

THE
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

Vol. XXXII.

JANUARY, MDCCCLXXXI.

No. 1.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFICE OF DEACON. By the Rev. Prof. J. L. GIRARDEAU, D D., Theological Seminary, Columbia, S. C.,	1
II. COMMON SENSE ARGUMENT. By the Rev. J. S. GRANTY, D. D., Mexico, Mo.,	30
III. THE CHURCH AND TEMPERANCE. By the Rev. R. C. REED, Smithville, Va.,	45
IV. THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS. By the Rev. Professor J. L. GIRARDEAU, D. D., Theological Seminary, Columbia, S. C.,	63
V. THE REVISED DIRECTORY FOR WORSHIP. By the Rev. G. D. ARMSTRONG, D. D., Norfolk, Va.,	103
VI. THE MINISTER OF EVANGELISATION,	115
VII. CRITICAL NOTICES,	134
VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	158

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1881.

With the address of each subscriber, we now print the date of the last number for which he has paid. For example, those who have paid in full for the current volume—Vol. XXXII.—will find after their names, “Oct. '81, ” which means that they have paid for the October number of 1881, and of course for all preceding it. If any one has paid for all past volumes, and one dollar on XXXII., he will find “Jan.” or ‘Jny, '81 and 25c. ;” which means that he has paid for the January number of 1881, and 25 cents on the April number. And so in other cases.

Those who have not paid for the current volume will confer a favor by forwarding the amount due to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C.

In compliance with the wishes of many friends, it is announced that hereafter *as a general rule*, the names of writers for this REVIEW will be attached to their articles, and the initials of each to the critical notices.

The REVIEW will continue to be, as it has always been, an open journal, favoring free discussion within limits. More than ever it is desired to make it a representative of our whole Church, as its name imports, and a faithful exponent of the Calvinistic Theology and the Presbyterian Polity.

Communications for its pages may be addressed to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C., or to ROBERT L. DABNEY, Hampden Sidney, Virginia, or to JOHN B. ADGER, Pendleton, South Carolina.

A more generous support by Southern Presbyterians would enable the proprietor to make the work more worthy of its name.

[Entered at the Post-Office at Columbia, S. C., as second-class postal matter.]

THE SOUTHERN
PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

VOLUME XXXII.

COLUMBIA, S. C.
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1881.

THE LIBRARY
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
The Importance of the Office of Deacon. By the Rev. Prof. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., LL.D.,	1
Common Sense Argument. By the Rev. Dr. J. S. Grasty,	30
The Church and Temperance. By the Rev. R. C. Reed,	45
The Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations. By the Rev. Prof. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., LL.D.,	63
The Revised Directory for Worship. By the Rev. Dr. G. D. Armstrong,	103
The Minister of Evangelisation,	115
God's Righteousness to be Universally Confessed. By the Rev. H. B. Pratt,	171
The Diaconate, Part III.,	191
Woman's Place in the Gospel. By the Rev. S. L. Morris,	210
The Influence of the German University System on Theological Literature. By the Rev. Prof. R. L. Dabney, D. D., LL.D.,	220
Our Schemes of Benevolence—Shall they be Revolutionised? By the Rev. Dr. J. Leighton Wilson,	248
The Second General Council of the Presbyterian Alliance. By the Rev. Dr. William E. Boggs,	282
The Drift of American Politics,	317
The Maine Law at Present in Maine and Vermont. By the Rev. Dr. Cyrus Hamlin,	335
The Presbyterian Diaconate. By the Rev. Dr. J. A. Lefevre,	343
The Diaconate of Scripture. By the Rev. Dr. J. A. Lefevre,	355
Revision of the English Bible. By the Rev. Dr. John B. Adger,	369
Agnosticism. By the Rev. Prof. Henry C. Alexander, D. D.,	399
Smith's Christian Antiquities,	423
The Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. By the Rev. Dr. Thomas H. Skinner,	441
The World's Marriage Law and the Deceased Wife's Sister. By the Rev. Dr. Wm. Stoddert,	469
The Problem of Human Life Here and Hereafter. By Prof. M. W. Humphreys,	497
Cosmic Vapor. By the Rev. Prof. L. G. Barbour,	511
The General Assembly of 1881. By the Rev. Dr. R. L. Dabney,	539
The Revised Version of the New Testament. By the Rev. Dr. R. L. Dabney,	575
Our Church Policy—Shall it be Progress or Petrefaction? By the Rev. J. A. Quarles,	597

BOUND Jul 13 1939

MAR 6 1939

453992

	PAGE
The Diaconate Again. By the Rev. Dr. J. L. Girardeau, . . .	628
A Century of a Presbytery. By Prof. J. T. L. Preston, LL.D., . . .	665
God's Marriage Law,	682
Remission of Sins in Immersion, and the Book of the Acts. By the Rev. Dr. Wm. Stoddert,	706
The South Vindicated from the Charge of Treason and Rebellion. By the Rev. Dr. Wm. E. Boggs,	743
CRITICAL NOTICES:	
The Life of Charles Hodge, D. D., LL.D., Professor in the Theo- logical Seminary, Princeton, N. J., 134. Jehovah-Jesus—The Oneness of God the true Trinity, 143. Certain Dangerous Ten- dencies in American Life, and other Papers, 146. Observations concerning the Scripture Economy of the Trinity and the Cove- nant of Redemption, 150. The Life and Work of William Augus- tus Muhlenberg, 151. A Popular Commentary on the New Tes- tament by English and American Scholars of various Evangelical Denominations, 154. The Faith of our Forefathers, 155. The Reports, Letters, and Acts of Pilate, 156.	
RECENT PUBLICATIONS.	158, 388, 584, 797

'THE SOUTHERN
PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

VOL. XXXII.—NO. 1.

JANUARY, MDCCCLXXXI.

ARTICLE I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFICE OF DEACON.

The particular topic to which we shall direct attention is *the Importance of the Office of Deacon*. But before proceeding to its immediate discussion, we shall offer some preliminary remarks in regard to the timeliness and desirableness of considering the whole subject of the diaconate.

1. It has not unfrequently been said, that the age in which we live is peculiarly called upon, in the providence of God, to take up Church-questions and subject them to a careful examination. There is truth in this remark, if it be received with necessary qualification. No doubt, it is the duty of every age to study the whole counsel of God as revealed in his inspired word. But there are peculiar circumstances connected with the Church, at particular times, which compel her attention to certain articles of faith and principles of order. Conflicts arise in consequence of the propagation of error, which necessitate a thorough investigation of the truth which is challenged, and a sharp and definite statement of true in contrast with false doctrine. And as every error is not circulated in every age, but particular heresies prevail at particular seasons, the result is that the special form of truth which is related to the prevalent type of false opinion, requires to be precisely fixed. It is in this way that the theology

of the Church has been gradually developed into scientific arrangement, and has found exact and permanent expression in creeds and symbols. The sword which our Lord said he came to send on earth cuts to pieces the error, hews off false appendages from scriptural doctrine, and carves out the perfect and enduring form of truth. The precise statement of truth is conditioned upon its conflict with error.

Now it takes but the commonest observation to notice that one of the most marked ecclesiastical features of our age is the existence, to an unprecedented extent, of denominational differences, differences not only as to doctrinal systems, but as to the government, order, and administrative economy of the Church. This is the incidental effect of the unfettered exercise of free thought, engendered by the revolutionary and disenthraling action of the great Reformation in the sixteenth century. The individual, who had been shackled in the chains of a rigid and despotic system, sprang into the blissful liberty of thinking and acting for himself, with no responsibility for religious opinion except that which bound him inalienably to his God. The natural, perhaps the inevitable, result of individual liberty in the formation and assertion of religious opinions within the sphere of the Protestant Church, in a condition not yet perfected by grace, was, that external divisions occurred. Outward unity was, in a measure, sacrificed to inward conviction. The evils growing out of this separation of the visible body of Christ into independent communities are confessedly great—they will not obtain in its glorified, and, it may be, not in its millennial estate; but they are to be preferred to those that spring from the enforced uniformity of an apostate Church, which forces the energies of the individual into the grooves of an iron system. It is better that external diversity should co-exist with inward agreement as to the essentials of Christianity, than that an outward unity should clamp together elements which are discordant with each other as to the vital principles of the gospel, and repress their free and separate development. This, however, in passing. It is not our purpose to expatiate upon the comparative evils or benefits which may be conceived to flow from the difference of denominations in the

bosom of the Church. They are now only adverted to as exhibiting the necessity, created by a conflict of views, for the formation, and embodiment in clear and definite shape, of our conceptions in regard to matters which constitute the chief points of dispute. The friction of denominational tenets makes an examination of ecclesiastical questions peculiarly necessary, since it is in reference to them that differences mainly occur.

It ought, too, to be considered, that the conflict of opinions as to matters of doctrine, and even as to the evidences of divine revelation itself, which is the consequence of unlicensed freedom of thought and action, renders it exceedingly important that there should be a fixed faith in relation to the necessity, the nature, and the visible form, of the Church, as an organised institute for the inculcation and maintenance of dogmatic truth. It is true that, relatively to the salvation of the soul, doctrine is of infinitely greater importance than ecclesiastical polity, order, and administration. But it must never be forgotten, that the visible Church is the divinely ordained "pillar and ground of the truth." Sink the Church, and down with it will go the gospel of our salvation. Yield to the clamor—Away with the Church! and we should soon obey the demand—Crucify Him! Him whom it is the duty and the glory of the Church to preach to a dying world. The existence of doctrine is conditioned upon the existence of the Church, the purity of doctrine upon its freedom from corruption. The Church is the body through which the living soul of the gospel breathes and acts, the medium through which alone the blessings of redemption are ordinarily communicated to our guilty and perishing race. However subordinate, then, ecclesiastical government and order may be to the doctrines of grace, judged with immediate reference to the life of the soul, they must be admitted to possess inconceivable importance, judged with reference to those doctrines themselves. Doctrine conducts to salvation and the Church conducts to doctrine. She cannot save, she is not Christ; but without her men would cease to see the index finger that points to him, and to hear the cry, "Behold, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world!"

It ought also to be observed, that the necessity for the legitimate restraints of ecclesiastical discipline in an age tending, in an unusual degree, to radical agitation and a lawless disregard of the checks of constitutional government, evinces the great importance of settling our views of Church polity upon a scriptural and therefore an immovable basis. We ourselves are at this very time witnesses of the need of more definite ideas as to the nature of Church-authority, and the application of recognised principles of government to the conduct of the professed subjects of the Redeemer's kingdom.

It deserves, further, to be noticed, that the genius of the present age, as peculiarly active, enterprising, and aggressive, necessitates the adoption of accurate conceptions in regard to the agencies by which the great and expanding work of the Church is to be most scripturally as well as most successfully achieved. Here there is great danger of mistake—just here lamentable mistakes are actually made. The functions of some church-officers may be diverted from their appropriate ends, and those of others, as distinctive and separate, may be wholly obliterated. The deacon, for instance, in the prelatie communions, as a scriptural officer different from the preacher, has ceased to exist, and the functions originally assigned to him are discharged by the ministry, or an order of secular agents, unknown to Scripture, and devised by the wisdom of man. Is it not the fact, too, in our own Church, that in many cases the presbyter performs the offices which the Scriptures attach to the deacon, and in this way functions, which the word of God disjoins and pronounces incompatible, are brought together upon the same person and merged into each other? And is it not also the fact that there is a tendency to neglect the employment of deacons, and, upon the plea of expediency or necessity, to cause them to give way to unofficial and voluntary agents who are charged with collecting the funds needed to fill the coffers of the Church?

These features of the age in which our lot is cast render the careful examination of church-questions especially important. It would be extravagant to say that these are the only, or even the most important, which claim attention. There are questions

concerning the grounds of theism, the proofs of a supernatural revelation, the inspiration of the Scriptures, the interpretation of prophecy, the future development of Christ's kingdom on earth, and others of a purely doctrinal character, which merit our profoundest consideration. But, still, prominent among these objects of investigation are the nature and authority, the ordinances, and the officers of the visible Church. And as one of these church-questions we are called upon to develop and establish our views of the diaconate. The subject has, to a considerable extent, been neglected. We cannot afford to thrust it aside.

2. We remark, in the next place, that the Elder Question—as it has been called—has for some time past almost absorbed the attention of our Church. We had that question to settle; we addressed ourselves to the discussion of it; and although an over-scrupulous adhesion to old forms has hindered the expression in our Book of Church Order of all the results which have been actually attained, still, what has been engrossed in our Constitution is in advance of anything yet reached in the development of principles of church polity in the American Presbyterian Church. We are on the path to grasp still clearer views of the eldership; and as we have broken the spell of enchantment which hung over the old Book, in consequence of historic associations, and have begun to adjust our form of government more nearly to what we believe to be the apostolic model furnished in the New Testament, the opportunity is fairly offered for making still further progress in the incorporation of scriptural views into our ecclesiastical law. It is to be hoped that the old leaven of semi-Congregationalism will be more completely eliminated, and that our Church will, with God's favor, more and more take on the type of a pure and unalloyed Presbyterianism, or, what is the same thing, the unadulterated polity of the New Testament Church. So much we ought to be thankful for as clear gain. The controversies of the past thirty or forty years have, as they rolled away, left a deposit of incalculably precious truth.

But the absorbing interest which existed in the Elder Question extruded and shut out from view the Deacon Question, the agitation of which promised for a while to be concurrent with

that of the other. It was practically laid over for consideration, until a breathing-time from the conflict about the Elder should be reached. We now have that breathing time; and Providence seems to be calling us to the attentive examination of the diaconal office, and to the development and settlement of our doctrine and practice in relation to it. In the discussion of the Board question, which took place before our separation from the Northern Church, Dr. Thornwell took very strong ground in regard to the employment of deacons, as officers not confined to strictly congregational limits, in connexion with the executive agencies charged with the prosecution of the benevolent enterprises of the Church. Whether he, in later life, modified these views, we will not now inquire. We would only observe that what modification of them he adopted seemed to be more practical than theoretical—an accommodation of them to an existing order of things, which he could not wholly change in accordance with his conceptions. He chose rather to work in connexion with a system in which he perceived defects, than to occupy the position of a theoretical and inoperative isolation. But we have not yet shelved the question which he raised. The General Assembly may have the inquiry to consider, whether the functions of the deacon ought to be employed in connexion with its Executive Committees as central agencies of the Church. That question is also before the Synod of South Carolina.

There is still another aspect of the subject which is worthy of notice. Probably in consequence of the prevalence of the Scotch doctrine that the higher office includes the lower, and therefore that the office of elder includes that of deacon, and in consequence of the habit which grew more and more out of that theory to neglect the election of deacons as superfluous officers, some of our churches have, until a comparatively recent date, been equipped with an incomplete complement of officers. The deacons were wanting. The election of those officers has, however, become more general, and this is progress in the right direction. But there is a degree of rawness in the incumbents of the office resulting from the absence of prescriptive usages which would have grown out of a long standing employment and cultivation of

diaconal functions. Our old Book was exceedingly meagre in its statements touching the office, and was therefore a very incompetent directory as to its duties; and although our present Book is fuller, there are aspects of the subject which it does not touch, and which afford matter for independent inquiry.

All the considerations which have now been mentioned go to show that the discussion of the Deacon question is both timely and desirable.

I. We now proceed to suggest some thoughts as to the importance of the deacon's office in its relation to the poor. Of the existence of a peculiar official relation of the deacon to the poor, which is unmistakeably affirmed in the Scriptures, we shall not now speak. Something may be said upon the question when, in the course of these remarks, allusion shall be made to the divine right of the deacon as an officer in the visible kingdom of Christ. At present we assume the fact of the relation as one maintained by the whole body of the Reformed Church, with the exception of the Church of England and its offshoots, which, in accordance with the prelatical theory, assign to the deacon, as such, a preaching function.

1. It will require no effort to prove the perpetual presence of the poor in the Church. Our Master determined that matter when he said that, although his bodily presence should for a season be withdrawn from the Church on earth, the poor should never be absent. "The poor ye have always with you, but me ye have not always." We cannot know all his reasons for a dispensation, which we adore as righteous, wise, and merciful. In the ordinary course of his providence towards mankind in general, he allows distinctions to exist between the rich and the poor; and he does not see fit to obliterate them within the circle of his Church. They constitute a means of wholesome discipline for his people, in their earthly preparation for his heavenly service. But ignorant as we are of the whole case, we have one reason intimated by our Lord himself for this procedure of his providence. It would appear that he retains the poor in his Church as, in some sort, representatives of his earthly poverty, and in this re-

gard, tests of his people's love to him. He is pleased to identify himself with them, and will treat, in the final distribution of the rewards of grace, every tender office performed for their benefit as done to himself. In that most affecting portraiture which he gives, in Matthew's Gospel, of the processes of the last judgment, he represents himself, the diademed Judge upon the great white throne, as accounting every deed of kindness, however humble, which had been done to his poor brethren, as having been done to himself, and as furnishing the evidence of affection for him. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these my brethren, yet did it unto me." Jesus still walks in this vale of tears as personated by his poor and needy brethren. A cup of cold water given to a thirsty disciple is as if pressed to the parched lips of the suffering Son of Man. Now, diaconal ministration to the needs of the poor sustains to the Church as an organised society precisely the relation which the private offices of charity hold to the individual Christian. Contemplated, therefore, from this point of view, the deacon's office assumes an importance which can only be measured by the Church's love for Christ and by the awards of the last great day.

2. The poor members of Christ in a very special manner require the help of the Church. The very fact that they are in the Church renders it less likely that they will receive assistance from without. Entitled as they are by the terms of the gospel to look for help from their brethren, they will, especially if sensitive and shrinking, refrain from seeking it from others. It enhances this consideration, too, when we reflect that outsiders, individuals and organisations alike, as they justly expect that the Church's help will be extended to its own poor members, will not be as apt to assist them as they would those who are not so related, and are therefore more completely thrown upon their own resources. So strong is this feeling that one church expects another church to provide, as is meet, for its own needy members, and reluctantly consents to divide the alms which are intended to relieve its own beneficiaries. This line of thought throws fresh light upon the importance of the deacon's office, as the organ for the extension of the Church's benefactions.

3. It also merits remark that the making of stated and competent provision for its poor members is necessary to the spiritual, and to some extent the temporal, prosperity of the Church. In the first place, no body of Christians can grow in the divine life who habitually neglect the cultivation of the grace of love, a grace which the Apostle Paul, in his glowing and eloquent description of it in the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians, crowns as foremost among the three essential and abiding attributes of our holy religion. All the other graces condition the development of this, which is the fulfilling of the law on earth, and shall infuse a thrilling rapture into the praises of the blood-washed throng above. A Christian without love would be a body bereft of the soul. We have seen that, in the judgment of our Lord himself, this sacred principle receives its chief manifestation, so far as creatures are concerned, in offices of charity to the poor and needy members of his body. The Church, therefore, which shuts up the channel of diaconal ministration must expect to be dwarfed in the development of experimental religion. In the second place, the judicial displeasure of Christ, the judge of his own house, who walks among the golden candlesticks and thunders in the ears of every flock of his professing people the solemn words, "I know thy works," must fall upon any church which neglects to provide for the wants of his poor. The frown of his holy providence chills the spiritual life of the individual and blights the spiritual prosperity of a church. The withdrawal of his Spirit is at once the seal of his disapprobation, and the shadow of approaching judgments. In the third place, a church which sinks the deacon's office, and so refuses to provide for its own poor, checks the growth of its membership, by making an unhappy impression upon the unbelieving world. A tree is known by its fruits, and, in like manner, a church is judged by its practical exemplification of the grace which it professes. A purely inward religion, which gives no proof of its existence by outward works of beneficence, cannot pass muster in the judgment of the world. It is condemned—and deservedly so—as a faith without works, which is dead. A church with such a faith must be pronounced a dead church; and who will seek for life amongst the dead?

One of the tendencies of the age is to deify the merely human impulse of charity, and render to it the homage which is due alone to the divine principle of love—a love which was incarnated in a dying Saviour, and when moving in the heart of a sinner is born alone of the new-creating power of the Holy Ghost. Societies, institutes, organisations of all sorts, founded in this earth-born sentiment of charity, spring up on every side, and flaunt their banners as the rivals of the Church in the field of benevolence. We would hinder no legitimate combination of secular agencies intended merely to alleviate the temporal woes of humanity. The fearful mass of suffering calls for massed effort to meet it. And, after all, the impression made upon it is like that which would be made upon the ocean by organised attempts to bale it out. Let the dead bury their dead: the office is indispensable. But when organisms designed to relieve the secular wants of men are represented as competitors of the Church of Christ, upon the theatre of a pure beneficence flowing from love, it becomes her to look to her charities. An array of facts confronts her which she cannot afford to overlook. She must provide for her needy members, or succumb to the verdict of failure pronounced by competing secular societies, and bow her head before the judgment that she is untrue to one of her most sacred responsibilities. Her own members would suck the paps of other institutions, and outsiders would shun her as a mother that refuses bread to the hungry offspring of her body. Lovers of Jesus, could we calmly look upon such a triumph of the world over the Church which he bought with his own precious blood, and constituted the exponent of his love in a world of suffering and sin? Not while a pulse of affection beats in our hearts for him who died for us on the tree. Not while we can lift a hand to wipe off the stain of such a reproach from the fair face of the Bride of Jesus—the Mother of our souls. Let us then exert ourselves, each in his own lot, to call forth the sympathies of the Church for her needy members; and if we are shod with the sandals of diaconal service, hasten as her appointed ministers to bear her charities to the hovels of the poor.

4. Owing partly to the disappointment of reasonable expecta-

tions, and partly to the imperfections of nature not wholly sanctified by grace, an evil which has in all ages, and perhaps in an increased degree in our own, characterised, as it is, by an unwonted upheaval of the masses, threatened the peace of society, is liable to prevail in the Church,—we allude to the discontentment and restiveness of the poor. In the sixth chapter of Acts, we are told that the Hellenists murmured because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration. This was a source of disturbance to the infant Church which required the prompt and decided application of some corrective measure. What was the remedy for the evil adopted by the apostles? The multiplication of deacons. As soon as this was done, the agitation subsided and contentment was restored. The precedent is instructive. The employment of deacons in the regular and adequate ministration of the Church's alms prevents the dissatisfaction of the poor, or, if through some administrative defect it has arisen, cannot fail to arrest it. The rich and the poor are harmonised upon the diaconate. It is the divinely erected breakwater against the irruption of agrarianism, communism, and every kind of levelling theory, against the peace and order of the Christian commonwealth.

5. It ought not to be supposed that the agency of the deacon should be used only for the relief of absolute pauperism. This would be to cramp the benefactions of the Church into very narrow limits; and yet it is to be feared that this is the view which is often entertained in regard to the extent of diaconal ministration. There are those who, although not reduced to extreme want, should, as struggling with difficulties or bowed down beneath affliction, be objects of the Church's sympathy and help,—honest workers who through no fault of theirs have failed to reap the fruits of labor; women plying the needle in garrets or toiling in garden patches near their cabins, to earn a scanty subsistence; mourners over the dead, unable to meet their funeral expenses; children left orphans at a helpless age, appealing to the Church as their only mother for subsistence and at least a primary education; and industrious young men cut off from the means of support and seeking places of employment, but in the period of transition liable to the experience of want. It is in such cases

that deacons would cease to be mere disbursers of stated stipends, and find occasion for the exercise of wisdom, good sense, and judgment, in ascertaining the actual amount of need, in determining the instances in which a draft should be made upon the beneficiary fund of the Church, and the time, way, and measure in which relief should be afforded.

Such are some of the reasons which serve to magnify the importance of the deacon's office in relation to the poor.

II. The second general aspect of the subject which we propose to consider is, the importance of the deacon's office in relation to the temporal interests of the Church, apart from the care of the poor.

In order to a satisfactory and impressive presentation of this view of the subject, it is requisite to exhibit the scriptural grounds upon which an extension of the deacon's functions beyond the care of the poor is justified. This we proceed briefly to do.

In the first place, if deacons have no scriptural warrant to act beyond the care of the poor, the Head of the Church has appointed no officers to take charge of her temporal interests. No proof can be furnished from Scripture that the ministers of the word have received such a commission. On the contrary, the declaration of the apostles that they—and what was true of them in this particular is true of all preachers—could not with reason leave the word of God and serve tables, but must give themselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word, excludes the preachers of the gospel from official devotion to the temporal affairs of the Church. The qualifications of ruling elders given in the Scriptures, the functions they are represented as discharging, and the analogy of their office to that of the ministry of the word, in the fact that it is concerned about spiritual ends, make it sufficiently clear to every candid mind that they were not appointed to take care of the temporalities of the Church. The only other officers are deacons; and if they were not divinely assigned to the performance of this function, the conclusion is, that Christ left his Church unprovided with officers whose business it is to look after her temporal interests. That conclusion we cannot accept, and are therefore compelled to believe that the office of

deacon is not confined to the care of the poor, but includes that of the Church's temporalities.

In the second place, the ordinary method of instruction in the Scriptures is to give a special case illustrating a principle or duty, and leave the principle or duty to be collected from that instance as a specimen. Hence it is a legitimate inference from the fact that one kind of temporal business was intrusted to the deacon, namely, the care of the poor, that all ecclesiastical business of the same kind was included in his office. In this way Dr. Thornwell argues, and we believe the argument to be valid.

Substantially the same consideration may be presented in a different form: the analogy of the deacon's office, as confessedly concerned about the temporal care of the poor, would lead us, in the absence of any direct proof to the contrary, to conclude that the office was also concerned about other business of a temporal nature. Either a spiritual officer was charged with the temporal business of the Church apart from the care of the poor; or no officer was charged with it; or the deacon was charged with it. The last supposition is the only one that is reasonable. And as there is no direct proof that can be adduced to rebut the force of the argument from the analogy of the deacon's office as related to the poor, that argument must stand in force.

In the third place, the reason, assigned by the apostles why they should not attend to the distribution of relief to the poor, holds equally against their attention to any other temporal business of the Church. That reason was, that temporal ministration to the poor would hinder the discharge of their spiritual duties. Now, it is perfectly plain that the same result would have followed from their undertaking any other temporal functions. Either, then, no officer was appointed to take charge of the Church's temporalities apart from the provisions for the poor; or the deacon was assigned to that duty. There is not the least reason that another possible supposition in the case could have been the true one, viz., that the ruling elder was appointed to that trust.

In the fourth place, the position that the functions of the deacon were not confined to the care of the poor, but were extended to that of all other temporal business connected with the Church,

has been maintained by the whole Reformed Church, except that portion of it from which the element of Prelacy was never purged out.

These reasons are sufficient to establish the comprehensiveness of the deacon's office for which we contend.

Having shown the legitimate applicability of the deacon's functions to all the temporal business of the Church, the way is open to consider the importance of them in view of this width of their scope.

1. The functions of the deacon are important as freeing the ministry and eldership from engrossment in the temporal business of the Church, and enabling them to concentrate their energies upon their own spiritual duties. We have already spoken of the reason assigned by the apostles for their refusing to take charge of the daily ministration to the poor. They affirmed that it would have been unreasonable for them to discharge that office, because it would have involved the neglect of their own spiritual duties. They declined to leave the ministry of the word for the ministry of tables, and expressed their determination to devote themselves to prayer and to the preaching of the gospel. Now, it is evident that the most important temporal function which they could have performed was ministering to the bodily necessities of their poor brethren. And it follows that if the pressure of their spiritual obligations constrained them to decline the discharge of that temporal function, there could have been no other of like nature which they would have been willing to perform. They declined attending to any temporal business of the Church, on the ground that they could not be diverted from that business which belonged peculiarly to them, and which was concerned about the spiritual interests and the eternal destinies of men. But some of the poor had been neglected. The daily ministration to their necessities from the common fund had not been adequately accomplished. A measure had to be adopted to meet the difficulty. What should it be? The apostles were solicited to remove the evil. How did they do it? By giving their personal attention to the daily distribution? No. They refused to abandon their own proper duties, even to discharge that

necessary office. What then? They counselled the Church to elect temporal officers for the performance of this temporal function. Inspiration had solved the difficulty again, as no doubt it had solved it in all the past history of the Church. Spiritual officers were restricted to spiritual functions; temporal officers were assigned to temporal. The discharge of the duty in question was indispensable. Somebody had to perform it. Had no deacons been appointed, the spiritual officers would have been obliged to attend to it. The appointment of deacons absolved them from the obligation, and set them free to devote themselves to their proper spiritual duties.

It is beyond dispute that the end contemplated in the appointment of "the seven" was a twofold one—the competent performance of a necessary temporal office, and the release of spiritual officers from its discharge.

But, say the Prelatists, the deacon was a spiritual officer with a temporal function. The view, they contend, that he was a purely temporal officer, is not supported by the subsequent history. That shows, according to them, that some at least of the seven were preachers—Stephen disputed publicly in synagogues, and Philip was an evangelist. Granted; but how does that prove that deacons are ordained preachers? Is even the private Christian muzzled, so that he cannot open his mouth to contend for the faith delivered to the saints? Is he prevented, because not an ordained preacher, from meeting the heretic, the infidel, the atheist, on the floor of public meetings, and confuting their arguments? Was it not a notorious fact, that liberty of exhortation was admitted in the Jewish synagogue? And what was to hinder Stephen, without ordination to the preaching function, fired as he was by extraordinary genius and filled with the Holy Ghost, from availing himself of that liberty to discuss the questions at issue between an effete Judaism and a gloriously inaugurated Christianity? The record affords not a particle of proof that he was, formally speaking, a preacher. As to Philip, all that can be proved from the history is, that some time after he had been inducted into the diaconal office, he preached in the capacity of an evangelist. Well; is it anything strange that a

lower officer should in the course of time become a higher? that an elder or a deacon should rise to the ministry of the word? Two ministers in one of the Presbyteries of this Synod were for some time only ruling elders; and in another there is one who had been a deacon. Does the case of these brethren prove that the deacon is a preacher? There is no evidence to show that Stephen and Philip were, as deacons, preachers of the gospel. The prelatical argument, taken at its best, is a bare presumption, and any positive proof to the contrary must rebut and destroy it. We have just such positive proof in the statement of the apostles: "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables. . . . We will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word." On this ground they enjoined upon the Church the election of deacons—and the Prelatists refuse compliance with this injunction—to the very end, that men not burdened with the cares and duties of the ministry should devote themselves to the charge and administration of the secular business of the Church. The deacon was appointed with a view to his not preaching. The prelatical position involves the contradiction: the deacon was appointed to preach and not to preach at the same time.

But the case was peculiar to the apostles, it will be said. Their reasoning in favor of an exclusive devotion to spiritual offices had reference to themselves as extraordinary officers, and not to the ordinary preachers of the word. This will not answer. It is a vain, although a last, resort. For the duties specified by the apostles were precisely those which were common to them with ordinary preachers—prayer and preaching. "We will give ourselves continually," they did not say, to sacerdotal functions, or prelatical offices, or the exercise of the gift of inspiration and the apostolic prerogative; "we will give ourselves continually," they did say, "to prayer and to the ministry of the word." Praying and preaching, therefore, are affirmed by them to be incompatible with the service of tables—with engagement in the secular business of the Church. All, then, whose official business it is to pray and preach, are, in a regular condition of the Church, in which all its offices are filled, debarred from diaconal service. How then, in

the name of reason, does the record prove that deacons are preachers? The truth is, it proves exactly the opposite.

Rejecting, as we do, the prelatical theory in regard to the deacon's office as untrue, it becomes us to face the question, Do we not act upon it as if it were true? Is not our practice, to some extent, contradictory of our doctrine? Do we not neglect to employ the deacon's office so as to free our spiritual officers from the discharge of the deacon's business? Are we not compelled to answer these solemn questions in the affirmative? Are not ministers and elders, who are not disabled in God's providence from discharging their own proper spiritual functions, charged with the duties pertaining to collectors, treasurers, and disbursers of the moneys of the Church? Do not our church courts, to some extent, undertake offices which, according to the scriptural standard, should be referred to boards of deacons? This is an evil which cries for removal, if we would conform the practice of our Church to her own pure scriptural standard. No doubt, it rests chiefly upon our church courts to correct this anomaly; and we earnestly pray, that as the question is now rising into prominence before them, they will give it the attention it demands, and hasten it to a scriptural conclusion. But we venture to say, that the deacons have also something to do in this matter. Let them show, by devotion to their duties, what can be achieved by a faithful use of the diaconal office. Let them thus destroy the supposition, implied in our practice, that they are incompetent to meet all the trusts reposed by the King of Zion in the incumbents of that office. And let them humbly and respectfully, but firmly and persistently, claim the privilege to do all that their Lord has assigned them to do, so as at the last day to render the account of their stewardship with joy and not with grief. We recommend no arrogant assumption of prerogative, no seditious agitation, on the part of deacons; but they are the free servants of their Master and have a right to speak in behalf of their office, so long as they soberly confine themselves within the bounds of Scripture and of our constitutional principles.

2. The deacon's office is important in its bearing upon the support of the ministry. There are few, if any, questions now before

our Church of greater practical consequence than that which is concerned about the adequate sustentation of the ministry. It is a deplorable fact that so many of our preachers are but poorly compensated for their labors. The principle of justice requires that they be fairly supported—distributive justice, for the laborer is worthy of his hire; commutative justice, for if the people receive spiritual things from the ministry, they ought in return to communicate to them their carnal things. The sentiment of gratitude should impel the people to furnish them a competent support—gratitude to God for the incalculably precious gift of a preached gospel, the instrument of our consolations in this world and the charter of our hopes for the next; gratitude to the human dispensers of this boon, who, for the elect's sake, are willing to endure reproach, affliction, and even death itself. It would not be difficult to show that upon the prosecution of the ministerial work hang the maintenance of our system of government, and the whole administrative working of our practical system. Suspend the work of the ministry, close the pulpits, shut up the churches, silence the preachers, arrest the indoctrination of the people in the truths and precepts of the divine word throughout our borders from Dan to Beersheba, and how long would it take to disperse our church courts, or reduce them to the mere shadow of government, bar the doors of our theological seminaries, scatter our executive committees, and dry up the fountains of Domestic and Foreign Missions, whence living streams are flowing to gladden the deserts of home destitution and heathen despair? Bury the ministry, and the visible Church would share its grave. The imagination of what its loss would entail helps us to appreciate it as a blessing possessed.

We take occasion also to observe, that the ministers of the gospel intrinsically deserve support from the Church and the world. We have lived long enough, and had sufficient contact with men, to form, in the exercise of ordinary judgment, some proper conception of the qualities of our fellow-laborers in the ministry; and we hesitate not to say, without detracting from the merits of others, that they are the noblest class of men that breathe the atmosphere of earth. Subject they are to the pas-

sions and infirmities of unglorified spirits in daily intercourse with a world of sin, and, like the impulsive disciple who denied his Lord, are exposed to temptation, and need to watch and pray. But the depth of an exceptional fall into vice and shame measures the height from which the plunge was taken. Modest as women and affectionate in manners, heroic and self-sacrificing in spirit, animated by zeal for the glory of God and a pure and tireless philanthropy, the least token of appreciation to which they are entitled is the means of living in order to prosecute their holy and beneficent vocation. The pleasure of fellowship with them is as charming below as it is suggestive of the joyful communion on high. Noble and honored brethren! be our lot cast with yours, and to your assembly be our honor united; at your altar we would bow; your trials and your toils be ours; may we live your life of faith, and may our last end be like yours! Gather our souls, Eternal Judge, with theirs, when thou shalt give them a place at thy right hand and lay the amaranth of victory on their heads!

But why speak further of the necessity of supporting the ministry? That will be admitted by all who honor the institutions of Christ, and pray for the advancement of his cause. The practical question is, How shall so desirable an end be attained? The answer to that inquiry must depend largely upon the temper of the eldership, and of the congregations which it represents. It is for the people, with the advice of the Session, to fix the stipends paid to ministers; but it is for the deacons to collect them. They have the best opportunities to judge of the people's ability to give; and in the discharge of their diaconal duties, as they have tongues to speak, as well as hands to receive, should exhort them to come up to the measure of that ability. And when the people respond to their appeals and express willingness to add to their contributions, it is their duty to inform the Session of that fact, and recommend, and, if necessary, urge, a corresponding increase of the preachers' salaries. There is no telling how much may be accomplished by deacons in these ways towards a more competent support of the ministry. How important their office becomes in

this relation must be estimated by the importance of the ministry itself.

3. The deacon's office is important to the prosecution of the benevolent enterprises and the support of the institutions of the Church. It is hardly necessary, yet to save misunderstanding it may be well, to say, that the benevolent enterprises in which our Church as a whole is engaged are, Sustentation, Foreign Missions, the Evangelistic work, the publication of religious literature, the education of indigent candidates for the ministry, and the provision by an invalid fund for disabled ministers and the needy families of deceased ministers. These enterprises depend for their support upon the free-will offerings of the Lord's people. As we have settled it that these offerings should ordinarily be made as a part of the stated worship of the sanctuary, and as, generally, the function of the deacons is exhausted in collecting and distributing them, no special comment is required upon the importance of their office in this particular relation. But there may be occasions, when in consequence of emergencies occurring in connexion with the maintenance of these enterprises, special supplementary effort in their behalf may be judged expedient. At such times a great deal would depend upon the faithfulness and zeal with which the deacons would perform their part of the work in making private collections, and in suggesting to Sessions the most effective mode of procedure. Or it may occasionally be deemed proper by the Sessions to present special causes, falling outside of the regular schedule, in the way of personal application for contributions to them. In this case, also, it is obvious that success would greatly depend upon the efficiency of the deacons in making the required application to individuals.

But let us look at the need of the deacon for the support of our institutions. Take the case of a theological seminary. There are three methods in which its support may be sought: either by an endowment, or by the stated voluntary contributions of the people, or by both combined. While, of course, much may be done by collections made during public worship in the sanctuary—and it deserves serious consideration whether the cause of our seminaries ought not to be put into the regular schedule of objects for

stated collections—still, according to our present practice, reliance must chiefly be placed upon application to individuals for their contributions. It is true that anybody may appeal to anybody in behalf of such an object, and occasionally these sporadic efforts secure large and valuable donations. But we are persuaded that we ought principally to rely upon the divinely appointed agency of the deacon's office. It would be systematic, searching, comprehensive. Put the deacons into the work in every congregation in the territory to which application for help could legitimately be made. Every individual in that scope of country who could be approached on the subject, would be approached. Every one of our church members would have the object brought to his particular attention, and would have the opportunity of contributing his gift in proportion to his ability. What a harvest would be reaped from such a field by such reaping and by such reapers!—the field the Church, the reaping omitting not a stalk, the reapers Christ's official servants, impelled by zeal for his honor and love for his cause. There are about one hundred and sixty churches in this Synod. Now let us suppose that the deacons in every one should canvass the congregation in behalf of the Theological Seminary at Columbia, which is now so sorely pressed for means to continue its noble work. Suppose that by this combined effort of the deacons an average of one hundred dollars should be secured from our churches. Why, that would give half the endowment of a chair in the institution. The other Synods interested in the Seminary might in the same way furnish the other half; and the chair so founded would deserve to be called the Deacons' Chair!

It may be said that this is a dreamy theory. It is a theory, but it is God's theory. It is not a dream, it is Bible doctrine. It is not, as has been intimated, the visionary crotchet of abstract speculation; it is the dictate of divine wisdom. We have long substituted our plans for God's. Suppose that we now try his plan. Ours have come short. Let us put his to the test of trial. Surely we might pay our Master the compliment of employing his method for once. If it fail, we can abandon it and resort again to our superior judgment. Perhaps it may yet suggest a

method which will not fail. Vain man would be wiser than God. Comte thought that he could build a better world than the one we have. But it turned out that he was cracked. Likely, his world would have been cracked too. Our seers have thought that they could construct a better Church than the one Christ gave us. They have tinkered at their scheme, but commend us to the one we have in the New Testament, if we may judge of theirs by its success. Ho, then, for Christ's plan! Deacons to the front! You do not know your own strength, for it has never been thoroughly tried. Go to the fight, each following the Lord fully as Caleb did, and walled cities and the fastnesses of the Anakim will crumble and yield before you. If we had the ear of our church sessions, the captains of the Lord's host, we would say to them: Why keep you back your corps of reserve so long? Why not set free the diaconal arm of the service which sleeps in the rear? Put forward the deacons, and cry with the Iron Duke in the stress of the great conflict, "Up, guards, and at 'em!" Try the deacons on this Seminary case, and let us see what *they* can achieve. It is a conflict we are waging with the covetousness and selfishness of the human heart and the wiles and power of the devil. The great Captain himself will lead us to victory if we obey his orders and adopt his plan.

It might be expected that something just here would be said in reference to the bearing of the full employment of the deacon's office upon those voluntary combinations of effort to sustain our enterprises and institutions which form a feature of the present time alike novel and conspicuous. But allusion can now be made with logical consistency to those combinations, only so far as they are liable to intersect the peculiar sphere of diaconal operations. There are some distinctions in relation to this matter which are apt to be overlooked. Voluntary associations of church members, such as those adverted to, may be contemplated from two points of view: the one governmental, involving the question of their relation to sessional jurisdiction and control; the other economical and financial, involving the question of their relation to the divinely prescribed functions of the diaconate. With the first mode of considering these associations—important as it is,

and demanding, we firmly believe, the prompt and earnest thought of our ministry and eldership—this discussion cannot logically deal. In regard to the second mode of contemplating them, further distinction is necessary. Voluntary combinations of church members, for the purpose of assisting in the pecuniary support of ecclesiastical enterprises and institutions, may be formed with reference to one or the other of three distinct, or at least distinguishable, ends: either to *give* money, or to *make* money, or to *collect* money. So far as the end contemplated is the giving or the making of money for church purposes, the legitimacy of these associations, or combined efforts, must be determined in view of the general principles, the ethical system, of the Scriptures. As the deacon is not obliged officially as deacon, but as a private believer, to give or to make money for the church, associations formed for the purpose of giving or making money for the church cannot conflict with diaconal functions. With such voluntary associated effort, viewed in these specific relations, we must further say, this discussion is not logically concerned. The principles in which they are grounded, the tendencies they inwrap in their bosom—the whole question of their conformity to the word of God as interpreted in our Constitution, ought, we are profoundly convinced, to be subjected to thorough examination; but this is not the place to institute such an investigation.

But, so far as these associations, or ephemeral combinations, contemplate the collection of money for church purposes, they are liable to overlap the prescribed sphere of the deacon and conflict with his official duties. The consideration of this aspect of the matter is pertinent to the scope of these remarks, but the question is a nice one, and difficult to settle in its details, and our space will not permit such a discussion of it as justice requires. All that we can now do is to lay down a general proposition, containing a constitutional principle which will be admitted on all hands, and which is capable of being applied to particulars, and of furnishing their due regulation. That proposition is: whenever voluntary organised associations, or temporary combinations of effort, contemplating the collection of money for church purposes, are substituted for, or come into conflict with, the legitimate

functions of deacons as the divinely appointed collectors of money for ecclesiastical ends, they are to be considered unwarranted by the word of God as interpreted in our standards. That there is more than a fancied danger among us of the violation of this indispensable principle, will be denied by no candid Presbyterian who reflects upon the current events of the Church. It becomes all, therefore, who love the order of Christ's house and ardently desire to see the practice of our beloved Zion conformed to his appointments, to guard against this evil by the use of all the means which God has placed in their power.

4. We remark, in the fourth and last place, that the full employment of the deacon's office is important, in its bearing upon the perfect conformity of our whole system of church order practically, as well as theoretically, to the pattern shown us in the Mount. We profess to hold the principle, that a divine warrant is necessary for every element of our system. This is a true and a mighty principle, and may we have grace never to over-slaugh it! Contended for by heroic champions of the truth, consecrated by the blood of our martyred ancestors, formulated amidst the solemn deliberations of St. Stephen's Hall, and embodied in our grand Confession of Faith, the principle that what God has commanded is binding, what he has not commanded, either expressly or impliedly, is forbidden, is a part alike of our inheritance and of our profession; and may we never be given up to the guilt and folly of abandoning it! All that the Lord hath said we shall do, may we be enabled with Israel, but without Israel's inconstancy, to say, That will we do—all, no less, no more. Having a "Thus saith the Lord" to direct us, we have a pillar of cloud by day and of shining fire by night to guide us through a wilderness of difficulties—a great and howling desert, in which human wisdom quickly loses its way and leaves the carcases of its followers to rot and their bones to bleach.

Now, of the divine appointment, and consequently, the divine right, of deacons as an order of officers in the Church, there has been, as there fairly can be, no dispute. Clear as is our conviction of the scriptural warrant of the office of ruling elder as distinguished from that of the preaching elder, that for the office of

the deacon is still more definitely furnished in the New Testament Scriptures. So clear is this, that the office, in some form, constitutes an acknowledged element in every ecclesiastical system—Prelatic, Independent, and Presbyterian. Paul addresses the deacons, in his letter to the Philippian church, and he expressly lays down the qualifications for the office in his first Epistle to Timothy. The only question about which there can be any debate is, whether the deacons mentioned by Paul as permanent officers were temporal officers, charged with the same functions as “the seven” whose election and appointment are recorded in the sixth chapter of Acts. Were the seven the same as Paul’s deacons? The question is not, whether the deacons are divinely appointed officers—that is conceded—but whether they are divinely appointed specifically to take care of the poor and attend to the secular business of the Church? There is room only for a few remarks upon this point, in addition to those made on a related matter in a previous part of this discussion.

First, it has been already proved that the deacon is not a preacher, as the Prelatists maintain. But he is not a presbyter: so all affirm—Prelatists, Independents, and Presbyterians. Now, preaching and ruling are the only spiritual official functions known to Scripture. The deacon, therefore, is not a spiritual officer. But he is an officer. He must, consequently, be a temporal officer. That granted, his divine warrant for attending to the temporal business of the Church must be admitted.

Secondly, it has also been conclusively shown, from the sixth chapter of Acts, that the seven were temporal officers, with temporal functions. The same thing has just been proved in regard to the deacons mentioned by Paul. Where then is the difference between them? It is clear that they were the same officers. This must be allowed, unless it can be shown that there are other temporal functions assigned to the deacon than those devolved upon the seven. That cannot, from the nature of the case, be done. But even if it could, it would only be shown that the deacon is excluded from the main temporal business of the Church, viz., that with which the seven were charged, which is absurd. Could it be proved—as Vitringa attempted to

do in his work on the Ancient Synagogue—that the seven were temporary officers appointed for an emergency, against which supposition their formal election and solemn ordination, as well as other considerations, afford a violent presumption, deacons must subsequently have been appointed to the permanent discharge of precisely the same class of duties. What then is the difference as to the nature of the office? None. Gibbon, in his *Decline and Fall*, tells us that the great church at Antioch supported three thousand poor from her beneficiary fund. Were temporary “stewards” appointed to meet the exigencies likely to arise out of the dissatisfaction of so vast a multitude of beneficiaries, and so mighty a distribution of alms running on with the existence of churches numbering one hundred thousand members? Were they not met by a powerful staff of deacons as permanent officers, and therefore adequate to the permanent requirements of the case? The hypothesis that the seven were not deacons, but temporary stewards, and that deacons had other functions to discharge than theirs, will not stand examination.

Thirdly, the almost unbroken judgment of the Christian Church has been that the seven of the Acts and the deacons of Philipians and First Timothy, were the same kind of officers. If this judgment is true, what is predicable of the seven is predicable of deacons. As the former were divinely appointed to attend to the whole temporal business of the Church, so must have been the latter.

From this position, that the office of the deacon is possessed of divine right, and its incumbents are divinely appointed to the performance of all the secular business pertaining to the Church, two consequences must logically flow. In the first place, deacons ought to be elected and ordained in every church in which the condition of its membership does not make it impracticable. The church which can elect these officers and does not, subjects itself to the charge of wilful disobedience to the will of Christ as expressed in his word, and of gross inconsistency with the acknowledged principles of our system of order. In the second place, where there are deacons—and we are glad to know that they exist in a great majority of our churches—they ought to be employed

to the full extent of their divinely appointed functions. This obligation rests upon the Church at large, as well as upon individual congregations. The significance of these consequences may not appear to the eye of carnal indifference. But apart from the consideration, that love to our Lord and Master, and the temper of obedience to the requirements of his word, should constrain his followers to walk in the path of duty which he has prescribed, there is a secret but certain operation of his providence over his own house, which visits with judicial inflictions their infractions of his will. The success of the ministry, the spiritual growth of the Church, and, it may be, its temporal prosperity are, in a measure, conditioned upon the conformity of its scheme of offices, of its practical work, and of all its administrative measures, to the beautiful and perfect model given by its King in its supreme directory of faith and duty. If we fail in this, the time may come when the sword of judgment will fall on the house of the Lord, and its "ancient men" become the first victims of its edge. Brightly beaming lamps of gospel faith and order once blazed on the shores of the Ægean Sea. Long since they were quenched in the midnight darkness of apostasy. May the time never come when the fearful vision of the ancient prophet will be realised in the history of our own beloved Church: may she never be visited by the linen-vested marker of the foreheads of the faithful, and the slaughter-weaponed executioners of a Saviour's wrath!

We have thus endeavored to magnify the office of deacons. It is not theirs to ascend the pulpit as commissioned legates of the skies to preach "the glorious gospel of the blessed God" to a dying world: not theirs, as official stewards of the mysteries of redemption, to extend the bread and the water of eternal life to the famishing soul. But it is theirs to descend to the pallet of the sick and the hovel of the poor; and as the almoners of the Church's charities to bear the dish of food and the cup of comfort to the suffering body. It is not their vocation to preside upon the bench of the ruler, and to sway the pastoral staff for the government and discipline of the flock of Christ; but it is, to sit at the board of finance, and to wield the staff of the collection bag,

for the sustenance of the ministry, the support of the poor, and the conduct of the Church's enterprises for the evangelisation of our fallen and perishing race. If they carry not the keys, they bear the purse. They are not the leaders of the sacramental host, to train them in the camp and to control them on the field of battle, but they are its quartermasters and commissaries, without whose offices the sinews of the holy war would be severed. They are not called to divide the word of truth; but they are, to distribute the money of the Church—material and earthly, it is true, but consecrated by the purchase of Jesus' death, marked with his atoning blood, and devoted to the advancement of his cause.

More humble and less conspicuous their office may be than that of the elder; but it is not the less divinely warranted, nor is it unilluminated by the splendor of a glorious example. It is a striking fact that the Lord Jesus, in his sojourn on earth, did not occupy the outward seat of the ruler—he condescended to appear as a prisoner at the bar of the eldership of his own visible Church. But, as the great Deacon of Israel, he declared that he came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and illustrated the noble unselfishness of that utterance by the untiring dispensation of healing to the suffering bodies of men. Having closed his wondrous mission of beneficence to the poor diseased body, it is affecting to contemplate him, entitled, as he was, to the submission and the homage of a prostrate universe, bearing a towel and a basin, the symbols of a servant; him, before whom every knee shall bow in heaven, earth, and hell, bending his knee and washing his disciples' feet. In the discharge of their peculiar duties, it will be glory to deacons to walk in his footsteps, and imitate his example of compassionate ministration to the temporal wants of men. Their office will not be lacking in dignity, even though sometimes in the estimation of a sensitive nature, it may seem to wear a crown of thorns. It is Christlike, and therefore sublime.

If, as she ought to do, the Church should commit to them the guardianship and management of her goods and property, a most responsible trust will be reposed in them. And so far as their office involves the collection of money for the maintenance and advancement of the Church's institutions and enterprises, they

are not beggars suing for alms. Deriving their warrant from their Master's word, and receiving their commission from his hands, they approach their fellow Christians and their fellow-men as his accredited agents, presenting to them alike the opportunity and the privilege of contributing their means to the promotion of his cause and the benefit of the world. Rebuffs need not abash them, nor call up a blush to their cheeks: they will seldom, if ever, equal the tide of spittle that was poured into their Saviour's face.

Constrained by his love, and supported by his grace, let them go on in the performance of their beneficent and important functions, satisfied with his approval and consoled by the conviction that they represent, in part, his ministry of mercy on earth. Let them use the office of a deacon well, and purchase to themselves a good degree and great boldness in the faith that is in Christ Jesus. And amidst the trials which must attend their service to their Lord, let them sustain themselves by the assurance that, the final conflict past, their disembodied spirits will be welcomed by the once poor, but glorified saints of Jesus, to everlasting habitations; and that in that tremendous day, when the great Minister of pity to suffering men shall take the seat and wear the crown of the Judge, he will publicly own their fidelity to him, and place an imperishable chaplet of honor on their heads.

J. L. GIRARDEAU.

ARTICLE II.

COMMON SENSE ARGUMENT.

Metaphysical reasoning fails to interest the majority of readers. And although abstruse discussion has its uses, and while a certain class of minds delight in abstract speculation, yet the profoundest philosopher is, himself, refreshed by a return to simplicity. Unadorned truth is attractive to all. Moreover, if the plain and practical argument is understood by the uncultured, the same method of proof can be comprehended, and appreciated equally well by the scholar and thinker. A "common sense argument," therefore, has this advantage, viz., that it is adapted to the learned and the unlearned, to the young and the old.

The proposition now before us is this, Do the Christian Scriptures make up a genuine and authentic record which can be depended on in all ages of the world, to "show light unto the people and to the Gentiles"? Can the book furnish, from its own pages, unquestionable signs of divinity, inspiration, and truth?

There is one fact that it may be well to state in the beginning, to wit, that every thoughtful person concludes, but through observation and experience, that unbelief does not arise, after all, from any lack of evidence—a bulk of proof sufficiently powerful, in itself, to convince a healthful mind, but scepticism is traceable to a want of original righteousness and a melancholy corruption of the creature's heart. For instance, a hearer may sit under the gospel, preached clearly and faithfully for years, and still remain listless and unbelieving. But, afterwards, a plain discourse, or a single text of Scripture, reaches the heart, and in the moment when the affections are touched, the testimony in behalf of the word becomes convincing and overpowering. The soul, hitherto callous about a Saviour's life and love, now exclaims, "Truly this is the Son of God!" The sum of evidence is unchanged, the proclamation is identically the same that the man has heard for years; but in the new dispensation, enlightening the mind, arousing the affections, and leading to repentance and head the magnificence of the truth.

The very same outward proof which the soul refused to heed in former days is so handled, through the operations of the Holy Ghost, that the stricken spirit exclaims from its depths, "What shall I do to be saved?"

In conducting the argument let it be remarked, in the first place, that the greater portion of our knowledge or information is derived from *testimony* brought to us from abroad. Experience and personal observation constitute the remaining sources. Now, upon which of these witnesses do we, as a Christian people, accept the sacred volume as the inspired word of God? We answer that the believer himself feels and is decided by both lines of proof. For such a one can appeal to an inward consciousness that confirms the signs without. But as mankind in general, unregenerate as they are, cannot appreciate a demonstration derived from Christian experience, let us call into court the writers of the Scriptures who themselves claim to have been companions of Jesus and spectators of the wonderful things recorded.

Before proceeding farther, however, let us pause and settle distinctly the prerequisites of a witness. (1) He must be endowed with a competent understanding. (2) His character for veracity should be justly established. (3) He must be left to testify free from the fear of punishment, and uninfluenced by the hope of unrighteous reward.

Let these tests be applied to the writers and witnesses of the New Testament. Were the authors of these gospels mentally competent? Did Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John comprehend their mission when called to testify concerning the sayings, work, and life of Jesus? Does any deficiency of capacity crop out anywhere in the writings of these authors? Does the slightest suspicion of intellectual unfitness in these men ever bring the reader of low or high degree to a pause? When we read the Epistles of Peter or Paul, do we for an instant entertain a doubt of the mental vigor of such apostles? Would such witnesses, were life itself at stake, be refused in a modern court, and upon the charge of mental incapacity? If Paul's "sufficiency" were in debate, then it might be inquired what man of the ages can the world point to, as possessed of larger natural gifts, aye of nobler culture,

than belonged to this "Roman citizen," "this vessel chosen of God to bear his name before the Gentiles and kings and the children of Israel"? What writer of ancient or modern times excels this man in logic, persuasion, fulness, and power? Where, again, can eloquence be found which surpasses the sublime and burning words of Paul when in bonds before Agrippa he pleads for truth, for true liberty, for Christ? or when on Mars' Hill, with "his spirit stirred in him," he sought to point the Athenian from the superstitious columns, altars, and temples, to the "unknown" but true God, "in whom we live and move and have our being"? Was this man of mighty thought and noble act unfit to testify?

Turn to either Gospel, and consider any parable or other reported saying of Christ. Are these utterances the product of incapacity? How can this be, when the entire literature of Greece and Rome furnishes nothing that so fastens itself on the judgment or so lingers in the memory as the Sermon on the Mount or the parable of the prodigal. And if the verdict of the whole race was ascertained to-day, it would decide, beyond a question, that no lines of gifted poet, no speculation of wise philosopher, can compare with the simple, profound, sublime, elevated, and elevating teachings which we of the present time receive through the pens of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Did these evangelists possess the mental capacity that a careful court demands? Can these writers be accepted as witnesses, when the intellect is considered? Why, to ask such a question is an insult to the understanding!

But, secondly, we must inquire, were these writers and witnesses persons of veracity? Who can cast a suspicion on them? What falsehood can be alleged? It is to beg the question to point to the remarkable facts and superhuman events which they record. For the question must be, Were these extraordinary deeds—these heavenly words—matters of observation, subjects of personal experience? The witnesses are in court, and their testimony is to be sifted and weighed by those rules which are righteously and almost universally established in the tribunals of the nations, for the reception of evidence involving property, honor, or even life

itself. We have proven intelligence already, and now what shall be the decision about the moral character of men who taught the purest doctrines, announced the loftiest precepts, and who themselves, so far as aught to the contrary has ever been shown or seriously asserted, lived lives above reproach and walked in a way that defied calumny itself? Turn to a few maxims propounded by these witnesses. "Deny thyself and take thy cross." "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness." "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out." "If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off." "Blessed are the pure in heart." "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use and persecute you." "Enter ye in at the strait gate." "Whosoever loveth or uttereth a lie is excluded from the kingdom of God. Can the authors of such sentiments of purity be aught else than pure themselves? Could falsehood find a lodgment in the heart, or thus issue from the lips of those who, in the same breath, make truth and holiness an indispensable condition of happiness and of the divine approval hereafter? The sword that the objector seeks to wield has a double edge to it. For if the law holds every man innocent until his guilt is made clear, simple fairness requires that the facts recorded in Scripture shall be disproved before the witnesses we have produced can be denominated liars. And he who charges his neighbor with perjury must either prepare himself beforehand to make the charge good, or else patiently suffer the penalty which his failure entails. With such a dire alternative in view, what sceptic would venture to charge the Apostles and Evangelists with lying? The third prerequisite of a witness is, that he shall not be in duress, neither must bribery in any form be allowed to enter. Unfortunately for the sceptic, the fears and hopes which existed in the bosom of our witnesses were all on the side opposed to unbelief. When Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John testified as they did, persecution, with the loss of everything earthly, stared them in the face. Therefore, if it was a lie which these men uttered, then they chose to speak falsely—and thereby incur disgrace and sorrow—at the hour that truth would have answered better. Yea, if it be contended that the writers

of the Scriptures were perjurers, then it may be proved that a man can deliberately, and without motive, rob himself of earthly gain, and voluntarily impose on his soul a great burden of guilt. Is this common sense? Does human nature ever thus act? Is there an attorney, practising in the very lowest courts, whose observation can unfold such a transaction as this? Do not the vilest criminals—witnesses bought with a price—have an eye to safety, or reward? One cannot sink so low, provided that intelligence remains, that he does not respect, in some form, the law of self-preservation. Hence the theory of unbelief literally places the scriptural witnesses outside of the pale of a common humanity. The Evangelists were anomalies—persons of an unknown description, in whose bosoms could be found no sentiment, principle, nor motive, which bound them to the race. For if infidelity speaks truthfully, the disciples and apostles who witness for the gospel devised more methods to throw away worldly honors—to provoke persecution, imprisonments, bonds, and trouble of every sort—than the most zealous unbeliever was ever known to put forth to establish any purpose or system whatever. For the writers and witnesses of the New Testament knew full well that they must suffer all things, lose all, so far as earth can give, if they ventured to affirm what they did. And, nevertheless, these men steadfastly refused to be silent. Aye, more, they diligently sought opportunity to declare the gospel in every household, from country to country. And notwithstanding an opposition which involved stripes, chains, and death, our witnesses exhibited to all, everywhere, an outward life of unceasing toil and heroic self-denial. Here let the thoughtful pause and consider the witnesses. Are they competent mentally? Can any legal cause, of any kind, be shown sufficient to reject, or in the slightest degree invalidate their testimony? On the contrary, has not each and every requirement, demanded by the exactest court, been met to the letter?

If it be asked, was the New Testament written in the first century, and how do we prove it, the method is very simple. That the Gospels, as they are accepted at present, existed in Luther's time, no sane man can doubt. Did these writings exist

a century earlier? The proof is still clear. And so we can easily ascend to the days of the Apostles. Indeed, so freely were the Scriptures quoted by the Fathers of the second, third, fourth, and fifth centuries, that from their pages alone might be collected every essential fact and doctrine. Throughout the rolling centuries not a single link is missing. The evidence that Horace or Virgil lived and wrote certain poems cannot compare in bulk to the proof ready to hand to demonstrate the genuineness of the Gospels. But if historical testimony is relied upon universally to point out the literary works of heathen authors, as well as the period at which they wrote, how can the same species of proof, with its quantity augmented, be refused when the Christian Scriptures are in question?

If, however, the New Testament is genuine and authentic, so, too, is the Old. For it will be recalled that Christ's constant appeal was not to the Gospels, but to the "Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms." In our Saviour's time, as every intelligent person knows, the New Testament had no existence. Even when Jesus said "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me," he referred to the Hebrew Bible.

Still further, a division in the Jewish family was remarkably overruled of God for the preservation of the sacred text in its integrity. Down here was the Jew and up there lived the Samaritan, and each had his version. Not a word, yea, not a letter, could have been changed by the one side or the other without quick detection and certain exposure. And during long years a deep seated jealousy excited envy and quickened vigilance in the minds of these sections of a divided Hebrew household. Added to this, it must be remembered that the scribes examined into the accuracy of each roll or copy of "the Law," even to every "jot and tittle." The minutest divergence excited suspicion. And had either Jew or Samaritan ventured to alter a line, or phrase, or syllable, an outcry would have been raised whose echo might not have died out even down to our own day and times.

After Christ appeared, and since the New Testament has formed part of the sacred Canon, a watch has been set between

the Gentile and the Jew. For eighteen hundred years neither of these could have altered their Scriptures and kept the fact concealed. The Jew, whose presence among the nations can be historically traced for thousands of years, could be a swift witness against the genuineness of the New Testament writings, provided these were a cheat—a pretended record—imposed upon the world at a posterior date, and by spurious authors. The Hebrew, whose existence embraces the whole period—the Christian era and centuries beside—has never sought to cast a shadow of doubt upon the claim that Jesus lived, that he gathered disciples and taught them, and that the Gospels and Epistles were written at the particular period, and by the very authors, contended for by the Church universal.

When we bring the Old and the New Testaments together and compare them, the argument is strengthened tenfold. For the same great mind and purpose run through them both. One is the necessary complement of the other. And is it not a wonder, yea, a miracle in itself, that persons who lived during a period of two thousand years, under governments the most diverse, should have written upon a variety of subjects, upon all that concerns man's responsibility to God and obligation to his fellows, and yet in the voluminous records not a disparity can be found? Prophets, authors, teachers, from first to last, speak and write with freedom and in correspondence to natural gifts, but there is never a conflict either of idea or spirit. Not the slightest jarring can be detected between Malachi and Moses, between Job and Jeremiah; but facts, lessons, predictions, from the opening sentence in Genesis onward to the close, move step by step in one direction and with a harmony and concert truly astonishing.

Yes, whoever investigates the Hebrew Scriptures with scrutiny will perceive that one great central thought pervades the whole. That type, symbol, prophecy, recorded providences, all point to a Mighty Prophet, like unto Moses, but far greater, who should fulfil all righteousness, put away sin, to the brightness of whose rising the Gentiles would come from the ends of the earth. Can this unmatched accord, this unity in design, traversing, as it does, centuries of time, including writers and actors brought up and

trained in different lands, amid opposing scenes, can a volume that under such conditions exhibits a perfect oneness of spirit, an identical aim, be aught else than a product where infinite mind controlled? This must be, for collusion in such a case was impossible. Its very suggestion is an absurdity. For how could authors and actors, whose places in history are five hundred or a thousand years apart, meet together and agree? And agree, too, about what? About events over which the greatest intellects of earth had no perceptible control! Nor could the prophets and thinkers of Moses' and Joshua's day have anticipated, without inspiration, the thought, customs, deeds, which were to dominate in the times of Isaiah, Daniel, and our Lord. This concord, therefore, that runs through the Book, and that has no parallel elsewhere, can be accounted for upon one ground only, viz., that "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," and that the entire drama unfolded in the Old Testament and the New, was present beforehand in the divine mind, and every scene and act and person and plan were subordinated in the roll of ages by Him with whom one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years as a day. As in the physical universe we can trace through all the periods the work of the same creative hand, can discern at each advance unique design, so in the Sacred Scriptures the careful inquirer finds conclusive proof that the identical contriver, the one omnipotent will, that presided in the beginning, continued to preside even to the end.

Look upon the Jew: is he not an ever-fulfilling prophecy? He is walking at present the precise path foretold by Moses and Joshua four thousand years ago. Scattered among the nations, no amount of contempt or persecution has induced him to amalgamate with the Gentiles. The same omnipresent hand that guided him in the long gone centuries, guides him to-day. He is preserved separate to subserve a purpose, and in that providence which awaits the Jew will be revealed "the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out." Into whatever land the Hebrew wanders, he bears in himself a living

argument to establish, beyond doubt, the authenticity of the Scriptures.

A dualism runs through all nature, from the smallest things up to the greatest. Stand by the machinist when he constructs the curious engine, and what does his skilful work suggest? Why, force, motion, of course. Look at the farmer as he ploughs the furrow, and does not this foretell sowing, harvest, garners, winter? See the architect who plans and rears the building, even in the wilderness, and are not our thoughts turned at once to an occupant? To ascend higher, let us examine the senses which belong to man's physical frame. Scrutinise the eye, and what does this organ suggest? Is it not light? And the capacity to see indicates objects to be seen. Consider the ear, was it not made to hear? Is this not a medium formed, of design, to transmit sound, from the first cry of infancy up to the grandest notes which peal out from the organ? The sense of smell is a prophesy of fragrance, incense, and the balm of flowers. Appetite points to food. Indeed, there is not a thirst or longing of the physical man that does not find a safe and healthful answer. And how exact the correspondence? Who, therefore, can discredit the identity of the power that planted the need, the desire, and that intelligence which supplies, at every turn, the creature's real wants. Is there not ONE God over all?

Examine man's intellectual and moral nature. There is within the human bosom (1) The sense of sin. (2) Conscience striving to bring an offering—to find an acceptable sacrifice. (3) A longing after immortality. (4) Hope and fear. The most favored are not exempt. All come short and every creature suffers, while "passing away" is written upon the entire framework around us, from the weakest to the strongest. Ask the wise or the simple, and each alike will tell of an inward void, of expectations wasted, plans marred, and of the sad changes which the "King of Terrors" makes, from time to time, in every house. For the ills which environ us in this sublinary state, the heart of the faint and suffering looks, yea, yearns after a remedy. As to the *facts* themselves, belief and unbelief are agreed. But when we apply to infidelity for a *solution*—aye, for any common sense explana

tion—it is here that faith and scepticism part company. It is true that unbelief abounds in negations, proposes to throw overboard every scheme heretofore proposed, but in the midst of its denials and objections no plausible substitute can be offered. Investigate one by one the systems of philosophy of India, China, and other heathen nations, and what contradictions we find. “Read,” says Gaussen, “in the Shaster, in the Pouran, in the four books of the Vedham or law of the Hindoos, their shocking cosmogony.” What mistakes in science—what physical errors throughout! And if we turn the pages of the renowned teachers of Greece and Rome, we can cull sentences uttered by Aristotle, Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, Cicero, which would fatally compromise any book in the Bible. And if we descend to modern times, the more far-famed schools offer nothing conclusive, nothing on which the weary and heavy laden can rest.

The inquiry still ascends from the yearning soul, “Who will show me any god”? Is there any balm for human sorrow, any life beyond this toiling vale, where the corruptible shall put on incorruption and this mortal immortality? Have man’s physical cries been answered, in the early and latter rain, in food convenient, and the soul been left to grope its way in darkness with no supplies for the present and no prospect in the future? Did he who planted those vast desires in the human spirit forget to provide a response thereto? Did the Creator exhaust his forces on the body and its needs, and leave out of view the longings of the spirit? In the search can we find some bright paged book whose teachings science and unbelief have attacked in vain? Is there a system in all the world that meets—yes, has already met—in cases innumerable, the holiest cravings of earth’s broadest minds and noblest hearts? We reply, that the Christian Scriptures answer, and have answered for mighty ages, man’s every moral want in time, and solved, as far as human thought can go, the mysteries beyond. This record, the more narrowly it is searched, reveals a superhuman Author. Whoever studies its pages devoutly must be convinced that he who fashioned man furnished this Book to guide and cheer him on his way.

What a spirit of catholicity pervades the Scriptures. Its ap-

peals and offers are to every one alike. "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." Condition, whether poverty, wealth, obscurity, or renown, is nothing. The Book speaks with authority in the pauper's hovel, but utters its voice none the less authoritatively in the ear of kings. Human societies exclude certain ages, but in that grace of God which appears to men, in this sacred volume, the young, the old, the middle-aged, the very babe in the cradle, can be made a partaker of the benefit.

In one place the lessons of the Scriptures are so simple that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein; in another the wisdom is so deep that the mightiest mind can "know only in part." We read a work of human genius once, twice, thrice, and the thought is mastered or becomes stale, but these Scriptures are a study for the loftiest intellect through generation and generation. Moreover, the terms of salvation presented here differ in components from all earthly schemes. Human associations and worldly plans demand a price; but the gospel requires, *allows* no recompence. Admittance free is written on its every lintel.

Furthermore, the Scriptures oppose desires native to the fallen soul, and condemn, without compromise, the creature's dearest lusts. Could such condemnation of self by man be pronounced aside from superhuman force? Is it possible for a person, voluntarily, to sentence to death his best-loved idols. Can a creature, to whom vengeance belongs and is sweet, say, "Avenge not thyself, but rather give place to wrath; if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink. Do good to them that hate thee, and if the right cheek be smitten, turn the left to the smiter"?

The Book abounds in such paradoxes as the following: "Blessed are the poor in spirit;" "blessed are they that mourn;" "blessed are ye, when men revile and persecute;" "the love of money is the root of all evil;" "cast thy bread on the waters." The boldest heathen intellect of all the ages never dared to utter one single saying like unto these. The Scriptures empty man of self

and pride. They tell of strength that flows from weakness, glory bought by shame, and a life which comes of death. To deny self, to take up a cross and bear it, here are the first steps toward true honor. From Genesis to Revelation, holiness is the watchword and a prerequisite indispensable. Are such doctrines and precepts divine or human? Would impostors and liars exalt righteousness and take pains to shut heaven's door against themselves?

The Scriptures explain affliction. As fire tries the gold and burns away the dross, so tribulation, for the soul of man, worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in the heart. It is through discipline that man's spirit is refined and ascends from glory to glory. Hence, without chastisement, the sons of God cannot grow. The pathway to eternal blessedness leads, by divine appointment, through "great tribulation."

The Scriptures elucidate the present inequalities. In this transitory world, preparation is the one great business. To watch, to labor, to suffer, to endure, these are the needed duties day by day. In the life that now is, Christ's soldiers are to be valiant, contending, to prison or to death, for the faith delivered to the saints. True, to him that runs well, much peace and honor are promised along the journey. But, about quiet happy hours, as men count happiness, the Christian pilgrim need not care. Heaven is the goal, and no earthly wrongs can keep the faithful back. Sorrow may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning. Said Richard Allestre, when speaking of the martyrs, "God's furnace made their crowns splendid, gave them a majesty of shine and an imperial glory."

Study the character of Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels. Did ever man thus speak? Does not Christ as a Teacher stand out alone, and unapproached in wisdom among the sons of men? Take the centuries and the nations through and through, and can one single son of Adam be found to match this Nazarene? He mingled day after day with sinners, ate and talked with them, relieved their needs, and yet never for once was guile found on his lips. The bitterest foe confessed that he was holy, harmless,

undefiled, and far separated from sin. Now, if Christ was simply human, why has not nature repeated itself? Why cannot the like of Jesus, even approximately, in the revolving centuries, be found speaking to the people? Yea, more, either such a person as Jesus Christ lived and acted as reported, or there did not. If Jesus lived, and performed the wonderful works attributed to him by the Evangelists, then he was divine, and the Scriptures true. But if the record be false, then we have a company of unprincipled conspirators creating a character of ineffable perfection and unearthly beauty! The illiterate and wicked produce a record before which the mightiest efforts of genius are as chaff! The intellects of Greece and Rome, however vast, must yield the palm to these untutored impostors—to men, who if they testify falsely, trample into dust every law spiritual and material, human and divine. Such a view of the case is not only impossible, but simply absurd.

In addition, the Scriptures—turn whither we may—contain the only plan that ever satisfied the deep yearnings of the immortal soul. For, when sorrow comes and sin oppresses, and the grave begins to open, every system of philosophy miserably fails. Only in the Christian Bible do we find words to cheer, and light to guide, when the shadows fall thick, and heart and flesh are failing. Through no other weapon has the benighted and encompassed pilgrim been enabled to cut his way in the darkness. In no other book, in the world's entire circuit, has light and immortality been brought to light, death the universally dreaded foe been robbed of his sting, and the grave, once victorious over all, made to yield its sceptre to a mightier Victor. Wonderful Book! Its pages penned by shepherds, publicans, fishermen, and dwellers in the desert. The record embracing mighty centuries, and yet, from first to last, in history, science, philosophy, not an error, not the shadow of a blunder, that hate, learning, or unbelief can show. Aye, more, as painstaking research ascends higher, or goes down deeper, the more amazingly does the truth, whether physical or moral, greet the eye in its finish and beauty. The things hitherto too deep for proud philosophy, hidden for ages from the schools and from science, are found revealed, far

back in the past, to those humble ones who walked with God, and unto whom, although counted babes and sucklings by this world's wise, he made known the secret wonders of his power in earth and sky.

Of what avail, then, is Hume's oft-repeated sophism before such proof as the Christian apologist can distinctly adduce? With nothing but a Jew before us, we could almost, if not altogether, accept the conditions of debate offered by this noted sceptic, and come off victors. Whence this Hebrew of undoubted physiognomy? We find him among all the nations, and yet diverse from all. With every temporal inducement to be otherwise, he has stubbornly refused. With no parallel in history, and yet working, living, acting, and suffering, just as was foretold of him four thousand years ago. Here is a wonder as great as the chiefest miracle of the New Testament, and brought home to "the experience" of every man. The assertion, that a miracle is contrary to human experience, and cannot be established by any bulk of proof, is false. For we reply that an individual or generation can know but little by actual contact and personal inspection. All information concerning the past, or the absent, must be derived from testimony. It is in this way alone that we are certified of facts which fell out in the ages long gone. And when the law, or rules, of evidence are properly considered, then Hume's boasted argument amounts to a simple begging of the question. For if it be asked, was there ever a miracle, how are we to ascertain? Certainly by putting the question to each generation. If the first century responds, Yes, we had miracles here, then its claims are to be tested upon the uniform grounds of proof. And if testimony can be rejected here, it can be refused anywhere that presumption chooses, and in the end nothing can be proved that has not been seen and handled. Even the existence and exploits of Napoleon must be accepted upon testimony, while the multitude of wonders which this man and others have performed—the authenticity of which no one questions—must be taken upon the statement of a limited number of witnesses.

We resort to no subterfuge. For no artifice whatever is needed. Indeed, that faith is not worth the advocacy which demands craft

or unfair dealing to be used in its defence. That system which cannot challenge light and scrutiny should be set down as false. The Christian defender occupies ground from which all opposing forces may be defied. If he wields his weapons aright, principalities and powers will be unable to move him. The true believer handles both pebble and sword, and is clothed from head to foot in the panoply of the Almighty.

We are willing to submit the genuineness and authenticity of the Christian Scriptures to the strictest formula of logic and to abide by the result. The Baconian method demands a full and adequate observation of the facts, and then from particular instances we are to rise through stage after stage of generalisation, till the regular law is reached. By this principle every theory is to be tried. Does geology or chemistry claim to be a science? Then let the "particular instances" be collected, and we shall ascertain whether these are sufficient to lead us up to the law of regular succession. We claim no exemption for the Bible. Let all the particulars be gathered, and let logic, in its utmost severity, proceed to deal with the facts, and if the deduction does not distinctly demonstrate the divinity of the Christian faith, it will, of necessity, enforce a belief in wonders even more astounding.

If the sceptic taunts the Christian on account of credulity, this charge, with twofold power, can be turned on himself. Mr. Morell has well remarked that "the greatest of unbelievers is of all men the most credulous. He rejects perhaps a thousand truths which rest on a solid and satisfactory evidence, but then is obliged to accept some crude system of his own into which none of these truths (to save his consistency) are permitted to enter. The sceptic, for example, who denies the divine origin of Christianity may often appear at first sight rational in his objections so long as he is *pulling down* the common belief of Christendom, but the moment he is called upon to *build up* a system of his own, the moment he is called upon to account for the facts in the case upon some other hypothesis, he soon begins to draw far more largely than his opponent upon the very credulity he has derided. And not only this, but the more universal the scepticism, the greater must be the credulity by which it is followed, because

exactly in proportion to the number of facts which are first rejected must be the paucity of those which are left on which to construct a new system.”¹

It is our firm conviction, therefore, that the Christian scheme taxes credulity far less than unbelief. J. S. GRASY.

ARTICLE III.

THE CHURCH AND TEMPERANCE.

The world moves; and while there is reason to believe that its general course is upward, to one viewing its progress from the standpoint of temperance, and embracing in his view the movement through centuries, it appears to be travelling on an incline towards the bottomless pit. Dr. Benjamin W. Richardson says:

“The discovery of distillation of wine has been attributed to Albucasis, or Casa, an Arabian chemist of the eleventh century: but many centuries elapsed before the process of distillation was applied to produce those stronger drinks which, under the name of ‘spirits,’ are now in such common use in daily life. Brandy is a late term in European literature. Gin was unknown two hundred years ago. Rum is an American term, applied to an American invention. Whiskey, a Celtic word meaning ‘water,’ has not been Anglicized more than a century and a half. Neither rum, nor brandy, nor gin, nor whiskey, nor any alcoholic drink of similar destructive power, has been in common use until comparatively recent modern times.”

It appears from this that during vastly the greater part of the earth’s history, the curse of intemperance has been slight compared with what it is now. “Drunkenness,” says the *Westminster Review*, “is the curse of England—a curse so great that it far eclipses every other calamity under which we suffer. It is impossible to exaggerate the evils of drunkenness.” When we read this statement, and know that what the writer says of England is true of every country where distilled liquors are used, we find

¹ Morell Spec. Philos., p. 192.

some relief in the reflection that it is only in the last few centuries that this king of evils has been exercising such cruel tyranny over miserable mortals. "The strong man" which now binds so many, never discovered the vast resources of his strength until "comparatively recent modern times." The warfare he has ever waged against the race, at least since the days of Noah, was formerly, like all ancient warfare, carried on with very imperfect weapons. He knew only the use of bow and arrow, wooden pike and sling; powder and ball and the dread artillery belong to a modern day. It is hard to conceive to what extent intemperance would be robbed of its destructive power, if every drink stronger than wine could be abolished. But even then we should not be as free from the curse as the ancients, for the reason that nearly all our wines are adulterated, and their intoxicating quality greatly increased by the addition of distilled liquors. The same eminent writer from whom we have quoted says that a "*bona fide* wine, derived from the fermentation of grapes purely, cannot contain more than 17 per cent. of alcohol. Yet our staple wines by an artificial process of fortifying and brandying, which means the adding of spirits, are brought up in Sherries to 20, and in Ports to even 25 per cent." Manifestly our ancestors of a distant day were compelled by their ignorance of distillation to be much better off than we would be, if robbed of every other means of making ourselves miserable than our "spiked" wines. But more than this, those strange old people put themselves under the voluntary restraint of a custom which required them to make their wines weaker instead of stronger. The learned Dr. Keith says, after speaking of the way in which they diluted their wines, "In general it was regarded as a mark of intemperance to drink pure wine, and characteristic of the Scythians and other 'Barbarians,' but unbecoming civilised men." People in those days could get drunk, and many did get drunk, but necessity was laid upon them to go through a very tedious and gradual process in order to reach the low level of beastly intoxication which can now be reached in a few moments. They could not step into a bar-room and get insanely drunk before breakfast. On the day of Pentecost when the apostles began to

create a great sensation by speaking with new tongues, their enemies charged them with being drunk. Peter's reply was, in substance, that the accusation was preposterous, seeing it was but 9 o'clock in the morning. What would be thought of such an argument to rebut the charges of drunkenness in our day? With our modern appliances, a man could begin after late breakfast, and reach the horizontal stage long before 9 o'clock; nor would it be necessary for experts to tell the crowd that he was drunk—it would be perfectly patent to the most unsophisticated. Progress is emphasised as one of the striking characteristics of this age. We are often called upon to conceive the astonishment which would overwhelm our ancestors of a few generations back should they arise from their graves and look on the wonders of modern improvement. When they should see our railroads, telegraphs, telephones, phonographs, stenographs, *et alia similia*, they would think certainly an age of miracles had intervened since they fell asleep. Doubtless their astonishment would reach its climax when they saw how the means of drunkenness had been multiplied and intensified, and learned that 80,000,000 gallons of spirits flow annually down the throats of the people of the United States. Probably the conclusion would be that however much progress may have been made, the devil is leading the van. The *New York Tribune* in 1867 contained an editorial supposed to have been from the pen of Mr. Greely, in which it was stated that the "whole cost of liquors annually made and sold in the United States is about \$500,000,000. In the consumption of this liquor 60,000 lives are yearly lost, 100,000 men and women are sent to prison, and 200,000 children are bequeathed to poor-houses and charitable institutions."

In the light of these unpleasant facts, it becomes manifest that the Church of God which is placed as a bulwark across the world's great currents of evil is now compelled to sustain a stronger pressure from the side of intemperance than ever before. The tide in this channel has swollen to alarming proportions, and seriously threatens to break over all barriers, and create a scene of wild desolation even within the pale of the Church. Many are the wrecks, from among the professed children of God, seen floating

out on this current into the whirlpools of ruin, beyond the hope of human redemption. It is cause for gratitude that the Church is becoming more and more aroused to a sense of her responsibility. Both in this country and Europe, she is putting forth strenuous efforts of resistance; and has recently been making perceptible progress against the tide. There is, however, a conviction in the mind of the writer, that the Church's attitude on the subject of temperance is not as clearly defined as it should be. Neither the outside world, nor the inside membership can tell exactly what the Church, in her functions of government, recognises as sins of intemperance. The prevailing sentiment in many sections of the Church is manifestly in favor of total abstinence, and regards moderate drinking, whether by official or private Christian, whether habitually or only occasionally, as sinful. But in no branch of the Church has total abstinence been made a requisite to membership. It is recognised that Church authority, while recommending total abstinence on the ground of Christian expediency, cannot require it on the ground of scriptural obligation. All that the Church can do, in reference to moderate drinking, is to exercise her didactic function. She can "reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long-suffering and doctrine"; but she cannot say, "Thou shalt not," for the reason that the Bible has nowhere said, either expressly or by implication, "Thou shalt not." It is not a sin *per se*, and while it may be, in most cases, the first step in a career of sinful dissipation, and may also, in most cases, "tempt others to sin", and should, therefore, be earnestly discouraged by Church teaching; yet it is possible that neither one of these sinful consequences shall follow, and therefore Church authority cannot absolutely forbid it. If disciplinable at all, it must become so by attendant circumstances, or subsequent results.

There is also a sentiment widely prevalent which condemns the traffic in spirituous liquors. By "traffic in spirituous liquors" is meant the sale of them, whether by wholesale or retail, as of ordinary articles of merchandise, without reference to whether or not the buyer will likely make an improper use of his purchase.¹

¹The reader will please bear in mind that in the following pages the word "traffic" is always used in the sense here defined.

Perhaps the moral sentiment of every Christian, whose piety is in a vigorous and healthy state, is shocked at the idea of a man's dealing out to his fellow-men indiscriminately and unreservedly that which he knows to be so generally the source of misery and ruin. But hitherto the Church has only expressed its disapproval in the same "didactic, advisory, and monitory" terms which she is accustomed to use in the case of moderate drinking. Judging from the attitude of the Church, the traffic and the moderate use are supposed to stand in the same relation to the sin of drunkenness; that while there is great danger that each will promote drunkenness, it is yet possible that neither may. We think the supposition involves an error. The relation between moderate drinking and drunkenness is very close, but not invariable, for drunkenness does not always follow moderate drinking. It is otherwise in respect to the traffic. The relation between it and the sin of drunkenness is as constant as that between sunlight and day. It is absolutely impossible to separate between the two. The writer has it on the confession of two intelligent, honest, and otherwise consistent members of the Church, who are engaged in the sale of whiskey in a community where habits of dissipation prevail to a great extent, that if they had full control of the business, and were to conduct it on the most approved methods, the quantity drunk in the community would probably not be diminished. They profess to use every precaution that sellers can to prevent the evil effects of their sales; they allow no liquor to be drunk on their premises; they refuse to sell to notorious drunkards and to minors; and yet they cannot, on their own confession, without quitting the business altogether, cut off the supply of a single man, woman, or child in the whole community. This does not prove that the sale of the whiskey and the drunkenness of the buyer are related as cause and effect. But it does prove that the sale of the whiskey is the invariable and known occasion, as well as the essential condition, of the drunkenness of the buyer, and this is enough to make the seller *particeps criminis*. "Woe to the man by whom the offence cometh." It is not a sufficient reply to say that the buyer is a free agent, and is not forced by the seller to make an improper use of his

purchase. The hired assassin is a free agent, but the instinct of justice as expressed in civil law, demands that he who offered the inducement by which his free agency was influenced shall share equally with the assassin in the penalty against murder. This principle is brought out in several of our laws, notably in those against the publication and sale of obscene literature. No person is bound to buy or read these bad books. The author does not force any one to make an improper use of the fruits of his labor. But the laws of the land, vindicating our sense of right, say to the author, "You shall not put the temptation in the way of your depraved fellow-men." The reasonableness of this restriction is due to the fact that it is infallibly certain that if the temptation is offered, the depraved appetency to which it appeals will yield. But it is equally certain that in any community where the traffic in liquors may be prosecuted, there will be found many who cannot resist the temptation to drink even to the extent of drunkenness. We do not ignore the difference between obscene literature and whiskey, in that one is altogether bad, while the other has its legitimate uses. Whiskey may properly be used for medicinal and mechanical purposes. The only logical consequence is that it may properly be sold for medicinal and mechanical purposes. We may go further, and admit the possibility of its being properly used in small quantities as a beverage. Even this does not draw with it the conclusion that it may properly be sold to promiscuous multitudes, as must needs be the case if the business is made profitable, when it is mathematically certain that an improper use of it will be the rule and the proper use the exception. It cannot be right to sell ten gallons simply because one of the ten will be used beneficially, or as least harmlessly, while there is every reason to believe that the other nine will be used to the injury of the buyer and others. Certainly opium can be applied to excellent uses. It is far more useful as a medicine than whiskey. But would this fact justify a Christian man in engaging in the opium traffic over in China, where it, like whiskey here, is used nine times out of ten, for its exhilarating, and not for its medicinal properties? Let an answer be given to this question in the language of a placard, affixed to one of the foreign houses

in Shanghai; "How absurd that these strangers come to Shanghai, and think to gain the people by their preaching. Twenty years ago they might have succeeded; but now opium, the real cause of all the evil, has perverted the hearts of the people." It is to the everlasting disgrace of the English government that it forced this traffic on those timid people at the point of the bayonet. As cowardly as is that heathen nation, it could not endure the unutterable evils of the opium traffic, until it had twice measured its strength in arms with the mightiest nation on the globe. They submit to it only as the fettered prisoner submits to the gloomy horrors of the dungeon. Does the fact that opium is a valuable drug justify a man in selling it as an ordinary article of merchandise in a community where its exceptional use is as a medicine, and its general use as a stimulant which destroys soul and body forever? The conscience of the heathen is not so perverted as to answer in the affirmative. Precisely the same reasoning applies to whiskey. The merchant cannot afford to pay license and sell it only for legitimate uses. He must make his profit from whiskey, which everybody knows, and no one better than the merchant himself, is used to gratify the craving of those who abuse it to their own eternal destruction. He quiets his conscience by the flimsy sophistry that while the State authorises the sale of it, there will certainly be enough sold to satisfy the demand, and so by his sales he is adding nothing to the quantity that would be sold even if he should refrain from selling. While the civil law remains as it is, "it must needs be that offences come." That is as true as gospel. But it is also as true as gospel, "woe be to that man by whom the offence cometh." The State by making this traffic legal, does not make it right. Civil law is not, and never was designed to be, the standard of morals among a Christian people. The great end of civil law is to prevent and punish outbreaking crimes against the peace of society. The State Legislature is not the fountain of that law which teaches us how to please God—the law by which we shall be judged in the great day. But the very fact that the State does legalise the traffic, and that many persons, even among those who have vowed allegiance to a higher power than the State, can pursue with an

easy conscience any calling sanctioned by the State, makes it the more imperative on the Church to assume a clear, positive, and unmistakably hostile attitude towards this business. She ought to take a decided step in advance of her present position, and array against it not only her didactic, but also her diacritic power. Where moral suasion proves ineffectual, she ought to apply legal repression. To every one under her jurisdiction, the Church should say plainly and firmly, "Thou shalt not." If asked for scriptural authority, let her point to the second table of the Decalogue. The trafficker furnishes to his customers an incitement to the perpetration of every crime that mars the welfare of society. His relation to these crimes is the more criminal because he knows with a certainty reached through experimental proof that they are the unfailling and inevitable resultants of his business. The argument by which we convict him is short, but we think conclusive. It may be thrown into the form of a syllogism thus: Whatever promotes the sin of drunkenness is itself sinful. The whiskey traffic invariably promotes the sin of drunkenness—*ergo*, it is invariably sinful.

