, however, the evidence that 2 Peter was the borrower rests on the probability that it borrowed from Josephus, it leans on a very broken reed, as we hope to show; and Dr. Abbott forgets that Clement is quite as confirmed a borrower as 2 Peter. If the one uses Jude freely, the other uses Hebrews quite as freely; and doubtless if accurate scales were used, as large a proportion of Clement’s letter might be shown to be borrowed as of 2 Peter. On the other hand, it seems to be clear that if there does exist literary connexion between the two documents, as we now think is morally certain, the dependence is of Clement on Peter. The considerations which drive us to this conclusion are the following: (1.) We have a series of writers dependent on 2 Peter—Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Theophilus, Melito, Hermas, Justin, Testt. xii. Patt., Barnabas, Clement of Rome; and it is exceedingly difficult to insert 2 Peter anywhere in that series and say it borrows from all on one side of it and is borrowed from by all on the other. It most naturally comes at the end of the series. The same consideration which Dr. Abbott pleads as a reason why he should not place it between

¹*Id.*, p. 46.

Josephus and Clement of Rome, we plead against placing it between Clement and Barnabas, or Barnabas and the Testt. xii. Patt., and so on. (2.) The phenomena of the parallel passages themselves do not seem to us, as they do to Dr. Abbott, absolutely neutral on this question. All the indications seem rather to point to 2 Peter as the original source, as perhaps a study of them as given in the note below¹ may convince the reader. (3.) Perhaps

¹ The parallel passages are as follows:

(1.) Clement vii. 1.

These things, dearly beloved, we write, not only as admonishing you, but also as *putting* ourselves in remembrance. (*ἰπομνήσκειν* as in 2 P. i. 12.)

2 Peter i. 12.

Wherefore I shall be ready to *put* you in remembrance of these things.

iii. 1. This is now, beloved, the second epistle that I write unto you; and in both of them I stir up your sincere minds by putting you in remembrance.

(2.) Clement vii. 5, 6.

Let us review all generations in turn and learn how, from generation to generation, the Master hath given a place for repentance unto them that desire to turn to him. Noah heralded repentance and they that obeyed were saved. xi. 1. For his hospitality and godliness Lot was saved from Sodom when all the country round about was judged by fire and brimstone; the Master having thus foreshown that he forsaketh not them which set their hope in him, but appointeth unto punishment and torment them that swerve aside.

2 Peter ii. 5-9.

For if God . . . spared not the ancient world, but preserved Noah with seven others, a herald of righteousness, when he brought a flood upon the world of the ungodly; and burning the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah into ashes condemned them with an overthrow, having made them an example unto those that should live ungodly; and delivered righteous Lot sore distressed by the lascivious life of the wicked (for that righteous man, dwelling among them, in seeing and hearing, vexed his righteous soul from day to day with their lawless deeds): the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation and to keep the unrighteous under punishment unto the day of judgment.

(3.) Clement iv.

Wherefore, let us be obedient unto his excellent and glorious will. . . . Let us fix our eyes on them that ministered perfectly unto his excellent glory. Let us set before us Enoch, etc. . . . Noah, being found faithful, by his ministration preached (*ἐκήρυξεν*) regeneration into the world, and through him the Master saved the living creatures that entered into the ark, in concord.

2 Peter i. 17.

For he received from God the Father honor and glory when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, "This is" etc., . . . and this voice we heard, etc. ii. 5, 6. And spared not the ancient world, but preserved Noah and seven others, a preacher of righteousness, when he brought a flood upon the world of the ungodly.

if it stood alone, the passage from Clement xxiii. 3, could not be asserted to be a reminiscence of Jas. i. 8, (*cf.* v. 7) and 2 P. iii. 4, combined;¹ but the fact that other sufficient proof of literary connexion between Clement and 2 Peter exists, turns the scale in this passage and determines that this is another item of it. If so, then, not only is 2 Peter the older document, but also it was held by Clement to be Scripture. We have purposely refrained from adding as (4) that all the presumption for the genuineness of 2

(4.) Clement xxii.

Let our souls be bound to him that is faithful *ἐπαγγελίας* . . . *ἐν λόγῳ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης αὐτοῦ συνεστήσατο τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν λόγῳ δύναται αὐτὰ καταστρέψει.*

2 Peter iii. 5-7.

For this they wilfully forget [speaking of the surety of God's *ἐπαγγελία*] that . . . οὐρανοὶ ἦσαν ἐκπαλαι καὶ γῆ . . . συνεστῶσα, τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . οἱ δὲ νῦν οὐρανοὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τεθησαν ἰσχυροὶ εἰσὶ, πυρὶ τηρούμενοι εἰς ἡμέραν κρίσεως.

(5.) Clement xxiii. 3.

Let this Scripture be far from us where it saith: "Wretched are the double-minded which doubt in their soul and say, 'These things we did hear in the days of our fathers also, and behold we have grown old, and none of these things have befallen us.'"

2 Peter iii. 4.

In the last days mockers shall come . . . saying, "Where is the promise of his coming, for, from the day that the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation."

(6.) Clement xxxv. 5.

If we accomplish such things as beseeem his faultless will, and follow the way of truth, casting off from ourselves all unrighteousness and iniquity, etc., etc.

2 Peter ii. 2.

And many shall follow their lascivious doings; by reason of whom the way of the truth shall be evil spoken of.

The first and sixth of these parallels hardly give indication of the direction of the borrowing; the second, third, fourth, and fifth, however, (independently of the statement of Clement, that he borrowed the fifth) all severally give clear hints of the fact that the passage in Clement is the borrower. Note, *e. g.*, the compression in the fourth by Clement, as he briefly takes from Peter's larger context the exact thought he needed. The way in which the peculiar phrase, "excellent glory," is introduced in the third, in each writer, is again decisive that Peter's is the original. The phenomena of the fifth are even stronger in the same direction, etc.

¹ Compare how Clement smelts together reminiscences of different passages in chapter xiii. (Matt. v. 7; vi. 14; vii. 12; Luke vi. 38; vi. 37; Matt. vii. 2), and from the Old Testament, *passim*.

Peter which arises from the varied proofs which combine to establish it¹ is against the hypothesis that it has borrowed from Clement: not because we do not regard this as a valid or convincing argument, but because we deem it unnecessary for the establishment of our point and do not wish to be delayed to show the strength of the presumption. The result of an examination of the relation between 2 Peter and Clement therefore seems to be that to a moral certainty Clement had and used 2 Peter and that probably as Scripture. This one fact, taken alone, burdens any argument which would go to prove a later date than say A. D. 75 for 2 Peter with an almost insuperable objection at the outset, and it is under a realisation of this that we would wish the reader to proceed with us in our further discussion. We purpose to examine, 1. Dr. Abbott's arraignment of 2 Peter's style, and 2. The relation of 2 Peter to Josephus.

DR. ABBOTT'S ARRAIGNMENT OF 2 PETER'S STYLE.

Dr. Abbott has a very low opinion of the style of 2 Peter. He thinks it "throughout that of a copyist and 'fine writer,' ignorant of ordinary Greek idiom, yet constantly striving after grandiloquent Greek, an affected and artificial style, wholly unlike that of the First Epistle of St. Peter, a style so made up of shreds and patches of other men's writings and so interspersed with obsolete, sonorous, and meaningless words, that it really has no claim to be called a style at all, and resembles nothing so much as the patchwork English of a half-educated Hindoo aping the language of Lord Macaulay and Dr. Johnson with an occasional flavor of Shakespeare."² He believes it possible "to show that there is probably not one original thought and scarcely one natural expression in the whole of it."³ This would be enough to take one's breath away, except that it admits of a very easy demonstration that the criticism itself is only a piece of "fine writing" and cannot be by any possibility true. Common sense refuses to be persuaded that native Greeks of culture and scholarship—acute critics of language and style, great scholars and rhetoricians, pro-

¹ See SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, January, 1882, p. 45, *seq.*

² P. 153.

³ P. 150.

lific writers—like Origen, Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Athanasius, should have read this Epistle for ages, studied it, criticised it, written commentaries on it, and honored it all this time as divinely inspired without ever discovering that its style was such as “would induce a Greek reader to form about it the same judgment that we naturally form about the ‘Native Estimate’ ”; ¹ in a word, that “there is no style, no naturalness” about it, nothing but “a barbarous medley of words.” ² Calm judgment again refuses to believe that scholars like Ewald, Brückner, Hofmann, Huther, Weiss, could be so wofully deceived as to admire a style which is “essentially ignoble” both in thought and wording, which is characterised by “vulgar pomposity, verbose pedantry, and barren plagiarism,” and can be but the natural expression of “a pedantical phrase-compiler who bungles and blurs” everything he touches. Surely a sober reader is entitled to brush away such a fanfaronade with a justly impatient gesture.

It will be of use to us, however, to observe the kind of specification that is made to support this wholesale attack at once on the style of 2 Peter, the discernment of the Greek fathers, and the scholarship of the best modern masters of Hellenistic Greek, as well as the manner of argumentation by which the style of 2 Peter is made an evidence of its spuriousness. Dr. Abbott recognises the fact that neither apostolicity nor inspiration secures to a writer Attic purity of Greek. “Let it be clearly understood,” he says, ³ “that we do not ground our objections to the genuineness of the Epistle on its bad Greek.” The argument bases itself on the contention that the style is bad in such a way as to exhibit not simply ignorance of Greek, but certain bad mental and moral traits: “barrenness,” “inanity,” “shallowness,” “pedantry,” “vanity,” “dulness,” “vulgarity,” “ignobility,” and so on, through almost “a glossary of the *rarest* words in the [English] language.” It is observable, therefore, that Dr. Abbott’s argument is confessedly not valid unless it be shown not merely that 2 Peter contains *bad Greek*, rare, otherwise unknown, or even falsely framed or used

¹ A characteristic specimen of the “half-educated Hindoo English,” mentioned above.

² P. 206.

³ P. 214.

words, rare, difficult, or even solecistic constructions; but also that these words are so used as to exhibit an ignobility of mental or moral constitution in the writer. Dr. Abbott must certainly be held in his specifications to items supporting one or the other of these two assertions: 1. That the style bears witness to a mentally or morally ignoble writer; or 2. That it is ineradically and inexplicably different from that of First Peter.

A careful reader will look in vain through Dr. Abbott's very interesting pages for such items. His three main contentions are that the Epistle is full of "barren plagiarisms," "artificial tautology of fine words," and "vulgar pedantry," concerning which it is immediately to be observed that the argument in each case lies in the adjective, while the facts do not justify even the noun. It is indeed true that 2 Peter has freely borrowed from Jude and adopted phrases here and there from other writings; but it is just as certainly not true that the borrowing has been done in any unworthy, ignoble, or barren manner, or can be justly described as plagiarism. There certainly do occur repetitions of words and phrases in the Epistle, and some unusual, not to say unique, words may be turned up in it; but this mere fact is certainly not unworthy or vulgar, nor are the circumstances of the various cases such as will render them so. We have already said all that we need say concerning the borrowing from Jude; it will be instructive to note here Dr. Abbott's way of dealing with the asserted cases of "tautologies" and "solecisms" in order to obtain a correct notion of the soundness and carefulness of his methods of work, and to guard the reader against the fear that we are dealing as unfairly with Dr. Abbott as he had dealt with 2 Peter.

By "tautology" Dr. Abbott does "not mean the mere repetition of the same word or phrase to express the same thing. Euclid is not tautological." He means the barren repetition of "fine words"—due to "paucity of vocabulary" and the desire of an empty writer to "make the most of the handsome phrases which he has accumulated," whereby he is led, "having found a bright patch," "to insert it twice or thrice before he can bring himself to let it go." It is clear now, that the words adduced to prove such a tautology must be poetical and striking; above all, they must not be such as

can be shown to have been in natural and familiar use in the sense in which they occur in "the tautology." A very fair example of the kind of tautology meant Dr. Abbott adduces from an estimate of Lord Hobart's character which appeared shortly after the death of that statesman, in the *Madras Mail*. It will be sufficient for our purposes to quote the first paragraphs of it:

"The not uncommon (*a, 1*) *hand of* death has distilled from febrile wings from amongst a débris of bereaved relatives, friends, and submissive subjects into (*b, 1*) *the interminable azure of the past*, an unexceptionably finished politician and philanthropist of the highest specific gravity. who, only a few days ago, represented our Most Gracious Majesty the Queen in this Presidency.

"The *hand of* (*a, 2*) destiny has willed that he should be carried into the infinite (*b, 2*) *azure of the past*, when the (*c, 1*) *incipient buds*, and (*d, 1*) *symptoms* of his fostered love and hope for the (*e, 1*) *Oriental* element were observed to be gradually blossoming. The (*e, 2*) *Oriental mind* was just in the (*c, 2*) *incipient* stage of appreciating his noble mental and moral qualities, and consequently can only confine itself to a prediction of what his indefatigable zeal would have achieved for it, had he remained within the category of 'the survival of the fittest.'"

Dr. Abbott thinks that 2 Peter is the same kind of Greek as this trash is English! We are not concerned now, however, with this already refuted and self-refuting charge, but only with the *tautologies*. These are marked by italics and figures in the above passage, and are all striking, either because they are figurative expressions, or intensely poetical expressions, or are used in strange senses. The only exception is, possibly, "*Oriental*," and that probably would not attract attention, or be noted as a tautology of this class, except in association with the others.

Now, Dr. Abbott thinks that in respect to its tautologies, 2 Peter ii. 14-20, is parallel to this; he admits, indeed, that the words there "are capable of being rendered into very simple English," but contends that "their use, and still more their repetition in this Epistle, would induce a Greek reader to form about it the same judgment that we naturally form about the 'Native Estimate.'" We might ask, Even were this true, what of it? Would this prove ignobility of soul or ignorance of Greek? Poverty of Greek vocabulary might be proved; a book-learned and half-understood vocabulary might be proved. But Dr. Abbott's

brief requires him to prove mental or moral unworthiness. It behoves us, rather, to ask, however, is it true? We can determine how the style of this Epistle would affect a Greek reader of say the last half of the first century A. D., only in two ways: 1, by observing how it actually affected the Greek readers who read it nearest to that time; and, 2, by noting whether the words thus "tautologically" used are of the same class that occur in the *Madras Mail* extract. Many Greek readers, sufficiently close to Peter's day to stand as examples, used this Epistle; some of them did not fail to observe the difference between its style and that of 1 Peter—a far more hidden phenomenon than this to which Dr. Abbott appeals. Yet none of them has seen this—which has been reserved to him to discover some eighteen centuries after the advent of the Epistle into an unbelieving and critical world. Again, the words used are found on examination to bear absolutely no real resemblance to those in the *Madras Mail* quotation; but, on the contrary, are used by 2 Peter in senses justified as simple and natural by either known usage or strong analogy.

Dr. Abbott's contention is that some of these words "are very rare in Greek literature;" and others, "though good classical Greek in themselves, are rare or non-existent in the New Testament." Elsewhere we learn that he deems a word not found elsewhere in the New Testament, or in the LXX., an uncommon word to the circle of ideas of a writer like 2 Peter, even though it be otherwise a common Greek word. But would the use of such words repetitiously be enough to convict a passage of being similar in style to the extract from the *Madras Mail*? Dr. Abbott seems to forget for the moment the kind of Greek he is dealing with, and the characteristics of the period to which it belongs. Winer¹ gives us, as the chief lexical peculiarities of Hellenistic Greek, as distinguished from classical, the mixture of dialects; great changes of sense in words; the commingling of poetical and other lofty words; changes of form; and an influx of newly made words, or of words new to the literary language. From these main characteristics of the kind of Greek occurring

¹ Winer's Grammar, etc., § 2; where a sufficient number of examples are given.

in 2 Peter, it is already apparent that Dr. Abbott has engaged in a rather difficult task, when he wishes to prove that its author has used his words in as ridiculous a way as the writer in the *Madras Mail*. That a word is a curious dialectic form, does not prove it was not in the commonest currency in Peter's day; that it occurs in the classics only in the loftiest of poetic speech, does not prove it was not the flattest prose in Peter's day; that old acquaintances are used in the most unheard of senses, or reappear in entirely strange dresses, or give way to utter strangers, obtained no one knows whence—all this would not only be no proof of ignorance of Greek in the author of a writing of this date, but is just what we are to look for and expect in him. It is just what we do find in all the writers of the time. Every one of the New Testament writers has his own ἀπαξ λεγόμενα, absolute, or in the New Testament. Queer phenomena are continually cropping out. The same word, for instance, appears in only two places in all Greek literature; in both cases independently, and in both it is used with the utmost familiarity; or a word can be found only in a single passage in the totality of Greek writing, until it suddenly turns up in an inscription; or a familiar word is used by two widely separated authors, and by them only, in a new and strange sense. The period in which 2 Peter was composed, was, in a word, linguistically speaking, an unsettled age, and an age of transition. Language, as a literary vehicle, was in a ferment; the old vocabulary was no longer clung to jealously; popular phrases and forms of speech were clamoring for recognition, and each man did, in the way of choosing a vocabulary, pretty nearly what was right in his own eyes.

Nor is it possible to speak of the LXX. as almost the only mine from which the writers of the New Testament drew their vocabulary; their great mine was doubtless the popular usage of current speech, as distinguished from any written sources. Professor Potwin, in his very interesting papers on the New Testament vocabulary,¹ gives us a summary view of the matter, which may help us here. He estimates that the New Testament contains eight hundred and eighty-two (882) native Greek words

¹*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct., 1880, pp. 653, seq.

not found anywhere until after Aristotle, or an average of about two to a page; and yet he has not counted merely dialectic forms, or slight changes of declension or pronunciation, or even the widest changes of meaning, so long as the form was preserved. Of these eight hundred and eighty-two words not found at all in the classical age, only some three hundred and sixty-three in all, or a little over *two-fifths*, are found in the LXX.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from such facts as these. It will require much more than the adduction of repetitions of words that are rare in the New Testament, or rare in the New Testament and LXX., or rare in Greek literature, to fasten such "tautologies" as occur in the *Madras Moil* extract on 2 Peter. The author of that Epistle ought to be given the benefit of the doubt that would necessarily arise in each case as to whether this or that word, known to us only as a rarely occurring word in Greek literature, or perhaps only as an intensely poetical one of the classical period, was not plain and familiar prose in his circle of acquaintances. It is another question whether he needs to ask for the benefit of this doubt. And we hasten to add that an examination of Dr. Abbott's chosen examples from 2 Peter will convince the sober reader that he does not. The "barren tautology of five words" is discovered to exist, not at all in 2 Peter's Greek, but only in Dr. Abbott's English representation of it. It is only by such a forced translation—proceeding by the resurrection of the etymological senses of derivatives and compounds, and the literal senses of figurative words which had acquired well-settled and simple derivative meanings—as would make any author ridiculous, that the "tautologies" can be found in 2 Peter at all. This may perhaps be made plain to the reader by placing Dr. Abbott's forced translation of the first of the two passages he adduces, side by side with another, not at all smooth, but which takes the words in justifiable senses, as the added notes will show. We trust the reader will carefully observe the effect. Any one who thought it worth his while, could readily make Dr. Abbott's own thoroughly clear English style muddy, by treating it as he has treated 2 Peter's. It is to be observed that the passage begins in the middle of a sentence:

DR. ABBOTT'S.

(a, 1) *Setting baits to catch souls*
 (b, 1) *unconfirmed*, having a heart
 practised of¹ greediness, and child-
 ren of curse, having left the straight
 way, they went astray *having fol-*
*lowed after*² the way of Balaam the
 son of Bosor, who loved *the wages of*
iniquity,³ but had the *refutation*⁴ of
 his own⁵ *law-breaking*; a dumb
 beast of burden with the voice of
 a man (c, 1) *uttering a sound*,⁷ hin-
 dered the *maddishness*⁸ of the pro-
 phet. . . For (c, 2) *uttering sounds*
 of swelling things⁹ of vanity, in the
 lusts of the flesh by wanton acts
 they (a, 2) *set baits to catch* those who
 are *in the least*¹⁰ (d, 1) *fleeing away*
from those who are spending their
 life in error; promising them free-
 dom, being themselves slaves of cor-
 ruption—for one is enslaved by that
 by which one is (e, 1) *defeated*. For
 if (d, 2) *having fled away from* the
 pollutions of the world by the *recog-*
*nition*¹¹ of our Lord and Saviour
 Jesus Christ, but afterwards having
 been entangled in these things they
 are (e, 2) *defeated*, their last state is
 worse than the first.

2 PETER.

. . . enticing unstable souls; hav-
 ing hearts practised in covetous-
 ness; children of cursing. They
 have left the straight way and are
 gone astray, following after the way
 of Balaam the son of Bosor who
 loved the wages of unrighteousness,
 but received a rebuke of his own
 transgression. The dumb beast of
 burden, speaking with the voice of
 a man, hindered the prophet's mad-
 ness.

For, speaking great swelling
 things of vanity, they entice, in the
 lusts of the flesh, by wanton acts,
 those who are just escaping from
 them that pass their lives in error,
 promising them freedom, while they
 themselves are slaves of corruption;
 for one is enslaved by that by which
 he is overcome. For, if having es-
 caped the pollutions of the world
 through the knowledge of our Lord
 and Saviour Jesus Christ, but hav-
 ing become again entangled in them,
 they are overcome, their last state
 is become worse than their first.

¹ "A rare and pedantic use of the genitive" (Dr. A.). It will be enough in reply to refer to Winer, §30-4.

² See *post.* ³ Ditto. ⁴ Cf. Job xxi. 4; xxiii. 2 (LXX.).

⁵ "The word *ιδιος*, *private*, ought not to be used where there is no antithesis between what is one's own and another's; but the author is . . . fond of the abuse of this word" (Dr. A.). Perhaps, however, *ιδιος* is not so unessential here as Dr. Abbott seems to think; there is a contrast between the "sin" of Balaam and of his ass. Balaam, supposing his ass to be stubborn and vicious, was punishing her for it, when the dumb beast spake and gave him a rebuke for his *own* sin. Neither is *ιδιος* in ii. 22 unessential, as the careful reader will readily see.

⁶ Cf. Prov. v. 22; Ps. xxxvi. 7; common in classics (e. g., Polyb., Dion. Hal.). Hence, only rare in the New Testament.

⁷ See *post.* ⁸ Ditto.

⁹ "The use of *ὑπέρογκα*, without the article, yet followed by a genitive, is bad Greek" (Dr. A.). Why? Cf. Winer (Moulton's Ed.), p. 235.

¹⁰ "The word *ὀλίγως* is rare, and most used in the phrase *οὐκ ὀλίγως*, *in no slight degree*, like our 'not in the least.' It probably means here: 'to some small extent.'" True enough; *valeat tantum*.

¹¹ See *post.*

Relegating to the foot notes all notice of words and phrases which have been forced from their obvious senses, in order to give the passage as a whole the appearance of the *Madras Mail* extract, we confine ourselves here to the cases of "tautology." Five of these are adduced, to which three more, marked as repeated elsewhere than in this passage, are to be added (marked 2, 3, and 11 above), amounting to eight in all. It is observed with reference to them that while in the left hand column they bear a strange appearance, as they stand in the right hand column they appear natural enough, and their repetition ceases to strike upon the ear unpleasantly or even markedly. Their "tautological" character (in Dr. Abbott's sense), then, depends on the necessity of looking at them from the standpoint of the left hand column, and the real question before us is: Are they fitly represented by the translation given in the right hand column? If no violence has been done to them in this translation, then violence has been done to 2 Peter by Dr. Abbott. Let us take a brief view of the usage of the words involved.

1. (a) *Setting baits to catch.* This is the translation which Dr. Abbott offers of the word *δελιάζειν*, which he further informs us is used only once elsewhere in the New Testament. But is it justifiable to dig up the literal sense of the word here? or has its metaphorical sense a recognised simple and no longer figurative meaning? The primitive *δέλεαρ* (cf. *δόλος*), meaning "a bait," has itself a settled metaphorical sense, as in Plutarch, *De Ser. Num. Vind.*, τὸ γλυκὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὡσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλλκειν [ἀνθρώπους]; and Plato, *Tim.*, lxix. 6: "Pleasure, the greatest incitement of evil" (Jowett). The derivative verb *δελιάζειν* means, in accordance with its form, 1, *literally*, to bait, *i. e.*, either to put on the hook as bait or to entice or catch by bait; and 2, *metaph.*, to bait—to entice. In this, its metaphorical sense, it obtained great currency, always *in sensu malo*; and, as it became common, lost its figurative implication. The literal sense is already out of sight in such passages as Demosthenes, pp. 241-2: *ρασιῶν καὶ σχολῆ δელιαζόμενον* (by all means compare the context), and Philo. *q. omn. lib. prob.* § 22 (cited by Grimm), *πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἐλαίνεται ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς δελιάζεται*. In the only one other New Testament passage in which the word occurs, the resurrection of the literal sense would even introduce confusion: James i. 14, "But each is tempted by being drawn out and having baits set by his own lust." The order of the words here, *ἐξεκόμενος first*, and *δελιαζόμενος second*, demonstrates that the latter is used in total neglect of its literal sense, and therefore

in no sense figuratively, but only as a current expression for "enticing." To insist on translating the word in 2 Peter, "setting baits to catch," is the same as to insist on giving *dilapidate* its original sense of *scattering stones* in such a passage as this. "The patrimony of the bishopric of Oxon was much dilapidated" (Wood).¹ 2 Peter simply uses a common Greek word, not unknown in the New Testament in its most natural, common, and obvious sense; his repeated use of it in the course of four verses is neither strange nor significant when once we recognise the commonness of the word and the naturalness of the sense.

2. (b.) *unconfirmed*. The word here is ἀσθηπικροί, which occurs in 2 Peter alone in the New Testament. It is rare also in the classics, cf. Longin. *de Subl.*, 2. 2., and Musaeus, 295 ("the *unstable* deeps and watery bottoms of the sea"). It may or may not have been a somewhat rare word in St. Peter's day. Certainly its use at 2 Peter ii. 14, iii. 16, cannot be called "tautological," and can occasion no surprise. It is at worst a vivid mode of speech. And it is worthy of note that words cognate with σθηπιζω (Luke xxii. 32) are favorites with Peter and seem to have had peculiar significance to him: cf. 1 Peter v. 10; 2 Peter i. 12; iii. 17. and SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, 1882, p. 69. note 1.

3. (2) *having followed after*. The word here is ἐξακολουθεῖν, concerning which Dr. Abbott remarks truly enough that it is used here, i. 16 and ii. 2, only, in the New Testament. This fact has, however, absolutely no significance, unless the word itself is either rare or peculiar in some way. It is, on the contrary, however, an exceedingly common word, whether in the LXX. (e. g., Isa. lvi. 11; Sir. v. 2; Amos ii. 4; Job xxxi, 9, etc.), or the writers of the κοινὴ (e. g., Josephus, Polybius, Plutarch), or of the early Church (e. g., Testt. xii. Patt., p. 644). It is used by 2 Peter in three separate (though only slightly divergent) senses, all of which are justified as natural and current by other writers. (Cf. Grimm's analysis of the word.)

4. (3) *the wages of iniquity*, μισθὸν ἀδικίας, "repeated," says Dr. Abbott, "from ii. 13," and but once used elsewhere in the New Testament, "namely, in the Acts (i. 18) in a speech of St. Peter, whence it has been probably borrowed by our author." We are at somewhat of a loss to understand what is thought to be proved by this. If there is anything curious or "fine-wordy" or pedantic about this phrase, then how account for its use by the genuine Peter (Acts i. 18, for we understand Dr. Abbott to accept that as "a speech of St. Peter")? at the least, then, this use, pedantic or not, is common to Peter and 2 Peter, and is a mark of the Petrine origin of this Epistle just in proportion as it is strange and unusual. On the other hand, if this phrase is not strange in Acts, why is it strange here? We have no wish to haggle over the point whether 2 Peter actually borrows the phrase from Acts, and the less so as it

¹Or, "Christ took our physically dilapidated nature" [Hodge].

seems certain that Acts was published some five or six years earlier than 2 Peter, and verses 18 and 19 of Acts i. do not appear to us part of Peter's speech. This much, however, is clear: in Luke's words we have an example of the same phrase that is here held to be "fine-wordy" and pedantic. Essentially the same phrase occurs also in 2 Macc. viii. 33; while *μισθός* in a bad sense is common in Greek literature (*cf. e. g.*, Callim. *Hymn. in Dian.*, 263, "For neither did Atreides boast in a small *μισθός*;" Eur. *Hipp.*, 1050, the *μισθός* due to an impious man, etc.).

5. (c) *uttering a sound, φθέγγομαι*. Dr. Abbott falls into a slight error in saying (p. 206) that this word does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament; it occurs in a precisely similar sense in Acts iv. 18: "charged them not at all to 'utter a sound' or teach in the name of Jesus." This fact is fatal to the adduction of the word here as pedantic or strange in the simple sense of "speak." Add that it is common in this same sense in the LXX.; *cf.* Job xiii. 7, *ἐναντι δὲ αὐτοῦ φθέγγεσθε δόλον* ("utter a sound" of guile?); Wisdom i. 8: "no one 'uttering a sound' of wicked things." Sir. xiii. 22. *Cf.* Hdian, iv. 6, 12; Xen. *Com.*, ii. 7; Mem., iv. 2, 6. Certainly, as we go on, we become more and more amazed at the items which must be adduced to prove pedantic tautology—if it be proved at all.

6. (d) *fleeing away from, ἀποφεύγειν*, used in New Testament in 2 Peter i. 4; ii. 18, 20, only. For the construction with the genitive (as in 2 Peter i. 4) *cf.* *ἐκφεύγειν* in Xen. *An.* 1, 3, 2, and the simple verb in Philoct., 1034. For the construction with the accusative as in our present passage, *cf.* *Batr.*, 42, 47; *Theogn.*, 1159; *Hdt.*, i. 1; *Plato Apol.*, 39 A.; *Dem.*, 840, 8; *Plato Tim.*, 44, c.; *Xen. Mem.*, 3, 11, 8. The sense in which 2 Peter uses the word is sufficiently illustrated by *Plato Apol.*, 39 A: "For neither in war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of *escaping death*" (Jowett); *Plato Tim.*, 44 c.: "And *escapes the worst disease of all*" (Jowett). As a pedant and fine writer 2 Peter's author can certainly be content to stand alongside of Plato.

7. (e) *defeated, ἡττᾶσθαι*; not found elsewhere in New Testament, (*cf.* 2 Cor. xii. 13), but not, therefore, necessarily rare, pedantic, or ignoble. *Cf.* Isaiah liv. 17: "And every voice that shall rise up against thee unto judgment,—them all *ἡττήσεις*;" *Josephus Ant.*, I. 19, 4, *ἐρωτι τῆς παιδός ἡττήθεις*. The word is common in the profane Greek, and 2 Peter's use of it is in no sense strange or unwonted.

8. (11) *recognition, ἐπίγνωσις*; "repeated above, I. 2, 3, 8, but the word is common in St. Paul's Epistles," and, we may add, in exactly the same sense that it occurs in here: *cf.* Rom. i. 28; Eph. iv. 13; Col. i. 10, etc. And thus just as we reach the climax of our wonder at what Dr. Abbott is able to adduce as tautologies like those of the *Madras Mail* extract, we reach the end of his enumeration.

The candid reader who has taken the trouble to read through

what we have thus thrown into small print, can certainly be trusted to bring in the verdict of "not guilty" to the charge of "tautology" as urged by Dr. Abbott. We must remember, however, that our author does not stop at the charge of "tautology;" that charge is, indeed, in reality only subsidiary to the farther one, that the author of the Epistle is full of the "vulgar pedantry" of forcing in the "fine words" of his vocabulary everywhere, without really understanding their meaning, and even of coining other "fine words" from the base metal of his own vain and pompous ignorance. We have seen already a sample of what he means by this in the passage we have quoted above from his translations of 2 Peter. That was not, however, quite a full sample; let us look further.

Dr. Abbott declares that the use of such words as *παραφρονία* (ii. 16), *κανσούμενα* (iii. 10), *κίλισμα* (ii. 22), *ἐξέοραμα* (ii. 22), *ταρταρώσας* (ii. 4), are "exactly parallel" to "gairish," "cognoscence," "sickishness," in such Indian English as: "He had one and uniform way of speaking. He made no gairish of words;" "bolstering up the decision of the Lower Court with his sapience and legal acumen and cognoscence;" "on multitudinous¹ occasions, when the hope and affiance of the clients of Justice Mookerjee *toto caelo* suspended on his pleading, and he was absent from court on account of some sickishness, he even on such a day came and pleaded their causes, when they importuned him to do so." He even thinks that "such idiomatic blunders" as "inducing [the Court] to his favor," and "their hope suspended *toto caelo* on his pleading" may be fairly matched by the corresponding blunders, *μνήμη ποιείσθαι* (i. 15), *σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενάγκαντες* (i. 5), the omission of the article (ii. 8, iii. 10, 12), and the use of *δγδοος* (ii. 5). "As for the misuse of *βλέμμα* (ii. 8), it can be matched with nothing so justly as the passage of the Bengalee writer in which he describes Mr. Justice Mookerjee as 'remaining *sotto voce* till half-past four in the evening.'" This arraignment is certainly thorough-going, and, if in accordance with facts, opens up a new and hitherto unsuspected characteristic of 2 Peter; not, certainly, inconsistent with its inspiration and authority, but, at all events, startling to one

¹Cf. Macbeth II., ii., 62.

who has been accustomed to read it reverently. It behoves us to test the charge somewhat in detail.

Let us begin with the word *παραφρονία* as one already in a sense before us.¹ Dr. Abbott tells us that the word—"of which Wahl produces no other instance in Greek literature"—"is probably bad Greek for *παραφροσύνη*, as bad as the Indian-English 'sickishness' for 'sickness.'" The facts in this account are, that no instance of the use of this word seems as yet to have turned up in profane Greek or elsewhere in sacred Greek, and that *παραφροσύνη* is used by classical writers to express the notion plainly intended here. Its analogy with "sickishness" seems to be confined to this—that both words are formed on a correct analogy, *cf.* "foolishness" (1 Cor. i. 18) and *εἰδαιμῶνία*. The word "sickishness" does exist in English, but in a different sense from that in which the Hindoo used it, having acquired its meaning from "sickish" in the sense of "nauseating" (*cf.* "the sickishness of the taste"); the badness of the Indian-English consists, therefore, in the use of a word in a sense possible derivatively, but utterly incongruous with its known usage. We are struck with the incongruity at once in reading the passage, and pronounce it bad English. On what ground, on the other hand, we can pronounce *παραφρονία* bad Greek, is not apparent. It is regularly formed; its sense is consonant with both its root-meaning and form; it suggests no incongruous action. The mere fact that it is not known to occur elsewhere in Greek literature could only prove it to be rare (literary) Greek, certainly not bad Greek. Are we to stamp every *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* as bad Greek? It is far from an impossible supposition that the word was in exceedingly common use in popular speech, and only crops up here in literature. On the other hand, we see no reason why Peter should not have coined it; it is good metal. Nor is it hard to see why he should have adopted here even a rare word instead of a more common one fitted equally to his sense, or even coined a new one for his purpose. He wished a word assonant with *παρανομία*: "but obtained a rebuke for his own *παρανομία*; the dumb ass, speaking in man's voice, hindered the prophet's *παραφρονία*." If Dr. Abbott thinks it unworthy of

¹See above, p. 406.

an apostle or sensible man to choose a little-used or coin a new word for such a purpose, he will be obliged to sit aloft on some misty height in literary loneliness. Few writers, whether in the New Testament or out of it, scorn such "pedantry." Is Dr. Abbott prepared, for instance, to condemn Paul's *κατάκριμα . . . δικαίωμα* (Rom. v. 16, *cf.* also verse 18)? or Mr. J. A. Symonds' "Antichrist . . . Antiphysis?"¹ If 2 Peter falls on account of this word, he falls in a great company.

The word *καυσούμενα* occurs in 2 Peter iii. 10, 12, only in the N. T.; it does not occur in the LXX.; and seems to be found in the classics only late, and in the sense of "to be feverish," "to be in a state of fever" (Dioscorides and Galen). Hence Dr. Abbott translates here "elements in fever heat shall be dissolved," "elements in fever heat are to be melted." Is this fair? Note: 1. The sense of "to be feverish" is late; it seems not to occur earlier than Dioscorides (c. 100 A. D.). 2. That sense is undoubtedly a *derivative* sense, the natural sense of the word, and therefore its primitive sense, being "to burn intensely." 3. All its cognates have this primitive sense, although several of them, such as *καῦμα*, *καυματίζω*, *καυματώθης*, *καῦσος* (primitive of *καυσομαι*), acquired a secondary derivative sense as applied to fevers. How Dr. Abbott can think he is dealing scientifically with a word which occurs four times, in two pairs, separated by both a century of time and the technicalities of the subjects treated, when he tries to force the derivative sense used technically by physicians of 100 A. D. +, on the term so used a century and a half earlier as to demand the primitive sense of the same word, passes our comprehension. He would be scarcely passing beyond this were he to attempt to translate its cognates in Rev. xvi. 8, 9, thus: "And the fourth poured out his bowl upon the sun; and it was given unto it to put men in a fever heat with fire. And men were put in fever heat with great fever heat." How would it do to say

¹*Age of the Despots*, p. 412: "And now in the pontificate of Alexander, that memorable scene presented to the nations of the modern world a pageant of Antichrist and Antiphysis—the negation of the gospel and of nature." *Antiphysis* appears to be a coinage of Mr. Symonds; although the adjectives *antiphysis* and *antiphysical* (Ogilvie) seem to be in use, medical and otherwise. The Greeks used *παράφυσος* (*cf.* Ro. i. 26).

“parched corn” really meant “fever-heated corn,” on the strength of the common phrases “parched lips,” “parched brow”? Would it not be as fair to translate Dioscorides and Galen by 2 Peter’s usage as *vice versa*?

The words *κυλισμὸν* and *ἐξέραμα*, (ii. 22) naturally go together. Dr. Abbott’s criticism is as follows: “For the word ‘vomit’ [in Proverbs xxvi. 11; 2 Peter] substitutes the word *ἐξέραμα* (‘hardly to be found elsewhere,’ Alford, but found by Wahl in Dioscorid., vi. 19), a technical term of medicine derived from *ἐξέρῳ* ‘to evacuate by purge or vomit,’ so that the passage may be rendered, ‘The dog having returned to his own *evacuation!*’ Further, [2 Peter] supplements this quotation by a reference to a sow returning to its wallowing; and here he introduces a word (*κυλισμὸν*) not recognised by Liddell and Scott. . . . It may be rendered ‘wallowance.’ [2 Peter] also uses about the sow a word generally restricted to human beings, ‘having washed herself or bathed.’ The whole passage will then run thus: ‘The dog having turned to his own *evacuation*, and the sow, *having bathed*, to her *wallowance*.’” A precious piece of criticism! Let us suppose “evacuation” fitly represents *ἐξέραμα*, does ignobility of heart or mind result in the writer? Suppose he has adapted to a more common use a technical medical term, has he done more than Mr. William Wallace in the following sentence in description of the historian Alison (*The Academy* for Dec. 23, 1882): “Called to the Scottish Bar, he made fair way both in law and literature, being industrious, *eupeptic*,² accomplished, and self-confident.” If, then, the argument is a case of *non sequitur*, even if the facts are true, what becomes of it when the facts asserted are themselves brushed away? Yet, in the interests of truth and fairness, we must ruthlessly brush away the “facts.” We have here, indeed, a parallel case to *καυσίμενα*, with the difference that the matter is even plainer. The verb *ἐξέρῳ* is defined as “to evacuate by purge or vomit,” and certainly was used technically as a medical term. But it certainly was not a *purely* technical term (was Dr. Abbott misled by the technical phraseology of the Lexicon’s definition?); that it was a common popular word is proved by the fact that it

²Used also by Carlyle and a few others in an untechnical way.

even passed into a popular metaphorical sense—"to empty" (*e. g.*, the ballot urn of its contents [Arrian], the lungs of air, a vessel of water, etc.). This growth in popular usage necessarily presupposes a common use of the word in its primitive sense; to translate it by the English word "evacuate," thus, gives a false impression save in this particular; "evacuate," like *ἐξεράω*, leaves the question of *manner* open. The noun *ἔξεραμα* seems to be known in the classics only in Dioscorides vi. 19, and Eust. Opusc., 248, 91. The cognates *ἔξερασις* and *ἔξεραστής*, both in the sense of *vomiting* (as distinguished from *purging*) also occur in Eust. The word was thus one of a class used to denote *vomiting*. What proof is there that it was a technical word? Just this: out of three times in which the word occurs, it is used twice by physicians! Is that a broad enough base for an induction? Another fact is now to be noted: in Levit. xviii. 28, where the LXX. reads *προσοχθιση* (= "abhor," losing the figure), Aquila translates the Hebrew word *אָרַב* by *ἐξεράω*; now in Prov. xxvi. 11, the words are *אָרַב-בָּצַר*, which 2 Peter takes the liberty of translating by *ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἔξεραμα*. Certainly, if Aquila can be allowed without horrible charges to translate the Hebrew verb "to vomit" by the verb, 2 Peter may be allowed to translate the noun "vomit" by the corresponding noun. Dr. Abbott seems to be indeed in this dilemma: either 2 Peter is translating Proverbs xxvi. 11 himself, or repeating it in its popularly current form. If the former, then Aquila justifies him in the word he uses as the Greek equivalent of *אָרַב*. If the latter, then *the people* are responsible for *ἔξεραμα*, and it is proved to be used in a current common sense. At all events and in any case, it is somewhat high-handed to take a word used three times—all in the sense of *vomit*—twice by physicians and once by the populace or a popular writer, and on the strength of these facts declare it to be a purely technical medical word.¹

¹No doubt it will seem natural to the reader to suppose that Dr. Abbott's method of proving words to be technical medical words is unexampled among students of Greek. As a matter of fact, however, it is not quite so. By the same process by which he makes *κασόδομαι* and *ἔξεραμα* appear to be technical medical terms, the Rev. Wm. Kirk Ho-

With reference to *κωλισμός*, which is used here only in the N. T. (*cf.* *κωλιν*, in Mark ix. 20), but occurs in Hippiatr. 204. 4, and in Theodotion, in Prov. ii. 18 (which brings it into the circle of 2 Peter's author's training), it is doubtless sufficient to observe (1) that the author of 2 Peter did not invent it; (2) it may have been a popular word, cropping up here in a popular proverb, and, indeed, this is by all odds the most likely supposition; and (3) there is no particular reason for preferring "wallowance" to "wallowing," as its translation. The careful Grimm feels no hesitation in translating it "*volutatio*;" and although verbals in *-μος* regularly express "an abstract notion of energy embodying the *intransitive* notion of the verb" (Jelf., § 332, B., p. 334, Vol. I.), yet that rule neither decides for *-ance* instead of *-ing*, in the *intransitive* verb "to wallow," nor is it of uniform application in actual usage. On the whole phrase, *cf.* Epictetus' phrase, *ἐν βορβόρω κωλισθαι*, as quoted by Grimm under *Βόρβορος*. The verb *λωω* (which occurs six times in the N. T.) is, indeed, nearly always used of persons, but not invariably; so that the usage in this passage, while not the most usual, is a perfectly natural one. Accordingly, the verse is found to be such as would strike a Greek ear about as the following strikes an English ear: "The true proverb: the dog turning to its own vomit again, and the sow that had washed, to wallowing in the mire." What concerns further Dr. Abbott's notion, that the fact that the three words, *κωσσομένα*, *ἐξέραμα*, and *κωλισμόν*, do not seem to occur after 2 Peter in Greek literature until about A. D. 60, has any tendency to prove a late date for 2 Peter, proceeds on his forgetfulness of the chief characteristic of the age in a lexical point of view, and needs no remark here.

Little need be said with regard to *ταρταρώσας* (2 Peter ii. 4). It is easy to confess that it is not found in the N. T. elsewhere, nor

Hobart, LL. D. (*The Medical Language of St. Luke, etc.*, Dublin,) makes *οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι* of Acts ii. 10, and *ἀνελήθη* of Acts i. 2, medical terms—the former on the strength of the use of the verb *ἐπιδημέω* (to be *ἐπίδημος*) of epidemic diseases (*e. g.*, Hipp. *Progn.*, 46), and the latter on the strength of the medical use of the verb *ἀναλαμβάνω* as equivalent to "to restore to health and strength," etc. Dr. Hobart, indeed, presents quite a number of instances quite as bad as Dr. Abbott's.

anywhere in classical Greek ; and as easy to admit that even its primitive *τάρταρος* is never found in the N. T. or the LXX., and may therefore be, in somewhat strong language, said to be "alien to both." That it was capable of being used by Jewish lips is, however, plain from, say, Josephus c. Apion ii. 33 ; although it is probably true that the N. T. avoids the use of the word "Tartarus," in order to avoid suggesting heathen associations. The *verb* is, however, a different matter. And although it is not found elsewhere in this short form, it is certainly impossible to say, in the face of the common *καταταρτάρω*, that it is "uncouth ;" "almost as uncouth as it would be in English to speak of 'helling' some one, instead of 'sending him to hell.'" That this is the very opposite of the fact, the current Greek expression "down-helling" some one is a standing and convincing witness. We have before us, indeed, only one of the well known, though somewhat rare, cases (like *θεατριζειν* for *εκθ.*, or *δειγματιζειν* for *παράδειγ.*), in which the later Greek (*i. e.*, probably the *popular* Greek) preferred, contrary to its usual custom, the uncompounded to the compounded form. See Moulton's *Winer*, p. 25, note 4. In connexion with *ταρτάρω*, however, Dr. Abbott makes much of another "curious" word, *σειροίς*, which he thinks, "to a well-educated Greek," would convey the meaning of "store-pit," and on the strength of which he proposes the following translation of ii. 4 : "If God spared not angels when they sinned, but having *helled* them, delivered them to *store-pits* of darkness." What can be gained by such a mysterious appeal to the "well-educated Greek," in the face of Hesychius' recognition of the sense of "prison" for the word, it is difficult to divine. The word, used here only in the New Testament, and not at all in the LXX., is tolerably common in the classics in the spellings *σειρός* (Pollux, Plut., Varro, Demosthenes [v. 5]), *σιρρός*, and more properly *σιρός* ; and its standing sense seems to be PIT. This seems clearly its primitive sense. It has three secondary meanings : (1) a PIT for keeping corn, and hence a magazine or store-pit. So Eur., Anaxim., Demosth. (2) A PIT for catching wild animals, and hence a pit-fall. So Longus. (3) A PIT for keeping prisoners. So Hesychius tells us, giving "prison" as one of its meanings, and

informing us that the Laconians used a word, *σπία*, for "safe-keeping." While it is to be freely admitted, therefore, that the word was most correctly used in literature in that one of its secondary senses which expressed "store-pit," it is certainly not clear that we must translate "store-pit" in 2 Peter any more than in Longus; or that its context would not determine the sense naturally and simply to "an educated Greek," provided he was educated enough. To an "uneducated" Greek, on the other hand, who might well know more of "pits" of the (2) and (3) kinds than of the (1), the suggestion might be *more* natural of a pit-fall or prison-house than of a store-room or magazine.

Turning from single words to phrases, we somewhat wonder that *μνήμην ποιείσθαι* is singled out for the first strictures on 2 Peter's idiom; nor is it very consonant to speak in one place strongly: this phrase is a blunder, corresponding to "inducing [the Court] to his favor" (p. 210), and in another mildly: "it is not known to be used in the author's sense (Thuc. II. 54, is ambiguous)." Thucid. II. 54 ought to be much more than ambiguous in order to justify the statement. To us, the probability is, that Thuc. uses the phrase in just 2 Peter's sense; though, perhaps, we can never be certain about it. At all events, does anybody suppose that if we should blot out 2 Peter i. 15, and then prove that Thuc. ii. 54 took the phrase as 2 Peter does here, Dr. Abbott would push the charge against him which he here raises against 2 Peter? If not, why not? It is not, however, so very unexampled that a phrase commonly used in the sense of "make mention," should sometimes be used in that of "entertain recollection." We need only recall the kindred phrase, *μνήμην ἔχειν*, which occurs in both senses. Cf. Hdt., i. 14; Soph. *Elect.*, 346; Plato *Phaed.*, 251. D.

"Still more objectionable," we are told (and if objectionable at all, we do not wonder at the "still more"), "is (i 5) *σπονδῆν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες*." Josephus and Diod. Sic. both use the phrase with the uncompounded verb, and rightly enough. "But the sonorous extra syllable added by our author makes nonsense of the phrase, by converting it into 'contribute all zeal in an indirect manner'; or 'as a secondary or subsequent consideration.'"

And then the conjecture is hazarded, that what led "our author" "so superfluously astray," was the grandiose sound of the word and the reminiscence of *παρεισ-έδισαν* in the parallel passage in Jude. Let us, however, remember the full pail and dead fish, and be sure of our facts before we explain them. Is the author so clearly astray? The reader who will read Huther or Alford *in loc.*, may be in a fair condition for deciding. He who will study the word criticised will be in better condition. Why are we told that either the idea of *indirectness* or *subordination* is expressed by the *παρά*? *Subsequence* may be *implied*, but what is expressed is simply *addition, along-sided-ness*. Compare the use of *παρεισῆλθεν* in Rom. v. 20, when the sense is not "came in between" or "subordinately," but simply "beside," "along with." When sin entered, then law had also entered; they came side by side. This thought, which is the natural thought of our phrase, too, is very consonant with its context; and the only one who is astray is the expositor.

The omission of the article before the word *δίκαιος*, in ii. 8, and before *οὐρανοί* and *στοιχεῖα*, in iii. 10, 12, seems to Dr. Abbott very blameworthy indeed. In the first case, it is very doubtful whether the article is rightly omitted, seeing that it is contained in all MSS. except B. But letting that pass, its omission can cause no surprise and produce no difficulty; we would simply read, instead of, "for that righteous man dwelling among them by sight and hearing, vexed his righteous soul day by day," rather, "for dwelling as a righteous man among them, he by sight and hearing vexed his righteous soul day by day," wherein the *δίκαιος* is taken as predicate, instead of subject, perhaps with an adverbial effect, as Dr. Abbott suggests; but perhaps, however, not. We do not assert that this is the way it ought to be taken; we merely assert that it is a way that it might be regularly taken, which is enough to void Dr. Abbott's objection of all force. If any one cares to know, however, how we understand the passage, we have no objection to telling him. We think the article is probably to be omitted; and then the passage reads as follows: "*for dwelling among them to both sight and hearing¹ a righteous man, he day*

¹Literally, "in appearance and report."

by day vexed his righteous soul with their lawless deeds." Many advantages flow from such an understanding of the passage: from an involved it becomes a simple passage; and to pass over the rest and come to one related to our present subject, it takes βλέμμα in its most natural sense, and hence forever destroys one of Dr. Abbott's chief charges against the purity of Peter's style. We do not assert or allow that βλέμμα cannot be used for the "sense of sight;" nor do we admit that on any other understanding of the passage, 2 Peter lies open to such charges as Dr. Abbott brings against it. The Greek writers do, however, use the word rather in the sense of "appearance," "expression," than in that of "sight," "seeing;" i. e., rather of the objective than the subjective "look" of a person (in the plural the word means the "eye" itself); and, although the transition from the objective to the subjective is very easy, and its meaning would argue no unworthiness, ignorance, or pedantry in the author, yet it is perhaps better to take his words in their more obvious and natural sense, and understand him to say that Lot gave every proof to his neighbors—both to their eyes and ears—of his righteous character.

The absence of the article before στοιχεια, needs no remark, as it seems paralleled by Wisdom vii. 17: "He gave me to know σύστασιν κόσμον καὶ ἐνέργειαν στοιχείων. The article's omission before οὐρανοί, is in general quite regular (Moulton's *Winer*, p. 150) and is only peculiar here because it does not elsewhere occur before the *nominative case*. This cannot argue, in a case like the present, any ignorance or pedantry or barrenness, however, but is only to be noted (as *Winer* does) as one fact of language. This class of words, like ἡλιος, γῆ, οὐρανοί, etc., quasi-proper names, are, indeed, in a transitional and unsettled state in N. T. Greek, and may and do take or omit the article according to the individual's fancy or training or mode of looking upon the object. Thus, this very word οὐρανός is treated differently by the various N. T. writers: the *Apocalypse* stands at one extreme, 2 Peter at the other. In the *Apocalypse* it always takes the article, in the *Synoptists* it is prevailingly omitted in certain phrases, in Paul regularly in those phrases, in 2 Peter it is omitted in new cases.

There is no more reason to object to or feel surprise over one writer's mode of viewing the matter than another's.

We do not feel drawn to join earnest issue, finally, with Dr. Abbott concerning the use of "*eighth*" before instead of after its noun in ii. 5. Greek order was more flexible than he seems to imagine; and we may content ourself with simply referring to the commentators on the passage, and to Winer (Moulton's Ed.), p. 312, where everything unusual or strange in the phrase is discussed and illustrated. A reference to Alford's note on i. 9, is sufficient to set aside the strictures offered on *μωπαζειν* (see also Lumby); and we can well content ourselves with declaring at this point that the difficulty found with the use of *μελλησω* (i. 12) is *wholly* imaginary.

And so it appears that these frightful ghosts of "barren pedantry" are like other ghosts—they need but calm looking at to disappear. The negative character of an examination such as we are carrying on, is apt to leave a false impression on some minds, and to weaken their confidence in an Epistle about whose good character there must be so much discussion. Cæsar's wife ought to be above all attack and defence. Ought not, however, such a discussion as the foregoing to have rather an opposite effect? Without mercy, ruthlessly, and even cruelly, 2 Peter has been plunged into the caustic acid of Dr. Abbott's sharp criticism, and as it lies in the seething fluid, we are boldly told that we need not even look for it: it is dissolved and has passed away. But we look, see, reach down, and draw it out; and lo! the pure gold has not so much as felt the biting touch of its bath. Out of the fiery furnace it comes without even the smell of smoke upon it. The result is negative. We have only shown that *these* objections are not fatal to the book; but there is a positiveness about it, after all. The argument based on an ignobility in the style of 2 Peter, framed with learning and pleaded with skill, as it has been, certainly entirely fails; and its failure means simply the failure of all arguments against the Epistle's genuineness, drawn from the phenomena of its style.

There is, indeed, one refuge left. Though it is not ignoble, it may at least be hopelessly diverse from that of 1 Peter. Dr.

Abbott is too good a general not to supplement his chief argument with such a contention (pp. 215, *seq.*). We have already seen how he frames this contention.¹ But its great support falls with the falling of the charge of ignobility; for Dr. Abbott's first point, here too, is that 2 Peter cannot be by the author of 1 Peter, because the latter Epistle has no trace in its style of the plagiarism, tautology, and pedantry that abound in the former. Beyond this he urges nothing which is new or which has not already been repeatedly fully answered. We do not permit ourselves to be drawn into this old discussion, but are content here with quoting the true words of so liberal a critic as Reuss: "On the theological and linguistic differences between the two Epistles, we lay no stress; the two Epistles are too short, have to do with wholly different circumstances, and especially present no direct contradictions; only if the Epistle is on other grounds proved to be un-genuine, can this also be brought into account;"² and with referring the reader especially to the most convincing discussion of the relation between the style of the two Epistles given by Prof. Lumby in the introduction to his Commentary.³

RELATION OF SECOND PETER TO JOSEPHUS.

The way is thus cleared for us to devote the remainder of our space to a discussion of, by all odds, the newest, most important, and most earnestly urged part of Dr. Abbott's argument—that which is founded on the relation between 2 Peter and the Antiquities of Josephus. Dr. Abbott is the inventor of this argument, and therefore may be, perhaps, credited with a certain measure of pardonable pride in his contemplation of it. Certainly he has made it a very striking argument, and certainly he expresses great confidence in it. He conceives that he has *demonstrated* that the author of the Epistle had read Josephus.⁴ Since the Antiquities of Josephus, from which the borrowing is made, were published in A. D. 93, it follows, in that case, with inevitable certainty, that 2 Peter could not have been written

¹See above, pages 393, *seq.*

²Geschichte, u. s. w., Neue Test., § 270-2.

³Speaker's Commentary, Vol. IV., pp. 228, *seq.*

⁴*Expositor* (1882), Vol. 3, p. 61.

until after A. D. 93, and therefore cannot be by the Apostle Peter, and must needs be a forgery. Certainly, the evidence by which the dependence of 2 Peter on Josephus is thus "demonstrated," demands, therefore, our most earnest scrutiny. We ask the reader to follow us as we very baldly state the evidence as adduced by its discoverer, and then attempt to test its relevancy and validity.

I. *Dr. Abbott's statement of the evidence.* As a matter of course, the only evidence available is internal to the two writings compared; and it is just as much a matter of course that it consists not of direct quotations of Josephus by 2 Peter, but of more hidden and subtle marks of literary dependence. As a matter of fact, the whole stress of the argument is laid upon one kind of evidence, namely, that which arises from the common possession by the two writers of a peculiar vocabulary, distributed in such a way in their writings as to suggest to the mind that 2 Peter, in penning his Epistle, must have had in his mind a very vivid reminiscence of certain assignable passages in Josephus. This main and central argument is, indeed, bolstered by two further considerations: the occurrence in the two writings of a couple of similar sentences which may be deemed parallels, and of a couple of common Haggadoth. But Dr. Abbott clearly assigns small value to either of these facts, and apparently would hardly consider them worth adducing in the absence of the more important marks of literary connexion. And this rightly enough; for nothing can be clearer than that neither of them possesses the slightest force as evidence of literary connexion between the two writings. The Haggadoth, the common knowledge of which by Josephus and 2 Peter is supposed to point to borrowing of the latter from the former, concern the statements that Noah was a "herald of righteousness" (2 Peter ii. 5), and that Balaam's ass rebuked him (2 Peter ii. 16). What 2 Peter says may be read in the English version. Josephus' words are: Noah "being displeased at their deeds, and pained at their counsels, tried to persuade them to amend their lives and actions" (Antiq. I., 3. 1), and "the ass, having received a human voice, blamed Balaam as unjust, having no cause to find fault with it for its previous

services, yet now he inflicts blows on it, not understanding that now, in accordance with the purpose of God, he was being hindered," etc. (Antiq., IV., 6. 3). It is extremely doubtful whether any Haggadah needs to be assumed at the basis of the latter statement at all; it is very difficult to see wherein 2 Peter ii. 16 goes beyond the warrant of the account in Numbers xxi., and not easy to see that anything beyond it need be assumed beneath the account in Josephus. The Haggadah with reference to Noah, on the other hand, occurs in the Mishnah, in a form much closer to 2 Peter than Josephus' account is: "There rose up a herald for God in the days of the deluge; that was Noah" (Bereshith Rabba xxx. 6); and, indeed, also, in Clement of Rome (ix. 3). In both cases, thus, common sources of information underlay both 2 Peter and Josephus, covering the whole case; and, in general, any number of Haggadoth might be common to the two writings, without in the slightest degree suggesting dependence of one on the other, provided they were not the *invention* of one of them. By as much as it would be probable that they were current legends of the time, by so much could they fail to suggest direct literary connexion.

The pair of parallel sentences that are adduced are equally invalid for the purpose for which they are put forward, as will become plain on one moment's consideration. They are as follows: 2 Peter ii. 10, *κυριότητος καταφρονοῦντας. τολμηταί κ. τ. λ.*, compared with Jos. B. J. iii. 9, 3, *τολμηταί καὶ θανάτου καταφρονοῦντες*; and 2 Peter i. 19, *ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες*, compared with Josephus, Ant. xi. 6, 12, *οἷς καλῶς ποιήσετε μὴ προσέχοντες*. At first sight there is undoubtedly a certain strikingness in the close verbal resemblance of the passages. But a glance at the contexts is enough to dispel at once the delusion. Josephus' "Now these Jews, although they are exceedingly *daring and despisers* of death, are yet both unorganised and unskilled in wars, etc.," has little in common with 2 Peter's "The Lord knoweth how to . . . reserve the unrighteous under punishment to the day of judgment; and especially those going after the flesh in the lust of pollution and *despising* lordship. *Daring*, self-willed, they tremble not when blaspheming glories, etc." Clearly, the hypothesis of a quotation here on one side or

the other is out of the question; the collocation of the two very common words, *daring* and *despising*, is indeed striking, but not in such a way as to present more than a strongly marked illustrative passage. As a matter of fact, it has been quoted by all recent commentators as an illustrative passage, and has never suggested literary dependence to one of them. The same is even more clearly the case with the other parallel quoted. The phrase *καλῶς ποιεῖν* is a very common set form of speech, and is usually construed with participles (*cf. e. g.*, Acts x. 33; Phil. iv. 14; 3 John 6); and *προσέχειν* is common in the sense in which it here occurs (*cf. e. g.*, Heb. ii. 1). Absolutely, the only thing, then, common especially to Josephus and 2 Peter is that they each happen to need, in utterly different connexions, to construe the common phrase *καλῶς ποιεῖν* with this particular common participle. It is not such parallels as these which can be appealed to, to prove literary connexion. Two other phrases common to Josephus and 2 Peter might have been with equal propriety, but are not, introduced in this connexion; one (which has been mentioned above¹) is "bringing in [besides] all diligence" which is found also, however, in Diodorus and elsewhere, and thus is shown to be a current phrase, and the other is "following in the track of myths" in which we do find a rare contribution of perfectly common words. All four are simple but close illustrative parallels which cannot suggest literary connexion, but only community in the same current forms of speech; they have consequently all four been the common property of commentators for years, and have been uniformly used as illustrative and only as illustrative passages.² We must, therefore, refuse to allow any, even corroborative, weight to either of Dr. Abbott's supporting considerations, and insist on viewing and estimating the central tower of his argument in its own separate strength. If its masonry is not solid enough to enable it to stand without such props as these, it is right that it should fall.

¹P. 417.

²Such closely illustrative but by no means connected passages are continually turning up, and many of them are much closer than these; *cf. e. g.*, with Rom. vii. 15, such a passage as this, from Epict. *Euclain.* ii. 26, 4: ὁ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ.

The axioms on which the argument is built are as follows: The common possession of the same vocabulary by two writers is evidence of literary connexion between them. "Obviously, uncommon words are far more weighty than common" ones as evidence (p. 53). A word not found in the LXX. or elsewhere in the N. T. is uncommon to the circle of ideas of a writer like 2 Peter, even though it be otherwise a common Greek word (p. 54).¹ "The evidence of a *group of words* is far stronger than that of a multitude of single words, to show that one author has read another" (p. 52). If, then, we can find a common peculiar vocabulary in 2 Peter and Josephus, and especially if we find that these peculiar words occur in groups of narrow compass, we have very strong evidence of literary dependence of one on the other.

Dr. Abbott thinks we can find this very thing, and presents us with two instances of it. We transcribe and condense a statement of the case from his pages (pp. 56, *seq.*):

1. "Assuming that the author of the Epistle had read parts of Josephus, . . . he had probably read the short Introduction which describes the motives and objects of the work. . . . Now, the Introduction (Par. 3) declares (*a*) that the moral derived from the Jewish records is, that those who follow God's will find success and happiness, whereas those who disobey find everything against them, and are involved in irremediable calamities (*a* thought repeated also in Par. 4); (*b*) Moses considered that the basis of all law was (Par. 4) insight into the *nature of God* (θεοῦ φύσιν); (*c*) he exhibited (Par. 4) God in the possession of his virtue (ἀρετήν), undefiled by degrading anthropomorphism; (*d*) he considered (Par. 4) that it was the duty of man to partake in this divine virtue; (*e*) the laws of Moses (Par. 4) contain nothing out of harmony with the *greatness* (μεγαλειότητος) of God; (*f*) he kept from all unseemly myths and legends, though he might have easily cheated man (Par. 3) with *feigned* stories (πλασμάτων); (*g*) he always assigned fitting actions to God's power (Par. 3); (*h*) nor did he do as other lawgivers (Par. 4) who have *followed after fables* (μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες). The Epistle declares (*a*) that the moral of the stories of the fallen angels, of Noah, and of Lot, is (ii. 9), that the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to

¹*Cf.* p. 62, where a word rare or non-existent in N. T. and LXX. is said to be completely out of the author's natural sphere.

keep the unrighteous unto punishment unto the day of judgment; (*g*) his divine *power* (i. 3) hath granted us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that called us (*d*) by his own glory and *virtue* (i. 3); that we may become (*d*) sharers in (*b*) the divine *nature*; false teachers shall arise to make merchandise (ii. 3) of men, with (*f*) *feigned* words (πλαστοῖς λόγοις) but we (*e*) were eye-witnesses (i. 16) of the *greatness* (μεγαλειότητος) of Christ; and (*h*) in declaring it we did (i. 16) not follow after cunningly devised *fables* (μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες).” The two most important points here are those marked (*h*) and (*b*). In the former, note: Ἐξακολουθήσαντες though found in the LXX. is not found in the N. T. except here; μύθοις occurs four times in the Pastoral Epistles and nowhere else in the N. T., and not at all in the LXX. (except Sir. xx. 19, in the sense of “*tale*”); while neither LXX. nor N. T. contain the combination. Even the word added by 2 Peter (σεσοφισμένοις) occurs but once in N. T. (2 Tim. iii. 15) and there in an opposite meaning, whereas it is found at least twice in Josephus in 2 Peter’s sense (B. J. iii. 7, 20; iv. 2, 3). With reference to (*b*) note: to apply φύσις to God is not only a *usage* not found in the N. T. or LXX., but a *thought* alien to the Bible. The Greeks and Romans so spoke, but no single N. T. writer. The exact phrase is, however, found in Josephus’ *Cont. Ap.* The other phrases in the passage are also noteworthy: πλαστός is found here only in the N. T. and LXX.; ἀρετή (singular) is applied to God only once in LXX. (Hab. iii. 2, where it means “*glory*”); μεγαλειότης is found only twice each in N. T. and LXX., and only once in application to a divine person (Luke ix. 43). Now combine all these, and note the slighter points also, and note the cumulative character of the argument.¹

2. “If the author was attracted by this comparison between Moses, the truthful lawgiver of the Jews, and the truthful teachers of the Christians, it is natural that in writing the last utterances of St. Peter, he should turn his attention to the last utterances of Moses (Antiq. iv. 8. 2). There, Moses is said to have spoken (*a*) as follows (τοιάδε): ‘Fellow soldiers and (*b*) *sharers* of our long hardship (μακρᾶς κοινῶν ταλαιπωρίας,) (where note the transposition), since I (*c*) am not *destined* (ὄν μέλλω) to be your helper on earth, (*d*) I *thought it right* (δίκαιον ἡγησάμην) still to regard happiness for you and (*e*) *memory* (μνήμην) for myself. Do not set anything above (*f*) your *present* customs (νομίμων τῶν παροῦτων), (*g*) *despising* (καταφρονήσαντες) the (*h*) *reverence* (εὐσεβείας) which ye now feel for God; (*i*) thus will ye be never *able to be taken*

¹Expositor, as above, pp. 56–59.

(ἐνάλωτοι) by your enemies. God will be with you (*j*) *as long as* (ἐφ' ὅσον) you will have him for your leader. Listen, then, to your leaders, (*k*) *knowing that* (γινώσκοντες ὅτι) men learn to command by obeying. These things I say (*l*) at my *departure* from life (ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ τοῦ ζῆν), (*m*) *not recalling* them (εἰς ἀνάμνησιν φέρων) by way of reproach, but for your good, that ye may not (*n*) *through folly* degenerate.' With these compare: (*a*) τοιᾶσδε (i. 17 here alone in N. T. and LXX.); (*b*) θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως (i. 4, where note the transposition similar to μακρᾶς κοινωνοὶ ταλαιπωρίας above); (*c*) μελλήσω i. 12 (v. r., οὐκ ἀμελήσω (?) οὐ μελλήσω, reading and meaning doubtful, *valeat tantum*); (*d*) *I think it right* (δικαίον ἡγοῦμαι) i. 13 (here only in N. T. and LXX.); (*e*) μνήμην, i. 15 (sense different from that of Josephus, but here only in N. T.); (*f*) καταφρονοῦ τες (ii. 10, in different context); (*h*) εὐσέβεια (four times in this Epistle, eight times in the Pastoral Epistles, only once in the rest of the N. T.); (*i*) *made for taking*, ii. 12 (εἰς ἄλωσιν, in different context, but the word is only here used in N. T. and twice in LXX.); (*j*) *as long as*, i. 13 (ἐφ' ὅσον) is only here used in N. T. and LXX. in this sense (in the only other passage in which it occurs, Rom. xi. 13, it has a different sense); (*k*) *knowing that* (γινώσκοντες ὅτι) is twice used in this Epistle (i. 20, iii. 3) to introduce a new clause, and only twice elsewhere in the N. T.; (*l*) *my departure* ἐξοδος (i. 15) only once used elsewhere in LXX. and N. T. (viz., Luke ix. 31) in this sense; note also in Josephus the juxtaposition of ἐξοδος and ἀνάμνησιν, and in 2 Peter ἐξοδος and ἐπιμνησεί; (*m*) the word ἀμαθία, *folly, inability to learn*, is not in the N. T. or LXX., but the kindred adjective *foolish* (ἀμαθής), though not in this context, is found in this Epistle (iii. 16) and nowhere else in the N. T. or LXX." "Here the evidence rests on similarity of words rather than thought; yet even in thought there is considerable similarity." To find words like μνήμην, ἐφ' ὅσον, δικαίον ἡγοῦμαι, which are never used in the N. T., and ἐξοδος only once, all in two or three verses, describing the last words of St. Peter, and in a page of Josephus describing the last words of Moses, is striking. Add the other expressions and the cumulative character of the evidence comes out strongly.¹

It appears to be admitted that these are the only passages which "show such striking groups of similarities;"² but it is mentioned that some thirteen or fourteen remarkable words or phrases might be pointed out as common to 2 Peter and Josephus and yet not found elsewhere in the N. T. or LXX. The argument, then,

¹ "Expositor" as above, pp. 59-61.

² Do., p. 61.

beyond doubt depends on the common possession by 2 Peter and Josephus of a small peculiar vocabulary (13 or 14 words), which in two instances tends to arrange itself in groups in Josephus and to a smaller extent in 2 Peter. This, we understand, to be Dr. Abbott's view of the basis of his argument.

II. *Examination of Dr. Abbott's Statement of the Evidence.*

Any extended meditation on the subject will force upon the mind a strong conviction that the method of investigating and determining the relations existing between two writers which Dr. Abbott has adopted, is an exceedingly unsafe one. We are sorry to bring ourselves, by this statement, under the disapproval of both Dr. Abbott and Canon Farrar. The latter¹ "can only suppose that the scholar who" makes this statement is "in reality unable or unwilling to give his full attention to the inquiry." It is, nevertheless, our strong conviction that this method is an eminently unsafe one. We do not, of course, mean to assert by this either that the method is illegitimate or that no secure results can ever be obtained by it. Conceivably, a very strong presumption, passing into moral certainty, might be obtained by it alone, that one writer had borrowed from another. But we are free to confess that we think the instances in which this can be done are very rare, and those in which it has been done are rarer still. When two writers can be shown to possess the same general vocabulary, there is a reason for that fact, and this reason is a legitimate object of search; when two writers can be shown to use in common a very peculiar vocabulary, the cause of this too is a legitimate object of inquiry, and may be demonstrably discoverable; and if this peculiar vocabulary occurs in the two authors grouped in narrow contexts, this also must have a cause, which should be sought, and may be found, and may prove to be direct literary dependence of one on the other. The unsafety of the method does not lie, then, in any necessary unsoundness attaching to it, or any necessary inapplicability of it, but rather in the extreme difficulty of so applying it as to reach secure results. He who launches himself on this method, begins a journey on a very treacherous sea. He who

¹ *Expositor*, etc., as above, p. 404.

attempts to tread this path to truth, starts, indeed, in a road that does lead to the goal, and which may, indeed, be safely trodden, but which can be trodden safely only at the cost of tireless and sleepless watchfulness, in a shifting, moveable road, not like the broad beaten way that invites the even careless step, but rather like a lane of the sea, which a skilful navigator alone can keep. There are so many ways in which two writers may obtain a similar vocabulary, even if a peculiar vocabulary—like training, like associations, like reading, like sources of linguistic knowledge, how many causes may have conspired to the result!—that the case must certainly be an exceptional one which will justify us in saying dogmatically that the real cause of the community is direct literary connexion. And there are so many causes, often subtle in the extreme, and hidden from the coarser sight of man, which may have worked together in crystallising groups of the uncommon words common to two writers around certain centres in their writings, that it is very unsafe to assume that a direct literary connexion can alone be the true account of such phenomena when observed and shown to really exist. And if all this be true in general, how specially true is it of the Greek writers of the time of 2 Peter and Josephus, when the language of literature was in a remarkably unsettled and transitional state; when words and expressions hitherto provincial or popular were suddenly appearing quite independently on the pages of the most widely-separated writers; and when one hardly knows what to assign to the new language common to all, what to the immense mass of underlying popular speech of which we know so little, but of which they knew so much, and which was now striving everywhere to make entrance for itself into literary recognition, what to personal idiosyncrasy or special training or literary borrowing. Our profound ignorance of the spoken Greek of the time—our almost complete unacquaintance with the colloquial vocabulary and usage—alone would bid us beware of too lightly explaining even striking resemblances of vocabulary in two writers by the hypothesis of immediate literary connexion. Nor do there lack special reasons why we should be even peculiarly chary of finding literary connexion at the bottom of resem-

blances existing between 2 Peter and Josephus among the writers of even that transitional age. In any event, the author of the Epistle and Josephus had much in common which bound them closer to one another than either was bound to his age in general, and which might bring to them a common, even peculiar, vocabulary. They were both Jews; both learned Greek doubtlessly in the first instance orally and in a popular form; both learned a peculiar type of Greek current in the same rather peculiar region; both were bred in the same land and under similar teachings and influences; both were accustomed to hear the same speech about them from the same kind of lips; both, so far as they read at all, were readers of largely the same literature. A similarity of vocabulary which might be startling if found in two entirely unconnected writers, might be a mere matter of course between 2 Peter and Josephus. And groups of similar words must be very striking, indeed, as groups, to force the conclusion that there has been immediate literary connexion between those two writers. We do not mean to assert that even in such a case a comparison of the vocabularies of two writers cannot be made profitably, or that evidence could not conceivably be obtained from it which would lead us to suspect that one of them had borrowed from the other. But we do mean to point out that this method of investigating the relations existing between authors, beset with difficulties everywhere, is most peculiarly liable in such a case to be misapplied. We do mean to point out that on launching ourselves upon it, we need a most untiringly careful navigator to our steersman; else, at the end of a voyage, we may fancy ourselves in a port which we are as far as possible away from.

It is worth our notice, next, therefore, that Dr. Abbott does not approve himself to our judgment as an eminently safe sailor on these unsafe waters. On a careful examination of the argument which he has presented, we observe several things which shake our confidence in him as a pilot. Let us enumerate some of them.

1. We observe, then, that Dr. Abbott fails to distinguish sharply, in presenting his argument, between different kinds of evi-

dence. In investigating the relations of two writings to one another, it is conceivable that we might find several kinds of facts, as for example, (1), general resemblance of vocabulary; (2), common possession of a peculiar vocabulary; (3), a number of rare words grouped together in a brief context in one, found also in the other, either (A) scattered through the writing, or (B) similarly grouped; and (4), clauses or sentences occurring in both, either *verbatim* or nearly so, or with strongly-marked similarities. Now the probative force of these several classes of facts is not the same, but increases as we pass down the list, *cæteris paribus*. It is, therefore, essential, in careful investigation, to keep them apart and estimate the bearing of each class separately. This, although he recognises these distinctions theoretically, Dr. Abbott does not succeed in practically doing. For example, if the reader will take his Josephus and mark the words which Dr. Abbott adduces in his groups above, he will not be slow in observing that some items which can justly be classed only under (2) above are included by Dr. Abbott under (3), with the practical effect of unduly raising their probative force as looking towards literary connexion between the two writings.¹

2. We observe, next, that Dr. Abbott does not carefully eliminate irrelevant items from his lists. Lists of expressions meant to prove literary dependence of one writer on another, ought to contain nothing which does not suggest borrowing, and ought, certainly, to contain nothing whose presence in the borrowing writing can be better accounted for by assigning a different origin to it. Dr. Abbott's lists contain words which, whether 2 Peter borrows from Josephus or not, were certainly not taken from Josephus by 2 Peter; and others which are of such character as cannot suggest any closer connexion than that both writings are Greek. Let us instance a few examples. To adduce 2 Peter's mention of the divine *power* (*δυναμις*) as granting unto us all things that pertain to life and godliness, and Josephus' statement that

¹ In the first of Dr. Abbott's examples, only [b, a,] h, c, d, e, and in the second only a, b, c, d, e, have any claim to be grouped in Josephus; while in 2 Peter in the first case only g, c, d, b, stand closely grouped, while in the second only f, d, j, l, e, stand tolerably grouped.

Moses had always assigned fitting deeds to God's *power*, and not attributed to him the indecencies which heathen fables ascribed to the heathen gods,—as an item suggesting literary connexion between the two is but one step removed from the adduction of their common use of the verb *είναι*. The same may be said of the pleading of the common use by the two writers of such words as *καταφρόνησαντες, εἰσέβεια, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι*, and the more so, as none of them occur in any well-marked group of common words. Once more, it hardly admits of question but that *ἐξοδος* in 2 Peter i. 15, is a reminiscence of our Saviour's words recorded in Luke ix. 31, or a quotation from that passage. The context of 2 Peter leaves no doubt on that point; it occurs just before the Transfiguration is mentioned, and in a context which contains other reminiscences of that scene, and consequently proves that his mind was, at the moment of writing the word *ἐξοδος*, dwelling on the details of that scene. It is no less than certain, therefore, that *ἐξοδος* was suggested here by a reminiscence of Christ's words, and consequently that it was not taken from Josephus. Its presence in Dr. Abbot's list, then, is certainly misleading, and, so far, vitiates the argument he has framed. With it, the attempt to find a parallelism between Josephus' *ἀνάμνησιν* and 2 Peter's *ὑπομνήσει* falls also into hopeless irrelevancy. And, indeed, also the parallel found between 2 Peter's and Josephus' use of *μεγαλειότητος*, which is found in the same context with *ἐξοδος* in Luke (ix. 43), and was perhaps derived from that passage by 2 Peter, but just because found just where it is in Luke and in this special context in 2 Peter, is not and cannot be derived from Josephus. To parallel *θεῖας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως* and *τῆς μακρᾶς κοινωνοὶ ταλαιπωρίας*, on the strength of the arrangement of the words, is, again, simply misleading in such an argument, since the arrangement of the words is determined in each case and explicable in each from the purpose of the writer and needs of the emphasis; the careful exegete will in neither case look beyond the context for the complete account of the matter. To point to the common word *μέλλω* in Josephus, again, as the literary parent of the *μελλήσω* of 2 Peter, is in like manner entirely without significance; and almost as strong language is applicable to the adduction of their common use of

δικαιον ἡγοῦμαι, as an item showing literary connexion between them. Both writers must have been thoroughly familiar with the phrase, independently of each other; and if the exact phrase does not elsewhere occur in LXX. or N. T., this is due to mere accident, as any one may satisfy himself who will compare Acts xxvi. 2; 2 Cor. ix. 5; Phil. ii. 3, 6, 25; iii. 7, 8; 1 Tim. i. 12; Heb. x. 29; xi. 26; 2 Peter ii. 13, etc. It is far from certain, once more—it is not even probable—that 2 Peter i. 3 has anything in common with Josephus' statement that Moses proved that God had his *virtue* unmixed. The paralleling of *ἀρετη* and *δόξα*, in 2 Peter, seems to prove that the writer meant the former word in the sense which it bears in Hab. iii. 3, and therefore in a totally different sense from what Josephus meant. So long as Hab. iii. 3 stands in the Bible, so long is all the probability that the usage represented there, and not the passage in Josephus, is the literary parent of 2 Peter's use of the word.

Now all of these items are out of place in Dr. Abbott's argument. And it is remarkable what a different aspect it presents when purged thus of some of its irrelevancies. The complicated second group is reduced to simply the common use by 2 Peter and Josephus of a half dozen words (*τοιᾶσδε* [τοιᾶδε], *μνήμην*, *παροῖση* [παρόντων], *ἄλωσιν* [εὐάλωται], *ἐφ' ὅσον*, *ἀμαθῆς* [ἀμαθίαν]), among which there are only two (*ἄλωσιν* and *ἀμαθῆς*) whose exceeding commonness in all Greek literature does not throw grave doubt on their relevancy; and neither of these really occurs in both writers. All semblance of *grouping* is gone. The first group suffers nearly as severely, but retains as yet the appearance of a group.

3. We observe, next, that Dr. Abbott, in presenting his argument, does not carefully distinguish between what is sound and what is merely plausible. The mixture of different kinds of evidence and the failure to sift out irrelevant items are themselves examples of this, as both increase the appearance but not the reality of strength in the argument. The same vice runs, however, through the whole treatment of the evidence, and it may be, perhaps, not without its value to illustrate this fact with reference specially to the strongest portion of the pleading. After having stated the parallelisms of the first of his groups, Dr. Abbott re-

marks, as we have seen, that the two most important items in it are those marked *h* and *b*, and then proceeds to develop the first of these as follows :

“As to the first, it must be borne in mind that the word *follow after*, though found in the LXX., does not occur in the N. T.; and the word *fable*, though found four times in the Pastoral Epistles, does not occur elsewhere in the N. T. nor (except in the sense of *tale*, Sirach xx. 19) in the whole of the LXX. The probability, therefore, that the author borrowed from Josephus this protest that the Christians, as well as the Jews, did not *follow after fables*, is increased by the fact that neither the LXX. nor the N. T. contains *both* of the words which are here combined in the same order by the author of the Epistle and Josephus. It may be suggested that the resemblance is less striking because the author adds the words, ‘cunningly devised’ (σεσοφισμένοις). But it is the manner of borrowers to add something of their own, and it is a confirmation of the borrowing hypothesis that this added word is used but once in the N. T. (2 Tim. iii. 15, ‘*make thee wise unto salvation*’), and there in a sense opposite to the meaning here; whereas, in the sense of ‘cunningly devise,’ it is found at least thrice in Josephus (B. J. iii. 7, 20, and iv. 2, 3).”

We presume that it will not be denied that this is the most striking piece of evidence that Dr. Abbott has adduced. But how much of it is plausible rather than sound! 1 Corinthians is one of the generally acknowledged Epistles of Paul; we imagine that Dr. Abbott feels no doubt of its genuineness. We open it at random and light upon 1 Cor. ix. 13, and ask, Is there evidence of the dependence of this, too, on Josephus? Let the reader compare the argument which might be framed in support of that proposition with Dr. Abbott’s pleading, as given above:

“We note that Josephus, in a striking passage (B. J. v. 13, 6) represents the zealots as saying: *δεῖ . . . τοὺς τῷ ναῷ στρατευομένους ἐκ τοῦ ναοῦ τρέφεσθαι*. Now, the parallelism of thought between this and 1 Cor. ix. 13, as well as the similarity of wording, is very marked. It becomes immediately evident that the author of 1 Cor. betrays his consciousness of being a borrower here by introducing his statement by the words ‘know ye not’—a mode of expression which not only implies that he is appealing to a well-known phrase not his own, but which is found in Josephus, and so suggests his manner. It is further worthy of remark, that the word *στρατεύεται* makes its appearance in this context (verse 7)

in a rather peculiar manner. And to make the case still more secure, we read in this same verse (13) the very rare word *παρεδρέβοντες*, which occurs here only in the N. T., and only once in all the LXX., and which yet is found in a cognate form in another book of Josephus (*Contra Apion*, I. 7) in a like context: *τῇ θεραπείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ προσεδρέβοντες*. Now, it is the manner of borrowers thus to combine passages; and this gathering together of phrases from different portions of a writer's works, and combining them into one context, only proves to us the more clearly that we have discovered the original source of the composite passage."

Now, how does the one argument differ from the other? Certainly not in *kind*. And yet the latter confessedly proves nothing. There may be, and there is, a kernel of evidential fact beneath Dr. Abbott's argument, but its outward form is—plausible pleading. Let us observe, now, (1) that Josephus' context and mode of introducing the phrase is totally different from those of 2 Peter. Just compare, "for other law-givers [than Moses], indeed, following after the fables [τοις μ. ἐξ.], transferred in their discourse the shame of human sins to the gods, and gave much pretext to the wicked," with 2 Peter i. 16. (2) That all the words employed are common words, and are used in current senses; the later Greek, such as that of Polybius, is full of *ἐξακολούω*, *σοφίζω*, and *μῦθος*, in just these senses. And (3) that no one of the words is absent from the narrow literature which alone Dr. Abbott is inclined to allow to be familiar to the writer of the Epistle (viz., N. T. and LXX). (4) Actually, therefore, the one only point of resemblance between 2 Peter and Josephus is the very natural collocation in two absolutely different contexts of *two very common words*. *Valeat tantum*.

The second of Dr. Abbott's "important" items is also more plausibly than soundly put. It is true that 2 Peter's statement with reference to our becoming "partakers of the divine nature," is very striking, and in phraseology unparalleled in the N. T. It is, however, often paralleled there in thought. But neither in thought nor phraseology is it paralleled in Josephus. He speaks nowhere of men partaking of the divine nature, but only of their obtaining a share of God's *virtue*, and that in the use of phraseology about as unlike 2 Peter's as it could be. He does

speak also of the "nature of God" and of the "divine nature," but so do nearly all writers of Greek. Peter would in any case be very familiar with the phrase; and the thing needing explanation is *not* where he could have gotten it, *but* how he came to use it. To point to its presence in Josephus, no more explains this, nor as much, as to point to its presence as a current phrase in the common Greek of the age.

4. We observe, once more, that Dr. Abbott does not inquire with sufficient anxiety after the exact account which the resemblances between the two writings, when once drawn out and clearly exhibited, demand for themselves. He seems, indeed, scarcely to recognise this duty, and declines almost contemptuously to investigate the subject.¹ The critical weapon he is wielding, however, is one exceedingly difficult to handle, and almost always cuts both ways. The only possibly sound method of procedure in such cases is clearly some such as the following: (1) The careful collection and classification of the points of resemblance between the two writings; (2) the most anxious investigation of what accounts could be given of them; and (3) the most thorough-going investigation as to which one of these accounts ought to be given. There is no trace in Dr. Abbott's papers that he has proceeded after such a fashion; to all appearance, he has assumed from the outset that, if resemblances exist, they must be explained by the assumption that 2 Peter borrowed from Josephus. On the contrary, however, it is obvious that we have in this case many ways of accounting for phenomena of resemblance. (1) There is the common inheritance by the two writers of a peculiar form of Greek belonging to a peculiar province. We must sharply investigate how much this will account for. (2) Reared thus in the same age, in the same land, under largely the same influences, there is probability of the common knowledge by the two writers of the same or a similar literature. We must determine very closely how much resemblance this will account for. (3) It is only after these methods of accounting for the phenomena have been exhausted, that we are justified in suspecting real literary dependence of one on the other, and not till

¹P. 51.

that is rendered probable, that we can begin inquiry as to who is the borrower. This last question, again, is not to be settled by either assumption or guessing. Many items combine to its determination, and each must be investigated. We must ask: (A) Which writing, on other evidence, seems to be the older? No force of internal evidence can make us believe that Shakespeare quotes Tennyson. (B) Which writer, on *a priori* grounds, is more likely to have known the other? (C) Are there any other phenomena of the two writings, besides their resemblances, which may help us to a decision? And (D) what solution of the question do the special phenomena of resemblance themselves suggest? It needs to be kept in mind, moreover, that a borrowing which may seem *a priori* impossible, if conceived of as having taken place directly, may yet be *a priori* quite likely, if conceived of as having taken place through an intermediate link.

The need of such a detailed and careful study of the meaning of phenomena of resemblance, in a case like the present, may be illustrated from the undoubted resemblances existing between Seneca and the Sermon on the Mount, or Paul's speech at Athens, or the Epistle to the Romans. It cannot be pretended that the items of resemblance between 2 Peter and Josephus are anything like so striking as those in any one of these cases. But who will believe that either Paul or Christ borrowed from Seneca, or Seneca directly from them? The more carefully the phenomena are investigated, the more clearly the true solution emerges. Is it impossible that an explanation found adequate to explain those closer resemblances should be inadequate to explain these? Meanwhile, when our author acts as if it were impossible, it is plain that under his leading we are in the hands of an unsafe guide.

III. *Sifting of the Evidence.* But if we cannot yield ourselves to Dr. Abbott's leading, nothing is left us but to seek to work our own way through the problem. And in order to this we must first of all attempt to classify strictly the actual phenomena of resemblance between 2 Peter and Josephus. We do not pretend to have made an independent thorough-going examination of the two authors with a view to discover their relation to one another. But we have carefully examined every statement of Dr. Abbott's

with the original texts before us, and gone over the whole ground independently in a cursory way. The result of our examination is as follows :

1. The general vocabularies of the two writings are in some degree alike.

2. The two writers have in common possession a number of words which are rare in the Biblical books. Dr. Abbott speaks of thirteen or fourteen of these (p. 61); we have counted some seventeen. At least fourteen of these are, however, too common in profane Greek to serve as marks of connexion between any two Greek writers. There remain the collocation *μυθοῖς ἐξακολουθήσαντες*, the phrase *ἐφ' ὁδον* perhaps, and the phrase *καταστροφή κατέκρινεν*, which, if it needed accounting for, would be sufficiently accounted for by Gen. xix. 29, but which is probably not genuine in 2 Peter (*καταστροφή* being omitted in B. C.¹ Copt.).

3. Of these words rare in Biblical Greek, *πλάσμα*, *θεοῦ φύσις*, *μυθοῖς ἐξακολουθήσαντες*, occur in §§ 3 and 4 of the Preface to the Antiquities; and *τοιάδε*, *μνημῆν*, *παρόντων*, *ἐνάλωται*, *ἐφ' ὁδον*, *ἀμαθίαν*, in Ant. iv. 8, 1 and 2—in both cases in connexion with other phrases bearing some resemblance to phrases in 2 Peter, which were either certainly or probably obtained elsewhere. Here is an appearance of grouping.

4. No silent quotation of clauses or collocations of words seems capable of being adduced.

5. There are of course no direct citations, and no such community in matter as to suggest connexion.

This sifted statement of the evidence will hardly need further justification than has been incidentally furnished in the preceding pages. On an examination of its contents it will be seen that what we have to account for is the common possession by the two writers of a number of words rare in Biblical Greek—but not peculiar out of it—some of which have a mild tendency to group themselves in the Preface §§ 3–4 and iv. 8, 1 and 2 of the Antiquities of Josephus. The real question before us in testing Dr. Abbott's conclusion is consequently something like this: Does this tendency to grouping, such as it is, raise a stronger presumption that 2 Peter knew Josephus, than all the evidence for the canon-

icity, genuineness, and early date of that letter raises for an earlier date for it than A. D. 90?

IV. *What Account should be Rendered of the Matter?* It will be the part of wisdom, however, to proceed by slower and surer steps to our goal. We note then, on a close view of the items of resemblance, that there are a variety of suppositions which, being assumed, would render an adequate account of them. Some of these are excluded, however, by evidence at once so patent and cogent that we need not occupy our narrow space in stating it. Such are, for example, that 2 Peter was originally written in Aramaic and that the resemblances to Josephus were introduced by a later translator, or that the Epistle, although originally Peter's, was subsequently reworked by a hand that knew Josephus, or that the resemblances are due to pure interpolations of the original letter of 2 Peter's. There are, however, at least four hypotheses which have nothing extravagant about them, and which will therefore require less summary treatment at our hands. We might account for the resemblances by assuming either, (1) that 2 Peter borrowed from Josephus, or (2) that Josephus borrowed directly or indirectly from 2 Peter, or (3) that they are due to the influence of a writing known to and affecting the language of both, or (4) that they are due to the common circumstances, surroundings, training, and inheritances of the writers. Our real task is to determine which one of these is the true account of the matter. In order to this we need to observe that:

1. Any one of them, if assumed, will account for the facts of resemblance. This is immediately apparent of the first three, but can be made apparent of the fourth also. Canon Farrar, indeed, cannot "feel respect for the judgment of any critic who asserted that the resemblances were purely fortuitous;" we do not desire to fail of his respect, and perhaps "purely fortuitous" is too strong a phrase. But if we have proceeded at all soundly in sifting the evidence and its significant elements are all contained in our re-statement of it, it can hardly be denied that it may be accounted for apart from literary as distinguished from what may be called educational connexion. On any careful consideration of the naturally mediated connexion between the two writers (as distin-

guished from the writings), it will be impossible to deny that very close resemblances in style, phraseology, manner, and wording, may be fully accounted for by it. When we remember that both writers belong to the same age and so might be expected to independently fall upon the words and phrases current in the Greek of the time, that both were Jews and wrote the same Hebraistically tinged Greek (though tinged in different degrees), that both were familiar with the LXX., and perhaps Philo and other Jewish-Greek literature, that both were brought up under the same social fabric, in the same narrow land, under the same manner of training, and were necessarily familiar with the same modes of speech and style of language, we cannot feel that it is mere prejudice which makes us doubt whether any further facts than these are needed to account for the resemblances noted. The semblance of grouping which remains after sifting the evidence is certainly not such as *may* not be accounted for in so closely related writers, as a mere "fortuitous" collocation of words common to both.

2. Each of these methods of accounting for the resemblances has its own advantages. The first has the great advantage of absolute simplicity; the second of combining with almost equal simplicity, freedom from the historical and chronological difficulties which lie against the first; the third of escaping the difficulties lying against both the first and second while supplying an exact account of all the facts, such as the curious coexistence of remarkable divergencies in sense and even phraseology, with close resemblance in the very same phrases, the appearance of grouping while yet the words grouped are excessively common, etc; and the fourth of making no assumptions and proceeding only on solid and well grounded fact.

3. Each of the methods is beset with its own difficulties. In the way of assuming that 2 Peter quotes Josephus there stands the immense presumption arising from the focussing of many separate lines of investigation, that the Epistle comes from a time earlier than A. D. 90. The mere fact that the Epistle was a part of the Church Canon of the time of Origen raises a presumption in this direction; the fact that it is quoted as an authoritative book by Justin Martyr increases it; the fact that it was used by

a series of earlier writers, including even Barnabas and Clement of Rome, clinches it. Its internal phenomena raise a presumption in the same direction: its undisproved assertion that it is by Peter; its phenomena of apostolical reminiscence; its resemblance in thought and wording to what we have elsewhere of Peter's; its fitness in manner and style to what we know of the character of the Peter of the Gospels; and perhaps more cogent than any of these, its total silence in the midst of an elaborate and plainly an interested polemic against the heresies that are opposed by it as well as by Jude and the Pastoral Epistles, of any hint of the forms of error prevalent according not only to John but also to Irenaeus towards the close of the century; its total lack of any trace of the state of mind that we know was induced among Christians of Jewish birth by the destruction of Jerusalem; its absolute unlikeness to any of the known literature of the Second Century; its immeasurable superiority in thought, style, and phraseology to any Christian writing of that period, and its likeness, on the other hand, to the writings of the apostolical age.¹

The assumption that Josephus has copied 2 Peter has to labor under the difficulty of supposing that such a man as Josephus had met with and read so unimportant a Christian Scripture as 2 Peter, and had been so sharply affected by its language as to unconsciously repeat it. We say "unconsciously" advisedly, for Josephus certainly introduces the common phrases most naturally and seemingly unconsciously. We are unable to find, indeed, that they are any less naturally and unconsciously used by 2 Peter, and especially dissent from Canon Farrar's making a stumbling-block of its use of *ἀρετή*, wholly, as it seems to us, from failing to take it in the sense which the author of the Epistle defines for us by parallelising it with *δόξα*. But, then, after all, would it be so very strange for Josephus to have known 2 Peter? He knew of Christianity; he could not have avoided knowing of it, and has betrayed knowledge of it. He studiously makes little of it and avoids telling us how much he knew, but he knew something of it. Nothing prevented his having met with the Chris-

¹Compare Canon Farrar's strong but not too strong remarks on this point: "*Early Days of Christianity*," Vol. i., p. 206.

tian Scriptures. Jews of his age, we know from chance hints in the Talmud and elsewhere, found no difficulty in becoming acquainted with their contents, found difficulty, perchance, at times in not becoming acquainted with them. And if he knew any of the Christian writings, would he not be most likely to know those current in such names as Peter's and James'? If, further, we conceive of his acquaintance with 2 Peter as not immediate, but through a mediating oral or written source, all difficulty seems to be on the verge of removing itself.

The third hypothesis, assuming a common literary source for the phraseology of the two writings, rests under the difficulty which always attaches to the assumption of an hypothetical book or literature, of which we know nothing historically, an assumption which is always dangerous and generally indefensible. We must not minimise this difficulty, but it is somewhat lessened by the facts: (1.) That both Josephus and 2 Peter are confirmed borrowers; (2.) That a large part of the sources of Josephus are known to be lost; and (3.) That a large and much-read popular Jewish literature certainly existed in this age, of which we have but few traces now left.

The chief difficulties lying in the way of accounting for the resemblances apart from all literary connexion, in accordance with the fourth hypothesis, arise from the semblance of grouping of the common words, and such collocations of a couple of words as "daring and despisers," "to do well to take heed," "following after myths," "bringing in all diligence." If the discussion of these collocations above be deemed sound, they will not stand much in the way of this explanation, and if the groups be no more strongly marked than appears from our restatement of the evidence, they cannot raise a presumption of more than slight force against it.

4. The phenomena of the resemblances themselves do not suggest with any strength of presumption any one of these explanations as distinguished from the others. They do suggest with some force some connexion between the two writings; and a calm and unbiassed consideration of them leads to the recognition of a mild suggestion in them of some form, but not of what form of

literary connexion. The strength of this presumption depends, of course, on the difficulty of explaining the phenomena in any other way. It amounts to only an original suspicion tending towards a probability, which may be readily overturned by the exhibition of any considerable difficulty in assuming literary connexion. The real problem before us, then, is: Is it more difficult to explain the semblance of grouping without literary connexion between the writings, or to assume literary connexion?

V. *The Conclusion.* The state of the case is simply this. The resemblances between the two writings are capable of being accounted for in at least four ways. There is an *a priori* probability in favor of each of the four in the reverse order of their statement above.¹ The resemblances themselves suggest that the account rendered should turn on literary connexion in some form, but do not distinguish between the forms. We must conclude:

1. That the assumption that 2 Peter borrowed from Josephus is out of the question. Nothing in the phenomena suggests this rather than at least two other accounts of the matter, and there is no reason for assuming it rather than the other accounts. On the other hand, it is burdened down with literary and historical difficulties quite peculiar to itself and such as would forbid its assumption unless the resemblances between the writings were certainly and utterly inexplicable in any other way.

2. Whether we assume one of the other forms of literary connexion or not, depends on our judgment as to the relative strength of the two presumptions; that raised for literary connexion by the phenomena of grouping, on the one hand, and that raised against it by the difficulties in the way of assuming it, on the other.

3. Perhaps the true explanation is to be found in a combination of two of the methods of explanation given above, namely in the natural connexion existing between the two authors combined with an *indirect* knowledge of 2 Peter by Josephus, derived through acquaintance with Jewish-Christian leaders.

4. While the present writer inclines to this explanation, in his judgment the evidence before us is not decisive between the last three of the explanations discussed above, and the true critical atti-

¹ See above, page 436.

tude is to esteem the question to this extent unsettled. Any one of the three, separate or in combination with the others, will explain the facts, and no one of them is burdened with overmastering difficulties. However trying it may be to find it so, it is true that history does not preserve to us, nor chance hide in the records themselves, the decisive considerations which will solve for us every problem of ancient literatures. It is enough to be able to point out, in a case like the present, somewhat narrow lines within which the explanation must be finally found; and enough for the defence of the genuineness of 2 Peter to be able to show that the assumption that it borrowed from Josephus does not lie within these lines. It is, of course, easy to say that that explanation has been excluded only on considerations which are "*rein apologetisch*." To all whose devotion is given to simple truth, however, apart from either apologetic or destructive bias, we can confidently look for a hearty recognition of the fact that it has been excluded (and must therefore be kept excluded) not on grounds of dogmatic or apologetical prejudice, but on purely historical and literary grounds, such as not only can be pleaded as raising a strong valid historical presumption for the early date of 2 Peter, but also apart from noting and yielding to which no valid historical results as to the date or literary relations of 2 Peter can be obtained at all. This is, in fact, one of the not rare cases in which Truth herself is an "Apologist."

And now, that our task is accomplished, we must take summary leave of our subject. Another attempt to find evidence of the spuriousness of 2 Peter has failed, and it begins to look as if that Epistle has too good a claim to a position in the Canon to be ousted by any legal process—as if violence alone could hope to tear it from its place. Certainly if the sharp attack that Dr. Abbott has led and so ably generalised has failed, we may expect others to fail. We confess to a high admiration for the acumen and force of his argumentation; the lever he uses to pry 2 Peter out of its firm bedding in the solid rock of God's word is certainly a most uncommonly admirable instrument. All that is lacking is a firm and solid fulcrum of facts which can stand the pressure

of the immense heaving. Dr. Abbott has brought forward one with a strong external appearance of solidity. But with the very beginning of the prying, it too, like all its predecessors, crumbles into dust, or ever the Epistle moves a jot from its bed. The moral is that 2 Peter must be most stedfastly fixed on its base—perhaps is an undivided portion of the bed-rock itself. So we believe it to be; and certainly, thus far, all the appearances are in that direction.

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

That eminent Biblical scholar, Dr. Green of Princeton, has done signal service to the cause of truth by the massive argument he has constructed in defence of the Pentateuch against the attacks of Welhausen, Kuenen, Robertson Smith, and other rationalists.¹ It would have been better, in our judgment, had Professor Green rewritten the separate essays making up this volume in such a manner as to have considered the subject more broadly in its general as well as particular aspects, and to have given more of individual and organic unity to the entire treatise. As it stands the book is nevertheless conceded in Scotland to be the ablest reply that Dr. Smith's alluring presentation of the advanced views on the Continent of Europe has yet received. Dr. Green's remarkable familiarity with the original Hebrew as well as with Oriental and German literature, and his complete mastery of the weapons of the practical logician, unite to render him a singularly formidable antagonist on the field of Old Testament criticism. Lünemann's "Hebrews" probably completes the so-called "Meyer series."² The Pauline authorship is not fully admitted. The

¹ *Moses and the Prophets.* By Professor W. Henry Green, D. D., LL.D. New York: Carters, 1882.

² *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament.* By

“Popular Commentary¹ on the New Testament” has already been repeatedly commended in this department of the REVIEW. The aim of the work is to put unlearned readers abreast of the results of modern criticism and scholarship, and at the same time furnish a succinct and perspicuous exposition of the whole New Testament. The plan is thus similar to that of the “Speaker’s Commentary” in England, but the execution in detail is somewhat different, the product even more compact, and the work even to a greater degree exempt from rationalistic traces. The indefatigable editor was the man of all men to superintend the arduous and useful undertaking. Biblical Theology, as it is called, is rising more and more into importance, and is one of the most fascinating studies in the world. Its endeavor is to present the strictly theological contents of each book of the Scriptures in consecutive order. Dr. Weiss confines himself to the New Testament.² He is an independent and highly original and able investigator and has done yeoman’s work by his thorough vindication of the fourth Gospel. The book is very unsound on some great matters, but will be a valuable aid abroad. The “International” is the only Commentary that is based on the Revision and is popular.³ The

Heinrich Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D. Hebrews. By Dr. Gottlieb Lünemann. Pp. 495. Translated by the Rev. Maurice J. Evans, B. A. Epistles of James and John. By Dr. J. E. Huther. Pp. 528. Translated by the Rev. Paton J. Gloag, D. D., and the Rev. Clarke H. Irwin, M. A. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark.

¹A Popular Commentary on the New Testament. By English and American scholars of various evangelical denominations. With illustrations and Maps. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Sacred Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. In four volumes. Vol. III.: The Epistles of Paul. Pp. 268. New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1882.

²Biblical Theology of the New Testament. By Dr. Bernhard Weiss. Vol. I. (Clark’s Foreign Theological Library, new series, vol. xii.) Translated from the third revised edition by the Rev. David Eaton, M. A. Pp. 489. Edinburgh: *Ibid.*

³International Revision Commentary. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D. Vol. iii., Luke. By Professor M. B. Riddle. Pp. 369. Vol. v., Acts. By Dean Howson and Canon Spence. Pp. 420. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Canon of Westminster,¹ under a misleading title, continues his attractive and serviceable, but at the same time dangerous, studies in the New Testament. This work is on the later books, and naturally follows the one on Paul. We took up a large and richly ornamented family Bible the other day in an humble cottage, and found an introductory essay on Inspiration by this seductive writer, which of course contained statements that were far from satisfactory. The Schaff-Hertzog Encyclopædia² is already too widely advertised to call for any description at our hands. Judging by the first volume we regard it as a work of extraordinary value. The articles are commonly of a reasonable length, often brief, but are by masterly experts. For instance "Agnosticism" is by Dr. Calderwood, "Emmons and the Edwardses" by Dr. Park, "Divorce" by Dr. Woolsey, "The Canon" by Drs. Strack and Schmidt, "Atonement" by Dr. A. A. Hodge, "Bible Text" by Dr. Ezra Abbott, and "Apologetics" by Dr. Christlieb. Dr. Schaff was the prince of editors for such a book. "Ecce Homo" made almost as great a sensation in the world as "Uncle Tom's Cabin," and deceived almost as many, or fully as many, of its readers. Yet in some respects it had a good effect in exciting and sustaining a new interest in our Lord's proper humanity. In that, and in all his semi-theological writings, the author (and in more senses than one) uses the livery of heaven to serve the Devil in. When we first read this literary masterpiece we inscribed in red pencil upon the fly-leaf the words Arnauld inscribed upon Malebranche's Philosophy, "*nova, pulchra, falsa.*" This new book by this consummate master of style is the sheerest atheism, thinly veiled under a pretence of nominal Christianity of the Anglican form. The literary charm of the book too is far below that of "Ecce Homo."³ It is refreshing to get another valuable

¹ The Early Days of Christianity. By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Canon of Westminster, and Chaplain-in-ordinary to the Queen. 1 vol. 8vo. Pp. i-xvii., 1-664. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., New York, London, and Paris. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

² The Schaff-Hertzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge. Vol. 1. Alpha-Future State. Funk & Wagnalls, New York.

³ Natural Religion. By the author of "Ecce Homo." "We live by

argument for the Resurrection of our Lord from the hands of one of our Christian lawyers.¹ The Rector of Naunton does not shrink from the avowal that the doctrinal tenets of the Church of England are set forth authoritatively in her Thirty-nine Articles. He is evangelical, but not distinctively Calvinistic in his exposition.² The "cry of back to Kant" is still to be heard on all sides, and is, on the whole, a favorable sign. The tendency even of much of the best conservative thought of the day, in metaphysics, is to recede alike from the ruinous extremes of idealism and materialism, and to find a *pou sto* (after a most severe excision of the indefensible parts of the system) in the solid residuum of the Critical Philosophy. Professor Morris is, however, himself a pronounced idealist, with decided Hegelian leanings.³ If we may accept the testimony of a thoroughly competent witness, Professor Hamilton's book on the Mind is not unworthy of a modest place on the same shelf with Porter.⁴ He is a Natural Realist, and believes in Immediate Perception. He also has his crotchets, and holds with Dr. Walker, and perhaps Ulrici, and Wilfred Hall, that the mind has extension. Dr. McCosh's "Criteria" is the first of a new series of *brochures*, for all of which we ought to be deeply thankful.⁵ President Schmid's critique of Darwin's views is not⁶ wholly unfavorable to some of them (notably the one about

Admiration"—Wordsworth. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1882. 12mo, pp. 251.

¹ The Proofs of Christ's Resurrection: From a Lawyer's Standpoint. By Charles R. Morrison. 8vo, pp. 155. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1882.

² Introduction to Dogmatic Theology. On the basis of the XXXIX. Articles of the Church of England. By the Rev. E. A. Litton, M. A., Rector of Naunton, Gloucester, late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Large 12mo, pp. 295. London: Elliott Stock, 12 Paternoster Row. 1882.

³ Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason. A Critical Exposition. By Geo. S. Morris, Ph. D. Pp. 272. Chicago, S. C. Griggs & Co.

⁴ The Human Mind. A Treatise in Mental Philosophy. By Edward John Hamilton, D. D. Pp. 720. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

⁵ Criteria of Diverse Kinds of Truth, etc. By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

⁶ The Theories of Darwin, and their Relation to Philosophy, Religion, and Morality. By Rudolf Schmid, President of the Theological Seminary at Schönlthal, Würtemberg. Translated from the German by G. A.

derivation), but is one of the most important books that has appeared on the subject. The author does not decide upon the truth or falsity of any of the six theories discussed, all of which have a direct or indirect relation to evolution or development, and insists with peremptory emphasis on their provisional and purely *hypothetical* character. The author is himself a theist, very much after the fashion of such apologists for Darwin as Professor LeConte and Professor Asa Gray. "Logic and Life" is a volume of sermons that are admired and introduced by President Porter. They appear to be chiefly valuable, however, rather as discussions than as sermons.¹ The work has been elsewhere judged to be one of great ability and timeliness, and especially adapted to intelligent readers of such writers of our time as Mill, Bain, Clifford, and Spencer. Lenormant's great work (the second volume of which has just appeared in Paris)² was referred to at least once before in these pages. The learned author undertakes to show that all the main incidents of revelation from the creation to the flood are imbedded in the traditions of the leading nations of the Eastern world. He argues plausibly, rather than convincingly (in his second volume), for Ararat as the site of Eden, and that the Babylonians borrowed their tradition from the Aryans of India. The modern craze for comparative studies has (as we have seen before) been extended even into the domain of theology. This exhibition of the true and the false, side by side, need do no more harm, if properly conducted, than that of the genuine and apocryphal Gospels, of the authentic and supposititious miracles. The only trouble is, that the exhibition is so often in the hands

Zimmermann, Ph. D., with an Introduction by the Duke of Argyll. Pp. 410. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co. 1883.

¹ *Logic and Life, with other Sermons.* By the Rev. H. S. Holland, M. A., Senior Student at Christ Church. New York, 1882. *Ibid.*

² *The Beginnings of History. According to the Bible and the Traditions of Oriental Peoples. From the Creation of Man to the Deluge.* By François Lenormant, Professor of Archæology at the National Library of France, etc. (Translated from the second French edition.) With an Introduction by Francis Brown, Assistant Professor in Biblical Philology, Union Theological Seminary. One Volume, 12mo., 750 pp., \$2.50, Scribners.

of unbelievers.¹²³⁴ Kuenen's endeavor is to account for what he styles the great universal religions, by regarding them as generalisations upon earlier and intensely particularistic systems. Thus the primitive religion of Israel grew up into Judaism; and from Judaism was, in course of time, evolved the universal religion of Christendom. The St. Giles Lectures, by such men as Dodds, Milligan, and Flint (to say nothing of such as Caird), are to a great extent free from the objection to the other books of this class, and present the subject in a compendious form.

The new Liddell-Scott is without doubt the best as well as the greatest Greek Dictionary in existence. Whole articles have been rewritten by those celebrated adepts, Professors Gildersleeve and Goodwin, and have received the encomiums of the transatlantic authors.⁵ "Short Sayings of Great Men" is a capital thesaurus on a new and interesting plan.⁶ Mr. Freeman is not only one of the greatest of living historians, but one of the first of living writers.⁷ The name of the venerated and gifted author will draw many eyes wishfully towards "Eras and Characters of History."⁸ Those who take up the book with the hope of a rich reward in

¹ National Religions and Universal Religions. By A. Kuenen, LL. D., D. D., Professor of Theology at Leyden. The Hibbert Lectures, 1882. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882.

² Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India. By Professor F. Max Müller. "Hibbert Lectures for 1878." Crown 8vo., \$2.50. *Ibid.*

³ The Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt. By Prof. P. LePage Renouf. "The Hibbert Lectures for 1879." 12mo., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴ The Faiths of the World. The St. Giles Lectures. 1882. Pp. 364, 12mo.

⁵ A Greek-English Lexicon. Compiled by Henry George Liddell, D. D., and Robert Scott, D. D. Seventh Edition, Revised and Augmented, with the coöperation of Prof. Drisler. New York: Harper & Bros.

⁶ Short Sayings of Great Men. With Historical and Explanatory Notes. By Samuel Arthur Bent. Boston: Osgood.

⁷ Lectures to American Audiences. (I. The English People in its Three Homes. II. The Practical Bearings of General European History.) By Edward A. Freeman. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates.

⁸ Eras and Characters of History. A series of Historical Studies. By William R. Williams. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. Harper & Bros., New York.

the way of intellectual and spiritual profit are not likely to be disappointed. Mr. Scott's treatise on Constitutional Liberty,¹ if sometimes a little heavy, is undoubtedly on the whole a really valuable one. Wilhelm Müller's "Political History of Recent Times"² is very comprehensive and full of learning and cleverness, though, if our impression be correct, not without grave faults. "Outlines of Ancient History"³ (if we may accept what a sensible critic says of it) is exceedingly well done, and gives us a bold and sharply-cut *silhouette* of the olden time. The great merit of the little book is that it shows plainly where the great limbs of the tree of nations branch off, and signalises only such events as are really of prime importance. Since Robinson there has been no one, as a popular guide at once to the Bible and to Palestine, to compare for a moment to the respected author of "The Land and the Book."⁴ This is the second of two portly volumes which put to shame the humble dimensions of the work as it originally appeared. The literary form that has been given to the exhibition of the subject-matter might in some things be changed with advantage; but the whole treasure-house of contemporary knowledge about the Holy Land has been ransacked and laid open for the benefit of the reader, and the unique value of the fruits here offered of the author's life-long and pious toil can-

¹ The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies of America. By Eben Greenough Scott. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1882. 8vo., pp. 334.

² Political History of Recent Times (1816-1875). With Special Reference to Germany. By Wilhelm Müller, Professor in Tübingen. Revised and enlarged by the Author. Translated, with an Appendix covering the Period from 1876 to 1881, by the Rev. John P. Peters, Ph. D. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

³ Outlines of Ancient History. From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Roman Empire, A. D. 476. Embracing the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Hebrews, Phœnicians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. Designed for Private Reading, and as a Manual of Instruction. By P. V. N. Meyers, A. M., President of Farmer's College, Ohio, Author of Remains of "Lost Empires," and Associate Author of "Life and Nature Under the Tropics." 12mo., cl., \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴ Central Palestine and Phœnicia. (The Land and the Book. Vol. II.) By William M. Thompson, D. D. \$6. New York: Harper & Bros.

not easily be overrated.† Sir James Stephen's History of the criminal jurisprudence of England is not improbably the most noteworthy contribution to the literature of the Bar that has been made in our time.¹ President Gilman has written an attractive life of President Monroe.² Mr. Bolles's financial views will not be entirely acceptable to the friends of a revenue tariff.³

By his two brief critiques on Gibbon and Macaulay, Mr. Morison, if he has not made good his title, has come near making good his title to be regarded as the sharpest-eyed and keenest-witted appraiser of literary excellence and literary quality now to be found within the limits of England.⁴ He has hit the *juste milieu* between undue laudation and undue blame; and what is still more singular, has pointed out with exquisite exactness and nicety, *la vraie vérité*, which lets one into the secret of the characteristic peculiarity of each writer. Macaulay's birth-gift, in Mr. Morison's opinion, was that of an inimitable story-teller. He even goes so far as to question whether, amongst writers of the same class, he ever had an equal here. As a *critic* of men and measures, he would assign him a much lower pedestal, but still a higher one than many do. Macaulay's personal character he shows was not without its heroic traits, and that even his gravest delinquencies as a historian sprang from a generous disposition and a manly heart. We must judge the few majestic pillars he has left us by picturing to ourselves the interrupted colonnade which it had been his intention to complete before our eyes. That erratic genius (and Virginian), Mr. Moncure Conway, turns aside from his multifarious intellectual and "spiritual" vagaries to enlighten and please the world with sundry reminiscences of his

¹ A History and General View of the Criminal Law of England. By Sir James F. Stephen, K. C. S. L., etc. 3 Vols., 8vo. Macmillan & Co., New York.

² James Monroe. By D. C. Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University. Vol. VI. of "American Statesmen" series. 16mo., gilt top, \$1.25. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston.

³ The Financial History of the United States, from 1789 to 1860. By Albert S. Bolles. D. Appleton & Co. 1883.

⁴ Macaulay. By J. Cotter Morison [English Men of Letters series]. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: Harper & Bros.

old mentor, the late Ralph Waldo Emerson.¹ Mrs. Fanny Kemble had given ample evidence of taste and capacity in her previous works, but this is (if we mistake not) her first venture in the way of serious and independent criticism. The hereditary gifts and traditions of her house, and the studies of a life fortunately environed for the purpose as hers has been, could hardly fail to make her a just and charming interpreter of the great poet of human nature. Our readers who become also readers of these captivating and discerning "Notes," will be apt to thank us for putting them on the track of such a marrowy volume.² Mr. Perry's subject is one that would almost bid defiance to dulness; and Mr. Perry's treatment is said to be marked neither by dulness nor by a want of solidity.³ The fascinations and perils of Mr. Froude's "Short Studies" do not need to be so soon again pointed out by us.⁴ Mr. Nicoll's "Landmarks" was a happy conception, and appears to have been happily carried out.⁵ The world has waited for Dr. Reber to give it in true perspective (what it never had before) a comprehensive and symmetrical view of the fine arts, contemplated not singly but in harmonious series; and viewed not as a mere collection of biographies, but as a mass of facts and principles that may be embraced in more or less general statements, and are reducible to a philosophic unity. In the volume before us, the topic discussed is the art of antiquity.⁶ The majority of intelligent readers in this country are not as *au fait* as they might be in the languages that are spoken in other lands. Hence they must depend for their knowledge of the foreign classics upon just such convenient aids as are afforded

¹ Emerson at Home and Abroad. By Moncure Daniel Conway. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1882.

² Notes upon some of Shakespeare's Plays. By Frances Anne Kemble. New York: Scribner & Welford.

³ English Literature in the Eighteenth Century. By Thomas Sergeant Perry. 12mo., cl., \$2. New York: Harper & Bros.

⁴ Short Studies on Great Subjects. By James Anthony Froude, M. A. Fourth Series, 1 Vol. 12mo., \$1.50. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁵ Landmarks of English Literature. By Henry J. Nicoll. 12mo., vellum, cloth, price \$1.75. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

⁶ History of Ancient Art. By Dr. Franz von Reber. Revised by the Author. Translated and augmented by Joseph Thacher Clarke. Harper & Bros., 1882.

them by Mr. Hassell.¹ The difference is immense between the school of Bach and the school of Wagner; but the second is a legitimate descendant of the first.² Of the musicians of the classic period, Mozart is the most precocious and dazzling; Beethoven the most profound and comprehensive and moving; Händel can scarcely be equalled in noble simplicity and solemn yet aspiring sublimity; nevertheless, Haydn's bewitching loveliness and pathos are scarcely more transcendent than is his occasional august grandeur. "The Land of the Arabian Nights" is either very badly named, or else is a book of real entertainment. It is warmly commended on the score of its information, as well as of its interest.³ Japan has leaped within the past few years from the twilight to the noonday blaze of civilisation.⁴ We have reserved for the last a notice of the third edition of Mrs. Margaret J. Preston's "Cartoons."⁵ This unobtrusive but beautiful volume is an honor to the South and to Christian womanhood. It is made up of cartoons from the life of the great painters, cartoons from the life of the legends, and cartoons from the life of to-day. We have read them all over and over again, and we measure our words advisedly when we declare our opinion that every one of these poems has the ring of the true metal. There is a masculine strength and daring about them, and at the same time a feminine tact and delicacy and sympathy and tenderness, that are not very often found in association. Mrs. Preston's muse resembles in many ways Wordsworth's "Phantom of Delight."

¹Tasso. By E. J. Hassell. (Foreign Classics for English Readers.) Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1 Vol., 8vo.

²The Life of Haydn. By Louis Nohl. Translated from the German, by George P. Upton. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co.

³The Land of the Arabian Nights. Being Travels through Egypt, Arabia, and Persia, to Bagdad. By William Perry Fogg. With Introduction by Bayard Taylor. A new edition, with nearly one hundred Illustrations. 1 Vol., 8vo., \$2. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁴Japan: Its Architecture, Art, and Art Manufactures. By Christopher Dresser, Ph. D., F. L. S., etc. London: Longmans, Green & Co.; New York: Scribner & Welford. 1882.

⁵"Cartoons." By Mrs. Margaret J. Preston. Third Edition. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

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ARTICLE I.

THE COUNCIL OF APOSTLES AND PRESBYTERS AT JERUSALEM.

The Acts of the Apostles is the first chapter of the history of the Christian Church, the transition chapter from the history of the Church under the Jewish dispensation to the history of the same Church under the Christian dispensation. Although not designed to teach ecclesiastical polity, yet the principles and precedents furnished therein by apostolic precepts and practices are so numerous and specific, that it alone would be sufficient to reveal the constitution of the Church, if there were access to no other inspired writings. Notwithstanding the fact that the voice of inspiration was never heard beyond the first century, yet the advocates of Prelacy and Congregationalism appeal alike to the testimony of the post-apostolic age in support of their respective systems. Thus Mr. Litton, of the Episcopal Church, quoted by Bannerman in his "Church of Christ," makes the remarkable statement that the claims of Episcopacy are strong so long as the appeal is to the post-apostolic age, and become weak only when the appeal is made to Scripture. Canon Venables, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article *Episcopacy*, furnishes the following still more explicit testimony to the same effect: "It may be desirable here to remove the confusion which may be produced by

the ambiguous use of the word 'Bishop.' . . . In its fundamental sense of an 'overseer,' 'inspector,' it was not originally a term of office at all. When it appears as such in the New Testament, it is simply synonymous with presbyter, the same officer of the church being called indifferently by one or the other name." After establishing that fact by the ordinary Scripture proofs, thereby indirectly testifying to the scripturalness of Presbyterianism, he frankly admits, "Any conclusion, therefore, drawn from the use of the term bishop in the New Testament, as to the existence of the episcopal office, would be fallacious," claiming for Episcopacy nothing more than "traces in apostolic times." Concerning its divine origin, he speaks unequivocally: "Do we intend that Episcopacy stands on the same level as Baptism and the Lord's Supper as a direct ordinance of Christ? . . . Though asserted as an unquestionable fact by many learned defenders of Episcopacy, we may safely assert that there is not a trace in the New Testament." To the same effect are the admissions of Dr. Lightfoot, Dean Alford, Dean Stanley, Canon Farrar, and Edwin Hatch, A. M., Bampton Lecturer for 1880. So Congregationalists have appealed to the testimony of Mosheim, that every local church in the post-apostolic age was independent. If deemed necessary, Presbyterianism might appeal as confidently as any to the post-apostolic age. Clement of Rome, Chrysostom, Jerome, Theodoret, as well as the historian Gibbon, affirm that for the first centuries presbyter and bishop were synonymous. That the government of the Church was essentially Presbyterian for several centuries, is the only explanation of the conflicting testimony of Church historians: one party magnifying the authority of Presbytery in the post-apostolic age into Episcopacy, the other magnifying the liberty of Presbytery into Independency. The time is coming when these testimonies of the "fathers" must be abandoned as props to support weak and tottering ecclesiastical systems. So much pious fraud has been practised, such as "Isidorian Decretals," "Ignatian Epistles," etc., which is now being exposed by the searching criticism of this age, as to cause loss of faith in uninspired testimonies. The Scriptures must be made the sole basis of any ecclesiastical system. That system of theology or

ecclesiology, and that only, must stand, will stand, ought to stand, which can be established by Scripture. Not Scripture in the sense of Dr. Wayland: "The New Testament, all the New Testament, nothing but the New Testament;" but Scripture in a more comprehensive meaning: the Bible, all the Bible, nothing but the Bible. The destruction of every system unscriptural, and consequently not *jure divino*, is the subject of prophecy. It was a prophecy, uttered by the Founder and Head of the Church, as yet still unfulfilled, though none the less certain: "Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up" (Matt. xv. 13). It matters not how men may build upon expediency, how beautiful their fabric, how successful their building according to worldly judgment, though it have but one defect, if it only lack scriptural support, it is a fundamental fatal defect, an house built on a foundation of sand.

Truth is ever consistent with itself; so perfectly consistent, that, given a few principles, these necessitate certain other correlative principles, forming a complete system. It is by virtue of the reliability of this fact, that the comparative anatomist can construct the entire skeleton of an extinct animal from the merest fragment of a bone. The records of science furnish illustrations where such men as Professors Owen, Kaup, and Cuvier, from fragments of bone or tooth, have restored the entire skeleton of extinct species, and subsequent discoveries corroborated the correctness of their conclusions. In like manner, deny predestination, and consistency requires denial of sovereignty of God, divine foreknowledge, special providence, limited atonement, human inability, sole efficiency of the Spirit in regeneration, and final perseverance of the saints. One stitch dropped from the web of divine truth, rends it in twain, or warps the whole according to the bias of perverted human judgment. It is on the same principle that, given the record of this Council or Synod at Jerusalem, it is possible from it to ascertain the constitution of the Church. The principles of ecclesiastical polity therein contained necessitate certain other corresponding correlative principles, which, taken together, form a well articulated system, and being tested by Scripture for confirmation, becomes impregnable against every assault.

The Church is indebted for this Council to the false teachers of circumcision. Just as the sneers of the Jews, "This man receiveth sinners," gave to the Church and the world the beautiful parable of the prodigal son, so the Church is indebted for the Council to the heresy, "Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved." It is the tendency of human nature in every age to attach great value to external ordinances or humanly devised means. "Except ye be circumcised," is but a tie linking the human nature of the apostolic age with the human nature of the present, which is still making similar demands for carnal ordinances: Except ye be immersed according to our mode, ye are not baptized; except ye be confirmed by a bishop in the line of apostolic succession, ye cannot receive the Holy Ghost; except ye be absolved by a priest, or anointed with extreme unction, "ye cannot be saved"! These three demands, legitimate successors of "Except ye be circumcised," etc., though varying in degree, and only the last attaining unequivocally the alternative of "ye cannot be saved," yet agree in one thing, virtually unchurching all other communions on earth except their own, and thereby casting considerable doubt on the prospects of others entering the kingdom of heaven in glory. Inordinate stress laid upon an outward ordinance is *prima facie* evidence of its human origin, or human corruption of the divine. Under the pressure of such teaching, the Council at Jerusalem becomes a necessity for the suppression of error and vindication of truth. It is immaterial who were "they" that appointed the delegation, consisting of Paul, Barnabas, and Titus (Acts xv. 2; Gal. ii. 1, 7), to carry the case to another court, whether parochial Presbytery or classical Presbytery of several churches affected by the teaching, or whether "they" yielded to the demand of Paul, Barnabas, and Titus for a hearing before a Council of apostles and elders at Jerusalem. The trouble arose at Antioch: a delegation from thence obtained audience (Acts xv. 12) before the body of apostles and elders, who came together for the express purpose of considering the matter (Acts xv. 6). A debate was held (verse 7); a decision was reached; and the decrees were published, not

simply at Antioch, but delivered to all the churches to keep (Acts xvi. 4).

Was it a Council? The primitive Church so understood it; and without it for a warrant and model for similar assemblies, the Church would have been utterly powerless to protect itself against Arianism, Apollinarinism, etc. The *Encyclopædia Britannica*, though alluding to Councils as "pitched battles of Church History," admits their value and even necessity for suppression of heresy and crystallisation of the truth. The Church of every age and every sect, whether heretic or orthodox, understood this assembly as the first Council of the Church. If ever there was an opinion in ecclesiastics, which could claim a "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*," the Council theory can. Truth is not converted into error, nor yet vitiated, nor even impaired, because many heretics have understood and advocated it as truth. Nor does the fact that the record of Acts xv. can be read through Prelatic and Congregational glasses as well as Presbyterian, alter the fact of its being a Council. The Bible itself can be read through Papal, Protestant, Calvinistic, Arminian, Presbyterian, or Prelatic glasses. The glasses do not alter the truth of the Bible, but simply affect our understanding of it. The world also can be viewed through any kind of glass, and the variety is neither in us nor the world, but in the glass. The very fact, therefore, that no matter through what kind of ecclesiastical glasses this assembly at Jerusalem is viewed, there is still revealed a Council of some complexion, determines the fact by the very best evidence that it was a Council without determining its nature.

Various opinions have been entertained with respect to the nature of this Council, its constitution, jurisdiction, authority, and how far it furnishes a precedent and pattern for the Church in after ages. Whether is it a model and warrant for similar Councils, or whether does it stand alone and solitary in the history of the Church? Every shade of opinion has had its advocates, from its being held to be an inspired infallible Council, with absolute power and authority to abrogate, annul, alter, amend, and enact law for the Church at will, down to regarding it as a mere voluntary association, having no warrant to convene except its

pleasure, and no power except to proffer friendly advice. It matters not what opinion is held, it will vitally affect our ideas of church government. It is the keystone in any system of Church polity. If the Prelatic interpretation of this Council be destroyed, the Prelatic system falls to the ground a mass of rubbish. Undermine the Congregational theory, and there is no warrant for any voluntary association, giving advice. If it be not a higher court, according to Presbyterian theory, it would be difficult to exhibit any warrant for higher court than the Presbytery of Antioch, which laid hands on Paul and Barnabas, and commissioned them to the foreign missionary work, or the Presbytery of Lystra (?), which ordained Timothy. The Confession of Faith is correct in citing Acts xv. as its Scripture warrant for Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies. Congregationalists object to this being any warrant for the higher court of appeal, because not corroborated by other cases. It is sufficient to reply that, having the Jewish ecclesiastical system as a basis, one well authenticated, inspired, apostolic precedent needs no other concurrent support. Presbyterians have yielded this case on opposite grounds, because Presbyterianism ought not to be based on one passage of Scripture, and there is much better warrant for higher courts elsewhere in Scripture. Let them produce the testimony, and exhibit more explicit Scripture precepts or examples. Yielding passage after passage to opponents of Presbyterianism, because other Scripture can be trusted to reveal the truth, will rob the truth by degrees of every vestige of support.

The multitude of theories which have prevailed in regard to the nature of this Council are reducible to three, according to the threefold classification of Church polity—Prelatic, Congregational, and Presbyterian. These are the only elementary systems. Independency, sometimes classified as a fourth, is not a system distinct from these three, but may, as an accident, modify either, though inherent only in the Congregational; so Papal and Episcopal are but the extremes of Prelacy. All other systems are but variations, modifications, or combinations of the three simple elementary forms. Consequently, this Council at Jerusalem must have been:

I. Either an inspired and infallible Council, with absolute power to alter the law of Christ for the Church at will;

II. Or, exactly the opposite, only a voluntary association, having no power, but advisory;

III. Or, something intermediate between them, a representative assembly, acting by virtue of a divine constitution, under guidance of the Holy Spirit, convened as a higher court, to hear appeals, interpret and apply the law of Christ. Each system, to a certain extent, stands or falls with the above.

I. It could not have been the first, because inspiration was not needed to determine a case which had *already been determined*, both by inspiration and the providence of God, admitting the Gentiles into the Church without circumcision. If inspiration had been needed, there was no necessity to search for the mind of the Spirit at Jerusalem among the apostles. Was there not an apostle at Antioch, one "not a whit behind the very chiefest," who could have given an inspired utterance? Being himself "the Apostle of the Gentiles," was he not possessed of the mind of the Spirit, touching the very class for whose sake he is specially called to be an apostle? There could have been no necessity for a college of inspired apostles, unless it be claimed that the inspiration of a collective body is more authoritative than the inspiration of an individual. But the very nature of inspiration is a denial of the latter assumption. If guided by human wisdom, then a "multitude of counsellors" might be required for safety. But from the very nature of inspiration, what God reveals to one man is as authoritative as if revealed to an assembled universe. The authority imparted by inspiration consists in the person speaking, the Holy Ghost, and not in the number who are made the medium of communication. * If the latter statement be erroneous, then the inspiration of the Epistles of Paul and all Scripture must be impugned, because uttered through the medium of single individuals. When has inspiration ever chosen a multitude to become the vehicle of conveying truth? What fundamental truth of the inspired word was revealed by a college of apostles, or by any other multitude? If inspiration be claimed for this Council, it would necessitate its influences also being imparted to all the "elders,"

who were associated with the apostles. But the Scriptures afford no warrant whatever for such a supposition. A Council half inspired and half uninspired would afford no guarantee whatever that the inspired utterances would prevail to the exclusion of the uninspired. The uninspired element would weaken the force of the inspired. If, however, to avoid that difficulty, it be claimed without any Scripture warrant, that the elders were also inspired, a still more insuperable difficulty obtrudes itself requiring solution. If guided by inspiration, every utterance must have partaken of the inspiration, else how shall we discriminate between the inspired and uninspired utterances? How could there have been "much disputing"? Does inspiration ever contradict itself? Inspiration is never given, except to reveal the will of God to men; but if every utterance of the Council were inspired, it follows, then, that a part of the revealed will of God has never been recorded, and is lost to the world. The very method of procedure is a denial of the inspiration theory. If the apostles and elders coming together to consider the matter, was in reality in order to consult the oracle of inspiration, there could have been no disputing, no difference of opinion. The truth would have been revealed simultaneously to the whole assembly. Or, if one person in the number had been made the vehicle of conveying it to the others, no sooner had he spoken than there would have been universal assent. The very opposite, however, were the facts of the case. It was only after "much disputing," consulting the word of God in the prophecies concerning the Gentiles, and the providence of God in admitting them without circumcision, that a conclusion was reached *in accordance with the mind of the Spirit*. But, does not the Council claim inspiration in that expression, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," etc.? The very union of their own names with that of the Holy Ghost forbids the theory of inspiration. What, then, must be understood by the expression, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost"? In other words, how did they learn what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost"? Not by a new revelation of the Spirit, but manifestly by consulting the inspired utterances of prophecy touching the Gentiles (Acts xv. 15-18), interpreted by the providence of God

in admitting them in uncircumcision (Acts xv. 7-11, 14). The record shows that exactly that was done and nothing more. Why demand a new revelation, when the mind of the Spirit could be learned by one ample and previously given? It was, therefore, by searching the Scriptures that they discovered what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost." If they had come together to inquire of an oracle, and "hear what God the Lord will speak," they would have published the decree simply, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost." But if they have come together themselves "for to consider of this matter," and express their judgment as to what the Spirit had revealed in the Scriptures, they could say, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." (Cunningham's *Hist. Theol.*, Vol. I., page 47.) Any Church court can discover the mind of the Spirit in the same way, by examining the written word, and being guided by the revealed will of God. It is the testimony of Calvin, that Christ "really presides only where he governs the whole assembly by his word and spirit" (*Institutes*, Book 4, Chapter 9, Section 1). Such, without attempting to legislate for the Church, can proclaim the law as uttered by Christ in his inspired word, and say in substance, what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost" also seems good "to us." If a Church court cannot be guided to conclusions in accordance with the mind of the Spirit except by inspiration, then the opening prayer of a church court, praying for the guidance of the Spirit, becomes a mockery. If it seem inconsistent to maintain that this Council was not guided by inspiration, and yet to insist that the record in Acts xv., and necessarily the conclusion of the Council, are inspired, it is sufficient to reply that the Jewish chronicles are not inspired, but when those chronicles are quoted by inspired writers, and incorporated as part of Scripture, that which was not inspired as chronicles becomes inspired by the incorporation into the Scriptures. Neither is the Septuagint version of the Scriptures inspired; and yet when quoted by Christ and his apostles in the New Testament, the part quoted and incorporated becomes henceforth inspired. If, then, it cannot be claimed that this was an inspired Council, and, consequently, infallible, Papacy must look elsewhere in search of a model and warrant for

its pretended infallible Councils, and "*a fortiori*" must Prelacy look elsewhere for authority to abrogate the law of Christ and legislate for the Church. Even if inspiration could be claimed for this Council, that would warrant neither Papal nor Prelatic assumptions, but rather forbid them. Infallibility depends on inspiration, but as the voice of inspiration died away with the first century, no other Council can claim inspiration; and infallibility without inspiration is a contradiction. However absurd the claims of Papacy, those of Prelacy are more absurd from inconsistency. If Papacy could establish its infallibility, that would warrant it in altering or amending the laws of Christ. But Prelacy claims the authority to legislate for the Church at will, without claiming infallibility to secure wise legislation.

II. It could not have been, according to the second theory, simply a *voluntary association giving advice*, considering the *composition* of the Council, the *authority* of its decrees, and the *extent* of its jurisdiction.

1. We join issue with the Congregationalists squarely upon the *composition* of that assembly. Their argument is based upon three expressions in the record: "the multitude," of verse 12, "with the whole Church," of verse 22, and "brethren," of verse 23. It seems almost ludicrous to base an argument on verse 12, "all the multitude kept silence"! Therefore, because "the multitude" were present and "*kept silence*," they are entitled to become a constituent part of every ecclesiastical court, and *not* "keep silence"! Arguing from the silence of "the multitude" on one occasion their right to participate on every other, is queer logic! It has been well remarked that nothing more can be claimed from the presence of a silent multitude than an argument framed against Prelatic conclaves, sitting with closed doors, from which the people are unwarrantably excluded. Kunoel, Mosheim, and Neander have very forcibly argued that "the whole Church" cannot be given a literal signification, as no place could possibly contain the myriads composing "the whole Church," but that the expression must, instead, designate simply deputies of "the whole Church." But even if it be literally interpreted, the expression, "Then pleased it the apostles and the elders, with

the whole Church," etc., announced only the acquiescence of the Church. It is difficult to comprehend by what logic it can be made to appear that because the whole Church was satisfied and eminently pleased with the action of the assembly, therefore the whole Church was a constituent part of the Council. The whole battle must be in regard to the word "brethren." It might be argued that the "brethren" simply appear in the attitude of sending "greeting," which makes them no more responsible for the decrees, "ordained of the apostles and elders," than the greetings of particular individuals in the Epistles of Paul make them responsible for the doctrinal utterances of Paul in those Epistles. But upon close examination of the case, the "brethren" disappear entirely, except as synonymous with "apostles and elders." In sending up the case from Antioch, the "brethren" are not mentioned as a constituent part of the Council, whose decision is asked. It is simply said certain "should go up to Jerusalem unto the *apostles* and *elders* about this question." In giving the composition of the assembly, nothing is said of any "brethren," but simply "the *apostles* and *elders* came together for to consider of this matter." In publishing the decrees among the churches, nothing is said of any "brethren" having participated in decreeing, but simply "delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the *apostles* and *elders*." Is it merely accidental that these two classes, and *no others*, are said to have been consulted by Antioch, to have come together to consider and to have ordained the decrees? Any lingering doubt of the case, already approaching the nearness of mathematical demonstration, is forever dissipated by the fact that the oldest and best Greek manuscripts show that the reading, "apostles and elders and brethren," is incorrect. In the oldest uncial manuscripts, there is no "and" before "brethren." The correct reading would be, "apostles and elders, brethren," making "brethren" synonymous with "apostles and elders," and comprehending both. This is the reading of the five chief uncials, regarded the oldest and best, and the chief basis of the late Revision, viz., (Σ, A, B, C, D,) Codex Sinaiticus, Codex Alexandrinus, Codex Vaticanus, Codex Ephraemi, and Codex Bezae. It is also the reading

of the Vulgate and several other inferior versions; and even of Irenæus (in the Latin). It is the reading adopted by Lachmann, whilst Neander and Alford approve it. It has likewise been supported by Meyer, De Wette, and Lechler upon internal evidence. It is marked by Griesbach as probably the correct reading. It is the reading of Westcott's and Hort's Greek Testament, which "is destined to become the classic form of the text in the original Greek." Such an array of evidence of the very highest character would have secured the admission by the Revisers of almost any other reading into the received text. It did not fail to secure their recognition, and the "and" before "brethren" was omitted, but the meaning was obscured by a false translation. *πρεσβύτεροι* is converted into an adjective, and made to qualify "brethren," giving us the unwarranted translation, "the apostles and the *elder brethren*," making the absurd statement that not *all* the "brethren" are associated with the apostles, but only those of a *certain age*, "the *elder brethren*." It is true the Revisers placed the correct reading, "Apostles and elders, brethren," in the appendix as the one preferred by the American Committee, but the false reading occupies the text, and the correct one is scarcely seen. With what authority *πρεσβύτεροι* is converted into an adjective, may be judged from the following: *πρεσβύτεροι* is employed with reference to that Council six times, five in the same chapter and once in the next. Of the six, it is translated "elders" five times, this case being the only exception. In the Acts of the Apostles, *πρεσβύτεροι* is a word of frequent recurrence, being found seventeen times, and is uniformly translated "elders," except in this one instance. Extending the research, so as to include Luke's Gospel as well as his Acts of the Apostles, it occurs twenty-three times; and besides this arbitrary exception made by the Revisers, it is an adjective but once, and that in the singular number, describing the elder son of the parable of the prodigal. If the field of inquiry be extended over the entire New Testament, besides *πρεσβυτέριον* (Presbytery) three times (Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5; 1 Tim. iv. 14), and *συνπρεσβύτερος* (co-presbyter) once (1 Peter v. 1), *πρεσβύτεροι* is found sixty-eight times; and of that number it is only four times used as an adject-

tive. Of these four seeming exceptions, one, as has been said, is in the singular number (Luke xv. 25); another is both in the singular and in a passage of Scripture regarded as spurious (John viii. 9); a third is feminine gender (1 Tim. v. 2); and the fourth is a doubtful case, with the preponderance of the doubt against its being an adjective and in favor of the translation "elders" (1 Peter v. 5). So, really, there is but one case where *πρεσβύτεροι* is used as an adjective, and that case is exceedingly doubtful. The doubt is still further increased by the use of *μειζων* (Rom. ix. 12), to express seniority. If, then, the support of the most ancient and most valuable manuscripts, and greatest critics and scholars is of any weight in determining the correct reading, it is demonstrated beyond question that the correct reading of this passage is "apostles and elders, brethren." Congregationalists utterly fail to discover any others in the composition of that assembly than "*apostles and elders.*" "The multitude kept silence," "the whole Church" simply acquiesced in the action of the assembly, and the "brethren" are only the "apostles and elders" combined.

2. It is equally easy to demolish the voluntary association theory by an examination of the *authority* of the decrees. The language is too emphatic and unmistakable to be regarded as the language of advice. Advice may be offered, but has never yet been offered, in such terms as, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us *lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things.*" Unless human language can be shown to have meant then exactly the opposite of its present meaning, *advice offered* and *decrees ordained* must be regarded as antipodes. Advice may be submitted for consideration, but never "delivered for to keep." "Lay upon you no greater burden," etc., and "delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of apostles and elders which were at Jerusalem," is the language of authority.

3. Still another feature of this Council does not comport with the Congregational independent theory. Does the decision affect Antioch simply? By no means. Instead of being published at Antioch simply, they are published with authority throughout Christendom (Acts xvi. 4). Recognising no frigid isolated inde-

pendency, but, on the contrary, acting on the principle of the unity of the Church, that what is binding on one is equally binding on all, the decrees are delivered to all the churches to keep. The decision of the Council affected every church as truly as Antioch. Considering the composition of the body, the authority of its decrees, and the far-reaching sweep of its jurisdiction, it could not have been a voluntary association. Congregationalism must look elsewhere for authority to enact the grand farce of giving advice.

III. If neither the first nor second theory can be accepted, let us go to the third, and view this Council as a Representative Assembly, according to the system of Presbyterianism. This follows from the nature of the destructive conditional syllogism. If truth lie between the three, to disprove two is equivalent to the establishment of the third. It may be further demonstrated from the composition, "apostles and elders," the former being teaching elders, and the latter, at least including, ruling elders, exactly the composition of every scriptural court in its normal condition. Arguments might be adduced from the *object* of the Assembly, "came together for to consider of this matter," which was a case of appeal or reference; from the *method of procedure*, the decision being reached by consulting the word of God as the sole authority; from the *authority* of its decisions, "decrees," "ordained," "delivered them the decrees for to keep," and laid upon them as a "necessary" "burden"; from its *jurisdiction*, acting not simply for Antioch, but for all the churches; from the *harmony* of this theory with the whole system of Presbyterianism; and from the concurrent support of the principles embodied in this Council by Scripture, ranging through the whole Canon. Passing by matters of minor consideration, whether James was the "brother of the Lord," or "James the Less"; whether this visit of Paul was the second or third of his five visits to Jerusalem; whether the prohibitions of this Council were the same as the Noachian and those exacted of proselytes; merely mentioning the curious remark of the acute Bengel, that the "greeting," *χαίρειν*, occurs nowhere else, with one exception (Acts xxiii. 26), except in the Epistle of James (i. 1), which indicates that his hand shaped

the address, and serves to mark it as authentic; attention is directed next to the principles of Church polity exhibited by this Council, confirmed and substantiated by appeal to other Scriptures, and serving to completely establish the Presbyterian theory of the Council.

1. Contrary to Congregationalism, this Council exhibits the government of the Church in the hands of *rulers*, and not in the hands of a mixed multitude of men, women, and children, where passion and prejudice sway alternate sceptres, or where the youngest child may hold the balance of power, and cast the deciding vote through parental tyranny or through ignorance, affecting most fundamental principles of Christianity. But instead of such anarchy, this Council exhibits the "*apostles and elders*" in the *very act of ruling*, considering and deciding a precedent, involving principles affecting all the churches. It exhibits all the churches in the attitude of recognising the authority of their rulers in the meekness of submission and the alacrity of obedience. This principle of rule exhibited, if tested by Scripture, is abundantly sustained. (1.) The *names* by which the officers of the Church are called, are the very insignia of rule, the badges of authority. The *πρεσβύτεροι* were the "rulers of the synagogue," and, according to Neander and others, were "transferred to the Christian church from the Jewish synagogue." In the New Testament, wherever *πρεσβύτεροι* occurs, only the connexion can determine whether it relates to elders of the synagogue or the church. The office and the name change place from synagogue to church, but retain the same relative significance. Interchangeable with *πρεσβύτεροι* is used *ἐπίσκοποι* (Acts xx. 17, 28), by which the same officers were called among the Gentiles. Concerning the latter title, Neander remarks: "The appellation, *ἐπίσκοποι*—overseers—over the whole Church and over all its affairs; just as in the Attic civil administration, those who were sent out to organise the states dependent on Athens were called *ἐπίσκοποι*; and just as this name seems to have become generally current in the language of civil life to denote any kind of governing superintendence in the public administration" (Neander's Ch. Hist., Vol. I., page 184). Synonymous with both is still another term, *ποιμένες*, "shepherds," signifying

two functions of teaching and ruling. "Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you *bishops* to *shepherd* the Church of God," etc. (Acts xx. 17, 28). A shepherd ordinarily both pastures and controls his flock.¹ (2.) Scriptural *distinctions* imply two classes, the rulers and the ruled. "He that ruleth with diligence," etc.

¹The import of "pastors"—*ποιμῆνες*—in Eph. iv. 11, in that enumeration of Christ's ascension gifts is in some respects difficult of interpretation. If it stood alone, there would be no difficulty in understanding it as designating teaching elders, the same as modern pastors. But when coupled with "teachers" in that expression, "pastors and teachers," the difficulty arises. If pastors be equivalent to *teaching* elders, then who and what are the "teachers"? If "teachers" are *teaching elders*, what is the difference between "pastors and teachers"? Three interpretations are mutually exclusive of each other. Establish either one, and the other two are destroyed. Destroy two and the third is established:

1. "Pastors and teachers" were either the same;
2. Or, else "teachers" meant something different from *teaching* elders;
3. Or, "pastors" meant some other than *teaching* elders.

1. They could not have been the same, because the grammatical construction shows that they are not used synonymously, but coupled together by the conjunction. Why would the apostle use two words *in the same connexion* without the shadow of a difference in meaning? There is no more reason for regarding them identical than for regarding "apostles" and "evangelists" identical in the same catalogue.

2. Teachers could not be other than *teaching* elders. It is so used in the parallel catalogue of 1 Cor. xii. 28. "Apt to *teach*" is one qualification of bishop synonymous with elder (1 Tim. iii. 3, *et al.*). If it be urged that "teachers" were preachers without pastorates, the difficulty then would be, that such a hypothesis cannot bring to its aid even the semblance of scriptural support. The only class of "teachers" without settled pastorates recognised in Scripture is that already enumerated as "evangelists."

3. "Pastors" must, therefore, be employed in this connexion to designate some other class than *teaching* elders. In this enumeration of church officers, it must be used simply in the sense of *rulers*, corresponding to "governments," in the catalogue of 1 Cor. xii. 28. If the objection be raised, that *ruling* would then be enumerated first as seemingly a more important office than *teaching*, it may be said that the same order is followed in another place, "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." (1.) In favor of this interpretation, it may be urged that *ποιμῆν* is used by Greek writers in the sense of ruler. Homer frequently alludes to

(Rom. xii. 8). "Governments" (1 Cor. xii. 28). "Ruleth" and "governments" are terms which demand the corresponding correlatives, "ruled" and "governors," or else they are unmeaning and misleading. (3.) The *directions to rulers*, how to rule, imply two classes. "The *elders* which are among you I exhort. . . . Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind: *neither as being lords over God's heritage,*" etc. (1 Peter v. 1-3). "*Elders that rule well,*" etc. (1 Tim. v. 17). "*Take heed, therefore, to yourselves and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers,*" etc. (Acts xx.

Agamemnon as ποιμένα λαῶν. Aeschylus calls the commanders or captains of ships ναῶν ποιμένες. Liddell and Scott, in their lexicon, recognise "govern" among their definitions as one meaning of ποιμαίνω. (2.) This is confirmed by the usage of the Old Testament. In 1 Chron. xi. 2, "Thou shalt *feed* (Septuagint ποιμανεῖς) my people Israel; and thou shalt be *ruler* over my people Israel," and in Ezek. xxxvii. 24, "And David, my servant, shall be *king* over them; and they all shall have one *shepherd*" (ποιμῆν), "ruling" and "feeding," "king" and "shepherd," are used as synonymous terms. So, also, Ezek. xxxiv. 23. "Pastors" in the prophecies of the Old Testament are simply *rulers*, civil rulers, not even religious. On "pastors" of Jer. ii. 8; xxiii. 1; Ezek. xxxiv. 1, 2, Jamieson, Fausset, and Brown, in their Crit. and Ex. Com., affirm: "Civil, not religious; princes whose duty it was to tend their people"; "Shallum, Jehoiakim, Jeconiah, and Zedekiah"; "not prophets or priests, but *rulers*," etc. Concerning "pastors" of Jer. iii. 15; xxiii. 4, the same authorities say: "Not religious, but civil rulers, as Zerubbabel, Nehemiah." On Eph. iv. 11, the same Com. remarks: "That the 'pastors' here are the superintending *rulers* and bishops or presbyters of the church, is evident from Acts xx. 28; 1 Peter v. 1, 2, where the bishop's and presbyter's office is said to be to '*feed*' (ποιμαίνω) the flock. The term 'shepherd' or 'pastor' is used of guiding and *governing*, not merely *instructing*, whence it is applied to kings rather than prophets or priests (Jer. xxiii. 4)." (3.) The New Testament employs ποιμῆν in the same sense as a *ruler*. Whilst it is the only word in the New Testament signifying "pastor" or "shepherd," there are four words translated "feed." Three of them, βόσκει, τρέφω, and ψωμίζω, signify simply "feed"; the other, ποιμαίνω, denoting the double function of *feeding* and *governing*, or *either function*. In his charge to Peter, Christ contrasts two of these; twice saying, "Feed" (βόσκει), and once "Feed (ποιμαίνε) my sheep." Trench, in his "Synonyms of the New Testament," calls special attention to this change from βόσκει,

28). These directions are not addressed to the *whole Church*, forbidding the majority from *lording* it over the minority, which would have been the case and the *danger* if all shared in ruling, but they are addressed to the *elders*. They are unmeaning, if there are no rulers, and unnecessary, if there are none ruled. (4.) The *instructions to the ruled*, concerning their attitude towards their rulers, imply such distinction. "Know them which labor among you and are over you in the Lord," etc. (1 Thess. v. 12). "Remember them which have the rule over you," etc. (Heb. xiii. 7). "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves," etc. (Heb. xiii. 17). The very word employed to express the ruling authority of the elders (*πρόιστημι*) is the same denoting parental government of children. One of the very qualifications of rulers in the Church is experience in ruling in their

meaning simply "feed," to *ποιμαίνε* meaning "tend as a shepherd," in the sense of governing. In Matt. ii. 6, *ποιμανεῖ* is used synonymously with *ἡγούμενος*, "governor." "For out of thee shall come a *Governor* that shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) my people Israel." Three times in Revelation *ποιμανεῖ* is employed to express the act of *ruling*. In Rev. ii. 27, "He shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) them with a rod of iron," etc. In xii. 5, "And she brought forth a man child, who was to *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) all nations with a rod of iron," etc. In xix. 15, "And he shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) them with a rod of iron," etc. In 1 Peter v. 2, *ποιμάνετε*, though translated "feed the flock of God," etc., is really used with the significance of rule, as is evident from its being employed in that connexion synonymously with *ἐπισκοποῦντες*, "taking the oversight" (overseeing, bishoping), and in contrast with *κατακυριεύοντες*, "being lords." Recognising this fact, the Revised Testament very correctly and appropriately renders *ποιμάνετε* in this place, "*Tend* the flock of God," etc. In the sense of *ruling* rather than *feeding*, in Acts xx. 28, the plurality of elders or bishops are commanded to *shepherd* (*ποιμαίνειν*) the church. Since then, *ποιμήν* is used for either function, and even more frequently for the *ruling*; and since "teachers" in this passage (Eph. iv. 11) are used for *teaching* elders, the conclusion is not only warranted, but necessitated, that "pastors" here are *rulers*, and the expression, "pastors and teachers" designates *ruling* elders and *teaching* elders. But the fact that it is said, "He gave *some* apostles, and *some* prophets, and *some* evangelists, and *some* pastors and teachers," not repeating the word "*some*" before "teachers," shows that they are two species, *ruling* and *teaching* elders; but still they belong to one genus, *ruling elders*. Only one teaches, but both rule. Teaching is the specific difference.

family. "One that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity. For if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?" (1 Tim. iii. 4, 5.) Such exhortations are inexplicable, if no such distinctions exist. (5.) The *plurality of officers in every church* cannot be explained on any other supposition than as rulers. "Ordained them *elders* in every church," etc. (Acts xiv. 23). "Ordain *elders* in every city," etc. (Titus i. 5). "To all the saints in Christ Jesus, which are at Philippi with the *bishops* and *deacons*" (Phil. i. 1). "Know *them* (plural) which labor among you and are over you in the Lord," etc. (1 Thess. v. 12). "Obey *them*" (plural) (Heb. xiii. 17). "*Elders* of the church," etc. (James v. 14). According to the Congregational theory and practice, but one elder is needed in each church. The government of the Church by rulers, exhibited by this Council, and supported by these five independent scriptural arguments, becomes an established principle of Church polity and impregnable.

2. Contrary to Prelacy, this Council exhibits the government of the Church in the hands, not of one man as pope, prelate, or archbishop, nor of apostles simply or apostolic successors (so-called) as diocesan bishops; nor of preachers simply, apostles and preaching elders as in conference of bishops, presiding elders, preaching elders, and preaching deacons; but in the hands of two classes of *elders*, teaching elders and ruling elders. In order to demonstrate this fact, it becomes necessary to examine the two classes who are six times mentioned in connexion with this Council, and five of the times at least as composing it. (1.) The "apostles" were present simply as "elders," combining in themselves the elements both of the teaching and ruling eldership. The proof is threefold: (a) The *fact* of their eldership is indisputable, for they call themselves "elders." "The elders, which are among you, I exhort, who am also an *elder*" (1 Peter v. 1). "The *elder* unto the elect lady and her children" (2 John 1). "The *elder* unto the well-beloved Gaius" (3 John i). (b) They are not engaged in this Council in exercising their *preaching* function of "apostles," "one sent," but are in the *very act of ruling*. Therefore it was the *ruling* function of their office which was then being exercised. The

conclusion seems inevitable, that because they are both teaching and ruling elders, and are engaged in the very act of ruling; therefore, they were present in that capacity. (c) The conclusion becomes irresistible, when it is further remembered that they did not exercise their *inspired apostolic authority*, or perform any act which had the appearance of exercising the *extraordinary authority* which belonged to the apostolate exclusively. Why allow "much disputing" in their presence if they were exercising extraordinary apostolic authority, and could have settled the question at once and authoritatively? From their not using their extraordinary ruling function of the apostolate, but the *ordinary ruling function of the presbyterate*, they could not have been present in any other capacity. In like manner, ministers in a church court are present, not as preachers of the word, but as ruling elders, because they are engaged in exercising, not the teaching function, but the ruling function of their eldership. (2.) The "elders" present in the Council were either ruling elders simply, or included some of both classes, some who were simply ruling elders, and some who were both teaching and ruling elders. It is utterly impossible to determine between the two alternatives, and it is quite as immaterial, it being necessary only to show that the ruling elder simply was present in that capacity. (a) The name *πρεσβύτεροι* has special reference to *ruling*. The *πρεσβύτεροι* of the synagogue were the "rulers of the synagogue," whilst the scribes, rabbis, and priests were the spiritual teachers. (Geikie's *Life of Christ*, Vol. II., p. 623.) Canon Farrar's effort to identify the elders of the synagogue with the "*Batlanim*," the body of ten men paid to be always present at every service in the synagogue, so as to always secure the legal number, is a complete failure, and is in the face of the testimony of the ages, the researches of scholars of all sects and shades of opinion. Wherever *πρεσβύτεροι* occurs, therefore, the burden of proof is not upon those who maintain that they were rulers to show they were not teachers, but the very opposite, upon those denying, to demonstrate that it is not used in its ordinary sense of rulers simply. (b) The *plurality in every church* cannot be explained, unless they are *ruling elders*. The previous chapter announced they "ordained them elders in

every church" (Acts xiv. 23), which must have had special reference to ruling elders; the same term being employed in the following chapter, without any indication of its being used to designate a different class, leads to the conclusion that the *πρεσβύτεροι* of the previous chapter and of this Council were identical. (c) The *distinctions* between them are proof of two classes of elders. "He that teacheth," etc., and "he that ruleth," etc. (Rom. xii. 8), clearly distinguish between them. "Let the elders that *rule* well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who *labor in the word and doctrine*" (1 Tim. v. 17), recognises two classes of elders. (d) The *burden of rule* is laid upon the elders of Ephesus (Acts xx. 17, 28), in the exhortation of Paul, at the very time when Timothy was preacher at Ephesus (1 Tim. i. 3). (e) The *use of the word* *πρεσβυτέριον* (presbytery) is further evidence of the ruling eldership. Occurring but three times in the New Testament (Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5; and 1 Tim. iv. 14), though translated presbytery but once (1 Tim. iv. 14), twice it refers to a Jewish court undoubtedly composed of ruling elders simply (Luke xxii. 66, and Acts xxii. 5), and when used with reference to an ecclesiastical court of the Christian Church, without any indication of a change of designation, the conclusion is irresistible, that it must have contained at least some who were ruling elders simply. Having then established the fact that the distinction between the two classes of elders existed, the fact that there was a plurality at Jerusalem in the local churches, which necessarily included some of this element, is proof positive that the *πρεσβύτεροι* of the Council were either ruling elders simply, or included some of that class; and therefore the government of the Church is in the hands of "elders."

3. Contrary to both Prelacy and Congregationalism, this Council at Jerusalem exhibited the *parity of the eldership*. Presbyterianism is not careful to demonstrate the parity of the ministry. If the parity of the eldership be established, the other follows as an "*a fortiori*" necessity. The latter is not peculiar to the Presbyterian system, whilst the former is one of its most distinctive principles, and is plainly demonstrated by this Council in several ways. (1) In sending up the case to Jerusalem for a decision,

no superior apostolic, prelatial, or ministerial authority is recognised by Antioch higher than the presbyterate. It nowhere appears that a decision is asked simply of the apostles, whilst they by courtesy or for some other cause associated the elders with themselves. But the very opposite appears, that Antioch acknowledged no superiority of apostolic authority whatever. The record simply states that certain "should go up to Jerusalem unto the *apostles* and *elders* about this question." Why not go simply to the apostles? Why are the elders associated with the apostles in the appeal? Did not Antioch appeal to *elders* as well as apostles? Did they not appeal to both upon precisely the same equality? Is there the shadow of authority for supposing that they made any distinction between the two classes in asking a decision of apostles and elders? (2) In their coming together, is any distinction made between them? Can any discover from the record, that the apostles came armed with more authority than the elders? The narrative simply states that the "apostles and elders came together for to consider of this matter." Did the apostles come to consider and act, whilst the elders came to be spectators? If our judgment must be formed solely from the inspired record, there is no alternative but to acknowledge the manifest fact, that they came together upon equal authority. (3) During the session of the Council did any apostle or the whole number at any time by any word or act *claim* any more authority than the elders? Did any apostle *assume* any more authority? Did any apostle *exercise* any more authority than the elders? What evidence is there that the body recognised the superiority of either class? So far as the record goes, each class considered the other as peers. If it be said, that the name "apostles" always precedes that of "elders," as evidence of superior authority, it will reveal to what straits the advocates of the hierarchical system are reduced. Principal Cunningham justly characterises such argument as mere trifling: "Papists, finding it recorded here that Peter took a prominent part in the discussion, which arose on this occasion, adduce the narrative as a proof that he acted then, was entitled to act, and was recognised as entitled to act, as the vicar of Christ and the head of the Church. Prelat-

ists, finding that several centuries afterward the notion was broached that James was appointed by the apostles Bishop of Jerusalem, profess to get scriptural evidence of this fancy in the prominent part which *he* took in the discussion. There is not in the narrative a trace of any *superiority in office or jurisdiction* on the part either of Peter or of James; so that the substance of the Popish argument is virtually this: Peter spoke first, and therefore he was superior in authority and jurisdiction to the other apostles; whilst the prelatist argument is: James spoke last and gave shape to the decision of the Council, and therefore he was diocesan bishop and as such superior in some respects even to the apostles. This, of course, is sheer trifling." (Hist. Theo., Vol. I., Chapter 2, Sec. 1.) (4) In publishing their decrees, did the apostles send them forth in their own name as their act and by their authority? On the contrary, associating the elders with themselves, and causing it to read, "apostles and elders, brethren," they acknowledged the parity of the eldership by issuing the decrees in their united names as by equal authority, wiping out even the distinction of names, and gathering both into one class of "brethren," exhibit the opposite spirit of those claiming superiority over their "brethren in the Lord." (5) In delivering the decrees to the various churches scattered throughout Christendom, did they lay them upon the churches as ordained by apostolic authority? Did they recognise any difference between the two classes constituting the Council? On the contrary, it is the positive statement of the Scripture, that the decrees were "ordained of the apostles and elders," equal authority being accorded to the elders as to the apostles. Considering these five facts, which could not have been merely fortuitous, that Antioch appealed to "*apostles and elders*" as upon equality, that "*apostles and elders* came together," as upon equal authority, that they acted together as upon equal authority, that they issued their decrees in their united names as by equal authority, that the decrees were delivered and received by the churches as "ordained of the apostles and elders" in equal authority, the conclusion necessitating the parity of the eldership is irresistible.

4. Contrary to Congregationalism this Council exhibits the

unity of the Church. If not upon the principle of unity of the Church, then upon what principle does a Church Council convened at Jerusalem decide a matter affecting Antioch simply? If it were a local matter, why should any other place than Antioch be the scene of the conflict? To answer that because the trouble originated at Jerusalem, and the teachers came from thence, therefore it must be carried back, will not satisfy inquiry, unless we could believe that the apostles and elders could not settle the matter by assembling at Antioch. Jerusalem was not troubled by the matter, but Antioch was. If an effectual settlement of the matter, as is alleged, had determined the place, then Antioch would certainly have been the place. That, however, is a matter of little importance, compared with another feature of this Council demonstrating the Church's essential unity. It is the *jurisdiction* of the Council, which the Congregationalist cannot explain upon any other theory than the underlying principle of unity. Did they publish the decrees simply at Antioch? "As they went through the cities they delivered them the decrees for to keep," etc. (Acts xvi. 4.) They are no more binding on Antioch than on Christendom! If the jurisdiction of the Council extended to all the churches, upon what principle other than the unity of the Church? Tested by Scripture, which is the interpreter of Scripture, the Church's unity is still more manifest. (1) The use of "*Church*" in the singular, comprehending the whole, manifests its corporate unity. Such unmistakable evidence is borne by one passage in the Revised Testament, that it alone would be sufficient to establish the fact. "So the *Church* throughout all Judea and Galilee and Samaria had peace being edified," etc. (Acts ix. 31, Revised Testament.) The twelfth chapter of 1st Corinthians is an elaborate argument to demonstrate the unity of the Church, which has the advantage over every other argument, that it is inspired; but if the Church's unity be denied, that argument becomes a mystery. Arguing the fact from all having the same spirit, illustrating it by the unity of the human body, it closes with the assertion, "Now ye are the *body* of Christ and members in particular. And God hath set some *in the Church* first apostles, secondarily prophets,

thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversity of tongues," etc. (1 Cor. xii. 27, 28.) If it be objected that this language applies to the invisible Church, the reply is, that the invisible Church, *as such*, needs no "apostles," "prophets," "teachers," "miracles," "healings," "helps," "governments," and "diversity of tongues;" these things are for the visible Church. If to this it be objected that the two cannot be separated except in thought, at least the part of the invisible which is still in the visible, that would *necessitate* predicating unity of the visible as well as invisible. If it be claimed that 1 Cor. xii. 28, applies to the local church, it may be answered, that God had not set "apostles," "prophets," etc., in the local church of Corinth. (2) Such *figures* are employed, representing the unity of the Church, that they become unmeaning when that principle is eliminated. Eph. ii. 19-22 presents the Church as a state, a family, and a temple; but a temple is not a building of independent disconnected parts. The Church is the body of Christ (1 Cor. xii. 27). But though every organ, muscle, bone, and sinew of the body were collected *disconnected* in a mass, they would not constitute a body. The Church is the kingdom of Christ. But a kingdom of absolutely independent clans or provinces would be an anomaly. If it be claimed that such expressions, "temple," "body," and "kingdom," refer to the invisible Church, then the reply is, if the invisible Church has essential to its very being a unity, the visible Church which approaches nearest the ideal must exhibit a visible unity. To the support of the latter truth may be adduced the testimony of Dr. Thornwell: "The relation between the two is so close, that it is unwarrantable to predicate unity of the one and the want of unity of the other. The visible or professing Church approaches perfection, as it seeks to realise the invisible or spiritual. The two ought to coincide, and the purity of the outward is determined by its approximation to the inward. A Church, therefore, which cannot realise a visible unity, and thus aim to coincide with the invisible Church, is self-condemned; and any constitution which does not recognise this fact, is convicted of being unscriptural. This principle of the unity of the Church lies at the foundation of the

Presbyterian polity, and all its peculiarities are designed to bring this out, and give it formal expression. It is singular that the only two bodies which claim to realise this unity are in the deadliest antagonism—each charging the other with being Antichrist. They are the Church of Rome and the Presbyterian Church. Rome does, in a certain sense, give unity to the Church. She compacts all its parts. There is no stronger outward representation of unity than is furnished in her system of government. There is, however, this marked difference between the two cases: the Church of Rome undertakes to exhibit the body in its unity with an earthly head—to exhibit Christ as well as his members; the Presbyterian Church exhibits in visible unity on earth the body only, and connects it with a heavenly Head. The Bishop of Rome claims to be the head of the Church. He alone who is in communion with him is a member of the Church, and consequently a member of Christ. Now, he must be either a real and true head, or a symbolical and typical head. If the former, then as a body cannot have two real heads without being a monster, the headship of Christ is displaced. If the latter, then, as the body must partake of the nature of its head, the Church is a symbolical and typical body, and the reality of the Church is destroyed" (Thornwell's *Col. W.*, Vol. IV., pages 135 and 136). In regard to the method of realising and exhibiting this unity of the Church, Dr. Thornwell affirms: "That unity is realised by representative assemblies. The government of the Church is not intrusted to individuals nor to the mass of believers, but to Councils. . . . These constitute a bond, which brings all the parts together into unity, and gives the Church the property of indefinite expansibility. . . . It is worthy of note how all Churches have practically acknowledged the representative feature of Presbyterianism. Episcopacy, for example, has its General Conventions, in which, in the attempt to realise unity, the parliamentary principle is grafted upon the system. Congregationalism has its Councils, the existence of which is a tribute to the importance of the representative principle. Even the Pope, on occasions of great emergency, calls Councils to decide disputed questions. We are but carrying out, then, a principle, the prac-

tical necessity of which is recognised by all Churches, but which is inherent in the very nature of the Presbyterian system alone" (Thornwell's Col. W., Vol. IV., pages 136, 137, and 138). The *Encyclopædia Britannica* bears similar testimony to the completeness of the Presbyterian system of Councils. "It is of course in the Presbyterian Churches that Councils have received their most systematic development, and without claiming infallible authority retain the most extended powers as legislative, administrative, and judicial. In the Church of Scotland, the regular gradation of kirk Sessions, Presbyteries, Provincial Synods, and General Assembly of representative ministers and elders, supervises and regulates all the functions of the Church, and forms a compact balanced system of constitutional government. In non-Presbyterian Churches, Synods have various degrees of deliberative or decisive authority. Even now the reorganisation of the synodical system of the United Protestant Church of Prussia is regarded both by churchmen and by statesmen in Germany as one of the ecclesiastical questions of the day" (*Encyclopædia Brit.*, ninth ed., Vol. VI., page 512). If it be argued that the Council at Jerusalem could not have exhibited the unity of the Church, because all the apostles were not present, and very few of the churches are supposed to have been represented (perhaps only Antioch and those in and near Jerusalem), it may be answered that a quorum of a court as truly realises unity as if every church in existence were represented by delegates.

5. Contrary to Congregationalism, this Council exhibits the *right of appeal*. This principle is inseparable from the unity of the Church, and either one established is proof of the other. If, then, the unity of the Church has been established by Scripture, the right of appeal follows as a correlative principle, and *vice versa*. It matters not what may be the difference of opinion as to the nature of the appeal to apostles and elders, whether a specific case was carried up, some supposing it to have been that of Titus from Gal. ii. 3, 4; or whether the Council was asked merely to give an "*in these* deliverance"; it matters not whether the church of Antioch, parochial or classical Presbytery, or Paul, Barnabas, and Titus, appealed to apostles and elders for a de-

cision, the evidence still remains in favor of an appeal, complaint, reference, or overture of some nature. The record is too plain to be "explained away." The heresy existed at Antioch, the delegation was appointed to lay the matter before the apostles and elders, they came together to consider the matter, the delegation was heard, a debate occurred, a decision was rendered, and a delegation appointed to publish the matter at Antioch. These are the facts furnished by the inspired narrative, which may be variously interpreted, but can never be so obscured that the multitude of Bible readers will fail to recognise the fact of some kind of appeal, furnishing a precedent, according the right to the humblest member of the Church to be heard at the bar of the highest tribunal of the Church. Nor is this the limit of Christian privilege. There exists even a higher right, in the case of injustice, of carrying the case from the earthly court to the heavenly, and appealing to the Head of the Church himself, as the martyred Huss is alleged to have done, when, condemned to the stake by an ecclesiastical court that, contrary to the law of Christ, had usurped the jurisdiction of Cæsar, and wielded the sword, he summoned his judges to meet him at the judgment bar of Christ, to answer the charge of murder, within less than an hundred years.

6. Contrary to the Charybdis of Prelacy on the one hand, and the Scylla of Congregationalism on the other, this Council exhibits the *word of God as the sole basis of any ecclesiastical deliverance*. The apostles and elders were governed by no traditions on the one hand, nor human wisdom and expediency on the other. They dared not attempt to legislate, in the sense of making law, for the Church of Christ. That would have been to usurp the authority of Christ, who alone is the Church's Law-giver. On the other hand, they dared not fail to exercise their "*jure divino*" church power to prohibit the recognised badges of idolatry, for that would have been unfaithfulness to Christ, who called them to be rulers in his Church; and the liberty of conscience guaranteed to Gentiles might have been by them converted into idolatrous licentiousness in conformity with the prevalent heathen practices. Nothing lay within the province of that Coun-

cil but to consult the written law, the revealed will of Christ, and apply the principles therein contained to the question under consideration. But they certainly acted as if it was their province to interpret, apply, and enforce Christ's law. Synods and Councils may not think to change the law of Christ, or legislate for the Church, but there must be some authoritative court to apply the principles of that law to each particular case. Whilst not interfering with the right of private judgment, yet ecclesiastical Councils may not permit licentiousness in word or deed. The only safety for church courts between ecclesiastical tyranny and ecclesiastical licensing of wickedness is speaking where the word of God speaks, and being silent where it is silent. If, then, one wishes greater liberty of private judgment than the word of God allows, or wishes to rob the word of its force by an unnatural and unwarranted construction, he must seek such licentious liberty in other communions. No man has the right to plead conscience or the right of private judgment to the subverting of law and order. Christ, who has given law to the Church, has also given authority to the rulers, assembled in the courts of his house, to enforce that law. Liberty of conscience and dissent of judgment are possible only where Synods and Councils have erred by violating the law of Christ. As that Council at Jerusalem inquired the mind of the Spirit by appeal to the Scriptures, so no church court can ordain, forbid, or enjoin anything whatever, unless it can exhibit as its warrant a "Thus saith the Lord," or an inference therefrom both good and necessary. This Council at Jerusalem answers the question how the Church can obtain the mind of the Spirit after revelation has ceased to guide unerringly. It furnishes a model and warrant for the Church in like circumstances. It is a precedent which should guide every church court in all its deliverances. The Ariadne clue, which alone is sufficient to guide the Church safely through all its labyrinths of difficulties and mazes of doubt, is prayerful dependence on the Spirit to discover in the written word what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost." Only when that which "seemed good to the Holy Ghost," also seems good to the Church, is there safe ecclesiastical action. Any church court, acting by virtue of a divine constitu-

tion, guided entirely by the precepts of Christ, and depending on the influence of the Spirit, can use the language of the Council, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." These principles exhibited by the Council at Jerusalem are also the principles of the Presbyterian system, the principles of *jure divino* Church government, the principles sustained by the word of God, the principles which shall yet triumph in the name of eternal truth.

S. L. MORRIS.

ARTICLE II.

THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL CAUSES AND THEIR
INDUCTION.

In our previous sketch of the History of Inductive Reasonings, we found that the chief (and the difficult) question, the great problem of this species of logic, which continually emerged, was this: How does the inference seemingly made from the some, or the many, to the all, become valid for the all?

The settlement of this, as of the other fundamental doctrines of logic, must proceed upon right postulates as to psychology, and especially as to its highest branch, the original powers of the reason. In our criticism of the Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century, a parallel question as to the Deductive Logic is considered (see pp. 265-272). That question was the old one between the assailants and defenders of the utility and fruitfulness of the syllogism, with which the students of philosophy are acquainted. The followers of Locke, from his day to ours, have argued that, since a syllogism which concludes more in its third proposition than is predicated in its major premise, is confessedly faulty, all such reasonings must inevitably be either sophisms, or worthless, only teaching us what we must have known before in order to state our premise. Yet we saw Mill, after echoing this objection, confessing, what all men's common sense must concede, that the syllogism is the full expression to which all deductive

reasoning is reduced. How was this paradox to be solved? It was shown that the solution is in recognising the *a priori* necessary and universal judgments of the reason. Admit that the mind is entitled to other judgments than the empirical, the intuitive namely, and that they are universal, then the synthesis of truths becomes a valid and fruitful source of new knowledge.

A similar resort to the doctrines of a true psychology must be made, again, to explain the Inductive Logic. This necessity has been disclaimed, on the ground that logic is a critical art, whose whole and only business is to test the validity, not of the contents, but of the forms of our elenctic thought. This might be admitted; and yet it would remain true that these processes, which it is the business of logic to criticise, are psychological processes, and that the critical acts are also psychological processes. Moreover, as in the world of matter, the substance determines the form, so in the realm of thought, it is the quality of the contents of thought which determines the logical framework. The science of logic, therefore, must be grounded in a correct psychology.

That psychology must not be the sensationalist. We must hold that the mind has original powers of judging *a priori* necessary truths; powers which, although they may be awakened to exercise on occasion of some empirical perception, yet owe the validity of the judgments formed, not to sense-perception, but to the mind's own constitutive laws. This, then, is the metaphysical doctrine assumed as the basis of this discussion: that while the senses alone give us our individual idea of objective things, it is the original power of the reason which gives us our universal necessary judgments about objective things and their relations; and these same powers furnish the forms according to which we connect them into general knowledge. Those necessary and universal truths are primitive judgments, intuitively seen to be true, and not dependent for their authority upon the confirmation of observed instances, be they many or few. For these first truths and laws of the reason must be, in their order of production (though not in their date), prior to the observations of the senses and to all deductions therefrom, because they are necessary to construe the individual perceptions intelligibly, and to connect

them for any purposes of reasoning. But it is our purpose here to postulate, and not to argue, this view of the mind's powers. For the latter, the reader must be referred to the work mentioned above ("Sens. Phil. of the 19th Cent. Considered," Chap. X. and XI.).

We have seen J. S. Mill's correct position, that the *law of causation* is the foundation of every inductive demonstration. We have also seen his inconsistent assertion, that our belief in this law is the result of an induction from experience. We have proved, on the contrary, that it is a necessary intuition of the reason. Whenever we observe a *phenomenon* or a new existence, the law of the reason ensures our assigning for it an adequate cause. It is impossible for us to think a thing or event as arising out of nothing. To think it as producing itself, would be the contradiction of thinking it acted before it existed. Nor can we avoid ascribing to the cause *power* efficient of the effect. The old objection, that we have no right to assume anything else than what the senses observe, a regular or uniform sequence between a certain antecedent and a certain consequent, is worthless to any one who has learned the true doctrine: that the reason is itself a source, and not a mere passive recipient, of cognitions. As, when sense-perception gives us only a cluster of properties belonging to body, the reason must supply the supersensuous notion of substance underlying and sustaining them, so when the senses perceive a cause preceding its effect, the reason compels us to supply the rational notion of efficient power in the cause. It is this, and this alone, which enables and qualifies the antecedent to be cause. And this power must be thought as efficient of the effect. This judgment involves the further belief that, wherever the cause is present, under the same conditions, the efficiency of its power ensures the same effect. Such is obviously the nature of the necessary judgment: "Same causes, same effects." A simple examination of our consciousness convinces us that our rational notion of substance involves the assurance of its continuity of being and permanency. As the rise of that substance *ex nihilo*, without any cause, is a proposition which cannot be rationally thought, so the cessation of that substance's continuity of being,

or its return into *nihil* without a cause efficient of its destruction, is equally incredible. This intuitive confidence in the permanency of true substance, as thus defined, is not an inference from any observations, but a phase of the intuition, a source and premise of all our reasonings about substances; and a regulative law for construing every observation experiences give us about them. So we have a similar intuitive confidence in the persistency and uniformity of power, wherever it inheres. So long as power qualifies any being, it is, in its own nature, efficient of the same effect which it is once seen to produce. If we see the agent and the recipient of the effect again present, and do not witness the rise of the same effect, we intuitively and necessarily believe that some other power, whether visible or invisible, is intervening to modify or counteract the known power. This is the explanation of our belief in the "uniformity of nature" when the belief is legitimate. Nature is uniform just so far as the same powers are present, and her uniformities are nothing but the necessary results of the permanency of substances and powers. What we call laws of nature are only the regular methods of the actions of natural powers. We believe in those laws, only because we intuitively judge that each power or energy is, under the same circumstances, efficient of the same effects.

But this conception of regular laws in nature implies an assurance not only of the permanency of substances, but of their essential properties. That substances have two classes of properties, distinguished as *attributa* and *accidentia*, is obvious; and it is according to their permanency or mutability that we ascribe a quality to the one class or the other. How is it that we are authorised to entertain this assurance of the permanency of essential properties? The answer is, *because these properties make themselves known to our reason as powers*. If we reflect, we see that what we call a property of a body is only revealed to us by its emission of a power, producing an effect either on some other body, or on our own percipient senses, and through them on our own spirits. This truth has been seen by Dr. McCosh, for instance (in his "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," p. 78). The evidence assigned for the proposition seems inadequate: that we

observe no body acts on itself, but only on another body in a certain relation to itself. The same writer, very singularly, excepts from his assertion those properties which affect our senses. Of all the properties of external things, he should have said that those which affect our senses directly, are most certainly powers. For it is only by some effect on our senses, propagating a perception, that we learn an effect has been produced on another body. What is perception? How do we convince ourselves of the reality of the external world? Consciousness, a subjective faculty, can of course only testify to the subjective part of the perceptive function. What, then, is the rational ground of that judgment of relation which, as we know, we all make between the perceptive cognition and the external source? Reflection convinces us that this ground is in the necessary and *intuitive judgment of cause*. We are conscious of a perception; we are also conscious we did not affect ourselves with it. But there can be no effect without a cause; therefore the object perceived must be a reality. It is frequently said that we derive, or at least we first see, the rational notion of power and efficiency in our own conscious volition; that we are conscious of the will to emit efficiency; that we see the effect, and that we thus form the notion of efficient power in cause. We have no disposition to dispute the fact that this may be one of the occasions upon which the reason presents her intuitive notion of power. But, whatever the change which she may observe, constituting a new *phenomenon* or state, whether in the subjective or objective sphere, she must supply the notion of cause and of efficient power. For the necessary law of her thinking is, *ex nihilo nihil*. The new effect could not have been, except there had preceded a sufficient cause. But when is cause sufficient? Only when it possesses power efficient of the new change.

Now, then, the first cognition which the mind can have of any objective thing, is *through experiencing an effect therefrom*. Is it not obvious, thence, that what we call properties of things are *only known to us as powers*? They are, simply, what are *able to affect us* with the perceptions. And since every perception is an effect, we only learn that any body has the property (or power)

of affecting another body, by experiencing its power of affecting us. Hence, we should say that we know the properties of bodies which affect our senses as powers primarily; and those which we see affecting other bodies we know as also powers secondarily. Instead of saying that properties are powers, it would be more correct to say that powers are the only true properties. The notion of power is in order to the idea of property. Here, then, is the ground on which we expect a permanency in any essential property, as immutable as that which we intuitively ascribe to substance; it is because "the same causes produce the same effects."

But there are properties which are not permanent; and yet they can produce effects on us, and on other bodies. The distinction of "attributes" and "accidents" made by the scholastics is just. The solidity of congealed water, for instance, is certainly not an essential property of that substance; yet it has power to affect our tactual sense, and it also has a power of impact on other bodies which the liquid has not. Here is an apparent inconsistency—that we should infer the permanency of essential properties from the fact that they are causes; that the same causes produce the same effects—and yet concede power to properties which are not permanent. But the inconsistency is only seeming. The explanation is, that the change or state which was just now an effect, may in turn become a cause, and may not only depend on its cause, but have another effect depending on it. While its own prior cause propagates it, it may also propagate its effect; with the suspension of the action of its cause, it and its effect cease. The original cause has thus its progeny, not only of the first, but of the second and subsequent generations. Now, what is an "*accidens*," a property not permanent, except a mutable effect of some other property, which is a permanent cause?—mutable, because, while the power of essential property has no change, the conditions for its action may change. While the more original power or powers of the essential property is acting, its effect, the accidental property, is propagated; and this in turn may become cause, so long as it subsists. Thus, solidity is not an essential property of water; for this substance often exists

uncongealed; the solidity is the result of a molecular energy, which is an essential property in the substance, and which is allowed to come into action by the departure of the caloric out of it. To understand this truth, we must avail ourselves of the old distinction between *active* and *passive powers*. Essential properties are active powers. Accidental properties are the results of passive powers in the bodies which exhibit them; of susceptibilities or powers of reciprocity, by means of which the more original powers of the essential properties, either simple or combined, show through and give themselves these new and mutable expressions.

We remark, again, that it is obvious the permanency of the properties which we predicate of a class, or of a general term by which we name it, is essential to the validity of all general and scientific propositions. This, to the logician, needs no arguing. Hence it follows that it is all-important we shall be able to distinguish, in classifying, between permanent or essential properties and "*accidentia*." How do we effect this? Here the rule quoted from Sir Isaac Newton comes to our aid. If we find that a given property is always present whenever the body is present, and that it is not affected with increment or diminution whatever other effects are wrought on the body, we may safely conclude that it is an essential property. This rule should be qualified by the following admission: It may be that the energy which we invariably see expressing itself through this property, is not the original energy, but is itself the next effect of a latent and undetected energy. If this were surely discovered, we should feel constrained to carry back the name and title of essential property to that original energy. For instance, we have been accustomed to regard caloric as an original energy in matter. Should it be that caloric is itself a result of a peculiar molecular motion in matter, or in some latent *medium*, we must give the name of original energy to that hitherto undetected cause. This, we suppose, Newton would have freely conceded. But this concession does not practically derange our inductive conclusions. For if there is the latent energy, and yet it always expresses itself through the known property, and if it is its necessary law to do

so, any practical conclusion from it is as solid as though the latent cause had been seen. We are, in fact, reasoning from it, while we only leave it anonymous. But, it may be asked, does the fact that a body always exhibits a certain property *as often as we have observed it*, prove that property to be essential, and therefore permanent? Is not this the defective induction *per enumerationem simplicem*? We concede that it is nothing more. Hence it is all-important that we employ the other part of Newton's rule also, that upon frequent observations we see the property takes no increment or decrease, whatever changes are made upon the body. If the property stands that test, it is essential. But the application of this test is, as we shall see in the subsequent discussion, but an employment of the canon of "corresponding variations," one of the methods of induction by which a valid is distinguished from an invalid inference. It may be asked, Does the process of inductive reasoning begin so far back in our thinking, in the very formation of our concepts, as well as in deducing from them? We answer, Yes; the rational function must come into play, not only at an early stage of our processes of logical thought, but along with their very beginning. This is the very principle of true metaphysics.

We shall see that this is not the only case of inductive inference, which takes place in the very processes of generalisation. It has been too long and too heedlessly repeated, that the generalisations which give us our general concepts are *preliminary* to our processes of inference, and therefore cannot be inferential. Dugald Stewart, in repeating this statement, seems to have a view of its inaccuracy; for he immediately qualifies it by remarking that, while a given inferential process has no concern with the question whence or how the premises employed came, but only with the question whether they are correctly related; yet one or more of these premises may be itself an inference from a previous illation. This is the vital concession. A general proposition cannot be correctly affirmed, save of general terms. Hence it is also essential that the concepts named in those general terms be correctly framed. The question of their correctness may require to be settled by a logical process. Let it be considered now, that

when we frame a general term, it must be understood to connote all the properties essential to the species. For instance, the general term horse must be held to signify each and every property essential to that species of quadrupeds. Let us suppose that, in a place new and strange to us, as the Shetland Isles, we meet with an individual quadruped, which we wish to classify. We see that, along with some quite striking differences, as of size and such like, it has several of the more obvious qualities of the horse species. May we refer it to that species? On the one hand, unless this individual quadruped has all and each of the properties essential to the species horse, we are not authorised to class it there. On the other hand, we have not seen all the possible properties of the Shetland individual: for instance, we have not dissected it; we have not yet satisfied ourselves, ocularly, that it may not be a *ruminant*, or that it may not present specific differences in its osteology. Yet we refer it to the species horse. It is obvious that in doing this, we make an induction, and it is an induction from a part to the whole. We know by observation that the individual has some of the equine properties; we infer that it has the rest of the essential properties. But all logicians agree that the induction from some to all is not necessarily valid. Are our general concepts themselves, then, only partially correct? How much uncertainty must not this throw over all our general reasonings? If we are not certain that a given thing really belongs to its class, we cannot predicate certainly about it what we have proved concerning the class.

Now, on this question, it may be remarked, first, that our references of individual things to their classes are often supported by only probable evidence, or incomplete inductions. And, therefore, our propositions, when applied to those individuals, have only probable truth. But in practical life, probabilities are far from valueless; if they are not universally accurate as guides of our action, they are generally so. But for the construction of a *science*, they do not suffice; for science claims *truth*, and not mere probability. Second, we all practise, in our customary generalisations, certain mental expedients to guard ourselves against erroneous classifications; expedients which we learn by experience,

and which are, in fact, approximate uses of logical canons of induction; although we have not distinctly analysed and explained to ourselves the rules which we virtually employ and trust. This is that practical sagacity which the mind acquires in the process of its own self-education. By its help we greatly diminish the probabilities of error in our generalisations. This may be explained by the instance already mentioned: An inexperienced child and a shrewd observing adult, neither of whom is a trained logician or natural historian, see for the first time the Shetland pony. The child, impressed by the puny size, shaggy coat, and bushy fetlocks of the quadruped, may exclaim that it cannot be a horse. The experience of the man tells him that these peculiar appearances may be but *accidentia* of the Shetland variety, striking as they are; and he at once directs his observation to other characters in the little animal, which convince him that it is, nevertheless, a true horse. The more discriminative marks, the uncloven hoof, the character and number of the teeth, the relations of the limbs to each other, furnish him with the inference that the rest of the equine properties would all be found in it if it were thoroughly dissected. Third, this observer, although not a naturalist, makes a practical application of a general principle to guide his induction. His reason has told him that *the ends* of nature cannot but dictate morphologic laws, which insure the associating of certain characters together; so that where some of them are seen, the rest may be safely inferred. He does not call himself a philosopher; he does not name those ends "final causes." But, none the less, his reason has the partial guidance of the universal principle. He does, semi-consciously, a similar thing to that which Cuvier did, when he argued that no quadruped having graminivorous teeth would ever be found with claws on its feet, because the final cause of the Creator would never lead him to provide an animal with the instruments for seizing prey, which was ordained, in other parts of its structure, to live without prey. And when the philosophic naturalist's classifications are made with scientific certainty, by inferring the whole number of essential properties from the knowledge of a part of them, it is because he has converted the invalid induction into a valid one by the help of a necessary principle which he makes his major premise.