In addition to the reasons already submitted in support of the minor premise, it may not be amiss to state a few pertinent facts gleaned from the history of State prohibition.

In February, 1869, a committee of the Lower House of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury reported 1,475 parishes where prohibition prevails, and say: "Few it may be believed are cognisant of the fact, which has been elicited by the present inquiry, that there are at this time, within the Province of Canterbury, upwards of one thousand parishes in which there is neither public house nor beer shop, and where, in consequence of the absence of these inducements to crime and pauperism, according to the evidence now before the committee, the intelligence, morality, and comfort of the people, are such as the friends of temperance would have anticipated."

Bessbrook, a town in Ireland, of 4,000 inhabitants, has no liquor shop, and whiskey and strong drink are strictly prohibited. There is no poor house, pawn shop or police station. The town is entirely free from strife, discord, or disturbance.

Tyrone County, Ireland, has 10,000 inhabitants. Right Hon. Lord Claude Hamilton said in 1870: "At present there is not a single policeman in that district. The poor rates are half what they were before the liquor traffic was suppressed, and the magistrates testify to the great absence of crime."¹

A few years ago the people of Maine concluded that the use of intoxicating liquors was destructive of the wealth, health, happiness, and morality of society. They rose up in the majesty of their might to put a stop to it. What measure did the united wisdom of the large majority of that people devise for this purpose? Did they say to the drinker, "You must stop drinking"? No, they knew that as a general rule he was in fatal bondage to a habit that made it impossible for him to stop. They said to the seller, "You shall stop selling. We cannot allow you to grow fat on the miseries of our people, while we pay taxes to support poor houses, and insane asylums, and houses of correction, to repair as far as possible the wrong you are doing, and to protect society from the maddened victims of your traffic." Did the result justify the wisdom of their course? We copy an answer by Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, D. D., from the pages of this Review, (Vol. 29, No. 3.) In summing up the effects of their prohibitory law, he says: "The second surprising effect was in the diminution of crime. Some of the county jails became absolutely empty. This was signally true of Oxford County, one of the largest counties in the State. It was also true of Penobscot, Kennebec, Franklin, and York. Their jails were entirely empty. In Cumberland County, the most populous county in the State, there were but five prisoners four months after the passage of the law, and three of these were liquor dealers who were imprisoned for violation of the prohibitory law. This jail had been usually overcrowded. In many places pauperism has entirely ceased, and all the work-houses and alms-houses have been greatly lightened of their heavy burdens." Ex-Governor Dingley, of Maine, recently gave the following answer to our question: "In 1855 there were 10,000 persons (one out of every forty-five of the population) accustomed

¹Prohibitionists' Text Book—New York: National Temperance Society and Publication House, 58 Reade street, 1878. Pp. 34, 35.

to get beastly drunk ; there were 200 deaths from delirium tremens annually ; there were 1,500 paupers made thus by drink ; there were 300 convicts in the State prison and jails ; and intemperance was destroying a large proportion of the homes throughout the State. Now not one in 300 of the population is a drunkard—not one-sixth as many ; the deaths from delirium tremens annually are not 50 ; and criminals and paupers (not including rum-sellers) are largely reduced, notwithstanding the great influx of foreigners and tramps.” Could the law be strictly enforced, the results would be even more wonderful ; but as it is they make this point certain, that just to the extent to which the sale of intoxicating liquors is suppressed, just to that extent are drunkenness and its concomitant vices diminished.

This is strikingly illustrated by the course of events in Massachusetts. In 1867 that State had a prohibitory law, which was repealed in 1868. The inspectors of the State prison reported to the Legislature in 1869 as follows : “The general fact is undeniable that a very large proportion of offences against law which bring men to prison for punishment are committed through the agency of intoxicating liquors, and that their increased public sale adds to the number of crimes committed, and the number of persons convicted.” In proof of this they submitted, among other things, this statement : “Total number of prisoners committed to the State prison during eight months of the year 1867, sixty-five ; number committed during the corresponding eight months of 1868, one hundred and thirty-six. The commitments were more than doubled when prohibition was taken off the liquor traffic.”

It seems, however, to be a work of supererogation to prove a fact that is universally admitted. The inseparable connection between the evils of intemperance and the whiskey traffic is recognised in the laws of all civilised countries. There is not a State in this Union which does not seek to mitigate the evils by regulating and restricting the sale. It is every where felt that the vice which marshals the long army of criminals that throng our jails ; and the long army of paupers that fill our poor houses ; and the long army of miseries that enter almost every home in

the land, and cast a shadow over every heart, must be guarded against by law. And the common sense of mankind has everywhere and always suggested the same thing—that the proper place to apply the law is on the person of the seller. The implication in all license laws is that the traffic is so exceedingly liable to result in great evil, that the State must exercise a very special guardianship over those engaged in it. The State examines them, and requires proof of good moral character, and then examines the neighborhood and premises where the deed is to be done, and finally sells them the dearly prized privilege of dealing out “liquid death” to their fellow-men, only on condition, however, that they do it in strict accordance with certain clearly and minutely defined regulations. It seems strange that any one whom Christ has made free, should willingly submit to the degradation of having his character investigated and passed upon yearly at the tribunal of Cæsar; and besides the degradation, pay a considerable sum for the legal right to follow a business which by the common consent of a wicked world is fraught with so much moral danger. When it is perfectly evident that all the evils still exist which the license laws propose to suppress, it seems strange that a Christian who is professedly striving to keep himself pure and unspotted from the world, should knowingly be a party with the State in perpetrating a miserable farce in pretending to regulate by law an evil which the law does not touch. Had our State Legislatures, in devising regulations and restrictions for the whiskey traffic, been consciously attempting to “frame mischief by a law,” it is doubtful whether they could have succeeded better than many of them have. For instance, it seems hardly probable that the devil himself could improve on the idea of making a license to sell whiskey equivalent to a certificate of “good moral character.” The more respectable the traffic, the more respectable is drunkenness and the more dire its consequences. The devil would have a respectable man at the head of every department of his work if it were possible. He can accomplish more through one Pharisee than through a half dozen Publicans. All that is required to make the evils feared from the traffic as great as they can be, is to see to it that the laws are

faithfully executed. Because this has not been done, the traffic has for the most part fallen into the hands of bad men. As a rule, only such men will follow a calling which a none too scrupulous government professedly watches with constant suspicion, and which is shown by abundant experience to merit not only suspicion but positive aversion. Certainly the Church is not to be charged with infringing Christian liberty, if she use even the rod of discipline in restraining her children from forming exceptions to that rule. There are but few things which respectability even pretends to do by way of preventing the evils which flow from an unrestricted sale. Respectability refuses the buyer permission to drink on his premises. This only necessitates the bringing or buying of a bottle, and this only insures that the purchaser will buy more than a drink at a time. Very recently the writer was told by a dealer that he began selling by the drink because convinced that it involved less injury to his customers. It is plain that whiskey drunk on any other premises is just as harmful as when drunk on the premises of the seller. Respectability refuses to sell to notorious drunkards. True philanthropy would sell to them rather than to others. They crave it more, and it will do them less hurt. They are already ruined. The time to have refused them, if mercy prompted the refusal, was before they had yet taken the step that carried them beyond the hope of recovery. Moreover, the refusal only puts them to the trouble of asking a friend to buy for them. Respectability refuses to sell to a man that is already growing disorderly under the influence of drink. If such refusal cut off the possibility of the man's sinking on down to the wretched state of beastly drunkenness, it would neither cut off nor retard what is far worse, the formation of a habit that ends in ruin. These little insignificant discriminations mark all the difference between the traffic as respectably conducted and as otherwise conducted. It is perfectly evident to a reflecting mind that these discriminations are utterly ineffectual in mitigating or diminishing the evils; and if any weight at all be allowed them, we certainly cannot allow enough to counterbalance the great moral aid given by respectability to the traffic.

The time has long gone by, if it ever was, when a man could

innocently follow this business because ignorant of the consequences. The tragic proofs of its desolating effects spring up quickly and thickly around every whiskey establishment that opens its doors to the public. The dealer must now be presumed to know perfectly the nature and results of his acts. However respectable he may be, however amiable in the other relations of life, as a whiskey dealer he must be regarded as a man who for the sake of gain is willing to be an accomplice in the wreck of the health, happiness, reputation, fortune, and homes of some, and it may be many, of his neighbors. He is a cool mercenary speculator, making profit out of the frailty and vices of those who are helpless slaves to a raging and tormenting thirst, and of others in whom he is helping to create and nourish just such a thirst. We insist that he is knowingly dependent upon these two classes for the success of his business. But for the quantity demanded by an artificial and destructive thirst, he could not pay a high license tax, and still derive a handsome income from the money invested. Take from any dealer the privilege of furnishing a part of the whiskey that produces the sufferings and inspires the crimes that attend on drunkenness, and he would at once turn his capital into other channels of commerce. "He has looked the sure consequences of his course fairly in the face, and if he can but make gain of it, is prepared to corrupt the souls, embitter the lives, and blast the prosperity of an indefinite number of his fellow-creatures. He knows that if men remain virtuous and thrifty, if these homes around him continue peaceful and joyous, his craft cannot prosper. But if the virus of drink can only be made to work, swift desolation will come of it, and every pang will bring him pelf; each broken heart will net him so much cash; so much from each blasted home and shame-stricken family; so much a widow; so much an orphan! He does not expect to win all that others lose; so far from that, he is perfectly aware that only a meagre per centage of the wreck will find its way into his hand. Yet for this he sets it all afloat! He fires a city that he may pilfer in the crowd." Why the State tolerates this traffic (to say nothing of feeding her own treasury on the profits, as is now the case,) is explained by such Scriptures as Job ix. 24. But why

should the Church tolerate it? Oh that she would ponder this question in a spirit of prayerful earnestness.

The obligation resting on the Church to assume a more clearly defined and actively hostile attitude towards the evils of intemperance is rendered more solemn in that experiment has proven what might have been concluded *a priori*, that the Church is the only organisation that can cope successfully with these evils. Temperance societies have no resources of strength sufficient for such a warfare. It is not denied that they have in some places, and for a time, achieved a partial success. But doubtless even this partial success has been due to the use of instrumentalities borrowed from the Church. The gospel truth, embodied in temperance lectures and tracts, and the fervent prayers breathed from pious hearts, which have always and everywhere formed part of the means of temperance societies, have not been entirely barren. But who that believes in the divine origin of the Church can doubt that if she had used her own weapons, the victories in behalf of temperance would have been much greater in extent, and more lasting in results? It is with reluctance, and certainly in no unsympathetic spirit, that we utter a word in disparagement of temperance societies. We recognise them as the fruit of a great woe-seeking relief. Their origin is to be found in hearts breaking under the pressure of sorrows unutterable. They are the feeble earthworks, thrown up in the agony of despair by those who saw no other way to prevent hopeless defeat and intolerable slavery. If there were in fact no other way, we would gladly give our aid, and pray God-speed to temperance societies. Although they give promise of no ultimate and permanent conquest, it is better to have the appearance of doing something than to sit idle in so dire an emergency. But there is another way which commends itself to reason, and especially to Christian faith. One of the objects for which God has established a Church on earth is to resist the swelling tide of intemperance, and hurl it back on its source, while the sacramental host cross over to the land of Canaan dry-shod. Drunkenness is one of the works of the devil, and Christ came to destroy *all* the works of the devil. He is made "head over all things to the Church"

for this very purpose. He and he only is stronger than the "strong man armed," and, therefore, to him only can we hopefully look as an adequate power to deliver us from our great enemy. We think Christians have shown a sinful lack of faith in turning from the Church, headed by Christ, to organisations founded on nothing higher than human prudence. Their excuse is that such a course is necessary in order to enlist and utilise the valuable aid found outside of the Church. Inasmuch as intemperance is a sin, many of whose consequences ripen in time, and are destructive of the dearest interests of society, many who "make a mock at sin" in general are ready to organise for the suppression of this social evil. We say, let them organise and put forth their most earnest and persevering efforts. But when they ask for the coöperation of Christians, let the answer be, "We are already working for the same end, in an organisation much better equipped for the purpose than your's. We can wield the thunders of Sinai, and present the melting picture of Calvary; we can terrify with the dire threats of wrathful Omnipotence, and persuade with the sure promises of incarnate love; we can open the pit of perdition to alarm, and the door of heaven to induce. We are under the leadership of the Son of God, and through him are in possession of 'all power in heaven and earth.' If they still show a want of confidence and insist on our coming down from our high vantage ground, let not Christians show practically the same unbelief by acceding to the demand. The Church is the best temperance society, and the word of God faithfully preached, and the discipline of God's house faithfully administered, are the best instrumentalities "under heaven given among men" for the promotion of temperance. Christians can only be justified in leaving the Church for other organisations in the war against the evils of drink when it can be shown not only that the Church has been unfaithful, but that it is either not designed, or not adapted to the end sought. It is readily admitted that the Church has been unfaithful, and is not yet throwing her undivided and mighty weight of influence on the side of temperance. But let Christians, instead of trying to set the Church in unfavorable contrast with purely

human organisations, strive to give her a more definite set, and a more powerful impulse in the right direction. Let them not relax their efforts in the cause of temperance; but while they strive even more earnestly, let the Church reap the glory and the benefit of their efforts. In other words, let them do the work they are now doing, simply as Christians, and not as Good Templars, Sons of Temperance, etc. If they are in the path of duty, fighting against sin, they are exactly where they pledged themselves to go when they publicly vowed allegiance to Christ. Their obligation to the Saviour demands that they should let the world know that they are doing their duty because Christians, and not merely because they have signed the pledge of a temperance order. Thus would they stimulate their too sluggish brethren to greater fidelity, and we might hope in the course of time to see the contagion of their example spread from heart to heart, and from rank to rank, until finally the whole army of Christ, recognising the spread and triumph of temperance principles as one of the distinct objects of its enrolment, would be marshalled under the lead of the Great Captain, and marching on to speedy victory. But even now there are hopeful signs of the good time coming. Not to speak of the advances made outside of the great brotherhood of Presbyterian churches, it is enough to cheer the most despondent to note the evidence of growing activity and deepening interest in all the influential Presbyterian bodies of the world. The Irish, English, and three Scotch Presbyterian Churches, the Calvinistic Methodist Church of North and South Wales, which is virtually Presbyterian, the Northern Presbyterian Church of this country, have all in their General Assemblies and Synods passed from time to time, during the last few years, more and more stringent resolutions, and inaugurated stronger and stronger movements in favor of temperance reform. Some of them explicitly, and all of them implicitly, condemn the whiskey traffic. The General Assembly of the Southern Presbyterian Church has never, so far as known to the writer, made a deliverance on the subject. But the largest and most influential Synod in connection with it has recently set its most emphatic disapproval on the traffic; and there is no doubt that it gave ex-

pression to the sentiment of the whole Southern Church. As this stage of reform has been reached by a gradual progress which shows no signs of abatement, it is certainly not too much to hope that the whole Church will advance to the position which the more zealous temperance workers throughout the country long to see it occupy. Its growing sentiment of aversion to the liquor traffic will find expression in terms of law; and the professing Christian who wishes to take advantage of the morbid thirst of his fellow-creatures for the purpose of filling his pockets will not be permitted to bring reproach on the fair fame of Christ's Bride.

There is another consideration that brightens hope. While it rests with man to formulate and give practical efficiency to Christian sentiment through the courts of the Church, it is the prerogative of woman to create and nourish this sentiment until it shall attain to such a degree of strength as to make its legal expression a certainty. The Christian influence of women is powerfully felt in every department of morals; but in no direction is it exerted so energetically as in the direction of temperance reform. The coarse and brutal sins of the drunkard are peculiarly shocking to her refined and sensitive nature. To know the attitude of the women of the Church (and they constitute the vast majority of the Church's membership) to the liquor traffic, it is not necessary to collect their votes. An ungodly custom may blind the minds of men who keep their eyes too steadily fixed on the prospects of gain, but custom can never stifle the true utterance of woman's heart, when that heart has been touched by the Spirit of God. The sophistries of error may pervert the judgment of man, especially when his interests seem to lie on error's side, but sophistry has no power over the unreasoning impulses that govern the life of woman. She owes this traffic no sympathy, and it is certain that she gives it none. Earth holds no greater enemy to her peace. It shoots its most envenomed shafts through her pure and gentle heart. Though she is as innocent of all personal participation in the sin as the angels of heaven, yet it sends its baleful influence into the sanctuary of home where she presides, and lays waste all the realm of its sacred and tender affections. It is not man who through intemperance has lost

health, character, and happiness, and gained in their stead poverty, shame, and rottenness, who suffers the sharpest pangs and deepest agony. The deadening of his sensibilities keeps pace with his degradation, and when he has finally lost all that glorifies human nature, he has also lost all sense of his deep disgrace and hopeless destitution. But the mother, the wife, the sister, these have hearts that can feel everything but the numbing effect of the beloved one's sins. Our most profound sympathy is with the countless multitude of tender women who are sitting in silent grief under the shadow of this awful curse, and waiting in mute despair until the welcome grave shall afford deliverance. At the same time we breathe a sigh of relief when we reflect that each one of this countless multitude is sending up prayers from her anguish-smitten soul to the great God of pity and of justice to stay this tide of evil and save the Church and the world from its destructive power. Could the Church be made to understand what is felt "by the bursting hearts of mothers for their ruined sons; of wives from whose lives all joy and hope, all love and tenderness has been blotted out; of daughters crushed and doomed to penury and disgrace", there would be no further need of witnesses to prove the guilt of the liquor traffic, nor any further question as to the righteousness of law to prevent it. By and by the Church will be made to understand it, and then she will no longer speak to her offending sons in the impotent language of advice and entreaty, but in the strong language of positive prohibition. In doing so the Church will not transcend her legislative function, which, in the sphere of morals, is simply to echo the law of God contained in Scripture; for that law in condemning the child condemns the parent. R. C. REED.

ARTICLE IV.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

In the continuation of the discussion of this question, we come now to a more articulate consideration than before¹ of the great Necessitarian argument, urged by our reviewer, that if God had not efficaciously decreed and therefore efficiently caused the first sin, he could not have foreknown it to be certain. To state the argument in few words: God must have made the first sin certain, or he could not have foreknown it as certain.

In the preceding articles of this series we endeavoured by various lines of proof to show, that God did not efficaciously decree, nor causally effect, the commission of the first sin. By an appeal to the Supralapsarian divines themselves, we evinced the fact, that the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees is one universally accepted by Calvinistic theologians, and must be regarded as an integral element of the Calvinistic system. We add now the express testimony of the Westminster Confession: "Our first parents, being seduced by the subtilty of Satan, sinned in eating the forbidden fruit. This their sin God was pleased, according to his wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to his own glory."² We have shown that neither the teachings of Calvin, nor of the Calvinistic symbols, lend any countenance to the Necessitarian doctrine that God made the first sin certain by a concreated necessity of nature. In our last article, contained in this REVIEW for October, 1880, we subjected to a careful examination, and attempted to refute, the Supralapsarian paradox that although God only decreed to permit the first sin, considered as sin, yet the decree to permit it necessitated its commission. An effort was especially made to show, that the hypothesis of the origina-

¹We discussed this aspect of the subject in the second article of this series, contained in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW for January 1879.

²Chap. VI., Sect. 1.

tion of the first sin, as sin, in a deficient cause, which has been used by Supralapsarians to save the divine efficiency from implication in the production of that sin, is one which cannot be maintained in consistency with their own principles, nor justified upon either scriptural or rational grounds.

It does not become us, whatever may be our convictions, to affirm that these arguments have been convincing; but if they have been, they have established the conclusion, that God did not by his causal efficiency necessitate the commission of the first sin, that is to say, that he did not make its commission certain. The great argument which is employed against this position is one which is derived from what is conceived to be a condition of the divine foreknowledge of the certainty of any event. In order that God should foreknow the certainty of an event, he must have determined its occurrence through the operation of necessary causes. The necessity of an event as fixed by the divine decree, and determined by the divine efficiency, conditions the possibility of God's foreknowing it as certain. Consequently, the indispensable condition upon which the foreknowledge of the first sin as certain depended, was an efficacious decree and the causal efficiency of God, which made it certain. There must have been, it is contended, an objective certainty in the event itself to ground the subjective certainty of the divine foreknowledge, in relation to its occurrence; and such an objective certainty could be referred to nothing but the operation of some necessary cause or causes. The conclusion is, that Adam's first sin was necessary and unavoidable. Against this argument, based upon a theory in regard to the conditions of the divine knowledge—conditions upon which omniscience is conceived to depend, we are entitled to urge the whole cumulative force of the preceding argumentation. It has gathered up proofs from Scripture, reason, and the teachings of the Calvinistic standards, and combined them in a great aggregate of evidence which goes to show that this condition of the foreknowledge of the first sin of the race could not have existed—that it could not be true, that God by efficacious decree so determined the commission of that sin as to make it necessary and unavoidable. The answer to all this is, that if these considera-

tions are valid, God could not have foreknown the certainty of that sin ; but it is unquestionable that he did foreknow its certainty ; consequently, they cannot be regarded as valid. We do not intend to imply that, the whole scope of the discussion being taken into view, this is the only or even the chief argument that is employed ; for, philosophically contemplated, the field of argument is more widely extended. But from a theological point of view, this is the proof upon which main reliance is placed. It is the theological citadel of the Determinist and Supralapsarian.

When we show, that the supposition of the necessitation of the first sin by an efficacious decree is attended with consequences, in relation to the character of the ever-blessed God, which cannot be admitted by the pious mind, the answer is drawn from the divine foreknowledge of the certainty of that sin. When we contend, that if man fell by reason of a con-created necessity of nature, he would not have sinned, but obeyed the laws of his constitution ; and that consequently there could have been no guilt, and no place for righteous punishment ; we are pointed, in reply, to the indispensable conditions of the divine foreknowledge. When we argue, that the whole dealing of God with man in innocence—the institution of the Covenant of Works, containing a promise of indefectible life to Adam for himself and his posterity upon condition of perfect, though temporary, obedience ; his probation, as a non-elect person, supposing the possibility of obedience as well as of disobedience, of standing as well as of falling, as a condition of its termination for weal or woe ; his endowment with competent ability to stand, with sufficient, though not determining, grace, and his possession of a mutable will which might incline either to holiness or sin—that all this excludes the supposition, that God by efficient decree had determined the necessity and therefore the certainty of the fall ; we are told that a refutation of these arguments is furnished by the divine foreknowledge. When we urge, that the dreadful necessity of sinning, which now, as an all-conditioning law, affects every human being from birth in his natural and unregenerate condition, cannot be accounted for, in consistency with scriptural conceptions of the divine attributes, the fundamental truths of

natural religion and the original intuitions of our nature, except upon the ground that it is a penal infliction in consequence of a free self-decision for evil which, in the first instance, was unnecessitated and avoidable, and therefore not made certain by efficacious decree operating through necessary causes, we are referred for an answer to the divine foreknowledge. When we press the view, that the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees is an almost universally accepted Calvinistic determination, that there are some things which God decreed that he would himself do, and that there are other things which he decreed to permit others than himself to do; and that it is an abuse of language and a self-contradictory affirmation, to say that what was permissively decreed was necessitated by decree—that a decree that a thing may be is the same as a decree that a thing shall be; we are directed to the divine foreknowledge. When, finally, we maintain, that a permissive decree, which is conceived to have necessitated the fall, as really implicates the divine efficiency in the production of sin as an efficacious decree could do, since it would have accomplished all that an efficacious decree would have effected; and that the attempt to avoid this inevitable consequence by representing sin as a mere privation of good, and ascribing its origination to a deficient cause in man, cannot succeed, inasmuch as the alleged deficient cause—even were it allowed to be possible as accounting for sin which is a stern reality—must itself be assigned to the causality of God, as withholding the grace which might have been, if given, an efficient cause of abstinence from sin; we are still confronted with the divine foreknowledge. All this is set aside as inconclusive, in view of the allegation that the fall must have been made certain by the operation of necessary causes, in order that it might be foreknown as certain.

This argument, to which so much importance is attached, when formally stated, is as follows: Everything which God foreknows as certain is foreknown only because he has made it certain; the first sin of man is a thing which God foreknew as certain; therefore, that sin was foreknown because God made it certain. In regard to the truth of the minor, there is no dispute—it is con-

ceded. The fallacy of the conclusion it has been the main purpose of the whole preceding discussion to prove. Now, it is obvious to one who attentively considers the case, that as so much is made to depend upon the truth of the major proposition, it behooves that it be clear and undoubted. If it be not, it cannot be legitimately employed to check and destroy the force of the numerous and weighty considerations by which it is opposed. Even though it could only be shown that there is a considerable degree of improbability attaching to it, the presumption against it, created by the contrary arguments, would be damaging to its claims. But if it can be evinced that it is really untenable, the main prop of the position, that the first sin of man was necessitated and unavoidable, will have been removed.

We proceed to consider the arguments which have been advanced in favor of the affirmation, that every thing which God foreknows as certain is foreknown only because he has made it certain.

1. The first argument which we notice is that which is sometimes drawn from the prophecies contained in the Bible. Future events, and among them the free acts of men, have been predicted by God. But they must have been made certain by him, in order to their being foretold. In answer to this we remark, that all which can be fairly collected from the prophecies is—and we fully admit it—that God foreknew the certain occurrence of the events predicted, and that, as the free acts of men are among those events, he foreknew the certainty of their occurrence. Against the position that God cannot foreknow the free acts of men, this argument is irresistible. For this purpose President Edwards used it, and he elaborately and unanswerably presented it. But with the question, whether God causally determined the certainty of the predicted events, the argument from prophecy is not logically concerned. That they could not have been foreknown, and therefore could not have been foretold, unless God had made them certain through the operation of necessary causes, is an assumption which requires to be sustained on independent grounds. From the proposition, God has foretold the free acts of men, therefore he foreknew their occurrence as

certain, the consequence is valid. But from the proposition, God has foretold the free acts of men, therefore he made their occurrence certain, the consequence is not valid. Whether the foreknowledge of the free acts of men, which is proved by the divine prediction of those acts, itself proves the divine necessitation of them—that is a separate question, and must be considered upon its own merits.

But it may be said, that some things which God has predicted were made certain by him. Granted, but to argue that therefore all things which he predicted were made certain by him would be illegitimate. From some to all the consequence is invalid. More cannot be contained in the conclusion than was in the premises. Before the argument could assume a valid form, it would have to be proved by an exhaustive induction of particulars that all things which God has predicted were made certain by him. But even supposing that such a generalisation had been reached upon a complete induction, and that it were shown that all the predicted sinful acts of sinful men were made certain by God, that would not prove that the unpredicted first sinful act of a previously innocent man was made certain by him. All the predicted sinful acts of sinful men were made certain by God; the first sin of Adam was the unpredicted sinful act of an innocent man; therefore, the first sin of Adam was made certain by God: this precise statement of the argument is sufficient to evince its invalidity. There is no recorded prophecy of Adam's first sin, and therefore his free act in sinning is exempted from the scope of this argument from prophecy. We do not mean to imply that God could not have predicted Adam's first sin. But he did not. And as the argument is only based upon prophecies which have been actually delivered, it does not, at least directly, apply to that sin. If it be contended that it applies by reason of analogy grounded in a general principle of God's providential government, we dispute the alleged fact of the analogy; and then it must be proved that the analogy holds; and by the time that the argument reached that stage, it would, to say the least, be so vague and indefinite as to be devoid of practical force.

But further: the connexion between the proposition, some of

the free acts of men have been foretold by God, and the proposition, some of the predicted free acts of men were made certain by God, there is, for aught that appears to the contrary, only a connexion of fact. Both are true; but there is no proof, arising from this consideration of a co-existence of the two facts, that there is a causal connexion between them—that the making of the acts certain was the indispensable ground of the prediction of the acts. And until that be proved, the argument, some of the free acts of men have been predicted by God, therefore they were made certain by him, breaks down.

Still further: to say that God could have predicted the first sin of Adam, therefore he must have made it certain, is to apply to the particular case of that sin an argument which, as general, has already been shown to be invalid. To say, that because he could have predicted it he must have foreknown it, that is true; but the affirmation, that in order to his foreknowing that sin, he must have made it certain, that is the very thing to be proved. The considerations which have been submitted are sufficient to show that the argument from prophecy is inconclusive in its application to the question under discussion.

2. The second argument which we consider is derived from God's intuitive knowledge as grounded in his own eternal purposes. He knows his own purposes to produce, or to necessitate the production of, all things—beings, acts, events—and as those purposes cannot possibly fail of accomplishment, he knows from eternity, in one perfect intuition, their actual results. This is the position maintained by our reviewer, as will fully appear from the following passage in which he definitely states it:

“According to the laws of thought with which we ourselves are endowed by the Creator, we cannot conceive of certainty which is not established by antecedents. But, before creation, all antecedents must have been in the mind of the Almighty. His volitions, therefore, are the fountains of his creative acts. His purposes alone established the certainty of those wonderful events. Resolutions formed by an infinite mind must be accompanied by a positive assurance of the acts to which they relate. This consciousness is not the result of calculation or inference. It is not an impression of overwhelming probability, but an intuition that the purposes of such a mind, unrestricted by conditions, will be fulfilled. The

purpose is a cause, of infinite efficiency, and the effect is immediately apprehended as a certain result."¹

This seems also to be the doctrine of Edwards in the following passages—seems, we say, for his statements savour so strongly of the assertion of presentative knowledge, that one can scarcely help doubting whether the language does not necessarily imply it:

"The very reason why God's knowledge is without succession is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty; all things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much clearness as if they were present; the view is always in absolute perfection . . . As God is immutable, and so it is utterly and infinitely impossible that his view should be changed, so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree; and, therefore, the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed by the succession of time—who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view."²

But what grounds this one, perfect, all-comprehending intuition?

"The certain truth of these doctrines concerning God's eternal purposes will follow from what was just now observed concerning God's universal providence; how it infallibly follows from what has been proved that God orders all events, and the volitions of moral agents among others, by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For, if God disposes all events so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence, then he doubtless thus orders and decides things knowingly and on design . . . If there be a foregoing design of doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a purpose or decree. And as it has been shown that nothing is new to God, in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity, hence it will follow that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearance, but are all eternal purposes."³

In these statements it is affirmed: that the divine knowledge of all things is "an intuition"; that it is "one, perfect, unalterable view"; that it "is not the result of calculation or inference";

¹ *Southern Presbyterian Review*, July, 1879, pp. 520, 521.

² *Inquiry*, etc., Pt. II., §12.

³ *Inquiry*, etc., Conclusion.

and that it is grounded in God's knowledge of "his eternal purposes", which pre-determine, and by "a decisive disposal," necessitate, the existence of all beings, acts, and events. Now it is evident, that the argument represented by these passages consists of two distinct members, one, which is concerned about the *nature* of the divine knowledge of all events, the other, about its *ground*. As to its nature, it is held, that it is uninferential and intuitive—it is one perfect view, or, what is the same thing, intuition. As to its grounds, it is contended, that it is God's eternal, efficacious decrees which determine and necessitate all events, including those which are denominated the free acts of creatures. The argument is, that the divine knowledge of all events is what it is, because it is grounded as it is. The divine being cannot know the certainty of any event without having decreed to make it certain, either by immediately producing it, or by producing it mediately through the instrumentality of necessary causes. But having eternally purposed so to produce all events, he must know them, not by inference, but by a perfect intuition. In considering, first, this position in regard to the nature of the divine knowledge of events, we shall inquire, what is inferential knowledge, then what is intuitive, and then whether the statement, which denies the former and affirms the latter of God, be self-consistent and convincing.

Without pausing to offer an unnecessary explanation of the meaning of the term *inference*, we remark that inferential knowledge is that which is grounded either in mediate or immediate inference. The ratiocinative processes of the discursive faculty—the faculty of reasoning as contradistinguished from the generic attribute of reason—arrive at conclusions through the comparison of the terms of two propositions by means of a third term. The conclusion is an inference which is mediately derived through this comparison, and which is therefore said to be mediate. The knowledge which is grounded in such an inference is, consequently, mediately inferential. It depends for its existence upon a reasoning process which has been instituted, and for its validity upon that of the inference which has been mediately attained. The questions, whether God can reason, and whether he ever de-

pend upon reasoning in order to know, are entirely different. The former we must answer in the affirmative, the latter in the negative. The divine mind which, by inspiration, constructed the argument of the Epistle to the Romans, can reason, but the conclusions of that argument, however they may be known to be true by God, constitute no ground upon which his knowledge depends. He who formed our minds as organs for reasoning must himself know how to reason; but it would be illegitimate to argue that because we depend upon reasoning for our knowledge, the same must be true of our omniscient Maker. There are limitations which we are obliged to impose upon the analogy of our mental processes to the infinite energies of the divine mind. But upon this point it is not likely that there will be any discussion. We are probably agreed in denying that the divine knowledge is, in any degree, grounded in mediate inference. God knows how to reason, but not because he reasons.

But there is another sort of knowledge—that which is founded upon immediate inference. When one proposition is directly deduced from another, without the intervention of any middle through which a comparison is effected, it is said to be an immediate inference; and if it be enforced by the fundamental laws of thought or belief, it is said to be a necessary inference. When, for example, one of two contradictories is known to be true, the inference is immediate that the other is false. When we perceive phenomenal properties, we immediately infer the existence of a substance which underlies them, and constitutes the unperceived ground of their unity. Even were the truth of this inference, for idealistic reasons, disputed, it serves its purpose as an illustration. When we perceive any phenomenon, or phenomena change, we immediately infer, by virtue of the original and necessary law of causality in our constitution, that it is an effect which has a cause, or has causes, for its existence. Upon this point there is no difference of opinion between the reviewer and ourselves. When we perceive the stupendous phenomena of the universe, we immediately infer, by reason of the same principle, the existence of a cause adequate to their production. And we are prepared to go further and maintain, that in consequence of

a fundamental law of belief which guarantees objective infinite existence, we immediately infer an infinite cause—the existence of God is, in a normal condition and the regular exercise of our faculties in connexion with the observed facts of the external world, an immediate inference. It may be said, also, that when we have by an exertion of will resolved to do what we perfectly know we have the power to do, the conviction that the contemplated result will follow, is an instance of immediate inference. These cases will amply elucidate what we understand by immediate inference, and the nature of that knowledge which, as grounded in it, must be conceived to be immediately inferential.

Here, however, the distinction must be carefully noted which obtains between knowledge accompanying immediate inference on the one hand, and immediate knowledge on the other—a distinction which is sometimes overlooked. Immediate knowledge is that which is grounded in the direct relation of phenomenal objects to the faculty of perception, internal or external. Objects when presented cannot be inferred. Our knowledge of them is immediate, not inferential. We gaze upon an object before us; we immediately know it. We close our eyes, and we are conscious of a mental image which represents it. We immediately know the representative image; we only mediately know the object which had been presented. We immediately infer its existence from its vicar, which is the only thing now immediately known. The knowledge which springs from immediate inference is mediate. Immediate knowledge is not inferential. Which of these sorts of knowledge—immediate, or mediate resulting from immediate inference—is ascribed to God in the statements which have been cited, must be ascertained upon inquiry as to the nature of that intuitive knowledge which is, in them, attributed to him.

The terms *intuition* and *intuitive knowledge* are employed in senses so widely different, that it is necessary that they be discriminated from each other, if confusion of thought is to be avoided. Frequently by intuitive knowledge is meant that which results from immediate inference. When it is said that we have an intuitive knowledge of the truth of self-evident propositions

in which the relation is immediate between the predicate and the subject, it is obvious that we designate a knowledge which supposes an immediate inference to the truth of one proposition from the truth of another. When we characterise the knowledge of the relation of effects to causes as intuitive, it is also evident that we mean a knowledge which grounds itself in immediate inferences from the existence of the effects to that of the causes. When, for example, orthodox divines speak of an intuitive knowledge of God, it is not meant to affirm the Absolutist doctrine that we have an immediate and presentative knowledge of him. He is not an object of consciousness or of external perception. We do not gaze upon him as a presented object. How could an infinite being be presentatively known by a finite? Neither is his essence phenomenal, nor are his attributes; nor could the omnitude of his existence be comprehended within the field of vision of the perceptive faculty. The meaning is, that there are original principles in the human mind which, when empirically brought into contact with cosmical phenomena, necessitate the immediate inference that God exists. These principles are often termed intuitions, and for the reason, probably, that their effect when elicited into expression by the conditions of perceptive experience is equivalent to that produced by sight. We know the certainty of the things guaranteed by them, just as if we actually looked upon them. And it deserves notice that this figurative employment of the term *intuition* implies that vision—or real intuition—affords the standard of certainty with which the knowledge accruing from the exercise of every other power is compared. In a word, consciousness, which is the gaze of the mind upon its own phenomenal manifestations and upon the presented objects of the external world in contact with the organ of vision, is the surest as it is the directest guarantee of the certainty of existence. There is between it and the divine veracity in which it is grounded no inferential process, and therefore no room for error. Immediate and necessary inferences from the data of consciousness, which is, strictly speaking, intuition, that is to say, the looking of the mind upon phenomena actually and immediately under its observation, although not themselves intuitions but deductions, are nevertheless

truly said to involve the intuitive knowledge which properly belongs to those data themselves.

Sometimes by intuitive knowledge is meant the certain conviction that a vicarious and representative image is a guarantee of the real, objective existence of the object which had been presented. In this case the intuition, accurately speaking, is of the representative mental modification—of that we are conscious, and therefore have immediate knowledge. But the inference to the real existence of the external object is immediate and necessary, and we transfer to the knowledge which springs from that inference the attribute of certainty which attaches to the intuition itself. We call it intuitive knowledge. This would seem to have been the view of those Schoolmen who, like Duns Scotus, held that God foreknows events future in time through ideal representations of them, anticipative of their actual existence. But there is a difficulty here. Whatever may be the possibility of the existence in the divine mind of ideal anticipations of events regarded as elements in a temporal succession, the term *representations* is certainly unfortunate when used for this purpose; for one cannot conceive how there can be re-presentations of things of which there was no previous presentation—how things can be again presented when they never were presented. The hypothesis of a representative knowledge—*cognitio representativa*—of future events is encumbered with a difficulty akin to that which we cannot but regard as damaging, if not fatal, to the scheme of Idealism which is known as Hypothetical Realism: real, objective existence presupposes a representative mental modification from which it is inferred; but the representative mental modification pre-supposes real, objective existence in which it is grounded. The circle is vicious.

Let it be observed, that, in all these cases in which intuitive knowledge is affirmed, the different aspects in which it is regarded are all brought into unity by the fact that they are grounded in immediate inference. And knowledge so grounded can be characterised only figuratively and derivatively, and not strictly and originally, as intuitive knowledge.

There is another, and that the strict, signification of intuitive

knowledge. It is that which makes it synonymous with what is denominated presentative knowledge. When any object is in immediate relation to perception, internal or external, it is said to be presented, and the knowledge resulting is correspondingly designated as presentative. Being directly before us we look upon it, we have a real intuition of it. We gaze immediately upon itself, unmediated by anything else which represents it, or through which its existence is inferred. We have immediate knowledge of it. This immediate knowledge of a presented object is, strictly speaking, intuitive knowledge. Mental phenomena presented to consciousness, material phenomena presented to perception, are thus intuitively known. They are not known by immediate inference—they are immediately known. This intuitive knowledge, therefore, is not inferential knowledge. It is to be sharply distinguished from it.

There is another feature of intuitive knowledge, considered as presentative, which must not be left out of account. When we have an intuition of an event, immediately presented to us, we do not depend for our knowledge of it upon a precedent knowledge of the cause or causes which have produced it. We do not know it as certain, because we know that it has been made certain. We may or may not be acquainted with its causes, but we know it as certain because of our intuition of it. It is a fact, and we apprehend it as a fact. Nothing can be more certain of existence than that which actually is; and no knowledge can be more certain than that of a thing which is perceived to be. This is the very standard of the certainty of events. The certainty of a past event is the certainty that it once was, and we are certain of it when we know that it was. The objective certainty of a fact lies in itself; and when the fact is perceived, there must be, from the nature of the case, a corresponding subjective certainty of its existence. No conviction, or experience, of the operation of causes, grounds, in such a case, the certainty of knowledge. The knowledge is certain because it is intuitive, immediate, presentative. We have, then, in this instance, a knowledge of the certainty of events which does not depend on the fact that they are made certain.

Let us now, in the light of these explanations, consider the positions maintained in regard to the divine knowledge in the statements which have been cited. It is affirmed to be intuitive, but not inferential. It must therefore be regarded as presentative. But it is affirmed to be grounded in the knowledge of purposes causally operating to produce the certainty of events; it is therefore intuitive knowledge proceeding by immediate inference, that is to say, it is inferential. Given the knowledge of the purpose certainly to produce an event, and the knowledge of the certainty of the event necessarily and immediately follows. If it be said that this holds only in reference to the order of thought, granted; but, in that order, the existence of the knowledge that the event will be certainly produced is conditioned by the knowledge of the purpose certainly to produce it. What is that but a necessary inference of the one kind of knowledge from the other? The knowledge of the event must be either presentative or inferential. If it be maintained that it is grounded in a precedent knowledge of cause, it is denied to be presentative. It remains that it must be inferential. There are, therefore, in these statements the contradictory affirmations that the divine knowledge is presentative, and that it is inferential, in relation to the same objects.

Let us next contemplate the divine knowledge of a past event, that is to say, an event which God knows as past in its actual relation to a temporal succession of events. The divine knowledge is characterised by these writers as one, perfect, and unalterable view—that is, one, perfect, unalterable intuition, which is not inferential, and which embraces the past, the present, and the future. How then does God from eternity know an event which as related to a succession in time must be viewed as a past event? Not surely in consequence of a purpose that it shall certainly be; for, according to the supposition, it certainly has been. And if he could know it in consequence of such a purpose, the knowledge would be inferential, and that is denied. How then does he know it? By memory? But the knowledge which includes the past is said to be one, perfect intuition. Is memory one, perfect intuition, which includes the present and the future

as well as the past? If not, how does it certify the past? By a mental representation of the past event? If so, the knowledge of the event is mediate and inferential. But that is denied. How then? By a conviction which is equivalent to immediate knowledge? But, on the supposition, the event, as in every sense past, is not an object of immediate knowledge. It is known as gone beyond the reach of presentative knowledge. How then can a conviction that it did occur exist, except through some apprehension of its past occurrence? For if there be no apprehension of it whatsoever, how could a conviction of its occurrence be grounded? It would be impossible. If we return then to the mental representation of the event, we are shut up to the admission that the knowledge of it is mediate and inferential, which is denied. How then is a knowledge of the past from eternity possible to God, upon the theory that it is neither presentative nor inferential? If it be said that he knew from eternity the certainty of past events in this sense, that he knew that at a given period they will have been, in consequence of the certain accomplishment of his purposes, we say again that the knowledge would be inferential; but that is denied.

Further, if it be said that God from eternity knew the past by memory, it would follow that memory as a knowledge existing from eternity antedated the past, for the past must succeed the present in time, and the present what was future, and so the whole succession must have begun, and therefore was not eternal. But an eternal memory is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. There could be no memory without the past, and the past could not be eternal. If it be admitted that God's memory of the past is conditioned and limited by past events—that is, that there could not be memory until the event be past in time, it is conceded that memory is not eternal. How then could there be an eternal view by memory of the past? But if there were not an eternal knowledge of the past, the position is maintained and denied that God's knowledge of the past, the present, and the future, was from eternity one, perfect, unalterable view. If it be granted that God did not from eternity know the past by memory, it must be allowed that his knowledge of it was from eternity

presentative; but a presentative knowledge grounded in a knowledge of causes, and not in the presence of the object, is a contradiction.

Take an event which is now occurring before us, and therefore to us a present event. How, according to this theory, did God know it from eternity? If the event is eternally presented to him, his knowledge of it is eternally presentative. If that be denied, he must from eternity have known it as a future event. But an event which is, has past out of the category of those that will be. It was, then, from eternity known to the same intuition as an event that would be and is, as to be in the future and as at present existing. If there be but one sense in which the divine knowledge is related to the event, a contradiction emerges; but more than one sense is not allowed. That one sense is, that God knows all events only as they will be actually developed in time in consequence of the successive acts of his power; and that, consequently, the divine knowledge is, strictly speaking, foreknowledge, present knowledge, and memory. But if, strictly speaking, that knowledge is divisible into these three sections, how can it be held to be one, perfect, unalterable view? An infinite intuition, as such, could not be conceived as thus distributed, without a contradiction.

Still further: if Edwards by one, perfect, unalterable view of all events, past, present, and future, meant a knowledge analogous to our presentative knowledge freed from its limitations and imperfections, he held the doctrine as to the divine knowledge of events for which we have contended. If such was not his meaning—if he did not mean by such a view existing “from eternity” an eternal presentative knowledge—there is but one other supposition, namely, that he meant a knowledge projected *from* a past eternity, forwards, through the whole series of non-presented events, *to* an eternity to come. It is plain, that memory must be excluded from such a knowledge, for memory could not exist before remembered events; and as, by the admission, presentative knowledge is thrown out of account, it would follow that the divine knowledge of events was simply prospective—that is, it could only have been foreknowledge. But the prospective knowledge

of the past, which is an object of retrospective knowledge, is a contradiction in terms. A foreknowledge of past events is not only inconceivable, but incredible.

Either this one, perfect, unalterable view was limited to events conceived as future, or it was not. That it was so limited is maintained in this affirmation: that God foreknew all events because of his purpose that they should be brought to pass—his purpose to make that actually certain which was not eternally in existence. But if this construction of the language in which the theory is conveyed be necessary, then, when the events decreed to be made certain in the future have actually occurred, God could have no further knowledge of them; for a knowledge grounded in a purpose to necessitate the future existence of events must cease when the event, having already occurred, is no longer future, but past. A purpose to necessitate the occurrence of a past event is incredible. And so, as the ground of the knowledge no longer exists, no more can the knowledge which depended upon it for existence. God's knowledge, consequently, would be limited; which implies a contradiction, since it is admitted to include all events, past, present, and future. If, on the other hand, this one, perfect, unalterable view was not limited to events conceived as future, but extended to events conceived as present and past, then, as the knowledge of past events cannot be grounded in a purpose to necessitate their occurrence, God's eternal knowledge of the past overlapped the only ground upon which all his knowledge of events is affirmed to be founded. How, then, could his knowledge of past events, upon this theory, be accounted for? It must have the ground of a purpose to make events certain, in order that it may exist. But as to past events it cannot have this ground. What then? Either, it must be admitted that God had no eternal knowledge of past events, which is contradictory to the affirmation that the one, perfect, unalterable view embraced all events, past, present, and future; or, if, as is confessed, he did eternally know past events, the theory must be given up, that he could know any event only because he eternally purposed to bring it to pass. The purpose to bring events to pass is said to be the sole ground of the knowledge of

the events; but the events having been brought to pass, the purpose to bring them to pass expires by its own limitation. The knowledge of the event as past, cannot, therefore, exist. The theory fails to account for God's eternal knowledge of past events, which yet is by the theory included in that knowledge. How then can its sole ground for the divine knowledge of the certainty of all events be consistently maintained?

Again: the divine knowledge of all events, as one, perfect, unalterable intuition, may be considered logically and relatively, or really and intrinsically. If it be regarded as a logical conception, it may legitimately be said to contain under it the distinct species—foreknowledge, present knowledge, and memory. In the case, for instance, of one, eternal divine purpose, we logically distribute it into decrees distinct from each other, in consequence of the distinction between the objects upon which they terminate, and the relations which they sustain to them—for example, the decree to create, the decree to elect, the decree to redeem. All of these are reducible to unity upon one eternal decree. So, in that of the divine knowledge, we logically separate it into specifically distinct knowledges, taking their denominations from the distinct events about which they are concerned—that being conceived as foreknowledge which relates to future events, that present knowledge which relates to present events, that memory which relates to past events. If, on the other hand, the divine knowledge be conceived as really and intrinsically one perfect, eternal intuition, it cannot be regarded as divisible. Real unity and real divisibility are incompatible with each other. As really one intuition it is not, in itself, partly prescience, partly present knowledge, and partly memory. What the nature of this unity is, it is not just at this point relevant to inquire. It is another fault of the theory we are considering, that it takes no account of this distinction in regard to the nature of the divine knowledge, which we are under the necessity of making.

Having shown the inconclusiveness of the argument: God, could not, from eternity, have known the certainty of any event unless he had determined from eternity to make it certain, so far as the doctrine contained in it touching the nature of the divine

knowledge is concerned, we will, secondly, consider the position held in it in regard to the ground of that knowledge.

The ground of the divine knowledge from eternity of the certainty of events, as affirmed by the Necessitarians whose views we are discussing, may be succinctly defined in one comprehensive sentence. It is the knowledge which God from eternity had of his own necessary purposes, proceeding necessarily, through necessary causes, to the production of the events,—his necessary purposes, for although they are admitted to have been spontaneous, they are held to have been necessarily what they were; proceeding necessarily, for they could proceed in no other mode than that in which they do proceed; through necessary causes, for all causes are necessary, none contingent. The questions, whether all God's purposes are necessary, and whether they proceed necessarily to the accomplishment of ends, we will not just here pause to consider. We regard the very hinge of the controversy to be the position that all causes are necessary, none contingent. That this is the position of the writers with whom we have to do, is so evident that to produce proofs of the fact from their writings would be entirely unnecessary. They over and over again affirm it, and treat any denial of it as absurd. Nothing is surer than that they assign all cause to the category of necessity, and refuse to admit the possibility of such a thing as is called a contingent cause. To hold that view is to be a Necessitarian, in the strict sense of the term, and Necessitarians, in that sense, they are. Consequently, that the will of a being divine, angelic, or human, can be, under any circumstances or relations, a contingent cause, they utterly deny. A free cause, which possesses the power of otherwise determining, they pronounce not only an impossibility, but an absurdity. They deem it strange that any intelligent man should believe in the reality of such a chimera, and passing strange that any Calvinist should entertain it.

As our end is mainly theological, we shall not enter into a strictly philosophical discussion of this question. What considerations of that nature may be submitted must be incidentally introduced. We shall not, however, exclude the little logic which is attainable.

(1.) The argument as to the ground of the divine foreknowledge of the certainty of any event is chargeable with the capital fault of reasoning in a circle. This may be regarded as a bold and startling assertion in reference to an argument which has been so famous, and has exercised so potent an influence upon theological thought. The presumption is heavily against it. But if its truth can be proved, that presumption will be rebutted, and the inconclusiveness of the argument evinced. It is provable in the following ways: In the first place, we have the position: the existence and operation of necessary causes proves the certainty of events. That this position is maintained, and maintained as one of leading and fundamental importance, will scarcely be disputed. To deny that it is, would be to deny the very existence of the Necessitarian scheme. It is argued—that all causes must be followed by effects; that necessary causes must be followed by necessary and therefore certain effects; that all causes are necessary and therefore all effects are necessary and consequently certain; that all events are effects, and are therefore necessary and consequently certain. In a word, the existence and operation of necessary causes proves the certainty of events. In the second place, we have the position: the certainty of events proves the existence and operation of necessary causes. That this position is maintained is provable in at least two ways: first, the certainty of past events is used to disprove the possibility of contingent causes, in relation to them. That some events are certain is beyond question, because they are past facts. “Having already made sure of existence,” says Edwards very truly of a past event, “it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true that that thing has existed.” But the certainty of those events proves that they could not have been brought to pass by contingent causes, for the reason that supposed uncertainly operating causes can possibly bring to pass no certain events. But if the certainty of events disproves the possibility of their having been brought to pass by contingent causes, it proves that they were brought to pass by necessary causes. The certainty of past events proves the existence and operation of necessary causes.

Secondly, the certainty of divinely predicted future events is used to prove the same thing. Future events which God has predicted must be certain to occur. Granted. But this being irrefragably established, the certainty of predicted events disproves the possibility of their being produced by contingent causes. Being causes supposed to operate without certainty, it is impossible that they should produce events certain to occur. The omniscient Being himself, it is contended, could not fore-know, and therefore foretell, the result of a cause which may go this way or that way. As he has predicted events, which are consequently certain, their certainty disproves the possibility of their being produced by contingent causes, and therefore proves that they must be produced by necessary causes. Again we arrive at the affirmation: the certainty of events proves the existence and operation of necessary causes. Both members of the circle having been proved to be maintained, it is, when stated in precise antithetical form: the existence and operation of necessary causes prove the certainty of events; the certainty of events proves the existence and operation of necessary causes.

That this is not a misrepresentation of the argument will be evidenced by asking two questions, and giving Necessitarian answers to them. How is the certainty of events proved? The answer is: By the operation of necessary causes. How is the operation of necessary causes proved? The answer is: By the certainty of events. If any doubt should exist, whether the second of these answers be fairly attributed to Necessitarians, let it be considered, that it is unquestionably in that way they disprove the operation of contingent causes; and that, of course, furnishes a proof of the operation of necessary. To make it still clearer: they hold that events which are certain of existence are necessary; but, argue they, necessary events cannot be the effects of contingent causes; therefore, necessary causes must be inferred.

If it be urged that we have confounded proof with ground, that the argument is correctly stated thus: Necessary causes ground the certainty of events; the certainty of events proves necessary causes; and so the circle disappears,—we reply: It

is admitted that ground sometimes signifies cause and sometimes proof; but in this argument, as is often done, ground is used as proof. There may be other proofs of the certainty of even future events, to us, but necessary causes, as grounding the certainty of events, constitute the great Necessitarian evidence of that certainty, especially in relation to God's foreknowledge of future events. If it be said that the divine prediction of future events is a proof of their certainty, we reply: First, it is to us, but not to God. The question is—it is the very one with which we are dealing—what is the evidence grounding God's foreknowledge of their certainty? The answer cannot be: His prediction of them. It must, if consistently given, be: The operation of necessary causes pre-determined and known by him. These considerations are sufficient to show that we have not unjustifiably confounded proof with ground as different things, but have warrantably treated them, as, in this argument, made to discharge the same office.

If the charge has been sustained, that the reasoning under examination, touching the ground of the divine foreknowledge of the certainty of events, proceeds by a vicious circle, that extraordinary fact would have a twofold edge—it would invalidate the proof of the particular position that there are no causes but necessary causes; and, also, by that means the general argument, resting upon it, that God can only foreknow the certainty of events through the operation of necessary causes by which he determined to make them certain.

(2.) The position that all causes are necessary, none contingent, is fatally inconsistent with other positions, of fundamental value, maintained by Christian Necessitarians themselves. None are more pronounced than they in the assertion of the principle, that every effect must have a cause—otherwise chaotic anarchy results. In this we thoroughly concur with them. But sin is an effect, and, therefore, must have had a cause. As the first sin of man is that from which all other human sins originated, and it must be admitted to have had a cause, or the universality of the causal principle is sacrificed, it is a question of the last importance, what was its cause? Now it is strenuously contended

by pious Necessitarians that God did not produce that sin, but that man, as a second cause, produced it. But all causes, according to them, are necessary. Therefore the human cause, whether efficient or deficient, of that sin, was a necessary cause. If not, all causes are not necessary, since this was not. But all creaturely causes derive, as second causes, their necessity from the necessary causality of the First Cause. If not, how are necessary second causes, as effects, to be accounted for? They surely cannot be consistently assigned an absolute beginning. They must be referred to God as the first, the original and determining First Cause. If so, the necessary causality of God operated, through the agency of man as a necessary cause, to the production of the first sin. It does not relieve the difficulty to say that man was the proximate cause, if God, though the remote, was the real cause. If the first ball of a series in contact with each other be struck, the last flies off. The detachment of the last may be proximately referred to the impulsion of that next to it, but its real, though remote cause, is the blow dealt to the first. The series of necessary second causes is a series of effects, and the first of the series is immediately connected with the efficiency of God as the First Cause. We have then the contradictory affirmations: God did not produce the first sin of man; God did produce that sin. These are not independent facts, the harmony of which we cannot apprehend. They are contradictories; and it must be left to our Necessitarian brethren to effect a reconciliation between them. If they decline the attempt, and, on the principle that of two contradictories one must be true, the other false, elect between them, which will they choose? Will they go with the doctrine of the Church, or with the Necessitarian philosophy?

(3.) The position that all causes are necessary, none are contingent, is inconsistent with admitted Calvinistic doctrine. In support of this view we refer to the explicit statements of the Westminster Confession of Faith. To avoid confusion let it be distinctly noticed, that the Confession observes the distinction between the nature of God's knowledge of causes, and the nature of causes themselves. God's knowledge it denies to be contin-

gent. These are its words: "His knowledge is infinite, infallible, and independent upon the creature; so as nothing is to him contingent, or uncertain."¹ In regard to this there is no dispute. But the Confession also affirms, as to the intrinsic nature of derived and dependent causes, that in some instances it is contingent. Some causes are declared to be contingent, and some events, which are the effects of such causes, are correspondingly said to be contingent events. This is the language employed:

"God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."²

"Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes either necessarily, freely, or contingently."³

There can be no discussion as to the question, whether the Confession affirms the existence of contingent causes. The language is too definite to admit of it. Not only is their existence asserted, but said to be "established" by the divine ordination; and necessary and contingent causes are, as to their nature, expressly distinguished from each other. Things fall out according to the nature of some causes necessarily, according to that of others, contingently. There is, therefore, no room for a supposition that it may have been meant, that necessary causes, as generic, may act specifically through contingent modes, that some necessary causes may be contingent and some necessary events contingent. They are contradistinguished upon the ground of nature. They are essentially distinct. With the question of the way in which the terms, "*liberty*" and "*freely*" are, in these statements employed, we are not now concerned. What is emphasised is the unequivocal assertion by the Confession of the existence and operation of contingent causes. This the Necessitarian denies, and a contradiction results: there are no contingent causes, says the one; there are contingent causes, says the other. A contin-

¹Chap. ii., Sec. 2.

²Chap. iii. Sec. 1. ³Chap. v. Sec. 2.

gent event, says the Necessitarian, is one which could have no cause. A contingent event, the Confession teaches, is one which falls out according to the nature of a contingent cause.

If, in order to neutralise the force of this contradiction, it be contended that since contingent events are said, in these statements from the Confession, to be among the all things "freely and unchangeably ordained", and which "come to pass immutably and infallibly", they are really necessary events, and must, therefore, be referred to really necessary causes, we remark, first, the contradiction is thus attributed to the Confession itself, viz., causes operate necessarily and contingently at the same time; and that ascription of the contradiction to the Confession ought not to be made except upon the clearest and most convincing evidence. Secondly, no allowance would be made for the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees, and it has been shown that it is a Calvinistic distinction, and that it is embodied in the Westminster Confession. Says Dr. Thornwell:

"Of course, this scheme [of the privative nature of sin] which deserves the reproach of Crypto-panteism, implied in the argument of Schweizer, abolishes the distinction, so vital to any consistent maintenance of the doctrines of grace, between the efficient and permissive decrees of God. The moderate Calvinists . . . have been compelled to admit that there is a sphere in which God leaves personal agents to themselves, and in which they are permitted to act as real, efficient causes. So, in innocence, Adam was left to the freedom of his will. This field is not beyond his providence; there are limits to the permission, and every act that takes place in it is made to play its part in the whole economy of the divine dispensations, and is ordered and overruled for the accomplishment of his ends. The divine ordination in this sphere of liberty does not impinge upon the creature's efficiency; he is the author of the deeds."¹

Certainly, if all foreordination is efficacious, none permissive, necessity, as always ruling moral agency and operating to the inevitable production of volition, is established; since, according to the supposition, God would have efficiently predetermined that all free, or spontaneous, acts should unavoidably come to pass. But permissive foreordination being allowed, that is to say, it being allowed that some decrees are permissive, that which in them is efficaciously predetermined, so as to be made inevitable and ne-

¹Coll. Writings, Vol. i., pp. 387, 388.

cessary is the *permission* of the given events. But the permitted events themselves, so far as the intrinsic causal agency of the creature is concerned, may be contingent, that is, so far as that intrinsic agency is concerned, not necessary and unavoidable. Hence the assertion by the Confession of the existence and operation of contingent causes, as distinguished from those of necessary. We are sustained in this view by Dr. Charles Hodge, who, although a Sublapsarian and a maintainer of the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees, held that all events are by foreordination made certain to occur. Yet, he shrinks from saying that a permissive decree necessitates the event upon which it terminates, and thus clearly enounces the discrimination we have given :

“The universality of the decree follows from the universal dominion of God. Whatever he does, he certainly purposed to do. Whatever he permits to occur, he certainly purposed to permit.”¹

The sum of this consideration is, that if the Confession makes the distinction between efficacious and permissive foreordination, and also that between necessary and contingent causes, it cannot be understood as teaching that contingent causation is but a mode of necessary causation, and that contingent events are really a species of necessary events. If these distinctions be denied—if all foreordination be efficacious, why the mention of permissive? if all causes be necessary, why the introduction of contingent? Thirdly, foreordination is by the Necessitarian view limited to rigid predetermination proceeding through necessity to the production of its results; whereas some Calvinistic theologians, of the strictest type, while, of course, they hold that some foreordination involves such predetermination, also understand by some foreordination a divine purpose to order and arrange events according to an eternal, definite, all-comprehending, plan. That this is not a rash assertion, will be evinced by the following observations made by the distinguished Francis Junius, in his Discussion with Arminius, when the Calvinistic theologian was expressly endeavoring to reconcile Supralapsarianism with Sublapsarianism in regard to the order and object of the divine decrees:

¹Syst. Theol., Vol. i., p. 542.

“Those holy men, therefore, rightly stated that the election and reprobation of man was made from eternity; some considered them as having reference to man not yet created; others, to man as not yet fallen; and yet others, to man as fallen. . . . Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that ‘according to that theory, God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall of Adam, and of sin, etc.’ I do not, indeed, perceive the argument from which this conclusion is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your own words, used in stating the first theory, ‘that he ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that he might thus prepare the way for the fulfilment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save some, etc.’ This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your reasoning: He who has ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is the author of the fall and of sin; God ordained that man should fall and become depraved; therefore, God is the author of sin. But the major of this syllogism is denied, because it is ambiguous: for the word *ordain* is commonly, though in a catachrestical sense, used to mean simply and absolutely to decree, the will determining and approving an act; which catechresis is very frequent in forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe religiously in this argument the propriety of terms, to *ordain* is nothing else than to arrange the order in acts, and in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing to decree acts absolutely, and another thing to decree the order of acts, in each thing, according to its modes. The former is immediate; the latter, from the beginning to the end, regards the means, which in all things pertain to the order of events. In the former signification, the minor is denied: for it is entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never the author of evil; that is, of evil involving guilt. In the latter signification, the major is denied, for it is not according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any respect that the same person who disposes the order of actions, and, in each thing according to its mode, should be the author of those actions. The actor is one thing, the action is another, and the arranger of the action yet another. He who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He who disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed is not the author of evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good end.”¹

Enough has been said to show that what is affirmed by the Confession in regard to the scope of the divine fore-ordination cannot legitimately be pleaded to annul the force of its express assertion of the existence and operation of contingent causes, in contradistinction from those of necessary causes.

¹ Answer to Prop. VI., Bagnall's Trans.

It deserves further to be considered that while, as we have seen, the Confession maintains, in the general, the existence of contingent causes, it clearly represents the will of man in innocence as a special instance of that kind of cause. It declares that our first parents had "the law of God written in their hearts and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change." Again, it says that "man, in his state of innocence, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it."¹ Now a contingent cause, as distinguished from one that is necessary, is a cause which is not determined by necessity to the production of a contemplated effect, but involves the possibility of producing or not producing it. What, then, according to the Confession, was the will of man, in innocence, but a contingent cause, since it might have chosen obedience to the law or might not, might have chosen sin or might not have chosen it? If it be said that man was a free agent, not the will, we care not, so far as the question immediately before us is concerned, to stand upon the difference; for if man, as an agent, might or might not have kept the law, might or might not have sinned, the result is the same. He was a contingent cause. The Confession, it thus appears, teaches positively, that the will of man, or man through his will, in innocence, was a contingent cause. But this is not all. It also teaches the same thing negatively. It denies that the will of man in innocence was a necessary cause. Its words are: "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil."² There are three suppositions in regard to the term *nature*, as here employed. Either it is intended to signify original nature, or corrupted nature, or both. It cannot designate corrupted nature, for the doctrine of the Confession, as of all Calvinistic standards, is that nature as corrupted is determined to evil. For the same reason, it cannot include both; it cannot be a generic term, characterising nature in all respects,

¹ Chap. IV., § 2, and Chap. IX., § 2.

² Chap. IX., § 2.

for that would be affirmed generically which is not predicable of one of the species. To say that the nature, in general, is not determined to evil, and yet that the same nature, in particular, is determined to evil, would involve the Confession in contradiction to itself. It remains that nature, as it originally came from the creative hand of God, must be intended. That being assumed, there are, in regard to man's original nature, two suppositions possible as grounded in the words cited. The determining necessity of nature must be either a necessity of co-action (or force) externally exerted upon the nature and through it upon the will, or, an internal necessity of spontaneity exerted through the nature, and so through the will. The first supposition is clearly excluded by the consideration that the determining necessity of nature is expressly distinguished from force. The will is declared to be "neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined." The necessity of co-action being ruled out as intended by the words, "necessity of nature," it follows that they must signify an internal necessity of spontaneity. It is, therefore, in this statement of the Confession, denied, that in the original and uncorrupted condition of man, his will was, by a necessity of spontaneity, determined to good or evil. It was not a necessary cause, determined in either direction. It was, consequently, a contingent cause, which had the power to operate either in the direction of good or of evil.

It has thus been shown, that the Westminster Confession of Faith both asserts the existence and operation of contingent causes in the general, and of a special contingent cause in the case of the will of man in innocence. There is, therefore, a want of harmony between the doctrine of Necessitarianism and that of the Westminster Confession.

In connexion with this question, whether all causes are necessary, it challenges attention, that the Necessitarian doctrine in regard to the necessary causality of the Supreme-Being is at variance with the ordinary, and, by us, accepted, teachings of the Calvinistic theology. That doctrine is, and to be self-consistent must be, that not only is God's being necessary, and his nature as the unity of attributes necessary, but that all the specific de-

terminations of his will and all the acts of his power are necessary. His causality however operating, whether *ad intra*, in reference to his own infinite subjectivity, or *ad extra*, in reference to things which are objective to and different from himself, is characterised by necessity. Upon this point we desire to be distinctly understood. We fully hold that the being of God is necessary; that it is absolutely uncaused, the sole instance of undeived, independent, infinite being, containing in itself, eternally and immutably, the reason of its existence. It must be what it is. We also as fully hold that the nature of God is necessary; that his infinite perfections must be what they are; and that the blessed God is in himself the infinite exemplification of the co-existence and harmony of spontaneous freedom with unchangeable necessity, of which our adorable Saviour in his humanity, angels confirmed in holiness, and human beings eternally elected to be regenerated, justified, and glorified, are finite analogues. But there is, so to speak, an infinite reservoir of power in God, which did not eternally flow forth in its fulness upon created objects. Creation, although incomprehensible by the thinking faculty, is affirmed as a fact by every theist; all creatures must have had a beginning, which was caused by the creative power of him who is the cause of causes. An eternal creation is a contradiction in terms, and cannot, as an alleged fact, be entertained even by a faith which indefinitely transcends the limits of thought. There must, therefore, have been—so we must phrase it—a period in eternal duration in which no creative act was exerted. Now the question is, whether the acts of the divine will which have had specific determinations *ad extra* were controlled by necessity. Were they necessary acts? It is not whether, on the supposition that God acts at all, he necessarily acts in a way befitting his infinite perfections. Holiness being taken to express the unity of the moral perfections of God, there is absolutely no dispute as to the question whether all his acts are necessarily holy. Of course, they are. To say that he cannot act inconsistently with his holiness, is but to say that he is infinitely perfect. But the question is, whether every act which he puts forth in relation to creatures is a necessary act—necessary in the sense that he could not have

abstained from it. This is the precise question in regard to which we maintain that the Necessitarian position is at variance with ordinary Calvinistic belief. That position is, not only that when God acts his acts are necessarily holy—that is admitted—but that whenever he acts he must act; the very acts which he performs are those, and no others, which he was under the necessity of performing. All causes are necessary; God is a cause; all the acts, therefore, by which he causes events to come to pass are necessary. The divine causality is, in no respect, an exception to the law that all cause is necessary. President Edwards devotes two sections in his *Inquiry* to the proof of this position, and it is maintained by our reviewer. We have not room to adduce passages in support of this allegation. But what need of it? The doctrine of necessity must include the view we have noticed.

On the other hand, it is common for Calvinistic theologians to take the ground that certain decrees and acts of God are free, in the sense of not being necessary. We cannot go into details, but let us for illustration take the question of the necessity of the atonement. It is maintained to be the necessity of means to an end. On the supposition that God determined to save certain sinners of mankind, it was necessary that he should provide atonement in order to secure the attainment of the end contemplated. But the question being, was it necessary for God to entertain the purpose to redeem, to elect some to salvation who were conceived as equally with others deserving of condemnation, the answer is, that it was not necessary, but God might in consistency with his perfections have left the whole race to perish. The decree to elect was not a necessary determination of the divine will. The same thing we confess in our prayers, which often represent a scriptural theology more accurately than do our speculations. We offer thanks to the Father of eternal mercies, that he freely purposed to redeem us, although he might have left us to our merited doom. We are sure that we utter Dr. Thornwell's view on this subject, though we have not just now the opportunity to refer to his discussion on the Necessity of the Atonement in which it is expressed. The following is Dr. Charles Hodge's explicit language in reference to this question :

"Freedom is more than spontaneity. The affections are spontaneous, but are not free. Loving and hating, delighting in and abhorring, do not depend upon the will.

"God is free in acting, as in creating and preserving, because these acts do not arise from the necessity of his nature. He was free to create or not create; to continue the universe in existence, or to cause it to cease to be".¹

It is not our intention to prosecute this special line of argument. It is enough to call attention to the fact that the doctrine of the necessary causality of God, maintained without qualification by Necessitarians, traverses the path of ordinary Calvinistic thought. In the hands of Edwards, although connected with some extravagant speculations, it was in a measure restrained, but in those of his New England disciples it soon developed itself by a rigorous logical process into doctrines which have ever been regarded as aliens and strangers in the Calvinistic household.

Before passing from this point, we would incidentally notice the curious fact, that while the doctrine of exclusive necessary causation has been reproached for agreeing with the tenet of the Stoics in regard to Fate, and the charge has been repelled by the Christian advocates of that doctrine, the truth probably is, that its assertion of necessity goes beyond that of most of the Stoic philosophers. Jackson, in his *Defence of Human Liberty*, collects a formidable array of citations from the works of those philosophers and their commentators to sustain this position, and, we are disposed to think, makes it good. He says:

"Leucippus, Democritus, and Empedocles, indeed the founders of the Epicurean or Atomical system, Heraclitus, the predecessor of the Stoics, and some others (whose notions shall be distinctly considered hereafter), held Fate in the sense of Necessity, as Cicero (*Lib. de Fato*, p. 359) informs us, and made the motion and exertion of the mind subject to it. But yet Epicurus and his followers, and the most eminent of the Stoical sect also, rejected the notion of necessity, and held the motions and actions of men's minds to be voluntary and free."²

A doctrine which is out of harmony with the analogy of the Calvinistic theology, and overpasses the fate of the Stoic philoso-

¹*Syst. Theol.*, Vol. I., p. 403.

²London, 1730, p. 132. "Free" is here used as synonymous with contingent.

phy itself—if the foregoing construction of it be true—would find difficulty, one would suppose, in vindicating itself from the charge of being exceptional.

3. The only other argument which we shall notice in favor of the position: God could not have foreknown events as certain unless he had determined to make them certain, is one which is derived from the infallible connexion between certain foreknowledge and the events upon which it terminates. Edwards thus argues: God's certain foreknowledge of future events, including the volitions of men, is proved by prophecy; but "certain foreknowledge infers some necessity;" that is to say, some necessity is an inference from certain foreknowledge, which is the same thing as saying, certain foreknowledge proves some necessity. We admit the inference, as a necessary one, from prophecy to the certain foreknowledge of future events. At the same time, while our faith in the certainty of the divine foreknowledge is fortified by fulfilled prophecy, we would have been obliged, in the absence of prophecies, to infer that truth from the infinite perfection of the divine knowledge. The fact that so great stress is laid by the Necessitarian upon the proof from prophecy goes to show that by him foreknowledge is strictly and properly ascribed to God as the only mode in which he can apprehend future events.

The certainty of the divine foreknowledge of future events being undisputed, the question is, whether it proves their necessity. We admit that it does, but admit this only under a limitation which vitally affects the general question. Edwards is very guarded in his statement of the case, as though conscious of the danger of ambiguity in the argument. He says that "certain foreknowledge infers some necessity"; that it proves the fore-known events not to be "without all necessity." Some necessity of future events is proved by certain foreknowledge. Now what sort of necessity? Edwards answers: "The necessity of infallibility or of consequence." How does he explain this kind of necessity? Thus: if a proposition be certainly true, a dependent proposition, proceeding from it by necessary inference, must also be certainly true; there is an infallible connexion, a connexion of logical consequence, between them. The necessity of the truth

of the derived proposition is established by the certain truth of the original. But it is certainly true that God has a certain foreknowledge of future events; therefore, it is certainly true, from the necessary connexion of a logical inference with the proposition from which it is deduced, that the foreknown future events will occur. This is the necessity which it is affirmed must attach to future events, if God's foreknowledge of them be certain—it is a necessity of infallibility or of logical consequence. Now this sort of necessity we as fully concede as does Edwards himself. Given certain foreknowledge of an event, and it follows that it will certainly occur; but the certainty of its occurrence follows by a logical and not a causal necessity. This is the limitation under which we admit the truth of the proposition: "Certain foreknowledge infers some necessity." We concede the proof of a necessity of occurrence in relation to God's knowledge; we deny the proof of a necessity of occurrence in relation to cause. It is one thing to say: an event will certainly occur because God foreknew it would occur; and another thing to say: it will certainly occur because God causes it to occur. The proof of certainty and the cause of certainty are different things. Edwards himself admits that the foreknowledge of an event cannot cause its existence.

What, then, are the force and bearing of this argument? If it stop here, all that it proves is a *cognitive* necessity—a necessity not inhering in the events themselves, but in the relation between them and God's knowledge. It is merely a necessity of connexion, as Edwards terms it; and the connexion is not one between cause and effect, but between the mind knowing and the thing known. But if this be all that is proved, the argument falls short of its mark, which is to show that God cannot foreknow future events, unless he causes their existence to be certain. What needs to be proved is not a logical, but a causal, necessity. The foreknowledge which the Christian has of the resurrection and the final judgment is certain, for it is founded on "the sure word of prophecy," which cannot fail. The immediate inference which faith draws from the statement of him who cannot lie, that those events will occur, to their certain occurrence, is a clear in-

stance of certain foreknowledge. There is a necessary connexion of infallibility and consequence between the knowledge and the events which it apprehends. The necessity, however, has nothing causal in it. No more has the relation between God's knowledge and foreknown events. It is allowed that the argument proves some necessity in connexion with foreknown events. But if it be arrested at this point, the necessity which is proved may be expressed by the formula, the events will occur because God foreknows them, and not by the formula, the events must occur because God will cause them. The "some necessity" which foreknowledge infers is not the "some necessity" which the requirements of the argument demand—that is, a necessity of events induced by the operation of necessary causes. We admit that God's foreknowledge of future events infers the necessity of infallible connexion or of logical consequence; but we hold that that is true of God's foreknowledge of events brought to pass by the operation of contingent causes. Every cause which is operative must produce some effect. A contingent cause must, if it operate at all, operate eventually in one way. There may, before the effect is actually produced, have been a possibility of the cause producing another effect. But it cannot produce two different effects at the same time; consequently, one effect must be the result. Now, whatever the effect of a contingent cause may prove to be, that effect God certainly foreknew eternally. Between the effect of a contingent cause and God's foreknowledge, there is, we maintain, the relation of infallibility or logical consequence. The argument that "certain foreknowledge infers some necessity," namely, the necessity of infallible connexion or logical consequence, in itself considered and apart from a farther prosecution of it by way of inference, makes no progress in regard to the question at issue between the parties. Both concede what it proves, and nothing is gained. The inquiry remains still to be settled, whether God cannot foreknow a future event, unless he determines its occurrence through necessary causes. If this be not allowed, and it be urged that it is sufficient that the argument from certain foreknowledge proves the necessity of the foreknown events, we insist that logical necessity and causal neces-

sity are unjustifiably identified. To use a familiar illustration: if we say that it has rained because the earth is wet, we do not mean to imply that the wetness of the earth caused rain, but that it proves that it has rained. If we say that the earth is wet because it has rained, we mean that rain has caused the wetness of the earth. So if we affirm that an event is certain because God foreknew it, we do not mean that the foreknowledge caused the certainty of the event, but only that it proves the certainty. If we wished to bring in a causal connexion, we should be obliged to say: God foreknew the event, because it was certain. Here we would indicate the certainty of the event as grounding the foreknowledge. A logical and a causal reason are different things, and ought not to be confounded.

But let it be admitted that the argument is not arrested at this point, but that it goes further, and although it does not formally and expressly, yet it does by implication, prove that all foreknown events derive their certainty from causal necessity; and that in this manner the proposition is sustained, that God cannot foreknow an event as certain, unless he has determined to make it certain through the operation of necessary causes. Upon this supposed state of the case we remark:

First, there are two ways in which Edwards implicitly extends the argument. In the first place, he contends that there must be certainty in events themselves in order to their being foreknown as certain. "There must be," he says, "certainty in things themselves before they are certainly known, or, which is the same thing, known to be certain."¹ A certainty to knowledge cannot exist before the knowledge of it exists. This preëxistent certainty, therefore, must be understood to be that which is engendered by the operation of necessary causes. Now, that is precisely what we deny, namely, that there must be a certainty in events, in every case, created by necessary causes, in order that God should know the events as certain. There is here, then, merely a positive assertion pitted against a negative, and the result is that nothing is proved. In the second place, it is implicitly argued that unless the certainty of events were produced by

¹ *Inquiry*, etc., Pt. ii. § 12.

necessary causes, there would be to the divine mind itself no evidence of that certainty. The operation of contingent causes cannot furnish the requisite evidence; consequently it must be found in that of necessary. ¹ This also is what we deny, namely, that the only evidence to God of the certainty of events is lodged in the operation of necessary causes. To affirm this, without proof—and none is given beyond the affirmation itself—is again simply to match a positive assertion against a negative; and no advance is made towards a conclusion.

Secondly, the Necessitarian either overlooks or throws out of account a distinction which ought to be observed between contingency, as related to knowledge, and as related to cause. Because nothing that occurs can be contingent, so far as God's knowledge of it is concerned, but is certain in relation to it, he denies what well-nigh all others admit—the existence of contingent events, that is, events which are brought to pass by contingent causes. This position, as we have shown, crosses the track of ordinary theological and philosophical thought. The presumption is against the view of the Necessitarian, and it behoves him to rebut it by clearer evidence than we have yet discerned in the arguments which have come under our notice, against the existence or possibility of contingent causes. The position, that God cannot foreknow as certain an event brought to pass by a contingent cause, can only be sustained on the ground that his knowledge of events is, in every case, conditioned by and inferred from the foreordained operation of necessary causes. We hold that some causes are contingent, and that their effects, as corresponding with them, are contingent; but that, at the same time, both the operation of the causes and the results are certainly known to God. Edwards constantly assumes that there can be no certainty which is not the result of causal necessity. We divide. Events may be certain to God's knowledge, which are not made certain by necessary cause. God's knowledge of the certainty of events cannot be employed to disprove the existence of contingent causes, unless it could be shown that all certainty in events is the same thing as necessity springing from

¹ *Inquiry*, etc., Pt. ii. § 12.

necessary causation. But it is obvious that there is some certainty which exists only in relation to knowledge, and which is to be distinguished from necessity produced by the operation of necessary causes.

Thirdly, no allowance is made for the distinction between impossibility as intrinsic and as relative—intrinsic, as to the nature of causes; relative, as to God's knowledge. Granted, that it is impossible, in relation to God's knowledge, but that an event certainly foreknown will occur, that does not prove that it is impossible, in relation to the nature of causes, that they might produce other results than those foreknown. One walks; that does not prove it impossible, so far as his causal agency is concerned, that he should have continued to sit. But it is impossible, so far as God's knowledge is concerned, but that the walking should take place. In like manner, the common judgment of the Church has been that, in relation to Adam's intrinsic causal power, it was not impossible that he should have abstained from sinning; but that, in relation to God's knowledge, it was impossible that the Fall should not have occurred. To say that God certainly foreknew that Adam *would* sin, is one thing; it is quite another thing to say that God certainly foreknew that he *must* sin, in consequence of the operation of necessary causes. He foreknew that Adam would sin; but he also knew that he had intrinsic ability to refrain from sinning. In short, God knew that Adam's sin was *avoidable*, but he also knew that it *would not be avoided*. If our first father had stood in his integrity, as the Church has steadily maintained he might have done, his standing would have been the event certainly foreknown; but then God would also have known the intrinsic possibility of the Fall.

It has been said, and will still be said, that this is inconceivable. But even supposing that it is, by our limited faculty of thought, it would not on that account be singular, but would have the company of many other revealed truths equally incomprehensible with itself. At the same time, this view, in regard to the scope of a knowledge which is confessedly infinite, is by no means as inconceivable as the position that God, having ne-

ecessitated sin, should punish, with endless and inexpressible torments, myriads of angelic and human beings for its unavoidable commission. The sentence of eternal truth in relation to every sinner is: "Thou hast destroyed thyself." Blessed be God, that he adds in reference to our fallen race: "But in me is thine help."¹

Dogmatically to affirm demonstration upon questions involving moral reasoning has ever been regarded as unwarrantable. That claim the Necessitarian boldly asserts in favor of his arguments, concerned though they be about the incomprehensible modes of God's infinite knowledge and the relation of his eternal purposes to the origin of sin. We presume not to adopt the same confident tone as to the challenge of them which has, in humble dependence upon the illumination of the Divine Spirit, been adventured in these discussions; but this may be said: it has at least been shown that, on rational grounds they have not been unquestionably demonstrated, and that, theologically considered, their harmony with the standards of Calvinism is not beyond dispute.

We have not room to develop our own views in a more positive manner. Suffice it now to say, that they have nothing in common with the conditional foreknowledge of the Molinist theory, or the conditional predestination of the Arminian.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

¹Uosea xiii. 9.

ARTICLE V.

THE REVISED DIRECTORY FOR WORSHIP.

The revised "Form of Government" and "Book of Discipline" having been adopted with great unanimity by the Presbyteries, the Assembly of 1879, to which that result was reported, determined to continue the "Committee of Revision," with instructions to revise our present "Directory for Worship."

This Committee reported a "Revised Directory" to the late General Assembly, whereupon the following action was taken by that body:

Resolved, That the Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Directory for Worship be accepted and recommitted to the same Committee, with permission to have a sufficient number of copies printed at the expense of the General Assembly, and that a copy of the same be forwarded to each minister of this Church, and two copies to each Session; also two copies to each Stated Clerk of Presbyteries, with a request that the same be critically examined by each Presbytery, and the result of such examination and criticism be forwarded to the Chairman of said Committee on Revision, for their use in making a report to the next General Assembly."

This action of the Assembly was substantially that recommended by the Committee in their Report; their object being to secure a revised Directory which should be the work, not of a Committee, but of the whole Church, as the new Book of Church Order is.

The Revised Directory for Worship, as reported by the Committee, is now before the Church "for examination and criticism." As the object of the action of the late General Assembly is to secure for the book a thorough and intelligent criticism, with such suggestions for alteration and amendment as the Presbyteries may see fit to make, it will not be thought out of place for a member of the Committee to state briefly the principles which guided them in their work, and to call attention to the particulars in which the Revised Directory differs from the old.

Dr. Thornwell in his published defence of what is now our "Book of Church Order," as it was first reported to the General

Assembly, besides claiming for it a more logical arrangement than that of the old Book, specifies as among the changes introduced, (1) "the lopping off of redundancies," and (2) the supply of omissions. The same claims we make on behalf of the Revised Directory now before the Presbyteries.

As instances of the "lopping off of redundancies," we mention : The entire omission of Chapter X., "On the Mode of Inflicting Church Censures." Our old Book of Discipline, while it specified the "censures" which might be inflicted by church courts, gave no definitions of these censures. Hence the necessity of such a chapter in the Directory for Worship. It was from this chapter alone that the nature of these "censures" could be learned. Our new Book has supplied this deficiency. In Chapter IV. of the "Rules of Discipline," the several church "censures" are clearly defined; and certainly the Book of Discipline, and not the Directory for Worship, is the proper place for such definitions; and so, the necessity for this chapter disappears. Chapter I., "On the Sanctification of the Lord's Day," is not retained as a distinct chapter. But so much of it as properly belongs to a Directory for Worship is retained in Article I. of the Chapter on "Public Worship on the Lord's Day." The sanctification of the Lord's day is a subject of great importance, and there is need that our standards give forth no "uncertain sound" respecting it. But the Confession of Faith (see Ch. XXI.) and the Larger Catechism (see Ans. 116-121) treat fully of this matter. And to introduce a brief and necessarily imperfect summary of this teaching in the Directory can have no other effect than to weaken the impression made by the full statement contained in its proper place in the Confession of Faith and Catechism. So, in the chapters on Baptism and Marriage, instead of giving a brief and necessarily imperfect statement of the truth respecting the proper subjects of baptism, and the laws of marriage, such as the present Directory contains, the reader is referred for information on these points to the full and excellent expositions contained in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms.

As instances of "the supply of omissions," we may mention the Articles on Sabbath-schools Prayer-meetings, and the Fo

eign Missionary work of the Church, as that work stands related to her worship. At the time our present Directory was adopted, Sabbath-schools, and what are distinctively called Prayer-meetings, were unknown in our Church, and she had not then awakened to her duties and responsibilities with respect to the great work of Foreign Missions. Hence that Directory contains no notice of them whatsoever. Now all is changed. Sabbath-schools and Prayer-meetings are regarded by all as important agencies in the accomplishment of the Church's work in the world. In our new Book of Church Order, among the duties of church Sessions, that of "establishing and controlling Sabbath-schools and Bible classes" is specifically mentioned, and Presbyteries and General Assemblies are accustomed to exercise a particular supervision of this work. In such circumstances it seems eminently proper that a Directory for Worship should contain, at the least, some general direction respecting the way in which these services should be conducted.

A more important change than those just mentioned—as most will probably regard it—is the introduction into the Revised Directory of certain "Forms" for the administration of Baptism, the Lord's Supper, etc. These are intended, as is expressly stated, (1) "as an exposition of the nature of the service; and (2) as furnishing a suitable pattern for such service, which may or may not be used, at the discretion of the officiating minister."

"The Churches of the Reformation have treated the subject of public worship according to four different methods.

"The first is that of an *imposed* ritual, responsive in its character, and prescribed to the minister and people for their common use. Such is the practice of the Anglican and Lutheran communions.

"Another method is that of a *discretionary* ritual, not responsive, and supplied to the minister alone, for his guidance as to the matter and manner of worship; leaving freedom of variation, as to the latter, according to his judgment. Such was the usage of the Church of Scotland for the first century of her existence; such is the practice of every Reformed Church on the continent of Europe at the present time.