POWERS AND PROPERTIES PERMANENT.

But it is time we had returned to another point in our explanation. If essential properties are powers; and if, as such, they must be permanent; why are not their effects continuous? Whereas, it is notorious that properties are not always active in the production of effects. A property, like the attractive energy of a loadstone, may remain for ages without effecting the actual motion towards itself of the bit of iron which lies in an adjacent drawer of the cabinet. This demands explanation at our hands. The explanation is, that properties of created things are causes only potentially: in themselves only powers *in posse*. In order for the effluence of the actual power, a certain relation or relations must be established between the thing possessing the property, and another thing. Thus, the loadstone is always potentially an attractor of iron; but a certain proximity must be established, in order for the effect, motion, to take place. Such instances may be multiplied until we convince ourselves that the essential condition for all physical effects is the instituting of some particular relation between two bodies. Not until the appropriate relation is instituted, is the potentiality of the causal property released, so as to become an actual power. Until then, the property remains quiescent. If this doctrine is correct, the action of an elastic spring, held in a state of compression, is the parallel to the powers of natural things. The elasticity is doubtless in the compressed spring all the time, and expresses itself in a steady pressure upon the bolt or key which holds it. Let that bolt be withdrawn, and the elasticity is released, and produces the visible motion of the body propelled by the spring, hitherto quiescent. The condition of the action of every natural property is, then, its release from some restraining energy; the condition of the cessation of action is the restoration of that restraint. Is not this strictly conformed with the recognised relation in science between Statics and Dynamics, action and reaction?

The instances of the beginning and cessation of effects which we are best able to read, seem to be conformed to this view. The rise of the mercury in the tube of the barometer is ascribed to the

counterpoising pressure of the atmosphere. This is a force which really exists perpetually; but it cannot produce this particular effect until a counteracting force is taken away from the top of the column of the mercury. As soon as this is removed, the mercury rises in its tube; when it is replaced, the atmosphere is no longer able to support the column; but the atmosphere has not lost a particle of its weight. Again: chemical affinities are deprived of many of their customary effects when organised bodies are presented to them. This is because there is another energy in the organism, the vital energy. Just so soon as this departs, the carbon, water, and nitrogen of the organism yield to the chemical energies, like other carbon, water, and nitrogen. Those energies are there, but cannot work "until that which letteth is taken out of the way."

This theory may be no more, as yet, than a probable hypothesis. But it substitutes another theory which has recently grown into much favor, and which is also only a plausible hypothesis. That is the theory of "the equivalency and transformation of energy." The conclusion from this doctrine, which is aimed at, is, that there is really but one kind of energy in the material universe; that as the caloric, for instance, which disappears from the sensible to the latent state in the volatilisation of water into steam, is transformed into an equivalent amount of elasticity in that steam, so caloric and elasticity are but two forms of the same energy. Now, much is yet lacking before this supposition is proved. The instances in which a body may be infused with a high degree of one form of energy, and then again deprived of it, while another energy in the same body remains constant, seem fatal to the inference that those energies are equivalent and transformable. Thus, a mass of metal may be greatly heated, and then refrigerated, while its gravity remains unchanged. Gravity, at least, then, cannot be thus correlated to caloric. The same argument seems to hold of all parallel cases.

Another seemingly fatal objection to the theory of the "equivalency and transformation of energy" has been urged by Clausius. What transformation and reflection of a force can take place, which is emitted on the exterior limit of the universe, and on a

line of action away from existing bodies? Let the energy be, for instance, that of heat or light. Its reflection back into the universe in the form of the same, or of a transformed energy would appear equally impossible, since nothing exists, outside the universe, to be the medium of its reception or reflection. Hence, it would seem that, as a wedge of heated iron placed in a winter atmosphere must continuously lose its caloric until as cold as the surrounding medium, so a universe, a system of bodies energised under natural laws, must continually diffuse its energies until its motions declined into universal quiescence. The favorite corollary of the theory under debate is: the permanency and equality of the aggregates of cosmic forces through all time. But this corollary, we here see, cannot be true on that hypothesis. Yet, if it be not true, how shall the physicist maintain his fundamental position, the uniformity of nature? The alternative hypothesis we suggest solves the difficulty. The powers of nature are not all equivalent and transformable the one into the other. But the powers of nature are permanent; because true powers are essential properties, and essential properties are permanent. The *forms* of matter change; but the matter, whose are the essential properties, is indestructible.

But the only *a priori* argument advanced for the new theory, so far as we are informed, is this: That reason forbids us to suppose that a power which we see now existing and active, can anon, upon the completion of its effect, be annihilated and pass into nonentity. It has disappeared in that form; but they argue, it cannot be extinct. Hence, they conclude that it has reappeared in the form of its effect. There has been, not an annihilation, but a transformation of the energy. Now, this argument seems wholly neutralised by the view which we have suggested.

Grant that reason requires our believing in the permanency of powers, as much as of substances; this energy which we see acting temporarily, has not gone into its effect, but has retired into potentiality in the matter which it inhabits. The conditions of its release have terminated; it is again remanded from its active to its potential state. The same energy is in matter still, in the form of essential, permanent property;

and is again able to emit the same power and propagate a similar effect, whenever the conditions of release take place again. This theory of power, then, instead of reducing all the energies of nature to a single one, recognises as many distinct kinds of energy in material things, as there are certainly distinct and essential properties in matter. We may not have concluded accurately as to which properties are really distinct and essential. We may be mistaking two properties for essential ones, which will turn out to be two effects of some more latent essential property of matter. We may find that what we call heat, light, and electricity are but three phases of some one molecular energy, transformable into these equivalent effects. But we return to the more natural and obvious theory of Newton and his great contemporaries, that matter has more than one real, essential property, and more than one power. This theory of power is encumbered with none of the difficulties besetting the newer one. It coheres with the rational view which, as we have seen, compels us to regard essential properties of substances as nothing else than powers *in posse*, because we have cognition of them only as we see them producing effects.

THE AIM OF REAL INDUCTION.

But the main use of the inductive logic is to enable us to anticipate nature. Our beneficial power over her can only be gained by learning her ways. To be able to produce the given effect we desire, we must know the natural law under which that effect arises. Bacon has tersely expressed this truth at the beginning of his *Nov. Org.* "Human knowledge and power coincide, because ignorance of the cause maketh the effect to fail. For Nature is only conquered by obeying her; and that which in our contemplation hath the aspect of Cause, in our working hath the aspect of Rule." The thing we need to do is to predict what sequent will certainly follow such or such an antecedent. For only thus can we know these two things, the knowing of which constitutes all practical wisdom: how to produce the effect we desire, and how to foresee what shall befall us. Our first impulse is to attempt to learn nature's secret, by the mere observation and

summing up of what we see occurring, with the circumstances of the occurrences. But when we have done this, and recorded our enumerations, experience speedily teaches us that we cannot yet certainly interpret and predict nature; since the same antecedents may not be relied on always to bring in the same sequents. Sometimes they may, and oftentimes they may not. The problem, then, is to distinguish between those observed sequences which certainly will hold in the future, and those which will not. And *between the antecedent and consequent of the former sort, there must be known to be a necessary tie; for it is self-evident that only a necessary tie can ensure the certain recurrence of the second after the first.* But it is equally evident, both to the human reason and experience, that nature has no necessary tie between her events, except that of *efficient cause*. Hence it appears that the sole remaining *problem of Induction is to distinguish the causal sequences we observe, from the accidental.* Whenever we see what we term an effect, a change, a newly beginning action or state, this necessary law of the reason assures us that it had its cause. Had not that cause been efficient of that effect, it would not have been true cause. It must, then, have communicated power. That power will always be efficient of the same effect, when it acts under the same conditions. Hence, when we have truly discriminated the cause from the mere antecedent, the *propter hoc* from the *post hoc*, we have found therein a certain and invariable law of nature. We have read nature's secret. We are now enabled to predict her future actions; and so far as we can procure the presence of the discovered cause and conditions, we can command nature, and produce the effects we desire. This, and this alone, is *inductive demonstration*. This position is substantiated also by the authority of the three most intelligent expounders of the inductive logic, whom we have quoted: by that of Lord Bacon, cited on p. 6; by that of Sir Isaac Newton, cited in his second Rule, on p. 8; and by that of Mr. Mill, p. 19. (See SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW for January.)

He who ponders the last argument thoroughly, will see that there is no consistent explanation of the inductive demonstration possible, upon the plan of Mr. Hume's metaphysics. Let the a

priori rational notion of efficient cause and power be discarded; let our judgment of cause be reduced to the mere observation of invariable sequence, without any supersensuous tie between antecedent and consequent supplied by the law of reason; let the vain distinction between efficient cause and physical cause be established, and the aim of science restricted to the inquiry for the physical cause, while the search after the efficient cause is discarded; and let the rational distinction between true cause and *conditio sine qua non* be obliterated; then, obviously, no necessary truth remains, from which any argumentative process can be constructed, to lift any series of observations above the uncertain level of an *inductio enumerationis simplicis*. Mr. Mill himself, while making the fatal denials enumerated above, is driven by the force of truth to say that such necessary, universal truth must be introduced from some whither, in order to give to *induction* the solid character of science. Whence can it be obtained, if not from the intuitive judgment of efficient cause? Experience, without this, only tells us that this has come after that a great many times. But the number of instances in which experience has not been, and will not be, able to observe whether the same consequent comes after that antecedent, is infinitely greater than the number of instances which have been experimentally observed. Hence we can never conclude by that method, whether the sequence we observe is the certain one in the future. The introductory citations showed the reader how the writers on this branch of logic waver and confuse and contradict each other. Is not the reason now disclosed? That so many of them have disdained the guidance of correct metaphysics.

The reader is now brought to the proper point of view to understand why the induction from a mere enumeration of agreeing instances can never rise above probability; and why it does, as we admit, raise a probable expectation of recurrence in the future. *So far as the observed presence of a given antecedent seemingly next before the consequent raises the probability that we see in that antecedent the true efficient cause*, just so far have we probable evidence that the consequent will follow it in future. Now, inasmuch as our rational intuition tells us that cause always imme-

diately precedes effect, the *phenomenon* which is seemingly next before another may be in many cases taken for the nearest antecedent, and, therefore, the cause. But even this rule of probability is liable to many exceptions, which we are taught to make by our practical sagacity. We have invariably seen darkness preceding dawn; and that immediately. But we have never felt the least inclined to see the faintest probability therein, that the darkness was the cause of the dawn. Why not? Because our observation showed us a species of heterogeneity between the two events, which made us disinclined to look for the probable, or even the possible, cause of light in darkness. But in many other cases, as, when the tides were seen always to follow the rise of the moon to the meridian, the probability that the moon's coming was the true cause appeared; and as soon as Newton's theory of mutual attraction was stated, that probability appeared very strong.

But ordinarily the observed sequences can only raise a probability that we have found in the antecedent the true cause; for this reason: *that we know there are often such things as unobserved or latent or invisible causes.* For instance, the old empirical chemists knew that something turned the metal, when sufficiently heated, into the calx. They talked of an imponderable agent which they named *phlogiston*. They had not suspected that oxygen gas was the cause; for this gas is transparent, invisible, and its presence in the atmosphere had not been clearly ascertained. Had the frequently observed sequence, then, led them to the conclusion that *heat* was the efficient and sufficient cause of calcination, they would have concluded wrong. Farther experiment has taught us this error: some metals, as potassium, calcine rapidly in the midst of intense cold, if atmosphere and water be present. None of the metals calcine under heat, if atmosphere and water are both excluded, as well as all other oxygen-yielding compounds. Here, then, is the weakness of the induction by the mere enumeration of agreeing instances: *We have not yet found out but that an unobserved cause comes between the seeming antecedent and the effect, the law of whose rise we wish to ascertain.*

And here is the practical object of all the canons of inductive

logic, and of all the observations and experiments by which we make application of them, to settle that question, *whether between this seeming antecedent and that effect, another hitherto undetected antecedent does not intervene?* Just so soon as we are sure there is no other, whether it be by many observations or few, we know that the observed antecedent is the true efficient cause; and that we have a law of nature which will hold true always, unless new conditions arise overpowering the causation. Not only is it possible that we may be assured of the absence of any undetected cause between the parts of the observed sequence by a few observations; we may sometimes reach the certainty, and thus the permanent natural law, by a single one. To do so, what we need is, to be in circumstances which authorise us to know certainly that no other antecedent than the observed one can have intruded unobserved. Such authority may sometimes be given by the testimony of consciousness. For instance, a party of explorers are travelling through a Brazilian forest, where every tree and fruit is new and strange to them. One of the travellers sees a fruit of brilliant color, fragrant odor, and pleasing flavor, which he plucks and eats. Soon after, his lips and mouth are inflamed and swollen in a most painful manner. The effect and the anguish are peculiar. His companions, who have eaten the same food, except this fruit, and breathed the same air, do not suffer. This traveller is certain, after one trial, that the fruit is poisonous, and unhesitatingly warns his companions with the prophecy: "If you eat this fruit, you will be poisoned." What constitutes his demonstration? His consciousness tells him that he has taken into his lips absolutely nothing, since the previous evening, that could cause the poisoning, except this unknown fruit. He remembers perfectly. He has tasted nothing except the coffee, the biscuits, and the dried beef which had been their daily and wholesome fare. But, *no effect—no cause.* This fruit, the sole antecedent of the painful effect, *must therefore be the true cause*; and must affect other human lips, other things being the same, in the same way. His utter ignorance of the fruit does not in the least shake his conclusion. The traveller has really made a valid application of the "method of residues." He has argued validly from a *post hoc* up to a *propter hoc*.

This is so important that it will not be amiss to illustrate it in another instance of inductive argument—that of the metals and calxes. The first observations seemed to show that heat was the cause of calcination. But when heat was applied to a metal excluded from atmosphere, it did not calcine. And when the metallic bases of the stronger alkalies, as potassium, were identified as metals, it was observed that this one of them calcined violently on a lump of ice. Hence the belief that heat was the efficient of calcination had to be given up—chemists had to confess that the apparent antecedent, heat, in their first experiments could not be the nearest antecedent, but that this, the true cause, was still latent. They had really corrected their erroneous induction by the joint method of “agreement and difference.” It was reserved for Sir Humphrey Davy to show them the true efficient of calcination, in the invisible, undiscovered, but all important agent, oxygen-gas.

Once more; when the observed antecedent is of a character which our previous conclusions have not condemned as heterogeneous from the supposed effect, and therefore not very unlikely to be its cause; as we increase the number of the agreeing instances observed, we feel that our probable evidence that we have found the true cause, grows also. Why is this? It is because reason has assured us that this effect has its efficient cause next before it; and as this antecedent seems to appear again and again before it, and no other has yet been detected between them, it becomes more probable that there is no other intervening antecedent. If such is the case, then this antecedent is the cause.

THE METHODS OF INDUCTION.

We are now prepared to advance to the correct definition of the inductive demonstration. It may be, in form, an enthymeme, but always, in reality, is a syllogism, whose major premise is the universal necessary judgment of cause, or some proposition implied therein. This view of the inductive proceeding corresponds with that conclusion to which the reflection of twenty centuries has constantly brought back the philosophic mind: that all illative processes of thought are really syllogistic, and may be most com-

pletely stated in that form; and that, in fact, there is no other process of thought that is demonstrative. The history of philosophy has shown frequent instances of recalcitration against this result, as those of Locke, of Dr. Thomas Brown, and of their followers; but their attempts to discard syllogism, and to give some other description of the argumentative process of the understanding, have always proved futile. The old analysis of Aristotle still asserts its substantial sway; and successive logicians are constrained, perhaps reluctantly, the more maturely they examine, to return to his conclusion—that the syllogism gives the norm of all reasonings. If our definition of the inductive demonstration, then, can be substantiated, it will give to logic this inestimable advantage: of reconciling and simplifying its departments. The review of opinions given by us at the outset revealed this state of facts: that logicians felt, on the one hand, that no reasoning process could be conclusive, unless it could be shown to conform, somehow, to syllogism; and on the other, that the custom and fashion of distinguishing induction from deduction as different, or even opposite, kinds of argument, had become prevalent, if not irresistible. Consequently, the most of them, following the obscure hints of their leader, Aristotle, endeavored to account for induction as a different species of syllogism, in which we conclude from the some to the all, instead of concluding from the universal to the particular or the individual. And then immediately they were compelled, by the earliest and simplest maxims of their logic, to admit that such syllogisms are inconclusive! And they have to confess this in the face of this fact: that this induction is the *organon* of nearly all the sciences of physics and natural history; sciences whose results are so splendid, and so important to human progress! Such a result is not a little mortifying and discreditable to philosophy. But we hope to show that it is a needless result. It will appear that induction is not only syllogistic, and therefore within the pale of demonstrative argumentation, but regularly and lawfully syllogistic. Mill has had a sufficiently clear conviction of the necessity of accomplishing this, to teach (Vol. I., pp. 362–365) that the conclusions of this species of reasoning can only become solid when grounded in a universal truth.

This, he thinks, is our belief in the invariability of the law of causation. But he then (p. 345) very inconsistently adds, that this universal truth itself is but a wider induction, which approaches universal certainty sufficiently near, by reason of its breadth. This universal and necessary truth, we hope to show, is the intuition of cause for every effect, along with the truths involved therein.

To effect this, the methods of induction must be explained. When we speak of observed sequences, we mean a set of observed resembling cases where one state or change seems immediately to precede another change, or "effect," which we are studying. These cases may be observed by ourselves, or witnessed to us by others. The *fact* of the sequence is the only material thing. But, first, one's own observation must be honest and clear, and his record of the case exact. He must not see his hypothesis in the facts, but only what occurs there. And, second, a case taken on testimony should be fully ascertained by a judicial examination of the evidence. Having now this set of agreeing instances, more or less numerous, which gives us, as it stands, only an induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, our task is, so to reason from it as to discriminate the *propter hoc* from the *post hoc*. The result of this task, when successfully performed, is to give us a "law of nature," which is such because it is a law of true efficient causation. It is to effect this, we need the methods of logical induction. In stating them, the chief guide will be Mr. Mill, whose discussion in this point seems the most complete and just.

1. The "Method of Argument" is the following. Observation usually gives us sequences of this kind, viz., Not one antecedent, but a cluster of them appear to stand next before an effect or (more commonly) a cluster of effects. Such observation, no matter how often the like case recurs, fails to tell us which antecedent, or which combination of them, contains the efficient cause of either effect. We must observe farther, and compare cases. Like the algebraist, we will use letters as symbols, for the sake of clearness, calling the antecedents by the first letters of the alphabet, and the consequents by the latter. Let us suppose that the cases agree in this: one antecedent remains the same in each,

and the same effect appears after each cluster of antecedents, however the other antecedents may change. Thus, in case 1st, $A+B+C$ are followed by X . In case 2d, $A+D+E$ are followed by X . In case 3d, $A+F+G$ are followed by X . Let it be postulated that these are all the antecedents: then the true cause of X must be among them. But in case 1st, neither D , nor E , nor F , nor G , could have caused X , for they were absent. In cases 2d and 3d, neither B nor C could have caused X , for they were absent. Therefore A was the true cause of X each time. The canon, or rule of elimination, or exclusion of seeming but false causes, then, is this: Whichever antecedent remains alone unchanged next before the same effect in all the known cases of sequence, is the true cause. The law of nature gotten in this case is, that A will always, *cæteris paribus*, produce X . The necessary universal truths on which we have proceeded are, that every effect must have some cause, and that, to be efficient cause, it must be present.

The converse process is also practicable. Let the cases observed be in the *a posteriori* order: several clusters of effects $X+Y+Z$, $X+W+V$, etc., are found to agree only in that among the antecedents A is constant. The counterpart canon will teach that X is the effect of A .

As an example of this method may be taken the earlier and simpler reasoning by which the tides were connected with the presence of the moon on the meridian. In one case the flood tide was observed, we will suppose, at the bottom of a bay penetrating the land towards the west. The observed antecedents were the passage of the moon over the meridian, and also a strong east wind. It did not appear whether the moon's attraction or the wind's force was the main cause. At the second observation, the flood-tide was preceded by the moon's coming to the meridian, and by a calm; at the third, by the moon and a south wind. The argument concludes that the moon is, all the time, the main cause.

But, simple as this process of exclusion seems, it is not yet a perfect demonstration in every case. This arises from three truths, which must be candidly admitted. First. Usually, we cannot know that the observed antecedents, $A+B+C$, are all the

antecedents really present; because often true causes remain long latent. Second. The same effect, X, may be caused at different times by different true causes. For instance, fulminate of mercury explodes under heat; it also explodes under percussion. Sensible caloric is emitted by the solar rays; by compression of a gas; by friction; by chemical actions. If, then, we were safe from the presence of a latent cause among the antecedents, all that we should prove by the method of agreement would be: A is one cause of X (while there may be others). But this would be no mean result; for it would give us thus much of power over nature, that we should know (whether or not X could be produced by other means) we could always produce it when we could, *ceteris paribus*, produce A. Third. One effect may be the result of the combination of two or more causes. And this single effect may be the total of what would have been the two separate effects of the two causes, acting severally; as when two mechanical forces moving in different lines, propel a mass along the diagonal of the "parallelogram of forces." Or, the mixed effect may present itself in a new form, concealing, by its apparent heterogeneity, both the causations; as when the affinities of an acid and an alkali form a neutral salt, which exhibits neither acid nor alkaline reaction. In view of this third truth, it is evident the "method of agreement" may not tell us absolutely whether A is the cause of X, or A with which other antecedent combined. Again, since A may itself be, along with X, one of a pair of effects of a latent cause, all we can conclude is, either A is cause of X, or is an invariable function of an unknown cause of X. The method of agreement, then, does not give us an absolute demonstration, unless we have means of knowing that the observed antecedents, A+B+C, A+D+E, etc., are the only antecedents present in each sequence—that no casual antecedent is left undetected.

2. The "Method of Difference" is applicable to the following case. A set of sequences is ascertained, in which, when a given antecedent is present, a given consequent is also present; but when that antecedent is absent, that consequent is also absent. Thus, A+B+C are followed by X+Y+Z. But B+C are only followed by Y+Z. Here the reasoning proceeds on this pre-

mise: because this antecedent A cannot be excluded without excluding the effect X, it must be the efficient cause of X. The canon derived may be thus stated: Whenever the absence of a given antecedent is followed by the absence of the effect, all the other circumstances remaining the same, that is the true cause. The law may consequently be inferred, that A will always produce X, *cæteris paribus*. For instance, let the problem be to ascertain the true cause of the corrosion or calcination of a metal, as iron. It is found that sometimes heat and atmosphere are present; at other times heat without atmosphere. In the former cases corrosion always followed; but when the atmosphere was excluded, there was no corrosion. The cause of corrosion must, then, be in the air; farther experiment confirms this, by showing it is in the oxygen of the air.

So far, then, as we can *know* that the second set of sequences, in which the effect failed, *differed* from the former set in which it had place, *only in one circumstance*, we know that the true cause is in that circumstance. This is the canon on which most of our experimental inductions in practical life proceed. It is the one of which *experiment* usually seeks to make use. For it is this feature which experiment is most often able to realise; the reproduction, namely, of the identical sequence, abating one single known circumstance, which has been observed before. Hence the method of difference is both more feasible and more definite in its conclusions than the method of agreement. Indeed, the chief value of the latter is to suggest a probability which points to the hypothesis indicating the experiment which will test it. By the experiment thus suggested, an appeal is made to the method of difference, and the probability of the law of cause is either established or exploded.

But the method of difference, when most rigidly applied, only proves that A is one cause of X. It does not prove that X may not be also produced, in other times and places, by other causes. It may, however, be again remarked, that this gives us so much, at least: that A, given similar conditions, will always produce X. Reflection will show, also, that this method may be used in the counterpart, or a *posteriori* way. Whatever antecedent is al-

ways absent when the effect X fails, all other circumstances remaining the same, is a cause of X. But, because this canon proves that A always produces X, it does not follow by the converse that every X was produced by A. To the heedless mind, the two propositions may seem almost identical; but they are really different, and the second may be false. Its falsehood appears from the admission that similar effects are often produced at other times by wholly distinct and independent causes. Observation may have proved that all solar rays directly produce calefaction; but it is entirely erroneous to say all calefaction is from solar rays directly. Few cautions are more important than this, which reminds the inductive reasoner, that while like causes give like effects, like effects do not prove like causes.

In this reasoning, we, of course, use the word cause in the sense of concrete causal antecedent. If it is taken in the more abstract sense of the efficient energy present in the concrete causal antecedent, it may be a probable hypothesis, that the energy is the same in these several concrete causes. Thus, let the effect be calefaction. It may be caused by the sun's rays, or by combustion, or by some other form of chemical action, or by friction, or by percussion, or by a modified current of galvanism. This proves beyond a doubt that the same effect does not always come from the same (concrete) cause. But the physicist may claim that the molecular energy, causing the sensible effect of calefaction, may be the same energy in all these different antecedents. If so, there is an abstract sense in which the effect, calefaction, proceeds from the same cause all the time. To affirm or deny this is equally unnecessary to our purpose.

3. The third method may be regarded, from one point of view, as a double application of the first, or as a combination of the first and second. The method of difference, as we saw, is the one to which our intentional experiments usually appeal. Having observed a number of cases in which a cluster of antecedents, $A + B + C$, is followed by several consequents, X, Y, Z, and having surmised that A causes X, we construct a designed sequence, in which the cluster of antecedents is in all respects the same, except the exclusion of A. If X disappears out of the consequents,

we reason that A is a true cause of X. But in the study of nature, instances may well arise in which we cannot control the antecedents A + B + C, so as to procure the rise of B + C without A. What can we do? The third method answers: observe and record all the instances in nature where B + C occur without A, and probably with some other phenomenon, as B + C + D, or B + D + E, etc. If we find that all these clusters of antecedents, however else they may differ, agree in the omission of A and also in the failure of X, the probability is increased that A is an efficient cause of X. We have made two different applications of the method of agreement, one affirmative and the other privative, and they concur in pointing to A as a real cause of X. As an example: the question was, Which is the real efficient of the anodyne effect in crude opium? This is known to be a complex gum. It is also known to contain, as one of its "proximate principles," the alkaloid known as morphia. Every time the crude gum is given, including the morphia, an anodyne effect follows. This is no demonstration. Let us now suppose that organic chemistry has not yet given us the ability to extract the morphia alone from the crude gum; with an exact certainty that we took out nothing else and left the opium, in all other respects, what it was before. This inability prevents our resorting at once to the definite method of difference. But we may collect all known gums any ways akin to opium, containing other proximate principles which it contains, and administer them. If we find that among the various effects of the various drugs, the anodyne effect fails in all which lack morphia, we adopt the probable opinion that this is the real anodyne agent. But the wise physician will remember that this is short of demonstration. The uncertainty always attaching to the method of difference may be diminished, but cannot be annihilated by doubling the testimony. Thus, in the instance taken, the first set of cases would still leave some doubt whether some undiscovered element in the crude opium, or some combination thereof with known elements, might not be the efficient; and in the second set of cases, where morphia was absent, and the anodyne effect also failed, it would not be demonstrated but that the new drugs given contained some element counteracting an anodyne effect, which, but

for this, might still have been emitted in the absence of morphia.

4. The fourth method has been termed that of residues. Cases which present a plurality of antecedents, followed by a plurality of consequents, are analysed by it until one pair is left unaccounted for. This may then be concluded to be cause and effect. The result observed is, that $A+B+C$ are frequently followed by $X+Y+Z$. Now, if, in any valid way, it has been proved that A is the cause of X , and, if single, produces only X , and that B produces only Y , then, although we may not experimentally insulate Z in any separate case, it may be concluded that C is the true cause of Z . For, the causal efficiency of A having been traced into X and of B into Y , there is no source to which to ascribe Z , except to C . Every effect must have a present cause. Obviously, to render this method a complete demonstration, we should be able to know that A , B , and C are the only possible causes present. For if a fourth antecedent, D , remains in addition to C , it may be proved that A has expended its efficiency in producing X , and B in producing Y ; and it will still be an unsettled problem, whether C or D , or a combination of the two, produces Z . The elimination is incomplete.

5. Another method remains, which may be applicable where, in consequence of the inability to experiment, the exact application of previous methods may be impracticable. This may be called the inference from *corresponding variations*. A given state or change, which we call A , is often seen to be followed by a change called X . This suggests, as has been so often said, only a probability that A is the efficient cause of X . But if a variation in the action of A is seen to be followed by a corresponding variation in the occurrence of X , the probability strengthens. If a second and a third variation in A is followed by still other corresponding changes in X , the evidence grows rapidly towards certainty. This variation in the antecedent may be not only in quantity, but also in direction of its action, or in some other circumstance; and still it gives us this inference. The nature of the proof is this: if a given antecedent had no power over a consequent, a modification of that antecedent would have no influence on that consequent. Hence, when the modification of the one is

invariably accompanied with a corresponding modification of the other, it seems plain that there must be some causal tie. But it is not, therefore, certain that the tie is direct; the two circumstances which change together may be connected as two functions of some more recondite cause. Until we are able by some experiment or reasoning to exclude this hypothesis, our induction by observing corresponding variations is not complete.

Examples of this method may be found in the conclusion that increments of heat are the causes of the successive expansions of the mercury in the thermometer. We observe that, the more heat, the more expansion; the less heat, the less expansion. Another application of this induction led to the discovery of the causes of the variations in the height of the tides. It was observed that when the conjunction or opposition of the sun and moon was most complete, the spring-tides occurred; when they were less complete, the tides were lower; and when the two luminaries were farthest from a conjunction or opposition, a whole quadrant apart in the ecliptic, the least, or neap-tides, occurred. Hence, we concluded that the concurrence of the traction of the moon's force with the sun's, in the same line, is the cause of the higher tide.

If the corresponding variations in the antecedent and consequent are variations in quantity, and especially if they maintain an exact proportion in their increase or decrease, such as can be measured by numerical *ratios*, the induction is very clear. The doubling of A results in the doubling of X, the effect; the quadrupling of A in the quadrupling of X, for instance. Then A is clearly the cause of X, or, at least, a regular function of a cause of which X is an analogous function. And the latter conclusion enables us to predict the future result as certainly as the former. But the variations may be in other circumstances than quantity. For instance, if a given body is surmised to be the cause of motion in another body, and if the direction of the produced motion changes regularly in correspondence with the changed direction of the first body, we conclude that our surmise is correct. Or else, again, both motions are functions of some force not yet de-

tected, to which they are both related by a causal tie; so that the regularity of the observed law of motion is safely assumed.

These five methods of interpreting nature, with their canons, appear to present all the valid means in the possession of science. No other are suggested. But the following reasoning seems to show that there can be no other. If the antecedent, which seems to be next the effect, could be surely known in every case to be really the nearest antecedent, no canons of induction would need to be applied. The simple observation would directly show us the causal tie, and, therefore, the natural law. (It is only necessary to say, that by *nearest* antecedent is not meant the one nearest in time or space; for in this sense an inefficient may be as close to the effect as an efficient antecedent; but we mean the nearest in the sense of efficiency.) The whole problem, then, is to make sure that, between the effect and the nearest visible antecedent, some invisible or unnoted antecedent has not come. Now, the only ways to test this, in man's power, are by some elimination of parts of the sequences, or some variation of parts. The methods of agreement, difference, and residues, if applied in their direct and converse modes, exhaust all the eliminations practicable, whether of causal or non-causal antecedents, or of essential or non-essential sequents. The method of corresponding variations completes the use of the remaining resource. These methods are but the effectuating of that task which the sagacity of Lord Bacon pointed out: the separation of the irrelevant instances from our observed sequences, so that the truly causal ones may be disclosed. That which he foreshadowed, the slow and painstaking care of other philosophers has carried out to its details, and presented with more exactitude. It may be rash to assert that no other method for separating the *post hoc* from the *propter hoc* will be added by the future advancements of logic. Thus far this critical science has advanced in the ablest hands of our day.

Dr. Whewell impugns, indeed, these methods as artificial and fruitless. He questions whether it is by them truth is really discovered, and challenges Mr. Mill to name the important physical laws which the discoverers have professed to reach by either of these methods. The answer to this view is, first, to deny Whew-

ell's allegation. All the valid inductions of common experience and of inductive science have been virtually made by these "methods." And, as we remarked, experiment, the great lever of induction in the physicist's hands, is both a virtual and a formal appeal to the "method of difference." The second answer is, that a logical science, in one sense, has not for its end the discovery of truth in the sense of the invention of it, but the proper function of logic is *to test* the processes of invention after they are suggested. Logic is the critical science. The syllogism, in its other or deductive aspect, is not the inventive *organon*. Its office is to sit as judge on the processes of deductive thought which claim to lead to truth. The function of the syllogism is to hold up its form as a standard of those relations of propositions which make illations valid, that the professed reasonings presented by the inventive faculty, suggestion, may be tried by that sure rule. So, the rules of the inductive syllogism are not claimed to be valuable because they are suggestive of unseen truths, but because they try and discriminate, in the suggestions supposed or claimed to be inductive, between the valid and the invalid. The processes which are active in leading to the unknown truth are observation, hypothesis, and the "scientific imagination," with experiment. Again, it is but seldom that the vigorous minds which have reasoned deductively to valuable truths, have expressed their arguments in formal syllogisms. Even geometers do not do this, with all the exactness of their noble science. The reasoner does not usually proceed farther than using *enthymemes* or *sorites* in the formal statement of his arguments; often he is not even so formal as this. But none the less is the syllogism the full form of each valid step; and the test of its validity is, in the last resort, whether the step can be stated in a syllogism of lawful mode and figure. So it may be true that a Galileo, a Newton, a Franklin, a Maury, may not have expressed his inductive argument in the technical form of either of the five methods. But if his induction is demonstrative, *he has virtually*, if informally, *employed them*. The test of its validity is, in the last resort, whether his inductive process can be expanded into one of them, and find in it its full and exact expression.

But it has been admitted that even these methods of induction do not always lead to absolutely demonstrated results. The insufficiency of the method of agreement was clearly evinced: either one of three contingencies (see p. 505) would vitiate the conclusion. Even the method of difference, the most exact of all, we found (see p. 507) only gave an absolutely certain result, on condition we could know positively that, between the two sequences, $A+B+C$, followed by $X+Y+Z$, and $B+C$ followed by $Y+Z$, we had made no difference among the antecedents except the exclusion of A . But, obviously, that is a thing very hard for us, in most cases, to know positively, and in many cases impossible to know. Yet, if it is not known, our inference that A is the efficient of X , is not absolutely sure, because the possibility remains that the failure of X to appear among the second set of effects may be due, not solely to the absence of A from among the antecedents, but to that other unnoticed change which was made among them when removing A . Hence, another work remains before an inductive demonstration is complete. This is *Verification*.

Now, obviously, one approximate method of verification is to apply a second method and canon of induction, or a third, in addition to a first. If they give the same result, the probable evidence mounts up towards certainty with a multiplying ratio. But in many cases only one method is applicable. The most complete verification is obtained by experimenting backwards. Having reasoned to the conclusion that X is the effect of A , the student of nature constructs an experiment, in which A is made to arise alone. If X follows, and the conditions of the case are such he can know that no other antecedent capable of producing X has been present, his induction is verified. Of this the method of Franklin is an instance, when he completed the inductive argument that the lightning of the clouds is electricity. His experiments on electrical bodies, and his observation of the lightnings, had suggested the belief that the causal energy was the same. This was, so far, only an induction by comparison and simple enumeration of instances. The lightnings were apparently followed by some of the consequences of the electric energy. Now,

if the two are in reality the same energy, the lightning should experimentally produce all the known effects of the electric excitement. To verify this, as is known, Franklin availed himself of the ingenious expedient of the kite. He thus found that a conductor, excited no otherwise than from the energy of the lightning cloud, emitted the spark, communicated the muscular shock, charged the Leyden jar, and did all that the electrical machine had done. Thus, an only probable induction was verified and raised to the rank of a certainty.

Verification is not confined to experiment; but sometimes a sagacious observation of nature will detect her giving the confirmation. Of this the most splendid instance is the confirmation of Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis of the orbital movements of the planets by the force of gravity. He had these data of probability. The law of *inertia* seemed to give a cause for a tangential motion absolutely constant. But Copernicus and Galileo had taught that the planetary motions were orbital around the sun as a centre. There was the great mechanical law of the parallelogram of forces, which teaches as that the mass acted on by two *momenta* in two lines, will move in the diagonal. Add to the inherent tangential *momentum*, then, a centripetal force, and the orbital motion seems accounted for. Of this orbital compound motion, the centripetal element appeared as real a *falling to the centre* as that of the stone (or the famous apple) falling to the earth. But now our terrestrial experiences had taught him most familiarly how this falling to the earth is the effect of gravity. The lines pursued by all falling bodies tend to the earth's centre. Obviously the earth draws them to her centre. Now, this attraction of gravity acts not only at the earth's surface, but above its surface to the highest distances attained by mountains and balloons. It obviously acts on the clouds and their contents. *Why suppose it limited at all?* Make the supposition that it is universal, though diminishing in intensity with distance, and why may not this be the very reason of all these centripetal motions? Can one guess by what ratio the force of gravity will diminish with distance? If it expands itself in every direction around its centre, it would appear

that its intensity in each point should diminish by the same ratio by which the surface of a sphere increases; that is, with the square of the *radius*. May it not be, then, that while the tangential motion of each planet is but the original impulse in a straight line, preserved absolutely constant by *inertia*, the centripetal or falling motion compounded therewith, is just the effect of this gravitation, acting with an energy inversely as the squares of the distances?

Such was the dazzling hypothesis. (We profess to state it, of course, not in the very words of Newton, but in the tenor of his expositors.) But he was too good a logician to assume it as proved; he had a probable induction thus far, nothing more. Verification was needful. He first established the law of planetary attraction, using Kepler's facts (or so-called laws) as his minor premises. Knowing thus the attraction between the moon and the earth, he supposed a piece of the moon brought to the surface of the earth, and from the established law of its attraction, computed the quantity and direction of the descent this piece would make in one second when it came to the tops of the highest mountains. He found that this was identical with the descent, both in direction and amount, of a piece of the mountain, as acted on by *gravity*. From the identity of behavior he inferred (by Rule II. of his *Regulae Philosophandi*) that the force which makes the planetary attraction is identical with the force of gravity. Thus the grandest hypothesis ever constructed by a scientific man, was converted by this verification (afterwards extended to the other planets) into an established truth.

Thus it is successful verification which completes the inductive demonstration. Where no verification is possible, many, or even most, of our inductions may remain but probabilities. But they are not therefore wholly useless; for, first, they may guide the investigator in the invention of tentative hypotheses; and, second, as we have seen, they may lend to practical life a guidance which, though not certain, has its value. But such an induction has no right to be set up as a proposition in science.

INDUCTION IS SYLLOGISM.

It is now time that we returned and redeemed our promise to show that induction is but the old syllogistic logic, inasmuch as each demonstrative process is but an enthymeme, whose real major premise is the intuitive judgment of cause, or some corollary thereof. We are glad to have the powerful and very emphatic testimony of Mr. Mill to this doctrine. In Book III., Chap. 21, he says: "As we recognised in the commencement, and have been enabled to see more clearly in the progress of the investigation, the basis of all these logical operations is the law of causation. The validity of all the inductive methods depends on the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every phenomenon, must have some cause—some antecedent on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. In the method of agreement, this is obvious, that method avowedly proceeding on the supposition that we have found the true cause as soon as we have negatived every other. The assertion is equally true of the method of difference. That method authorises us to infer a general law from two instances: one in which A exists together with a multitude of other circumstances, and B follows: another, in which A being removed and all other circumstances remaining the same, B is prevented. What, however, does this prove? It proves that B, in the particular instance, cannot have had any other cause than A; but to conclude from this that A was the cause, or that A will, on other occasions, be followed by B, is only allowable on the assumption that B must have some cause; that among its antecedents in any single instance in which it occurs, there must be one which has the capacity of producing it at other times. This being admitted, it is seen that, in the case in question, that antecedent can be no other than A; but that, if it be no other than A, it must be A, is not proved, by these instances at least, but taken for granted. There is no need to spend time in proving that the same thing is true in the other inductive methods. The universality of the law of causation is assumed in them all."

Let us submit this assertion to a more critical examination; and first as to the method of agreement. Refer to p. 504. In the

first case, or cluster of cases, we saw $A+B+C$ followed (possibly among other effects) by X . In the second, $A+D+E$; and in the third, $A+F+G$, are also followed by X . The reasoning, rigidly stated, now proceeds thus (and that it may proceed strictly, it is necessary to make the supposition that no other causal antecedents are present except A, B, C , in the first case, etc., which, in practice, it will usually be very difficult to know): In the first case, the cause of X must have been either A or B or C , or some combination of them. Why? Because it is a universal *a priori* truth, that there is no effect without a cause. This step thrown into a formal syllogism will be:

1. No effect can arise without a cause.

2. But X arose preceded only by $A+B+C$,

Therefore A or B or C , or some combination of them, must be cause of X .

So, we prove that, in the second case, $A+D+E$, and in the third, $A+F+G$, must have caused X . But next we construct another syllogism:

1. A cause must be *present at the rise* of the effect (immediate corollary from the intuition of power and efficiency in cause).

2. B and C were absent in the 2d and 3d cases; D and E were absent in the 1st and 3d cases; F and G were absent in the 2d and 3d cases, while yet X was always present;

Therefore, none of these, but only A was cause of X each time.

But why the last part of our conclusion? Why may we not conclude that A was cause of X at one of its occurrences, and D at another, and G at another? A third syllogism precludes this:

1. "Like causes produce like effects."

2. None but A could be possible cause of all the X s;

Therefore A was only cause of each X .

The method of difference (see p. 506) proceeds thus: In one case, or set of cases, $A+B+C$ are followed by $X+Y+Z$. In another case, or set of cases, $B+C$ are followed only by $Y+Z$. As we saw, to entitle us to proceed rigidly, we must know that in the second case, the absence of A is the only differing circumstance in the cluster of antecedents; that no other change in

them has been made. We then conclude certainly that A caused X. The proceeding is a syllogism:

1. Like causes produce like effects.

2. But in the 2d case B + C did not produce X, which was present in the first case;

Therefore neither B nor C is cause of X. And, since there is no effect without its cause, A must be cause of X.

The third method of induction (see pp. 508, 509) was a combination of the two first, in which the affirmative result of the method of agreement was strengthened by the privative result of the method of difference. The syllogistic of the first part has been already given. In the second part, the process is like that of the method of difference.

1. Like causes always produce like effects.

2. But neither B + C + D, nor B, D, E, in the second class of instances, produced X;

Therefore neither of them is cause of X. But, as there can be no effect without a cause, A was the true cause of X.

The fourth method is that of residues (see p. 510). What observation gives us is a cluster of antecedents, A + B + C, usually followed by a cluster of effects, X + Y + Z. We prove that A produces only X, and B only Y. The inference which remains is, that C is the cause of Z. The syllogism is the following:

1. Like causes always produce like effects.

2. But A produces only X, and B only Y;

Therefore neither is cause of Z. But as there can be no effect without a cause, the remaining antecedent, C, must be cause of Z.

This formulation of the inference enables us to see with great clearness what are the conditions necessary to make it demonstrative. We must know, first, that A, B, and C are all the antecedents present which could be causal of Z; or, in other words, that there is no possible cause latent. We must know, first, that A or B produce only X and Y, and that Z is not also another effect of one of them or of their combination. For it is not impossible in itself that a cause may, under changed conditions, pro-

duce a second effect, different from the first, or at least differently conditioned. The intuition, Like cause, like effect, is only a universal truth while the cause is conditioned in the same way.

The last method of induction is that by noting the corresponding variations of antecedent and consequent. If a change in the circumstance of A is invariably followed by a corresponding change in X, we infer that A causes X. What is the analysis of this inference? Our intuition of cause is of that which has *efficient power* over its effect. This intuition involves the consequence that only an efficient cause could thus invariably propagate corresponding change in a sequent. But to make this consequence rigid, we must know that nothing varies in the cluster of antecedents, except that one of them which we suppose to be connected with the varying sequent. For, if other things among the antecedents vary, those other things may have to do with the variations in the sequent. But, with this caution, we may frame this syllogism :

1. Whatever sequent varies always with a given antecedent must receive its causal power.

2. But X varies always as A varies, no other change causal of X concurring ;

Therefore X is the effect of A.

Thus, by the successive examination of all the methods of induction, it is shown that they are all virtually syllogistical. The simple and satisfactory conclusion is thus reached, which unifies our theory of logic, and which also secures for careful and sufficient inductions that apodeictic character which is so essential to make them scientific propositions, and which we yet saw denied to them by so many great logicians. Induction and deduction are not two forms of reasoning, but one and the same. The demonstrative induction is but that species of syllogism which, getting its minor premise from observed sequences of fact, gets its major premise from the intuition of cause.

R. L. DABNEY.

ERRATUM.—On page 504, line 27, for “method of argument,” read “method of agreement.”

ARTICLE III.

GOD'S COVENANT WITH MAN.

I. God's covenant with man is a fundamental fact in man's religion.

What God has done for man, as determining man's religion, is included in two facts: the creation and the covenant. Given the fact that God created all things, and man in his own image, and there emerges for man natural religion—the gift of righteousness. This is the religion of man's first estate. It proceeds upon the principle of do and live—pure moral government. The doing is perfect and personal, the life is contingent, and the *status* a servant. The external light is the works of God, and the internal organ of vision, reason. In addition to the fact of the creation, given the fact of God's covenant with man, and there emerges a modification of natural religion—revealed religion—the gift of goodness. This is the religion of man's covenant estate. It proceeds upon the principle of believe and live. The believing carries a twofold righteousness, a personal and a federal or imputed. The life is justification, and the *status* a son—an organised body of sons in a representative head. The external light is the word of God; the internal organ of reception, faith. The point especially insisted upon under this head is, that this overture of goodness from God is to man, not as fallen, but as God's creature, capable of such "fruition" of God. The sufficient proof of this position is, that this "voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant," was first "expressed" to man, innocent and upright, in the garden of Eden. It offered to man, innocent and upright, the blessing of justification through a representative head. It still offers to man, guilty and depraved, the same blessing by the same means. It is therefore a fundamental and permanent fact in man's religion. If man's religion, as determined by this fact, is of grace, how can a dispensation of religion, based upon this fact, be called a dispensation or covenant of works?

II. God's covenant with man is of grace.

What God has done for man by covenant is an improvement upon what he did for him by creation. If, in man's first estate, resulting from the fact of the creation, God gave to man all that righteousness required, then what he has done by covenant is of goodness, grace. But the Confession, Sec. 2, says that the first dispensation of this "voluntary condescension on God's part" was a covenant of works. So, Thornwell: "The Scriptures assure us that two such dispensations (Confession: covenants) have been instituted; . . . one called the covenant of works, . . . the other called the covenant of grace." So, Dabney: "There are but two imaginable ways, and but two known to Scripture—grace and works by which a soul can win adoption of life." Likewise Hodge, *et cæteri*. But St. Paul: "And if by grace, then is it no more of works." If it be replied that Paul is speaking of sinners under the covenant of grace and not of unfallen creatures under the covenant of works, then let us call attention to the fact so much overlooked, that this excludes the works made under the present dispensation. But further, if grace for fallen creatures is exclusive of works under the covenant of grace, would not works according to Paul (if of works, then no more of grace) be equally exclusive of grace under the covenant of works, if there were a covenant of works? Was, then, the condescension on God's part expressed to Adam in the garden of Eden a condescension that was in justice due to unfallen man, or was this condescension of grace even to man unfallen? Or does the question of man's moral condition, as fallen or unfallen, have anything to do with the question whether the covenant is of grace or of debt? If it be replied that the condescension is of grace, but the benefit of it—fruition of God, adoption of life—is of debt (conventional merit) to man unfallen, then we ask again, whether what is said to be of debt in the covenant, when the covenant deals with man unfallen may not be said to be equally of debt when the covenant deals with man fallen? In either case, whether the covenant deals with man fallen or unfallen, the reward is of debt to the representative head, but of grace to the members. If the reward in the dispensation called "the covenant of works" is of debt because of the conventional merit of the worker—the first Adam—

much more is the same reward under the dispensation called "the covenant of grace," of debt, because of the conventional—absolute merit of the worker—the second Adam. And if there is a grace element in the first, much more is there a grace element in the second. There is, therefore, in kind, the same essential elements of grace and of debt in both dispensations. As there is much more of grace in the second, so is there much more of debt in it also. The two dispensations, therefore, are one, so far at least as the elements of grace and of debt are concerned. Therefore, to distinguish them as two covenants, calling the one "the covenant of works," and the other "the covenant of grace," can tend only to confusion. It is distinguishing one from the debt element in it, and the other from the grace element in it, while the dispensations themselves do not determine which should be designated from the grace and which from the debt element. It would answer just as well to reverse the names and call the first "the covenant of grace," and the second "the covenant of works." If the first of the covenants is of works, then must the second be of works, for the *same reason*. And if the second is of grace, then must the first be of grace also, for the *same reason*. The second is of grace, therefore the first is not of works. The phrase "covenant of works," as the name of one of God's covenant dispensations, is excluded, and God's covenant with man (as a whole) is of grace; of grace when that covenant deals with man un-fallen as well as when it deals with man fallen. That God should deal with man by covenant at all, is of grace. That God should, in his covenant with man, offer him the blessing of justification, is of grace. That this covenant offer should be by means of a representative head, is of grace. And if for all these reasons God's covenant with man, considered as a whole, is of grace when that covenant deals with man fallen, why is it not also of grace when it dealt with man un-fallen, since, to man un-fallen, it offered the same blessing—justification by the same means—through a representative head, on the same condition, "the obedience of faith" to the members, and "perfect personal obedience" to the head.

III. God's covenant with man is through a representative head.

When God's covenant with man, as "expressed" to Adam in the garden of Eden, is called "a covenant of works," this proceeds upon and leads to a misapprehension of the footing upon which God's covenant plan offers its blessing to man. This first expression of the covenant is constantly spoken of as a legal covenant, as if it offered to individual human beings the blessing of justification on the ground of personal obedience. It is even gravely announced that all that keeps a sinner now from claiming justification on the ground of good works, is the inability of the sinner to produce the good works. This proceeds upon an utter misconception of the footing upon which the covenant plan offers its blessing. It loses sight also of the blessing offered. But we are speaking now of the footing upon which it is offered. It is a leading characteristic of God's covenant plan, that its blessing is not offered upon the ground of personal obedience, perfect or imperfect, but upon the ground of the obedience of the federal head. So that even if it were possible for a sinner to render what is meant by perfect personal obedience, it would not claim the blessing of the covenant, since it is not offered upon this ground. Had the first Adam succeeded as the head of the covenant, his descendants could not have claimed the blessing of the covenant on the ground of their own individual obedience. For the fact is, that a personal obedience that disregarded the righteousness of the representative head as the ground of justification, could not be perfect obedience for man under any dispensation of the covenant. For God's covenant with man, as soon as it is revealed, becomes thenceforth a fundamental element in man's religion, creating an obligation of its own, on the same footing with the obligation grounded by the fact of the creation. So that a personal, individual obedience, that disregarded the righteousness of the federal head, or did not include "the obedience of faith," could not be perfect, because of the very grounds of obligation created by God's covenant plan, modifying God's moral government. So that there is, indeed, no sense in which it is true that the only thing that keeps a sinner from claiming the blessing of the covenant, is his inability to produce the good works of personal obedience. The inability commonly meant is the inability

that results from depravity. But even if the individual to be justified were without sin, if his obedience stopped short of the federal, imputed element in the righteousness demanded by the covenant, it would not claim the blessing. There is, indeed, a works element, a legal element, in God's covenant plan, but the legal element has to do with the head, and not the members.

This distinction seems to be constantly lost sight of, especially in speaking of the first expression of God's covenant with man. When this first expression of God's covenant is called "the covenant of works," the mistake seems to be that of designating the whole plan from what is special to the head. And so, when the whole covenant plan is called "the covenant of grace," this is designating it from what is special to the members. It is true, indeed, that God's covenant plan, as a whole, is of grace. But the phrase, "covenant of grace," is commonly used of what is special to the members. The party of the second part in the covenant includes a representative head and individual members. Some of the provisions of the covenant are special to the head, while other provisions are special to the members. Losing sight of this, and asserting of the whole plan what is true only in reference to what is special to the members, the result is inconsistency of statement and confusion of ideas. When it is said, "the first covenant was a covenant of works," and the condition perfect *personal* obedience, this is asserting what is not true of the covenant as a whole. It is true only as to what is special to the head. And it is as true of the second head as of the first. When God said to Adam in the garden, "this do and live," "that do and die," this was special to Adam as the head. The first head having failed, the terms of the blessing to the posterity are not mentioned. When the covenant thus called "the covenant of works" is further described in the Confession as promising life to Adam, "and in him to his posterity," these words, "and in him to his posterity," bring in what is special to the members; but what is special to the members is not of works nor on condition of perfect *personal* obedience. Was the life promised to the posterity on the ground of the perfect personal obedience of the individuals of the posterity? Then what place is left for the head? This

severs the body from the head. We venture to suggest the question whether it would not contribute to perspicuity to call God's covenant with man "the covenant of justification." This would be designating the covenant from the end contemplated by it. It is the blessing bestowed rather than the means of bestowing it, that seems to be the leading characteristic of God's covenant mode of dealing. This also seems to be the *ultimate* ground of the grace element in the covenant. The blessing—justification—is to the angels as individuals. It is to man through a covenant head. The condition to angels is perfect *personal* obedience. The condition to man is perfect imputed obedience. In either case it is of grace, since it is over and above justice to bestow justification on the ground of perfect obedience, either personal or imputed. The reward of perfect obedience, according to pure justice, is contingent happiness. Who can plead perfect obedience, cannot be condemned. It is of grace that the reward of perfect obedience should be justification. The phrase, "covenant of grace," does not determine the extent of the covenant. It might stop at pardon and contingent holiness and happiness, so far as sinners of mankind are concerned, and still be a covenant of grace. The phrase, "covenant of justification," determines at once the nature of the covenant as of grace and the extent of it as unto justification, without confusing what is special to the head with what is special to the members.

IV. God's covenant with man is unto justification.

That fruition of himself which God condescends to give to man by way of covenant, bestows upon man a grade of well-being additional to that originally involved in the gift of the creation. It is admitted by all that this higher grade of well-being is included in the blessing of justification. Man's nature is so constituted as to awaken within him a consciousness of the need of such a gift of goodness, additional to that which pure justice affords, in order to complete his well-being. This gift of goodness which God condescends to bestow by way of covenant, this is that mysterious unknown which humanity has always felt the need of, without being able to define to itself what was needed. Nor is it possible, in the nature of the case, that natural reason should dis-

cover the supply for this great want of humanity. For the thing sought is not included in the principles of pure moral government, but lies altogether in the will and purpose of God, and therefore can be known only as he reveals it. And what he has been pleased to reveal is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. And the revelation as to what man needs and has always needed to complete his well-being, is included in justification—an ended probation, an indefectible holiness, a confirmed title to eternal life and adoption to sonship in the family of God. This is what man wants and has always wanted in order to experience the perfection of his well-being. And this God from all eternity decreed to bestow upon man. This is the blessing that was offered to man innocent in the garden of Eden, in what the Confession calls “the covenant of works;” and this is the blessing God now offers to man fallen, in what the Confession calls “the covenant of grace.” The blessing of justification, therefore, was not included in the perfection in which man was originally created. When man first proceeded from the creative hand of God, innocent and upright, he still wanted, from the first, this one special thing to complete his well-being. He was innocent and upright and happy, but not confirmed in this state. This treasure of innocence and uprightness and happiness with which he was originally endowed was intrusted to himself, and was held by himself, in contingency with an interminable line of probation stretching out before him, at every point of which he was liable to fall into sin and ruin. The treasure of well-being, therefore, with which he was originally endowed, in order to be complete, lacked this one special thing: justification, pronouncing his probation ended, and his title to eternal life confirmed, and his relation to God that of a son. This finishing touch of his well-being constitutes that fruition of God which the Confession says God of his goodness gives to man “*by way of covenant.*” The Scriptures present the idea of life in a two-fold form—the one contingent happiness in an unjustified state, the other confirmed happiness in a justified state. The one is the reward of pure justice on the ground of personal obedience, according to the principle of pure moral government resulting from the fact of the creation, the other is

the reward of goodness on the ground of the righteousness of a federal head according to the modification of pure moral government resulting from the fact of the covenant. No little confusion results from overlooking this distinction between *life* "under the law" and *life* "under grace," *e. g.*, the question of the lawyer and the answer of the Saviour. The usual interpretation is that the Saviour in his answer to the lawyer—"This do and thou shalt live"—reannounces the covenant of works. In our view the idea of a covenant of works, in the sense of a covenant offering the blessing of *justification* to individual human beings on the ground of their own individual obedience is unknown to the Scriptures. When the lawyer repeated to Christ the law of moral government, Christ replied to him, "This do and thou shalt live." Was this offering the man the blessing of justification on the ground of personal obedience to the law? Was this, as Hodge says, a "reannouncement of the covenant of works"? And was this the covenant made with Adam in the garden of Eden? Christ does not say, "This do and thou shalt have justification," but "This do and thou shalt live," viz., the life of contingent happiness in an unjustified state: thou shalt not be condemned. A guiltless creature under God's moral government cannot be condemned, neither under pure moral government can perfect personal obedience claim the blessing of justification. Therefore, when our Saviour said to the lawyer, "This do and thou shalt live," he did not announce a covenant of works as Hodge says: that is, he did not announce that justification is accessible on the ground of individual personal obedience. Instead of this he merely announced the law of pure justice, the law of pure moral government. This interpretation proceeds upon the assumption that the word *life* has a double meaning. Practically, to say to a sinner, "This do and thou shalt live," serves as a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ. For a sinner cannot produce the perfect obedience which God's moral government demands for *contingent life*; therefore all need Christ. The answer of the Saviour is from the lawyer's standpoint. The lawyer had no higher idea of life than that of contingent happiness. Christ answers him according to the idea he has, using the word *live* in the sense that

the lawyer used it. This is the *practical* interpretation. There is, however, a deeper theory in the Saviour's answer than the lawyer had in mind: it is that which results from taking the word *life* in its highest sense and comprehending in the condition which he states—"this do"—the condition of the gospel covenant. The love which is the fulfilling of the law cannot be perfect without taking in and approving all the facts from which moral obligations arise. But these facts include God's overture of goodness expressed by way of covenant. But the love which approves of God as he reveals himself in the covenant of justification includes "the obedience of faith." The first or practical interpretation serves to convict the mere legalist of sin (this is Paul's standpoint in Romans), the second or theoretical interpretation convicts of sin and sets forth the way of salvation at the same time. The self-righteous man, therefore, who expects to be *justified* on the ground of his own personal obedience bases his expectation upon what neither God nor justice ever promised. The very best that pure justice could do for personal righteousness, even if it were perfect, is to bestow contingent happiness. God has never offered the blessing of *justification* upon any other ground than that of federal imputed righteousness. Neither does God offer the blessing of justification to individual sinners as individuals, but as members of the mystical body of Christ the head. The best that God or justice could do for the self-righteous man, even if his own righteousness were perfect, would be to bestow upon him that contingent happiness, in the *status* of a servant, which belonged to man of right and justice before any covenant was entered into with him, offering the blessing of justification. The same principle applies to the professing Christian who expects his own good deeds or gracious exercises of soul to form part with the justifying righteousness of Christ the head. Let it be borne in mind, therefore, that God's covenant with man is unto justification, not merely unto contingent happiness.

V. God's covenant with man after the fall is continued in a modified form through Jesus Christ the second Adam as the representative head.

The relation between God and man is determined by what God

is to man or has done for man, in connexion with what man is to God or has become as to God. Man having become, as to God, a sinner, God's covenant with him must be modified to suit this new moral condition of man, and the specific form of man's duty to God is determined henceforth by these two new facts, that man is a sinner and God is a Saviour. As God's purpose of goodness to man in his first estate of innocency and uprightness must needs be revealed to man, so if this purpose of goodness still continues to man in his second estate of guilt and depravity, this also must needs be revealed to man. God's covenant with man, therefore, has been revealed in two successive forms. It was first revealed to man innocent and upright with the first Adam as the federal head. It was, after the fall, revealed in a modified form to man guilty and depraved with the second Adam as the federal head. The form of the covenant, in the first "expression" of it, differs in some of its details from its form under the second "expression." This difference is due to the entrance of sin. Sin having entered, a mere human being is no longer competent for the place of federal headship. Hence under the second form of the covenant, the federal head is God-man. Also, in consequence of sin justification includes pardon, and faith includes repentance. With the first Adam as federal head under the first form of the covenant, what was actually incurred was condemnation in guilt and depravity. This fatal result of the covenant in its first form being from the beginning known to God, a second federal head was, from the beginning, appointed to represent us and to obtain for us the blessing of justification from a state of guilt and depravity. The failure of the first Adam remanded the race back to the relation sustained to God before this overture of goodness by way of covenant, with the addition of guilt and depravity. Now, if the principles of pure moral government admit of the first Adam's standing for the justification of his posterity from a state of contingent innocency and uprightness, then those principles of pure moral government admit of like provisions for man's justification from a state of condemnation in guilt and depravity, provided there can be found a second federal head competent to fulfil the conditions which the principles of God's

moral government must demand for our justification from the state in which we now find ourselves as the result of Adam's representation in the garden.

Here these two questions arise: 1st. What is the moral state in which man now finds himself? 2d. What must God's moral government demand for the justification of moral creatures in this state? As to the *first* question, the testimony is, first, that all mankind are dead in trespasses and sins; and second, that the penalty is suspended under respite. One object of the covenant with man was to fix a point in the line of probation at which justification might take place, and so man's destiny be no longer a matter of contingency and doubt, but of confirmed certainty. at this point in the line of probation, two alternatives were placed, life and death. Continuance in perfect obedience up to this point in this line of probation, would secure the blessing of life confirmed for ever in holiness and happiness, which is justification. Disobedience would secure death, confirmed for ever in sin and misery. The covenant thus provided for man's bringing his probation to an end, either in life or in death, either in justification or in condemnation. The testimony is that the probation of the first head ended in his eating the forbidden fruit. This act was a disobedience, and a disobedience amounting to a repudiation of God as his God, as revealed both in the fact of the creation and of the covenant. Having thus ended his probation in condemnation instead of justification, he had this remaining prospect before him—to bear the penalty in sin and misery for ever. But here the provisions of the covenant under the second head begin to take effect. The second Adam assumes the probation of the race with all the consequences upon it of the fall of the first Adam. Dr. Dabney: "The second Adam perfected for his people the line of probation dropped by Adam." Again: "The second Adam steps into the place vacated by the fall of the first, takes up the work where he dropped it." Again: "The covenant which fell through in Adam's inept hands was successfully accomplished in Christ's." In virtue of this continuance of the covenant under a second federal head, a respite is granted, the penalty is lightened and partially suspended. To what extent

the penalty is lightened to the whole race, is not easily determined; but in general, whatever evil the human race suffers in this world, is of the penalty; and whatever good it enjoys, is of the lightening of the penalty. The two fundamental and essential elements of sin, viz., guilt and depravity, are of the penalty. The depravity is total and the guilt responsive. That the depravity is only total and not absolute, is of the lightening of the penalty; so also of the responsive guilt. The moral state in which we find ourselves, therefore, in this world, is that of condemnation unto death in guilt and depravity, with a respite looking to justification through a second Adam as the federal head of the same covenant that "fell through in Adam's inept hands."

Now, the *second* question is, What must the principles of God's moral government demand of this second federal head, as the condition of man's justification from a state of guilt and depravity? And here the testimony, from the nature of the case, is evident, that in addition to what was required of the first Adam, the second must take away sin, both as to its guilt and as to its depravity. "For this the Son of man was manifested, that he might take away sin." This is what devolved upon the second Adam in addition to what was required of the first. The first Adam represented innocent and upright creatures; the second Adam represents guilty and depraved creatures. Therefore, the obedience of the second Adam must needs include the suffering of the penalty. And since the penalty upon the soul that sinneth is death, therefore the obedience of the second Adam must be an obedience unto death, an obedience that shall satisfy the precepts of the law for the acceptance of man as righteous; an obedience involving a death that shall satisfy the penalty of the law for man's sin. This is the "perfect personal obedience" which is the condition to the second Adam of man's justification from a state of guilt and depravity. This is the righteousness which, at the bar of God's moral government, is demanded of one who would represent us a second time in the covenant in which the first failed. As to the other question, whether there can be found one competent to fulfil this condition for us, the glad tidings which we call *the gospel*, is that Jesus Christ is thus competent,

and has actually fulfilled this condition as the second Adam of our justification from a state of guilt and depravity. Thus God's covenant with man after the fall is continued, in a modified form, through Jesus Christ, the second Adam, as representative head.

VI. God's covenant with man is ministered through the revelation of it.

Sinners of mankind become a party to the covenant by union with the federal head, and this union is by faith. And since faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, therefore the covenant is ministered through the revelation of it. Faith sums up the duty which man owes to God as revealed in the covenant. The obedience of faith completes the union between the head and the members. And since the party of the second part is thus constituted of a body of members in a federal head, the promises of the covenant to the head are, in measure, to the members; and so also of the *principle* of obedience. This peculiarity of the party of the second part in the covenant seems to be a source of trouble to theologians. Some, for the sake of perspicuity, distinguish between what they call "the covenant of redemption" and "the covenant of grace." In our view, it would contribute to perspicuity, in the first place, as we have already intimated, to call God's covenant with man "the covenant of justification." Then, if a distinction of the kind referred to were made at all, it would, in our judgment, contribute to perspicuity to represent the covenant of justification as consisting of two parts, called, respectively, "the covenant of works" and "the gospel covenant." The phrase, "covenant of works," would indicate the legal or works element in the covenant of justification, and the phrase, "gospel covenant," would indicate the special grace element. The works element for the head, and the grace element for the members. This distinction would apply to the covenant of justification in both its forms, *i. e.*, with man unfallen and with man fallen. There is, in substance, the same legal element in what the Confession calls "the covenant of grace," that there is in what the Confession calls "the covenant of works;" and there is, in substance, the same gracious element in both.

But the point upon which perspicuity is sought is, "Who is the party of the second part to the covenant?" We answer, the party of the second part evidently consists of a head with a body of members. Now, this party of the second part may be considered *separately*—either as to the head, apart from the members, or as to the members, apart from the head—or it may be considered as *one whole*, and this from two points of view: either as to the head with the members, or as to the members in their head.

Considered separately, if it is desired to contemplate the head under the covenant as the principal party, apart from the members, then the portion of the covenant thus contemplated might, for the sake of convenience and perspicuity, be called "the covenant of works." The phrase, "covenant of works," is a "concise and convenient expression for" the part which the head performs in the economy of God's covenant dealing with man. On the other hand, if it is desired to contemplate the members as the secondary party of the second part, separate from the head, then the portion of the covenant thus contemplated might, for the sake of convenience and perspicuity, be called "the gospel covenant." The gospel is the revelation of the plan of justification involved in the covenant, setting forth the covenant offer, and the seals thereof. The form of this gospel covenant before the coming of Christ in the flesh, is different from the form of it after; but the substance of this portion of the covenant is the same before and after the advent. The difference in the form before and after Christ, we would distinguish not as "in the time of the law," and "in the time of the gospel." It is the gospel all the time. What is called "the law," or "the legal covenant," is only the legal element in the covenant, and pertains to the head. *The members must not try to fill the place of the head.* This is the force of the New Testament argument against the legalist. The legalist seeks to dispense with a federal head. On this principle, "Christ is dead in vain." If (the) righteousness (which the members seek) were by the law (which specifies what is required of the head), then Christ is dead in vain. The person thus establishing his own righteousness would sever himself alike from the body and

the head. Both the Old and the New Testaments set forth the terms of the covenant both to the head and to the members. The Old Testament typical sacrifices, for instance, set forth what the head was to do, and the New Testament history what he has done. And both Testaments also set forth the terms on which the members become with the head a party to the covenant of justification. If, therefore, it is deemed desirable to consider the covenant in its essential parts, and to give these parts a distinguishing name, then, in our view, the parts of the covenant are determined by the parts which constitute the whole of the covenanting party of the second part. These parts of this whole are, first, the head, and second, the members. If it be deemed desirable to give to these essential parts of the covenant a distinguishing name, then, in our view, that portion of the covenant in which the head is concerned separately from the members should be distinguished as "the covenant of works," and that portion in which the members are concerned separately from the head should be distinguished as "the gospel covenant," and both together constitute the one "covenant of justification."

But if the party of the second part be considered as *one whole*, then the covenant will be considered as one, and the gospel or the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments will be the charter of the covenant, containing its stipulations, conditions, and promises. And the covenanting party of the second part is the head with the members, or the members in their head. This gives two points of view from which the covenant may be contemplated. It is perhaps the number of standpoints from which the whole subject may be viewed that gives rise to confusion. The members covenanting in their head is the point of view from which the plan of salvation is principally presented in the Scriptures. This is the point of view that determines the language of the Confession in the words: "Wherein (in the covenant of grace) he freely offers to sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ." From this point of view the condition of the covenant to the covenanting party of the second part (the party being the members in their head) is "the obedience of faith." Sinners become a party to "the covenant of justification" when they give the consent of faith to ful-

fil this condition. This is the covenant engagement on our part, of which the Lord's Supper is the seal, or one of the seals, baptism being the other. The whole of this obedience is characterised by faith, that is, by the fact that the knowledge involved in it is knowledge received by faith, hence called "the obedience of faith." The knowledge of which faith is the source (for faith is a source of knowledge just as reason or the five senses are sources of knowledge and the knowledge once received into the mind through this source determines the mind or the will just as any other knowledge received through any other source)—the knowledge of which faith is the source is the knowledge of what God proposes to do for us by covenant; or, as over and above what simple pure justice would require. The obedience to which this knowledge determines the will is *evangelical* as distinguished from that which is merely *legal* or *natural*. This evangelical obedience rendered constitutes evangelical righteousness, or what Paul calls "the righteousness of faith." The great fundamental fact to be borne in mind concerning this righteousness is, that it is twofold in its nature and in its object. It includes *the righteousness of justification* and *the righteousness of personal holiness*. The first is wrought exclusively by Jesus Christ as our head and representative and becomes ours by the consent of faith to become a party to the covenant through or by means of him as our head and representative in the covenant. He thus becomes the mediator of the covenant. He mediates the covenant between us and God; that is, he works the righteousness on the ground of which we become a party to the covenant. And he works in us the righteousness of personal holiness by which we are willing in the day of his power to be a party with him in the covenant. Hence we say "in the Lord have I righteousness and strength." This part of the righteousness of faith, viz., the righteousness of justification, we, in becoming a party to the covenant, bind ourselves to render by means of Jesus Christ as our surety. Hence the propriety of his blood being the seal of the covenant. His blood shed on Calvary sealed his own part in the covenant as our federal head, and when we receive the symbol of his blood in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, we seal our part in the covenant

by means of him as our head and representative. This, then, is the way we render that part of the righteousness of faith which is demanded as the ground of our justification, and this is the way we seal our covenant engagement with God to render this part of the righteousness of faith. We covenant to render to God the suffering that shall satisfy the penalty of the law for our sins, and to render the perfect obedience to the precepts of the law which shall be meritorious ground of the acceptance of our persons as righteous. But all this righteousness, active and passive, of our justification we render not by ourselves personally—hence boasting is excluded—but by our federal head by whom we become a party to the covenant. Hence we thus do not make void the law, but establish the law—the law, if you please, of the covenant of works. This explains the vexed question of the legal element in the old dispensation and also in the new. It is the federal head that has to do with the works element of the Mosaic ritual as a condition of life. It shows to the members the rule of duty and the condition of life for the head. This part of the righteousness of faith is the meritorious part of the righteousness of justification, on the ground of which God, on his part, in the covenant binds himself not only to bestow the blessing of justification itself, including pardon and adoption, but also to bestow all that special regenerating and sanctifying grace whereby we are enabled unto the other part of the righteousness of faith which consists in personal holiness, and is our good works and reward. In the sacrament of the Lord's Supper we covenant and seal our covenant engagement with God to exercise this personal holiness and to perform these good works. The righteousness of faith, therefore, as we said, is distinctly twofold: it includes the righteousness of justification satisfying the penalty of the law for our sins and satisfying the precepts of the law for the acceptance of our persons as righteous. This part of the righteousness of faith is rendered by Jesus Christ our head and representative. It becomes ours, as a party to the covenant, when we give the consent of faith to become a party to the covenant and partakers of the blessing of justification through Christ as thus representing us. We thus by faith hold up to God Jesus Christ as our representative, ful-

filling for us and *we fulfilling by him* the righteousness of our justification. This is one of the advantages of considering the covenanting party of the second part as one. What is done by either the head or the members is *seen* and *felt* to be done by the one whole consisting of head and members. The prevailing Scripture representation is that the covenant of justification is with the members in their head, the members covenanting to render both the righteousnesses, the one by Christ the head, the other themselves in their own persons as the expression of their gratitude to God and as acting out the life received from God under the covenant. As to the meaning we give the phrase "righteousness of faith," we would say *first*: Let it be held fast for ever that the phrase "righteousness of faith," sometimes called "the righteousness of God," carries prominently the idea of the righteousness wrought out by Jesus Christ, which is imputed to us and received by faith as the sole meritorious ground of our justification. We would say *secondly*: That the phrase, "obedience of faith," in Rom. i. 5, and xvi. 26, by common consent means that obedience which is personal as distinguished from that which is imputed. Hodge says: "The subjective sense of the word faith is so predominant in the New Testament, that it is safest to retain it in this passage." "It is that obedience of which faith is the controlling principle." This obedience rendered constitutes a righteousness—the righteousness of faith. Heb. xi. 33, with Acts x. 35. "By faith wrought righteousness"—the righteousness is personal. Faith works a twofold righteousness, one personal, one *by means* of a representative surety.

VII. General remarks.

Now, with the view we have given of God's covenant with man, what becomes of what the Confession calls "the covenant of works" and what theologians generally call "the covenant of works"? We answer, when our Confession of Faith and our orthodox theologians following the Confession speak of the "first covenant which God made with man" as a "covenant of works" "on condition of perfect personal obedience," this is a mere *side* remark which is inconsistent with the general tenor of the teaching of the Confession of Faith, and inconsistent with the general

tenor of the teaching of our orthodox theologians. As a specimen of the teaching of our orthodox theology on this subject, let us hear Dr. Dabney. We shall hear him at one time speaking of the covenant made with man as a "covenant of works," and actually discussing the question whether the covenant of works is abrogated, or whether Christ reannounced it to the lawyer as a covenant still in force, whereby, if its condition could be fulfilled, justification might be secured under it. At another time and in another connexion we shall hear the same Dr. Dabney saying that "the covenant that fell through in Adam's inept hands was successfully accomplished in Christ's." And much more to the same effect. Now, what covenant was it that fell through in Adam's inept hands? Dr. Dabney: The same that was successfully accomplished in Christ's. But the covenant successfully accomplished in the hands of Christ is the covenant of grace. How, then, was it the covenant of works when it was in the hands of the first Adam? If the covenant in the hands of the first Adam was a covenant of works, then what Christ accomplished was the covenant of works. This is only one specimen of the inconsistency of statement that pervades the whole of our orthodox theology. Hodge says the phrase "covenant of works" is a "concise and convenient expression for the eternal principle of justice." 2 Cor. iii. 6. And the eternal principle of justice (he says) is *do and live*, and that, when Christ said to the lawyer, "This do and thou shalt live," he reannounced the covenant of works. This would make Dr. Dabney say that Christ "successfully accomplished" the eternal principle of justice. Now, as we understand it, the eternal principle of justice, or the principle of *do and live*, knows nothing of a point in the line of probation at which justification might take place. Here is the great oversight. If the covenant with Adam did not promise the blessing of justification, how did it better his condition? He could do and live before. If it left him where justice left him, it was not of goodness or grace, and therefore "the fruition of God" of which the Confession speaks, which God offered to man by covenant, amounts to nothing. Moreover, the eternal principle of justice, or of *do and live*, deals with individuals according to their

personal righteousness, but the covenant with Adam offered the blessing of justification to individuals as members of a body organised in a federal head, and on the ground, not of personal, but of imputed righteousness. The truth is, the phrase "covenant of works" is a concise and convenient expression for the self-righteous idea of justification upon the ground of individual obedience. But this blessing, upon this ground, neither God nor justice ever offered; and there is no such thing as the covenant of works other than as the eternal principle of justice is involved in the covenant of justification, specifying what God's moral government must require of the federal head of that covenant.

K. M. McINTYRE.

ARTICLE IV.

THE VITAL CONNEXION BETWEEN REVELATION
AND SOUND LEARNING.

Of the objections brought against Christianity by its enemies, none is more popular in our age than its supposed hostility to scientific discovery and sound learning. For a long time this opposition was confined to the learned, but now it is extending among the simple. By the universal diffusion of newspapers, the words of the wise and their dark sayings have become the common property of mankind. The latest discoveries of science and their supposed correction of the mistakes of Moses and the prophets afford occasion for many an infidel sneer in the drawing-rooms of the polite and the cabins of the poor.

The alleged grounds of this opposition are various. Because the methods of investigating historical truth differ widely from those adopted by the students of physical science, the patrons of the latter are fond of challenging the conclusions of the former. In response to this challenge the treatises on theology which appear from time to time are prefaced with a formal and elaborate reasserting of the arguments in rebuttal of the testimony of

critical scientists. Thus the conflict is carried on from age to age. But the popular belief in the opposition between Christianity and physical science is due more than anything else, perhaps, to such declarations of Scripture as these, viz. : "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes." "Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called ; but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise ; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty." It is true now, as it was in the days of the apostles, and always has been, that God calls into the Church, for the most part, men of humble origin and little personal influence. But this proves only the sovereignty of God, and not the unworthiness of Christianity, which many fail to see. The principles of Christianity being divine, are not subject to the test of human reason. Man cannot rise above and try them *de loco superiori*. They are planted in the heart of man by the hand of God, and taking root there, grow up into the head and manifest themselves in the life. Until received by faith and in love, they transcend all our powers. But the facts of Christianity are to be tried as the facts which lie at the bottom of any other science. Did Christ rise from the dead? If so, then he is divine, and all he revealed is divinely true. This is so simple that a wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. But this fact, on which the great doctrine of revelation rests, is to be proved just as any other fact in history is to be. Philosophers are no more competent to try the claims of the Christian religion than men of plain minds. A well-balanced judgment and patient perseverance in searching for evidence, are the best qualifications. Vague notions on this subject lead many to scepticism, and give to worldly-wise men a weight of authority which is by no means their due.

But the object of this paper is not so much to disparage the value of the testimony of the wise men of this world on divine subjects, as to show that the popular belief in the extent of this testimony is erroneous. While it is true that "not many wise

men after the flesh are called" through Christ, by the Holy Ghost, into covenant with God, yet enough of them have been called to offset the adverse testimony of those who have not; to show that revelation and human learning have ever been allies instead of enemies; that the connexion between them is vital; that each has rendered most effective service to the other in all ages; that they have acted and reacted upon each other as coördinate factors in the history of the race, and consequently that the fear in many minds lest the steady progress in scientific discovery may eventually overthrow Christianity, is wholly groundless. The Church thrives on the discoveries of science, and science has ever received most valuable aid from the Church.

THE CHURCH AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE.

In spite of theories, the facts go to show that the Church has, from the earliest times, kept the education of the young in her own hands. Before the end of the first century, even in apostolic days, if we may believe Mosheim, schools were set up in which learning, both secular and religious, was taught. At the end of the apostolic age, when the gifts of tongues and miracles were withdrawn, the Church, feeling her need more than ever of an educated ministry, increased the number of these schools and kept in her hands the control of education for many centuries. When Monkery arose, which was about the sixth century, the schools became the lawful property of the Church by being attached to the monasteries. In this way it became possible for them to receive and to hold endowments in money and estate without liability to alienation. Such was actually the case on a large scale. Enlightened princes, like Alfred and Charlemagne, made large grants to them in money, in order to raise their standard of learning. Thus the schools grew up into colleges, and the colleges into universities. This state of things remained unaltered throughout Europe for ages. Oxford and Cambridge were considered and treated as Church property, without chartered rights, until the canonical laws were superseded by the common law of England. Nor were there any schools in Europe of

any grade that did not owe their origin and support to the Church.

The history of the institutions of learning in America has been much the same. The first grammar schools in this country were taught by ministers of the gospel. They were almost the only educated class. Our colleges, with scarcely an exception, were founded by the Church for the purpose of training young men for the ministry. Harvard, the oldest of American colleges, was founded, if not by a court of the Church, yet by individual ministers and godly laymen, to prepare young men for the ministry. "*Pro Christo et Ecclesia*" is her motto to this day. The same is true of Yale, Princeton, Brown University, Dartmouth, and nearly all that were founded prior to A. D. 1850. The change in the educational system of the country made about that time, divorced the schools from the Church. The State now has the matter in hand. But the Church, while she had them in her possession, made great use of them, and fully proved the wisdom of their erection. Of the thirty-five thousand graduates from American colleges previous to 1846, as many as eight or nine thousand became preachers of the gospel.

The history of education among the pagan races is substantially the same as that in Europe and America. Wherever the foreign missionary builds a chapel, a school-house goes up beside it. Some of these schools have grown into colleges, teaching a full academic course. When, now, we consider that these missionaries are teaching four millions of pupils in twelve thousand schools, and two hundred and fifty languages and dialects, it is not extravagant to say that the Church is educating the world. Thus she fulfils in part her high mission as "the salt of the earth." From these schools come those who will make the literature of all races. For, while now and then a man of rare genius, in spite of illiteracy, becomes a leader of men, yet, as a class, those who make letters have been taught by others. Mr. Macaulay has said that a careful examination of the calendars of Oxford and Cambridge discloses the fact that those who have distinguished themselves in Great Britain since the foundation of those institutions, have, with few exceptions, been trained in their walls, and that many

of them have been first honor graduates. What is true of Englishmen, we may expect to be true of civilised man everywhere.

THE CHURCH THE CONSERVATORY OF LITERATURE.

The decline of letters in Europe was consummated by the irruption of the Northern barbarians into the Southern and civilised kingdoms. Thus the Roman Empire was overthrown and almost every feature of her ancient civilisation obliterated. Literature then fled for refuge into the monasteries and cathedrals, from the barbaric hand of Goth and Vandal. Here, within the precincts of the Church, she was nourished and defended throughout the Dark Ages. During that long night of centuries the monks trimmed her lamps and fed them with oil until "the eyelids of the morning lifted themselves up," and the Reformation ushered in a day of light.

This fact is supported by the testimony of the highest authorities on mediæval history. Mosheim says: "Until the eleventh century the only schools in Europe were those attached to the monasteries and cathedral churches, and the only teachers of learning, both secular and religious, were the Benedictine monks" (Vol. II., p. 150, Carters, 1858). Hallam says: "During this time every sort of knowledge was almost wholly confined to the ecclesiastical order. . . . But for the clergy, the records of philological literature would have perished. . . . If they had been less tenacious of their Latin liturgy, the Vulgate copy of the Sacred Scriptures, their canonical laws, and the authority of the Fathers, all grammatical learning would have been laid aside" (Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, School Ed., Harper & Bros., 1854). Guizot is equally as express. And even Hume concedes the truth of this statement in the times of Alfred. The Troubadour literature is an apparent exception. But its advent into Spain was subsequent to the time of which we write. Even if it had come in earlier, it would not damage our claim seriously, for it was shallow, sentimental, and short-lived. It was not worth preserving, and soon perished. If, as is maintained, it was derived by the Arabians from the Nestorian Church, it becomes another fact in support of the claim of the friends of Christianity.

The testimony of these writers on history is vindicated by incontestible facts, some of which are familiar to the mere tyro in history; *e. g.*, the legal phrase, "The benefit of the clergy," denoted the exemption of the clergy as a privileged class from the operation of the civil law. The civil courts had no jurisdiction over them. No pain nor penalty of any kind could be visited upon them for any offence. Action could be brought against them only in ecclesiastical courts. An ecclesiastic brought before a civil magistrate defended himself by simply showing his connexion with the Church. This done, his indictment was instantly quashed and his liberty restored. And to prove his ministerial character, nothing was necessary except to read a book placed in his hand; for in that age, few but ecclesiastics could read. So universal was illiteracy outside the Church, that some even of the kings of England could not write their names.

Other facts might be adduced to corroborate the testimony of the above cited historians in support of the assertion that the literature of past ages was preserved by the Church in her monasteries and cathedral schools. No fact in the history of the Dark Ages is better established. We say nothing of the motive for this act. Her praise is not unqualified. It was more a matter of necessity than of enlightened benevolence or wise forecast. Her liturgy, her copy of the Scriptures, and her laws, were all written in Latin. A classical education of the priesthood was therefore indispensable. Without it, no part of religious worship could be conducted, and their privileges at law were forfeited.

THE SCRIPTURES A MIGHTY STIMULUS TO THE HUMAN MIND.

Throughout the Christian era the human mind has been greatly stimulated and strengthened by writings on sacred subjects. First and principal among these is the Holy Bible. Out of this have been drawn those great doctrines and historical facts which constitute the staple of so large a portion of the literature of the world. Before Christ moral ideas were exceedingly rare in any books. Even the Iliad is almost wholly barren of them. The Jews were the sole possessors of religious truth of the highest order. But when the canon of Scripture was completed and the Bible trans-

lated into various languages, its influence became prodigious. Its truths radiate in every direction and connect themselves with all other truths. Starting with the doctrines of the Scriptures, an inquisitive mind is led to the investigation of all other truth. Questions arise, the answers to which are to be found in extraneous fields. The doctrine of creation, for instance, starts questions that can be answered only by the geologist and astronomer. The doctrine of divine providence leads to the study of history. The constitution of man as a creature fearfully and wonderfully made, connects itself with many points in psychology. The Bible is the true and only basis of moral science. Theology has been called not only a science, but the *scientia scientiarum*. It is the centre around which they all revolve, the corner stone of the temple of knowledge, "the granary into which the fruitage of all the sciences is gathered."

The great movements of the human mind during the Christian era are the result of the study of both the Old and New Testaments. The dispersion of the disciples of Jesus by the persecutions which began with the martyrdom of Stephen, and their preaching the word everywhere in Jewish synagogues, diffused the peculiar doctrines of Christianity in every direction. This excited discussion, roused the human mind from its lethargy, and produced a literature whose effect is felt throughout Christendom to this day. The writings of the Fathers, however much they may be disparaged as repositories of thought in our times, were once a powerful instrument in quickening the human mind. The names of Justin Martyr, the apologist; Eusebius, the historian; Origen, the expositor; and Augustine, the philosophical theologian, are scattered thickly over the pages of literature during the last eighteen hundred years.

The next great movement of the human mind resulted in the scholastic theology of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The founders of this theology—Abelard, Anselm, John Scotus, Eri-gena, Lanfranc, and Thomas Aquinas—were defenders of the faith. Their principal aim was to solve the problems of theology by applying to them the dialectics of Aristotle. Discarding the old method of answering theological questions by an appeal to

Scripture and the writings of the Fathers, they submitted them to reason and philosophy. True, this method was false. It introduced confusion, and finally brought both the writings and their authors into contempt. The discussion of the most enigmatical and perplexing trifles, like the dead fly in the apothecaries' ointment, made their writings unpopular and brought their good name for wisdom and honor into disrepute. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this literature exerted much power in reviving letters and advancing learning. There were many causes for the *Renaissance*. The fall of Constantinople, introducing classical authors and teachers from the East into Europe, the invention of paper, and especially the art of printing, all contributed much to this great event. But these were mere auxiliaries to the main cause. This lies deep beneath the surface, as indeed does the main cause of every great event. The philosophic mind seeks "the spirit of the age" immediately preceding any such event as its supreme cause. The movement of many minds in the same direction, the deep undercurrent of thought and feeling, breaking out now and then in the thoughts of some great mind, this is *the* cause of great epochs in the history of the race. There were reformers before Luther and Zwingle, men who lived in advance of their contemporaries and drew their minds together upon a great subject. The gravitation of many minds towards a common centre, the coöperation of many wills upon a single subject, these bring on the issue. No one individual brings to pass any great event. Nor can the counter-working of any single mind, however great, prevent the catastrophe when it is at hand. It must come. When the mountain has been tunnelled and the mine laid and the match applied, the overthrow is inevitable. The influence of master-minds may hasten or retard somewhat the spirit of the age; but to turn it aside or dissipate it is the work of omnipotence. "Révolutions never go backward." The history of almost every nation affords examples illustrative of this fact. Some explain it by reference to what is scientifically called "The Reign of Law;" others by ascribing it to divine providence. Explain it as we may, the fact stands that events of far-reaching influence upon the history of the race, are the outcome of a wide-

spread public sentiment that has been gathering force and "coming to a head" for a long time, which no one man originated and no one man can control. This is the true explanation of the revival of letters. The diffusion of religious ideas drawn from the Sacred Scriptures gave an impetus to the human mind which worked itself out in this great issue. That this was the spirit of the age preceding the Reformation and the revival of letters and of art in the sixteenth century, is plainly set forth by M. Guizot in his "History of Civilisation" (pp. 136, 137, School edition), and his testimony is the more forcible because it was not given with any reference to the question now in hand. He writes: "The fact is evident; the intellectual and moral progress of Europe has been essentially theological. Look at history from the fifth to the sixteenth centuries and you will find throughout that theology has possessed and directed the human mind. Every idea is impressed with theology. Every question that has been started—whether political or historical or philosophical—has been considered in a religious point of view. The spirit of theology has been as it were the blood which circulated in the veins of the European world down to the time of Bacon and Descartes. Bacon in England and Descartes in France first carried the human mind out of the pale of theology." If this is a correct statement of the intellectual and moral progress of Europe before the fifteenth century, it furnishes us with the true and sufficient cause of the threefold revival of religion, of letters, and of art.

Let us now add to these three great movements of the human mind that of the age in which we live, which is characterised by nothing more than the interest felt in theological questions, and we have proof upon proof for the opinion that theological and scientific enterprises go hand in hand, that they are natural allies, and that theology, instead of fettering the human mind, unfetters it and gives it wings and atmosphere in which to fly; instead of retarding, it accelerates the progress of knowledge; instead of denying the right of free inquiry, demands it, and is ever stimulating bold, speculative, truth-loving minds to push out into untrodden fields in search of new principles.

IT REFORMS LANGUAGES.

This fact is clearly revealed in the history of the translations of the Scriptures into human tongues, and the discussions of its doctrines by leading minds. So different are the thoughts revealed in the Bible from those current among the unevangelised races, that the propagation of these ideas requires a new religious nomenclature. The effort to express these ideas in intelligible forms of speech, compels the recasting and renovating of the mother tongues of the nations. The first idea in revelation, viz., the unity of God, ranges far beyond the highest conception of the unevangelised mind. Anderson found great difficulty in coining a word to set this idea in a true light before the Chinese mind. For many years he was trying to invent a suitable word. The same difficulty is found in the effort to express many other scriptural doctrines. The ancient Greeks and Romans had no conception of sin in the scriptural sense. The Greeks conceived of it as physical evil; and the finest moralists among the Romans so confounded God and nature, and so deified man, that the scriptural idea of sin was impossible to them. A bold, original, creative, and master-mind surmounts the obstacle, but invents a new language in so doing. Thus did Martin Luther recast the German language, which before was hard and inflexible. In his hands, while bodying forth the sublime doctrines of revelation, it was completely transmuted into, what another has called, "a malleable material of thought." And by this great achievement, he endeared himself to the Germans no less as a reformer of language than of religion. The French language was an imperfect vehicle of thought until Pascal, by his Provincial Letters and other writings on religious subjects, invented a new vocabulary. Henry Rogers, in his essay on the genius and writings of Pascal, says: "By the confession of the first French critics, the *Lettres Provinciales* did more than any other composition to fix the French language. On this point the suffrages of all the most competent judges—of Voltaire and Bossuet, D' Alembert and Condorcet—are unanimous." And from that time he dated the epoch when the French language assumed a settled form. D'Aubigné also bears testimony to the same fact, viz.: "Both the

poetry and the prose of the French language were remodelled by Port Royal." In another place he testifies that John Calvin contributed largely to the same result. "The French of Calvin," he says, "became the language of Protestant France; and when we speak of Protestant France, we speak of the most cultivated portion of the French nation." Both Hallam and Tytler testify that Dante began the work of remodelling the Italian language. Chaucer was for a long time the recognised representative of the middle English literature; but Wickliffe, in the estimation of modern critics, has supplanted him. His Bible is regarded as opening an epoch in the English language no less marked than that of Luther's Bible in the German. And what has contributed so largely to the preservation of our English tongue in America as King James' Version? This "well of pure English undefiled" is said to contain but one word in twenty-nine of foreign origin, while in Gibbon one-third, and in Johnson one-fourth, have been brought from abroad. This Bible is read every Sabbath day in all of our cities, towns, and rural neighborhoods. Tens of thousands of families read it in concert every day at family prayers. In this way our vernacular has been so stereotyped that it has changed less in a hundred years than perhaps anything else American; and that, too, in spite of so many and such powerful agencies to debase it. The heathen languages also afford striking illustrations of this reformatory power in the Scriptures. Missionaries with one voice attest the fact that its modifying influence over these tongues is similar to that it wrought upon the German, French, and English. Much, of course, depends upon the genius of the translator; but this will not account for the whole of it, nor, indeed, for any considerable part of it. Other books so translated fail to modify and enrich the language. Moreover, the Bible alone retains its freshness in translation. The writings of the most gifted authors are emasculated by this process. Shakespeare in French is pronounced by competent critics barely readable. The Greek classics, when rendered in English, are like the salt that has lost its savor. But the Bible has been translated into more than two hundred languages, in most instances by plodding minds, without losing its fragrance or

power over the human soul. This incidental result alone justifies the remark that the progress of Foreign Missions is the most wonderful fact of the nineteenth century. In a sermon by the Rev. Jacob Chamberlain, D. D., before the American Bible Society, 1878, we find the following testimony, viz.: "I know whereof I affirm, when I declare that the Bible has stood this crucial test" (of translation) "in the languages of all quarters of the globe. From Greenland to Patagonia in the Western hemisphere; from Iceland, through Europe and Asia, to the Japanese and the Australian in the Eastern; from the Copts of Egypt to the Kaffirs of South Africa; from the South Sea Islands of the Pacific, through the oceans to Madagascar—the Bible has been rendered into their languages with triumphant success." We may add that when the way is thus opened, the literature of all ages and lands finds its way to the door of all the heathen. Thus the Bible becomes directly and indirectly a powerful agent in reforming, purifying, ennobling, and enriching the languages of all, even the most benighted, nations of earth.