“The third method is that of a *rubrical* provision; consisting of directions without examples; indicating the subjects, but omitting the language of prayer. Of this character was the Directory composed by the Westminster Assembly, and adopted by our Church.

“And the fourth method, if such we may call it, is that of *entire freedom*, as respects both subject and language; leaving all to the option of the minister. Perhaps no denomination has followed this course since the days of the old Independents, who opposed even the introduction of a Directory of Worship, as hampering the liberty of the individual.” (*Eutaxia*, pp. 8, 9.)

The adoption of the first of these methods, viz., that of an imposed prescriptive liturgy, admitting of no variation, will find few, if any, advocates in the Presbyterian Churches of this country; certainly it had none among the members of the Committee which has prepared the Revised Directory. The last-mentioned method, that of entire freedom, leaving all to the option of the minister would, we believe, be as unanimously rejected as inconsistent with the apostolic injunction, “Let all things be done decently and in order” (1 Cor. xiv. 40). The only methods which find favor among us are—the third, *i. e.*, “a rubrical provision, consisting of directions without examples,” and this is the character of our present Directory; and the second, that is, “discretionary forms” prepared for the use of the minister only when, and so far as, he may see fit to use them. The Revised Directory combines these two methods. There is no liturgy, or Form of Worship, proposed for the public service of the sanctuary; here the instruction is rubrical, and in this it differs from the method pursued by the Reformed (Dutch) and Huguenot Churches; it is only in the administration of the sacraments, and for certain special occasions that “forms” are proposed.

The objection most frequently urged against our use of even *discretionary* forms is, that for us it would be an imitation of the practice of other Churches; and that “the dignity of our Church, to say nothing of individual self-respect, would suffer by such imitation.”

In reply we say, (1) So far is such a use of forms an imitation

of other Churches on the part of the Presbyterian Church, it is, in fact, but a return to her original usage, following upon her revival at the Reformation. For the first century our mother Church, the Church of Scotland, had "an order of worship, liturgical in its character," and the Reformed (Dutch) and Huguenot Churches, as thoroughly Presbyterian as our own, retain such liturgies to the present day. (2) As a matter of fact, several books of forms for use in baptism, etc., have been prepared and published by ministers of the Presbyterian Church in this country. *e. g.*, that of Dr. A. A. Hodge, of Princeton; and these books are largely used among us, especially by our younger ministers. These are, some of them, very good books; but we believe that one better than any of them will be secured if the Church herself takes the matter in hand; and so the collective piety and wisdom of the many be substituted for that of the few.

Among the Forms proposed the reader will notice that there is no Form or "Office" for use in the burial of the dead, excepting a very brief one "which may be used at sea, or when no minister is present to conduct the service." The reason for this will appear if we examine the liturgies of any of the Churches which have undertaken to provide a form for use on such occasions—take that of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, for example.

As an "Order for the burial of the dead" Christian, or one who in the judgment of charity is a Christian, it is scriptural and most appropriate, with one exception, *viz.*, the repetition of the Lord's Prayer at the grave—evidently the Romish Pater-noster—one of the remnants of Romanism of which "the Prayer-book was never thoroughly purged." But it is confessedly altogether inappropriate at the burial of any other than a Christian; and in many a case it cannot be used without "associating the hopes of the Christian with the close of an obviously Christless life." We say it is *confessedly* so, for the rubric which accompanies it in the Book of Common Prayer is in the words, "The office ensuing is not to be used for any unbaptized adult, or any who die excommunicate, or who have laid violent hands on themselves." This rubric was evidently intended to forbid the use of this ser-

vice at the burial of any but such as are, in the judgment of charity, Christians. Without stopping to criticise the terms in which this is done, we ask—

What must be the practical effect of adopting such a form, with such a rubric as this? Obviously, it will require the minister, if he means conscientiously to do his duty in every instance in which he is called upon to bury a dead person, to sit in judgment upon the Christian character of the deceased, and to proclaim that judgment, too, by reading or refusing to read the service at the funeral. This very few are willing to do; especially as the proclamation of an unfavorable judgment at such a time would be particularly painful to mourning friends, already overwhelmed with grief. And hence, as a matter of fact, the Episcopal burial service is used without any regard to the rubric which accompanies it, and is often read over those who have led a notoriously godless life.

In the Episcopal "Order for the burial of the dead," the lesson is from 1 Cor. xv. 20-58, a passage which concerns, not the resurrection of the wicked, or even the general resurrection, but distinctively the resurrection of the righteous dead; those who, having died in the first Adam, have been made alive in the second; those who "are fallen asleep in Christ;" those who "are Christ's at his coming." "While the earth is cast upon the body," the minister is directed to say, "Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God, in his wise providence, to take out of this world the soul of our deceased brother, we therefore commit his body to the ground: earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust; looking for the general resurrection in the last day, and the life of the world to come, through our Lord Jesus Christ; at whose second coming in glorious majesty to judge the world, the earth and the sea shall give up their dead; and the corruptible bodies of those who sleep in him shall be changed, and made like unto his own glorious body; according to the mighty working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself." And afterwards follows the prayer, "Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of those who depart hence in the Lord, and with whom the souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden

of the flesh, are in joy and felicity; we give thee hearty thanks for the good example of all those thy servants, who, having finished their course in faith, do now rest from their labors. And we beseech thee, that we, with all those who are departed in the true faith of thy holy name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss, both in body and soul, in thy eternal and everlasting glory, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

The use of such a service as this—appropriate and scriptural as it is for the burial of the Christian—at the grave of a notoriously profane and godless person: is it anything else than "associating the hopes of the gospel with the close of an obviously Christless life"? An examination of the burial service of the Reformed (Dutch), the Huguenot, the Lutheran, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, will satisfy the reader that in this particular they are as objectionable as that of the Protestant Episcopal Church quoted above.

The question may be asked, Can this difficulty be avoided by leaving the whole service to the discretion of the minister conducting it? To this I answer, Yes, if he be a discreet educated man, as the ministers of the Presbyterian Church are presumed to be. In a ministry extending over more than forty years, during which I have been called upon to conduct the funeral services of persons of all classes and characters, I can say that I have never found any serious difficulty in so ordering the service as not to compromise God's truth on the one hand, and not to seem to sit in judgment upon the character of the deceased or wound the feelings of mourning friends on the other. And in many of these cases, I see not how I could possibly have done this, had our Directory of Worship contained a burial service similar to any of those referred to above. If, however, any one thinks that a suitable burial service can be prepared which shall not be open to the objections stated, the whole Directory is now before the Church for criticism and amendment, and it is altogether in order for him to prepare and offer such a service.

In the "Larger Catechism," to the question, "To whom is baptism to be administered?" the answer is, "Baptism is not to be administered to any that are out of the visible Church, and so

strangers to the covenant of promise, till *they profess their faith in Christ, and obedience to him*; but infants descending from parents, either both or but one of them, professing faith in Christ, and obedience to him, are, in that respect, within the covenant, and are to be baptized." A Form for the baptism of adults must therefore necessarily embody a form for professing faith in Christ, or, in other words, a creed. On this point all Christian Churches agree. On the further question, How extensive and particular should this creed be? there is not the same agreement. Presbyterians, on the authority of our Lord's own special instructions, hold the visible Church to be "the school of Christ," into which pupils are to be received by "baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," there to be "taught to observe all things whatsoever he has commanded" (Matt. xxviii. 10, 20). The very fact that they are received into the Church to be taught, necessarily implies their present ignorance of, and consequent inability intelligently to profess, much of God's truth. In the language of Scripture, they are "babes in Christ, to be fed with milk and not with meat" (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2). To require a person at baptism to adopt our whole "Confession of Faith," or even the "Shorter Catechism," would be irreconcilably at variance with the character of the ordinance, viewed as the initiatory rite of the Church. The creed professed must be much more limited than either of these. According to the Larger Catechism, their profession is "of faith in Christ and obedience to him." They must be ready to profess their faith in all that is fairly included in Paul's expression, "Christ and him crucified;" all that is fairly included in the expression of our Confession used in defining the visible Church, "the true religion;" and as by their baptism they become members of a particular church, in which Christ has set men to rule, and in which Christians are associated for a common work and mutual edification, they must be ready to promise "subjection in the Lord to the constituted authorities of the Church: to walk in brotherly love with its members, to study its peace, and to pray and to labor for its prosperity;" but further than this they cannot be required to go, at baptism.

Such a creed as thus indicated, a creed covering the fundamental truths of our holy religion, all that must be believed in order to salvation, we have in what is popularly known as the Apostles' Creed. This Creed is historical rather than doctrinal in its form of statement; and in this it resembles the inspired Gospels rather than our treatises on theology, and on this account it is the more readily and thoroughly comprehended by "babes in Christ." The Presbyterian Church has recognised this as the best known summary of "the true religion" by incorporating it in her Confession of Faith; and there is, therefore, a special propriety in adopting it as the creed to be used in a "Form for the baptism of adults," as the revised Directory does.

In giving this creed, the reader will notice that the clause, "he descended into hell," has been omitted. This has been done on the ground that this clause does not properly belong to the Creed. As is now universally conceded, the Apostle's Creed, as it is popularly called, is not the work of the apostles, as the Church of Rome teaches, but is a symbol of gradual growth, its oldest known form being that given by Irenaeus, A. D. 200. During the whole ante-Nicene or strictly primitive period of the Church's history, the clause, "he descended into hell," had no place in the Creed. As Dr. Schaff, in his "Creeds of Christendom," has shown, it is in the writings of Rufinus, A. D. 300, that it first appears; and it was not until A. D. 650 that any Church Council recognised it as belonging to the Creed.

It is true that the Westminster Assembly recognise it as a part of the Creed, not only in printing it as such, but in their explanation of it in Ans. 59, Larger Catechism: "Christ's humiliation after death consisted in his being buried, and continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death till the third day, which has been otherwise expressed in the words, he descended into hell.'"

On this we remark: (1) At the time the Westminster Assembly sat, this subject had not received the thorough investigation it has since; and seeking to correct the text of the Creed, by the aid of the means modern scholarship has at command, no more implies a reflection on the honesty and intelligence of that

Assembly, than seeking to correct the text of the Scriptures, to which that Assembly constantly appealed in support of their statements of doctrines, does ; and (2) that the sense that that Assembly puts upon the clause in question, whilst it is a sense in which it expresses a truth—the very truth expressed in the words which immediately precede it, “dead and buried”—is not the true historic sense of the clause ; it is not the sense in which the Council understood it at the time it was formally incorporated in the Creed. Had it been so understood, it could never have become the germ from which the Romish doctrine of purgatory has developed. For these reasons, the Committee, following the example of the Reformed Episcopal Church, and Dr. A. A. Hodge in his “Book of Forms,” in introducing the Creed in the “Form for the Baptism of Adults” in the Revised Directory, have omitted the clause altogether. Should this course be sanctioned by the Presbyteries, of course a corresponding change must be made in the form of the Creed as published in our Confession of Faith, and the Committee stand ready to take the proper steps to secure such a change in a constitutional way.

Art. VI. of Chap. III. of the Revised Directory is: “In the case of such as have been baptized in infancy, and having reached years of discretion, after making a credible profession of saving faith in Christ, have been received into full communion by the Session, it is proper that they, as well as adult persons received by baptism, should make a profession of their faith in the presence of the congregation. This public profession on the part of those baptized in infancy may be made in the same words with that made by adults at their baptism.” In the early days of the Presbyterian Church in this country, the common practice was, after a person baptized in infancy had been examined as to his personal faith in Christ, and received into the communion of the church by the Session, simply to announce the fact from the pulpit before the administration of the Lord’s Supper in which he was for the first time to participate. Gradually a change in this particular has taken place in the practice of the Church, and this without any authorisation or even formal notice on the part of the higher judicatories of the Church. At the present day, a

public profession of faith by those who have been baptized in infancy, when they are admitted to full communion, is almost universally required in our Church, both North and South.

This seeming novelty is not in reality a novelty, but a return to the practice of the primitive Church, if Calvin's view of the matter is correct, and we think it is. His words are :

"It was an ancient custom in the Church for the children of Christians, after they were come to years of discretion, to be presented to the bishop" (a Presbyterian bishop, as he elsewhere explains), "in order to fulfil that duty which was required of adults who offered themselves for baptism. For such persons were placed among the catechumens, till being duly instructed in the mysteries of Christianity, they were enabled to make a confession of their faith before the bishop and all the people. Therefore, those who had been baptized in their infancy, because they had not then made such a confession of faith before the church, at the close of childhood or commencement of adolescence, were again presented by their parents, and were examined by the bishop, according to the form of the catechism which was then in common use. That this exercise, which deserves to be regarded as sacred and solemn, might have the greater dignity and reverence, they also practised the imposition of hands. . . . Such imposition of hands as is simply connected with benediction, I highly approve, and wish it were now restored to its primitive use, uncorrupted by superstition. . . . I sincerely wish that we retained the custom, which I have stated was practised among the ancients before this abortive image of a sacrament made its appearance. For it was not such a confirmation as the Romanists pretend, which cannot be mentioned without injury to baptism ; but a catechetical exercise, in which children or youth used to deliver an account of their faith in the presence of the Church."—*Calvin's Institutes*, Book IV., Chap. XIX.

As already stated, the custom of requiring a public profession of faith on the part of those baptized in infancy, when they are admitted to full communion, has grown up in the Presbyterian Church in this country without any formal authorisation by any of the higher judicatories of the Church. Indirectly, it has been recognised by Presbyteries sending up overtures to the General Assembly, asking it to provide a prescribed form of confession to be used on such occasions. And this action of Presbyteries has sprung out of the fact that in some of our churches a profession is required covering points of doctrine and particulars in practice which are altogether improper in the case of mere

“babes in Christ;” and so terms of communion have been prescribed which Christ has not authorised. In such circumstances the Church should do one of two things—either prohibit such public professions altogether, or else clearly define the nature and extent of the profession. Believing that our Church would not consent to the first alternative, because, in the judgment of most of our people, as is evident from their practice, such profession is both eminently proper in itself, and because such would seem to have been the practice of the primitive Church, the Committee have provided, in the Revised Directory, a “form” of profession to be used on such occasions. In churches where this public profession is required, it very frequently occurs that adult persons admitted to baptism, and baptized members of the church admitted to full communion, make their public profession of faith at the same time; and where this is the case, they make that profession in the same terms. As both classes alike are then and there admitted to communion, and their examination by the Session covers the same ground, there would seem to be a propriety in having their profession made in the same terms; and this the Revised Directory provides for.

There are two methods which may be pursued in preparing such “forms” as those embraced in the Revised Directory. One is to give the form in full, embracing all that can properly belong to it, and then mark such portions as may be omitted, when it is desirable, for any reason, that the service should be shortened. This method is adopted, to a limited extent, in the Liturgy of the Reformed (Dutch) Church. The other is, to embrace in the form only that which is essential to it, leaving all else to be supplied by the officiating minister. After careful consideration, the latter method was adopted by the Committee of Revision. As an example of what is meant, take “the form for the baptism of infants.” It is customary, and every way appropriate, where circumstances permit, to introduce the service with a brief scriptural argument for infant baptism, and exposition of the nature of the ordinance. Yet this is not necessarily a part of the service, and in certain circumstances is universally and very properly dispensed with. In the “form” given in the Revised Di-

rectory, all such introductory matter has been omitted, it being left to the discretion of the officiating minister to introduce it when and at such length as he may judge best. With a thoroughly educated ministry, such as that of the Presbyterian Church of our day, the course adopted by the Committee seemed best, since in this way all necessary assistance is afforded to such as desire assistance, and yet the liberty of the minister conducting the service is left unimpaired.

Such are the more important particulars in which the Revised Directory differs from the old. It is now before the Presbyteries for criticism. That it may be subjected to a thorough criticism, and improved thereby, is the expectation and desire of the writer of this article.

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

ARTICLE VI.

THE MINISTER OF EVANGELISATION.

The Scriptures teach us that a fully organised congregation has, besides private members, a preacher, rulers, and deacons. Sometimes these three are comprehended under the terms "bishops and deacons." Phil. i. 1. All these are ministers. The deacon is a minister (servant) of the "distribution"—"daily ministrations;" the elder is a minister of rule—government and discipline; the preacher is a minister of the word—"labor in word and doctrine"—popularly styled minister of the gospel. (Acts iv. 35: vi. 1, 4; viii. 4, 5; 1 Tim. v. 17; Luke i. 2; Rom. xv. 16; 2 Cor. iii. 6.) Yet the Church is charged with the duty, "Preach the gospel to every creature." Her very organic law, therefore, exhibits her as Christ's missionary institute: every member of the Church is a member of Christ's missionary society. How, then, is this society to meet this obligation, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature?" Shall the deacons do it? They are not *preachers*; they must attend to the

ministry of distribution. Shall the ruling elders do it? They are not “preachers;” they must attend to the ministry of government and discipline. Shall the teaching elder do it? *He* is indeed a “preacher;” but he is set apart to the ministry of government and discipline, and to the ministry of the word, over a particular flock. Manifestly, therefore, he cannot minister to one particular flock at home, and at the same time be the organ by which the Church shall preach the gospel to the heathen.

What then? Shall we conclude that the Church, as Christ’s missionary institute, is a *failure*, because he has insufficiently equipped her for the very work for which she was instituted? Far be such a thought from our minds! “But unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ. Wherefore he saith, When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. . . . And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, *evangelists*; and some, pastors and teachers,” etc. (Ephes. iv. 7–16.) Amongst the very ascension gifts which the Master bestowed upon his missionary institute, when he sat down on the right hand of the Father, was this very one—the evangelistic. Apostles we have not; because we need them not. Prophets we have not; because we need them not. But evangelists (though in a sense extraordinary) we have, because they are exactly what we need, and greatly need; yea, what the “great commission” imperatively demands.

Give the institute then ministers of finance, ministers of rule, and ministers of the word, and she is fully equipped for all her home wants, *i. e.*, all her own wants as an organised congregation. Give her, in addition, the *minister of evangelisation* (2 Tim. iv. 5), and she is fully equipped as a missionary institute for home missions and foreign missions; she is thoroughly furnished for her great mission—to evangelise the world. This much needed, all important, indispensable church officer, is termed in Scripture the “evangelist.” “The house of Philip the evangelist.” “And some evangelists.” “Do the work of an evangelist.” (Acts xxi. 8; Eph. iv. 11; 2 Tim. iv. 5.)

Thus will the whole Church engage in accomplishing the end for which she was instituted. Let all contribute of their sub-

stance; let the deacons attend to the collection and distribution of the funds; let the elders, in court assembled, examine and verify the credentials of the evangelists and others; let the preachers press home the claims of Christ and of a dying world upon the hearts and consciences of God's people and of sinners; let those who are called of God consecrate themselves to the ministry of evangelisation; and then, in the name and by the authority of the King in Zion, let them be sent forth to subdue all nations unto Christ.

We may safely challenge any fully organised Presbyterian Church to say whether she has ever found any defect in her organisation in the discharge of any duty to which she may have been called by the Master in his word. Not a duty to be performed but he has furnished to her hand the appropriate functionary. The reason is obvious: she is modelled according to the divine pattern. God's handiwork is perfect. It cannot be improved upon by human inventions. All such pretended improvements are defects in reality, and in the end prove disastrous. (1 Chron. xiii. 3, 4, 7, 10 (*cf.* verse 7, and 1 Samuel vi. 7); xv. 2, 13, 15, 28; xvi. 29).

Let us look now more particularly into the nature of the evangelist's office; the scope of his functions; and the sphere of his operations.

I. The Nature of the Evangelist's Office.

He is an extraordinary minister of the word. 1. "Minister of the word." He teaches by word and by symbol; *i. e.*, he not only preaches, but administers the sealing ordinances—baptism and the Lord's supper. He addresses the gospel to the ear by the words of his mouth, and he addresses the same gospel to the eye by the administration of the symbolic ordinances. He exercises the "*several*" power—"the power of *order*." 2. "Extraordinary"—not in the sense of being inspired, or of having miraculous gifts. He makes no new revelations, no substantive additions to the word of God. But extraordinary has reference, (1) to his field—outside the ordinary. (2) To the extent of his power—it is "the power of *jurisdiction*"—"joint" power committed to his *single*

hand. He is not only presbyter, but presbytery. He is a court. He has the *one-man* power of rule. He is—exactly what the Church needs in order to found churches amongst the heathen—a portable Presbytery, in perpetual motion and perpetual session. He is a travelling preacher, like Philip, Timothy, Titus.

Evangelists succeed to the work of apostles and prophets, and precede the work of pastors. (Ephes. iv. 11.) The pastor is a shepherd who *has* a flock: the evangelist is a shepherd in *search* of the scattered sheep, in order that he may organise them into a flock, that they may elect their own pastor.

II. The Scope of his Functions.

1. We gather it from the meaning of the word—evangelist—one who declares the glad tidings; messenger of good news from God to sinners. “How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth.” (Isa. lii. 7.) “Behold upon the mountains the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace!” (Nahum i. 15.) “And how shall they preach, except they be sent? as it is written, How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things!” (Rom. x. 15.) The word used by Isaiah and by Nahum, and translated, “that bringeth good tidings,” is rendered by Paul into the Greek word, translated “preach the gospel,” “bring glad tidings.” Notwithstanding therefore the dissent of the translator of Calvin’s Commentary on Romans, we think there is scriptural ground in the context of Isaiah and Nahum and Paul for saying that, as used by them, the Greek word now corresponds with the Hebrew. Those who are fond of tracing *literal* resemblances, may easily trace it between the Hebrew word and our *Ambassador*; and between the Greek word and our *evangelist*. What a striking passage. Jerusalem—“the mountains are round about her”—how beautiful in her eyes must have been the approach of the ambassadors from Babylon, coming over the mountains, their faces shining for joy as they announced the glad tidings—the end of Babylonish captivity. The moun-

tains of our iniquities are round about us, shutting out the light of our Father's countenance; how beautiful the approach of the Son of God—legate from the skies—bringing the good news of "peace with God." Surely he is the Rose of Sharon, the Lily of the Valley, the chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. How does the face of the minister of the gospel shine with gladness, as he announces the finished redemption, the fulness and freeness of the Saviour's love! How beautiful upon the mountains must have been the approach of Paul, as foot-sore and weary, and naked and hungry, and cold and bruised with cruel stripes, he hastened over mountains and valleys and rivers and seas, his heart burning within him, and his face beaming with light and joy in his eagerness to evangelise the nations. So with the modern missionary to the heathen: what joy on earth can compare with his who first carries to pagan lauds the knowledge of God's redeeming love! How beautiful in the eyes of "every one that thirsteth" amongst the idolatrous nations, must be the feet of him who carries the "water of life!"

But the Scriptures furnish us a threefold subdivision of this first item in the scope of the evangelist's function:

(1) He is a herald—preach the word. (2 Tim. iv. 2.) He is to blow the trumpet; cry aloud; *arrest the attention* of men and women and children.

"Ho! ye that pant for living streams,
And pine away and die,
Here you may quench your raging thirst
With springs that never dry."

(2.) He is a teacher. What shall he do with the teeming millions of heathendom? Wait till he can gather a respectable congregation? a full house? No. But one at a time, or as many as he can get to lend a listening ear, he must, having as a herald arrested their attention, *teach* them—anywhere, in the house, in the street, in the market, on the public highway—everywhere. The Apostle Paul, in 2 Timothy, second chapter, thus instructs the youthful evangelist: "Thou, therefore, my son, be strong in the grace that is in Christ Jesus. . . . Endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. . . . Study to show

thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth. . . . Flee also youthful lusts. . . . But foolish and unlearned questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes. And the servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, **APT TO TEACH**, patient: in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves; if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, who are taken captive by him at his will." Dr. Killen (*Ancient Church*, pp. 231, 232), says (commenting on 1 Tim. iii 2-7): "It is remarkable, that when the apostle enumerates the qualifications of a bishop or elder, he scarcely refers to oratorical endowments. He states that the ruler of the church should be grave, sober, prudent, and benevolent; but as to his ability to propagate his principles, he employs only one word—rendered in our version, '*apt to teach.*' This does not imply that he must be qualified to *preach*, for *teaching* and *preaching* are repeatedly distinguished in the New Testament (Mat. iv. 23; Acts v. 42; xv. 35); neither does it signify that he is to become a professional tutor; for, as has already been intimated, all elders are not expected to labor in the word and doctrine; it merely denotes that he should be able and willing, as often as opportunity occurred, to communicate a knowledge of divine truth. All believers are required to 'exhort one another daily,' '*teaching* and admonishing one another,' being 'ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh them a reason of the hope that is in them;' and those who 'watch for souls' should be specially zealous in performing these duties of their Christian vocation. The word which has been supposed to indicate that every elder should be a public instructor, occurs in only one other instance in the New Testament; and in that case it is used in a connexion which serves to illustrate its meaning. Paul there states that whilst such as minister to the Lord should avoid a controversial spirit, they should at the same time be willing to supply explanations to objectors, and to furnish them with information. 'The servant of the Lord,' says he, 'must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, *apt to teach*, patient, in meekness

instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth.' Here the *aptness to teach* refers apparently to a talent for winning over gainsayers by means of instruction communicated in private conversation." In a foot note Dr. Killen adds: "Even a female, though not permitted to speak in the church, had often this aptness for teaching. Such was the case with the excellent Priscilla. (Acts xviii. 26.) The aged women were required to be 'teachers of good things.' (Titus ii. 3.)"

The simple duty of teaching therefore is common to bishops, private members, women. It is associated with catechists and catechumens, parents and teachers, Sabbath-school teachers and their classes. (Acts xviii. 24-26; Heb. xii. 9.) The mother who draws her young offspring to her knees and teaches him to say, "Our Father which art in heaven," or who patiently drills into his treacherous memory the answers to the 107 questions in the inimitable Shorter Catechism, is prosecuting a divine vocation; so also when she gathers her class in the Sabbath, hears them recite the catechism, the hymn, the selected Scripture portion, and adds, as the Spirit may give her utterance, the word of exposition or exhortation, then, returning to her closet, waters the seed sown with pious tears and believing prayers, she is as much within the scope of a scriptural commission as the preacher in the pulpit, and no less than he, shall have jewels in her crown of rejoicing to cast at Immanuel's feet. But when she undertakes to "preach the word," she has no commission, violates the plain precepts of Scripture, and is guilty of presumptuous sin. The earnest exhortation of the apostle in 2 Tim. iv. 2, although given in immediate connexion with "preach the word," is not inappropriate as an exhortation in connexion with "teaching." "Be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine."

(3.) He is a preacher of the gospel. He is a minister of the word and sacraments. This is the specific and solemn "charge" which the aged apostle delivered to the youthful evangelist. "I charge thee therefore before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his

kingdom: PREACH THE WORD; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine." (2 Tim. iv. 1, 2.) But this point has already been sufficiently presented, perhaps, under the preceding general head. These three subdivisions—herald, teacher, preacher—considered in the light of the scope of the evangelist's duties, present nothing different from the ordinary minister of the word and sacraments.

2. The evangelist is an organiser. The materials furnished by God's blessing as the result of his labors, must be organised. The Scriptures give no encouragement to such evangelists as some nowadays who tramp the country over, refusing to organise the fruits of their labors, thus throwing contempt upon the Church as a heaven-appointed organisation. Not so did Paul and Barnabas; not so did Peter on the day of Pentecost: "Then they that gladly received his word were *baptized*: and the same day there were *added* unto them about three thousand souls. And they *continued steadfastly* in the apostles' doctrine and *fellowship*, and in *breaking of bread*, and in prayers." (Acts ii. 41, 42.) "And there came thither [Lystra] certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, supposing he had been dead. Howbeit as the disciples stood round about him, he *rose up and came into the city*; and the next day he departed with Barnabas to Derbe. And when they had preached the *gospel* to that city, and had taught many, they *returned again* to Lystra and to Iconium and to Antioch, *confirming* the souls of the disciples, and exhorting them to *continue* in the faith, and that we must through much tribulation enter into the kingdom of God. And when they had *ordained them elders in every church*, and had prayed with fasting, they commended them to the Lord, on whom they believed." (Acts xiv. 19-23). Not so did Titus; for we must suppose he faithfully followed the instructions of Paul: "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldst *set in order* the things that are wanting [left undone], and *ordain elders in every city*, as I had appointed thee." (Titus 1. 5.) Not so did Timothy; for Paul says to him: "These things write I unto thee, hoping to come unto thee shortly; but if I tarry long, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to be-

have thyself in the *house of God*, which is the *church* of the living God, the *pillar and ground of the truth*. . . . Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine. . . . Them that sin rebuke before all. . . . I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels, that thou observe these things without preferring one before another, doing nothing by partiality. *Lay hands suddenly* on no man. . . . And the things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also. . . . Reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine. . . . But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, **DO THE WORK OF AN EVANGELIST, MAKE *full proof* of thy *ministry*.**" Surely these pictures of the *scriptural* evangelist, from the pen of the Holy Ghost, are sufficient, without farther comment, to condemn lay evangelists of every kind.

It is only necessary to call attention to these citations to assure any one that the evangelist of Scripture had an extension of the *potestas jurisdictionis* beyond the ordinary minister of the word. *By himself* he was to pass judgment upon the qualifications of elders elect, and if they were found blameless, he was to *ordain* them. Ordination is an act of *government*—the act of a court, of a presbytery. Hence the evangelist has the one-man power of rule. He is an extraordinary minister of the word; or more properly, perhaps, an extraordinary *presbyter*—minister of government and discipline.

3. The evangelist is a regulator or reformer. It was in this capacity that Timothy was left at Ephesus. "As I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus, when I went into Macedonia, that thou mightest charge some that they teach no other doctrine, neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions, rather than godly edifying which is in faith: so do." (1 Tim. i. 3, 4.) Thus God raised up Luther in the sixteenth century to testify against the corruptions of an apostate Church. Thus to-day the Protestant Churches send their evangelists to Papal countries and other parts where the true religion has been defiled and corrupted. Paul says to Titus, "For there are many

unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, specially they of the circumcision: *whose mouths must be stopped*, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake. One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, The Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness is true. *Wherefore rebuke them sharply*, that they may be sound in the faith; not giving heed to Jewish fables, and commandments of men, that turn from the truth." (Titus i. 10-14.)

III. The Sphere of his Operations.

1. From what has been already said, it must be evident that the evangelist's sphere is not any settled pastorate; not any fully organised congregation; not any settled abode or permanent place of labor. His work being special and temporary, his sphere must be here, yonder, elsewhere. Timothy is now left at Ephesus, again sent to Corinth, then receives the summons of the apostle: "Do thy diligence to come shortly unto me—come before winter." (1 Tim. i. 3; 1 Cor. iv. 17; 2 Tim. iv. 9, 21.) Titus is now left in Crete, now departs unto Dalmatia, then summoned by the apostle: "Be diligent to come unto me to Nicopolis." (Titus i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 10; Titus iii. 12.) Philip "went down to Samaria and preached Christ unto them;" then went "toward the south, unto the way that goeth down from Jerusalem unto Gaza," preached the gospel to the eunuch, and baptized him; afterwards "was found at Azotus: and passing through he preached in all the cities, till he came to Cesarea." (Act viii. and xxi. 8.) The Seventy, appointed by our Lord, were sent forth "two and two before his face, into every city and place whither he himself would come." (Luke x. 1.) The Twelve had their sphere of operations at first restricted: "Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not: but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." Afterwards their field of labor was enlarged—"Go . . . teach all nations." "Go ye into all the world." "And they went forth and preached everywhere." (Matt. x. 5, 6; xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15, 20.)

2. Any church partially disorganised, by lack of a pastor or

other ruling officers, furnishes a sphere for the discharge of evangelistic ministrations; not to the full extent of his powers, however, because he is within the territorial jurisdiction of Presbytery—a court. The condition of the church calls for the labors of an evangelist “to set in order the things that are wanting;” but since the church is under the care of Presbytery, this factor modifies the exercise of evangelistic powers. The force of this consideration, and of the one immediately succeeding, against “lay-evangelists,” is, in our humble judgment, simply irresistible to all who strive to have a divine warrant for all they do.

3. The proper field of the *Scriptural* evangelist is outside the proper limits of church courts. Where the Church is not, there he goes to plant the standard of King Emmanuel, preach the gospel, call men to repentance, admit to sealing ordinances, and ordain “elders in every church.” Amongst the heathen, in the outlying darkness, he carries the torch of gospel light, till all nations, kindreds, people, tribes, and tongues shall rejoice in that light—

“Till every isle and nation,
Till every tribe and tongue,
Receive the great salvation,
And join the happy throng.”

In conclusion, there are three questions which may perhaps be profitably pondered in this connexion.

I. In order to verify the evangelist’s call, how many witnesses are necessary?

In the case of one who is to be a pastor, we say that the word of God directs us to expect three witnesses to substantiate the claim that the Master has called, viz.: 1. The candidate’s own conscience. 2. The Presbytery. 3. The Congregation. In the case of an evangelist, it would seem indisputable that the first two, viz., the call of conscience, and the call of the court, must still be furnished, before the candidate can be satisfactorily ascertained of his privilege and his duty to preach the gospel to the heathen. But from the very nature of the case the last, *i. e.*, the call of the congregation, becomes unnecessary; instead thereof we must take the unutterable wail of the perishing heathen like

the man of Macedonia, saying, "Come over and help us;" and we may add the informal call of all the congregations as expressed in their representative assemblies.

The formally expressed testimony of the congregation is not essential in this exceptional case. For, 1. The peculiar dangers and hardships of the foreign field serve to some extent as a safeguard against presumption. 2. The rights and liberties of the people are not so intimately (if at all) involved in this case as in the case of a pastor. One reason of the requisition that the people shall call before ordination, is not only that the court may have their testimony that the candidate's preaching is edifying, but mainly (we think) in order that they may preserve their *divine right of electing* their own rulers. Election, therefore, is the people's safeguard against encroachment on their spiritual rights and liberties by those already in office and those seeking office. Indeed, so jealously does our Constitution guard this point, that it provides at the very last moment, just before proceeding to "ordain and install" (although the Presbytery has placed the written call in the hands of the candidate,) that the presiding officer shall propound this question, "Do you, the people of this congregation, CONTINUE to profess your readiness to receive —, whom you have called to be your pastor?" If the people fail to answer this question "in the affirmative," there would, of course, be an immediate arrest put upon the ordination and installation. When the people without protest allow this clause of the Constitution to be violated, they thereby endanger their liberties, inasmuch as they yield to their representative assemblies the dangerous prerogative of creating rulers upon their own motion. It is as if the State Legislature should claim the privilege of filling all vacancies amongst its own membership. As the Constitution is jealous of this point, so the people should be jealous of any infraction. "*Nemo quis vage ordinetur.*" This third witness, therefore, may be properly dispensed with, because the true evangelist in his proper field is not a ruler of the home Church. His power of one man rule is always in abeyance within the sphere of the settled Church. Moreover, even the churches upon heathen soil are not subject to his jurisdiction any longer than they

remain unorganised; the moment they have a fully organised session—court—they pass from under his jurisdiction, and he passes (or should pass) on to the regions beyond.

II. May one evangelist ordain another?

Inasmuch as the evangelist carries in his single hand the Presbyterial power of jurisdiction, since he is presbyter extraordinary, since ordination is an act of government and the evangelist is a court, it would seem incontrovertible that he may ordain an evangelist as well as a presbyter. Yet this line of argument is after all merely *analogical*: The evangelist is a presbytery, the presbytery may ordain an evangelist, therefore one evangelist may ordain another. To this argument, *analogy* again furnishes a contradictory and exactly parallel syllogism: The evangelist is a presbytery, one presbytery may not erect another, therefore one evangelist may not ordain another. Again, it must ever be borne in mind, that it is only where the Church is *not*, that the evangelist has free course for the exercise of the *potestas jurisdictionis*; wherever there is an ecclesiastical court, there the one man power of rule is paralysed. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on this **CARDINAL** principal. Now upon supposition, that anywhere within reasonable reach of the evangelist and the candidate for ordination, there should exist an organised church, though it be but a single congregation, the session of that church being an ecclesiastical *court*, furnishes within its sphere the proper organ for the ordination of an evangelist on heathen soil.

But suppose the foreign missionary, soon after landing upon heathen soil, before he has been able to collect material enough to organise a church, should find, in the providence of God, one every way qualified to be an evangelist, and one who believes himself called of God to the work of an evangelist, what now? Shall he wait until he can get material out of which to organise a session? or shall he, in the exercise of his evangelistic power, at once ordain and thrust him forth as a co-laborer into the great harvest field? It is said that extreme cases test the soundness of principles; and we are willing to submit to this test.

In the first place, then, we remark that we have learned to be suspicious of this method of judging of concrete cases, which

seem to contradict fundamental principles, by resorting, *ex hypothesi* first to one and then to another possible predicament in which the providence of God may place you. Against every such hypothesis we lay down these propositions as our safeguards. Providence never contradicts the Word; Providence may sometimes tempt us in the sense of testing our reverence for and fidelity to the limitations of the Word; Providence never calls upon any man to sin presumptuously. Hence in the case under supposition it would seem that one of two inferences would be necessarily drawn: either God has not called this candidate, for God never calls prematurely; or if he has indeed called him, the providence of God clearly intimates the necessity for delay in his ordination. "Lay hands *suddenly* on *no man*" (1 Tim. vi. 22). In the second place, the Scriptures abundantly warn us against precipitate action, even in concrete cases where the providence of God *seems* clearly to have shut us up to but one course of action—viz., a course contrary to the word. We need quote but one pregnant passage: "And the Philistines gathered themselves together to fight with Israel, thirty thousand chariots, and six thousand horsemen, and people which is as the sand which is upon the seashore in multitude: and they came up, and pitched in Michmash, eastward from Bethaven. When the men of Israel saw that they were in a strait, (for the people were distressed,) then the people did hide themselves in caves, and in thickets, and in rocks, and in high places, and in pits. And some of the Hebrews went over Jordan to the land of Gad and Gilead. As for Saul, he was yet in Gilgal, and all the people followed him trembling.

"And he tarried seven days, according to the set time that Samuel had appointed: but Samuel came not to Gilgal; and the people were scattered from him. And Saul said, Bring hither a burnt offering to me, and peace offerings. And he offered the burnt offering. And it came to pass, that as soon as he had made an end of offering the burnt offering, behold, Samuel came; and Saul went out to meet him, that he might salute him.

"And Samuel said, What hast thou done? And Saul said, Because I saw that the people were scattered from me, and that thou camest not within the days appointed, and that the Philistines gath-

ered themselves together at Michmash: therefore said I, The Philistines will come down now upon me to Gilgal, and I have not made supplication unto the Lord: I forced myself therefore, and offered a burnt offering. And Samuel said to Saül, Thou hast done foolishly: thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, which he commanded thee: for now would the Lord have established thy kingdom upon Israel forever. But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, because thou hast not kept that which the Lord commanded thee." (1 Samuel xiii. 5-14.) In the third place, a sufficient rule in all such cases is the good old rule, Whatsoever is not commanded is *forbidden*. "And hath gone and served other gods, and worshipped them, either the sun, or moon, or any of the host of heaven, which I have *not commanded*." (Deut. xvii. 3.) "They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal, which I commanded *not*, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind." (Jer. xix. 5.) In the last place, under the circumstances of this hypothesis, we should think it our most solemn duty not to move a step towards ordination till we could find a "*thus saith the Lord*."

But now if we turn to the sacred oracles of God, and consult them on this question, May an evangelist ordain an evangelist? they are dumb; and the *silence* of Scripture is always its *most emphatic condemnation*. So far as we have been able to gather the facts of Scripture upon which to base a final conclusion they seem to be summed up in the following—

1. There is no account in Scripture of the ordination of an evangelist by an evangelist.
2. There is no account of the ordination of an evangelist except by a presbytery.
3. No instruction to evangelists to ordain evangelists.
4. No instruction to evangelists to ordain any but *elders*.
5. No *account* of their ordaining any but *elders*.

The reason of all this seems intuitively obvious. When they had ordained *elders*, having thus a presbytery, they had the proper church court for the ordination of all officers—deacons, rul-

ing elders, teaching elders, EVANGELISTS. Moreover, the power of the *whole* is in *every* part. Let us now suppose one little church planted in the wilds of Africa; that little church is "The Presbyterian Church in Africa." Its session is both lowest and highest court, presbytery, synod, and "General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Africa." As such it is as competent and as fully equipped, so far as ecclesiastical power is concerned, to evangelise not only Africa but the *world*, as is "The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States," and there is no more room in the presence of that session for the ordination of an evangelist by an evangelist, than there would be room for such an act in the presence of our General Assembly. We cannot forbear introducing two short passages from Calvin: "If we deviate from it, [the word] as I have just observed, though we run with the utmost celerity, yet being out of the course, we shall never reach the goal. For it must be concluded, that the light of the divine countenance, which even the Apostle says 'no man can approach unto,' is like unto an inexplicable labyrinth to us, unless we are directed by the line of the word; so that it were better to halt in this way, than to run with the greatest rapidity out of it." (Institutes, Book I., Chapter VI., Paragraph III.) "Wherefore let not the Church be wise of itself, nor think anything of itself, but let it fix the boundary of its wisdom where Christ has made an end of speaking." (B. IV., C. VIII., P. XIII.)

III. Does our Church sufficiently employ the evangelist at home?

The clear distinction which the Scriptures make between the "office" of pastor and the office of evangelist, the clear intimation in Eph. iv. 11, that the "gifts" are distinct, should teach us that these two functions cannot be conjoined, and that ordinarily we cannot expect to find the gifts bestowed upon the same individual. Generally speaking, if the Master has given his servant the gift of "pastor and teacher," it must be a mistake for that servant to undertake "the work of an evangelist;" so also, if he has given another the gift of an "evangelist" it would seem clear he does not call him to the work of the pastorate, and what can

any poor wretch do in the pastorate, who is neither "gifted" nor "called." May not the confounding of these two things afford at least a partial explanation of some failures in the work of the ministry. One thing would seem self-evident: no man having a pastoral charge, (whether large or small, whether embracing one or more congregations,) can successfully gospelise the outlying and adjacent territory. He may indeed occasionally exchange pulpits with a brother pastor, or he may engage with others in a protracted meeting; but this is not properly or technically speaking evangelising. From this point of view we may well question the propriety of the plan adopted by some Presbyteries—that of detailing its pastors to preach at certain times to the vacant churches. As a *dernier resort* this may be better than nothing; but we diffidently suggest, very little better. Is there not room to suspect that, after all, this is but one of the many human devices to substitute or improve upon the divine model? If so, is it any wonder that our churches languish, droop, and die under the substitute? But some one will say, We have not the men with the evangelistic gifts. The simple reply must be, "Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest." "Be careful for nothing; but in everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God." Another will say, Where is the money to come from to support the evangelists? "O ye of little faith." "Men ought always to pray and not to faint." "O thou that hearest prayer, unto thee shall all flesh come." Where is the money to come from? Ask a thousand saints in this dawning of the twentieth century, and they will tell you, that the God who fed Elijah by the brook, multiplied the widow's oil and brought water from the flinty rock, that God is our God, and even now sends money and bread and clothing in answer to the prayer of faith and importunity. "Ye fight and war, yet ye *have* not because ye *ask* not."

But apart from our feeble and vacant churches, are there not in many destitute neighborhoods, in our villages, towns, and cities, fields that are white unto the harvest, crying out for some one to do the work of an evangelist? As already intimated, it is not to be expected of the "pastor" that he shall do the work

of an "evangelist." He has his flock, and his regular place of preaching. The demands upon him for pastoral visitation, besides pulpit preparation for once or twice every Sabbath, to go before the same people year after year, fully exhaust his time, attention, and energy. The Sabbath bell announces to the public that he is about to preach, the doors are open, the pews (to such an extent as may be at all necessary) are free, a hearty welcome awaits every one who comes. Those who may feel disposed to come, if they do not like what is said, or the mode of conducting the worship, or if they are in any way uncomfortable, or in any manner displeased, are at liberty to retire. Yet notwithstanding these abundant church privileges, thus gratuitously furnished by the Church to the world, how few, alas! of the latter avail themselves of these opportunities. All over our country there are hundreds, yea thousands, habitual frequenters of bar-rooms, billiard saloons, gambling saloons, and other dens of iniquity and vice, who are travelling the broad road to eternal death, many of them clever enough in their own way, good natured, generous, sociable, hospitable, oftentimes entertaining a high regard for the faithful minister of the gospel, contributing cheerfully and liberally when he presents a subscription list for some great church enterprise: some are husbands of pious wives, others are fathers of pious children, some perhaps children of the sainted dead, others, alas! have wives who for filthy lucre's sake encourage them in their gambling and liquor-selling: others have sons following in their fathers' footsteps. How many of these there are who never are found in the sanctuary on the Sabbath or any other day, unless perchance it be a funeral occasion! What shall be done for this class of worse than heathen? Shall we say, There is the church; let them go there or let them perish? Not so did the Saviour—"He went *round about the villages teaching*;" he called Matthew from the tax-receiver's office, and Zaccheus from the sycamore tree. Not so did the Apostles—"they went forth and preached *everywhere*." Not so did "they that were scattered abroad," as Philip the "Evangelist" and others—they "went *everywhere* preaching the word." Clearly, then, there is a work in nearly every commu-

nity, and certainly in every large town and city, which calls loudly for the evangelist, no matter how many churches and how many pastors there may be in those localities. As the sacred history abundantly testifies, he who engages in this work faithfully may expect persecution for Christ's sake. Just at this point, however, comes out beautifully the adaptability of the evangelist to this work, and his superiority in this respect to the pastor: for when persecuted in one city, he can flee unto another. We are so much accustomed now-a-days to our regular sanctuary services, that we are in danger of losing sight of the fact, that it is the duty of the Church to *carry* the gospel to the benighted, to *press* its claims upon the unwilling, to *obtrude* it upon the attention of the indifferent and the abandoned. This is the divine plan as taught in Scripture both by precept and by example: it should never have been departed from; it ought to be revived amongst us, and continue until the whole world is EVANGELISED.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Life of Charles Hodge, D. D., LL.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. By his Son, A. A. HODGE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway, 1880. Pp. 620, 8vo.

The first thing which is to be noticed as one opens this attractive volume is its excellent *getting up*. The second and still more pleasing feature is the portrait of Dr. Hodge in his venerable old age, which fronts the title page, and then the beautiful portrait of him in his early career, which meets one in the middle of the volume. Both are singularly faithful as likenesses, both extremely pleasing as pictures. The youthful Professor's face must strike every reader as remarkably handsome; the old Doctor's presents every attraction which can belong to the aged: there is no lack of force and fire: the eye is bright and piercing, and the whole aspect exhibits intelligence and strength; but the predominant impression is from the gentleness, the sweetness, the lovingness that beams on you from the calm, wise, thoughtful face of the life-long student, the ripe scholar, the thoroughly accomplished theologian, the humble-minded, great, and good man, whose countenance you behold when you first open this book.

Dr. Hodge's biographer is his own son, the eminent Professor Archibald Alexander Hodge, who, the last time we had the pleasure of seeing him, was little "Archy Hodge," a rosy-cheeked and very attractive boy of some six or eight years, that was running through the halls and over the grounds of the old Seminary, as it was just a half century ago, but who grew up, was ordained, went to India as a missionary, was forced to return after some years, became a pastor in Virginia, removed to Pennsylvania at the breaking out of the late war, became Professor of Theology at Allegheny Seminary, and author of several valuable books, and who, a few years ago, was removed by the General Assembly of his Church to Princeton, that he might assist and subsequently succeed his father. The present work does not seem to have sus-

tained any injury in its execution from the relations of its author to its subject. The son has not intruded upon the reader his estimate of his father, nor yet his affection for him. He has simply gathered up and presented to the reader those materials through which the father and the biographer's work may speak for themselves, and the reader also have impartially reflected before him the judgment of Dr. Charles Hodge, formed by the most competent of his contemporaries.

The book consists of fifteen chapters. The first two contain autobiographical notes, giving a view of him as he was in boyhood and then at college. Two more chapters, not autobiographical, but consisting largely (as, indeed, the whole volume does) of his letters to his loving and beloved brother, the late Dr. Hugh L. Hodge of Philadelphia, and to his mother, tell us of the close of his college life, of his life at the Seminary, and for some two or three years after that, when he was elected, in 1822, at the instance of Drs. Alexander and Miller, the two first Princeton Professors, to be their colleague and the Professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature. Three more chapters give us his life and studies in France and Germany, and his return to his work in the Seminary, and subsequently his transference, in 1840, to the chair of Systematic Theology. Then there is a chapter on the disruption of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America into the Old and the New School Presbyterians. Two more chapters bring the life of Dr. Hodge down "to 1861, and the commencement of the civil war," as it is constantly termed in this book, while so many other writers delight in the offensive and insulting term, "rebellion." This chapter also treats of the reunion of the Old and New School Presbyterians. The twelfth chapter gives an account of Dr. Hodge's semi-centennial; the thirteenth, of his last years; and the fourteenth of his last days. The concluding chapter considers Dr. Hodge as a teacher, a preacher, a theologian, and a Christian man, and is the work of several eminent writers.

We are not ashamed to say, that, to our taste, the most interesting chapters of the whole fifteen are those autobiographical ones, in which, at the repeated and earnest solicitation of his chil-

dren, Dr. Hodge jotted down, during the last year of his life, some reminiscences of his early days, telling his family, with characteristic simplicity and modesty, the history of his boyhood and youth, together with those chapters which tell us of his life and studies in France and Germany. We have known Dr. Hodge with some degree of acquaintance, both personally as his pupil, and as a student of his writings, and an observer of his public course, ever since the second year after his return from Germany, and therefore the biography as a whole contains little that was new to us. The charm of novelty and freshness belongs, however, in the fullest degree to those portions of the book signalled above. During the two years of his sojourn in Europe, he introduces us familiarly to a number of his intimate friends there, whose names have long been illustrious in the world of biblical literature. It is pleasant reading what is told about such men as Krummacher, Olshausen, Gesenius, Hengstenberg Neander, and Tholuck, with all of whom Dr. Hodge was more or less intimate, most especially with the last named. And so it is pleasant reading what Dr. Hodge tells us of the days of his childhood, when he recited the Shorter Catechism to Dr. Ashbel Green, who was his pastor. It is a beautiful picture of his early piety, which in all simplicity he draws when he says :

"There has never been anything remarkable in my religious experience, unless it be that it began very early. I think that in my childhood, I came nearer to conforming to the apostle's injunction, 'Pray without ceasing,' than in any other period of my life. As far back as I can remember, I had the habit of thanking God for everything I received, and asking him for everything I wanted. If I lost a book or any of my playthings, I prayed that I might find it. I prayed walking along the streets, in school and out of school, whether playing or studying. I did not do this in obedience to any prescribed rule. It seemed natural. I thought of God as an everywhere present Being, full of kindness and love, who would not be offended if children talked to him. I knew he cared for sparrows. I was as cheerful and happy as the birds, and acted as they did. There was little more in my prayers and praises than in the worship rendered by the fowls of the air. This mild form of natural religion [so Dr. Hodge rather strangely calls it] did not amount to much. It however saved me from profanity. [He should have said profaneness.] I cannot recollect that I ever uttered a profane word, except once. It was when I was thirteen or fourteen years old. I was walking with my

brother, and struck my foot against a stone, and said, 'D——n it.' My brother was shocked, and exclaimed, 'Why, Charles !' I cannot tell why I said it. I was not hurt, neither was I angry. It seemed to me to be an effect without a cause. I felt like a very, very small Paul when he said : 'It was not I who did it, but something dwelling in me.' I am thankful that no similar experience ever happened to me."—Pp. 13, 14.

Not long after this, another event occurred which is described by the great theologian, and he tells what part he played in the scene. His widowed mother had moved with her two boys to Princeton for their education. Hugh was in the Sophomore class of the College, Charles in the Rev. Mr. Fyler's Academy. Dr. Archibald Alexander was, about that time, inaugurated the first Professor in the Seminary. "That important service (says Dr. Hodge) was performed in the old Presbyterian church which occupied the site of the present First church, August 12, 1812. I can well remember, then a boy of fourteen, lying at length on the rail of the gallery, listening to the Doctor's inaugural address and watching the ceremony of the investiture."

Let us bring in another scene of the early life of the learned Professor recorded on the same page 18: "One day during the same summer, the school-room door being opened, Dr. Alexander walked in. He found me stammering over a verse in the Greek Testament. The process seemed to amuse the old gentleman, (just forty—old to a boy.) He asked me what *πιστις* was derived from. I could not tell him. Mr. Fyler apologised for me by saying I had been studying Greek only a month or six weeks. This occurrence was the first thread of the cord which bound me to Dr. Alexander—a cord never broken. He never failed to notice me when I crossed his path. Frequently he would take me in his gig when he went out into the country to preach."

In the month of October, 1816, when eighteen years old, Dr. Alexander took him with him on a tour through Virginia, among the scenes of his earlier ministry. Some three years after this, when nearly through his Seminary course, he writes to his mother, on the 10th February, 1819, about his having no plans of life after he should quit the institution. Then he says, "I laughingly told the Doctor he must dispose of me before a great while. He asked if I would be willing to go where he would send me. I

said 'Yes.' 'Take care,' says he; 'I may shock you when I come to tell you what to do.' But I am not afraid of him." Then follows this statement from the biographer: "In the morning of May 6th, 1819, young Charles Hodge, then approaching the end of his Seminary course, happened to call upon Dr. Alexander in the study in the wing of the small wooden house on Mercer street, first door east of the Episcopal church-yard, which the Doctor occupied before his entrance upon his permanent residence. After the business which brought him had been transacted, Dr. Alexander, without preparation, suddenly said: 'How would you like to be a Professor in the Seminary?' Our father often in after years told us that this question overwhelmed him with surprise and confusion. The thought had never entered his imagination before. The Doctor, without waiting for an answer, said: 'Of course I have no power to determine such a result. It will depend upon the judgment of the General Assembly. Say nothing now, but think of it. My plan for you at present is simply that you spend the next winter in Philadelphia learning to read the Hebrew language, with points, with some competent instructor.'" Accordingly, he graduates from the Seminary the 27th September, 1819; is licensed the next month, October 20, along with a young colored man, Samuel Cornish by name; is appointed to missionary work by his Presbytery and devotes himself to it, but in November commenced also the diligent study of Hebrew; the following May is appointed an assistant teacher in the Seminary by the Professors, with authority to do so, at a salary of four hundred dollars. He preaches as a stated supply during this period, and in 1821 is ordained. In May, 1822, he is elected Professor at a salary of \$1,000, and in October, 1826, departs for a sojourn of two years in Europe.

The career of Dr. Hodge was every way remarkable. As a mere boy he attracts the notice and secures the friendship and patronage of Dr. Alexander, and, as a very young man, is, through his favor, made Professor in the Princeton School of Theology, his own course and that of the Seminary beginning as it were together; and for over fifty years he there continues to instruct young Presbyterian ministers until his pupils have

come to be some three thousand in number and fill very many of the most important and useful stations in the Church. He lives to be a very old man, working with his brains and his pen and his tongue, quietly, patiently, perseveringly, earnestly, successfully, and most acceptably, until, as it were, the very close of his four score years. His life is a very retired, and yet, in one sense, a very public one; for he sits in the very centre of all the operations of the great ecclesiastical communion to which he belongs, and his influence is felt through all its circumference. He is the author of three ponderous and most valuable volumes of Systematic Theology, which present us with the labors, as it were, of his whole life—and yet he writes much and usefully outside of this great work; especially, he edits and to a large extent writes that grand set of theological, historical, and critical reviews which for near half a century came forth quarterly from Princeton, to frame and guide the policy of his Church. To very few men has our Divine Head given the privilege of running any thing comparable to such a career. Of very few men has He condescended in his grace to make any such a blessing to the Church and to the world as this eminent, but modest and humble, and, therefore, truly great man constituted.

But this is no eulogium we are writing. We are not called to be and do not undertake to be the panegyrist of Dr. Hodge. Accordingly we hesitate not to declare that this biography does not impress us with the idea of its subject's having been intellectually a very extraordinary man. It was not genius, but industry and diligence, and quiet, persevering, faithful, conscientious labor—a better thing, perhaps, than genius—that made Charles Hodge what he was and enabled him to accomplish what he did. We are not aware that there is anything original in all that Dr. Hodge ever wrote. Indeed, he gloried in denying that either he or his school had ever taught novelties, or got beyond the Bible. Through all his theology he preserves the modesty which befits the Christian theologian. He is accordingly a sound and a safe teacher, and the work for which the Church especially honors him is that, in Dr. Boardman's language, he completed and published "the only comprehensive work of Systematic Theology in

our own or any other language which comprises the latest results of sound scriptural exegesis, discusses the great themes of the Augustinian system from an evangelical standpoint, and deals satisfactorily with the sceptical speculations of modern philosophy and science;" and that thus he supplied "what was confessedly the most urgent want of Protestant Christendom in the way of authorship." (P. 517.) But if it were a question of genius, we think we could name a theologian of the Presbyterian Church to whom it was given to unite with all of Dr. Hodge's humility, modesty, soundness, safeness, and moderation, a power of setting the same old truths in a new and fresh light, and in fact of shedding fresh light on old and tangled questions. He was a genius, and sanctified genius has a glorious work to do in the discussions of theology as well as of the other sciences. We stand in awe of the good and wise and adorable Providence which removed him, as Calvin also was removed, when but little more than fifty years old: but perhaps we may be permitted to ask, What might not Calvin, what might not Thornwell, have accomplished in elucidating the old, old doctrines, had they lived in the enjoyment of good health and every possible aid and advantage for fourscore years?

The Rev. Dr. Benjamin B. Warfield, a Professor in Allegheny Seminary, and former pupil of Dr. Hodge (and, by the way, a grandson of the immortal Robert J. Breckinridge), says in his estimate given of Dr. Hodge as a teacher of Exegesis (pp. 588-591), that he commanded his respect as an exegete, while at the same time he "could not fail to recognise that this was not his *forte*. . . . He was great here, but not at his greatest. Theology was his first love." This is no doubt a true testimony. We add, that no intelligent and candid observer could fail to recognise that the great theologian was not so great in *ecclesiastics*. Prof. C. P. Krauth, D. D., of the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, says, in his estimate given (pp. 611-616) of Dr. Hodge's Sytematic Theology, that "the most important defect in the plan is that it does not embrace a distinct and full treatment of the doctrine of the Church. The omission has been made for some reason which satisfies Dr. Hodge." He adds very justly that this

is "one of the most vitally important and interesting doctrines of all times, but especially in our own day." But surely, Dr. Krauth must be aware how generally Dr. Hodge was understood to disparage the visible Church. In his zeal against Rome's disparagement of the Invisible, and her undue exaltation of the Visible as the only proper aspect in which the Church is to be considered, the Princeton Professor certainly ran to precisely the opposite extreme. Some have thought Dr. Hodge's long life of secluded study had unfitted him to handle practical questions; some have supposed his mind to be so constituted naturally as to grasp abstract but not practical truths. It may be that neither statement is the correct one. And yet it is certain that Dr. Hodge did not accept what is beyond doubt the true Presbyterian idea of the parity of all elders as such; and it is certain that he failed to grasp the clear distinction which Presbyterianism demands between joint and several power; and it is certain that he insisted on the Church's having discretionary powers of legislation; and it is certain that he did not agree to that most true and sound, safe and necessary, principle for which our Puritan fathers, our Presbyterian fathers, contended, that whatsoever in religion is not commanded is forbidden. Let the reader consider what we quote from his journal when in Halle as illustrating this statement. He witnessed there the ceremony of *confirmation* in a Lutheran church, and he says, "The impression which the whole service made upon my mind was very pleasant. And I could not help feeling, that, however little authority there may be for Confirmation as of divine appointment, that some service of the kind might properly be introduced into our churches." (P. 126.) He proceeds to enlarge upon the *expediency* of such an improvement on the divine plan of church government and discipline, and his biographer takes the trouble to bear testimony, in brackets inserted in the middle of the paragraph, that to the end of his life Dr. Hodge maintained this opinion. We have no doubt of it. He held no such principles concerning the *Jus Divinum Presbyterii* as would forbid his acquiescing in any inventions of men in religion which should commend themselves to his judgment as wise and expedient, however devoid of all divine authorisation.

The eighth chapter gives account of the disruption of the Church in 1837, and states Dr. Hodge's conception of the course pursued by the "Princeton" or conservative party. Succeeding chapters present us with his views on a variety of subjects that have been and still are of interest and importance. His scriptural views of slavery and slaveholding, and his wise and moderate position and attitude when the Presbyterian Church was again rent in the convulsions of the war, are fully and fairly stated. Particular reference is made to "his great debate with Dr. Thornwell in the General Assembly of 1861." The reference to this topic is unfortunate. Dr. Hodge gained no victory in that contest, except for the moment and in appearance merely. The victory was really with his antagonist. True, the Princeton Professor, as here stated, "as he looked over the Assembly, saw perhaps more than half of the ministry of this great body, who once had sat at his feet as learners." And of course this gave him a very great advantage when the voting came on. And his biographer seems to imagine that Dr. Hodge must certainly have advocated the right view, since the Assembly voted for his side by a majority of 234 to 56. And yet there can be no doubt that in this case, as so often happens, the beaten minority, led by Dr. Thornwell, were the real victors. That was the last Assembly in which the Northern and Southern Old School Presbyterians met. A few years pass, and the Northern Old School are reunited to the New School, and then the reconstructed body actually adopts the very same organic changes in the system of the old Boards which the minority in 1861 had urged. Those old Boards had consisted in some cases of one hundred members, scattered all over the Church. They never could meet to do the work which the Assembly had so unlawfully transferred from itself to them. And so they appointed *their* Executive Committee, which made report to them. They constituted, in fact, a separating wall between the Assembly and its duty. Dr. Thornwell urged their abolition and the appointment of an Executive Committee of the Assembly, responsible directly to it. Dr. Hodge opposed this organic change. But when "the other branch" was joined again to the Northern Old School, their Boards were cut down to some

twelve or fifteen members, constituting a working body, a truly Executive Committee, although retaining the old name of Board. A more complete vindication could not be of the proposition urged by Dr. Thornwell, but opposed by Dr. Hodge, and put down by the majority at Rochester.

J. B. A.

Jehovah-Jesus. The Oneness of God the true Trinity. By Robert D. Weeks. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1880. 12mo. Pp. 140.

Solomon tells us that "there is nothing new under the sun." Psychologists tell us that the imagination, in the human mind, can fashion nothing new as to the elements of the image; that while the combination may be new, these elements can only be the old ones given the mind by sense-perception. Mr. Weeks's book can only be brought under Solomon's canon by means of this rule of the philosophers. While the elements are old, long known, their combination makes a novelty, to which the 19th century alone could be competent. His new theory of the Trinity is, in a word, a combination of the old Patripassian and the old Arian!

He assures us, (p. 18,) that "there is but *One indivisible and undivided God, of absolute, unqualified unity; existing or subsisting not as three persons, but as one only; revealed and described by various names, referring to different attributes, different relations, different operations, not in any sense to different divine personalities.*" So (p. 73) the Holy Spirit is "*not a personality in the Godhead distinct from the Father and the Son, the 'third person in the Trinity,' so called.*"

His doctrine of the Messiah, God-man, (Chap. 4, 5,) is, that the one, personal God, the Father, is the divine being incarnated in Christ. This is precisely the doctrine of Noetus, the first Patripassian, and the doctrine so famously revived in New Jersey a year or two ago. But then, our author thinks that there is another preëxistent and superhuman being incarnated in Christ, besides: the first and glorious creature, created and not begotten, of Arius the heretic. This glorious being Mr. Weeks supposes to be the archangel Michael! One would suppose that, having already gotten two rational persons into the mediatorial person,

one divine and the other super-angelic, he would find it advisable to adopt also the Apollinarist heresy, and assign to the human nature no rational spirit, but only the material and animal properties. But no; he is express, that there is also a rational human soul, and all the parts and properties of a natural man. Thus, unless he denies that the divine Father is hypostatically united to the humanity; unless he teaches that he is only in the God-man by his gracious influence—which reduces his scheme to simple Arianism—he has in his mediatorial person a complication much harder to believe than the doctrine of the trinity, which he rejects. But, so far as his inaccuracy of statement shows, he believes firmly in the hypostatic union of the divine and human in Christ; for he repeats most emphatically that his Christ is very God. Now, the Westminster doctrine of the trinity teaches, that this hypostatic union took place by the Second Person's taking to himself the nature (not the person) of very man. This is, of course, mysterious; but it is credible. But how *two Persons*, that of the Father, and that of the archangelic first creature, can be united into the one mediatorial Person, "without conversion, composition, or confusion," as the Confession, with the whole Christian world, says, passes credibility. Here we have three distinct rational spirits—the divine, the archangelic, the human, with the animal faculties of a holy man, all dwelling in the body of Jesus! Yet Mr. Weeks is too logical to believe in the trinity.

Those who depart from the tried and established faith of the Church catholic usually exhibit two traits: the assumption that those who went before them have not been intelligent, or not quite candid (as they claim to be), in interpreting the testimonies of Scripture; and the superfluous exhibition of a great deal of heroism in bearing the persecution which their candor and love of truth are to provoke from the naughty orthodox. Mr. Weeks has the bad taste to betray both these weaknesses. We hope he will be reassured, so far as we can do it, by our declaration that the only persecution we design to visit on him is precisely that which he has already visited on us: the venturing to differ very decidedly from him. To us, he does not appear to have construed the Scriptures bearing on the doctrine one whit more

correctly than those who have gone before him. On the contrary, wherever his exposition departs from that of the Church doctrine, it leans very suspiciously to the old Arian. For instance, we find the old classical texts—Col. i. 15; Rev. iii. 14—wrested by him precisely as they were by the old Arians: Christ is “the first-born of every creature,” which shows that he also belongs to the class of creatures, though he is the eldest of the class; and Christ is “the beginning of the creation of God;” that is, the first thing God created, and so, a creature. And we refute him precisely as Athanasius did. What Paul says in Col. i. 15, is that the Messiah is *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, which teaches us expressly that while he exists before them all, he is himself not a creature, being *τίχθεις*, and not *κτιστός*; existing in a totally different way, being eternally *begotten*, while they were *made*. And in Rev. iii. 14, Messiah is not the “beginning,” in the sense of the first created thing; but *ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ*, “*Source of God’s creation*,” and hence himself not created, but divine.

But to pursue the argument of this book would only be to repeat the orthodox trinitarian argument, so familiar and so irrefragable. The Patripassian view was, centuries ago, crushed and annihilated by this numerous class of scriptural proofs. Whereas that doctrine teaches that the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, mean nothing more than three parts, which the one God and one person, Father, acts in the work of redemption—three *dramatis personæ* which the one Actor assumes successively in the drama of grace; if a single text is found, in which two of these Persons appear on the stage together, or bear reciprocal relations to each other or entertain mutual affections, or perform personal actions distinct from the Father, that theory breaks down before it. But there is a great multitude of such texts, and before them all, Patripassianism breaks down hopelessly. It is amusing to see the simplicity with which our author unconsciously handles many of these texts, so destructive to his theory. Thus we notice, almost at random, on page 55, John xiii. 3, “Jesus knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands,” etc. How can the one divine Actor transfer power from himself acting the rôle of Father, to himself acting the rôle of Son?

VOL. XXXII., NO. 1—10.

But our purpose is not to discuss Mr. Weeks's argument, but only to signalise the appearance of this new speculation.

R. D. L.

Certain Dangerous Tendencies in American Life, and Other Papers. Boston: Houghton, Osgood & Company, The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1880. Pp. 260, 12mo.

The first paper in this remarkable little volume, is on "Certain Dangerous Tendencies in American Life." The other papers are seven in number, and on the following topics: The Nationals, their Origin and their Being; Three Typical Workingmen; Workingmen's Wives; The Career of a Capitalist; Study of a New England Factory Town; Preaching; Sincere Demagoguery.

These anonymous papers are from some masterly hand. Who or what the author is, it is very difficult to conjecture, further than that he is a New Englander, who has lived in New York and New Jersey, and also in the Northwest; that he is thoroughly *American*, and yet wide awake to some of the dangerous tendencies of American life; that he is not a minister, but evidently a Christian man; that he is of a liberal spirit and of great benevolence deeply interested in the condition of the working classes, and yet very fair towards the manufacturers; that he is an observer, a scholar, and a thinker, far removed from any sort of fanaticism of spirit, able to look very impartially at the questions of our time, and to consider fairly the claims of both capitalist and laborer.

He begins by setting forth the unpreparedness of the American people for the difficulties which have resulted from the civil war. "Little practical knowledge of pauperism or the labor question, and little knowledge amongst our politicians (he very properly does *not* say our statesmen) of political economy"—that is the way he states the case. "Indeed," says he, "the politicians of those days cannot be said to have studied anything very deeply besides party politics, except the slavery question: and they were fond of repeating that history had no lessons for us, and that the experience of other nations was not in any way valuable for our guidance." "The slavery agitation," he says, "unavoidably ex-

aggerated the sentimental character which already marked our politics, and gave them an impulse toward humanitarian and intuitive methods which has not yet spent its force." The war destroyed hundreds of millions of property, and the Government had to borrow two thousand millions to continue the struggle and maintain the existence of "the nation." The most rigid economy should have succeeded the war; but there did follow really the wildest extravagance. People lost their heads, believing that wealth could be created by Congress authorising the issue of paper promises to pay. Meanwhile a passionate greed for riches was developed, men who had lived by the labor of their hands now began to live by their wits, Government contracts and corporation jobs abounded, and then dishonesty and repudiation and an alarming development of the disposition to steal trust funds. There was a general intoxication of fancied prosperity, "into which was plunged a population which had no sufficient moral safeguards whatever."

The reader of course observes that no part of this description applies or was intended by the author to apply to the South. In fact, the South is apparently *ignored* (to use a Yankee word) in the whole volume. The South is no part of the country, in our anonymous author's view. It is New England, New York, New Jersey, and the West, he has in his mind, and these only. This is all as it should be—he knows what he writes of, and he writes of what he knows. Would that as much could be said of Northern authorship generally!

Having introduced the reader to the condition of financial matters at the North which succeeded the war, the writer proceeds "to consider the religious and moral character and equipment which our people possessed fifteen years ago, and the effect of the new conditions upon these factors of our national life." He states that the "nominal faith was what was called evangelical Protestantism. Its early creeds and symbols were still unchanged, but the real religion of the people was already to a great extent a decorous worldliness. . . . Many ministers and multitudes of the more intelligent members of the churches had become sceptical in regard to some of the cardinal doctrines of the popular

Christianity. These doctrines were in the preaching of the times habitually so softened and accommodated to the growing doubt, that nearly all their original meaning was explained away. . . . Preaching became more and more speculative and rationalistic. Everywhere it almost ceased to deal with morals or duty. It lost all edge; . . . it was no longer addressed to the conscience, but to the taste, the aesthetic judgment. . . . The new tide of worldliness rose everywhere and submerged to a great extent a Church which it found open and without defence against the flood." What follows as to church members is a very dark picture, but, we apprehend, a true one. Hear what the writer declares of the ministers: They are "men of intelligence and of considerable culture. They believe even less than their people of the doctrines of their creeds. They generally avoid doctrinal subjects in preaching, and have for some years based their teaching mostly upon utilitarian grounds. They have for themselves accepted rationalistic beliefs far in advance of what they teach, and consider themselves engaged in a most necessary and useful work—that of leading the people gradually onward in thought and knowledge, by carefully giving them the truth as they are able to bear it. Their caution is extreme, and they thus sacrifice whatever strength may belong to courage and outspoken sincerity."

Following this picture of the Northern ministry by one who is evidently no enemy to the Church of Christ, is a full delineation of different classes of their people, until he comes to the class of the "working men." Here he declares that "we are in the earlier stages of a war upon property, and upon everything that satisfies what are called the higher wants of civilised life;" and "the war against all these things will be prosecuted with desperate energy and persistence, unless something is speedily done to counteract and change some of the chief tendencies of the age: unless there is an evolution or application of forces adequate to create a new series of circumstances." "The greatest danger is not that of armed violence or riotous destruction of property." "They believe that the interests of the laborer, of the people, as they say, will be advanced by crippling and injuring capital in every possible way, and this they intend to do." "The aim is to

destroy, little by little, the constitutional and representative character of the government, in order to enable the people to decide everything anew, if they wish to do so, at each annual election." "We have a great increase and development of unfavorable and disorganising forces within our national life, and no corresponding increase of wholesome or vital activities. The influence of the Church and of religion upon the morals and conduct of men has greatly declined, and is still declining. . . . Multitudes who are religious are not trustworthy. They declare themselves fit for heaven, but they will not tell the truth nor deal justly with their neighbors. . . . There is no article of food, medicine, or traffic which can be profitably adulterated or injuriously manipulated that is not in most of the great centres of trade thus corrupted and sold by prominent members of Christian churches."

The remedy proposed by our author may be summed up in one word, viz., *Education*. He wants to change the reading of the masses. He wants better religious teaching, and the secular press to come down with purifying power on the pulpit. He wants a good low-priced newspaper, of better character than exists. He wants popular books on political economy. He wants good lecturers. He wants *tramps* regulated. All these may be very good things in their place. But alas, not one nor all of these can reach the seat of the disease. There is but one remedy, and that must come from a power superior to man's.

In his essay on *Preaching*, our author displays his own want of acquaintance with the case he has in hand. There he declares that it is necessary for Christianity to make "a partial change of front to meet the errors and evils" he has been describing. "Other-world sanctions have to a great extent lost their force in Christian teaching. . . . Neither the distant past nor the distant future awes, inspires, or restrains men now as heretofore." So, therefore, "the Church will be obliged to recognise these changes," . . . and she must lay "increased emphasis upon the sanctions, obligations, and activities belonging to this world, and to the moral life of the present time. Heaven can wait. . . . Righteousness, justice, order, patriotism—these are the principles which religion should henceforth emphasise in this country. If Chris-

tianity should come to mean this and do this, it would regain its lost vitality and sovereignty; it would be again a light to guide and a law to govern mankind." Does not this very intelligent writer, this candid, bold, and earnest thinker, make it very plain that he has lived indeed in a region where there is little preaching of that gospel which is the power of God and the wisdom of God to save mankind both here and hereafter? We are very impressively reminded of the prediction of Thornwell, that the time will come when missionaries will have to be sent to preach the gospel in New England.

We are also reminded, in reading this book, of the prediction so often uttered by the South to the North when her domestic institution was assailed, namely this: "These principles of your crusade against *slavery*, as soon as it is destroyed, will be turned against *property*, because, if all men have equal rights to liberty, so they must have also to property." Our Northern brethren have now the chalice commended to their own lips.

Our notice of this book fails to give the reader any adequate idea of its power and value. It cannot be too highly commended for the ability and interest of its discussions. J. B. A.

Observations concerning the Scripture Economy of the Trinity and the Covenant of Redemption. By JONATHAN EDWARDS. With an Introduction and Appendix. By EGBERT C. SMYTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway. 1880. Pp. 97. 12mo.

In 1851, Dr. Bushnell, of Hartford, who was by no means free from suspicion of heresy, threw out the intimation that a manuscript of President Edwards was in existence, but suppressed by his friends, "the contents of which would excite a good deal of surprise if communicated to the public."

In July, 1880, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes directly asserted, "on unquestionable authority," not only that such a manuscript existed, but that it evinced the views of President Edwards to have "undergone a great change in the direction of Arianism or of Sabellianism." He called on the men of Andover not to conceal the fact that "so able and so good a man lived to be

emancipated from the worse than heathen conceptions which had so long enchained his powerful but crippled understanding."

These charges of the great New Englander's swerving from orthodoxy and of his friends suppressing all evidence of that fact, met with immediate and indignant denial, and have led also to the publication of the manuscript of which the title is given above.

The reader should notice that the title given to this manuscript is *Observations, etc.* It does not appear that the author intended them for publication. They seem to have been designed rather for the satisfaction and improvement of his own mind, and to have been written down simply that he might retain thoughts which appeared to him worth preserving. And yet it is no crude production. Neither was it an early one. President Edwards left above 1,400 Miscellaneous Observations, and this one is number 1,062. At the same time these Observations are not a treatise on the subject of the Trinity. They do not touch upon the relation of the three Persons to the divine Unity, nor other topics which such a *treatise* would necessarily discuss.

We have been able to find no evidence whatever in this little work of any leaning of the mind of Jonathan Edwards to Arianism, Sabellianism, or any other form of Unitarian heresy. The adherents of "Liberal Christianity" in New England shouted too soon. They will get neither aid nor comfort from these Observations.

J. B. A.

The Life and Work of William Augustus Muhlenberg. By ANNE AYRES. *Vir antiqua fide et virtute.* New York: Harper & Bros., Franklin Square, 1880. 8vo. Pp. xiv., 524.

This deeply interesting memoir is well executed; by one who is evidently a person of social and literary as well as Christian refinement, and to whom the lamented subject of the biography once said, "You know more of my heart and mind, on all points, than any person living." Dr. Muhlenberg is chiefly known outside of New York, and of Episcopal circles, as the author of the hymn "I would not live away;" but, in addition to being the author of that famous composition, (which in its original form

is not a hymn at all,) he is also widely remembered for his venerable form and countenance, his unspotted Christian character, his remarkable public and ecclesiastical charities, his fervor and liberality of sympathetic feeling, and his prominence in the deliberations, but especially in the practical enterprises, of his Church. He was sprung from an ancient Saxon family, "probably of the historic town of Mühlberg, on the Elbe." His ancestors had removed to Einbeck, in Hanover, "then one of the free cities of Germany," where, in 1711, was born the founder of the American branch of the family, who is styled in his epitaph at Trappe, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, "the blessed and venerable Henry Melchior Muhlenberg." This was a great and good man, once connected with the orphanage of Francke at Halle, afterwards a graduate at Göttingen and a Lutheran pastor and missionary. He was the friend of nobles and men of letters, and once received a silver-mounted snuff-box as a present from Frederick the Great. Much might be said of his varied gifts and apostolic zeal. His chief field of labor, under the direction of the German and Swedish Lutherans, was in the British Provinces (as they then were) of America. He passed with untiring endurance from Georgia to the verge of Canada, building churches and schools in the waste places, and preaching and teaching in different languages. "Father Muhlenberg" is the affectionate name by which he is still indicated by the Lutheran people. His first church was at the village of La Trappe, Pennsylvania, which is still the burial place of the Muhlenberg families.

William Augustus Muhlenberg, the subject of the memoir, was born in Philadelphia, September 16, 1796, and died in New York, April 8, 1877. His name is peculiarly associated with his pious labors in St. Johnland, in Long Island, and St. Luke's Hospital, in New York. Schools, orphanages, charities—these were the most characteristic expression of his inward thoughts. Dr. Muhlenberg was, we are assured, an eminently spiritual and effective preacher. He was greatly devoted to aesthetics in all departments, and was much misunderstood even in his own denomination. At one time he was, indeed, strongly tinctured with a species of modified ritualism. He visited England and

Oxford, in 1833 and 1834, and was "ravished" with the immemorial charm of the University, St. John's College, Magdalene College, and Addison's Walk. There he was hospitably entertained by Newman and Pusey. Yet even at that time, though in some sort "a Puseyite," he rejected the dogma of baptismal regeneration. By some strange instinct he seemed at once to recognise the Jesuitical tendencies and Romish leanings of Cardinal Newman. Afterwards he saw and acknowledged that the logical outcome of Tractarianism is the system of Rome. Dr. Muhlenberg was himself no logician; hardly a theologian. He was wont to say that the heart had more to do with his theological tenets than his head. In matters of worship he verged, in many things, towards extreme imaginative ritualism. He was, nevertheless, grandly catholic in his views of the Church and the ministry, and utterly opposed to sacramentarianism. He exulted in the plainest Methodist services in Paris. Once he said: "I fear my heart will always be Low Church." (P. 170.) In 1852, he writes: "I was never a High Churchman. Receiving my theology from Bishop White, the apostolic succession and sacramentarian doctrine were alike foreign to my system, if I ever had a system; but I have been claimed by High Churchmen because of my liturgic, or what would be now called ritualistic, propensities, or, to use another word, *aesthetic*." (Pp. 171-2.) He was a devoted servant of Jesus Christ, and the spiritual element entered into all his closer friendships. He wrote the celebrated stanzas on the words in Job at a comparatively early period, and in the authentic form in which they appear in this biography they differ widely from the form in the Hymnal, which is, however, Dr. Muhlenberg's own abridgment.

His end was peace, and tranquil enjoyment of the divine mercies, and the prospect of eternity and heaven. He lived to disapprove the sentiment of his own hymn, as in his later opinion too melancholy and querulous, and used to say he preferred Paul to Job.

"The festival trump calls for jubilant songs." H. C. A.

A Popular Commentary on the New Testament by English and American Scholars of various Evangelical Denominations. With Illustrations and Maps. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL.D., Baldwin Professor of Sacred Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Vol. II. The Gospel of John and the Acts. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. 1880. Pp. 577, large 8vo.

This is a truly magnificent work, beautifully printed in clear type and on the finest paper, elegantly bound and profusely illustrated with photographic engravings, representing places and things in the East. There are maps and plans by Prof. Guyot of Princeton. The illustrations are from views taken or selected by our old and dear friend, the Rev. William M. Thomson, D. D., late of Beirut, Syria, and his son, William H. Thomson, M. D., of New York; the first named being the author of that admirable work, "The Land and the Book." There are twelve full page engravings, representing Antioch, Cana, Jacob's Well, Bethany, The Shadow of the Cross (from the painting by Gerome), Samaria, Damascus, Joppa, Lystra, Derbe and Attalia, Athens, Tarsus, and Caesarea. Besides these, there are more than fifty illustrations *in the text*, giving to us pictures from life of the Oriental world.

The first volume of this work contained an Introduction to the New Testament and Commentaries on Matthew, Mark, and Luke, by Dr. Schaff and Prof. M. B. Riddle, D. D., of Hartford. The present volume contains John and the Acts; the one commented on by Prof. William Milligan, D. D., University of Aberdeen, and Prof. William F. Moulton, D. D., of Caius College, Cambridge; the other expounded by J. S. Howson, D. D., Dean of Chester, and Canon Donald Spence, Rector of St. Pancras, London. Two more volumes will complete the work. The writers are to be Drs. Schaff and Riddle, and a number of English and Scotch divines.

So far as we have been able to judge by examination of certain test passages, the work appears to be sound as well as able. The exposition of every passage is full enough without being overlong and tedious. The only possible objection we can make to

the book is its excessive ponderosity. No other volume ever so taxed our physical strength. To hold it up and read it is out of the question. One must sit at a desk or table, and lay this marvellously solid and weighty, though not very bulky, production down before him, if he would possess himself of its contents.

J. B. A.

The Faith of our Forefathers. By REV. E. J. STEARNS, D. D.
New York : Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House, 1879.
Pp. 380, 12mo.

The Right Reverend James Gibbons, D. D., now an Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, put forth some years ago a little book entitled "*The Faith of our Fathers; being a plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ.*" This work passed rapidly through thirteen editions, amounting to sixty-five thousand copies. The author says in his Preface that "his chief aim has been to bring home the truths of the Catholic Faith to our separated brethren." The topics discussed in his thirty chapters are such as these: Infallible Authority of the Church; The Church and the Bible; The Primacy of Peter; The Supremacy of the Pope; Temporal Power of the Popes; Invocation of Saints; Sacred Images; Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead; Civil and Religious Liberty; Charges of Religious Persecution; Celibacy of the Clergy; Matrimony.

The Archbishop handles these topics ingeniously, but not ingenuously. His treatment of them is such as would easily mislead the uninformed, but will not endure examination by even ordinary scholarship. As a specimen of his powers of assertion, take the following. Speaking of Luther and Calvin and Zuinglius and Knox, he says: "The private lives of these pseudo-reformers were stained by cruelty, rapine, and licentiousness" (p. 47); again speaking of the primacy of Peter, he alleges that "John Calvin, a witness above suspicion," does "not hesitate to recëcho the unanimous voice of Catholic tradition" respecting Peter's residence at Rome and his occupation of that See. Every scholar knows that Calvin denies and disproves the primacy of

Peter. Take another specimen. On page 134 (of the sixth revised edition) it is declared in the strongest terms that no nation has ever been converted from Paganism to Christianity except by Romish missionaries!

It is in reply to the Archbishop that Dr. Stearns puts forth his book. We cannot say too much in its favor. Chapter by chapter he pulls Dr. Gibbons's work to pieces. It is a most thorough and complete refutation, in perfect good humor, racy and sparkling. The blows of his logic fall, like those of the sledge hammer, with crushing weight.

J. B. A.

The Reports, Letters, and Acts of Pilate. With an Introduction and Notes. By W. O. CLOUGH, B. A. Indianapolis: Robert Douglass. 1880. Pp. 206, 12mo.

This work reopens the interesting inquiry touching the genuineness of the "*Acta Pilati*." It furnishes the English reader, in an excellent and scholarly translation, the *data* for a probable conclusion on this question. The learned author has here collected, besides his own Introduction and a sketch of Pilate's history and life, the *Gesta Pilati*, with Notes; the document claiming to be his Report to the Emperor Tiberius, in two forms; a Letter to Tiberius; a Letter to Claudius Cæsar; and the Gospel of Nicodemus, usually printed in the apocryphal collections as that of Fabricius.

It has been customary with historical critics to condemn all these as spurious. Our author advances a hypothesis which would rescue the *Gesta Pilata*, and possibly the Epistles, from this verdict. He states that this document is now for the first time published, from an old MS. in the Vatican Library; that it is free from the internal marks of forgery and fraud which condemn the Gospel of Nicodemus; and that its language and sentiments are such as this Roman governor would naturally have expressed. But Justin Martyr, in his Apology, A. D. 135, staunchly asserts the existence of a document from Pilate, among the Roman archives, testifying to facts about the trial and crucifixion of Jesus, which ought to convince all of his divine mission. Tertullian, about A. D. 200, does the same. Eusebius, on the

authority of Tertullian and Melito, makes the same assertion: and adds, that such an impression was made on the sensual despot, Tiberius, by this report of his deputy, that he actually proposed to the Senate to enrol Jesus among the Roman *Dii Liciti*. Now, the adverse critics, leaping to the conclusion that the assertions of Justin, Tertullian, Melito, and Eusebius, were grounded on and referred to the document currently known as the *Acta Pilati*, or Gospel of Nicodemus, refuse to allow any authenticity to the assertion of these Apologists; because this document is a self-evident forgery. But let us suppose, with Mr. Clough, that the real reference of these ancient authors was to an earlier, more authentic document, namely, the *Gesta Pilati*, obstinately overlooked hitherto by these adverse critics, then their argument falls. It should be noticed that this hypothesis is entirely agreeable with the words of the early Apologists: for they do not specify the Gospel of Nicodemus as their source. Then the general argument which has been urged in favor of the truth of their references, comes into fair application: that writers of such respectability would never have ventured, especially in the presence of bitter and well-informed adversaries, like Justin's opponent, Crescens, to advance an apocryphal evidence.

It is worthy of note that a German scholar, a century ago, Altmann, advanced, with great ability, the same hypothesis. *Disquisitio historico-critica de Epistola Pilati ad Tiberium*. Bern., 1755. Here it is maintained that Pilate was actually informed of the resurrection of Christ by the guard; that he did actually send to the Emperor an account of the resurrection and crucifixion of Jesus, though not such an account as the one usually advanced in the apocryphal Gospel; and that Tiberius did propose to the Senate the paying of religious honors to Jesus as a God. Does the discovery of this more brief, simple, and *verisemblable* document, the *Gesta Pilati*, confirm the sagacious guess of Altmann? This is the cardinal point of the whole inquiry.

R. L. D.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Shutting off from our readers for this once the flood-gates of Christmas literature, we open our assortment with a list of foreign issues. We are confronted at the outset with several valuable German Commentaries. The¹ first of the lot is by a Romanist, who is in general conservative, but displays an overweening attachment to the LXX., and argues sophistically in defence of the deutero canonical books. The² second is by a pupil and adherent of Delitsch. Töttermann favors the *paraboli- cal* rather than either the allegorical or literal view as to Hosea's marriage; and to this, which seems to be the prevailing Jewish theory, we have been ourselves of late somewhat inclined. It is gratifying to find that able and sound exegete,³ Keil, turning his attention to the New Testament. Professor Schmidt's⁴ Monograph on the critics of "the Philippians" is a valiant and successful protest against the entire school of destructive criticism. The fifth⁵ on our list is a volume of popular and older exegetical excerpts in explanation of the entire Bible.

The next work⁶ we have to present to the notice of our read-

¹Commentar zum Buche des Propheten Jeremias. Von Dr. Anton Scholtz, Professor an der kgl. Universität Würzburg. Svo, pp. 609. Würzburg, 1880. [B. Westermann & Co., New York.]

²Die Weissagungen Hosias, bis zur ersten assyrische Deportation (i.-vi. 3), erläutert von Elias August Reinhold Töttermann. Leipzig: M. Schaefer, 1880. Svo, pp. 131. [*Ibid.*]

³Commentar über die Evangelien des Markus und Lucas. Von Carl Friedrich Keil, Dr. und Prof. der Theol. Pp. 591. Leipzig, Dörrling und Franke, 1879. [*Ibid.*]

⁴Neutestamentliche Hyperkritik, an dem jüngsten Angriff gegen die Aechtheit des Philippbriefes, auf ihre Methode hin untersucht. Nebst einer Erklärung des Briefes. Von Lic. Dr. Paul Wilhelm Schmidt, o. d. Prof. der Theologie in Basel. Berlin, 1880. Svo, pp. 192. [*Ibid.*]

⁵Die Heilige Schrift A. und N. Testaments, nach Dr. Luther's Uebersetzung, mit der Auslegung der vorzüglichsten Schriftforscher der älteren Evangelischen Kirche. Neues Testament. Erster Band. [*Ibid.*]

⁶Die Deutsche Augustiner-Congregation und Johann von Staupitz. Ein Beitrag zur Ordens- und Reformationsgeschichte nach meistens ungedruckten Quellen. Von Lic. Dr. Th. Kolde. Pp. 466, Göttingen, F. A. Perthes, 1879. [*Ibid.*]

ers is of a historical character, and is pronounced of high value and interest. It is in three parts—the first giving an account of the Augustinian Order; the second of the German Congregation of the Order; and the third of John von Staupitz. Melancthon is not thought to have fared particularly well at the hands of his pious but unskillful admirer¹ who publishes at Gotha. The Old Catholic movement is made the subject of a patient and discriminating investigation² by a scholar by the name of Förster, who (as it would appear) is neither wholly unsympathetic, nor wholly prepossessed in its favor. He hopes the new effort at internal reform in the Romish Church will be productive of good results. The analogy of past efforts of a kindred tendency is to our minds not particularly reassuring. The two volumes of A. F. W. Fischer are said to be a desirable addition to the already voluminous mass of German Hymnology.³ The important biography of Hengstenberg, so far as here⁴ published, gives us only the earlier portion of his eventful life; a life almost as much mixed up with the affairs of the state and the aristocracy as with the struggles of the controversialist and the theologian. A well-known Göttingen Professor and Philosopher, in his "Philosophy of Religion,"⁵ reviews, with modifications, the mystical and transcendental views of Böhme and Schelling. Schleiermacher came as near to being a devout and fervent believer as any man ever

¹ Die Theologie Melancthon's in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Zusammenhange mit der Lehrgeschichte und Culturbe-
wegung der Reformation, dargestellt von Lic. Th. Herlinger. P. 468. Gotha,
F. A. Perthes, 1879. [*Ibid.*]

² Der Altkatholicismus. Eine geschichtliche Studie von Lic. Th. Förster.
Svo, pp. viii., 149. Gotha, F. A. Perthes, 1879. [*Ibid.*]

³ Kirchenlieder-Lexicon. Hymnologisch-literarische Nachweisungen
über ca 4500 der wichtigsten und verbreitetsten Kirchenlieder aller Zeiten
in alphabetischer Folge, nebst einer Uebersicht der Liederdichter, zu-
sammen gestellt von Albert F. W. Fischer. Gotha, Friedrich Andreas
Perthes, 1878 and 1879. Two volumes.

⁴ Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg: Sein Leben und Wirken, u. s. w.,
dargestellt von Johannes Bachmann. Bde 1, 2. Pp. xvi., 376: viii.
431, 60. Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1876-1880. B. Westermann & Co.,
New York.

⁵ Religions-Philosophie. Von Dr. Albert Peip. Svo, pp. xii., 464.
Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1879.

did who was essentially a pantheist. His "Discourses on Religion"¹ is one of his most famous and characteristic works, and really the foundation of Morell's "Philosophy of Religion." A Jena Professor discusses the same subject under a narrower² title, and in a historical rather than a dialectic way. His own views are reserved for exhibition in some later form. The great etymologist of Saxony³ discusses certain matters connected with the Greek verb, which no one else can discuss so well. Another German doctor takes up the knotty idiom of the old Nibelungenlied.⁴ Alphonse and Juan de Valdès⁵ were two brothers, Spanish courtiers and men of letters, contemporaries of Charles V. and Martin Luther. They advocated reformation, but not *the* Reformation: or rather, Juan did not at first favor the proposed radical changes, and Alphonse never did: and Juan was thoroughly independent of Luther and Zwingli, although led by a different path to the same opinions held by the great German and Swiss leaders. The common spoken Persian⁶ of the present day is probably as widely different from the dialect of the Gulistan or the Shah-Nameh as the vulgar Arabic is from that of the Koran. *L'Arabe Vulgaire* is, however, full of military terms introduced by the French soldiers in Algeria. Oriental Philology⁷ has taken a new departure of late years in the direction of a genetic law resembling that of Grimm, and exciting approaches seem to have been

¹Friedrich Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion. Kritische Ausgabe. G. Ch. Bernard Puejfer. Svo, pp. xvi., 306. Braunschweig, C. A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1879. [B. Westermann & Co., New York.]

²Geschichte der Christliche Religions-Philosophie seit der Reformation. Von G. Ch. Bernhardt Puejfer. I. Band—Bis auf Kant. Svo, pp. ix.-492. [*Ibid.*]

³Curtius (Geo.), das Verbum der griechischen Sprache seinem Baue nach dargestellt. 2 Bd., 2 Aufl. gr. 8 (N., 478 s.), Leipzig, Hirzel, 10 (pl. 18).

⁴Griesmann (Schuldir. Dr. J. R.), Einführung in das Nibelungenlied, v. die Gudron, gr. 8. (84 s.) Leipzig, Webel, 1.50.

⁵Alphonso et Juan de Valdès: leur vie et leurs écrits religieux: étude historique par Manuel Carraseo. Svo, pp. 136. Genève, chez les principaux libraires. 1880.

⁶Gayard (Stanislas), Manuel de la langue Persanne vulgaire. In-12. Leide, Maisonneuve & Co., Cart. 5fr.

⁷Manuel de la langue Assyrienne. Par Joachim Menant. Paris, 1880.

made to such a possibility. The Assyrian language is still a bone of contention, and Ménant is one of the oldest Assyriologists. Oriental archæology¹ has in the meanwhile been making steady, and often astonishing, progress. Phœnicia and the Hittite civilisation divide the antiquarian interest with the significant relics of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon. One of the most marvellous of all lexicons is the recent and new dictionary of the French Academy and of the French tongue. The name of *Littré* is a fortunate one for the success of these linguistic studies² in French, for it is the name of the Academy's editor. Sicilian treasures in geography, history, biography, and bibliography are exposed to view and rendered available in book form to those who are able to read Italian.³ While on the subject of French dictionaries, we take occasion to refer to two others: one of which is presumed to be of a scientific character, being by an eminent French *savant*, and having been "crowned";⁴ the other is by an Englishman, and is of far less size and pretension.⁵ Of the many new grammars of the Latin language that are coming out every month, we think it not amiss to speak of one which

¹ Clermont-Ganneau (Ch.) *Etudes d'archéologie orientale. L'Imagerie phénicienne et la mythologie iconologique chez les Grecs. I. partie. La Coupe phénicienne de Paestrina.* In-8. Leroux. 10f.

² Littré (E.) *études et glanures, pour fair suite à l'Histoire de la langue française.* In-8. Didier. 7fr. 50.

³ *Biblioteca arabico-sicula ossia raccolta di testi arabici, che toccano la geografia, la storia, la biografia, e la bibliografia della Sicilia. Raccolti e tradotti in Italiano da Meh. Amari.* Torino, 1880. 8vo, pp. lxxxiii., 570.

⁴ *An Etymological Dictionary of the French Language.* (Crowned by the French Academy.) With a Preface on the Principles of French Etymology. By A. Brachet, formerly Examiner and Professor of the Polytechnic School, Paris; Laureate of the Institute, etc. Translated by G. W. Kitchen. Second edition, revised and corrected. 12mo, \$1.75. Macmillan & Co., New York.

⁵ *A Compendious Dictionary of the French Language.* (French-English, English-French.) Followed by a list of the principal diverging derivatives, and preceded by chronological and historical tables. By Gustave Masson, Associate Master and Librarian Harvard School. 12mo, \$1.70. *Ibid.*

proceeds from a representative scholar of Cambridge,¹ and has a definite regard to the historic changes in the vocabulary and structure.

Another philologist introduces us to the more limited study of the classic etymology.² We take for granted that at this late day the author is sufficiently a master of the methods and results of Grimm, Bopp, Schleicher, Steinthal, and Curtius. The great authority on the etymology of our own language is Mahn; whose conclusions will be found embodied in the later editions of Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. We have now to point to two^{3 4} other dictionaries, both of them by Cambridge men, and one of them⁵ by a professor of Anglo-Saxon, which concern themselves exclusively with this subject. The first of these books³ pursues a historical method; The second⁴ has prefixed a disquisition on the origin of language. The editor and finisher of the Icelandic Lexicon⁵ would appear to a casual observer to be himself a native of the cold and insulated territory from which he here takes a moiety of his vocables. The most fruitful researches into all the ramifications of the old Aryan mother tongue, are those which begin lowest down the stem and go nearest to the root. The dialects of modern Europe are thus best studied in connexion with the sacred dialect of ancient India. A professor of Sanskrit in an English University ought then to be the man to track the English derivatives back to their ancestral sources in the Orient, as

¹A Grammar of the Latin Language, from Plautus to Suetonius. By Henry John Roby, M. A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. 2 vols., 12mo, \$4.60. *Ibid.*

²An Introduction to Greek and Latin Etymology. By John Peile, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Christ's College. Third edition, revised. 12mo, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

³An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. Arranged on a Historical basis. By the Rev. W. W. Skeat, M. A., Professor of Anglo-Saxon at Cambridge, 4to. To be completed in four parts. Parts I. and II. now ready, each \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴A Dictionary of English Etymology. By Hensleigh Wedgwood, late Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge. With an Introduction on the Origin of Language. Third Edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged. Large Svo, pp. lxxi., 746. \$6.50. *Ibid.*

⁵An Icelandic-English Dictionary. Based on the MS. Collection of

well as to compare them with the words and radicals of kindred and contemporaneous languages. This is done by the distinguished scholar, Professor Monier Williams.¹ Principal Caird is the same who gave to the press some years ago those eloquent sermons on "Religion in Common Life," and on "The Invisible God." He is a charming rhetorician as well as a profoundly earnest philosophic thinker, but we regret to be compelled to add that he has been becoming progressively more and more rationalistic, until now² he seems to have given his assent to the main postulate of transcendental idealism. From Trübner's Oriental series we select for mention several which relate mostly to Hindostan,^{3,5} partly to Burmah^{3,4} and Persia. The story of Gautama has acquired new attractions from Edwin Arnold's poem. A general history of Indian literature⁶ is very desirable for those who intend to prosecute the study of any of the Asiatic members of the Indo-European group, whether from

the late Richard Cleasby. Enlarged and completed by Dr. Vigfusson. With an Introduction and Life of Richard Cleasby, by G. Webbe Dasent. D. C. L. 4to, cloth, \$16.00. *Ibid.*

¹ A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Etymologically and Philologically arranged, with special reference to Greek, Latin, German, Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, and other cognate Indo-European Languages. By Monier Williams, M. A., Boden Professor of Sanskrit. 4to, cloth. \$25. *Ibid.*

² An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. By John Caird, D.D., Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, and one of her Majesty's Chaplains for Scotland. \$3.00. *Ibid.*

³ Miscellaneous Essays Relating to Indian Subjects. By B. H. Hodgson, late British Minister at Nepal. Two volumes, post 8vo, cloth, price 28s. (Trübner's Oriental Series.) Trübner & Co., London.

⁴ The Life or Legend of Gautama, the Buddha of the Burmese. With Annotations, the Ways to Nebban, and Notices on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks. By the Rt. Rev. P. Bigandet, Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar Apostolic of Ava and Pegu. Third edition. Two volumes, post 8vo, cloth, price 21s. *Ibid.*

⁵ A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, Geography, History, and Literature. By John Dawson, M. R. A. S. Post 8vo, cloth, price 16s. *Ibid.*

⁶ Weber's History of Indian Literature. Translated from the Second German Edition, by John Mann, M. A., and Theodor Zachariae, Ph.D. Post 8vo, cloth, price 18s. *Ibid.*

the point of view of the linguist or the man of letters. For all such the octavo volume of Mann and Zachariae may be somewhat confidently recommended. Oriental Philology¹ receives a fresh impulse from the hand of a well-known representative of the Indian Civil Service and of the Royal Asiatic Society. Sanskrit done into English verse and prose affords a palpable verification of the validity of the principles of sober scholarship.² From India to Persia (even in linguistics) is a short journey. The first translation of the masterpiece of Sadi³ is by a Fellow of the Royal Society; is accompanied by an introduction and a life of the author, and now appears in a third edition.

The books issued by the Messrs. Ginn & Heath, of Boston, are of exceptional excellence as to scholarlike accuracy as well as neatness of dress. The "Parliament of Fools"⁴ is of greatly inferior interest to the "The Canterbury Tales," but is equally a specimen of "Chaucer's well of English undefiled," and richly worthy of the critical labors of the Yale College expert who has taken it in hand to edit the work. It is perhaps an easier gradation from Chaucer to the Bard of Avon, than from any other English poet. Two such fit men as have essayed to discuss Shakespeare's English⁵ and to comment on his "Julius

¹Linguistic and Oriental Essays. Written from the year 1846 to 1878. By Robert Needham Cust, late member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service, Hon. Secretary to the Royal Asiatic Society, and Author of "The Modern Languages of the East Indies." Post 8vo, cloth, price 18s. *Ibid.*

²Metrical Translations from Sanskrit Writers. With an Introduction, Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from Classical Authors. By J. Muir, C. I. E., D. C. L., etc. Post 8vo, cloth, price 14s. *Ibid.*

³The Gulistan; or, Rose Garden of Shekh Mushliu'd-din Sadi of Shiraz. Translated for the first time into Prose and Verse, with an Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah, by Edward B. Eastwick, F. R. S., M. R. A. S., etc. Second edition. Post 8vo, cloth, price 10s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁴Chaucer's Parliament of Fowles. A revised Text with Literary and Grammatical Introduction, Notes, and a full Glossary. By J. R. Lounsbury, Yale College. Ginn & Heath, Boston, Mass.

⁵Craik's English of Shakespeare, Illustrated in a Philological Com-

Cæsar" are not commonly to be found working in concert. Professor Hudson's book¹ on the broad aspects of Shakespeare's genius and characteristics has won for itself a high place amongst the students of the dramatist. The continental and transcontinental fame of Professor Whitney as a linguist seems to warrant large expectations of his critique on English Grammar.² The Spedding edition³ of Bacon, now superbly issued by the Riverside press, is, so far as we are aware, the only one which has thoroughly availed itself of the large mass of hitherto inaccessible materials. Mr. Spedding is, like Montague and Dixon, altogether too partial to the moral dignity of the great Chancellor. The popular edition⁴ of the same house is in two elegant crown octavos. We have deliberately placed side by side with the works of this greatest of England's prose authors, the two^{5 6} books which imperfectly express to modern readers the incomparable

mentary on his Julius Cæsar. By George L. Craik, Queen's College, Belfast. Edited by W. J. Rolfe, Cambridge. *Ibid.*

¹ Hudson's Life, Art, and Characters of Shakespeare. Including an historical sketch of the origin and growth of the Drama in England, with studies in the Poet's Dramatic Architecture, Delineation of Character, Humor, Style, and Moral Spirit, also with critical discourses on twenty-five of the plays. By Henry N. Hudson, Professor of English Literature in the Boston School of Oratory. *Ibid.*

² Essentials in English Grammar. By W. D. Whitney, of Yale College. The facts of English Grammar are presented in such a way as to lay the best foundation for the further and higher study of Language in all its departments. *Ibid.*

³ The Works of Francis Bacon. Collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglass Denon Heath. Riverside edition. Two steel portraits of Lord Bacon and a full Index. 15 volumes, crown 8vo, \$33.75; half calf, \$60.00. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

⁴ The Same. Popular edition. With portraits. 2 volumes, crown 8vo, \$5.00; half calf, \$9.00. *Ibid.*

⁵ The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal. A new translation, with Historical Introduction and Notes by the Rev. Thomas McCrie, preceded by a Life of Pascal, a Critical Essay, and a Biographical Notice. 2 volumes, crown 8vo, each \$2.25; half calf, \$4.00. *Ibid.*

⁶ The Thoughts, Letters, and Opuscles of Blaise Pascal. Translated from the French by O. W. Wight, A. M., with Introductory Notices, and Notes from all the Commentators. *Ibid.*

excellence of the greatest thinker and genius whom France has given to the world. Of the "Provincial Letters" it is enough to say that they are in every sense the finest dialogues since Plato's; and that Voltaire kept a copy of the poignant little volumes on his study table as a specimen of style. With regard to the "Thoughts," they are the flings of the most cunning and most opulent goldsmith's shop in Europe. We fancy that besides Pascal France can show no such literary genius as that of Molière and Montaigne.¹ In reading the "*Pensées*" of Pascal one must be as careful to have the genuine *words*, as in reading Ignatius one must be careful to have the genuine *writings*. There is only one of the French editions of the "*Pensées*" that is thoroughly trustworthy. The drawback in the case of Montaigne's *Essays* is the old French, just as the drawback in the case of the Nibelungenlied is the old German. But for the bristling husk one would never tire of the kernel. This is possibly true, both of the old essays and the old epic; it is certainly true of the old essays. Montaigne will long be valued for his originality, his penetrating insight, his knowledge of the world, and his extraordinary learning; and be relished for his quaintness, his humor, and his odd mixture of genial humanity and apparent cynicism. He has traits in common with Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Thomas Brown, and Charles Lamb.

With those exalted French names we join the names of the two most influential English prose writers, with perhaps the exception of Coleridge, and, as some may say, Macaulay, that have appeared in our time, considering, as we do, Edmund Burke as the connecting link between our time and that of Johnson, and the greatest writer since Bolingbroke. We agree with the late John Stuart Mill in putting Thomas Carlyle at the very top of contemporary British writers, so far as his *matter* is concerned, at least if that matter be regarded aside from the question

¹ The Works of Michael de Montaigne. Comprising his *Essays*, *Journey into Italy*, and *Letters*; with Notes from all the Commentators, Biographical and Bibliographical Notices, etc., by W. Hazlitt. With a portrait of Montaigne. 4 volumes, crown 8vo, cloth, \$7.50; half calf, \$15. *Ibid.*

of its soundness or its truth; and as to his *manner*, we concur with the same critic in the judgment that the "unspeakable" Scotchman (to borrow the epithet he has himself applied to the Turk) is "a law unto himself." In the *Essays*, however, and especially in the essay on "Bivens" and the essay on "Boswell's Johnson," Carlyle's English is more like other people's English than it is any where else. Carlyle's *Essays*¹ is, moreover, on purely literary grounds, one of the best introductions in existence to the study of German literature. Carlyle's philosophy and theology are a treacherous dependence; but the old man seems to be dropping somewhat in his green old age the crude integuments of his early pantheism. De Quincey² narrowly missed being the greatest, as he is in point of fact probably the most brilliant, master of English prose composition. President McCosh is to be praised and thanked for his valuable treatise on the *Feelings*.³ Uhlhorn's "Conflict of Christianity" is now available for English readers.⁴ We have lately spoken of the "Speaker's Commentary" on the New Testament, and of Canon Westcott's noble contribution.⁵ Dr. Field's books of travel^{6 7} are equal to any. A gifted scholar and hymnologist (if it be the same) reappears as

¹Critical and Miscellaneous Essays of Thomas Carlyle. With a fine steel portrait of the author. 4 volumes, crown 8vo, \$7.50; half calf, \$15.00. *Ibid.*

²Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays, and Complete Works of Thomas de Quincey. Riverside edition. Re-edited and enlarged, with steel portrait of de Quincey. 12 volumes, crown 8vo; per volume, \$1.75; the set, \$21.00; half calf, \$42.00. *Ibid.*

³The Emotions. By James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., President of Princeton College. 1 volume, crown 8vo, \$2.00. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁴The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism. By Dr. Gerhard Uhlhorn. Translated by Professor Egbert C. Smyth and the Rev. C. J. H. Ropes. 1 volume, crown 8vo, \$2.00. *Ibid.*

⁵The Bible Commentary. New Testament. Vol. 2. St. John—by Canon Westcott. The Acts—by the Bishop of Chester. 1 volume, 8vo, \$5.00. *Ibid.*

⁶From the Lakes of Killarney to the Golden Horn. By Henry M. Field, D. D. 1 volume, 12mo, \$2.00. *Ibid.*

⁷From Egypt to Japan. By Henry M. Field, D. D. 1 volume, 12mo, \$2.00. *Ibid.*

an exegete.¹ Dr. Macdonald was the well-known pastor of the First Presbyterian church of Princeton, and was a graphic and instructive sermoniser. His popular work on the Apostle John² needs no other endorsement than that of Dean Howson. Renouf's work on the Religion of Egypt³ is of too much pretension to be dismissed without further examination. The newly published manuscript of President Edwards,⁴ to which reference was made in our last number, is chiefly noteworthy as a complete refutation of the charge against his memory, made in advance of the publication, that in this work the author has abandoned the position of old-fashioned orthodoxy. Each fresh instalment of "The Epochs" series is to be welcomed, and in this⁵ instance we think is to be applauded. The Pilgrim Psalms⁶ is spoken of in terms of strong favor in journals of the Episcopal Church at the North. Mr. Jackson's cloth octavo⁷ is a timely addition to our apologetic alcoves. There is a sweet devotional aroma about the title of Dr. Raleigh's little volume.⁸ Dr. Hodge's admirable biography

¹ Studies in the New Testament. By the Rev. C. S. Robinson, D. D. 1 volume, 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

² The Life and Writings of St. John. By the Rev. James M. Macdonald, D. D. Edited, with an Introduction, by Dean Howson. Illustrated. 1 volume, 8vo. A new edition. Price reduced to \$3.00. *Ibid.*

³ The Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt. By P. LePage Renouf. (The Hibbert Lectures for 1879.) 1 volume, 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴ Observations concerning the Scripture (Economy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption). By Jonathan Edwards. With Introduction and Appendix by Professor Egbert C. Smyth, D. D. 1 volume, 12mo, \$1.00. *Ibid.*

⁵ Rise of the Macedonian Empire. By A. M. Curteis, M. A. (Epochs of Ancient History series.) With three maps and five plans. 1 volume, 16mo, \$1.00. *Ibid.*

⁶ The Pilgrim Psalms. An Exposition of the Songs of Degrees. By the Rev. Samuel Cox. Introduction by the Rev. Martin R. Vincent, D. D. 12mo, cloth, \$1.00. A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

⁷ The Philosophy of Natural Theology. An Essay in confutation of the Scepticism of the present day. By William Jackson, M. A., F. S. A. 8vo, cloth, \$3.00. *Ibid.*

⁸ The Little Sanctuary, and other Meditations. By Dr. Alexander

of his father¹ (*clarum et venerabile nomen*) leaves little, if any, room for adverse criticism, but calls loudly for a more formal notice in these pages.

Dr. Gibson is the eminent Presbyterian divine who went from Canada to Chicago, and from Chicago to London. His book on the "Ages before Moses"² is a discussion of undoubted interest and suggestiveness, and we should perhaps hazard little in saying a discussion of more than ordinary novelty in the method of treatment and of positive value in the results. Dr. Campbell's "Story of the Creation"³ is also favorably mentioned in quarters which are usually to be depended on. The "Analytical Concordance"⁴ makes wonderful pledges to its prospective purchasers, and one says that Mr. Spurgeon is heartily willing to subscribe to the truth of these seductive protestations. The comparatively new work on the story of the English Bible⁵ that now greets the eye in three of the great capitals of Christendom, comes to us with very flattering assurances of its worth and soundness. The British Astronomer Royal's elaborate work⁶ on the oldest and most mysterious of the Pyramids will convince most readers that the an-

Raleigh, author of "Quiet Resting Places." Square 16mo, cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

¹The Life of Charles Hodge, D. D., LL. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. By his son, A. A. Hodge. *Ibid.*

²The Ages before Moses. Twelve Lectures on the Book of Genesis. By John Monro Gibson, D. D., late pastor of the Second Presbyterian church, Chicago. 12mo, cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

³The Story of Creation. By S. M. Campbell, D. D. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible. By Robert Young, LL. D., author of "Chronological Index to the Bible," "Biblical Notes and Queries," "Hebrew Tenses," etc. One volume, 110 pages, quarto. Imported in sheets and bound here in the very best cloth binding, which is even more durable than the ordinary sheep binding. Net \$9.00. In substantial half morocco binding, \$11.00 net. *Ibid.*

⁵History of the English Bible. *New Edition.* By the Rev. W. F. Moulton, M. A., D. D. Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, pp. 240, cloth, \$1.50. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., London, Paris, and New York.

⁶Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid. Fourth and much enlarged edition, including all the most important discoveries up to the time of

cient Egyptians knew a thing or two about orientation and the precession; even should it fail to satisfy them that it was built by Shem, and that the English people are sprung from the Lost Tribes of Israel.

publication, with twenty-five explanatory plates—maps, plans, elevations, and sections of all the more difficult and crucial parts of the structure. By Piazza Smyth, F. R. S. E., F. R. A. S. Pp. 627, 12mo, cloth, \$6.00. George Routledge & Sons, New York.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW

Is published Quarterly, in January, April, July, and October.

TERMS.—Three Dollars per Volume, payable in advance. Single number, One Dollar.

☞ All business communications should be addressed to the Proprietor, J. W. WOODROW, Columbia, S. C. No subscription discontinued until a special order is given, and all arrearages are paid, or after the first number of a volume is published.

☞ A few complete sets of the back volumes can be had at Three Dollars per volume. Single back volumes, when they can be furnished without breaking a set, Two Dollars per volume.

☞ Ministers of the Gospel, and others, who shall obtain three subscribers, and remit the regular price, (Three Dollars each,) will be entitled to a copy of the REVIEW for one year, or, if they so prefer, one dollar for each new subscriber.

☞ Subscribers changing their Post Office are requested to give immediate notice of the same to the Publisher, or their REVIEW will be sent to their former office.

☞ The Editors of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW think it is due to themselves and to their subscribers to announce that they do not encumber in every particular what is uttered in their pages. Each author is responsible for the views he expresses. This is a matter of convenience where there are minor differences between editors themselves, or between them and their brethren. Free discussion, too, is important to the interests of truth, if kept within just limits. These limits must be strictly observed. Editors would be worthy of censure, should they allow opinions to be expressed, subversive of any doctrine of the gospel; nor would it be becoming to allow their views, or those of their contributors, to be rudely-attacked in their pages.

Their desire is, to make the REVIEW worthy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States—the representative of its views and its literature, a means of disseminating sound doctrine, and a stimulus to the genius and talent of our ministers and people.

THE
NORTH AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

LXXII.

APRIL, MDCCCLXXXI.

No. 2.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
MAN'S RIGHTEOUSNESS TO BE UNIVERSALLY CONFESSED. By the Rev. H. B. PRATT, Winnsboro, S. C.,	171
THE DIACONATE, Part III.,	191
MAN'S PLACE IN THE GOSPEL. By the Rev. S. L. MORRIS, Walhalla, S. C.,	210
THE INFLUENCE OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ON THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE. By the Rev. Prof. R. L. DAB- NEY, D. D., LL.D., Union Theological Seminary, Va.,	220
THE SCHEMES OF BENEVOLENCE—SHALL THEY BE REVOLU- TIONISED? By the Rev. J. LEIGHTON WILSON, D. D., Baltimore, Md.,	248
THE SECOND GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE PRESBYTERIAN AL- LIANCE. By the Rev. Wm. E. Boggs, Atlanta, Ga.,	282
THE DRIFT OF AMERICAN POLITICS,	317
THE MAINE LAW AT PRESENT IN MAINE AND VERMONT. By the Rev. CYRUS HAMLIN, D. D., Middlebury, Vt.,	335
THE PRESBYTERIAN DIACONATE. By the Rev. J. A. LEFEVRE, D. D., Baltimore, Md.,	343
THE DIACONATE OF SCRIPTURE. By the Rev. J. A. LEFEVRE, Balti- more, Md.,	355
THE DIVISION OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE. By the Rev. JOHN B. ADGER, D. D., Pendleton, S. C.,	369
RECENT PUBLICATIONS,	388

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1881.

With the address of each subscriber, we now print the date of the last number for which he has paid. For example, those who have paid in full for the current volume—Vol. XXXII.—will find after their names, “Oct. '81,” which means that they have paid for the October number of 1881, and of course for all preceding it. If any one has paid for all past volumes, and one dollar for XXXII., he will find “Jan.” or ‘Jny, '81 and 25c. ;” which means that he has paid for the January number of 1881, and 25 cents on the April number. And so in other cases.

Those who have not paid for the current volume will confer a favor by forwarding the amount due to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C.

In compliance with the wishes of many friends, it is announced that hereafter, as a general rule, the names of writers for this REVIEW will be attached to their articles, and the initials of each to the critical notices.

The REVIEW will continue to be, as it has always been, an open journal favoring free discussion within limits. More than ever it is desired to make it a representative of our whole Church, as its name imports, and a faithful exponent of the Calvinistic Theology and the Presbyterian Polity.

Communications for its pages may be addressed to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C., or to ROBERT L. DABNEY, Hampden Sidney, Virginia, or to JOHN B. ADGER, Pendleton, South Carolina.

A more generous support by Southern Presbyterians would enable the proprietor to make the work more worthy of its name.

[Entered at the Post-Office at Columbia, S. C., as second-class postal matter.]

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

VOL. XXXII.—NO. 2.

APRIL, MDCCCLXXXI.

ARTICLE I.

GOD'S RIGHTEOUSNESS TO BE UNIVERSALLY CONFESED.*

The pure and unsullied righteousness of God lies at the foundation of all right conceptions of his nature, his word, and his works. God is himself absolute moral perfection. Whatever he speaks is absolute truth; whatever he does is absolute righteousness. It must be so. The God who is infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom and power, must be so no less in his holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. You can more reasonably deny the existence of God altogether, than deny that. An infinite devil is a moral impossibility; our reason revolts at it, no less than our conscience. The heathen, with all their devil-worship, have never imagined, much less believed in, such a monster. The advocates of Dualism never held to such an absurdity; for even in their view, the eternal principle of evil is eternally limited and checked by the eternal principle of good. Consciously or unconsciously, the mind refuses to ascribe infinite attributes to a being even tainted with moral imperfection. Jupiter with all his magnificence

*Some peculiarities of this paper render it proper to state that it embodies the substance of a sermon preached before the late Synod of South Carolina, which has been reduced to writing and prepared for publication in this form, at the particular request of one of the Editors of this REVIEW.

and awful majesty, was stained with too many crimes to be regarded as infinite and eternal even by his own worshippers. In Christian lands, the men who deny in theory the righteousness of God's administration, deny also his being or personality, as if in sheer consistency; so that even by their implied confession, if there be a God who is infinite and eternal, he must be a God of infinite righteousness. The only hope of lost men is based on this great necessary truth. Were there "none righteous, no, not one," in heaven above any more than in earth beneath, whither, ah, whither should we flee!

In theory, or in the way of vague general statement, it is easy to secure the ready admission of all this; but in practice, the righteousness of God in his dealings with us, and with a world of sinners, is precisely what the heart of fallen man (whatever his mind may say) is slow to admit. It is the old complaint of man against his Maker, as much so now as in the days of the Hebrew prophet: "The ways of the Lord are not equal"—equitable.

But the truly pious heart delights to acknowledge that "the Lord is holy in all his ways, and righteous (or, "merciful") in all his works." To all his regenerate people, that perfect transcript of his moral nature, "the law, is (and must be) holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." In all true conviction of sin there is the same absolute and unqualified confession. Job, who, while contending with sinners like himself, was resolved (and not without good cause) to maintain his integrity till he died, no sooner heard the voice of God himself, than he cried: "Behold I am vile! what shall I answer thee? I will lay my hand upon my mouth!" And yet once more, and more expressly: "I have uttered that which I understood not! * * * I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee; wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes!" Isaiah, the man whose lips were touched with seraphic fire, cried in dismay: "Woe is me! for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts!" "But we are all as an unclean thing; and all our righteousnesses are as

filthy rags ; and we all do fade as a leaf ; and our iniquities, like the wind, have carried us away !” So Daniel exclaims : “ O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee ; but unto us confusion of faces as at this day !” To which Ezra adds this solemn and affecting testimony : “ O my God, I am ashamed and blush to lift up my face unto thee, my God ; for our iniquities are increased over our heads, and our trespass is grown up unto the heavens.”

As these are the touching confessions of sin spoken by eminent saints of God, so the same is true of all really convicted sinners. Watts well expresses the inmost consciousness of every truly convicted sinner, in these familiar lines :—

“ My lips with shame my sins confess
 Against thy law, against thy grace :
 Lord, should thy judgments grow severe,
 I am condemned, but thou art clear !”

The conviction of sin which does not reach to this—and it is to be feared that much of what passes under that name is of this character—is a contradiction in terms, and wholly unworthy of the name ; it may be a vague or a vivid conviction of *danger*, but not of *sin*. In theory we may be sound enough ; there may be no room to complain of our orthodoxy ; but till the heart is really broken under an intelligent and thorough conviction that God is wholly right, and we are wholly wrong, there is neither health nor healing for us. By nature our guilt is only equalled by our insensibility. Thus it happens that while sunk in spiritual unconsciousness, we may please ourselves with our self-complaisant judgments of God, his ways and word and works ; but let one ray of his glory break upon us, and, like Job, we are dumb !

Now what is true of his people, and of convicted sinners, God intends shall be true, deeply, thoroughly, experimentally true, of all men without distinction. “ What things soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law ; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God.” Rom. iii. 19. It is not that all sinners shall acknowledge God’s righteousness in theory, or in the abstract, or in general terms, but most practically, and in respect of their own personal guilt ; they shall own his righteousness as regards his whole procedure towards

sinner, and particularly in the matter of their eternal condemnation. Sublime, grand, soul-moving truth!—it is God's purpose to save his elect, believing, obedient people, and to destroy his stubborn, proud, and unbelieving foes; but to do it in such a way as that the one shall have nothing to glory of, and the other nothing of which to complain. His righteousness is to be so signally manifest therein, that "every mouth shall be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God." The apostle of course does not mean that men will become guilty then who were not guilty before; but that, conscience-stricken, sinners will find no excuse or palliation to plead, nor any complaint or protest to offer; but becoming at last profoundly conscious of their sins, they will own themselves to be guilty and inexcusable before God.

This appears to be in some respects the most wonderful declaration in the Bible; and at first sight it would seem to be the most impossible thing God could undertake to accomplish. The guilt of men is, indeed, a thing most undeniably true. The whole gospel is based upon that fact. There is no such thing as "the grace of God," if all men are not, as the apostle says, "without excuse" for their wilful and persistent apostasy from him. Yet the guilt of men is one thing, and their unqualified confession of that guilt is quite another. That the saved should confess their own deep unworthiness, and God's sovereign and unmerited mercy, seems reasonable enough; though by far the greater part of the nominally Christian world deny it: but that the lost should own God's righteousness in their own condemnation, that they should plead *guilty* at his bar, and have nothing to allege in their own defence, is the most amazing of wonders. The more we revolve this thought in our minds, the more amazing does it grow. When we reflect how men are born into the world with a corrupt nature; when we remember under what various, and for the most part pernicious, systems of government, morals, and social life they are trained up to adult age; when we take into view the absolute moral impossibility of three-fourths of earth's teeming millions, when arrived at adult age, attaining even in this nineteenth century of grace to an intelligent conception of the way of salvation; when we consider what multitudes are born in infamy,

baptized into vice, and schooled in wickedness by those who exercise parental authority over them; when we call up and pass in review the millions of the living and of the dead, who have been taught, persuaded, seduced, commanded, persecuted, compelled to do wickedly, to forsake the counsel of the Almighty, to worship false and abominable deities, or to worship the true God in ways and to a purpose which he has expressly and most severely forbidden—we stand bewildered in the presence of this awful declaration, that “every mouth shall be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God!”

Now men in general have no idea that it will be so. They believe that the reverse will be exactly true. They think it possible that God may conquer because he is mighty; that he may bind puny mortals because they are weak: they suppose that the finally lost, if such there be, may submit to a hard lot, because they cannot help themselves: but they imagine that there will at least remain to them the right of protest—solemn protest against the arbitrary and irresponsible use of almighty power. Now there can be no doubt that God could bind us hand and foot and cast us, the strong and the weak together, into the outer darkness, with as much ease and expedition as we can manage a spider or a fly: but what glory would that be to him, what honor, if righteousness remained, even partly, with the vanquished, or at least a righteous protest against God’s procedure as faulty, rash, hasty, irascible, unjust, tyrannical, cruel, oppressive, or even excessively severe? However impossible of performance it may seem to us, the honor of God and the spotlessness of his throne demand that his righteousness be confessed as well as his power; or as the apostle expresses it, “that every mouth be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God.”

We go forth among men and listen to their self-conceited judgments about God and divine things; their proud and vain glorious thoughts of themselves; their coolly expressed opinions about sin and salvation; the fall, the atonement, and regeneration; the trinity, the incarnation, miracles, inspiration, hell, heaven—of what they will, and what they won’t believe; of what God may, and what he cannot, do:—but amid this Babel of vain opinions

and conceits, let God but signally manifest, in any one of a thousand ways, his presence and his power, and all this profane babbling is hushed in an instant! Even so natural, or ordinary, an occurrence as the falling of a thunderbolt at their feet, is enough to fill them, for the moment, with a painful sense of their impertinence or impiety. How ought this to teach us sobriety and modesty in all our judgments upon the word, works, and ways of God!*

Many there are of God's professed and believing servants who are at times greatly perplexed and troubled upon this very point. They are harassed with a secret dread lest God should become

*Above all men of commanding talents who have lived since the times of the apostles and prophets, John Calvin, perhaps, was possessed of this spirit in the most eminent degree. He had his faults, and he committed his errors; he would not have been human had it been otherwise: one of his last acts, upon his dying bed, was to ask pardon of his associates for his personal failings, and particularly for his infirmities of temper, which occasionally manifested itself in outbursts of irrepressible indignation. But his few recorded errors were committed out of zeal for God's glory, and for the repression of wickedness. It is precisely this characteristic trait of his—to maintain God's righteousness, however severe the condemnation of sinners—which has procured for him the obloquy and maledictions of multitudes who owe to him, directly or indirectly, their richest temporal and spiritual blessings. Calvin holds his heart in his hand, and moves the scorn and hatred of unrenewed men, while he stirs to their depths the hearts of all who fear before the one only and eternal God of righteousness and truth, with these awful words: "But the folly of being afraid that too much cruelty is attributed to God, if the reprobate are doomed to eternal destruction, is evident even to the blind. * * * But their sins are temporary. This I grant; but the majesty of God, as well as his justice, which their sins have violated, is eternal. Their iniquity, therefore, is justly remembered. Then the punishment is alleged to be excessive, being disproportioned to the crime. *But this is intolerable blasphemy, when the majesty of God is so little valued, and when the contempt of it is considered of no more consequence than the destruction of one soul!* But let us pass by these triflers, lest, contrary to what we have before said, we should appear to consider their reveries worthy of refutation." Institutes, B. III. Ch. xxv. end of Sec. 5.

In Christ's coming kingdom of righteousness and eternal life, it will be a privilege to look upon the face of the man whose God-fearing soul was capable of conceiving, and his honest lips of uttering, a sentiment like that, which causes men's hearts to quake like a call to judgment.

guilty of injustice, or cruelty, or at least of a culpable degree of rigor, if he does just what his word declares, and executes the solemn threatenings of his law. The fear that in the end it may not turn out that the throne of God is guiltless forever, haunts them day and night, and puts their invention upon the rack to devise some theory or scheme by which the glory of God's righteousness may be saved from the turpitude of an endless dishonor. It will be sufficient to refer to the Bible doctrines of the fall of man, the imputation of Adam's sin, the election of grace, the free agency of men and their consequent responsibility for their opinions and beliefs as well as their corresponding deportment, the eternal and irreversible decrees, or purposes, of God, the hopeless perdition of all "who know not God and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ," and other such like Bible doctrines, in order to explain the allusion. And yet a moment's reflection is enough to convince any man who is in his right spiritual senses, that the short line of our feeble and darkened understandings cannot reach half way down to the bottom of these deep matters, where doubtless the minds of angels are put upon the strain, if not quite overtasked. We may, in any case, spare ourselves all such needless concern on God's account, and rest our hearts upon the divine assurance that in that sublime hour of destiny, when eternal life and everlasting damnation shall stand unveiled, stretching forth in interminable vistas of glory, honor, and peace, or of indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, before our amazed and astonished vision, "every mouth shall be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God." The lost shall confess his righteousness as unequivocally as the saved! God has declared it must and shall be so.

It were a small matter with the Infinite One to tread down Satan with all his agents, abettors, and followers, angelic or human, beneath his feet; and doubtless he would long since have done so, long since he would have verified all that is comprised in "making an end of sin, and bringing in everlasting righteousness," wiping away tears from off all faces, swallowing up death in victory and taking away the rebuke of his people from off all the earth, had not considerations of the highest importance called

for this long and dreadful reign of error, sin and death. Here as elsewhere, faith in God is our only recourse. The infinite Reason cannot act arbitrarily: with him there must be an infinitely wise and an infinitely immaculate reason for his whole course of dealing with sin and sinners, angelic and human, from first to last. Infinite Love can never "afflict willingly." Infinite Wisdom can never err, either in counsel or execution. Infinite Power can never be limited or checked in its resistless operation, except by infinite holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Lost and confounded, then, in this labyrinth of difficulties, in which so many harass or finally destroy themselves, making shipwreck of faith and of a good conscience, the believing soul exclaims: "It is the Lord; let him do what seemeth him good!" And he himself quiets our apprehensions the while, with the assurance, not only that "the Judge of all the earth will do right," not only that he will "judge the world in righteousness," but that he will "openly manifest his righteousness in the sight of all nations," and his throne shall be universally confessed as guiltless forever. "His judgments are righteous and true;" "he will be justified in his sayings, and will overcome when he is judged."

While then we are bewildered and amazed in the contemplation of this wonderful thing which the Lord has made known unto us in his word, let us notice with due particularity and emphasis THE GROUND of this universal self-condemnation. It is THE LAW (to which heaven, earth, and hell are subject), whether written on tables of stone, or on the fleshly tables of the heart. "Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God." In nothing has Satan so signally failed, as in the attempt to blot out from his own and from the mind of sinners a sense of personal accountability.* During the six thousand years of the reign of

*The Day of Judgment, that mysterious and wonderful day of which the Bible is so full, is as far in the future to the devil as it is to us. Matt. viii. 29 and James ii. 19 furnish no sufficient ground for the common notion that wicked angels accept as certain the fact of their responsibility and of God's coming judgment, any more than wicked men. They know more, indeed, of God's power than men do, and have reason to tremble at it;

sin and death in this lost world, there is nothing men have so earnestly essayed to do as to rid themselves of the consciousness of their responsibility to God; or in other words, of the fact that they must answer to him for the deeds done in the body. But they have utterly failed. Success in this matter would be self-destruction. Blot out the fact of man's accountability, and you destroy the grand distinction between men and brutes; blot out the consciousness of that accountability, and the race of man sinks at once to a lower level than the devil and his angels. How it will be when the account has once for all been rendered, when man is no longer properly *account-able*, when there no longer "remains a certain fearful looking for of judgment and of fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries," but the more fearful realisation of it instead, we dare not divine: that eternal reign of *lawlessness* is too densely dark for us as yet to comprehend it: but thus far, through the long reign of sin and death, there lies deep down in the inmost soul of every child of Adam, a secret, ineradicable consciousness that he is THE SUBJECT OF LAW; and inseparably joined with this, is the twin consciousness that systematically, persistently, not by accident, inadvertence, or compulsion, but of deliberate choice and fixed purpose, he has violated that law and disregarded his moral obligations, by sins of omission and commission, times and ways beyond all his power to compute them. It may slumber ordinarily; but it slumbers *there*, deep down in his heart, imperishable as the soul of man, and ready at any moment to be

but sin would not be that *folly* which the word of God everywhere represents it to be, if Satan accepted in advance God's judgment and his own accountability, any more than God's commands. Fallen spirits, like fallen men, no doubt hope to "escape the judgment of God." There is every reason to believe that the cry of raging sinners, and raging nations of sinners, "Let us break his bands asunder and cast away his cords from us!" is but an echo of the same cry on the part of the devil and his angels. The most plausible and consistent, unquestionably, of all the conflicting interpretations of Rev. xx. 7-10, is that it represents, in symbolical speech, the last and supreme effort of Satan and his adherents to rebel against and overthrow the authority of "the Judge of the quick and the dead," of angels and of men; who is to "rule them with a rod of iron, and dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel."

awakened into the most distressing activity and power. During the two hundred generations of the past, parents have taught their children, superiors their inferiors, both by precept and example, the adoption of excuses, pretences, subterfuges, maxims, false systems of morals, and corrupt or corrupted systems of religion, all tending to break down this sense of *responsibility to God**, or to provide some more or less plausible evasion of the stern and solemn obligations it imposes; and yet the conviction, in utter defiance of the will of men and demons, lies as deeply imbedded in the heart of Adam's race this day, as in the dim and distant age when the spirit of error first began "to do his pleasure in the hearts of the children of disobedience." It may be smothered, it may be choked down, it may be, and often is, perverted; but no human or Satanic power or art can eradicate it. It is indestructible as the being of man, or as the throne of God.

If we pass successively through the infinite gradations of belief and practice which are to be found among Protestants, Romanists, Orientals, Jews, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Brahmans, Confucians, till we get down into the deepest darknesses of paganism, we shall find the same to be true in every case. Wherever we find the power of reflection, there do we find this twin consciousness of obligation due and obligation disregarded. From the palace to the hovel, from the halls of science to the coal-pit, from pole to pole, from shore to shore, we find this universal consciousness of violated moral obligation—a knowing to do good, and a deliberate choosing to do evil! We peer into the darkest corners of Africa, and we find it there, as everywhere else, to be true, that however little the light men possess, it is more than they wish to improve; however limited their apprehension of holiness and righteousness and truth, it is more

*The most deadly of all the errors of Romanism, that one in which the whole system is summarily comprehended, consists in the substitution of *responsibility to the priest* (or as they say, "the Church," that is the Romish clergy), for *responsibility to God*. By the denial of the right of private judgment and of the unfettered freedom of the Scriptures, God is made to speak intelligibly and authoritatively only through the lips of the "teaching Church;" and "judgment to come" is converted into the great argument for enforcing this dreadful *idolatry of man*.

than they desire to retain in their hearts and their minds; however little the knowledge of God which remains to them, it is always *far in advance of their will to perform it*. Everywhere we find men, women, and children, kings and peasants, sages and simpletons, busy in extinguishing the much or little light they possess, making the worse appear the better way, calling evil good and good evil, putting darkness for light and light for darkness. O Sin, Sin, what error and desolation hast thou wrought upon the earth! "This," says he whom God hath appointed Judge of quick and dead, "this is THE CONDEMNATION—the one condemnation which reaches to every child of Adam, of every race, religion, age and clime, of high and low degree, old and young alike—that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil." John iii. 19. To a like purpose God everywhere charges upon men the *inexcusableness* and wilfulness of their perverse and obstinate way: "They have chosen their own ways, and their soul delighteth in their abominations. I also will choose their delusions, and will bring their fears upon them; because when I called, none did answer, when I spake, they did not hear, but they did evil in mine eyes, and chose that wherein I delighted not." Isa. lxvi. 3, 4. "God looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, any that did seek God. Every one of them is gone back; they are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good, no, not one!" Ps. liii. 2, 3. The condemnation is not that all have had and have rejected the gospel; but rather that "they did not (and do not) like to retain God in their knowledge;" their souls are so set against the true light, in whatever degree it reaches to them, that even when without the gospel, they are virtual rejectors of it; for such is their misuse of the light they possess that there exists an antecedent and absolute certainty that (left to their own free will) they will reject Christ just as soon and as persistently as he is offered to them. "The Macedonian cry," in the sense usually attached to the expression, is purely a figment of the imagination. Romancers may tell of men far removed from the reach of gospel influences, who clamor for

the light, and are only too glad to receive it; but he who is himself "the Truth" has declared as the natural condition of all sinners, that they "hate the light;" while that most merciful One who commissioned and sent him forth to seek and save that which was lost, when *he* looked down from heaven to *see if there were any* that did understand, any that did seek God, emphatically declared that there was "none, no, not one!" Long, patient, and persistent are the instructions, persuasions, entreaties, and endless the admonitions (in addition to the promises) that are needed, to say nothing of the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit—and all is none too much to persuade and enable a few, whether in Christian or pagan lands, to embrace Jesus Christ as he is freely in the gospel, and having received him to *walk in him*. Verily has the word of God declared of all alike that "they are without excuse," and that the day is coming when all, without any exception, shall know and shall own themselves to be "without excuse;" when "every mouth shall be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God."*

*The only conceivable ground, in the nature of things, for God's sovereign election and effectual calling, is this, (and it relieves the subject of one half its difficulties), viz., that GOD ELECTS TO LIFE BECAUSE MAN WILL NOT ELECT. If men would choose, God would be spared the necessity of choice. Nothing sets the stupendous folly and sinfulness of sin in so terribly condemnatory a light as this—that only God's free, sovereign, unconditioned election of some to eternal life has prevented the whole race of man from willingly precipitating itself into the abyss of ruin—grateful to God and man alike for the privilege of being left to do as they please! It is no stern decree of election and reprobation which cries "Hands off!" when sinking shipwrecked souls would clamber into the ark of salvation; it is the sinner himself who cries "Hands off!" when, with a holy violence, believing friends and the convicting Spirit would constrain him no longer to refuse, or delay, but flee at once to the only refuge from the wrath to come.

But the question is perpetually recurring: "If God could eternally decree or purpose, (and effect that purpose in time), to save some, why not then to save all?" Matt. xi. 26 furnishes the only completely satisfactory reply; yet some light may be shed upon this painfully dark subject by the following considerations. In spite of the plainest teachings of Scripture, attested and confirmed by all human observation and experience during the past six thousand years of this world's sad history,

Exceedingly instructive it is to notice once more how little is needed to wake up men from their vain conceits, and fill them with an unendurable sense of their guilt and shame. Nothing more is needed than a little *light from God's throne*. Anything whatever which brings the sinner into a clear consciousness of the presence and power of God, will do it. How unutterably awful is this reflection! and yet nothing is more undeniably certain. The most stout-hearted transgressor, the most hardened unbeliever, at any hour of his existence, and when he least expects it, may be made instantaneously to cry out: "I am undone!"

nine-tenths of the nominally Christian world believe that the election of grace has nothing to do with it, but that the will of every man is alone as decisive of his salvation as of his perdition. How, then, would it be—we beg pardon for the form in which the proposition must unavoidably be put—if God should propose, as the objector would express it, to elect none, but effectually call and save all alike? In that case, so far as reason enlightened by Scripture can guide us to a right conclusion, these consequences would necessarily result: the "second birth" would come to be as natural an event as the first; the deceitfulness and desperate wickedness of the heart could not be even suspected; our guilt and danger would seem as unreal as fiction itself; sin, as Paul expresses it, could never "appear (or, "be seen as") sin"; the grace of Christ would be, or would seem to be, as unreal as our guilt and danger; the love of God in bestowing salvation would be no more manifest than in giving rain from heaven; and each man would appear to be, and would inevitably believe himself to be, the author of his own eternal welfare, as truly as the artificer of his own worldly estate. This mass of contradictions brings us back to the point from which we started; and Adam's lost and godless race, profoundly ignorant of its malady, guilt, and misery, on the one hand, and of "the kindness and love of God our Saviour towards man," on the other, would, at the end, be as far from salvation as he was at the beginning!

It is a common but an utter mistake to imagine that in the almighty-ness of his power it is as easy for God to remove sin as to remove mountains; or to heal the souls as the bodies of men; or that he could save the whole race just as readily as an elected people. Heaven is not farther removed from earth than is the moral from the physical universe; and derangements in either require a treatment no less widely different. Our standards do not teach that it was a question of God's "mere good pleasure" whether he would save a part of the race, or save the whole; but rather whether he would save a part, or allow the whole to perish.

It may be proper to remark in passing that if there be force in the above

by the simple discovery of the perpetually existing fact, that he is in the hands of a justly angered God. Every minister of large experience has known men to whom it happened as suddenly, and far more terribly, than to the holy Job; proud, hardened men, perhaps, and not always (nor usually, if the writer's experience may serve as a guide,) resulting in their saving conversion. They waked up for a few days, or weeks, to a terrible and intolerable consciousness of guilt and ill-desert; they felt and confessed, like Saul, that they had "played the fool and erred exceedingly;" and then, without having accomplished anything for their security, they deliberately relapsed into their former and normal condition of spiritual insensibility, with the certainty before their minds that, the distant vision whose dreadful aspect had so terrified their souls, will soon become a present, an ever present reality, to which they will one day wake up, and sleep no more!

reasoning, then "the Millennium," when it is imagined that just the state of things supposed is to be inaugurated and to continue for a thousand years or more—thirty generations at least—is shown to be a moral impossibility. The belief that all men, absolutely or relatively, will be saved during the expected "Millennium," takes for granted that the same might have been true from the beginning, if it had pleased God, in the exercise of his sovereign pleasure and almighty power, to *bind Satan* six thousand years ago, rather than in the predicted thousand years yet to come. But this is as abhorrent to all right feeling, as it is utterly unsustained by Scripture; *which nowhere teaches that anybody will be converted while Satan is shut up in prison.*

Without irreverence it may be said (and the doctrine of Election furnishes the most convincing evidence of it), that sin is a deadly, malignant, incurable, unmanageable, and infinite evil, which taxes the resources of the infinite God to deal with it. Under such circumstances and with respect to the treatment of such an evil, to discard the correlative doctrines of election and effectual calling, as even many Presbyterians incline now to do, and fall to devising ways and means of imparting to the gospel sufficient efficacy to "convert all the world" and "regenerate society," is only to repeat the ruinous experiment made in the days of Constantine and his successors, and reduce the Church to the low level of a *Modern Christian Civilisation Society*. The only real efficacy we can impart to the gospel must ever consist in believing it, obeying it, and preaching and teaching it, *just as God has revealed it.*

The panic terror which often seizes on pagan nations, the superstitious fears (they scarcely know of what) that from the most ancient times have rendered unnumbered millions "all their lifetime subject to bondage," are but examples of this slumbering consciousness of sin, any half-waking movement of which within is enough to fill the soul with vague, but most distressing apprehensions. To his people, who know his power and providence, God says: "Be not ye dismayed at the signs of the heavens, at which the heathen are dismayed." Why is it that any extraordinary portent in the heavens fills the pagan nations, ignorant as they are of God and of his coming judgment, with consternation? It is because these silent remembrancers of the great Unseen awaken their dormant consciousness of guilt and danger. In nations not pagan the same thing has often been witnessed. About the year 1000 the whole of Europe was convulsed, for the space of several years, with the belief, which grew in intensity as that epoch approached, that the last day was at hand. On the 18th day of May, 1875, the busy, enterprising, and prosperous city of San José de Cúcuta, in Colombia, S. A., a place of 8,000 or 10,000 inhabitants, was, in five seconds' time, buried by an earthquake shock beneath its own ruins. The disaster occurred at a quarter past 11 a. m.; the sun was shining in cloudless brilliancy, when in one instant every house was a ruinous heap, and about three thousand souls perished. A dense and stifling cloud of dust went up that darkened the sun in heaven; and when the astonished survivors arose to their feet and looked around them, it was black as midnight. The writer conversed with many who escaped in that dreadful catastrophe, and it appears that with wonderful uniformity the thought assailed every man's soul at the same instant, that the day of judgment had come. The day of judgment! Oh wonderful transformation; and how instantaneous! One moment it was coffee; tobacco; merchandise; buying; selling; getting gain: and then, with the swiftness of the lightning's flash, all these thoughts had vanished, and in every man's heart "*The day of judgment*" was the one absorbing thought! Nor need any ask, Why so? Should some blazing comet pass through these skies to-night, casting a lurid, ominous glare upon the puny

and sinning inhabitants of the earth, more solemn and affecting thoughts of God's eternal judgment would occupy men's minds in one hour's time than all our sermons have been able to produce in a score of years. And why? Because there slumbers in every bosom, Christian, Mohammedan, Jewish, Pagan, A PRE-SAGE OF COMING EVIL, a dumb prophecy of judgment to come, (caused not so much by an external and supernatural revelation, as by an inward conviction that every man is answerable to a Higher Power for violated moral obligations, past all reckoning), a deep and ineradicable conviction of personal guilt, ready to start into distinct and agonizing consciousness upon any and every occasion when God seems to obtrude his unwelcome presence upon the scene of the business, and pleasures, and follies of men. What a thought is this for Christless souls, and how awakening to all who will consider at all their ways and their doings—that the God whose presence they shun, and yet in whose reconciled presence alone they can be blessed, has it in his power, at any instant, and by any one of a thousand different means, to sink them down at his feet in abject self-condemnation and hopeless despair!

Oh then, how will it be in that so wilfully forgotten day, the day of days, as God is perpetually sounding it in our ears, when the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall bring to light the hidden things of darkness; when every secret thing shall be known; when even the heart of man, so carefully cloaked, shall be unveiled, and God shall make manifest the counsels of all hearts; when of every idle word that men have spoken they shall give account; when the whole inward and outward life shall stand uncovered and revealed; when every disguise shall be torn aside, and the clearest light from the face and throne of God shall be shed directly down upon the guilty and darkened course and character of the sinner! When we fix our minds attentively on the dread solemnities of that tribunal where each of us shall appear and give account of ourselves to God, so little room does there seem to be, on the one hand, for querulous complaint or impertinent excuses, that we find ourselves repeating unconsciously the inspired declaration: "Every mouth shall be

stopped, and all the world become guilty before God;" and on the other, so little room is there seen to be on the part of the best of us for boasting and self-commendation, that the exclamation leaps involuntarily to our lips: "Alas, who shall live when God doeth this?" "It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed, because his compassions fail not!"

Since, then, our guilt and inexcusableness is a thing so undeniable, and so certain to be confessed eventually by none more than by ourselves, how earnestly and how persistently should we abhor that which is evil and cleave to that which is good, resolutely taking up our cross and following him whom God hath constituted the eternal life of men; whose blood cleanseth from all sin, and who having once died for our sins and risen again for our justification, and is now seated at God's right hand, in our own nature and on our behalf, is able to save eternally all that come unto God by him!

Among the deceits which in this age of superficial religiousness many would practise on their souls, and by which the adversary of God and man would destroy the salutary influence these great truths were intended to produce on our minds and characters, few are more false or pernicious than this, that as they expect to give account of themselves when they die, the day of judgment is nothing to them; or this, that if they have ever been "converted," and had "a gospel hope in Christ," the righteous Judge will not be ashamed to screen their habitual and wilful violations of known duty with the spotless robe of his own righteousness, and, as his friends and *favorites*, will not allow them to be presented in judgment at all; or this, that since believers are *raised up in glory*, and come forth from their graves in power, incorruption, and immortality, a thousand years at least (so some of them will have it) before the judgment of the dead begins, that very fact will anticipate and forestall *their* individual judgment, and renders *their* solemn account, and the inquest of *their* hearts and lives, a nullity or a farce. Nothing contributes more powerfully to foment the light, superficial, forward, presuming, and unsanctifying religiousness so common in our day, than the schemes and theories by which men contrive to attenuate to the unsub-

stantiality of a shadow the tremendous realities of Christ's great day.

It is plain that the believer who is really a believer, has nothing to dread, but everything to hope for, in that great day of the coming and kingdom, the glory and power of Jesus Christ our Lord; but that does not consist in the fact of his being delivered from it, but rather in his being "openly acknowledged and acquitted in the day of judgment," as one of whom God is witness, and men also, that in simplicity and godly sincerity he has believed in, and therefore followed, our only Redeemer and Lord, doing the will of God from the heart. If our gospel salt *have not this much savor*, "it is good for nothing but to be cast forth and trodden under foot of men."

The only Lawgiver and Judge sweeps away all our fine theories, and stamps with the seal of fatuity all our delusive, unscriptural, or anti-scriptural, and dangerous conceits, when with reference to that day which was always on his lips and in his thoughts, "he said TO HIS DISCIPLES FIRST OF ALL, Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy: *for there is nothing covered which shall not be revealed, neither hidden that shall not be known.*" Luke xii. 1, 2. "Every tree (whether planted in the Church or the world) that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be hewn down and cast into the fire." Matt. vii. 19. In all this (*if we truly believe God*, and do not prostitute the terms "faith in Jesus Christ" to mean a spurious acceptance of his blood and righteousness, and a real rejection of his solemn testimony on every other point,) there is more than enough to make us each resolve with Paul, "WHEREFORE WE LABOR, that whether (at the time of his coming) we be present (in the body), or absent (from the body), *we may be accepted of him.* For we must all—the present and the absent, the waking and the sleeping, the living and the dead, the faithful and the unfaithful, the believing and the unbelieving, the righteous and the wicked—we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that (Greek, "IN ORDER THAT") every one may receive the things done in the body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." 2 Cor. v. 9, 10.

NOTE.—In view of the intrinsic importance of this subject, about which many hurtful errors are current, while certain parties preach it as a point of high gospel doctrine that the believer “*does not come into judgment at all,*” but is exempted from it, as part of his gospel prerogative, it will not be amiss to append the following note:

“Some men’s sins (says the Apostle) are open beforehand, going before to judgment, and some men they follow after. Likewise the good works of some are manifest beforehand; and they that are otherwise cannot be hid.” 1 Tim. v. 24, 25. David’s most shameful sins, with all their aggravating circumstances, are related in Scripture with a minuteness of detail which would seem to leave nothing further to be revealed in the day of trial. Nor is David’s case a singular one. We are fully warranted in saying that the Bible lays bare the worst failings of the most eminent saints, as if for the express purpose of teaching that God’s favor is poles apart from favoritism; and that his forgiving love will never, can never, screen his dearest servants against the most honest, open, and searching scrutiny of their real outward and inward life in the last great day. “Righteous judgment” demands nothing less than this. Those who hold that sins are not more than half forgiven unless they are absolutely forgotten—who claim that the figurative promises that God will cast the sins of his people behind his back, cover them, cast them into the depths of the sea, never mention them again, nor remember them any more, are to be understood of the sins themselves as well as of their guilt and punishment, what would they say to the *expunging from David’s history*, and Peter’s, and Jacob’s, of the sins which the Holy Ghost has left so faithfully on record? Do they not see that a man’s sins and unfaithfulnesses, together with their immediate and remoter consequences, are as much a part of his personal history as the place of his birth and the time of his conversion? David is no longer David, if you blot out from the book of remembrance the names of Bathsheba, Uriah the Hittite, Amnon, Tamar, and Absalom. And further still, a man’s sins, whether persisted in or abhorred and forsaken, go to form traits of his character, as well as his history, which are as distinctively part of himself as are his bodily form, or the features of his face; so that to affirm that a believer’s sins will be *suppressed* in the day of judgment, is the same as to insist that God will present his children there *under a fictitious character!* Such persons seem also to forget that there is an infinite difference between the exhibition of sins as repented of, abhorred, detested, forsaken, forgiven, blotted out, cancelled forever; and sins as revealing a man’s real character and chosen way, which neither God’s mercy nor his wrath could induce him to forsake.

What is most important and most practical in the Scripture presentation of the subject seems to be this: that “there is no respect of per-

sons with God"—no partiality or favoritism in judgment—because he "will render to every man according to his deeds" "in the day when he shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to the gospel." See the whole matter discussed in Rom. ii. 3-16. He will therefore conceal nothing, but reveal everything; and if on an honest inspection of a man's true character and life it cannot be made evident that he was an unfeigned believer in, and therefore an obedient follower of, the only Redeemer of lost men, Christ will plainly declare that he is none of his. This he expressly asserts, not once, but a score of times. It is the height of madness to hope that "the righteous Judge" will in our own case pronounce the "wicked and slothful servant," to have been a "good and faithful servant," or use his skirts (or allow them to be used) to cover up unrepented and unforsaken sin. He offers no harbor for any but penitent and believing sinners. When, therefore, "he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe," he would cover himself with everlasting dishonor if it should be brought to light in the discoveries of that day that he was admitting to the glories of his heavenly kingdom such as took things seen and temporal as their portion, and would not deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, nor take up their cross and follow him. This is the error which numberless thousands seem to be committing.

It is folly to insist that *κρίσις* in John v. 24, (and elsewhere,) does not mean "condemnation," but "judgment," and so teaches that the believer "shall not come into judgment;" for in that case we should be obliged to read in Matt. xxiii. 33, "how shall ye escape the judgment of hell?" in Mark iii. 29, "is in danger of eternal judgment;" in John iii. 19, "this is the judgment that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light;" and in Rom. xiv. 22, "Happy is he that judgeth not himself in that thing which he alloweth!"

That Paul had no idea of escaping the judgment day himself, he expressly states in 1 Cor. iv. 3-5. That he had no desire to do so, is no less expressly implied in the statement that "the crown of righteousness" on which his heart was set, he expected to receive from "the Lord, the righteous Judge"—"in that day." 2 Tim. iv. 8.

H. B. PRATT.

ARTICLE II.

THE DIACONATE.*

III. Thirdly, we will consider the sphere of the deacon's operations. In regard to the question, whether the functions of a deacon are confined to the limits of the congregation of which he is an officer, opposite opinions have been maintained. We propose, first, to discuss this question: and, secondly, to indicate the practical consequences which flow from the conclusion which we hope to establish.

FIRST. We will endeavor to show that the sphere of the deacon's operations is not confined to the limits of the particular church of which he is an officer, but may, at the call of the higher courts, embrace the temporal interests of the Church at large.

1. The first class of arguments in support of this view will be derived immediately from the Scriptures.

(1.) It is plain, from the record in the Acts of the Apostles, that the Church at Jerusalem had a common fund, from which distribution was daily made according to the necessity of every individual. "And all that believed were together, and had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need." (Chap. ii. 44, 45.) "And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. . . . Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them and brought the prices of the things that were sold and laid them down at the Apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man according as he had need." (Chap. iv. 32, 34, 35.)

It is also evident, from the record in Acts, that the body of believers in Jerusalem soon became so numerous as to render separate congregations necessary for purposes of worship and instruction. Upon the occasion of Paul's last visit to that city,

*Report presented to the Synod of South Carolina November, 1880.

he was informed by James and the elders that there were many thousands—in the original, many myriads—of Jews who believed. Now, either these congregations were distinct organisations, or they were not. If they were, as there were deacons who distributed the common fund, they must have sustained a catholic relation to as many particular churches as existed. If they were not, it must still be admitted that the deacons who distributed the common fund were not officers confined in the discharge of their functions to the limits of particular congregations. They held a common relation to all the congregations, and, as representing the general interest, administered the fund for the benefit of all. The inference is plain. Our Church is divided into particular congregations. She has common funds which are administered for the good of the Church at large. If, therefore, she should follow apostolic example, and appoint deacons to distribute them, they would, of necessity, act outside of the limits of particular congregations. Even if the extreme, and, as we have previously endeavored to show, unscriptural ground should be taken, that deacons are confined to the administration of funds for the relief of the poor, this conclusion would not be invalidated. For, we have common funds which contemplate the relief of the poor, the invalid fund, for example, and the education fund, for the assistance of needy candidates for the ministry. And, as according to the view under consideration, deacons are legitimately assigned to the distribution of every poor fund, and these, though common, are poor funds, deacons may properly be constituted their distributors, and must, of necessity, transcend in the discharge of such functions the sphere of the particular congregations of which they are officers. In short, deacons, in the church at Jerusalem, by the appointment of the apostles, were distributors of a common fund, and were, therefore, common distributors, sustaining a catholic relation to distinct congregations. We have, therefore, apostolic authority for the appointment of deacons to act with reference to the general interests of the Church.

(2.) The same conclusion will be reached by considering the relation which the deacons who administered the common fund

sustained to the apostolic college. It will be admitted that the apostles held a catholic relation to the Church as a whole. Now let us suppose that they had yielded to the solicitation that they would personally superintend and direct the work of daily distribution. It is obvious that they would, in that case, as distributors of common provisions, in that capacity, have also sustained a catholic relation to the Church. But they declined to discharge this office, and having counselled the people to elect deacons, appointed them to perform it. The deacons, consequently, as distributors of the common fund, held precisely the catholic relation to the whole Church which the apostles would have sustained had they consented to perform this diaconal function. Take another view of the matter. The apostles confessedly bore a catholic relation to the whole Church. But the deacons, who distributed the common fund, acted under the supervision and control of the apostles. It follows, that as distributors they must have sustained a relation to the Church as general as was that of the apostles in their capacity as teachers and rulers. It is out of the question that the superintendence of the apostles was exercised within the several limits of particular congregations. The deacons who served the tables under the direction of the apostles must, therefore, have sustained catholic relations to the Church.

(3.) The employment of deacons in connexion with the temporal interests of the Church in general is legitimated and enforced by the principle enounced by the apostles in refusing to take charge of the daily distribution—namely, the unreasonableness of commingling incompatible functions. “It is not reason,” they declared, “that we should leave the word of God, and serve tables.” It is admitted by Presbyterians, that this principle is one which was not confined in its application to the case of the apostles, but extends to that of all ministers of the word. A competent discharge of their peculiar duties excludes their attention to diaconal business. But, as we have previously shown in these discussions, the same principle holds in relation to ruling elders simply. They have special functions, the thorough-going performance of which debars their devotion to the duties incumbent upon another order of officers. The presbyter cannot, in

an ordinary and regular condition of the church, assume the official obligations of the deacon without unreasonably commingling incompatible functions. It ought to be sufficient to those who obey the authority of the divine word, and deny to the church any discretionary power not guaranteed by that word, to know that the apostles, proceeding upon this principle, did not direct the multitude of believers to elect elders for the purpose of adequately administering the daily alms, but to choose deacons for the attainment of that end.

Assuming, then, that the Scriptures pronounce unreasonable the union of inconsistent functions in the same officer, we must conclude that it is alike unreasonable and unscriptural that either the minister of the word or the ruling elder should, in ordinary circumstances, discharge the duties of the deacon. In all cases in which the temporal business of the Church is to be attended to, and deacons are accessible, they are the officers to whom it ought to be intrusted. Let us now apply this principle to our own church operations. For to confess a principle to be scriptural and to fail to apply it, involves no tonly inconsistency, but unfaithfulness to God. We have already mentioned the fact that we have general funds which are administered without specific relation to congregational limits, business of a financial character to be done, which is connected with the general interests of the Church and with the evangelisation of the world. The distribution of these funds, the management of this business, upon the principle we have signalised, demand the deacon. Is it not, then, perfectly obvious that the deacon is not confined, in the discharge of his functions, to the sphere of the particular congregation? Tie him to it, and you force upon the Church the practical necessity of violating the principle, upon which the apostles acted, of refusing to commingle incompatible functions. Admit that the General Assembly, or Synods, or Presbyteries, may hold property or perform temporal functions, and you admit the necessity of employing the deacon beyond congregational limits. It is conceded, both by our theory and our practice, that ministers of the word and ruling elders ought not to displace the deacon in the discharge of temporal functions within

those limits. The same principle which holds within the congregational sphere must hold without it; otherwise inconsistency emerges, and Scripture authority is resisted. If temporal business of a congregational nature ought to be committed to deacons, so ought the same sort of business connected with the Church at large. The principle is the same.

This argument may be still more impressively exhibited by presenting it as one from the less to the greater. If ministers and elders ought not to be diverted from their spiritual duties by attention to the temporal business of a single congregation, much more ought they not to be turned aside from them by devotion to the secular interests of the whole Church. The Executive Committees of our General Assembly, for instance, are each of them scarcely larger than some of the sessions of particular churches. The spiritual and ecclesiastical business which they have to perform is confessedly urgent, difficult, exhausting. How, then, can they, without being unduly diverted from it, discharge the temporal functions connected with the management and disbursement of the funds of the whole Church which are appropriated to general ends? The argument is irresistible: a session ought not to be distracted by attention to the secular business of a single congregation; much more ought not a committee, no larger than a session, to be embarrassed by devotion to the temporal interests of the whole Church. Is it not manifest that the diaconal function is a necessity beyond the sphere of particular congregations?

So much for the direct argument from Scripture for the employment of deacons beyond the bounds of the particular churches of which they are officers.

2. We next submit considerations in favor of this position derived from the analogy of the Presbyterian system.

(1.) If we contemplate the fundamental principle of the unity of the Church, we shall see that it is legitimate to employ diaconal functions outside of the limits of particular congregations.

Besides the spiritual unity of the whole body of the elect, springing from a common relation to Christ the Head, and a common possession of the Holy Spirit as the principle of life, we

hold, as Presbyterians, that the Church is externally one. All who profess the true religion, together with their children, constitute the one catholic visible Church on earth. Within the circle of this one great visible institute, we also hold to the legitimacy of a denominational unity, grounded in a distinctive creed, and certain definite principles of church order. Our own Church is one body, not as made up of an aggregation of independent units, but as an organic whole of which particular churches are special organs. The individual churches are members of one body, parts of one great organism; and taken together they are not a collection of churches—they are a Church. If this be true—and no Presbyterian will dispute it—it follows that the constituent elements of each particular church are constituent elements of the whole Church. The officers and members of the particular church are officers and members of the whole Church. True, they sustain a special relation to the particular church to which they are attached, but it is also true, that, through it, they sustain a general relation to the whole Church of which it is an integral element. Probably no one would deny that this holds in reference to the members. The members of this church, in whose edifice we are sitting, are certainly members of the Southern Presbyterian Church. The minister of the word who officiates here is a minister of that Church. The ruling elders are ruling elders of the same. How, then, can the deacons be excluded from the scope of this principle? They cannot. The deacons of this particular church are deacons of our Church as a whole. Why, then, may they not be employed in connexion with its general interests? It behoves those who contend that they cannot, to show that what is true of the other officers of a particular church is not true of the deacons; that they are excepted from the influence of the principle of organic unity, which is admitted to be fundamental to our system.

In answer to this demand, it may be said that the principle of external organic unity is but the principle of representation, that it is this which constitutes the basis of our system of correlated courts, and that as presbyters are representatives they necessarily enter as factors into the whole system, and discharge

functions which bear a catholic relation to the general interests of the Church. But deacons are not representatives. There is no series of diaconal courts. Their case, therefore, is peculiar, as restricted to the particular churches to which they are attached. To this we reply, that by virtue of the action of this very principle of representation, all the interests of the Church expand beyond the limits of particular congregations. And this is true not only of spiritual but temporal interests. Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies, representing interests more or less extensive, necessarily have functions of a temporal nature to discharge, business of a secular character to which attention must be given. The temporal duties which accompany the representative principle in its expansion create a demand for the deacon. Wherever the presbyter goes, the deacon must go with him. For we have seen that it is unreasonable, and, as the apostles pronounced it unreasonable, it is unscriptural, for the presbyter to perform the duties of the deacon. Wherever, therefore, in the practical reach of the representative principle, temporal interests are encountered, there diaconal functions become a necessity. "Out of the eater comes forth meat." The objection, founded on the principle of representation, against the extension of the deacon's functions beyond the sphere of particular congregations, furnishes a conclusive reason in favor of that which it is designed to disprove.

(2.) But while we admit and maintain that the representative principle is that in which the external organic unity of the Church is grounded, so far as its polity is concerned, we hold, at the same time, that there are other aspects of ecclesiastical unity which justify and require the employment of deacons in relation to interests wider than those of particular congregations.

In the first place, there is the unity of temporal interests, a unity springing from the common possession of temporal goods, and the common administration of ecclesiastical funds. Representation holds not only strictly and technically in regard to rule over persons and over ecclesiastical things, so far as personal rights and duties are involved, but also in a looser sense, in relation to the care of things. The deacon represents the particular

church in reference to its temporal, as the presbyter represents it in reference to its spiritual, interests. But the Church is one in all its interests, both temporal and spiritual. And as the elder represents both the spiritual interests of the particular church, and of the Church at large, the deacon who immediately represents the particular church with respect to its temporal interests, also represents the whole Church with respect to the same sort of interests.

In the second place, there is the unity arising from the common need of diaconal service. The deacon, as his name imports, is emphatically a servant of the church. Now the Church, as a whole, needs service in the temporal sphere. There is not, for example, an executive committee of the General Assembly which has not a large amount of money intrusted to its care, that not only requires to be appropriated according to the wisdom of the presbyter, but to be received, kept, and disbursed by the deacon, if we would conform our whole practice to scriptural principles. But the service, which would thus be rendered to the Church in its organic capacity, would be performed in behalf of all the particular congregations which compose it. The Church, as one, needs diaconal service. Consequently the minister of that service cannot be legitimately confined to the sphere of a particular congregation. In a word, the deacon, like the minister and the ruling elder, is a servant of the whole Church, and if in that capacity she requires his service, as it is plain she does, that service cannot be refused.

In the third place, there is the unity of temporal want and suffering. If, in the expansion of the Presbyterian system, the Church were relieved of temporal necessities beyond the limits of particular congregations, there would be no need of the offices of the deacon beyond those limits. But the Church, in its development into Presbyteries, Synods, and Assembly, is pressed by temporal necessities. The deacon, as temporal officer, is, therefore, a necessity to the Church as a whole. As the ground of his office, viz., temporal need, exists in the Church as a whole, the deacon has functions to discharge in relation to her in that capacity. Wherever in the Church, either within or with-

out the limits of particular congregations, there is temporal need to be supplied, there the services of the deacon not only may be, but ought to be, invoked.

These considerations, derived from principles fundamental to the Presbyterian system, go to show that the sphere of the deacon's operations is not bounded by the limits of the particular church which elected him to office, but may be legitimately extended so as to embrace the temporal interests of the Church at large.

3. We present a few arguments, based both upon the actual practice of our Church, and upon her formal declaration as to a mode of action capable of being reduced to practice.

(1.) It is a matter of common occurrence that the deacon, in making collections during the public services of the Lord's house on the Sabbath, goes outside of the limits of the particular church to which he is attached. He collects money from persons who are members of other particular Presbyterian churches, from persons belonging to other denominations, and from persons connected with no denomination. This is an instance, occurring statedly, in which, so far as the function of collecting is concerned, the sphere of the deacons extends beyond the bounds of a particular church. It will probably be urged in answer to this consideration that, although it be true that in discharging the function of collecting he goes outside of the limits of the particular church, he acts on its behalf, and in his special relation to it as its officer. It is the particular church which makes the collections through him as its agent. To this we rejoin: In the first place, many of the collections thus made do not terminate on congregational objects, but on those contemplated by the Church's general schemes of benevolence. They are, in one sense, made in behalf of the particular church, as they express its worship and lead to the cultivation of its graces; but, in another sense, they are not made in its interest, since the end upon which they terminate is the benefit of the Church at large, or the evangelisation of the Christless world. They are, in a special relation, means of grace; but, in a general relation, material contributions to the advancement of extra-congregational objects. They are, therefore, not simply made in behalf of a

particular church. In this case the deacon acts not merely for a particular church, but also for the Church as a whole.

In the second place, the particular church, in directing that collections be made in behalf of the general objects of benevolence, acts in compliance with the authority of the Supreme Court representing the whole Church, and is, therefore, in a sense, its agent. The deacon, consequently, though in making these collections he is immediately the agent of a particular church, is, at the same time mediately through that church the agent of the whole Church. In a special relation, he is an officer of a particular church; in a general relation, an officer of the whole Church.

These considerations are sufficient to rebut the objection to our view that in making collections for general objects the deacon transcends mere congregational limits. What has been said holds also of collections for general objects made by the deacon in the way of private application to individuals.

(2.) That the deacon is not merely a local officer, confined to a particular congregation, is evinced by the fact that, when his membership is transferred from one particular church to another, he is not re-ordained. The practice of the Church, in this respect, shows her doctrine to be, that, besides his special relation to the particular church which elected him, the deacon sustains a catholic relation to the Church at large. While *in transitu* he is still a deacon. His office, like that of the ruling elder, goes with him from church to church.

(3.) Our own Church has distinctly assumed the principle that deacons are not confined in the discharge of their functions to the sphere of a particular church; and has deliberately and formally expressed its judgment that they may act in connexion with Executive Committees appointed by the higher courts. The constitution of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions which was, after mature deliberation, adopted by its first General Assembly, held in the city of Augusta, in 1861, contains the following article: "This Committee shall be known as the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America. It shall consist

of a Secretary, who shall be styled the Secretary of Foreign Missions, and who shall be the Committee's organ of communication with the Assembly and with all portions of the work intrusted to this Committee, a Treasurer, and nine other members, three of whom at least shall be ruling elders or deacons or private members of the Church, all appointed annually by the General Assembly, and shall be directly amenable to it for the faithful and efficient discharge of the duties entrusted to its care. Vacancies occurring *ad interim*, it shall fill, if necessary."*

The same Assembly adopted the following resolution: "*Resolved*, That the principles of organisation involved in the establishment of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, be considered as applying to all the Executive Committees to be appointed."† Accordingly, we find not only that provision is made, in the constitution of the Committee of Foreign Missions, for the possible appointment of deacons as members of that committee, but that the same provision is made in the respective constitutions of the Committees of Domestic Missions, Education, and Publication.‡

A question may, we think, be legitimately raised in regard to the propriety of this action, so far as it implies the commingling of presbyters, deacons, and private members of the Church in the same committees. In our judgment, the difficulties lying in the way of the realisation of such a scheme are formidable, if not insuperable. It is not our intention, however, just at this point, to discuss that question. What is now designed is to call attention to the fact that our Church, from its very inception as a separate organisation, has been committed to the position that deacons may, at the call of the higher courts, be employed beyond congregational limits, and that they may be appointed as committee-men by the General Assembly, and, by parity of reason, may be appointed to act in the same capacity by the other courts of the Church. In view of this fact—that the admissibility of diaconal functions in connexion with the general interests of the Church was conceded by our first General As-

*Minutes of General Assembly, 1861, p. 16.

†*Ibid.*, p. 14.

‡*Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23, 40.

sembly, and that the concession of it has never been revoked—we might have been content with simply treating it as an assumption, in regard to which there is now no open dispute among us; but inasmuch as there was formerly some difference of opinion touching the matter—and for aught we know may be now—it was deemed best to subject it to a discussion somewhat thorough.

To this view it may be objected, that while the practice of the Church has sanctioned the appointment of persons as committee-men who are not actually members of the bodies appointing them, it is supposed that they might be members; but as deacons cannot be members of Presbyteries, Synods, or Assemblies, it would be illegitimate for those courts to appoint them as committee-men. We reply: First, no more, for the same reason, could a Session appoint a committee of deacons. But surely a Session may commit to a deacon, or a number of deacons, the discharge of a certain duty, say, the collection of money needed for a particular purpose. But if one court may do it, so may all. Secondly, the objection proceeds upon a mere quibble as to the technical word *committee*. The real question is, whether a body, of which deacons cannot be members, may appoint them to the performance of ecclesiastical functions of a temporal nature; and that question, we conceive, is settled by scriptural precedent. The deacons mentioned in the sixth Chapter of Acts were elected by the people; but the record expressly says, that they were appointed by the apostles to distribute the common provision. It is needless to remark that they could not have been members of the apostolic college. It will require no argument to show that when the apostles fell asleep, the same power was lodged in the divinely ordained rulers of the Church.

It may further be objected, that it is unwarrantable to detach the deacon from the service of the particular church to which he is bound by his ordination vows. To this we answer: First, the same objection would lie against the employment of a ruling elder out of immediate connexion with the interests of the particular church of which he is an officer. But no one objects to such a procedure in regard to the elder. The difference between the two

cases could only be made out by showing that while there are general interests of a spiritual character which require the services of the elder, there are no similar interests of a temporal kind which call for those of the deacon. But that, as we have already proved, cannot be done. Secondly, the higher bodies may, under constitutional limitations, command the lower. It is competent for the Session of a church to assign certain duties to the deacons of the same church; so likewise for a Presbytery, to the elders and deacons of the congregations under its care; and so moreover for a Synod, or a General Assembly. Thirdly, no particular church can legitimately segregate itself from the whole flock of which it is a part, or insulate its individual interests to the neglect of the general good. The visible unity of the Church would be impaired to the extent of the severance, and a tendency to Congregationalism established. Fourthly, we do not think that the detachment objected to could be realised in fact.

It gives us pleasure to be able to add to these considerations in favor of the position, that the deacon is not merely a local officer, confined within the limits of a particular congregation, and that the sphere of his operations may be extended so as to embrace the temporal interests of the whole Church, two testimonies from sources which true Presbyterians have been wont to regard with profound respect. The first is from a discourse entitled "The Christian Pastor," by Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge.* He says:

"The unity of the Church of Christ is one of the plainest doctrines concerning it, which is taught in the Scriptures: and its division into sects and parties is one of the greatest evils which has ever been allowed to overtake it on account of its sins. Though the visible church universal is thus unhappily rent, yet each particular portion or denomination of it is still able to appropriate to itself, in some degree, those great principles and reasonings, which rightly apply to the whole, if all were united in one general fold. Thus, we by no means assert of our branch of the Lord's purchased people—what is boastfully and foolishly asserted of themselves by some others—that we constitute *the Church of Christ* on earth. But our received faith is, that into how many parts soever our Church may be divided for convenience' sake, or from neces-

*Pages 25, 26.

sity, either as congregations or as larger portions, still the whole of these parts constitute but one Church. It follows, that all the office-bearers who may be more particularly attached to any one portion of this church are, in the same sense, office-bearers of the whole body, as the particular part is one portion of the whole."

That among these office-bearers Dr. Breckinridge designed to include deacons, is proved by the fact, that he immediately afterwards speaks of them distributively as teachers, rulers, and distributors.

Our next testimony is from Dr. Thornwell. In his *Argument against Church-Boards*, he says :

"The Book provides that our churches should be furnished with a class of officers for the express purpose of attending to the temporal matters of the Church : and these deacons might be made the collecting agents of the Presbytery in every congregation, and through them the necessary funds could be easily obtained and without expense. For transmission to foreign parts, nothing more would be necessary than simply to employ either some extensive merchant in any of our large cities, or a Committee of Deacons appointed by the Assembly for that purpose. So far, then, as the collection and disbursement of funds are concerned, our Constitution has made the most abundant provision.

We know of nothing that more strikingly illustrates the practical wisdom of the divine provision of deacons as collecting agents in each congregation than the fact that, after long and mature experience, the American Board has recommended the appointment of similar agents in each congregation contributing to its funds as the most successful method of increasing its resources. Our book, however, does not confine deacons to particular congregations. There should be a competent number of them in each particular church ; but we insist upon it that Presbyteries, Synods and the General Assembly should also have the deacons to attend to their pecuniary matters. Those ordained at Jerusalem were not confined to a specific congregation, but acted for the whole college of apostles. By intrusting all pecuniary matters into the hands of men ordained under solemn sanctions for the purpose, our spiritual courts would soon cease to be what they are to an alarming extent at present—mere corporations for secular purposes."*

That these views were not hastily formed is evinced by the fact that, having been assailed by a distinguished reviewer, Dr. Thornwell thus proceeds to vindicate them :

* *Coll. Writings*, Vol. iv., pp. 154, 155.

“But how does the reviewer establish his point that the plan set forth in the Argument against Boards is contrary to Scripture? By asserting, first, that deacons are confined to particular churches, and empowered only to take care of the poor. That deacons are officers, elected and ordained in particular churches, is true. So are elders; but as there is nothing in this fact inconsistent with an elder’s acting for the Church at large in our ecclesiastical courts, so there is nothing to prevent the deacon from exercising his peculiar functions in a wider sphere. A pastor is installed over a particular church, but is he at liberty to preach nowhere else? An elder belongs to a specific congregation. Is our Constitution, therefore, wrong in permitting him to sit as a member of Presbytery? If the mere fact of being an officer in a particular church necessarily confines one to that congregation alone, the reviewer will find it a hard task to show how elders and pastors are formed into Presbyteries. He must either admit that the Presbyterian form of government is unscriptural, or that deacons may act for Presbyteries as they act for their particular congregations. His only alternatives are Congregationalism, or the abandonment of his reasoning upon the subject of deacons. His syllogism is, that whoever is installed as an officer in a particular church can never be an officer of the Church catholic; deacons are so installed; therefore deacons can never be officers of the Church catholic. I might change the minor proposition and say, elders are so installed, and how could he avoid the conclusion? He must either abandon his major proposition or abandon Presbyterianism.”