THE CHURCH THE PATRON OF LITERATURE AND SCIENCE.

Literary and scientific men have always received aid and encouragement from the Church. Here we are met by a flat denial, and the assertion of just the opposite. The enemies of the Church, in the most unblushing manner, charge her with frowning upon all progress in knowledge, and persecuting literary and scientific men in all ages. Mourners are hired annually to make a show of grief at the tomb of Galileo—not to excite a generous pity for injured innocence, but to inflame the mind of the civilised world against the Christian Church. Now, in answer to this, we admit that the Church has sometimes, in the exercise of that conservatism which in itself is useful, erred by excess. Galileo was imprisoned for teaching the Copernican doctrine of the solar system. Others have at times suffered in like manner. This is an occasion for grief and shame. But there is truth on both sides of this subject, and much the greater part of it is in favor of the Church. Her persecution has been exceptional and in spite of her principles, while her favor shown to scientific men has been uniform and in the line of her principles.

Not to undertake a wide induction of facts, which the limits of a REVIEW article forbid, we cite only two facts out of many that might be adduced, which ought to set this matter in a new light, and suffice to drown the wailings of professionals at the philosopher's grave.

Nicholas V., a Roman Pontiff of the fifteenth century, proved his devotion to letters in a most signal manner. Moved by a noble zeal for his people, as well as by ardent love for learning, he had classical works translated, at his own expense, into the vernacular, and put into the hands of his subjects. He fed, clothed, and domiciled at Rome, every classical scholar whom he found without a competent maintenance. He brought over from Constantinople to Rome many classical teachers, to whom he gave employment throughout his dominions, and supported from his private purse. He founded the famous Vatican library, which contained at his death five thousand volumes—the richest, and at that time the largest, collection in Europe. And it is even said that his death was hastened by grief over the fall of Constantinople into the hands of the Turks, by which the loss of all classical literature in the East was threatened. Let those who join the procession to Galileo's grave think of this—a Pope of Rome dying of a broken heart over the loss of classical literature in the East! Next to Nicholas among the illustrious patrons of classical learning, comes Leo X. He held the pontificate in the sixteenth century, and signalised his reign by placing scholars in the most honorable stations of his court. Many poor men devoted to literature were thus kept from want and enabled to pursue their studies without annoyance or care. Workmen in the fine arts also, as well as scholars, enjoyed his patronage. Raffaele received large favors at his hands. He also had classical works translated into the vernacular for his subjects. It is unpardonable in men who ought to know better, not to recognise such facts as these. They stare at them from many pages of history, and fully vindicate the generosity of the Church towards true and solid learning.

But even if the Papacy had systematically and mercilessly persecuted scientific men, yet the Papacy is not the Church. The dis-

inction between the Romish hierarchy and the Christian Church is valid, and must be drawn in seeking the *animus* of Christianity towards literary and scientific men. The one is a political institution, the growth of centuries, actuated by a purely worldly spirit, and aiming at results by the use of carnal weapons. The other is a spiritual commonwealth, wielding spiritual weapons, and animated by the spirit of its great Founder and Head. She derives her life, her doctrines, and her polity from the Sacred Scriptures. She is the creature of revelation. This the Papacy ignores. She claims that revelation is her creature. She canonised the Scriptures. They stand on her endorsement, not she on theirs. She claims to be older than the Scriptures, to have power to make the truth, and that she does make it. The Christian Church, which is a purely spiritual commonwealth, repudiates the hierarchy, which is a world-power. The crimes of the latter are not to be laid at the door of the former. That Church, which is not of this world, which derives all her doctrine and polity from the Sacred Scriptures, which is animated by the spirit of her great Head, and whose aim is the conquest of the world for Christ, has never persecuted, but befriended and nourished in her bosom, the true votaries of science. Many of them have acknowledged their indebtedness. There is good reason to believe that Copernicus was led to announce his great discovery as a hypothesis, and not as a fact, by his unwillingness to antagonise the common belief of the ecclesiastics, to whose generosity he was so great and so grateful a debtor.

REVELATION AND LETTERS NATURAL ALLIES.

That literary and scientific men have been greatly indebted to the Scriptures is a fact that has been sufficiently illustrated. Nor is it necessary to say much to show that this benefit has been reciprocal. Yet some notice should be taken of it. Theology is indebted to science for no little aid, not only in interpreting and illustrating her sacred writings, but also in confuting the doctrines of false religions. The latter are founded for the most part upon false scientific theories. Buddhism is founded upon a false theory of creation; and when the astronomer or geographer proves the truth

on this subject, like an entering wedge, it cracks and opens the whole system to its foundation. Mr. Macaulay says: "Every Hindoo boy that learns geography laughs at Hindoo Mythology." For this reason, among others, missionaries teach the heathen secular as well as sacred knowledge. The Church carries their minds into these green pastures that she may the more easily win them into her spiritual fold. As the doctrines of religion reach out into the whole province of truth, connecting themselves with it at every point, so the true doctrines of science lead the mind back to theology again. Thus the Church invokes the aid of the sound principles and real facts of science in seeking the overthrow of false religions. Hand in hand science and religion opposed the foolish pretences of alchemy. They locked shields in attacking astrology when its baneful influence was felt throughout Europe. At the present time the preacher and the professor are engaged with equal zeal in unmasking Spiritualism and exposing it to the ridicule and scorn of all who hate a lie.

This alliance is not conventional but natural and necessary. The cause is one and inseparable. Truth is a whole whose parts are mutually dependent. They may be and are supported by different kinds of evidence, but can never be opposed. The vagaries of men may oppose each other; but true and sound principles cannot fall out. They are united in natural wedlock, "and whom God hath joined together let not man put asunder." The publication of books based upon the assumption of a conflict between them is to be deprecated. One such appeared a few years ago from a venerable seat of learning in this country, a friendly but withering review of which may be found in the May number of the *Princeton Review* for 1879. The line of battle drawn by the author is imaginary. The strategic points he marks cannot be identified. There is no conflict between scientific and religious truth. Moreover, his method of reconciling is not new. The proposition to adopt a "final philosophy" as the necessary umpire to a peaceful arbitrament is simply the germ of the scholastic philosophy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The conflict is imaginary, and the weapons are antiquated. Let scientists and theologians seek the truths of their peculiar provinces in their

own peculiar way and not fall out about theories. There are other truths than those which are subject to the senses; truths which depend for their acceptance neither upon a positive revelation nor a positive science; truths which do not admit of demonstration; but which, being taught to all men more or less clearly everywhere, are universally believed, which, on their ground of evidence, are just as trustworthy as either the principles of science or the doctrines of the Scriptures. The being of God, the immortality of the soul, man's accountability for his actions, the idea of justice and equity, etc., divine providence, these are the common property of mankind, insinuated into the understanding through the heart by common sense. And man is just as rational in holding them as in any other act of his understanding, although utterly unable to explain the way in which they came into his possession. Philosophy, theology, and common sense are the three great provinces of knowledge. Their boundaries merge into each other, and their author is one and the same. They constitute the realm of truth of which the Lord Jesus Christ is King alone.

If the connexion between the Sacred Scriptures and the writings of literary men has been proved to be vital, then it follows that there should be no reasonable repugnance to the Christian religion in men of gifted and highly cultivated minds, but that it should attract them and command their respect. Dr. Whewell, of Cambridge University, in his *Bridgewater Treatise on Astronomy*, maintains that the great and original discoverers in science have been peculiarly in the habit of considering the world as the work of God, while those scientific men whose employment it is to learn from others these general laws and to trace their consequences, are not exempt more than others from a tendency to atheism. This thesis he maintains by citing names, and then proceeds to show why it must be so. The reason for the fact he claims to find in the constitution of different minds. Minds of the highest order, inspired by the love of truth, and delighting in bold and original speculations, cannot be satisfied with a cold and mechanical method of investigation. A mathematical demonstration affords them little interest. Their sphere is the empyrean:

they soar into untrodden fields. Plodding is irksome to such minds. Napoleon Bonaparte said of Laplace that his mind was not formed for great enterprises. He excelled only in arithmetical calculations. Now, Laplace was an atheist. (Bridgewater Treatise, Whewell, London, 1871.)

This thesis of Whewell we think may be enlarged so as to read thus: The *foremost men* in *all the departments* of literature, science, and art have been believers not only in God but also in Revelation. In support of this opinion the following array of names is submitted, which may be greatly increased. In the front rank of those who have excelled in literature are, Samuel Johnson, Addison, Hallam, and Guizot. These all accepted the Scriptures as a revelation from God. In the department of philosophy we find the names of Roger Bacon, Newton, and Locke. The most gifted poets have been Christians, viz., Dante, Milton, Shakespeare. The first article of the last will and testament of Shakespeare reads as follows, viz.: "First, I commend my soul into the hands of God my Creator, hoping and assuredly believing, through the only merits of Jesus Christ my Saviour, to be made partaker of life everlasting; and my body to the earth whereof it is made." This is a full and unequivocal testimony from the intellect of the greatest of poets to the authenticity of the Christian religion. Whether or not his moral nature was the subject of renewing grace, is a question not pertinent to the subject in hand. Among astronomers are Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Herschel. Watt, Sir Humphrey Davy, Sir David Brewster, and Faraday, are acknowledged to be of the highest authority in chemistry, and their religious convictions are notorious. Hugh Miller's name is preëminent in geology. In the department of science the same fact holds good. The most illustrious of military geniuses believed in the Christian religion. The argument of Napoleon Bonaparte in proof of the divine character of Christ is familiar to all readers of modern history. Wellington and Washington and Von Moltke were professing Christians, communicants in the Church. Among statesmen no names stand higher than those of Burke, Gladstone, Bismarck, and Webster. The science of law is adorned with no more illustrious names

than those of Chief Justice Hale, Blackstone, Kent, Story, and Chief Justice Marshall. In the science of medicine, Hervey, who discovered the circulation of the blood, was a decided Christian. In the department of arts the most renowned names are those of men who devoted their genius to the service of God. Beethoven, Mozart, Handel, and Haydn, in music; Raffaele and West in painting; Powers in sculpture, with Michael Angelo and Sir Christopher Wren in architecture, were all men of faith and all laid the noblest achievements of their splendid genius at the foot of the Cross.

Long and brilliant as is this catalogue, and fully supporting, as it does, all that we claim, it would yet be incomplete without the names of "the immortal triumvirate who took all knowledge for their province," *i. e.*, Solomon, Aristotle, and Lord Francis Bacon. Of the first, we need say nothing. As to Aristotle, we have no evidence that any part of the Bible was ever submitted to his examination. Dean Stanley says that "the philosophy of Aristotle was supposed to have sprung from Alexander's gift of the works of Solomon." But these were probably his treatises on philosophy, and contained but an occasional reference to the religion of Moses—if any at all. Lord Francis Bacon not only believed the Scriptures for himself, but composed many sayings commending them to others, *e. g.*, "A little philosophy turneth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth it about to religion." Again, "It is impossible to sever a great mind from piety."

With those who appeal to human authority in settling questions of faith these names should be conclusive. What boots it for the despisers of Revelation if a Shelley spurned the Scriptures when the author of *Paradise Lost* is put in the opposite scale? Who trembles for his faith at the blasphemies of Voltaire will be reassured when he hears Lord Bacon calmly saying, "It is impossible to sever a great mind from piety." Or who will not despise the flippant challenges of a Tyndall when the reverent voice of Samuel Johnson is heard in humble supplications at the throne of grace. If it was true that during the life-time of our Lord these things were hid from the wise and prudent, and if

during the days of the apostles, "not many wise men after the flesh" were called, and though it be still true that those things which give men power over their fellow-men are so unfavorable to religion that comparatively few of those thus endowed become disciples of Christ, yet we must remember that testimony is to be weighed, not counted. The greatest names in all departments of science, the foremost men, the acknowledged leaders, are almost if not quite to a man arrayed on the side of Revelation. Their testimony is given on conviction and not in a patronising manner. Its sublime truths attract their genius and its defences satisfy their minds. Many of them, like the great Newton, spent the evening of their days in poring over its sacred pages, imbibing its spirit, and filling their souls with its promises. Letting go the lamp of reason, they took hold of "the light of the world," and entered "the valley of the shadow" with a firm step and a confident hope. This divine word, attractive to them in life, became precious when heart and flesh failed them.

The weight of authority, such as is derived from the suffrage of great minds, as to the credibility of the Christian religion, is certainly in its favor. That it should win the assent of all lovers of science is not to be expected. The carnal mind is enmity against God, it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. That poverty of spirit, that humility and self-denial, that surrender of self to the poor despised Nazarene, to become his follower unto death, required by the gospel as indispensable to salvation, fatally arouses the prejudice of the worldly-wise man whose heart is unchanged. The cause of infidelity among the learned and the unlearned is the same. A bad heart is at the bottom of each. This, as has been well said, is the only argument against Christianity. The taste is offended and the judgment perverted by a depraved will.

The Church has nothing to fear from the progress of science. If for eighteen hundred years she has found in sound learning a faithful ally, she may surely rely upon it for all time to come. Indeed, the Church must not only have patience with the votaries of science, but must also patronise them, as we have seen she did in the past. To be a dumb debtor to so helpful an ally is ungen-

erous. It is an encouraging sign of the times that our Theological Seminaries are now endowing chairs in which the results of scientific investigation are to be taught our candidates for the ministry. Lessons learned in this class-room will serve not only to illustrate the doctrines of theology, but also qualify ministers to silence those who fling the theories of science instead of facts and well-established principles at the Christian religion. While it is the duty of the minister to preach the gospel in order to commend it to those seeking God, it is also his duty to defend it against those who hate God. Nor can this defence be made so effectually as with their own technical weapons—by turning their guns against themselves. The astronomical discourses of Dr. Chalmers afford striking illustration of this. By his attainments in this, the most imposing and dazzling of all the sciences, he was eminently fitted to “strip infidelity of those pretensions to enlargement and to a certain air of philosophical greatness by which it has often become so destructively alluring to the young and the ardent and the ambitious.” And this, he says in his preface, was the object he had in view in writing those discourses. The Apostle Paul, by his knowledge of Greek philosophy, was helped in his conflict with the beasts of Ephesus. His familiarity with Roman law taught him when to stand upon his rights as a Roman citizen. By his knowledge of affairs he made a favorable impression upon governors and courtiers. He was all things to all men. “Nothing human was foreign to him.” And when the Church learns her indebtedness to literary and scientific men, and acknowledges it and uses it, then at least will one root of bitterness between them be removed.

H. M. WHITE.

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ARTICLE V.

THE REGAL CHARACTER OF CHRIST.

AN ARGUMENT FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

In eternity, God the Father and God the Son entered into a covenant of grace for the redemption of a lost world. The conditions of the covenant were that God the Son should become incarnate, satisfy the immutable demands of the law and the inflexible justice of God, and atone for the sins of the elect by his vicarious sacrifice on the cross. One of the promises made to him upon the fulfilment of these conditions was universal dominion. As Theanthropos, he was to be sovereign Ruler of the inhabitants of hell, the nations and tribes of earth, and the innumerable hosts of human and angelic spirits in heaven. Now, "when the fulness of the time was come," Christ actually fulfilled the conditions of the covenant. For he condescended to leave heaven and assume our nature, with all its sinless infirmities; to endure the manifold miseries which are incident to an earthly life, its temptations, privations, and toils; to meet the requirements of God's law in extent and spirituality; to suffer the inconceivable agonies of the garden and the cross, and to lie in the grave three days under the power of death. He has thus executed God's decrees and fulfilled the prophecies concerning him, and wrought out a complete and eternal salvation for his chosen people. God has, therefore, exalted him to his mediatorial throne, where he reigns in ineffable glory. "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Phil. ii. 9-11. His coronation is a consequence of his humiliation. He wears on his head many crowns, because he has overcome sin, death, and hell. Daniel, with prophetic eye, looks down the long avenues of time, and witnesses the august scene of Christ's receiving a universal kingdom from the Father after he had risen from the dead and ascended to

heaven. "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." Dan. vii. 13, 14. Jehovah Jesus has assumed the government of the world, and the spiritual kingdom that he has inaugurated shall embrace the whole earth.

I. The absolute certainty of the evangelisation of the nations, because Christ is King.

If our faith may rest in this proposition as undeniably true, it will greatly encourage us to pray earnestly and labor persistently in view of the apparently insurmountable difficulties which beset the Foreign Missionary work. These difficulties are numerous and great: such as the magnitude of the work and the utter inadequacy of existing agencies to overtake it; the natural wicked tendencies of human nature, wherever found; the unbelief, ignorance, illiberality, and apathy of the Church at home; the difference in doctrine, practice, and methods of work of the missionaries themselves; the number, experience, and subtlety of the enemies of Christ's kingdom, both human and satanic; the pernicious influence of wars waged between civilised and uncivilised nations, and of wicked diplomatists and traders, and disregard of international treaties. There are also hindrances arising from the caste system of India; the bigotry of Mohammedanism; the custom of foot-binding and the habit of opium-smoking in China; the unhealthy climate of Africa, and the intrigue of Jesuits. Add to all these the obstacles resulting from the variety of different languages and dialects, and in many places the necessity for the reduction of spoken to written language; disgust of all religion, especially among many in Italy, France, South America, and Mexico, caused by the prevailing irreligion of Antichrist; the religio-political system of Confucius; the Parseeism of Zoroaster; the atheism and idolatry of Buddhism, and all other Oriental faiths; the literature of such men as Voltaire, Strauss,

Hegel, Renan, and Darwin, and from the ignorance, cruelty, and degradation of many heathen communities. Nothing but faith in the infallible word of the crucified and exalted Redeemer, whose authority is supreme and whose government is universal, can inspire hope that the world will be Christianised and "new heavens and a new earth" be created, wherein righteousness shall dwell. But he who created and preserves the world and died for its redemption, declares that millennial glory shall encompass it, and he is as much above the difficulties of earth as the sun is above the storms that sweep its surface. It is absolutely certain that his spiritual kingdom will be world-wide—

(1) Because this is his will. It is in harmony with his eternal purpose to convert the heathen. His will is the law of the universe, and the Bible is the perfect expression of that will. It is a supernatural revelation of his will relative to the salvation of mankind, and his will is expressed in the various forms of promises, commands, prophecies, and simple declarations. In the second Psalm, God the Father says: "Yet have I set (*i. e.*, anointed) my King upon my holy hill of Zion. I will declare the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, 'Thou art my Son: this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.'" Ps. ii. 6-8. "Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me; for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." John xvii. 24. "And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it." Isa. ii. 2. "The kings of Tarshish and of the isles shall bring presents; the kings of Sheba and Seba shall offer gifts. Yea, all kings shall fall down before him, all nations shall serve him." Ps. lxxii. 10, 11. Just before he ascended to the right hand of God, he said: "All power is given unto me in heaven and earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever

I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen." Matt. xxviii. 18-20. It is perfectly evident from these and other Scriptures, that the heathen were included in the sovereign, eternal, and immutable plan of salvation devised in infinite wisdom and love by God the Father, and executed by God the Son, and that Christ's kingdom of grace will be unlimited. It is the purpose of Jesus to save all that are "ordained to eternal life," whether they be in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, or Oceanica. He did not die for the Jewish nation, nor for kings, nor the rich, the poor, the intellectual, the cultivated, the learned, as such; but for all of every nation, class, color, who accept him as their individual Redeemer from sin and death. But whomsoever God has elected of "his mere good pleasure" to be "vessels of mercy," will be glorified. "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Rom. viii. 29, 30. Here we have foreknowledge, predestination, vocation, justification, glorification. The links of this divinely-forged chain are inseparable. Therefore, if the heathen were included in God's original purpose of redemption, as has been demonstrated, and if all that are included in his purpose will certainly be glorified, their evangelisation is an absolutely necessary event, on the one hand, to fulfil God's decree relative to their salvation; and on the other, to prepare them for eternal glory. Effectual calling, justification, and sanctification, are fruits of God's electing love, and must necessarily precede entrance into heaven. We cannot conceive how the saintly Richard Baxter, in view of such an irrefragable scriptural argument, could doubt that the Oriental world would ever receive the gospel, or how thousands in the Church to-day can assert that God will, *in some way*, save the heathen without a knowledge of the gospel, thus essentially denying the truth of the proposition affirmed above, that it is Christ's will or design to save them. For, so far as we know, he has revealed only one way of redemption; and

all adults are saved or lost, just as they accept or reject this one way, which grounds itself ultimately in God's eternal purpose.

Further: history proves that it is Christ's will to extend his kingdom to the heathen world, and history is but an unfolding of the book of God's decrees. Events reveal what God permits or directs. Now, if the book of the Acts of the Apostles be good ecclesiastical history, the apostles believed it to be Christ's will to proclaim the gospel to the remotest regions, beginning at Jerusalem. They were to be his witnesses unto the uttermost part of the earth. And when they had tarried in Jerusalem until the promise of the Father was fulfilled, they began to preach not to the Jews only, but also to representatives of other nationalities and cities assembled at the Jewish metropolis; so that Parthians, Medes, Elamites, Cretes, and Arabians, and the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Palestine, of Libya, Rome, and Egypt, and the provinces of Asia Minor, heard, in their own languages, the wonderful works of God. Before three and a half centuries had passed, the gospel was heralded to the then known world. Paul preached it in Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome, and perhaps even in Spain, Gaul, and Britain; St. Thomas, in China and Parthia; Bartholomew, in India and Armenia; Peter, in Babylon; Jude, in Idumea, Syria, and Mesopotamia; Simon, Mark, and Jude, in Egypt and other parts of Africa; Matthias, in Ethiopia; Philip and Andrew, in Scythia; and Frumentius, in Abyssinia. Thousands were converted under the preaching of the apostolic Greek and Latin Fathers, and the severe and general persecutions in the Roman Empire, scattered the truth everywhere. Now, as God decreed to permit sin to enter the world, perhaps to display his boundless love to the universe, and sin has actually entered it, and as he determined beforehand the death of Christ for sin, and Christ has actually died, so he has decreed the evangelisation of the nations, and this decree will like the others become history.

Further, still: Christ is incontestably proving to Christendom in modern times, that it is his will to Christianise the earth by blessing the instrumentalities employed for the accomplishment of this end.

Hence, if the gospel is not preached to all the world, God's unchangeable purpose will be thwarted, the plan of salvation disconcerted, Christ's spiritual kingdom circumscribed, and the prophecies unfulfilled, and all the favorable indications of Christian progress in distant lands are so many misinterpreted signs of the times.

(2) Because Christ is a King of unlimited resources, and can fully execute his will. He is qualified to reign over a universal kingdom. He is the embodiment of infinite perfection, and is clothed with all the attributes of deity. He is sovereign, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and infinite in holiness, justice, love, and truth; and all these attributes are engaged to accomplish his will. He made and preserves all persons and things for his own glory, and he is over all, God blessed for ever. He is unchangeable in his being, character, and purposes. He is no capricious king, whose laws vary with circumstances. If he were mutable, he would be finite; and if he were finite, he could not execute the entire will of his Father, who is infinite. He is always at all places in his realm, and to him there is no history or prophecy, no past or future, as such. He fills immensity with his presence, and to him there is no succession in time or thought. He views all things in their essences, relations, causes, and results; and the most unimportant event cannot happen in his vast domain without his perfect knowledge. There are no mysteries in nature, providence, or redemption, to the uncreated mind of him who is the First Cause and Final End of all things. He is always fully conscious of his eternal design to save his chosen people, and is acquainted with their wants, sins, infirmities, and spiritual attainments. He looks into the inmost recesses of the human heart, and knows its character and possibilities. His most cunning foes cannot conspire against his government, or in the darkest caverns of hell league against the weakest of his subjects, without his cognisance. By his limitless power he regenerates the soul, implants the germs of spirituality, and satisfies its wants of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, from the inexhaustible treasures of his grace. By it he causes all the complications of his providence, afflictions, pleas-

ures, and even sin itself, to contribute to the good of his servants, and restrains and conquers all his and their enemies. He hates all kinds and degrees of sin, and cannot look upon it. The heavens are comparatively unclean in his sight, and he charges the burning ones before his throne with folly. He has exhibited his spotless holiness in hurling rebellious angels to Tophet; in visiting the earth with countless forms of death for one sin of disobedience; in deluging the antediluvian world with water; in converting the cities of the plain into a miniature hell, and scattering the Jews throughout the world. His retributive justice will mete out condign punishment to all his enemies, and render to every man, at the final judgment, according to his works. Rom. ii. 5-11. But infinite love is united with inflexible justice in the person of the King of kings, and in the exercise of it he sends his Spirit to operate effectually upon the hearts of his people, and regenerate, convict, convert, sanctify, and save them. His immutable truth also is pledged to extend his gracious government to the ends of the earth. It is impossible for him to lie. He who is to be the Head of the heathen is therefore rich in resources, and will utterly demolish the antagonistic kingdom of Satan, and establish his own upon its ruins. But he will not renovate the world without means, for his is a kingdom of means, and he controls them for the realisation of his ends. If he has predestinated the salvation of the nations, he has equally predestinated the use of the means by which they shall be saved. He ordinarily works by means in the three worlds of nature, providence, and redemption, and he is Head over all things for the Church. For nature is but the theatre of God's providential dispensations, and his providential dispensations discipline and sanctify the Church. So that the world of nature exists principally for the world of providence, the world of providence for the world of redemption, and the world of redemption for the glory of God. The chain of means connects and binds the whole. Now, the great instrumentality by which he works in the world of redemption is *the truth*. By it he will emancipate the world from the dominion, power, presence, and being of sin. By it he will purify the Church and revolutionise

society. But without a knowledge of the life-giving truth, the heathen will remain spiritually dead, and will be eternally lost. The first chapter of Romans is an accurate description of the Gentile world without the gospel. That world is peopled with living corpses. Its inhabitants break the laws of man, nature, society, and God. They are idolators, cannibals, murderers, blasphemers, thieves, liars, and drunkards. They are guilty of the sins of polygamy, polyandry, witchcraft, malice, treachery, envy, strife, revelling, infanticide, indolence, cruelty, revenge, and pride. In many places human sacrifices are offered to their gods, women are slaves and warriors, and often commit suicide to escape temporal miseries, and every principle of humanity and natural affection is disregarded. In many more civilised communities, atheism, materialism, rationalism, and idealism prevail. Their minds are darkened, their hearts are hardened, and they are filled with ignorance, delusions, and superstition. Nevertheless, they are inexcusable, because they do not even try to utilise the knowledge they possess. They have the light of nature, their moral constitution, and, in many instances, fragments of revelation itself, as, for example, the Karens of Burnah. Still, they have no knowledge of God as Father, Christ as Saviour, and the Holy Ghost as Sanctifier and Guide, and must be finally lost, unless the glorious gospel of the blessed God is proclaimed in their ears by Christ's ministers, and the Holy Ghost makes it effectual. Thus we conclude from the sorites of Paul, there can be no salvation without the righteousness of Christ; the righteousness of Christ can be obtained only by faith; there can be no faith without hearing; no hearing without preaching, and no preaching without preachers. Rom. x. 10-15. There is no other name under heaven than Christ's by which men must be saved. Acts iv. 12. True, they will not be lost because they reject the gospel; for they do not have it to reject. But they will perish because they possess no knowledge of the only way of salvation. "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law." Rom. ii. 12. Knowledge determines the degree of guilt and punishment. Knowledge of the laws of nature,

providence, and conscience, renders them inexcusable, because they do not exercise a natural faith in the God these laws reveal. Is it not probable that if they would utilise the knowledge of the being and perfections of God derived from these three sources, and feel after him in the exercise of this natural faith, and of a sincere desire to obtain higher truth, God would, in infinite mercy, send them the gospel and impart a supernatural faith? But they have a natural, inherent aversion to the truth, and they do not like to retain God in their knowledge. They enter the world with a want of holiness in their wills, intellects, affections, and consciences, and their original sin is the prolific source of actual transgressions.

Further, it does not harmonise with the unity of God's plan of salvation, and with the unity of the human race to suppose that the heathen will be saved without the gospel. Certainly God has not one scheme of redemption for one nation and another for another. If he has, the only infallible rule of faith and practice does not reveal it to us, and the Church is mistaking the very end for which she was established, by disseminating the truth to the nations. Moreover, the human race is one (Acts xvii. 26) in constitution and spiritual wants, and Christianity lucidly evidences its divinity by its wonderful adaptability to all grades of intellect and to every class of society. Many, however, seem to be slow in accepting this truth. Their convictions are similar to those of the Dutch farmer in Africa who said to Mr. Moffat, "Hottentots! Are ye come to preach to Hottentots? Go to the mountains and preach to the baboons; or I will bring my dogs, if you like, that you may preach to them;" or, to those of the Frenchman, who affirmed to the first missionary to Madagascar: "So you will make the Malagasy Christians? Impossible! They are mere brutes, and have no more sense than irrational cattle." But the actual conversion of many Hottentots, Malagasy, and even of the Bushmen of Terra del Fuego and Papuans of New Guinea, the very lowest in the scale of human intelligence, clearly proves the complete falsity of these objections. Nothing, then, seems to be more patent than that the heathen without the truth are not only spiritually dead, but eternally damned. If this conclusion is un-

true, to send them the gospel would be the greatest of curses; for the great majority of them will not believe it, and therefore will be lost; whereas, according to the supposition under consideration, all would be saved. However terrible it may be, our conclusion is certainly scriptural. Column after column, year after year, march under the prince of darkness into their everlasting prison-house. Now, Jesus Christ, as King, has absolute control of the truth, the necessary means by which immortal souls are quickened, and he has established his Church in the world to propagate it. He has instituted the ministry to proclaim it, and sends his Spirit to make it efficacious. Christ is the Light of the world. He is the uncreated Fountain of pure truth, and all the histories, sacred writings, and prophecies of the Old, and the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament, are valuable because of their relation to him. He has, by a stupendous miracle, preserved his word from corruption, in spite of the rancor of his enemies, the downfall of empires, and the vicissitudes of time, so that amidst all the variations of human belief, our minds may rest calmly in the obvious fact that the Bible contains the very words of Jehovah which are the power of God unto salvation to every one who believes, whether he be Jew or Gentile. He has made it obligatory upon his Church to send this unadulterated, supernatural revelation of his will concerning the redemption of men, to the ends of the earth, that they may see the salvation of our God. The command is explicit and unmistakable, and why the Church has slumbered over it for centuries, in negligence and disobedience, is one of the insoluble mysteries of God's providence. It is not the duty of the Church to regenerate the world; for this is the prerogative of the Spirit. The truth possesses no inherent power to regenerate the soul. But, ordinarily, the Holy Ghost does not operate without it as an instrument, although he is sovereign and almighty, and can work with or without means. Unless, therefore, the word of God is promulgated by the ministers of Christ, in obedience to his ascending command, to the kingdoms of the world, they never will become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ. But if it is the will of Jesus Christ, who administers his mediatorial government, and if he has ample

resources to effect his will, the gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations ; and then shall the end come. Matt. xxiv. 14. Then shall all his enemies be put under his feet. "And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." 1 Cor. xv. 28.

II. Christ's is a progressive kingdom. It gradually takes possession of the individual soul, illumines the darkened intellect, subdues the stubborn will, and destroys carnality in the affections. The streams of thought, word, and act that flow from the regenerated soul are more and more colored with holiness. The leaven of Christian truth by degrees diffuses itself through the corrupt mass of the natural heart. The old man is in a dying state, and the new man is more and more actuated by spiritual motives, governed by spiritual laws, and his mind and heart furnished with spiritual ideas, principles, and dispositions, which manifest themselves in a spiritual life. As it is in the individual, so it is in the world: the law of development obtains. The land of Canaan was not at once conquered by the Israelites. The kingdom of heaven in the world is like a grain of mustard seed sowed in a field. When sowed it is the least of seeds, but when it germinates, grows, and matures, it is the greatest among herbs. The Christian Church planted in Eden will continue to develop until it enlightens the whole earth. The thick darkness of the world's ignorance, superstition, and error is even now gradually receding, and the morning light betokens the coming splendors of the Sun of Righteousness. Christianity has made unparalleled progress within the last century, as will appear from the following facts and figures collected from various reliable sources: "A few mechanical superficial Dutch missions in Ceylon and the Moluccas; the missions of private Americans and the Moravians, existing with great difficulty, because of the constant confusion of war, among the Indians of North America; the much-promising, but under the bad influences of that thoroughly rationalistic age continually crippled, missions in some small districts of East India, of the Halle-Danish mission; the missionary efforts of the Nor-

wegio-Swedish mission, put forth with spasmodic zeal among the heathen Laps of Scandinavia; the flourishing missions of the Wesleyans and Moravians in the West Indies and Surinam; some faint scattered flames of gospel light in ice-bound Greenland and Labrador, fanned by Norwegians, Danes, and especially Moravians; small and soon suppressed missionary beginnings of the Moravians in Cape Colony—these were in the main, notwithstanding many heroic never-to-be-forgotten missionary pioneers, the very humble results of evangelical foreign missions, up to the end of the eighteenth century." But at the present time the subjects of King Jesus are found in Africa, Hindostan, Burmah, Siam, China, Japan, Persia, Syria, Turkey, South America, Mexico, and the isles of the sea. In 1800 there were not more than fifty thousand converts; now there are seven hundred thousand communicants and one million six hundred and fifty thousand native adherents. Then there were only seven missionary societies; now there are one hundred and sixty. In 1820 there were only one hundred and seventy missionaries; now two thousand four hundred ordained foreign missionaries and twenty-three thousand catechists, teachers, evangelists, and native preachers are laboring in distant regions. A century ago the Protestant mission schools did not exceed seventy; now they number twelve hundred, with four hundred thousand scholars. Eighty years ago all the Protestant denominations contributed the mere pittance of \$250,000 annually to the cause of Foreign Missions; now they give \$7,000,000—five times as much as is collected by the Propaganda of Rome. Then, the Bible was translated into only fifty different languages, and only five million copies were distributed; now it is translated into about two hundred and seventy-five languages and dialects, and one hundred and forty-eight million copies are circulated. Seventy languages without an alphabet have been reduced to writing and grammars composed. A hundred years ago the gates of many powerful nations were barred against the heralds of the cross; now, religious toleration, in some degree, is universal, except in Corea, and eight hundred million heathen are at liberty to hear the glad tidings of redeeming love. Certainly, this is a partial answer to the sublime prayer

of Christ and Christendom: "Thy kingdom come." The stupid Papuan and the degraded Hottentot, as well as the intellectual Brahman and the courteous Japanese, have felt the power of Christianity, and the railroad, steamboat, telegraph, and printing press are its servants. But an account of such general results is unsatisfactory; we must descend somewhat to details.

Two hundred missionaries preach the gospel to the Indians of North America. The Presbyterians, North and South, the Friends, the Protestant Episcopal Church, the American Missionary Association, the Moravians, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, have missionaries among the Creeks, Choctaws, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and other tribes, and thousands have been converted. Among the Dakotahs there are eight hundred and fifty converts, five hundred and fifty children in the Sunday-schools, ten native ministers, and eleven churches. At Carlisle, Pa., there is an Indian training school, in which two hundred and twelve Indians annually receive instruction. Sixty-four Indians attend the Normal and Agricultural Institute at Hampton, Va., while numbers are educated in common schools at home. The Indians were represented in the last Pan-Presbyterian Council by Rev. Allen Wright, of the Choctaw nation, who said before that body that the "Choctaw Indians were natural Presbyterians." In that nation there are eleven hundred Presbyterian communicants, and their twenty-six churches are starting missions among the wild tribes upon the western border of the nation. Even Alaska has recently been occupied.

Five years ago there were only eleven churches, one hundred and seventy-five congregations, six presses, fifty-six schools, six religious periodicals, and one hundred and twenty mission agents employed in Mexico. Now there are two hundred and sixty-five foreign missionaries and helpers, two hundred and forty-five congregations, twelve thousand members, twenty thousand adherents, a hundred and ten Sabbath-schools, with three thousand seven hundred scholars, eleven religious periodicals with a circulation of twelve thousand eight hundred, and last year six million one hundred thousand pages of Christian literature were distributed. Thirteen theological students attend the Seminary in the city of

Mexico. The Presbyterians, North and South, the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Southern Methodists and Baptists, the Associate Reformed Presbyterians, and the Friends are striving to enlighten the Mexicans, ninety-three per cent. of whom are steeped in papal and pagan ignorance. Church property has been purchased, thousands of Bibles and Testaments have been distributed, and encouraging progress has been made in emancipating the people from the thralldom and deadening influences of Rome. The Moravians have seven stations, and a thousand and one hundred native Christians among the negroes and mulattoes of the Mosquito Territory. In the West Indies the Wesleyan Methodists have seventy-seven stations and circuits, ninety-nine missionaries, six hundred and twelve local preachers, forty-seven thousand four hundred members, and two thousand three hundred and fifty probationers. The Baptists have a membership of twenty-five thousand. The United Presbyterian Church of Scotland has in Jamaica four Presbyteries, one hundred and twenty stations, eighteen ordained European missionaries and eight ordained native preachers, and seven thousand members. The Protestant Episcopal Church has ten ministers and three hundred and fifty communicants. The Presbyterian Church of Canada has a prosperous mission in Trinidad. The Moravians have a theological seminary in Jamaica. The thirty-six thousand native Moravians in the West Indies constitute many Christian congregations, but the churches are not self-supporting. In the British West Indies two hundred and forty-eight thousand regularly attend church, about eighty-five thousand are communicants and seventy-eight thousand six hundred children are instructed in the day schools.

In South America the Methodists have missions in Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation, and the South American Missionary Society of London has missions in the Falkland Islands, Terra del Fuego, Patagonia, and Chili, and some of the natives have been baptized. In Brazil Protestants have one thousand two hundred members, thirteen missionaries, twenty-five churches, and annually collect \$2,000 for religious purposes. Christianity is rapidly extending in English and Dutch Guiana, and

many seek Christian instruction. In Surinam the Moravians have fourteen stations, seventy-four missionary agents, three hundred and twenty-six native helpers, and twenty-one thousand six hundred members, including the candidates for baptism and the baptized children. (The Moravian is emphatically a missionary Church. It has only nineteen thousand communicants and thirty thousand seven hundred adherents at home, and it has three hundred and fifteen missionaries in Greenland, Labrador, North America, South America, Central America, West Indies, South Africa, Australia, Thibet, and other countries, with twenty-five thousand two hundred communicants and seventy-four thousand adherents. Its contributions average \$5.00 per member for Foreign Missions.) The prevailing religion in South America is Roman Catholicism; but large numbers, although nominally Catholic, are really indifferent towards that faith, and the distinction between Christianity and Romanism is becoming more apparent to them. The intellectual, moral, and religious forces operating from centres of Christian influence in that land of Popish ignorance are effecting social and civil changes so permanent and radical, that a spirit of inquiry has been awakened and the huge empty structure of the Papacy is being undermined.

In Australasia, Malaysia, and Polynesia the successes of the gospel have been truly wonderful. Australia conducts its own missionary operations. The Protestant Episcopal Church is the strongest in the island. It has two hundred and thirty-seven ministers and five hundred and ninety churches. The Wesleyan Methodists have two hundred and thirty ministers and eight hundred churches, while the Independents have fifty ministers and a hundred and fifty churches. In addition to these, the Baptists have twenty-four preachers and one hundred churches, the Primitive Methodists twenty-one ministers and two hundred and forty churches, and the Presbyterians a hundred ministers and four hundred churches. Even the aborigines have, in some instances, been evangelised. There are also flourishing missions in the New Hebrides, New Zealand, and Tasmania. In New Zealand alone the Protestant population is two hundred and fifty thousand. Schools have been established among the Maories.

The University has power to confer the same degrees as Oxford and Cambridge. Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Celebes, and New Guinea have been occupied. Polynesia is almost completely Christianised. Seventy thousand communicants and a Christian community of three hundred and fifty thousand attest the power of Christianity to change the hearts and lives of the most barbarous human beings. Family worship is almost universal, the horrors of heathen rites have ceased, the Sabbath is observed, and a native ministry proclaim the distinguishing doctrines and duties of the Bible. Heathenism exists only in the mountainous sections of the country. From 1838 to 1843 twenty-seven thousand natives of the Sandwich Islands were admitted to the sealing ordinances. The highest type of Christian character in this, as in many other heathen lands, is not attained, but there are among them numbers of intelligent, sincere, self-sacrificing Christians. Many of the Polynesian missions are self-supporting. They pay the salaries of their native pastors, purchase Bibles and other books, and build their own chapels. Many Hawaiian pastors occupy a position nearly equal to that of American pastors. They are influential, intelligent, impressive preachers. Within the last fifty years three hundred islands of Polynesia have abolished idolatry and human sacrifices. Cannibalism and infanticide have ceased. In the Sandwich Islands there are no illiterate people. They have eleven high educational institutions, and two hundred other schools. The fifty-six Congregational churches in these islands contributed \$3,893.62 in 1879 to *Foreign Missions*. They are sending the gospel to the heathen.

The kingdom of Christ is also coming in the land of the "Rising Sun." As a government, Japan has separated itself from idolatry, and the educated class is losing confidence in Buddhism. Japan officially recognises the Christian Sabbath, uses the Christian calendar, and has admitted the Bible into the higher schools. It has railroads, telegraphs, and great postal facilities. Christianity is materially influencing the state of politics and society, and when we consider that ten years ago there were only twelve native Christians in Japan and now there are twenty Churches and Societies at work, which have a hundred and sixty mission-

aries, one hundred native preachers, fifty organised churches with three thousand communicants and eight thousand adherents, it will appear that Protestantism is not only firmly established, but rapidly advancing. A tract distributed by the Japanese themselves says: "Christianity is spreading like fire on a grassy plain, so that in capital and country there is no place where it is not preached." The Japanese Church has organised a Board of Foreign Missions to send the gospel to Corea whenever religious toleration shall be granted in that country. Not only so, but there are numerous preaching stations, schools, dispensaries, colleges, and translations of the Scriptures. A Christian newspaper and thousands of religious works have been published and circulated. Shintoism, the religion of Japan, is nothing but a system of mythology, the ranks of its priesthood are being depleted, and it is gradually declining. The Protestant Church is striving to raise up a native ministry, and one hundred and seventy-three students are studying in three theological seminaries. The contributions of the Church average a dollar a member for religious purposes. Twelve churches are self-supporting. These revolutions have taken place in a land whose government in the seventeenth century prohibited all Christians from entering the kingdom, and publicly proclaimed that "if the God of the Christians himself should transgress this law, he would pay the penalty with his head."

Thirty-three Churches and Societies are expending their energies among the four hundred millions of China. Dr. Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to China, entered the "Celestial Empire" in 1807, and in twelve years the whole Bible was translated into Chinese. To-day millions of pages are circulated in the various dialects of China. Bibles may be obtained from depositories in all the principal cities and from colporteurs. There is increased demand for Protestant publications. Some of the *literati* subscribe for them, and whatever is issued in the dialects of the Empire may be read more extensively than if it were published in English, for it reaches not only the eighteen provinces of China, but also Japan, Corea, Cochin China, Thibet, and the India Archipelago. In 1842 five ports were opened to foreign-

ers, and by the treaty of Tientsin in 1861 complete religious toleration was granted throughout the whole Empire and protection to religious teachers. In 1842 there was not an organised church. There are now three hundred and twelve, eighteen of which are self-supporting, seven hundred church edifices and chapels, four hundred and seventy-three foreign missionaries, seventy-three native preachers, and six hundred native helpers, ninety Bible women, six hundred stations, fifteen thousand communicants and fifty thousand adherents. The Chinese church membership doubles every seven years. Many of the members are manly, humble, working Christians. Mr. F. Stevenson said at the Mildmay Conference: "I have found nowhere in Christian lands men and women of a higher type than I met with in China, of a finer spiritual experience, of a higher spiritual tone, or of nobler spiritual life." In twenty-one theological seminaries and seventy training schools, two hundred and thirty-six native students are preparing to propagate the truth as it is in Jesus. Ninety thousand patients are annually relieved in forty Christian hospitals and dispensaries. When China was sorely scourged by the recent famine, by which twelve millions perished, Christian beneficence produced a profound and lasting impression upon the Chinese mind, and thousands have more adequate ideas of Christianity and Christian missionaries. The Mandarins are more favorable to Christ's cause, a better class of boys attends the mission schools, and the higher classes are beginning to receive the gospel. Thirteen provinces are already occupied by missionaries and their families, the gospel is preached and tracts distributed in the principal cities and towns, and the native churches give \$9,200 to the various schemes of beneficence. China is deeply interested in education. There is an Anglo-Chinese University at Shanghai, and the Government has appropriated \$1,500,000 to establish a Chinese Educational Commission in America at Hartford, Conn. The hundred Chinese students in America will return to their native land with American ideas of science, civilisation, literature, and Christianity. The College at Peking has a corps of foreign teachers. Six hundred boarding schools for boys and forty for girls have been opened by the missionaries, and seven

thousand Chinese yearly receive secular education from them. Such facts clearly demonstrate that the Chinese are capable of education and religion, and that the possibilities of the land of Sinim are incalculable. As Dagon fell prostrate before the ark of Jehovah and was broken in pieces, so are the hideous idols of that land destined to be utterly destroyed, and their worshippers to raise sublime doxologies to the crucified Redeemer.

In India twenty-nine Churches and Societies have six hundred ordained missionaries and four hundred and thirty principal stations, with four hundred and sixty thousand communicants. In 1878 sixty thousand were added to the Christian Church from Mohammedanism, Parseeism, and Hinduism. In the Madras Presidency alone there are two hundred thousand professing Christians. The converts, however, are chiefly among the lower classes. Hinduism is declining; there are no new temples, and the caste system is decaying in many quarters. Four hundred and sixty missionaries attended the recent Decennial Conference in Calcutta. It was the largest missionary conference that has ever assembled, and, like that of Allahabad, has given fresh impulse to Christianity throughout India. In that promising field for missionary labor, schools and theological seminaries have been instituted and thousands of women and girls are taught the precious truths of redemption in the zenanas and boarding schools. Hundreds of Parsee and Hindu ladies have learned the English language and other accomplishments of Europeans and Americans in the great Alexandrian Institute at Bombay, and may be seen sitting in beautiful parks and gardens with their husbands and brothers, a social scene never witnessed fifty years ago. In ten years the twenty-five mission presses in India have issued three thousand four hundred new works in thirty different languages, one million three hundred and fifteen thousand portions of Scripture, and two million three hundred and seventy-five thousand school books, and eight million seven hundred thousand tracts and Christian books have been distributed. These presses exert untold influence for good in disseminating Christian truth and combating infidel publications, for whatever is printed in Germany, Great Britain, or the United States goes immediately

to India. The Bible has been translated into twenty different languages, and grammars and dictionaries of these languages composed, which are standing monuments of missionary toil. The horrible suttee has disappeared, no children are cast into the Ganges, and infanticide has ceased. Seventy years ago young men and maidens were decked with flowers and slain in the temples before the hideous goddess Kali, lepers were burned alive, thousands of prostrate forms were crushed by the car-wheels of Juggernaut, aged parents were thrown into the sacred river by their children, and devotees publicly starved themselves to death, while thousands gazed with delight upon others in the swinging circles writhing with iron hooks piercing their backs. But by the influence of Christianity, directly or indirectly, these heathen customs have been abolished, the truths of the Bible are substituted for the ritualism of the Vedas and the land whose science, civilisation, and philosophy are more ancient than ours is yielding to Western thought and Christianity. Keshub Chunder Sen, the false theist, says: "The spirit of Christianity has already pervaded the whole atmosphere of Indian society, and we breathe, think, feel, and move in a Christian atmosphere. Native society is being roused, enlightened, and reformed under the influence of Christianity. Our hearts are touched, conquered, overcome by a higher power, and this power is Christ. Christ, not the British Government, rules India. No one but Christ has deserved the precious diadem of the Indian crown, and he will have it." Lord Lawrence says: "I believe, notwithstanding all that the English people have done to benefit India, the missionaries have done more than all other agencies combined."

The gospel is making progress, too, in Siam. In that country one hundred and fifty-seven Presbyterians, with a church, school, and mission press, contend with Buddhism, the reigning religion, whose priesthood is supported by \$25,000,000 annually. Among the Laos religious liberty was proclaimed in 1878, and the Sabbath is observed. In Burmah four hundred Baptist churches have twenty thousand members on their rolls. Nearly all the churches are self-supporting, and have their native pastors and school teachers. Nine-tenths of the work of evangelisation is

done by the natives. Some of the churches support foreign missionaries, and they contribute more for religious purposes in proportion to their numbers and strength than churches in Europe and America do. In 1880 the Karens gave \$31,000 for mission work. Many of the four hundred native ministers are men of influence, power, and education; knowledge of the fundamental principles of Christianity is extensive and ever growing, and missionaries are better understood. The Baptists have a college at Rangoon, in which five hundred and sixty pupils are instructed, and a seminary at Ramapatam with two hundred students. Thirty years ago worship by sacrifices ceased. Buddhism is waning. Its idols and pagodas are crumbling and its altars are neglected.

In Persia the work of reforming ancient Christianity and extending the gospel to the heathen is contracted, but encouraging. Socially and intellectually there is an upward tendency among the Armenians of Persia. Not only the Armenians, but also the Nestorians and Mussulmans receive instruction in the college at Oroomiah. Bibles are kept for sale at Teheran, Tabriz, and Oroomiah. But among the Persians there are only eight ordained preachers, fourteen female missionaries, twenty-one native pastors, sixty-six native assistants, twenty-four churches (five being self-sustaining), one hundred preaching centres, one thousand three hundred communicants, and twelve students for the ministry. The old Nestorian Church has been revived by the American Board and the Presbyterians. Fifteen thousand of its members attend evangelical preaching. Twenty-three of the old churches are used by the Protestant congregations, who now have a Constitution with Presbyteries and Synods.

In Syria the great work of the missionaries has been the translation of the Bible into Arabic. It is electrotyped and printed in Beyrout, where there are five Protestant printing presses. Thousands of copies have been distributed in Syria, Palestine, Arabia, and Africa. The Arabic is the sacred language of the Moham-medans, and to translate the Koran into any other language is expressly forbidden. In the mighty conflict between Islam and Christianity, what superior advantage does this circumstance afford! Religious, educational, and scientific books

have been published, hundreds of common schools have been opened, and four colleges, a dozen academies, six theological seminaries, and a medical institution have been founded. Prejudice against Christianity is being removed, the public mind is awaking in favor of female education, priestly and persecuting power is relaxing, and there is a widespread preparation for preaching and teaching evangelical truth. In Syria and Palestine there are eighty-one male and a hundred female foreign missionaries, five hundred and eighty native preachers and assistants, one hundred and forty preaching stations, twenty-six organised churches, and six thousand members and adherents. Thus the land where the Teacher sent from God established Christianity, wrought miracles, delivered his incomparable discourses, and wept, bled, and died, needs to be evangelised! If America, with her boasted Christian civilisation does not become a heathen land in the future when she receives to her shores many heterogeneous religious elements, and when her churches become universally lukewarm and latitudinarian in doctrine and practice, it will not be in accordance with the history of many powerful, civilised, and Christian nations of the past.

Only fifty years ago the first missionary arrived in Turkey. Now, seventeen Protestant Missionary Societies labor in European and Asiatic Turkey. The languages of the inhabitants have been mastered and the Bible translated into Turkish, Armenian, Bulgarian, Hebrew-Spanish, and editions have also been issued in Armeno-Turkish and Greco-Turkish, and portions of it in Kurdish. Books on mental philosophy, grammar, geography, and arithmetic have been published. In Asia Minor alone there are twenty thousand Protestants, and Christian congregations are scattered over the land from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. One hundred and sixteen native educated pastors and three hundred school teachers labor in the causes of Christ and education. Great attention is given to the organisation and management of Sabbath-schools, and men, women, and children attend them. Fifteen thousand scholars study in a hundred and seventy schools the essential doctrines of the cross. The members of the Turkish churches are poor, and oppressed by the Porte, but they have

contributed \$21,000 to support education and religion. Boarding schools, colleges, and theological seminaries have been instituted in many parts of Asia Minor. There is a university at Constantinople with two hundred students, representing twelve different nations, and there are colleges and high schools at Aintab, Harpoot, Erzeroom, and other places, in which American professors teach. Incalculable good has been done by medical missionaries, especially during the recent war in Turkey, and the degraded Moslem women have been elevated by Christian instruction, prayer, and meetings for Bible study.

Protestantism is storming the strongholds of Antichrist in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Belgium. In Italy there are a hundred and thirty-eight churches in all the principal cities and towns, and a hundred and fifty native pastors and evangelists, the greater number of whom are converts from the priesthood. The Free Church of Italy has fifteen ordained ministers, fifteen evangelists, eighteen hundred communicants, and seventy churches and stations. It has a college at Rome, with a theological department, in which there are nine students. The Waldenses have eight Presbyteries, fifty ordained ministers, fifteen evangelists, fifty-four churches, eighty-six stations, and eighteen theological students. The Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians have missions in Italy, and eight Protestant churches have been organised in the Eternal City. There are five hundred thousand Protestants in France, who have twelve hundred schools and thirty religious periodicals, and many of their missions among the Roman Catholics have been very successful. The Presbytery of Andalusia, in Spain, has eight organised churches, seven hundred communicants, two thousand adherents, ten schools, five hundred scholars, and six native ordained ministers, while in Portugal there are five Protestant churches, with four hundred members and a thousand adherents. Evangelical missions have been established, and a pure gospel is preached among the millions of the Greek Church in Russia and Greece, and the London and British Societies for the propagation of the gospel among the cosmopolitan Jews support a hundred and seventy-five converted Jewish preachers, at a cost of thousands of dollars an-

nually, who preach Jesus Christ and him crucified to Israelites in the large cities of England, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Russia, Turkey, Holland, France, and yearly distribute tens of thousands of Bibles, Testaments, missionary books, and tracts and periodicals. There are now in the world two hundred and fifty Jewish ministers and twenty-five thousand converts, and they are found in every class of society, from the rich and intelligent to the poor and degraded; from the white Jews of Jerusalem, to the black Jews of Cochin China and Morocco.

The two hundred millions of the "dark continent" are now encircled with gospel light. Ethiopia is stretching out her hands unto God. Africa is being penetrated from all sides by England, France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Scotland, and Portugal, and its hitherto unknown resources discovered. Burton, Speke, Krapf, Baker, De Brazza, and Stanley, as discoverers, and George Schmidt, Vanderkemp, Moffat, and Livingstone, as missionaries, have contributed immense stores of knowledge necessary to missionary operations, and opened the doors to commerce, science, and Christian civilisation. Thirty-three Churches and Societies are laboring in Africa, and, including Madagascar, they have five hundred thousand adherents. In Northern Africa, the United Presbyterians have four hundred and eight stations, twenty-two missionaries and assistants, two hundred and twenty-seven native workers, eleven churches, fifteen hundred Sabbath-school scholars, and a thousand communicants. In 1826 the Basle Society sent out Gobat, Kugler, Steinberg, Stern, and others, by whom many educational works and portions of Scripture were translated into the native languages. In many places the slave trade has been abolished; the kings receive the missionaries, and the nude nations hear the gospel preached. In West Africa, the Senegal region is occupied by the Paris Missionary Society, and on the Gambia the Wesleyans of England have eight stations, ten missionaries, and six hundred and forty-five members. In Sierra Leone there are fifteen thousand members, and there are four thousand Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Methodists in Liberia. The territories of bloody and inhuman Ashantee, Dahomey, and Yorubah have been invaded by the servants of the

Most High, and the good news preached in the lands of those kings whose palaces are ornamented with skulls and bones. Mission work in the Niger country is conducted wholly by native agency. In that country there are ten stations and two thousand members. The Wesleyans have six thousand six hundred members along the gold coast, and the Basle Society four thousand. The German and Southern Baptists also have stations in that vicinity. Missions have been planted in the Islands of Fernando Po and St. Helena. In Old Calabar, Gaboon, Corisco, and the Camaroons, in which there are ten missionaries and five thousand six hundred converts. In the whole of West Africa there are thirty thousand communicants and adherents; the Bible has been translated into the native languages, and idolatry is on the decline. In Southern Africa thirteen Churches and Societies are at work, and they have a hundred and eighty thousand adherents. The Berlin Missionary Society sustains at a cost of \$60,000, sixty missionaries, has eight thousand communicants, and proclaims the gospel in seven languages. The Wesleyans have a hundred missionaries and sixteen hundred members, and congregations aggregating nearly one hundred thousand. The Free Church of Scotland, believing that Africa must be evangelised by Africans, has founded a school at Lovedale, in which there are five hundred pupils. The object of this institution is twofold: to train up a native ministry and to teach the natives the mechanical arts. Sixty of its students preach the gospel every Sabbath in the community. The American Board has twenty-five missionaries, nineteen stations, and seven hundred members among the Zulus.

Central Africa, so long an unexplored region, has recently proved to be a beautiful, fertile country, abounding in vegetation, lakes, rivers, and high mountains. The inhabitants are a much superior race, both physically and intellectually, to the other tribes of Africa. "Schweinfurth and Stanley were sometimes received in palatial halls, splendidly decorated, and found skilled artisans in copper, iron, and pottery work." The first mission was established there by the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin. At one time they sent out Bishop Mc-

Kensie and four others; it has planted missions in the dominion of the capricious King M'tesa, and a few converts have been added to the church. The London Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland, and the Church Missionary Society are also laboring in Central Africa.

The revolutions in Madagascar cannot be rivalled even by the days of Pentecost. The number of converts in thirty-five years probably exceeds the total number of professed Christians throughout the Roman Empire for the first three centuries. Christianity is the State religion; but many who were merely nominal Christians have been excluded from church privileges by discipline. In Madagascar alone there are three hundred and eighty-six native ordained pastors, a hundred and fifty-six evangelists, and three thousand four hundred and sixty native local preachers. Truly the gospel has run and been glorified in Africa. The preceding facts will warrant us in saying, with approximate truth, that this is an age of universal missions. Christ's kingdom is making unwonted progress. The sun even now never sets upon the kingdom of Christ in the earth. The Church established by Omnipotence upon an immutable basis, is conquering the world, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. The stone cut out without hands is breaking to pieces the iron, the clay, the brass, the silver, and the gold, and becoming a great mountain and filling the earth.

But after all the foreign missionary work is really in its initiation. Compared with what is yet to be done, it is only begun. The Church is simply "playing at missions." The work to be done is extensive and difficult. Systems of idolatry, hoary with age, and supported by the immense riches of heathendom, are apparently as imposing as the image of Nebuchadnezzar and impregnable as the rocks of Gibraltar. Of the fourteen hundred millions who inhabit our globe, six hundred and forty-eight millions belong to the Asiatic religions, one hundred and seventy-five millions are Mohammedans, six millions are Jews, and two hundred millions are unassigned. Two hundred millions of professed Christians are Roman Catholics, and eighty-three millions belong to the Greek Church, while only a hundred millions are Pro-

testants. But to make up this number of Protestants, such sects as the Unitarians, Adventists, Universalists, Swedenborgians, Quakers, etc., are included. Several millions are merely nominal Christians. "The fact is, it is too soon to begin to sing songs of victory; we ought rather to spend the time in working the guns, and save strength and breath for the long struggle yet to come before the world will be Christianised. We need to take into account three facts: first, the immensely preponderating mass of absolutely hostile humanity; second, the large proportion of the remainder which is *practically* hostile, since it stops at a mere intellectual assent to the general truth of Christianity, or holds a perverted and vicious form of faith; and third, the exceedingly small remnant upon whom falls the duty and privilege of transforming the world by the power of the Holy Spirit." Many Indian tribes are left to die in *savagism*, without schools and churches; and millions in Mexico are in a wretched social condition, and in as gross spiritual darkness as the African. Roman Catholicism holds in abject servitude the consciences of the Mexicans in general, and retains its heartless domination by keeping them in ignorance. The press of Central America exposes the corruptions of that religion, and seeks to destroy them, but does not strive to build up any other system; and the people think there is no other. South America is not only steeped in papal ignorance and superstition, but cursed by the general circulation of debasing French literature. Japan is willing to accept Christianity, if it will be a stepping-stone to greater progress. Buddhism is sustained by the Japanese at great cost; expensive temples are erected, and they are educating *missionaries* to send to *Europe* and *America*. The six hundred students in the University at Tokio are all infidels. But the final conflict in Japan will not be between Buddhism and Christianity, but between Atheism and Christianity. Rejecting Shintoism and Buddhism, the people reject *all* religion. Only one-tenth of China is occupied by evangelical missionaries. Seven out of ten in that great empire are opium-smokers, which is almost equivalent to saying that they will not become Christians. Two hundred millions are spent annually in idolatrous worship. In India and Africa Moham-

medanism is increasing, and the Turkish Government is opposed to all Christian enterprises. The right to proselyte from Mohammedanism has never been granted by the Porte, and every Mohammedan that accepts Christianity, does it at the peril of his life. "Hence, do not wonder," says Dr. Christlieb, "that in the kingdom of Turkey itself, the number of converted Mohammedans, who must peril their lives by accepting Christianity, is reduced to three in Constantinople, three in Cairo, and three in Jerusalem." Myriads in India are perfectly satisfied with the Vedas, Puranas, and Shasters, and regard them as good as the Bible. Many places in Africa have not been discovered, much less evangelised. The Austrian Government forbids the sale of Bibles in Bosnia. The Roman Catholic Church in Austria, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Mexico, and South America, is the same in spirit as it was in the days of the Spanish Inquisition or the massacres of St. Bartholomew and Valteline. Of the seven hundred thousand in these and other lands who have professed conversion, numbers are the merest babes in Christ, and many have relapsed into the abominable practices of paganism and heathenism. But infinitely more discouraging than all these, are the impurity, unbelief, and covetousness of the Church itself, the divinely-appointed instrument for the amelioration of the condition of society and the salvation of the world. It is an appalling fact, that Christendom spends three billions for intoxicating drinks, and only seven millions for Foreign Missions. It is easy to raise a hundred millions for any commercial enterprise; but to collect a fourteenth of this amount for the redemption of the dying heathen, requires the instructions, prayers, and efforts of all the professed Christians in the world. Yet faith in Foreign Missions is inseparably connected with faith in Christ. "If thou forbear to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain; if thou sayest, Behold, we knew it not, doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul, doth not he know it? and shall not he render to every man according to his works?" Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. It is the nature of true Christianity to make its possessor earnestly desire and labor for the salvation of others. Christianity and

selfishness are mutually exclusive. Christ was absolutely unselfish, and his subjects possess his lineaments and reflect his image. He is their sovereign and almighty King, and he will pour out the vials of his wrath upon all his and their enemies. Let the Church eye her Leader and obey his commands. His eyes are as a flame of fire, and he has on his vesture and on his thigh a name written: King of kings and Lord of lords. Before the triumphant march of his embattled legions Antichrist shall be destroyed, the temples and altars of idolatry demolished, and the emissaries of hell banished; and gathering all his implacable foes to Armageddon, he shall obtain a complete, universal, and final victory over them, while the victors shall take the harps of God and sing: "Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints." Rev. xv. 3.

E. P. DAVIS.

ARTICLE VI.

THE MYSTERIES OF THE BOOK OF ESTHER.

A Discourse by Rabbi J. L. LEUCHT, Touro Synagogue, New Orleans, La. Dedicated to Rev. Dr. H. M. SMITH.

Inasmuch as the Book of Esther is still a stumbling block to the critics, we submit the following considerations in defence of a sacred inheritance, dear to every one whom the waves of materialism or atheism have not strangled in their poisonous embrace; the defence of a book of Holy Writ, regarded for centuries as a stepchild in that sacred family, because that in it the name of the Father is not mentioned. For this reason it was denied equal respect. Nay, it was even claimed that it ought not to be received into the Canon of Scripture.

Now, while fully acknowledging the singular fact that there is one book of Scripture, "The Book of Esther," from which the name of Jehovah is entirely omitted, it is precisely our object to

show that this is in reality the conclusive argument to establish its claim as a genuine historical document.

We take it for granted that every one is acquainted with the beautiful and touching romance of Esther. How an heroic Jewish maiden, assisted by her cousin Mordecai, came to the rescue of the Jewish people, doomed to die by King Ahasuerus, inspired by his jealous Minister of State, Haman. By a peculiar concurrence of events Israel is saved, and his enemy, Haman, is defeated.

IS IT HISTORICAL ?

Let us first inquire whether the Book of Esther is historical ; whether the related facts agree with the general history of those remote times. Who was King Ahasuerus ? He certainly was a Persian king, for the whole scenery, all the customs and usages, are Persian in character, all the actors in this drama bear Persian names, and the city of Susa was the winter residence of the Persian kings.

Let us see who Ahasuerus might have been. Was he perhaps Artaxerxes, at whose court Ezra lived and was honored ? This cannot be, for this king was very kind to Ezra, and would not have permitted his compatriots to be delivered into the hands of Haman ; and, furthermore, if Artaxerxes was Ahasuerus, we are inclined to think that Ezra would have played the role of Mordecai.

Insurmountable chronological difficulties rule out Darius Hystaspes ; for under this king Jerusalem was rebuilt, and his whole character does not permit us to identify him with Ahasuerus. It could not be Cambyses, or even Smerdis, for the time of their government did not last long enough, for in Esther iii. 7, we read : "In the first month," that is the month of Nissan, "in the twelfth year of the king." There is but one king left, and this is Xerxes, "the Cruel," in whom we are able to recognise Ahasuerus.

Xerxes was the son of Darius, who had divided the Persian Empire into one hundred and twenty-seven provinces as recorded in the Bible. There seems to be scarcely a doubt that Xerxes is Ahasuerus. He was a cowardly, cruel, and self-indulgent tyrant,

and was capable, in a moment of drunken revel, of commanding the murder and pillage of his own subjects. The great feast which introduces to us that brute and tyrant, was no doubt given in honor of the subjection of Egypt, which exactly happened in the third year of his reign.

Now let us glance at the chronology, and here also we will experience some difficulties. The Bible relates that Mordecai "had been carried away into exile from Jerusalem, with the exiles who had been exiled with Jeconiah, king of Judah, whom Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylon, had carried into exile." Jerusalem was destroyed in the year 586 before the common era, and Xerxes came to the throne nearly a hundred years later; therefore Mordecai would seem to have been at least one hundred and twenty years old. And Esther would seem to have been a virgin of about seventy years, not well adapted to make such a deep and lasting impression on a heathen tyrant. And, indeed, there exists a Jewish tradition that Esther was seventy-four years of age when she appeared before King Ahasuerus. But this objection, it seems to us, can be easily met. We cannot read from the above quoted text, that Mordecai left in the immediate company of the king of Judah, but simply that he belonged to those exiles who had come to Susa after the king was carried to Babylon; for many had left Palestine long before the last catastrophe that ended the Jewish Empire. Mordecai and Esther were cousins, and he found her no doubt a forsaken orphan; perhaps her parents died on the way, and thus it happened that she, being bereft of father and mother, was raised by Mordecai, as if she had been his own child.

§ SILENCE OF THE PROPHETS.

Another objection is of a more serious character. How does it come that Ezekiel, Jeremiah, the second Isaiah, Ezra, and all the prophets of the exile never mention Esther or Mordecai? Does it not stand to reason that when Israel once more was assembled in the Holy City, Ezra or Nehemiah with pride and enthusiasm should have named those patriotic spirits which even in time of bitter exile did not forget their people, and stood by them

in time of need? Their names are not found in any of the prophetic writings.

Had the prophets ever heard of Mordecai and Esther? Is it possible that so great an event as the salvation of the Jews in Persia was *unknown* in Judea, in spite of the fact related in the Book of Esther, that Mordecai "sent letters to all the Jews in the hundred and twenty-seven provinces, words of peace and truth"!

There is Daniel—we might call him a contemporary of Mordecai. Ezekiel speaks of him: "Daniel, Noah, Job, through their righteousness, should save their own souls." Not a word of our hero.

There are the Psalms—this depository of Israel's poetry and song, of Israel's trials and victories, a book wherein the whole scale of human affection is touched, and not a single line is devoted to that lovely queen, whose very name, "Hedassa"—myrtle—should have inspired the lyre of many a Hebrew poet!

We know of seven Psalms that were written after the destruction of Jerusalem and during the exile, and twenty-five are ascribed even to a later period; and Judah's harp is silent on one of the grandest episodes of Jewish history. For all these reasons many critics are of the opinion that the Book of Esther is a mere romance, without foundation or truth.

May we be permitted to offer an explanation of this strange neglect to recognise one of the most wonderful deliverances of the Jewish people, and offer a clue in this labyrinth of doubt and uncertainty?

Jerusalem had fallen, the walls of Zion had crumbled to dust and covered with their debris Priest and Levite, and the death-groan of holy sacrifices was heard no more. Fulfilled were the prophecies of the seers—"that but a few would be left of a nation that once was as numerous as the sands of the sea and the stars of heaven." Of the four millions at the time of David, only a few hundred thousand had been left. Millions had died either by sword or pestilence, of hunger and in prisons. A feeling of utter despair had taken hold of the people. Grotesque idolatry and a coarse sensuality had enervated the nation beyond recogni-

tion, and had placed in their hearts' shrine, where once Jehovah was enthroned, the gods of Babylon, the idols of their enemies. Patriotism had nearly died out, and lived but in the immortal souls of Judah's prophets and their immediate followers. And when Jerusalem, the heart of Palestine, had ceased to beat, the whole body politic of Israel seemed paralysed, slumbering in death's embrace, beyond the power of resurrection. The largest portion of the nation had given up the hope of ever returning to Zion; they were convinced of their physical weakness, nor had they the moral strength to break with their sinful past, for very significantly the prophet Ezekiel exclaims in his grand vision: "Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel; behold, they say: Dried are our bones, and lost is our hope, we are quite cut off."

But there was yet a minority, which in all their trials and visitations had remained true to Jehovah, and could not bear the idea of living without Jerusalem, without the land of their prophets. Deeply were they convinced that the Messiah must come to lead Israel back to their inheritance. In all their misfortunes they beheld the chastising hand of God, who, to cleanse Israel, had stretched forth his hand to drive him into exile. This minority of the unhappy people never for a single moment doubted the regeneration of Judah, and their sole heart's prayer was—Jerusalem.

They were at the same time, let us say, the body guard of the prophets who, with their inspired and inspiring tongue, never permitted this thought to fade altogether from the mind and heart of the nation.

Ezekiel pictures to them the dimensions and form of the new temple: "And he said unto me, Son of man, this is the place of my throne where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever: and the throne of Israel shall not defile any more my holy name." There is Jeremias: "Hear the word of the Lord, O ye nations, and tell it to the isles afar off and say: He that scattereth Israel will gather him and keep him as a shepherd his flock. Refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes from tears, for there is a reward for thy work, and they shall *return* from the land of thine enemy." Many more passages of Scripture

could we cite to prove the tenacity with which the prophets and their followers believed in the ultimate victory of their cause. These men prayed three times a day, turning their faces toward the Holy City. All their thoughts and feelings, all their dreams and hopes, concentrated upon Jerusalem.

Now, from the moment the Jewish people became dispersed and scattered among other nations, these very ideas travelled with them into exile, and those who had lost faith in the regeneration of Judah, sought a kind of a spirito-political alliance with the nations among whom they dwelt. Some of them went even so far as to adopt foreign religious systems; many remained true to their God, but ceased to be Jewish enthusiasts, and were not sanguine enough to expect a new Jewish Empire. And there was a good cause for it.

Babylon had conquered Judah, both were subdued by Persia, which, with her legions, had overrun Babylon, Palestine, Syria, Media, Egypt; what hope was left for poor Israel? How strong and powerful this party must have been, is clearly proven by the fact that when the second temple was built not one-tenth of the Jews did return to their country. They had become, in the mean time, citizens of the different countries in which they had been scattered, were honored and respected at the courts of kings and governors, and in a short time had succeeded in making themselves indispensable by their shrewdness, learning, and general adaptability. Many even of the best men, in course of time, thought it preferable to live peaceably in exile, than in a continual struggle and strife at home. Even Jeremiah at one time was of the opinion that his people should submit to the rulers of Babylon.

Among those men, entertaining ideas of that kind, we class Mordecai, the hero of the Book of Esther. He was, at the court of Xerxes, certainly a man of some consequence; otherwise Haman would not have found it worth his while to honor him with his hatred, nor could he have been his successor as minister of state of the Empire. And no doubt Mordecai also influenced his people in that direction; for we know that he sent letters to Jews in one hundred and twenty-seven provinces, informing them of

the great honor bestowed upon the exiles, and how they had risen in a foreign country to such a degree that a Jewess was the reigning queen, and a Jew her chief counsellor.

No doubt they were all good Jews in their hearts, but Persians in appearance; and well, therefore, can we understand the words of Esther, "How could I endure to look on the extermination of my kindred? If we only had been sold as bondsmen and bondswomen, I would have remained silent; for the adversary regardeth not the damage of the king." Here at once we are able to grasp the leading idea of the followers of Mordecai. "We will submit to everything except extermination." Furthermore, Mordecai brought Esther himself, and of his own free will, to the king's palace, for the purpose of having her selected to be the successor of the doomed queen Vashti. This proves conclusively that he did not view intermarriage with a heathen as a crime, if some great end was to be attained for his people; and his connivance with Esther's eating at the king's table shows that the dietary laws of Moses had no value in his eyes, where the great interests of Israel were concerned.

But what kind of impression must the conduct of Mordecai and Esther have made upon the prophets who looked with inexpressible disdain upon those who had given up all hope of ever seeing Zion rebuilt?

Listen to Zechariah, who hopefully exclaimed, "And every pot in Jerusalem and in Judah shall be holy unto the Lord of hosts;" and who thought so much of his Judaism that he ventured to prophesy, "In those days it shall happen that ten men out of all the languages of the nations shall take hold. Yea, they shall of the skirt of him that is a Jew, saying, Let us go with you, for we have heard that God is with you."

There is Haggai, who, in the bitterness of his heart, addresses those who lived in affluence, "Is it a time for you, O ye, to dwell in fine houses while God's house lieth in ruins?"

There is the prophet Daniel, who refused to eat of Nebuchadnezzar's table, and lived on herbs and water.

Behold Ezra and Nehemiah! The very first thing the former required of the people, before their return to Jerusalem, was, that

all Jews should divorce their heathen wives ; “for they have taken of their daughters for themselves and for their sons, and the holy seed have mingled themselves with the nations of these lands, and the hand of the *princes and rulers* has been first in this trespass.” This sounds like a direct accusation against Mordecai.

Now, do you not think that the prophets had excellent reasons for not endorsing Mordecai and Esther? How could they? How could these patriotic enthusiasts, or enthusiastic patriots, glorify a man or woman who held convictions the very opposite of their own? Their harp sang only immortal lays to their great ideal, their inspired tongues knew of no compromise. In their hearts the idea of Jehovah, in all its unbroken splendor, found an abode, and in their great souls there was no room for any doubt as to the future of Israel.

How could Ezra or Nehemiah speak well of Mordecai and Esther, who had done exactly what they required to be undone? How could they refer to them as examples, who, had they lived, would not have returned to the Holy Land, but would have preferred to rule in Persia rather than be ruled over in Palestine, and again be subject to ruin and death? Although, no doubt, the prophets all recognised the great services rendered by our heroes to the people of Israel, they could not, from their standpoint, hold them up as types of Jewish manhood and womanhood; but they would not speak against them; they could not praise them, and therefore remained silent.

This is, in our humble opinion, the reason why none of the prophets of the Exile speak of the contents of the Book of Esther; and we believe it meets the objection of those critics who, upon this plea, would exclude it from the historical books of Scripture.

THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT.

After we have tried to meet the objections raised against the Book of Esther from a chronological and historical standpoint, we feel obliged to answer those critics who view the book as being but a copy of some Persian romance, invented, perhaps, by an ancient Troubadour; for these savants were not able to detect the

hand of Providence throughout the whole story. They maintain that everything which occurred was but a result of mere chance, and nowhere is even a sign or hint that Israel's God interfered in behalf of his people.

It was a matter of chance that Esther was a more beautiful woman than all the Persian ladies, and therefore she was selected as queen. It was accidental that the glutton, King Ahasuerus, had partaken of too bountiful a dinner; therefore, could not sleep; and, accidentally, again, that the chronicler happened to read how the powerful tyrant's life was once saved by the Jew Mordecai. They admit that even a blood-thirsty king may be subject to a slight attack of generosity and of mercy, and *therefore* Mordecai and his people were saved; but nowhere can be detected a direct interference of God, or even a sign that the actors in this drama believed in his providence.

Were it not necessary for the completeness of our argument, we would not dwell at all upon this point; for in every line of the book we perceive the wonderful traces of the unseen hand that has inscribed the history of the Jewish people upon the world's pages. Believe us, we do not speak here *pro domo*; but can an unprejudiced eye to-day view the history of the Jews without coming to the conclusion that their very existence is due to the wonderful interference of Providence? Is not the Jew to-day the greatest living miracle? If you wish to see a dead Egyptian, Persian, or an old Roman, you have to hunt them up in the museums and scientific cabinets of Europe, where their mummies, inscribed with grotesque hieroglyphics, relate the wonders of a past glory. But the Jew, in spite of thousands of years of the most cruel persecution, walks to-day upon the highways of the world, the most gigantic argument in history of God's endless providence.

The most wonderful fact of the Book of Esther is, that it has been the key-note to all the persecution of the Jews which since its date has taken place. In Russia and in Prussia the Hamans speak to their Ahasuerus: "There is a people scattered, yet separate among the nations, in all the provinces of the kingdom, and their laws are different from those of every people, and it is no

profit to the king to tolerate them. If it be pleasing to the king, let a decree be written to destroy them."

How often have such decrees gone forth against Israel, and has Providence ever permitted his extermination? And why, then, should the great deliverance in the Medo-Persian Empire have been but a matter of chance or accident?

There are still more wonderful occurrences in history where, at the same time, Providence does not appear on the surface. In the very year when pious Isabella and Ferdinand of Spain, with the assistance of the hangman, *par excellence*, Torquemada, decreed the expulsion and destruction of the Jews—in that very year Columbus discovered America, which, thank God, has since then become the haven of liberty of all the oppressed of the world, and which but lately has opened her merciful arms to the poor downtrodden Jews of Russia.

As far as the Book of Esther is concerned, it is perfectly plain that Mordecai and his cousin had full confidence in their God. After the edict of murder had been issued by Haman, Mordecai sent word to Esther, "Imagine not in thy soul to be able to escape in the king's house, out of all the Jews, for if thou do indeed maintain silence at this time, enlargement and deliverance will arise to the Jews from another place, but thou and thy father's house shall perish; and who knoweth whether thou hast not for a time like this obtained the royal dignity?"

It is indeed incomprehensible to us how any one can read these verses and not at once perceive the idea of a governing Providence. What could Mordecai have meant by "deliverance will arise to the Jews from another place"? He had no armies at his command; it could not refer to the Jews themselves, for they were in exile under the iron rule of Ahasuerus Xerxes. It can but refer to Providence. Mordecai was obliged, as we shall see later, to speak of God in an enigmatic way; and, furthermore, in the most direct manner he attributed the selection of Esther to divine influences, for he said distinctly: "Who knoweth whether thou hast not for a time like this attained the royal dignity?" and threatens her with destruction, should she not be found worthy of her sacred trust. We believe this in itself suffices to prove Pro-

vidence in the Book of Esther; and verily can we exclaim with Solomon: "My friend, behold! there he standeth behind our wall, looking in at the windows, seeing through the lattice."

THE ENIGMA.

Now arises the momentous question, If the Book of Esther is chronologically correct, if it is historically sound, and if the finger of Providence can be detected on every page, why, then, is the name of God not found in a book which is considered worthy to belong to Sacred Writ?

This question is not by any means a new one. It was propounded many hundred years ago, but, as it seems, no satisfactory reason has been presented to explain this wonderful enigma. But this is not all that strikes the careful reader, for it is even more wonderful that there is no reference to prayer at a time when all the people of Israel dispersed throughout the empire were threatened with annihilation. And when Mordecai commanded that all the people should fast for three days, is it not natural that he should have added, "and pray to your God," for there is rarely an instance in Scripture where prayer and fasting were not twin sisters in time of sorrow and distress? Does it not stand to reason that Mordecai should have asked of Esther to find strength and fortitude in prayer for her hazardous undertaking, namely, "to present herself before the king, against the law"?

Look, for instance, at Abraham when God announced to him the destruction of Sodom, how touching was his prayer for that undeserving city. There is even the servant of Abraham, who, when charged to find a wife for his master's son, invokes divine guidance before he makes his choice. There is Moses, who prefers rather to die than see his people destroyed; and he prays, "Blot me out of the book thou hast written;" and even on minor occasions, Moses resorts to prayer, for instance, when Miriam was struck with leprosy in the wilderness, he uttered that short but comprehensively eloquent prayer, "Heal her, O Lord." There is David. When his son was struggling between life and death, he humbled himself and refused food for seven days; but at the same time, "David sought the Lord on account of his child."

There is Elijah. He, even in the presence of an excited and idolatrous priesthood, proved his faith and courage by calling on Jehovah. And we could cite many incidents, proving that the heroes of Scripture firmly believed in the efficacy of prayer in times of need. And how is it, when so great a calamity threatened Israel, neither Mordecai nor Esther appealed to their God in prayer? Had they forgotten him? We have already shown that they both had unbounded confidence in Providence. Had they altogether forsaken the God of Israel? If this had been the case, the fate of their brethren would have been of little consequence to the queen and Mordecai, particularly as Esther had never told the king that she belonged to Israel, and even at the direct command of her cousin had concealed her nationality. Furthermore, when Mordecai hears of the edict just issued against his people, he rends his clothes, girds himself with sackcloth, cries aloud in the streets "a bitter cry," but not a word is addressed to his God. And what is still more surprising, when all the danger was removed and Israel breathed again the air of liberty, not even then is a prayer of thanks or gratitude offered to Jehovah. Oh, they made merry, they danced, drank, and sent each other presents, but of prayer we do not read anything. These are, at least, you will admit, strange facts in a book that has been accepted as inspired, by the authors of the Canon.

Before we enter into an explanation of this mystery, it might be of some interest to know how Jewish and Christian authors and critics try to solve this enigma. The Anshi Keneseth Haggadolah, or the men of the Great Assembly, to whom the editorship of Holy Writ is ascribed, at first refused the book's admission into the Canon, because the history of Mordecai and Esther might engender ill feeling between Jew and Gentile; but they had to give way to the demands of the people, in whose hearts our heroes had become immortal. Others say that the name of God *does* appear in the book, for Mordecai sent word to Esther, "Help and enlargement will come from another place," and the word *makom*, place, signifies God. It is true that this word has been adopted for the name of God, but only in Rabbinical literature, and throughout the whole of the Scriptures it is never used

in this sense. This will be better understood when we call your attention to the fact that even to-day orthodox Israelites never mention God's name except in prayer, even in studying the law or in writing books or letters they use the word *makom*—"place," *shomayim*—"heaven," or simply *hashem*—"the name," and the Rabbi of the Rabb School, at the city of Würzburg, during our time, threatened to suspend a student for insisting on pronouncing the name of God during the study of the Talmud.

The great Hebrew author and critic of the Middle Ages, Abraham Ibn Ezra, says that "the Persians were accustomed to write the name of their idols under the holy name of Jehovah; therefore Mordecai would not insert the name of God."

Rabbi Isaac, the author of the book of Baal Akedah, says, "The Book of Esther has been copied from Persian chronicles in which Mordecai had written it, and therefore God's name is not found."

Rabbi Moses, in his book, Hoel Moshe, says, "Mordecai had to show the book to Ahasuerus, and he did not dare therefore to rouse the king's anger by attributing the great deliverance of the Jews to any one but the king himself."

Another Rabbi of the Middle Ages finds the name of God in two acrostics :

יבא המלך והמן היום
כי כלתה אליו הרעה

Among the modern Jewish writers I may mention the great Zunz, who finds in the omission of God's name "a true sign that the prophetic spirit had already departed from the people." For he says the name of the king is mentioned one thousand one hundred and eighty-seven times, and that of Jehovah not once.

Dr. Philipsohn thinks that "piety and faith had departed from the people, and they therefore did not care for the name of God."

Let us see, now, what the Christian authors have to say on this subject. Luther, for instance, had a strong aversion to this book, and went so far as to declare that "it was not fit to be placed in the Canon."

Semler, Bleek, and Berthold regard the book as being "un-authentic," because of its omission of the name of God.

Hävernicks says that "the piety of Mordecai and Esther was of an inferior kind."

Kuenen finds "impossibilities and improbabilities pervade the whole book."

Matthew Henry says "the name of God is not found, but the finger of God is seen everywhere."

Scott says: "It is very remarkable that there is no clear mention of any of the names by which the God of Israel is distinguished in the sacred oracles. Perhaps this omission was designed."

Adam Clarke says: "It is a singular circumstance that the name of God does not occur once in the whole course of the book."

Lange (Prof. Schultz), who claims to give the latest results of theological criticism, says: "It is well known that the name of Jehovah was entirely withdrawn from usage, as being too holy. We also might hold that God himself was held to be too holy and exalted to be much spoken of even in divine worship. Having once inclined to this tendency of mind, a further step was not difficult of execution. Hence, a childlike trust in God and a true moral fear of God had no more a proper place." A very remarkable opinion, indeed!

And lastly, the *Encyclopædia Britannica* says: "The name of God is not mentioned once, a phenomenon entirely unique in the Old Testament, from a theological point of view; therefore the book is not of much interest."

Now, you will readily admit that all these opinions are only ingenious apologies. The authors found themselves in this dilemma: Here is a book belonging to Holy Writ, and the name of God is not mentioned; therefore, *volens volens*, we must find *some* defence, unsatisfactory as it may be, to the close and investigating reader. As far as the mere existence of the name of God is concerned, some of the reasons given might appear to be at least plausible, but not one of them raises the question, "Why Mordecai and Esther, even when alone in their own houses, are never spoken of as addressing God in prayer?"

The position we maintain is this: *Had the name of God appeared in the book, it would simply prove that the book is apocryphal, and not entitled to a place in the Canon.*

ARGUMENT.

It was a well known usage among the ancients to prohibit the religious worship of the conquered nations, and the first act of reconstruction in the enemy's land was to erect the idols of the victor. The gods of these nations were national deities, and therefore the idols of Babylon were powerless in Persia, and the gods of Egypt of no consequence in Syria. As long, therefore, as the people were true to their deities, their patriotism could not so easily be stamped out; for religion and love of country were so closely interwoven that the one hardly existed without the other. And particularly among the Hebrews, their national life existed entirely upon their faith, and through the whole prophetic literature runs, like a red thread, the idea that one depends upon the other. Although the prophets declared a God who regards all men alike, although prophetic Judaism teaches a religion uniting all men in the worship of one God, "From sunrise to sunset"—still the *worship* of that God found its ideal expression in Jerusalem.

Therefore the conquerors of Judea knew but too well that, as long as the Hebrews were permitted to adore and to worship their Jehovah, they would embrace every opportunity to rebel against their oppressors.

It was no doubt in the interest of the Persian court to befriend the Jews, for Persia ruled over many conquered nations, and was, therefore, afraid of an alliance between Judea, Syria, and Egypt, which had been the hotbed of revolutions. It seems, therefore, that at first Nebuchadnezzar was exceedingly kind to the exiles, and at the same time permitted Daniel to pray only to his God, and he was allowed even to glorify his Jehovah in the presence of the king. Nevertheless he set up a golden image and commanded its worship. There were at the same time the three companions of Daniel, Shadrach, Meschach, and Abed-nego, who refused to obey the king's order, and when they were charged with treason preferred to die rather than bow down to the idol of the king. The king being sure that the God of Israel could not protect his followers in Persia, exclaimed, "Who is the God that can deliver out of my hands?"

Darius, the son of Nebuchadnezzar, goes a step farther. He issues a general order "that whosoever will ask anything of any God or man, save the king, shall be cast into the lion's den."

Nevertheless Daniel prayed to his God three times a day, and we know from the sacred record that, by a miraculous interference of his God, he was saved from a brutal death.

We have already shown that Mordecai did not think it prudent to antagonise the Persians, and believed in a Judaism outside of Judea, and therefore permitted his cousin Esther to become the wife of Ahasuerus, thus bringing the Persian empire under Jewish influence. The very first thing necessary for Mordecai was to avoid seeming to pray to Jehovah, or even mentioning his name, for he even prohibited Esther to reveal her nationality. Mordecai knew but too well, from the history of Daniel and his friends, what his fate would be were he to disregard the laws of the country in that direction. At the same time, let us call your attention to that powerful "Know-Nothing" party in ancient Persia, who begrudged the exiles the honor to serve the king as high court officials, for already, during the time of Daniel, all the presidents of the kingdom, the superintendents and the lieutenants, the councillors and the governors, conspired against Jewish influence at court, and Haman, the great enemy of Mordecai, had certainly not forgotten what his predecessors had taught him. He did not simply aim at Mordecai alone, but he proposed, even without having preferred a single charge, to exterminate the Jews in one day, and so in a radical manner rid Persia of the dangerous exiles. Do you not think that Haman had Mordecai surrounded by hundreds of detectives to find out whether or not he was yet true to the God of his fathers? Would he not have been delighted to appear before Ahasuerus, exclaiming, "I have found that Jew Mordecai praying to his Jehovah, and all the Jews still cling to him, therefore these Hebrews will be a continual menace to the kingdom and its faith"? But he sought in vain for pretext of this kind.

Could Mordecai, under the circumstances, act otherwise than he did? Could he, who only through a Persian servant was able to communicate with Esther, send word, "O queen, pray to Jeho-

vah"? This message, in the first instance, would have never reached her, and then it would have been his death warrant and that of his people. He only assured her, "Help will come from another place." She knew what that meant, and thus found strength and fortitude for her dangerous undertaking. Was it possible for Mordecai, when he ordered his people to fast for three days, to ask them at the same time to prostrate themselves before Jehovah and seek his help? This would have been high treason, had all the Jews on one day publicly prayed to God.

And when Mordecai and Esther inscribed the great deliverance of their people upon the pages of the court chronicles, they could not dare to ascribe their wonderful escape to anything else than to the kind interference of the brutal Ahasuerus, for he never would have believed nor understood "that the hearts of kings are in the hands of God."

For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the name of God in the Book of Esther is an impossibility; and had it appeared in its pages, it would prove that it could not have been written by the actors of that great drama; its historical statements could have been justly doubted, and, therefore, would have never received the honor of being enrolled in the Canon of Holy Writ.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The great subject just now with the neological critics is the reconstruction of the Old Testament history. The direct assault of Strauss and Baur on the fidelity of the gospel narratives having proved an ignominious failure, it is followed up by this distant and circuitous attempt in the way of sapping and mining. Lenormant's remarkable series of volumes, which has been noticed before in these pages, can hardly be classed with the efforts of men like Wellhausen to destroy what has formerly been believed. Accepting many of the extremest results of what is known as "The Higher Criticism," Lenormant tries to show that on the whole the sacred record is in harmony with the discoveries of archæological science. "The Beginnings of History"¹ is a very unsound, and therefore (as well as for other reasons) a very unsafe book, but it is wonderfully learned, novel, brilliant, and enticing, and is not only intentionally but unintentionally rich in unexpected confirmations of the divine word. Even where seemingly most fanciful, Lenormant is always apparently sustained, at least to some extent, in his bold conjectures by Assyriological or other parallels. For instance, we may cite the supposed androgynous form of our first parents; the vertically whirling sword between the cherubim at the gates of Eden, and the horizontally revolving drum or cylinder supporting the cherubim in Ezekiel. There is much interesting matter about the flood, which he regards as having covered an immense area in the eastern hemisphere. "The sons of God" he takes to be *angels*; thus going back to a very ancient and wide-spread tradition. As an offset to Professor Lenormant's fascinating, yet too often erroneous and misleading, speculations, we place Mr. George Rawlinson's very sober

¹ The Beginnings of History according to the Bible and the Traditions of Oriental Peoples. From the Creation of Man to the Deluge. By François Lenormant, Professor, etc. (Translated from the second French edition.) With an Introduction by Francis Brown, Associate Professor in Biblical Philology in the Union Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882. xxx and 588 pp., 8vo.

and authoritative statements upon a kindred but more restricted topic.¹ Professor Charteris's monumental work entitled "Canonicity" (which indeed is the point of departure of the present volume) was meant to introduce us to the masterly vindication he now offers us of the claims, history, and authority of the New Testament.² Dr. Bruce's work on the Parables of our Lord³ takes its place at once by the side of Drummond and Trench. Without the patristic lore or the vivid genius of the Irish prelate, Professor Bruce is more systematic, more doctrinal, more unequivocally orthodox at all points, and has a compression and terseness and a rare and subtle literary charm that are all his own. According to this new exegete there is an unutterable pathos about this form of teaching; Jesus spoke in parables "because he had a sorrowful heart." Subtle as this is, it is so advocated as to be rendered very plausible. The Concordance⁴ to the English Revision is of course indispensable to the biblical student, and is to all appearance one of the best that has been made of the New Testament. The German Revision⁵ was conducted on more cautious and tentative, and therefore wiser, principles than the English. The process was far less wholesale, and the result was not to be accepted as a finality.

¹ The Religions of the Ancient World. Including Egypt, Syria and Babylonia, Persia, India, Phœnicia, Etruria, Greece, Rome. By George Rawlinson, M. A., Author of "The Origin of Nations," etc. 1 Vol., 12 mo., \$1.00. *Ibid.*

² The New Testament Scriptures: their Claims, History, and Authority; being the Crowell Lectures for 1882, by A. H. Charteris, D. D. London, 1882. 8vo., pp. 227.

³ The Parabolic Teaching of Christ: A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of our Lord. By Prof. A. B. Bruce, D. D. 8vo., pp. 515. London: Hoddle & Stoughton.

⁴ A Complete Concordance to the Revised Version of the New Testament. Embracing the marginal readings of the English Revisers as well as those of the American Committee. By John Alexander Thoms. Published under the authorisation of Oxford and Cambridge Universities. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883. 8vo., pp. 532.

⁵ Die Revision der Lutherischen Bibelübersetzung. Von Lic. th. Ernst Kühn, Konsistorialassessor und Diakonos in Dresden. Pp. 64. Halle, 1883.

The exceedingly able and valuable work of Professor Hicks may be said to be a treatise on the logic of apologetics.¹ Among other noteworthy peculiarities of the book, due attention is paid to the distinction between the ideas of "order" and "end."