After showing that it is unscriptural to restrict the scope of the deacon’s functions to the care of the poor, and that it is legitimate to extend it so as to include all the temporal business of the Church, Dr. Thornwell further says as to the field of diaconal operations: “It is plain, also, that the deacons acted for the whole college of apostles, not by travelling about with them in their various missionary tours, but by being under their inspection and control while they continued in Jerusalem. They stood in the same relation to them that I would have them occupy in regard to our Presbyteries. The office of deacon, then, as set forth in the Argument against Boards, is both scriptural and constitutional.”*

It would be irrelevant, in a report like this, to discuss the question whether the mode of conducting our missionary operations now employed by our Church, and ultimately acceded to by Dr. Thornwell, be preferable to that originally advocated by him,

**Ibid.*, 199, 200, 201.

their supervision and control immediately by the Presbyteries; viz., all that we design by these quotations is to show that he fully held the view for which we contend in regard to the wide sphere of the deacon's operations.

We have thus proved, by appeals to Scripture, to the principles of Presbyterianism, to the practice of the Presbyterian Church in general, and to the constitutions of the executive committees of our own Church in particular, that the sphere of the deacon's operations is not confined within congregational limits, but that his functions may be employed in connexion with the temporal interests of the Church at large.

SECONDLY. We proceed to indicate the practical consequences which legitimately flow from this conclusion, taken together with those which have been established by our previous discussions.

In the first place, we have seen, by an argument derived from Scripture and the principles of our system, that the higher office of presbyter does not include the lower office of deacon; that those offices are generally different, and that, consequently, diaconal functions, in a regular condition of the Church in which all the offices are or can be filled, ought not to be discharged by presbyters, but by deacons.

In the second place, it has been proved, on scriptural grounds, that "it is not reason" that we should commingle in the same officer the distinct and incompatible duties of different offices, but that each officer, in an ordinary condition of the Church, is restricted to the discharge of the functions appropriate to his own office.

In the third place, it has been shown by elaborate argumentation that the scope of the deacon's functions not only includes the care of the poor, but all the purely temporal business of the Church.

And now, in the fourth place, the conclusion has, through various modes of proof, been reached, that the sphere of the deacon's operations embraces not only the temporal interests of the particular congregation, but also those of the whole Church.

Having already pointed out the application of the first three of

these principles to the interests and methods of particular churches, let us go on, under the sanction of the fourth, consistently to apply them to the general agencies of the Church. And let us go on unflinchingly, as, in the words of Calvin, we have the lamp of Scripture in our hands.

1. The first sort of agencies which we encounter as falling under the scope of these principles is treasurerships. We have seen that wherever purely diaconal functions are to be discharged, deacons ought to be assigned to their performance. As treasurers are charged with purely financial functions, they ought to be deacons. We are glad to know that some of our Presbyteries are carrying this principle into effect. Their treasurers are deacons. So ought the treasurer of every court and of every committee or board to be.

2. In accordance with the same principle, boards of trustees, having ecclesiastical business of a purely financial character to manage, should consist only of deacons. This applies to the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly. Where legal advice is needed, deacons are competent to secure it.

3. We are of opinion that the same principle will apply to the Assembly's Committee of Education. We concur with Dr. Thornwell in the judgment "that its office should be exclusively confined to the aiding of indigent candidates for the gospel ministry. It should have no power to determine their places of education, nor the extent and period of their studies." And as our Church has acted upon that view, there is really no necessity for any functions which deacons may not perform. The whole business of the Committee is exhausted in the receiving and disbursement of money, and is, therefore, properly diaconal. Of that Committee one member should be a salaried treasurer. Should it be connected with another Committee, one treasurer would suffice for both.

4. The Committees of Publication, and of Home and Foreign Missions, stand on a different footing. They have important functions to discharge which are not at all of a diaconal nature, and should, therefore, be simply composed of presbyters. The fact has already been noticed that in the constitutions of the execu-

tive committees adopted by the Augusta Assembly of 1861, it was provided that they might be jointly composed of presbyters, deacons, and private members of the Church. It has so happened, as far as we know, that in the practice of the Church neither deacons nor private members of the Church have had a place on the committees. And as the Assembly, in framing their constitutions, did not make it imperative that those classes of persons should be appointed as constituents of the committees, we are clear that the practice of the Church has, in this respect, been right. For, as has been shown, it is a scriptural principle that the incompatible functions of distinct offices should not be united in the same officers. If it would be unreasonable, the apostles being judges, that presbyters should perform the duties of deacons, much more, for obvious reasons, would it be unreasonable that deacons should discharge those of presbyters. The committees under consideration represent, in a measure, the ruling power of the Assembly, and it would seem to require but little argument to show the incongruity of investing deacons with such authority.

But while this is so, we are equally clear, that as there are diaconal functions which need to be performed in connexion with these committees, the very same principle demands that deacons should be appointed in connexion with, although not as parts of, the committees, for their discharge. A committee of presbyters should be confined to their appropriate duties, and not undertake those which, on scriptural grounds, should be assigned to deacons.

We do not desire to enter into details, but would offer a few suggestions. Should the Committee of Education be made, as we have shown it ought to be, to consist of deacons, and should hereafter be connected with the Committee of Publication, the same treasurer could act for both committees. If the Education Committee should not be connected with that of Publication, as the Assembly has directed that the Publication house should be sold as soon as it can be done to advantage, only a treasurer, who should be a deacon, would be needed in connexion with the Publication Committee.

The administration of the Invalid Fund, requiring strictly only diaconal functions, ought to be intrusted to a committee of deacons. That committee being situated, as we think it best it should be, in the same place with the Committee of Home and Foreign Missions, could be appointed to act in connexion with it, so far as its financial duties are concerned; and the treasurer of the Invalid Fund could at the same time serve as the treasurer of Home and Foreign Missions. Should these suggestions ever be realised, we would have but two treasurers for all our benevolent schemes. Perhaps experience may ultimately show that but one employed for his whole time and adequately remunerated, is really needed.

It is almost needless to say that these principles apply to the executive committees of Synods and Presbyteries.*

Their application to a Board of Directors of a theological seminary may, practically, be opposed by serious difficulties, but as far as it may be practicable, we must, to be consistent, hold that the attempt ought to be made. The interests of other than a financial kind which are intrusted to such a board are so transcendantly important that its members should be appointed with special reference to their qualifications for their management, and not chiefly with regard to their financial ability. A committee of deacons, selected with an eye to their business qualities, as well as their integrity, should, we think, be connected with the board, and charged with the management of investments and other purely secular interests. Of their number one should be appointed treasurer.

We submit these suggestions as indicating what are, in our judgment, some of the special ways in which the principles we have endeavored to establish may receive a practical application. They will have served their purpose, if by means of them the attention of the Church is turned to this question, and her wisdom determines the methods in which the application should be made. That the application ought to be made, we are thoroughly convinced.

*It gives us pleasure to mention the fact that one of the Presbyteries of this Synod has appointed a board of deacons, which is a corporate body, to manage its financial interests.

We now bring to a close these reports, comprising discussions somewhat elaborate upon a subject the literature of which is exceedingly meagre, and prepared, we may be permitted to say, not without earnest supplication for divine guidance and painstaking reflection. Exhortation would perhaps be unnecessary and gratuitous; for, if the principles which we have labored to elucidate are grounded in Scripture, they claim their application by virtue of their own inherent authority. We cannot, however, forbear saying that no Church, in modern times, has fully tested the power of the diaconal arm, employed in connexion with a wise and efficient senate of presbyters. Either that arm, in the foolishness of human wisdom, has been amputated, and the vain attempt made to develop the strength of two arms in one, or if it has been suffered to exist, it has been allowed to remain, to so great an extent, unused, that it has been well-nigh withered. To a Church which, comprehending the mighty power of a divinely ordained diaconate, should give it, upon a spiritual basis, a thorough-going employment, the results would soon afford occasion alike for surprise and joy.

ARTICLE III.

WOMAN'S PLACE IN THE GOSPEL.

I. It is a question of great interest to us who love to dwell upon and study each circumstance in the life of Christ, how he was sustained during his public ministry, from his baptism of consecration at its beginning, till his baptism of blood at its close. Who supported heaven's missionary, that not only left his native shore, but descended from a throne, laying aside his royal robes and divine glory, to publish the gospel of salvation to the heathen of earth at the expense of his life? Whence came the means that ministered to his wants whilst he "went about doing good," "healing the sick," "raising the dead," "preaching the gospel of

the kingdom," in the synagogues or private houses, along the public highways of Palestine and in populous cities, or in lonely deserts and on mountain heights, exhibiting an unselfish, unworldly, self-sacrificing and consecrated life, which is the type and model of all missionary effort? He could not have been sustained by his family, for the offering of his mother at her purification, (Lev. xii. 8, and Luke ii. 24,) and the occupation of his father, Joseph the carpenter, (Matt. xiii. 55) indicated that the family at Nazareth were not strangers to poverty. It could not have been furnished by other members of his family or kindred, "for neither did his brethren believe in him." (John vii. 5.) He had no means of his own, for "though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor." (Mark vi. 3, and 2 Cor. viii. 9.) It was necessary, by a miracle of knowledge, that he should apply to the fish of the sea to obtain the money for paying the tribute required of each Jew for the temple service. (Matt. xvii. 24, 27.) Alluding to his own poverty, how touchingly he exclaims, "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the son of man hath not where to lay his head." (Matt. viii. 20, and Luke ix. 58.) The disciples could not have ministered to his maintenance, for although they possessed a treasurer, who "had the bag and bare what was put therein," yet they were but poor fishermen, and as they shared his manner of life and lot, must themselves have been sustained in the same way. He worked no miracle to satisfy his wants; the suggestion of Satan, "Command that these stones be made bread," he positively refused. By miracles, on more than one occasion, he supplied many thousands with bread, but never worked a miracle in his own behalf. The only light which can be thrown upon this inquiry is that which gleams in a few seemingly casual references by the Evangelists in their Gospels. In Luke viii. 2, 3, there occurs the remarkable statement that there were certain *women* which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities, Mary, called Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils, and Joanna, the wife of Chusa, Herod's steward, Susanna, and many others, which MINISTERED UNTO HIM OF THIER SUBSTANCE." Some of the best and most ancient manuscripts in the latter

clause read "them" instead of "him," thus including the disciples as objects of their ministrations as well as Jesus. Matthew, in describing the various circumstances and characters which surround the cross of Christ at his death, mentions (Matt. xxvii. 55.) that "many women were there, beholding afar off, which followed Jesus from Galilee, MINISTERING UNTO HIM, among which was Mary Magdalene," etc. Mark, alluding to these women, who beheld him crucified, explains that they were the same "who also, when he was in Galilee, followed him and MINISTERED UNTO HIM." (Mark xv. 40, 41.) The word in the Greek, translated "ministered," is the one from which is derived our English word "deacon." From the infallible testimony of the Sacred Scriptures, it is evident that Jesus, the great itinerant, was sustained in his work by the liberality of a few noble, self-sacrificing, devoted women! It is never said that *any man* ministered unto him of his substance. It is true that the Magi brought gifts unto his manger; that Nicodemus brought a "mixture of myrrh and aloes" to the cross: and that Joseph of Arimathea furnished him a sepulchre; but these were at the beginning and close of his earthly life, and were not to sustain him in his work. On one occasion it is recorded, that, having refused to convert stones into bread for his use, "behold, angels came and ministered unto him." Angels and women were his ministering spirits. Angels and women are placed in the same category. O woman, what honor has been attained by you! To be classed with angels! To have ministered unto the Son of God! "Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, this, also, that she hath done, shall be spoken of for a memorial of her."

II. By whom supported, and from whence come the means that send out missionaries of the cross, in this age of the Church, who have caught the spirit of their Master, to imitate him in preaching the gospel to the heathen of every land? Through whose liberality comes it to pass, that one hundred missionaries have sailed from the United States alone within the last year; that every sea bears upon its bosom the "ambassador for Christ;" that the sun shines upon no land where the gospel is not now

being preached? The hand and heart of woman are conspicuous in this matter. She who sustained the first missionary out of her substance bears no inferior part in the work of the Church, which characterises, and is the glory of, the nineteenth century. The magnitude of her labor cannot be estimated, but only indicated. Compare the membership of the Southern Presbyterian Church and the membership of the "Ladies' Missionary Associations" in its bounds, and then compare the respective contributions of each by the year, or from any number of "Missionary," compare their gifts by the month, and some idea will be furnished in regard to the question who supports the missionaries. Add to this the other fact, that more than half the membership of the Church, whose contributions are compared with these "Ladies' Missionary Associations," are themselves women, who contribute a large share of that credited to the Church; and their work will be even more manifest. But disband these associations of devoted women, and paralyse the individual efforts and estop the gifts of others, much of which is earned by their own personal labor, and what disastrous results would overtake the cause of missions! Many laborers would be recalled; many stations abandoned; many souls left to perish, if not the whole work, humanly speaking, involved in hopeless confusion and utter ruin. What a commentary on the love of woman! What a specimen of her self-sacrificing spirit! What proof of her devotion to Christ!

III. Women have ever been true to Christ. It was no woman who denied him. Woman never betrayed him into the hands of his enemies. Though endowed by nature with a shrinking, modest, timid disposition, yet they stood by his cross, when the disciples forsook him and fled, who had boasted they would die with him. It is not mere sentiment that woman was "last at the cross and first at the sepulchre." The fact that the Evangelists explain that these women at the cross were the same who ministered unto him, confirms a great principle that the parties who contribute to an object or cause are the parties to whom it is dear, and who will cling to it with an ever increasing devotion. That object which costs us thought, labor, or money, is the objec-

around which our affections will entwine their strongest tendrils. Woman had ministered unto him of her substance, therefore she stood by his cross, followed the body to the sepulchre (Luke xxiii. 55), her loving hands assisting in this sad duty, prepared the articles for embalming (Luke xxiii. 56), was seen "sitting over against the sepulchre" (Matt. xxvii. 61), first discovered his resurrection (Matt. xxviii. 1-10; Mark xvi. 1-8, etc.), and was consequently the first to whom he appeared (Mark xvi. 9). Only one of the twelve was at the crucifixion, not one at the burial, nor is there any evidence on record, or any probability even that any one of them ever visited the sepulchre till after the announcement of his resurrection. She who was so true to Christ, is it any wonder that she should be true to his cause? The more she labors for Christ, or contributes to his cause, the more her affections are stimulated; and the more they are stimulated, the greater are her labors of love. By the law of action and reaction, her labor and her love continually augment each other, her labor giving strength to her love, and her love giving fervor to her labor.

IV. Owing to causes like these, the highest commendation or eulogies ever uttered by Christ to the honor of any human being, were spoken by him in behalf of woman. It was a woman, who out of the depth of her love anointed him with the precious ointment so costly (Mark xiv. 3, 4.) as to move the indignation of *a man*, who only a few days afterward sold him to his bitterest enemies, betraying him with a kiss for a sum of money less than one-third the cost of the ointment (Matt. xxvi. 14-16). Of this woman on a former occasion he had said, "But one thing is needful; and Mary hath chosen that good part, that shall not be taken away from her." Now for this loving act of anointing she is to receive still greater honor from Christ. From his lips she receives the noblest tribute that could be bestowed on any human being, "She hath done what she could" (Mark xiv. 8). Such a testimonial may never have been deserved by *any man*. There is at least no record that Christ ever said of any man, He hath done what he could. She erected for herself a monument more beautiful than marble, more lasting than adamant or brass, more

valuable than ruby or diamond. "Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, this also that she hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her." His commendation of the "poor widow" is his testimony to the liberality of woman. "Jesus sat over against the treasury, and beheld how the people cast money into the treasury." He is not indifferent to the gifts of his people, but beholds and considers the proofs of their love and devotion. "And many that were rich cast in much. And there came a certain poor widow, and she threw in two mites, which make a farthing." This was the smallest offering allowed to be made. "And Jesus called his disciples unto him." He calls their attention specially to her act; "and saith unto them, Verily I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury, etc." He *weighs* the gifts of his people, and makes ability the standard of estimating their value, and gives them credit accordingly (Mark xii. 41-44). Woman hath this additional honor that she made the most valuable contribution in the estimation of Christ ever made to his treasury. It was not a man that had this honor or praise of Christ. "The coats and garments, which Dorcas had made while she was with them," were shown after her death as evidence, that she was a "woman full of good works and alms deeds which she did" (Acts ix. 36-43). In concluding his Epistle to the Romans, it is remarkable how large a proportion of the salutations given and commendations uttered were of women. Of Phœbe, Priscilla, Persis, Tryphena, Tryphosa, Julia, Junia, and Mary, it was variously said by him in approbation: "For she hath been a succorer of many and of myself also"; "who bestowed much labor on us"; "which labored much in the Lord," etc. (Rom. xvi.) These references indicate how important was the work of women in the primitive Church. All these numerous and varied commendations of different women, and which were not bestowed on men, are not simply accidental but proofs of their greater devotion and superior merit, and are but specimens of Paul's exhortation, "Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; honor to whom honor." What a work is being done in the Church of the present day for Christ

by the Dorcases, the "poor widows," the Lady Huntingtons, and many others, whose worth is known only to Christ, and whose praises are spoken only by him! How many church debts have been paid, how many ministers of the gospel have been sustained, how many church edifices and chapels have been erected by them! Fortunate is the church that hath a Dorcas, or a pious "poor widow"! These are more valuable than the rich or noble. As they stood by his cross, so they will not desert his cause at the approach of disaster, but will rally closer around it, water it with their tears, uphold it by their prayers, labor for it with their hands and sustain it by their gifts, till the calamity be overpast. "Then Jesus answered and said unto her, O woman, great is thy faith; be it unto thee even as thou wilt."

V. It is a slander perpetrated on woman, which charges her with being liberal at the expense of her husband. It is a charge which is quite easily refuted. That one, of whom Jesus said, "She hath done what she could," was an *unmarried* woman. She, whom Christ announced to his disciples as having made the most liberal contribution of all that cast into the treasury, was "a poor *widow*." Of those that "ministered unto him of their substance," concerning whom anything definite is known, most were either *widows* or *unmarried*. Not many years ago, a young lady of culture and wealth, to whom the world presented as many attractions as to any, to whom home and friends were as dear as to others, offered herself to the Church as a missionary to a foreign shore. Nor was this all, for many other devoted women have done the same: *but she went at her own expense*. In the majority of churches the most liberal contributors, those whose gifts are greatest in proportion to their ability, are the "poor widows," and those whose offerings are the result of their own exertions. Many pastors and deacons would doubtless confirm that statement from their own personal observation, and would be ready to prove it with the facts and figures. It may be, therefore, that in the aggregate "the widows' mites" will amount to a far greater sum than the gifts of the rich not only in the estimation of Christ, but also in actual figures. If the whole Church were but endowed with the faith and love and conse-

quently the liberality and devotion of many "a poor widow." it would be comparatively easy to conquer the world for Christ!

VI. What is it a Christian woman cannot do? She may have been a heathen; but let her heart be won for Christ, and henceforth her efforts in his behalf are untiring. It was reported in the missionary periodicals that not long ago a missionary in India was awakened out of sleep by a noise at the door. Upon inquiry he found there a woman, who had been converted from heathenism and was now connected with his church, who said to him, "O sir, I cannot sleep for thinking of these perishing people; and I have come to ask you to pray with me for their conversion." They knelt there and mingled their entreaties for the heathen around them. In a short space of time they witnessed the conversion of that people by the thousand, and the Telogoos are to-day a Christian nation. No sacrifice is too great, no cross too heavy for her to bear, if she but recognise in it the will of her master. The wife of a missionary stood upon the seashore in India watching the diminishing form of a receding vessel. On board are her children, being taken home to be educated. Knowing they would be months upon the water, and many years must elapse before she could see them again, perhaps never, with her heart full of emotion she exclaimed, "This I do, O Christ, for thy sake!" It may be that God has not endowed woman with the wisdom of man, nor has he created her with the strength of man, and she is, therefore, designated "the weaker vessel." But he has given her that which is better, he has enriched her with *more heart and irresistible influence*. Her heart is a match for his wisdom, and her influence can cope with his strength. Although called "the weaker vessel," yet doubtless she far outstrips him in the race. Her opportunity is inferior to his. She is not permitted by the Master to advocate his cause from the pulpit. Her sphere, compared with that of the other sex, is limited. But when the history of redemption is written, and the "books are opened," and the rewards of faithfulness and activity are meted out "according to their works," then, perhaps, it will be revealed that if her opportunities were

not so great, yet she accomplished more and performed a more important part in the evangelisation of the world than man.

VII. Woman ought to be devoted to Christ. Although the human race is under an obligation to Christ which no service, no tears, no zeal, no homage, no love can ever cancel, though all were combined and prolonged during the ages of eternity, yet woman is under peculiar obligation to Christ and the elevating influence of his religion. If it were permitted to give utterance to the expression, that all human beings, both men and women, were infinitely indebted to Christ, and that the latter class were, if possible, even more indebted to him, it would be but saying that his religion had brought the same spiritual blessing to woman as to man, and had added even another in elevating her from the most abject slavery to man to a position of influence and a degree of refinement in some respects at least even superior to his. Christ was and ever has been her truest and best friend. His religion civilised man; it emancipated and ennobled woman. The difference between the position of woman, the slave of man in every heathen land, and her position of honor in every Christian country, is a difference caused by nothing else except the religion of Christ. Neither civilisation, education, refinement, nor any other system of religion, ever accomplished such a marvellous result. The learning or philosophy of a Socrates did not impel him to undertake the task of ameliorating her bondage. Neither the moral culture of a Seneca nor the statesmanship of a Cicero was of any material benefit in alleviating her bitter life. The religion of the most righteous Pharisee did not secure his friendship in her behalf, or induce him to become the champion of her rights; but, on the contrary, caused him to take the least public street leading to the synagogue, and to gather up the folds of his flowing robe, lest he become contaminated by accidentally touching a woman. The very disciples of Christ were imbued with the same spirit, and marvelled, not so much that "he talked with the woman" of Samaria, as that "he talked with *A woman!*" (John iv. 27, correct translation.) According to the teaching they had received, he was violating one of the tenets of the rabbis. His conversation with woman was not the only method

by which his friendship was exhibited towards her. He did not scorn her touch like the self-righteous Pharisee, but addressed words of comfort to her who touched him secretly with fear and trembling, "Daughter be of good comfort" (Luke viii. 48); and to the woman that was a sinner, bathing his feet with penitential tears, whose touch moved the scorn and indignation of the Pharisee, he said kindly, "Go in peace" (Luke vii. 50). It was this spirit of Christ once manifested in his person, ever afterward manifested in his religion, that emancipated woman from the most galling and degraded bondage of man. It is his religion and that alone that caused the difference in the condition of woman among heathen and Christian nations. It is not strange, therefore, that she should be the friend of Jesus, his religion, his Church and his cause of missions. The appeal in behalf of evangelisation may be made to woman with a double argument and more intense emphasis. One appeal may be based upon the wretched state of her sisters wherever the gospel's blessed sound has never been heard. She cannot resist the appeal of such a peculiar nature, that which calls upon her to redeem her sisters from a twofold bondage of tenfold bitterness, from bondage of slavery and bondage of sin, from bondage to man and from still more degrading and galling bondage to Satan, to relieve her body from the yoke of man and release her soul from the yoke of Satan. Such an argument could not fail to exert a most potent influence in arousing many a "Ladies' Missionary Association" to even more fervent zeal and increased activity, in securing many "a widow's mite" with Christ's blessing upon it and its giver, and in stimulating many a one to win Christ's approbation, "She hath done what she could," "Well done, good and faithful servant." But the second is a still more powerful appeal even than the first; one which comes alike to man and woman; the argument which is hoary with age; that which prompts the converted heathen to send the gospel to other heathen: it is the voice of a risen Redeemer crying in the ears of apostles in an imperative command, thundering through the ages like the voice of mighty waters, heard by the men of this generation, orders which the Church dare not disobey, "All

power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." "Go ye, therefore, into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." "And lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world!" This appeal is based upon the cross of Christ. The same voice seems to sound aloud from Calvary, half reproaching, half entreating the indifferent, stimulating the devoted, crying with irresistible pathos, tenderest emotion, intensest love,

"I gave, I gave, my life for thee;
My precious blood I shed;
What hast thou done for me?"

S. L. MORRIS.

ARTICLE VI.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM ON THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

In the great Protestant Universities of Germany are to be found wonderful advantages for learned research, a mighty spirit of research, and many and great merits. The Germans, compared with the Hollanders, the British, and even the French, are a poor nation, and both munificent salaries and large incomes are rare among them; so that the endowments and emoluments of their professorships are munificent when viewed in relation to the habits of the people, although very moderate when measured by a British standard. The organisation of their Universities is wise and liberal, the professorships amazingly numerous, and the division of labor accordingly minute. This partition of branches of instruction, with the cheapness of living and of books, and the scale of the libraries, enables scholars to pursue the different departments of literature to their extreme ramifications, with a nicety unknown in any other country. Hence, in German Universities are found men devoting their whole lives to examining

and teaching departments which, in other countries, are either not touched, or treated as a brief appendage to some other branch. Studious effort is, moreover, honored, and literary success valued by the whole people and the governments. The appointing power is, no doubt, usually employed with great impartiality and wisdom to elevate men of real diligence and learning to distinguished chairs.

The genius of the German Protestant people also contributes in a splendid way to the fruitfulness of this vast literary husbandry. Intensely devoted to freedom of speculative thought, thorough, laborious, patient in temperament, they are perhaps the more independent and adventurous in literary inquiry, because they have been allowed so little liberty of political action. This part of Germany is still the *Protestant* nation—proud of the right of free inquiry, and zealous to exercise it every where they are allowed. In no country of Christendom is the higher education so prominent and so honored; and no where is the *trade of scholarship* so completely organised, or so persistently plied.

Hence it would be both incorrect and ungrateful to deny the indebtedness of the civilised world to German scholarship. In no department of human learning have the Germans been laggards; in some they have laid scholars under peculiar obligations. In philology, the editing of the classics and the patristic writings, the illustration of the Scripture text, the compilation of accurate lexicons and critical grammars of all the tongues which are taught in civilised countries, they have long taken the lead. And they are now coming to the forefront in the more realistic sciences of law, medicine, chemistry, which men used to consider as the prerogative of the more practical Briton and Gaul.

But in no department have the Germans attracted so much attention as in theology. Men speak of "German theology," sometimes with fear, sometimes with admiration, but often as though it were a something single and unique, and separated from all other schools of theology by uniform traits. Whereas, there are as many German theologies, at least, as there are

British or American, differing as widely from each other in merit and in opinions. There is, indeed, so much of a pretext for speaking of "German theology" as a single system by itself, that the most of the writers of that nation, of all the various schools, have a few common traits. One of these is the use of a peculiar philosophic nomenclature, made prevalent among them by the long ascendancy of one or another phase of idealism. Another may be said to be a certain boldness of criticism in dealing with inspired declarations, which, to the orthodox apprehension of the Reformed, savors of a degree of license. But German theology is yet as many-sided as that of Britain or America, and there are as wide differences between the good and the bad. Of some of their expositors and dogmatic theologians, it is hard to utter praise too high.

But in settling the weight to be attached by English-speaking Christians to the theological emissions of the German press, there are some very plain facts which must be considered.

1. In German Protestantism, Lutheranism is now virtually dominant. One sufficient cause of this result is the ascendancy of Prussia, and her persistent policy of unifying her State Church. The University of Marburg, a small one, is now the only distinctively Reformed or Presbyterian institution left in Germany. It is not asserted that all Reformed divines are excluded from all the rest. But the general rule is, that the Lutherans are preferred, and are in the ascendant. Now, as students well know, Lutheran theology is no longer that of Martin Luther, as to the distinctive points of Calvinism. On these doctrines the most evangelical and orthodox teaching one hears in Germany is as hostile and as condemnatory as that we are wont to hear at home from Wesleyans and Arminians. But this fact is almost trivial, when compared with another, viz., that the present Lutheranism, when not rationalistic, is sacramentarian. The most devout, the staunchest assertors of inspiration, like Luthardt of Leipzig, teach a phase of baptismal regeneration, and the real, corporeal presence in the supper. The fruits of this teaching there, as everywhere else, are evil.

2. The Protestant Churches of Germany are State establish-

ments; and such are their universities with their theological departments. The theory of this relation to the State is rigorously Erastian. It is well known in history, that at the Reformation the German princes usurped the power of dictating to their subjects a religion, with a tyranny at least equal to that of the popes. The motto of treaties and laws was: "*Cujus regio, ejus religio.*" The ruler of the land ruled the religion of the land. The people of an unfortunate State had to change their faith and worship backwards and forwards, from the Reformed to the Lutheran, and from either to the Popish, as the sword, or the interests, or the lusts of the prince dictated. Nor is the Church in Germany less helpless under an imperious Erastianism to-day. Of spiritual church government there is simply none. The church courts are either absolute ciphers, or they are but names for what are, really, *bureaux* of State administration, as little reflecting a spiritual power, as a bureau of police or street-paving. The prostration of church power under the secular received notable illustration as late as 1875-6, when the foul state of the marriage and divorce laws of Prussia (which Bunsen has cited as the one of two grand blots on the Protestant world*) provoked a protest from the Lutheran pastors. The answer was an imperious edict from Bismarck, suppressing their protest, commanding them to solemnise the adulterous unions, and ordering them to expurgate the church liturgy so as utterly to suppress its implied disapprobation of the antichristian law and usage.† In England, where a nominally Protestant, but Erastian Church is established by law, the healthy vitality of the national conscience is expressed in Dissent. The Dissenting Churches embody nearly or quite half the population, and give a place of refuge to honest and manly Christians. In Germany, Dissent is so insignificant as to be practically *nihil*. The pressure exists in full force: there is not enough vitality to evoke this form of remonstrance.

Hence, with this State subjugation of the Church, and doctrine of baptismal regeneration, every German Protestant child

*Hippolytus, Vol. II., p.

†*Edinburgh Review*, Oct., 1880, p. 270.

is baptized in infancy, and is confirmed at the approach of puberty, before it is betrothed or conscripted. All are full members of the Church: all have been to their first communion: there is no church discipline in the hand of any spiritual court to deprive any of membership, however he may become infidel, atheist, adulterer, or drunkard. Every member of the Church is, so far as ecclesiastical title goes, eligible to a theological professorship. The appointing power to theological chairs is, virtually, the State. There is no need whatever that a man be ordained to the ministry, that he have a saving, personal knowledge of the gospel, or make any profession of it. Rather is it necessary that he attain the proper academic degree, defend his *Thesis theologica* in a Latin disputation, get himself much talked of as a diligent linguist and student, and an adventurous, slashing critic; and that he be acceptable to the government. The class of theological students, from whom the appointments to theological professorships most naturally are taken, does not pretend to be in any way more spiritually-minded than the body of University students. To require a credible profession of regeneration and spiritual life, as a prerequisite for joining a theological school, (or for receiving ordination and a parish, even,) would excite in Germany nothing but astonishment: it would be hard to tell whether the feeling of absurdity, or of resentment, would most predominate in the German mind at this demand. It is not meant that none of this class of students are devout, praying men: there are doubtless cases of true piety. But no such profession or quality is ever demanded. Certainly there exists, between the mass of the students of divinity and the others, no marked distinction of manners, morals, church attendance, or habits of devotion. Church historians know that the theory of Spener and Francke, was denounced by the general mind of Lutheran Germany, and dubbed by the nick-name of "Pietism." But that theory was, in the main, embraced by evangelical Christians in America, as almost a self-evident truth. It is, at least, an accepted axiom, that the pastor, and especially the teacher of pastors, must be a man who has spiritual experience of the truth.

Hence, the American evangelical Christian must be reminded of the large abatement to be made in estimating the weight to be attached to much of the German theology. To tell our people that an author is a *theological professor*, is virtually to say, that he is not only a living, experimental Christian, but that he is supposed to be an eminent one. His opinions are the object almost of religious reverence. At least, he has credit for the most thorough earnestness and sincerity in his teachings. It is supposed, as of course, that his declarations are made with all the solemn intent proper to one who believes himself dealing with the interests of immortal souls. It is hard for our people practically to feel that a man so trusted in the holiest things, may be dealing with the sacred text in precisely the same spirit as that in which he would criticise a Saga, or an Anacreontic ode. To appreciate the matter aright, they should represent to themselves a Bancroft or an Emerson, with aims perhaps very genteel and scholarly, but wholly non religious and unspiritual, criticising the authorship of Ossian, or of Junius's Letters.

Now, the Apostle Paul has passed his verdict on such men. "Christ crucified . . . to the Greeks foolishness." "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things." They "have the understanding darkened by reason of the hardening of their heart." "But the anointing which ye (believers) have received of him abideth in you," says the Apostle John: "and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." "He that believeth hath the witness in himself." Unless we are prepared to contradict God's Holy Spirit, we must ascribe to the unregenerate critics, however learned, this consequence, that their carnal state must cause them to dislike and misconceive true godliness and salvation by grace. Such a judgment they will, of course, disclaim and resent; they will flout the pretensions of spiritual

discernment, which the children of grace derive with sanctification from the Holy Ghost, as Bœotian, or as fanatical, or as a cheap and vulgar mode of asserting one's intellectual and literary aristocracy without paying for it the price of that diligent learning which they arrogate. If Paul and John speak truth, it is, of course, unavoidable that these men should answer the charge thus. The same "blindness of heart" which makes them unconscious of the spiritual beauty of the gospel, will, of course, make them unconscious of their prejudice. They are perfectly sincere in thinking themselves dispassionate. They are in a state analogous to that of the freezing man, who, *because he is so chilled* as no longer to feel the cold, does not feel that he is frost-bitten. It is thus with the man who is so utterly possessed by a blinding prejudice against his neighbor, that it is, for the time, simply impossible for him to take an equitable view of that neighbor's acts. This is the very time he protests that he is entirely dispassionate, and is calmly condemning his neighbor from the simple force of truth and justice! It is obvious that if the Apostles' verdict be true, these worldly men will be unconscious of its truth. And they cannot but resent the charge as unhandsome. But none the less, the Christian who does not wish to fly in the face of Inspiration must make the charge. He makes it, not because he is glad to insult anybody, especially any learned men; but because he dares not insult God by contradicting Him. We will, while making it in this case, give these scholars all the credit we can, for every excellence they can claim, courteous manners, correct morals, (shaming, of course, all mere pretenders to spirituality,) diligence, minute learning, and even a commendable intellectual honesty wherever the spiritual truth which is the object of their unconscious prejudice does not present itself. When it comes to the handling of the themes of redemption, there must be, then, a certain incompetency, in spite of their learning; and if the Apostles have not slandered the "natural man," we must hold ourselves prepared to discount a large part of their conclusions.

3. The spiritual atmosphere which these scholars inhabit, moreover, must be judged by us extremely unfavorable to evan-

gical investigation; or several of our most firmly established convictions must be discarded by us. We have held it beyond a doubt, that the influence of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration must be deadening and unwholesome. But the Lutheran divines now usually hold this with a tenacity proportioned to their professed orthodoxy. We have been taught to regard the sanctification of the Lord's day as ordained by a *jus divinum*; and to believe that God has thus enjoined it, because its right observance is essential to the healthy culture of the soul. Well; Lutheranism believes that all sacred days of divine authority are as utterly abrogated as the new-moon-sacrifices; that "to sabbatize is to Judaize"; and Lutheranism very diligently "shows its faith by its works." Take this sample from Luther's "Table Talk." "If anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day's sake, if anywhere any one sets up its observance on a Jewish foundation, then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast on it, to do anything that shall remove this encroachment on Christian liberty." When their holiest man can so insolently reject God's ordinance, the common-sense of the reader will suggest how much improvement is like to be made of the Lord's day by average Lutherans.

The evangelical Christian accordingly recognises the spiritual atmosphere of these great centres of learning as *fearfully cold*. One index of this is, that American students of divinity around them, although sufficiently masters of the language to attend German lectures, feel themselves instinctively drawn to set up separate preaching. Devotional meetings are rare. Sunday is, to most, merely a holiday. The average University student is heard to boast, not seldom, that he has not entered a church for a year, and hopes not to do so until his marriage, when he will have to enter it once more. But he is none the less a baptized and confirmed member of the Lutheran Church. The state of church attendance tells the whole story, as to the spiritual atmosphere. Berlin now has more than one million one hundred thousand people. It has about thirty-two Protestant places of worship, of which many are very small, and scarcely any have a full attendance. Göttingen is a little city of twenty thousand.

Its University has about seventy professors and one thousand students. In the whole town and University are four places of Protestant worship—two of which are small. The "University Church" has *one sermon a fortnight* during the sessions. On a good day one may see there from fifteen to twenty-five young men, who may pass for students (or may be, in part, genteel merchants' clerks). The theological department counts from eighty to a hundred students! Where are these on Sunday morning? "In the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg an inquiry was made in 1854 into the condition of the Lutheran Church, and it was found that no service had been held in the head churches for 228 times, because there had been no congregations."* No one has drawn this picture in darker colors than the evangelical divine, Christlieb, of Bonn. He says: † "There are large parishes in Berlin and Hamburg where, according to recent statistics, only from one to two per cent. of the population are regular church-goers. Elsewhere it is somewhat better. But speaking of Germany in general, we may say that in the larger towns the proportion seldom exceeds nine or ten per cent., and in the majority of cases it is far lower." In fact, the general aspect of Protestant Germany, on the Lord's day, is prevalently that of a civilised pagan country like China. The bulk of the population does not enter God's house, but does go to places of amusement. The only marked religious activity in the larger part of Germany (there are happy *oases* of spiritual fruitfulness, like Elberfeld), is among the Papists. Their churches are thronged; and during the hours of mass the worshippers remind one of a busy swarm of bees about their hive. The contrast is, to the Protestant, most mortifying.

The inferences which the practical mind must draw from this picture are two: the spiritual atmosphere is not one in which we should expect evangelical views to flourish; and the fruits of German theological criticism in its own country are not such as to encourage its dominancy here. While German scholarship has been busy with its labors, it has suffered almost a whole nation to lapse into a semi-heathenish condition. It has had

*Edinb. Rev., Oct., 1880, p. 274. †Mod. Doubt. and Chr. Belief, p. 27.

Popery within the reach of its arm ever since the end of the "thirty years' war" (Peace of Westphalia, 1648), and has won nothing against it. Tried by its works, German divinity is found wanting.

4. The writings of the Rationalistic schools betray this spiritual blight in a defect which the living believer must ever regard as a cardinal one. This is the failure to appreciate, and to weigh at all, that class of internal evidences for the gospel and for the doctrines of grace which is presented in the correspondence between them and the experiences and convictions of the gracious soul. This is, indeed, the vital, the invaluable evidence. The class of criticisms alluded to know nothing of it. They dissect the Evangelists, Epistles, and Prophets, just as they do Homer or the Vedas. They have never felt that declaration of our Saviour: "The words which I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." The response which is made by the profoundest intuitions of the human heart and conscience, quickened by the Spirit, to these lively oracles, immediately avouching them as the words of the Creator of the human soul, is unnoticed by these critics. They propose to settle the authenticity or falsehood of the records by antiquarian processes only, similar to those by which Niebuhr proposed to test the legends of early Rome, or Wolf, the genuineness of the Homeric Epics.

5. The sober and practical mind finds the best argument of the real value of this species of discussion in its history. Let us glance over a small part of it. The time was when Rosenmüller and Kuinoel were ranked as marvels of critical acumen and learning. Now, the mention of their special conclusions excites a smile, and their works are obsolete. In the latter part of the last century, Semler led off in what was then the new school of Rationalism, explaining away everything in the sacred records which transcended human conception. To-day, while there are plenty in Germany who hold to his sceptical results, none follow or believe in his criticism. He was first *Professor of Theology in*, and at last head of, the divinity-school of Halle. Eichhorn was a famous professor of Oriental Languages and Literature at Göttingen, up to 1827. He also is a disbeliever in all

the supernatural, and explains all the miracles of the Bible as natural events. The book of Isaiah he regarded as entirely unauthentic—the product of a plurality of writers put together at random.

DeWette was theological professor in the University of Basle. He is usually regarded as the founder of the historico-critical school in Germany, which was, though less extreme than the Tübingen school, tinged largely with Rationalism. He does not believe that the Chronicles are Scripture, or that the Apostle Paul wrote Ephesians or 1st Timothy. The latter he rejects, because it has un-Pauline phrases, and because it portrays a too advanced state of the Gnostic heresy for Paul's day, and a church government too mature. In these points he has been utterly refuted by Bunsen's Hippolytus.

Paulus, professor of theology at Heidelberg, 1811, was a thorough Rationalist, who "sat down to examine the Bible with the profound conviction that everything in it represented as supernatural, was only natural, or fabulous; and that *true criticism* consisted in endeavoring to prove this."

Baur (Ferd. Chr.) was professor of Protestant theology at Tübingen from 1826 to 1860. He is usually regarded as the founder of the "Tübingen school," which arrogates to itself the name of "*the critical*." He has been both represented and contradicted by his pupils and successors, Volkmar, Keim, Hilgenfeld, etc. Its principles may be said to be two: that nothing supernatural can ever have really occurred; and that the Christianity of the first age was from the first divided by two hostile and contradictory schools, the *Petrine*, and the *Pauline*. For this notable hypothesis the only tangible pretext is the narrative of Gal. ii. 11 to 16. The advocates of the two doctrines had, he thinks, each their Gospels, compiled to suit their views; and the later Gospels, especially John's, were forged to smooth over this fatal breach and hush up the squabble, long after the deaths of the men whose names they bear. Hence, the source of the materials used for these pious frauds must be guessed. The guess of Baur and Volkmar is, that at first there was a brief writing of somebody, possibly the Evangelist Matthew, strictly

Petrine (or Judaizing) in tenor. Somebody on the Pauline, or Liberal side, got up a life of Christ in Luke's name. Of this the Luke now in our Bibles is a later rehash and expansion. Then, somebody, to make weight against this fuller Luke, about A. D. 134, wrote the book which now passes by the name of Matthew. And after this somebody forged the Gospel of Mark, as it now stands, in order to smooth over this ugly Petrine and Pauline difference, and give homogeneity to the Christian scheme. Then, finally, about 170 A. D., still another forger wrote a Gospel, with the object of completing this amalgamation, and affixed the Apostle John's name to it. But Baur's pupil, Hilgenfeld, supposes Matthew was completed first, then Mark, and then Luke. Köstlin thinks there was first a Mark, then Matthew, then another Mark, then Luke. Ewald, once at Tübingen, but later at Göttingen, teaches that there was (1) a Gospel of Philip; (2) some *Logia* or speeches of Jesus, of unknown authorship; (3) a short biography ascribed to Mark; (4) an anonymous Gospel; (5) the Matthew now in our Bibles; (6, 7, 8) three short writings of unknown authors, detailing incidents of Christ's early years, of which there is no extant remains or proof, but of which Ewald speaks as confidently as though he had them in his hand.

But an anonymous critic of this Tübingen school cuts the matter short. The "Anonymous Saxon" concludes that the fourth Gospel was the work of John, but that it is wholly unreliable and false. His theory is, compared with the learned Ewald's, refreshing for its simplicity. It is that John did his own lying.

Would the reader see a specimen of the "criticism" on which the date of John's Gospel is settled by this school? Hilgenfeld argues, that John omits the circumstance that Simon the Cyrenian was impressed to bear the cross for the fainting Saviour. The synoptic Gospels narrate it. But Basilides (2d cent.) made a pretext of that narrative to support his Gnostic crotchet, that the person crucified was an ordinary Jew, and not the Messiah. Therefore John's Gospel was written after Basilides! If this is argument, one might as easily prove that the Declaration of Independence was written after the fourteenth amendment.

But the admirable harmony of this criticism displays itself in the date the school assign for the forgery of John. Baur is certain it could not have been earlier than A. D. 160. Bunsen fatally refuted him in his Hippolytus. Zeller places it at 150. Hilgenfeld 130 to 140. Keim in A. D. 130. More recent examinations by Luthardt, of Leipzig, of the orthodox school, refute the whole of them, and demonstrate the genuineness of the Gospel as work of the Apostle John in the first century. Bunsen even carries it up to as early a date as A. D. 60-65.

Schenkel, in his sketch of the life of Jesus, undertakes to construct a biography of the Saviour, wholly omitting the supernatural powers, by the violent supposition that the Gospels were later works, embodying a number of superstitious legends of the early Christians. But David Fr. Strauss, crowned this work by his "Life of Jesus," fashioned on the mythical hypothesis. This learned professor of divinity studied for a time at Tübingen. He was elected divinity professor at Zurich, (Switzerland), but by a popular *émeute*, prevented from taking his chair, though he continued for the rest of his life to draw a part of his salary. He married an actress, from whom he was afterwards divorced. The use he made of the leisure subsidised by this Christian annuity was to publish a second "Life of Jesus" more antichristian than the first; and at last to carry his anti-supernatural position to its consistent extent—*atheism*. His last work adopts the evolutionism of Huxley and Hæckel, denies the existence of soul and God, and makes man a helpless subject of mechanical fate. The English reader may see a full, moderate, and intelligent account of these speculations in the 6th, 7th, and 8th Lectures of Christlieb's "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief."

Now, the purpose of this bird's-eye-view is not to attempt a refutation in this place of any of these conclusions. The reader is only requested to note the following facts. Each of these mutually destructive speculations has been advanced by theologians. Each has had in Germany a large following, and has claimed to be the final result of sound investigation. Each has been superseded in its turn; and while a virtually infidel result is still reached, the old methods are discarded for some newer

hypothesis. None of them has been able to do what the old orthodox doctrine of inspiration has always done, retain the hearty and permanent confidence of a mass of Christians great in numbers, respectable in learning, and venerable for character.

Another trait of this part of the German theology is its submission to the sway of successive schools of philosophy. One century has witnessed the triumph of Kant's, of Schelling's, of Fichte's, of Hegel's system; and the death of all of them. To-day one must look out of Germany for learned Hegelians, the last of the schools mentioned, and the unorthodox philosophy of Germany to-day sways towards the opposite extreme from Idealism, that of Materialism. But it has been the weakness of the popular German theologians to mould their creeds into the forms of these unsubstantial and fleeting philosophies. A. Feuerbach, following Hegel, as he supposes, reduces God to the mere objectified reflex of his own consciousness. A pious and eloquent Schleiermacher imbues his whole system with idealistic pantheism.

The unhealthiness of the theological atmosphere is revealed also in a way still more painful and significant by the foibles of the so-called orthodox. What name is more venerated by Americans than that of the sainted Tholuck, the beloved theologian of Halle? But even he charges the Apostle Paul with making "a false construction." He seems to confess that, on Rom. ix. 17, he intimated that the apostle had misrepresented Exod. ix. 16, (Septuagint,) "because he believed he could in that way better refute the Calvinistic view." (Haldane on Rom., pp. 741, 742, Ed. of 1870.) Tholuck's Semi Pelagianism, and his utter unconsciousness of man's natural state of ungodliness and enmity to God, seemed to have perverted his view of the Epistle to the Romans. Again, the pious Neander seems to give the weight of his assent to that deficient theory of inspiration, which makes it only an elevation of the prophet's own rational consciousness. A Bunsen (Hippolytus, Vol. I., p. 10,) declares with passion that the cloven tongues of fire at Pentecost were only lightning flashes from a thunder cloud, and flouts the idea that the twelve really spoke in unknown tongues. Meyer, the so-called conservative,, the vaunted bulwark on the orthodox side,

began his career an Arian. He seems to have gotten no further than *Homoiousianism*, admitting that Christ has a nature *like his Father's*. But he admits that his divinity would be proved by 1 Tim. iii. 16, *were the Epistle only genuine*. He teaches that man has two souls, the *ψυχή* and the *πνεῦμα*. He holds the Gnostic doctrine, that sin resides in the "corporeo-psychical" part of man's constitution, and that the *πνεῦμα* is only trammelled by it like an unwilling but chained captive. His theology is distinctly Semi-Pelagian. He declares that Paul borrowed the allegory of Hagar from the Rabbins, and holds that he was sincere, but erroneous, in thus arguing. "If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

6. Why is it that men of undoubted learning and diligence thus pursue speculations so convicted by the result of evanescence and futility? The more profound solution has doubtless been given in our picture of the State Church and its results. Another solution is to be sought in the defects of the German system of University education. These are so great that, after conceding all the praise these Universities deserve, we cannot but ascribe the main credit of German scholarship to the *Gymnasia*. In the Universities there is no regimen exacting diligence in study. There is no roll call; and a student need not even present his body with any punctuality in any lecture room. But if his body is there, absolutely no means are used to secure the exertion of his mind. The University professor never asks questions, never holds any recitation. With the most of his students he most probably never speaks one word on the subject he teaches, and may remain utterly ignorant whether the man before him is an idiot, or is mentally rejecting every item of instruction he offers him. Unless the student is a candidate for a degree, he is not even examined at the end of the session or the course. The excuse for this fatal neglect is, that the student has had enough of this species of drill in the *Gymnasium*, so that now it is sufficient for him to have the lecturer's example and guidance in the work of study. But this plea is wholly inadequate. The mere lecturer maintains only a one-sided relation to his pupils' minds. If they listen, they may learn his mind; but he never

learns theirs. Every mind has its own idiosyncrasy, out of which arise its own peculiar weaknesses, wants, and misapprehensions. The experience of the writer as a teacher of Bachelors of Arts, in studies properly post-graduate and of a university grade, who may be presumed to bring to their work at least as much mental discipline as the lads from a German *Gymnasium*, confirms this view. This experience proves that lectures without recitations would leave his students only half-taught. All but a few would carry away the queerest possible half-views and misconceptions of the doctrines enounced to them. The recitation, the personal dealing, the detection of the individual's peculiarity, the testing and correcting of his apprehension of the ideas delivered to him, are worth more than the lecture. Consequently, the one-sided instruction must result in a one-sided culture. Is not this the solution of that feature of the German mind, that, while the memory is stored with such a multitude of facts, the logical power remains so inaccurate, and the mind is so often the victim of its own hobbies?

There is another feature which presents an instance of the law that human imperfection permits no good to exist without its evil, even as there can be no tree without its shadow. The great division of labor in the German Universities has been spoken of, with its grand advantage of enabling scholars to pursue the *minutiæ* of scholarship at their leisure. But hence result the known evils of *specialism*. Judicious medical men have recognised it. The specialist, who devotes all his mind to the study and medical treatment of a particular set of nerves, acquires, of course, an amount of knowledge and dexterity about them beyond the attainment of the finest general practitioner. But unless this specialist is a very wise and self-restrained man, he gains this at the expense of one-sidedness of mind; he becomes overweening in his thinking; he makes his set of nerves his pet crotchet; he exaggerates their influence, until his judgment in pathology becomes weak and even absurd. Doubtless there is too much specialism in German erudition; and, hence, while the pursuit of particular branches is thorough beyond that of any

other scholars, the views of truth are not well coördinated, and the scientific judgment is infirm.

There is reason, also, to believe that the overweening applause so long given to German scholarship has borne its natural fruit, undue inflation of the applauded. It is not asserted that there are no men in their learned circles who pursue a cosmopolitan learning; but certainly the general result is that their scholars consider Germany sufficient unto herself. Their boast is, that Germany is "the schoolmistress of the world." They feel that they can give to all, but have need to borrow of none. The best recent efforts of learning and study in other countries remain usually unnoticed by them and discounted from their appreciation. A German theologian, for instance, when told that the American students are waiting with eagerness for the final work of Dr. Ph. Dorner, complacently accepts it as perfectly natural and proper, as much so as that one should "go to Newcastle for coals." But when one mentions the final work of the American Dorner, Dr. Charles Hodge, the exceedingly learned man, who has read the Vedas, and is deep in the latest Sanscrit and the most recondite German discussions of Egyptology, knows nothing of Hodge. He feels that for him to read any other than German scholarship would be more like "carrying coals to Newcastle." An exception to this contemptuous discounting of all the rest of the world exists in favor of a few British and American authors. These are men who studied in Germany, who have continued their correspondence with the German scholars, and who make a boast of retaining in those foreign lands the German methods. A few such scholars, Professor Max Müller, Professor Robertson Smith, for instance, receive some recognition, because in smiling on them, Germany is still, in a sense, exalting herself.

If the late Dr. J. Addison Alexander may be believed, there was still another exception to be noted in his day. In the last conversation the writer had with him, (June, 1856,) the character of the English scholarship of the 17th and 18th centuries was mentioned, at once thoroughly modest, and honest. The works of Prideaux were mentioned as fine specimens of historical re-

search, exhaustive in their learning, and yet plain, perspicuous, and modest in their method. Dr. Alexander replied about in these words: "I am extremely glad to hear you say so; because such is just my estimate of those scholars. And I will tell you, what you, who are so much younger than I am, and who have not been in Germany, as I have been, are not in a position to know so well as I do. That is, that these Germans, with all their affectation of ignoring British learning, sometimes make a quiet use, nevertheless, of these old scholars, as convenient quarries to dig ready material out of which they use without acknowledging. You have mentioned Prideaux. Now, it is singular, that there is a late German work, very pretentious, on that part of the ancient church history, which has almost made its fortune out of plagiarisms from Prideaux." This is given on the authority of Dr. Alexander solely.

1. But the worst literary influence remains to be explained. As the German university is actually administered by its teachers, its "final clause" is not to communicate knowledge to pupils, but, to manufacture professors. The professor does not lecture so much for the purpose of teaching the ascertained and recognised body of his science—the student is presumed to have gotten that already, in the *Gymnasium*, or by his own reading—the prelection is rather designed to set him a pattern of the methods of new research in the outworks of the science. The aspirant is perpetually taught that to get into the line of promotion, he must "do new work;" which means, that he must make some addition, not known before, to the science which he has adopted as his speciality. The test of ability is not the man's capacity to acquire an intelligent, perspicuous knowledge of the science, however thorough and extensive. Nor is it to be able to make useful applications of the principles of the science, already established, for the benefit of mankind. Nor is to be able to teach the whole known science effectively to other minds. All this is not enough. The aspirant must "do new work." He must also evince independent powers of research or invention by extending his science in some quarter not explored before, however minute, or merely curious and trivial. Hence, "Do new work" is a sort of *shib-*

boleth with them. The "dissertation," which introduces the candidate to the privilege of an examination for an honorary degree, must profess to "do new work." When the young aspirant has become a "*privat dozent*," his main hopes of promotion and a salary repose on his getting the name of having "done new work." When he becomes at last a "professor extraordinary," his prospect of elevation to the rank of a full professor depends still on his "doing new work." One peculiarity of the German University is, that this "*professor ausserordentlich*," or assistant professor, is not really the assistant of his senior, but his rival. He may have a miserable pittance of salary; but he has the privilege of lecturing on any part of the course he pleases; on the very same parts his senior is lecturing on, at the same time; and instead of following, he may move abreast of, or in advance of him. It is supposed that this license stimulates both senior and assistant, and keeps them both diligent and pushing. It certainly stimulates the assistant; for he is grasping up after his "bread and butter." Hence, it is not unknown that the superior shall lecture to six or seven students, and his assistant to forty or sixty. And the case is probably found to be this: that the old, superior professor is still delivering the same course which, twenty years before, made him *Magnus Apollo* in the University, and delivering it with all the increased efficiency derived from experience in teaching and successive re-explorations of his ground; while his assistant is "doing new work." The senior has done his "new work," a few years ago. Probably it was really important work, constituting really grand extensions in the domains of his science; possibly it was work so valuable, that it really left little except the gleanings of trifles in that sphere of science for those who come after him; but, alas for this senior! it is no longer "new work" to day. And so, his students pronounce that he is no longer "fresh." They forsake him for his young aspiring assistant, who is "doing new work"; the new work, namely, of whittling and polishing some little angle of the science which his senior had left "in the rough," and which is never going to be anything more than a curious trivialty after it is polished. And the enthusiastic young gentlemen fancy that

they are mastering the body of the science, because they are assisting so zealously in this polishing of the useless angle; when, in fact, what they need is, to be studying the old work, which is not fresh, so as to ground themselves in the rudiments of their science.

The consequences of this system are in part admirable. It begets in a numerous body of young aspirants a restless, if an innovating, activity in research. A multitude of minds are pushing the outer boundaries of knowledge in every direction. In the physical sciences, which partake of the almost boundless variety of their subject-nature, and in antiquarian researches, where the documents are so numerous, this plan may work well. The young man who would teach mineralogy, or chemistry, or botany, or electricity, cannot indeed hope to add a whole province to the domain of his science, like a Davy, a Franklin, or a Linnæus. But he may hope to construct some acid or neutral salt never combined before, and give it a learned name; or to detect, analyse, and classify a few weeds or mosses which the books had not before recorded. Nor should these minute industries in the scientific field be wholly despised; for it may be, that in some future induction, which really leads to important truth, the little facts may bear a useful part. No one can predict.

But obviously, the results of this system are far from healthy in the spheres of philosophy and (especially) revealed theology. The facts and *data* with which the philosopher can properly deal are limited; they can properly include only those contents of consciousness which are common to sane men. That is all. Hence, when this imperious injunction is still imported into philosophy, that the aspirant in this branch of study must "do new work," or else remain an underling, with no professorship, no honor, no fame, and very little "bread and butter," he is placed under violently unhealthy influences. What can he do? He can only innovate: he can only attack existing doctrines; and if it happens that the existing doctrines are already settled aright, he must unsettle them to get them wrong. Let us suppose, for example, that the venerable Dr. Archibald Alexander, while

teaching in Princeton that beautiful course of elementary ethics which is left to us in his little volume of "Moral Science," was condemned, according to the German system, to have under him this "Professor Ausserordentlich," with the privilege, not of assisting, but of rivalling his senior, with a starveling salary of \$250 per annum, and a nice young lady in some New Jersey church, betrothed to him some five or seven years ago, with no chance of marriage under present circumstances. This young gentleman is told that his getting a full post and salary in some younger western seminary, (as the Alleghany or Chicago,) depends on his "doing new work" in his department. It will not be enough for him, adopting the system of his venerable senior, to add some more resources of diligence in illustrating it and successful perspicuity in teaching it. This is not really "doing new work." It does not evince original, creative, philosophic talent. Let us suppose, again, that the ethical philosophy of Dr. Alexander is the true one. We now have precisely the German conditions. Unless the assistant professor is almost miraculously a saint, of course he gets a "bee in his bonnet." He can only rise by differing substantively from his senior's philosophy. But that is the right philosophy. Then he must rise by inventing a false one, and by exerting his learning and ingenuity to make the false one look like the truth.

But it is when this law is virtually applied to the student of theology that it works the most deadly mischief. Here, as we believe, is a divine science. Its whole *data* are given to us in revelation, and are therefore limited and definite in number, and immutable, because infallible in character. There can be but one right system. All others, so far as they vary from this, are wrong. There is, indeed, much scope for exegetical diligence. But this continued exegetical labor can never introduce substantial modification into a single essential member or relation of the system: it can only add the lesser, and as the industry proceeds, increasingly minute, confirmations to the main results accepted from the first by true believers. Here is a vital distinction, which is more and more overlooked in days of pretended "progress." And the proof of its justice is this: that the re-

vealed code, containing all these *data* of the science of redemption, was avowedly and expressly given by God to the common people, with the pledge that it was sufficient to give them the infallible knowledge of salvation; and the qualifications required for its right apprehension were not any antiquarian learnings and sciences of criticism, to be acquired in the future development of civilisation, but an obedient heart and spiritual discernment given in answer to believing prayer. John vii. 17; xvi. 13 and 23; James i. 5; 1st Epistle of John ii. 27, etc., etc. In short, that revealed theology *cannot be a progressive science*, is proved by this short argument. It was equally given by its Author to save sinners of the first century of the Christian era, and of the last. He declares that it saves by its truth, and by the reception of its truth alone. If then, the system by which we are to be saved in the last age is the result of a progression in science, it could not have been a system to save the sinners of the first age.

Hence, when the injunction to "do new work" is thrust upon the theologian, it is almost a direct incentive to heretical innovation. The *animus* which this trait of the German erudition has imported into theological study, is poisonous to orthodoxy. It begets an endless and ever restless spirit of innovation. To the current inquiring mind, the doctrines which are accepted and established are presumptively obnoxious because they are accepted. The Protestant principle is that nothing is to command our faith merely because supported by human prescription. Educated Germany is prone to push the truth to this extreme: that because a proposition happens to be supported by the prescription of the day, therefore it is not to be believed.

When the influence of this usage is properly appreciated, the American Christian becomes aware that he has been under a species of hallucination in attaching any serious significance to this species of critical and theological speculations. Devout and evangelical men among us are, of course, "in dead earnest" in handling the topics of redemption. They believe that it is by these topics immortal souls are to live or perish forever. Through these topics the holiest attributes of God, and the most sacred

compassions of the incarnate Saviour, receive their manifestation. We remember that there is an ever-present responsibility resting on all who touch them, for the manner in which they handle them. Hence, it is hard for us to apprehend the footing which doctrines, and facts concerning the sacred writings, hold in these minds as merely interesting antiquarian subjects for an intellectual sword play. The Rationalists are, of course, not oblivious of the ephemeral life of the previous speculations of their comrades. They know that the usual term of their life is not more than a generation; and as all the previous ones have had their day and died, there is a tacit understanding that the ones they are studying will have the same fate. To the resident in Germany, there is, as men say, a "feeling in the air," that no one regards these critical theories as final. This admission betrays itself in a hundred hints. One inquires, for instance, whether a given great man is a leading power in his department of literature. The answer is: "Oh, not now: he has been before the German public too long. Blank is now the coming man" (mentioning a younger celebrity). Does one ask why, if the writings of the first were true and just, they should not continue to lead the mind of the country, inasmuch as Truth is never old? The answer is a shrug, and the remark, "Why, his last great work has been out twenty years!" The new contribution is recognised with favor, not as destined to establish final conclusions, but as furnishing a new scholarly theme, as creditable to German erudition, and as placing a literary comrade in the way of promotion.

In a word, much of this writing is the literary "student's duel." The young German of fashion is the model of military courtesy, and member of a fashionable university *corps*. He fights two or three duels per session with gentlemen of other *corps*, with whom he has not the shadow of a quarrel, and with whom he will be thoroughly warm and cordial at the next "kneiper." He seeks to slash him with his sword, and shed his blood (in a mild way). Now should this antagonist take his discomfiture *au grand sérieux*, and pursue his quarrel, after the fashion of the British or American duelist—with real deadly in-

tent—the men of fashion would view this as clear proof of lack of breeding, almost of lack of civilisation. So when German *literati* learn that we take their attacks on the Scriptures and the doctrines of grace in this solemn way, they are affected with a somewhat similar sentiment. It is a combination of amusement and disgust; our making a life-and-death affair of them is an index of “deficient culture,” indeed of a state of very imperfect civilization. It proves that we have not experienced the liberalising influences of letters which educate a man out of intolerance. Had we the full German culture, we should be too courteous and tolerant to “contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints;” we should not allow a consideration so prosaic as that “there is only one name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved,” to obstruct the freedom of learned inquiry.

8. Our indictment against the spirit of this theology then is, that it tends to unsettle everything, and settle nothing. It has mistaken license of mind for liberty of mind. It claims the privilege of pursuing the Protestant freedom, “to prove all things and hold fast that which is good”; but it perverts that right to a questioning of good things, which results in the holding fast to nothing. It is said that the truly philosophic method is to question every position in our beliefs, and that this is a duty which one man cannot do for another more than he can eat and breathe for him, so that even the most fundamental and settled dictates of belief shall be held subject to debate by each new comer. It is sneeringly asked: Would you have the pastors of the Church especially, hold their creeds on ignorant prescription? Shall they preach dogmas as Bible truths only because a Synod, confessedly not inspired, said three hundred years ago, that the Bible taught them?

 We reply, Of course not. But let it be supposed that possibly that Synod was right; that the canonical Scriptures are God’s Word; and that the creed formulated by the Synod from them is the meaning of God in them. If, on the one hand, the “say so” of this naughty thing, a Synod, does not prove this true, neither does it prove it untrue. Suppose, now, for argument’s sake, the Synod true. How then will this universal right and

duty of free inquiry combine with that fact in the results? This question reveals at a touch the shallow and impertinent sophism. Does this right of free inquiry take the form of a right to reject the truth, and that on the ground that some good men, before us, in the legitimate exercise of this same right, ascertained that truth for us? Hardly! In the case supposed then, the individual right of free inquiry resolves itself simply into this: the right (and duty) of embracing heartily and intelligently the truths given to us. That is all. The sophistical assumption in this innovating criticism is, that this individual right can only be fully exercised by differing from all previous uninspired results. But this would be true only on the supposition that all previous results must be erroneous, because uninspired. If this were true, then all the exertions of these last (uninspired) critics are thereby shown to be thoroughly impertinent. How baseless the theory is, appears from a simple *dilemma*. Either this method of criticism and free speculation is not a method for the ascertainment of truth; or it is. If it is not, it is worthless, and the sooner we have done with it, the better. If it is, then it leads to the permanent establishment of truths. Therefore the Protestants who come after these critics can no longer exercise their freedom of inquiry without claiming a license to *criticise and reject Truth!* Any other science of ascertained truth may offer us good and sufficient instances. The teacher of geometry does not inhibit free thought. He does not teach the conclusions of his science by dictation, but he knows that the right exercise of free thought by his pupils will inevitably lead to their reädoption of the same old theorems taught ever since Euclid. How is this? Because they are clearly true. Ah, but this is an exact science; a science of absolute truth, says one. Let another instance be taken, then. The German antiquary teaches his pupils, that Dionysius, Paul's convert in Athens, *did not write* the "Celestis Hierarchia." He by no means teaches this by mere dictation. He invites his pupils to the fullest freedom of inquiry. But he expects them inevitably to reädopt his conclusion.

But it is pleaded that the human mind is an imperfect instru-

ment of cognition, and this imperfection cleaves, in some degree, to its most fundamental exercises. Hence, it is argued, the only way to secure accurate knowledge is to hold all conclusions, even the foundation ones of the science studied, subject to reëxamination and possible modification, by every student. This conception implies, that the only way to build the temple of truth securely, is for each builder to relay for himself all the stones, including the foundation stones. Another proposition is far more certain: that if everybody is to be continually moving the bottom stones, no temple of truth can be built at all for anybody. Each builder should, indeed, acquaint himself intelligently with those foundation stones, (as with all above them in the wall,) but not for the purpose of moving them. He acquaints himself with them for the purpose of approving their position, and satisfying himself they are in the right place. This overweening critical spirit overlooks an all-important truth, that the attainments of sound, healthy research are cumulative. The results of the mental labor of previous generations should count for something. Some things should get settled by the progress of knowledge. Truths ascertained in one way reflect their light of evidence on other truths; so that these latter become perfectly clear in their certainty, and are most thoroughly settled for the most enlightened and just-minded men. There is no theory which is really more dishonoring to the rights of the human intellect, than this innovating criticism, for its tendency is to mark all the efforts of men, continually, with practical futility. It seems to say, that man's intelligence is never to attain conclusive results. If this were indeed so, we see not how such a faculty is worthy of rights to any prerogative, or any freedom.

When we see the rationalistic theology and criticism, then, perpetually announcing new results, we ask: Have any new and important *data* been discovered, such as justify the laying anew of the foundations? Have any more primitive documents been discovered? What are they? The Moabite stone, the Rosetta stone, with the readings of Egyptian monuments deduced therefrom. The cuneiform remains in Mesopotamia. The Sinai MS. of the Scriptures, found by Tischendorf, the lost work of

Hippolytus of Portus (if we may trust Bunsen). But every one of these are favorable, and only favorable, to the old conclusions as to the canon and text of Scripture, so far as they touch the subject at all. Have any new lights of importance been thrown upon dates or the genuineness of patristic writings since the era of Cave, Bentley, and the other great critics who settled the estimation of this literature? Have any testimonies as to the Canon been unearthed more authoritative than those of Caius and Eusebius? None. *The materials* remain substantially as they were, when the renewed and exhaustive research of a Hug, an Alexander, and a Sampson, made a final settlement for fair minds of the Canon. But the new criticism goes on, shuffling its pack of cards over and over, without any ground, making its new deals of pretended conclusions, which have nearly as much fortuity, and as little authority, as the deals of the fortune-teller's cards.

But it is claimed that, though the materials remain substantially the same, the advance of philology has given a new *apparatus* of exposition, and the methods of the new criticism place the *data* in new lights.

No one can be readier than the writer to recognise every collateral ray of light thrown on exegesis by philology with gratitude. But the recent beams are, compared with the great flood thrown by the Reformed exegetes of the previous ages, slender side lights, and they are in the main confirmatory of the old orthodox methods and conclusions. To say that modern philology has furnished any grounds for revolutionising exegesis, is simply a boastful misrepresentation. Let *Winer* be taken as the most illustrious example. His Rationalism was probably so entire as to create for him the conditions of a complete grammatical equity and impartiality, by means of his very indifference to the doctrines extracted from the text. It made no difference to his prejudices or feelings whether the Scriptures were so interpreted as to teach Calvinism or Semi-Pelagianism, since to him they were no inspired authority for anything. Hence, he could investigate their grammatical laws with the same equanimity as those of Tyrtaeus or Pindar. What has been the result? That the

principles of his grammatical constructions give the same conclusions in exegesis usually reached in Calvin's. In the minuter details and accomplishments of exegesis, he completes Calvin's exegetical results, in a few cases he differs from him, usually not for the better.

As for the methods of the new internal criticism, we meet the claim by a direct denial of their correctness. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Their most pungent condemnation is from their clashing results in the hands of their own advocates. On such critical premises an ingenious man might prove almost anything about any authentic writing. A much more plausible argument could be made to prove that the history of the first Napoleon is mythical (as Archbishop Whateley showed), than that the Gospels of Jesus are mythical. One maxim of the common-sense of mankind contains a refutation of the most of these criticisms: that "Truth is often stranger than fiction."

Only one of these so-called critical principles—one now exceedingly fashionable—will be mentioned in conclusion.

Protestant expositors have always admitted the utility of learning all that is possible of the personality of the human penman of the inspired document, of his times, education, opinions, modes of thought, idiosyncrasy of language, and nationality. Why? Because it is possible that any of these, when authentically known, may throw a side light, usually a dim one, on the interpretation of his words. But now, this obvious old admission is travestied and reappears in this form: that the human author's ascertained doctrinal "standpoint" is to dictate our construction of his inspired writing. And this, sometimes, when the doctrinal standpoint is the one he held before his conversion to the gospel! Clearly, this principle begs the whole question of that writer's inspiration. On the orthodox theory of inspiration, that the Holy Spirit, using the man as his *amanuensis*, did not suppress the human element of thought and style, but directed it infallibly to the giving of the form of expression designed by God for the composition, the penman's personal traits would naturally appear in the verbal *medium* of the divine thought. But even then, they would not be allowed to vitiate the perfect truth

of that thought. But to say that the propositions themselves were the results of the human writer's education and opinions, is simply to say that he had no inspiration. If the sacred writers claimed inspiration, and sufficiently attested the truth of the claim, then this theory of exposition is naught.

R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE V.

OUR SCHEMES OF BENEVOLENCE—SHALL THEY
BE REVOLUTIONISED?

Much controversy has been stirred up in the Church of late in relation to the character and management of our schemes of benevolence, brought about chiefly by the Reports submitted to the last Assembly on "Retrenchment and Reform," and now laid before the churches by order of the Assembly for their consideration. As there are great principles, as well as serious misconceptions, involved in the discussion, and as the future welfare of the Church and the cause of truth and righteousness alike are to be affected by its results, it becomes a matter of grave importance to look carefully both into the constitution and the practical working of these schemes.

The following is the form of the constitution adopted by the General Assembly, at the organisation of the Church, for the management of the Foreign Missionary work. The same principles were applied to all the other schemes of benevolence, so that they all rest on the same general basis. The constitution consists of three brief articles with a preamble, and is as follows :

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS.

Resolved, 1. That this General Assembly proceed to appoint an Executive Committee with its proper officers, to carry on this work, and that the character and functions of this Committee be comprised in the following articles as its constitution, viz.:

“Art. I. This Committee shall be known as the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America. It shall consist of a Secretary, who shall be styled the Secretary of Foreign Missions, and who shall be the Committee’s organ of communication with the Assembly and with all portions of the work intrusted to this Committee, a Treasurer, and nine other members, three of whom at least shall be Ruling Elders, or Deacons, or private members of the Church, all appointed annually by the General Assembly, and shall be directly amenable to it for the faithful and efficient discharge of the duties intrusted to its care. Vacancies occurring *ad interim*, it shall fill, if necessary.

“Art. II. It shall meet once a month, or oftener if necessary, at the call of the Chairman or Secretary; five members may constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. It may enact By Laws for its government, the same being subject to the revisal and approval of the General Assembly.

“Art. III. It shall be the duty of the Executive Committee to take direction and control of the Foreign Missionary work, subject to such instructions as may be given by the General Assembly from time to time; to appoint missionaries and assistant missionaries; to designate their fields of labor, and provide for their support; to receive the reports of the Secretary and Treasurer, and to give such directions in relation to their respective duties as may seem necessary; to authorise appropriations and expenditures of money, including the salaries of officers, to communicate to the Churches from time to time such information about the missionary work as may seem important to be known, and to lay before the General Assembly from year to year, a full report of the whole work and of their receipts and expenditures, together with their books of minutes for examination.

“Resolved, 2. That this Committee shall be located at Columbia, S. C.”

Dr. Thornwell, then fresh from a sharp controversy in the old Church about the abuse of Boards, had a share in constructing this constitution, and said at the time, as the writer personally testifies, that he was not only satisfied with it, but that everything had been secured in this constitution which he had ever contended for in the united Church. In reviewing this constitution, after the lapse of years of practical working, it is difficult to conceive how any instrument of the kind could have been made more simple in its structure, more sound in its principles, or better adapted to the circumstances and wants of our beloved Church. In the controversy going on in the Church in

relation to this matter, so far as the writer is aware, no charge has been brought either against the committees or their officers for violating any of the principles of their constitution. So far as conformity to its principles and obedience to the commands of the Assembly are concerned, both stand unchallenged before the Church. We are glad, therefore, that no personal or administrative acts are involved, so that those who are calling for "reform," are not warring with the Committees or their officers, but with the constitution of the schemes themselves.

The Church, at the time of its organisation, saw the necessity of employing committees (or commissions, as they are now more commonly called) to carry on the great work, both at home and abroad, that had devolved upon her in consequence of her new and responsible position. Similar commissions were not only being employed by all other branches of the Presbyterian brotherhood, but something of the kind was absolutely necessary to enable any of them to discharge the solemn behests that rested upon them. It is scarcely possible for a Church to carry on any kind of work outside of her own bounds, or any general work within those bounds, without the intervention of commissions. Nor is this more peculiar to the General Assembly than it is to all the lower courts, inasmuch as all of them employ commissions when it is deemed necessary. A commission has been defined to be the *hand* of the Assembly. What the Assembly does by her *hand*, she does herself. Her *hand* (*i. e.* her commission) is the instrument of executing her will in the same general sense that the human hand is the instrument of executing the human will. When a Church is carrying on a work of evangelisation in a foreign land, through the agency of a commission, she is not only doing it herself, but she is doing it in the only effectual way possible.

Our Church, in prosecuting her appropriate work, both at home and abroad, employs four distinct agencies or commissions, viz., the Executive Committee of Education; the Executive Committee of Publication; the Executive Committee of Home Missions, including its four ramifications of Sustentation, Evangelistic Work, Invalid Fund, and Church Erection; and the Ex-

ecutive Committee of Foreign Missions. These Committees consist respectively of a Secretary, a Treasurer, and nine other members, all of whom are elected annually by the General Assembly; each has a definite work assigned it, and each has to account to the Assembly from year to year for the fidelity and efficiency with which its duties have been discharged. It is evident, therefore, that there is no want of accountability on the part of any of the schemes, whatever else may be said in disparagement of them.

As the first three of the above mentioned commissions carry on all their work within the bounds of the established Church, and as they are strictly inhibited from interfering in any way with duties and functions of the regularly established courts of the Church, they have in themselves no ecclesiastical functions or powers whatever, using the term in its stricter sense.

Beyond the duty of gathering and circulating information in relation to the condition and wants of the different portions of the Church, and especially of the poorer and more destitute parts of it, they are little else than *central financial agencies* for gathering up the gifts of God's people and disbursing them so as to promote the highest interest of the whole Church, it being understood that they always act in concert with the Presbyteries and also with reference to the account of stewardship that must be rendered to the Assembly from year to year. We can think of no kind of agency more simple in its structure, more consistent with the spirit and teaching of God's word, less likely to infringe upon any of our well established ecclesiastical usages, or better adapted to promote the highest interest of the whole Church. One of the great ends of this arrangement, (which, however, seems to have been lost sight of for some years past,) is, that it is calculated to bring together all the different parts of the Church and bind them in the common bonds of unity and brotherhood. In this will be found the strength of any Church, but it is especially so in relation to our Southern Presbyterian Church. Animated by this heaven-born principle, our Church has already passed safely through dark nights and severe afflictions; and, under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, nothing more is wanting to conduct it to the

highest stage of spiritual prosperity. Our schemes of benevolence were intended and are eminently suited to promote this kindly and fraternal feeling among the different parts of the Church; and what is really needed, therefore, as it seems to the writer, is not change, readjustment, or consolidation, but a hearty, earnest, and liberal support of these schemes just as they are. Much of the blame that has been laid at the door of these Committees, is not justly chargeable to them, or to any defect in the constitution under which they act, but to the indifference of those who ought to have given them a heartier and more conscientious support. Whilst the means of efficiency are withheld, they are blamed for not being efficient. It is unreasonable in the last degree to expect a child to grow by withholding from it its necessary nourishment. Give these domestic committees the hearty and the general support which they deserve and ought to have, and which it is perfectly safe for them to have, and the consequence will be that new life, new energy, and a tenfold increase of spiritual power, will soon be imparted to the whole Church.

It was originally intended that these four schemes of benevolence should be entirely separate and independent of each other, and with this view they were located in different parts of the Church. During the war, however, there was such an upturning of affairs, that it became necessary that the four should be consolidated into two, *i. e.*, Home and Foreign Missions were united under one administration, which was located in Columbia, S. C.; whilst Education and Publication were united under another, which was located in Richmond, Va. There was a propriety in this combination at the time, inasmuch as there was but little to be done in any one of these departments during the war; but it was not intended to be a permanent arrangement. After the close of the war, and when partial prosperity was restored to the country, the writer, who was then acting as Secretary both for Home and Foreign Missions, and who had been mainly instrumental in getting the above-mentioned combination effected, insisted that all the Committees should be restored to their primitive and separate condition. The Assembly in an informal way discouraged the proposal, simply on the ground that it was premature. At a

subsequent meeting, the Secretary earnestly urged either that the Home and Foreign work should be separated, or that an associate should be appointed to aid him in carrying on this twofold work. The latter suggestion was adopted, and a coördinate Secretary was appointed, when Publication and Education were separated and were assigned to different locations. The Secretary insisted upon this measure under the deep conviction, that neither he, nor any other one man, could do full justice to both of these causes. Eight years' subsequent experience has tended only to confirm this impression. Each of these important causes needs the full time and strength of the best man that can be found to occupy the place; and one or both of these causes will certainly languish and become inefficient, if forced under one administration. We hold, at the same time, that it is nearly as important that Publication and Education should be kept distinct and apart. It is admitted that the duties of a Secretary of Education are somewhat of a routine character, and that there would be no impropriety in connecting with them a pastoral charge or some other church work. But it is absolutely necessary to the well-being, if not the permanent existence of our beloved Church, that we have a well ordered and effective system of Education. It is not a question with us now whether there are not inherent evils connected with the whole system, but whether in view of the times and circumstances in which we live it can be safely dispensed with. Some things we are compelled to do in self-defence, which we would not otherwise do. Other evangelical Churches have made ample provision for the education of young men for the ministry; and if we are without such provision, our young men will either be drawn away entirely from us, or will be trained in a way that will unfit them for acceptable and active service in our Church. But how can an effective system of Education be maintained among us? Only, so far as the writer can see, by adhering strictly to the original design of the Assembly, *i. e.*, by having the strong and weak Presbyteries stand shoulder to shoulder, the strong helping the weak, and both acting in the common bonds of brotherhood. The same applies to the cause of Publication. The times demand, as they never did before, that a wholesome religious

literature should be spread over the land, to counteract that flood of immorality and infidelity which threatens to sweep everything before it. It is no time, therefore, for us to relax our efforts in behalf of this cause. A mistake was made, we think, when the publishing department was removed from under the immediate direction of the Executive Committee, and we doubt whether the churches will ever be satisfied until it is restored. When that is done, the Secretary and the Committee will find their hands fully occupied.

But the question will be asked, Can our churches sustain all these schemes in their separate and independent character? We reply that they can; and we doubt whether there is an intelligent Christian man within our bounds who after serious reflection would take the opposite ground. We believe that it is not only possible, but that the very highest spiritual interest of the Church herself is involved in doing this very thing. The sum of \$250,000, contributed annually, would place all her schemes of work on a good and solid foundation. This would be an average contribution of \$2 per member for all of these schemes. Other evangelical churches in the land are giving twice and three times as much for the same objects; and why cannot we, if proper and systematic efforts were made, rise to this humbler standard? And should we not rather aim to stimulate our people to this noble Christ-like liberality, instead of pulling down our schemes to accommodate them to a narrow and selfish avarice?

At the same time we earnestly pray that our beloved Church may not be seduced by any specious plans for simply *saving her money*. What she needs to be taught, and what she ought to practise, is not stern economy, but more cheerful liberality in supporting the cause of her blessed Master. It is this that will bring honor to the Church herself, and will be well pleasing to her great Head. We frankly admit that watchfulness over those who are intrusted with the duty of dispensing the alms of the Church is an important responsibility; but it is equally important that this watchfulness should not degenerate into a mere capricious and fault-finding spirit. If a spirit of innovation becomes dominant among us; if fault-finding becomes a chronic com-

plaint ; if change and readjustment are perpetually insisted upon, then we can see nothing in the future but disaster. More harm may be done by substituting untried experiments in the place of well-tried schemes than can be repaired in fifty years. Our hope is that God may preserve us from all such follies.

The Committee of Foreign Missions rests upon a somewhat different basis from our domestic schemes, and our further remarks will be confined almost exclusively to this particular department of the Church's work.

The work of the Committee of Foreign Missions lying entirely beyond the bounds of the settled Church, and having for its object the establishment of Christianity where it has not before existed, or only in name, it is necessarily clothed with ecclesiastical powers. Its powers or functions, however, are strictly defined, are limited in their nature, and are temporary in duration, inasmuch as they are conferred from year to year. It comes within the scope of its powers to appoint missionaries, to designate their fields of labor, to assign to them the particular department of labor in which they are to engage, to remove them from one post of labor to another in the foreign field when circumstances demand it, make provision for the support of the missionary and his family, and all other duties of a similar character; it being understood, however, that all these functions are to be performed on the part of the Committee with considerate regard to the views and wishes of the missionary himself, and also with reference to the instructions that may be given by the appointing body. A missionary may be recalled for incompetency, for disregard of instructions, for neglect of his proper work, or other causes of a similar nature. On the other hand, the Committee has no power to ordain a man to the work of the ministry, cannot judge or try a minister for heresy or immorality, and still less has it the power to depose a man from the ministry, these being the acknowledged and exclusive functions of the Presbytery. Furthermore, a missionary, if he feels that he has been wronged by the Committee in any administrative act, has the right to appeal to the Assembly, to whom he and the Committee are alike respon-

sible, so far as the general missionary work is concerned. If the Committee fails to discharge any of its duties with efficiency and fidelity, or if it transcends its authority in exercising powers not intrusted to it, it becomes the duty of the appointing body to withdraw its commission and appoint another in its place. In view of this fact, it is hard to see how more perfect accountability could possibly be secured, or how any wrong-doing on the part of the Committee could be more speedily redressed.

In view of this brief statement about the nature and functions of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, it seems to us that the plan of the Assembly is not only the simplest, the most practicable, and the most scriptural, that could be employed, but is really almost the only way by which the work of foreign evangelisation can be carried on in the present state of the world. The plan, therefore, is not a device of human wisdom, as has been charged, but is the exercise of the highest style of wisdom, inasmuch as it is founded upon the divine authority.

Much has been said of late about going back to the apostolic times for a model; but this we shall consider in the further progress of this article.

There are one or two remarks which we propose to make in relation to the general tenor of the Minority Report, before we proceed to consider some of its more particular suggestions.

And first, the great and controlling idea which seems to pervade this Report from beginning to end is *economy*, or, more properly speaking, *money saving*. No one will raise any question about the propriety or the duty of using public funds, and especially church funds, in a frugal and economical way, a prudent regard being had, of course, to the nature of the object which it is proposed to accomplish. But economy, if permitted to degenerate into parsimony, will prove ruinous to any cause to which it may be applied. We have heard of a ship and cargo that were lost because the owner was too parsimonious to furnish the oil necessary to light the binnacle. Money may be saved by having the General Assembly meet only once in three years; by abolishing the Colored Institute; by consolidating the schemes of benevolence, and by doing away with secretaries. But the ques-

tion naturally presents itself, Will the best interests of the Church, or the best interests of those great objects which it is the chief end of the Church to promote, be thereby secured? One is almost tempted to infer from reading the Report that the writer regards it as the chief duty of the Church to *spare* the money of her people, or, what is substantially the same thing, conduct all her work on the most niggardly scale, in order to save their money, and thus save them from the necessity of giving *cheerfully* to the cause of Christ. If it is best for the General Assembly to meet only once in three years, that \$18,000.00 may thereby be saved, or because more harm than good is sometimes done by her meetings, as is stated in the Minority Report, why not fix the time of meeting at once in ten or twenty years, or, what would seem to be more consistent with the reasoning of the Report, have no meeting at all?

Something of the kind might be said in relation to almost every other item of retrenchment that has been suggested. But apart from these particular suggestions, there is, we think, a vicious principle, but perhaps not so intended by the author, running through the whole of this plan of retrenchment. It aims to conduct the work of the Church on the narrowest and most sordid scale. In other words, that what is done for the Lord must be done in a grudging manner. It takes sides with the avarice and selfishness of the human heart, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it meets with much favor. But if this narrowness becomes the prevailing feeling of the Church, and is encouraged by our Church courts, its influence will not be felt alone in connexion with our schemes of benevolence, but in every possible direction. Ministers' salaries, miserably insufficient as they are at present, will have to be brought down to a corresponding standard. Theological Seminaries will be allowed to languish, if not die out altogether, for the want of proper support. In short, all the streams of Christian benevolence will be dried up by the power of this contracted principle. But where does this narrowness find countenance in the word of God? The great Redeemer bestows all his blessings on the most munificent scale. The air we breathe, the light of the sun which cheers our world, the

showers which water the earth, the products of the soil, are all bestowed with an open and liberal hand. But far above all this the Redeemer gave HIMSELF to ransom a lost and ruined world. Where in all the universe is there such munificence! But not only has He bestowed these rich gifts upon the children of men, thereby furnishing an example for their imitation, but he has most distinctly informed them, in his revealed word, that he loves to witness the same kind of benevolence in them. At the same time we are expressly told that he loves a cheerful giver. The Macedonian disciples were commended because their liberality abounded in the midst of their poverty. The poor widow was commended, not for the littleness, but the greatness of her gift, it being all her living. The woman who broke the alabaster box of ointment on his head was amply defended against the charge of wastefulness.

Nor can there be any doubt as to the Saviour's design in requiring gifts at the hands of his people. It was not surely because he needed any such gifts. But the intention obviously is to repress selfishness, which is the master sin of the human heart, and to develop benevolence in the hearts of his people, which assimilates them to the character of God himself. The great need of the present moment, therefore, is not increased economy or contractedness of any kind, but greater liberality on the part of the people of God. Let them bring such offerings into the store house of the Lord as they are able to make, and such as the circumstances of the case demand, and there will be no occasion for any further call for either retrenchment or reform.

Another general feature about this report, if we have read it aright, is its tendency towards *disintegration*, on which we would bestow a passing notice. We do not suppose that the writer distinctly intended this, but this is the tendency of his reasoning nevertheless. He speaks disparagingly of the powers and functions of the General Assembly; charges the Assembly with usurping prerogatives that belong to the Presbyteries; and indirectly insinuates that an Assembly, as such, is not an essential part of the Presbyterian system. At the same time he seems to regard the Presbyteries as the source and centre of all ecclesias-

tical power, and that they have been thrust out of their proper sphere by the encroachments and usurpations of the General Assembly. We do not intend to put the views of the writer in stronger terms than he himself employs, but we do not see how any one can put a different construction upon his language. Nor have we any idea of going into a general discussion about the relative positions and prerogatives of our different church courts, having neither the time, the space, nor the ability for this. But there are two things that most Presbyterians are ready to admit: first, that there is as clear authority in the word of God for a General Assembly, as there is for a Presbytery; and second, that our constitution defines the prerogatives of the Assembly as distinctly as it does those of the Presbyteries. Now, it is easy, and, in the times in which we live, somewhat popular, to charge the Assembly with exercising powers which do not belong to it. But when that charge is brought forward without sufficient grounds to sustain it, as it seems to us in the present case, its tendency can only be to weaken the bonds that ought to bind us together. If Presbyteries can repudiate the authority of the higher courts, then as a matter of logical consequence, the churches can and will repudiate the authority of the Presbyteries, which plunges us at once into the depths of Congregational Independency, if not into something worse. Certainly if there is danger in our Church of consolidation, or Prelacy, as the writer is pleased to put it, on the one hand, there is equal if not much greater danger of Congregationalism or anarchy, on the other. Our only safety, as a Church, is to steer as near as possible to the constitution, which we all believe to be founded on the word of God.