Dr. McIlvain's admirable volume on the Wisdom of Scripture² is evidently the fruit of a lifetime of thought and faith. The relation of religion to science, and also to politics, is fully discussed. We do not care to be understood as endorsing all that is laid down respecting the aspect of the Church towards the State. The book is profound and original, and yet perspicuous and edifying. Dr. Porter's Essays on "Science and Sentiment,"³ make a lofty claim on the admiration of intelligent, and especially of Christian, readers. The presumption in regard to such books as Mr. Footman's⁴ is always in their favor. If any matter is to be sifted to the bottom, the Germans are the people to do the work. When an estimate of results is called for, the judgment of a Teuton may or may not be of any particular value. Herr Bastian's treatise on Buddhism⁵ (though by its title limited to one aspect of the subject) covers the whole ground and much more besides, and in the most exhaustive way. The work is chiefly noteworthy for its immense learning. The darkness of the great oriental system is not much illuminated by the Berlin author. He seems to identify Nirvâna with the state of "absolute existence." Herr Kern⁶ regards it as the condition of the highest good, and "that 'admits

¹ A Critique of Design—Arguments. A Historical Review and Free Examination of the Methods of Reasoning in Natural Theology. By L. E. Hicks, Professor of Geology in Denison University, Granville, Ohio. 1 Vol., crown 8vo., \$2.00. (In Press.) Charles Scribner's Sons.

² The Wisdom of Holy Scriptures. By the Rev. John H. McIlvain, D. D. 1 Vol., crown 8vo., \$2.50. *Ibid.* (In Press.)

³ Science and Sentiment. By Noah Porter, D. D., LL. D. 1 Vol. crown octavo, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴ Reasonable Apprehensions and Reassuring Hints; being Papers designed to attract attention to the Nature of Modern Unbelief, and to meet some of its Fundamental Assumptions. By the Rev. Henry Footman. 8vo., boards, \$1.50. Scribner & Welford, New York.

⁵ Der Buddhismus in seiner Psychologie. Von A. Bastian. Berlin, 1882.

⁶ Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien. Von Heinrich Kern. Translated by Herman Jacobi. First Volume. Leipzig, 1882.

of neither birth nor death.' " To attain to this condition is the practical aim of Buddhist teaching. Only one volume of the English translation has yet appeared; but enough is before the world of critics to justify the statement that the discussion is clear and systematic. Dr. Hurst's thesaurus¹ is a most useful volume; and is especially strong in the exhibit it gives of modern and continental authorities. The memorable return of vitality to what might well have been regarded as the moribund body of the Papacy, and the sudden arrest of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, presents one of the most important and singular problems that can engage the attention of the student of history. Mr. Creighton, of Merton, has written on this subject, and particularly on the events relating to the unreformed Church, with the hand of a master.²

The direct and also the reflex influence of Christianity on the world have not been exaggerated. Mr. Loring Brace has occasion to deal with this matter in his "Gesta Christi,"³ and his former literary efforts gave no false promise of his success in the present undertaking. It has long been known to close observers in such matters that the *soi disant* "Unitarianism"⁴ of New England is to a large extent nothing but a name for the so-called "liberal religion," and that "liberalism" in religion and rationalistic infidelity differ only as tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. This is now plainly avowed by one of the acknowledged hierophants of this audacious but delusive form of what may be styled bap-

¹ *Bibliotheca Theologica*. By Jno. F. Hurst, LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

² *A History of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*. By M. Creighton, M. A., late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Vol. I., 1378—1418; Vol. II., 1418—1464. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1882.

³ *Gesta Christi: Or, A History of Humane Progress under Christianity*. By Charles Loring Brace, author of "Races of the Old World," "Home Life in Germany and Hungary," "Norse Folk," "Dangerous Classes of New York," etc. 8vo., pp. xxi., 496. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1882.

⁴ *The Liberal Movement in Theology*, chiefly as shown in *Recollections of the History of Unitarianism in New England*, being a closing course of Lectures given in the Harvard Divinity School. By Joseph Henry Allen, Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University, Hono-

tized secularism and unbelief. Dr. Killen's "Ancient Church"¹ is one of the greatest works of our time, and in many essential particulars (notably its doctrinal soundness) one of the best Church-histories in existence for the fundamental period which it covers. Dr. John Hall has done well in connecting his own honored name with a new edition of a book that has already done yeoman's service, and is destined to become more and more celebrated.

That eminent thinker and historian, the late Dr. H. B. Smith, is set before us with exceptional distinctness and force in his notable "Introduction to Christian Theology."² The forte of Dr. Smith was, as we opine, in Church History and Apologetics. Some of his monographs in these departments leave nothing to be regretted or desired. The gifted and accomplished author of "The History of Virginia" has for some years past made a shining name for himself in the field of theological and ecclesiastical disputation, and been a frequent contributor to our current periodical literature. He has now³ chosen to grapple with a number of the most intricate questions that could occupy the mind of man or angel. That he has succeeded in establishing all his positions beyond reasonable peradventure, is doubtless more than can be affirmed with confidence. Our author is, notwithstanding, satisfied that his curious, and it may be sometimes hazardous, lucubrations do not anywhere impinge upon the system of truth contained in the Scriptures, as interpreted by the Westminster standards. Of the freshness and variety of the thought, and the

ary Member of the (Unitarian) Supreme Consistory of Transylvania, author of "Hebrew Men and Times," "Fragments of Christian History," etc. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1882. 8vo., pp. 220.

¹The Ancient Church; Its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the First Three Hundred Years. By W. D. Killen, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology in the Irish Assembly's College in Belfast. New edition, carefully revised. With an Introduction by the Rev. John Hall, D. D. Royal 12mo., 612 pages, \$2.00. A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.

²Introduction to Christian Theology. By Henry B. Smith, D. D., LL.D. Edited by William S. Karr, D. D. 12mo., pp. 237. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.

³God and Creation.

interest imparted by a lucid style and skilful treatment of the subject, there can be no two opinions; and the writer is to be congratulated on what looks very like a prosperous entrance on the *mare magnum* of theological disquisition. Mr. Holland's Sermons¹ are lauded without stint in high quarters, and above all as displaying some of the very rarest intellectual and spiritual traits. They are said to be full of massive thought, and yet to be preëminently opportune and practical. Dr. Parkhurst has also published some capital discourses.² The editor of the *Evangelist*³ belongs to a family that have been distinguished for their parts and versatility. The most popular literary gift amongst them is that of the amiable and vivacious New York editor. His books of travel are in the first rank of such literature, and his account of the Desert was *viséd* on the spot by so high an authority as Dr. Post, and has been endorsed and praised by experts like Professor Hitchcock and Dr. Chambers.

The pastor of Regent Square, London, appears again as an author; now, of an expository volume that is happily entitled "The Manifesto of the King,"⁴ and is favorably noticed in safe journals. Dr. Dykes is always attractive, but his statements of doctrine have not invariably passed unchallenged. Professor Hodge's useful Manual of Forms⁵ has been not only reissued, but

¹ Logic and Life, with other Sermons. By the Rev. H. S. Holland, M. A., Senior Student of Christ Church, Oxford. With an Introductory Notice by President Noah Porter. 1 vol., 8vo., \$1.50. (The Scribners.)

² The Blind Man's Creed and Other Sermons. By Charles H. Parkhurst, D. D., Pastor of the Madison Square Church, New York. 12mo., cloth, 246 pages. Price, \$1. (Randolph, New York.)

³ On the Desert. With a brief Review of Recent Events in Egypt. By the Rev. Henry M. Field, D. D., author of "From the Lakes of Killarney to the Golden Horn," and "Egypt and Japan." 1 vol., crown 8vo., with a Map. \$2. (The Scribners.)

⁴ The Manifesto of the King. An Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount. By J. Oswald Dykes, M. A., D. D. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

⁵ Manual of Forms of Baptism, Admission to the Communion, Administration of the Lord's Supper, Marriage and Funerals, Ordination of Elders and Deacons, etc. Conformed to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church. By Archibald Alexander Hodge, D. D. New and rewritten Edition. Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication.

rewritten. The liberty of Presbyterianism, as regards anything like a liturgical rubric, does not wholly close the door against the occasional employment of such optional helps as are here judiciously provided. The story of "Moravian Missions"¹ is, in some aspects of it, the crown of the entire story of "Modern Missions," and deserves a record only second to that of the Acts of the Apostles; and it may be to that of the doings of the Reformers, and of the founders of English and American Methodism. The great and increasing attention that is paid in England and this country to early English and Anglo-Saxon, augurs well for a more general as well as an improved acquaintance with our mother-tongue.^{2 3 4 5} Dr. Morris³ (after excepting Professor Skeat) has scarcely a rival in England in the field of early English; and Mr. Henry Sweet, of Oxford, is the recognised chief of Anglo-Saxon scholars in the domains of Victoria. It is extremely gratifying to find that the Southern schools take a decided lead of the Northern in this general department, and that this fact is admitted, and has been commented upon by specialists on the other side of the water. Professor Garnett, of the University of Virginia, is one of the scholars of the South who are laboring conjointly with Professor Harrison, of Lexington, in the field of Anglo-Saxon poetry: The almost matchless name of the great Oxford scholar, one should say, would be all that were needed to launch his Grammar of Homer's form of the Ionic dialect⁶ upon a tide of good for-

¹ *Moravian Missions. Twelve Lectures.* By Augustus C. Thomson, D. D. 12mo., pp. 516. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

² *Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry. Beowulf.* By J. A. Harrison. Ginn, Heath & Co., Boston.

³ *Development of English Literature and Language.* By Alfred H. Welsh, A. M. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

⁴ *Specimens of Early English. A new and revised Edition, with Introduction, Notes, and Glossarial Index.* By the Rev. Richard Morris, LL.D. Part I., from "Old English Homilies" to "King Horn," A. D. 1150—A. D. 1300. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1882. London: Henry Froude.

⁵ *An Anglo-Saxon Primer, with Grammar, Notes, and Glossary.* By Henry Sweet, M. A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1882. London: *Ibid.*

⁶ *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect.* By D. B. Monro, Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Clarendon Press series. Large 8vo., pp. 344.

tune. The joint work of the two French authors on Egyptian Art¹ in ancient times, is said to be as excellent as it is elaborate. Two other Frenchmen have written separately on engraving. One, the Viscount Delaborde,² is ample in what he has to say about ordinary engraving on steel, but is succinct and meagre in his references to wood engraving and etching. He is naturally very full and rather over-partial in his estimate of work done by the artists of France. The other, M. Lostalot,³ takes a more comprehensive view of the subject, also inclines to over-frequent mention of French artists to the comparative exclusion of those of other European nations, and appears to have allowed the Viscount to outstrip him in the interest of his details. American engraving appears very unfavorably in some of these pages, and very inaccurately in others. The Heidelberg Professor who writes of Haydn⁴ has written almost or quite as much as any one living about music and musicians. Haydn was seventy-seven at his death, and had known many of the other great musicians, such as Mozart, Beethoven, Weber, and Cherubini. His own noblest works were the fruit of his old age. He was more of the older school than Beethoven, and a serene gaiety of spirit is united in his compositions with the perfection of classic form. Ole Bull is the most noted virtuoso on the violin since Paganini; and Mrs. Bull's Memoir⁵ is entertaining. Carlyle⁶ believed in Emerson almost as much as Emerson believed in him. The cor-

¹ A History of Art in Ancient Egypt. From the French of George Perrot and Charles Chipiez. Illustrated with 598 engravings in the text, and 14 steel and colored plates. Translated and edited by Walter Armstrong, B. A., Oxon. Two volumes. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1883.

² *La Gravure. Précis élémentaire de ses origines, de ses procédés et de son histoire.* Par le Vicomte Henri Delaborde. Paris: A. Quantin. New York: J. W. Bouton.

³ *Les procédés de la Gravure.* Par Alfred de Lostalot. *Ibid.*

⁴ Life of Haydn. By Ludwig Nohl. Translated from the German, by George P. Upton. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co. 1883.

⁵ Ole Bull. A Memoir. By Sara C. Bull. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

⁶ The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson. 1834-1872. 2 vols. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1883.

response of these two quaint souls and remarkable intellects is worth studying. The inventor of quaternions¹ is thought by many to have been a far more original thinker than Sir William Hamilton, the logician and psychologist. Certainly he was one of the most precocious linguists as well as one of the most influential and greatest mathematicians of the age.

Mr. Jeaffreson has made an interesting book upon Lord Byron,² and has argued cogently in support of his positions. Whether he has really found out anything new is another matter, and may be questioned. He has effectually dispersed the most recent and odious charges against his lordship's character.

The author of "Rab and his Friends" lived long enough to make everybody admire and love him and welcome the effusions of his delightful reflection and sympathy.³

¹ William Rowan Hamilton, Knt., LL.D., D. C. L., M. R. I. A., Andrews Professor of Astronomy in the University of Dublin, and Royal Astronomer of Ireland, etc., etc., including selections from his Poems, Correspondence, and Miscellaneous Writings. By Robert Percival Graves, M. A. Vol. I. Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1882.

² The Real Lord Byron. New Views of the Poet's Life. By John Cordy Jeaffreson. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co.

³ Spare Hours. By John Brown, M. D., LL.D. (Third series, Locke and Sydenham, and other Papers.) Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

THE ARTICLE ENTITLED “A THOROUGHLY EDUCATED MINISTRY” EXAMINED BY THE AUTHOR OF “AN INQUIRY INTO THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF PRESBYTERIANISM.”¹

In essaying an answer to the criticism of our views contained in the April number of this REVIEW, we are aware that we undertake no light task. There are in the criticism elements of extraordinary strength. Judging from the admiration it extorts from a mind already satisfied to the contrary, it must have proven irresistible to others. As *a priori* reasoning, the argument amounts to a demonstration, but the strongest presumptive demonstration must yield to obstinate fact; and here, we think, lies the weakness of this otherwise strong paper. Its author has ignored some of the most conspicuous developments of the last half century; he has hung his votive tablet in the shrine of Logic, and right royally has the divinity responded to her devotee. We invoke the aid of her less brilliant sister, History.

Conviction is always strong; that of our author is so absolute

¹ It is due to the writer of this article to say that it was received in time for publication in the July number of the REVIEW, but our space was already fully occupied with previously accepted articles.—EDITORS SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

as to preface his paper with a virtual apology for any discussion of one of "the best established principles." This conviction is sustained throughout, and imparts to the article a character as judicial as fate. The judge is but thinly disguised in the rôle of the advocate, and the traditions of the bench color the conduct of the bar. This *ex cathedra*-ness—by which we mean nothing that could offend even the most sensitive—makes unsuspected conquest of the reader at the start, and raises the suspicion that doubt is folly; this element, together with the impressive ease with which the topic is handled, betrays in the writer long familiarity with that armor which we have "proved" so little; it warns us that we are meeting a very giant in dialectic; with a conviction, however, somewhat akin to his own, we advance to encounter him, choosing from the little brook of our own observation only a few small facts, worn ready to our hand by the currents of common place, contemporaneous events.

Our author in the outset states the issue with a fairness alike honorable to him and gratifying to us; but in the progress, heat, and exigency of argument he vacates this position, sometimes in express terms, but oftener implicitly in the use of certain phrases which render his representation of our views inadequate, and the presentation of his own too sweeping and extreme; in this latter it may be said of him that when he is *strong* then is he weak. The former is foreshadowed in the very title of his article; it appears in his use of the phrase "thorough education" throughout the discussion, and of the contrasted phrase "an English education." Now, every reader has his own idea of a thorough education, and this idea he will give to the words without bearing constantly in mind the author's use of it as equivalent to Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, *e. g.*, on p. 360 he represents his opponent as saying that God "may have elected the devout man without *Latin*, while we practically refuse to have him," and answers: "Suppose it should be that God's election and call are to a *thorough education*, and then to preaching." Most readers, interpreting the indefinite phrase "thorough education" as general fitness for the work, would yield ready assent to the supposition; but if our author had repeated the word (*Latin*) which he

replaces with his synonym, the assent would not have been unanimous.

Moreover, the majority of readers would give to the frequently recurring phrase "English education" a much more limited scope than it ought to have in this discussion, inasmuch as it is used, not in the ordinary sense of the words, but as an equivalent for the course we recommended and might therefore include, with the exception only of the ancient languages, anything in the ordinary college course or in the present demands of our standards. If our critic had substituted Latin, Greek, and Hebrew for his phrase, "thorough education," all through the article, and instead of the words, "English course," "English education," etc., had always used terms which would have reminded readers that he did not refer to reading, writing, and cyphering as far as vulgar fractions, some parts of his argument might have been less effective.

We are represented as having claimed that the Methodists and Baptists "have done five times as much real work for Christ and souls" as the Presbyterians; this is not exactly our claim. The subject set before us was aggressiveness in the distinct and limited though important department of propagandism. We claimed that statistics accredited these denominations with a five-fold numerical superiority over us, and we were somewhat careful to use the term "numerical superiority" or its equivalent throughout the discussion, in order to keep the reader in mind that we were not discussing the whole domain of Christian activity. In commenting on the statistics of these denominations our critic charges us with "rather dogmatically forbidding readers to go behind them or deduct more from them than from our own, for inaccuracies;" whereas a reference to p. 651 of our article will show that we expressly allowed the reader to deduct *half* from theirs and leave ours untouched; or if he chose to do so, we were willing to have figures scouted altogether, and base our discussion upon the evidence borne by the very face of the country. But our critic grants all that we thought it necessary to claim when he follows his discredit of the statistics by saying: "But both denominations have become far more numerous than ours. We freely admit it."

As to our twenty listed reasons for their numerical superiority, let us say that they were not ours; they were assigned by a number of writers discussing the topic lengthily and elaborately, and arguing from the same general standpoint with himself. Referring to this prefatory list, he says: "The really influential causes of their comparative numerical growth do not appear in his list," and then proceeds to give them:

1. The broad scriptural catholicity of our Church.
2. The presentation to the world of the humbling doctrines of the gospel with faithful candor.
3. Refusal to countenance any shade of ritualism.
4. Refusal to employ "new measures."

If the reader will turn to p. 653 of the REVIEW for October, 1882, he will find that our critic's *first* reason is given explicitly in (13) of our list and is one of those commented on; his *fourth* occurs explicitly in our (5) and again implicitly in (14); his *second* is excluded by its contrary in (7), in which one of the writers on his own side of the question attributes our slow growth to our failure to do the very thing, the faithful performance of which our author says retards our numerical progress; his *third* reason is anticipated and negatived in paragraph (3) on p. 649 of our discussion; so that we think all four have had some consideration.

As to the influence of his reasons: the first three are presented concentrated and intensified in one denomination, viz., the Episcopal Church, which unites in conspicuous and marked degree these very essentials in a threefold cord; here bigotry assumes its most polished and refined form, here are offered the easiest terms of Church membership conceivable, here ritualism dons its most alluring garb. But it might be alleged that there are associated with these other "notes" which neutralise and render them inoperative in this particular instance. There may be, but we fail to discover them; indeed, upon further examination the case appears even stronger, for in other respects this Church is much the same as ours; leaving out these very characteristics which are listed by our author as so effective, we find that the tastes, sentiments, surroundings, customs, traditions, etc., of this denomination are just those likewise of Presbyterianism; our author has

singled out the very notes which distinguish the Episcopal Church from the Presbyterian, so that we have a denomination *which presents the characteristics of Presbyterianism plus three-fourths of his desiderata* for numerical success, and lo! it is not more than half as large as our own.

Passing on, we note his fourth reason: "new measures," the anxious seat, altar of penitents, revival measures, etc. After sketching the *modus operandi*, he adds:

"No wonder that these 'measures' have been found a prime engine for religious self-deception; the patent process for building wood, hay, and stubble into the fabric of the visible Church, instead of precious metals and stones. If our consciences would permit us to resort to these measures, we could burn over wide surfaces as others do, leaving them, as they do, blighted and barren for all more scriptural methods." P. 347.

There is ground for condemnation, doubtless, and force in his objection; but his condemnation is too sweeping and extreme; there is good mixed with the evil, and we have argued in our January article to the best of our ability for the adoption of the good and the exclusion of the evil. When our author singles this out as the chief cause of their growth, it must be remembered *that their success is not due to the evil, but in spite of it*. If the only result were inflated communion rolls, his condemnation were just; but burning over wide surfaces and leaving them barren and blighted, does not describe Methodist and Baptist propagandism; such a course does not plant flourishing churches all over our country; such methods do not equip and sustain a home-mission work that has long been the admiration of Christendom. Is it not time Presbyterian writers should cease to give this stereotyped explanation of inaccurate statistics? Whatever truth there may be in it, it utterly fails as an explanation. To say that their success is more apparent than real, satisfies no one who has had occasion to travel through the evangelistic territory of our Church. The writer has heard and read this statement since childhood, and accepted it as perfectly satisfactory, until after entering the ministry he has had opportunity for observation in the extreme eastern evangelistic portion of his Synod, in the extreme western field, as well as in the centre; and while he has found vast sections totally destitute of Presbyterian preaching,

he has never found a region that was not supplied with Methodist or Baptist preaching, or with both, and generally with both. This testimony comes from all sections of our country.¹ While there is no doubt that they are less careful in the use of the means of grace than we are, and are more hasty in the admission of members to the church, yet we do not think this at all adequate to account for their real and unmistakable growth; this is rather a hindrance than an aid. The secret of their progress, and an open secret, too, is, that they have so many more ministers at work than we (and by ministers we do not mean *local preachers*, as our critic seems to think; they are chiefly a reserve force for special occasions, and are rarely engaged in regular stated preaching). When we remember that for every preacher at work in our Church, the Methodists and Baptists have each two or three, there is no need to account for their growth as abnormal. If we had as many men preaching the gospel, we would grow equally fast. Let our Church recognise this discrepancy and awake to her duty and her privilege in the premises.

Our author is persuaded that the real solution of the difficulty, the one which most needs looking at, is the one which we, he says, dismissed most hastily; that the fault is not ecclesiastical, but spiritual. The reason we dismissed this solution so hastily was simply because our discussion was concerned with comparative, not absolute, progress. We are presented with three denominations working side by side; two of these outstrip the other very far. In searching for the cause, we deem that it is to be found in some superiority of matter or method in these over the third. We cannot think the problem is to be solved by pointing to a defect which obtains in all three alike. Especially is it unsatisfactory in our author, after making unequivocal claim of superior spirituality in substance and style for our Church, in almost the same breath to account for our numerical inferiority chiefly in a lack of spirituality.

In order to meet the imperative demands for a vastly increased ministerial force, we urged that some provision, authorised and regular, be made for such candidates as were debarred by their

¹ See extract quoted on p. 632.

age or the providence of God from attending a theological seminary; that while we announce our present standard as the desirable one, and as such recommend it to all, we shall at the same time declare that failure therein need not be a bar to entering our ministry; that we will make some discrimination according to the previous training and future facilities for study, according to the varied circumstances of the applicants and the providence of God, not requiring a knowledge of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin from *every* candidate.

The first reason that our author urges against such recommendation is, "that it opposes the deliberate judgment of the wisest and best of our fathers, when viewing and deciding the very same problem." P. 349.

The argument from precedent is always peculiar in some respects. It is unanswerable, and yet it can always be urged against any change whatsoever. It therefore deserves jealous scrutiny. In recommending change, we attempted to give satisfactory reasons therefor; and we think that, before bringing the prejudice of precedent to bear upon us, our author ought to have overthrown those reasons; and even then, if he had succeeded in turning our positions, his appeal to precedent would have been needless; if he had not succeeded, it would have been useless. With this *demurrer* to the appeal to the natural and instinctive reverence for our forefathers, we pass from this first reason with the remark that the wisest and best of our fathers never "viewed and decided the very same problem," for the simple reason that "the very same problem" did not exist in 1825, and could not have existed. The main *data* of the problem is the rapid and constant progress of these denominations during the last fifty years. It is since 1825 that the most marked and conspicuous progress of these denominations has been made. There are persons now living who can remember the time when to be a Methodist or Baptist was a sort of reproach. They have grown in every respect—in intelligence, influence, and numbers. The farther back you go, the smaller become their numbers. In 1770, the Baptists had only eighty more churches than the Presbyterians in the whole United States, and the *Presbyterians had ten times as*

*many as the Methodists.*¹ To say that our fathers viewed and decided the very same problem sixty years ago, is to say that they did what, in the nature of the case, it was impossible for them to do.

We stated that our standards were nearly two hundred and fifty years old. Our author replies :

"We must remind readers, first, that the dates of the creation of our Constitution, as an American Church, are not those of the Westminster Assembly, but are 1729, 1758, 1789, and especially 1820." P. 350.

The effect of these dates is misleading, though they are literally true; and so he might have truly said that our Constitution dates from 1879, but the answer would have been that the Book of Church Order was only a revision, the changes being too few and slight to be called the "creation" of a Constitution. Somewhat the same answer we make to our author's reminder above. We would remind readers that the above dates mark the adoption rather than the creation of our Constitution; that we are living under substantially the same Church Order that our forefathers brought with them from the mother country. Does not our author himself, in this very article, p. 361, charge us with attempted "innovating on the wisdom of our *laws approved by the experience of centuries*" ? Is he referring there to a Constitution created in 1820 ? We are living under the methods devised centuries ago; and while we do not believe in the so-called progress of theology, we do believe heartily in progress as to methods of work, in those "circumstantial details which are left to the Christian prudence and wisdom of church officers and courts." We have transferred to this vast and sparsely-settled wilderness of the new world the very plans and methods devised for a country, thickly settled and well supplied with churches, in which the evangelistic work was necessarily in abeyance; and while they met every demand in Scotland, there is room for doubt whether the last century's experience has altogether approved their wisdom in America. And here we quote some pertinent observations from the pen of a North Carolina minister :

"The most remarkable deficiency in our methods of work seems to con-

¹ Dorchester's Problem of Religious Progress, p. 537.

sist in the neglect of the evangelistic office in the ministry of the word. Our forefathers came from a country in which the office and work of the pastor were considered sufficient to meet all the ordinary needs of the Church. The evangelist had well-nigh ceased to be regarded as one of the Master's chosen instrumentalities for propagating the gospel. The age in which the habits of the Church had been formed was not a missionary age. And in consequence, the habits and traditions which came with them across the sea, were such as were in a large measure unsuited to the needs and conditions of the work on this side of the water. Churches were formed here and there by immigration. Or they were gathered by the independent labor of some minister who, uncalled by Presbytery or people, was engaged in evangelistic labor. In any case the church so formed called a pastor or stated supply, and gave themselves only to the work of maintaining the gospel among themselves. The thought of sending it to the destitute regions around seems not to have been entertained. And while clamorous necessities and equally clamorous opportunities were rising on every hand, no thought seems to have been entertained that the Lord was calling them to undertake the work. The Methodist and Baptist Churches were more fortunate in the traditions which they brought with them to this country. The work of the evangelist has from the beginning been made prominent by them both. In the Methodist Church it has perhaps had an undue prominence. Almost every pastor is also an evangelist. Most of them in former times had more work to do as evangelists than as pastors.

"It is given to us to see and note the results of this difference in methods of work. The two denominations referred to are to be found in every part of North Carolina. They are everywhere strong, confident, and aggressive. And the task of winning new territory for our Church is now harder, by reason of the fact that they have gone in and taken possession of openings which we might have occupied and did not."

Many readers will admit the force and justice of these paragraphs. They account for the anomaly we noted in the opening sentence in our October article, that a Church established in a widely extended, sparsely settled, and rapidly growing territory, should *at the end of a hundred years*, be found discussing elaborate official theses on the nature, functions, and warrant of the office of evangelist!

In arguing for the omission of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin in certain cases, we said:

"While such a course as we recommend may relax the claims of our standards in the letter, it does not in the spirit; the standards prescribe learning sufficient to expound intelligently the word. No one will

question the fact, that since our standards were framed, there has been a perfect revolution in the methods, means, and appliances of study." P. 682.

Which drew forth the following rejoinder :

"At the last date (1820), which marks the real establishment of our polity, the English works on all branches of divinity bore as large a ratio to the Latin then accessible to American scholars, both in quantity and value, as at this day." P. 350.

We have been much perplexed by this paragraph. It is a surprising statement to be made in 1883. We have thought that possibly there was some important qualification or limitation in the words "accessible to American scholars;" but we cannot see that there is, or that such would not apply equally to the English as to the Latin works. Surely our author cannot mean what we understand him to say: that from 1820 to 1883, the ratio between English and Latin works has been preserved. How many Latin works on any topic of ministerial study have been published in the last fifty years? How many English? Let it be borne in mind, however, that we cannot accept 1820 as the date of the creation of our standards. Their character was fixed, by our author's own admission, "*centuries*" ago. But even accepting his late date, we say that even then works of all sorts were scarce, costly, and learned, as compared with the present. The ratio is not a main point, but the quantity, cheapness, and chiefly the *popular* character of the works. At the time our standards were framed, there was no such thing as "popular commentaries." Since that time, and even since 1820, if our author stickles for that date, multitudes of English works on all branches of divinity have been published, and the tendency has been steadily towards what we may call the popularising of this and, indeed, of all kinds of literature. Surely our critic cannot deny this conspicuous development of our century; he certainly ignores it completely in this important part of his discussion. There are men reading this article who can remember that in their school-boy days the Greek lexicons gave their definitions in Latin. We have in our library a Gesenius Hebrew of as late date as 1833, with its definitions in Latin. Our author fortifies his strange statement with a list, and the list is his refutation. Let readers turn to page 350 of his article and

read it. A large number of the authors are not even now catalogued by the leading theological house in America. His first four authors alone foot up *eighty-two* volumes, and over them all he crowns John Owen as "prince." Fortunately for our discussion, John Owen is the least rare of the list; some of our readers have *portions* of him; let them compare the "prince" as a *popular* writer with any one of a dozen that might be named. We have twenty-one octavo volumes of this "admirable old scholar," and occasionally, when not in any particular hurry, we read him on some point, and it is an all-day task to get John Owen's view on anything. His style suggests to us the leisure of Methusaleh. As a list of popular accessible writers, our author's catalogue is rather a failure. He shows what he means, a few paragraphs further, when he says on the next page: "Nor are the English books of this age on divinity more learned, or accurate, or useful, than the former. They are more frequently feebler rehashes of the very materials already gathered by those admirable old scholars." Exactly! To those who had money to buy them, and time to study writers on so extended a scale, these voluminous, costly, and always inaccessible authors may have been more accurate and useful, as they certainly were more learned; and the modern books may be but "feebler rehashes of the very materials gathered by these admirable old scholars;" we did not claim that they were stronger or more learned, but the very reverse. It is just because these interminably voluminous and superhumanly strong, and severely learned, and painfully exhaustive and exhausting, admirable old scholars have been "rehashed" and "enfeebled," that we claim our point. This is one very important aspect of the very revolution we mentioned, and which our critic so strenuously denies in favor of these departed worthies. The proof of the pudding is chewing the bag, and the fact that the world has allowed these writers to go out of print is significant. We will take Dabney, Thornwell, and Hodge in preference to the first four of his list, with their eighty-two volumes, and we suspect our author would do the same. We must confess that such rehashes suit the feeble stomach of our sense better than the awful "*muchness*" of the "prince" and his *confrères*.

Let our critic give us in his list a few counterparts of Ryle's Expository thoughts on the Gospels; The Speaker's Commentary; The Pulpit Commentary; Jacobus, Barnes, Cowles, Hodge, Haldane, Chalmers, Alexander; The Homiletic Commentaries of Dr. Thomas on Matthew, Acts, and Proverbs; Arnot on Acts; Spurgeon on the Psalms; Bonar's Thoughts and Themes; Godet on Romans, Luke, and John, etc. Let him point to something like the homiletic periodicals, quarterly and monthly; the religious weeklies, with their regular columns of exposition furnished by leading ministers; Sabbath-school periodicals, like the *Earnest Worker*, *Westminster Teacher*, *Sunday-School World* (with expositions by men like Dr. John Hall, of New York); Peloubet's bound volumes; the various lecture foundations, the Bampton, Bohlen, Cunningham, Hulsean, Yale, etc.

It may be doubted whether the whole of the eighteenth century put together witnessed as much done for the multiplication, the cheapening, the popularisation of exegetical and homiletic literature as the last twenty years alone of the nineteenth century. No, we cannot yield our point; we repeat here our statement, and upon it we go to our jury of readers with perfect confidence in their verdict:

"In our day, learned commentaries have been so simplified as to put their results within the reach of any industrious English scholar. Even the critical study of the original Scriptures can now be successfully prosecuted through the medium of 'Englishman's Editions' of the Critical Commentaries. We hazard the opinion that the facilities for Bible study have been so multiplied since the framing of our standards, that a zealous conscientious student of our age, ignorant of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, can yet better interpret the Scriptures than he of the days of the Confession of Faith with no mean attainments in those languages." REVIEW, October, 1882, p. 683.

After denying this revolution in the methods, means, and appliances of study, our author proceeds to say:

"We have, then, the battle to fight over again for the utility of thorough education and a knowledge of the 'dead languages' to the pastor."

We beg his pardon, but this is not the battle at all. This is a battle of his own making. We do not propose to fight him on this ground, or to allow him to fight us there without protest. On these two points it is more than likely there would be sub-

stantial agreement between us, though we could not share his dread of the inroads of doctrinal error, such as he instances during the Reformation, as growing out of the mistranslations of the Hebrew in the Vulgate. Thank God, we have King James's Version, and there is no danger of serious error in fundamentals of piety, growing out of ignorance of Hebrew now. Moreover, as we shall see further on, classic education is a very poor staff to lean on, even in the aberrations still possible; as witness the errors circulated by the works of the erudite Farrar, at once one of the most learned and most loose religious writers of our day.

We might differ also, somewhat, in definition of terms. There might not be perfect agreement as to what constitutes thorough education. He uses the term here as somewhat different from a knowledge of the dead languages, and yet, in his general discussion, they are synonymous; and necessarily so, *for this is all the phrase "thorough education" can mean, as contrasted with, and directed against, our recommendation.*

We maintain that thorough education is not absolute, but comparative; the degree and character of it to be determined by the work in which it is to be engaged; that consequently it may be of many grades and of various kinds; that there may be various ways of attaining it. We might even go so far as to say that thorough education for the Second church in Richmond would require more than thorough education for a country cross-roads; that thorough education for Dr. Dabney's chair in Union Seminary was different from thorough education for Dr. Hoge's pulpit. We would not admit that in thorough education for the ordinary preacher, the dead languages were necessarily the determinate factor, though we would at the same time agree heartily with our author's forcible plea in their behalf as a valuable means for the cultivation of an elegant style of composition. We cannot see how a professional writer, like himself, for instance, could dispense with such training. We can also see how such classic elegance, if humbly consecrated and severely subordinated, may well be used in the service of the pulpit; but at the same time we contend that this modelling upon the classics, which he praises so eloquently, is a secondary thing in preaching, is far from being

of such importance as to warrant our losing numbers of godly, earnest, effective preachers on its account, and falls lamentably far short of compensation for being outstripped fivefold by our ecclesiastical neighbors.

Furthermore, in discussing this matter of "thorough education" and its results, we would enter somewhat into the question, how far the study of the dead languages in our ordinary curriculum colleges conduced to this classic elegance. We would raise the issue whether a student who, in a play of Sophocles or a dialogue of Plato, had to dig every third word out of a lexicon, was in a position to appreciate and emulate the classic elegance of these authors. All such questions would require settlement before we could give our author's eloquent plea a *practical* application to our subject. So that while we are at one on the matter in the abstract, there is room for difference in the concrete. To be well versed and thoroughly at home in the classics is one thing; to have a mere smattering, and not be able to read a page in Æschylus without slavish use of a lexicon, is another.

And this suggests the rebuke implied in our critic's double reminder to readers that the charge anent the practical standard's not being up to the theoretical requirement of the Constitution was not brought by him; while it "was not his to sustain the charge," it *was* his to deny it if it was not true. We entered into the discussion of this as a practical question and with the determination to go *conscientiously through it*, lead whither it might. We regretted sincerely the turn our study took here, but we could not shut our eyes to this particular fact, that the classic knowledge for which we were sacrificing so much was after all more ideal than real. How could we spare ourselves the reproach of pointing out this thing and yet do justice to our topic? Is it not of immense practical bearing on the question? If it is unquestionably true—and in all the numerous and lengthy newspaper articles called forth by our discussion we have not seen one denial of it—that a large majority of our ministers in active service do not find this classic knowledge of sufficient necessity, or even utility, to lead them to maintain it, if they almost invariably allow it to lapse utterly and are using this very English course

of study which our author condemns, are we not practically requiring more from candidates for licensure than from pastors? He urges return to the strict construction of our standards "with deep repentance and loathing of delinquencies so shameful," "there is no need for our looking one step farther to find out what is the matter, our quest is ended," etc. From the fact that he continues his "quest" a good many steps farther it is to be inferred that he utterly discredits the charge; and yet his שְׂפָתַי incident on p. 355 shows that he has at least heard of such a thing; and now, while even such "thorough education" as the young pastor in this incident¹ possessed is not without some utility, the question recurs: Is it sufficient to counterbalance the results of our requirements pointed out in the article he is criticising?

But to return; the fight is not as to "the utility of thorough education and a knowledge of the dead languages to the pastor;" the question raised in our discussion was the *necessity* of the *dead languages*, and this not to "the pastor" but to *pastors one and all*. The battle our author set out to fight, according to his own statement of the issue in the outset of his article, was the claim we made that in certain specified instances the dead languages ought not to be a *sine qua non*. We did not argue that they were not useful, we did argue that they were not absolutely necessary. Of course our author recognises the difference between the useful and the essential, therefore after emphasising the utility of classic culture he attempts to carry the weight of this argument across a syllogistic bridge to the necessity bank of the chasm, and thus establish the propriety of requiring it as a *sine qua non*.

A classical training is an important means of greater efficiency;

It is each minister's duty to serve God . . . with the fullest effectiveness possible for him;

Ergo: It is each minister's duty to serve God with a classical training. P. 351.

¹ Suppose one of the counterparts of that young Virginia pastor, of whom there may possibly be several still left in our Church, were to encounter one of those Texan cow-boys of whom the author speaks on page 366!

Now let him add to his conclusion the qualification contained in the last three words of his minor premise, without which that minor premise would not have been true, and the conclusion is valid. It is the duty of each minister to serve God with a classical training *if such is possible*. We state confidently that without this qualification his syllogism is not worth the ink expended in writing it; moreover, we state that with this qualification his syllogism expresses the position maintained by us in the article he criticises, as witness our own words:

"We have not the slightest prejudice against theological seminaries; we would double the number of their students if possible. We would advise every candidate, who could do so, to attend one. But there is a class which the seminaries cannot reach, and for this class we plead," etc. P. 678.

Our author then points his argument with his striking illustration of the faithful and devoted bondsman with a dull axe; gifted by nature with a giant frame he may with it cut more wood than another of feebler frame with the keenest axe; by "putting to more strength" he may even cut the average day's task; but if by grinding his axe thoroughly he is enabled to cut even two days' task in one, if he loves the Master he will grind it, and this he will do even if his day is advanced towards the middle of the forenoon, etc. P. 352.

This analogy seems faultless when considered in itself alone; its failure is patent, however, when you attempt to apply it. The edge of its sharpness is taken off by its author himself in his admission already made in the opening of his article: "But both denominations have become far more numerous than ours. We freely admit it." P. 344. So that according to his own free admission *the dull axe in the illustration has cut far more wood for the Master than the sharp one*.

True, a sharp axe can cut more than a dull one; but suppose the devoted bondsman is so situated that he cannot sharpen his axe, shall we forbid his cutting with such as he has; especially if, as our author admits, *he cuts as much as some feebler men do with the keenest axe and may accomplish even an average day's task?* Shall we say, You must do even more or none? This is the question we raised, and it is too important to be obscured;

we do not think our critic has met it fairly and squarely. His axe illustration is exceedingly ingenious; we thank him for suggesting it, we will borrow it and use it in a manner more accordant with the real state of the case.

The government has given to three men, Mr. John Baptist, Mr. Wesley Methodist, and Mr. Calvin Presbyterian, the privilege of cutting cord wood from a vast tract lying in one of its reservations. They all advertise for choppers; Mr. Presbyterian publishes in his advertisement the fact that no man cuts for him whose axe is not up to a certain regulation sharpness; he also announces that he has in Virginia and South Carolina two first-class grindstones where any man's axe will be brought to the required edge free of cost. The result is, he has sharper axes than the other two, but only about one-third as many. Some friend remonstrates with Mr. Presbyterian on his course; Mr. Presbyterian answers: "Will not a sharp axe cut more wood than a dull one?" Undoubtedly. "Do I not offer to sharpen every man's axe? It is their duty to come to the grindstone, and if they don't come, they don't wish to cut."

The argument seems unanswerable, but at the same time the woods are resounding with the axes of Mr. Baptist and Mr. Methodist and they have corded five times as much wood as Mr. Presbyterian. This we conceive to be a fairer application of the axe illustration than that made by our author; but it fails in one very important particular, viz., *the wood is not standing waiting for the sharpening of the axes*, the timber is perishing while the axes are grinding, or rather, are supposed to be grinding, for really they are not grinding, they are for some reason failing to come to the grindstones.¹

Let us try another illustration: An immeasurable harvest is

¹ The last Minutes of the General Assembly (1882, p. 669) give a comparative summary for the last five years, 1878—1882. The increase of ministers is thirty-seven; that is, about *seven* each year to be divided among *sixty-six* Presbyteries. And in the same Minutes there are *four hundred and seventy-three* churches accredited with neither "P." nor "S. S." Readers can calculate how long it would require the annual increase to supply vacant churches, even if it all were devoted to this purpose.

standing ripe for the reapers; the gathering of the crop is intrusted to stewards; two of them put every available means into the field, the McCormick reaper, the cradle, and even the old-time reaping-hook; the other says, I will use only the best means known, the McCormick, and none other. Now, while this machine furnishes a beautiful illustration of first-class, conservative reaping, obtaining it is a slow and expensive process, and there are vast stretches of the field whither it has never gone; whither, so far as human eye can see, it can never be expected to go; indeed, whither the defenders of its sole use admit that it "practically elects not to go"—while this is the case, the harvest home of the others re-echoes from eastern shore to western wild, on mountain, hill-top, and plain. At least such is the testimony of the leading Presbyterian paper in the United States:

"The Methodist Church has kept ahead in its missionary work. This Church has trod on the heels of the savage from the rising of the sun in this land of ours unto the going down of the same. Every school-house and barn and court-house and cabin was dedicated to the extension of Christ's kingdom; and the circuit-rider pushed on and squatted, and by 'squatter-sovereignty' the Methodist Church has covered the broad places of this land. After the place was occupied the local preacher was ordained—the best man usually in the neighborhood, who knew more than the average of his neighbors—and he became high priest and oracle. He was provided with a book of sermons, Wesley's or Watson's, and from these he carried on the mission work of this great Church. We have never found a place so destitute in our country that a Methodist preaching place, with a local preacher, was not within reach; and we have heard them all our lives, and while they have said ridiculous things, and ranted and shouted themselves hoarse, we have heard no heresy about the salvation of the world through the blood of Christ. There need be no fear of rant when it spends itself at the cross.

The Presbyterian Church has had all this power, and better endowed within her own bosom, but it has remained in a comatose state. Instruments have been hers that could have turned the world upside down for Christ, and could have held every spot in this land until the educated ministry could have moved on, without the enormous expense which our present methods require. Our educated ministers would have been bishops, and with such a lay force as is provided in the diocese one educated minister could have chased a thousand, and two could have put ten thousand to flight. This country was given to the Presbyterian Church in the beginning, but she set her face against an ignorant ministry, and rightly. Her first serious schism occurred when

the Cumberland Presbyterians quit her communion because the destitutions of the Southwest were greater than her production of an educated ministry, but she never thought to look in her own standards for the ordained supply for these needs, by whom her destitutions could have been met and the members of her own body kept intact. We have been acting on as absurd a policy as the government would if it should insist that West Point should change its policy in educating the higher officers, and should require sergeants and corporals and teamsters and the rank and file to be all graduates ere they could do duty in their country's perils." *Philadelphia Presbyterian*, April 14, 1883.

In this article, entitled, Does the Church need Lay Preachers? the editor argues for the employment of deacons as such, others argue for the elders; there seems to be a growing conviction that our present system, as we practise it, cannot meet the demands upon us. We are too exclusive; we press the question, Have we a right, under all the circumstances, to insist on the invariable application of the demands of our standards? When the great Lord of the harvest confessedly owns and blesses the labors of men ignorant of the ancient languages, have we a right to require them as a *sine qua non*? We would like to see some warrant of this requirement from the Scriptures. Our author quotes 1 Tim. iii. 2, which requires "aptness to teach;" very true, but there is a very wide gap between this and the "Greek, Latin, and Hebrew" demands; in spite of the attempt to fill it up with logic, it still yawns. We have argued that such was the state of theological, exegetical, and homiletic literature at the time our standards were first framed, that "aptness to teach" required absolutely a knowledge of the dead languages, just as fifty years ago aptness to write required the ability to make or mend a quill pen. Does any reader suppose that if the same facilities for study had existed then as now, and the same text-books had been used, it would have ever occurred to anybody to have required the discussion of the topic in divinity to be in Latin? Our author admits that an intelligent tradesman or mechanic in Ephesus might possess this aptness to teach, but then he claims that a classical education is necessary in our day to put us on a level with the mechanic, to give the modern pastor this *minimum* qualification. Now, we fancy that some of his readers dissented here. More-

over, does not our author himself conclude his paper by saying that this same passage applies to ruling elders as well? would he require Greek, Hebrew, Latin, etc., from them?

But let us examine this Ephesine elder. There is something in his *tout ensemble* which makes us think he is not an entire stranger; we have a faint remembrance of having had the pleasure of an introduction to him before under circumstances somewhat similar to those under which he now appears. We then entertained heartily the very views he was summoned to sustain, but we could not welcome him as an ally then for the very same reason that compels us to discredit him now, viz., *he proved entirely too much*. We hazard the conjecture that some of our author's readers felt this as they read:

"We may suppose that the chasm of eighteen centuries is crossed, so that an Ephesine scholar (not mere mechanic) appears in Charleston now, and it is made his duty to instruct his Greek fellow-colonists in the municipal and State laws. But they are printed in English, a tongue strange to him, antipodal to Greek in idiom. Well, this difficulty may be surmounted by learning English, or, as our opponents think, simply by purchasing a translation of South Carolina laws into Greek; though how this translation is to enable him to *guarantee* his clients against error in their legal steps passes our wit to see. But this obstruction out of the way, he begins to read. He finds enactments about property in 'cotton'! What is cotton? The wool which old Herodotus reported grew on trees in Nubia? And property in steam engines! And in steamships! And in steam cotton-compress engines; and in stocks of railroads, and in banks, and in government securities! And of buying and selling cotton futures! And of valuable phosphate works, etc., etc. What a crowd of surprises, of mysteries, of astonishments! How much to be learned, after the knotty, sibilant, guttural English is learned, before the book has any light to his mind!

"We thus see that the plain Ephesine mechanic elder had an immense advantage over us, emerging directly from his epoch, contemporary with the events of redemption, from his vernacular, from his providential position for understanding the sacred books. But we again urge the question, Are we 'apt to teach,' unless we make up our deficiencies to a level somewhere near his? The modern who has become a learned Greek scholar and archæologist, has not done more than reach the level of this Ephesine elder. It were well for us if we had reached it." P. 357.

Now review the picture with the following observation, in order to establish anything like a just parallel, ought not this colonist

to have *in addition to his translation of the laws (i. e., our authorised version of the Scriptures) something corresponding to our vast and varied literature, expository, exegetical, and illustrative, of the contents of the Scriptures?* The picture supposes him to have nothing in his own tongue but the laws, and these laws filled with things of which he has never heard. Now suppose that all South Carolina was found using his language; that the business of the people was conducted in it; that his translation was used in the law courts instead of the original; that the law lectures and law commentaries were in his language; that ever since childhood he had been accustomed to meet in a congregation three times a week to hear these laws expounded in his own language; that there were thousands of books, periodicals, and papers discussing these topics, terms, and themes in his own language; what then? Would he be at such an infinite loss how to get on in South Carolina without a knowledge of the original copy of the laws? You might as well say that an English lawyer must be able to read the old "black letter" before he can do his clients justice in London.

Our author emphasises archæology. Do students of theology learn this from Greek books or works in English about the biblical antiquities, such as Angus, Barrows, Josephus, etc.?

And the point of this Ephesine gentleman's testimony is to persuade the readers of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW in 1883 that, unless they understand Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, they are as helpless with the New Testament in hand as a Greek of eighteen centuries ago would be now with laws about steam engines, steamships, steam cotton-compress engines! That, notwithstanding the rich and varied religious literature of all sorts, a man of our day without a classic training is as much perplexed with the themes of grace, faith, salvation through Christ, the love of God, the fruits of the Spirit, the cleansing blood, as an ancient Greek would be with government securities and national-bank stock! Well might our author call this an imaginary picture; he says of it, it may help to put us in a point of view for understanding his argument. Possibly.

We think this Ephesine mechanic belongs to the same class

with that Texan cow-boy whom, our author says on p. 366, "You shall see reclining on his greasy blanket to read a pocket edition of Horace or Molière," in whose "shanties alongside of the whiskey-jug will be found the writings of Huxley, Bradlaugh, and Büchler, with the Westminster Review and the works of Renan." Now, we cannot honestly think that this classic, *Tityre-tu-patule-recubans-sub-tegmine* cow-boy is sufficiently numerous to have special provision made for him.

We feel sure that our readers cannot fail to feel that this Ephesine witness has gotten before the wrong jury; they will receive his evidence *eum grano salis*. In connexion with this too comprehensive testimony, we notice another part of the article in which our author, in all gravity, states that he does not take the ground "that the Christian ignorant of the classics may not get the rudiments of redemption out of English books." P. 351. We would have liked him to tell us here what truths and doctrines of redemption could *not* be gotten out of English books. Could not one get a little more than the rudiments of redemption out of Dabney's Theology? In the preface to his second edition Dr. Dabney says: "The main design, next to the establishment of divine truth, has been to furnish students in divinity, pastors, and *intelligent lay Christians*, a view of the *whole field of Christian Theology*." And what shall we say more, for the time would fail us to tell of Charnock, Dick, Hill, Hodge, father and son, Breckinridge, and of thee, O peerless Thornwell! The rudiments of redemption!

Take another of our author's telling illustrations; they are always introduced with marked ingenuity and force:

"An author offers him (the pastor) his English commentary on Scripture designed for the English reader. The pastor receives it and says: 'That is well. But, Mr. Expositor, have you yourself tested your own expositions by the light of the original Greek?' 'No,' he answers; 'writing only for English readers, I myself stopped at the English version.' That pastor would throw the commentary from him with indignation." P. 353.

So he would; and were such commentaries the only dependence of men ignorant of the ancient languages, we would recognise the *necessity* of a knowledge of these tongues to all pastors; but the fact is, there are many very able and scholarly commentaries

prepared for English readers whose authors did not "stop at the English version." The kind of commentary spoken of is one we have never seen. Let us warn readers here against the possibility of thinking that our author in this illustration is referring to the commentaries of which we have made mention in our article. We made it clear in that article that we referred to commentaries which gave the English reader *the results of critical study of the original*. This point we repeated and emphasised.

Again, in the encounter with the Romish priest :

"The Romish priest rises and says : 'Holy Mother Church teaches the opposite. How do you know what the word signifies?' 'I read what I asserted in Dr. Hodge's English Commentary on Romans. He says so.' 'But Holy Mother Church is inspired. Is your Dr. Hodge inspired?' 'No.' 'Do you know Greek so as to assure us, yourself, that he may not be mistaken?' 'No.' 'But,' the priest adds, 'the Church is not only infallible, but knows Greek perfectly ; and she asserts, of her knowledge, that you and your Dr. Hodge are mistaken.' In what a pitiable attitude," etc. P. 354.

This "defender of the faith" deserves to be put in a pitiable attitude ; he invites confusion by switching in that word "*English*," in his first response. But suppose he had answered, "Yes, I know Greek," would not Holy Mother Church's argument have been just the same and equally effective ? Would Holy Mother Church have any more respect for the Greek knowledge of an average minister than for that of Dr. Hodge ? Would anybody else have any more respect for it ?

Our critic says :

"It is urged that, by our requirements we actually limit God's sovereignty. He may have elected the devout man without Latin, while we practically refuse to have him. That this is a 'begging of the question,' appears from one remark : Suppose it should be that God's election and call are to a thorough education" (*i. e.*, Latin ?) "and then to preaching. But whether this is God's purpose, is the very question in debate." P. 360.

Now we submit that in this answer our author begs the question in two particulars : 1st. In assuming that thorough education is Latin ; an assumption that pervades the whole discussion of the need of a "thorough education" for preaching ; an assumption that underlies all the protests against an ignorant ministry.

2d. In his supposition that God's call is to Latin and then to preaching. In this supposition we claim that the burden of proof rests upon him, not upon us; and this we claim, because,

(1) He himself admits that classical learning is not so essential to the being of a ministry as to refuse the character of valid ministers to those who are without it; that the plain man's ministry is not invalid because he is no classic. This is his own language. Pp. 349, 351.

(2) He admits that there are many such men called into the Methodist and Baptist ministry without Latin, and that God abundantly owns and blesses their labors.

(3) He admits our distressing scarcity, and the great and yearly growing demand for laborers.

The presumption is, that God is as gracious towards us as towards these denominations whom he believes to be spiritually and scripturally inferior to us. The presumption, again, is, that God's call is the same. When he admits that God calls into the ministry of these Churches without Latin, it is incumbent upon him to show that he makes some discrimination between us and them. If he points to the "providential" demands of our standards, we retort the charge of *petitio principii*. This is the very point at issue between us at this stage of the discussion; it is just here that we have placed the limitation of God's sovereignty. Do not the requirements of these standards constitute the proof that God's election and call are first to Latin and then to preaching? But in addition to the presumption that God calls as graciously and in the same way for us as for others, we have occasional proofs of it. Such men, notwithstanding our course in this matter, sometimes apply to us, and are advised to connect themselves with these other denominations. We can give three authentic cases from one Presbytery—two of them comparatively recent, and the third a good while ago. The two were once under the care of the Presbytery; they left us avowedly for this reason, viz., that they felt called to preach, but their circumstances forbade their attaining our standard. One is a most acceptable, useful, and successful minister in the Methodist Church, and the other one of the most prominent and active men in the pulpit of

another denomination. The third case was related to us by a brother minister as having occurred in the congregation of which he is now the pastor. A young man expressed to his pastor a desire to enter the Presbyterian ministry, but was advised, owing to his circumstances and the requirements of our standards, to seek ordination from the Baptists. He did so; and though, unlike the other two cases just mentioned, he seems never to have prosecuted his studies, but the rather to have gloried in his lack of advantages, he nevertheless became a leading man in his denomination, a preacher of great reputation and influence, and worked with great zeal until laid aside by the infirmities of extreme old age. He built up two strong churches of five or six hundred members. Our brother added: "And the church of the Presbyterian pastor who advised him to enter the Baptist ministry now numbers about *thirty*, while the County in which they both labored is now the banner County of the Baptists in the State."

We think that our author's own admissions, the character and success of the Methodist and Baptist ministry, their abundant supply and our contrasted scarcity, the occasional indications of God's providence in cases which have been practically rejected by us and sent to other denominations, all sustain our position in this matter, and throw the *onus probandi* on our critic.

We argued further limitation of our supply from the strong tendency among students to ignore the ancient languages, to which it is replied:

"We see no evidence of such a revolution as permanent. We see, indeed, a plenty of rash innovation; but there is no sign that the educated mind of Christendom will submit to such a change in the methods of liberal culture. The business school is relied on, indeed, to make architects, engineers, and clerks; but real education, in its higher sense, still resorts to the classics as the foundation." P. 359.

He then cites Germany, her "*reol-schulen*" for the bread and butter sciences, and her *gymnasia* for culture. We had no reference to "business schools" of any sort, but to what are commonly considered the educated classes. We made mention of optional tickets in our great Universities, to special provision for degrees without the ancient languages in curriculum colleges, to the liberal

professions of law and medicine. A few years ago all men who made any pretence to education studied the ancient languages as a matter of course. This is not the case now. The wisdom or the permanency of the rash innovation does not affect our argument, inasmuch as we alluded, not to a prospective result, but to the present effect of this tendency. We disapprove it as thoroughly as he does, and we sincerely hope it will not be permanent; but it has lasted now for twenty years, and Presbyterianism has suffered from it.

Our author goes on to say:

"The Church does not exclude the four-fifths of the cultivated English scholars, by requiring of all classical knowledge; because her call is to come forward and accept a classical education, and then be ordained. The man who is fit for a minister will not refuse the additional labor for Christ when he learns that it is requisite for his more efficient service of Christ." P. 359.

Is not this exactly Mr. Calvin Presbyterian's argument anent the wood-choppers? It would be conclusive but for the fact that men who are undoubtedly fit for ministers do labor efficiently for Christ elsewhere, and we lose the benefit of their aid. If we could persuade the Christian world in general that God's call and election are first to Latin and then to preaching, we would secure some of these men, though we would probably thus persuade the majority of them that God was not calling them into the ministry, and consequently limit all the denominations as we do our own. As it is, however, we only turn them from our work into that of other Churches. Notwithstanding our author's logic, this is the practical effect. We are warned that "if we make the proposed change, we shall be in danger of putting on the old shoes of these denominations just as they are throwing them away," and in this connexion we read:

"Now, it is a significant fact that both these denominations are now expending great effort in making certain changes in their methods of rearing ministers, and that these changes are in the direction of the way we are now advised to forsake. . . . If we are correctly informed by those who are in closest intelligence with their influential men, these are yearly less and less satisfied with their old species of training, and more and more desirous to have all their ministry improve the advantages of the excellent seminaries of theology which they have founded." P. 363.

We have no claim to be, like our author's informants, "in closest intelligence with their influential men," but this disadvantage we have counterbalanced by other intelligence; *e. g.*, we clip the following from the catalogue of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville:

"The institution was established in 1859, by general coöperation of Southern Baptists, with the design of furnishing such theological education as is needed by Baptist ministers. The theory of our churches has always been, and will doubtless continue to be, that the ministry must not be confined to such as have enjoyed superior advantages for mental culture; but that every one who proposes to be a preacher shall be encouraged to gain the most thorough education in his power; while all, whatever general cultivation they may possess, are urged to a diligent study of religious truth, and are examined as to their acquaintance with this before they can be ordained. Our ministry thus contains men of every grade of culture. To meet its wants, then, a Theological Seminary must furnish to college graduates ample facilities for studying the Scriptures in the original, and for pursuing all the branches of a complete theological education; and at the same time it must afford to such as have only a good English education the opportunity of studying the Scriptures in the English version, and full theological instruction in all other respects."

A recent graduate of this institution informs us that during his three years' course there about one-half of the *graduates* were students of the English course only. Moreover, we have examined the catalogues of *seven* Baptist Theological Seminaries, and every one provides an English course. So that "to improve the advantages of these excellent seminaries of theology" does not necessarily involve Greek, Hebrew, and Latin.

As to the Methodists it is well known that attendance upon a seminary is very exceptional with them; their regular recognised system is a combination of work with private study and Annual Conference examinations; there is no mention made of a classical course or the ancient languages, they are entirely *extra curriculum*.¹

That there has been an elevation of the general standard of the ministry of these denominations is true, but this does not justify the retort about putting on their old shoes; as well might a

¹ See foot note on p. 643.

wearily, when complaining of the stiffness and style incident to a five story brown-stone palace residence, rebuke one who would remind him that real refinement and true home-life were to be enjoyed in houses of medium size and style, by pointing to a shed-room building to a roadside cottage, and ask whether his friend were advising him to put on the peasant's old shoes!

Until these denominations manifest some disposition to require the dead languages as a *sine qua non*, our author's objection drawn from their experience has no force against our recommendation. Their experience is in our favor.

He objects that these "grades" would violate the *parity of the ministry*, one of the corner-stones of our Constitution. This sounds very much like a play upon the word "grades." We referred only to grades in scholarship; the Constitution surely does not require *parity* of scholarship. Differences fully as great as any resultant from this recommendation do already exist among us; there is as great distance between the scholarship of such men as Dr. Alexander and Dr. Dabney, and that of our average pastor, as there would be between our average pastor and the diligent student of English works in divinity, exegesis, homiletics, etc. Moreover, we maintain that the line dividing the higher and lower grades of our ministry according to this objection, is not the line of scholarship chiefly, but that of natural force, fluency, originality, tact, and talents, together with the power and influence and popularity derived therefrom. Can any one deny that above this imaginary line in popularity, usefulness, and influence are found many men who have allowed their scholastic attainments to lapse, while below it are many whose scholarship is indisputable? *In this discussion it seems to be assumed that scholarship in the dead languages is the inevitable and invariable test of efficiency in the ministry.* Let readers pause and examine their own observation as to the justice of this assumption. We hope we do not under-rate the importance of scholarship; we have certainly striven hard and conscientiously, ever since we became a school-boy, to attain it; but we think there is room to question whether the Presbyterian ideal does not lay too much stress on scholarship in God's work.

We find some pages devoted to the inconvenience of grafting an English course on the Seminary; as this is not our plan, we pass that by. Our plan, as our author himself states, was "not to lower the standard of learning in our Seminaries, or discourage such as have a taste for it from acquiring classical training," (did we not expressly say, recommend and advise all who could to acquire it?) "but that there shall be another wide door," etc. P. 348. We did not emphasise particularly the *width* of the door. We think there is need for some method of preparation which may be pursued without leaving home, family, and business to go to a theological school; a course of study that may be prosecuted privately by a student depending on his own resources, so situated that he cannot attend a seminary. As it is, our requirements in the languages necessitate a teacher. In all the other departments a faithful conscientious student could with reasonable diligence prepare himself for examination before his Presbytery; Church history, theology, polity, homiletics, pastoral theology, are accessible in the very text-books used in the seminaries. Could not a course be devised and authorised for certain cases by which a way would be open to any and all who wished to avail themselves of it? Our critic speaks of "English course," "perfunctory Sabbath-school course," etc., as if such were bound to be the grade; but we need not remind readers that such a course of study could be framed as would be just as comprehensive as the Presbytery chose to make it and yet *be within the reach of home study*, and attainable in two or three years conscientious application. More than this, we think that such a course could be arranged in a way to combine study with work, and to allow the candidate to pass by graded annual examinations from licensure to ordination somewhat as they do in the Methodist Church,¹ and

¹ It may be a matter of some interest to readers to see the Methodist Course of Study; we therefore give it. It is taken from the Minutes of the South Carolina Conference for 1879, p. 77. We think material improvement could be made in it by some substitutions.

"COURSE OF STUDY.

"FOR ADMISSION ON TRIAL.—The Bible in reference to doctrines generally; Wesley's Sermons on Justification by Faith, and on the Witness of the Spirit; Book of Discipline; the ordinary branches of an English education.

thus by the exercise of their gifts, make full proof of their ministry, in the meantime rendering efficient service to the Church. Is this impossible? Has it not been tested and approved by the Methodist Church?

We are pointed to the already existing "provision for extraordinary cases," but nobody pauses to explain just what this provision is. We recommend readers to examine into this matter and see just exactly how much provision is made, what the standard prescribed for such cases is, what the cases are, how far the provision applies in the matter of licensure, ordination, etc. Suppose we were ungracious enough to intimate that nearly the only use made of this provision is as a general background to fall back upon when a candidate, coming regularly to us from the Seminary, yet passes his examinations so unsatisfactorily as to keep us from "sustaining" them conscientiously without a dim remem-

"FIRST YEAR.—The Bible in reference to its historical and biographical parts and chronology; Book of Discipline, with special reference to Chapter I., Sections I. and II.; Manual of Discipline, Chapters I. and II.; Wesley's Sermons, Volume I.; Ralston's Elements of Divinity; Watson's Institutes, Part IV.; Preacher's Manual; History of the organization of the M. E. Church, South, by A. H. Redford; Written Sermon on Repentance.

"*Books of Reference.*—Watson's Biblical and Theological Dictionary; Theological Compend; Fletcher's Works; Watson's Life of Wesley.

"SECOND YEAR.—The Bible in reference to its prophetic parts; Wesley's Sermons, Volume II.; Watson's Institutes, Part III.; Smith's Elements of Divinity; Book of Discipline, with special reference to Chapters II., III., and IV.; Manual of Discipline, Chapters III. and IV.; Coppee's Rhetoric; Written Sermon on Justification by Faith.

"*Books of Reference.*—Newton or Keith on the Prophecies; Angus's Hand-book of the Bible; Claude's Essay on the Composition of a Sermon; Watson's Sermons; Bickerstith on the Spirit of Life; Whately's Rhetoric.

"THIRD YEAR.—The Bible in reference to the Life of Christ; Wesley's Sermons, Volume III.; Watson's Institutes, Part II.; Coppee's Logic; Rivers's Mental Philosophy; Edgar's Variations of Popery; Book of Discipline, with special reference to Chapter V. to the end; Manual of Discipline, Chapters V., VI., and VII.; Written Sermon on the Witness of the Spirit.

"*Books of Reference.*—Young's Christ of History; Neander's Life of Christ; Hickok's Mental Science; Vinet's Pastoral Theology; Stevens'

branch of the provision, whereas the only "extraordinary" thing about the case is that a conscientious man could have so wasted his opportunities during a three years' seminary course, that practically the chief use of this provision were thus to "hide a multitude of sins." Suppose we were to make such an ungracious insinuation, would our brother-presbyters feel safe in denying it? But let us examine some of the results predicated of the change we recommended.

One is, that the multitude of men, assumed to be ignorant men too, availing themselves of this change would flood us with their ignorance. Now, on p. 362 our author argues that the door is already open, but that the good sense of the Church is against using it; that pastors, churches, and even the possible candidates themselves feel this. "If the Christian community felt the need of this way, it would use it. It does not use it; and the inference

History of Methodism; Paine's Life of McKendree; D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation; Whately's Logic.

"FOURTH YEAR.—The Bible in reference to the Acts and Epistles, their analysis and design; Wesley's Sermons, Volume IV.; Watson's Institutes, Part I.; Powell on Apostolic Succession; Hickok's Moral Science; Mosheim's Church History; Summers on Baptism; Book of Discipline, reviewed; Manual of Discipline, Chapters VIII. and IX.; Written Sermon on Regeneration.

"Books of Reference.—Butler's Analogy; Bingham's Antiquities; Rivers's Moral Philosophy; Hoppin's Homiletics; Wall on Infant Baptism; Litton's Church of Christ; Neander's Church History; Liddon on the Divinity of our Lord; Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul.

"COMMENTARIES.—Clark's; Watson's Exposition; Wesley's Notes; Summers on the Gospels; Stier's Words of the Lord Jesus; Lange on the New Testament; Ohlhausen on the New Testament; Alford on the New Testament; Bloomfield on the New Testament; Macnight on the Epistles; Henry's Exposition; Whitby's Commentary.

"NOTE.—The examination will be confined to the Course of Study. The books of reference are recommended to be read, and the Commentaries to be consulted.

"*.* The candidates for admission on trial, and the several classes to be examined, and the members of the Examining Committee, are required to be present at the seat of the Annual Conference, at 9 o'clock on the morning of the day next preceding the day appointed for the meeting of the Conference, and enter upon the prescribed examinations."

is that really it does not want it." But when we reach the latter part of the article, the argument assumes that there are crowds looking longingly over the bars only waiting to rush in and overwhelm us; and this, too, in the face of his previous point, so forcibly put, that the bars, and a wide pair at that, were already down, yet nobody entered, *ergo*, nobody wished to enter!

We do not think either statement correct; that there would be substantial increase, we believe; but we apprehend no very overwhelming rush. We believe that a large majority would still pursue the full classical course. There is no danger of the Presbyterian Church's ever being swamped by ignorance. Her tastes, predilections, and prejudices, so ably voiced by our author, would be her safeguard. There would still be as strong inducements to attain this standard as there are now to *maintain* it. And our critic will agree with us in asserting that if the only spur to diligence be the Presbyterian trials for licensure, the future scholarship of the candidate is very dubious. Besides this, according to our scheme, the course of study would not be left to the option of the candidate; the ultimate decision would rest with the Presbytery, to which the matter may be safely trusted; this court would not have any more real power than it now actually exercises, it would have a law to do that which it now frequently does without law.

Another point is worthy of note in this connexion. While we are warned of the danger of being swamped by ignorance, we are pointed to the Methodists and Baptists as having worked themselves from a very low standard to one which requires us in the future to be careful for our laurels in this matter. We are specially directed to beware of the history of the Cumberland Church, which, we are told, owes its *raison d'être* to the determination to have an uneducated ministry, and is described as if it were conceived and born in ignorance. A writer is quoted, with approval, who advertises us of the danger of sinking so low that even this Church may make our lack of scholarship a bar to alliance with us. We have no knowledge of the Cumberland Church or its ministry; but this same writer says of it, "that no branch of the Presbyterian Church has, in proportion to its numbers and

resources, more colleges, universities, and theological schools." Now, then, if such is the state of things existing in these denominations; if, though struggling with ignorance from the beginning, they have nevertheless managed to attain in a few years such a standard, why attempt to frighten us so? Surely, with our past history and traditions, our present standing, tastes, and sentiments, we need not be so alarmed when they have accomplished such results under such circumstances.

A second result prophesied of the proposed change is *Broad Churchism*. Our author gives greater prominence to this result than any other. As we have said already, we are not acquainted with the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. So far as the Methodist and Baptist Churches are concerned, we hardly think they can with justice be called broad. The Baptists are considered in our country as just a little narrow, if anything. And we think the Methodists will be found quite *sound* on Arminianism; those we have met have not enough Calvinism to hurt them. It is highly probable our author has heard some preaching which he considered inconsistent with Arminianism; and we fancy if the Methodists were to hear him preach on such a topic as "God's free, sincere offer of salvation to all men," they would in all probability charge him with being inconsistent with *his* creed, and go away declaring that it was as good *Methodist* doctrine as they cared to hear. If they generalised, as he does in his argument on this point, they would say that the Presbyterian Church is "broad." Such inferences are unreliable; what course the denomination pursues with such men as the great Hebraist Toy, now Professor at Harvard, at one time a tower of strength in the same department of the Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville, is a better criterion. And the case of Prof. Toy introduces very well our reply to this objection. We have made somewhat a study of the matter of Broad Churchism; and while we are not able to discover its *genesis*, yet we are satisfied that it is not to be found in a lack of scholarship, certainly not of classical learning. We are inclined to consider it entirely independent of scholarship, whether as regards churches or individuals. The Northern Presbyterian Church is certainly broader than the

Southern; the Continental Presbyterian Churches are broader than the Northern Church; they are said to be more Arminian than the Cumberland Presbyterians; the Church of England is broader than any we have mentioned, and it is doubtless more learned than any of them. If we consider individuals, we find such men as Toy, Newman Smyth, Beecher, John Miller, Farrar, Kingsley, Stanley, Robertson, Godet (see his "Romans"), Robertson Smith, and hundreds of others, all of whom are decidedly above average scholarship, and some of them distinguished specialists in the very departments in which they are broad. When we think of such things we cannot regard learning, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, any sure defence against this great evil. We rather incline to the opinion that the best antidote is to be found, not in Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, but in earnest, active preaching of the gospel for the salvation of souls. We do not hear of much Broad Churchism among this class of men. It generally finds its victims not in the pulpit, but in the Professorships and among professional students. We mention this merely as a coincidence, but one bearing on our author's argument.

And now, in conclusion, what is the best substitute which a man of the conspicuous ability of our author has to offer for our recommendation? He recognises these "crying needs in our outlying destitutions"; and how would he meet them? He would lift up the ruling elders to the level of *official teachers*; he would require from them that "aptness to teach" which he has expounded, in connexion with the Ephesine elder, as requiring in the man of this day the attainments of a "learned Greek scholar and archæologist." But, supposing that the elders, *qua* elders, could be thus lifted, how could they supply the outlying destitutions?

This plan smacks a little of our hint about local preachers, only it keeps them where they are least needed. We think many of them might be thus lifted by pursuing such a course as we recommended, *and which our author here must rely upon, unless he proposes to send them to the Seminary*; but then, after they have attained the standard of "official teachers," by all means ordain

them and send them out. We certainly cannot afford, under our present circumstances, to have from three to six official teachers confined to the average congregation.

But even this plan is not needed, according to the position maintained in the early part of the article. He renders all argument and discussion useless by saying, on page 348 :

"Presbyterianism is providentially fashioned and employed to do for Christendom her own peculiar part. It is the conservative branch of the family of Churches, checking the departures of all others from sound doctrine. It is the exemplar of scriptural organisation. It is the sustainer of the more thorough education of both ministry and laity. And we assert that, constituted as poor human nature now is, it is entirely reasonable to expect that Presbyterianism cannot, in the nature of the case, both perform all these her peculiar and precious functions, and also compete successfully for the largest and most promiscuous numbers. . . . The normal school cannot have as many pupils as the popular school ; to do so, it must cease to be normal."

This is a comfortable claim, to say the least of it. The paragraph has an exceedingly pleasing ring ; but how much of it is rhetoric ? Let us examine and see.

1st. How far are we a normal school ? We are a select school, certainly ; but in what sense are we *normal* ?

2d. We are conservative, checking the departures of other Churches. Conservatism always smacks to us of *ballast*, when used in this connexion. Can we afford so much constant self-sacrifice in behalf of other Churches ?

3d. We are the exemplar of scriptural organisation.

But our author had already said (we emphasise several words), "Aggressiveness ought to be a *prime* trait of every Church, and *test of its fidelity* ; for what else is her great commission from her Lord, except a command to be aggressive until she has conquered the *whole world* ? She ought to be able to reach the *poorest and lowest*." P. 348. While here we are told that her "*precious and peculiar functions*" prevent her competing successfully for the "*largest and most promiscuous numbers* ;" and promiscuous, too, in the sense of the ordinary common school, as distinguished from the normal.

4th. The sustainer of the more thorough education of both ministry and laity.

Is the education of the laity a "precious and peculiar" function of the Church? Is this any part of her distinctive work as commissioned by her Lord? Is even the thorough education of the ministry an *end*, or is it only a means? This looks like saying that we cannot work with the same effectiveness as others, because our means are unsuitable, and yet justifying the fact by claiming to be at the same time sustainers of the best means; *i. e.*, we cannot be as effective, because our means are too effective to allow us to be! Moreover, this plea of being the sustainer of the more thorough education, is deprived of some of its force by the representations, made in his article, of the standard of these other denominations. If those representations are correct, we should think these denominations had about reached the position of independence in this matter, and could dispense with our aid. We have seen what is said in the matter of colleges as to the Cumberland Presbyterians on page 646. Dorchester gives statistics of denominational colleges (1877) in his recent work. The following is from table xiv., p. 550:

	<i>Colleges.</i>	<i>Students in the</i>	<i>College property.</i>
		<i>A. B. course.</i>	
Baptists,	46	4,011	\$10,368,016
Methodists, . . .	57	4,496	11,050,600
Presbyterians, . .	41	3,459	7,073,947

We must remember that our relations to these denominations are not what they once were. In 1800, according to Dorchester, the Baptists had only one college, the Methodists none, and the Presbyterians three. At that time we might with more reason have claimed to be occupying a providential position in America with reference to education; though, all things considered, we believe the loss to be ours, the gain theirs. Has not the providence of God relieved us of our duty to our brethren in this matter? Will statistics now allow this claim of sustaining the higher education as a "precious and peculiar function" of our Church, even if ever it was?

We leave one question with readers for serious and mature consideration: Suppose these denominations continue to progress numerically and educationally for the next fifty years as they

have done in the last fifty, what will be *our* relative position at the end of that time? Can we fall back then upon this pleasing portrait our author has painted? Can our readers accept it as satisfactory and compensatory even now? Is it the gospel ideal of a Church? Is it their ideal?

ARTICLE II.

THE NEW TESTAMENT PLAN OF EDUCATING CANDIDATES FOR THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.

Christ, our Saviour and Redeemer, is the divine Head of the Christian Church. From him come all her ordinances, all her rights, all her powers, and all her life. Her ministers and officers derive all their authority and functions from him. And therefore all who are to enter the sacred office, all who are *candidates* for the exalted duties devolving on ministers of Christ, must be prepared, trained, and educated, not according to merely human methods and principles, but according to methods and principles either expressly set forth in, or deduced by good and necessary inference from, the teachings of the inspired word of God. And, although the Scriptures of the Old Testament are inspired, and testify, in all their parts, of Christ the Messiah, yet it is especially to the Scriptures of the New Testament given to us by the inspired evangelists, apostles, and prophets of Christ that we must look for the rules and principles to be applied by the Church in selecting and educating candidates for the Christian ministry.

Let it be observed that Christ, while on earth, availed himself of his omniscience as God, and set in motion examples and principles, the full meaning of which his chosen apostles and disciples themselves did not understand, but which were intended to provide a constant succession, a deathless band of ministers, who should follow each other in successive ages, and, as heralds, go into all the world and proclaim the gospel. He did not keep his chosen twelve constantly by his side or in his society, although,

from the time when he first chose them, he was constantly employed either in working miraculous works of love which they would have been glad to see, or in delivering sermons, discourses, parables, and instructions which they would have been glad to hear. His heart of divine love was already yearning over the thousands and tens of thousands of poor, lost, sorrowing children of Adam's race, who were in the country and the cities and towns of Palestine, but who, in the very nature of things, could not reach his person and see his works and hear his words. Therefore, we have those simple yet pathetic and deep-toned words of the first evangel: "But when he saw the multitudes, he was moved with compassion for them, because they were distressed and scattered, as sheep not having a shepherd. Then said he unto his disciples, The harvest truly is plenteous, but the laborers are few. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth laborers into his harvest." Here is the divine germ of all subsequent *candidacy* for the Christian ministry. Here is the solemn admonition uttered by the lips of the God-man, the Lord of the harvest, urging all Christians, and especially all Christian parents, guardians, and teachers, not merely to be ceaseless, earnest, importunate in prayer for laborers, but, as the logical outcome from such prayers, to use every prudent means in their power for finding, directing, equipping, and encouraging such laborers to enter the harvest field as soon as they are prepared for the needed labor.

It was immediately after uttering these words of heavenly cheer that Christ called his twelve apostles and sent them out from him into the field to preach the gospel of the kingdom. Matt. ix. 36-38; x., *pass.*; Mark iii. 13-15; vi. 7-13. And not content with the very limited number thus sent, he soon afterwards appointed seventy (perhaps seventy-two) other ministers of the word and sent them out on a similar mission. Luke ix. 1-6; x. 1-24. The authority and instructions given to each of these classes of preachers were substantially the same. Both classes were empowered to work miracles; both were instructed to proclaim the gospel. It is true, the mission of each class was, then, for a special and temporary purpose. They were sent to the mul-

titudes of the distressed and scattered people who were "as sheep not having a shepherd," to announce the coming and the presence of the "Good Shepherd," the "Shepherd and Bishop of souls." And in order to authenticate their mission, and to leave all men without excuse, if they rejected him, they were empowered to work miracles like his miracles—wondrous works of mercy and love. These miracles were to be continued in the Church and in the hands of the apostles and ministers of Christ, as instruments, for such time as might be needed and reasonable, in order to prove the divine power and mission of Jesus of Nazareth as the Son of God, and then were to cease. Matt. x. 8; Luke x. 17-20; 1 Cor. xiii. 8-10.

But the example given, in the sending forth, first of the twelve apostles, and then of the seventy *other* (*ἑτέρους*) ministers of Christ to preach to the poor, distressed, and scattered people, and to act as under-shepherds to them, was *not* temporary in its effect, nor special in its design. It was the type and forerunner of the permanent and undying Christian ministry in the world. As to this permanent duty, no distinction was established between the twelve apostles and the seventy *others* sent forth. This is proved by the words used in establishing the two missions. *Both* are preceded or accompanied by the same divine words: "The harvest is plentiful, but the laborers are few; pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth laborers into his harvest." "Go your ways: behold, I send you forth as lambs in the midst of wolves." And as to the seventy, the word used to signify their appointment by Christ is very strong—*ἀπέδειξε*—he manifested them, showed them forth, held them up as torches in the darkness. In fact, it is the same word from which comes the noun in Luke i. 80, applied to the mission of Christ himself to the Israel of God. And moreover, it is declared of these seventy that Christ *ἀπέστειλεν αὐτοὺς*. He *apostled* them—sent them on the same mission as he sent the twelve apostles, so far as the high functions of preaching the gospel and being under-shepherds to the scattered sheep were concerned. Hence the inference is proximate and reasonable that these seventy, or some of them, composed a part of the company of favored ministers and dis-

ciples who were gathered together just before the ascension of Christ, and to whom the two from Emmaus came, and who are thus described by the same inspired evangelist, Luke, who has preserved to us the only account we have of the appointment and mission of these seventy; "And they rose up the same hour, and returned to Jerusalem, and found the eleven gathered together, *and them that were with them* (*καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτοῖς*), saying, The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon." It seems manifest, from the continuous narrative in Luke xxiv. 33-53, and also from that in the Acts of the Apostles i. 1-26, and especially verse 15, that, besides the eleven, other ministers of Christ (included in the expression "and them that were with them," and included in the one hundred and twenty who were addressed by Peter, and who took part in the prayers and the lot which designated Matthias, the twelfth apostle) went out to the scene of the ascension; and that to all these apostles and ministers were delivered the words of the divine commission: "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye, therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; *teaching* them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you: and lo! I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

The qualifications and functions of the twelve apostles of Christ, so far as they were miraculous and special, were such that they formed a class strictly *sui generis*, so that it was impossible that they could ever have successors. They were all his own chosen and personal companions; all had seen his human personality (for even Paul was no exception to this rule, having, at his miraculous conversion, seen Jesus of Nazareth, whom once he persecuted); all were witnesses of his life, his miracles, his sojourn on earth after his resurrection from the dead, and of his ascension to heaven. All were auditors of his heavenly lessons and of his final commission. And all were to aid in the great work of laying the Christian foundation. But in respect to the functions of preaching the gospel, heralding salvation to all ages and all peoples, administering the sacraments and ordinances of his Church on earth, and acting as under-shepherds until the Chief Shep-

herd (*ἀρχιποίμην*, 1 Peter v. 4) shall appear, these twelve apostles never claimed and never had any preëminence over their fellow-ministers. Philip i. 18–21; 2 Tim. iv. 1–5; 1 Peter v. 1–4.

Christ knew well that all his apostles and ministers, personally chosen and sent out by him, would soon die. He himself predicted the death and mode of death of one of them. In using, therefore, the words, “Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world,” he assuredly contemplated and provided for their successors, a ceaseless band of ministers, of heralds of the cross, who, in all subsequent ages and in all nations, should proclaim salvation through his atoning blood and his spotless righteousness. Under no other conditions could the ample terms of his grand commission be fulfilled. By no other means could his intercessory prayer, rising from the depths of his all-compassionate heart, and uttered in immediate view of his sufferings and death, be answered, and its petitions granted by the Paternal Power and Majesty. John xvii. 16–24.

If, then, an unending succession of ministers of the word was contemplated and provided for, they were to be chosen, trained, and educated for their sacred duties. The idea of a set of men spontaneously choosing and appointing themselves, and going forth untrained, uneducated, illiterate, to perform the highest function of *teaching* others that the world has ever known, is an idea condemned and repudiated by the whole tenor of the inspired word. Even under the Jewish dispensation, although the duties of the priest involved, to a very small extent, the function of *teaching*, and were, to a great extent, matters of ritual and formal routine, yet no man was permitted, spontaneously and of his own mere choice, and untrained and unfitted by education, to enter the sacred courses of the priesthood. “No man taketh the honor unto himself but when he is called of God, even as was Aaron.” Heb. v. 4. And if the priest of the abrogated dispensation and bloody sacrifices dared not come uncalled, uneducated, and unfitted, how much less can the minister of Christ, whose paramount function is to *teach* to others the way of eternal life, venture to come to the discharge of so exalted a function unless called by the voice of the Church, which is the voice of God speaking

through his people, in whom is his Spirit; and unless trained, educated, and prepared for duties so solemn and issues so momentous! Without such call, and without training and education, he will be but "a blind leader of the blind, and both shall fall into the pit." Matt. xv. 14.

The inspired *exemplars* given to us in the New Testament all tend to prove that ministers of Christ must be called, not merely by the inward call of their own spontaneous inclinations and convictions, but by the outward call of Christ, which, ever since his ascension and the death of his apostles, has been made by the action of his visible Church on earth. And they are never so called until they are fitted by training and education for their arduous and exalted duties. To expect a man to *teach* others who has never been *taught* himself, is to expect a miracle for which there is no precedent even in the varied miracles recorded in the Scriptures.

The days of miracles ceased with the authentication and establishment of the divine mission and teachings of Christ and his apostles. Yet even in those days of miracles, the ministers of Christ were all trained and *educated* for their duties by processes not necessarily nor entirely miraculous. The apostles of Christ were, for three years, in a theological school taught by the divine Teacher himself. And all of his heavenly teachings which he deemed needful for the permanent regeneration and instruction of fallen man, are preserved in the New Testament. There they are in the Greek language, and containing depths of holy meaning which the close studies of eighteen hundred years have not sounded. Can it be pretended that no training, no education is needed for the man who undertakes to unfold those heavenly meanings?

And Paul, the great Apostle to the Gentiles, and the inspired writer of a large part of the New Testament, was a *thoroughly educated man* in secular and Jewish learning before he ever entered the Christian ministry. He had studied the marvellously beautiful and flexible Greek language with sedulous care, and he had read, with taste and discrimination, the philosophy, natural, mental, and moral, and the poetry recorded in that language.

And he had studied ancient Hebrew, and all the law, the prophets, and the Psalms, under the accomplished Jewish Rabbi, Gamaliel. Acts v. 33-40; xvii. 16-31; xxii. 2-4, 39, 40; xxi. 1-21; xxvi. 1-29; 2 Cor. xi. 5-7, 22, 23.

Yet, after he had acquired all this profane and Hebrew learning, when he was converted to Christ, he was not at once admitted to the active duties of the Christian ministry, but went down into Arabia, and after a time returned to Damascus, so that a period of three years passed between his baptism as a Christian and his public assumption of the character and duties of a minister of Christ. That these three years were spent in study and thought, and furnished a very important part of his theological education, cannot be doubted. Gal. i. 15-24. It is true that parts of his studies were inspired and miraculous, but we have reason to believe all were not so, and that many of his studies were the ordinary workings and reflections of a regenerated and vigorous soul on the already recorded revelations of the Old Testament, and on the facts furnished to him by human history, philosophy, and science. 2 Cor. xii. 1-10; Romans and Hebrews *passim*; Acts xiv. 1-18; xvii.

Therefore, the life and career of the Apostle Paul furnish positive proof that Christ requires training and education to be applied to the man who is admitted to the high honor of being his minister. And the same is true as to the life and career of Peter, James, John, Thomas, Philip, Timothy, Titus, Apollos, Barnabas, Silas—in short, of every man concerning whom the New Testament furnishes evidence that he was a minister of Christ. *No education—no minister*, is the constant verdict of inspiration. To teach others, the teacher must himself have been taught.

From these premises we draw the inevitable conclusion that there must be *candidates* for the ministry before there are ministers. If we needed express scriptural authority for this conclusion, we should find it in the case of young Timotheus of Lystra, who was instructed in all the Messianic and ethical knowledge that could be drawn from the inspired Hebrew Scriptures, by his grandmother Lois and his mother Eunice, concerning whose “unfeigned faith” the Apostle Paul testifies, 2 Tim. i. 5. Yet he did not

hurry into the holy office, but studied still, and doubtless heard from the lips of Paul that grand sermon against idolatry and in favor of *natural theism*, delivered to the idolaters of Lystra when the priest of Jupiter (after the healing of the impotent man) brought oxen and garlands and would have offered sacrifice to Paul as Mercury and to Barnabas as Jupiter. A considerable time passed between the first visit of Paul to Lystra and his second visit, when he introduced Timothy (with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery) to the full and active duties of the Christian ministry. During this interval, it is but a reasonable inference from the inspired records on the subject, that Timothy was, as a candidate, diligently prosecuting his theological studies, and especially improving daily his knowledge of the Holy Scriptures which "were able to make him wise unto salvation through faith that is in Christ Jesus." Acts xvi. 1-5; 1 Tim. iv. 6, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16; vi. 20, 21; 2 Tim. i. 13, 14, 23; iii. 14-17. Therefore, before a man can be a minister of Christ he must be a *candidate* for that high office and must pass the trials needed to ascertain whether he have the vocation and the training and education requisite therefor.

Thus we are brought to the inquiry, What are the teachings of the New Testament as to the qualifications and education which ought to be required of every man who is admitted, by the visible Church, to the office of a minister of the gospel of Christ? We are to gather these teachings from the express words of Scripture, or from good and necessary inferences deduced from such express words.

First, then, we say that the candidate must give credible evidence by his profession and his walk, conversation and conduct, his words and his deeds, that he is himself a truly regenerated and converted man, a child of God, a believer with the *heart*, *i. e.*, the whole spiritual nature, in the Son of God, in Christ the only Saviour and Redeemer of mankind. Nothing of natural or acquired gifts, of genius, of talent, of learning, human or divine, of eloquence, or of penetrating insight into human nature can compensate for the want of spiritual life, of humble and vital godliness in the candidate. To teach others a knowledge of

Christ, he must himself have that knowledge; to teach others the way to heaven, he must himself be in that way, so as to be able to walk therein before them.

This indispensable condition precedent is required in the candidate for the holy office, by many teachings of the New Testament. We have seen that the seventy preachers mentioned by the Evangelist Luke, though sent on a special and temporary mission, were yet appointed, commissioned, and instructed with so much of the solemnity appropriate to the mission of the apostles, that they must be considered as types and exemplars of the ministerial succession in all subsequent ages. What, then, was the paramount qualification possessed by them prior to their appointment and mission? It appears in the very words of Christ. They returned from their evangelistic tour *with joy*—a joy which, although spiritual and justifiable in its basis, had in it an alloy of human ambition and pride. Their joyful report to Jesus was, “Lord, even the devils are subject unto us in thy name!” His answer contained an indulgent appreciation of their triumph (through his power) over Satan and the powers of darkness, and a promise of the continuance to them of miraculous protection, but it closes with a divine admonition in these words: “Howbeit, in this rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you: but rejoice *that your names are written in heaven.*” Luke x. 20. Without regeneration and a title to heaven, all intellectual, spiritual, and even miraculous successes in a candidate for the ministry of Christ will be worse than nothing.

And this same lesson as to the absolute necessity for genuine personal Christianity in candidates for the sacred office is taught by the inspired Paul in the ninth chapter of his first Letter to the Corinthians, wherein, after declaring the fixed law of Christ's earthly kingdom in the words: “Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel,” he proceeds to give the true ideal of a faithful preacher, and ends with the impressive words: “But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway.” 1 Corinthians xi. 14, 27. The word *ἀδόκιμος* here used and rendered “a

castaway" occurs eight times in the New Testament, and means "disapproved, rejected, reprobate" in the strongest significancy of those words. How all-important, then, is it that the Church shall use all the vigilance and means in her power to bar the very outer doors of the holy temple against men concerning whose piety and Christian character there is even a shade of reasonable doubt!

And this same lesson Paul farther teaches in the close of the twelfth and in the thirteenth chapter of that same inspired Letter, wherein he shows that gifts of tongues, miracles, prophecy, mysteries, knowledge, faith to remove mountains, yea, even the enthusiastic devotion to a cause or a party which is sufficient, in many cases, to generate a martyr and to carry a man who is *not* a Christian triumphantly to rack, fagot, stake, and scaffold—all these gifts and qualifications, which would seem so peculiarly to adorn a minister and to fit him for his high office, will not compensate for the want of that genuine Christian *love* which is the first fruit of the Holy Spirit in his regenerating act and sanctifying work on the fallen spirit of man. 1 Cor. xii. 12–31; xiii. *passim*. And this same lesson is repeated in new and impressive forms in the fourth chapter of his second Letter to the Corinthian church; and is wrought into the very texture and essence of his inspired Epistles to Timothy and Titus.

Better, therefore, would it be for the visible Church of Christ that she had *no ministers* at all, and that she trusted the question of her maintenance and progress in the world to the blessing of her divine Head on the prayers and exertions of her private members, than that she should clothe with the outward forms of the holy office men calling themselves *ministers*, and yet destitute of the inward gifts and graces coming from the Spirit of God. And as the candidate is the minister *in embryo*, and as no prescience of the visible Church is adequate to predict that a man not now a true Christian will ever become one, the scriptural argument, requiring that the *candidate* for the ministry shall be a truly regenerated and converted man, is overwhelming in strength, and increasing rather than diminishing in its inspired admonitions to the Church, urging her to vigilance, fidelity, honesty, and firmness as to the reception and *status* of candidates.

Second. In addition to satisfactory evidence that he is a genuine Christian, the visible Church must be satisfied, upon adequate evidence, that the candidate is a prudent and reasonably well-balanced man in respect to mental equilibrium. In other words, he must be a man competent to exercise a reasonably sound judgment as to the facts and events of life which environ him, and to carry out the decisions of such judgment in prudent practical conduct. This qualification is important, for it is well known that some truly sincere and pious men are yet so wanting from their childhood and youth in common prudence and sound judgment, that they cannot be intrusted with the projection and conduct of important worldly affairs; and therefore *much less* can they be intrusted with the momentous interests of the Church of Christ. Such men are sometimes useful both in the Church and in the world, but they can only be relied on when they are kept working in subordinate positions, subjected to and sustained by the constant care and *surveillance* of more prudent people. Yet in deciding on such disqualification, great caution and discrimination must be exercised by the visible Church. Mere eccentricity, mere departures from the ordinary and normal modes of thought and word and action, even as to important matters, must never be mistaken for incurable imprudence and chronic unsoundness of judgment. Some of the most eminent and useful men that have ever worked either in the Church or the world, have been marked out, in youth and early manhood, chiefly by their eccentricities. On this head of disqualification, therefore, no certain and specific rules can be laid down, because no definite *indicia* exist for determining the judgment. The question must depend upon the preceding and surrounding facts in each case presented, and must be brought under the principle laid down by the learned Grotius in a form slightly extended beyond his words: "*Lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni (et sapientis) viri remittit.*"

But, while giving full effect to these cautions and urging on the visible Church the kindest spirit in deciding upon such an alleged ground of disqualification, it must not be forgotten that the ground often exists, and is fully recognised and insisted on by the Holy Spirit in the New Testament Scriptures. It is laid

down by the Apostle Paul in his inspired Letters to Timothy and Titus. In the first, in giving the qualifications to be required of the teaching presbyter or bishop charged with the *oversight* of souls—that is, of the minister of Christ whose duty it is to labor in word and doctrine, Paul uses two very expressive Greek adjectives *σώφρων* and *κόσμιος*. And of these, the first is repeated in the Letter to Titus, wherein the *presbyter* is even more distinctly identified with the *bishop*. These Greek words are rendered in our common version “sober” and “of good behavior,” but in the revised version of 1881 they are, with far greater accuracy, rendered “sober-minded” and “orderly.” Yet even these English words do not give full and adequate expression to their meaning. The first conveys the exact idea of a prudent, well-balanced judgment. It means “of sound mind and good understanding,” “discreet,” “prudent,” “wise,” “moderate,” “having a well-regulated, well-balanced mind.” And *κόσμιος* is even higher in its meaning, being derived from a verb which means “to set in order,” “to adorn,” “to decorate,” “to embellish,” “to beautify.” When such words are used by the Holy Spirit to express the qualifications to be looked for by the visible Church in her candidates for the holy ministry, we cannot doubt that, in addition to genuine piety, the qualities of prudence, discretion, sound judgment, and love of order are, in reasonable measure, to be required. And they are specially needed in the private pastoral duties of the minister—in visiting, admonishing, encouraging, and counselling his people.