There is one other matter of a general nature brought out in this Report, that must not be passed over without notice. It is charged upon ministers who have acted as treasurers to some of our benevolent schemes that they have violated their ordination vows in performing the duties that belong exclusively to the diaconate, and they are exhorted to return to their proper work as preachers of the gospel. It is not stated, as it should have been done, that these ministers were devoting only a portion of

their time to this kind of business, and that as a matter both of convenience and economy, whilst the main part of their time was directed to objects that more properly belong to the ministerial office. The writer draws a distinction between what are called the secular and the spiritual functions of the Church, which we believe cannot be maintained under all possible circumstances without subverting the very foundations of our Church system. We admit that deacons exist by divine appointment; that their business is to manage the secular affairs of a particular church; that they are the proper custodians of church property; that they are to collect and disburse the alms of God's people for the benefit of the poor; they are, perhaps, the proper persons for taking up the stated and regular contributions of the churches for the different schemes of benevolence; that the design of their appointment was to relieve ministers from pressing secular cares; that it is a most important office in the Church, and ought to be magnified and utilised to any reasonable extent. All this is cheerfully conceded. But when the cast-iron law is laid down that no officer of the Church, except the deacon, is allowed to handle secular matters, when it is charged that the General Assembly becomes the "temptress" of her own ministers in assigning them to such positions; when ministers are charged with violating their ordination vows in performing certain secular duties that are unavoidably connected with their official position, we revolt against the assumption as opposed to both reason and Scripture. Let the principle be tested by a few practical facts. The writer of the Report himself, if we have been correctly informed, has spent the greater part of his ministerial life in teaching. Was he ever arraigned before his Presbytery for violating his ordination vows? The Presidents of most of our Colleges, who are generally ministers of the gospel, are expected and required to keep a thorough oversight of all the financial affairs of the institutions over which they preside. Have any of them ever been arraigned for violating their ordination vows? Here, at the present moment, Drs. Girardeau and Mack are travelling among the Southern churches to raise money to repair the shattered endowment of the Theological Seminary at Columbia—

an enterprise in which every good man gives them his hearty sympathy. But they have, according to the reasoning of the Minority Report, invaded the deacon's office, and ought to be arrested and tried for violating their ordination vows. But there is another still more flagrant violation of this cast-iron law. Paul and Barnabas, in forgetfulness of their solemn ordination vows, actually raised money in Antioch, carried it all the way to Jerusalem, and there, no doubt, rendered as strict an account of their receipts and disbursements as any of our modern missionary secretaries have ever done. Nor is this the only case in which Paul is chargeable with handling money. In his defence before Felix, he distinctly states that he had come to Jerusalem to bring alms and offerings to his nation—offerings that he had carefully gathered up in the churches where he had been preaching. More than this. If any one will turn to the second chapter of Galatians, he will find that when the other Apostles gave him the right hand of fellowship to go and preach to the heathen, they enjoined it upon him to “remember the poor,” which he says he was always forward to do. But why censure these secretaries, and let Paul and Barnabas go unrebuked? But there are illustrations of different kinds that ought to be, at least, noticed. A missionary is sent to the heart of Africa or China; it is not found convenient or practicable to send a ruling elder or a deacon along with him; he is expected, nevertheless, in the prosecution of his mission, to establish the Church of Christ where it has not before existed. Now how can he effect this without exercising the threefold functions of preacher, ruling elder and deacon? Shall he be recalled and censured for mixing up these threefold functions? Still further, and in the last place the Church has appointed a commission with ecclesiastical powers to carry on the work of foreign evangelisation. That commission, made up mainly of elders, soon finds that it has to deal with secular as well as with spiritual matters. It has to provide salaries, build or rent houses, make contracts for carrying missionaries to their fields of labor, etc., etc. Now, if it is sacrilegious, or something approaching that, for a presbyter to handle money, what is to be done in such a case? Must the commission be constituted one

half of elders and the other half of deacons, so as to meet the difficulty? Now, to say nothing about the endless confusion and conflict that would necessarily arise from such an arrangement, where shall we find any Presbyterian usage to justify the Assembly in putting deacons on ecclesiastical commissions? It is a favorite idea with the writer of the Minority Report, that deacons ought to be made treasurers for our different schemes. We have no objection to this. But it would be easy to demonstrate, which, however, we shall not for the want of space undertake to do, that according to the reasoning of the brother himself, it would be utterly unlawful for a deacon to occupy any such position.

We proceed now to consider some of the special recommendations, as well as some of the conclusions at which the writer of the Report arrives. To discuss all the points brought out in the Report would be very much like undertaking a voyage around the world.

We propose to consider the three following propositions as the most important in their general bearing:

1. Will it be found practicable or economical to substitute one central treasurer, to be located in some rural town for the sake of economy, in the place of those local treasurers now employed for this purpose?

2. Can any of our Committees, and especially our Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, carry on its work with system and efficiency without a Secretary?

3. Has the present mode of conducting the Foreign Missionary work proved a failure, and is it necessary therefore to go back to apostolical times for a model upon which to conduct it?

As to the first of these questions, it would be easy to show that the plan of a central treasurer would cost more than twice as much as it does on the present plan to perform the same work. But it would be replied, that the general plan contemplates the abolition of the Secretariat, and thus save these salaries to offset this excess of expense. But as the economy in this case is based entirely upon the practicability of dispensing with Secretaries, it may be held in abeyance until that question is disposed of.

Our first remark about the proposed central treasurer is that it is not new. It has been tried, and undoubtedly with good success, by two branches of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland. But it does not follow that what is practicable in Scotland is also practicable with us. Their plan of a central treasurership is part and parcel of their general scheme of Sustentation, which very few would think of introducing among themselves. Furthermore, this central treasurership is located in the commercial metropolis of the country, where all the necessary banking and commercial advantages may be had.

Nor is the idea new to the Presbyterian churches in this country. It was brought forward at the organisation of our own Church in 1861, by Judge Shepherd, of North Carolina. His plan was to have one grand financial trusteeship established in some central portion of the Southern country, to be composed of Christian gentlemen of high standing from different parts of the Church, by whom all church funds, even those intended for our benevolent schemes, should be managed. The scheme, when first presented, was received with great favor, mainly on account of its apparent simplicity, and at first was advocated by some of the leading members of the Assembly. It required but little discussion, however, to convince that Assembly that our benevolent schemes, and especially the Foreign Missionary work, could not stand the strain that would be imposed upon it of receiving its funds in this indirect and round-about way; while it was argued at the same time that an Executive Committee, judiciously chosen, was just as trustworthy in the management and disbursement of funds as any central trusteeship could possibly be. The main feature of the plan was set aside by a resolution directing that all funds intended for our benevolent schemes should go directly to the Treasurers of the different Committees. At the same time a general trusteeship was established, and in a year or two afterwards located at Charlotte, N. C., which has since been performing its appropriate duties to the entire satisfaction of the Church.

The Northern Presbyterian Church some five years ago appointed what was called, if we remember aright, a *financial commission*, consisting of fifteen or twenty Christian gentlemen

from the city of New York and vicinity, whose business it would be to superintend the raising of all church funds, and of apportioning them to their different schemes of benevolence, according to their own judgment, or according to a rule to be given to them by their General Assembly. This scheme continued for only one year, if, indeed, it can be said to have had an organic existence at all. It was objected to, if we have been correctly informed, mainly on two grounds: 1. That it created needless machinery in carrying on the work of the Church. 2. That the contributors to these causes were unwilling to be placed at so great a distance from the objects to which their benevolence was applied. Very little funds, if any at all, were ever sent to this commission, and at the end of the year it died a quiet, natural death. There are two difficulties in the way of having a central treasurer such as has been proposed by the Minority Report: 1. He would soon find himself surrounded with difficulties, which neither he nor the proposer of the measure had ever thought of. He would soon see, that to carry on his work efficiently and satisfactorily to the Church, he would have to perform the duties of a Secretary as well as those of a Treasurer. A very large proportion of the letters which convey money to the Treasurer contain also inquiries, and make suggestions in relation to almost every department of the missionary work. These inquiries are of a very varied character; as, for example, how much it will take to support a heathen child in a given school; what is the comparative expense of supporting schools in Greece, China, and South America; will a lady teacher be appointed to the Mexican, the Indian, or the Italian Mission, if a certain Ladies' Missionary Association will provide the means of support; what has become of a certain boy that was supported by a certain Sabbath-school, that was named for a certain Doctor of Divinity, that was in a certain Chinese school, a certain number of years ago. These are only specimens of the almost innumerable questions that would be showed upon the central treasurer as soon as his office was in full operation. How are they to be dealt with? It is no part of his business, nor is it possible for him to be particularly acquainted with all the details of the Foreign Missionary

work, or to be able to answer all the letters. His duties are all summed up in keeping his books, and receiving and remitting money. According to the present arrangement, all letters of the kind above referred to are handed over to the Secretary to be answered, and it is no small tax upon his time and strength to discharge this single department of labor. If these questions, as well as the innumerable others of a similar character, are to be cast aside or neglected, then Christian people will very naturally excuse themselves from contributing altogether.

Another remark which it is important to make in this connexion, is, that it is essential not only that the Treasurer be officially connected with the Executive Committee of Missions, but that both be located in some commercial centre, where banking and commercial facilities can be enjoyed, when necessary. This necessity was not sensibly felt in the earlier periods of the work, when its resources and operations were confined within narrow limits. But as soon as it began to assume broader proportions, the necessity for these increased facilities soon made itself manifest. We need refer only to our own experience to show that this is not a mere theoretical matter. When the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions was transferred something less than five years ago to Baltimore, it carried along with it a debt of \$27,000. This was not owing to any mismanagement on the part of the Committee formerly located at Columbia, but to the unexpected falling off in the ordinary contributions of the churches, and to a debt contracted by the Campinas Institute which was never authorised nor approved by the Committee, but which had to be paid, nevertheless, in order to save a property of three times the amount of the debt. Subsequently a debt of \$3,000 had to be paid on the same property, making the aggregate debt \$30,000. Now the great problem, and one which has cost the Committee no little anxious thought, was how to carry on the general work and liquidate this heavy debt at the same time, and to do this without any material increase in the ordinary contributions of the churches, and in the midst of one of the severest and most prolonged financial crises that the country has ever known. That debt of \$30,000 will be reduced at the close of the present eccle-

siastical year, if nothing unforeseen arises, to something less than \$7,000. Now, how has this been effected? We reply, without going into specifications, that it is owing, in some measure, to the rigid economy that was enforced in every department of the work, to the diminished appropriations made for the Missions, but mainly to the skill, the wisdom, and the financial experience of the Executive Committee, several of whom had had large experience in such matters. The Treasurer, as well as several other members of the Committee, had repeatedly to pledge their personal property as collateral security for money that had to be borrowed in order to keep the wheels of this great enterprise in motion. They did it cheerfully, and they deserve, as we think, the thanks of our entire Church. All of this could not have been done, as it seems to us, and especially during the financial straits through which we have passed, if the Treasurer had not been officially connected with the Committee and both located in an important commercial centre.

But it will be said that the missionary work ought to be carried on without debt, or even the liability of debt. Now we have no hesitation in saying that in view of the work to be done, in view of the condition and circumstances of the Church, and in view of the prevailing modes of transacting commercial business, to which the missionary work is unavoidably related, this proposition is well nigh impossible. There are four indispensable conditions necessary to the successful prosecution of this great work without occasional debt or liability to debt:

1. That the churches shall never fail behind in their regular annual contributions.

2. That there shall be a regular increase in those contributions from year to year, sufficient to meet the growing demands of the work.

3. That these contributions shall be equally distributed over the year, so that the income and outgo of the treasury shall correspond with each other.

4. That no great unforeseen providential contingencies shall arise to make heavy and unavoidable drafts upon the treasury.

Now it may be asked, who is ready to guarantee all or even any one of these conditions?

The fact is, this great work, involving as it necessarily does so much that is secular and temporal, must be conducted, to some extent at least, upon secular principles. The only safe and wise course for the Assembly is to appoint godly, judicious, and practical men to conduct it; and with the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and with the oversight which the Church herself will exercise, we need have no fears about discomfiture or disaster.

Our second inquiry is, whether the Foreign Missionary work can be carried on by a Committee without a Secretary? This is a leading feature in the plan of the Minority Report. No one will deny the claim to originality here, whatever else may be said about the matter. If this suggestion could be made practicable, then the originator of it would deservedly take rank among the wisest men of the age. There is not one of our church courts, from the lowest to the highest, that does not appoint one of its own members as its clerk or secretary, and all of these, except in the sessional court, are paid clerks or secretaries. The functions of this office vary, of course, according to circumstances, and may consist simply in recording the proceedings of the body to which it belongs, or it may include its correspondence at the same time, in which case the officer is usually denominated the Secretary. To attempt to carry on the Foreign Missionary work, with all its varied details of business, without a Secretary whose business it is to keep the Committee informed in relation to its condition and wants, and to make the necessary suggestions for its prosecution, is simply preposterous. The Indians have a saying, that "if you buy a horse, be sure to include in the contract his eyes and feet," by which is implied that a blind or lame horse would be of very little account. Now the Minority Report in separating the Treasurer from the Committee and abolishing the office of Secretary, virtually proposes a committee that would be of no more value than a horse without eyes or feet. This is no disparagement of the noble men who have composed our Committees in the past, or may be chosen to do so in the future. No practical or judicious set of men in the world would allow themselves to be incorporated into such a body. One is almost

tempted to think that the writer really intended a practical joke in making the suggestion.

But what are the duties of a Secretary of Foreign Missions, that they can be so easily dispensed with?

They may be arranged under four heads: 1. To maintain correspondence with the churches at home in all matters relating to the Foreign Missionary work, including visits to Synods, Presbyteries, and also to churches, when this can be done in connexion with these more extended tours. 2. Correspondence with missionaries in the foreign fields, and with candidates desirous of entering upon the work. 3. Editorial labors connected with the management of *The Missionary*, as well as the preparation of articles on the subject of Missions for other papers and magazines. 4. Duties that have to be performed in connexion with all the official acts of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions. The simple mention of these labors shows at once that the office of Secretary is no sinecure. It is impossible, in our limited space, to give anything like a full or exhaustive account of either one of these departments of labor. In relation to editorial labors connected with *The Missionary*, it is sufficient perhaps, to say, that the American Board of Foreign Missions employs the whole of one man's time to edit the *Missionary Herald*, and that the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in the city of New York, employs the chief part of the time of one of its three Secretaries to edit the *Foreign Missionary*. These magazines are larger somewhat than ours, and are illustrated on a scale that is impossible to us; but the additional labor expended upon them is not materially greater than that demanded by ours. But in addition to these editorial labors, the Secretary, if he would maintain the interests of the foreign missionary cause as it ought to be done, must prepare frequent articles for the weekly religious papers, as well as more elaborate ones for periodical magazines.

Then again, the correspondence which the Secretary has to maintain with ministers of the gospel, with individual members of the Church, with Ladies' Missionary Associations, and with Sabbath-schools, answering questions, giving information, and

making suggestions, is by no means an unimportant department of work, and imposes a heavy tax both of responsibility and labor.

The correspondence which it is necessary to carry on with the missionaries in the field, as well as with candidates for the work, though exceedingly pleasant in itself, is, nevertheless, very laborious. The Secretary is the chief medium of communication between the missionaries in the field and the churches at home. The wants of the missionary, his views of the importance of the work in which he is engaged, the appeals which he sometimes feels himself called upon to make to the people of God for the support of that work, the information that he would lay before the Christian public in relation to the habits and character of the people among whom he lives and for whom he labors, are, as a general thing, brought into the hands of the Secretary and by him pressed upon the attention of the Christian public. This correspondence, with rare exceptions, is always of the most friendly and confidential nature, and it is a comfort and solace to the missionary to remember that he has left one at home, who is not only able to understand his circumstances and wants, but who will do everything in his power to forward the great cause to which he has devoted his life. As a general thing, there is a monthly interchange of letters between the missionaries and the Secretary, amounting to fifty or sixty per month, and it is not often that any of them are short letters. The correspondence between the office and missionary candidates is also a considerable item; but we forbear entering into further details.

But the weightier and more responsible duties which devolve upon the Secretary are those which he has to perform in connexion with the official acts of the Executive Committee. They expect him, as a necessary qualification for his office, to be thoroughly acquainted with the missionary work in all its varied bearings, and to be able to lay before them all the information that they may need in reference to any particular matter that may be brought before them for their action. It is impossible for a Committee, except to a limited extent, to know all the facts bearing upon any particular case that may be brought under

their notice, and hence the necessity of some one to impart this information, whose special business it is to study out such matters. If, for example, it becomes necessary for the Committee to appoint some one to the missionary work, the Secretary must be prepared to show that the young man has all the qualifications necessary for the work. The question with the Committee is not whether the young man is qualified to preach the gospel, that having been settled by the Presbytery to which he belongs, but whether he is a suitable person to send off on a foreign mission; in other words, whether he has a sound physical constitution, earnest piety, mental training, versatility of character, steadiness of purpose, and capacity for acquiring language, as well as other qualifications of the same kind. It would be very unfortunate for the cause of missions, as well as injurious to the influence of a young man himself, to send him abroad without these necessary qualifications. But how is this information to be obtained? By personal intercourse or correspondence with the young man himself; by inquiries made among his associates in study; by ascertaining the views of his teachers; and, so far as physical soundness is concerned, by procuring the advice of a skillful physician. No member of the Committee, who does not give special attention to the subject, could give this information so necessary to wise action on the part of the Committee.

Again, if it is proposed to establish a new station in some part of the heathen world, the Secretary must be able to set forth the reasons which justify such an undertaking. He must be able to give information in relation to the condition, the character and disposition of the people among whom it is proposed to establish the mission, whether the climate is healthful or otherwise; whether the language is easy or difficult of acquisition; the facilities of intercourse between the proposed mission and the civilised world; the probable cost of maintaining such a mission; the relation of such a mission to the adjoining or surrounding population; whether the occupation of such a position would interfere in any way with the claims of other missionary associations, and various other points of a similar character too numerous to be specified, but too important to be overlooked by any

Committee that would conduct its work wisely and efficiently. But who can give all this information without making the subject a special study?

We must specify another matter in relation to which the Secretary must be thoroughly posted. The Committee makes all of its appropriations at the beginning of the year. Those appropriations are based upon schedules sent up by the different Missions before the close of the previous year. The schedules contain specifications of all the items for which appropriations are asked, and together they amount to several hundred. These items pertain to the salaries of the missionaries, varying, of course, according to the cost of living in different countries; the support of schools and seminaries; the employment of colporteurs; the expense of building or renting houses; the pay for native helpers; the expense of missionary tours; the cost of medical attendance; the cost of translating and circulating religious books and tracts, and various other items, too many even to be enumerated. The missionaries usually send explanations of the various items embraced in their schedules, and ordinarily this would be a sufficient guide for the Committee. But when it becomes necessary to cut down these schedules one-third or one-fourth, as has been the case every year for the last five, how will it be possible for the Executive Committee to apportion out the funds under their control in a just and equitable manner and so as to promote the highest interests of all the different missions under their care, unless there is some one in that Committee who has a minute knowledge of all the affairs and surroundings of each one of these different Missions?

The writer is perfectly aware that the foregoing statements are utterly insufficient to give a just idea of the actual labors of a Secretary of Foreign Missions. If you add to these the sense of responsibility which ever presses upon his mind and heart; the anxieties and perplexities with which he is constantly surrounded; the unmerited censures that are sometimes heaped upon him by persons who do not comprehend the actual condition and demands of the case, the inference would necessarily be that it was not an easy office to discharge, but indispensable,

nevertheless, to the great cause of Missions. If the writer could see any relief, or any improvement, in the suggestions of this Minority Report, he would be first to embrace and utilise them; but seeing, as he does, nothing but failure and discomfiture to result from the experiment, he is shut up to the duty of simply recording his solemn and earnest protest against all such unwarranted innovations.

We come now to consider the twofold question, whether the Foreign Missionary work, conducted as it is at present, has been a failure, and the consequent necessity of going back to apostolic times for a model or pattern by which to conduct it in the future. We will consider these questions in the inverse order in which they are here presented.

The writer of the Minority Report charges that the Church, in prosecuting the work of Missions, has gone astray from the word of God: that "we have been prevented from going up and possessing the land, because God has a controversy with us;" that "we must be restored to the simplicity of the primitive Church," etc. He quotes from a letter received from a venerable minister, "one whom the Church delights to honor," as saying: "It seems to my ignorance that all our schemes are managed at an expense which would be considered monstrous in the business of this world. I can find nothing like it in the Acts of the Apostles, nor anywhere else in the New Testament. I find nothing like it in other great missionary ages of the Church." Nor are these views wholly confined to the writer of the Report and his correspondent. A writer in the July number of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, in criticising some of the modes of raising funds for the missionary work, remarks, "Better wait on the clearly revealed methods, we think. Better abide by 'the pattern shown in the mount.'"

Now what is that "pattern shown in the mount"? Who can tell us what was the Apostolic plan for carrying on the great work of evangelising the world? Or whether they had anything that could properly be called a plan or "pattern" for carrying on that work? So far as we are informed, the Apostles prosecuted their work of evangelisation under the immediate direction

and inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Paul and Barnabas were set apart for their work by the church at Antioch, but in going from place to place they were not guided by that church, but by the special direction of the Divine Spirit. Philip, who is denominated an evangelist, seems to have been guided in the same way. Timothy and Titus were directed in their plans and measures by Paul. The disciples that were scattered abroad by the persecution that followed the death of Stephen, went everywhere making known the unsearchable riches of Christ. Great blessings attended the labors of these different classes of persons because of the immediate, special presence of the Holy Ghost. But how their temporal wants were supplied, we are not distinctly informed. It was not probably from funds that were sent to the poor saints at Jerusalem; for these were exhausted in meeting their temporal wants. It is possible that the church at Antioch may have furnished money to pay the travelling expenses of Paul and his companions on their different missionary tours, but of this we have no certain account in the Acts of the Apostles. Paul acknowledged his obligations to the church at Philippi for their gifts to him. It is probable that those who were converted at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, many of whom were from the distant cities of the Roman Empire, had returned to their homes and were prepared not only to entertain the missionaries in their own houses, but render them help in various other ways. On certain occasions and under special circumstances, Paul wrought with his own hands rather than tax newly-formed churches for the means of his support. Christian women, if we may judge from the frequent allusion which Paul makes to them as his helpers and succorers, no doubt contributed to promote his personal comfort, as well as to meet the necessary expenses of his work. Now these are about all the facts that can be gathered from the New Testament Scriptures as to the mode or plan of the Primitive Church in carrying on the work.

The fundamental principles of the constitution of the Church are distinctly set forth in the word of God, in relation to which there can be no controversy. But many of the powers and functions involved in that constitution were not carried into effect in

the days of the Apostles. They were left to be developed by the Church under the guidance of the Holy Ghost as their situation and circumstances would seem to demand. No particular form of outward worship existed in the Primitive Church. She had no creed, certainly none formulated after the manner of our Confession of Faith and Catechisms. She had no distinct system of discipline established for the government of the Church, and she had no Book of Church Order by which her powers could be distributed among different church courts. And so no particular plan was adopted by which all the energies of the Church could be concentrated on the great work of evangelising the world. The times did not favor anything of the kind. The brotherhood were miserably poor. The world was in open hostility to the cause of Christ. The fires of persecution were raging around, so that it was utterly impossible for the primitive Christians to have adopted any well developed plan for carrying on their work. The Apostles acted under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost. But since their office has ceased, the Church in her organised capacity becomes the controlling power; and it is by her direction that the great work of evangelisation is to be carried on. Of course her authority will be valid only so far as it is consistent with the principles of her own constitution and with the teachings of God's word. Now if the Church has power to formulate her creed, which no one denies; if she may establish a system of discipline; if she may institute a Book of Church Order; and if she may adopt a Directory for Public Worship, all of these being founded upon the authority of God's word, why may she not adopt some general plan for evangelising the world, provided that plan is also consonant with the teachings of God's word? The altered condition of the world, the wonderful changes that have been brought about in human affairs by the providence of God, the greatly increased resources and power of the Church herself, all call for some plan of conducting the work suited to the circumstances and demands of the case. It would have been utterly impossible for the Primitive Church to have carried on her work as we do; and quite as impossible for us to carry ours on according to their plan, if indeed they had

anything that could be called a plan. Why, then, is the plan adopted in our day to be denounced because no exact counterpart can be found in the Acts of the Apostles?

Furthermore, it would be well for those who call for the exact "pattern shown in the mount," to look well to what their principles lead. If the Committee of Foreign Missions is to be sacrificed because it is not strictly conformed to the "pattern shown in the mount," what becomes of our Theological Seminaries? Who will point out a "pattern" for them in the Acts of the Apostles? More than this. These Seminaries are very expensive. It takes more money to operate one of them than to conduct all our schemes of benevolence joined together. Worse still, these institutions have large invested funds, which, according to the reasoning of the Minority Report, is a scandal to the Church. If justifiable to hold invested funds in one case, why may it not be done in another?

Still again. We have Bible Societies, which are engaged in printing the word of God in all the languages of the world, for the grand and glorious purpose of carrying the knowledge of salvation to every human being on the face of the earth. Yet we have no "pattern" for even this in the New Testament Scriptures. But who believes that Paul would have rejected the printing press as an auxiliary in the great work of evangelising the world? And so in relation to the Tract Society, the publishing agencies of the Church, Sabbath-school organisations, and numberless other agencies of a similar character, all of which must be condemned because there is no exact "pattern" for them in the Acts of the Apostles.*

*We confess that we do not comprehend the spirit that animates this crusade against our schemes of benevolence. The officers are charged with receiving high and wasteful salaries, when in reality those salaries are not much more than half of what is paid to settled ministers in the same cities; very much less than what is paid to the officers of similar institutions in the country; and, rightly viewed, they are receiving less than the Professors of our Theological Seminaries, whilst those Professors labor only nine months out of the year, but the Secretaries have no vacation at all. In connexion with the "Relief Fund," it is regarded almost as a scandal for the Church to have invested funds. And yet one

We do not know what method would be suggested for prosecuting the Foreign Missionary work by those who object to our present modes. If it is claimed that individual Christians, or voluntary associations of persons, should go abroad on their own motion, laboring among men as the way might be opened up before them, and living upon their personal resources or depending upon Divine Providence for the means of their support, as more consonant with the plan pursued by early Christians—we have only to reply that this course, so far as it relates to the saints that were scattered abroad by persecution, was the only one that was possible to them, in their condition; and it would be equally so for us, if we were forced into similar circumstances. But this is not the plan contemplated by our Church system. Here concerted action is the prominent idea. One of the great ends of the organisation of the Church itself undoubtedly was that all the resources of God's people might be more effectually brought to bear upon the conversion of the world. Union is strength in Church as well as in other matters. All independent action, except under special circumstances, is disorganising and weakening, and ought to be avoided.

Furthermore, all efforts that have been made to promote the Foreign Missionary cause apart from and independent of Church organisations, have, so far as is known to the writer, terminated in one of three things, viz.: 1. The undertaking has been found impracticable, and has been given up. 2. The members of such

of our Theological Seminaries has twice as large an invested fund as was ever contemplated by the Relief Fund, whilst the other Seminary is laboring, might and main, to bring her investment up to the same notch. We do not object to this, but we do object to this one-sided warfare waged against our benevolent schemes. We are told in the Report that during the last fourteen years it has cost \$160,000 to operate our four different schemes of benevolence. This big sum is so presented as to schok the sensibilities of unthinking men. Why not have stated at the same time that it cost a good deal more than twice this sum to operate our two Theological Seminaries during the same time? Or why not have mentioned that it cost more than one-half of this amount to operate one single city church? Perhaps it will be said that we attack you first as the most assailable, and will then follow up the attack upon the Seminaries and rich churches. Be it so. But let us know at once all that you propose to do.

associations have been compelled to betake themselves to secular employments for the means of support, and have thus been able to do very little in the proper missionary work. 3. Or have been compelled to resort to organisations of some kind, in order to secure the means of living as well as for carrying on the general work.

This latter result was particularly the case with the China Inland Mission, which determined to carry on its work independently of Church oversight, and without any expense of machinery. Whether it has been the gainer or loser by the former, we shall not undertake to decide. But it soon found itself necessarily entangled with as much machinery as any Church organisation whatever. We do not deny that there are individuals in the foreign field, acting upon their own authority and sustained by private means, who may have done much good. We only doubt the practical wisdom of the plan. Certain it is that Apostolic methods cannot be divorced from Apostolic men. The two must go together.

We come now, in the third place, to consider the question whether the missionary work, conducted in a way so much disapproved by the Minority Report, has been a failure. That such is the belief of the writer is not only distinctly implied in the paper itself but without which there would be no force or argument in it whatever. In replying to this assumption of failure, we shall not confine ourselves to our own missionary operations, though that would be sufficient of itself, but take a wider range, bringing into review the operations of all the great evangelical Churches of the day. All of these Churches conduct their work, with some unimportant modifications, on the same plan with ours; or, to speak perhaps more correctly, our plan is virtually a copy of theirs. If theirs has been a failure, then we might expect ours to be a failure also; but if they have been successful, it is safe for us to walk in their footsteps.

In considering the success or the want of success in connexion with any enterprise of the kind under consideration, we cannot always be governed simply by the number of converts. The Holy Ghost is sovereign in the dispensation of converting grace,

and he works when and where he chooses. Nevertheless the people of God may confidently expect him to crown their efforts in the conversion of men where they act in obedience to the divine command and reliance upon his presence and blessing. In this view of the matter, it is entirely proper, in order to settle the question of the success or failure of modern Missions, to compare the results of the missionary labors of the present century with those of the first, which we have always looked upon as the time of the Church's greatest spiritual power, and which may be taken, therefore, as a proper standard for gauging the spiritual power of any subsequent age.* There were certain advantages, as also disadvantages, attending both periods, which it is proper to notice.

On the side of apostolical and primitive Christians, there was the freshness of the impression made upon the world by the life and the death of the Lord Jesus Christ; the undeniable proofs of his resurrection and ascension to heaven; the extraordinary outpouring of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost; the gift of tongues, and the power of working miracles bestowed upon the first heralds of the cross; the special preparation, both of the Jewish and Gentile mind, to listen to the claims of the gospel, and the nuclei for the establishment of Christian churches in most of the great cities of the Roman Empire by the Pentecostal converts.

On the side of modern Christianity, there is the power of greater numbers; thorough organisation for Christian work; greater pecuniary resources; extraordinary facilities for travelling; easy access to all the benighted nations of the earth; the printing press, by which copies of the Scriptures may be almost indefinitely multiplied; the full energies of a thoroughly educated Christian ministry; the subordination of the languages of the world to the cause of Christ; the rapid progress of science and civilisation; the waning power of heathen systems, and the awakening desire in many parts of the world to know the truth. The difficulties and discouragements attending the propagating of the gospel in these two different periods would probably constitute a similar parallel, but need not be mentioned.

Now, in the first place, what have been the results of missionary labor, so far as the conversion of men is concerned, in these two distant and different periods of the Christian Church? It is impossible to arrive at anything like a certain knowledge, or even at a very close approximation to it, of the number of conversions that took place during the first century of the Christian era. By those, however, who have made the subject a matter of special study, it is supposed that the number of converts of the first century did not exceed 100,000. The number possibly might have been twice as great. The results of modern Missions are ascertained with greater certainty. According to Dr. Christlieb, whose authority no one will feel disposed to question, the number of converts in connexion with the Missions in various parts of the unevangelised world, at the present day, is something more than 1,600,000, to say nothing about the number of conversions that have taken place in the Christian world at the same time. But the great mass of these have been gathered into the fold of Christ within the last twenty-five years. So that during the last twenty-five years there have been more than fifteen times as many as in the whole of the first century. More than this. If the work of conversion goes on among the benighted nations of the earth as rapidly during the next twenty years as it has been during the last twenty, the number of converts at the end of this century will be scarcely less than 5,000,000, or fifty times as many as those of the whole of the first century.

This is not only great increase over the converts of the Christian world during the same length of time, but is something greatly in advance of anything that has ever been known in the history of the Christian Church.

But what kind of human agency has been employed in the promotion of this great work? Just that which has been so sweepingly denounced a failure. Is it possible for the writer of the Minority Report or any one else, to propose any plan that will be likely to bring about more glorious results?

But there are other matters that must be brought to view, if we would fully understand all that is being done for the evangelisation of the world. At the beginning of the present cen-

tury, there were 170 ordained missionaries in the whole of the unevangelised world. At the present time, there are 2,500 ordained missionaries, as many more male and female assistant missionaries, and about 25,000 native laborers, making an aggregate force of 30,000 laborers. In all institutions of learning connected with the various Missions, there are at the present time 400,000 native youth being specially trained for the same work. Now, if these schools turn out annually one-eighth of their number as sufficiently educated to engage in the work, and if only one-half of these should be regarded as worthy to take part in the work, still there will be at the close of the present century an army of 500,000 workers. Who can form any adequate conception of what may be achieved by such a force as this during the first half of the twentieth century?

In the next place, let us look at the expansion of the work during the last fifty years. At the beginning of the century, all the missionary stations in the unevangelised world, as has been truly and forcibly stated, could be numbered on the fingers of the two hands. At the present day, it might be asked what considerable portion of the heathen world is there in which there are not now representatives of the Cross. They may be found among every considerable tribe of Indians in either North or South America; in almost every group of islands in the broad Pacific; along the eastern and western shores of South America; on the shores of eastern and western Africa; and along the banks of the Nile, the Niger, the Zambesi, and the Congo Rivers; and on the shores of all the great lakes of that continent; in eastern Europe and western Asia; in central and eastern Turkey; in Syria and Mesopotamia; in Armenia and Persia; in every portion of the great Empire of India; in Burmah and Siam; in eastern and central China; in Japan; and in almost every other portion of the heathen world. Of course the number of missionaries occupying these out posts is very insufficient, but they are, nevertheless, occupying these various countries in the name of their rightful Sovereign; and before the lapse of a very long period they will, with the blessing of Almighty God, be in full possession of all these lands.

One more fact must be brought to view. During the present century, the word of God, in part or whole, has been translated into more than 250 different languages and dialects, many of which have been reduced to writing for the first time. In this way a channel has been provided for conveying the knowledge of salvation to the minds of hundreds of millions of the most ignorant and debased of the human race. Not only have the Scriptures been translated into all of these varied languages, but it is estimated that there are now in circulation as many as 150,000,000 copies of the Bible—about one for every ten persons in the world—undoubtedly a larger number than was ever possessed by the human race from the times of Moses to the beginning of the present century. Now if the circulation is increased as much in the next twenty years as it has been during the last twenty, then there will be in circulation as many as 200,000,000 copies of the Scriptures, which will be nearly equivalent to one copy for every family on the face of the earth.

Now if the Holy Ghost, in the exercise of his sovereign power, should make each copy the instrument of one conversion, then our converts would not be numbered by tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, or even by millions, but by hundreds of millions.

Here is success, both present and prospective, that has no parallel in the history of Christianity. If what has thus been achieved is almost as nothing compared with what remains to be done, nevertheless, it is clear that, with the blessing of God, the task laid upon the Church by her great Head, of making known the gospel to every human being on the face of the earth, is not only possible, but may be fully realised in a comparatively short time. And now by whose instrumentality were these plans bearing such undeniable proof of the divine approval, which have already been productive of so much good, and which promise still greater results in the near future, devised and carried into execution? Every intelligent Christian man replies at once, It was the Lowries, the Andersons, the Venns, the Stidmans, the Duffs, the Mullens, and other living men of kindred views, who were mainly instrumental in proposing and carrying them into

effect. If the world has produced men whose lives have been productive of grander or mightier results, we know not who they are. And yet the author of the Minority Report regards such men as mere dispensable appendages, if not excrescences on the missionary work.

J. LEIGHTON WILSON.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SECOND GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE PRESBYTERIAN ALLIANCE.

Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Council of the Presbyterian Alliance, convened at Philadelphia, September, 1880. Printed by direction of the Council. Edited by JOHN B. DALES, D. D., and R. M. PATTERSON, D. D. Presbyterian Journal Company, Philadelphia; and J. C. McCurdy & Co., Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis. 1,154 pp. 8vo.

We have had special reasons for sympathising in the general impatience for the appearance of this volume. But now that we have actually seen it, have felt its weight, have looked into its 1,154 pages of closely printed matter, impatience gives place to wonder that it has appeared so soon, or that it should have ever come at all. And when, by some effort of the imagination, we try to realise that the larger portion of this volume was really delivered before one audience within the space of less than nine working days, we believe more than ever in Presbyterian pluck and endurance. To our own humble share in the proceedings, which, for the most part, consisted in the effort to hear, "mark, and inwardly digest" this Noachian deluge of learning, we feel like applying the urchin's translation of the well known lines of Horace—

Exegi monumentum ære perennius.

Regali situ Pyramidum altius, etc.

"I have eaten a mountain tougher than brass, and taller than

the kingly structure of the Pyramids"! We no longer feel the slightest touch of shame at the sense of utter satiety which more than once impelled us to forsake the Academy of Music, resounding with the ceaseless stream of orthodoxy, for the melancholy roar of the sea-lions, the antics of the monkeys, and the chatter of parrots in the Zoological Garden. Surely the mere sight of this bulky volume will convince Dr. Knox and the Belfast Committee, if nothing else does, that the next programme must be cut down at least to one-half if not to one-third of these proportions. It may be very well, once for all, to demonstrate in this manner that we are the lineal descendants of the iron men of old, who wrote ponderous folios and preached four hours. But if the Council goes on at this rate, there will be a gross literalness in the Apostle's hyperbole, "The world will not be able to contain the books." Only by stern repression of this exuberant genius for "Papers" can time be found for conference upon schemes of practicable coöperation, upon the inauguration and success of which, we must believe, more than all else, depends the value and perpetuity of the Alliance.

The work as it lies before us reflects credit upon the editors and publishers. Errors of course can be detected here and there. The phonographer fails occasionally to catch the exact purport of the extemporaneous remark, or the correct name of the speaker may not in every case be given. But the wonder is that so few mistakes occur in a volume so extensive, the contents of which are of such diversified character. The appendices are full, and the index enables one to turn in a moment to any topic in the programme. The value of the book is enhanced not a little by the elegant designs, due to the taste and skill of Dr. McCook, Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, representing by appropriate emblems the various historical Churches of the Alliance, so that a glance of the eye takes in an epitome of their history, its great events and chief actors.

The reader will cheerfully excuse us from attempting to analyse in detail so large a volume, and one embracing such a variety of topics. Instead of attempting this, we will content ourselves by a rapid survey of some of the principal matters dis-

cussed in the Council, in order that we may see the present status of opinion in the Reformed Churches as reflected in these discussions. To do this we shall not attempt to adhere to the order laid down in the programme, but rather seek to group the discussions together under such headings as: 1. Dogmatics; 2. Apologetics; 3. Ecclesiology; 4. Religion and Society; 5. Christian Activity and Cooperation.

I. DOGMATICS.

The topic of Dogmatics was fittingly introduced by Dr. Rainy's paper on "Modern Theological Thought" (p. 77). We heard the paper criticised at the time, as being deficient in a plan and devoid of a clearly defined point. However, much information, the fruit of an intelligent survey of a very wide field, is given, and the paper is better suited for private reading than for the rapid process of public presentation.

"During a period of great mental activity," he says, "maxims and methods have formed themselves on the general field of intellectual effort. They are found, or are supposed, to be valid in that field, and they claim universal application. They embody strong impressions adverse to the admission of authority, incredulous of the supernatural, inclining to trust exclusively to what may be called material and tangible proof. They embody also strong impressions as to the condition of human existence, the measure of human responsibility, the past history and future destiny of man. These maxims and methods press on the convictions and habits heretofore cherished in believing minds. They claim a right to alter or to subvert. How is this pressure to be dealt with? What is to be made on theological ground of these maxims, of these methods? By various schools this question is diversely answered. Sometimes a hostile, or a precautionary, attitude is assumed toward the tendencies whose presence is felt. Sometimes, on the contrary, they are welcomed, and their influence in a new shaping of theology is studied with predilection. Hence arise problems for all the theologies and for our own."

Dr. Rainy proceeds by noting the *apologetic tone* imparted to all theological literature. Every belief being called into question,

it is natural that belief be stated with eye to that expected doubt. The immediate source of this critical movement he finds in the great crisis of the last century, our own times witnessing the unfolding of that movement. The whole contents of human thought have been all the while involved, but the effects have been more marked in the theological sphere. Criticism has attacked the credentials of Christianity, and in order to reach as many as possible, apologetic discussion has, *argumenti causâ*, been disposed to make provisional concessions. "Grant that the measure of divine guidance vouchsafed to the writers is debatable, yet," etc. Criticism has invaded the contents of revelation, and the same concessive tone is heard. The *tendency* is inbred, for the nature of apologetic is to persuade. In dealing with various classes, it must argue, of course, *ex concessis*. Speculative theology reflects the tendency also, "for the object of such systems is not, directly at least, the practical service of the Church, nor is it edification. The want they meet is purely intellectual. The aim is to exhibit theology in its relations to philosophy; or to exhibit it as one department of the whole of reasoned knowledge, continuous and coherent with the rest. It proceeds on the idea that theology, like other systems, must be pervaded by the questions: How do I know that I know? in what sense do I know? Theology is to be placed in harmonious relation to man's faculties; and not to these alone, but to the whole world of thought and impression which man has acquired, and to the maxims he has learned to hold valid. In short, theology is to be contemplated in the light of man's best conceptions of the intellectual world he lives in, and his best conceptions of the conditions of his intellectual and moral life" (p. 81). Hence it is not to be wondered at that speculative theology is somewhat at a discount in orthodox schools. The tendency is to overdo its work—to minimise difficulties and differences in order to effect adjustments with the thought of the age. Dr. Rainy illustrates these positions by instancing the tendency to retire into the background, as it were, the "juridical element" of the Reformed Theology, to which he is disposed to give, if not the central place, yet the name of the "organising or dogma-building ele-

ment." He does not, of course, assume that the Reformed Theology may not be supplemented or corrected, but he emphasises the thought that such a change as this, if effected, would be a great step.

He proceeds to intimate the bias imparted to the view taken of this central principle by the prominence recently given to the "Fatherhood of God," and more recently still by the idea of the "educative process" through which the race is being led.

And then, after briefly glancing at the persistent influence now exerted by discussions as to the "theory of religion"—its root in human nature, the primary ideas of the mind—he goes on to say: "Thus considered, modern theology bears the aspect of one who revolves and ponders the necessity of a revision and the propriety of a reaction. A question is in presence about the earlier theologies, the theology of the churches and the confessions. These earlier theologies—take them as a whole—may be described as projected simply from the point of view of Bible teaching and of faith. In intention, at least, that was their character, whatever perversities of method clung to them. The question now everywhere in the air is, Did not all those theologies overdo the confidence of their interpretations and the sweep of their conclusions? Did they not, as some think, trust their sources too simply, *i. e.*, trust too much to the Bible? Or did they not, as others say, interpret those sources too unguardedly, taking that as absolute which was true only under qualification, and that as universal which was true only *secundum quid*? And if such errors do attach, is it in great and substantial matters, or only in small and circumstantial, that the errors are?" (P. 87.)

In her efforts to solve these questions, modern theology applies herself to every available source of information; the sacred writings are analysed afresh to determine, if possible, the exact mental state of the writer; historical theology traces the influences under which this or that doctrine was brought into prominence; philosophy restates man's latest exposition of the intellectual world, in order that Christianity may be adjusted to it. "We who meet here are not of the number of those who imagine that sweeping changes will prove inevitable or imperative." But.

the Church must be ready to act her part. In order to know just how the mind of Christ strikes upon and into the ferment of human thought, one must study both the revealing word, and also our time in its mental workings. It may be well to signalise more clearly the relative certainty for the various elements of our theology. But Dr. Rainy cannot see how the Church can undertake to discriminate, as she is asked by some believing theologians to do, between two theologies—a biblical one, and one that is speculative—requiring absolute assent to the one, but allowing a certain latitude of questioning as to the other.

We have been more careful to exhibit the contents of this paper because the comparative isolation of our country and Church had hardly given us an opportunity to measure the ferment which is heaving and working so actively in other centres of Christian life. Let us be instructed betimes. Many of us shall not have passed from the stage of action until the cyclone shall be careering overhead and around us. Deeper thinking, broader culture, is demanded of those who would guide the thinking of the coming era. May it be true of us that "*Forewarned is forearmed.*"

But the key-note to all that was done under this head may be said to have been struck by Dr. Humphrey in his masterly paper, "The Inspiration, Authenticity, and Interpretation of the Scriptures." (P. 104.) Recent movements of thought, especially in Scotland, have given marked prominence to this cardinal doctrine. Hence every eye was fixed and every ear open when the Doctor began. The trumpet gave no uncertain sound. Taking the same line of thought which we first met with in Dr. Tayler Lewis's admirable little volume, "The Divine-Human in the Scriptures," he proceeded with incisive, rapid strokes to develop the analogy between the incarnate word and the written word—all Human, all Divine! The *modes* of the Spirit's operation unrevealed and undiscoverable, but the results *demonstrable*. The warm assent of the Council found expression in a burst of applause. And then Dr. Watts, of Belfast, followed in an oral discourse of great cogency and power (p. 113), the chief point being the testimony of Christ as to the authenticity and the plenary inspiration of Scripture, contrasted with the position of

the Higher Criticism, so-called. And along with this crushing reply to the critics, he insisted upon the office of the Holy Ghost in the economy of grace, as to the person of the Mediator and all his official acts, and then *a fortiori*, as regards the functions of the apostolate. And when opportunity was allowed for brief discussion on the topic (p. 137), earnest words of assent were spoken by Principal Cairns of Edinburgh, Dr. Skinner of Cincinnati, and Dr. Burns of Halifax, while Dr. J. Murray Mitchell, Narayan Sheshadri, and Mr. McKenzie of China, added interesting testimony, growing out of their experience of the contact of the Bible with the sacred books of Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Parseeism, and Confucianism. And Principal Caven of Toronto filled out the remaining time in warm endorsement of the confessional doctrine of an infallible rule of faith. The whole body, as it were, had spoken with one heart and one voice on this great question.

The next great dogma to which we shall call attention was brought up on the fifth day of the sessions (p. 357)—“The Vicarious Sacrifice of Christ.” The first paper was read by Dr. Cairns of Edinburgh, and it is not too much to say that nothing more completely enchained the attention of the Assembly or thrilled its heart more than the lucid setting forth of the “old, old story.” The reader’s soul was manifestly wrapt in the intense enjoyment of his theme. Singularly devoid of the graces of elocution, his “blood-earnestness” overbore all criticism and commanded full sympathy. 1. The idea of atonement, he contended, had generally in some shape or other commended itself to the religious instincts of man. 2. It rests upon the data of the Old Testament revelation. 3. It is in harmony with all other revealed truth. 4. It is tested and illustrated in Christian experience. It is the centre of life and enterprise to day. It is the burden of those hymns of devotion which vibrate upon the hearts of God’s people. The hearty earnestness of the venerable Scotchman, more still, his mighty theme, stirred feelings too deep for utterance, and many a cheek was wet with tears.

Dr. Hodge’s paper, “The Vicarious Sacrifice of Christ as understood by the Churches represented in this Alliance,” was

worthy of his reputation. He is careful to define the exact import of the phrase "Vicarious Sacrifice." It is not coextensive with redemption, soteriology, or the provinces covered by justification and adoption, but expresses the exact connexion between the sufferings of Christ and the remission of sins. This being settled, he proceeds to emphasise the historical fact that this conception of Vicarious Sacrifice is confessed in all the symbols of the Reformed Churches. And not only as a doctrine, one among many, but as *the doctrine*, carrying with it our whole gospel, our whole religious and ecclesiastical life. It is the catholic creed of all the Churches of the Reformation as well. It comprehends all those partial views of the truth which have been so eagerly held by aberrant minds within the evangelical fold—the theory of a moral impression to be made on men's minds; an exemplification of the great principle of self-sacrifice; sympathetic self-identification in order to a full confession of our sins; the governmental theory of Hugo Grotius. All these are but dismembered parts of the complete whole, and are defective rather because of what they deny than what they affirm.

It happened in the hurry of business that discussion was not called on these papers. But the sympathies of the body were unmistakably shown. The great Council was as one man with regard to the vicarious sacrifice of Christ.

And while all were thus standing, mellowed and tender, before the Cross, it was judiciously arranged that Dr. Witherspoon, of Petersburg, Va., should read his paper on "The Duration of Future Punishment." He began by briefly giving the *status questionis* as it might be gathered on *prima facie* evidence—on the one hand, God's witnessing Church in all successive ages, standing in solid phalanx with scarcely a discernible gap; on the other, an incongruous mass moved by feeling which vents itself in passionate denunciation. The appeal to antiquity is neutralised by the manifest unsoundness of their witnesses upon other vital points as well as this. While among themselves they are divided into opposing schemes of Universalism, Annihilationism, Restorationism, and the latest phase, for which Dr. W. proposes the designation, "Æonism." It is, in fact, a species of Nescience or

Agnosticism introduced into the exposition of Scripture. Of this, as all know, Canon Farrar is the foremost champion at present.

In setting forth the confessional doctrine as to Future Punishment, Dr. W. wisely forbore to attempt in thirty minutes the compass of so wide a topic, which could only have resulted in cursory mention of trite points connected with the discussion. Instead of this, he chose a single term, and that specially commended not only because of the prominence given to it by recent discussions, but also because it is perhaps the most important word in its applications to this awful theme.

"In coming before you to-day," he said, (p. 372,) "I have no purpose to attempt a compass of this controversy. Time would not permit. I take my stand upon a single point in the line of defense—one that seems to me to be the key to the whole position. I shall ask your attention to a review, in the light of recent scholarship, of the signification of a single word—a commonplace word, I know, but one upon which the whole controversy is made to hinge. I refer to the word *αἰών*. Of the original signification of this word no better expression can be given than that found in the celebrated passage of Aristotle, who makes it to be a compound of *αἰεί*, *forever*, and *ὄν*, *existing*, so that it carries in its very structure the idea of eternity. Classical scholars all agree that it comes from that root whose simplest formation, and therefore the one most colorless, is the adverb *αἰεί*, *forever*. They all agree that this same root, passing into other languages of the Indo-European stock, appears in the German *ewig*, and the English *aye* and *ever*; that it lies at the basis of the Latin *æternus*, *æternitas*, and the English *eternal*, and *eternity*. But that which we claim of importance is the testimony of Aristotle as to the usage of the word to signify the complete period of existence. Taking this idea of the complete period, the *all of existence*, as our clue, it is easy to trace the whole classic usage of the word; for evidently the first measure of completed existence which suggested itself to the mind was a human life. It was the man's *all of existence* to the eye of sense. Hence, in the earliest Greek literature a man's life is his *αἰών*. And so,

viewed by these same standards of sense, the nation has its *aión*—its all of existence from its rise to its fall. The material world, in so far as it is viewed as temporal, has its *aión*—its all of duration. But as the mind advances in thought beyond the temporal and finite, there comes into view, first dimly shadowed forth, then more clearly revealed to cognition, a past in which there must have been existence of some kind that never began, a future in which there must be existence of some kind that shall never end. And thus *aión* comes to signify the complete period of all existence, past and future—eternity in its strictest sense—that unmeasured and measureless duration in which all conceivable time is but a brief parenthesis, a ripple upon the surface of an ocean without bottom and without shore.”

Having thus seized upon the clue which is to guide him through the tangled labyrinths of affirmation and denial, Dr. W. proceeds to apply and justify the position gained, by a reference to the contrasted usages of Plato and Aristotle, of the poets philosophers, and rhetoricians. And then passing into the Septuagint translation, he signalises the continuity of this idea of a totality of existence. *aión* renders the Hebrew עוֹלָם when it expresses the being of God, his kingdom, glory, mercy, etc. And even when it expresses duration which is clearly finite, the limitation in every instance can be seen to arise from the nature of the case—it expresses the completed period of existence for that thing. The same principles obtain in the New Testament. Twenty instances are admitted in which *aión* expresses duration less than infinite, “but in every case in which it is so used the subject is one that admits of only a limited duration, and the word *aión* retains its original force, as expressing the totality of duration of that to which it refers.” In perfect accord with this radical signification we find the contrast made between the present *aión*, (*time*, as we say,) the completed existence of the present order of things, and the future *aión*, which never ends, being the whole existence of God and immortal souls. These conclusions are applied with crushing force against the position of Canon Farrar, that *aión* is a word indeterminate in its application to future punishment. The force of the prepo-

sitions *ἐκ*, *ἀπὸ*, and *εἰς* is carefully noted, and the blunder exposed that *πρό*, in temporal clauses with a genitive, should be rendered *before* the time, instead so long a time *before*, the later Greek usage being exactly parallel with the Latin *pro* with the ablative of time. *Pro paucis diebus*, *πρὸ πέντε ἡμερῶν*, being respectively, "a few days before," "five days before."

The expressions *εἰς αἰῶνας*, *εἰς αἰῶνα αἰώνων*, *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*, etc., are then taken up and analysed, the procedure of the mind being given as to their formation. *Αἰών* in itself expresses limitless duration. But when the mind seeks to enter into that sphere, it strives to realise more vividly to itself the vastness of duration.

"The mind stretching itself to embrace the utmost conceivable period of duration, makes that the unit in a system of additions and multiplications, that by these as stepping-stones, it may pass on and on in its nearest possible approximation in consciousness to the infinite period embraced in its logical concept. But so far from the idea in these expressions being less than strictly eternal, the very purpose of their formation is to give the most expression possible to this idea, and for Canon Farrar and others to plead these passages as a proof that *αἰών* does not mean *endless*, is about as rational as it would be to plead that because we use in English such phrases as *forever and ever*, and *eternity of eternities*, therefore the English words *forever* and *eternity* imply a period that may have an end."

Dr. W. then alludes briefly to the abortive effort to produce from the Scriptures stronger assurances for the endless happiness of the redeemed than for the endless misery of the lost. Of these terms he says: "There is not one of them the classical usage of which is more uniformly in the sense of eternal and everlasting—not one of them which could any better withstand the destructive criticism that has been brought to bear upon *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*." And then with a passing allusion to patristic usage, he adopts the conclusion of Tyler, that "if the idea of duration without end is not expressed in the words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*, it cannot be expressed by any words in the Greek language." The statement of Moses Stuart in 1830 stands good to-day, he

thinks, when viewed in the full light of later scholarship: "If the Scriptures have not asserted the endless punishment of the wicked, neither have they asserted the endless happiness of the righteous, nor the endless glory and existence of the Godhead."

The charge that the ministry of the day has discarded the frequent use of "hell," "damnation," "the gnawing worm," etc., may only mean that they have ceased to employ the terrible pictures of Dante and Milton, which is to be commended; but if it signify the surrender of the testimony to the hopelessness of those who die unbelievers, then it is to be deplored and denounced. 1. "The formulation of Christian doctrine must base itself first, last, always, upon the simple testimony of God's word." 2. To falter is to admit that with regard to one of the greatest doctrines, the future state of the impenitent, the Bible speaks in variable and doubtful terms, which differs immensely from saying that it is silent. 3. To shrink from this testimony is to imperil the souls of men who cling persistently to the faintest hope of pardon after death as the ground of neglecting salvation now.

We have dwelt at some length upon this paper, not only because it was one of the most scholarly and able of all, and because it came from our own corner of the vineyard—(may it be the harbinger of the higher Biblical scholarship that is to be among us!)—but also because the confessional doctrine has been recently challenged. It was commonly reported that at least one delegate on the floor (he was from Canada) has been recently dealt with on account of alleged departure from the faith more or less pronounced. But when in view of all the facts the writer of these lines felt called upon to invite special attention to the attitude of the Alliance toward this solemn doctrine (p. 785), the allusion was met with such demonstrations of assent as showed the Council to be practically unanimous on this point also.

A valuable report on "Creeds and Confessions" was presented to the Council by Dr. Schaff, Chairman of the Committee, which appears as the fourth topic in the Appendix, (p. 935,) and fills no less than one hundred and fifty-eight pages in small

type. No explanation was given as to the precise purpose in view, except a most emphatic denial on the part of the Council of any assumption of authority on its part to "revise" creeds and confessions, which are in every case the property of the Church which holds it. No dread need be felt, we think, of unauthorised interference by way of enactment or advice. And yet, of course, if ever in the good providence of God the Churches shall see their way clear to constitute an **Œcumenical Assembly** with the powers of a church court, this movement must come about by ascertaining first what basis do our various Confessions, as they now stand, afford for such a consummation. Into this carefully prepared document we cannot at this time enter at all. It richly deserves a separate article in this **REVIEW**. And although the whole topic has been again committed, Dr. Cairns, of Edinburgh, being made the Chairman, enough matter has been already furnished to warrant such a critical article by some competent hand, showing the common basis of the Confessions, so that we may arrive at a satisfactory opinion as to the feasibility of a great federation to be expressed in a **General Assembly** for all the Presbyterians of the world. Of course it is to be expected that the closer intercourse among the Churches, and the discussions growing out of the Council, will bring the men of to-day nearer together than the framers of the Confessions may have been, acting as they did in comparative isolation. And this has given rise to grave apprehension in the minds of honored brethren in our own bounds lest we be carried away by the drift from the old moorings. Of course this danger inheres in all such associations. But unless we greatly mistake, the conservative tone of the Council will go very far toward giving preponderance to the opposite consideration that it is our duty and privilege to testify for the truth as we hold it, gladly availing ourselves of this association in order to help forward such of our brethren as may have creeds less complete than our own. We may incur some risk, but no more than we are necessitated to do in reading their books or in holding intercourse with the unbelieving of the world.

And this brings us to the excellent paper of Dr. Van Zandt of

the New Brunswick Theological Seminary (Dutch Reformed) on "Creeds and Subscriptions to Creeds." (Pp. 263-268) This he discusses under the two heads: I. "The necessity and uses of Creeds"; and II. "The nature and extent of the obligation incurred by subscription to them." Under the first head, the doctor answers briefly the various objections which have been urged against Creeds: 1. That they antagonise the fundamental principle of Protestantism. 2. That they disparage the Scriptures by implying defect as to substance, or as to mode of statement in God's word. 3. That they obstruct research and progress in theology. 4. That none is qualified to be a Creed-maker. And all these objections having been fairly met, he proceeds to the more difficult matter of subscription.

"It is obvious that on this question extremes are to be avoided. But the discovery and adjustment of the golden mean is not so easy. It is against the whole spirit of our Protestantism, and would be ruinous to any Church, to insist upon unqualified assent to every sentence and clause of an extended confession; but it is no less contrary to good faith and honest dealing to profess acceptance of a creed or confession, and yet hold one's self at liberty to reject and contradict whatever in it does not accord with one's own opinions. Where shall the line be drawn at which liberty becomes license? What is the criterion by which to distinguish an honest subscription from a disingenuous evasion? Who is to decide what may or may not be excepted from the obligations of an *ex animo* conformity?"

"For meeting the difficulties thus suggested, two methods have been proposed.

"First, to simplify the creed until it shall express only the essentials of the Christian life. Second, so to modify the form of subscription, that it shall involve no obligation of conformity to details, or explanations of doctrine.

"The first method is, in effect, a giving up of the whole controversy by reducing the creed to such narrow limits and general terms as to defeat all the purposes for which creeds exist.

"The second method would equally destroy the value of subscription, as a test of doctrine, or a protection against error.

The formula of subscription, '*for substance of doctrine,*' may be a relief to a scrupulous conscience, or it may also be a convenient refuge from the unwelcome pressure of an orthodox creed. The phrase itself is too indefinite and ambiguous to fix a man's theological status, or the position of a Church in which such a form of subscription prevails.

"It is not, then, by reducing creeds to the brevity of a few undefined general articles, nor yet by modifying the terms of subscription so as to destroy all the value, and significance and value of the act, that we are to avoid the extreme of a too rigid enforcement of the obligations of an accepted creed. In point of fact, that extreme is seldom reached; and in these days the danger in that direction is rather a theoretical possibility, than a matter of actual apprehension. Ecclesiastical martyrdom now lies oftener in the path of those who insist upon the obligations of an honest subscription.

"The truth is, that where creeds are not imposed, but accepted, the practical difficulties of subscription recede almost to the vanishing point. A man is not obliged to confess in the words of a creed which does not express the faith that is in him. But to whatever creed he does confess, thereto is he bound until he is lawfully discharged from the obligation.

"Moreover, he is bound to that confession, not with indefinite reservation, but *ex animo*, and in the historical and commonly received meaning of its articles, as held by the Church whose creed it is. If he has scruples or doubts concerning this or that paragraph, or proposition, it is for the authority requiring the confession to decide whether these excepted propositions are necessary to the integrity of the creed as a system of doctrines. An honest man will make these scruples known *in limine*, and he will always find provision made for their due consideration. He will find, too, that their treatment is liberal and generous; more generous sometimes to the individual than to the denomination represented."

To this solution there will be few to take exception. It embodies these fundamental propositions: 1. That it is competent to each Church or body of disciples entering into covenanted fel-

lowship with the Lord and with one another, to make as the articles of their confederation such a statement of the principal truths of Scripture as may express with sufficient fulness their common faith. 2. That it is also competent to this body of disciples, as a free Christian commonwealth, acting under a due sense of responsibility to God, and also duly observing the provisions of their own organic law regulating the modes of procedure, to amend this confession when further light has been gained. 3. It is the duty of the individual in seeking office in the Church, *first*, to ascertain the honest meaning of the confession, and *then*, his own mind sincerely agreeing thereto, to subscribe to the confession in the received historical sense, making known to the authorities who receive his confession any doubts or exceptions that may then occur to him. 4. Should subsequent examination convince him of a defect or error in the confession, it is his plain duty to go before the tribunals of his Church, state his exceptions, and cheerfully abide the decision of the power which, acting for Christ, gave him a commission to exercise authority, as to continuing or withdrawing that commission. Should the man still adhere to the conviction that he is called to preach or rule, he can seek connexion with some other branch of the Church which agrees with him. Or that failing, he can stand forth in his individual capacity to testify for Christ and his truth as he understands it. But for one who has accepted office under a written contract to attack the propositions of that agreement, while he holds to his commission as an office bearer in covenant with the Church, upon plea of "advanced thought," or light subsequently obtained, is, we humbly submit, nothing less than bad faith. This point was clearly brought out in the discussion upon Prof. Flint's paper. The overwhelming agreement of the house was plainly manifested. But Principal Grant, of Kingston, Canada, showed both misapprehension of the point and dissent from it; the manner of expressing himself not being free from the appearance of personal discourtesy to one of the speakers. No one had questioned the right of a presbyter, sitting in a court and acting under the limitations of the constitution, to move amendments to the confession. The allusion was plainly to individual action outside

of the courts, to criticisms and attacks upon a proposition in the confession made before the general public, and in such a way as to produce discontent and schism in the body of the people, who have no voice in amending the confession. To this Dr. Grant: "But we are told that brethren may go outside of the Church. I answer, that we do not endorse secession. No true minister of Christ should secede from the Church so long as he is true to the One to whom he made his ordination vows—the Head of the Church. If he is preaching what he believes to be the truth, why charge him with dishonor? Has the Church no power of discipline? Let the Church exercise its power of discipline, and cast off the brother if he is unfaithful; for the point is, that he does not think himself unfaithful, because he speaks the language of his own age, and not the language of two or three centuries ago. . . . We talk of ordination vows. A brother is under the law, primarily to Christ, and secondarily to the Church. Because he is under the law to Christ, let him speak all that Christ teaches him. He owes a duty to the Church; and let him give to the Church all the truth that he is capable of giving, until the Church says to him, 'We cannot tolerate you.' Let me illustrate by way of analogy. You of the United States have, from time to time, made amendments to your national constitution. Now, if you were to propose, as a fundamental requirement, that no amendment shall be made to the Constitution of the United States unless the citizen proposing it shall have left the United States, gone to and lived in Canada or Great Britain, do you think that any such amendments would ever be ratified by you?" (Pp. 299, 300.) The analogy is utterly inapt as to the point intended by the speaker. A "citizen" of the United States can only propose amendments when he is a member of Congress, and such proposal can only be acted upon by the legally appointed representatives of the people, not by the mass of citizens. Dr. Grant laid himself open to the reply of Dr. De Witt: "But I do wish most solemnly to protest against a most vicious illustration made use of by Principal Grant. The supposition that a judge of the supreme court of our Church may, in the exercise of his teaching gifts and in his official capacity, impugn or strike at the

very constitution which he has received and adopted, is the most vicious supposition that I have ever had the infelicity of hearing from a Reformed Churchman."

And when the opportunity was given (see p. 379.) for discussion on "Creeds and Confessions," the conservative view was shown to be the one which found favor with the house. Dr. Burns, of Halifax, earnestly deprecated the belief that the "advanced" opinions of Principal Grant, and others, represented the Church in Canada. Of eighteen delegates present in the Council, only three were believed to entertain such views. "I felt yesterday," he said, "when listening to the remarks of Dr. DeWitt, that that gentleman had struck the nail on the head. I felt that my beloved brother, Principal Grant (and no one loves him, with his great heart, more than I do), did speak unadvisedly with his lips. I do hope that the remarks of Dr. DeWitt will strike him with such force as to make an impression upon him without breaking his head."

Rev. Mr. Neilson, of New Hebrides, raised the inquiry as to the possibility of simplifying the creeds, and hoped that the discussions in the Council might shed light upon this question. "I belong," he said, "to a very old Church—to what was called 'The Reformed Presbyterian,' or 'Cameronian' branch of the Church in Scotland. In taking upon myself ordination vows, I subscribed a very long creed: I subscribed the Confession of Faith; I subscribed the Catechisms—the Larger and Shorter; I subscribed the Declaration and Testimony of the Reformed Synod. I bound myself to maintain the faith contended for by the martyrs in all the persecutions in Scotland. Now, for the last fourteen years, I have been in a mission where we have been admitting converted heathen, cannibals—men who have been eaters of the flesh of ministers of the Christian Church—and we have admitted these upon a creed that can be written upon a small scrap of paper." Mr. Neilson does not clearly discriminate between the subscription required of the private member at his admission into church fellowship, and of an officer at his ordination. He leaves us in doubt as to whether he did in fact give in his adhesion twice to his long creed. But Dr. McVicar, of

Montreal, replied well: "I presume that the creed of a cannibal, in the New Hebrides, or elsewhere, when brought into the Christian Church, may be a very short one; but that the creed of the public preacher of the gospel of Jesus Christ, and of the whole word of God, cannot be quite as short as that of the cannibal.

"Hints have been thrown out, I think, on the floor of the Council (and they are quite abundant beyond it), that there is a want of freedom in discussing the doctrines of our Church, on account of something in our polity. I grant at once that there is a limit set to the province of the public preacher. I hold that no man is entitled to go before the people, and deliver a message, until he is quite sure himself that it is the truth of God. There is a limit for him. But there is no limit set for any one of the fathers and brothers of this Council in bringing forward for discussion, by overtures in Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies, any doctrine which is formulated in our creed. In the Presbytery of Montreal, I would be willing to sit for eight or ten days to hear a man plead for an overture touching the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other great doctrine. I suspect, however, that we should send him home convinced that he had undertaken a very foolish piece of business, in assuming to disturb that doctrine. Yet, he is at liberty to bring it up, and discuss it to his heart's content.

"It has been hinted, too, that there is something wrong about the creeds. These hints may be wisely made in Presbytery or Synod; but, for one, I should much prefer to see such propositions distinctly formulated so as to set forth exactly what it is these brethren wish and demand. If the creed is too long, pray tell me what it is you are going to cut off. If the creed is too diffuse in its texture, pray give me a proposition which you design to substitute for that diffusiveness in a creed which you have had so long. Then I shall have something tangible to consider. But, until that is done, these mysterious hints (which often conceal far more than they express) do not present anything definite. It is hinted, too, that an adherence to creeds is calculated to hinder progress. Historically the evidence is just the reverse. The

Churches which have had long, concatenated creeds, are themselves, to-day, strong and vigorous. Churches, on the other hand, which have been constantly extemporising their creeds have been non-progressive. So that the evidences of history are in favor of length in creeds; and I can conceive of nothing that would be a greater advantage to the truth than for this great Council to gather up all the accepted truths held by Christendom, and set the stamp of its approval upon them. That alone would shut the mouths of sceptics, and would break the back-bone of the argument by which Romanism is accustomed to hold its votaries in thralldom. What we need to do, is not to go back in formulating creeds, but to discover the truth as we reason it out more fully, and as we are ready to subscribe to it. Progress is not in the direction of disintegration, but rather in the direction of reformation."

Dr. Calderwood of Edinburgh followed in one of those discriminating addresses for which he stands unexcelled among all the debaters to whom it has been our pleasure to listen.

"I listened with very great attention and interest to the discussion which we had yesterday, not at all marvelling that there are many among us who are anxious for some degree of liberty beyond what we at present enjoy, and not wondering that there were some inclined to seek a greater simplicity of creed. But as I listened, I thought it became obvious that the discussion needed to be somewhat carefully regulated with regard to all the interests involved. What was sought for by those who did so earnestly and passionately plead for increased liberty, or for a reduction of the creed, was simply that which would allow liberty to the individual, along with fidelity to the Church. But the question is, what liberty to the individual is to be allowed, and under what circumstances is it to be allowed? The fidelity of the Church is quite above the liberty of the individual in the Church, and the fidelity of the Church is its fidelity to its Master, and to the great work which the Church has to do in instructing mankind. Accordingly, we must put the responsibility of the Church for its teachings altogether above any liberty which may belong to the individual in respect to his own teachings.

“Next, it must be obvious to every one that his teaching is to be in harmony with the creed of his Church, and whosoever, acting under authority to teach God’s truth from the pulpit to the Church, asks the liberty to teach that which that Church does not hold to be God’s truth, asks what the Church cannot grant.

“But when we are brought down to this point, it is urged that we are placing ourselves in a wrong position, unless we admit that the creed may be revised. That, however, is another question, and one that stands in a totally different position. It is the liberty, the right, and the duty of each Church to revise its creed, as that Church shall see fit, by means of its own representative courts. It is for the good of theologic truth; it is for the interest of the whole Church, that the man who entertains a wish to modify, alter, or improve, shall be required first to think so long, so carefully, and so patiently, about what he means to propose, that he shall meet his brethren in the regular court to make that proposal, and shall go through all the necessary restrictions that are involved.

“In the same way you may say that it belongs to us to remember that we may shorten our creed. Certainly may the Christian Church, if it see fit, by its representative office-bearers, shorten its own creed. But it is not the right of the individual minister, whatever his position, either in the pulpit or in the chair, to begin that work of reduction. It belongs to the Church as a Church, through its representative body, to shorten its creed. The Church, rejoicing in its liberty, will act slowly, cautiously, prudently, and well, as it proceeds in this great work. Let it not then be said that we are in any way lowering the power of the Church to deal with its creed; but rather that we are asking that Presbyterian order and honor be constantly and carefully guarded in all that we do in dealing with a question such as this.

“Let us ask ourselves (while we allow all such discussion, and while we value it,) what is the exact position of this Council, and what is the relation of the Churches represented in it as a Council? We may yet do something very important in our history, by presenting the different aspects of the several Churches

in relation to the creed; but if we have to do that work at all, we have to do it well. This Council will follow behind the Churches which have the individual right (and they cannot be deprived of it,) of dealing with their creed; and it will very slowly and patiently, step by step only, and with the utmost caution, do that which, as a Council, it may think may be done, in the interest of truth and in the service of the whole Presbyterian Church. Just as we are open to admit free discussion, and yet are cautious and slow in formulating, do we serve our Churches."

Dr. Skinner, of Cincinnati, after distinguishing clearly between what is required for admission to the sacraments, and for ordination, signalled the only two omissions in the Westminster standards—a testimony against the preaching of women, and a declaration of the duty of alms-giving. These he is in favor of incorporating into the Confession.

Dr. Wallace, of Wooster, Ohio, followed in a similar strain, claiming that freedom of investigation was amply provided for. But investigation should be had before vows are taken. The candidate for ordination is competent for it, having gone through the course of philosophy and theology. Let him examine before he subscribes, and let it be understood that he has something settled when he avows his acceptance of the creed of his Church.

Dr. Murkland, of Baltimore, gave a telling illustration of the moral power of a clearly defined creed. A high dignitary of the Roman Church had said not long since to a friend of Dr. M.'s, "There is one Church that we fear above all others, and that is the Presbyterian Church, because we always know where to find it, and it meets us at every point with an intelligent answer for its faith and the Bible for its basis." And, so too, said the doctor, if the rampant infidelity of this age were to name the Church which it hates most, it would say the Presbyterian Church. The Church which Rome dreads and infidelity hates above all others, enjoys her preëminence because of her allegiance to the historic Confessions.

But enough has been produced, we think, to show the conservatism which largely predominated in the Council. There

were three brethren from Canada, a few from Scotland, just how many we could not tell, who were understood as leaning toward what is usually termed "Broad Church Views." Of these Principal Grant displayed most vigor, and was the recognised leader. From certain letters to the New York *Independent* we learn that Prof. Bruce of Scotland, as we had reasons to surmise, fully sympathises with these "advanced" views. We have given much of our space to these points, not only because of their transcendent importance, but also because we were positively told by brethren from our Church who were visitors at the Council, that there are ministers in our Assembly's bounds who do not fully receive certain doctrines of the Confession as they are held by the Church. No names were given, and we are ignorant at this writing of any such brethren. We heartily wish that we could believe our informants to be mistaken. But we wish to lift up a testimony against the danger of wounding one's conscience, on the one hand, by continuing to profess propositions (as silence certainly does), which one no longer believes *ex animo*. On the other hand, we would, to the extent of our ability, protest against the violation of one's vows, which surely results from giving forth, as a recognised teacher of the Church, views which contradict the creed one has subscribed as the condition of his ordination. The discussions herein set forth have shown us a more excellent way. Let the exception be frankly avowed to the Presbytery. And, if after consulting together in brotherly fashion, the exception be judged of such a nature as to impair the integrity of the creed, let him resign his commission into the hands that gave it. If his conscience impels him to preach, there is ample room outside the Presbyterian Church. We shall be sorry to part with such honest men. But they may be assured of the respect and esteem of every presbyter. The truth, as they understand it to be, will not suffer disadvantage from such candor and honor in those who profess it. And the seceder will lay the Church under obligations to one who has saved her from a prosecution which is sure to evoke bitterness and endanger souls. We have known such an instance, and the separatist is fully assured to this day of the respect and confidence of his former associates.

II. APOLOGETICS.

The papers read under this head were well worthy of the distinguished men who wrote them, and of the Presbyterian name.

Dr. Calderwood's (p. 198) on "The Relations of Science and Theology," insisted upon rigidly defining the respective spheres of the two departments of thought. 1. "Science" (physical science we prefer to write it) "is concerned exclusively with observed facts, and it can advance only as observation leads or warrants a given form of inference. Science does not, indeed, profess to advance only under warrant of a perfect induction; but treating this as unattainable, asks that such precautions be taken to secure rigid accuracy of observation, that there can be no misgiving as the facts. Facts must be carefully ascertained, and so, also, must their uniform relations, in order that we may with certainty speak of accurate classification or competent inference as to the laws of nature. External observation is the instrument, facts coming within the compass of such observation are the material; and inference from these affords the result which may be described as scientific induction, or a contribution to the vast body of scientific truth. The legitimacy of all this will be universally allowed; but the most important thing to be remarked at present is, that theology does not enter upon this sphere, and is in no respect involved in what is attempted or achieved within it. The sphere lies quite apart from that of theology, which cannot under any pretext be brought into a position of antagonism. Theology has nothing to offer by way of contribution, and nothing to refuse out of the host of conclusions which may on adequate scientific tests be accepted by the human intelligence. There would be no need for insisting upon this very obvious truth, were it not that certain scientific men are accustomed to protest against the interference of theology. The interference is a myth. Science has nothing to encounter save the tests which its own methods impose, and these are the ordinary conditions of intelligence. Natural theology refuses to be restricted to external observation, but it does not suggest doubt of such observation, or profess to offer opposition to its exercise; rather it asks from all the sciences the ma-

terials with which it may itself work. Christian theology finds upon an authoritative revelation, but the revelation does not offer any help on scientific questions, does not profess to be a substitute for science. It does not forestall inquiry as to the facts of nature or the laws by which these are governed. It professes to be a revelation, by the searching of which the simplest man may learn the highest wisdom; but it does not profess to reveal the elements of geology, biology, or physics. On the contrary, it is quite in accordance with all its professions, that men should have been left waiting till the nineteenth century of the Christian era before they were able to reach a truly scientific investigation of the secrets of nature. This being so, there is ample ground for urging that theology cannot interfere with science, and protestations against theologic interference may well take end, as inconsistent with intelligent recognition of the boundaries of the sphere assigned to theology.

“On equally valid grounds it needs to be admitted that science cannot interfere with theology, because it cannot enter into its sphere, and thus can neither bear testimony nor offer criticism. Science cannot transcend its own boundaries. Unchallengeable within these, it is powerless beyond. It cannot, on any warrant capable of bearing scientific test, maintain that there are facts save those recognised by external observation, or that there is no form of truth save that which expresses the phenomena presented to the senses. Science has no testimony to bear save as to the facts of observation, and can neither affirm nor deny beyond the boundaries which it has marked out for itself and proclaimed, and which all intelligent men see must be the boundaries of science according to its nature. As it is no disparagement of theology to say that it cannot do the work of science, so neither is it any disparagement of science to say that it cannot contribute toward a rational test of theology otherwise than by presenting its testimony as to the facts of nature. I am not in this way seeking to deny that intelligence may challenge the reality of the supernatural, but merely suggesting that when this is done it is not part of the work of science; or, otherwise expressed, it is not scientifically done. There can be no scientific denial of the su-

pernatural, for science is only of the observational—that is, of the natural. What bearing this has upon the attitude and intellectual work of scepticism concerning the supernatural may be matter for after consideration. The primary and fundamental fact is that science and theology occupy distinct spheres, so that the one cannot occupy the province of the other.

“The bearing which this fact should have upon the attitude of theology toward science is that which chiefly concerns us here. It clearly implies a sound intellectual sympathy with science and delight in its progress. It is the province of one department of inquiry or thought to cherish intelligent respect for other departments; and if this be a general maxim, it must be to have special force in its application to theology; for whereas there may be that in educational science which contributes toward doubt in the supernatural, belief in the supernatural must accept with thankfulness the widening of the area of knowledge, in whatever direction advance be made. It is manifestly a part of the Church’s work to encourage and sustain the profoundest interest in the advance of science. Belief that the worlds were made by the power of God must quicken intellectual enthusiasm in the systematising of our knowledge of the universe. Whatever scientific men may have to say of theology and theologians, they should have no difficulty in recognising the sincere and delighted acknowledgment which the Church of Christ makes of the gain to the human race from widened knowledge of man.”

2. Prof. Calderwood next proceeds to note the “*closeness of the relations of theology to science.*” “Theology cannot dwell apart from science, though it is quite possible that science may dwell apart from theology. . . . Theology must stand in close and friendly relations with science, as a condition of its own existence. Even a profession of concern, because of the progress of science, is an admission of weakness. There can be no disguising of this from ordinary reflection, and there should be none in the councils of the Church. Such apprehension betrays mistrust of scientific methods, which is a challenging of human intelligence; but, in its worst light from a Christian point of view, it is mistrust of the testimony of creation from those who proclaim

unwavering trust in the Creator, and in the truth—the grand certainty—that all his works praise him. It is, therefore, one essential part of the task intrusted to the Christian Church to banish from its borders mistrust of science.”

3. “The point most for consideration is that *theology has been specially assailed from the regions of scientific inference*. Theology has not been assailed by science, the impossibility of which assault has been indicated; but by scientific men, distinguished in various departments of science, it has been met by a distinct refusal to recognise the Supernatural. It may seem only a verbal difference to say that it has been assailed by recognised scientific leaders, not by science, but the difference between science itself, and the applications which scientific men make of scientific conclusions, is immense. Science does not rest on authority, and teaches us to rest lightly on the dicta of individuals. It accepts only what evidence establishes, and constrains all to recognise. But when scientific men proceed to reason as to the logical consequences of scientific results, as warranting inference concerning the government of the world, science ceases to be responsible, whether these inferences favor theology, or assume an aspect of antagonism. Such inferences as to the government of the world become fit subjects for the general intelligence; and, according to the analogies of experience, theologians may be fairly regarded as having trained aptitude for dealing with them, while scientific observers have no special training for this task, and are in fact so much disciplined in intellectual exercise of a different kind, that they may in a large measure lack the training which fits for this work. Accordingly, it is only expressing a very general impression among intelligent men, if I say that examples of cosmic speculation from recognised scientific authorities have in several cases failed to awaken a favorable judgment of fitness for the voluntarily selected task.”

Space fails us for the remaining paragraphs of this profoundly able and compact paper. And it is next to an impossibility to compress it, since every superfluous word has been carefully eliminated. The readers of this REVIEW will not fail to detect the substantial agreement between the principles elaborated by Dr.

Calderwood, and those propounded more briefly by Prof. Woodrow in two able articles on the same general topic in the Nos. for July, 1873, and April, 1874. For the present, scientific men and theologians seem to be alike averse to a careful observance of the boundary lines between the two provinces of thought. Nevertheless, such reading and reflection as we have been able to devote to this great question brings us more and more to the belief that therein lies the solution of the question of the relations of theology to physical science. After briefly applying his principles to the defence of religion, Prof. Calderwood goes on under his fourth head to say:

“In view of the immense advance in scientific knowledge, and the admitted conflict as to the legitimate inferences from this knowledge, the interests of the Christian Church require among its adherents, and specially among its ministers, some devoted to the study of distinct departments of science. It is a legitimate claim on the part of scientific men, that the defenders of theology give evidence of possessing ample scientific knowledge. To meet this claim there must be division of labor and *specialising*. The interests of the Christian Church so obviously call for this, as to present a legitimate object of Christian ambition to those who recognise the power of such knowledge.”

Thus, from the further side of the Atlantic and from the highest seats of learning in Edinburgh, do we have a tribute paid to the far-seeing liberality of the founder of the “Perkins Chair” in the Columbia Seminary. This feature of the instruction there given constitutes, in our opinion, a separate and decisive reason for the reopening of that institution, and for special satisfaction among the friends of religion at the prospect, growing hourly brighter, that this will certainly be done, in the good providence of God.

We can scarcely resist the impulse to copy the concluding paragraphs in this notable paper in which Dr. Calderwood earnestly cautions ministers against the evil habit of making “general charges against science, and general attacks upon scientists,” and then urges them, while carefully defending the faith once for all delivered to the saints, not by hasty denunciations, but pro-

found and discriminating analysis, to cultivate the spirit of intelligent and hearty recognition, on our part, of the immense service rendered to the race and to Christian education by the expanded horizon of our knowledge of the Universe, "in which moral and spiritual life is the grandest thing discovered."

Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, followed in a paper discussing the question, "How to deal with young men trained in science in this age of unsettled opinion." (P. 204.)

After some discriminating remarks showing the limitations which must be put upon the scientific use of the much disputed term "evolution," limitations which strip it of certain metaphysical and theosophic speculations which have grown up around it, Dr. McCosh goes on to lay down wise maxims for pastors, teachers, and parents who may be called to deal with interests so delicate and so unspeakably precious. He closed by giving the results of these rules as brought out in his own experience. "In the Irish College I knew of only one young man who went away an avowed unbeliever; and he had been induced by a friend not to attend my upper class lest he should fall under my influence. I have watched the career of the thousand young men who studied under me then, most of them wielding influence in their own country, some of them in high position in India, and a few of them in this country, and I have not heard of one of them openly joining the ranks of the infidel. In this country four out of the twelve hundred students who, trained under able Christian instructors, have graduated in Princeton since I became connected with it, have left its walls believing in nothing." The subsequent history of these four is most wonderful. Two of them are now ministers of the word, one an advanced student in a theological class, and the fourth has been heard of as conducting Sunday-school exercises and opening them with prayer!

The discussion on these papers (pp. 225-234) developed nothing requiring comment beyond mention of the evidence given in the course of it, that many, perhaps the most, are hardly prepared just yet to accept Dr. Calderwood's Eirenikon. The opposition is easy to locate. Men insist just yet upon a traditional interpretation of Scripture which makes it responsible for certain

scientific theories, which thereby become matters of faith with them. Secondly, such as may develop great love for some branch of science, if they be at the same time devout, are apt to infuse their science into their theology, or their theology into their science, or both, to the great injury of all interests. We have been convinced for years that Dr. Calderwood's position is the one to which we must come. And the history of past controversies between theologians and scientific men amply justifies it.

There are some wise suggestions in the paper of Dr. de Presensé, the distinguished apologist of the Church in France, to which we must refer the reader without attempting the analysis which it richly merits. His references to recent volumes will be of great service to such as are resolved to enter into this great domain. The paper is found in its English garb at p. 902 of the Appendix. Speaking of the hostile demonstrations against the faith made by men eminent in physical science, M. de Presensé remarks (p. 906): "We cannot ignore them. The first duty of apologetics is to know them well—to possess such knowledge that the blows may not be in vain and hazardous. *I cannot approve too highly of the establishment of scientific courses in our Theological Universities*, at least where they are not already introduced. I am convinced that the more information is spread, the more easy will be the victory over contemporaneous materialism.

"The more I consider its gigantic efforts to ruin the belief in the spiritual world, the more I am persuaded of the force of our position towards each other as Christian spiritualists, and that we should not ignore the opening of the combat which is inevitable." We have taken the liberty to italicise the recommendation coming from this distinguished defender of the faith, who has earned our admiration in the thickest of the fight. It coincides fully with the advice of Dr. Calderwood in pointing out the special danger to our young men arising from the potent name of *Science*, and also in indicating that special culture is required in the ministry along that border of theology which separates it from physical science. The whole of that border-line is in dispute, and to locate it requires knowledge of the country on both

sides. It is to us at this time just about what "the Eastern Question" is to British statesmanship. And while it is true that, owing to our comparative isolation at the South, and also, in part, to the conservative character of our people, less progress has been made here by "scientific doubt" so-called, yet is it also true, as every pastor knows who is brought into contact with young men and especially such as may be entering the cultivated professions, that the epidemic has already set in. The "sporadic cases" daily become more numerous and the type of the disease more clearly defined. The cry shall soon be going up from agonised mothers, fathers, and ministers, all over our land, for our Moses and Aaron who may stand between the living and the dead, that the plague may be stayed. The taint is spreading through all our popular literature—books, magazines, newspapers. We have nothing to fear save ignorance in the ministry and unrighteousness in our membership.

The reading of Professor Flint's paper on "Agnosticism" was perhaps as vividly impressed on our mind as any incident in the proceedings. We had not seen the distinguished author before, and there was nothing in his *personnel* to suggest greatness: under medium size; of a sallow complexion; light tinted eyes; forehead broad, but low; manner rather quick and decisive, but not graceful. But when once he was fairly launched into his subject all else was forgotten, or else obscured. The only gesture was a nervous hitching of the right hand as it passed to and fro between the stand which held his manuscript and its favorite position on the right hip. The voice was not sonorous, the Scottish accent was unmistakable, but there was something in the words as they passed out into the great hall which was like the peculiar *wheep* of a minic-ball. The effect of such concentrated energy, such "blood-earnestness," to recur again to Lord Kames' description of Chalmers, is ever irresistible. Let a man have something to say that is worth hearing, and let him say it with heart and soul, he is always sure of attention and sympathy. Such was the fact with regard to Dr. Cairns—the opposite of Dr. Flint in physical proportions, but like him in being destitute of comeliness or the graces of an orator. No two men

were heard more eagerly in the Council. And their attractiveness consisted in weight of their thoughts and the energy of soul which launched the thought like a rifle-shot.