Third. The visible Church of Christ has no right to receive as a candidate for his ministry any one who does not give sufficient evidence that he possesses those native powers and qualities of mind that will fit him to be “a teacher” of others. This qualification is plainly required in the inspired Letters to Timothy, where Paul declares that the minister and servant of Christ called by the Church to labor in word and doctrine must be *διδασκικόν*. This word is twice used, viz., in 1 Tim. iii. 2, and in 2 Tim. ii. 24. Our common version translates it by the expressive phrase, “apt to teach,” and the revised version does the same. The phrase, in its full meaning, can hardly be improved. It indicates

that peculiar mental power which some men, by the gift of nature, have, by means whereof they are able to impart and communicate thought and knowledge to others in a manner that excites the attention and takes hold of the intellect and gains the affections of the hearer. Some men have this native power to such extent and in such concentration that it amounts to *talent*—sometimes even to *genius*. Other men have it by nature in a much inferior degree. And in all men who have it at all, it is capable, like every other native power, of great improvement and expansion under the influence of culture and exercise. But, be it ever remembered, that there are some men *born entirely without it*. They have not one particle of *native aptness to teach*. They are evidently designed by Providence for some other department of exertion in which they may be really useful. Men born without “aptness to teach” may be good citizens, laborers, artisans, agriculturists, clerks, merchants, doctors, even lawyers, in the plodding sense which is frequently the money-making sense of the word lawyer; but no amount of reading, study, or culture will make them “teachers” of men; because the native foundation being entirely wanting, it is vain to attempt to create something out of nothing. To receive such men as candidates for the Christian ministry and to induct them into the office is to do violence to the inspired word, and to bring reproach on the cause of Christ. For it must be borne in mind that the candidate is intended to be not merely “a teacher,” but a teacher in a peculiar sense. His mode of teaching in general is to be by *heralding* salvation with the voice and the eye and the hand—by *preaching* the gospel to hearers whose attention and sympathies *must* be gained in order to accomplish to any extent the end desired. The Holy Scriptures nowhere encourage the notion that men not “apt to teach” are to be received as candidates, and to be inducted into the sacred office merely because they are good zealous Christian men and desire to be endued with the office of ministers. God can indeed work good by means of instruments which seem little fitted for the purpose. But such is not his ordinary and indicated method. Therefore his inspired word forbids the Church to receive candidates and to send forth ministers

who are not "apt to teach" in the best and highest sense. Hundreds of such men have been admitted, either by honest mistake or by sinful dereliction of duty on the part of the Church. It would be far better for themselves and for the unfortunate people who from sense of duty are compelled to sit quietly in the pews and *appear* to listen (for real attention is out of their power), and far better for the honor and progress of the Christian Church, if such men were otherwise employed.

But let us beware of misconception or mistake on this subject. The holy word nowhere encourages the Church to seek as her candidates only such persons as may become what are called "popular" or "eloquent" or "sensational" preachers. What the New Testament requires is simply "aptness to teach," that is, "the art of being listened to," the capacity to enlist the attention of and to impart scriptural and saving knowledge to fallen or imperfectly sanctified human souls. Apollos was an "eloquent" man, and he was a very useful minister. Therefore eloquence is not to be despised or undervalued. But Paul is never called "eloquent" in the holy word. On the contrary, if we may judge from his style in his inspired Letters, we should judge that he was didactic, severe, and logical rather than "eloquent." Indeed, he several times declares that, in his own opinion and that of others, he had not the graces and charms of the orator. He says he "came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom," meaning worldly wisdom (1 Cor. ii. 1); and that his speech and preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom (4th verse), and that though he be *rude* in speech (*ιδιότης τῷ λόγῳ*) he is not so in knowledge; and that those who opposed him drew a disparaging comparison between his written compositions and his oral addresses. "For his letters, they say, are weighty and strong; but his bodily presence is weak and his speech of no account"—*καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος*. This Greek participle strongly expresses the idea that, in the opinion of some of his hearers, Paul was not considered a very eloquent or impressive speaker. Nevertheless Paul was "apt to teach" in the best sense. His words conveyed his thoughts which flowed out from a soul on fire with love to Christ and desire to save souls. Therefore no preacher

of whom we have any knowledge ever had greater success in winning souls than Paul. And since his time, many faithful ministers who were not "popular" or "eloquent" or "sensational" in the modern sense of those words, have proved themselves to be, like Paul, "apt to teach," and have been blessed with abundant fruits in their ministry.

Fourth. Candidates intended for the Christian ministry must be men who "have a good report from them that are without." This is insisted on in the inspired word (1 Tim. iii. 7) with a distinctness and emphasis which may well challenge our earnest attention. The expression, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν, is too general and broad to authorise us to confine the meaning only to those outside of the ministerial office. It must mean outside of the visible Church, which is the power that receives and tries and inducts the minister. It is true that in the case of Timothy himself we read only that he "was well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium," (Acts xvi. 2) at the time when Paul received him into the ministry. But this very fact gives a wider meaning to ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν, "by those outside," as here used in the Letter from Paul to this same Timothy. Therefore the teaching of the word is, that candidates for this high office must be well reported of both by the Church and the world. To gain such double and apparently incongruous testimony may not be easy, but it is necessary if the candidate is to be admitted to the ministry of Christ. Of course, it is not meant that the candidate must stand well with the world because he is "of the world" and worldly in his spirit and character. That would run counter to all the spiritual and heavenly-minded qualifications elsewhere required in such candidate, and which have been heretofore dwelt upon herein. It is not meant that any ridicule or scoff or insolence of the worst part of the world cast upon him as a "saint" is to be regarded by the Church as any reason against his admission to her ministry. They may sometimes, and with proper discriminations, be regarded as testimonies in his favor. But the true meaning is, that he must have a *good* report from the world as to those virtues which the world and the Church unite in admitting to be virtues, such as honesty, truth-telling, integrity in

business so far as he has come into contact with worldly business, courtesy and proper attention to the rights and feelings of others, and that sober-minded prudence and sound judgment as to worldly affairs, the want of which "those that are without" are not slow to detect, and to impute to ministers as a serious hindrance to their usefulness in their high vocation.

Fifth. Having completed the survey of such qualifications in candidates as the New Testament requires rather as *conditions precedent*—as foundations for their subsequent training than as that training itself, we are now to examine the teachings of this inspired word as to the actual *education* or studies through which the candidate must pass before he can be rightfully and safely endowed with the ministerial office. Therefore, next we say that the Scriptures require him to be well acquainted with and able to use his own language, his own vernacular, as a ready vehicle of thought. Even if he is to be a foreign missionary and preach to the heathen, he ought first to be well acquainted with his own language, because otherwise he will never be able to deliver in a foreign tongue thoughts which have theretofore always presented themselves in the words of his own language. All the apostles and primitive ministers were, in a very real and important sense, foreign missionaries. But we must carefully note that before they were miraculously and for a temporary purpose taught other tongues, they had all learned their own native tongues, and those who had attended upon the personal ministry of Christ had heard in that native tongue (the Syro-Chaldaic) which he used, lucid, beautiful, and soul-moving discourses and parables which they were expected afterwards to use in teaching their hearers. Mark v. 41; vii. 34; xv. 34; Acts ii. 1–11; xxi. 40; xxii. 1, 2; 1 Cor. xiv. *passim*. But in general the minister is expected to "preach the word" in the language of his own country. He is therefore to master that language, its grammar, its rhetoric, and so much of its literature as will best enable him, with his opportunities and in his sphere, to proclaim salvation by expounding the holy word to those to whom he ministers. He is never excusable for using false grammar, or incoherent rhetoric, or offensive pronunciation or emphasis. For, while many in his congre-

gation may not be thereby offended, one or two or three may be, by such violations of the purity of their language, so shocked and wounded, that all the teachings and appeals of the sermon will be lost to them, and their only recollections of it will be painful and discouraging. The inspired words of God never violate the laws of sound grammar or rhetoric. If, from time to time an ellipsis or unwonted construction occurs, causing obscurity to human minds, it is susceptible of final vindication, and is intended only to increase the disposition to study the word.

Sixth. The candidate for the high functions of the Christian ministry is required by the principles laid down in the New Testament, to study the original languages in which the inspired word was written. He is not required so perfectly to master those languages as to be able to read them, speak them, and write them as well as he can his own vernacular. Neither is he required so to study them as to become a professed philologist therein and to spend his days and nights in studying their difficulties and niceties. All that ought to be required is that he shall diligently study the grammar, the constructions, and the vocabularies of those languages until he is able, with such reasonable aid of lexicon and grammar as he may provide for himself, to test the translation into the forms of his own language, which he received or any revised version may give of any passage of the Old or New Testament, and to obtain from his examination such suggestions and aids as to the true meaning of the Holy Spirit in using or authorising the original words as may help him rightly to expound to his congregation the word of truth.

Less than this cannot ordinarily be required of the candidate, consistently with the teachings, direct or inferential, of the New Testament. It is known that the inspired Scriptures of the Old Testament were originally recorded in Hebrew. The few passages from the books of Ezra and Daniel which appear in Chaldee or East Aramaic, are so little different from the pure Hebrew of the rest of the Old Testament, that very small additional study is needed for them. And all the inspired books of the New Testament are in Greek; for if a Hebrew copy of the Gospel of Matthew was ever in existence, it has long since disappeared.

Therefore, the study of the Hebrew and Greek languages, and the reading and careful grammatical examination of considerable portions of both the Old and New Testaments in those languages respectively, is indispensable to the candidate who intends to conform his education to the New Testament standard. For that standard lays down the fixed rule that the great duty of the minister of Christ is to "preach the *word*;" and by the word is meant the inspired word of God; all those Scriptures which are given by inspiration of God, and are "profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work." 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. It is obviously impossible that a man unacquainted with the original tongues in which the inspired Scriptures were given, shall know that he is "preaching the word." For if he be compelled to trust entirely to a translation, he may be preaching the word of man, and not the word of God, and no means are in his hands to avoid this grave error.

In the New Testament, *six* distinct verbs are used in expressing the duties of the minister in proclaiming the salvation of Christ. These verbs are all significant; and although they are all used in reference to the same high duty, they all stand apart, each with its own separate meaning. In order to obtain all the light as to the *education* of candidates which the inspired Book furnishes, we must pass these six words in review before us. They are:

εὐαγγελίζω, to evangelise, to declare the glad tidings.

κηρύσσω, to herald, to proclaim as a herald.

διδάσκω, to *teach*, in the widest, purest sense.

μαθητεύω, to disciple, to instruct as a disciple.

παιδεύω, to train up, to educate as a child.

κατηχέω, to sound out, to instruct orally.

Of these, the *first* is used in the New Testament fifty-seven times; the *second*, fifty-nine; the *third*, ninety; the *fourth*, four times; but its derivative noun, *μαθητής*, a *disciple*, is used two hundred and fifty-three times; the *fifth*, twelve times, and the *sixth*, eight times. This simple recital of facts will plainly manifest how important the subject of education for the ministry is in the view of the Holy Spirit. And from every one of these words

thus used to indicate the function of *teaching*, which is the paramount function of the Christian minister, the duty of acquiring a competent knowledge of the original languages of inspired Scripture is legitimately derived. For the gospel—the glad tidings of Christ, the Messiah, and of salvation through him—appear in the Old Testament from Genesis to Malachi. They appear in forms gathering brighter and brighter light in type and emblem and slain lamb and sprinkled blood and in Him who was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities, and who hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows, until, in the closing book of the Old Testament, we comfort our souls with the coming light of the Sun of Righteousness with healing in his wings. How are these premonitions of the gospel—the glad tidings—to be understood and brought out in their divine force, without knowledge of the vehicle and form of holy thought which originally conveyed them? And the word meaning “to proclaim as a herald,” gives the true idea of the Christian minister. He is not a *priest* in any other sense than that in which every true Christian is a priest. He is a *herald*, commissioned by the court of heaven to proclaim terms of peace and reconciliation to the revolted province of earth. These terms are set forth in the Holy Scriptures in all their inspired fulness of meaning. No herald ever employed has been considered competent, even according to the standards of earth, unless he was well acquainted with the *language* in which the commission and terms of peace intrusted to him by his sovereign were expressed. The word *διδάσκω*, *teach*, necessarily implies a competent knowledge of the original languages of Holy Scripture; for how shall a man *teach* who has not *learned*; and how shall he learn if he be ignorant of the meaning of the very words which the Holy Spirit originally used or suggested in conveying the messages of God to man? The word meaning “to instruct as a *disciple*” is still stronger in its inferential requirement. For the disciple is not only one who has entered, by gospel invitation, the school of Christ, but who continues in it as a learner through all the rest of his life; and for his continuous instruction the minister needs all the lessons, illustrations, analogies, precepts, warnings, and promises that

he can draw from the holy word in its entirety; and how shall he master these, if he know nothing of the meaning of the words in which they were originally written? The word meaning "to train up, to educate as a child," is equally strong in its exaction on this point; for all experience has shown that, in order to educate a *child*, a deeper insight into the true nature, both of the pupil and of the truths to be taught to him, is required in the teacher than in the case of an adult. The teacher ought not to attempt to teach the child Hebrew and Greek; but he must himself read and understand Hebrew and Greek, in order to draw out the genuine teachings of the word of God; to distil them to their purest essence; and, in that form, to saturate in them the young and receptive mind, so that they shall never be forgotten. And finally, on these six expressive words, that which means "to sound out, to instruct orally," conveys the inmost idea of "preaching the word," rather than reading it, or reading discourses founded on it, and presupposes a competent knowledge of that word, which can only be obtained by knowing its original forms, and what ideas they convey.

But we have in the New Testament even a more potent requirement on this point than any yet presented. Paul, in his Second Letter to Timothy, exhorts him thus: "Study to show thyself approved unto God; a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." 2 Tim. ii. 15. (N. B. The revised version, 1881, is pitifully faulty on this verse.) The original Greek here is very significant: ὀρθοτομοῦντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας. The idea indelibly impressed is, "cutting straight," or "cutting correctly," or, in the happy words of our common version, "rightly dividing the word of truth." Now, the lesson here conveyed is, that the minister of Christ shall, by previous study, know how to divide aright that marvellous book called "The Bible," so as to understand, himself, and to teach to his hearers its true meaning, and each meaning in its true proportion and in its relation to other truths. To do this aright, a competent knowledge of the original forms of the inspired teaching is indispensable, and is even more important now than it was in the days of Paul and Timothy. For, in our day, every version of the Holy Scriptures in common

use has been divided up into chapters and verses, by well-meaning but uninspired men; and though their work has, in general, been well done and has contributed much to the convenient study of the word; yet in many instances the division has been not only *not right*, but specially unfortunate, so as to obscure the meaning intended by the Holy Spirit. For this, the only adequate remedy is such knowledge of the inspired original and of its meaning as will enable the candidate for the ministry *rightly* to divide the word of truth.

Seventh. The New Testament teaches to the visible Church, not in direct and express words, nor by any necessary inference from such words, but by suggestions and intimations which the Church ought to notice, that her candidates for the ministry ought to acquire a competent knowledge of the *Latin* language. Although no part of the inspired Scriptures was originally recorded in Latin, yet facts pointed at and statements made in those Scriptures tend to prove that a knowledge of that language is needed by the man who is to teach the truth of God, and to distinguish it from the conflicting errors and falsehoods which man has invented and sought to maintain as truth. It was not without a profound and far-reaching lesson that the Holy Spirit has inspired the Evangelists Luke and John to record the fact that the Roman Procurator, Pilate, caused a superscription to be placed over the head of our Lord and Redeemer, Jesus Christ, even while he was yet alive and hanging on the cross, "lifted up and to draw all men unto him," John iii. 14, 15; viii. 28; xii. 32; and that this superscription declared him to be King of the Jews, and was written in three languages—in *Hebrew* and *Greek* and *Latin*. Luke xxiii. 38; John xix. 20. No hesitation is here felt in declaring that this fact is testified to by Luke as well as by John. It is true that the learned Doctors Westcott and Hort exclude this statement from the text of Luke, in their critical edition of the Greek Testament on which the revised version of 1881 is supposed to be founded. But the principles of recension confessedly acted on by these erudite editors have never yet gained the assent of the best students of the holy text, and have been openly condemned by many such students, and have be-

trayed those editors into patent errors which have already shaken faith as to the soundness of their work, and of the English version founded on it. Drs. Westcott and Hort, in their "notes on special readings," give no reasons for excluding this statement from the text of Luke; and as the "Textus Receptus" and the most generally approved editions retain them in Luke, we are not yet at liberty to discard them. The very fact that Luke gives his testimony on this point in a different form from John's, is evidence of original and independent record.

The use of these three languages on this occasion by Pilate was doubtless, so far as he was concerned, only the result of a desire to perpetrate a grim sarcasm at the expense of the Jews, and to give it currency in languages, one or another of which would be intelligible to all present. But the declaration of the Kingship of Christ thus made on the hill of Calvary, and recorded in Hebrew and Greek and Latin, gave to those three languages a Christian significance never afterwards lost. From the time of the death of the Apostle John, onward, all ministers of Christ who have really desired to be workmen that need not to be ashamed, have diligently studied those three languages.

And we have in the New Testament other teachings tending to show the value and importance of a competent knowledge of the Latin tongue to the minister of Christ. In the time of our Redeemer's life, death, resurrection, and ascension, and in the days of his inspired apostles, Rome had become the mistress of the world, and she continued so for many centuries afterwards, and, in an important religious sense, claims to be so to this day. Paul looked on the city of Rome and her secular dominion, which was then spread over most of the civilised world, as presenting the fairest of fields and prospects for extending the gospel of Christ. Hence, he valued very highly his freedom as a Roman citizen, and availed himself of it for his own protection, and for the furtherance of the cause of Christ. Acts xvi. 37, 38; xxii. 25-29; xxiii. 27. In all his previous journeyings and evangelistic tours, he never forgot the city of Rome, and always made it the objective point towards which he persistently tended. Hence, we read that "Paul purposed *in the spirit*, when he had

passed through Macedonia and Achaia, to go to Jerusalem, saying: After I have been there, I must also see Rome." Acts xix. 21. And so through many perils by land and by sea, he made his way to Rome, and long abode and preached there, until the gospel of Christ had even penetrated into Cæsar's household. Philip. iv. 22. And even before Paul ever visited Rome, that church of the faithful was collected in that city to whom was addressed from Corinth that wonderful Epistle which, in all subsequent ages, has moulded the religious thinking and inspired the hopes of the people of God.

From that time onward, through many subsequent ages, Rome, her influence, and her language, became more and more important in their bearing on the Christian Church. The Latin language was not only the language of the city of Rome and of millions in the vast empire over which she ruled as head, but during the Dark Ages, and the dawning light of the Middle Ages, and the clearer light of the Reformation ages, it was the language in which all Christian thought and doctrine and admonition found expression. It was the vehicle for conveying, not only precious and saving *truth*, but pernicious and ruinous *error*, to the minds and hearts of men. And when we remember how large a part of all the best and the worst of human thought concerning the truths taught in Holy Scripture, and especially concerning the doctrines and ethics of Christianity, yet retains its genuine original form only in compositions existing in the Latin language, it is not easy to see how a candidate for the Christian ministry can be soundly prepared for his work without any knowledge of this tongue.

But, having said thus much, we feel it to be our duty also to say distinctly, that we do not herein claim that the New Testament, either by express words or by good and necessary inference, teaches that the visible Church is bound to require in her candidates a knowledge of the Latin language in order to their admission to the ministry of the word and ordinances. Holy Scripture often suggests and intimates as desirable and important what is not absolutely required as a duty.

And this leads us logically to the admission of the right which

the visible Church has, in all ages, exercised of inducting, in extraordinary cases and for extraordinary reasons, men into the sacred office and functions, who are not fully equipped with the needed education, but who, being men of proved piety and Christian zeal and being well grounded in their own vernacular and having shown themselves to be "apt to teach," may be, in extraordinary emergencies, sent forth as licentiates or evangelists to preach the gospel of Christ and to draw sinful and needy men into his kingdom. This provision for "extraordinary cases" seems to find its sanction in the example of Christ and his apostles, and in the primitive ages of the Church. Yet, when we come to look at the actual facts recorded in the New Testament which may be supposed to require, or at least to justify, such extraordinary departure from the safe line of precedent, established in Holy Scripture, we will find it difficult to demonstrate, by competent evidence, any such exception to the sound general rule.

Those who contend that such extraordinary cases ought, in our day, to be so much recognised and acted upon as to become the rule instead of the exception, and who seek to support such opinions by telling us that even the Apostles Peter and John were spoken of, after they had fully entered upon their ministry, as "unlearned and ignorant men," Acts iv. 13, will find the ground they thus attempt to take and hold, give way beneath them. Peter, filled with the Holy Ghost, had just delivered that brief but powerful and incisive discourse of which the very words are recorded. *Ibid*, verses 8-12. Now, it does so happen that this short discourse is not only on fire with mingled fact and logic for Christ, but that it contains a quotation from the cxxviii. Psalm, and quotes it in such form as to show that Peter was not only familiar with the lessons taught by the lips of Christ himself, but familiar with the Greek Septuagint version of the Scriptures. This certainly was not the vernacular, the rude native language of Peter. And we have something even more decisive on this subject. Although the narrative tells us that the "rulers, elders, and scribes" had perceived that Peter and John were "unlearned and ignorant men" (the epithets used are ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται,

meaning illiterate and private men; *i. e.*, men in a private and humble sphere of life), yet it is evident that this notion had been obtained, not from what they saw and heard of Peter and John on that occasion, but from what they had otherwise seen or learned about them. For we have immediately the significant statement, "and they took knowledge of them *that they had been with Jesus.*" Here was the fact as to their education. They had been for three years in a theological seminary taught by Christ himself! And their education had been completed on the day of Pentecost by the Holy Ghost; so that, instead of being confined to their own vernacular, they spake all tongues of peoples then within proximate reach of the gospel call! Were these "unlearned and ignorant men"? When such men, so educated, shall present themselves to the visible Church, and ask to be inducted into the ministry, no appeal to the principle of "extraordinary cases" will be needed for their admission.

It seems evident, therefore, that when the Church is requested to dispense with the education required by the New Testament, and to admit an applicant for ordination upon the ground that his is "an extraordinary case," it ought to be proved that it is, indeed, "extraordinary." We are not, in this brief treatise, dealing with such cases. They must be dealt with by the Church as exceptions, and exceptions like angels' visits, "few and far between." Each of such cases must stand on its own merits, and be separately disposed of. Our duty now is to continue the presentation of the form and the substance of the educational qualifications of candidates for the ministry, required in the New Testament. Therefore we say that—

Eighth. The candidate for the high office of *teacher* in the Christian Church must, by careful reflection and study, acquire adequate knowledge of *mental philosophy*. He cannot expect to gain the attention of, and influence healthfully the minds of, others, unless he knows the faculties and powers of mind, and especially those laws which regulate *association of ideas*. The New Testament has its own system of metaphysics, partly expressed in plain words, partly suggested by fair inferences. When Christ our Saviour declared that the first and great command-

ment of the law is "to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength" (Matt. xxii. 37; Mark xii. 30), and commended the scribe who interpreted his words as meaning "to love God with all the heart and with all the understanding and with all the soul and with all the strength," he recognised those distinctions in the spiritual nature which mental philosophy designates as the *affections*, the *memory*, the *imagination*, or representative faculty, the *reason*, and the *will*. Moreover, without some sufficient and systematised knowledge of the powers of the mind or spirit, it is hardly possible to study intelligently the seventh and eighth chapters of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in which the Holy Spirit led the great apostle into the very "arcana" of the human soul in its fallen state, and in its renewed and partially sanctified state, wherein the conflict between the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, the spiritual product of the flesh, and the *φρόνημα τοῦ Πνεύματος*, the spiritual product of the Spirit, begins and continues unto the day of the Lord Jesus, of perfect sanctification. In truth, as the paramount function of the minister is to bring human souls to a saving reception of the truth as it is in Christ Jesus, a knowledge of the distinctions between intellect, judgment, memory, imagination, affections, and will, is indispensable, in order to enable the minister to expound to his hearers that faith of the *heart* (Romans x. 10), that is, of the whole spiritual nature—which saves the soul, and which is different from and far beyond the mere assent of the intellect to the historic facts concerning Christ. A sound system of *mental philosophy*, therefore, lies at the foundation of all knowledge, and of all faith, whether it be merely intellectual assent, or the faith that is unto righteousness and salvation. And mental philosophy, in its widest meaning, embraces a knowledge of *logic*, which is neither more nor less than knowledge of the laws of the human mind soundly applied to the process of reasoning from premises to conclusions, so as to elicit *truth*. The discourses of Christ and the inspired letters of the New Testament exhibit constant illustrations of the rules of sound logic applied to the conceded facts of mind and matter.

Ninth. The New Testament, by necessary implication, requires

the candidate for the Christian ministry to obtain a competent knowledge of mathematical and natural science. He need not, indeed, aspire to be either a finished mathematician or a profound *scientist*, especially in the modern sense of that word. But at the time when Paul lived and wrote, Euclid and Hypsicles, Plato and Aristotle, had all lived and written, and therefore it is certain that *exact* science had arisen and made considerable progress, and that *natural* science had at least made its appearance. And already *materialism*, which denies the existence of Spirit, and therefore of God and of individual immortality, had been taught by Democritus and Epicurus of Greece, and by Lucretius of Rome. The Greek word *γνώσις* had already passed beyond its primitive meaning of "knowledge," and had taken to itself the idea of "science," in its modern sense, viz., knowledge formulated into system. There was abundance of science falsely so called in the civilised world then as there is now. Hence the indispensable necessity that the minister of Christ should be able to distinguish between *true* science and *false* science; and the only effectual mode of doing this was to study and learn *true* science; for it is certain that the man who has never seen and carefully examined true and honest coins, will never be able to detect their counterfeits.

Therefore Paul, by necessary inference, admonishes both Timothy and Titus to make themselves acquainted with true science. As far as exact science, whether arithmetical or geometrical, was known at that day, it was as true then as it is now. But natural science had made very little progress, and pretensions to it had already seduced many bright minds into atheism and its inevitable pollutions. Hence Paul warns Timothy with an interjection of solemnity: "O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of *science* falsely so called," τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως. 1 Tim. vi. 20. And the same lesson in substance is repeated in chap. i. 4, 5, and iv. 7, and 2 Tim. ii. 14, 16, 23, and Tit. i. 14; iii. 9. The word rendered "babblings," both in the common and revised versions, means, literally, "empty sounds," "vain disputings," and conveys a lively prophetic idea of what was coming from

false science in our age. These oppositions of science falsely so called, led men away from divine truth in that age as in this, for we read in the succeeding verse as follows: "which some *professing* have erred concerning the faith." How many modern *professors* of science falsely so called would this inspired description include? The indirect lesson, therefore, taught in the New Testament to the candidate for the Christian ministry, is plain. To detect and overthrow the errors and unchristian teachings of false science, he must study and know true science, with the fixed assurance that no *truth* will ever be finally found to be in conflict with a sound exegesis of the word of God.

Tenth. This naturally leads us to the fact that the New Testament, by its whole tenor and its special teachings, requires the candidate for the sacred office to study *theology*—that is, the knowledge of God—both natural and revealed. Inspiration constantly testifies that the intuitions of the human soul and the light of nature suffice to teach us the being of God, the leading attributes of his nature, the substance of his law, our duty to obey, our dereliction therein, and our consequent guilt and just condemnation. Acts xiv. 14–18; xvii. 16–34; Rom. i. 18–32; ii. 1–16. But the deepest questionings of the soul and the voices of nature are alike impotent to reveal how a sinner may be saved; how God may be just, and yet justify the ungodly. This "knowledge of God" can only be learned from his revealing word, accompanied by his revealing Spirit. Therefore, the systematic study of what the Holy Scriptures teach concerning God and his divine Son and his Holy Spirit, and the part borne by each in the salvation of sinners—this must ever be the duty of the minister of Christ, not only during his preparation as a candidate, but during all his subsequent career as a herald of salvation. John xvii. 3, 17, 20, 21; Rom. iii. 26; 2 Tim. iii. 15, 16, 17.

Eleventh. From this required study of the holy word, the candidate will learn all of the science of *ethics* that he needs, especially of Christian *ethics*, which he must seek, as rapidly as possible and as far as his influence will extend, to substitute for every system of so-called morality taught by the world. There is no sound foundation for morality except the will of God, which is

the active expression of his moral attributes. And so complete are the teachings of the word, so vast is its sweep of thought, so manifold are its illustrations, and so minute and pointed its moral lessons that it may be safely declared that no ethical question can arise in public or private life, in society, in business, in recreation, or in work, to which this inspired word does not furnish a sound and sufficient answer. 1 Peter ii. 1-10.

Twelfth. This holy word will also teach the candidate all that he needs to know on the subject of *Church government*, and it is his duty to seek for full instructions on this question, so as not only to confirm his own preferences, whether they be traditional or acquired, by the inspired teachings of the word of God, but to give light and information to all who need instruction on this subject. 1 Peter iii. 15; Romans xiv. 5; Acts xiv. 23; xx. 17-31; 1 Tim. v. 17; Titus i. 5-9; 1 Peter v. 1-3.

Thirteenth. The New Testament requires the candidate for the sacred office to learn especially from the inspired word the *sacraments* of the Church of Christ, their number, essence, nature, and design, in order that when he comes to administer them as a steward of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. iv. 1) he may be able so to explain and unfold and apply them that they may, being accompanied by the blessed Spirit of God, carry with them grace and mercy to the recipients. Mark i. 14; Luke iii. 3; xx. 4; Acts xix. 4; 1 Peter iii. 21; Matt. iii. 11; Luke iii. 16; John i. 33; Acts viii. 38; 1 Cor. i. 14-17; Acts ii. 38, 41; viii. 16, 36; xvi. 15, 33; Matt. xxvi. 26, etc.; Mark xiv. 22, etc.; Luke xxii. 19, etc.; 1 Cor. xi.; John vi.

Fourteenth. The teachings, examples, and discourses set forth in the New Testament all admonish the candidate for the Christian ministry to inform himself thoroughly in *history*, both sacred and profane. Christ in his impressive discourses, delivered while he was on earth, constantly referred to the historical characters and events recorded in the Old Testament, and did not confine his lessons to the strict lines of Church history. Matt. v. 21-23, 33-36, 38, 39, 43; x. 34-42; xi. 20-24; xii. 3-8, 38-42; xv. 1-10; xix. 3-8; xxiii. 1-4, 13-18; 34-39. Stephen, the first Christian martyr, in his strong discourse to his persecu-

tors, showed by an extended historical review the dealings of God with the Jewish people, and the prophecy of the Messiah furnished by the person and character of Moses. And Paul, James, Peter, and Jude frequently illuminated their divine lessons by the light of past history. On the subject of Church history and secular history, we cannot better sum up the true lessons of the New Testament than in the words of one who has deeply studied them, and who knows their value. He says: "They differ as Church and state, as Christianity and humanity, as the order of grace and the order of nature; yet they are inseparably connected, and the one cannot be understood without the other. Among the Jews, the spiritual and secular history together form one history of theocracy. Both currents intermingle in the Byzantine empire, in the European states, and the Latin Church during the Middle Ages, in the period of the Reformation, during the colonial period of America, and in all countries where Church and state are united." "The study of history enables us to understand the present, which is the fruit of the past and the germ of the future. It is the richest storehouse of wisdom and experience. It is the best commentary of Christianity. It is full of comfort and encouragement. It verifies on every page the promise of the Saviour to be with his people always, and to build his Church on an indestructible rock. It exhibits his life in all its forms and phases, and the triumphant march of his kingdom from land to land and generation to generation. Earthly empires, systems of philosophy have their day; human institutions decay; all things of this world bloom and fade away like the grass of the field; but the Christian religion has the dew of perennial youth, survives all changes, makes steady progress from age to age, overcomes all persecution from without and corruption from within, is now stronger and more widely spread than ever before, directs the course of civilisation, and bears the hopes of the human race." Dr. Philip Schaff, in *Schaff-Herzog Encyclop. of Rel. Knowl.*, I., 480, 482.

Fifteenth. Finally, the New Testament, in assigning to the minister of the word the high duty of preaching the gospel, proclaiming salvation, and expounding orally the inspired Scrip-

tures, requires that the candidate shall study and, as perfectly as possible, master the arts of *composition* and *eloquence*. He ought to learn, by previous study, reflection, and the use of his pen, to construct language in its best, most incisive, most effective forms for conveying thought. And after having thus faithfully studied in private, he ought to strive to deliver orally (not by *reading*, but by *preaching*) the thoughts thus prepared to his hearers, with such earnestness, fire, and magnetic power, and with such perfection of manner, gesture, pronunciation, accent, emphasis, and ease, as will give all the human elements that the Holy Spirit, may use and bless, so that the word of the Lord may have free course and be glorified. 2 Thess. iii. 1; Acts xviii. 28; 2 Cor. v. 11, 12, 20; vi. 4-8; 1 Tim. iv. 15, 16; 2 Tim. ii. 14-16; iv. 1, 2; Titus ii. 15. This, at the least, should be the ideal of every faithful minister—the goal to which he should constantly run, and to attain which his earnest, persistent, prayerful efforts should be directed.

And now, having laid down the rules and principles set forth in the New Testament for the selection, training, and education of candidates for the Christian ministry, the question may well arise: "Who is sufficient for these things?" 2 Cor. ii. 16. The tendency of many in the visible Church is to ask: "Is such a standard practicable? Is it not too high? Ought not the Church to avoid the delays necessarily incident to a scheme of education so extended and complete, and to send out her ministers with less of learning, less of intellectual culture, if she be satisfied only that they are truly pious and regenerate men?" And already this theory of a lower standard has taken form and method; and the inquiry is pressed on the Church whether she ought not to be content to ordain and induct her ministers when they shall be furnished simply with the elements of a sound English education?

To this we answer: No! never! unless the Church of Christ is prepared to reject the authority of her divine Master, to throw off his laws, and to discard the teachings of himself and of his inspired apostles and holy men who wrote the New Testament, who spake and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

That the Church has not come up to the full measure of her

duty in her aggressive movements upon the world, is only too apparent, and is frankly admitted. That her subordinate officers and functionaries, her ruling presbyters, her lay-readers, her deacons, her stewards, have not put forth the powers and energies for impressing and converting fallen souls which legitimately belong to such officers, and which it is their solemn duty to exercise, is sadly true, and is the cause of a large part of the inefficiency attributed to the visible army of God. And that her private members (each of whom has the warrant of holy Scripture for proclaiming to others the joys of salvation, and seeking, by a Christian life and Christian counsels, to bring others to Christ, Matt. v. 16; 1 Peter iii. 1; Rev. xxii. 17) have fallen far below the standard of their duty, is too plain for doubt.

But no considerations of supposed wisdom or expediency or immediate efficiency can justify the Church of Christ in the slightest lowering of the standards of training and education for her candidates for the sacred office required in the New Testament either in express words or by good and necessary inference from such words. By whatever name her ministers may be called, whether pastors, or rectors, or evangelists, or preachers, or heralds, or teaching presbyters or elders, or bishops, or ambassadors, or angels of the churches, their training and education, in order to conform them to the requirements of the New Testament, must be in substance what are herein laid down. So far from being lowered, the exigencies of the age in which we live inexorably demand that they be maintained.

When these requirements shall be disregarded and the visible Church shall begin to admit men to the sacred ministry who do not conform to them, then on her brow will be written the word "Ichabod": "the glory will have departed from her;" and the world will immediately begin to relapse into darker ages than any it has yet known.

R. R. HOWISON.

ARTICLE III.

MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER.¹

We cannot hope to exhibit any remarkably original or novel views in elucidation of the question before us—the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife. The subject has been so long before the Church, and has been so thoroughly looked into, that we can hope to present no view of it that may not, in some form, be found in the essay of some one or other of the numerous writers upon it. The most we can do is to present that course of argument that has determined our own conclusions, and which, we may trust, will affect the judgment of others.

The word of God is the only authoritative rule with us for the determining of moral questions. The passages of Scripture mainly relied on by those who think such marriages as we have under consideration to be sinful, are in the book of Leviticus, xviii. 16, 18, and xx. 21.

On the citation of passages from Leviticus, the first inquiry that arises is, Are the teachings and directions of that book binding upon the Christian Church? They certainly were obligatory upon the Israelites; but do they continue of authority?

The institutes of Moses consisted of three classes of law—the ceremonial, the civil, and the moral law.

The moral law, as contained in the tables of the Ten Commandments, or in any precept elsewhere found that necessarily flows from the Decalogue, or that fully comports with any of its behests, is unquestionably of universal and perpetual obligation.

¹This article was presented to Charleston Presbytery in April last, in the form of a report from a Committee previously appointed to consider the subject. It was unanimously resolved by the Presbytery that the Editors of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW be requested to publish it in the REVIEW. Although at the meeting of the late General Assembly it appears that the question discussed is virtually settled in our Church, it is nevertheless deemed desirable by members of the Presbytery that the article be published, inasmuch as it may help to bring some who are opposed to the expunging of the law, to acquiesce in the present state of the matter in our Church.

Moral principle is unchangeable. It is based in the nature and will of God; and to it, our nature, with all the relations he created and established for us, is adapted. The same cannot be said of the two other departments of law. They were enacted for temporary purposes. When the occasion for their application ceased to exist, they, in consequence, ceased to be obligatory.

The ceremonial law, in all its aspects and bearings, was designed for the single purpose of prefiguring the Christ, the Redeemer that was to come. All other aims that were to be effected by it, were but subsidiary to that one great result. It fully accomplished its purpose, and ceased to be of significance when Jesus, suspended on the cross in the agony of death, said, "It is finished! and bowed his head and gave up the ghost."

The civil law was for the regulation of the affairs of the Israelites constituted as a state. It consisted of laws adapted to their peculiar condition and needs; and except when they involve some essential and moral precept, are in no respect obligatory on other peoples. They ceased to be of force on the dissolution of the municipal organisation of the Jews, which occurred at the coming of Shiloh. Many of them, indeed, are worthy to be re-adopted by peoples; but the obligation ensuing would result from their re-enactment, not from their being embraced in the Hebrew civil code. Any moral precept found amongst these laws is binding upon us, not because it is a part of that law, but because it flows out of that other great department of law, the moral.

Now, the passages in Leviticus which are assumed to be the law regulating marriage are a section of the civil law, and whatever be their import, except so far as they involve moral purity, are no more binding on Christians than is the law forbidding the eating of swine's flesh, the laws in regard to the division of lands, the sowing of mixed seeds, the law requiring a Sabbath year's rest to be given to the land, the law in regard to the cities of refuge, the law of divorcé, and many other laws. These views, it is presumed, will be controverted by none.

The corollary from these propositions is this: Admitting that these laws in Leviticus, to which we have referred, relate to marriage; admitting that on this hypothesis they can properly

be construed into a prohibition to the Israelite to marry his deceased wife's sister; still such prohibition is not of force now, unless it can also be shown that such marriages are essentially immoral. This, we apprehend, cannot be done. There is no use in appealing to the sentiments of men in regard to the matter; they are as discordant as are the northwest and southeast winds; they vary accordantly with the variant circumstances under which the men have been reared. One will declaim, as with holy horror, against them, as though they were a violation of all the finer feelings of humanity as well as of pure morality; another will approve of them as connexions eminently proper and becoming. Our only sure appeal is to the Scriptures. "To the law, and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, there is no light in them." What, then, say the Scriptures? Their teaching on the question can perhaps be more readily ascertained by prosecuting the broader, the more comprehensive inquiry, Is there any moral force whatever in these injunctions in Leviticus? and if there is, What is it? There is, indeed, great moral force in these prohibitions, when rightly interpreted, as we shall see, but in no degree has it the relation to marriage that is assumed.

The first of the passages preconceived to forbid the marriage of a man to his deceased wife's sister is this, "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness." If this passage be understood as relating to marriage, it must, in order to prove by it that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is sinful, be shown 1st, that the brother's wife spoken of is his widow; 2d, that marriage with a brother's widow is incestuous, and therefore under any circumstances immoral; 3d, that marriage with a brother's widow is equivalent to marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Neither of which positions, we apprehend, can be established. These positions we will consider in inverse order.

First. Is marriage with a brother's widow equivalent to marriage with a deceased wife's sister? It is asserted that by parity of reason it is; for that a wife's sister is of the same degree of affinity to a man as is a brother's wife. This statement, with the

Hebrew law before us, does not seem to us valid; but from that law we infer rather that a brother's wife stands to us in a very different category from that of a wife's sister. The connecting link of affinity between a man and his wife's sister, is a woman, his wife; the connecting link between a man and his brother's wife, is a man, his brother. Now, under the Hebrew law, the status, the rights, relations, and influence of the man were very different from those of the woman. Consequently, that which may be true of connexions formed through the one, may not with equal certainty be affirmed of connexions formed through the other. If we keep not this difference in mind, we may in our deductions be led into error. For instance, under the law, a man was allowed to have, at the same time, several wives; by parity of reason, if such reasoning were valid, a woman should be allowed to have, at the same time, several husbands; but that was not the case. Again, because the law requires that if a man die without an heir, his brother shall marry his widow and raise up a family for his deceased brother, therefore, by parity of reason, if a woman die without an heir, her sister must be married to her husband to raise up a family for her deceased sister; but that was not the case. It may be said, however, that in this case there was a special reason for the difference; that heirship came through the husband, not through the wife. Exactly so; and that, in this case, destroys the parity of reasoning, as in all other cases, for special and obvious reasons in each case, such reasoning does not obtain. This failure of parity of reason in any one case, precludes our acceptance of the statement that the prohibition to marry a brother's widow with equal force, on this ground, forbids one to marry his deceased wife's sister. If it be so, *i. e.*, if it be wrong to marry the sister of a deceased wife, it is not sustained by this so-called parity of reasoning.

Secondly. We cannot admit that this passage forbids a man to marry his brother's widow, because by the law of Moses, Deut. xxv. 5, a man, in certain conditions, already incidentally adverted to, is required to marry his brother's widow, under the penalty, if he refused to do so, of being subjected to humiliating indignities—that is, “his brother's wife shall come unto him in

the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his foot, and spit in his face," and stigmatise him as having failed to meet the obligations of one in his relation. Now, we cannot believe that God would, in view of any conditions, or for any reason, specially for the merely secular object of retaining the inheritance in the family, ordain a law that involved an essential immorality, as this manifestly would if it be in itself morally wrong to form such a connexion. Evil might be tolerated, but never commanded.

Thirdly. We must believe that the word wife in the prohibition means wife, not widow. Yet it must mean widow if the subject of the prohibition be marriage; and for the same reason it must mean widow in every case in this category. For it can hardly be supposed that there could have been gravely embodied in the code a series of laws forbidding a man to marry certain female relatives while their husbands were still living. Indeed, the force of the deduction from this passage that it is wrong to marry a deceased wife's sister, depends wholly on the assumption that the brother's wife spoken of is his widow. Further; if the word wife, in the passage before us, means widow, and a man is forbidden to marry his brother's widow, it follows that a neighbor's wife that is spoken of in one of these laws must mean his widow, and consequently a man is forbidden to marry any widow. That would be simply preposterous, and directly contrary to what every where in the Bible is admitted as right and proper.

The prohibition in the passage before us in regard to a brother's wife, and in regard to the wife of any one of the kindred specified, whatever it be, is a prohibition of such connexion with her while the husband is still living.

We do not, therefore, understand this passage, or any part of the paragraph in which it is contained, except in one case only in which the phraseology employed is wholly different, as speaking even in the remotest degree of marriage. The paragraph or section of laws, is a series of special prohibitions of illicit sexual intercourse. This is illustrated by the case just mentioned, and fully explains the seeming anomaly of that case, in which, while at one time marriage with a brother's widow is supposed to be forbidden, at another time such marriage is enjoined. The seem-

ingly contradictory laws are rendered harmonious when we regard illicit intercourse as the thing prohibited in the one case, while marriage in the other case is enjoined.

But it may be asked, If these laws relate to illicit intercourse, why such special prohibitions when there was before the people one of the Ten Commandments that covered every case, *i. e.*, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"? It is not for us to explain the repetition of laws. There is in the second chapter following the one before us, an almost identical repetition of the laws we are now considering. There was, no doubt, sufficient reason for such repetition. But we may remark, that for the special expression of the laws before us, there was a special and obvious reason to be found in this: the sanctity of domestic intercourse is specially to be guarded. The violation, in this way, of the confidence engendered in it is a crime far more heinous than simple adultery, and is worthy to be branded as it here is (and as we shall presently more specially note) with a special term of *infamy*. It is a crime here put in the same category with sodomy and bestiality. We may add, as some judicious writers have suggested, that by the manner in which the Hebrews were at this time living, temptations to evil in this direction were specially imminent. They were in the wilderness, dwelling in tents, in closer and more familiar intercourse than they would be were they in settled homes, dwelling in houses more commodious. This unavoidable familiar intercourse needed to have special guards thrown around it, that that confidence amongst members of the same family, which is so necessary to domestic happiness, might be in no danger of being violated. Still further; violations of chastity in these relations, as (on our interpretation of the passage) it is expressly stated, were prevalent vices amongst the peoples with whom they were about to come in contact, and for which those peoples were to be expelled from the land, yet by coming in contact with whom the Israelites might be contaminated.

This view of the character of the forbidden acts is beyond question established, as appears to us, by the signification of the Hebrew word עֶרְוָה, which is the emphatic word in these sentences. It is the word in our version translated *nakedness*. It imports

lewdness, not marriage. The equivalent word in the Septuagint, in every instance of its occurrence in these passages, is ἀσχημοσύνη, which signifies that which is unseemly, discreditable, base, disgraceful. The signification given by Bretschneider is 1, dishonor; 2, a base action, specially in illicit love; 3, pudenda (or that which one should be ashamed of).

That the word עֲרָוָה, when it is employed as the subject of the verb *to uncover*, as it is here employed, signifies illicit intercourse, appears in its use universally in the Scriptures. It is needless to multiply quotations. Take a passage from Ezekiel xvi. 36, "Thou hast discovered thy nakedness through thy whoredoms." The same reappears in ch. xviii. 18. Here the phrase, *to uncover*, or *to discover nakedness*, is employed as equivalent to whoredom. Indeed, it is confidently asserted by proficient scholars that there is not a single example in the Scriptures in which the phrase has the sense of marriage, unless it can be shown to have that signification in the passages we are considering, which, in view of the argument before us, it would, if we are not greatly mistaken, be difficult to do. Moreover, if marriage had been intended in these passages, there is a word in the Hebrew expressing that relation clearly, and an equally unambiguous equivalent phrase, both devoid of any imputation of impurity, and both in common use. Why, instead of these expressions, should a phrase signifying only crime and disgrace have been employed? It is wholly incredible that Moses would have employed such terms to designate that relation which on divine authority is pronounced to be "honorable in all."

There are some who lay considerable stress on the fact that in Leviticus xx. 21, "If a man shall take his brother's wife, it is an unclean thing: he hath uncovered his brother's nakedness," the term *take*, a part of the phrase equivalent to marriage, is used. But besides that this passage is only a repetition of the law given in ch. xviii. 16, and therefore must have the same signification with that, the term *take* does not when alone, as it is in this passage, necessarily mean marriage. Its meaning is dependent on its connexions. "The word never imports marriage of its own force: never without being connected with the word wife as its subject, ex-

pressed or necessarily implied; and that, not as in this case, the wife of another." Thus, to "take to wife," or "to take a wife," unmistakably means marriage; but other connexions make it signify uncleanness. As in Ezek. xvi. 32, by its connexions it is used to express adultery—"the wife that committeth adultery, that taketh strangers instead of her husband." The use of the word take, as signifying marriage, appears in the 18th verse of ch. xviii. of Leviticus: "Thou shalt not take a wife unto her sister," etc., a passage which we shall presently have under consideration.

It is an effectual way to test the import of a sentence, to substitute in it for a questionable word or phrase, a word or phrase unequivocally expressive of the meaning it is supposed to convey. If the substitution make not sound sense, it becomes manifest that we have mistaken the meaning of the sentence. If, therefore, "to uncover nakedness" signifies "to marry," let us make the corresponding substitution. Take this sentence, "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's brother; thou shalt not approach to his wife." For this read, "Thou shalt not marry thy father's brother; for this thou wouldst do in approaching to his wife." Or take this: "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's wife; it is thy father's nakedness." For this read: "Thou shalt not marry thy father's wife; for that would be marrying thy father." Or this: "The nakedness of thy father, or the nakedness of thy mother, thou shalt not uncover." For this read: "Thou shalt not marry thy father; thou shalt not marry thy mother." You see the effect of the substitution is preposterous.

But if the substituted word gives the true meaning of the original word, it will make sound sense in all its applications. Now, according to the lexicons, "to uncover the nakedness" of one, signifies "to dishonor" that one. Let us try this substitute thus: "Thou shalt not dishonor thy father's brother; for this thou wouldst do in approaching to his wife." "Thou shalt not dishonor thy father's wife; for that would be to dishonor thy father." "Thou shalt not dishonor thy father; thou shalt not dishonor thy mother." Here is good sense; lucid, forcible. The crime forbidden is of the deepest dishonor, the deepest disgrace

to all concerned. In dishonoring the wife, the husband is dishonored.

As, therefore, the terms so freely employed in these statutes are such as convey only the idea of a disgracefully criminal connexion, we infer that they are not such terms as would have been used if the design had been simply to point out that degree of relationship within which marriage might not be contracted. We hence conclude that this passage has no bearing upon the question before us.

Let us endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the other passage that is regarded as forbidding the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister. That passage is this: Lev. xviii. 18. "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other, in her life-time." This passage is the one to which we have referred as unmistakably signifying marriage. "Take a wife," as we have noted, has no other meaning. Yet this marriage, though real marriage, is impure. Therefore, the other phrase, "to uncover nakedness," which is used to characterise criminal intercourse, is appended to indicate that such marriage is no better than the grossest incest. Notice that this phrase is here only appended to characterise such a marriage. It is not, as in the other passages, the leading, and, indeed, the only term employed to designate the relation.

The special inquiry that arises is, What kind of marriage is that, or between what parties formed, that is designated by the phrase "take a wife to her sister"? There are those who tell us that the term "sister," as here employed, signifies only "one who is an equal, or one who is in the same relation; they are sisters by position." This gloss is put upon the passage to make it signify this: "Whilst having one wife, thou shalt not take another." They regard the statute, therefore, as designed only to prohibit polygamy.

But this certainly cannot be its purpose, because, in another portion of these same statutes, polygamy is recognised as existing, as being a thing common. And without rebuke, without any intimation of disapproval, a law is given simply to regulate polygamy, as in Deut. xxi. 15: "If a man have two wives, one beloved

and another hated; and they have borne him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the first born son be hers that was hated, then it shall be, when he maketh his sons to inherit that which he hath, that he may not make the son of the beloved first born before the son of the hated, which is indeed the first born; but he shall acknowledge the hated for the first born, by giving him a double portion of all that he hath; for he is the beginning of his strength; the right of the first born is his."

Besides this, we know, from the history of this people, that polygamy was common amongst them. To say nothing of the practice as it prevailed before the promulgation of this law, Gideon, so highly esteemed of his people, and so manifestly favored of God, had, as the record states, "threescore and ten sons, of his own body begotten, for he had many wives." Elkanah, the father of Samuel, pious and devoted to the service of God as he was, "had two wives; the name of the one was Hannah; the name of the other, Penninah." David had many wives. Indeed, the limit to the number of wives a man might have seems to have been determined only by his ability to support them. We cannot suppose that David knew of any law forbidding the having of more than one wife at the same time. Had he known of such a law, he certainly would have obeyed it. He was a man "after God's own heart;" and the law of his God was his "meditation day and night." To know of such a law, yet to violate it, would have been iniquity of heart and life. But, said he, "If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me; yet verily he hath heard me." We find David lamenting many sins; some of them heinous sins; yet never does he give any intimation that he regarded this habit of his life as a sin. It was not till the time of Christ that the original law of creation was revived, and polygamy authoritatively pronounced a sin.

What, then, is the meaning of the prohibition before us, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, in her life-time"? It is this: that a man having a wife shall not, while she is living, marry her sister. The burden of the prohibition lies on these two clauses, which, by leaving out all adjuncts we have quoted in juxtaposition, viz., "wife to her sister, in her life-time." "Wife to

her sister"—as it means not the having of more than one wife, must mean, and mean only, the taking of a woman for your wife, whose sister is already your wife. The clause, "to vex her," implies the evil that would result from such a marriage. The clause, "in her life-time," is full of meaning, as bearing on the subject under consideration. Does not the prohibition to marry a wife's sister in the wife's life-time imply that after her death such a marriage is admissible? It is a prohibition under certain definite conditions. If the conditions do not exist, the prohibition has no force. This passage, then, so far from forbidding one to marry his deceased wife's sister, by the strongest possible implication authorises such a marriage.

There is, then, according to the Scriptures, no impurity in the marrying of a deceased wife's sister. If this is not a fair and just interpretation of the passage, we know not where the unfairness is.

Why is it that the marrying of two sisters at the same time is characterised, as in this passage it is, by the term of infamy? We will not specifically assign a reason; that is needless. But, whatever be the reason, it ceases to be of force on the death of the first sister. "A woman which hath a husband is bound by the law of her husband as long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So, then, if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man." We conclude, therefore, that the law which forbids the marriage at the same time of two sisters, ceases to be of force on the death of the first sister.

It may be said that, in the former part of this dissertation we objected to parity of reasoning from husband to wife, and that the same objection will apply to reasoning thus from wife to husband. But not so. For that was reasoning from the greater privileged person to the less, while this is reasoning from the less privileged person to the greater. Examples of this greater privilege in the husband were cited; as that while the husband, under the Hebrew law, was allowed to have more than one wife, the wife was

restricted to the having of one husband. We may, therefore, with perfect propriety, say, "If the wife be loosed from the law of her husband by his death, at least as fully is the husband loosed from the law of his wife by her death."

We conclude, in view of the whole argument, that even if the Hebrew polity were to its full import binding on us, there was in it no statute forbidding the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister.

But the gospel is more stringent as to the law of marriage than was the Mosaic law, as evinced in this, that monogamy, a marriage between one man and one woman, the original law, was restored; and divorcement was allowed only in a single class of unfaithfulness. It might, therefore, with great propriety, be inferred that like stringency would prevail in regard to the question before us—the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife, if there be any impurity in such a marriage. But on this subject not a word is to be found in the gospel. The gospel, on its promulgation, went forth to nations and peoples amongst whom such marriages were admissible, were common. Yet there is, in the whole teaching of the New Testament, not one word of disapproval.

It might be said in reply, that amongst the nations this custom, by its universal prevalence, had grown to be a politico-social custom; that, therefore, interference with it would array against the gospel all the power and hostility of the state, as well as the opposition of the people. Consequently, that the gospel "winked at" the matter. But the gospel is not a time-serving scheme. It does not blink at crime because it is afraid to rebuke it. It unhesitatingly levelled its shafts at "wickedness in high places," as well as at prevalent wickedness amongst the people, such as drunkenness, debauchery, adultery, dishonesty, violence, murder; and against every one that "maketh or loveth a lie." Idolatry, characteristically, was so interwoven with the authority of the state, that to attack idolatry was to arouse the vengeful power of the state. Yet the gospel did not hesitate to denounce idolatry in unmeasured terms. No; the fact that neither our Lord nor his apostles ever uttered a word against such marriages, and

specially so when at least one proper occasion for the utterance of such a rebuke occurred, when the Jews propounded to our Lord the question touching the marriage of a man with his brother's wife, evinces that in such marriages there is nothing to reprove. It may be said that the rebuke of John the Baptist to Herod, for having his brother Philip's wife, is such direct denunciation. But, for the moment, admitting that a brother's wife is equivalent to a wife's sister, no such denunciation of the case in hand can be affirmed in face of the fact that, as Josephus, Book 18, chap. 5, informs us, he took her from his brother by treachery and stratagem, and had her for his wife while her husband was still living. His own wife, also, though repudiated, was living.

Now, if in the whole of the Scriptures there is no prohibition of such marriages, how is it that such marriages ever came to be prohibited by ecclesiastical law? It is easy enough to give a satisfactory answer to this inquiry.

Says an able writer: "Although in the New Testament we find no prohibition of such marriages by Christ; although we have no evidence that the apostles discountenanced them, or that in the primitive Church they were condemned," it came to pass, in the course of two or three centuries, that "Christians, in the spirit of Oriental enthusiasm, became dissatisfied with Christian principles of ethics, and invented for themselves new rules of continence (and of piety in general), which God never imposed." And, we may add, so far so, indeed, as to brand the second marriage of a widower, no matter how far remote from him might be the woman whom he married, as "legal adultery." They taught, still further, that celibacy and absolute continence was necessary to the attainment of holiness. The Romish Church, through which the error in question became entailed on Protestant Christendom, when it was constituted, finding such notions in vogue, adopted and fostered them; and with a still greater refinement of fanaticism conceived what is called spiritual affinity, which, as they taught, was contracted in the sacraments of baptism and confirmation. According to this chimerical affinity, a man may not marry his god-daughter, nor her mother, nor her sister, nor her cousin. The only difference of opinion amongst

the doctors was, whether the prohibition should extend only to the fourth, or be made to embrace the seventh, degree.

At the Reformation, the law of marriage was in great degree expurgated; but such is the tendency of the human mind to cling to superstitions of long standing, and such was the respect paid to the convenience of Henry the Eighth of England, in the matter of Catherine, the widow of his brother Arthur, that the prohibition was retained by several of the Protestant States and Churches of the period.

The laws of States, and the mind of the Church have, within the last hundred years, undergone a great change, and many Churches and States have repudiated this error of the ages.

In 1851 there was instituted in England a society having for its object the purging of the English municipal law of this error. The society is called "The Marriage Reform Association." It is composed of persons distinguished for their scholarship or their position. By their influence, the matter was in 1858 brought under consideration in Parliament. The lower house voted to rescind the law; the house of Lords, however, dissented. In 1862, the same thing was repeated, the house of Commons voting for repeal, the house of Lords sustaining the law. The members of the Reform Association are concerned in this matter, we have no reason to believe, because of any bearing it has on their personal relations. They profess to regard the law as a grave error, and as injurious in its effects upon the community. Therefore have they continued their efforts to have it repealed. Their number is constantly increasing, and their influence extending. They have caused the question of repeal to be several times, of late years, renewed in Parliament. In the last vote that was taken, besides that the Commons voted strongly for repeal, the Lords, in a house of 260 members, gave a vote of 128 in favor of repeal, 132 in the negative. A change of three votes to the affirmative would have reversed the result, and throughout the British dominions the prohibitory law would have been abolished.

The Provinces of Great Britain by no means follow the leading of the mother country in retaining the law. The Dominion of Canada has lately rescinded it; and the Queen has declined to

disallow the annulling act, or as we say in this county, to veto it. We may here, in passing, remark, that it is affirmed by those who are in a position to know, that her Majesty, Queen Victoria, and also the Prince of Wales, are in favor of full liberty in this matter. The only importance we attach to this fact is, that the opinions of these royal personages are formed, in all probability under the advisement of those who are learned on the subject. Perhaps a more important fact is this, that of the almost nine millions of square miles of her Majesty's dominions, the people of nearly seven millions of square miles have either annulled the prohibitory law, or refused to enact it.

All the Protestant States of continental Europe, we are informed, have annulled the prohibition.

Although, in this country, under the colonial *regime*, the prohibitory statute was universally in force, there is now no such law on the statute books of any one of the States of the American Union.

Of the Churches, the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland has repealed the prohibition; likewise have the Protestant Churches on the Continent.

The Dutch Reformed Church in America, with which our Church enjoys such close fraternal relations, and with which, a few years ago, our Church so cordially agreed to coöperate in Church work, in 1843 repealed the prohibitory law.

The Protestant Episcopal Church, in which, if in any Church in our land, a law or canon prohibiting such marriages might be expected to be in force, has no statute or article of belief touching the matter. Their house of Bishops did some years ago, *recommend* their clergy to follow the English law in such cases. But we are informed by one of their best informed clergymen, that this is not regarded as of authority in the Church; that it is merely a recommendation, and that some even of the bishops, as well as the body of the clergy, ignore it in their practice, and determine their action by their personal convictions.

There is no law prohibiting such marriages in the Methodist Episcopal Church, nor in the Baptist Church, nor amongst the Congregational churches; nor in the Lutheran Church; nor, we

presume, in any Church in our land except in the Presbyterian Church, North and South, and, it may be, in one or two of its congeners. We stand almost alone in America, and in Protestant Christendom, in upholding this mythical dogma of Rome and of the Dark Ages.

We cannot but regard the action of our Church on this subject, or rather that of the "Presbyterian Church in the United States of America," of which at the time we were a constituent part, and through which we derived our existence, as singularly infelicitous, because so remarkably inconsistent.

The first act that we note was in 1782, by the United Synod of New York and Philadelphia, prior to the formation of the General Assembly, but which, being the act of the whole Church then existing, is an authoritative precedent. In the case of the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister, when the question was in regard to the restoration of the parties to the marriage to the privileges of the Church, from which for their marriage they had been debarred, in the language of the record, "After full and deliberate discussion the question was put, 'Shall these parties be capable of Christian privileges, their marriage to the contrary notwithstanding?' the question was answered in the affirmative by a large majority." The Synod adds, "Nevertheless the Synod in consideration that such marriages are of ill report in many parts of the Church, do recommend it to their people to abstain from them, in order to avoid gross offence." They base their advice, and it is mere advice, not on this, that it is contrary to Scripture, nor even on this, that it is contrary to our standards to contract such marriages, but on this, that public opinion is against them!

Again, the United Synod in 1783 "recommended to their members (*i. e.*, to their ministers) to abstain from celebrating such marriages and to discountenance them by all means in their power." Mark, this, as in the former case, was only a recommendation; and that recommendation was based, so far as Scripture is concerned, on what they themselves regarded as doubtful authority, for thus they say, "Although the marriage of a man to two sisters, one after the death of the other, may not be a direct

violation of the express words of the Levitical law, yet as it is contrary to the custom of the Protestant Churches in general, and may through the prejudices or generally received opinion of the members of our Church, be productive of very disagreeable consequences," etc. This certainly plants the standard of Christian morals and practice on a very insecure basis. Nothing is more uncertain, more unreliable, than public prejudice and opinion, whether in the Church or out of it. And, as to "the custom of the Protestant Churches in general," whatever it is worth, it is now, as we have shown (after sober second thought and consideration), wholly on the other side of the question.

The only inquiry with the Church should be, as several times we have said, What says the word of God in the case? If there be clearly ascertainable instruction in the word of God, follow it; if not, take no step, assume no position, maintain no attitude, under the dictation of public prejudice and opinion.

In 1810, "A reference from Bethel church, S. C., was over-
tured" (we quote from the record), "requesting the decision of the Assembly in regard to a case in which a person had married the sister of a deceased wife. On motion, *Resolved*, That this reference be answered by the decision of the Assembly of 1804." The only case that was before the Assembly in 1804 was that of James Gaston, which, though it appears under a different category, we must suppose to be the case cited. The principle involved in the decision of that case is thus expressed: "The Assembly cannot advise to annul such marriages, or pronounce them to such a degree unlawful as that the parties, if otherwise worthy, should be debarred from the privileges of the Church."

In 1821, the most that the General Assembly was willing to affirm in a case then before it, was this: "In the opinion of this General Assembly, the marriage of a man to his deceased wife's sister is highly inexpedient." Again: "This Assembly is by no means prepared to decide that such marriages are so plainly prohibited in Scripture as necessarily to infer the exclusion of those who contract them from church privileges."

This was reaffirmed in 1822.

Yet in 1842, in the case of Rev. McQueen, and again in 1848,

in the case of Ruling Elder John Cathey, the Assembly sustained the action of the lower courts in their suspending from the privileges of the Church these persons who had contracted such marriages.

The specially notable case that engaged the attention of the Church from 1842 to 1845, was one of the instances just adverted to—that of the Rev. Archibald McQueen, of Fayetteville Presbytery, N. C. Mr. McQueen was, as was universally said of him, a minister of otherwise unexceptionable character. Having married the sister of his deceased wife, he was for this deposed from the ministry by his Presbytery, and debarred from church communion. The sentence of the lower court was sustained by the General Assembly. But in 1845, only three years later, the Assembly, on the ground that, by the submission of Mr. McQueen to the decree of deposition, the ends of discipline had been attained, directed the Fayetteville Presbytery to restore him to his former standing. The Presbytery accordingly placed him *rectus in ecclesia*.

Now, the anomaly of the action in this case is twofold: 1st. The deposition of Mr. McQueen, and his suspension from church privileges, is contrary to previous decisions as quoted above. 2d. While the Assembly, in concurrence with the judgment of his Presbytery, degrades Mr. McQueen from the clerical office for what it regards as crime that renders him unworthy of that office, and while he is still unrepentant for that reputed crime, and continues to live in the practice of that so-called crime, it restores him in full to his office! The Constitution of the Church decides that while crime continues, there can be no restoration to Christian privileges or standing. Its language, in Chap. 24, Sec. 4, is emphatically this: "Such incestuous marriages can never be made lawful by any law of man or consent of parties, so that those persons may live together as man and wife."

Dr. Thornwell, Works, Vol. IV., page 493, commenting on the case of Mr. McQueen, says: "According to the Constitution of our Church, the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister is null and void, from the simple fact that the parties are incompetent to make the contract. The only satisfactory evi-

dence, therefore, which can be furnished that the parties have repented, consists in separation ; they cannot live together as man and wife. It is just as wicked to perpetrate the contract as to make it. Hence, according to our standards, Mr. McQueen has never repented, and the ends of discipline have never been answered in the punishment to which he has submitted. He is as guilty to-day as he was before the Presbytery deposed him." Dr. Thornwell continues : "If the law of our Church is more stringent on this subject than that of the Bible, it ought to be changed ; but as long as we profess to believe that our standards faithfully exhibit the mind of the Spirit, our practice and our creed ought to be consistent." If we act otherwise, "we make our Church the jest of the mocker and the scoff of the profane."

This view of Dr. Thornwell is eminently just. We do not understand him as advocating the repeal of the law of our Church as a thing in itself wrong ; nor as giving the slightest intimation of his judgment for or against it on its own merits. But he forcibly shows that the restoration of Mr. McQueen was a practical ignoring of the law. In our view, it was a practical annulling of the law.

The highest court of our Church further, by its treatment of and by its direction for the official conduct of ministers in the premises, virtually again makes null and void the law of the Church. We reason thus : If it be a crime for a man to marry his deceased wife's sister, it is also criminal for a minister to "aid and abet" the parties in their doing wrong, by his performing for them the marriage ceremony. Again, as he acts professedly under the authority of God and in the name of God, as well as that of the State, by his act he proclaims the divine sanction to that which the law of our Church asserts to be incestuous. Yet no one of our ministers has ever been arraigned for thus aiding and abetting crime, nor for thus arraying himself against the authority of the Church. Nor does our Assembly forbid ministers to marry such parties, in terms such as should be used to prohibit a criminal act. It recommends our ministers to abstain from celebrating such marriages, and that mainly as a matter of expediency, because public opinion is against them ! This is a strange position.

It despoils the law of all right of magistracy ; it is a lowering of the high authority on which, as is assumed, the prohibition of our standards is based, to that of the variable and ever varying current of public opinion ! This is, indeed, a practical voiding of the law.

The only solution of the inconsistent action of the highest court of our Church that we can conceive of is, that those whose business it was to vote in such cases were perplexed. They were in a dilemma, as will be many others who may be called on to give a verdict on the marriage of some offending brother, if the law remains in our Book. They were not fully convinced—as the Assembly itself frankly says—that there really is divine authority for the prohibition ; yet, inasmuch as such marriages in our Book are prohibited, they felt it incumbent on them to maintain the authority of the Church. Still, in respecting the majesty of law, they would so frame their action as to avoid, as far as possible, the doing of that which might be an act of injustice, which might be an act of cruelty.

This certainly was amiable, and challenges our admiration ; but still the question recurs, As the law in our Book stands, was it right ? What is the law is law ; and the administrators of law have no right to go behind the law, and question the principle on which it is based.

In conclusion, we again cite the judgment of Dr. Thornwell. “Our practice and our creed ought to be consistent. If the law of our Church is more stringent on this subject than that of the Bible, it ought to be changed.” Our conviction is that the law of our Church on this subject is without support from the Scriptures, and that, therefore, it ought to be expunged from our standards.

FERDINAND JACOBS.

ARTICLE IV.

THE METAPHYSICAL AND THEOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS OF INDUCTION AND ANALOGY.

It is to be lamented that Mr. Mill, after teaching so much valuable truth, and displaying so just an insight up to this point, should then assert a view of our universal judgment of cause, which, if true, would destroy his own science. He believes, after the perverse metaphysic of his father, Mr. James Mill, and of the school of Hume, that the mind has no such universal *a priori* judgments. He believes that our general judgment of cause is itself empirical, and is gotten simply by combining a multitude of inductions *enumerationis simplicis*. But these, he admits, are not demonstrative; and the whole and sole use of all the canons of induction is to lead from these invalid colligations to certain truths. And he has confessed that this is only done by assuming the universal law of cause; so that his conception of the whole inductive logic is of a process which assumes its own conclusion as its own premise! That he is not misrepresented, will appear from the following citations from his *Logic*, Book III., Chap. 21: "As was observed in a former place, the belief we entertain in the universality throughout nature of the law of cause and effect, is itself an instance of induction, and by no means one of the earliest which any of us, or which mankind in general, can have made. We arrive at this universal law by generalisation from many laws of inferior generality." P. 100. "Is there not, then, an inconsistency in contrasting the looseness of one method with the rigidity of another, when that other is indebted to the looser method for its own foundation?" P. 101. "Can we prove a proposition by an argument which it takes for granted?" P. 96. This question, Mr. Mill then says, he has "purposely stated in the strongest terms it will admit of," in order to reject the doctrine of a belief in causation as a necessary intuitive law, and to assert his (as we think erroneous) doctrine, which attempts to make the inductive process prove its own fundamental premise. His apology for this violation of the very first principle of logic

and common sense is, that the belief in causation, while only an empirical induction, is "an empirical law coextensive with all human experience; at which point the distinction between empirical laws and laws of nature vanishes, and the proposition takes its place among the most firmly established as well as the largest truths accessible to science." P. 103.

One question dissipates this attempted solution. Is a process of inductive demonstration only valid, then, to one whose empirical knowledge "is coextensive with all human experience"? No. Mr. Mill, for instance, when explaining the proof of a natural law by the "method of difference," made these two correct statements: that this method is rigidly conclusive when its conditions are observed; and that it is by this method the common people really infer the commonly known laws. It appears, then, by his own statement, that a beginner in inductive reasoning, long before he has widened his knowledge until it is "coextensive with all human experience," may make, and does make, inductions to general laws that are valid. Whence does he procure his universal major premise? Again: the empirical knowledge of the most learned observer in the world, bears but a minute, almost an infinitesimal, ratio to the multitude of consecutions of events which take place outside of his knowledge. The idea that mere empirical observation can ever establish a law as universal, is therefore delusive. It proceeds upon the supposition that, as the number of agreeing observed instances is widened, the probability grows towards a certainty that their agreement expresses the universal law, because the cases actually tested bear a so much larger ratio to the cases not tested. But it must be remembered, if the intuitive and original character of our judgment of cause be denied, we have no means, except the empirical, to know whether the cases of sequence still untested, and therefore unknown, will conform to our supposed law or not. And the belief arising out of this supposed *calculus* of probabilities is utterly deceptive. For the number of cases tested, however large, is still, in the mind of the most learned physicist, infinitesimally small, compared with the number of the unknown cases occurring in nature, not to speak of the more multitudinous cases in past

ages. When the physicist has observed for years, the number of instances empirically tested does bear a larger ratio to the number with which he began. True, and this is precisely the delusion which cheated Mr. Mill's mind. But it is the increased ratio of the empirically known to the unknown which is necessary, for the purpose of even grounding a probability. But this still remains infinitesimally small. Mr. Mill obviously has in his mind some conception of concurring witnesses, confirming each other's testimony. The analogy is plausible, but it should be carefully considered whether it is just and exact. When a court of law would ascertain the truth as to a crime, we may suppose that more or less doubt rests on the competency or credibility of the first witness summoned. But his statement is taken; yet it is no sufficient ground on which to condemn a citizen. A second witness, whose credibility is also imperfect, is called; and his statement concurs with the first. If it is manifest no collusion exists, the correspondence of his statement with the first lends it confirmation. If many witnesses of this kind, each independent, tell the same story, although neither one would have been trustworthy enough, alone, to condemn a man, yet the concurrence begets a practical certainty, on which a court might even proceed to convict. Now, Mr. Mill's thought evidently is, that a similar cumulative process goes on, as one induction is added to another, with results which appear mutually confirmatory. According to him, the uniformity of nature is assumed as the general premise in each of these inductions. But it has to be employed as a major premise, while it is still only an assumption without proof. But this, that, and the other process, grounded in it, turn out so as to correspond with each other and with experience, until at last the inference in favor of it becomes sufficiently cumulative to be taken as a practical certainty.

The remarks already made, when considered, will show that this analogy is deceptive. Why does the judge, after examining many witnesses, each of imperfect credibility, yet conclude from the concurrence of their statements, that he has the truth? Because he deems the number examined such as is nearly exhaustive of the whole body of possible evidence. Suppose that judge, after examining even ten such witnesses, were taught that the

whole number of spectators of the crime was not, as is customary even in public cases, some twelve, or possibly twenty, bystanders, but that the number of equally near eye-witnesses was ten thousand, and that there was in each of the unexamined nine thousand nine hundred and ninety, any, even the slightest, tendency to contradict possibly the statement of the ten. The judge would in that case feel that he had no certainty. There is the concurrence of the ten thus far examined? Yes; but there is also some possibility that the next ten may concurrently contradict them; and the same possibility is repeated with nine hundred and eighty other tens. Had the case been this: the whole number of possible witnesses being twelve, or possibly twenty, ten have been actually examined and found concurrent without collusion, the cumulative probability arising out of this concurrence of the ten, might weigh very potently against any surmise or expectation of a contrary testimony in the two, or even the ten, not examined. This is the case which has deceived Mr. Mill. But it is not the case at all which the inductive reasoner has in hand. The number of sequences tested by physicists bears a most minute *ratio* to the untested sequences, in which, on Mr. Mill's theory, there is an *à priori* possibility of a contradictory law. He has himself given us a remarkable confession of this, Book III., Chap. 21, in his assertion that, *after all our inductive researches, we still have no evidence that this uniformity of nature is the law of the universe. We may assume it only of "that portion of it which is within the range of our means of sure observation."*

Again, the postulate of the uniformity of nature would not be, on Mr. Mill's theory, even one that might be provisionally assumed, because it is obnoxious at its first suggestion, and throughout our provisional course of inquiry, to apparent contradictions. To the merely empirical eye nature appears variable and capricious almost as often as she does constant. So that, had our inductions only an empirical basis, instances of apparent testimony against this general premise might multiply as fast as instances of seeming concurrence in its favor. The real reason that the results of induction are not thus embarrassed is, that true induction is not merely empirical, as Mr. Mill supposes. Once more,

if the general premise underlying each case of induction is only an assumption, then it is *a priori* possible it may involve an error. If it does, why may not that element of error be multiplied and spread itself through the body of connected processes in a geometrical degree? Then, the body of supposed science is always liable to turn out, after all, like the Ptolemaic hypothesis of the heavens, an inverted pyramid, an ingenious complication of propositions forced into a seeming harmony by their common trait of involving the radical error? Science has often shown that a hypothetical structure may be widely built out, and may stand long in apparent strength, and yet be overthrown.

We close this refutation with this testimony from Esser, adopted by Hamilton ("Logic," Lec. 32, end): "It is possible only in one way to raise induction and analogy from mere probability to complete certainty, viz., to demonstrate that the principles which lie at the root of these processes, and which we have already stated, are either necessary laws of thought, or necessary laws of nature. To demonstrate that they are necessary laws of thought is impossible, for logic not only does not allow inference from many to all, but expressly rejects it. Again, to demonstrate that they are necessary laws of nature, is equally impossible. This has, indeed, been attempted, from the uniformity of nature, but in vain. For it is incompetent to evince the necessity of the inference of induction and analogy from the fact denominated *the law of nature*, seeing that this law itself can only be discovered by the way of induction and analogy. In this attempted demonstration there is thus the most glaring *petitio principii*. The result which has been previously given remains, therefore, intact. Induction and analogy guarantee no perfect certainty, but only a high degree of probability, while all probability rests, at best, on induction and analogy, and nothing else."

Hamilton and his German teacher, Esser, here do two things, one of which is right and the other is wrong. They utterly refute Mill's attempt to ground an apodeictic induction in his false metaphysics as to man's primitive judgment. This is the right thing. They also deny to the inductive logic all apodeictic character. This is their wrong teaching. Surely this conclusion is as much against

common sense and the universal practical convictions of mankind, as it is against their experience. Men assuredly believe that they have a multitude of certain demonstrated inductions. They are right in believing so. On these practical inductions, simple and brief in their processes it may be, yet real inductions, men are proceeding with absolute confidence, in their business, every day of their lives. It is by an induction that we all know we shall die. Does any man think his own death only a high probability? All know death is certain. Here are all the modern triumphs of physical science, which civilised mankind regard as much their assured possession as the pure propositions of geometry. No one regards their laws as of only probable truth. The world intrusts its wealth, health, life, to them with absolute faith. But most of the laws of physics are truths of induction. Hamilton's conclusion, then, while right in denying a foundation for their certainty where Mill and his predecessors propose to place it, in the uniformities of nature, is wrong in allowing to the inductive logic only probable force. He, like the rest, overlooked too much the concern which our primary judgment of causation has in these processes. They did not correctly apprehend the relation of this great intuition to them. It is humbly claimed that, in explaining that relation, by means of a rigid and exhaustive analysis of the inductive methods, this branch of logic has been reconciled with itself, and with the practical convictions of mankind. Its complete exploits of proof are discriminated from its incomplete ones. The former are lifted out of their uncertainty, to the prerogative of the syllogism, by showing that they do not conclude from some to all; but from a universal and necessary judgment to particulars and individuals. Why should it be thought a strange thing that this primary judgment should be found to hold so fundamental a place at the very corner-stone of the sciences? The farther philosophy is rightly pursued, the more is the unique importance of this great norm of the reason, *Ex nihilo nihil*, in all the departments of human thoughts disclosed. It is the regulative notion of the reason.

In defending the intuitive quality of this judgment, then, we are defending the very being of the natural sciences, and also

of theology. This is the principle of the reason, on which both the cosmologic and teleological arguments for the being of a God are founded. Hume, the great finisher of the Sensationalist metaphysics, saw that in denying to the mind an intuition of cause, he was undermining those arguments. Teach with him, that this judgment is only an empirical one, learned from experience; and his cavil against those arguments: that the world, if an effect, is one too singular and unique to be argued about as we argue of common experienced effects, at once becomes formidable. To undermine theology was his purpose. But we have shown that his metaphysics also undermines the sciences. The inductive method, on this philosophy of Hume, becomes as baseless and uncertain as he wished theology to be; and its doctrines are degraded from certainties to guesses. The history of the inductive sciences illustrates this influence. When they were prosecuted by the Boyles, Newtons, and the illustrious company of Christian physicists, whose metaphysic was that of Cudworth, Clarke, and Butler, they gave the world those splendid and solid results which constitute the wonders of modern civilisation. But when the votaries of the inductive sciences, like Dr. Huxley, have embraced the empiricism of Hume, Comte, and Mill, they stagger and grope, and give the world, in place of true science, the vain hypotheses of evolutionism and materialism. In asserting the true nature of induction we have been pleading the cause of science, no less than of theology.

FINAL CAUSE AND INDUCTION.

If we may judge from the gentleman last named, the hostility of the empirical school is particularly directed against the theistic doctrine of Final Causes. They see how intimately it is connected with the teleological argument for the being and attributes of God. The Aristotelians, it will be remembered, were accustomed to say that an effect, in order to be fully thought, must be considered in its *material*, its *formal*, its *efficient*, and its *final* cause. No intelligent agent acts without an *aim*; for he cannot, as intelligent, act without motive. The purpose of coördinating the effect he produces to some end which, in his view, has some value,

is implied in his action; and the supposed value of that end is his motive for the volition. In this sense it may be considered as the (psychological) cause, *airia*, of the effect. This is *final cause*. If the universe is the product of intelligence, and is governed by intelligence, then it follows that every physical effect has also a final cause. This is the doctrine which is the especial object of the empiricist's opposition. He is fond of quoting the words of Bacon, *Nov. Org.*, L. II., Ap. 2, "*At ex his causa finalis tantum abest ut prosit, ut etiam scientias corrumpat, nisi in hominis actionibus.*" But farther examination of Bacon's system would have shown them that it was not the belief in final causes he disapproved; but that illicit assumption of a particular purpose of the Creator in a particular effect, in advance of inductive proof, which he had found corrupting physical science in the hands of the scholastics.¹ When, for instance, he saw them arguing that the "waters which were above the firmament" must mean a literal transparent ocean of water in the inter-planetary spaces, because God's final cause for placing it there was to arrest and temper the beams of the sun, which otherwise would scorch the planets too much, Bacon very properly objected to this assumption of a final cause, in the midst of the inquiry into a physical fact. In its proper place he does due honor to the doctrine of final cause. He was too wise to reject it. For it is the meeting-point of theology, philosophy, and the inductive logic. Mr. Dugald Stewart (Vol. III. Collected Writings, Ch. IV., § 6) has elegantly explained Bacon's true position, cited the approbation of Boyle, Cudworth, and Newton for the study of final causes, and shown their importance as a guide to inductive inquiry. Descartes professed to decline their consideration, on the ground that it was presumptuous for a creature, so short-sighted as man, to undertake to impute designs to God's actions. This objection is met at once by distinguishing between the lawful and unlawful uses of this inquiry. To assume that God always has some designed rational end for all his creations and actions, this surely is not presumption, but only the necessary respect for his wisdom; to suppose that he had not always such designs, this would be the

¹ See *De Augmentis Scient.*, L. III., c. 4, 5.

presumption, yea, the insult, for it would ascribe to him the action of working when he had no rational motive; a surmise necessarily disparaging to his wisdom. Which particular design God has in a given structure, this we are not to presume, but humbly to learn from his teachings through his works, in such cases as they disclose their end; and in all other cases we are to remain modest in our ignorance. But the doctrine that each thing has *some* final cause; that a wise Creator did not make it aimlessly; this is the main guide of induction. It is by its light we are guided to the discovery of the laws of cause and effect. The illustration given by Dr. Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood is equally splendid and familiar. He himself informed Boyle, that he was led to it by the fact that he found in the veins membranous valves opening towards the heart, and in the arteries similar valves opening the other way. He reflected that nature never does anything in vain (which is the same thing as saying that every structure has some final cause); and he was thus taught that the blood flows inward to the heart from the parts of the body by the veins, and outwards by the arteries. In like manner, the doctrine that every structure has certainly *some* function, is the very lever of the construction of comparative anatomy. But what is this function but the final cause of the structure? To discover the function is the main task this science proposes to itself. This is the end pursued through all the comparative dissections. And when the function, or final cause, is discovered, the physiologist knows that he has discovered a general law, not only of that variety or species, but of all species possessing that organ. Cuvier argued: No animal devoid of canine teeth will ever be found with its feet armed with prehensile claws. Why? Because the function of the canine teeth is to masticate living prey; but nature, after depriving the mouth of such teeth and equipping it only with graminivorous teeth, will never perpetrate the anomaly of arming the feet with claws whose function is to catch living prey. Such is the character of the arguments of this great science. Deny the doctrine of final cause, and it has no basis.

Indeed, if final causes are discarded, there is no longer any

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basis for any inductive demonstration. The object of this process, in every branch of science, is to discover a *general and permanent law*. How do we accomplish this? Let the admitted answer be repeated: It is accomplished by distinguishing from among the seeming antecedents of a given effect, that one which is the "invariable unconditional antecedent" (Mill). For, the very nature of inductive logic is to assure us that when we have truly found this invariable unconditional antecedent in some cases, it will infallibly introduce that effect in all similar cases. This is what is assumed as the "natural law." But how are we authorised to infer this? By our general premise concerning "the uniformity of nature." But the system which discards final cause also denies that there is any intuition of a necessary law of cause. It denies that there is any cognition of an efficient power in cause; for the senses perceive nothing but a sequence. It teaches that the belief in the invariability of natural law is itself but an empirical conclusion, and one which cannot possibly be proved to be universal or necessary, since it begins in no necessary first truth, but only in probabilities. Then, it is impossible the mind can validly conclude the connexion between any antecedent whatever, and any consequent, to be universal and necessary. For, where does that connexion abide? On this system it can abide only in the material things which exhibit the *phenomena*. But they are dead, senseless, unknowing, unremembering, involuntary matter; matter which, as it is empirically observed, exhibits itself to us as infinitely variable, and unaccountably variable. From such premises the expectation of any permanent law whatsoever is unwarranted, and scientific induction out of the question.

Now, if there were no other ground for invariable unconditional sequence, would an intuitive expectation of the universality of any law of cause be better grounded than this empirical one? Let this be pondered (our main effort has been to show that this expectation is intuitive, and not merely empirical, and that therefore it is the inductive inference holds good). Could the intuitive or *a priori* reason consistently hold this expectation if it saw in a true cause no efficient power? Obviously not. This would be to expect the first link certainly to draw in the second, when

there was no certain connexion between them. But again, if efficient power in a second cause is not the expression of any final cause whatsoever, in any intelligent agent, would the reason ever regard it as a *certain* connexion between the parts of the sequence? Obviously not. For, the first lesson the reason has learned about the material bodies which are the seats of the *phenomena*, is, that they are blind, inert, unintelligent. All the education the reason has received about these bodies is, that they are *subject to variation*. Our whole discussion is about "effects." But what is effect save change? The very problem of all science is, *Nature's changes*. How did the reason learn from nature's perpetual variations, then, to trust in the invariability of nature? And especially when this nature is material, and too blind to have consciousness either of her own changes or stability, of her observance or violation of her supposed laws? To explain this intuitive expectation of the invariability of causal changes, as a healthy act of the reason, there must be somewhere a sufficient cause of the law in nature. And the only sufficient cause is the final cause which is the expression of the intelligence which made and governs nature. We believe in the stability of a natural law, when we discover it, only because we believe in *the function* which a stable intelligence has designed in endowing that thing with that law. Why are we so certain that "like causes always produce like effects"? Because the same reason tells us that the power deposited in that natural cause was put there by a supreme intelligence, and, therefore, for a final cause; and that the wisdom which planned will certainly regulate, on the same consistent plan, the machinery of causation there established. The postulates of theism are necessary to ground the inferences of induction. The doctrine of divine purpose, and that of the stability of the law of true causes, are the answering parts of one system of thought. When this is asserted, it is not designed to retract the proposition so often asserted as fundamental, that our belief in the regularity of the law of cause is intuitive, or to represent that judgment now, as a *deduction* from the propositions of theism. What is meant is this: that while the Creator did fashion the human reason so as to be intuitively necessitated to believe in

cause, that he might be consistent in doing so he also gave it the evidence of his own causation and intelligent design in all his works. The two judgments are complementary to each other; the suppression of the latter would leave the other inconsistent. *God's constancy to his own ends* is the only explanation of that stability, which he has necessitated us to expect in the laws of the second causes by which he designs to effectuate those ends. Or else, the alternative explanation must be, that the causal ties in physical sequences are eternal and necessary, essentially immanent in the very being of the material bodies acting and acted on, and *this is fatalism*. Let the Huxleys and Comtes, then, choose between this absolute fatalism and the doctrine of final causes. They have no other alternative.

EXPERIENCE AND ANALOGY.

It has been debated, what relation the popular arguments from experience bear to inductions. If the reader has accepted the view of the inductive logic here taught, he will answer that *experimental arguments are identical* with inductive. That is to say, they are nothing but popular attempts to reason inductively; and they differ from scientific inductions only in the simplicity of the process attempted (which is most frequently by the "Method of Difference"), the homeliness of the cases argued, the smaller number of the particulars colligated, and the heedlessness or inaccuracy commonly practised. So far Macaulay was correct in his amusing application of the Baconian method. A moment's consideration shows that the attempt made by the experimental argument is either an imperfect induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, or else it is an attempt to develop a law of cause among experienced instances, by some canon of inference. "It is observed that rains often follow the new moons" (so the populace suppose). "Therefore, the changes of the moon somehow cause rain." Such is the most imperfect and invalid form of the process. In the picture drawn by Macaulay, an attempt is made by the plain squire to apply a canon of inference. "I ate minced pies on Monday and Wednesday, and I was kept awake by indigestion all night." This is the *comparentia ad intellectum in-*

stantiarum convenientium. "I did not eat any on Tuesday and Friday, and I was quite well." This is the *comparentia instantiarum in proximo quae natura data privantur*. "I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was very slightly indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas day I almost dined on them, and was so ill that I was in some danger." This is the *comparentia instantiarum secundum majus et minus*. "It cannot have been the brandy I took with them. For I have drunk brandy for years, without being the worse for it." This is the *rejectio naturalium*. Our invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon the *vindemiatio*, and pronounces that minced pies do not agree with him.

So the most of the practical truths men use in their daily life, are but easy inductions by the Method of Difference. That fire burns, that water quenches thirst, that alcohol intoxicates, that emetics nauseate—these common judgments are made, and usually made so early and so easily in our experience, that we cease to analyse them by comparing our conscious antecedents in the instances when we were burned, or satiated, or intoxicated, or nauseated, with the instances when we were not, and noting that the only difference in the antecedents was the presence of the fire, or the water, or the alcohol, or the emetic.

The question, What is the analogical argument? has been greatly confused by varying definitions of the word Analogy. Some of these, as the one from Quintilian, prefixed by Bishop Butler to *The Analogy* (*Eius haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile de quo non quaeritur referat, ut incerta certis probet*), are not incorrect, but are indefinite. Such, also, is Dr. S. Johnson's: "A resemblance between things with regard to some circumstance or effects, as when learning is said to *enlighten* the mind." It would appear that in popular language the word is often used as a synonym of the word likeness or resemblance. Things are said to have analogy because they have like properties. It is obvious that, if this is all the word means, we have no use for it. Some, seeing this, propose that where we see between two objects diversity of qualities and yet a likeness in some one quality, we shall term these analogous. According to this

view, analogy would be resemblance in diversity. But again, it is obvious that we have no use for the term; for it only describes what we have described already as partial or incomplete resemblance. Moreover, the definition is fatally defective, in that it fails to signalise the qualities or circumstances in which the analogous things must agree, while differing in others. On that discrimination it is obvious the validity of an analogical argument, from one of these things to the other, must turn. Stewart, in one place, distinguishes resemblance from analogy thus: Resemblance is similarity of property between individuals; analogy is similarity between *species* or *genera*. But he almost immediately confesses that this is a distinction without a difference. The act of comparison by which we colligate two agreeing individuals in a *species*, does not differ from that by which we colligate two agreeing *species* under a *genus*. As Hamilton has so luminously shown by his discussion of "extension" and "intension," the only difference is, that in making the sub-class, we cognise fewer individuals and more agreeing attributes; and in the larger class, more individuals and fewer agreeing attributes.

Hamilton aims, after his favorite teacher, Esser, to discriminate analogy very sharply; yet his distinction is also unsatisfactory (Logic, pp. 450, 455). He teaches that the inference of induction is, when from observing that many individuals of a class have a given quality, we predicate it of *all* the individuals of the class. The inference of analogy is, when from observing that several individuals agree in two or more qualities, we conclude that they agree in all the qualities essential to the class, and we collect them under it. The inference of induction may be illustrated thus: A class is composed of A, B, C, D, E. We observe in A, B, C, a given property, Z; whence we conclude the same property qualifies D and E. The inference of analogy would be illustrated thus: We have a class which is defined by the essential qualities X, Y, Z. Examining an individual, A, not yet grouped under this class, we find in it the properties X and Y; whence we infer, without examining farther, that A also has the other property, Z, and thus belongs to the class. Of this description we observe, first, that both inferences are from

the some to the all, and therefore, as Hamilton admits, not demonstrative. The first, which he calls the inference of induction, is in fact sophistical, and has no proper place in logic. For, how came D and E to be in the class supposed, when their possession of the essential class-property, Z, has not yet been ascertained, either by observation or inference? It must be observed that the places of D and E in the class are conceded first, in order to prepare the way for the inference of induction, which extends to them the class-property Z; whereas, if that property had not been already ascribed, they would not have place in the class at all. Further, if there is any even probable authority for extending the property Z to them, in advance of actual inspection, that authority must come from the second kind of inference, called the inference of analogy. The one inference, then, is only a corollary of the other, instead of being a distinct logical process. This attempted distinction, therefore, gives us no help in defining the argument by analogy. On pages 489-493, we explained the real processes of the mind in the ascription of class-attributes and the formation of classes. The remarks there made will sufficiently clear up this subject.

The only mode of making the doctrine perspicuous is to restrict the word analogy to a particular kind of likeness. While resemblance, the basis of classification, is similarity of properties in single objects, analogy should be defined as *parallelism of relations between cases*. Resemblance is between an object and an object (either individuals or classes). Analogy is between a pair of objects and a pair of objects. Both Stewart and Hamilton mention this view of the matter, but seem to mention it only to discard it. But Whately sees the value of this view, and defines analogy as parallelism of relations. The most definite conception of analogy is given by a mathematical equation of ratios. Thus, $3 : 9 :: 4 : 12$; or $9 \div 3 = 12 \div 4$. Neither of these pairs of numbers is equal, nor are their sums equal. But there is one relation between 3 and 9 which is identical with a relation between 4 and 12. It is, that in each pair the smaller is one-third part of the larger. The "mathematical proportion," then, is a perfect analogy; and it gives us the most definite and exact con-

ception. And inasmuch as the relation between the two pairs is not only like, but identical, the expression $9 \div 3 = 12 \div 4$ is a true equation, and may be used as a premise for demonstrations as exact and rigid as any other mathematical proof. Let it, then, be agreed that our nomenclature shall be cleared of confusion by using the word analogy in the sense only of resemblance of relations between pairs, and we shall grasp a tenable conception of the analogical argument.