Prof. Flint briefly characterised that phase of anti-Christian thought which is known as "Agnosticism." Hume and Kant are given as its twin-source, so far as modern thinkers are concerned. It is the dogmatism of August Comte and the Positive School carried back to its justification in a metaphysical theory of knowledge. Hamilton and Mansel, Christian theists though they were, paved the way for its most conspicuous living champion, Herbert Spencer, as John Stuart Mill was before his death. "Wherever, therefore, assent is withheld because of the alleged incompetency of the mind to ascertain the truth, there is Agnosticism. The rejection of any one kind of truth on that ground is as much Agnosticism as the rejection of any other kind. What is essential in Agnosticism is the reason on which it supports itself, the attitude towards truth and knowledge which it assumes; what is non-essential are the objects or propositions to which it is applied."

"Some have represented the scepticism, which may be appropriately called Agnosticism, as negation or disbelief; others contend that it should be confined to doubt. For reasons which I have not time here to state, I hold that it may be either doubt or disbelief. It is not, however, either merely doubt or disbelief, but the doubt or disbelief which rests upon the supposition that what are really powers of the human mind are really untrustworthy; that what are actually normal perceptions, natural, or even necessary laws and legitimate processes, are not to be depended on. Ordinary doubt and ordinary disbelief have their reasons in the objects or propositions examined by the mind, not in distrust of the mind itself; they imply nothing more than the conviction of the absence of evidence for, or the existence of evidence against, the particular position in dispute. But Agnosticism challenges evidence, and refuses to be convinced by it, on the deeper and subtler ground that the mind is not endowed with faculties by which it can derive truth and certainty from what is alleged to be evidence."

“In the present day, Agnosticism is seldom applied, as it was by the ancient Greek sceptics, to all forms and kinds of what is called knowledge; it is also rarely now maintained, as it has, however, not unfrequently been maintained, to be valid with respect to what is termed reason and science, but not to faith and religion; and on the contrary, it is only in reference to the spiritual and the supernatural that it is very prevalent, and, as regards them, it is alarmingly prevalent. Contemporary Agnosticism, unlike the more consistent Agnosticism of former ages, endeavors to show that ordinary experience and the positive sciences may be received with deference and confidence, but that religion and revelation must be rejected, as presenting only credentials which the human mind is capable of testing.”

Having thus skilfully laid bare the tap-root, so to speak, from which this upas-tree, the baleful night-shade of modern scepticism in its most advanced form, originates, the apologist goes on to specify the various forces that enter into the movement. The personal influence of such great thinkers as Hume and Kant, the Neo-Kantism of Germany, ignoring, as it does, the best elements in the master's system, being the most developed form of Agnosticism. The next element is the critical temper of this age. “We are living at a time when a very large number of persons claim the right to their own judgment, who have, unfortunately, but very little judgment to exercise; when a very large number of persons forget that the right of private judgment, although very important, is only a half truth, and that the duty of judging rightly is its complement and equally important.” For this state of things, as he properly suggests, there is no rapid cure. Time and Providence must work out the problem, and in the meanwhile we may possess our souls in patience. When such immense interests are thus brought into question by minds capricious and ill-advised, there is, humanly speaking, no reasonable means of avoiding the sad consequences. Many, alas! will go down in the greedy waters for whom the gospel life-boat will not, cannot, avail, since they will have nothing to do with it. We are to stand like true men to our oars, however, ready to save all within hail.

The question, How are our Churches to comport themselves toward this danger which threatens them all? Dr. Flint answers with ability and courage. Mere discipline, however just, however necessary, will not answer. Its criticism must be opposed with criticism of a legitimate kind. "Its irreverence must be confronted with piety; its narrow and exclusive views of development, with adequate and comprehensive ones; its ingenious but erroneous conjectures, with *sound* and true inductions; its hypotheses, plausible merely because drawn from facts arbitrarily selected and illusively combined, with conclusions drawn from all classes of relevant facts."

Among the causes of Agnosticism, the Professor alleged a torpid resting of Churches in creeds and confessions, however true and orthodox. There must be movement, life, growth, in order to keep pace with the rapid movements of the age. Past acquisitions must be viewed as the stepping-stones to higher attainments in the knowledge of God, as he is revealed in his word and works. And finally, with true pathos, he ended his thrilling argument thus: "If time had allowed, I should finally have dwelt on the thought that whatever tends to make us unspiritual, worldly, selfish, is favorable to Agnosticism; that all that tends to raise us above unspirituality, worldliness, selfishness, is unfavorable to it; and that the strongest of all anti-Agnostic forces, in fact, the one great safeguard of humanity against the general or final triumph of Agnosticism, is none other than the redemptive power of the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ. Each one of you—fathers, brothers, sisters—by simply so living as to show that religion is supremely worth believing, may do far more to combat the spirit whence Agnosticism arises, than I or any one could do by a merely formal written attack upon it. The grand argument against anti-religious Agnosticism is the practical one of a consistent and vigorous Christian life; the argument which, through God's grace, we can all use."

It was some days ere the echoes of these vivid thoughts had subsided sufficiently for us to feel more than a passing interest in other matters. And the picture of the earnest Scotchman, his quick, nervous manner, the flashes of his mind, playing like the

sheet-lightning over the rim of the horizon, is with us, abides with us to this hour. Only once before in our life, it seemed to us then, had we met a mind possessed of that dynamic influence, the thrills as it were of some hidden galvanic battery.

"Oh for the touch of a vanished hand,
The sound of a voice that is still!"

Prof. Flint's attainments we have only been able as yet to see displayed in the field of Apologetics. Here his erudition is positively astounding, and his logical acumen wields the immense array of facts and authorities as Hercules handled his mighty mace. We have been told by one who ought to know, that his power is not so great in other directions. If this be so, our Thornwell excelled. For his grasp upon the controversies, past and present, was but an incident in his wider learning, within the scope of which he frankly acknowledged there was less of acquaintance with the Physical Sciences than he desired. That department of knowledge is a growing necessity for apologist and system-builder.

Two points in Dr. Flint's paper were criticised in the discussion which is recorded at page 295. And in both instances by delegates from our Church. After submitting the paper to closer examination, we are sure that one of these exceptions was an honest misconception, and we doubt whether the other is necessary to a reader, though it seemed needful for the hearers of the paper. And upon better acquaintance with Prof. Flint's mind as revealed in his masterly treatise, "Theism," and "Anti-theistic Theories," we are sure that he cordially adopts the limitation to advance in theology which we then ventured to suggest, viz., that the great discoveries in Christian Theology are behind us.

It is understood that Dr. Flint will publish in due time a third volume upon Apologetics, in which he will deal at length with Agnosticism. We make bold to recommend it in advance to our brethren, as also the volumes above named.

And with this topic we must close for the present. If the editors permit, we will conclude our review of the great Council

by some discussion of the papers on the Church—its organisation, and its attitude toward society—the schemes for active co-operation among the Churches of the Alliance, and the place of our own Church in it.

WM. E. BOGGS.

ARTICLE VII.

THE DRIFT OF AMERICAN POLITICS.

In all governments where the forms are at all popular, there are two great parties, with lines of demarcation more or less distinctly drawn. And while there may be offshoots from either or both, these are usually insignificant, and devoid of any essential element of power. It has happened some times, that one of these small factions has grown into importance, and by the folly and obstinacy of the real contestants, has suddenly possessed the power for which the other two contended. This was very distinctly illustrated, nearly a quarter of a century ago, by the sudden triumph of the Abolition party, through the dissensions in the camp of the dominant party of this country. While the old Whig party confronted the old Democratic party, presenting clearly defined issues, and adhering to the foundation principles of its platforms, the latter party was kept in a compact organisation, by the constant danger of defeat. And the votes which were then cast for the smaller factions, might as well have been omitted from the count as not, so far as any national result was concerned. But the prominent result of this unexpected Abolition success, was the death of the Whig organisation, and the consequent absorption of its elements. At the North, the fragments fell into the Republican ranks: and at the South, the Democracy absorbed the remnants of its ancient opposition.

In order to a clear apprehension of the present topic, it is necessary to recall some of the more prominent issues that differ-

entiated these old organisations. Forty or fifty years ago, the Whig party made up its platforms of two or three prominent postulates. The chief plank was called "the Protective policy;" that is, the enactment of such laws as would exclude foreign products of industry from competition with American products. Opposed to this was the Democratic war-cry of "Free Trade," and while this party did not contend for the abolition of duties upon imports, it still insisted upon "a Tariff for revenue alone." The effect of the protective doctrine was to enroll all mill owners and operatives under Whig banners. All Americans who were interested in industrial enterprises, were supposed to vote for Whig success for this reason alone; while the Democratic leaders industriously pointed out the inevitable effect of protective legislation, in compelling the masses to pay higher prices for all the necessaries of life. Because the percentage of duty, upon the imported fabric, followed every yard of that fabric until it reached the consumer. And by the operation of the same law, the domestic fabric was enhanced in cost, to the exact extent of the percentage of duty upon its foreign rival.

As all legislation appeals to self-interest, it is evident that this cardinal principle could not maintain a secure hold upon any national party. Some States were agricultural, while others were manufacturing. No watchword was more hateful to Democratic theorists than the word "Tariff;" yet the present writer saw a banner from an interior Pennsylvania district, bearing the inscription: "Polk, Dallas, and the Tariff!" Because Pennsylvania has always been a pronounced Tariff State, and to-day, there are thousands upon thousands of rural voters in that great State who vote ballots bearing a hickory tree as the Totem of their political family, and who think they are still voting for Jackson.

The second postulate of the ancient Whig organisation related to the establishment of a national bank. This plank in the older platforms was certainly carved out of pure hostility to the party of Andrew Jackson, whose reputation, aside from his military career, was entirely builded upon his destruction of the old United States Bank. All that was desirable in financial theories on the Whig side—that is, the grand result of equalisation of exchange—

has since been accomplished by the present national bank system. The issue of the First National Bank of Portland, Oregon, is just as current in New York as the issue of the local banks in the latter city. And the simple reason is, that the Government is equally responsible for *both* issues. Consequently, the national bank issue died out, and no power could revivify it at this day, or give it a place in modern politics.

Between these two parties, there grew up the anti-slavery faction. It should be very easy at this late date to discuss the question in cold blood, and to examine the foundation principles upon which Abolitionism was erected. The very name "Abolitionist" was always hateful to Southern ears, because abolitionism constantly threatened and finally destroyed the structure of Southern society. It was by no means the Southern love of the "peculiar institution" that induced the rancorous enmity which culminated in war. But it was the ferocious attitude and utterances of abolition orators and organs, in advocating servile insurrection, and in the publication of highly distorted caricatures of Southern society, representing the master as invariably cruel and exacting, and in representing the slaves as universally groaning in chains, or howling under the lash of brutal owners. Nobody doubts that there were cruel masters in the South; and nobody doubts that there were some few dishonest citizens in the ranks of the Abolition party in the North. But it was just as far from the truth to suppose that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" presented a true picture of Southern life, as it was to suppose Sing Sing was the just home of all slavery-haters at the North. There were multitudes of godly men who owned slaves. There were multitudes of godly men who deplored slavery as a great evil, and who prayed God for its extinction. But the great multitude of Abolitionists were ignorant of the true status of the negro peasantry of the South; while all Southern men who have lived fifty years *know* that this people was the happiest peasantry on the face of the earth, until freedom was thrust upon them.

Among the moral people of the Abolition party, there were many pious men who were hampered by two considerations. One was the Revelation of God, which not only recognised the insti-

tution, but also enacted laws for its administration. It was formally recognised in two commands of the Decalogue; it was formally conserved in the didactic portion of the New Testament, the reciprocal obligations growing out of the relation of master and slave being clearly stated. Paul took to himself the title "δοῦλος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ"—the slave of Jesus Christ; and nothing resembling a prohibition of the relation is anywhere suggested in the Bible. The other obstacle to an abolition crusade, was the enactment of laws in the national legislature, and the decisions of the highest judiciary in the land, not only recognising the relation, but enforcing its natural obligations. But the party of high moral ideas was equal to the emergency. Both the law of God and the human enactments were swept away by the majestic march of a higher law, and the feeble voice of the more conservative slavery-haters was drowned in the clamor for blood. So the war came, and slavery disappeared in the smoke of the conflict. Here, then, was the opportunity for the formation of new parties, and the construction of new platforms. The mission of the great party of freedom was surely accomplished, with the establishment of freedom, and now some other issue must be sought out, around which citizens might rally under brand-new banners.

The cardinal doctrine of the victors was speedily announced: "They who saved the Union must keep control of the Union." This doctrine seemed to be eminently just, and the warning against Democrats, Copperheads, Secessionists, and Traitors, was everywhere heard throughout the length and breadth of the land. The emancipated slaves were furnished with ballots, before the scars of the gyves and of the slave-driver's lash were obliterated from their free bodies; and so through many mournful years, the stricken South groaned under this degrading domination. At last there came a Presidential election, in which the Democratic nominee was chosen by an enormous popular majority, and also by a very large majority of the Electoral vote. But the party of high moral ideas was equal to this emergency also. They were quite able to keep their places by the strong-hand, and in fact, the Executive actually accumulated troops at

the capital, with the avowed intention of seating the defeated candidate. Had it not been for the indignant protests of the respectable men and papers at the North, this course would have been taken, as the Stalwart leaders did not hesitate to avow their determination to retain power at all hazards. Then the Electoral Commission was invented. Seven prominent men were appointed from each party, and the umpire was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—once a body so dignified and pure, as to command the respect and veneration of all citizens. But the umpire of the Electoral Commission voted with his party, and by the force of a compact, either expressly stated or tacitly admitted on both sides, the minority President took the reins of government, while the Southern States emerged from their long night of carpet-bag domination.

Questions of finance then attracted public attention to the exclusion of other topics, and there came another Presidential election. The country had not recovered from the war-disease, although the war had ended sixteen years before. Therefore military candidates were nominated by both Conventions. Each party bespattered the other during the campaign, which was conducted—not upon platforms—but upon the total unfitness of the opposing candidate, and nothing else. One was stained with certain ugly charges of “bribery and corruption.” The other was laughed at for his total ignorance of politics, or statesmanship. An alien unlettered Papist, who controlled fifty or sixty thousand Democratic votes in New York, managed to cast the vote of that State for the Republican candidate, and thus secured his election. It would be idle to charge any special fraud upon one party more than upon the other. Both were desperately intent upon the same object, to wit, to gain the office for the sake of its emoluments and opportunities.

Because the country has undoubtedly drifted precisely into this condition. It would avail nothing, even if this were the place for such disputation, to inquire how far the party of high moral ideas was responsible for this humiliating condition. But the fact is patent that fraud and immorality dominate American politics. And the real topic for present inquiry relates to the pro-

bable drift of American politics under this unhappy state of affairs. The moral character of many of the most prominent men now holding custody of national interests is as bad as that of any score of convicts taken at random from any Penitentiary. It is true that the former could not be charged with murder, or burglary, or pocket-picking, in the technical application of the law that deals with these crimes. The late Secretary of the Treasury, nicknamed "Honest John" in hideous pleasantry, was guilty of the most atrocious oppression during his official career. He spared no pains in his efforts to destroy the import trade of New York simply because the vote of New York wire-pullers of his own party could not be obtained for him during his open candidacy for the Presidential nomination. He made the most ridiculous decisions in his controversy with sugar importers. He directed his subordinate thieves, who held their official positions at his pleasure, to assess the value of two-button kid gloves at about fifty francs per dozen, when the notorious fact, verified by every importer in this country and corroborated by every manufacturer in France, was less than forty-two francs for the very choicest specimens. And he thereby broke up the trade in these articles to a large extent, and all to gratify a personal malignant hatred of New York. He appointed a man in Chicago as Collector of that port whom he employed to furnish matter for the Chicago *Tribune*, all bearing upon this topic, and aroused a spirit of jealous rivalry between the inland city and the real metropolis of the western world. The largest importer of these gloves published an offer to furnish six thousand dozen of these very gloves to any buyer who would take them at forty-two francs, and his reply to this overwhelming argument was, "the Government did not buy gloves." Yet he reached his estimate of value by ordering one of his spies to buy a single dozen at *La Bon Marché*, in the *Rue du Bac*, in Paris. During the election campaign, he openly accused Wade Hampton of utterances that had never been in that gentleman's thoughts, and to-day he stands quiet under the charge of deliberate and wilful falsehood, which charge was widely published by the man he slandered. One of his most trusted agents is an ex-convict, and from this man, up, or down,

to his miserable creature in the Chicago Custom House, there is scarcely a reputable name among his personal followers.

Another prominent man, whose chief characteristic is unparalleled insolence, is the avowed leader of his party in the Empire State. All that he has ever done to gain his high reputation, was to get chased away from Narragansett Pier, by an outraged husband. He made "the greatest effort of his life" in getting beyond the range of that husband's shot-gun.

Another prominent member of the dominant party is a Brooklyn preacher, who escaped conviction in a scandalous trial by the disagreement of the jury, and who very recently clasped hands on a public platform with the blatant and ignorant Atheist, Ingersoll, merging all "mere theological differences" in their hearty agreement upon political questions.

None of these instances are given for the sake of showing special turpitude in one *party* more than in another. The questions that divide *parties*, are not the questions here discussed. But the moral status of the country's leaders, and the open contempt these pour upon the law of God, and the purest instincts of man, is the point to which attention is invited. And it is by no means asserted or even implied, that the triumph of the opposing party would bring about a better condition of affairs. With honorable exceptions, the law-makers of the United States are worse men than the heathen of whom Paul said "they were a law unto themselves," because Paul predicates *conscience* of these heathen, and thus differentiates them from many leading Congressmen

Whither then, does this drift tend?

There are two possible answers to this question. It is possible, humanly speaking, for the corruption that disgraces American politics to culminate in positive anarchy. There was never a country in the world, where Agrarian doctrines were more openly advocated. There was never a time in human history, when the advocates of Communism were more numerous or more compactly organised. The accumulation of wealth, by one man or by one corporation, is the ground of antagonism between such a man or such a corporation and "the People." There is a theory,

more or less openly announced, that all property rights are an invasion of some "inalienable" right that belongs to man as man. Of course, the application of this theory varies in various localities. In one of the trades-unions in England, an orator recently promulgated this postulate: A yard of cloth costing ten shillings had really only five shillings value of material in it. The other five shillings consisted in the wages paid the spinner and weaver; and therefore labor which furnished half the value was an equal partner with capital, which provided the other half in raw material, machinery, and the like. It requires no thought to answer that Capital paid the five shillings for Labor as well as the five shillings for material, and by this payment became the owner of the completed fabric. Because there is the vague idea in the mind of the worker, that he should have some share in the *profit* of the manufacture to which he contributes.

This single illustration will suffice to show one current of this evil drift. And the idea is so firmly fixed in the minds of the ignorant and vicious, that hordes of tramps threaten every sparsely populated section of the land. It is true that laws have been enacted and enforced in some few localities, providing a penalty for tramping. And such laws are based upon the clear apprehension of the truth, that nomadic life is destructive of organised society in its tendency. But no national enactment has ever dealt with the evil, although it is a monstrous evil, and there has never been an expression of national disapproval of tramping. Every man and woman in America, who has any visible stake in society, would rejoice if these wandering vagabonds would all disappear under the visitation of a discriminating pestilence. Because every man and woman in the land knows that no more portentous evil threatens social life.

In addition to the low state of morals, as touching the commandments against theft, lying, and covetousness, there is a most horrible state of corruption in American society touching the obligations of the seventh commandment. Very few decent men have any idea of the awful spread of immorality in this direction. There is a popular delusion that places France in general, and Paris in particular, at the head of the world in the bad præmi-

nence in vicious habits. But there is good reason for the belief, that Washington society is more stained with crimes against the marriage relation than any other capital of equal population in the world. And it is certainly true that the most populous of the Northern cities are gaining ground every year in the open contempt of restraints against indulgence in sensual pleasures. The leaders of public opinion promulgate loose theories, rivalling the filthy utterances of free lovers, and the common people are rapidly falling under the power of evil example. The divorce trials that fill the newspapers familiarise the public mind with the most revolting details. In New York, there are scores of lawyers, who take charge of divorce suits alone, and who fatten upon the fees paid by the soulless scoundrels who employ them. No pen wielded by mortal hand can do justice, in the way of invective, in discussing this hideous topic. But the fatal fact abides, that American society is annually increasing in rottenness, and there is but a short step between its present condition, and the semi-legal debasement of Mormonism.

No thinker can escape the conclusion that the "free and equal" doctrine that gives the suffrage to the ignorant and vicious, goes a great way towards fastening this condition upon American society. Nearly a million of recently emancipated slaves are armed with the ballot. Nearly as many ignorant aliens, who have been "naturalised" under the organic law of the nation, participate in the choice of law-makers and rulers. Perhaps these two elements neutralise each other, as parties are now constituted; but when the swiftly approaching time comes, and the conflict between conservatism and communism is fairly inaugurated, who can predict the outcome? These tramps, and negroes, and aliens—many of them ex-convicts—have intelligence enough to say: "The leaders have been able to steal the Presidency; they still control the millions of public money—why should not we also take our share? The rich are able to obtain divorce upon any pretext—why should not we abolish all marriage laws? The respectable managers of moneyed institutions boldly steal the scanty savings of widows and orphans—why should not we enter the bank vaults with crowbar and dynamite?"

If any reader thinks this is an exaggerated statement, he need only read the daily papers to change his opinion. The vicious portion of the population are in the majority; and the idea is rapidly assuming shape and coherence, that the virtuous are only living upon sufferance. The restraints of law are always irksome to the vicious, and one of the most wonderful of the phenomena of modern times, is the fact that Americans are a law-abiding people. But when the vile population of Paris discovered their own power, how quickly they used that power in the work of destruction. Twice, within the memory of some who still live, the French Empire has been virtually at the mercy of a merciless mob. And the present drift of American politics tends to invite the horrors of the French Revolution and the horrors of the Commune. Such orators in New York as "Citizen Megy," who boasts that he murdered the Archbishop of Paris; and as "Citizen Schwab"—a German atheist, who retails lager beer—and as "Citizen Kearney," the orator of the sand lots in California—are far more powerful in American politics than any three honest men in the land.

The great distinguishing peculiarity of your Communist, is insolence. A gentleman owning some land in the vicinity of one of the largest cities, recently had two instructive interviews with members of the Commune. The first was on a Sabbath afternoon, when he found six French gunners crossing his fields. They were all armed with doubled-barrelled guns, and were shooting every bird that came within range. The owner accosted the leader of the party, saying: "You may pass across my land, if need be, but you will please shoot no birds while you are on it." With an indescribable air of insolent contempt, the Frenchman replied: "And why not? Do you own the birds as well as the land?" The owner's coachman, who came from the Emerald Isle, and who was belligerent, happened to come up at this juncture, and with the aid of a well directed volley of stones, persuaded the six gunners to retire by the way they came. The other interview was in the autumn, when the ground in the woods was covered with nuts, and the owner happened to find a stranger industriously gathering these in his wood-land. His

first thought was to pass on and allow the uninvited guest to help himself, but there was such an air of defiant insolence about the man, that the owner paused and said: "This is private property, and you are trespassing—probably in ignorance." "You are mistaken!" answered the other, promptly; "these nuts cannot be private property. They are provided by nature in the free forest, and they belong to him who gathers them." Of course the first impulse was to kick the intruder from his premises, but some vague suggestion that a gentleman is bound by the laws of hospitality to restrain himself on his own property, caused the owner to repress his rising anger. So he passed on, merely saying: "Every nut you gather without my permission is a theft. And as I cannot allow you to steal my property—I now present you with all the nuts you want. Help yourself."

These two illustrations will serve to show the real *animus* of Agrarian doctrine. The old Abolition crusade was preached upon one text, to wit: that "man's property in man" was abhorrent to the native instincts of pure humanity. The ready answer to this foolish postulate was—that man could not have the right of property in the soul of man. The citadel of the soul could not be invaded by man or devil. But the right of property in the labor of another, was as clear a right as any that humanity enjoyed. All the laws of apprenticeship, and of clerk-hire, are founded upon it. And the domination of the New England mill-owner over the "hands" he employed, was always more absolute and generally more cruel than the domination of the Southern slave-owner. And within a year there have been well-authenticated cases, where the mill-owner compelled his workers to vote for the Republican candidate—or to vacate their places. It is true, the mill-owner paid regular weekly wages. But it is also true that the slave-owner furnished food, clothing, and shelter to the slave and the slave's family, whether the labor happened to be profitable or not.

It was an easy step from this Abolition text to the text of the Commune; as man could not rightfully hold property in man, he could not righteously hold property in land. The earth was given to man as man, and all the products of the earth were na-

ture's bounties, and free to all, and therefore the primal postulate of the Commune is, "Property is robbery." Another easy step reached the doctrine of the Nicolaitans—"which thing," says God, "I hate!" A man could have no right of husbandhood, and so the last ditch of Agrarian philosophy is reached in the unrestrained power of brute force, and the unrestricted indulgence of brute appetites.

The assassination of the Russian Emperor, on the 13th of March, gave occasion for an unusual burst of Agrarian eloquence in New York. The annexed quotations are from the New York *World* of the 15th and 16th March, and will fairly represent the ferocity of the murdering villains who dare to proclaim their infamous doctrines in the face of American society.

"The flags of the city and those of the various consulates were at half-mast yesterday for the murdered Czar. Mr. Kartebewsky, the Russian Consul, had intended to have some public assembly here, but gave up the idea because of a summons to Washington from the Russian Minister. He went to Washington last night in company with Father Bjerring, pastor of the Greek Chapel in this city, who will celebrate a requiem service in the rooms of the Legation at the capital this evening, assisted by the Rev. Mr. Lopuchin, also of this city. They will return on Thursday, and on next Sunday at 11 a. m. will celebrate a requiem mass at the Chapel, 951 Second Avenue.

"Nearly a dozen members of the Société des Réfugiés de la Commune met last evening at No. 123 West Houston street to arrange for the commemoration next Sunday of the anniversary of the declaration of the Commune at Paris on March 18, 1871. They also drank beer and discussed the assassination of the Czar, which they highly approved. Sympathy was expressed for the Nihilist bomb-thrower who was arrested, but no action was taken by the society as a body. Among those present was Edmond Megy, who was implicated in the killing of the Archbishop of Paris and the hostages. Hand-bills printed in German and English on blood-pink paper and announcing a meeting to express sympathy with the Nihilists were distributed. The meeting is to occur this evening at the Steuben House, No. 295 Bowery. The German side of the bill was as follows: '*Sic semper tyrannis! vicat sequens*' (which may be translated 'Next!'). 'The judgment of the Nihilists upon Alexander II. How long will the German Social Democrats bear with Bismarck and the Hohenzollern?!? Mass-meeting of all revolutionaries to express sympathy with the deed of the Russian Nihilists.'

On the other side was the announcement of the meeting headed with the same Latin mottoes and the sentence, 'Russia's despot killed by our friends!' Speeches are to be made in English, German, and Russian. The German notice is signed by Emil Klæssig, Secretary of the New York section of the Socialistic Labor party, and the English by Peter Knauer, Secretary of the 'Social Revolutionary Club.'

"Joseph Hansfeld, of No. 50 First street, was arrested in Second avenue, near Third street, last night, for posting bills announcing the meeting—not because of the character of the meeting, but because he posted the bills on a telegraph pole.

"At Justus Schwab's saloon, where a red flag floated yesterday, there was a gathering of Socialists all day. Inside the saloon there hangs a picture representing a table on which are three plates, one containing the severed head of Gambetta, another that of Bismarck, and the third is to be supplied to-day with the likeness of the dead Czar. The circular giving notice of the meeting at Steuben Hall was handed to every newcomer. The hall will be decorated with banners and devices expressive of the sort of triumph that the participants enjoy. Occasion was also taken to distribute a circular addressed to workmen, which says:

"**COMRADES AND FELLOW-WORKERS:** The oppression of labor by capital and monopoly daily becomes more violent—the rapacity of the employing class (unscrupulous enough to commit the blackest infamies) shows more marked evidence of its evil purpose. Every just demand for an amelioration of your condition, every humble petition for simple justice, but calls forth the threat of lead and steel, to drown your complaining cries in your own blood. Thousands of you are being murdered in the mines, the workshops and the factories—suffering painful deaths or death in life—through the criminal heartlessness of your masters, and that their gains may be greater. The fetters of poverty hold you in bondage, and when you make an effort to lighten them, when you ask for a little—a very little—more than the grace and favor of your taskmasters have hitherto granted you—a leaden ball is the answer; and over the graves of your murdered comrades you are dragged into yet deeper slavery. Brothers: there are yet means by which you can liberate yourselves from the ignoble serfdom of your present condition—means which will not fail to accomplish their object. Meet force with force! An organization of workers coextensive with the bounds of the nation must be established, whose guiding-star, whose sole end, aim, and purpose shall be—Freedom!—from the reign of tyrants; freedom from the dominance of a horde of lawless law-makers; freedom from the galling fetters of capital. Take advantage of the last remnant of liberty that you yet possess! Organise; provide yourselves with improved arms, and your courage and sense of independence will increase a thousandfold."

"The 'Social Revolutionary Club' arranged to hold a meeting last eve-

ning at the Steuben House, No. 295 Bowery, to express approval of the assassination of the Czar and sympathy with the Nihilists. A blood-red cloth with the words '*Sic Semper Tyrannis*' on it, was stretched across the head of the room, and near it was a red banner with a representation of the scales of justice, and the motto, 'The spirit of the Commune expands as the axe of the executioner falls upon the necks of its martyrs.' These were the only decorations arranged for the joyous occasion. The room contained as many persons as it could hold, and the overflow reached out of the doors. Half a dozen women were present. Justus Schwab, who sells beer in First street, and says he is a Communist, called the meeting to order, and announced that he was Chairman, George McNichols, Vice-Chairman, and Hugh McGregor, Secretary—'and dot's all,' he added, after a pause. He said they had mourned and wept upon hearing of the death of John Brown of Ossawatimie and Abraham Lincoln, but they rejoiced when they heard of the execution of Maximilian in Mexico and of the death of the 'greatest tyrant of the nineteenth century.' 'We rejoice, too,' he continued, 'because we are met to assert the right of free speech, and we denounce Mr. (with scorn) Brown, of Otsego County, who dared to introduce in the Assembly a resolution declaring that this meeting should not be held. We arraign him before the public for having tried to commit high treason in stifling free speech. We arraign Erastus Brooks for having introduced a resolution of condolence with the Government of Russia. We dispute the right of Blaine to speak for the American people in this matter and to send that despatch. The feeling of the people is pleasure, not condolence. We arraign the authorities of New York for daring to draw the flags at half-mast. We do not sympathise, but rejoice, because the greatest tyrant and enemy to progress of the nineteenth century has been removed.'

"Then Schwab introduced Citizen Victor Drury, who said that the introduction of the Brown resolution was a disgrace to republican institutions and threatened liberty as much as a ukase could. He declared that Secretary Blaine knew nothing of the feelings of the people, and said that minds greater than his were on the side of the Socialists. To prove this he cited a recent speech by Wendell Phillips, and spoke of William Cullen Bryant's presence at the unveiling of Mazzini's statue in Central Park, when Mazzini had taught that tyrannicide was a virtue. 'After having answered these dirty politicians who live like suckers on the taxes of the people,' continued Drury, 'let us turn to the condition of Russia.' He spoke of the prosecution of the Nihilists and of their struggle, and said: 'As the French have killed off nearly the last of the Napoleon dynasty, so the Nihilists will kill off the last of the Romanoff dynasty. They are perhaps twenty to 60,000,000 people, and the 60,000,000 will wipe out the twenty. Now we are asked to drop a tear'

(in a mocking voice), 'let's see some one drop a tear. Pass around your hat, Citizen Schwab, for the tears, and we will bottle them up and send them to Russia.' This provoked laughter.

"Schwab then read the following resolutions, which were adopted without a single dissentient voice :

"*In the name of humanity :*

"We congratulate the world upon the overthrow of absolutism of feudal autoocracy in Russia. We congratulate the people of Europe upon the removal of the greatest obstacle to the establishment of the Western Republic, or the United States of Europe. We congratulate our fellow-socialists that the great prop of monarchical institutions which has supported kingcraft throughout the world has been shaken to the very base by the fall of the Czar, and that the way is being cleared for the foundation of the social republic.

"We call upon the liberty-loving people of the United States of America to rejoice in the overthrow of the Czar equally as they rejoiced at the overthrow of Maximilian, whose presence endangered republican institutions.

"Resolved that the following address be forwarded to our fellow-workingmen in Russia, to our best friends and most active partisans—the Nihilists :

"**FELLOW-WORKINGMEN OF RUSSIA :** Between the aristocracy and the proletariat there can be no compromise. Between the parasites and the producers there can be no peace. While louts and loafers live in luxury upon the products of our labor, we must suffer and starve. Brothers, your cause is that of the oppressed against the oppressor. That cause is a holy cause ; that cause not only of Russia, but of all countries. It is universal. Brothers, we approve your actions ; we approve your methods. Between you and your oppressors there can be no truce. Kill, destroy, assassinate, annihilate, even to its very germ, your aristocracy. Have for them no feeling of love, for they are incapable of that noble emotion.

THE COMITE."

"S. Weinstein, a Russian, whose name was concealed with an air of mystery by Schwab, but who readily wrote it out himself for everybody who asked him to, was the next speaker. His speech was in Russian. He said the Czar had murdered so many men and women that it was hardly blamable to murder him. He described the suffering in Russia, and said that if the Nihilists did not make any gain from their work, their descendants would. In conclusion he drew a parallel between persons who believed in God and killed, and persons who did not believe in a future life and who killed, saying that the sacrifice by the latter of their lives was greater than that of the former, they not hoping to live hereafter !

“Wilhelm Hasselmann, a German socialist and ex-member of the Reichstag, then made an address in which he compared the condition of Germany to that of Russia. When Hasselmann had finished, a man with a red face, big black mustache and the general air of a policeman, steadied himself against the table and poked Schwab in the ribs. Schwab put a motion to adjourn, which was carried. The man said afterwards that he wanted to make a speech. The meeting was as orderly and enthusiastic as possible.

“Joseph Hausfeld, of No. 50 First street, who was arrested Monday night for posting on a telegraph pole the announcement of the meeting, was fined \$10 by Justice Bixby at Essex Market. Justus Schwab paid his fine.

“ST. LOUIS, March 15.—A handbill embellished with death’s head and cross-bones and a coffin was freely circulated on the streets to day, calling a meeting of the friends of progress and children of the Goddess of Liberty to indorse the action of the Nihilist Society in the assassination of the Emperor Alexander. The police are attempting to find the author of the handbill.”

The second possibility may now be considered. If the country is going to avoid this last ditch of pollution and shame, it can only be done by the establishment of the domination of virtue over vice; of cultivation over ignorance; of righteousness over sin. And, other things being equal, the predominance of these better attributes, must be sought amongst those of the higher class, in breeding and in wealth. And while this last proposition does not include that form of aristocracy called “codfish,” or that volume of wealth that carries with it the title of “millionaire,” it does include a certain amount of *family* pride, and such an amount of worldly goods as will secure the owner against the necessity of daily manual labor. And there is just this sort of aristocracy in America, which, by a combined effort, could easily take the reins of power and redeem the land.

Centralisation of power and authority must needs be the primal factor, if such a revolution as that suggested would be successful. It were idle to erect such a system of government if sections or factions could subvert the central authority. And although many warning cries have been uttered, especially by the Democratic press, against this tendency in American politics, it is certainly a growing tendency, and is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. Even Autocracy is far better than Mob-

ocracy; and a "landed aristocracy" is the most promising and most stable form of modern social life.

There is probably not one man in every hundred readers of this periodical who does not think the suffrage should be restricted. The doctrine of "manhood suffrage" is an indefinite generalisation that carries no weight. It says too much. Because the convicts in the penitentiaries are still men, and the "Indians not taxed" are still men; and the real intent of the catchword was only to justify negro suffrage. This added a vast volume of votes to the dominant party, so long as carpet-bag and scalawag government were sustained in the Southern States. But with the revival of lawful forms, the value of the enfranchised voters was lost to the men who invented the system, while the new basis of representation gave the Opposition a far stronger voice in the House of Representatives. But the party now in power is certainly more pronounced in its advocacy of centralised authority, and this doctrine is precisely antagonistic to universal suffrage. It is an easy matter to elevate men to citizenship. It is quite another matter to deprive them of these rights, when once bestowed. And while the demagogues now in power would gladly disfranchise the negro, whose vote is no longer available, and gladly take away the voting power of the naturalised foreigner, who cast his ballot for the Democratic candidate, they can never accomplish this reform except by positive revolution. The Constitution of the United States, and especially the later additions to it, are essentially democratic in scope and tendency, and in the worst sense of the word.

Here then is the Drift. And this Drift, if it should begin to manifest its dynamical energy, will be like the viscous flow of the great ice fields of the frozen North. These vast seas of ice issue from the deep fiords of that desolate region, in one steady, irresistible *flow*, and they sweep away every obstacle that is movable. They bear on their cold bosom enormous masses of rock that no human machinery could move; and when the giant ice-berg breaks away and sails into lower latitudes, it leaves behind it, the same unmeasured area of flowing ice fields, which will continue to breed these Titans so long as the present isothermal lines are unchanged on the earth's surface.

No man can predict the course of this Drift. It may begin in violence and fraud and bloodshed. Or it may keep within the limitations of law. But it is the Drift, and while it may be retarded or hastened, it will be incessant. No thinker can survey the present condition of American politics without finding his thoughts assuming some vague suggestion of revolution, and this revolution always includes the resistance of *οι πολλοι*, the multitude that may be terrible under educated leaders, but which would be a thousandfold more terrible unled.

Now the Gospel of Christ is the one dynamical engine which God has appointed for the conservation of social life. Every Christian man is ready to pray fervently for the conversion of the wicked. And no Christian can fix a limit beyond which he may not pray, in so far as his petition seeks pardon and sanctification for sinners. Moreover, there is no doubt that the prayers of God's people in this land form a barrier to the aggressions of *οι πολλοι*. And it may be that God will be pleased to convert the truculent scoundrels who are now holding jubilee over the murder of Alexander II. But it is also possible that God has in view his dealings with Amalek, and may have the fate of Amalek in reserve for the hideous miscreants who now curse the earth with their presence on its surface.

The argument here presented does not deal directly with the blessed doctrines of grace. The believer in Jesus must needs feel unspeakable compassion, when he contemplates the present condition and the violently probable future of the wicked. And every Christian man shrinks with horror from the thought of the wholesale destruction of tramps and Mormons and Communists. But let any Christian take up these classes, and add a few names from the roll of the American Congress, and let him try to pray *especially* for their regeneration. The Bible does not furnish many examples of prayer in behalf of the flagrantly wicked, yet no man may say this or that sinner is beyond the reach of saving grace. And if such praying should bring the answer, and if Mr. Schwab and Mr. Megy should become consistent members of a Christian Church, the drift suggested may be depleted or subverted. But if not—so much the worse for Messrs. Schwab and

Megy. And it may be—so much the better for American society, when the whitening bones of these human wolves shall form a ghostly monument—celebrating the triumph of Anglo-Saxon morality, and Anglo-Saxon civilisation.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE MAINE LAW AT PRESENT IN MAINE AND VERMONT*.

REV. DR. ADGER—MY DEAR BROTHER: In answer to your request, I will give you the clearest statement I am able to make of the present aspects of the "Maine Law" in Maine and Vermont, and of the chief grounds of argument by which the wisest and ablest defenders of the law maintain it. Of course, it has many advocates that are neither wise nor able, as every similar cause will have. We shall not concern ourselves with such.

In the two States of Maine and Vermont, the prohibitory law, so generally called "the Maine Law," is intact, and is conferring inestimable blessings upon those States. The law in general is

*The author of this letter is the Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, D. D., for many years a missionary to the Armenian people, and President of Roberts College, Constantinople, designed for their benefit. Circumstances beyond his control, in the providence of God, kept him from returning to Constantinople, and he is now the honored President of Middlebury College, Vermont. A most acceptable article from him on the Maine law appeared in this REVIEW for July, 1878. Being solicited to report the real state of public feeling in that region now, touching the operation and effects of the Maine law, (about which unfavorable reports have been very sedulously circulated amongst ourselves,) it has pleased him to do so in the form of a letter to one of us. Perhaps this form of communication may draw the more attention from our readers to his testimony. Dr. Hamlin is both a good and a great man, and his name must carry weight wherever he is known to any position which he advocates. We accept without qualification his testimony to the exceedingly great advantages derived from the prohibitory laws of Maine and Vermont, and we earnestly wish that all

as well executed as any other law. In some cities, as in Augusta and Bangor, it is violated in a shameful manner. There are many reasons why those places should have a majority of drinking or drunken people. Let a city have a majority of thieves, and good-natured relatives of thieves, who can't bear to have any body punished, and the law against theft would be laxly executed, especially if the officers were thieves, or thievish. But in the country towns and villages, among all the farming population, the law is held with a firm grasp and a steady hand. It shows no signs of weakening. The great liquor interest of Boston, controlled by men of great wealth and small morals, is spending money at every accessible point to weaken it.

That they succeed in making some drunkards, I admit. The law does not undertake to prevent a man from buying a cask or a case of liquors for his own use. What it forbids is all manufacture and retail sale of intoxicants. When you have shut up all the dram-shops and closed all the distilleries, you have removed nine-tenths of the drunkenness and its many attendant evils that cluster thick around the dram-shops. This work has been done, and well done, in Maine and Vermont.

our State Legislatures would come to adopt the same expedients against the dreadful vice of drunkenness. There is only one of his arguments which we cannot accept; but it is one which the advocates of prohibition do not need. And moreover it appears to us that it is one which they do not gain but lose by employing. We refer to his endeavor to make out that Scripture gives no sanction to wine when used in moderation. Our friend Dr. Hamlin has no sympathy with what is called the "advanced thought" of this boastful age. But surely the thought of this age as to temperance is too *advanced* when it would add to the perfect law of God. The scriptural virtue is not abstinence, but moderation. At the same time, love for a weak brother may well give up its liberty for his benefit, but the surrender is to be of free choice and not by compulsion. At the same time, also, we may well ask the State to employ its power as a human institute as may seem to us and to it to be wise. The State may adopt *opinions* and make use of *expedients*. The Church has no opinions, but a faith in the perfect law. She knows only duty as marked out, and no *expedients*. The old Puritan principle is the true one, viz.: that the Word is the sole and sufficient rule of faith and practice, and that to the Church whatever is not commanded is forbidden.

EDITORS SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

The existence of drunkenness to a certain extent does not prove the law to be inefficient, for, I repeat, it does not attempt to keep a man from making a brute of himself at home. If he come into the street drunk, he will be arrested as a dangerous and pernicious man, and will be taken care of and suitably fined. If in his drunkenness at home he commit acts of violence, the common laws will take cognisance of his crimes.

The following are the chief logical grounds upon which the advocates of the law base their cause.

1st. The general right of self-defence or protection.

This is one of the acknowledged rights of government, and carries with it a great and noble duty. No government can abandon the right nor evade the duty. If it have reason to believe that an enemy is undermining its power and plotting in any way whatever its destruction, it is under obligation to destroy the enemy or effectually baffle his designs. The government moreover must defend society against *evils* as well as enemies. Hence laws against adulterated food, against the communication of contagious diseases by the establishment of quarantine laws, and forbidding the sale of common virulent poisons.

On this broad and solid ground the duty of government to prohibit the sale of intoxicants is urged. For alcohol is a poison more dangerous than any other poison in this, that its use establishes a vicious and uncontrollable destructive to industry, health, morals, and reason, often making its victim dangerous, always injurious to society. As the evil is confessedly greater than any other evil, government is under supreme obligation to guard society against it. It cannot discharge its duty as a government and leave society a prey to the most merciless destroyer man has ever known.

2. A second and valid ground of argument for prohibition relates to the defence of the family. All governments that are above barbarism take the family constitution under their protection. They establish laws of marriage, and define many of the rights and duties of husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters. The perpetuity of the government and the progress of a Christian civilisation depend very largely upon the

purity of the family constitution. Nothing corrupts and destroys it like alcohol. The children of drunken parents inherit a disordered constitution. Insanity or idiocy is often the final outcome to thousands. The whole race will deteriorate physically, mentally, and morally, unless the manufacture and sale of intoxicants be forbidden by law, and suitable penalties be inflicted upon transgressors.

The following petition to Congress was formulated and circulated by the "Woman's Christian Temperance Union" in Maine. It expresses well the views and feelings of all thoughtful women with regard to the defence of their homes.

To the Honorable Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled :

WHEREAS, The best government, the highest national prosperity, and the happiest people result where Legal Right is one with Moral Right; and

WHEREAS, The Traffic in Intoxicating Drinks is a sin in itself, and its legalisation is a national crime; and

WHEREAS, The conservation of Home is essential to the highest welfare and happiness of our people, and to the permanence of all that is good in our civilisation, and is a worthy object of the most watchful solicitude of our law-makers; and

WHEREAS, The Liquor Traffic is the intolerable curse of thousands of homes throughout our land, the fatal destroyer of thousands more, and is Home's most mighty and cruel enemy; and

WHEREAS, Congress has power to protect from this curse the present and future homes of millions of men and women in the Territories, and to purify from this chief corruptor the Capital, which is the centre of all our social life, the fountain of our national legislation, and the home and seat of our nation's government; and

WHEREAS, The men who are laying the foundations of future States emphatically need that their stalwart arms be not unnerved, nor their clear brains clouded, and the wives and mothers who so faithfully share in the labors, the perils, and the privations of frontier life, need to be protected from the desolation and ruin of the homes upon which alone can a noble civilisation be built;

THEREFORE, We the undersigned, citizens of Maine, who know the priceless blessing of our own Prohibitory Law, and can point with grateful pride to the facts and figures which shine like stars in our State record, respectfully petition, for the Protection of Home, that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks in the District of Columbia and the Territories, be forever prohibited by Law.

3. Another very strong ground of argument in favor of prohibition is found in the political economy of the question.

It is urged that every intelligent government has, and must have, a watchful care over the sources of wealth and poverty. It must cherish commerce and the arts, and must open all possible avenues to useful industries. It must prevent the waste of national resources. It must prevent the silting up of rivers and their ravages by overflowing; it must prevent the destruction of harbors, the waste and destruction of forests. It must facilitate railroad and steamboat communication, and the regular service of the mail; because all these contribute to national wealth and growth.

But here is one single obstacle to the increase of national wealth, which obstructs more than any four great national industries ever can increase. This is a matter of reliable statistics, and admits of no answer. The census of 1870 proved an annual expenditure of 300,000,000 of dollars per annum for alcoholic drinks. Alcohol is a poison of little real use, except in the arts and in medicine, and we may safely say that five hundred and fifty millions of dollars are thus wasted every year, and abstracted from our possible growth in wealth.

This, however, is but a very small item, great as it may seem in the vast account. It used to be said forty years ago that 60,000 drunkards die, every year, a drunkard's death, in the United States. This is an old estimate. No one will now estimate the number as less than 100,000. Every drunkard, on the average, shortens his life from twenty to thirty years, as the statistics of Life Insurance abundantly prove. You will find careful statistics putting it higher than this, none lower. Then here is the astounding loss of two millions of years of human life to our country every year. A man's productive power in the various arts and employments, while he is in the prime of life, ought not to be less than \$400 per annum. In many States the common laborer gets that, the skilled artisan twice that. Here we have another grand item of loss of \$800,000,000, making a grand total of one billion four hundred and fifty millions. We have not added the crime, the idiocy, the insanity which result

from alcohol, for our result is already beyond our full comprehension. When men shall begin to discuss this fearful drain upon the possible wealth of the land, and the sad prevalence of paupery and crime, the indifference of government will not be tolerated. It is, even now, to some extent, a bribed indifference, for the liquor interest foresees the coming storm, and knows whose friendship it must seek.

4. Crime and poverty make a strong and direct appeal for prohibition, outside of the view of the political economist. His account is made up in dollars and cents. But here we contemplate the ruin of souls and the sufferings of our humanity. "Three fourths of the crimes of the land are from intoxicating drinks." This sentiment has been uttered by the Judges of England and America for two hundred years. Its accuracy cannot be questioned. The same proportion will hold true of poverty. A large share of this is entailed upon the innocent, upon women and children. When we say it is the most solemn duty of the government to punish the crime, and protect the innocent and defenceless from all this wrong—we mean it is the duty of the people. If the laws are insufficient, they must see that better laws replace them. If the officers of justice are lax, the people know well how to make them attend to duty. Public sentiment must support the laws. In the States of Maine and Vermont a general public sentiment was first created, and the stringent laws now existing are the expression of that sentiment.

5. The subject of education is most intimately connected with temperance. The children of the drunkard grow up in illiteracy and vice. The dram shop destroys the school house. Ignorance and degradation among the youth of any place bear a noticeable proportion to the rum and gin that are drunk. We cannot have a good school by the side of a drunkerie. The two cannot co-exist. We must shut up our schools or our dram shops. It needs no spirit of prophecy to foretell the future of a people that allows drunkenness and illiteracy to do their worst, and to go hand in hand unrebuked.

I have not spoken of the argument in its religious bearings. All men are agreed that drinking habits are destructive of true

religion. All admit that the Bible denounces the most terrible penalties to the drunkard, that its warnings against wine-bibbing are positive and severe. Those who quote, or misquote, Paul's advice to Timothy are not regarded as honestly believing that the Bible justifies the common use of wine, but as wresting the Scriptures to their own selfish gratifications. The soundest advocates of total abstinence take the ground which the Apostle Paul took in reference to certain meats. "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no meat while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."

The example of our Saviour in furnishing wine at the marriage feast is often referred to. Some have treated the question unwisely and weakly, as though the temperance argument would be abolished by the admission that it may have been real wine. But there are very many things which he did, which are not for us to follow. His mode of life in Palestine eighteen centuries ago as a Jew, his clothing, food, drink, mode of travelling, keeping the Jewish Sabbath, having no woman at the institution of the sacrament of the supper, and many other like things, we do not even think of as binding upon us under our altered circumstances.

As his disciples, we have perfect confidence in him, that he did just what was proper and right for him to do under those circumstances, and he knew that his Church would find the right way of understanding him. Whoever has his self-sacrificing spirit, and is ready to do anything for the salvation of men, will not be led astray by any unnatural or false interpretation of any one of his acts. But those who wish, doubtless, will wrest that Scripture of Cana to their own destruction, "as they do also other Scriptures."

What now are the lessons of experience in these two prohibitory States? How do the people themselves view the law? What is the *trend* of legislation with relation to it? The people of these States are fairly intelligent people. Where can you find a more intelligent, industrious population, than the farmers of Maine and Vermont? They are not embarrassed by a large foreign population, with the exception of a few cities. And yet

after the long trial of twenty to thirty years, the legislation, despite all the power of the liquor interest of Massachusetts, grows more and more stringent.

The Vermont Legislature at its last session passed a law making every place where intoxicants are sold, or given away, a public nuisance, and requiring the officers of justice to close it. Whether it be a hotel, apothecary's shop, boarding-house, or store of any kind, it must be shut up, on complaint, and shut up as a public nuisance. The modes and means of executing the law are provided, and it has gone into operation with excellent effect.

In Maine there is a movement to have the prohibitory law inserted into the Constitution, which will make it impossible for any political party to tamper with it. Then if any change shall be proposed, it must be referred to the votes of the entire people of the State.

The many false reports put in circulation about these States and their prohibitory laws have an easy explanation, and a sufficient cause. The manufacture of alcoholic drinks is the greatest industry of the United States. But it trembles at the possible awakening of public sentiment. It is bent upon securing the abolition of these laws. While they exist it is determined to limit their influence. In this, its unholy war, the end justifies the means. It would be too much to require those whose business it is to profit from the destruction of the family, and from the misery and distress of women and children, to have any regard to truth. Falsehood is as natural to them as the mixing of poisons in their unholy preparations.

While we feel that the contest has only commenced, and that we have to fight the greatest enemy to God and man that earth has ever known, we see progress, we feel sure of final victory.

Kansas has done nobly. Every State that joins in will add to the force of that movement that shall finally reach the impure halls of Congress, cleanse them of their filth, interdict the fatal manufacture, and save the land.

If my letter has marks of haste, you will know how to excuse it. It has been written under pressure.

Your old and faithful friend,

Middlebury, March 12, 1881.

CYRUS HAMLIN.

ARTICLE IX.

THE PRESBYTERIAN DIACONATE.

The nature and functions of the Diaconate, as part of the Presbyterian polity, have lately become a subject of discussion in our Church, with special reference to certain reformatory movements "for a change of the plan of conducting the benevolent enterprises of the Church." The proposed reform involves, as its justification, a novel theory of the nature, and a vast extension of the scope, of the diaconal office. It is this use of the new doctrines that has impressed the writer with the necessity of endeavoring, according to his ability, to stay the tide of what he considers an unscriptural and impracticable speculation. An article in the last number of this REVIEW, together with certain resolutions docketed by the Synod of South Carolina at its last meeting "for consideration" at its next, will be taken as presenting in its clearest and strongest form the scheme that is here opposed. It is a pain and grief to enter into controversy with the distinguished and learned author of those papers, at whose feet it is a delight to sit and learn; but the very reverence and authority which he is justly awarded by all, and by none more sincerely and fully than by the present writer, constitute the reasons of this public opposition. If it were not for the weight of *his* name and the eloquence and ability of *his* advocacy, this article would never have been written.

I.

It is affirmed "that the deacon belongs to a different order from the elder; from which position it follows, *first*, that the higher office of presbyter does not include the lower office of deacon; *secondly*, that those two offices should be kept distinct." It is to be hoped that the Synod of South Carolina will reject this "*resolution*," if not for its bad doctrine, at least for its bad logic, which is the matter just now under review. Its plausibility is first derived from a disregard of the two logical quantities of extension and intension, and a consequent confusion of the con-

cepts, which are viewed *extensively* in the premises and *intensively* in the inferences. But, before the dry bones of logic begin their rattle, it will be profitable, perhaps, to illustrate what is meant by the statement that the higher office or order *includes* the lower. Take, for instance, the different orders of the English nobility, Duke, Marquis, and so on down to Baron. Each higher order, whilst it contains in its differentiating marks and functions which determine its rank and distinguish its office in the scale and works of nobility and are wanting to the lower, has all the offices, rights, functions, etc., of all the lower—to use the language of logic, *connotes all their marks*, the members of all the orders meet and sit and work and vote as equals, constituting the House of Lords. In that court, each higher order lays aside its *distinctions*, and takes the status of the lowest member; the Duke *there* is only a Baron, though he keeps his distinct name. This common character and office gives them the common name *lord*. *Church-officer* is the common name of Presbyters and Deacons. It may likewise be affirmed that, in any *system* of orders, of which higher or lower may be predicated, there must be this involution of the marks of the lower in the higher. Otherwise they would not be a system—they would be in different worlds. Presbyters and Deacons are orders of the *Presbyterian Church*, one ecclesiastical world, in which and of which both the reviewer and the reviewed “live and move and have their being.”

Now, it is in the sense of the word illustrated above that it is maintained that the office of the Presbyter comprehends that of the Deacon. If the order of Presbyters be taken in the logical quantity of *extension*, then it does not include but necessarily excludes the Deacon's; and so, of all the orders which have been named and all that have not been named, it must be granted that it “follows” that they are coördinate and coexclusive. The order of dukes or earls, or colonels or majors, or bishops, or popes, might be extended to infinity, and still, nothing would “follow” but dukes or earls, or colonels or majors, or bishops or popes in dreary and endless succession. In like manner, animals and rational beings are coexclusive orders. The one does not necessarily include the other. There are animals that are not rational

beings ; and there are rational beings that are not animals. But change the view to that of an *intensive* concept, and forthwith we have a rational animal, and he is called a *man* ; and this illustration, by the laws of association, brings us back to logic. But these very concepts, *man* and *animal*, are illustrations of the extreme slipperiness of logic, so slippery that it can only be held fast by predacious teeth. Man, in the logical quantity of intension, is of a higher, or, to speak the language of logic, a *deeper* order than animal ; on the other hand, animal, in the quantity of extension, is of a higher, or *wider* order than man. Now we ask the reader to recall and apply the logical tests which discriminate these two quantities. An intensive concept *contains in it marks*, or attributes, that are *not partes extra partes*, but permeate the *substance* which *connotes* them. An extensive concept *contains under it objects* which are *partes extra partes* and constitute the *group* which *denotes* them. The test words are italicised. Intension is *depth*, extension is *width* : The former is a synthesis, and the latter an analysis. The former is an indivisible unit, and the latter a divisible sum of units.

The following is an example of the defective logic in one respect, under which the argument of the other side is laboring :

Whatever has parts is divisible ;
 The human soul has parts ;
 Therefore, the human soul is divisible.

Assuming that there are only two orders in the Presbyterian Church, it is here claimed that the following is an exact logical parallel :

One ecclesiastical order excludes the other ;
 Presbyter is one ecclesiastical order ;
 Therefore, Presbyter excludes the other, that is, the Deacon.

If "parts" and "order" have the same quantity throughout their respective syllogisms, the conclusion is inevitable. There is no other possible defect in either. But, having a clear immediate intuition of the untruth of the first conclusion, every one immediately sees that the major means, "Every group of objects that have a separate existence, is divisible;" but the minor means, "the human soul is a unit, containing in it all pervading

attributes;" and that the conclusion ought to be, "therefore, *nothing follows.*" Is it meant, then, that the untruth of the second conclusion is as plainly absurd as that of the first? By no means. This would be an imputation offensive to the last degree. The only justification of this essay is that the second conclusion is *not* plainly absurd, but flows legitimately from the premises taken in one sense throughout, and expresses a truth—a truth, however, that is of no relevancy whatever to the extension of the office and functions of the deacon, and the reform, in head and members, of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The trouble is that, because it is true in one sense, its untruth is not perceived when used in the other.

Let us, therefore, test the concept "ecclesiastical order" in the two quantities, by the insertion of the test words, "group" and "unit." "One group (ecclesiastical order) excludes the other; the group of Presbyters is one group; therefore, the group of Presbyters excludes the group of Deacons." Very good logic, but very barren consequence. It means that the group of Presbyters, A, B, C, D, E, F, does not include the group of Deacons, M, N, O, P. Who ever denied it? It is universally admitted that on the roll of Presbyters there is not the name of a single Deacon. Now take it the other way. "One unit (order) excludes the other"; Presbyter is one unit or order; therefore, the (order) Presbyter excludes the (order) Deacon. True indeed, but who ever affirmed that the *order* of the one was the *order* of the other? or that Rev. Mr. P. was Deacon D? or that there was not as clear a distinction between them, as that between a ten-foot pole and a yard-stick? Is it then charged that any one wishes the Synod of South Carolina to *adopt* such truisms? *Far from it.* But it is claimed that these are the only legitimate inferences from the premises, take them either way. When the concepts are confused, and one appears in one premise and the other in the other, there is no inference at all, not even a *non-sequitur*. The propositions, "one group of separate objects excludes another," and "one substance excludes another," will not even lie in the same syllogism.

Now, it may be objected, that the reviewer has thrown out of

the account the term "office," which appears, according to the published "resolutions," in the conclusion, and therefore ought to be supplied in the premises. He did so undoubtedly, and also justly. It is unrighteous, according to the ethics of logic, to allow "office" and "function," etc., a *conscious* existence in the argument. They are simply principles of classification, and, when they have done duty there, the concepts which they have created have an independent existence, and are the raw material on which logic *begins* to work. The *office* merely informs us what objects the group denotes; the *functions*, what subject or substance connotes them and reduces them to unity; but the group is a group, species, genus, order, or some other *classified* collection; and the unit is a unit, undivided and indivisible. Logic, in any given case, does not and dares not take notice of the *principle of classification or the natures that are unified*. As it is suspected that the importation of these terms into the syllogism, especially into the unexpressed parts of it, produces the confusion that is felt on all hands, and creates the possibility of difference of opinion, permission is implored to illustrate what is meant. Take the concept *man* in the quantity of extension. The objects that it denotes may be classified thus: Caucasian, Mongolian, African, etc., on the principle of *race*; or thus: lawyers, physicians, clergymen, etc., on the principle of avocations. There are hundreds of principles according to which the objects may be constituted; but the syllogism, as such, is perfectly unconscious of the principle of classification. It simply takes *man as a group of objects*. On the other hand, take the concept *man* in the quantity of intension; and then the marks that it connotes are, say, rationality and animality, or any other functions or attributes, or all-pervading elements that analysis will give; but still, *man* enters into logic as a *synthesis* or unit. But the syllogism is totally unaware of the principle of the analysis. *Man* intensively conceived is a unit, the ideal man, or *one man*, or *any man*, taken as the vicarious representative of all men. Now, this being the case, how can there be any other result than a break-down of the reasoning when thus overloaded? There is no *office*, as such, in

the premises, nor any *functions*, as such, either; and there cannot be any in the conclusion.

But it may be objected, secondly, that this paper omits without warrant the important qualification, "higher" and "lower," which expresses the relation in the inference that subsists between the office of Presbyter and that of Deacon. True indeed, but with a purpose, and to our own damage so far. The intention was to exhibit the only possible cases of exclusion that pertained to the orders in any relation, and thus show the want of any relevancy on the part of those cases of exclusion to the matter in discussion. For this purpose the words were simply unmeaning. Taken in the one case they simply mean "more" and "less" objects, in the other case, "more" and "less" natures. It is perfectly plain that *any group* excludes *every* other group, and *any* unit, every other unit. A group of five will exclude a group of ten, and a brass coin will exclude one of gold.

Having accomplished this task, the damage to ourselves will now be repaired by the restoration of the banished relation, which will give us the only case of inclusion that exists—the only one that is wanted or contended for. The *higher* office is that which has the nature of the lower and one or more natures besides. Now, if the word *higher* can in any sense be predicated of the presbyter and his order, it is the sense we claim for it when we say, the higher office or order is that of Presbyter, or the Presbyter is the higher officer of the Church.

The standing illustration of inclusion, or rather involution, as the terminology of logic here requires, is the comprehension of animality and rationality in man: man is higher (or deeper) than animal, *because* he contains in him "animal" and *something besides*. Though a unit, he has *two* natures. This intensive meaning is, observe, the only *possible* one applicable to the case, whether applied to order or office. The higher order or office is the one that comprehends *the nature* of the lower order or office, together with that other nature which is its mark of distinction. And observe, again, this distinction of "higher" and "lower" *must* be made, or we have only one order, and Presbyter-Deacon.

We have thus reached the first halting place after having

travelled over we know not how many parasangs of logic. Let us halt and sum up. *First*: the only two meanings which it is possible to assign to the statement, "one ecclesiastical order, either higher or lower, *excludes* the other," are such truisms and so utterly unfruitful, that no man would think of contending for them. *Secondly*: that the meaning, taken in *extension*, of the statement, "the higher ecclesiastical order *includes* the lower," is a flat contradiction, which no man would think of affirming. *Thirdly*: that the meaning, taken in *intension*, of the proposition, "the higher ecclesiastical order *includes* the lower," is the one for which the writer is contending—the one held by the whole Reformed Church, and every other too, to wit, that *the Presbyter, besides his own personal nature, has the nature also of the Deacon*. *Fourthly*: that the occasion of mistake is the neglect and consequent confusion of the logical quantity of the concepts that enter into the argument.

II.

Issue is formally joined with the author of the REVIEW article on the logic of the following argument: "Either a spiritual officer was charged with the temporal business of the Church apart from the care of the poor; or no officer was charged with it; or the deacon was charged with it. The last supposition is the only one that is reasonable." On the contrary, we maintain the second supposition, *i. e.*, that *no officer was charged with it*, as the only one that is reasonable. There are some things common to ecclesiastical and secular corporations, and it is precisely those things that the Church, not as a church but as a secular corporation, is to care for under the light of reason, and according to the civil and social institutions of the land. The word gives her no officers, no instructions, and no commands for such business; and she needs them not, no more than a banking firm or a railroad company. We mean those very interests which the proposed reform in manners and the proposed enlargement of doctrine would transfer to the deacons, such as the treasurer's duties, endowment funds, and, in general, all business

that refers to the acquisition, disposal, management, and custody of property and cash. These four marks we will connote by the word *secular*; or, to define "secular" by a practical test, we would say that all business is secular which requires the official concurrence of a *civil magistrate* in order to undertaking and managing it. Reason, as it scrutinises the Church in its two aspects, as a civil and ecclesiastical body, immediately infers, (or rather suggests irresistibly,) that its officers and functions and whole nature, *are different in kind*. In the one case the Church realises the idea of grace and charity, recompenses faithfulness with ecclesiastical rewards, punishes misconduct with the withdrawal of church privileges and the infliction of church censures, and judges all questions by the light of the word, and is equipped with special endowments of grace for the discharge of these functions. Now reason manifests that the Church thus viewed *involves a constitution different* from that of a civil body. She is different in matter, nature, orders, offices, functions, and ends. And, furthermore, this necessary difference is all-pervading and all-informing. Its business, energies, officers, duties, and actions, *temporal and spiritual, are ecclesiastical all through*. Nay, more, there is not a single thing predicable of the Church in the aspect of which both *temporal and spiritual* must not also be predicated. The distinction is totally irrelevant. From her constitution down to the last action of her energy, the Church of Christ as not of this *world*, contains in it the marks of temporality and spirituality. In this discussion the words are of no weight, but of great misleading power.

Let the reader now turn the eye of reason, that of immediate perception, and that of immediate belief, and inspect the Church *as contained in the world*. This is precisely parallel to the view of man as contained in animal. Now, as *man's* animal welfare depends on his conformity and obedience to the law of animality, so it is immediately seen and felt that the *Church's* secular welfare, in temporalities and spiritualities, depends on its conformity and obedience to the law of secularity; and, as the degree in which man's rational nature is properly served by the animal is determined by the degree of that conformity and obedience, so

the degree in which the Church's ecclesiastical nature is properly served by the secular will be measured by the degree of this conformity and obedience. We need not reverse the illustration; nor need we draw at full length the Church's portrait in this regard. She is simply a corporation in the world, and, like similar secular bodies, has business which brings her before the civil magistrate, who is ordained of God to realise the idea of justice according to the light of nature—that revelation which God has made as the King of kings, in the books of Nature, Providence, and the Human Soul. And this light is *sufficient*, and will avail to its ends according to the same law by which the light of Revelation avails to its ends—the law of faithfulness. “To him that hath shall more be given:” “from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have.” Reason certainly seems to say that when a function carries the functionary before the civil magistrate, *there* is the distinctive mark of secularity, and both the performer and the performance are secular, and each belongs to a secular order, and all the orders belong to a secular system. Everything in which the Church requires *security*, as the bonding of a treasurer, or of a custodian of funds; everything in which it requires a *deed* to be given or received, as when the Church buys or sells property; everything in which she appears at Cæsar's tribunal, as plaintiff or defendant, is an act which she performs in her secular capacity, just as truly as perspiration is done or suffered by man in his animal capacity. What warrant has an ecclesiastical tribunal to send her ecclesiastical subjects, *as such*, to him who wields the sword of justice? No more than a civil tribunal has to send his subject, *as such*, to him who wields the pastoral crook. The Church must have, and obtain, and appoint her officers for secular business on the same principles on which any sound secular corporation would do the same things, if she would ever reap the reward of doing all things “decently and in order.”

And this brings us to the last logical knot, in those knotty resolutions, that needs untying, though it deserves cutting. “The deacon belongs to a *different* order from the elder; from which position it follows,” etc. The writer italicises the knotty word.

If the author of those resolutions had written "*distinct*" the *non-sequitur* would have been felt by all and seen by some; and the *difference* could not have reappeared so plausibly in the inference under the mask of a distinction between *higher and lower*. A *difference* resides in the essence of a thing, and is created by a nature; a *distinction*, in its subsistence, and is created by an *accident*. Two drops of dew are distinct but not different. A quart and a pint of water are distinguished from each other merely by proportion, and each must have the same nature, water. In our previous commentaries on the argument of the "resolutions," it was quietly assumed that the expressed premise said what it should have said in order to have any possible relation either to the argument or the court or the subject in hand. In this we have done him whom we oppose no wrong, for he too evidently takes it in that sense, to wit, that he is speaking of orders which have the same ecclesiastical nature. But, "different ecclesiastical orders" means the orders of churches differing in *ecclesiastical polity*, as, Prelatic orders and Presbyterian orders. But the trouble is, that the expression cannot lose the energy of this meaning in logic. *It is felt when it is not seen.* Of course, they are perfectly coexclusive, and that, too, whether higher or lower or equal; as mutually exclusive as "pound" and "pint." They cannot be compared in the same syllogism any more than judgment can be measured by the peck. In this part of our essay, however, we have need of this plain truth: *different* orders, irrespective of accidental distinctions, are co-exclusive by virtue of their different natures. The Presbyterian Church, as a body that sues and is sued, buys and sells, bonds and is bonded, is a trustee and has trustees, is a treasurer and has treasurers, holds titles and gives titles, goes into the market and the bank and the civil courts—in a word, exercises all the functions of a secular corporation—is as truly secular, in this aspect, as if she were *only of a secular nature*; and is bound, by the laws of reason and logic and conscience and God, to select and appoint and invest with authority her agents,—call them an order or class, or what you choose,—according to their *fitness for the business*, irrespective of their ecclesiastical marks, provided only they be within the organisa-

tion; and this makes them a *different* order from any ecclesiastical class, as such, whether deacons or presbyters or privates: they are a secular order.

Different orders are coexclusive;

Ecclesiastical and secular orders are different:

Therefore *they* are coexclusive.

The conclusion proves that deacons, as such, cannot be the Church's agents as trustees, treasurers, etc. Of course they may be, and so may presbyters, and so may privates. The spheres do not even *intersect*.

In conclusion, we claim not only to have overthrown the positions taken in the resolutions and the article reviewed, *as far as logic* is concerned, but have made all the positions of the "reformers," in any form in which they can enter into a just syllogism, do good service (*διακονία*) for rejecting their services. The higher order includes the lower order in any and every system that is unified by one nature; that is, the office of Presbyter includes that of Deacon. *Any* order of one nature excludes every order of a different nature; that is, the ecclesiastical office of Deacon excludes the secular office of Treasurer, Trustee, Custodian, etc.

The world of logic, however, includes nothing but "concepts," and has a vast population of amazing fertility, and one "concept" has the trick of getting into the place of another, and actually looks incredibly like it, and in many cases is really its child or grandchild, and in many more its twin brother. Therefore permission is asked to give the reader, if he has forgotten or never studied his logic, a little practical advice.

(1.) Hold fast the intuition that the greater (whether higher, or wider, or longer, or more numerous,) includes the less: for example, one yard includes three feet. Apply this principle wherever you *feel* like doing so, and at least ninety-nine times out of a hundred you will do well. Scarcely will any one attempt to measure his appetite with a yard-stick. If in some cases, you misapply it, the chances are that nine times out of ten you will do *better*; for—"is not the life *more* than meat?"

(2.) Hold fast the intuition that a thing is what it is, and not a different thing. Believe that buying and selling are always

just simply buying and selling, and nothing more. Act fearlessly in this belief, and you will be a conqueror; and, if you succeed by a superhuman effort in making a mistake, and "buy wine and milk without money and without price," why, you will come off "*more than CONQUEROR!*"

(3.) Finally, let us heed the preacher with faith and prayer and vows of obedience, and "the bringing into good effect" of those vows, as he charges us to infuse our religion, not our ecclesiastical marks, *into our business in our daily life*, remembering that "the ploughing of the wicked is *sin*;" but let us also heed with equal devotion of heart and life, that other solemn sermon which is preached to us, as from a pulpit draped in mourning for the dead. It charges us, by the wrecks and perils of the Church's property, to infuse sound business—not our professions or trades—into our religion; for the "wisdom" of the serpent is needed as well as the "harmlessness" of the dove. Let the Church, when her business agent wilfully and wittingly disobeys her commands, or fraudulently risks her property, act like a man of sound business sense. Then when "the children of light" have become as wise "in *their* generation" as "the children of this world," the Church at last may take off the badge of her dulness and indocility which the Master has put on her brow that he may shame her into soberness. Verily, there is a secret holy providence that is the almighty guardian and patron of business that is business, and preaching that is preaching; but business that is preaching, or preaching that is business, it abhors and blasts. The trouble is not that Church officers do business, or business men hold Church offices, but that the business of the Church is not done by business men in a business way.

J. A. LEFEVRE.

ARTICLE X.

THE DIACONATE OF SCRIPTURE.

In a former article, reviewing an argument before the public, it was shown that one ecclesiastical order, whether of a different or of the same Church, whether higher or lower, excluded every other order only in the sense that one order is not the other; also that in the same Church, if there are two orders, there must be a higher and a lower, and that "the higher *ex vi terminorum*, whilst having a distinct energy and distinct functions of its own, must involve the energy and functions of the lower. There is no other sense in the word. It is now proposed to show from Scripture that this involution of the diaconate in the presbyterate is affirmed, explicitly and implicitly, in the most emphatic manner. Such a discussion of any subject will best begin with the word which stands vicariously for it; and happily this word *deacon*, with its cognates "to *deacon*," (meaning to be a deacon or to perform the functions of a deacon,) and "diaconate," (signifying the act of deaconing, or the status or office of a deacon, or possibly in a few instances the order of deacons as a collective body,) is of exceptionally frequent occurrence in the New Testament. The widest secular sense of *deacon* is simply that of *servant*, as distinguished from *slave*, and is translated servant or minister; and its derivatives, *service* or *ministry*, in the corresponding signification. See the following passages in which the words "deacon" and "diaconate," and the verb "to deacon," occur in the Greek: Matt. xx. 26 and 28, xxii. 13, xxiii. 11; Mark ix. 35, x. 45; Luke iv. 39; John xii. 26; 2 Tim. i. 18; Heb. i. 14.

A narrower secular meaning of "deacon," often occurring in the New Testament, is that of table-servant, or "waiter," as the word is now used; the verb and noun having the same limitation of meaning. See Matt. viii. 15; Mark i. 31; Luke iv. 39, x. 40, xii. 37, xvii. 8, xxii. 27; John ii. 5 and 9, xii. 2.

As examples of the transition of the words from the general sense of *servant* to that of *waiter* may be quoted the following passages: Matt. iv. 11, xxv. 44, xxvii. 55; Mark i. 13, xv. 41; Luke viii. 3; Acts xix. 22; 1 Cor. xvi. 15; Acts vi. 2.

As a specimen of the manner in which these passages would all read, if the Greek word be retained, take the following: "If any man deacon unto me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my deacon be; if any man deacon unto me, him will my Father honor."

Let it be remembered at the outset that the name can never lose the odor of the thing which it represents; and, therefore, that our search for the ecclesiastical significance of these terms must start with the idea of service as opposed to rule, and that, too, service rendered to the body immediately in distinction from service rendered to the spirit. This notion is the very soul of the word, and the word must die forever the moment it loses its soul. Bishop and presbyter, on the contrary, with their cognates, are words of authority and dignity, and, into what region soever they are transferred, bear with them always the insignia of rule.

The search for the ecclesiastical meaning of the word also starts out with an *a priori* conviction of the impropriety and violence of distinguishing the office of the presbyter from that of the deacon by the *scope* or objects of their official powers. They both equally care for persons and things—things both in and apart from their personal relations. The principle of discrimination lies in the fact that the one occupies the place of ruler and the other that of servant in the same house. This adjustment of their mutual relations also makes evident the inclusion of the lower service in the higher oversight and direction. The master may not command what he is excluded from doing in his own person. How often did *the* Master serve? "For which is greater, he that sitteth at meat or he that *deaconeth*? Is not he that sitteth at meat? But I am among you as he that *deaconeth*—Luke xxii. 27. "Blessed are those bond-servants, whom the Lord, when he cometh, shall find watching; verily I say unto you, that he shall gird himself and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and *deacon* unto them—Luke xii. 37. Most certainly the master must superintend and oversee the work of his servants, and engage in it too, so far as he can, without sacrificing his higher position and duties as "the lord of those servants."

II.

It is time, however, to pass on to the religious and ecclesiastical sense of the words, which will appear in self-evident light, if the following passages be examined: Acts i. 17 and 25; vi. 1, 2, and 4; xi. 29; xii. 25; xx. 24; xxi. 19; Rom. xi. 13; xv. 8, 25, and 31; 1 Cor. iii. 5; xii. 5; 2 Cor. iii. 6-9; iv. 1; v. 18; vi. 3, and 4; viii. 4; ix. 1, 12, and 13; xi. 8, 15 and 23; Gal. ii. 17; Eph. iii. 7; iv. 12; vi. 21; Col. i. 7, 23, and 25; iv. 7 and 17; 1 Thess. iii. 2; 1 Tim. i. 12; 2 Tim. iv. 5 and 11; Heb. vi. 10; 1 Pet. iv. 10, 11; Rev. ii. 19. The inspection of these passages will reveal that "deacon," "diaconate," and "to deacon," have a religious sense exactly parallel with their secular sense, to wit, that the deacon *serves* in religious thing, and is bound to a religious *service*, and performs it as an act of religion, both in the general sense of service, and in the special one of *caring for the poor saints*. But, whether the service is rendered to the soul or the body or the man, whether it is a service in spiritual or temporal things, it is a *religious* service, performed under authority, by duly appointed agents of the Church. It is a service rendered by the Church as such, through its servants as such, for the welfare of the whole body. It is part of the internal economy and autonomy of the Church; and the agents are responsible only to the Church. They do not properly come into contact with the civil magistrate. Christ himself, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, all "deacon," whatever else they do; all hold a "diaconate," whatever else they hold; all fill the office of deacon; whatever other offices they fill—*all are deacons*.

And it will not do, in the presence of these scriptures, to say that the words are predicated of church-officers as Christian men, and are to be taken unofficially as denoting those services of charity which every saint is bound to render to every other. Why, these are the very passages which give, and are quoted to justify, the leading official title of *minister* and *ministry* to the foremost officer and office of Christ's Church on earth. It is a singular exegesis that makes the Greek word unofficial, and the English word by which it is rendered official. There are no other

passages which can give the title. Some of the passages, indeed, do signify the Christian services of all Christ's people; but far the most demand an official sense. Listen to some of them. Peter says of Judas, "For he was numbered with us, and had obtained part of this *diaconate*;" and in the third verse below (Acts i. 20), referring to the same office which Judas vacated, he says, "His *bishopric* let another take." When the qualified candidates for the vacant office were before them, the eleven prayed the omniscient Lord to show "which of these two thou hast chosen, that he may take part of this *deaconship* and *apostleship*, from which Judas, by transgression, fell." Surely here, in the same breath, the office of the apostles is called, once a bishopric, once an apostolate, and twice a deaconship. The only possible harmony of the passage is the assumption that the extraordinary apostolate included the ordinary episcopate and diaconate.

In that address of Paul to the elders of the church at Miletus, that same address which contains one of the classic proofs of the identity of the episcopate with the presbyterate, Paul says (Acts xx. 24), "But none of these things move me, neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy, and the *deaconship* which I have received of the Lord Jesus." Paul's apostleship "to testify the gospel of the grace of God," included a deaconship, and therefore, when he reached Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 19), in the presence of all the elders, "he declared particularly what things God had wrought among the Gentiles by his *deaconship*." Writing to the church at Rome he says (Rom. xi. 13), "I speak unto you Gentiles, inasmuch as I am the apostle of the Gentiles, I magnify my *deaconship*." Repeating the Corinthians (1 Cor. iii. 5), he asks, "Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but *deacons*, by whom ye believed?" Speaking to the same church of his apostolic labors, he says, (2 Cor. iii. 6), "Our sufficiency is of God, who also hath made us able *deacons* of the New Testament," and (iv. 1), "seeing we have this *deaconship*, as we have received mercy, we faint not;" and (v. 18), "God hath given to us the *deaconship* of reconciliation;" and again (vi. 3-4), "giving no offence in anything that the *diaconate* be not blamed; but in all things approving our-

selves as the *deacons* of God." Speaking of his Judaising (xi. 23) opponents, he says, "Are they *deacons* of Christ? I am more." In Eph. iii. 7, and Col. i. 23 and 25, speaking of the gospel or the Church, he says, three times, "Whereof I am made a *deacon*." Speaking of Christ's ascension gifts to his Church, he says (Eph. iv. 12), "He appointed some apostles, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the *deaconship*." In the First Epistle to Timothy (i. 12), the Apostle exclaims, "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the *deaconship*." Twice does Paul call Tychicus (Eph. vi. 21; Col. iv. 7), and once (Col. i. 7) Epaphras, both of whom are believed to have been travelling preachers and companions of the Apostle, "faithful *deacon*." Of Timothy, the evangelist, he says (1 Thess. iii. 2), "We sent Timothy, our brother and *deacon* of God, and our fellow-laborer in the gospel of Christ, to establish you and to comfort you concerning your faith:" and to him he gives the solemn charge (2 Tim. iv. 5), "But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, do the work of an evangelist, make full proof of thy *deaconship*." The church at Colosse, in reference to their bishop, he charges (Col. iv. 17), "Say to Archippus, *take heed to the deaconship which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.*"

It is important, too, to note that, whenever mention is made of the particular work which the Apostle and others performed in virtue of their status and functions as *deacons*, it is always *the care of the poor*. It is said, (Acts xi. 29,) "Then the disciples determined to send (means) to *deacon* unto the brethren that dwelt in Judea; which also they did, and sent it *to the elders* by the hands of *Barnabas and Saul*." Again Paul says, (Rom. xv. 26,) "But now I go to Jerusalem *to deacon unto the saints*, for it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem." Compare Rom. xv. 31; 2 Cor. ix. 12; Heb. vi. 10; 1 Pet. iv. 11; Rev. ii. 19. In all these passages the context necessitates the same sense of *deaconing to the poor* with the charities of those to whom God in his providence has given a competence or an

abundance. Now, in the presence of these passages of the inspired word, the *rule* of faith and practice, it is *righteous* to ask: *Why* does any man, when reading these words in English, under the rendering of *minister* and *ministry*, dare to give them an *official* application; but, when reading the same words in the original Greek, say they must be taken in a general and *unofficial* sense? If these quotations were translated so as to contain in English, as they do in Greek, the words "deacon" and "deaconate," or their variations, the evidence of the involution of the office of the lower order in the higher would be so overwhelming, that no amount of prevenient prejudice, except that which reached an invincible force, could make successful resistance. The scriptural proofs that the *pastor* is a *teaching* deacon are a hundred-fold more numerous, and tenfold more strongly corroborated, than those which evince that the pastor is a *teaching* presbyter. This same conclusion might be reached by an argument founded on the technical verb which expresses the functions of the pastor, or bishop, or presbyter, viz., "*to feed*" the flock. This verb is formed from the noun "shepherd," and signifies "to shepherd," that is, to fill the office and do the work of a shepherd. This "shepherding" of the flock is not only guiding and ruling the innocent sheep, but chiefly the humbler task of feeding them with food, sufficient and comfortable and convenient for them.

The first appointment of deacons as *officers* of the Church (Acts vi. 1-6) cannot be put later than A. D. 33, and the name must have been bestowed at the same time. The date of Paul's earliest epistles, those to the Thessalonians, was about A. D. 54; that of his latest epistle, second Timothy, about A. D. 66, thirty-three years, at least, after the institution of the diaconal office. Is it possible, if Paul had held this new theory of the office of deacon, that for these twelve years, at so great a distance from the origin of deacons, when their office and work were so well and universally known, that he could or would have regularly and officially spoken of himself, his fellow-apostles, evangelists, pastors, preachers of every kind, as *deacons*; their status or office as a *diaconate*, and their work as a *deaconing*? It is plainly impossible. No one of the brethren who have invented

the new doctrine, would for a moment be guilty of speaking either of himself or his fellow-ministers in such misleading phrases. There is no escape from the conviction that Paul believed that "the higher" office included the lower, and it will be a sad day when the Southern Presbyterian Church differs from Paul. It would be far better to reform our language and put into the word *minister* that consciousness of a deaconship which it has lost.

Now, perchance, some one will suggest that the argument is invalid, on the ground that it proves too much; because, as it is conceded to be equally true that the presbyter is a bishop and the bishop a presbyter, therefore it must be true that the deacon is a presbyter as well as the presbyter a deacon. To such an objection the easy reply is that presbyter and bishop are not names of a higher and lower order, but merely interchangeable names of one and the same order. The bishop is only a presbyter and nothing more. But, *ex concessio*, the presbyter is not only deacon, though truly a deacon. The standing formula of logic is: man is an animal, but an animal is not, therefore, a man.

The conclusion, therefore, is, that Scripture demands that we hold the old doctrine steadfast, that *the higher order includes the lower*.

III.

It remains to inspect those passages of Scripture which speak of deacons and the diaconate as a separate order of Church officers, in order to form a just judgment of the nature and scope of the office. These passages are few, and some of them simply affirm the existence of the office. "Paul and Timothy, (Phil. i. 1,) the bond-servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and *deacons*." Very probably also the word "diaconate," occurring twice in Rom. xii. 7, refers distinctively to the office and functions of the *deacon* as well known in the Church. The only other passage, and the only extended one in the whole New Testament, in which any of the words occur in their restricted

sense, is 2 Tim. iii. 8-15. The verb is here translated, "use the office of a deacon." This statement of the qualifications for the diaconal office, like the other passages, assumes that its nature and functions are well-known. No qualifications seem to be required other than those which belong to every exemplary Christian of good common sense. Compared with the prerequisites for the office of a bishop, given in the previous part of the chapter, they appear to be less varied, but are conspicuous for the absence of two, to wit, aptness to teach and skill to rule the Church of God. These omissions are commonly taken to justify the inference that teaching and ruling are not distinctive diaconal functions, but rather that their office requires aptness to hear, and skill to execute. We now turn to the only remaining passage—the classic passage on this subject: Acts vi. 1-6. It is conceded on all hands, that we here have the history and occasion of the institution of the diaconate. The word is not in this passage formally applied as an official term; but it is thrice used in such a way as to suggest the origin and aptness of it as an official designation. The Grecians murmured that their widows were neglected in the "daily *deaconing*;" and the apostles declared to the Church, that it was not right for them "*to deacon tables*" at the cost of neglecting the word of God; whereupon the seven were elected and ordained and charged with this business; and the apostles, thus relieved, adhered to or persevered in "prayer and *the deaconing* of the word." The simple inspection of the passage seems to compel the admission, that we have here two classes of deacons: those who labor in the word and doctrine, or teaching deacons; and those who do not so labor, but only serve tables, or ministering deacons. The passage in its whole spirit, and to a good extent in its letter, stands side by side with the solitary passage (1 Tim. v. 17) on which is scripturally grounded the distinction between teaching and ruling elders. And if we are filled with admiration of the perfection of the plan, when we contemplate the economy of grace under the majestic aspect of a divinely appointed twofold episcopate, why should we doubt and wonder at the discovery of a twofold diaconate, when we behold that same economy in the

tenderer aspect of a service—a face of inexpressible sweetness that is far oftener unveiled to our admiration than any other?

When we remember the vast variety and rigorous unity of all that God has elsewhere caused to be or to happen, how each higher takes up into itself the lower, and thus creates a seamless robe of praise, why should we not feel infinite relief in discovering the same divine “handiwork” in the constitution of his Church? Nay, more: the thoughtful mind cannot rest until the one body, constituted of many members, forms one mystical person by its union with the living head, crowned with “majestic sweetness,” at once Bishop of bishops and Servant of servants. But not only does some such view of the diaconate—the old view—appear to be justified and required by the facts of Scripture, but it is the only escape from the monstrous but inevitable result, which logically flows from two coexclusive orders throughout the whole Church. If we start from such data, then the two orders can never be united in one court, but necessarily stand apart from beginning to end of the series; each one clothed in its own envelope of logical repulsion. And what then, if deacons belong to the Church at large? Why, necessarily a series of diaconal courts, parallel with the presbyterial courts, but separated from them by an impassable gulf—two series of parochial, district, synodical, general, and finally ecumenical courts. The two streams never unite. Is there a Presbyterian in the wide world prepared for theory involving such results? There is nothing like it in Scripture, unless it be the beast and the image of the beast in the Apocalypse.

But to return to the passage. Here is the institution of an order of *officers* in the Church; and if ever it is wise and obligatory to observe most strictly that rule of interpretation that the “*expressio unius*” is the “*exclusio alterius*,” here is the very case. Manifestly the Apostles, before the ordination of deacons, performed these functions as part of their pastorate; but the peculiar domestic economy of the mother Church, and its great increase of membership, made it impossible for them to attend to the daily ministerial routine without sacrificing the duties of their higher office. They therefore, by the guidance of the Holy

VOL. XXXII., NO. 2.—13.