Relations are multifarious. There may be, between all objects qualified by quantity, relations of quantity, as *ratio* and equality. There may be, again, between events connected in sequence of time, relations of causality. There may be, between bodies, relations of space; but as space is measurable, these would resolve themselves into the first class. Again, between organisms, there may be relations of function, and these being causal, resolve themselves into the second class. We have seen that in a mathematical proportion, identity of *ratios* may give us demonstrated results. So, in a causal analogy, that parallelism of relations which is complete and amounts to identity, may give a demonstrative conclusion. What else is the demonstrative induction by the Method of Difference? It is but the establishment of full parallel or identity between the causal relation in a pair of terms, the antecedent and consequent, namely, in an observed sequence, and other antecedents and consequents in future sequences not yet observed. And this identity of causal relations is the ground of our belief that the same sequence will recur. This is what gives us the "law of nature" as to that class of phenomena. But if the parallelism of relations is imperfect, or imperfectly ascertained, then the analogical inference is only probable; and the probability diminishes as the parallelism of relations weakens.

If this perspicuous view of analogy is true, we are led to results very different from those announced by the eminent logicians criticised. But the results, if tenable, greatly simplify and unify this department of logic. Instead of separating the analogical argument from both the experimental and the inductive, we find that the analogical is but the common method, including both the others. We have already shown that the experimental inference

is simply a plain and brief induction. An inductive argument is simply an inference from that subdivision of the analogical argument (from parallelism of relations between two or more pairs) where the relations in question are the causal relations in sequences. The inference from a complete parallelism in causal relations is the apodeictic induction; the inference from an imperfect parallelism of causal relations is the probable induction, that *per enumerationem simplicem*. Previous writers have been mistaken, also, in deciding that the analogical argument cannot rise above probability (as we saw Hamilton declare of the inductive). In fact, the analogical argument, like the inductive, which is a branch of it, may be demonstrative, or it may be only probable, according to the completeness of the parallel between the relations compared or its incompleteness.

THE APODEICTIC INDUCTION.

In concluding this exposition, then, it is necessary to remark on the looseness and confusion which have prevailed in the use of the term induction, as of the word analogy. 1. Sometimes the mere colligation of resembling cases has been called induction. 2. Sometimes the name has been given to the mere tentative inference from the some of the observed cases to the all, including the unobserved. 3. Sometimes it has been used to describe what is in reality no *process* of argument at all, but the mere formulating in a single proposition of a class of observed facts, as when, having seen by inspection a given predication true of each and every individual separately, we predicate it of the class. Thus Hamilton, more than once. 4. But the *inductive demonstration* is wholly another and a higher matter. It is the valid inference of a law of nature, from observed instances of sequence, by applying to them a universal necessary judgment, as premise, the intuition of cause for every effect. It has been often said, as by Grote's Aristotle, for instance, that induction is a different process from syllogism, and is, in fact, preliminary thereto; that induction prepares the propositions from which syllogism reasons. This is true of that induction, abusively so called, which we have just numbered 1st and 3d. It is not true of inductive demon-

stration. It has usually been assumed that while induction is a species of reasoning, it is a different, and even an opposite, species from deduction. The first and third actions of the mind, abusively called inductions, do, indeed, differ from deduction; but they are not argumentative processes at all; they do not lead to new truth, either inwards or downwards. They merely formulate in general terms, or in general propositions, individual percepts or individual judgments already attained. True induction, or inductive demonstration, is simply one department of syllogistic reasoning, and is as truly deductive as the rest of syllogism; giving us, namely, those deductions which flow from the combination of the universal and necessary intuition of cause, with observed facts of sequence.

This explanation of the nature of the Inductive Logic powerfully confirms the cautions of its wisest practitioners, as to the necessity of painstaking care in its pursuit. It is a method of ascertaining truth closely conformed to the divine apophthegm, "With the lowly is wisdom." It is evidently a modest science. Only the greatest patience, candor, and caution in observing, and the most honest self-denial in guarding against the seduction of one's own hypotheses, can lead to safe results. After this review, the charge which Mr. Mill brought against much of the pretended inductive science of our day, quoted by us at the outset, appears every way just. What else than unsafe results can be expected from persons who have never truly apprehended what the inductive argument is; when they venture to employ it, with the most confused notions of its real nature, and under the *stimulus* of competition, haste, prejudice, and love of hypothesis? Time and the future have a huge work of winnowing to perform upon the fruits of the busy mental activity of this generation, before the true wheat is gathered into the garners of science.

As Moses and our Saviour epitomised the Ten Commandments into the one great law of Love, so the canons of valid induction may be popularly summarised in one law. It is this: *So long as all the known facts can be reconciled with any other hypothesis whatsoever than the one propounded as the inference of the induction, even though that other hypothesis be no better than an*

invention or surmise, *the inductive argument is invalid to give a demonstration*; it yields only a probability. This rule receives an excellent illustration from the legal rule of "circumstantial evidence" in criminal trials. And the illustration is so good for two reasons: that there is so close a resemblance, in many points, between inductive reasoning and circumstantial evidence; and that the great men who, as jurists, have settled the principles of the legal science of evidence, have brought to their problem the ripest human sagacity, sobered and steadied by the consideration that these principles were to have application, in dreadful earnest, to the lives and liberty of all citizens, including themselves. Let us suppose, now, a case in which a murder has been committed, in darkness and supposed privacy, with a fire arm. No other species of evidence is supposed to be available than the circumstantial. The prosecution therefore collect every, even the most minute fact, and, with great ingenuity and plausibility, they construct this hypothesis of guilt: that the dead man was feloniously shot by A. B. So many observed facts seem to tally with this, that all men lean to the conclusion A. B. is probably guilty. But the learned judge instructs the jury that the prosecution are bound to show, not only that the hypothesis of A. B.'s guilt *may satisfy* all the observed facts, but to demonstrate absolutely that *it alone can satisfy* them; so that the logical result shall be, not only that we may, but that we must, adopt this as the only true explanation of the circumstances proven. And the judge will authorise the defence to test that point thus: If another hypothesis than A. B.'s guilt, which, as a proposition, is naturally feasible, can be even invented, though unsupported by any array of proved facts, which may also satisfy the facts established before the court, the prosecution have failed to establish the guilt of the accused. The ingenuity of the lawyers on that side is no less than was supposed, and the probability of A. B.'s guilt may remain; but it is not *proved*, and the man must be discharged.

This principle of jurisprudence is in strict accordance with the logic of induction. The analysis of the judge's grounds of ruling is this: no one can assert that *every event*, preceding and attending the killing, has been ascertained and stated by the prosecu-

tion. That this remark is true, appears sufficiently from the fact that both sides postulate that the killing was done in darkness and the absence of spectators. Of course, then, the probability, or at least possibility, always remains, that while the facts given in testimony are all true, other circumstances also truly occurred, not appearing in testimony, and so not considered by anybody. But may it not be that, if there were such other circumstances, and if they were established in testimony, we should see them to be material? They might contain what would refute the hypothesis of A. B.'s guilt, or suggest some other. How shall we be sure, in our ignorance, that the case may not be such, in truth, in its unknown circumstances? Only by making an induction which shall be *positively exclusive* of that other hypothesis; that is to say, only by showing that any unknown circumstances of the killing, if brought to light, *could not* weaken the hypothesis of A. B.'s guilt. And this is not shown, as long as circumstances naturally feasible, which would supersede that hypothesis, can be imagined or suggested. In other words, in order to raise the argument on the circumstances to the grade of a demonstration, it must be like the positive induction, by the "Method of Difference." The effect investigated is the killing; the cause assigned is A. B.'s agency. To prove this hypothesis, it must not only be shown that the presence of A. B. *plus* any cluster of known or unknown antecedents, D, C, E, etc., could cause the killing; but it must also be shown that the presence of all those other antecedents, D, C, E, etc., *minus* A. B.'s agency, could not cause the killing. See the Canon of the Method of Difference, p. 507. And as the second killing of the same dead man is impossible, no experiment can be exactly instituted to apply the method of difference in this case. The completion of the argument must be by demonstrative deduction. Thus this scientific canon of induction receives an apt illustration from this employment of it in the rigid science of jurisprudence; and the correctness and usefulness of the canons is splendidly evinced in this great instance.

This seems the proper place, also, to state and explain the relations between inductive inference and parole-testimony. We will do this by resuming our supposition. Just when the prosecutors

are in the full tide of their ingenious and very highly probable circumstantial argument to A. B.'s guilt, the defence introduce an eye-witness named M. On examining him, it is evident that M. is naturally competent to have been an eye-witness of the killing, that is to say, that no natural impossibility of his having witnessed it, as from a demonstrated *alibi* during the night when it happened, exists. But M. testifies that he lodged in the room with the dead man on that night, and saw him killed by another agency than A. B.'s; we will say, for instance, by the dead man's own suicidal hand. (The prosecution may, of course, disparage the *credibility* of this witness by raising the question, Why his testimony has remained so long latent? Let us, then, to clear away this complication, suppose farther, that M. explains this reasonably; as, by showing that as he rushed horrified from the scene of the tragedy through the darkness to summon other witnesses and assistance, he had been suddenly kidnapped and detained by his own enemies.) What is now the effect of this parole-evidence as against the circumstantial? The learned judge rules that, unless the prosecution have valid grounds for impugning M.'s credibility, their circumstantial evidence breaks down wholly before it. They reply that they cannot impugn M.'s credibility. The judge then instantly decides that they have no case; declines to hear farther argument, and if the prosecution will not take his advice to discharge the accused by a "*nolle prosequi*," instructs the jury to acquit. The industry and ingenuity of the prosecution are no less than they were. But it is logically worthless against the knowledge of an admitted eye-witness. The analysis, on which this correct conclusion grounds itself, is similar to the previous. It is admitted by all that this killing may have been preceded and attended by other circumstances than those ascertained in the circumstantial evidence. Unless the induction is of that exclusive and demonstrative sort which proves that the possible unknown circumstances *cannot have been* material to the causation of the killing, and therefore could not, if known, shake the conclusion that A. B.'s act was the cause; then there is a remaining probability that the cause was not in A. B., but in those omitted antecedents. Hence, when M. testifies, he places

the causation there, where confessedly there is room for it to be placed. His testimony is legitimate, and goes with the whole weight of the moral credibility he deserves, to establish the fact against the hypothesis.

We thus learn that unless the induction be positively demonstrative, it must give way in the presence of any adequate intelligent parole-evidence affirming a different cause for the phenomenon. Another more popular reason supports this conclusion. Does one say, "The living witness may be dishonest or deceived; but my facts and inductive argument are wholly dispassionate, impartial, and valid"? He forgets that his facts also have no better foundation than the professed eye-witnessing of some human witness. Does he say, "They are facts; for I saw them"? He is but a human witness. Or if he derives his facts from the observations of others, they are mere human witnesses. But the facts are a premise of his inductive logic. The inference cannot be more valid than its premise. It thus appears that it is wholly unreasonable to claim superiority for an induction over testimony, for this is as though one should claim that "testimony is stronger than testimony." The only consistent meaning would be the arrogant assumption that "my testimony is honest and the other's dishonest." This conclusion, that competent testimony is superior to any except an absolute exclusive induction, is practically accepted by all sound physicists. Let all the facts previously known tend to refer the effect to a supposed cause, so that the scientific world is almost prepared to accept it as a law; if one competent observer arises, testifying to another actual cause for the effect, seen by him to produce it in a single case, the other hypothesis is withdrawn. For science admits that here is a case which cannot be reduced under it. An illustrious instance will be remembered in the first telescopic examinations of Galileo. He saw that the planet Venus was *gibbous* at a time and in a way she would not have been according to the Ptolemaic hypothesis. That one observation, with men of true science, made an end of the Ptolemaic theory. The only alternatives were to surrender it, or to say that Galileo did not see Venus gibbous at that part of her orbit.

The nature and methods of the inductive logic have now been discussed purely in their formal aspect. So far as the views advanced differ from the best writers, the difference is in favor of a simplification of the principles, a closer conformity to sound philosophy, and a natural explanation of what had been left by others as either imperfections or mysteries of the results. Especially is it claimed, that the inductive logic is, by our exposition, rescued from that fatal accusation of incompleteness of demonstration, with which the greatest previous logicians, as Hamilton, close their discussions of it. Whereas they decide so positively, that no inductive inference can rise above probability; the common sense of mankind has always insisted that some inductive inferences do rise above probability, and mankind have, in all ages, persisted in venturing their lives and interests upon some inductive inferences, without having their confidence in their validity refuted by events. Here was a most awkward contradiction between common sense and philosophy. This contradiction we claim to have reconciled, by showing that some inductive inferences are apodeictic, not being in truth inferences of an illegitimate order "from the some to the all," but inferences in a regular syllogism, from a universal necessary judgment. It is always one of the soundest features of a philosophy that it ratifies and explains the conclusions of common sense. Our theory of induction also bears this signature of truth, that while it earnestly claims for that branch of logic some demonstrative conclusions, it gives a natural explanation how men, and even able scientific men, are continually advancing with confidence so many faulty and erroneous inductions. This is because the methods of the demonstrative inductions are few, because they require a rigid compliance with their conditions, and because, amidst the fascinating complications which so many physical problems offer, the observance of these safe conditions is often difficult, and demands unusual patience, perspicuity, and candor. Especially is the confused state of these sciences accounted for, by the fact that the investigators were proceeding upon erroneous theories of inductive logic, which failed to discriminate the valid from the imperfectly valid processes. Mr. J. S. Mill has treated the subject

with superior insight, in the main, to any other British or American writer, because he comes after his able competitors, and because he brought to this branch of logic the resources of great learning and acuteness. Now, the reader is requested to note, that while truth has compelled the criticism and correction of his error as to the necessary and universal judgment underlying the inductive syllogism, the essential and vital features of his system are retained; and that in a form even more practical and useful than his. These are: 1. That there is a demonstrative induction. 2. That its essential basis is the universal judgment of cause and effect. 3. That there are no other methods of discriminating the valid induction from the invalid, than the five he enumerates; and that these are only valid when guarded as he directs. The practical applications of his system are obviously not disturbed, but confirmed, by the theory asserted here against him, that the fundamental premise is not an empirical but an intuitive judgment.

THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT ILLUSTRATED BY APPLICATION TO
CASES.

This discussion will be concluded by applying the principles of logic taught above to a few physical doctrines which have recently interested the scientific world.

1. That the theory of the equivalency and transformation of energy has not yet been made more than a hypothesis, was intimated on page 495. What is denied is, that it has been extended as a valid induction to all the energies of inorganic matter. We have never seen, for its supposed extension to vital energies, any portion of evidence whatever, or anything more than groundless assertion. It cannot claim to be an induction, even as to the forces of inorganic matter, even when tried by the popular criterion. It does not preclude the rival hypothesis, that there are as many permanent and distinct powers in matter, as there are essential properties; which powers are not annihilated on the completion of their effects, but only restored to an *equilibrium*, in which they exist still as potential tendencies. This theory is not only not excluded, but accounts for many cases for

which the other theory of the "equivalency and transformation of energy" does not account. The first also solves successfully the very cases, like that of the absorption of so much sensible caloric, reappearing in the form of so much elasticity, which are claimed as so favorable to the latter. Let us suppose that caloric is a persistent and distinct molecular energy, which never really transforms itself into and disappears in elastic force; but that the application of the caloric is only the cause of release of the elastic force from the state of potential tendency to activity; while the caloric, having done that work, is itself remanded, for the time, to its former potentiality. Then, the equivalency between the caloric recalled and the elastic force released, would of course follow. It would be the old case of the correspondency of action and reaction. But a more serious defect is, that the theory has not been extended to some material energies, as that of gravitation, by any collection of sequences giving even the invalid induction *per enumerationem simplicem*. Next, we have seen that the theory cannot meet the question, What becomes of the forces radiated outwards from the exterior bounds of the universe; and how, on that theory, can we escape the conclusion that the total aggregate of force, instead of being persistent and identical, as the theory wishes to claim, is diminishing, and tends to total cessation and stagnation? Thus the theory fails to meet the grand final test stated on p. 720. Nor would any one individual instance of the theory (as this: that it is the heat, and not the distinct power of elasticity released by the heat, which lifts the piston in the steam-cylinder) stand the test of either one of the canons of induction. Let the reader attempt it, and see for himself. And once more; the *verification* of the equivalency of what this theory calls the transformed force, has never been attempted even, except as to the related energies of caloric and elasticity; and we suspect the farther verification will ever be impracticable.

It is worthy of inquiry also whether this hypothesis, if adopted, would not destroy the very foundation of the inductive process. That foundation is, "Like causes, like effects." The plurality of effects is accounted for by referring them correctly to their different causes. But, according to this theory, *there are no dif-*

ferent causes—there is but one cause. The search after efficient cause, which has been proved to be the vital problem of induction, must be degraded into the inquiry after the uniform antecedent; an inquiry which, as we showed, could lead to no assured result.

2. The laws of refraction revealed by the spectroscope are now supposed to be so established for all worlds as to be relied on to teach us the chemistry of the heavenly bodies. Let us see first to what extent those laws are demonstrated for the material elements of our planet. The analyst proceeds thus, for instance: When vapor of sodium is present in an incandescent flame, the rays of white light coming through that flame, being enlarged into a spectrum, exhibit certain black lines in certain places. When the sodium vapor is removed from the flame, those lines disappear from the spectrum cast by those rays. Now, it may be claimed that this is a proof, by the method of difference, the most rigid of all, that sodium always causes those lines in the spectrum. It is conceded that this may be a valid induction, to a certain extent. Let us refer to pp. 506–508, and we see that, provided the experimenter can be certain he has made no change whatever in the flame inspected, nor in the refraction, save the removal of the sodium vapor, it is proved that sodium is *a cause* of these lines. But it is not yet proved to be the *only cause*; for similar effects may be produced by more than one cause. Let the analysis be extended, then, to all the sixty-six simple substances catalogued by analytical chemistry; and let it be tested by experiment, that none of the others produce the same lines in the spectrum. Then it may be considered proven that sodium is not only *a cause*, but *always the cause*, of those lines; just so far as, and no farther than, it is proved that chemistry has already discovered all the elemental material substances in this world. In the present advanced stage of chemical research, it is admitted that the probability is *very strong*, the sodium vapor is the only cause of those particular lines in the spectrum. It is certain, by the method of difference, that it is a cause of them. That is to say, the causation of those lines is certainly connected with that metal, either directly by its efficiency of them, or relatively, by the constant connexion of both of them with some other efficient still

undetected. A law is revealed, which may be relied on as to this earth.

But, as Dr. William B. Carpenter cautioned the admirers of the *spectrum analysis*, in his inaugural lecture before the British Association, the induction does not hold when extended to other worlds. Its invalidity is not now inferred from the facts that the pencils of light from the stars are so exceedingly slender, and that they have to pass through unknown possible influences in penetrating the whole thickness of our atmosphere, nor from the exceeding difficulty of making so entire a separation of these minute and faint pencils of light in the tube of the spectroscope from other very minute rays, direct or refracted, travelling on lines which vary from them by infinitesimal angles, as is necessary in experiments so delicate; for these difficulties concern rather the practical manipulator than the logician. But the chasm in the induction is this: all that the most valid application of the method of difference can by itself prove is, that A is *one efficient* of X. It does not disprove this proposition: that nature may contain other *efficients* of X. It may prove that, *cæteris paribus*, all As will produce X. But it does not prove that all Xs are produced by A. The concession which we made as to earthly chemistry, that all so-called *sodium lines* are produced by sodium, rests on a farther fact (which is an enumeration of facts only, and not an induction) that all the other known simple substances have been tried and failed to produce the *sodium lines*, coupled with the probable inference that analytical chemistry has been carried so far on this earth, *it is not likely any substance capable of producing sodium lines remains undetected* among earthly materials. But as to other worlds, we have made no chemical analyses! We know not what unknown simple substances, endowed with we know not what properties, would be found there. And obviously, to infer an analysis from this feature of a spectrum of that world's ray, and then reason about that spectrum from that assumed *analysis*, is but "reasoning in a circle." As a demonstration, it is worthless. Nor does it seem likely that this fatal chasm in its logic can ever be bridged. All that we can be taught is a possibility of the presence of the same simple substances, in part, in

our world and other worlds. This possibility receives some probable confirmation from the fact that some of those substances, as iron and nickle, are found in meteoric stones; that is, if the theory is valid that these are fragments of planetary bodies.

3. Another very important application of these logical principles is to the inductions of geologists concerning the mode of formation of *strata* and mineral deposits. The rule has just been recalled, that the law, "Like causes, like effects," does not authorise its converse, "Like effects reveal the same cause." For, as is so obviously clear, two independent causes may produce effects exactly similar. Now, much of the supposed inductive reasoning of treatises on geology is, in reality, but an application of this vicious converse. Observation shows us a given stratum of rock or indurated sand and slime, resulting from sedimentary deposition from water. The inference is, therefore all stratified rocks are sedimentary. And some treatises on geology assume this unsafe and invalid surmise so absolutely as to use the words "sedimentary" and "stratified" as synonyms. A very plain and useful instance of this sophism is given by the case of the Italian savant who inferred an immense age for the strata in a volcanic spot of South Italy, by examining a well. The sides of this little excavation showed certain strata of volcanic earth superposed on lava. The savant's assumption was, that all this earth was formed gradually by disintegration of hard lava; and as the process is notoriously slow, the thickness of the beds of loose earth denoted a vast lapse of time. Now, had he been certain that disintegration was the *only* cause of volcanic earth, his inference might have been worth something. But the heedlessness of his logic was put to shame by a very simple statement of fact, made by the peasants. Disintegration of hard lava was not the only cause of volcanic earth. Another cause was dust and ashes, showers from the neighboring volcano. These peasants had been actual eye-witnesses of several such emissions, which, guided by a favoring breeze, had covered their fields with an inch or two of new soil in a single night. And by the simple light of this other cause, which the great savant had not thought of, it was clearly shown that the accumulation

for which he required many scores of centuries, had been the actual work of about two hundred years.

To the candid mind these hints are enough. The most careful observer is most fully aware of these facts: that our knowledge of the terrestrial energies which have exerted themselves in our globe, is imperfect; that the grade of speed at which known forces are now observed to act, may have been exceedingly different at other times and under other conditions of temperature and climate; that the causations which would need to be accurately determined, in order to settle many of these physical questions, were probably complicated beyond all reach of our observation and ascertainment at this late day.

4. The evolution theory presents a most interesting and instructive case for the application of this logic. Its main points are: that what we supposed to be distinct *genera* of animated beings did not originate in the creation of first progenitors, from whom all the subsequent individuals descended by a generation which transmitted, by propagation, precisely the properties essential to the *genus*; but that higher *genera* were slowly evolved from lower; that the causes of the differentiations wherein the more developed individuals differ from their less developed progenitors, are to be found in three unintelligent physical influences, heredity, the influence of the environment on the being's powers, and the survival of the fittest. The observed facts from which this hypothesis claims to derive its induction, may be grouped under these general statements: that in fact the known *genera* of animated beings form a continuous ascending scale, from the most rudimental up to man, the most highly organised; thus suggesting the ascent of organisation along this ladder, from a lower stage to a higher; that a multitude of organs and limbs are actually seen to grow from their infantile to their adult states, under the interaction of their environment and the instinctive animal exertions of them; that the conditions of animal existence are, in the general, such that the individuals possessing most of the natural vigor, qualifying them to reproduce a strong or a developed progeny, are most likely to survive, while the less qualified perish; and that observed facts in the breeding of animals pre-

sent cases in which the rule does not hold that "Like produces only its like," but often it produces the slightly unlike, differing from itself by a slight shade of improvement or deterioration. These facts, the theory claims, when a very long time is allowed for the slow and irregular, but in the main progressive, action of the forces they disclose, prove that all animated *genera* can be accounted for as the ultimate progeny of the most rudimental protozoon.

The task in hand here is not to give a full refutation of this theory, but to criticise it in the light of the logical principles established, simply in order to see whether it is an induction. It appears at once that it has no claim to come under the head of either method of induction, not even of the loosest, the method of agreement. Indeed, it cannot be said to have a single *instance* (much less an agreeing multitude) in the proper sense of inductive instances. To resort for simplification to our notation, let A stand for the aggregate of supposed evolutionary agencies, which are the combined cause; let X stand for the effect, *a new genus*. There has not been presented one instance, as yet, in which A has been followed by X, even seemingly, A being accompanied or unaccompanied by other antecedents, B, C, D, etc. The utmost which can be claimed is, that a few "varieties" have been evolved, but no permanent *species* or *genus*, which can meet the tests of generic character. Even these "varieties" cannot be proved to be the effects of the supposed evolving physical causes, since it does not appear that they have evolved themselves, except when these unintelligent influences were guided by a rational purpose, as that of the stock-breeder or bird-fancier. Again, the theory fails as to man, the rational, and the highest result of the supposed evolution, in that its energies are unintelligent and blind; but man has a reason. There must be enough in the cause to account for the effect. And it fails as to man and all the lower animals, in that their organs all display, even down to the lowest, the work of thoughtful design and the intelligent selection of final cause; whereas the evolving energies are all blind and unintelligent. Nor has the first instance been found where the influences of "environment" have evolved a single new organ or physical faculty,

in the sense necessary to the theory. The facts observed are these: that when nature has implanted the generic organ or function by regular propagation, but in the infantile state, the "environment" has presented the occasion, not the cause, for its growth, by its own exercise up to its adult strength. The fish's fin grows by beating the water, in this sense; the bird's wing by beating the air; the child's arm by the wielding of his toys. But where is the first instance that the environment has evolved a new organ over and above the generic model? Where has environment placed a new fin on a fish's back, or an additional finger on a youth's hand? The instances ought to be of this nature, to give any show of an induction. And the organ evolved ought to become not merely an individual peculiarity, but a permanent trait transmitted uniformly by propagation.

The canon of the inductive logic requires, again, that all other possible causes, other than the one claimed in the hypothesis, shall be excluded by at least some of the known instances. But the theistic account, which is made entirely probable, to say the least, by arguments in morals and natural theology, presents another sufficient cause in the creative power and wisdom. Since the origin of species antedates, confessedly, all human observation and history, this cause for it is probable, until atheism is demonstrated. Even were the evolution theory an induction from real instances, in which these evolving influences were truly adequate to the effect, there would be no valid induction until the theistic cause was positively excluded by a demonstration of atheism. And to offer the conclusion which would flow from such an induction, when completed, as sufficient for that atheistic demonstration of the non-existence of a Creator, which alone would complete the induction; this would plainly be "reasoning in a circle." The conclusion would have to be assumed, in order to make out the process leading to it. But supposing there may be a Creator of perfect wisdom and power and full sovereignty, it is always supposable that he may have seen reasons for clothing his creatures with those very qualities on which evolution argues against a Creator. Is it said that the regular gradations of organised life suggest the belief that the higher forms were evolved

from the lower, along the stages of this ladder? But the theistic hypothesis suggests, with more probability, the belief that the Creator had reasons for filling all the stages of this ascending scale with *genera* and *species* which are yet distinct. To lift the former surmise to the faintest approach to an induction, the latter hypothesis must be precluded.

Once more, the scheme is fatally defective in that it has *no verification*. Not a single new *genus*, or even individual, has been presented, or can be evolved by experiment, to confirm the hypothesis. Indeed, it is impossible, from the nature of the case, that there can be a verification, since the advocates of the scheme admit that the latest evolution, that of man, was completed long before the earliest human history. The most that can be said for this theory is, that it is an ingenious collection of guesses, which bear a fanciful but deceptive likeness to real analogies.

So far the pretended argument goes in its simpler form. Its manifest invalidity constrains some evolutionists, as LeConte, to surrender it. But these assert that deeper researches into the parallelisms of organic relations give a truly inductive ground for their theory. It is claimed that the likeness between the stages which Agassiz (chiefly) disclosed in embryology, paleontology, and our existing gradations in natural history, now called the ontogenic, the phylogenic, and the taxonomic gradations, establishes evolution by a solid induction. The animals now upon the earth form a gradation, through the four grand divisions of radiates, molluscs, articulates, and vertebrates, from the lowest and simplest up to the most complicated and highest. So, evolutionists assert, the living creatures made known by the fossils as once having lived in paleontologic ages, show the same gradation. And third, the transformations through which the foetal organisms, even of the highest species, pass from the *ovum* to the adult, exhibit the same gradation. The proposed argument is, that these analogies give an inductive proof that *species are evolved from species* by an equally natural law of evolution.

Let it be again observed that all we need attempt, in criticising this supposed argument by the principles of induction, is to show that the process is invalid. And we would preface the farther

criticism by the *caveat* that we do not admit the parallelism of the three sets of instances, in the sense claimed by evolutionists. The paleontologic series, for instance, in order to support this pretended evolutionist induction, should be a series of higher and more complete animal forms succeeding the more rudimental in time. But such it is not. At each paleontologic period, some of the four groups of living creatures are found coexisting, in at least some types of each, and not merely successive. The palæozoic strata are found to contain vertebrate fishes, along with the radiates and molluscs of that first period. And, if we may trust Agassiz's assertion, there is no evidence that the embryonic changes of any individual animal of a higher group exemplifies all the gradations from the lowest group up to its own. These mutations of its foetal life only illustrate fully the gradations of the species in its own group.

But, waiving for the time these questions of fact, we show, in this pretended induction, this vital defect: it mistakes an analogy (an imperfect one) in the method of action of certain vital energies for a causal identity. The essential link of a demonstrative induction is lacking. If we take, for instance, the embryonic order of development, all that is proved by the multitude of cases colligated is, that the individual *ova* are all endued with a vital energy which causes, and thus insures, the growth of each individual into the matured type of its own species. For such, and such alone, is the result, as observed. In no single case has an individual *ovum*, be its analogy of mode of development to that of other species what it may, resulted in an evolution into a different species from its own. Hence, there is not a particle of inductive evidence that this causal energy which we see at work is competent to such evolution. Each individual gives an instance of a development through an embryonic series? True. But in every instance the development terminates within the strict limits of its own species; and the induction from the latter set of facts is precisely as broad and as inexorable as from the former.

Again, the analogies noted all receive their sufficient solution from another hypothesis, namely this, that they are the expressions of a common plan of thought, by which the creative Mind

voluntarily regulates its creative and providential actions. Now, as we saw, the conclusion from an induction is not demonstrated, unless the instances collected preclude all other probable, and even possible, hypotheses. Here is the other hypothesis, not only probable and intrinsically reasonable, but, in the light of other arguments, certain—the theistic one: that the reason why the vital energies wrought in paleontologic creatures in a way analogous to the way they work now is, that the same God created and governed then, and that he sees good reasons for following, in the different ages, similar types of working. It might be conceded that the analogies under discussion, if viewed alone, would be insufficient to prove the existence and action of a God. Yet they do suffice to show that solution a probable one. This alone is enough to prove the evolutionist conclusion invalid.

The argument, then, is not a demonstrative induction. Here our logical criticism might stop. But it will be instructive to show how it is confirmed by the positive refutation which other laws and facts of natural history inflict upon the evolution theory. This is excluded, as a tenable explanation of the organised universe, by the following instances, which do have, what the previous analogies have not, an application in strict accordance with the principles of induction.

1. No existing species has displayed a particle of tendency towards the change in a single truly specific attribute, within the longest period of human history. The mummies, as well as the effigies, of the living creatures associated with the oldest Egyptian remains, were found by Cuvier and by Kunth specifically identical with the same creatures now existing in Egypt. Researches into antiquity have everywhere led to the same result. Now, if evolution of one species from another is to be inductively proved, some instances at least tending to the result must be adduced. The fact that all human knowledge through three or four thousand years presents no approach to a single instance, is fatal.

2. In paleontology, each species, so far as known from its fossils, has remained absolutely fixed during the continuance of its period. It is very true, that a species may be found in a subsequent cosmical period, showing resemblances to, and improve-

ments on, a given extinct species of the previous cosmical period. But this fact makes nothing for evolution, because science shows that there has been, between the two periods and their two sets of living creatures as two wholes, a clear breach, interrupting the natural and regular forces of reproduction. The evolutionist must show some instance where, within the limits of some one cosmical period, a different species has been naturally evolved from one simpler than itself.

3. If the existence of the higher forms of life were accounted for by slow evolutions from the lowest, then the paleontologic history should unquestionably present us with this state of facts: First, with a period of the simplest forms, as the radiates; then, afterwards, with a period of more developed forms, as molluscs; then with the still higher, as the articulates; and then with a period of the highest. But the state of the facts is exactly the opposite. All the paleontologic periods give us some of the four groups contemporaneously.

4. The methods of nature, in the formation of the four groups, are essentially different. While some of the species belonging to one group have a higher organisation than others, they all display a community of plan in their structure. But when we pass to another group, we meet a different plan. Hence we infer that even if we could do what has never been done, find an actual case of the evolution of a species from a lower one of the same group; the barriers separating the groups as grand divisions, would still be insuperable. Their several plans of structure are too different for the transmutation of one into another.

5. Men speak of organic life as if its different species formed one regular and continuous series "from the monad up to man." This is found to be a misconception. The animal kingdom is composed of a number of partial series. When the attempt is made to range all these in one single continuous series, fatal dislocations appear. The line of progress is not a continuous ascending line.

6. The theory of evolution assigns great force to the influence of "environment," in developing organs into those of a new species. But naturalists tell us that they find a number of the

most diversified types existing and prospering together for long ages, under identical circumstances. But, were evolution true, the identity of the whole environment ought to be working an assimilation of the various types subjected to it. Again, identical species are found persisting for long ages under the most diversified environments. These facts show that there has been deposited within each species its own form of vital energy, which resists differentiation, and insists, against any influence of a changed environment, on reproducing only its own type. The rational inference is, that either each species is eternal, an impossible proposition, or else each points to an extra-natural Power, which deposited its specific vital energy in it at its beginning.

And that *Power*, in the last place, was *Mind*, because every adaptation of organs to their functions, every reappearing analogy of structures in successive cosmical periods, every relation instituted between the individual and its environment or its fellow-creatures, discloses *thought*. But evolution is claimed to be only a physical process.

Such is the use of the observed facts of the animal kingdom, as sanctioned by the true principles of the inductive logic. The result of this correct colligation is to show that evolution cannot be true.

Let us make another application of these logical principles, and that the most important of all. It concerns the limits of the *a posteriori* inference from similarity of results to identity of cause, concerning the origin of the structures composing the crust of our earth. If theism is admitted to be not demonstrated, but even possible, then, according to the rules of induction, such inference from naturalness of structure to natural origin, is inconclusive. This follows from two of its rules: first, the analogical argument from similarity of result to identity of cause, must give way before competent and credible parole evidence. The supposed but invalid argument is: we see natural agencies producing this and that structure; therefore, all similar structures are of natural origin. But if there may be a creative God, *there* is a different sufficient cause for the origin of the earlier. And if a witness appears who may be naturally competent to testify, his testimony

wholly supersedes the evidence of the supposed analogy. The only way to uphold it is to attack the credibility of that witness. If his credibility is not successfully impeached, the analogical argument must yield before it.

But such a parole-witness appears in the book known as the Christian Scriptures. It assumes to testify that there is a Creator, and that he here gives his own witness to his supernatural creation of the first structures. The value of any induction from naturalness of traits to a natural origin of those structures, must depend therefore upon the other question: whether this witness is competent and credible. Some persons attempt to evade their logical obligation here by saying, that these are theological questions with which physical science, as such, has no concern; that they restrict themselves properly to the lights of this department, and, in assigning a natural origin to these structures, speak only for science. But this is a violation of the principles of natural induction, which must necessarily include some adjustment of the relations between analogy and testimony; seeing the truth of the very facts, claimed as analogical, itself rests on testimony. Farther, the questions, whether there is a Creator, and whether there have been creative causations, enter into this argument, not as theological, but as natural questions. In their relations to the inductive problem, they are as purely physical questions, as the question whether a given rock is the result of fusion or sedimentary deposition from water. A moment's reflection will show the justice of this statement. And hence it follows, that an *a posteriori* analogical argument on this topic is entirely fragmentary and inconclusive, until the claims of this parole-witness are entertained and adjusted. The historical and the physical parts of the argument cannot be thus rent asunder and legitimately pursued apart.

The second rule of induction which applies to show this reasoning invalid, is that pointed out on p. 508. If there may be two antecedents, either of which is competent efficiently to produce an effect (naming one of them A, and the effect X), the closest possible induction can only prove that all As will, *cæteris paribus*, produce X; but cannot prove that all Xs are produced by A. Now, *until atheism is demonstrated*, another competent

cause for natural structures may be supposed as possibly existing in the existence and action of a God. And whatever is the strength of the probable or demonstrative evidence that there is a God, from whatever valid quarter drawn, there is just so much probability of error in the attempted induction, which assigns a natural origin to all structures. To attempt to exclude the divine cause by the force of this *a posteriori* analogy is to reason in a circle; because the validity of the analogy depends wholly on the prior exclusion of the divine cause. Second, a wise Creator must have had some final cause guiding his action. We should not be so presumptuous as to surmise in advance what particular final cause prompted a given creative act, but when his own subsequent action has disclosed it, we are on safe ground. It is always safe to conclude that the object for which a wise and sovereign Creator produced a given thing is the object to which we see him devoting it. When, therefore, we see him in his subsequent providence subjecting all things to the reign of natural law, we may safely conclude that, when he created them, he designed to subject them to natural law. But that which is to be ruled by natural law must needs be thoroughly natural in traits. Hence this Creator must have made the first structures, which in their origin were supernatural, in their properties entirely natural. Whence it follows that the inference from naturalness of qualities to a natural origin would be, as to those structures, wholly worthless. Let it be repeated also: that whatever probability or certainty there is of God's existence, from any source of evidence, just so much evidence is there of this defect in the naturalistic argument. Or, in other words, to make it conclusive, its advocate must *demonstrate* (not surmise) the truth of atheism. But John Foster has shown that this is impossible.

Third. The argument is peculiarly conclusive as to living creatures. If there was a Creator, he created the first individuals of a species to be, by reproduction, the heads of the species. But in order to do this, these first parents must have been created natural. What are the qualities connoted by any name of species? The most accurate answer which the science of natural history itself can make is: they are precisely those which are

transmitted regularly from parents to progeny in the propagation of the species. Then, these first individuals, in order to fulfil their final cause, to be the heads of their species, must have been, while supernatural in origin, as thoroughly natural in qualities as any of their natural offspring.

Fourth. If this be denied, then we must assign a natural parent before the first parent of each species. Thus we should be involved in infinite series, in a multitude of instances, without cause external to themselves; a result which science herself has discarded as an impossible absurdity. Suppose, for explanation, that an observer has found some part of the very organism of one of those first heads of species, which, on the theistic scheme, was directly created by God. He would, of course, find in this fossil every property of the natural structure. Yet he cannot infer thence a natural origin for it, because on the hypothesis it is absolutely a first thing. But suppose that he may assign for it a natural origin. That origin then will be, propagation by birth from prior parents. And should a fossil organ of that parent be found, the same argument would apply again! Thus we should be driven to a ridiculous *regressus*. It is concluded, therefore, with the most perfect logical rigidity, that the argument from naturalness of structure to a natural origin is inconclusive, until the impossibility of creative agency in any age prior to authentic human testimony is demonstrated.

Fifth. This absurd *regressus* may be shown in a general way, by testing this analogical argument upon the "nebular hypothesis;" that guess which the atheist La Place suggested as only a possible hypothesis for the origin of the universe, and which some Christian physicists now seem so ready to adopt, without proof, as the real account of the matter. Let us suppose the scientific observer from some other system watching this vast incandescent mass of "star-dust," rotating around an axis of motion, with which the nebular hypothesis begins. If he uses the analogical reasoning we are criticising, he must proceed thus: Matter is naturally inert; *momentum* must therefore be derived from some prior material force. This rotary motion, which the nebular hypothesis supposes to be the first state, cannot be the first state.

Again, vapor implies evaporation. Sensible heat suggests latent heat. Hence this other first state of incandescent volatilisation cannot be the first state. Thus, on this logic, before each first state there must have been another first state.

"Beneath the lowest deep,

Another depth still threatening to devour me, opens wide."

This, then, is the eternity of "Naturalismus"—it is Atheism.

This wholesome limitation of analogical inference has been sometimes met with disdainful resistance. It has been said that it would subvert the very basis of natural science. It is exclaimed, "If we may not securely reason, 'like causes, like effects,' the very lever of scientific discovery is taken from us." The answer is very simple: that there is no intention to rob science of her prime *organon*, "Like causes, like effects." The main drift of this treatise has been to defend and explain it. Only we do not desire to see the votaries of inductive science disgracing themselves by the very shallow blunder (a blunder which the schoolboy's class-book of Logic points out) of mistaking an all important proposition for its erroneous converse, "Like effects the same cause." This is really the extent of our caution. The inductive logic is in no danger of being cramped or restricted by theology, within the proper domain of natural science. That domain is the known present and the known past of human history, where testimony and experience give us sufficient assurance of the absence of the supernatural. In this field natural induction is useful and legitimate; it has been the honored instrument of splendid and beneficent achievements. Let physicists continue to employ it there, to the full, for the further benefit of mankind and the illustration of the Creator's wisdom and glory. But in the unknown eternity of the past prior to human history, it has no place. It is like the mariner's compass carried into the stellar spaces. We know that the poles of this globe have a certain attraction for it, and, therefore, on this globe it is a precious guide. But away in the regions of Arcturus or the Pleiades, where we are not certain whether the spheres have poles, or whether they are magnetic, we are not authorised to follow it.

One more application will be made, and this to a supposed so-

cial and moral induction; in order to exhibit the fitness of the logical canons for ethical as well as physical science. The case is that of the colligation of instances, so often presented by the enthusiastic fanatics in the cause of secular education, as a proof of their proposition that this species of education promotes virtue and suppresses crime. The supposed evidence is, that the statistics of prisons, penitentiaries, and criminal convictions usually show a ratio of illiterate to educated criminals considerably larger than the ratio of illiterate to lettered citizens in the commonwealth. The governor of an American commonwealth, for instance, reported that of all the convicts in his state-penitentiary for ten years, only a little more than ten per cent. could read and write. And he presented this as a conclusive demonstration that illiteracy was the cause, and a knowledge of letters would be the sufficient cure, of crime.

Now, a very simple application of the logical criticism discloses the inconclusiveness of this popular argument. The effect to be accounted for is, breaches of statute laws. The observed antecedent to this effect is, in a large majority of cases in this State, ignorance of letters. Obviously, this is but an induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, which gives no proof whether the sequence gives a *post hoc* or a *propter hoc*. The argument offers neither canon of induction to complete the separation. We have in this enumeration nothing whatever to teach us whether the true efficient of the crimes does not lie, hitherto unnoted, between the supposed antecedent, illiteracy, and the effect. The pretended argument gives us no ground whatever for excluding this other obvious hypothesis, that something else may have been the true cause of the crimes, of which cause the illiteracy itself may be also another coördinate effect.

As soon as another equally authentic enumeration is compared with the previous one, the justice of this suspicion is fully confirmed. Farther study of the statistics of crime shows, that while American prisons contain a larger percentage of illiterate criminals than American society contains of illiterate free citizens, yet the *ratio of criminals to the whole number of citizens* in any given community is uniformly *far larger where all, or nearly all,*

adults can read and write, and far smaller where fewer of the adults can read and write. For instance, in Boston, the boastful metropolis of free schools, with scarcely an adult who could not read and write, the census of 1850 showed that the white persons in jails, penitentiaries, and alms-houses bore to the whole white population the ratio of one in every thirty-four. But in Richmond, the capital of a State endlessly reviled for its illiteracy, the same classes of whites bore to the whole number of white citizens the ratio of one to every one hundred and twelve! The difference in favor of the less lettered communities, as revealed by subsequent censuses, is still more astounding; and this, when extended to the whole South, as compared with the North, and as deduced by Northern students of statistics.

Now, were these enumerations of sequences employed in the same illogical way, they would seem to demonstrate exactly the opposite conclusion: *that the knowledge of letters causes crime, and illiteracy causes virtue*. This is a sufficiently biting demonstration of the worthlessness of the pretended induction. The true solution, to which the comparison of the two enumerations points, is this: that neither letters nor illiteracy cause crime in America, but another combination of moral causes, to which these states of the population are themselves related as effects. In any given prison will be found a majority of prisoners who cannot read and write. This does not prove that the possession of these arts is preventive of crime, as the other statistics show. But as American society happens to be constituted, the rearing of children without a knowledge of letters has happened to be the usual accompaniment of a domestic condition of penury and moral degradation, while families of substance and domestic morality have usually given letters to their children. Thus it is made plain that it is not the illiteracy, but the penury and domestic degradation which are the real causes of crime. The illiteracy, turns out not to be cause at all, but an incident or appendage which the domestic habits of Americans have connected with the real cause, the combination of want and domestic degradation.

But when, by the intrusive activity of the civil government,

the children of destitute and morally degraded families are universally invested with the arts of reading and writing, without that moral and economical elevation of the parents and children, to work which the State and State schools are so nearly impotent, then the result is a fearful increase in the *ratio* of criminals to the whole number of citizens. The explanation is, that it is the want and family degradation which together are the main efficient cause of crime, and which the knowledge of letters, while those continue, rather aggravates than checks. R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE V.

THE LIGHT OF ASIA, AND BUDDHISM.

Since Mr. Arnold, in 1879, gave to the reading public his "Light of Asia," forty editions of his poem have been published in England alone, and the avidity is scarcely less with which it has been seized by readers on this side the Atlantic. Such success is almost unparalleled, but it is not surprising. No contemporary poem equals it in loftiness and novelty of theme, and in brilliant execution.

The poem is usually styled an Epic, but the classification is hardly critically accurate. No plot awaits development, no incidents are essential to the narrative, and no subordinate characters in the slightest degree influential appear upon the scene. It is the biography of a teacher, grand in the sincerity of his love of truth, in his self-abnegation in seeking for it, in his boundless compassion towards his fellow-men in proclaiming it, when as he believed he had found it, and grand as he stands before us, the historic founder of the most ancient and most prevailing of ethnic religions. But one could hardly write an Epic, and take for his hero John the Baptist, Luther, or Loyola. It is, however, of small importance by what technical name we designate this superb poem. It finds an immense audience, in an age that praises, but does not read, any one of the three or four acknowledged Epics of

the world's literature, From "The Light of Asia," more people, we venture to say, will form their notions of Buddhism, than from all the many learned works upon the subject.

The Orient has always been the wonder-land of the world, and nothing reported since the time of Sir John Mandeville has been too large for Western credulity. The legends of Buddha contain material of tropical luxuriance, and hardly could they have fallen into any hands better skilled for moulding it than Mr. Arnold's. In a recent notice a writer says of him—"Mr. Arnold is an impassioned lover of India. Early in life, fresh with honors as a classical student at Oxford, he went to India, and became Principal of the Deccan College at Poona. There he resided for seven years. He acquired a knowledge of Sanscrit and other Indian languages, and translated what is known as the 'Hitopodesa,' which has long been a valued text-book for Sanscrit scholars. He has published several volumes of poems besides the present one, among them, the exquisitely beautiful 'Indian Song of Songs.'" How much Mr. Arnold is indebted for his success to his happy choice of a subject, may be inferred from the fact that, according to the critics, he has failed in his late attempt, "The ninety-nine beautiful names of Allah," to treat the life of Mahomet as he has treated that of Buddha.

Of the eight books which compose the poem, six are taken up with the legendary biography of Gautama—his miraculous birth and superhuman childhood, his brief love-life, the awakening of irrepressible anguish in his great soul as he contemplated the ceaseless misery that clings inevitably to human existence, his renunciation of throne and palace and the peerless Yasodhara, in search of the truth that should make him the Redeemer of the race. The seventh and eighth books give an exposition of the doctrines of *Nirvana*, *Dharma*, and *Karma*.

Thus the author has occasion to set before his readers the gorgeous scenery, the glow of passion, the subtle thought, and the mystic superstition of the East. This, Mr. Arnold's expansive scholarship, strong imagination, and his profuse fancy, with his command of picturesque words woven into harmonious metre, have enabled him to do most effectively. His word-painting in

description might at once be transferred to canvas. Some extracts, as samples, will give, better than anything we can say, a just idea of his power. Those who are familiar with the poem will not begrudge the space allowed. Take this of an Eastern morning:

“And in the east that miracle of day,
 Gathered and grew. At first a dusk so dim
 Night seems still unaware of whispered dawn,
 But soon—before the jungle cock crows twice—
 A white verge clear, a widening, brightening white,
 High as the herald star, which fades in floods
 Of silver, warming into pale gold, caught
 By topmost clouds, and flaming on their rims
 To fervent golden glow, flushed from the brink
 With saffron, scarlet, crimson, amethyst:
 Whereat the sky burns splendid to the blue,
 And, robed in raiment of glad light, the King
 Of Life and Glory cometh!” P. 113.

Who that has watched the tender dawn of a summer's morning grow into the glory of sunrise, does not recognise the truthfulness to nature of the poet's rendering of the scene?

But we have not, any of us, ever looked upon the gorgeous luxury of the interior of an oriental palace, and therefore can only gaze with ignorant delight upon the luscious fresco Mr. Arnold gives us in his description of the ante-chamber of Princess Yosodhara. It is too long to quote entire, and thus preserve the full impression, but the portions given will serve as specimens of its beauty:

* * * “All the chosen ones
 Of Prince Siddartha's pleasure-home were there,
 The brightest and most faithful of the court,
 Each form so lovely in the peace of sleep,
 That you had said, ‘This is the pearl of all!’
 * * * * *
 With careless grace they lay, their soft brown limbs
 Part hidden, part revealed; their glossy hair
 Bound back with gold or flowers, or flowing loose
 In black waves down the shapely nape and neck.
 Lulled into pleasant dreams by happy toils,
 They slept, no wearier than jewelled birds
 Which sing and love all day, then under wing

Fold head, till morn bids sing and love again.
 * * * "Here one lay full-length,
 Her *vina* by her cheek, and in its strings
 The little fingers still all interlaced,
 As when the last notes of her light song played
 Those radiant eyes to sleep and sealed her own.
 Another slumbered folding in her arms
 A desert-antelope, its slender head
 Buried with back-sloped horns between her breasts
 Soft nestling; it was eating—when both drowsed—
 Red roses, and her loosening hand still held
 A rose half-mumbled, while a rose-leaf curled
 Between the deer's lips. * * *
 Thus lay they on the clustered carpets, each
 A girlish rose with shut leaves, waiting dawn
 To open and make daylight beautiful—
 This was the ante-chamber of the Prince." P. 85.

At the close of the eighth book, Buddha in set form explicates his doctrines. Oriental scholars debate with wide difference what is meant by *Nirvana*. Whether Mr. Arnold has shed much light upon the vexed question must be determined from the following lines :

* * * "Seeking nothing, he gains all;
 Foregoing self, the universe grows 'I':
 If any teach Nirvana is to cease,
 Say unto such, they lie.
 If any teach Nirvana is to live,
 Say unto such they err; not knowing this,
 Nor what light shines beyond their broken lamps,
 Nor lifeless, timeless bliss." P. 231.

Now to what are we to attribute the uncomfortable feeling left in the minds of some Christian people after the reading of this delightful poem? And the more the poem has been enjoyed, the more uncomfortable is the feeling.

The answer to this question may perhaps be given better by illustration than by analysis. The reader of "Ivanhoe" rises from its perusal strongly impressed with a sense of the reality of the characters of that unmatched historical romance. His mind is thoroughly saturated with the spirit of chivalry, and with admiration for it as depicted by Scott. He has surrendered himself willingly to the magic of the writer, and accepts with delight the

impression intended to be conveyed. And this, all the more readily, because the ground-work of the story is indubitable historic fact. King John was occupying the throne of his brother Richard, absent as a royal crusader in the Holy Land; the feudal system with its hierarchy of monarch, knights, squires, and vassal followers armed with lance and bow, was the actual form of government, state of society, and style of war in Europe; the struggle in England between the Saxon and Norman was ended, but the spirit of jealous animosity survived in the breasts of the yet unamalgamated people; chivalry was the flower of Feudalism, and the gracious tournament was the fitting arena for mimic war.

To paint into this historic frame-work vivid pictures with the coloring of truth, so that all should blend into one powerful impression, was the recognised purpose and prerogative of the novelist, and the more thoroughly we give ourselves up to the illusion, the greater our enjoyment. We do not care to consider the probability of the feats-at-arms of Ivanhoe and Front-de-Bœuf, the woodcraft of Robin Hood, the queenliness of Rowena, or the devotion of Rebecca. Much less do we concern ourselves with the question of the comparative excellence of Feudalism and the government of the United States.

Analogous in enjoyment is our experience when we read "The Light of Asia." Mr. Arnold has displayed to our view a cartoon of Orientalism far more magnificent than that of Feudalism. India is presented to us in the midst of a weird antiquity at an epoch many centuries before the conquest of Britain, and as giving birth to a new religion, seventeen centuries and more older than the Catholicism of Scott. The principal figure, far grander than Richard, is Gautama, whose name will be living in the mouths of men when *Cœur de Lion* will be an archaic title, and whose life and doctrine now influence potentially one-third of the human race.

How impressively the poet has treated his theme, we have already seen.

But our enjoyment is not, as in reading Ivanhoe, unalloyed. We are aware of a current of uneasiness rising in our minds, which increases as we proceed, to be augmented at the close into

positive anxiety. When we endeavor by reflection to make clear to our own consciousness the particulars which have given origin to this feeling that mars our enjoyment of the power and beauty of the poem, we will, we think, first pause upon the fact that so many of the characteristic events given in the inspired narrative of the life of our Lord are found in these legends of Buddha, who was born more than five hundred years *before* our era. The only solution that occurs to those (and they are not a few) who have had but little previous acquaintance with Buddhism, is that Mr. Arnold has, for poetic effect, made unwarranted use of Sacred Writ. In a writer of his standing, this would be astounding and unpardonable. The mere supposition does him great injustice. In point of fact, there is not to be found in "The Light of Asia" a single incident not contained in the sacred books of Buddhism. Let the following summary of apparent coincidences be sufficient to exonerate Mr. Arnold on this score. We quote from Dr. Eitel, for many years a missionary at Hong-kong, of the London Missionary Society.

Dr. Eitel says (Lecture, p. 14) :

"Shakyamuni Buddha—we are told—came from heaven, was born of a virgin, welcomed by angels, received by an old saint who was endowed with prophetic vision, presented in a temple, baptized with water and afterwards baptized with fire ; he astonished the most learned doctors by his understanding and answers ; he was led by the Spirit into the wilderness, and having been tempted by the devil, he went about preaching and doing wonders. The friend of publicans and sinners, he is transfigured on a mount, descends to hell, ascends up to heaven ; in short, with the single exception of Christ's crucifixion, almost every characteristic incident in Christ's life is also to be found narrated in the Buddhistic traditions of Shakyamuni Gautama, Buddha. And yet this Buddha lived and died 543 years *before* Christ !"

These coincidences are so numerous and so startling, that to account for them is a matter of great concern. Did the Scripture narrative imitate earlier legends of Buddha? Let Dr. Eitel answer :

" . . . The doctrines of Buddha appear to have been handed down from generation to generation, orally. . . . The very earliest compilation of the modern Buddhist canon that *history* can point out is that of Ceylon. Part of it was reduced to writing about 93 B. C. The whole canon, how-

ever, was first compiled and fixed in writing between the years 412 and 432 of our present Christian era. . . . It can be proved that almost every single tint of Christian coloring which Buddhist tradition gives to the life of Buddha is of comparatively modern origin. . . . Nearly all the above given legends which claim to refer to events that happened centuries before Christ, cannot be proved to have been in circulation earlier than the fifth century after Christ."

Dr. Kellogg, of Allegheny Seminary, in a comprehensive and thorough examination of the subject, says :

"No competent scholar professes to be able to prove that the [earlier] legends had a single feature of detail coincident with the later gospel story. . . . Not to enlarge further, it is the significant fact that nearly all of the existing original authorities for the legend of the Buddha were written about the time of that great missionary activity of the Nestorian Church in Southern and Eastern Asia, and none whatever antedate the known existence of Christian churches in India. Here, then, was the opportunity required for a transfer of details from the story of Christ to a preëxistent legend of the Buddha. Of the existence of any real agreement between the two stories before the establishment of Christian churches, we have no evidence at all."

The chronological proofs for these statements are given by Dr. Kellogg, and the question ably argued from other points of view, and he concludes thus :

"Some of the coincident features are either in part or wholly superficial and apparent, others merely accidental ; others again, may reasonably be ascribed to the influence of a tradition of the promise of a Redeemer ; and a remainder, more or less numerous, may with good reason be attributed to an actual transfer to the original legend of Buddha of certain elements in the story of Christ, as preached through the East in the early centuries of our era."

Mr. John T. Perry (in the *Critic*, February, 1882,) says :

"The Buddhistic legends, at least the mock-Christian and other extravagances, cannot be traced back beyond the Christian era. The rock-cut inscriptions of King Aroka, the Buddhist Constantine, contain none of these resemblances, and the inscriptions and carvings on temples and tops do not begin to present Christian legends until the third or fourth century of our era. Finally, the Buddhistic books come to us with changes which may have been introduced more than eight centuries after their subject's death, four or five centuries after Christ."

These are testimonies from Christian writers. We will add to them the following from Mr. Rys Davids, a recognised authority

upon Buddhism. His opinion upon the important question in hand is of the more weight, inasmuch as he does not occupy the Christian standpoint. He does not allow to Christianity a divine origin more than to Buddhism. He treats each religion as the independent outgrowth of the human mind. Mr. Davids writes :

“I have carefully considered the subject throughout with a candid mind, quite open to conviction, and can find no evidence whatever of any actual and direct communication of these ideas from the East to the West. Where the gospel narratives resemble the Buddhist ones, they seem to me to have been independently developed on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the valley of the Ganges.”

The reader will not censure us for the copiousness of our extracts, since they at once dissipate the most serious difficulty in the mind of the perplexed admirer of “*The Light of Asia*,” and at the same time relieve Mr. Arnold from an injurious suspicion. He might, indeed, have notified his readers that he was rendering the *later* legends, and have given an estimate of their historic value ; but perhaps he considered that he had given a sufficient caution in his preface, where he states that he has mainly followed Mr. Spence Hardy’s work. This, the erudite know, was translated from the “*Pujawaliya*,” written between A. D. 1267 and 1301.

A charge of unfairness, less in degree, but not slightly reprehensible, may be made against Mr. Arnold. It is of the occasional illegitimate use of the very words of Scripture. We adduce two instances on the authority of Dr. Kellogg. In giving the legend of the worship and blessing of the babe Gautama by the old saint Asita, which bears some resemblance to the blessing of the infant Jesus in the temple by the aged Simeon, Mr. Arnold introduces a startling verbal coincidence in the lines—

“Yet not all-happy, *for a sword must pierce
Thy bowels for this boy.*”

Dr. Kellogg says :

“We venture to raise the question, whether the above phraseology can be justified by any original authority whatever. Again, in the lines—

“*If thou be’st Buddh,*’ she said, ‘let others grope
Lightless.’

“For this verbal agreement, we have been able to find no warrant in

any original authority. Except such warrant can be clearly shown, we must protest, in the name of common honesty, against this mischievous practice as involving gross misrepresentation of the similarity between the story of Buddha and the life of Christ."

If we allow that in his poem Mr. Arnold has not transcended the limits of poetic license, we must still hold him to a stricter account for the personal convictions which he has avowed in his brief preface. He speaks of Gautama as

"A personality the highest, most gentle, holiest, and most beneficent, with one exception, in the history of thought. [The 'one exception,' as it stands in the sentence, has a slight suggestion of a *pro forma* limitation.] A teacher who united the truest princely qualities with the intellect of a sage and the passionate devotion of a martyr; . . . securing a stupendous conquest of humanity, the love and gratitude of Asia, along with (contrary to his mandate) her fervent worship. . . . Most other creeds are youthful, compared with this venerable religion, which has in it the eternity of a universal hope, the immortality of a boundless love, an indestructible faith in final good, and the proudest assertion ever made of human freedom."

Now, this strikingly erroneous estimate of Buddhism, along with the extravagant eulogium of its founder, so beautifully expanded in "The Light of Asia," might be overlooked in one who has been characterised as "an impassioned lover of Asia," were it not for the false impression made upon the minds of some readers. We have known some young Christians say: "Hardly can we perceive any essential difference between this noble religion and our own. We may well spare ourselves the labor of missions to the Buddhists, until the Church at home has risen to a higher plane of faith and practice."

We trust we shall be able, in the remainder of this article, to disperse the glamor of such an impression. And we may as well dismiss any special reference to Mr. Arnold, as it has long been a common method of assailing Christianity to exaggerate the supposed excellence of other religions, especially those of the East. The French Encyclopædic philosophers vied with each other in extolling the writings of Confucius, in order to disparage Christianity, and later philosophers have exhibited the same spirit. To establish this last observation, we will quote from Mr. Davids (Hibbert Lectures, 1881). It will be observed with what sys-

tems, and how, he classifies Christianity. Having called Buddha the great thinker and reformer of Asia, the teacher of enlightenment, of purity, and of universal love, in another paragraph he says:

“It may be added that each of the various systems can also be said, in one sense, to have practically failed. Stoicism, Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, Comteism, and all the rest, have so far disappointed the hopes of their founders, and of their early disciples. Though alike in many essential points, they differ from one another, not only in details, but in other things which their followers held to be of the first importance. And the reason why they differ is the one thing in which they are most essentially alike. Each . . . is the natural outcome of an immeasurable past.”

This is the undisguised animus pervading Mr. Davids' whole volume.

Let us consider briefly, and therefore most inadequately, what justification there is for this high claim for Gautama and the religion of which he was the founder. We make no pretence to a complete exposition of Buddhism, much less to argue its falsity; we are merely endeavoring to remove needless doubts from minds that may have been uncomfortably affected by the reading of “The Light of Asia.”

In order to disentangle the historical facts, as well as they can be ascertained, of the life of Gautama from the gorgeous legends which have grown up around them, and which have been so seductively rendered by Mr. Arnold, we will quote the following *résumé* from Mr. Davids. It is rather long for our space, but it contains information which will be of value to those who have paid little attention to this interesting subject, and who may compare it with Mr. Arnold's story. As Mr. Davids is a great admirer of Buddhism, and does not allow a divine origin to Christianity, we may feel assured that he has not unfairly reduced the claims of Gautama. After speaking of him as a perfectly natural man, he writes:

“Gautama was the son of a raja, a kind of petty chieftain, of the Sakya clan, who were settled some hundred miles north of the Ganges, on the spurs at the foot of the Himalaya range. The date of his birth is not quite certain, as the oldest authority on the point gives two inconsistent accounts. But it can be fixed with sufficient accuracy at between

the middle and the end of the sixth century B. C., a period during which the valley of the Ganges underwent no material change. He was married in early youth to his first cousin; the daughter of the raja over the neighboring clan of the Koliyans, whose principal village was only a few miles from the village of Kapila-vatthu, in which he was born. We hear nothing more till his twenty-ninth year, when, after a long struggle the causes and the nature of which we may guess at, but shall never exactly know, he finally abandoned his home. After first studying under teachers of repute, from whom he derived no satisfactory solution of the problems of life, he devoted himself for six years to the strictest penance, by which men then thought that they could obtain the mastery over the gods. Though his efforts in this direction were such that we are told of his fame having spread abroad like the sound of a great bell hung in the skies, this also led to no lasting peace. And in his thirty-fifth year he passed through a second great mental crisis, the details of which, as described in Buddhist books with all the poetry the Indian mind was at that time master of, are curiously similar to those of the temptation in the wilderness. The end of this struggle was reached when, under the famous Bo-tree at Buddha Gaya, he attained to that state of mind which was afterwards called Buddhahood, and found at last a final solution of all his doubts and all his difficulties in the power over the human heart of inward self-culture, and of love to all other beings. After a struggle with the not unnatural hesitation whether it would be of any use to make these views known to others, he decided to proclaim publicly the truth he thought he had discovered; and for forty-five years he walked from place to place in the valley of the Ganges, publishing the good news and gathering round him a small band of earnest and faithful followers, the earliest members of his afterwards famous Order. At last, having gained a considerable measure of success, he died peacefully in the midst of his disciples in his eightieth year, at Kusinagara, in Vesali, not very far beyond the Ganges, the scene of his early studies.

“Such are the simple facts of the career of the man whose life has been more momentous in its influence upon a large proportion of the human race than that of any other man who has ever lived.” Pp. 126-7.

This is certainly not the Gautama of Mr. Arnold, nor of the legends which he has adopted. Nevertheless, this outline, uncolored as it is, presents to our view a character that awakens sympathetic interest, commands respect, and which in some aspects we may admire and love.

Gautama possessed a deeply religious nature, an honest conscience, a true appreciation of moral beauty and love for it, a strongly emotional temperament, quick and unbounded sympathy

of every kind, with uncalculating self-abnegation, and courage to act upon his convictions. In some respects he resembled the pure and gentle Marcus Aurelius, but greatly surpassed him in manliness and force of character. He has been compared to Socrates, but he lacked the practical sagacity of the Grecian sophist, and moved in a plane of higher philanthropy. In his soul-agony, in striving for light and peace, in his resort to bodily mortification, and in his final deliverance from the principal falsities of Brahmanism and the wiles of corrupt priests, he anticipated Luther; while after he had attained what he mistook for truth, his consecration to the work of proclaiming it was scarcely less than that of the Apostle Paul. Gautama was probably a partial contemporary of Daniel. Had he only met with that inspired instructor of troubled souls, and heard him say: "Blessed be the name of God for ever; for wisdom and might are his. He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding; he revealeth the deep and secret things: he knoweth what is in the darkness, and the light dwelleth in him"—and had been taught, not the despairing conjecture of future annihilation, but the sure doctrine, "Many of them that sleep in the dust shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt"—his hungry soul would have fed upon the divine doctrine, and how different would have been his life, and how different might have been this day the condition of the continent of Asia!

Notwithstanding all that has been said, we see in Gautama nothing godlike, and not enough of anything to justify the exalted terms applied to him by Mr. Arnold and Mr. Davids. He was not a sage, nor an enlightener, nor a deliverer. He held gross and fatal errors of his own, and spent his long life in propagating the absurd and ruinous Brahmanic superstition of transmigration, an error which necessitates a false and pernicious view of man's present life, extinguishes the flickering light cast by natural reason upon futurity, and nullifies the instinctive hope of heaven. His religious system has proved itself incapable of elevating the character, purifying the morals, or (with a single exception) of bettering the social condition of the millions who have accepted it.

Let us now turn from the founder of the religion to the religion

itself—from Buddha to Buddhism. And we repeat the notice that we are not attempting a systematic inquiry into Buddhism, but only for the sake of some readers of "The Light of Asia," an exhibition of its most prominent features in relation to Mr. Arnold's poem. For this purpose we think it will suffice to lay down and establish the following proposition—

Buddhism, in the fundamentals of its creed, is farther removed from Christianity than is any other of the non-Christian religions of the world.

We will content ourselves with signalling three of its fundamental principles. It would be waste of time to argue their direct antagonism to revealed truth.

I. While Brahmanism is Pantheistic, Confucianism Agnostic, Zoroastrianism and Mahomedanism Monotheistic, *Buddhism is Atheistic!*

Mr. Davids says :

"For the first time in the history of the world, Buddhism proclaimed a salvation . . . without any the least reference to God or gods, either great or small."

Dr. Eitel :

"It is a religion without God. . . . Buddhism knows no creative prime agent, no supra-mundane or ante-mundane principle, no preëxisting spirit. . . . When Gautama became a Buddha, . . . he was simply in a state of moral despair. He threw overboard all faith in God and moral consciousness; he abandoned all hope for the actual world, which appeared to him radically and irremediably bad; he saw no way of escape but that of the extinction of existence itself."

II. Buddhism rejects the doctrine of a soul in man.

Mr. David's :

"It swept away from the field of its vision the whole of the great soul-theory, which had hitherto so completely filled and dominated the minds of the superstitious and the thoughtful alike. . . . In no case, therefore, is there any future life in the Christian sense. At a man's death, nothing survives but the effect of his actions, and the good he has done, though it lives after him, will redound not to his own benefit, as we should call it, but to the benefit of generations yet unborn, between himself and whom there will be no consciousness of identity in any shape or way."

Dr. Kellogg :

"When the Buddhist writings speak of the preëxistence of the Buddha,

and of other men, they do not mean to teach their preëxistence in our sense of the term at all. For when we speak of a previous or future existence of any one, we mean, of course, the previous or future existence of the animating soul. But nothing can be clearer than that Buddhism, according to its own authorities, denies *in toto* that there is such an essence as the soul."

Dr. Caird, of Glasgow, says :

"It is a religion destitute of every idea that has lent, or that can be conceived to lend, to any system of belief its power over the human spirit. It is a religion which seems to deny the very being of God, and which refuses to man the hope of immortality. It teaches, as one of its cardinal doctrines, that existence is wretchedness, and the love of it a feeling to be suppressed and exterminated ; that the highest happiness attainable on earth is in extinction of all natural desires and affections, and the only heaven beyond it utter and final extinction."

III. It cruelly denies to its votaries, who are taught that existence on earth is necessarily bitter misery, the consolatory hope, instinctive in the breast of man, of a blissful existence in a life to come. This is logically included in the denial that there is such an essence as the soul ; but as it is the direct contrary of a distinct and most precious article of Christian faith, to enumerate it separately is not superfluous.

Nirvana is often spoken of as the heaven of the Buddhist. What is *Nirvana*? To this question, equally competent scholars have given directly opposing answers. Some hold that it means absolute annihilation, and others that it means everlasting bliss. Dr. Eitel seems to present a fair view of the state of the question when he says :

"The most ancient sutras we possess coincide with the popular literature of modern Buddhism, in describing *Nirvana* as a condition of conscious personal felicity. . . . On the other hand, both ancient and modern philosophical schools of Buddhism have always had a leaning to, and in most instances have actually defined *Nirvana* as a state of absolute annihilation, where there is neither consciousness nor personality nor existence of any kind. And I do believe that a consistent development of the principles of Buddhism must always lead to the same negative result. . . . It is impossible to decide which of the two views Buddha himself actually held."

A late writer in *Blackwood* thus characterises, in a striking passage, the Buddhist faith :

"A resigned and tranquil pessimism, whose gospel for wearied human-

ity has no promise of life, but only of *Nirvana*, an eternal calm, of which nothing can be affirmed but the absolute negation of individuality and consciousness. Self-restraint and purity, the knowledge of the 'noble truths,' the realisation of *Nirvana*—this is the greatest blessing. According to Buddhism, 'the path of the holy ones' is literally the path to spiritual suicide; for its goal is the annihilation of even the desire to exist; and the wise who attain it become like the flame of an extinguished lamp. A religion, one may well say, of sweetness (?) without light, of patience without humility, of morality without love, of self-abnegation without hope; the consecration of an innoxious apathy, reserving its highest honors of canonisation for the houseless celibate, who is neither pleased nor displeased with anything, cares not for learning, clings not to good nor to evil, and has severed himself from all passion and all desire."

As far as we are informed, Confucianism is the only other ancient religion which does not distinctly hold out to its followers the hope of happiness hereafter.

It is quite remarkable how some of the great problems of life most important to man are exhibited in reversed statements by Christianity and Buddhism respectively. Christianity, upon the authority of revelation, affirms that man is the creature of an act of God; that our condition in the life to come depends upon our character and acts in this life, and that death is the termination of earthly existence. Buddhism, on the contrary, reaching its conclusions by meditative thought, maintains that God (*i. e.*, Buddha) is the result of man's acts; that our condition in this life has been determined by the character and acts in a prior life of some one else, with whom we have no connexion by descent or otherwise, and that death is the occasion of renewed existence on earth. For the triumphant Christian, death is swallowed up in eternal life; for the Buddhist who attains salvation, life, otherwise endless, is swallowed up in death. The faith of the Christian is immortality; the hope of the Buddhist, annihilation. Heaven is the Christian's home; *Nirvana* the Buddhist sepulchre!

The object of this article has not been to attempt to handle the argument for the truth of Christianity drawn from its immeasurable superiority over all false religions, yet the fact that it is so must ever be present to the mind of every intelligent believer. This is eloquently expressed by Canon Farrar:

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“And we who can compare Christ’s teaching with all that the world has of best and greatest in philosophy, eloquence, and song, must not we, too, add that, teaching as one having authority, he spake as never man spake? Other teachers have, by God’s grace, uttered words of wisdom; but to which of them has it been granted to regenerate mankind? What would the world be now, if it had nothing better than the dry aphorisms and cautious hesitations of Confucius, or the dubious principles and dangerous concessions of Plato? Would humanity have made the vast moral advance which it has made, if no great Prophet from on high had furnished it with anything better than Sakyamuni’s dreary hope of a *Nirvana*, to be won by unnatural asceticism, or than Mahomet’s cynical sanction of polygamy and despotism? . . . Is Christianity no better than what Grece became, and what Turkey and Arabia and China are? Does Christianity wither the nations which have accepted it, with the atrophy of Buddhism or the blight of Islam? . . . Other religions are demonstrably defective and erroneous; ours has never been proved to be otherwise than perfect and entire; other systems were esoteric and exclusive, ours simple and universal; others temporary and for the few, ours eternal and for the race. Kung-footse, Sakyamuni, Mahomet, could not even conceive of a society without falling into miserable error; Christ established the reality of an eternal and glorious kingdom, whose theory for all, whose history in the world prove it to be, indeed, what it was from the first proclaimed to be, the kingdom of heaven, the kingdom of God.”

Let us conclude that we may enjoy without alarm the beauties of “*The Light of Asia*.” Our faith is not disturbed. Let us charitably suppose that Mr. Arnold did not mean to assail it. Rather let us be filled with compassion for those who, groping in darkness, are helplessly feeling after God, if haply they may find him. And let our hearts swell with renewed gratitude that we have not been left to follow cunningly-devised fables, but have been taught by divine revelation the truth which the combined wisdom of the ages has proved itself insufficient by searching to find out; that we worship the Triune God; that we have an Almighty Father, Protector, and Benefactor, a divine Saviour, Redeemer, and Mediator, and a gracious Holy Spirit, Regenerator, Sanctifier, and Comforter, to make us meet for the inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away.

J. T. L. PRESTON.

ARTICLE VI.

"THE LORD'S DAY, AND NOT THE JEWISH SABBATH," REVIEWED.

It is with extreme reluctance that we enter upon a review of the articles that appeared some time since in two consecutive numbers of this REVIEW, on "The Lord's Day, and not the Jewish Sabbath," by the late Rev. John Beveridge, as the hand that penned them now lies cold in death, and therefore utterly powerless to defend itself. But as so many of the positions of our tract on the "Holy Sabbath" have been assailed, and its very orthodoxy seemingly questioned, though with the *imprimatur* of the Church upon it, ; and as the views presented in the above mentioned articles are in so many important particulars so radically different from the commonly received opinions of the Christian world, and, in our judgment, so unscriptural and hurtful in their tendencies, that we cannot allow them to pass unchallenged. The interest clustering around the Sabbath is of no ordinary character. The foundation of this institution lies coördinate with the foundation of the Church and the structure of society, and the overthrow of the one means simply the overthrow of the other. It is impossible, therefore, for its friends to stand idly by and see any of its impregnable bulwarks undermined, either by the false positions of its friends or the open assaults of its foes, without lifting the voice in its defence. Whilst we shall endeavor to deal with all tenderness with the memory of our departed brother, we must be allowed to point out any error into which he has fallen, and show the dangerous tendency of some of his positions.

Our reviewer contends for what he terms the Lord's Day in contradistinction to the Jewish Sabbath. He maintains that there was no express command to observe a day of weekly rest before the exodus ; that the Jewish Sabbath was instituted in the wilderness in connexion with the giving of manna, and having nothing whatever to do with the creation as to its origin ; the fact of God's resting only being confirmatory of the appointment, and not the ground of it, that ground being the giving of the manna ;

that the Jewish Sabbath being a part of the Mosaic ritual, it was fulfilled with the rest of that ritual, and abolished with it; that the Christian Sabbath is not a transfer of anything from the old covenant—"not a patch on the old garment," as he expresses it—but something entirely new, being an outgrowth of the new covenant, and no more a transfer than the gospel ministry is a transfer of the Levitical priesthood; and we must therefore look to the New Testament teachings, as confirmed by the Old Testament types and the teachings of the prophets, for our warrant for its observance.

Before entering upon the consideration of his arguments, we must be allowed to take exceptions to his method of putting the question. He states it thus: "The Lord's Day, and not the Jewish Sabbath." - With all due deference, we must assert that this is not the issue. The alternative is not between the Lord's Day and a Sabbath that originated with the Jews. No one, that we are aware of, holds to the transfer of the Jewish Sabbath as such. The orthodox view is that the Christian Sabbath is not the transfer of a Jewish, but of the *original ordinance*, instituted at the creation, and which was temporarily ingrafted into the Mosaic ritual, as Fairbairn expresses it. The writer has correctly stated our view when he says: "Dr. Fairbairn maintains that a seventh day of rest was given to the world at the creation, and that it was engrafted into the Jewish system, which gave it a symbolical and typical value, and that from thence the original ordinance was transferred to the Christian system, with a new day and a new name." P. 92. That this is precisely the position of the Holy Sabbath, appears from the following: "As the day existed previously, it could not have originated with the Mosaic ritual, and not having originated with that ritual, it could not in any way depend upon it for its perpetuity. Like the law of murder and the ordinance of marriage, having a previous and independent existence, and being of universal application, it was only united to the Sinaitic laws in a temporary union, and together with them formed the statutory code of the land; the after-dissolution of that union could only leave it where it found it. The only part that strictly belonged to the state was the

death penalty which was afterward added, and which has been repeated, being no part of the original law." P. 30. It seems strange, therefore, that with this interpretation of Fairbairn, and this clear and emphatic utterance of the Holy Sabbath before him, he should endeavor to confine the issue to a choice between the Jewish Sabbath and the Lord's Day. If the real issue be the transfer of the original ordinance, then all that he has said about the death penalty, warm dinners, and our obligation to keep the day as the old Jews did, at once falls to the ground, being wholly irrelevant; and we might dismiss the further consideration of the subject, were it not for the many untenable and erroneous assertions and positions assumed in the course of the argument.

1. Before anything can be done towards upsetting the orthodox view, some disposition must necessarily be made of that first seventh day rest; for there it stands in its isolated grandeur, a Gibraltar of strength, upon the very opening pages of revelation. Naturally, therefore, our reviewer makes this his first point of attack, and his weapon the periodic character of God's resting. He argues that as God did not enter again upon the work of creation on the eighth day, that the seventh could not be a day of ordinary length, but a period, and reaching, as he defines it, "from the end of the six days in which creation was brought into existence, down to the morning of redemption, when a still more holy day was ushered in." P. 617. The point of the argument is simply this, that as the seventh day was a period, and wholly disproportioned to the other six days, and extending to Christ, when the Creator begins to work again, but in another field, the field of redemption, the only solution is, that it must be a type of the gospel rest; and if so, then it furnishes no foundation for a seventh day rest of twenty-four hours.

In reply, we have to say, the Scriptures make no such distinction between day and period. They apply the same term alike to both. They say day each time. If you make the seventh day a period, why not the other six? To use the same word in such different senses, when in such close proximity, is a freedom in the use of the sacred text which seems wholly unwarrantable.

Further, if the Sabbath day of Genesis be a period extending

to Christ, then the conclusion is irresistible that the sacred period is past; for the blessing and the sanctifying which impart the sacredness are to be coextensive with the day. When it stops, they will also cease. But why stop with redemption? Did God then cease to rest? Is he not now resting? Can any one see any reason why the first four thousand years only of the world's history should be blessed? If the simple ground of resting be the ground of blessing, then all future time must be blessed, for God is now resting, and will ever continue to rest. And not only so, but as a question of fact, is it true that God waited four thousand years before he commenced the work of redemption? If he did, what became of the inhabitants of the old world? Are they all lost? If saved, upon what ground? We have always been accustomed to think that initiative steps were taken for the salvation of man immediately after his fall. To say that the seventh day is a period, and that period to be limited to the time of Christ, seems arbitrary in the extreme.

Then, if this be the only period blessed and sanctified, in what did the blessing consist, and how sanctified? To sanctify is to set apart from a common to a sacred use. But where is the evidence of God's setting apart this first four thousand years for a sacred use? And for whom? Surely not for himself; for all times are equally sacred with him. And if for man, how was he to observe it? The writer tells us how it was blessed and sanctified. "He blessed it by walking with man at the beginning, and sanctified it by coming himself in human flesh to redeem man from the curse of the fall." P. 617. Thus, according to our reviewer, this period was blessed only at its beginning, and sanctified at its close. But did Moses speak thus? Did he say the blessing was confined to the beginning, and the sanctification did not come till its close? If blessed only at the beginning, we do not see how that could be a reason for the Jews sanctifying the *whole* of the seventh day; and if the sanctification was withheld till its close, we are equally at a loss to understand how a sanctification not yet accomplished could be given as a reason why the Jews should sanctify anything. And even if the whole of the period were blessed and sanctified, we are still unable to see why the Jew or any

one else should keep holy one-seventh of their time because the Lord rested four thousand years; and yet the writer so uses it. He makes the resting confirmatory of the appointment of the Jewish Sabbath in the wilderness. The giving of the manna the ground, the resting the confirmation of the ordinance. They were to rest, because God had rested.

And now we might just as well consider this period difficulty here as at any other time. Let us admit, for argument sake, that the seventh day was a period extending to Christ, and what then? May not the first six days be periods of similar length, and if so, what becomes of the argument based upon the ground of disproportion? Or even extend it to the final consummation of all things, and those first six periods may still also have been periods of similar length. We know nothing about the length of days in the early cosmogony. As God's ways are not as our ways, neither are his days as our days. And no matter how prolonged they may have been, it is very easy for us to see how they could be made to correspond in length with the period of God's resting, though that period may have run through interminable ages to the time when, in his inscrutable wisdom, he may begin the inauguration of a new scheme of readjustment of his works, if not of a new creation. If so, we at once have an answer to the argument of disproportion.

But this idea of seven equal periods, though furnishing an answer to the argument of our reviewer, does not meet the real difficulty in the case, and for the reason that no matter whether we adopt the geologic idea of six indefinite periods or not, the difficulty resting upon the ground of disproportion will remain, since God's resting does not stop with redemption, nor yet with the dawn of heaven, but will continue for ever; and his blessing, instead of stopping, will only deepen and widen throughout the countless ages of eternity. And though the first six geologic periods may embrace millions upon millions of years, there will always be a disproportion between them and the eternal rest of God.

The true and only solution of the difficulty, in our judgment, lies in the typical and prophetic history of the Scriptures and of the world. Any one who has given any attention to this subject,

knows that the prophetic plan is that of a system within a system, a period within a period, and that the last period of any one series includes all the series of the next period. Thus, the seventh seal contained the seven trumpets, the seventh trumpet contained the seven vials; so the seventh day of creation contains the whole of redemption, both in its typical and actual aspects. Like seven concentric circles, these periods lie within each other, the innermost being the Sabbath of creation, interminable in its very nature, and having in its bosom other concentric circles, representing redemption in all its phases, including the rest of the gospel and terminating in the rest of heaven. Even as the bark includes the concentric rings of the enclosed body, showing the growth and development of the tree, and as the court surrounded the tabernacle that contained in its bosom the shekinah of the Lord, so the sabbatic rest of creation includes the entire series to follow. It swallows up in its vast sweep all the other rests, till at last it merges into the rest of heaven. Like the two opposite oceans, the complements of each, these two rests, the rest of creation and the rest of redemption, though distinct, are nevertheless bound together, and after all are one and inseparable. The rest of heaven is but the completion and perfection of the first rest of creation: the seventh day rest, the rest of Canaan, the rest of the sabbatic year, and the rest of jubilee, as well as that of Canaan, being but integral portions of the first, and adumbrations of the second. Hence the expression of Scripture, "Enter into his rest," which clearly began at creation, but stretches illimitably into eternity. The seven days of creation is emphatically the foundation of the whole scheme, giving shape to the whole interior structure, as the rind or bark determines the configuration of the enclosed kernel. To make the rest of the Creator cease with Christ, or to make the scheme of creation simply confirmatory of the Sabbath appointment, instead of the ground of it, is certainly a misconception of the whole scheme.

2. The second step in the argument of our reviewer is the giving of the Jewish Sabbath. Having, to his satisfaction, destroyed all foundation for the ordinance in the seventh day rest of creation,

his next step is to show that the Jewish Sabbath was peculiarly a Jewish institution, and therefore not binding upon us. The argument is this, that as the Jewish Sabbath was given in connexion with the manna, and as the manna was fulfilled in Christ, the true Bread, so the Sabbath was fulfilled in the spiritual rest that Christ brings his people. The force of this argument clearly rests upon these two points: 1st. The implied assumption that the Sabbath is now instituted for the first time. 2d. The indissoluble union of the manna with it, and the fulfilment of the two in Christ.

As the first of these is the main point in the whole controversy, we invite special attention to it. And we at once raise the question, Was the appointment in the wilderness the initial point of the institution? This is what our reviewer asserts with emphasis over and over again, and yet, with the increasing necessities of the argument, he is compelled to modify and even deny the same. "Moses," says he, "tells the people: 'The Lord hath given you the sabbath, therefore he giveth you the bread of two days;' which proves clearly that the Jewish Sabbath was a *new institution*, given with the bread, and that the manna, or its equivalent, and the day of rest are so intimately united that they cannot be divorced." P. 620. "Counting from the tenth day of the first month, when the passover lamb was chosen, to the twenty-second day of the second month, that on which the Jewish Sabbath was *first instituted*." P. 622. "Now just as the Jewish Sabbath was *instituted* forty-two days after the passover lamb." P. 623. Here in these passages he makes the wilderness the beginning. But in other places, as the necessities of the argument press upon him, he locates the origin even of the Jewish Sabbath farther back. In the January number he says: "The Jewish Sabbath was a terrible memento of death—death in Egypt. The destroying angel was at work on that terrible night when Israel left Egypt, and the Jewish Sabbath was *instituted* as a monument of the sad events of that night." P. 71. "The carnal first-born lay in the tomb in Egypt on that day which was the *origin* of the Jewish Sabbath." P. 71. "It was in memory of a dark and terrible night when Israel went out of Egypt, that resulted in the *institu-*

tion of the Jewish Sabbath." P. 74. "Just as Christ was forced into his grave at the commencement of a Jewish Sabbath, that Israel passed through the Red Sea *on the Sabbath day* also." P. 74. (The italics in the above are ours.) Here, then, at one time it is distinctly asserted that the Sabbath was instituted for the first time in the wilderness, at another just as distinct mention is made of its existence in Egypt. At one time it is given in connexion with the manna, from which it can never be divorced, at another with the deliverance from Egypt, and as a memento of death, the children of Israel having "passed through the Red Sea on the Sabbath day also." Now which does he mean? Why assert so positively that the ordinance originated in the wilderness, if the necessities of the argument demanded its recognition in Egypt and at the Red Sea? And if its existence be recognised in Egypt, why not at a still earlier period, in that "proper portion of their time," which he had reason to infer that God required of the patriarchs of old? "We know," says he, "that God walked with the patriarchs, and no doubt taught them to obey his will by verbal communications; and we also know that he had his servants, who, like Noah, were preachers of righteousness, or, in other words, teachers of the moral law; and thus have good reason to infer that he required of his children a proper portion of their time in consecration to himself." P. 618. And what would be a more proper portion than a seventh? The very fact that God afterwards by formal statute required that portion, is of itself sufficient to lead to the conclusion that that was the portion then required. And, indeed, this is what our reviewer is forced to admit, though in the face of his argument. Says he, "We have nowhere maintained that God gave the world no weekly rest until he gave the manna to the Israelites in the desert, we have admitted that from inference we understand that God's preachers of righteousness did teach the people to observe a weekly rest. We think there can be no doubt about this, and we should consider it a great error to say that the antediluvian world had no seventh day of rest." P. 92. And what was this but the Sabbath? Here, then, according to the admission of the writer himself we have traces of a Sabbath running back far anterior to

the time of Moses, wholly inexplicable upon any other supposition than the existence of an ordinance, traditionally or verbally communicated, as he expresses it; but nevertheless in existence. And what matters it whether verbal or written? A verbal communication would be just as binding as any other. Can we suppose for a moment that there were no sacred rites and sacred times; no Sabbaths of communion with God prior to the flood? Did God thus abandon his chosen seed for fifteen hundred years? No, says the whole analogy of Scripture. No, says our reviewer himself. "We consider it a great error to say that the antediluvian world had no seventh day of rest." God doubtless did communicate his will in this as other things of which we have no mention in the Scriptures. Why, then should it be considered an incredible thing that that should first be communicated privately and verbally to the line of the patriarchs which was afterwards given by Moses publicly with all the formality of statutory law?

But let us look more closely into this proposed origin of the Jewish Sabbath, given in the wilderness for the first time, and given in connexion with the manna. These were unquestionably given together, but in what order? One must have preceded the other. Which, then, the cause, and which the effect? Did the manna give rise to the Sabbath, or the Sabbath to the manna? Our reviewer adopts the former. Says he: "The Sabbath day was given to the Jews because God gave them food from heaven for six days, doubling the supply on the seventh." P. 621. How different this language from that used by Moses will appear at a single glance. Moses says: "See, for the Lord hath given you the Sabbath, therefore he giveth you on the sixth day the bread of two days." Ex. xvi. 29. Our reviewer says the Sabbath was given because of the doubling of the manna on the sixth day. We understand Moses to say just the reverse: that the manna was doubled on the sixth day because the Lord had given them the seventh as a Sabbath. Look at the history: with the first promise of manna is coupled the command to gather twice as much on the sixth day. For six consecutive days the people gathered an homer apiece. On the sixth day they gathered two homers. The elders report the fact to Moses, and he explains,

"This is what the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of the holy sabbath unto the Lord," and for this reason they were required to gather double. With this explanation is coupled the additional instruction to bake or seethe what they had and keep the remainder for the next day. Then follows the standing command to gather it for six days, with a double portion on the sixth, for there would be none on the seventh, and for the reason already assigned, that "the Lord hath given you the sabbath, therefore he giveth you on the sixth day the bread of two days." Let any one turn and read the history in the sixteenth chapter of Exodus and see if the idea of the pre-existence of a Sabbath does not underlie the whole transaction.

The utter falsity of this manna theory will further appear, not only from the explicit language of Moses, but its utter unreasonableness. An institution that was to occupy such a conspicuous position, and play such an important *rôle* in the after history of the Church and world, being the adumbration of so much that is grand and glorious, founded in the merest circumstance of gathering a double portion of manna! How natural the inquiry, Why was the quantity doubled on the sixth day more than on the eighth or ninth? and how impossible of explanation, according to the theory of the writer. God has a reason for all that he does. It is not for us to scan his plans and demand reasons of him. But who does not see, with all the luminousness of a sunbeam, his finger pointing to the original rest as the foundation of the appointment, the giving of the manna being simply the occasion of the renewal of the original ordinance, he himself thus showing respect to his own appointment: To make the manna-gathering the foundation, and the rest of creation simply confirmatory, instead of creation the foundation and the rest in the wilderness the after development, is simply to contradict the whole analogy of nature which requires the embryonic cell to contain the germ of all that is future.

Besides, if the original idea of the Sabbath be simply a rest from manna-gathering, how account for the prohibition in other directions? They were not to do work of any kind, and wherefore? Because the manna was doubled on that day? Is that any rea-

son why the people should rest all day and do no other work? The theory utterly fails to explain the universality of the prohibition. It explains why there should be cessation from manna-gathering, but not from other work. And is it not strange, if manna-gathering be the foundation of the rest, that when God so shortly afterwards thundered that law so loudly in the ears of Israel, he said not one word about resting from manna-gathering? Six days shalt thou work and rest on the seventh, not because thou rested from manna-gathering, but solely upon the ground that the Lord thy God rested on the seventh day after six days of labor. In view of the awful surroundings and proximity to Sinai, to make the simple fact of resting from manna-gathering the ground of the appointment is irrational and unsatisfactory in the extreme.

This brings us to the second part of our reviewer's argument, the typical character of the manna, and its indissoluble union with the Jewish Sabbath. These, we are told, were bound together in a union "from which they can never be divorced." And as the one was fulfilled in Christ, the true Bread, so must the other likewise be fulfilled in the rest that he brings, and this, of course, brings the termination of the Jewish Sabbath, it being merged in that rest to which it pointed, and in which it was fulfilled.

One would suppose, from the prominence given this argument, that surely there was no doubt in the mind of the writer as to the true typical character of the manna. But let him speak for himself. Speaking of Christ, he says, "That true Bread from heaven of which the manna was an imperfect type, if type at all, gives not life to the body, but life to the soul." P. 623. Again, "It is usually supposed that the manna was a type of Christ. This can hardly be true. If it were, it would not become filled with worms, nor would the gathering of it be prohibited on the Sabbath day." Again, "The manna ceased when the Israelites entered Canaan; does Christ's presence leave us when we enter the rest of his kingdom?" P. 625. Here, then, we have an argument based upon an assertion, the truth of which is afterwards doubted, if the assertion itself be not retracted. If the typical

character of the manna be the thing that limits the fulfilment of the Jewish Sabbath in the gospel rest, and that be surrendered, then what becomes of the limitation? Furthermore, can any one see any reason why things so diverse as the manna and the Sabbath should be indissolubly bound together? Besides, as a matter of fact, that union was not indissoluble. The manna gave out in Canaan and the Sabbath continued. They can never be divorced, says the writer, and yet they were divorced. What, then, becomes of the argument based upon the indissolubility of the union? And still further, if the Sabbath survived the manna, why may it not in its essential features still and ever continue to exist? And this must necessarily be the case, unless fulfilled in something. What, then, did it represent? and in what fulfilled?

And here again our reviewer seems particularly unfortunate. For at one time he makes it mean one thing, and at another quite another. At one time, "the type of Christ," p. 54; "a shadow fulfilled," when Christ the body comes, p. 637. At another, the Christian Sabbath, "the first day of man's redemption," p. 63; the Sabbath day fulfilled in the Lord's day, "the antitype," p. 78. Then at another still, the "type of that rest of the soul from the bondage of sin, which our Saviour introduced." P. 57. Thus at one time it is made the type of a definite, at another of an indefinite, period. At one time the type of the Christian Sabbath, and at another of the whole Christian era! Furthermore, whilst making it the type of the Christian Sabbath and gospel rest, he at the same time argues that it differs from the former, inasmuch as whilst the Christian Sabbath was the "symbol of light," the Jewish was the "symbol of darkness," and yet one the type of the other! That which is the symbol of darkness the type of that which is the symbol of light!

But we must insist upon knowing what has become of the Jewish Sabbath. "That a type is a prophecy that cannot be abolished until fulfilled in the antitype, is a truth which no one can question," says the writer, p. 56. Again: "The Jewish nation may be considered a type of the world from the death of Christ to the end of time." P. 621. Of what, then, was the Jewish Sabbath a type? What has become of it? Was it fulfilled in

the Christian Sabbath, or the rest of the soul? Or if not, in what? It is a very easy matter to say fulfilled in Christ, and therefore abolished. But how, wherein, and according to what law? In the formal delivery of the law, but a few days afterwards at Sinai, not one word was said about manna. "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work," etc. Now, we would like very much to be told wherein this law of labor of working six days and resting one has been fulfilled in Christ. Go, read and see what Jeremiah and the prophets, when speaking of gospel times, say about working on the Sabbath, and calling it a delight, and tell us where the same has been fulfilled in Christ. We simply deny the allegation that the law establishing the Sabbath at Sinai has been fulfilled in Christ, and challenge the world to show wherein the Fourth Commandment has been fulfilled in Christ, any more than the Seventh or Eighth or Ninth. If the Fourth Commandment has been abolished because fulfilled, so has the Sixth and Seventh and Eighth, and man is for ever absolved from the sin of murder, adultery, and theft. Christ has distinctly laid down the law that nothing has been abolished save what was fulfilled in him. Now, if a part of the law requiring a seventh day of rest has been abolished by reason of the fact that Christ has substituted another rest in the place of it, and into which it merges, then tell us wherein the other part, requiring six days of labor has been fulfilled by him in the substitution of labor for the six days of work required of the Jews. We simply assert it, without any fear of contradiction, that Christ has never kept that part of the law requiring six days of work, so that he has released the Jews, or any body else, from the duty of manual toil and labor.

We are now in the very heart of this controversy, and therefore invite special attention to the points involved. If the Jewish nation is to be considered the "type of the whole world from the death of Christ to the end of time," as our writer asserts, then the rest of Canaan is to perform a very conspicuous part in the system of typology, being its fulfilment, and therefore its termination. If the land of Canaan be the "type of God's kingdom," as he also asserts, then its rest must be the type of the rest of

that kingdom, begun on earth and completed in heaven. But here is the astounding fact, that whilst the manna gives out, the Sabbath from which it "can never be divorced" continues on. The sabbatic year and the year of jubilee, having their origin in Canaan, according to the law of types, must find their fulfilment in the spiritual kingdom of Christ and the prophetic unfoldings of the Apocalypse. But not so with the Sabbath. That originated anterior to the rest of Canaan, and as part of the typical system ought to have been fulfilled, and, like the manna, ceased upon entering Canaan, especially according to the argument of our reviewer, who insists that the rest of the Sabbath bears the same relation to the rest of Canaan, that the Christian Sabbath does to the rest of the gospel. The latter, therefore, is clearly the earnest, prophecy, and pledge of the final rest which is but the completion of that which begins on earth. So the other must have been the earnest, prophecy, and pledge of the rest of Canaan. If so, why did it not cease upon the entering upon that rest, just the same as the other is to cease when it merges into the everlasting rest of heaven? How explain its continuance? "The Jewish Sabbath is not discontinued when the Jews enter Canaan. A law had already been given, which confirms its continuance till the true manna and the true rest should come." P. 623. But what law? Why did he not tell us? It was indissolubly bound with the manna, but the manna had ceased. The manna clearly pointed to the corn in Canaan, and found its first fulfilment in the ample provisions made for the support of Israel in Canaan. Hence it ceased as soon as the corn was reached. These, again, to a higher fulfilment in the true Israel feeding upon Christ, the true manna, in their pilgrimage through this world to the heavenly Canaan. For the same reason, the Sabbath ought to have had its fulfilment in Canaan, and merged into its rest. Here, then, are the only alternatives. If the type of the rest of Canaan, it ought to have ceased on entering Canaan. If the type of the Christian Sabbath, as he asserts, then it simply gives place to that Sabbath. If of the gospel rest, which our reviewer so strenuously maintains, then, as the rest of Canaan was the type of the gospel rest, and the Sabbath rest did not cease on entering upon

that rest, neither should it now cease until we enter upon the higher rest of heaven. The truth is, our reviewer is completely at a loss to know what to do with the Jewish Sabbath. Hence, at one time he makes it the type of the Canaanitic rest; at another, of the Christian Sabbath; and still at another, of the gospel rest; and in the midst of all this confusion, and with the general statement "fulfilled in Christ," he leaves it wholly unexplained. The truth is, there is but the one simple, scriptural, rational explanation, and that is, that the original law indelibly stamped upon the whole creation at the beginning, and reiterated at Sinai with such tremendous emphasis, can be the type of, and fulfilled in, nothing less than the everlasting rest of heaven, and therefore must continue to bind to the end of time.

3. Having disposed of the seventh day rest of creation and the Jewish Sabbath, the next step of our reviewer is to show the true foundation of the Christian Sabbath. This he asserts to be the new covenant, it being simply an outgrowth of that covenant, having its germ, however, in the Pentecost. But where is the evidence of this? The Pentecost was an annual feast, the Sabbath a weekly rest. How could the one grow out of the other? The very enunciation of the proposition is enough to show its unreasonableness. A weekly rest the outgrowth of an annual feast! How much easier to make it the outgrowth of a former Sabbath, to which it stood in the relation of "antitype," according to the writer's own statement. Further, if the Christian Sabbath be something entirely new, and "not a patch on an old garment," how can it have its germ in the Pentecost? An outgrowth of the new covenant, and yet the Pentecost its germ. If the Pentecost be its germ, is it not rather the outgrowth of the old covenant?

We have here, indeed, a strange bridging over the chasm between the old and new covenants. We followed the Jewish Sabbath to the close of the old dispensation, when it suddenly disappeared like some of those rivers that so mysteriously sink out of sight in the earth. Then at the beginning of the new, we find the Sabbath again springing up as a full grown river out of the ground, and yet no connexion, but entirely new; a Sabbath on

oneside, and a Sabbath on the other, and yet no connexion ; the latter a new outgrowth ! Although entirely new, and not a patch, yet strange to say, he finds it necessary to use the old as illustrative and explanatory of the new, and which simply means that the one, if nothing more, must be the shadow of the other, and if so, the same in essence. It is idle to talk of anything being entirely new when it is necessary to go back to the old for its germ. The river phenomenon could easily be explained upon the supposition that it was precisely the same river with a new name and in a new bed. But not so here. Our reviewer attempts a different explanation, "The new covenant rest," says he, "bears the same relation to the Lord's day that the rest in Canaan bore to the Jewish Sabbath." "It is the basis or foundation upon which the Lord's day is built." "If we wish to know what relation the Lord's day bears to the rest of grace which Christ has introduced, we must first learn what relation the Jewish Sabbath bears to the rest in Canaan, and then carry out the analogy, and the whole question will then become perfectly plain." P. 62. But why the rest of Canaan ? We had thought all along the analogy was between the first long period of creation and the second long period of grace ; that the Christian Sabbath was the outgrowth of the one, as the Jewish was of the other ; and on this principle, according to the law of the first fruits, the separation of a part being a pledge of the consecration of the whole. "Now, in regard to time, one day in seven was consecrated to God as a first fruits of all their time, in memory of that first day of the new period in which God rested from the creation of the world, this day being, if we may so express it, an outgrowth of that long period of rest." P. 63. Thus the second Sabbath was the outgrowth of the second rest, as the first the outgrowth of the first. But if so, why overleap that first long period altogether, or wait till the rest of Canaan to draw the analogy ? And how can there be any analogy between the rest of grace and the rest of Canaan, when the Sabbath was not its outgrowth, being in existence before the entrance into Canaan ? And here we have another illustration of the loose and illogical theory of our reviewer. At one time the Sabbath is the outgrowth of the manna ; at another, the

rest from Egypt; at another, the rest of Canaan; at another, the first long period of creation—and all this confusion clearly the legitimate outgrowth of that fundamental error which denies the true origin of a day of rest. The truth grows upon us as we proceed, that the Sabbath rest is the outgrowth of none of these, or anything else than the first rest of creation, when the Creator, at the conclusion of his work, pronounced his approving benediction, "that all was good," and proclaimed from his high throne in the listening ears of the universe, that the seventh period was for ever to be the hallowed period to the end of time.

Having thus hastily sketched the general outline of the theory and the arguments of the writer, we proceed to point out some of the more obvious and serious difficulties connected with the same.

1. In the first place, it utterly fails to give anything like a satisfactory explanation of that first broad fundamental statement that God rested on the seventh day, and therefore blessed and hallowed it. There is manifestly a creation of a day of rest at the very beginning. The question naturally arises, What ever became of it? Any theory that fails to answer that question, must be fundamentally defective. We think we do our reviewer no injustice when we say that his theory completely ignores the existence of such a day of rest. No such divinely-appointed day of rest based on the fact of creation till the time of the exodus. The Jewish Sabbath a new institution, the outgrowth of the manna-giving, and the Christian Sabbath a new institution, the outgrowth of the new covenant. The old patriarchs required to give a proper portion of their time, but not the original seventh day rest; thus that original rest day is completely ignored in his theory, though such prominence is given it by Moses in his history.

The only explanation he gives is, that this statement was historical, not mandatory. Admit it, and what is gained? Is it not the history of a command? Is it not an inspired statement, setting forth the fact that such a day was then appointed, though the special command to the old patriarchs omitted through brevity of the record? If such a day was sanctified and set apart at the beginning, for whom if not for man? Surely not for God

and the angels ; nor yet was it simply sanctified in the abstract ; that would amount to nothing. So the sanctifying a day and setting it apart for a use, and yet no command connected therewith, would be a strange anomaly. The very appointment of the day carries with it the idea of command. Besides, if this statement be simply historical, where did the writer get his authority for his first long sabbatic period ? If a period could be sanctified by it, why not a day ?

That a Sabbath day existed at the beginning is obvious, from the fact that God himself observed it. Moses says, God entered upon the rest immediately after the creation. So does Paul, Heb. iv. 4. The writer himself says the long period was blessed at the beginning, immediately after creation, and sanctified at its close, at redemption. To delay the sanctification to the close of the long period, is simply an unwarrantable separation by a space of four thousand years of things closely conjoined by the pen of inspiration. It is completely to ignore the example of God in keeping the day himself. Besides being a simple contradiction with the fact that the sanctification existed in the wilderness and the land of Canaan, as the writer asserts. He simply contradicts himself when he declares that the long period was sanctified at its close, and then turns round and argues for the existence of a Jewish Sabbath, from the fact that the period was already sanctified, the Jewish Sabbath being simply the first fruits or pledge of the sanctification of the whole of that period. The fact of a sanctified time at the beginning, settles the whole question. The historical statement and example of God prove the existence of the ordinance. The simple absence from the record of a formal statute to observe the day has no force. It is a very easy matter to understand how that, in the early history of the race, in the absence of all written law, God made known his will to his creatures concerning this thing by verbal communications, as he did with regard to sacrifices and other things of which we have no mention.

Not only does this theory fail to explain the fact of creation, but also degrades it to a secondary place. The theory is that the giving of the manna was the ground of the appointment,

the resting of God simply subsidiary and confirmatory. "The law confirmed," says the writer. The doubling of the manna the reason, the example of God the confirmation. Now we submit, if this be not a marvellously strange grouping of first and secondary causes? The manna first, and creation last. A complete transposition of events in the order of time. And not only so, but the making the less the cause of the greater; the boy the father of the man; creation projected with reference to the manna, and not the manna given with reference to creation. God must create the world in six days because the Israelites were to gather manna for six days, and not the Israelites must gather for six days because the Lord had wrought for that many days. The example of man the model for God, and not the example of God the model for man. God's rest made to suit the after-history, and not the after-history to suit the rest. The theory of the writer simply does violence to all reason, in thus degrading the sublime and stupendous facts of creation to a secondary and subordinate place, in making them merely confirmatory instead of the very foundation and origin of the original ordinance.

2. The theory fails just as signally in accounting for the septenary cycles, with which the whole scheme of revelation and providence are so completely interlaced. We meet with the number seven and its multiples on every side; seven days, seven weeks, seven years; so forty-two marches, forty-two years, forty-two months. Is the giving of the manna the foundation of all this? How unreasonable the supposition that all these hebdomadal divisions and typical arrangements that run all through the Scriptures, its history, its types, its prophecies, should all grow out of such a comparatively unimportant event as the gathering of manna! How much more reasonable that the giving of the manna itself, as well as all these others, should be made conformable to the first general plan sketched out at the very commencement, and made the foundation for all future operations!

The first seven days of creation were unquestionably prophetic days, even as every germ and every seed contain the prophecy and pledge of the future plant, and as the last seven periods of revelation were prophetic of what was to be to the end of time.

The seventh seal, as we have already seen, contains seven trumpets, the seventh trumpet seven vials, and the seventh vial the destruction of the beast with seven heads. So the seventh day of creation contains seven millenary periods, the last being the millennium of the Apocalypse, and this millennium, in turn, may, for aught we know, contain the seven periods, the last of which is the everlasting rest of heaven.

Then, going back again to the first, as there is always a creation within a creation, the one natural, the other spiritual; the one the shell, the other the kernel enclosed within its enfoldings, and receiving all its configurations therefrom, and beginning with the seven typical periods of Israel, marked by the forty-two stations and forty-two years of toil, we meet with another seventh period of rest in Canaan, and this period comprehending seven other periods; the seventh day bringing on the weekly Sabbath; the seventh Sabbath the Pentecost; the seventh Pentecost the Jewish year; the seventh year the sabbatic year, and the seventh sabbatic year the jubilee; and all prophetic of the forty-two months of the Apocalypse, embracing six other periods of the churches' toil, and again terminating in the millennium of rest, and all showing the entire misconception of those who think the first long period of rest upsets the foundation for the Christian Sabbath. Instead of overthrowing, it only confirms. The first long period, like the seventh seal that embraces the seven trumpets and seven vials, instead of stopping with the time of redemption, as our reviewer would have us believe, takes in its vast sweep all times till the end of time. It includes the hebdomadal divisions in nature, in the wilderness, in Canaan, in the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and likewise all rests; the seventh day rest, the rest of the patriarchs and of Israel, the seventh year rest, and the rest of jubilee, or the seventh seven years of rest of Canaan, and the millennium or seventh thousand year rest of the world; and merging at last into the everlasting rest of heaven. God the Creator resting after six periods of toil; God the Redeemer resting after six periods of toil; Israel resting after six periods of toil; the Church, the true Israel, resting after six periods of toil; and all terminating in the everlasting sabbatism of the skies! Now surely

the giving of the manna is not the foundation for all this mysterious symbolism. Nothing gives the key to it but the broad philosophic statement in the opening chapters in the Book, that God rested on the seventh period, and therefore the seventh period is the blessed and hallowed period, and the foundation for all the other holy periods, patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian, and how much beyond, we are unable to say. The Sabbath is laid deep in nature and in the very constitution of the universe; and those who are endeavoring to overthrow it, are endeavoring to upheave the very foundation of the universe itself.

3. But the most serious defect and greatest objection to the theory is, that it utterly fails to give any rational and satisfactory account of the Christian Sabbath. If there be no command to observe a seventh day rest previous to the Exodus, and if the Jewish Sabbath was given entirely to the Jews, and now done away with, because fulfilled and no longer obligatory, then where is your authority for asserting its claims? If a new institution, it can be maintained only upon the supposition of a new and positive command. The teachings of the prophets are good as far as they go, but are not enough, nor yet the practice of the apostles. The writer himself admits this to be too vague, and therefore claims higher authority than even that of the apostles or Moses, even the Lord of the Sabbath. But why did he not produce the authority? If it were a transfer simply of something already existing, no such command would be necessary; but if new, it demands such authority. He tells us it was an outgrowth of the new covenant as the gospel ministry. But the cases are not at all analogous. We have an account of the direct appointment of the ministry, but not so of this. He tells us it is a new institution, but goes back to Moses and the prophets, and even the moral law, for his authority.

Now, we lay down this broad axiom: Before he can go back to the old dispensation for authority, the things must in some way be connected, and this in one of two ways. The things must be identically the same, or one must be the type of the other. Our reviewer adopts the latter, and therefore, in arguing from the prophets, declares that what they said literally, must be under-

stood spiritually, concerning the Christian Sabbath, which he asserts is the antitype of the Jewish, though elsewhere he makes the latter the type of the gospel rest. He also tells us that the former bears the same relation to the rest of the gospel that the latter did to the rest of Canaan. If so, then as the latter existed previously to the rest of Canaan, the former must also have existed previously to the rest of the gospel; and if so, then, according to his own position, it becomes a simple transfer, notwithstanding his assertion and argument to the contrary.

Now, the objection to this whole interpretation is this, that if you reject the orthodox position, which is, that the Christian Sabbath is not the antitype or simple transfer of the Jewish, but the coming down or flowing through of the original institution, then you are completely barred from the use of all arguments from the Old Testament, unless you adopt the typical character of the Jewish Sabbath, as the writer did, without being able to say of what it was the type, and in what fulfilled; whether the Christian Sabbath, or the gospel rest. Make it the type of either, and what then? Why, simply this, that the physical rest is all abolished. According to the law of types, the antitype must have the same meaning with the type, only in a higher sense. In other words, the Jewish Sabbath being a rest from physical toil, the Christian must be entirely a spiritual rest. This is precisely the position of our reviewer. Driven by his logic, he was compelled to assert that the Christian rest was not a rest of body, but of soul; that the burdens of which Jeremiah speaks were not "packages of rice and sugar, but mental burdens." In other words, that there is now no law forbidding physical toil and labor. What an admission, and what an argument to support it!

But the strange thing is, that notwithstanding all this, he still insists on quoting the Fourth Commandment as authority. And wherefore? If the institution be a new ordinance, why go to the law at all? According to his position, the Pentecost was the germ of the institution. If so, what had the law to do with it? Did it escape him that the law was given before the Pentecost, and the Jewish Sabbath even before that? How, then, can these things be authority for that which had its germ, its initial point,

after them? Besides, if the old ordinance be abolished, what becomes of the law that controls it? If the Jewish Sabbath be overthrown, then is not the Fourth Commandment too, which was given with exclusive reference to that Sabbath, according to the theory of the writer? And if the fourth, the other nine also. To overthrow the Jewish Sabbath, is simply to overthrow the law that supports it, and with the overthrow of the one comes the overthrow of the entire code of which it forms an integral portion.

But to avoid this difficulty, our reviewer divides the law into that which is typical and that which is moral. "We do not deny," says he, "but there is a moral law given to the universe, written not in tablets of stone, but in fleshly tablets of the heart, which is eternal." "The Ten Commandments spoken in an audible voice from the summit of a typical mountain, etc., are vastly different from the moral law given by God to the universe." P. 629. The Ten Commandments, having a typical and moral meaning, and yet not the moral law written on the tablets of the heart! We are at a loss to know either what he means or what his authority for these distinctions. Whether we understand him or not, we think we know this much, that if this distinction exists in the Fourth, so also in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth; and if the typical be abolished in the one, so in the others. And when the typical is abolished from adultery and theft and murder, we would like very much to know what will be left.

Indeed, the position of the writer on this whole subject of the perpetuity of the moral law, seems to us remarkably strange and confused. Says he: "We read of the everlasting gospel, but nowhere of the everlasting law." P. 629. "Christ kept the law for man through life, and annihilated it for him through eternity." P. 630. The moral law eternal, and yet annihilated through eternity! Written once upon tablets of stone, now on tablets of fleshly hearts, and yet under no law hereafter, or else under a new moral law entirely! Is this revelation? Is it reason?

That he is speaking about the moral law, appears from the following quotation: "Is that throne which is to shelter us to be based on the Ten Commandments? Does not probation end

when we pass from earth to heaven? Of what use the Ten Commandments in a world where there can be no sin?" P. 629. To our ears all this sounds very strange in a leading Presbyterian journal. We were always taught to believe that the essential principles of morality were eternally the same, everywhere in God's boundless empire; that the moral law was but the transcript of the divine nature itself, founded in the very nature of things, and having for its basis the unchanging will of an unchanging God; and therefore unchangeable and eternal, and that when translated to heaven, the law will be translated with us, not written, however, upon outward tablets, because then written upon our very hearts and stamped upon our very natures; and therefore in all its essential principles will be our rule through eternity. And yet we are told the law is annihilated for ever! Why, if annihilated in heaven, it is annihilated in hell, and the lost are for ever absolved from its future demands, and will be held responsible only for transgressions that are past. And, indeed, if Christ is to do the work of annihilation, has he not already done it, and the law already annihilated, and we, therefore, for ever freed from it?

The law has, indeed, been abolished as a condition of justification, but never as a standard of duty. Christ did not come to abolish any law, but to uphold, establish, fulfil. Instead of annihilating the law, the very object of his mission was to enable us to keep that very law. This is precisely what we understand the apostle to assert when he says: "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." Rom. viii. 3, 4. The problem was to secure obedience on our part. Two things were necessary to this end. The first was our justification, or, in other words, our deliverance from the judicial condemnation of law. This was effected by Christ's paying the penalty of death, and furnishing the perfect righteousness required. The other part of the problem was our sanctification, so that we would sin no more. This is effected by his blood and Spirit, two of the most

powerfully cleansing agencies in the universe. The Spirit renews, and the blood cleanses from all sin. And now being sanctified, the redeemed shall hereafter be able, in their own strength through Christ, to keep the law of God perfectly, even as the angels do in heaven. And there shall be no more sin; not because there shall be no more law, but for the better reason, that, being sanctified, they will ever be able to keep that law.

And now, so far as the Sabbath is concerned, being the type and first fruits of the everlasting rest, it will hereafter be merged into that rest; and instead of being annihilated, will only become universally and eternally established.

The position of our reviewer seems to us, if not entirely abolishing the Sabbath, to place it at least upon a very precarious foundation. If there be no command to observe a weekly rest before the manna; if the old Sabbath was exclusively for the Jews, and abolished in Christ; if the practice of the apostles be "too vague," as he asserts, and there be no positive precept in the New Testament, then upon what does the institution rest? Once admit that the Fourth Commandment was part of the Jewish ritual and abolished, and it will be idle afterwards, as he does, to appeal to that Commandment as furnishing any ground for observing the Christian Sabbath. Tell the world that the Fourth Commandment was exclusively Jewish, and abolished with their ceremonial law, and then tell them to keep the Christian Sabbath because the Jew was commanded to keep it, and they will laugh at you. Tell them that it is the type of gospel rest, and therefore they should keep it, and you need not be astonished that they will contemptuously curl the lip at such sophistical reasoning. The little reverence for the Christian Sabbath in Continental Europe to-day, is but the legitimate fruit of the lax teachings of the old Reformers upon the subject. And let those teachings be revived in this country, and the result will be the same. Do away with the original ordinance and the binding obligation of the Fourth Commandment, and our main defences are gone. And how, after virtually surrendering both of these, our reviewer could use such severe terms concerning the Sabbath-breaker as he does, we are at a loss to know: "Brand him as you would a thief." "The man

who will not devote a portion of his time, . . . is a villain." "Brand him as a thief and robber." P. 86. Such denunciation and such reasoning are wholly incongruous.

We place this institution upon far higher, stronger ground, and just where we think the Scriptures place it. Our position is, that its foundation was laid in the scheme of creation, and made the basis of all subsequent arrangements; that it was orally delivered to the patriarchs, and afterwards formally incorporated in the moral law, which was given to the Jews, but not intended for them alone, but for the whole world. Antedating and forming no part of the ceremonial law, it could not be abolished with that law. Not being the type of anything in Canaan, nor in the spiritual kingdom of Christ, it was neither abolished when the Jews entered Canaan, nor can it now be upon the establishment of Christ's kingdom; but rather as the first fruits or pledge of the heavenly rest, it can only be fulfilled in that rest. Being clearly foretold by prophets of old, who make distinct mention of its existence in gospel times; recognised and established by the Master himself, in his lucid expositions of the law and the manner in which he would have the day observed, and also confirmed by the practice of the apostles and primitive Church, it must ever stand unshaken in its position till the end of time. And we here express the decided opinion that no moral and religious duty is more clearly and lucidly set forth in the Scriptures than this.

There are several minor points in the articles before us we would like to notice; but as we have already exceeded the limits we intended, we must here arrest the further consideration of the subject.

JAMES STACY.

ARTICLE VII.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1883.

The Lexington Assembly was the largest court of our Southern Church that has ever yet convened. The number of commissioners enrolled was one hundred and forty-seven—being only seven less than a complete roll of the delegates chosen by the Presbyteries. Every one of our sixty-seven Presbyteries was represented. Every ministerial representative was present, the seven absent commissioners being elders. Of these one hundred and forty-seven commissioners, one hundred and thirty-four were on the floor the first day; by the third day, one hundred and forty-seven were enrolled. Very few members left before the Assembly was dissolved, only eight having retired up to the day before adjournment.

THE OPENING SERMON.

Precisely at 11 o'clock a. m., May 17th, 1883, Rev. R. K. Smoot, D. D., the retiring Moderator, ascended the pulpit and preached the opening sermon, on Isaiah liii. 10, a splendid discourse on "The Sufferings and Glory of Christ," worthy of the occasion, and of wide dissemination. The closing passage is quoted here for its strong practical ring:

"If the work before us looks like an impossible thing to be performed, let us look upon that picture in the Gospel of Luke, where our Saviour commanded his disciples to feed, with the five loaves and two fishes, a multitude of five thousand people, and learn the lesson that the measure of our duty is never limited by our present ability to do, but that an accruing power to perform shall come step by step as we march on in the line of our duty. Away with that plea of poverty and inability. We are not poor. A rich man may talk himself into a belief that he is; a poor man may so manage as to enjoy all the real benefits of riches. No true gentleman ever parades his poverty, and no true Church of God should be found whining about her's. Let us throw the same business energy into the Church that is given to tunnelling mountains and bridging rivers for the advance of commerce, and the song of our victory will go ringing through the land. Against the infidelity of the day, the speculations of science and philosophy falsely so-called, let us

entrench ourselves in the infallible word of God as the constitution of the conscience and the great bill of rights to the soul, and there make our stand, knowing

“That the bird is safest in its nest;
O'er all that flutter the wing to fly,
The hawk is hovering in the sky.”

THE ELECTION OF MODERATOR.

Dr. Theodoric Pryor, of East Hanover Presbytery, Va., was unanimously chosen Moderator; Rev. H. R. Raymond, D. D., of South Alabama Presbytery, Temporary Clerk; and Rev. J. P. Smith, in Dr. Brown's absence, was chosen to act in his place. He made a most admirable officer. Dr. Pryor, venerable with the frost of eighty-two years, is remarkable for his mental and physical vigor. He has been in the ministry fifty-one years; his strong, eloquent voice rings with clarion tones when he becomes roused in speech. He won all hearts by his earnestness, honesty, and kindly manner.

NEXT PLACE OF MEETING.

Vicksburg was chosen as the place for the twenty-fourth Assembly, to meet on the third Thursday of May, 1884.

RECEPTION AND SPEECHES OF THE NORTHERN DELEGATES.

Saturday morning, the delegates from the Northern Church were introduced to the Assembly by Dr. Bullock, chairman of the Special Committee of Reception. They were a fine body of men, a credit to the Church which sent them. As Dr. Pryor said, in response to their greetings: “If we ourselves had made the selection, we could not have done better.” Judge S. M. Moore, of Chicago, spoke first. He read his address with a warm, yet modest, earnestness and dignity, impressing himself on all as a man of eminent honesty of character, purity of purpose, and kindness of heart. The drift of his speech was, that since the two bodies had established friendly intercourse on the basis of mutual regret and withdrawal of everything regarded as reflecting upon or offensive to the other, their common heritage of doctrine and polity, history and hope, was an argument for mutual

love and help, without strife or interference in each other's separate work and organisation. Had the Church North maintained its purely spiritual functions as sketched in Judge Moore's peroration, teaching through its courts and pulpits "only a crucified Redeemer," there never would have been anything "offensive" to withdraw.

Dr. S. I. Prime, of New York, spoke next with a warm, chaste greeting from the Northern Church to the Southern. After referring to the measures taken to secure fraternal intercourse, he said: "We come to you on equal terms. We meet as Churches and as gentlemen." He said there was no tendency in the Northern Church to the union of the two Assemblies; but only a desire for friendly efficient coöperation. In his person Dr. Prime won the respect and good-will of all.

Dr. S. J. Niccolls, of St. Louis, followed. His address had more of rhetoric and oratory than any of the others, and contained passages of genuine power and beauty. He repeated what the preceding speakers had said about "*everything offensive*" being withdrawn; adding, "If it were not so, we could not stand unabashed before your faces." His allusion to the "explanatory resolution" was somewhat "hard to be understood," to put it mildly. As an explanation it had as much of a sphinx character as the thing explained. Dr. Niccolls's speech sounded like a subtle masked argument for organic union. If it was his intention to put forth a casual feeler to see how the idea would take, he could not have arranged his speech better for the purpose. His figure of the two clouds uniting would have been a fine illustration in an open argument for union, and could be as fittingly used in an argument against it; for often when two clouds meet, swept by different currents, instead of a gentle fertilising rain there comes down a destructive cyclone.

Dr. Humphrey, of Louisville, and Judge Strong, of the Supreme Court, closed the salutation with short addresses, which were closely listened to.

Dr. Pryor responded in a hearty speech, assuring the delegation of the honesty and cordiality of Southern men in all their actions. At the close of the speeches the Assembly adjourned,

and the members gave the Northern guests a courteous, cordial greeting in person. Those who had objected to the terms and manner of the invitation which brought these guests, were as polite and kind as those who had been satisfied with every part of the ceremony. The delegation made a pleasant impression on the Assembly.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF COMMITTEES.

This question was sprung incidentally on the Assembly in connexion with certain overtures on Fraternal Relations.

Saturday morning, when the overtures were presented to the Assembly and assigned to the various committees, Dr. T. D. Witherspoon moved that certain Fraternal Relations overtures be referred to the Committee on Foreign Correspondence. Dr. Smoot favored the reference of all these overtures to the Committee on Bills and Overtures, which, as the eye to look through, the mind to digest, and the hand to arrange, would sift them, and recommend their reference to the proper committees, as the speediest way of distributing them. At the suggestion that Dr. Smoot's plan would be economy of time, Dr. Witherspoon withdrew the motion.

Tuesday afternoon, when the report on Overtures Nos. 44, 47, 49, and 55, and the report on Nos. 39-46 inclusive, concerning Fraternal Correspondence, were taken from the docket for consideration, Messrs. Ponder, Evans, and Rayl presented a minority report, "That these overtures be returned to the Committee on Bills and Overtures, and placed in the hands of the Committee on Foreign Correspondence, as being the usual course in such cases, as right that this action should be taken in the premises, and otherwise a seeming discourtesy to the Committee on Correspondence."

A debate of much interest ensued on the motion to adopt the minority report. It was argued by the defenders of the Committee on Bills and Overtures that this was not a matter of courtesy or discourtesy, but of right; that it was the right of this Committee to handle all questions relating to the Constitution of the Church; that correspondence with other Churches was such a

question; that after this Committee had suggested and the Assembly had adopted a method of correspondence, the Committee on Foreign Correspondence carried on the correspondence after this method. Against this it was contended that the action of previous Assemblies was opposed to the Committee's view; and, further, that, admitting the right of the Committee to act upon the overtures relating to a continuance of fraternal relations, it had no right to touch those relating to the method of correspondence. On the vote to refer the Committee on Bills and Overtures was sustained by 76 to 56, and their report being divided, the first part was adopted.

The question thus incidentally raised is an intricate and interesting one. A spirited discussion of the subject has since taken place in one of the Church papers between Dr. Smoot and Dr. Witherspoon: the latter urging that *usage* in our Assembly for twenty years favors the reference of such overtures to the Committee on Foreign Correspondence; Dr. Smoot, on the other side, arguing that the original laws and functions of the Committee on Bills and Overtures are still in force, even though they may have been in some instances disregarded.

The following is a brief synopsis of the law and history of the Committee on which Dr. Smoot based the rightfulness of his Committee's claim to retain and answer the overtures in question.

The first Committee on Bills and Overtures was appointed by the Presbytery of Philadelphia in 1710. It consisted of three members. "They were to *prepare and bring in overtures to the Presbytery, and also take cognizance of whatever may be laid before them and prepare it for Presbytery.*" In 1768, fifty-eight years after its origin, the question was raised as to its *functions*, a member of the Synod asking "whether the Committee on Overtures are to be considered as agents and councils, or shall they be considered as judges?" the "consideration of which is to be deferred to the next Synod." The next Synod, 1769, answered as follows:

"To the question concerning the business and powers of the Committee on Overtures the Synod answers, that the Committee is intended to introduce business into the Synod in an orderly manner; that they

give advice concerning either the matter or manner of business brought to them; but have no power to suppress any that comes regularly before them from inferior judicatories, according to our known rules, or such overtures and petitions as inferior judicatories or particular persons desire to have laid before the Synod."

Their powers and functions remained, as thus defined, until the organisation of the General Assembly in 1789. At that meeting "a committee was appointed to prepare rules for the government of the Assembly in their proceedings." "The committee reported; and the rules having been amended were adopted, and were ordered to be entered in the minutes of the house." These rules are printed (see Baird's Digest); the 3d and 4th are as follows:

"3. The General Assembly, at every meeting, shall appoint a Committee on Bills and Overtures to prepare and digest business for the Assembly. Any person thinking himself aggrieved by the Committee, may complain to the Assembly.

"4. Petitions, references, and appeals, and usually all new propositions tending to general laws, shall be laid before the Committee on Bills and Overtures, before they are offered to the Assembly."

According, then, to the original law on this subject, it is the duty of the Committee on Bills and Overtures "to prepare and digest business;" to "give advice concerning either the matter or manner of papers brought to them;" "to consider all new business tending to general laws."

In 1822, the powers of this Committee were more fully defined in these words:

"Petitions, questions relating to either doctrine or order, and usually all new business tending to general laws, shall be laid before the Committee on Bills and Overtures before they are offered to the Assembly."

The Committee on Bills and Overtures at Lexington felt that, under the provision of these laws, which had never been repealed, they were right in retaining and answering the overtures in question.

It has been well said, both in the Assembly and in the newspapers, that the question would not have arisen, nor would the debate have taken place, but for the difference of opinion in the Assembly as to the *answer* which should be given to three overtures, and the well-known fact that the Committee on Foreign Correspondence would have given a different answer from the one

recommended by the Committee on Bills and Overtures. In dismissing the subject, we venture the suggestion that, as difference of opinion exists in regard to this matter, and as there are obscure and debatable points about the rights and powers of Committees, it would be wise for the next Assembly to appoint a Committee to frame a digest or manual, setting forth clearly the rights, duties, methods of procedure, etc., of all the various Committees. Such a manual could specify, or at least classify, the subjects appropriately belonging to each, and lay down the rules and forms according to which their reports should be drawn up and presented to the house. This manual should also embrace a more complete set of parliamentary principles than are given in the brief "Rules of Order" adopted by the Assembly of 1866.

CHANGING THE STANDARD OF MINISTERIAL EDUCATION.

The subjoined statement of Rev. Dr. J. H. Nall, concerning the origin of this movement, is given as introductory to the subject:

"This question was brought before the General Assembly of 1882, by a memorial of Rev. Dr. C. W. Lane, of Georgia, requesting the appointment of a Committee *ad interim*, to consider certain proposed changes in the course of study prescribed for the training of our candidates for the ministry, and to report thereon to the General Assembly of 1883.

"This movement, we suppose, resulted from the concern on the whole subject of an adequate ministry, which has been deeply felt and widely manifested in the Church. No one can disguise the fact that the supply of ministers has not kept pace with the demand. In one view of the case, it would be distressing if the reverse were true—if the supply should exceed the demand. In the present state of the world, it would be fearful if we could not usefully employ all the available ministers. But looking at the case as it is, there seemed to be serious danger of losing ground from want of ministers. And this appears to have suggested the thought that our requirements for entrance into the ministry are too rigid, and that by providing alternative and equivalent courses of study, together with the division of students into three

classes, according to age, viz., those under nineteen, those between nineteen and twenty-five, and those over twenty-five, many might be led into the ministry who are debarred under the present order.

“The Committee could not agree as to the conclusions which should be presented to the General Assembly. Hence two reports were submitted. Five of the Committee reported against the changes proposed, and suggesting one change which might properly be made. The two remaining members reported not in favor of the changes proposed, but recommending a certain overture to be sent down to the Presbyteries.”

Several Presbyteries overtured the Assembly against changing or “*lowering the standard of ministerial qualifications,*” in opposition to the movement that had been so widely discussed. These overtures (Nos. 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35) from Potosi, Tuscaloosa, Abingdon, Holston, Upper Missouri, and Lexington, were placed in the hands of the Committee on Bills and Overtures. The ground covered by them being substantially the same as that of the *ad interim* Committee’s report, the Assembly’s action on one would decide the fate of the other. The chairman of the Committee had sent the report to the Assembly in the custody of a member of the Committee on Bills and Overtures (the present writer). In this way the Committee learned the drift of the argument, and the conclusions arrived at in it, and their answer to the six overtures on the subject was meant substantially as a recommendation to adopt the *ad interim* Committee’s report as the Assembly’s official interpretation of the clause in question. Hence, when their report was made on Monday morning, they asked that it be docketed and taken up for consideration along with Dr. Nall’s paper. Both were subsequently taken from the docket together and discussed as one. At the end of Dr. Lane’s speech, Mr. Woods of North Carolina asked whether Dr. Lane’s paper was proposed as a substitute for the Committee on Bills and Overtures’ report, or for that of the Committee appointed by the last Assembly. Mr. Flinn, of New Orleans, replied: “If Dr. Lane’s paper is adopted, it will be a substitute for both, for the ground covered by them is the same. The whole subject is now before us, and

the report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures will stand or fall with that of Dr. Nall." Later on in the discussion, Tuesday morning, some one suggested that Dr. Lane's proposal should be reversed, and instead of an overture from the Assembly to the Presbyteries, asking for an interpretation of the law, it should more properly be an overture from the Presbyteries, asking the Assembly to interpret the clause. Mr. Flinn replied: "The adoption of the majority report will be an interpretation of the clause of the Constitution referred to; so that an overture to the Assembly was not necessary." The report of the Committee on the six overtures is as follows (Assembly's Minutes, p. 21): "It is considered unnecessary by this General Assembly to make any change in our standard of ministerial education or qualifications."

The following is an outline of the *ad interim* Committee's report, drawn up by Rev. Dr. J. H. Nall, the chairman:

"I. General preliminary principles:

"1. Some general law is necessary, regulating the training of candidates for the ministry.

"2. Such a law must specify what should be required to constitute a 'competency of human learning,' etc.

"3. All cases not conformable to this general law should be provided for as 'exceptional or extraordinary.'

"4. Possibly, with some slight amendment, the present law meets these requirements.

"II. Following these general principles are two conclusions: that the Constitution of the Church should not be changed in the manner proposed; because,

"1. The sentiment of the Church at large does not demand it.

"2. The changes proposed practically involve a reversal of the principles and policy of our Church, as the necessary consequence of which the present 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' courses must exchange places; and this should not be, in view of two facts:

"(a) That other denominations are elevating their standards of education; and

"(b) That in this age we need ministers not less, but more, thoroughly trained.

"3. The scheme proposed is arbitrary, complicated, and impracticable.

"4. That the change is not necessary, even to effect the object contemplated, inasmuch as the introduction into the ministry of men otherwise qualified, who have not pursued the ordinary course of study preparatory thereto, is subject to the discretion of the Presbytery.

"As between the two reports, this is the main issue—the minority maintaining that the provisions as to 'extraordinary cases,' etc., refer only to licensure ; while the majority report, resting on all the statements of our Form of Government, insists that the provisions in question apply to ordination also, since licensure is in order to ordination, etc.

"5. In like manner, special provision for 'an English divinity course,' is unnecessary.

"6. The ordinary course for those preparing to 'preach the word,' should rest most directly on the study of that word in the original and inspired form.

"7. The plea in favor of change is based on the assumption that many men would thus be brought into the ministry. Here the proof is wanting.

"III. The report suggests that, to the parts of trial (Form of Government, Chap. VI., Sec. 6, Par. 4) might properly be added: '5. An analysis of one book of the Old Testament and one book of the New Testament each, according to the authorised English version.'

"*In conclusion*, it is suggested that, if the matter should be further investigated, the records of the Church show :

"1. That similar necessities have been felt and urged in the past.

"2. That similar efforts were made to secure some relaxation of the requirements as to preparation.

"3. That such proposals have been uniformly declined.

"4. That other measures were adopted, which, under God's blessing, were successful."

The following is a synopsis of the minority report:

I. The Ordination Section in our Book, in all cases, *without exception*, requires Greek, Hebrew, and Philosophy, as well as Divinity, as conditions precedent to ordination. The design of the framers of that Section was to specify a *minimum* of the requirements essential to ordination, both for ordinary and extraordinary cases of licensure. Hence, in the Ordination Section they omitted three things found in the Licensure Section: (1) The exception of extraordinary cases; (2) The Latin language; (3) The Mathematical course. Besides, it is uncertain what they included under the word Philosophy. If candidates were not masters of Greek, Hebrew, and Philosophy, they were expected to make them up before ordination.

II. The views of only a small number in our Church on this subject are known. Those favoring practical changes are numerous enough to warrant a full consideration of the subject, by sending down to the Presbyteries the following overture:

1. Does the exception "extraordinary cases," found in our Book of Church Order, in Chapter VI., Section 6, relating to *licensure*, also belong to Section 5, relating to *ordination*.

2. If not, shall the Constitution be altered by inserting "except in extraordinary cases" in Section 5, or by adding a paragraph defining in what cases Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and the higher secular education generally, may be dispensed with as prerequisites for *ordination*, as well as *licensure* ?

After reading the Committee on Bills and Overtures' report, part of the *ad interim* Committee's report, and Dr. Lane's paper, Mr. Flinn moved the adoption of the two former; Dr. Lane moved his report as a substitute, and opened the debate. He was followed by Messrs. Primrose, S. C. Alexander, Bracken, Davies, Allen Wright, Park, Aiken, Fentress, Hemphill, Woods, White, Flinn, Clark, Campbell, Stratton, Armstrong, Watson, and the Moderator.

At the end of Dr. Pryor's speech the question was loudly called; the vote resulting in the defeat of Dr. Lane's substitute by a vote of 104 to 35. Mr. Flinn then moved the adoption of the Bills and Overtures Committee's report and of Dr. Nall's paper. Some one remarked "that as all the *argument* of this paper had not been read, and it would require too much time to hear it then, it would perhaps be wiser to adopt the conclusions and main substantive propositions of the paper, though no doubt, if the Assembly read the argument, they would endorse it too." In accordance with this suggestion, the following propositions in the report were read, and in connexion with the Committee on Bills and Overtures' report, adopted almost unanimously, viz. :

"That the Constitution of the Church should not be changed in the manner proposed.

"The proposed change of the Constitution is not necessary, even to effect the object contemplated, *i. e.*, to open the way to the ministry for men otherwise qualified, who have not pursued the ordinary course of study preparatory thereto; inasmuch as this is a point which, so far as it should be an open question, is left to the discretion and decision of the Presbytery.

"The Presbyteries already possess the constitutional powers in question, both for *licensure* and for *ordination*."

The subject came up again Friday night on the report from the Committee on Bills and Overtures, in answer to Overture No. 31, from the Presbytery of Athens, asking the Assembly to define what is meant in our standards by the phrase, "*extraordinary cases.*" The Committee recommended the following: "In answer to the request from Athens Presbytery to define '*extraordinary cases*' this Assembly refers to its action already taken on the report of the Committee appointed by the Atlanta Assembly to consider Dr. Lane's paper on this subject." The mind of the Assembly had already been expressed in its action substantially adopting Dr. Nall's report, which declared that no definition could be given of "*extraordinary cases,*" from the very nature of the case, and that the decision of this question as to what made a case extraordinary, was designedly left with the Presbyteries; hence the overturists could learn the judgment of the court in the matter by referring to its decision already given.

Dr. Lane moved as a substitute to this answer an overture to the Presbyteries for a definition of "*exceptional cases.*" In support of his motion he urged that the language was so indefinite that he never could find any one who could explain the meaning of this term, and it needed explanation, so that any minister could readily define it without having to refer to the Presbyteries for an explanation. He insisted that it was best to have the words defined fully, and by the Presbyteries, so that there could be no mistake or doubtful interpretation in the premises. He did not want the Assembly's interpretation at this late hour, but a calm and thoughtful definition by the Presbyteries. He also insisted, in reply to others, that this was a different action in the premises from that just before determined by the Assembly.

To this it was replied that this question had already been settled by the Assembly, and that no definition of extraordinary cases could be made, without destroying the very purpose of the provision.

Dr. Junkin moved that the substitute be laid on the table, in view of the reasons above given. This motion was then carried, and the report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures was adopted.

Of course it was a parliamentary blunder to move the adoption of the Committee's report after the substitute to it was laid on the table; for "when a motion to table is carried affirmatively, the principal motion, together with all the motions subsidiary and incidental connected with it, is removed from before the Assembly" (Cushing's Manual). This was neither the intention of Dr. Junkin, nor of the Assembly in voting for his motion, as is shown from the nearly unanimous (though unparliamentary) adoption of the Committee's answer.

As the report was really, though unintentionally, tabled in this way, the Assembly's action was technically nothing, and hence no mention of it is found in the Assembly's Minutes of Friday night's proceedings.

A careful study of the *ad interim* Committee's very able document would, perhaps, had prevented this long debate. It should have been read in full, or printed, before it was acted on. The reading was omitted to economise time, but it resulted in loss of time. The report embodies substantially every argument made in favor of it, and meets fully every objection urged against it in the discussion. The debate was exhaustive and exhausting, occupying nearly two days. Some of the members seemed to have speeches "in their hearts as a burning fire, shut up in their bones," that had to come out. Thirteen speakers supported the Committee's report, and seven favored the substitute, at least that part of it which proposed a reference of the matter to the Presbyteries. Some of the ablest men in the Assembly desired to speak, but the question was called before they obtained the floor.

The substitute proposed to send down to the Presbyteries, (1) A *categorical inquiry*, concerning the interpretation and application of a clause in our law; and, (2) A *hypothetical question* involving two alternatives, should a negative answer be given to the first inquiry, viz.: (a) Shall the clause referred to be *inserted* in another Section of the law? or, (b) Shall a new paragraph be *added* to the Book specifying what requirements for ordination—and under what circumstances—may be omitted? This complex question is reducible under two heads:

(1) A question of constitutional interpretation;

(2) A question of constitutional amendment.

It was inevitable, therefore, that the debate should take a wide sweep. In spite of the frequent disclaimers on the part of those who supported Dr. Lane's substitute, disavowing all desire to "lower the standards," the speakers on the other side insisted that this would be the logical and speedy result of the measure proposed; hence they laid themselves out to check this apparent movement. We believe it was the unqualified judgment of all who voted against the substitute, and of many who voted for it in part, that the third clause would necessarily result in lowering the scholarship of our ministry. Several members of the Assembly who made no speech on the subject have favored us with their views on this point, confirming our statement.

REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION.

This report was presented by the Chairman, Dr. T. D. Witherspoon, on Thursday and adopted on Friday. It makes an encouraging showing, and contains some important recommendations. Two proofs of growing interest and more fervency of prayer on the part of the Church, and of God's blessing upon it, are found in the larger contributions to the cause this year than last, and in the increase of candidates for the ministry. In view of these facts the Assembly adopted the recommendation that an effort be made to raise at least \$21,000 for the Executive Committee of Education to carry on this work. This amount was apportioned among the Presbyteries, the object aimed at being to give more definiteness and system to the effort to raise the needed \$21,000.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.

Dr. J. B. Stratton, Chairman, presented this report Thursday; it was adopted in the afternoon of the same day (Assembly Minutes, 33-35). The subjects considered by it are the Annual Reports from Columbia and Union Seminaries and of the Tuska-loosa Institute for the Training of Colored Ministers. These were all very gratifying. Columbia Seminary, which had been closed two years, opened in September, 1882, with five Professors and

twenty-eight students. The finances and Library of the Seminary were reported as in good condition and rapidly growing; over \$17,000 having been added to the endowment fund this year through the energy of Dr. J. B. Mack, the Financial Agent, while the Library contains about 23,000 volumes. The death of the loved and venerated Dr. Howe was officially announced, and the Assembly, on the Committee's recommendation, adopted the following resolution:

Resolved, That this Assembly hereby expresses its profound grief at the death of the Rev. George Howe, D. D., which occurred on the 15th of April, 1883, and records its high appreciation of the eminent services which, as a teacher in the Theological Seminary at Columbia for the long period of fifty-two years, as a minister of the gospel, and as a Christian man, distinguished by everything which is 'lovely and of good report,' he has rendered to the Church and to the world. For the rich endowments, both of nature and of grace, with which he was gifted, we render thanks to God, and while lamenting the loss of them, would gratefully reflect that though withdrawn from the field of labor himself, his works still follow him, and that though dead, through the lips of hundreds trained by him for the Christian ministry, 'he yet speaketh.'"

Union Seminary reported four Professors and fifty-six students, the finances in sound condition, and 12,000 volumes in the Library. Both institutions are striving to increase their Libraries and endowments, and add new Professors to the Faculty. The Columbia Alumni and Directors are making an important move for annual lecture courses, and for the erection of a large fire-proof Library building. The Smyth fund will soon be large enough for its revenue to be used for library or lectureship purposes, or perhaps both. Attention should be widely called to this fund as a nucleus which can be speedily augmented and made of great service to the Seminary and to the Church. We need a system of annual endowed lectureships at both our Seminaries as a help to the students and as a stimulus to the literary activity of our ministers. Some such definite incitement would transform capacity into actual work, furnishing valuable contributions to the various departments of Theology, Criticism, Church History, and Apologetics.

The Assembly's action on the Tuscaloosa Institute evinces a lively interest in the work of training colored ministers for the

negroes. Dr. Stillman's address on the subject presented points worth noting. The negroes are a foreign race on our home soil. Our Church has a fine record in her past work for these people, and a roll of noble names who gave themselves to labor for them. While our own ministers should preach to them as much as possible, yet the greatest good we can do them is to train ministers of their own race, and in this way help them to that point of intelligence and power, at which they can stand alone, not only self-supporting but furnishing a missionary army for Africa. Doubts about their capacity for training are disappearing, and they make gratifying progress in doctrinal and biblical study. Early errors of speech are the main difficulties to remove. Baptist and Methodist students come to Tuscaloosa, and the doctrines of our Catechism are thus spreading among them in these Churches. The religious character of the students and their zeal and efficiency in teaching Sunday-schools and preaching to the colored churches, at Tuscaloosa during term time, and in their Presbyteries during vacation, are very commendable.

The coöperation of the Church, the care and zeal of the Presbyteries in seeking out suitable candidates were earnestly desired.

The speech was listened to with great interest by the Assembly, and its sentiments were those of the body, as shown by the resolution which was adopted in regard to the organisation of colored churches.

HOME MISSIONS.

Wednesday morning Dr. T. R. Welch presented his report as Chairman of the Committee on Home Missions. It is an encouraging and stimulating document. The importance of this work is urged with solemn emphasis as the foundation of the Church's progress. The proposal of the Executive Committee to raise during the current year at least \$100,000 for Home Missions was cordially endorsed, and they were authorised to apportion the amount among the coöperating Presbyteries, requesting them to raise their respective quotas by apportionment among the churches. This measure seems to be proper and wise; if carried out, it will secure contributions from a greater number of churches and increase the amount given by those already contributing.

The most interesting and important item in the report is the recommendation to establish a bureau of information for vacant churches and unemployed ministers. Such an agency will be of great value. The Scotch Churches find it very useful. The Free Church employs an agent to keep a list of vacant churches and ministers without charge, with all necessary data concerning each for reference.

On Wednesday night a meeting was held in the interest of this cause.

RESIGNATION OF DR. MCILWAIN AND ELECTION OF HIS SUCCESSOR.

Dr. McIlwaine having offered his resignation as Secretary, and having accepted the Presidency of Hampden Sidney College, the Presbyteries of Lexington and Paris overtured the Assembly to use all proper means to retain him. The Committee unanimously endorsed the petition of these overtures, and recommended his reëlection. The consideration of this part of the report came up on Friday morning. After some discussion, an amendment offered by Col. Fitzgerald, a Trustee of Hampden Sidney, to accept Dr. McIlwaine's resignation, was adopted.

Dr. McIlwaine made an earnest speech, stating that he could not conscientiously retain his position, because he thought it did not demand the whole time and energies of one man, and that the work of Home and Foreign Missions could be easily conducted by a single Secretary. He thought the Assembly ought to consolidate the offices as a matter of economy.

The Assembly felt it would be wiser to continue both, and accordingly elected Dr. J. N. Craig, of Holly Springs, Miss., Secretary of Home Missions. A wise choice; he is the right man in the right place.

THE PARK CASE, AND ORGANISATION OF A COLORED CHURCH.

The action of the Assembly on Overtures Nos. 15 and 16, from the Synod of Mississippi and the Presbytery of Louisiana, on the Park case, and No. 17, from the Presbytery of West Hanover, respecting the organisation of a Colored Church, though involving

a constitutional question, may be properly noticed here. (See Minutes, p. 49.)

The Committee on Bills and Overtures' report, drawn by Dr. W. T. Hall, of Virginia, was unanimously adopted. The mind of the body was clearly expressed by Dr. Hall's speech, which was to this effect:

“This subject is brought before the Assembly in three ways:

“(1) First, by a memorial from the Presbytery of West Over, asking the Assembly to organise, *at once*, all the colored ministers and churches under its care into a separate and independent Synod. The petition is based on two grounds. The fact is urged that it was never contemplated to have negro churches or their officers as substantial component parts of our Southern Church. The scheme contemplates a subordinate and provisional *status* for the negroes until they were sufficiently numerous and well trained to stand by themselves. Again, a number of grave dangers are indicated. The purity and peace of our churches, it is urged, are threatened. Now to this memorial the Committee recommend the Assembly to answer, directing the Synods to erect colored Presbyteries, with a view to the establishing of a colored independent Synod, *as soon as this can be done consistently with a wise regard to the stability and growth of the colored churches*. To organise a separate Colored Church *now* would be premature.

“(2) By an overture from the Synod of Mississippi, asking the Assembly to decide as to the *constitutionality of the plan of 1867 and 1874*, under which the Park case arose. To this it recommends as an answer that *it is inexpedient to open that question*. The plan of the Assembly scheme, finally adopted, after much consideration, was the best that could be devised under the circumstances. It was, perhaps, never regarded by any as strictly constitutional. It was simply a provisional scheme to meet an emergency not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. But it has worked well enough. As far as there has been earnest effort to put it in operation, we have seen fruit. To unsettle it now would be disastrous.

“(3.) By a complaint from the Presbytery of Louisiana against

the decision of the Atlanta Assembly in the Park case. To this also it is answered, that the question had better not be opened again. It is no doubt unfortunate that Park was induced to cast a vote in one of our Presbyteries; but having done so, and the Assembly having approved it on the ground of the parity of the ministry, the matter had better be allowed to rest. The Presbytery of Montgomery recently received an ordained colored minister from the Northern Presbyterian Church. The question of his standing was raised before the vote. The understanding was that he had all the rights of a presbyter. Thus the matter must rest for the brief period necessary to get ready to set them apart as a separate Church.

“It is greatly to be desired that a spirit of impatience that seems to threaten our work among the negroes shall be restrained. The papers referred to in these remarks *involve the very existence of the work*. We cannot afford to turn this work over to others. Paul said he must be ‘a debtor both to the Greeks and the barbarians; both to the wise and to the unwise.’ To have fruit among all classes of society is a holy ambition. The negroes also need just that training that the Presbyterian Church gives.”

FOREIGN MISSIONS.

Dr. J. Bardwell, Chairman of the Foreign Missions Committee, in presenting his report, made the gratifying statement that “the general condition of this department of the Church work was never more encouraging.”

The main items in the resolutions are:

- (1) A commendation of the diligence and efficiency of the Executive Committee.
- (2) An exhortation to the Presbyteries to consider God’s call to go forward, and an injunction to strive to increase the churches’ gifts; and
- (3) As means to these ends, the observance of the day of prayer for missions, regular collections, and an effort for a wider circulation of the *Missionary*, were urged.

Proposals were afloat to consolidate the Home and Foreign Missions work under one head, practically retiring Dr. Wilson;

but the Committee and the Assembly voted unanimously against this change.

The recommendation to allow the Executive Committee \$1,200 a year to employ such clerical aid as Dr. Wilson might need, was adopted. The Committee has since employed a clerk at a salary of only \$200, showing that the Assembly's confidence in their conscientious wisdom and prudence in using the Church's money was not misplaced. Dr. Wilson himself draws only \$2,500 of his \$3,000 salary—a characteristic act of this noble Christian veteran. As Dr. Bullock well said, "He is worth far more to the Church than all the salary he draws." His long and valuable services entitle him to honor. One of God's greatest blessings to the Church is the gift of consecrated heroic men. Theories may be very fine, but of far more value is the character to energise them, the heart and soul to give them life, and make them bloom in grand results. A man is a greater power than a plan.

FRATERNAL RELATIONS.

The action of the Assembly on this subject was in two forms : 1st. A number of Presbyteries overtured the Lexington Assembly to modify the Atlanta action. 2d. Eight Presbyteries to conduct correspondence by letter.

The subject was introduced before the Assembly in two other forms : 1st. Four Presbyteries—South Alabama, Eastern Texas, Athens, and Indian—sent up brief overtures (Nos. 45, 52, 53, and 56), informing the Assembly of their approval of the Atlanta action, and of their satisfaction in view of the establishment of fraternal relations. These overtures did not ask for any action, and the Committee on Bills and Overtures' report to this effect was received as information. (2) Overture No. 48 from Louisville Presbytery, asked the Assembly to prepare a pastoral letter on the subject of fraternal relations and organic union. The Committee on Bills and Overtures recommended that the Assembly appoint a Committee to draft the letter called for. This report was presented Friday night, but after a brief discussion was laid on the table.

The report of the Committee on overtures Nos. 44, 47, 49,

and 55, asking for a modification of the Atlanta action, was presented Monday morning, and is as follows :

“While recognising the constitutional right of the Presbyteries to protest against the Assembly’s actions, yet

“First. Inasmuch as the sentiment of the majority of the Church seems to approve of the object had in view by the Atlanta Assembly : and

“Second. Inasmuch as a majority of the Presbyteries regard the establishment of fraternal relations on the basis of the Atlanta proposal as a settled fact, which it would be unwise to disturb : therefore this Assembly considers it unnecessary to take further action.”

The report on the eight overtures, Nos. 39–46 inclusive, asking that all correspondence should be conducted by letter, was read at the same time, as follows : “*Resolved*, That all correspondence with other ecclesiastical bodies shall be conducted by letter.” Both were received and simply docketed.

When taken from the docket for consideration, the minority report presented by Messrs. W. M. Ponder, of Arkansas, J. A. Rayl, of Knoxville, and Rev. R. R. Evans, of Memphis Presbytery, was presented. The discussion of this minority report, involving the rights and powers of Committees, has already been given. At its close, Mr. T. M. Barron, of Missouri, moved, as an amendment to Mr. J. Adger Smyth’s motion, to adopt the Committee’s report, the division of the question, and the adoption of the first part of the report in answer to overtures Nos. 44, 47, 49, and 55. This motion was immediately carried without debate, and by a nearly unanimous vote, only two, as far as known, voting in the negative. The Committee’s report had been printed, and was in the hands of members of the Assembly all day Tuesday before it was taken up for action. Ample opportunity for studying it was given. Its statements are brief, and it was therefore clearly understood. Under these circumstances, the facts and principles embodied in the paper were heartily endorsed and emphasised by the nearly unanimous vote of the Assembly.

After the adoption of this report, Dr. Bullock moved as a substitute to the report recommending correspondence by letter, the following : “While it is our rule to conduct correspondence by letter, yet, under present extraordinary circumstances, and to avoid

the appearance of discourtesy, this Assembly deems it proper that for the present delegates be commissioned to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America."

Dr. Bullock supported his substitute earnestly. The debate which followed was very able, but our limited space obliges us to pass it all over. Drs. Smoot, Bracken, Davies, Bardwell, Alexander Martin, H. M. White, and Mr. J. Adger Smyth, all vigorously maintained that correspondence should be by letter. The writer of this article, and Rev. W. C. Clark and Col. Brooke stood by them. Rev. J. A. McKee, Rev. John S. Park, Dr. T. D. Witherspoon, Rev. Z. B. Graves, and Mr. J. H. Tyler, supported Dr. Bullock.

In the midst of the debate on Wednesday afternoon, Prof. Hemphill, in order to secure unanimity, offered a substitute to send just one more delegation. In offering this substitute he said it was essential for us to be at one among ourselves. Love for others could not justify us in introducing discord among ourselves. There would be bitter feelings if either side gained the victory for their views. The question involved was not one of principle, but of method; and for the sake of harmony, he hoped there would be a compromise. The vote on this substitute was soon reached, resulting in its adoption by 113 to 23. A Committee of seven (Prof. Hemphill, chairman) was then appointed to perfect its phraseology. It was presented next day, as follows:

"That the usual method of correspondence by letter between this General Assembly and other ecclesiastical bodies shall hereafter include the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America; with the exception, however, that delegates be appointed by this Assembly to these bodies at their next ensuing sessions in 1883 and 1884 respectively, to convey our most cordial Christian and fraternal salutations; these delegates being instructed to state to them this method of correspondence hereafter by letter, as adopted by this body, with the hope that it may meet with their co-operation; and that the special attention of the Presbyteries be called to this action of the General Assembly, for an expression of their opinion on the mode of correspondence for the future."

Ten members received permission to have their reasons for voting in the negative recorded on the Minutes.

This substitute prevented a square vote on the two modes of correspondence. The expressed views of many prominent defenders of the Atlanta action, and the fact that the substitute adopted by five-sixths of the Assembly, endorses the letter mode of correspondence as proper, and as our Church's settled policy, leaves no room to doubt that, as a naked issue, the letter method would have been adopted almost unanimously. The Assembly felt that the circumstances called for an exception to the rule for this year.

The adoption of this substitute indicated no desire to change our plan of correspondence. The call for the Presbyteries' special attention to the subject, was in no sense meant by the author, or by the Assembly, as an overture to them to consider the question of change, any more than a similar call of attention in the action on Education or Home Missions would be.

PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES AND ORGANIC UNION.

An overture from the Presbytery of St. Louis (No. 51), asked the Assembly to appoint a Committee to confer with a similar one from the Northern Assembly (should one be appointed) concerning the organisation of three or four Provincial Assemblies out of the two Churches—the Presbyterial basis of representation, the powers of jurisdiction over their constituencies in these bodies to remain as now. They were each to have an equal number of commissioners, meeting in triennial or quadrennial *General Council*, to consider cases of appeal from each Provincial Assembly concerning disputed interpretations of the Constitution of the Church. The General Council was to have only advisory powers in matters pertaining to the general interests of the Church. The answer to this overture was: "This Assembly judges that the providence of God does not indicate the time to be yet ripe for such action." The genius of Presbyterianism may some day find its logical and natural development in a grander climax than a *General Council* of all the Presbyterians on one continent; but the Assembly's answer was eminently wise. The fit time has not yet come to begin the movement as a co-operative one between these two bodies. This idea is not a new

one. It has stirred the minds of some of our greatest men, North and South, and is at this day shaping itself into a dream or hope of a grand *Œcumenical Presbyterian Council of the World*. Possibly a coming age will witness its realisation in the General Assembly of the world convened at Jerusalem—the mighty tree, whose seed was the Apostolic Council which met there over eighteen hundred years ago.

An overture from the Presbytery of Upper Missouri (No. 54) asked that steps be taken to unite with the Church North in the formation of Provincial Assemblies. The wording of this paper misled the Committee on Bills and Overtures. Their report on it as a move for organic union did not, as Dr. Boude informed the Assembly, correctly represent the intention of his Presbytery, which was to propose measures looking to union and coöperation with the Church North *in the formation of Provincial Assemblies*. The *terminus ad quem* was not organic union, but Provincial Assemblies. The overture was answered as follows: "This Assembly declines to appoint a Committee for the purpose stated in the overture, as our principles are essentially different from the Northern Church; and therefore the idea of organic union cannot be entertained." In the brief discussion of this report, three amendments were proposed. The first making it read: "It is inexpedient to appoint a Committee for the purpose stated." The second: "This Assembly declines to appoint a Committee for the purpose stated in the overture, *for the present*." The third: "This General Assembly declines to appoint a Committee for the purpose stated." The paper was adopted in this last form.

The Assembly's answers to both these papers were consistent with its reply to another overture (No. 50) from St. Louis Presbytery, asking for the "rejection of propositions looking to organic union with the Church North, because of the widely *divergent* and *contradictory* views of the two bodies on several most important and vital doctrines; so that organic union would involve on our part a surrender of principle and a recession from our historic testimony to the truth, for which there is neither occasion, excuse, nor palliation." The Assembly's answer was: "*The question of organic union is not to be entertained as a subject before the Church.*"

Some dissatisfaction has been expressed because the Assembly did not embrace the opportunity afforded by the overtures from Upper Missouri and St. Louis Presbyteries, of restating the distinctive principles of our Church, and the differences between the two Assemblies, which constitute the bar to organic union. Some think that the uneasiness in many minds (caused by the Atlanta action) for the integrity of these principles, and the loyalty of our Church to them, made it the duty of our Assembly to reaffirm and plant the Church more firmly upon them. All this was thought of and fully discussed in Committee and in private conference with leading men of various shades of opinion. Such a statement was determined upon at one time, and was finally abandoned for reasons given below. We give an outline of the proposed detailed statement of obstacles which was privately endorsed by leading "fraternalists and anti-fraternalists," as they are called. To the St. Louis paper the following was proposed: "In response to the overture from the Presbytery of St. Louis, anent organic union, this Assembly judges such union to be impossible, not only for the reason assigned by said Presbytery, but because the divergence between the two Churches, as to the exclusively spiritual functions of the kingdom of Christ, has been proclaimed by the Northern Assembly '*an insuperable obstacle*' to organic union."

The following is a synopsis of the proposed answer to the overture from Upper Missouri: "The union of the two Assemblies is impossible, because of—

"1st. Fundamental differences as to the functions of the Church of Christ.

"2d. Our Books of Church Order and Discipline are different.

"3rd. The change in our executive agencies would work evil.

"4th. There is a contrariety in theological opinion and biblical criticism.

"5th. The absorption of our Church into a larger and richer body, would be sure to work us injury.

"6th. Union with the Church North would be certain to cause division among ourselves, which would be schism, and this is sin.

"7th. The act of the Northern Church, in embodying in their

Digest the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Walnut Street Church case (Watson-Johns) as the rule to govern the property of the Church."

The above were almost, if not quite, the unanimous views of the Assembly. They were not expressed, for the following reasons :

1. Such a statement had been made so often, and the points were so well known, that it was now unnecessary.

2. The Assembly, in answer to overtures (Nos. 44, 47, etc.), had already stated that our Church, in entering upon friendly relations with the Church North, meant to do so on the *unmodified basis of the Atlanta proposal*, "*receding from no principle*;" therefore standing on the same old ground.

3. In answer to overture No. 51, the Assembly had just declared *that the question of organic union was not even to be entertained as a subject before the Church*. The reply was made more emphatic by its brevity, implying that the reasons were too patent and well known to need recital.

4. It was felt that, even if it were desirable, the Assembly had neither the time nor the necessary documents to make a complete detailed statement that would be satisfactory to all.

JUDICIAL CASES.

There were two judicial cases before the Assembly, viz. :

1st. The appeal of Mr. W. S. Turner against the Synod of Georgia, which was tried by a Commission, and the judgment of the Synod sustained.

2d. The appeal of Rev. W. McKay from an action of the Synod of Georgia. Both the legal points and the merits of this case involve interesting questions. The facts are : In 1881, the Presbytery of Macon adopted the following paper : "*Resolved*, That from this time Presbytery will regard any use of Sabbath railway trains by its members, to fill preaching appointments or for any other purpose or on any other plea, as an infraction of the Fourth Commandment, and will deal with it accordingly." Mr. McKay complained to Synod, alleging this action to be unscriptural and injurious to his rights. Synod dismissed the "*com-*

plaint," as not coming under that term, as defined in Rules of Discipline, Chap. 13., Sec. 4. The judgment of Synod was reversed, and the case remanded, with directions that the question be tried on its merits.

Col. Mynatt defended Synod's action, saying that a complaint can be taken only from a "*decision*;" that Mr. McKay complained of what he called a "legislative act," but what was really a mere "admonition," which Presbytery had a right to utter, and against which complaint could not lie. There had been no "decision" to complain of, and Mr. McKay should wait till Presbytery tried to enforce its action before he complained. He was not aggrieved or injured, and hence had no right of "complaint." If Mr. McKay thought Presbytery's action irregular, he should have had it corrected through Synod's power to review and control the proceedings of the court below.

Rev. Dr. D. O. Davies (chairman of the Judicial Committee), Rev. J. L. Rogers and Rev. R. S. McAllister replied, showing clearly that a complaint can lie against any act or deliverance of a court, judicial or *in thesi*; that these acts are "*decisions*," in such a sense that when a man feels aggrieved by them, as detrimental to truth, or injurious to himself, he can *complain*, and the upper court must hear the complaint and decide whether there is a real grievance.

Dissent has been expressed from the Assembly's action in this case; but it was clearly constitutional. The law declares: "Any member of the Church, submitting to its authority, may complain against *every species of decision* except where a party against whom a decision is rendered takes his appeal against it;" which means that when a party in a judicial trial appeals from the verdict of the court, he is then debarred from complaining; but in all other cases, judicial or otherwise, a complaint may lie. The power of review and control carries with it the *necessity* of the superior court deciding on the regularity of everything done by the lower; and a "*complaint*" of any action whatever is virtually a special call of attention by the complainant to some particular proceeding as irregular, wrong, or grievous to himself. A complaint particularises and emphasises some action of the lower

courts as demanding the scrutiny and judgment of the higher, and by so doing increases the already existing obligation to examine into its legality. All non-appealable questions or decisions can be carried up by complaint. It would be a dangerous principle that complaints could only lie against "judicial cases." Mr. McKay's Presbytery said: "If you ride on a Sunday, we will punish you." Mr. McKay, thinking they meant what they said, complained. This decision was Presbytery's interpretation of the Sabbath law, which, *as thus interpreted*, was to be the basis of a trial in case Mr. McKay went contrary to it. Whether the action was right or wrong, the complaint should have been heard.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.

I. An amendment to Chap. IV., Sec. II., Par. 6, empowering foreign evangelists to ordain "other evangelists," was sent down to the Presbyteries. (Assembly Minutes, p. 60, should read *Par. 6*, instead of *Par. 7*.) Dr. Bullock offered as a substitute for the Committee on Bills and Overtures' report, that Drs. Peck and Lefevre be appointed a committee to report to the next Assembly. This substitute was vigorously supported by Dr. Bullock, and also by Dr. J. L. Wilson and Rev. E. Lane, of Brazil, who were invited to give their views. The drift of their arguments was, that the committee would understand and digest the matter more thoroughly than the Presbyteries, because they had carefully studied it. A new chapter on the evangelist was needed. The granting of such power to inexperienced young missionaries would be dangerous. It might be abused and mislead the heathen as to the fundamental principles of Presbyterian Government, and would develop into Prelacy or Congregationalism. This power was unnecessary for the practical work of missions, as the power ordaining could and should always be exercised jointly.

On the other side, Dr. Alexander Martin, Rev. J. W. Flinn, Mr. J. A. Smyth, and Rev. G. Nash Morton, (missionary from Brazil, who was invited to speak,) urged that the question had now been before the Church for seven years. Our ablest men in one committee after another had failed to agree in their views. Decided steps ought to be taken to bring this subject to a

speedy issue. A new committee would only bring in rival reports, as this very Assembly had witnessed. The necessities of the mission work demanded a settlement of the question. The Presbyteries must finally act, if the law was to be changed, and all that had been said, or was yet to be said, on the subject could be brought before them, so that their action might be intelligent. The missionaries should act together when possible, as a matter of expediency. But their delegated powers as evangelists made each one a *quasi condensed* Presbytery.

The matter was remitted to the Presbyteries as the shortest and safest way to bring it to a conclusion, without the Assembly committing itself to either of the conflicting views that have been presented in various numbers of this REVIEW. It is to be hoped that the Presbyteries will appoint able committees to consider the subject, and that all who have written on it will lay before them all the data necessary to bring about a wise decision, whether it be to adopt the proposed amendment, or add a new chapter on the evangelist.

II. An amendment in answer to an overture from Mecklenburg Presbytery was unanimously adopted without debate, to limit the Assembly's power to "correspond, coöperate, and go into organic union with other Churches," by making it necessary for two-thirds of the Presbyteries to agree to the terms of the relationship in question before the matter was settled. The proposed amendment, of course, is not meant to prohibit the Assembly from replying to a simple message or communication from another body touching some specific matter that requires immediate attention. The object is to limit the Assembly in concluding formal treaties or agreements of comity with other bodies, just as its power (in the same paragraph) is limited in taking other bodies under its jurisdiction.

Changes in the Constitution can only be made with the consent of a majority of the Presbyteries; and as new relationships with other Churches may logically result in constitutional changes, the Presbyteries should have a controlling voice in determining them. Besides, such a law will lead to a careful study of the history, polity, and doctrines of other bodies with whom official relations are proposed.

In making treaties or in conducting regular official negotiations the Assembly is simply the agent of a sovereign, and that sovereign is the whole Church, whose collective voice is expressed in the Presbyteries. The treaty belongs rightfully to the sovereign, and unless the agent's functions in this matter be limited, some future Assembly, under a rash momentary impulse, may commit the Church to measures which she would not endorse, and which might result in great confusion and strife. It is the Assembly's business as agent to conduct correspondence, etc., but it is for the *whole* Church to decide with whom, and on what terms, it shall be conducted.

III. *All* the Presbyteries were requested to send up *distinct* answer to the following question: "Shall Chapter VII. of the Form of Government be amended by adding a third Section to read as follows: 'Amendments to the Confession of Faith, and to the Catechisms of this Church, may be made only upon the recommendation of one Assembly, the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the Presbyteries, and the enactment of the same by a subsequent Assembly.'" This proposal was almost unanimously adopted. Speeches were made in favor by Rev. Messrs. N. M. Woods, J. W. Flinn, S. B. Campbell, Col. Aiken, Judge Armstrong, and Rev. Drs. Bracken and Smoot. Rev. T. P. Epes wanted two-thirds majority in three-fourths of the Presbyteries in order to amend the Confession. The drift of the discussion was that the Confession is amendable; the mode of amending should be made difficult; that we should be especially conservative in matters binding the conscience, making changes only when the sentiment in favor thereof is nearly universal; that the Presbyteries, as the prime law-making bodies, had chief control in such questions. Messrs. Woods and Flinn held that the adopting act of 1788 was still in force, and that we already have a law for amending the Confession.

Several remarks are proper here:

1. There are always five classes in voting on proposed amendments: (1) Those who vote "Yes." (2) Those who vote "No." (3) Those who vote indeterminately by suggesting something else than the distinct proposal. (4) Some *fail to vote*. (5) Some

fail, by accident or carelessness, to send up their vote to the Assembly. Of these, only two classes are generally counted, viz., those voting either "Yes" or "No." The others are left out as *against* the amendment, which is neither correct nor fair. When there is neither a constitutional majority for or against an amendment, the Presbyteries *not* voting, or voting indeterminately, should be ordered to vote, and there should be time enough taken to secure a categorical answer from all the Presbyteries. Perhaps a still better rule would be to count the *silent* voter with the majority, and leave the *indeterminate* votes altogether out of the count.

2. The rule for amending the Confession, which was made part of the "adopting act" of 1788, was never formally inserted in any of our printed standards.

3. The mode of amending the Confession is a provision of *order*, and it is no part of our creed. It belongs to our system of polity or government—not to our doctrine. The matter of our creed is eternal Scripture truth; the formulation of it, or modification of its form, is a governmental act.

4. The provision of 1788 has never been repealed. If, therefore, the Confession be amendable, under any specific constitutional rule, it is this old one. And as such a law is a provision of order, its place is in our "Book of Order."

5. To transfer this rule from the adopting act of 1788 to our Book, *or to amend it*, requires a vote of only a majority of the Presbyteries.

6. If the proposed three-fourths rule, which is virtually an amendment to the old unrepealed two-thirds rule, is not adopted, the Confession will remain amendable under the adopting act. For, while not incorporated into our present law, the fact that a different mode of amending was rejected by the framers of our new Book, proves that it was their intention to let the old law remain in force. No creed or symbol framed by man can be changeless. The power of creed-formation or adoption, and of creed-amendment, go together and imply each other. The Church is not the creator of the facts on which her creed rests, but her creed is her *interpretation* of these facts, and with varying viewpoints and increasing light it may change.

7. The repeal of the "Deceased Wife's Sister" clause is already a virtually accomplished fact. The next Assembly will be constitutionally bound to count the votes of Presbyteries on this subject under the old unrepealed two-thirds rule. More than two-thirds of the Presbyteries have voted for its repeal. They did so on two assumptions: (1) The Confession is amendable *from the very nature of the case*. (2) It was taken for granted that it was amendable according to the specific mode of 1788.

8. The law concerning the mode of amending the Confession should not be made amendable in the same way that the other parts of the Book of Order are capable of change; but in the same way that the Confession itself is amendable.

Our work as reviewer has been very imperfectly done. The Lexington Assembly was worthy of a better pen and a stronger hand to state and weigh its actions. As Dr. Pryor said, in response to the vote of thanks for his justice and kindness as Moderator, "There never has been, since the first Assembly, a more important one than this, and one intrusted with more important duties, which have been well performed by a conscientious body of men." The most important questions were settled in such a way as to win the endorsement of the Church. The Assembly was a conservative, yet a wisely progressive body of men. In all the great questions discussed, the leaders represented the vigor and vim of youth, the strength of manhood, and the wisdom of age. It was a busy Assembly. It was a body of *representatives*, who felt it was their duty to work for the interests of the Church and the honor of her King.

J. WM. FLINN.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The book of Ecclesiastes, while not altogether so difficult as "the Song of Songs," has yet proved a great stumbling block in the way of incautious and injudicious commentators. This new work¹ is by a learned and able man. The current opinion is favored that Solomon's name is assumed by a late (but canonical) writer, much as Cato's is similarly employed in two of the compositions of Cicero. The "Pessimism" of Kohheleth is compared and contrasted with that of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. After a tempestuous struggle (that is wonderfully portrayed), the agitated mind of the preacher sinks to rest in humble faith and piety. The new Commentary to the Corinthians² is undoubtedly in the main a sound and good one, though not without salient faults. "Baptism for the Dead" (referred to at XV., *e. g.*), is supposed to be explained on the hypothesis of the appearance in the Christian assembly of a friend who confesses Christ in the name and on behalf of a death-bed convert. We have already signalled the announcement of the "Pulpit Commentary."³ A well-known scholar has privately assured us of its decided homiletical usefulness. The volume on Genesis has a general introduction to the Old Testament from the fascinating but superficial and misleading pen of Archdeacon Farrar. This is also largely and distinctly homiletical in its character. The great errors of the sermons on "Eternal Love" are here again and again reiter-

¹ The Book of Kohheleth, commonly called Ecclesiastes, considered in relation to Modern Criticism and to the Doctrines of Modern Pessimism: with a Critical and Grammatical Commentary and a Revised Translation. The Donnellan Lectures for 1880-81. By the Rev. C. H. H. Wright, D. D. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 8vo., pp., xxiv., 516.

² A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians. By Joseph Agar Beet. 1882. Small 8vo., pp. 542. London: *Ibid.*

³ The Pulpit Commentary. Edited by the Rev. Canon H. J. M. Spence, M. A., and by the Rev. Joseph S. Exell. Genesis. Exposition and Homiletics by the Rev. Thomas Whitelaw, M. A. Eighth English Edition. Pp. xviii., xlvi., xviii., xii., vi., 543. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.

ated. The volume on "Exodus,"¹ is from the conservative hand of Canon Rawlinson, who, when not occupied on the race question, may commonly be followed as a safe guide. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is fully and cogently maintained. Professor Kellogg's argument about the Chosen People² is marked by that writer's special knowledge, as well as by his recognised ingenuity and piety. Dr. Killen's admirable volume³ on the history of the first ages of the Church after apostolic times, has not been unduly lauded in these columns; perhaps not lauded up to the full measure of its deserts. It is refreshing (in the way of novelty) to peruse a glowing encomium of the Papacy. Such is "The Chair of Peter."⁴ The historical side of Romanism is one of its weakest sides. History, in its application to this subject, is the spear of Ithuriel. The life of the great missionary⁵ is fittingly told by his son, and is likely to replace the earlier and less attractive biography by Wayland. In the April number of this REVIEW we made a brief and very inadequate mention of the startling work by Mr. Howison.⁶ We then remarked upon its suggestive title, and congratulated the amiable and respected author on his reappearance in the field of letters. Whether he is to be congratulated on the promulgation of *the views* set forth

¹ Exodus. Exposition and Homiletics by the Rev. George Rawlinson, M. A. Two volumes. Third edition. Pp. xxxix., ix., 348, 405. *Ibid.*

² The Jews: or, Prediction and Fulfilment. An Argument for the Times. By Samuel H. Kellogg, D. D., Professor in the Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Penn. New York: 1883. 12mo., pp. 279. *Ibid.*

³ The Ancient Church; its History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution, traced for the first three hundred years. By W. D. Killen, D. D. A new edition, carefully revised, with a Preface by John Hall, D. D. New York. *Ibid.*

⁴ The Chair of Peter; or, the Papacy Considered in its Institution, Development, and Organisation, and in the Benefits which, for over eighteen centuries, it has conferred on Mankind. By John Nicholas Murphy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1883. New York: Scribner & Welford.

⁵ The Life of Adoniram Judson. By his son, Edward Judson. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

⁶ "God and Creation." By Robert Reid Howison. West & Johnson, Richmond, Va.

in this book is another matter. We stated before that the author claimed that these views, though unusual, were, in his judgment, not opposed to the system of doctrine inculcated in our standards. Whether this pretension can be successfully sustained, may be determined in the light of the statement that the author, whilst disclaiming Manicheism or Gnosticism in any form, yet avows and makes fundamental to his scheme that doctrine of theological dualism which involves the eternity of matter; and thus, though leaving the teleological argument for certain attributes of a divine being unaffected, destroys at one blow the whole foundation of the *cosmological* argument (at least as ordinarily presented) for the existence of a God, and requires a thorough rehabilitation of the so-called "Calvinistic" creed. A more honest and sincere inquirer after truth does not live; but we sadly fear that Mr. Howison has thrown away his apt reasoning, his wide reading, and fine literary attainments and expertness, in the chase of an alluring but elusive and ensnaring *theodicy*. The Critique of Design—Arguments,¹ is partly historic and partly critical. It is sound on the argument from order, but fatally erroneous on the argument from the indications of purpose. Dr. McLane² treads in the footsteps of John Young and Bushnell in their theory of the atonement. On this point his view resembles, if it does not essentially coincide with, that of the Socinians. Dr. Cheever's characteristically quaint title³ points (obscurely enough) to the Bible as the only sure and authoritative rule of human faith and conduct. He is intense, logical, original; full of old-fashioned marrowy godliness, but equally so, too, of whimsies and crotchets, which sometimes loom up in fanatical proportions. Dr. McIlvaine's valuable work on the same general subject,⁴ has

¹ Critique of Design—Arguments. By L. E. Hicks, Denison University, Granville, O. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

² The Cross in the Light of To-day. By W. W. McLane, D. D., Ἡ ζωὴ ἰφανερώθη, etc., 1 John i. 2. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1883.

³ God's Timepiece for Man's Eternity. By the Rev. G. B. Cheever, D. D. Armstrongs.

⁴ The Wisdom of Holy Scripture, with Practical Reference to Sceptical Objections. By the Rev. J. H. McIlvaine, D. D. 1 Vol., crown 8vo., \$2.50. Ch. Scribner's Sons.

already been noticed with favor in these pages. The "Samuel Johnson"¹ here named is not the dictator of Bow Street, but a sort of recluse priest of New England transcendentalism. In habit like Thoreau, in sentiments he resembled Emerson. In method, he seems to have been nearer of kin to Parker. Where his fantastic theological notions are not obtruded, his writings are often as acceptable as they are able. Dr. Watson's valuable book on Kant is appropriately followed up by a valuable exposition of the transcendental school that succeeded immediately upon the subjective Idealism of Fichte.² German Idealism is, in all its forms, almost unintelligible to the English mind that has not been specially tutored for the purpose. The author of the "Characteristics"³ was a genteel, high-bred man of the world. His infidelity was the fashion of the time, and was simply deistical. His style would now be regarded as prolix and tumid, but was gracefully adapted to the manners of the time. His friend and admirer, Hutcheson, had more earnestness and equal vigor, but considerably less to recommend him in a literary point of view. He took a far higher view of conscience than Shaftesbury did, allowing to it the position of a special moral sense.

We welcome the *Life of Lord Lawrence*⁴ as so far the most important historic biography of the day. John Lawrence was a Scotch-Irishman; first served under the East India Company; afterwards organised and governed the Punjaub, and finally became Viceroy of India. His chief title to fame is the heroic and successful part he took in suppressing the Sepoy rebellion of 1857.

¹Lectures, Essays, and Sermons. By Samuel Johnson, author of *Oriental Religions*, with a Memoir, by Samuel Longfellow. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883. 8vo., pp. 466.

²Schelling's *Transcendental Idealism. A Critical Exposition.* By John Watson, Ph. D., F. R. S. C., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Pp. 251. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co.

³*Shaftesbury & Hutcheson.* By Thomas Fowler. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 8vo, pp. 240.

⁴*Life of Lord Lawrence.* By R. Bosworth Smith. 2 Vols., 8vo., pp. 484, 567. (Price, \$5.00.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

The story of this manly and chivalrous, no less than memorable, career is excellently told by the author of a recent work on Islam. Since Mr. George's brilliant little work entitled "Progress and Poverty," in which the essential principle of Communism has received its most plausible defence, hardly a single book on this general class of subjects has appeared that is said to possess greater interest than that of Mr. Moody on "Land and Labor."¹

The great book on the *soi disant* "Nihilism" is "Underground Russia."² Whatever may be thought of its sentiments, there can be no two opinions as to its eminent readableness. Sir James Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of England³ (to which we directed our readers in a previous number of this REVIEW, is one of the few books that give their authors lasting fame. It is voluminous, and is made up of two elements throughout, viz., the speculative (and critical) and the historic. The light this work sheds on the philosophy of jurisprudence, is exceeded by the light it sheds on the changes in English life and modes of thought. Mr. Amos's treatise on Politics⁴ is said to go over the whole ground covered by the writers from Aristotle to Gladstone, and to touch on all the questions—however briefly and imperfectly—which they have considered. Charles Edward Appleton⁵ was an eminent scholar and metaphysician. There surely could not have been a broader churchman amongst the English clergy. He was a Hegelian. He was also the founder of the "Academy."

Sidgwick is a disciple of Mill: but his commentary⁶ on his

¹ Land and Labor in the United States. By William Godwin Moody. 1 Vol., 12mo., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

² Underground Russia. Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life. By Stepniak, formerly Editor of *Zemlia i Volia* (Land and Liberty). With a Preface by Peter Lavroff. Translated from the Italian. 1 Vol., 12 mo., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

³ A History of the Criminal Law of England. By Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, a Judge of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division. London and New York: Macmillan & Co, 1883. 3 Vols.

⁴ The Science of Politics. By Sheldon Amos. [International Scientific Series.] D. Appleton & Co., 1883.

⁵ Dr. Appleton: His Life and Literary Relics. By John A. Appleton, M. A., late Vicar of St. Marks, Staplefield, Sussex; and A. H. Sayce, Professor of Comparative Philology, Oxford. London: Trübner & Co.

⁶ The Principles of Political Economy. By Henry Sidgwick, author

master is said to be, though far from popular, to an expert literally indispensable. The crisis during which Mr. Buchanan was at the head of American affairs was one of signal importance in American annals. The temperate biography by Mr. Curtis¹ explains much that was before difficult to understand in regard to the views and motives and actions of a number of persons who figured prominently at that epoch. Lord Gower's blood relationship to many of the highest peers in England, added to his literary accomplishments, makes his gossiping reminiscences² one of the most palatable books of the sort (though in another way) since Greville's memoirs. Jean Jacques is coming into note again, and we fear coming into greater favor.³ For ourselves (if we must make a choice), we decidedly prefer the cynical author of the "Dictionary" and "Zaire" to the author of the "Confessions," "Emile," and "*La Nouvelle Éloïse*." Mr. Paul's "Sketches"⁴ is an interesting volume from a strong character. In his Mississippi notes Mr. Clemens aims to be chiefly serious.⁵ Unfortunately there are many who persist in the imagination that Mr. Clemens always aims to be funny. There is no lack of fun, however, in this his last book, and the grave descriptions are as usual in the main sufficiently accurate. The accounts of Skobelev⁶ remind one of Rodrigue the Cid, of Roland, or some other paladin of romance. He was superb in physique, with a grand forehead,

of "The Methods of Ethics." London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1883.

¹ Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth President of the United States. By George Ticknor Curtis. With two steel-plate portraits. Two vols., 8vo., cloth, gilt tops and uncut edges, \$6.00. Harper & Bros., New York.

² My Reminiscences. By Lord Ronald Gower, F. S. A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.; New York: Scribner & Welford, 1883. 2 Vols., 8vo., pp. 422, 384.

³ Rousseau. By Henry Grey Graham. [Foreign Classics for English Readers.] Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1883.

⁴ Biographical Sketches. By C. Kegan Paul. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1883.

⁵ Life on the Mississippi. By Mark Twain. With more than 300 illustrations. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co.

⁶ Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause. By O. K. London: Longmans & Co., 1883.

“shaded by chestnut curls,” a keen, frank eye, a pose and expression “gallant and *débonnaire*.” He was as enthusiastically followed by his men as Bonaparte or Gustavus. Like Stonewall Jackson, his seeming indifference to wounds and death was in part calculated, and no one cared more for his troops when not in action. His was a powerful influence in advancing and concentrating the Pan-Slavic tendencies of his countrymen. Skobeleff spoke English faultlessly, spoke Romaic and other dialects, read French, German, Italian, and other tongues, and was very winsome and charming (when he chose to be so) in private. O. K. is the *nom de plume* of a Russian lady and politician.

Mr. Day has no doubt given us a good book on Spain.¹ We have crossed the ocean with him, and travelled in his company among the inns and galleries of England. M. Filon² (after the manner of his people) has written a delightful book that skims the surface and is filled with unpardonable mistakes. Mr. Justin McCarthy³ is an Irishman; but then Mr. Justin McCarthy is also a “liberal.” As Mr. McCarthy’s “liberalism” did not warp his judgment, or excite his feelings, in his history of contemporary England; so his Irish blood has not, so far as it appears, affected his character for fairness in his narrative of Irish events. M. Bovet is full of reverential fervor, and being in addition a trustworthy repository of facts and recollections, and of local descriptions, he offers us in his work on the East⁴ the best corrective to “The New Pilgrim’s Progress.” The introduction is by that ripe scholar, Dr. Godet. Mr. Ruggles’s “German seen without Spectacles,”⁵ has been laughed at as “near-sighted” and in

¹ From the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules. Sketches of Places in Spain. By Henry Day. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.50.

² *Histoire de la Littérature Anglaise*. Par Augustin Filon. Paris, 1883; New York: F. W. Christern.

³ An Outline of Irish History, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. By Justin H. McCarthy. Baltimore: Jno. Murphy & Co., 1883. 12mo., pp. 134.

⁴ Egypt, Palestine, and Phœnicia—A Visit to the Sacred Lands. By Félix Bovet. Translated by W. H. Lyttleton, M. A., Rector of Hagley and Canon of Gloucester. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author, by Prof. F. Godet, D. D. E. P. Dutton & Co., 1883.

⁵ Germany seen without Spectacles. By Henry Ruggles. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1883.

reality, has no great claim upon the notice of well-informed men and women. Its principal vice is that of judging manners and customs on the continent of Europe from the view-point of the Northern States of America. Everything by any of the Hares is worth reading and pondering; but the later works of "Augustus" are not much more than a skilful digest of guide-books.¹

The older of these two botanists² knew Jussieu and De Candolle, and by the aid here afforded him has completed his monumental work on the flora of Kew. As Robert Browning has been styled the poet's poet, so has Bach been called the musician's musician.³ Bach is himself perhaps the greatest of all the musicians; certainly (with the possible exception of Wagner) the most original and influential, and is daily growing in favor with the most discerning critics. Dr. Poole's biography of him is exceedingly well done. One of the most gifted of novel-writers, and masters of French style of our day, here essays to discuss the problems of the time out of the columns of a great foreign periodical.⁴ It is needless to state that where the shadow of the grim German Chancellor has not projected itself too darkly over the reflections of this brilliant yet cautious writer, he has furnished forth a banquet of varied succulence and nourishment.⁵

¹ *Cities of Southern Italy and Sicily.* By Augustus J. C. Hare. Geo. Routledge & Sons. 1 Vol. 8vo.

² *Genera Plantarum ad Exemplaria imprimis in Herbariis Kewensibus serrata definita.* Auctoribus G. Bentham et J. D. Hooker. Londoni: Reeve & Co. 3 Vols., imp. 8vo., 1882-1883.

³ Sebastian Bach. By Reginald Lane Poole. Ph. D. [Hueffer's "Great Musicians" Series.] Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁴ *Hommes et Choses du Temps Présent.* Par Valbert. (M. Cherbuliez to the *Revue des Deux Mondes.*) Paris, 1883.

⁵ *The Index Guide to Travel and Art-Study in Europe.* By Lafayette C. Loomis, A. M. With Plans and Catalogues of the chief Art Galleries, Maps, Tables of Routes, and 160 Illustrations. Part I.—Scenery, Art History, Legends, and Myths. Part II.—Plans and Catalogues of the Art Galleries of Europe. Part III.—Maps, Tables, and Directions for all Leading Routes of Travel. 1 Vol., 16 mo., pp. 600, \$3.50.

THE

By B. M. Smith
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