Ghost, moved, and the Church adopted the motion, to appoint distributing agents for the efficient performance of this duty of the body towards the poorer members; whilst they themselves kept the general oversight and control of the work. When aid was sent from the richer Gentile churches, it was brought not to the deacons, but to the elders, whose counsels the deacons merely executed. The elders did not merely advise, but authoritatively directed the distribution. They needed no relief,—they proposed no relief,—except that which freed them from the actual but constant labor of daily distribution. Here again we see the conformity of the universal practice of the Presbyterian Church with the holy Scriptures. The Scotch doctrine with its mixed court, a convention of the elders and deacons of a particular church, has always been the Presbyterian theory and practice, though in our country, instead of the elders' presence in a body, they are represented by their moderator, who is *ex officio* the moderator also of the board of deacons, and conveys to them the decisions of the Session. The writer is unacquainted with a single Presbyterian church, whose pastor does not sit and vote with the deacons and preside over their meetings. He needs indeed relief from the burdens and details of the executive work; but he needs not and dares not to shirk his official oversight thereof. Who will affirm that, in even our largest churches, the pastor or the whole session would be over-burdened by his or their attendance once or twice a month on the meetings of the board of deacons? The Apostles did not think or feel or act in such a manner; and woe to that church whose bishops pursue a contrary course! The elders, before and after the appointment of deacons, throughout the churches founded by the Apostles, nowhere give the least sign of a suspicion that they had parted from their deaconship, but recognise the fact that the official deacon was their executive officer, sent forth like angels to minister to their brethren, the Lord's poor saints; and thus to show forth the communion of the saints in things both temporal and spiritual. Just here, too, looms up the importance of the deacon's office. It is an essential mark of a true Church that it preaches the gospel to the poor—preaches

it as a doctrine and as a life, by precept and by deeds. No church can afford to be without its poor. The rich need the poor more than the poor need the rich. If any church have no poor, they must find them and bring them in from the highways. Each church is judged in time as each professed disciple will be judged at the last day, according to its "deaconing" to the poor,—the representatives of Christ in his humiliation as he still stands before his visible people to see whether they will receive or reject him. The church that fails to endure the test is "salt that has lost its savor," and the secret providence of God will, after patient endurance, reveal the true judgment that it is "good for nothing." Instead of exhorting the deacons to covet a "larger scope" for their office, and agitate a claim for wider functions, and grasp the custody and rule of "ecclesiastical things apart from their personal relations," let them rather be instructed to appreciate the vital importance and divine sweetness of their office and work in caring for the poor. This work is enough to occupy all the time and energy of the deacons, and, if faithfully done, will place them by the side of those women of blessed memory who followed Christ and "deaconed" to him; and, in this blessed service, they will "purchase to themselves a good degree," and crown their heads with a saintly halo, that, above all others, will liken them most to Him who "came not to be deaconed to, but to deacon, and to give his life a ransom for many." O ye able and faithful deacons, whilst I live, when I die, and on the morning of the resurrection, to your assembly let mine honor be united! Let me, with you, hear the Saviour-Judge say, "Ye deaconed unto me." Let me not then be terrified or shamed by the high name of bishop or presbyter; but, let me know the divinest of all joys—that of having been the dear Lord's *faithful deacon!*

Thus far the point has been reached that the deacon is an executive officer of the Church, the hand of the presbyters, and that he has the official daily care of the poor, that the higher officer may not be hindered in the discharge of his other duties. It is wished now to deny emphatically that there is any justification or excuse for burdening the deacon as such with other

temporal or secular business. No one pretends that there is direct command or example in Scripture for this extension of the deacon's office—no more than that official preaching is also one of his functions. But it is argued, that such extension is a good and necessary inference from the fact that one kind of temporal business, to wit, the care of the poor, is by divine warrant, given to their charge; and, therefore, all kinds of temporal business must follow into their hands. We have already given the only safe principle that can regulate the interpretation of the language which enacts an office and appoints the corresponding officer, viz., that what is not expressly commanded is forbidden, and this to a Presbyterian ought to be enough. But the argument is a most singular example of logical inaccuracy. *In the first place*, it is utterly unjust to argue from one kind of temporal business to *another kind*; the utmost that can be claimed at the bar of sound reason, is that all business of the *same kind*, besides that expressly named, is included in the decree. *Secondly*, it is a confusion of terms to call the *church's* care of its poor, *business*: it is not business, but charity—not the natural virtue, but the divine grace—whose end is the realisation of the communion of the saints, a peculiar mark of the true Church; and not the realisation of justice and common humanity, which is the end of the civil ordinance. *In the third place*, “temporal” is not a properly discriminating word, as opposed to “spiritual,” in this connexion; at least not sufficiently accurate for logical uses. Just as the pure ruling elder necessarily teaches in his ruling, so the administrative deacon also performs spiritual functions in virtue of his office, whilst he performs his daily ministering. Surely no one will go the length of denying that it is the deacon's duty, *as such*, to pray with the poor and proclaim to them the consolations of the gospel.

In the next place, it is wild to argue from the temporal affairs of the Church, as an institute of grace, to the secular affairs of the Church as a mere civil corporation to hold property and funds, to sue and be sued. The officers of the one and those of the other belong to totally different orders. The Church can exist and do her work without the latter, but never without the

former. The one is of the earth, earthy; the other is of the Lord.

Finally, there is not a particle of scriptural evidence that the deacons belong to the Church at large and not only to a particular congregation. The care of the poor is a matter necessarily congregational, and where a congregation is blessed with more poor than it can itself care for, then it is the province of the *elders*, according to Scripture example, to call for help on the *elders* of other churches.

IV.

It is affirmed, finally, that the position "that the functions of the deacon were not confined to the care of the poor, but were extended to that of all other temporal business connected with the Church, has been maintained by the whole Reformed Church, except that portion of it from which the leaven of prelacy was never purged out." This is the argument from authority—an argument to which the writer is disposed to attach more weight than perhaps the great majority of his brethren. But to claim its weight in favor of this proposed enlargement of the scope of the diaconate is, he is sure, utterly unwarranted by the facts of the case. He freely confesses his ignorance of what *all* the Reformed Churches "maintain" on this point, but professes to know what the greater and better part, to wit, the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, England, Ireland, and America, have constantly maintained as their doctrine of the diaconal office. These all, except our own, since the days of the Westminster Assembly, maintain and declare their position in the following words: "The Scriptures clearly point out deacons as *distinct* officers in the Church, whose business it is to take care of the poor and to distribute among them the collections which may be raised for their use. To them also may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the Church." "The new Book" of our own Church does not differ essentially from the old, which has been quoted. Now, it is here plainly stated (*a*) what the business is that accompanies and flows from the office, and

also (b) what other business, not scripturally comprehended in their office, *may* be properly committed to them, but may likewise be properly committed to others, as it is not part of the deacon's business as such. The last clause is manifestly intended to be a mere permission, without claiming scriptural warrant, in a matter that is not peculiar to the church or church-officers, but common to it with secular organisations. We hold with the distinguished advocate of this proposed reform that a permissive decree grounds only the certainty of the permission and leaves the author of the deed to his own peril. Besides, the clause looks very like an amiable concession to a conscientious minority, which indeed it was right to make. Of course, the Church, under its civil incorporation, can elect whom she chooses, if they be discreet and reputable men, to be her trustees, treasurers, &c. Is it the true explanation, that the predecessors of the present advocates of the extension of the diaconate were to be found in the Westminster Assembly? Some of them were undoubtedly favorable to a mixture of civil and spiritual jurisdictions. However this may be, it is certain that no man can properly argue from *may* to *must*. Indeed, it cannot be argued from this clause that this extra-diaconal business may not *more properly* be committed to special agents created for this sole purpose. No violence is done to the words or spirit of the chapter if we add: "Which, however, it is best for the deacons and the Church *not to do*." At any rate, the whole Presbyterian Church has declined to avail itself of the doubtful permission, but has with singular uniformity not committed to the deacons, as such, this extra-official business; and to the wisdom as well as authority of this fact, the example of the fathers, we do most cordially bow. It is good logic. It is good scriptural doctrine. It is a plain and practicable plan, and has received the blessing of the great Head of the Church.

J. A. LEFÈVRE.

ARTICLE XI.

REVISION OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE.

In the year 1857, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church met at Lexington, Kentucky. Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, from the Committee on Bills and Overtures, presented the following overture concerning the American Bible Society and certain alterations made by it in the English Bible:

"1. The American Bible Society has, by the terms of its Constitution, no legitimate right to alter in any way the common and accepted standard English Scriptures as they stood at the period of the creation of that Society.

"2. Concerning the said English Scriptures, the American Bible Society has full power to print and circulate them, and to collect and manage funds for those purposes; but it has no power to edit them in any other sense than to keep them in the exact condition in which the standard English Bible stood at the formation of said Society.

"3. This General Assembly and the Church it represents are, and from the beginning have been, warm and unanimous supporters and friends of the American Bible Society. And it is in this sense we feel called on to say that we neither do nor can allow, on our part, of any, even the smallest, departure from the original principles on which that Society was founded, and to express the settled conviction that the continued support of that Society by the Presbyterian Church depends upon the strict adherence of the Society to those clear and simple principles.

"4. The Board of Publication of the Presbyterian Church will consider and report to the next General Assembly a plan for the preparation and permanent publication by it of the common English Bible, in a form suitable for pulpit use, with the standard text unchanged, and the usual accessories to the text commonly found in pulpit English Bibles from 1611 to 1847."

Dr. Breckinridge said he had never performed any duty in his whole ecclesiastical life with more regret than the one he was now undertaking. His friends knew that from the first he had viewed the Church of God as a different thing from what most people thought her. He had always believed she had power given her to carry on all her own work, and had always been jealous of the assumption by the voluntary societies of any of the powers of the Church. These societies were a class of Christians whom

he had looked on always as predestinated to mischief. But he had regarded the Bible Society as an exception. The work of publishing and circulating the Scriptures was peculiarly appropriate to an organisation in which various denominations could unite. From the beginning, and down to this day, he had been an earnest friend to that Society. It was in his heart next to his own Church. And if we shall be compelled to withdraw from this Society he did not see what we are to do next. He proceeded to say there were two ideas in the overture: one that the Society is the *printer*, but not the *editor*, of the Bible, which two things were widely diverse; the other that the Board of Publication should just publish one impression of the Bible as a standard text, as in all governments they keep a standard of weights and measures. What was the standard text was a question as easily settled as any literary proposition whatever. It was near five hundred years since Wickliffe first translated the Bible into English. Various other translations were subsequently made. King James appointed fifty-four scholars to translate the Bible, or rather to collate those various English translations. This work was published in 1611. All we have to do now is to get the text of 1611 and print it; and the British Bible Society not long since actually republished the Bible of 1611 to show that what they publish is the genuine version. Again, in 1769 Dr. Blaney, under the authority of the Oxford and London authorised presses, brought out an edition of a revision made by him, which was adopted as the English standard text, and is the standard to this day. The English-speaking people and the Protestant Churches throughout the world had accepted the Bible of 1611 and also the Blaney Bible, and the Bible Society might publish either of these.

The late movement of the American Bible Society (he said) originated not with the Church of God; it came not from any public clamor; not from thrones of kings or breasts of scholars. In 1847 a superintendent of printing spoke of some errors in the Bible to a secretary of the Society, and he to the managers, six and thirty laymen in the city of New York, and the result was a new standard Bible, edited, printed, and stereotyped. A question

of the *purity* of the text arising within a society organised solely to *print* and *circulate* the Bible—a question which may ultimately rend Protestantism in pieces, is taken up and carried through on the motion of a *nameless printer*. The Christian public knew not aught hereof until too late. He would lift up his voice against this thing whether any here concurred with him or not. The Christian Church shall answer and say whether a voluntary society on the suggestion of a printer and under the control of one New School man, one Old School man, and some other one man, are to be justified in these alterations.

The English Bible, Dr. Breckinridge said, had been blest in saving more souls than the original Hebrew. It was a bold but true statement. Hence the importance of this matter: much is at stake, for English is to be the language of the world, and the Bible is the greatest classic in the language. Moreover, the English Bible is one of the strongest and most tender ties that bind together the English-speaking peoples of the two greatest nations of the earth. The Bible, too, is the standard of our language. Who are this printer, preacher, and who their colleagues, that they should take it upon themselves to amend this standard of our noble English tongue? We do not hold them competent for that work. If that work is to be done at all, we must go higher than they for the doers of it.

Dr. Breckinridge then examined the explanatory report of the Society. Some of the changes made were unimportant, others involve glosses and comments, and are, as the Society itself admits, of consequence. Many of the things done may be right in themselves, but not right to be done by a Society organised simply to print the Bible. We never gave them our money for that purpose. It establishes the precedent, that the text is under their control, which we can never allow. The report admits two things: changing *the text* and changing the *accessories of the text*. Under the first head, it admits changes in *words, orthography, particles of exclamation, proper names, compound words, capital letters, italics, punctuation, parenthesis, brackets*. Under the second head, it admits changes in the *contents of chapters, the running heads of columns, the marginal references, etc., etc.*

All these heads together involve every conceivable principle of editing except the adding of notes and comments. They had changed some of the very *words* of the text. Then they had changed the *spelling* of the Bible. Dr. Breckinridge had a great reverence for New England English, but we had a better English before New England was born, and he trusted we would still have it when New England English was run out. Then they had changed the *italics* of the text, and that is a change of the Bible. If it was not a change, what was the use of making it? If it was a change, they had no power to make it. So with all the other items. The Society itself says they "believe" there are five cases in which they have altered the sense by changes of punctuation. If we could only know all the other changes in punctuation they have made, perhaps we might "believe" the same was true of many more of them. Dr. Breckinridge was firm in his conviction that this movement, if persisted in, will ruin the Society in less than ten years. All that it has to do is just to go back to where it was before. If they do not retract, there will be a new Bible Society. This Assembly is a Church of God, and if we regard the Bible as in danger, we are bound to rise up in its defence.

After Dr. Breckinridge, the Rev. Mr. McNeill, of North Carolina, Agent of the Bible Society, was heard in defence of what had been done by it.

The matter was felt by the Assembly to be of great consequence, but the body was not prepared for immediate action. Many of the leading members wanted more light. Dr. Thornwell was of this number and took no part whatever in the discussion. It was moved to refer to the next Assembly. One hundred and twenty-eight favored this course, but the impression made by Dr. Breckinridge's speech was strong enough to induce one hundred and fourteen to vote for immediate action.

The following July, Rev. Dr. Charles Hodge took up the subject in the *Princeton Review*. He discussed three questions: 1. What had the Bible Society a right to do? 2. What had it done? 3. What ought it now to do?

As to the first question, Dr. Hodge said any individual or

company of men may revise and publish the Scriptures, but the Bible Society being established not to improve but simply print and circulate the English Bible is limited to that object alone. But what is the Society to print? Where is the authorised version to be found? The English version appears in different forms in different editions. Collating the edition of 1611 with those of Oxford, Cambridge, London, Edinburgh, and the standard American editions, no less than twenty-four thousand discrepancies appear. These are for the most part very minute indeed. Still no universally recognised standard edition exists. The Oxford and Cambridge and Edinburgh and American standard editions all differ from each other in minute points. What had the Society a right to do in these circumstances? One of two things: either what the British Bible Society does—make no attempt to produce a standard text, but reproduce and circulate some one of the standard editions which have no differences that ordinary readers would ever discover or be offended with; or else take these standard editions and collating them determine the true text from this comparison. But in prosecuting this collation, the Society must be guided by authority and not by its judgment or its taste. If three or more authorities of equal weight give one reading and a fourth gives another, the fact that the Society or its Committee think this fourth one affords a better sense or would be more appropriate is not sufficient reason why it should be adopted. It is not competent for the Bible Society to choose the readings which it deems to be best suited to the original—it must take those which have the most authority. The Society has no discretion—it has no more right to alter the received version in a single passage than to make a new translation.

This principle applies to all changes in punctuation, italics, parentheses, etc., affecting the sense. In Rom. iv. 1, the words "according to the flesh," if pointed in one way, qualify the word *father*, and Abraham is said to be our "father according to the flesh;" if pointed in another way, they qualify the words *hath found*, and the question asked in the text is, "What hath Abraham found according to the flesh?" To alter the punctuation

then is to alter the sense, it is to assume the office of expounder, which of course does not belong to a Bible Society. Its only course is either to take some one edition which has the confidence of the Christian public, and to follow it *verbatim, literatim, et punctuatim*, or by a careful collation form a text supported by a majority of the standard editions.

As to spelling, Dr. Hodge maintained that the Bible ought not to initiate changes, but slowly follow after the usage of the English-writing community. Sweeping changes are never to be introduced. It would be a just cause of protest if the Bible Society were to introduce all the peculiarities of Dr. Webster's spelling. We do not want a Bible in American-English, but in the *lingua communis* of the Saxon race.

As to the second point: From the Report of the Committee on Versions, adopted by the Board of Managers, Dr. Hodge gives a full account of what the Bible Society did in the matter of revising the English Bible. The Committee on Versions, consisting of Rev. Dr. Gardiner Spring and six other gentlemen, were directed to have a collation made of all the different editions. A collator is appointed and sets to work, and he reports to the Committee from time to time the progress he is making. Subsequently a set of rules are adopted for the guidance of the collator, and then the Committee of Seven, finding it impossible to meet so often, appoint the Rev. Dr. Edward Robinson (the celebrated oriental scholar and traveller), and the Rev. Dr. Vermilye of the Reformed (Dutch) Church, a sub-committee to attend to the work. They meet the collator once a week and sit generally for hours in this laborious business, which occupied them for nineteen months. At length the new edition appeared.

Dr. Hodge shows that the object contemplated in this official revision of the English version evidently was to remove existing discrepancies—a laudable object and one clearly within the province of the Society. And he holds that the gentlemen who devoted so much time and labor to this enterprise deserve the thanks “of the Christian public for their disinterested zeal,” which seems to show that they labored gratuitously.

Dr. Hodge commends as worthy to receive the approbation

of the public almost all the principles which the Board adopted for the guidance of the sub-committee and collator. But, he says, they made two great mistakes. One was the not authoritatively restricting the work to the restoration of the English version to its purity instead of admitting departures from that version and its accessories at the discretion of the Committee. The discrepancies, moreover, which were to be removed, related only to *orthography, capital letters, words in italics, and punctuation*—not a word being said about altering the version itself, nor about the headings of the chapters. But there was no authoritative direction to the Committee to limit themselves to the removal of discrepancies and of discrepancies relating only to the four items above named. Gradually, perhaps unconsciously, all such limits were lost sight of and the sub-committee and collator undertake to alter the version even where the sense was affected, pleading with themselves, no doubt, in every instance, “Is it not a little one?” and “Is not the change for the better?”

The second great mistake was in giving the collators leave to exercise their own discretion in the choice of readings afforded by the British editions. The fourth rule adopted was, “That so far as the four English copies are *uniform* the American copy be conformed to them, *unless otherwise specially ordered by the Committee.*” This exception, says Dr. H., vitiates the whole rule and opens the door to emendations *ad libitum*. The true principle was laid down in Rule Seventh: “That in cases where the four recent British copies, and also the original edition (that of 1611) and our own vary in *punctuation*, the uniform usage of any three copies shall be followed.” But why should this rule have been limited to *punctuation*? Why not extend this rule to all matters subject to change? Had it been so extended and faithfully observed no complaint could have arisen.

The alarming feature of the case, Dr. Hodge said, was not that changes of essential importance had been made, but that good and eminent men could coolly claim, exercise, and defend the right as a Committee of the Bible Society to alter the version in matters confessedly affecting the sense. What were to be the limits to this right, and where was this work to stop?

Dr. H. summarises thus: "In several cases mentioned on pages 19 and 20 of the Report they have altered the sense by altering the *words*; in five cases they have altered the sense by altering the *punctuation*; in several other passages, by a change in the *italics*; and, in one case, 1 John ii. 33, they have *introduced a whole clause* into the text, which, in all previous copies, is marked as not belonging to it. The Committee have thus assumed the powers of translators, expounders, and emenders of the text." But he holds that this is not the worst feature of the case. The alterations in the accessories of the text, and especially in the headings of the chapters, are of far greater consequence than any yet referred to. "These are so numerous, so radical, and in general so much for the worse, that we should regard the general introduction of this new edition of the English Bible as one of the greatest calamities that has ever come upon the American churches." We cannot particularise here to the extent to which Dr. Hodge did, but we quote his words briefly: "It is most extraordinary, lamentable, and unaccountable, that evangelical headings familiar and endeared to all readers of the English Bible should be discarded, and others, such as Gesenius or De Wette would have preferred, adopted in their stead. However this may be accounted for, the fact is undeniable."

The third point was briefly disposed of by Dr. Hodge, viz., What ought the Society now to do? He said: "They must give us back our old Bibles. We are no prophets, we have less opportunity than many others to learn the state of the public mind upon this subject; but from what we have and what we feel, we are fully persuaded that, unless the Society does retrace its footsteps and return substantially to its old standard, its national character is at an end. We are entirely misinformed if our late General Assembly were not withheld, by an imperfect knowledge of the facts in the case, and by the hope that the Society would thus recede, from adopting at once the overture presented by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge."

But the Society did recede. And, accordingly, when the matter came up in the succeeding General Assembly, which met at

New Orleans, a minute proposed by Dr. Breckinridge, expressing very fully the views he had urged the preceding year, was unanimously adopted. And in his review of that Assembly, Dr. Hodge, speaking of the changes that had been ventured upon by the Bible Society, says: "This is a work which the Church would not commit to any six or six hundred men in the country. Its assumption by this Committee, the acquiescence of the Board in this assumption, and their sanctioning the stereotyping and distribution of thousands of copies of the Bible with these spurious headings, has done more to shake public confidence than anything which has ever occurred in the history of our benevolent institutions. It is the greatest public wrong that, so far as our knowledge extends, has ever been committed by any of our national societies."

We have thus gone back to the records of 1857 and 1858, at a special request made on behalf of our younger ministry, to whom this whole matter is *res incognita*. It is the more proper to do so because the Rev. Dr. C. S. Robinson, of New York city, we believe, has recently published in *Scribner's Magazine* that "The (Bible) Society made quite a needless surrender." He earnestly maintains that when it decided to go back to the old position, which its constitution and the safety of its vested funds alike required it always to maintain, that that was indeed "the most melancholy moment in the history of the Society"!

In maintaining this idea, he is hardly respectful at times to Dr. Charles Hodge, but very much the contrary to another very great Presbyterian name, that of ROBERT J. BRECKINRIDGE, while he is utterly and flagrantly unjust to our beloved and honored Thornwell and the General Assembly which met at Lexington in 1857. He represents that Assembly as debating and almost adopting "a string of violent resolutions," which were at last, by only "fourteen majority, not adopted, but referred" to the succeeding Assembly. The reader of this article has seen those resolutions, and can judge if they contain one violent expression. He represents Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Breckinridge, as well as the writer of this article, as "talking sharply about New England, and speaking spitefully as to New School tenden-

cies"; and he charges that "there was a measure of suspicion and jealousy in the discussion outside of the regard for King James's version of the Scriptures. Some things (he says) besides the eternal verities of God's truth were involved. Questions of policies widely distinct from Greek and Hebrew floated in the startled air. First of all, sectional feeling was simply rampant during those melancholy days," etc.

Now, if Dr. C. S. Robinson knew so little of the real character and feelings of the distinguished Kentuckian with whose name he made so free in these remarks, it is not so much to be wondered at that he should have so unjustly dealt with the no less eminent South Carolinian. Both these great men have long been in their graves. If they were alive, they would probably not consider it necessary to make any reply to these charges. Being dead, a friend's jealousy for their honor may excuse his noticing the unfounded allegations. The simple truth is, that Dr. Thornwell said not one word from the beginning to the end of this debate over the Bible Society's undertaking to amend the English version. His venerated name, therefore, is dragged into the accusation made by Dr. C. S. Robinson without the least ground whatever. The present writer knows what he is asserting, for Dr. Thornwell said to him that he was not prepared to condemn the Bible Society without further light, and Dr. Breckinridge also expressed to the writer some disappointment that his friend had not supported his views. Then, as to Dr. Breckinridge's "sectional feelings," the statement of Dr. C. S. Robinson is simply ridiculous. Every person who knew Robert J. Breckinridge was aware how utterly opposed he was to secession, and how free he was from all jealousy of the North, although a Southern man; and Dr. C. S. Robinson has been guilty of assailing departed greatness in entire ignorance of what he was asserting.

But Dr. C. S. Robinson has made another and more offensive assault upon the memory of the great Kentuckian in these words: "Dr. Breckinridge collapsed rather suddenly, for he found he had as much on his hands as he could attend to at the moment in repelling the charge of plagiarism, which some theologians

were pressing: he had published a volume of divinity, and they said he pilfered the best part of it from Stapfer."

Let us put against this infamous charge of plagiarism what Dr. Thornwell said of Dr. Breckinridge's book: "It will take its place by the side of the works of the greatest masters, and none will feel that they are dishonored by the company of the new comer. It has peculiar merits. It is strictly an original work—the product of the author's own thoughts, the offspring of his own mind. He has studied and digested much from the labors of others, but has borrowed nothing. No matter from what quarter the materials have been gathered, they are worked up by him into the frame and texture of his own soul before they are sent forth."

Let us put against Dr. C. S. Robinson's statement Dr. Charles Hodge's words: "Few books from the American press produced so deep an impression on the public mind as the first volume of this work. Whatever diversity of opinion existed as to its merits in some respects, it was felt and acknowledged to be a work of extraordinary power, and a noble exposition and vindication of divine truth."

Let us also put against Dr. C. S. Robinson's allegation what Dr. Humphreys, of Danville Seminary, said about his colleague's books: "Now, Dr. Breckinridge's two volumes contain 1,221 pages, while all the alleged plagiarisms which have been so industriously accumulating from the different parts of the work amount, in Dr. Park's article, to perhaps a couple of pages, and those of words and sentences which belonged no more to Stapfer than to Dr. Breckinridge, or to the entire Church in every age."

And let us also put against this slanderous charge a few sentences written by Dr. Breckinridge before this calumny was uttered. From the Preface to his work, let the reader judge how he himself regarded what he had written:

"I have not aimed to produce a compend of theology. I aim to teach theology itself. . . . This knowledge of God unto salvation I accept and develop as a science of absolute truth. . . . As to books in such a science as this, and in such an attempt as this, the Bible is the only one having any authority. And yet, I am far from undervaluing the immense ad-

VOL. XXXII., NO. 2—14.

vantages I have derived from the labors of others: without which, indeed, I could have done nothing. The fruits of such attainments as I have painfully made will manifest themselves to the learned who may honor me by considering what I advance. I know too well that the Spirit of God has been on his Church always, to treat with unconcern the deliverances of her great teachers, much less her own well-considered utterances of her constant faith; and I perceive clearly enough that on such a subject as this, and after so many centuries of exalted effort, any claim of proper originality touching the subject-matter would be merely a confession of folly, of ignorance, and of error. The general doctrine of this treatise is in the sense of the unalterable faith of the Church of the living God: in the sense of the orthodox Confessions of the Reformation; in the sense of the standards of the Westminster Assembly, which constitute the Confession of so large a part of the Christian world, and amongst the rest of my own Church. The details which have been wrought out by learned, godly, and able men in all ages, of many creeds, and in many tongues, have been freely wrought into the staple of this work, when they suited the place and the purpose, and turned precisely to my thought. That for which I alone must be responsible is that which makes the work individual: the conception, the method, the digestion, the presentation, the order, the spirit, the impression of the whole."

Now it is respecting these very details which Dr. C. S. Robinson was not ashamed to charge a great and exalted genius with *pilfering from Stapfer*, that another learned professor in a theological seminary thus expressed himself: "The details have such a relation to the book and its abstract, scientific object, as details in an arithmetic bear to an account, or in a dictionary to a translation, so that there was no more reason why their authors' names should be mentioned, than why an accountant should always give the name of the arithmetic in which he learned the multiplication table. The details were not Stapfer's but borrowed by him from previous authors; and in fact such as were the common property of the science." And we remember distinctly how strongly Dr. Thornwell expressed himself to us regarding the extent to which what is found in all systems of theology has been derived by their writers from their predecessors. A very large part of all divinity, ancient and modern, is indeed, as just expressed, "the common property of the science." So that Dr. Breckinridge was quite right in saying that "any claim of proper originality touching the subject-matter of

theology would be merely a confession of folly, of ignorance, and of error," and so that all which any theologian can claim as his own, and all that he can be held responsible for, is what makes his work individual—the conception, the method, the presentation, the spirit, the impression of the whole. In a high and true sense theology is *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. Dr. Hodge made a grand and glorious claim for Princeton Seminary, when he said that they had never made any discoveries of truth there and had never taught anything new.

There is one more quotation from Dr. Breckinridge's own words which it may be suitable to add. It is taken from the *Preliminary Remarks* prefixed to the second volume of his *Theology*. Referring to what is quoted above from the introduction to his first volume, he says those statements "were never capable of being misunderstood; unless perhaps to authorise the supposition that my use of the labors of others, both in that treatise and in this, was far more extensive than in fact it was, and that my contributions to the true progress of Christian theology were less distinct than they might turn out to be. Claiming nothing except a patient consideration by the people of God, of a sincere endeavor to restate with perfect simplicity and according to its own sublime nature and in its own glorious proportion, the Knowledge of God unto salvation; I confidently ask who are they amongst the living—how many are there amongst the dead—on whose behalf it can be truly asserted that such a claim is unjust to them, or unbecoming in me?"

So much we have thought it necessary to put on record once more in denial of an old falsehood intended now to cast dishonor on a great name and fling defilement on the grave of our beloved and honored friend. As to the other part of the charge, viz., that Dr. Breckinridge *collapsed* and *collapsed suddenly* from his attack on the Bible Society because of this accusation, the reader is sufficiently informed. *Collapsed* indeed, when after a year's reflection and inquiry, the next Assembly to that where he brought up the subject, unanimously endorsed his sentiments, and before that the very Society itself had receded most absolutely from its false position. What is to be thought of a writer

who on one page alleges that Dr. Breckinridge collapsed, and on the next page complains that the Society should have surrendered its ground to him and to those who agreed with him ?

Returning at length from this digression to our proper subject, let us refer to what Dr. Hodge said (while denying to the Bible Society any right to put forth as the authorised version one which it has altered to suit its own views of improvement), viz., that "any body [except the Bible Society] may make a new translation of the Bible or alter the old one" on his or on their proper responsibility. Dr. Blaney about a century since took it on him to revise the text and alter the italics, the punctuation, etc. He put out his edition for what it was worth. Noah Webster, more adventurous still, put out an "expurgated" edition of the English Scriptures, and as Dr. Hodge remarks, no one had anything to say against it. But the English Bible, he says well, is the common heritage of the Anglo-Saxon race in all parts of the world, and no body of men either in Europe or America have a right to change it by any *formal* and *authoritative revision*. But he adds, if any good and competent man should now do what Dr. Blaney did in revising the English version, correcting with wise and sparing hand its blemishes, retaining its spirit and its precious aroma, and if these corrections should commend themselves to the minds of English-speaking Christians, and be gradually introduced first in one edition and then in another, first in Oxford and then in Cambridge, then in London and Edinburgh, then in New York, or in the reversed order, until it was universally adopted, then that would come to be, after this slow and gradual fashion, the "received version," and our Bible Societies would be authorised to print and circulate it.

Now this is what a body of learned men, some in Great Britain and some on this continent, are actually attempting. And their revised edition of the New Testament in English is at length about to appear. For perhaps a century or more this subject has been under consideration and discussion, but more earnestly for some twenty-five years past. Errors in both the original text as used by King James's appointees and in their translation of the same have been often observed and pointed out by com-

mentators and by scholars. During the last half century great has been the progress of biblical learning along with all the other progressive sciences. Dr. Daniel Curry, associate editor of the *New York Methodist*, says well that "a new era" in the interpretation of the Scriptures has arrived. There are "vastly improved methods and apparatus for study." "New manuscripts of unequalled value" have been discovered. "New commentaries, learned and elaborate beyond all precedent, and monographs devoted to every kindred subject, with improved grammars and lexicons and whatever else may aid in the study of the Scriptures, have been multiplied." "Probably the study of the Bible with the means for its elucidation . . . has advanced more during the last fifty years than it did during the whole time from Erasmus and Beza to fifty years ago," so that "built on these foundations the structure of biblical science has risen to an eminence before entirely unknown."

Dr. Curry goes on to remark that, for a long time back, our authorised version, with all critics and many merely English scholars, has not been accepted as a final authority. Preachers from the pulpit give corrected renderings of their texts, and Bible-class leaders, and even Sunday-school teachers, tell their scholars that the common version is not always the most correct and felicitous translation of the sacred original. And so we have a different Bible for the learned from that put into the hands of the unlearned; and if the latter are to be permitted to get at the real matter of the word, they must accept it at second hand or obtain it by a roundabout process. "All this (says Dr. Curry) is not entirely according to the Protestant rule which calls for the Bible—the whole Bible, in the nearest possible approach to purity—for all the people. The time has therefore fully come that English-speaking Protestants should have prepared for all the people a version of the Scriptures brought fully up to the present advanced standard of Biblical learning. To meet this reasonable demand is the purpose of the proposed revision of the Holy Scriptures for general use."

The Christian public are of course very curious, nay anxious, to see this Revision. None of the Churches of God, so far as we

know, have been consulted on the subject, nor have had any hand, directly or indirectly, in appointing the scholars to whom this work should be intrusted. It is, in a sense, altogether a private undertaking. The learned men who have been thus employed are doing this work on their own responsibility. Meanwhile both hope and fear are much excited; some not doubting that the Revision will be cautiously, wisely, safely accomplished; others seriously apprehensive that evil and not good is to be the result. This latter class do not deny the progress of Biblical science, but they distrust the spirit of the age as it affects our Christian scholarship. They remember what Dr. Hodge said: "If the English Bible had been altered to suit the public opinion of the first half of the last century it would have been thoroughly pelagianized; if altered to suit the dominant sentiments of the Church of England during the last decennium (1847-1857) it would have been semi-romanized." We do not know how far English and American Biblical critics can withstand and have withstood the influence of German scholarship in some of its dangerous tendencies. And then we do not know what is afterwards to grow out this first beginning. Now, and for a long time back, we have enjoyed the benefits of a standard version of the word in our own vernacular. Imperfect it is, of course, because the translation is human, but the popular mind has rested confidently in this unequalled version as giving substantially the mind of the Spirit of God. And more and more the Church of God, amongst all English-speaking people, has been getting to be supplied with a ministry capable of correcting whatever really stood in need of being corrected in the English Bible. But in 1881 we are to have a Revised Version which it is to be hoped will be wisely and honestly and soundly executed. Who can tell what other revisions of a different character are to follow this one, until perhaps by 1900 there shall be no standard English Bible in the world?

Dr. Curry says "one of the ablest and most active of the English New Testament Committee (Dr. Moulton of Lee's College, near Cambridge,) remarked to the writer, some years ago, that 'the revised version, if read from the pulpit, probably would not in many cases be detected by the hearers as anything new; and

yet (said he) the whole of the emendations necessary to be made will amount to very much.'” It does not appear to us that this test would be at all a satisfactory one. Very great changes in the version might be made and the reading of them from the pulpit not attract the attention of a congregation. Nor does it assure us much for Dr. Curry to say that Dr. Moulton is “one of the ablest and most active of the English New Testament Committee.” His ability and activity might be just what are most to be dreaded.

Neither yet does Dr. Curry do much to quiet our apprehensions when he says—

“Small portions of the revised text have been published and carefully compared with the old form, and these indicate at once the care with which the old style has been preserved; and yet the needful emendations—sometimes very considerable ones—introduced. And yet, as many and as weighty as these may seem to be, they will not be new to biblical students, for nearly all of them may be found in the commentaries; and not a few of them have been heard of from the pulpit and the platform. Certain texts—verses and paragraphs—will be either omitted or changed, and, if any one is impatient to know what ones they are, and what they are to be, he need not wait for the appearance of the revised version, for almost any good critical commentary will answer his requirements. The coming changes are old acquaintances, and, to borrow a commercial phrase, the Church has already very fully discounted the work of the revisers.”

What if the coming changes are *old acquaintances*? We do not like all our old acquaintances, nor are they all worthy of being liked. And as to their all being found *in the commentaries*, that only raises the question, What is the character of the commentaries that contain many of them? But what will alarm many is, that certain verses and paragraphs will be omitted or changed.

Dr. Curry says: “The revision of our English Bible was clearly a duty owed by the Christian scholarship of the age to the commonality of the Church.” But who is prepared to vouch for all that the Christian scholarship of the age (so called) may say and do? Dr. Curry proceeds: “It has been undertaken at the right time, and all the conditions of the work are especially felicitous. The conduct of those having charge of it has been

highly judicious and altogether praiseworthy." Well, not knowing much about the particular details, we cannot speak as to the "judiciousness or praiseworthiness" of what has been done. We are waiting to see for ourselves what this Revised Version is really to be. But Dr. Curry proceeds:—

"And as we have gotten on pretty well thus far with the old version, though recognising our need of a change, there need be no great haste about the new one. Nor is it desirable that ecclesiastical bodies shall especially concern themselves about it—and we hope the Bible Society will have nothing to do about it for some time to come: the free Christian intelligence of English-speaking Christendom is the tribunal that must be allowed to decide on its merits. It will be wise to allow the most ample time for the consideration of the subject. The hundred million dollars' worth of Bibles in the land will not all at once become worthless. But with the same old Bibles that our fathers have used—simply adapted at all points to the sacred original, but changed in no considerable historical or doctrinal statement—it is designed that the common people shall have in their hands and homes versions of the Scriptures that approximate as nearly as possible to the words which holy men wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Upon this let us remark:

1. That we consider ecclesiastical bodies will be very derelict if they do not "especially concern themselves about" a revision of the English Bible which is to come forth with such claims to attention.

2. That we must needs be anxious to know what the Revisers have been doing when those who applaud their undertaking and their work acknowledge, as Dr. Curry does, that some of the historical and doctrinal statements of the word have been changed.

3. That Dr. Curry's hope for the Bible Society is that it will have nothing to do with the Revised Version, ought not to have been limited, as he has limited it, to "some time to come." Dr. Hodge seems to have supposed that it was possible for a revision in the course of time to be recognised as the authorised version. That possibility evidently depends on whether the language of the Society's Constitution will fairly admit of such a metamorphosis. If the language is such as to shew that by *received text* was meant the text and its accessories as they stood when the Society was organised, it is difficult to conceive how the substitution

could possibly be made. The English-speaking people might all be well satisfied with the surrender of their present Bibles for the new ones, and the heirs of those parties who gave permanent funds to the Society for publishing the now received text be not satisfied. We take it for granted that the Bible Society holds funds that are liable to revert back to legal heirs, if it shall ever violate its Constitution. Dr. C. S. Robinson talks about "some men loving the Bible and the Bible Society enough to go even to the primary meetings every year till a Legislature could be created which would give a new charter that would permit a new constitution, which would let in a new version," etc. But we are confident that there is still integrity enough in the courts of the land to set aside any such a charter as illegal and void. How could a new charter carry the vested funds of the present Society into a different organisation?

4. Dr. Curry is certainly right when he says: "the free Christian intelligence of English-speaking Christendom is the tribunal that must be allowed to decide on the merits" of the Revised Bible. And he is further right when he adds: "It will be wise to allow the most ample time for the consideration of the subject."

Whatever apprehensions may be felt about this Revision of the English Bible, there is ample consolation and support in the assurance we have that Providence has always watched over the preservation of the word and will doubtless do so to the end.

JOHN B. ADGER.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We have only words of good cheer for the Popular Commentary on the New Testament,¹ if the names of the men can ever guarantee the quality of the work. Professor Milligan is Professor of Theology and Criticism in Aberdeen, the author of that capital little book, "The Words of the New Testament," and a most agreeable gentleman. Dean Howson is known, trusted, and honored all over the globe. Dr. Schaff is too well known to require commendation. His learning is unquestioned and diversified. His views are, in general, orthodox, though his sympathies are somewhat too broad on certain points, and too extreme on others not properly theological. Dr. M. B. Riddle is one of the best scholars and ablest exegetes in this country, and the son of one of our own venerated ministers. The work is for "the masses." Dr. Bissell's timely volume on the Old Testament Apocrypha² has already been noticed in these hit-or-miss references. We like to have our Apocrypha in a separate dish from our Bible: but we like it with such good sauce as Dr. Bissell knows so well how to regale us withal.

Dean Stanley³ is an amiable and genial man, and a charming rhetorician, but so latitudinarian in his theological opinions and

¹ A Popular Commentary on the New Testament. Vol. II. John. By Prof. Wm. Milligan and Prof. Wm. F. Moulton, D. D. The Acts. By J. S. Howson, D. D., Dean of Chester, and Canon Donald Spence. (Now ready.) Volume I. Comprising an Introduction and the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. By Prof. Philip Schaff, D. D., and Prof. Matthew B. Riddle, D. D. (Already published.) Each volume illustrated by nearly one hundred original engravings on wood, and full page maps and plans. Royal 8vo, cloth extra, price \$6.00. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

² The Apocrypha of the Old Testament. With Historical Introductions, a Revised Translation, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. By the Rev. E. C. Bissell, D. D. (The supplementary volume to "Lange's Commentary.") 1 volume, royal 8vo, \$5. *Ibid.*

³ Christian Institutions: Essays on Ecclesiastical Subjects. By A. P. Stanley, D. D., Dean of Westminster. *Ibid.*

tendencies as to make some of his books dangerous reading to those who are not thoroughly grounded in the faith. It is an important testimony, however, that is rendered by so high a dignitary of the Church of England (in which he is fully sustained by two bishops and another dean—Ellicott, Lightfoot, and Alford) to the identity of the New Testament bishops and presbyters. George Smith and Emanuel Deutsch were not "harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose." They had abundance of mental vivacity as well as knowledge and power. Their lamented deaths have been productive of a well-nigh irreparable loss to biblical studies. The Chaldean Inscriptions,¹ on the whole, remarkably confirm the Scripture narrative, though not in all particulars. The variations of uninspired legend were, of course, to be anticipated. The respected pastor of the Brick church in New York favors us with a volume of welcome discourses,² addressed to a select class. The Cambridge Professor is fully competent to treat of chemistry in its relations to religion;³ he is the author of that advanced text-book, "The New Chemistry."

St. George Mivart⁴ is a great naturalist and a masterly writer, but, we believe, a Romanist. He is an antagonist of Darwin. This book of Professor Bowen's⁵ is chiefly philosophical, and a sequel to his admirable work on "Modern Philosophy." Schlie-
mann's great work has put everything else about the Troad in the shade, but many will be glad to have a less massive, less expensive, and more popular treatise on the subject set before them. This Mr. Benjamin has done in a contribution to the useful

¹ The Chaldean Account of Genesis. By the late George Smith. New edition, edited, revised, and corrected by Professor A. H. Sayce. With illustrations. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

² Sermons to Students and Thoughtful Persons. By Llewelyn D. Bevan, D. D., LL. D. 1 volume, 12mo, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

³ Religion and Chemistry. By Prof. Josiah P. Cooke, of Harvard University. 1 volume, 8vo, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴ The Cat: An Introduction to the Study of Back-Boned Animals, especially Mammals. By St. Geo. Mivart. Very fully illustrated. *Ibid.*

⁵ Gleanings from a Literary Life. By Prof. Francis Bowen, of Harvard University. 1 volume, 8vo, \$3. *Ibid.*

"Epochs" series.¹ Sir William Herschel was probably the greatest astronomer of modern times. His name is especially associated with his discoveries and speculations in regard to the sun. His biography,² and the editorial care of his writings, we should say, have been intrusted to skilled hands, so far as acquaintance with the subject-matter is concerned. The additional volumes of Metternich's Memoirs³ cannot fail to be of the highest value in a historical as well as a biographical point of view. The prince was the diplomatist, as the readers of Trevelyan will doubtless remember, of whom Talleyrand once remarked to Macaulay, that he never lied, but often deceived.

The rage for Russian travels and Russian stories has in a measure subsided; but there is a sort of underlying craving for such literature that is permanent. *This* book,⁴ however, is about the army, and the way the soldiers live; and seems to be a good deal advertised; and yet may be a poor book "for a' that, and a' that." A better criterion is the military rank, and the politico-martial, and geographical station and education of the author. As the enthusiasm of the unconquerable claimant to the tomb of Agamemnon⁵ sobers down, he is gradually gaining not only the ear

¹ Troy: Its Legend, History, and Literature, with a Sketch of the Topography of the Troad in the Light of Recent Investigation. By S. G. W. Benjamin. 1 volume, 16mo, with a map. ("Epochs of Ancient History Series.") \$1. *Ibid.*

² Sir William Herschel: His Life and Works. By Edward S. Holden, Professor in the United States Naval Observatory, Washington. With a steel portrait. 1 volume, 12mo., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³ The Memoirs of Prince Metternich. Volumes III. and IV., 1815-48. Containing particulars of the Congresses of Laybach, Aix la Chapelle, and Verona; the Eastern War of 1829, and the Revolutionary period of 1848, etc. Edited by his son, Prince Richard Metternich. Translated by Robina Napier. 2 volumes, 8vo, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁴ Army Life in Russia. By F. V. Greene, Lieutenant of Engineers, U. S. A., late Military Attaché to the United States Legation in St. Petersburg. 1 volume, 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵ Ancient Mycenæ: Discoveries and Researches on the Sites of Mycenæ and Tiryns. By Dr. Henry Schliemann, author of "Troy and its Remains," with Preface by the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P. With maps, colored plates, views, and cuts. 1 volume, 4to, cloth extra, gilt top. Enlarged and revised edition. Price reduced to \$7. *Ibid.*

but the credence of the world. There was room for another book (if a good one) on Brazil.¹ It is a great Empire, and deserves (as it has not always been destined) to receive an account that should avoid being on the one hand overpoweringly sleepy, and on the other overwhelmingly *couleur de rose*.

Mr. Stoddard² has an acknowledged standing as a writer of poetic, and at the same time artistic and scholarlike, verse. Gilbert Stuart³ was a real genius; and a very prince amongst colorists. He was in many ways too an accomplished and interesting man. It is delightful to see such a banquet of solid and appetising edibles furnished forth to the boys of America as is afforded by the old chronicles of Malory⁴ and Froissart.⁵ It is well, moreover, to get the Arthurian romance at first hand, at least as regards its *English* form. We are pleased, in addition, to find that expert workman, Mr. Sidney Lanier, turning away from unintelligible centennial odes, and discovering, like M. Jourdain, that he can express himself in comprehensible prose. And yet Mr. Lanier, all the same, can write clever verses too with the rest of them, and verses which people can sometimes understand.

The author of "Bitter-Sweet" and "Kathrina" has some literary merit, but that merit has been greatly overrated. His magazine is probably the best in the land in an intellectual, and certainly in an artistic, sense. The dead fly in his precious oint-

¹Brazil: The Amazons and the Coast. By Herbert H. Smith. Illustrated from sketches by J. Wells Champney and others. 1 volume, 8vo, extra cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

²The Poetical Works of Richard Henry Stoddard. With portrait. 1 volume, 8vo, extra cloth, pp. 512, \$4. *Ibid.*

³The Life and Works of Gilbert Stuart. By George C. Mason. With Reproductions of Stuart Portraits. 1 vol., 4to, \$10.00. *Ibid.*

⁴The Boy's King Arthur. Being Sir Thomas Malory's History of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table. Edited for Boys: with an Introduction by Sidney Lanier. 1 vol., 8vo, extra cloth, with twelve illustrations by Alfred Kappes. \$3. *Ibid.*

⁵The Boy's Froissart. Being Sir John Froissart's Chronicle of Adventure, Battle, and Custom, in England, France, Spain, etc. Edited for Boys, with an Introduction, by Sidney Lanier. Illustrated by Alfred Kappes. 1 vol., crown 8vo, extra cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

ment is his narrow and intolerant provincialism. The insults which he has systematically directed against the manners and character of a class of Americans of whom he has no real knowledge, has had no appreciable influence in diminishing the regard in which this peripatetic vender of new wares is held by those guileless and forgetful admirers of his seductive lace and flaming ribands.¹ The worst charge against this reckless essayist is, however, that he sets up to be a religious teacher, and at the same time inculcates a second-hand rationalism that pranked out as it is in the guise of a persuasive rhetoric, is none the less insidious for being transparently shallow.

We shrink from seeing Bunyan's exquisite description² applied to even so good a book as Mr. Clarence Cook's appears to be on house furniture. Grove's Dictionary of Music³ has just received a discriminating laudation in the *Edinburgh Review*. The biographical part is the most attractive to readers generally, and is exceedingly well done; but there is a want of proportion about a narrative which gives but five pages to Bach and sixty to Mendelssohn. There is thought to be evidence too in other things of the need of a severe editorial revision and remodelling of a work which might thus be rendered as nearly perfect as it is already almost unexampled. Heilprin's critique on Hebrew poetry⁴ turns out to be a thoroughly bad book: one of the most offensive exhibitions of the destructive criticism of Germany.

Dr. Guillemand's opportune treatise⁵ on the New Testament

¹The Complete Poetical Writings of Dr. J. G. Holland; with illustrations and a Portrait of Dr. Holland, by Wyatt Eaton, engraved by Cole. 1 vol., 8vo, extra cloth, \$5; half calf, \$7.50; full morocco, \$9. *Ibid.*

²The House Beautiful. Essays on Beds and Tables, Stools and Candlesticks. By Clarence Cook. With over one hundred illustrations from original drawings. 1 vol., small 4to, cloth extra, price reduced to \$4. *Ibid.*

³A Dictionary of Music and Musicians (A. D. 1450-1878), by eminent writers, English and Foreign, with illustrations and woodcuts. Edited by George Grove, D. C. L. London: 1878-1880. *Ibid.*

⁴The Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews translated and critically examined by Michael Heilprin. Vols. I. and II., pp. 243 and 213. New York: D. Appleton.

⁵Hebraisms in the Greek Testament. By William Henry Guillemand, D. D. 8vo, pp. xiii., 120. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co. 1879.

Hebraisms leaves much to be desired, but is a devout and painstaking effort in the right direction. The method pursued is the historico-linguistic, and is the only satisfactory one. Any one would suppose, from the noise made about it, that John's Gospel is inferior to the others as respects the evidences of genuineness. Now it so happens that the mass of testimony for its reception as a part of the canon is unbroken and overwhelming. It is not even one of the "antilegomena," as they were styled by Eusebius, or books which were questioned by some in the early post-apostolic ages, although in common with the other canonical writings such of them as now form a part of the canon were universally recognised by the Church, certainly from an early period in the fifth century, and indeed, with the possible exception of some of the Syrian congregations, from about the close of the fourth century. The only argument that has ever been constructed against the genuineness and canonicity of the book has been derived from purely internal considerations and the fluctuating fancies of the critics of the Tübingen school. Even DeWette never gave in to the notion that John was not the author. There is a partial reaction already, even at Tübingen itself, as is evinced by the position of Keim and others. Hengstenberg settled the question long ago. Westcott's defence is unanswerable. Bleek, by a remorseless historical process, has established that the Fourth Gospel *must* have been written at a date when John *may* have been its author; as the testimony proves that he was. Luthardt has completed the triumphant vindication. In this state of things it was well that a scholar so rarely qualified as Dr. Ezra Abbott¹ (*who in some things fortifies weak points in Westcott*) should present the external argument to English readers.

Godet's² Commentaries are distinguished by ample scholarship,

¹The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel: External Evidences. By Ezra Abbot, D. D., LL.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 101 Milk St. 1880. 8vo, pp. 103.

²A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. By F. Godet, D. D., Professor of Theology, Neuchâtel. Translated from the French by the Rev. A. Cusin, M. A. Pp. xii., 446. Edinburgh, Vol. I., T. & T. Clark. Scribner & Welford, New York. \$3.

by profound meditative thoughtfulness, by singular though sometimes fanciful originality, by descriptive power that makes his strokes as unerring as they are graphic, and by the charm of an exquisitely limpid and attractive style. We fear that, though a leader in the Reformed Church on the Continent, and though an uncompromising foe of the Tübingen critics, this penetrating and eloquent writer holds somewhat too low a view of inspiration. We are at times impressed by him in much the same way, though in a lessened degree, that we are in reading Canon Farrar; albeit there is no comparison between the two men in point of genius and taste. We are more familiar with the Commentary on Luke than with those on John and Romans.

Dr. Demarest has already won a high place in the regards of the Church by his exposition of First Peter; and now comes before us again in a valuable exposition of the catholic Epistles.¹ The illustrious name of Dr. Candler is the only recommendation needed for his work on the Sacraments;² which, notwithstanding, is said to require no extraneous support to its intrinsic merits. Two strong works in advocacy of the Scripture doctrine of eternal doom^{3,4} have recently been issued by able and learned writers of the Church of England, and were intended to counteract such influence as that of the enticing orator of Old St. Margaret's.

If we are to take Principal Caird as a fair sample of the lot, we should surmise that these Scotch preachers⁵ are representatives of the broadest of the broad school. Yet it may be far otherwise.

¹A Commentary on the Catholic Epistles. By Jno. T. Demarest, D. D. Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. 1879.

²The Christian Sacraments. By James S. Candler, D. D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. Scribner & Welford, New York.

³Everlasting Punishment. By Edward Meyrick Goulbourn, D. D. New York: Pott, Young & Co.

⁴What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment? By E. B. Pusey, D. D. New York. *Ibid.*

⁵Scotch Sermons. 1880. By Principal Caird. The Rev. G. Cunningham, D. D., the Rev. D. J. Ferguson, B. D., Professor W. Knight, LL.D., the Rev. W. McIntosh, D. D., the Rev. W. L. McFarlan, the Rev. Allan Menzies, B. D., the Rev. T. Nicoll, the Rev. T. Rain, M. A., the Rev. A. Semple, B. D., the Rev. J. Stevenson, the Rev. Patrick Stevenson, the Rev. H. Story, D. D. *Ibid.*

Cunningham, for instance, is a name redolent of orthodoxy. The work of Mr. Henry George¹ is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable books of our time. It is written with judgment and power. As to the value of the remedy proposed for the evil considered we reserve the expression of our opinion for another number. The Atomic Theory,² as suggested by Boscovitch and modified by late writers, still holds its ground, we understand, with strictly physical inquirers: though mathematicians and metaphysicians (calling themselves "scientists") more and more continue to speculate of centres of force.

Mr. Oliphant does not need a trumpet to be blown before him. His fame ensures the success of his description of the territory of Sihon.³ The *Saturday Review* says it would be the sheerest affectation to deny the charm of Mr. Jennings's *Anecdotes of Parliament*:⁴ and the *London Telegraph* says there has been nothing since the days of Selden to equal this book as a solace for the leisure hours of educated men of affairs. The author of "South-Sea Idyls" has certainly hit upon an arresting title.⁵ It is impossible not to see it, and not to be stopped by it, on the

¹Progress and Poverty. An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy. By Henry George. Fourth edition, 1 vol., 12mo, 528 pp. Paper, 75c.: cloth, \$1. D. Appleton & Co., Publishers, 1, 3, and 5 Bond St., New York.

²The Atomic Theory. By Ad. Wurtz, Member of the French Institute. Translated by E. Cleminshaw, M. A., Assistant Master at Sherburne School. Number XXIX. of the "International Scientific Series." 12mo, cloth, price \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³The Land of Gilead. By Laurence Oliphant. With illustrations and maps. Crown 8vo, cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴An Anecdotal History of the British Parliament, from the Earliest Periods to the Present Time, with Notices of Eminent Parliamentary Men and Examples of their Oratory. Compiled from Authentic Sources. By George Henry Jennings. One vol., crown 8vo, 546 pp., price \$2. *Ibid.*

⁵Mashallah! A Flight into Egypt. A Book of Adventures and Travels on the Nile. By Charles Warren Stoddard, author of "South-Sea Idyls." Appleton's "New Handy-Volume Series." Paper, 30 cts.: cloth, 60 cts. *Ibid.*

page. The new adaptation of the phrase so commonly used of the family of Nazareth is hardly an allowable one. Every additional work on any branch of science, if the work only be a good one, has something that was called for to supplement what went before. This is eminently true of elementary text-books;¹ where so much has to be condensed and so much to be omitted.

Probably no critic ever named that admirably just and sensible writer, Hallam,² but to praise him. As is well known, Hallam and Macaulay* were mutually very friendly; and the historian of the Revolution has in one of his splendid essays soberly panegyricised the historian of the feudal system. "The gentle Elia"³ has been so fortunate as to receive the benefit of all the light that could be shed upon him by a Boston gentleman who is said "literally to know Lamb by heart." The growing celebrity of Lord Beaconsfield has brought the works of the elder Disraeli

¹Elements of Astronomy. Being No. 18 in the Series of "Text-Books of Science, adapted for the use of Artisans and Students in Public and Science Schools." By R. S. Ball, Professor of Astronomy in the University of Dublin. 16mo, cloth, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

²Hallam's Complete Works, with new Table of Contents and Indexes. 6 vols., crown 8vo. The Constitutional History of England, 2 vols. The State of Europe during the Middle Ages, 2 vols. Introduction to the Literature of Europe, 2 vols. Reprinted from the last London edition, "revised and corrected by the author." (?) Price, \$7.50 a set. (Reduced from \$17.50.) A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York.

³Charles Lamb's Complete Works. Including "Elia" and "Eliaua" (the last containing the hitherto uncollected writings of Charles Lamb, corrected and revised, with a sketch of his life by Sir Thomas Noon Talfourd, and a fine portrait on steel. With a volume of letters and essays collected for this edition, by J. E. Babson, Esq., of Boston. 3 vols., crown 8vo. (Reduced from \$7.50.) Price, \$3.75 a set. *Ibid.*

*In our last issue the names of Carlyle and DeQuincey were associated with those of Bolingbroke, Burke, and Macaulay. The types made us say that one of Carlyle's best essays was on "Bevins;" it should have been "Burns." In the same criticism the statement is made, that DeQuincey came near being the greatest, as he was probably the most brilliant, master of English composition. Our thought would have been more accurately expressed in this way: that "DeQuincey came near being one of the greatest, as he clearly was one of the most brilliant, masters of English composition."

into fresh notice. The present edition¹ is edited by the noble earl himself. Isaac Disraeli was nothing if not a book-worm; but he was also in the high sense of that term a man of letters. His books are filled with interesting, and often very curious and amusing, information.

¹D'Israeli's Complete Works. Edited by his son, Lord Beaconsfield. With a fine portrait on steel. 6 vols., crown 8vo. Price, \$7.50 a set. (Reduced from \$15.) The Curiosities of Literature, 3 vols. The Calamities and Quarrels of Authors; and Memoirs, 1 vol. The Amenities of Literature, and Sketches and Characters, 1 vol. The Literary Character; and History of Men of Genius, 1 vol. *Ibid.*

With the address of each subscriber, we now print the date of the last number for which he has paid. For example, those who have paid in full for the current volume—Vol. XXXII.—will find after their names, “Oct. '81,” which means that they have paid for the October number of 1881, and of course for all preceding it. If any one has paid for all past volumes, and one dollar for Vol. XXXII., he will find “Jan.” or “Jny, '81 and 25c. ;” which means that he has paid for the January number of 1881, and 25 cents on the April number. And so in other cases.

Those who have not paid for the current volume will confer a favor by forwarding the amount due to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C.

In compliance with the wishes of many friends, it is announced that hereafter, *as a general rule*, the names of writers for this REVIEW will be attached to their articles, and the initials of each to the critical notices.

The REVIEW will continue to be, as it has always been, an open journal favoring free discussion within limits. More than ever it is desired to make it a representative of our whole Church, as its name imports, and a faithful exponent of the Calvinistic Theology and the Presbyterian Polity.

Communications for its pages may be addressed to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C., or to ROBERT L. DABNEY, Hampden Sidney, Virginia, or to JOHN B. ADGER, Pendleton, South Carolina.

A more generous support by Southern Presbyterians would enable the proprietor to make the work more worthy of its name.

[Entered at the Post-Office at Columbia, S. C., as second-class postal matter.]

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

VOL. XXXII.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXXXI.

ARTICLE I.

AGNOSTICISM.¹

When Auguste Comte propounded his philosophical system to the world, he gave that system the name of Positivism. The scientific method which he in common with the body of physical inquirers pursued, and which he commended as the only method that is fruitful of valuable or satisfactory results, he styled the Positive, and the thinkers who, under his guidance, adopted and advocated that method to the exclusion of every other, he denominated Positivists. These descriptive terms were willingly accepted by the bulk of his followers; even by such of them as John Stuart Mill, and perhaps *M. Littré*, distinguished pupils who considerably modified and extended the views of the acknowledged master of the school. From this it was a very natural step to apply the convenient term "Positivists" to *all* who, in addition to the familiarity they betray with Comte's nomenclature, agree with Comte in his essential principles; nor has the fashion of doing so wholly gone out even now that so

¹This paper takes its starting-point from the article on Positivism in the work entitled "Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. By Francis Bowen, A. M., Alford Professor of Natural Religion and Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. Second Edition. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Company, 1878."

many (in England particularly) of this class of sceptical materialists have protested vehemently against any classification that would put them in the same category with the author of *La Philosophie Positive*. Amongst the prominent men who have uttered such a caveat, we need only mention Mr. Huxley, Mr. John Tyndall, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. These leading writers prefer, it seems, to cut loose from Auguste Comte, and strengthen their connexions with David Hume. Mr. Huxley, in one of his Lay-Sermons, ridicules the notion that he or any who think with him are disciples of the crazy mathematician of France, and is at some pains to evince that Comte's pretentious fabric has crumbled little by little under the pressure that has been brought to bear upon it by a host of later scientific specialists. It is a little curious, and not a little diverting, to see the sharp-witted savans of the present day flying from the lordly scientific structure erected by the man who but a short time ago was cried up as "a Daniel come to judgment," or as the Bacon of the nineteenth century—as rats are said to desert a falling house. What makes this all the more noticeable, and what is not especially creditable to the fastidious champions of Hume as against Comte, is that some of them probably never saw any good in Hume until Comte showed it to them, and that they continue to use those words which may justly be regarded as Comte's *shibboleths*—such as "environment," "sociology," and the like; but above all, that they retain, and without due acknowledgment, the foundation stones on which Comte builded. It is true that Comte himself builded on the foundation-stones laid by Hume, and afterwards strengthened by Brown and James Mill. It is true also that Condillac and others on the Continent of Europe had pushed the reasoning from Locke's premises, as they understood them, to the extremest materialism. But Auguste Comte was the first to connect the experience doctrine of Hume, and his theory as to causation, with an elaborate scheme of physical science on the one hand, and of philosophical nescience on the other; and this is the very thing that is regarded as the peculiar glory of the most advanced school of English agnostics. It is hardly enough to say in reply, that Comte abhorred metaphysics and rejected

psychology entirely from his pyramid of ascending sciences. This is a fact; and it is a fact too that Mr. Herbert Spencer, and others who agree in a general way with Mr. Herbert Spencer, have in *their* scheme left "ample room and verge enough" for psychology and metaphysics; but it is equally a fact that some of Comte's most distinguished pupils have done the same, and have expressed regret that their master should have been color-blind in relation to the whole domain of supra-physical and supra-social phenomena. This is conspicuously the attitude of the late Mr. Lewes and of John Stuart Mill.¹ Besides, let them say what they please, the grand realm of agnosticism is after all the realm of the strictly mathematical, physical, and economic sciences; and, as considered by *some* agnostics, psychology itself is treated of from a *stand-point* which requires the student to regard it as little more, or nothing more, than a department of animal physiology.

Notwithstanding all the disclaimers of their opponents, however, certain eminent apologists for Theism have persisted in using the terms "positive" and "positivist" in application not only to Comte and the Comtists proper, but to many who are unwilling to be so designated and yet answer readily to the name *agnostics*. A year or two ago the writer of this critique was gently chided at a dinner-table by a very gifted and accomplished man, who has become justly famous for both mathematical and classical researches, because the writer had ventured to take the term "positivist" in its broad and popular acceptance. Already the high authority of President McCosh, and others in England and America, could be pleaded, and was pleaded, in partial justification of this usage. Thus, under the head of "Positivism," Dr. McCosh says: "I take as representatives of it. M. Comte, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. They have auxiliaries in Mr. Grote, Mr. Lewes, Mr. Buckle, Professor Bain, Professor Huxley, and others, powerful in particular departments; but these three may be held as the ablest defenders of their peculiar principles. All agree in this, that man can know nothing of the

¹See Mill's Preface (or introduction) to his "Positivism," and Lewes's History of Philosophy.

nature of things; that he can know merely phenomena, or relation of things unknown; and that all he can do with these is to generalise them into laws. All agree further, that it is impossible to rise to the knowledge of first or final causes, and they exert their whole energy in denouncing the attempt to find what they call occult causes. So far they agree. On other and not unimportant points they differ.¹ . . ." Since the conversation took place that was just now referred to, the testimonies of Professor Francis Bowen and of Mr. Mallock have been given in, and will be found to sustain at once the definition and the nomenclature of Dr. McCosh. Says Professor Bowen :

"Notorious as it has become, Positivism pure and simple is not in good repute nowadays, and finds very few, perhaps not more than half a dozen, thorough-going adherents. In fact since the death of its French founder, I hardly know any writers or thinkers of some note and importance, except Mr. Congreve, Mr. Harrison, and Dr. Bridges in England, and perhaps M. Littré and one or two others in France, who are now willing to be called Positivists, and as such, are still zealous and thorough-going advocates of the whole body of doctrine which was first promulgated, as he says, by Auguste Comte, though the real merit or demerit of the largest portion of it is due to David Hume. Even Mr. G. H. Lewes, author of two ponderous but well written volumes on the 'History of Philosophy,' though an earnest proselyte, as it seems to me, of Hume and Comte on all important points, or for general substance of doctrine, still does not accept the name of *Positivist*, perhaps because he prefers to be considered an independent thinker. And Mr. Huxley, after giving an amusing account of the attempts made by two eminent speculatists to shake off the odious appellation, takes an opportunity of repudiating Comtism in his own behalf, and he might have added, of taking leave of it in a very characteristic manner, by affixing to it a stinging epigram. He designates it, with no less truth than point, as 'Catholicism *minus* Christianity.'²

Truly this is a reversal of the ancient fable of Saturn eating his own children! Professor Huxley's jibe is, of course, directed against the Atheistic *religious* [!] system of Comte's old age, and which had for its object the "worship of humanity." Professor Bowen then goes on to inquire how it comes to pass that a

¹See "Christianity and Positivism," p. 107.

²Bowen's "Modern Philosophy," pp. 262, 263.

system of philosophic thought propounded about a half a century ago by "a partially insane French teacher of mathematics," and that now has no more than a corporal's guard of ardent defenders who adopt the entire system, should be popularly regarded as so widespread and so formidable. Here is his answer. . . . "Positivism has two perfectly distinct meanings:— the first, a broad and comprehensive one, including the whole body of doctrine taught by Auguste Comte in the six ponderous octavo volumes, averaging about eight hundred pages each, denominated by him the 'Positive Philosophy.' In this sense Positivism hardly merits notice, for it does not now count over half a dozen proselytes among men of any repute as sober and earnest thinkers." . . .

It will be observed that Professor Bowen uses the terms "broad and comprehensive" (and the correlative term "narrow") in reference to *the doctrines* embraced in the system, and that these terms are employed in this essay in reference to *the men* who embrace the system. Accordingly Mr. Bowen's "broad and comprehensive" sense of the word Positivist is exactly equivalent to the "narrow" sense of the same word in the meaning given to the term "narrow" in this article, and *vice versâ*. It is manifestly, then, in Professor Bowen's "narrow" sense of the word, *i. e.* in the "broad and comprehensive sense" of that word as defined in this paper, that Positivism is to be dreaded, or at all events to be earnestly opposed, as formidable not only in itself but as making great headway in the world. Throwing overboard all Comte's trash, together with certain minor and affiliated speculations, "there still remains," says Professor Bowen, "a body of doctrine properly denominated Positivism in the narrower sense, which is, however, really of metaphysical origin and purport. its parentage in modern times being distinctly traceable to David Hume, from whom Comte borrowed it, and as usual in such cases, marred and disfigured it in the borrowing. Hume knew little or nothing about "natural history or physical science; he was a metaphysician pure and simple, a teacher of scepticism on metaphysical grounds. But his system was adopted and applied by Comte as, in a special sense, *the Philosophy of Physical Science*; and in this respect,

Comte has been followed, not only by such speculatists as John S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Mr. Lewes, but by a large and increasing number of naturalists and physicists, who, of course, only in this narrower sense are earnest and thorough-going Positivists. It is equally clear, that the system thus understood is not specially corroborated by their adhesion to it; for, as I have said, it does not rest upon physical, but upon metaphysical grounds. . . ." (*Ibid*, p. 266).

We think the accomplished Harvard Professor does some injustice (unintentionally, of course,) to the votaries of the system fashioned in its main details by Comte. It is hardly fair to regard the peculiar *religious* system of that writer as forming an integral part of his *philosophical* system. The *religious* system of Comte was a vagary of his declining years, and was promulgated in a work (*La Politique Positive*) bearing a wholly different title from that of his earlier and more famous publication. It is odd how extremes sometimes meet. The Absolute Idealism of Hegel and the Relative Materialism of Comte agree in attempting to reduce God to Zero and then recreate him in the form of an idol, or godling, named Man. It is a correct statement that the hierophant of this new *cultus* (for it was new in the shape given it by Comte) did not succeed in numbering many devotees, or even in making out a respectable catalogue of luke-warm adherents. It must not be forgotten, however, that congregations have been gathered for the purpose of worshipping man instead of God¹—and thus avowedly "serving the creature more than the Creator"—in Paris, in London, in New York, and possibly elsewhere. The anniversary, in 1879, of Comte's death, was duly observed in London; and a special service was held at the Posi-

¹ . . . "It is a merit of Auguste Comte to have recognised the necessity of some answer: and he tells us that it is our privilege and our business to love, reverence, and worship a 'being, immense and eternal—Humanity.' Not, mark you, a sinless and divine representative of the race, such as we Christians adore in the Incarnate Jesus, seated as He is at the right hand of the Father. Not even an idealized abstraction, which in pure realms of thought, might conceivably be separated from the weaknesses and degradations of the sum-total of human flesh

tivist Chapel, Holborn, and an address made by Dr. Richard Congreve—an enthusiastic and somewhat eminent disciple of the great founder. The smallness of the attendance, it is said, was unusual, and was attributed to a dissatisfaction that had manifested itself in certain quarters at the effort to introduce a liturgy into the ceremonial. We may, however, concede the paucity of these man-worshippers (and we rejoice to do so); but that is a very different thing from conceding the paucity or insignificance of Comte's system of philosophico-physical science. The adherents of Positivism in the limited sense (as regards the numbers and classes of persons embraced under the term,) the thinkers and writers who belong to the school of Comte properly so-called, are by no means to be despised. The late historian Buckle seems to have been one of them; and Grote, in his *History of Greece*, announces himself unambiguously in favour of Comte's doctrine of the three states of the human understanding. The late Mr. Mill and his entire following accept Comte's leadership and phraseology, and Professor Huxley has thought it worth his while to carry on a vigorous discussion with Mr. Frederic Harrison, one of the great champions of "Positivism" in their sense, in the columns of a well-known English periodical.

It is nevertheless sufficiently clear, that the distinguished logician and metaphysician of Harvard recognises at once a broad and a narrow definition of the term which is applied universally to the immediate and distinctive school of Comte, and applied more irregularly to a far wider circle of scientific and speculative writers.

We shall call but one other witness to the stand in reference to the current usage in relation to the extent of meaning to be

and blood. But this very collective human family itself, in all ages and of all conditions, viewed as one organism; this human family, not merely illuminated by its struggles, its sufferings, its victories, but also weighted with its crimes, its brutalities, its deep and hideous degradations. It might be thought that 'we men know man too well to care to worship him.' Yet, seriously, this is the god who is to supersede the Most Holy Trinity, when Positivism has won its way to empire in European thought.' Liddon's "Some Elements of Religion." Rivingtons, 1873, pp. 47, 48.

attached to the term; but it is one who will generally be admitted to be competent to pronounce on such a point, being no less a personage than Mr. William Harrell Mallock, the author of "Is Life Worth Living?" and "The New Republic." In an introductory note to that brilliant, and every way remarkable, though painfully unsatisfying, book, "Is Life Worth Living?" Mr. Mallock says:

"In this book the words '*positive*,' '*positivist*,' and '*positivism*,' are of constant occurrence as applied to modern thought and thinkers. To avoid any chance of confusion or misconception, it will be well to say that these words as used by me have no special reference to the system of Comte or his disciples, but are applied to the common views and position of the whole scientific school, one of the most eminent members of which—I mean Professor Huxley—has been the most trenchant and contemptuous critic that '*Positivism*' in its narrower sense has met with. Over '*Positivism*,' in this sense, Professor Huxley and Mr. Frederic Harrison have had some public battles. Positivism in the sense in which it is used by me, applies to the principles as to which the above writers explicitly agree, not to those as to which they differ."¹

Nothing can be plainer than the concord of Mr. Mallock and Professor Bowen as to the point in question. It will be remarked, however, that Mr. Mallock uses the word "narrow" as it is used in this article, and not in the sense in which it is employed by the Professor of Natural Theology and Moral Philosophy.

We have said enough to vindicate the popular acceptance of the disputable terms, and to point out the slender ground on which those terms can be disallowed by the sceptical *savans* of our day as fairly descriptive of the general school of thought to which most of them confessedly belong. It is, notwithstanding, always safest to curtail as much as possible the area of ambiguity in such matters. The term "positive" is furthermore (as has often been repeated) a misnomer even in application to Comte's "narrower" school, and equally so as to the wider school of scientific writers. The new science is not, distinctively considered, *positive* but *negative*; it is, indeed, as regards all intimate, all profound, all supreme knowledge, not a scheme of *science* at

¹"Is Life Worth Living?" G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1879, p. xxiii.

all, but simply one of *nescience*. We are willing then to take their own term, and to style all the men who assent to the fundamental principles of the general school "*Agnostics*." Even here we feel some degree of embarrassment; for certain of these very fastidious gentlemen are not unreasonably somewhat chary of the application of a term to *them* which may so easily be turned into the English, *Know-Nothings*,"—a phrase which, however accurate a translation, is not thought to be just as a description, and is supposed to have the air of being disrespectful. But we cannot help it. The designation is appropriate, comes (it is now claimed)¹ from one of themselves, has been widely adopted, avoids all ambiguity, and will be insisted on and employed in the remainder of the present essay. By the term "*Agnostics*" is sometimes denoted such of the "*Positivists*" in the wide sense as do not give in their adhesion to the entire complex system that is peculiar to Auguste Comte. By the term "*Agnostics*," we agree with Mr. Mallock (in his use of the word "*Positivists*") in understanding all, of every shade of opinion, who hold Comte's and Mr. Spencer's doctrine of "*The Unknowable*." It will be found that all such persons also hold Hume's doctrine as to the nature of causality, either as maintained by Hume himself, or as stated by Dr. Thomas Brown, or else as slightly modified by John Stuart Mill.² Some of them (as for instance, Mr. Spencer,) go altogether out of Comte's system for the fundamental support they would give to their positions, and buttress themselves up on the speculative conclusions of Sir Wm. Hamilton and the late Dean Mansel. The positions themselves which are thus supported are nevertheless included in the scheme of the erratic Frenchman. Indeed, it is not denied that the body of

¹The credit for this designation, as we have once before remarked in this REVIEW, has of late been given to Professor Huxley.

²"I agree, however, with Mr. Mansel in the opinion which he shares with Comte, James Mill, and many others, who see nothing in causation but invariable antecedence; . . ." Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy. Longmans, &c., 1867, p. 361. In his work on "*Positivism*," however, Mr. Mill asks leave (if our recollection is not at fault) to add to the word "*invariable*" the words "*and unconditional*."

tenets making up what is known as *La Philosophie Positive* embraces every characteristic feature of the reigning school of Agnosticism; but it embraces much more. It is then evident that the way to get at the *residuum* of belief which is held in common by the narrower, and the broader, school of Agnostics, is to eliminate from the series of Comte's fundamental positions those which are peculiar to the Comteian system, and then to retain the remainder. Comte's fundamental positions we take to have been the following:

First. The doctrine of the Three States of the Human Understanding, or three successive stages of human progress.

Second. The doctrine of Causality, advocated by Hume, which resolves the notion of *causation* into that of invariable antecedence.

Third. Hume's doctrine, that all our knowledge is derived from sensible experience.

Fourth. The doctrine, that the inquiry after first and final causes is necessarily fruitless, and that the philosopher must be content to ascertain and classify laws.

Fifth. The Hierarchy of the Sciences.

Now of these several positions, the first and last are the only ones that are peculiar to Comte and his immediate disciples. If then we proceed to eliminate the first and last of these statements, the core of the system will be found to have remained intact, and to consist of three propositions which are affirmed by none but Agnostics, and which all Agnostics affirm. These interior or central propositions are these:

First. Hume's Causality Doctrine.

Second. Hume's Experience Doctrine.

Third. Hume's Doctrine of the Futility of Searching for Ultimate Efficient and Final Causes: applied in a somewhat new way to the determination of the boundaries of physical and transcendental research. So that the controversy in its Briarean aspect virtually transforms itself into a single-handed rencounter with David Hume.

If we scrutinise these three propositions, it will be evident further

that *the core* of the entire system, big and little, whether as advocated by Comte or Mr. Spencer—by Mr. Harrison or Mr. Huxley—is the second proposition. To change the figure, the second of these propositions is the key-stone as well of the inner as of the outer arch. Grant the experience doctrine, and the causality doctrine, follows by course of logic. Again, grant the causality doctrine, and you have already virtually, because you have already logically, granted the doctrine of the inscrutability of ultimate efficiency and of supreme design—whether as regards their nature or their reality. In other words, in granting the causality doctrine, you have conceded premises from which is inevitably deduced the modern doctrine of the unknowable. But under our definition the man who maintains the doctrine of the unknowable is an Agnostic. It is therefore apparent that the discussion has been logically narrowed down to this, the truth or falsity of Hume's doctrine that all our knowledge is at last derived from experience, in Hume's sense of that word. And this is no new contest. The author of the "Treatise of Human Nature," although the subtlest adversary against whom Christianity has had to contend since the days of Porphyry and Celsus, and of Julian, if not the subtlest of all her adversaries, has been amply and repeatedly refuted. The truth is, Agnosticism has no logical basis on which to stand at all that has any longer more than a colorable show of validity. Hume himself has unwittingly but strikingly evinced this by denying, as it is notorious that he did deny, the validity (at any rate on the premises of Locke,¹ which are also the premises of the modern Agnostic) of *all* our knowledge. But if all our knowledge is invalid, then Hume's deductions are invalid, and Agnosticism which is shored up by Hume's reasoning is invalid.

We are, of course, aware, and have just stated, that a foundation has been sought for the new philosophy by Mr. Herbert Spencer in the speculations of Sir William Hamilton. In two

¹ . . . "But as a sceptical conclusion from the premises of previous philosophers, we have an illustrious example of Nihilism in Hume:" . . . Sir Wm. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Vol. I., p. 294.

previous numbers of this REVIEW we have undertaken to show two things. The first of these was, that Hamilton's language is by no means free from ambiguity and has been differently understood by different writers of acknowledged perspicacity; and that no countenance is given to the Agnostic system in the teachings of Hamilton except on the assumption that the views of Hamilton on these points were identical with the views of his pupil and reverential admirer, Mansel, and that even then no conscious aid was afforded the Agnostics by either of those stalwart champions of the Christian faith, both of whom sedulously rejected the extreme and miserable sentiments which are now in vogue. The second thing we took it in hand to demonstrate (following the beaten path already marked out by J. S. Mill, Dr. John Young, Professor Calderwood, Mr. Martineau, and even Mr. Spencer himself,) was, not only that the cardinal thesis of Dr. Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought" is precarious and dangerous to the cause of truth, but that it is logically indefensible and wholly untenable and erroneous.

To revert now to the averments which constitute Agnosticism, we shall do well to accept the representations of one of its very ablest as well as certainly one of its most lucid expounders, Mr. John Stuart Mill. Mr. Mill says: "We have no *knowledge* of anything but phenomena; and our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations, to other facts in the way of succession and similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. All phenomena without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere. The essential nature of phenomena, and their ultimate causes, whether efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us."¹ This perspicuous writer was analysing the principles underlying the Comteian positivism, in the narrow

¹Quoted in Bowen's "Modern Philosophy, pp. 266, 267."

sense; but we have seen that these principles lie at the heart and core of the entire Agnostics system. Professor Bowen therefore very naturally remarks that upon this showing Positivism is but another name for Empiricism; and that Huxley and Tyndall, Darwin and Helmholtz, ought not to refuse to lie down with Mill and Littré and Lewes, and even Harrison and Comte.¹ The Harvard Professor is right in saying that Mill's statement is a correct and fair statement of what is true in relation to Agnostic "science," as the Agnostics themselves understand the matter, and as people generally understand it.

In what remains of this paper we lay out to take a general view of Agnosticism, and to do what we can within these confined bounds to overthrow its title to intelligent credence. True, the sills and walls of this pretentious fabric have long ago been ready to crumble into what seemed to be irremediable ruin. True, the vast pile has before this been actually made to totter, sink, and fall; and has again and again been levelled with the dust. But error as well as truth, though not to the same extent as truth, when "crushed to earth, shall rise again." A logical overthrow is not always the same with an historical overthrow. But with every stroke of the logical battering-ram, advances are made towards the decisive historical catastrophe.

Our first argument against Agnosticism, is, that it is only true in partial sense that the system follows from its own premises. In so far as it is based on the Hamiltonian doctrine of the incogitable, we have already pointed out that the conclusions of Agnostic incredulity do not follow from the admission of its own postulates. But we now go further. From the premises so liberally furnished by Hume, a system of thorough-going Agnosticism does follow, but not the very insolent and very illogical system that passes current under the name. Agnosticism, as we have previously pointed out, may assume three forms. It may affirm God's existence, and deny the knowableness of God's nature. This is very nearly the position of Herbert Spencer (in terms at least); for he is continually asserting and insisting on the existence of the great

¹See Bowen's *Modern Philosophy*, p. 267. The general idea is Bowen's, the form of the thought, as well as the proper names, chiefly our own.

“Cause” or “Power” which is disclosed as an ultimate fact by the phenomena of the universe. Professor John Fisk, his acute American expounder, adopts the same view still more fully and unanimately. Another and more radical form of Agnosticism denies that we can know either the existence or the nature of God. Many who take this ground are probably real, though tacit, Atheists. There is no God known because there *is* no God to be known. In all other cases, and ostensibly in all cases, this form of Agnosticism is non-committal on the question of the fact, as well as of the question of the definition, of a God. This was theoretically the speculative attitude of Comte,¹ though he seems to have been individually an atheist, in his private opinion, and was latterly a man-deifier. This too, was about the usual attitude of Mr. Mill; and (except in his more exalted moments) appears to be the idea of Mr. Tyndall, and perhaps expresses the view of Professor Huxley.

Now the first form of Agnosticism is logically untenable on Agnostic principles. The affirmance of the fact of the Divine existence is only reasonable on Theistic grounds. If we cannot predicate *anything* of an ultimate *principium* of all things, we are, clearly, debarred from ascribing even reality to that *principium*. Much more are we debarred from ascribing to it causality and power. Equally is Mr. Spencer debarred from rejecting (as he does peremptorily) the hypothesis of the existence and attributes of the God of the Scriptures—under the travesty of what he denominates² “the Carpenter Theory” of the universe—and of adopting instead the theory of the current scientific materialism, or (if he prefers) the theory of realistic, or absolute, pantheism.³

¹ Mill in his “Positivism” is at pains to deny (much greater pains than Comte was at himself) that Comte was “a dogmatic Atheist.”

² “Alike in the rudest creeds and in the cosmogony long current among ourselves, it is assumed that the genesis of the heavens and the earth is effected somewhat after the manner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture.” Herbert Spencer, “First Principles.” D. Appleton & Co., 1871, p. 33. Cf. Porter, Human Intellect, p. 659; who quotes the very phrase.

³ Materialism in its subtlest exhibition differs very little from the pantheism of Schelling or Strauss. “Seine Existenz als Wesen ist unser

With what semblance of rational propriety do these advocates of scientific (!) nescience (!) one and all declare (either in terms or by implication) that the infinite and absolute power is an impersonal principle? It is not a sufficient reply to say, that, although we do not know what the first cause *is*, we yet may know what the first cause is *not*. This is a sophistical evasion. If our ignorance of the nature of the first cause be total (and every form of Agnosticism asserts that this is so), there is plainly no room here either for affirmation or denial. Besides, the averment of the Divine existence coupled with the denial of the Divine personality, is logically equivalent to the positive enunciation of Pantheism. But the enunciation of pantheism is the enunciation of a theory which undertakes to solve the problem as to the nature of the first cause; and Agnosticism by its very definition is estopped from all inquiries in that direction. The contradiction is palpable and unavoidable.

The other and more subtle form of Agnosticism holds *sub judice* not only the question as to the nature, but also the question as to the existence, of a great first cause. This form of the negative philosophy, as well as the preceding, has been shown to have its main historical and argumentative foundation in the empirical principles of Hume.¹ But the flippant and aggressive scientific scepticism of our day is not a legitimate deduction from the premises. The conclusions of the scientific sceptics, belonging to what we may call "the Extreme Left" of contemporary thought are not justified by any of the laws of regular logical procedure. The most clear-headed of all the defenders of the general philosophic system now under review is John Stuart Mill. On Hume's principles we do not well see how Mill can be successfully dislodged. Mill defines matter as "a permanent possibility

Denken von ihm; aber seine reale Existenz ist die Natur, zu welcher das einzelne Denkende als Moment gehört."—Strauss, Gl. 1, §517. Quoted by Liddon.

¹Of course we have not forgotten that Hume in turn was the disciple of such men as Helvetius, Condillac, Hartley, Locke (as the sensationalists interpreted him), and Hobbes—who was himself a sinister reflex from Bacon and the Reformation; and Agnosticism is thus nothing but the lengthened shadow of the light shed upon the world by Luther and by Paul.

of sensation."¹ What he means by this odd language is that there is a permanent ground for the sensations which give us the impressions we have from time to time of the existence and qualities of material objects. In this sense Mill (though a sort of idealist) avows himself a believer in a material world. His notion is that there is such a place as the island of Madagascar; but only in the sense that whenever any one goes there he will have the same sensations, and consequently have the same conviction of the reality, shape, magnitude, and other properties of the island. The cause of these sensations is inscrutable, but it is permanent; it is, so far as we can judge, (in our profound ignorance of such mysteries,) simply the fixed fact, or certainty, that the required sensations will be invariably produced in the possible circumstances imagined. Against such a refined hypothesis as the one just stated, as Mill himself keenly indicates,² the *argumentum baculinum* of knocking a stick against the ground is of no avail even when the stick is in such hands as those of Dr. Johnson. Sir William Hamilton never reasoned in that way. "He never supposed that a disbeliever in what he means by matter, ought in consistency to act in any different mode from those who believe in it. He knew that the belief on which all the practical consequences depend, is the belief in permanent possibilities of sensation, and that if nobody believed in a material universe in any other sense, life would go on exactly as it now does. . . ." (Mill's Examination, p. 228.) This very able writer then proceeds to extend the hypothesis cautiously and modify it so as to lead to an analogous definition of *mind*, viz., that it is (or rather "may be") "merely a possibility of feelings." (*Ibid.*, p. 237.) If this view is correct, he goes on to inquire, "if . . . my mind is but a series of feelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, however supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness which are not, though they might be, realised; if this is all that mind, or myself, amounts to," what evidence do we have of the existence of our fellow-creatures; of

¹ See Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 227. Longmans & Co., London, 1867.

² *Ibid.*, p. 228.

a hyper-physical world; of God; of immortality? Dr. Reid unhesitatingly responds, We have none. Here, Mill contends, Reid committed a signal blunder; and urges that whatever evidence for each of the three points there is on the ordinary theory, is matched by exactly the same evidence on the theory which he maintains. (*Ibid.*, p. 236.) Daring and untenable as this speculation is, we venture to reproduce once more the remarkable words of its author: "As the theory leaves the evidence of the existence of my fellow-creatures exactly as it was before, so does it also with that of the existence of God. Supposing me to believe that the Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God's existence to be as real as my own. And as for evidence, the argument of Paley's Natural Theology, or, for that matter, of his Evidences of Christianity, would stand exactly where it does." (*Ibid.*, p. 239.) "Again, the arguments for Revelation undertake to prove by testimony, that within the sphere of human experience works were done requiring a greater than human power, and words said requiring a greater than human wisdom. These positions, and the evidences of them, neither lose nor gain anything by our supposing that the wisdom only means wise thoughts and volitions, and that the power means thoughts and volitions followed by imposing phenomena." (*Ibid.*, p. 240.) It will be observed that Mill does not here announce what were his private sentiments as to the existence of a God. He, however, distinctly and explicitly admits that on Agnostic principles, and even on his own peculiar idealistic principles, there *may* be just as much reality about the existence and operations of a God as there is about our own. If so, at least so far as all practical purposes are concerned, we might reconstruct *in posse* the entire Christian scheme of the New Testament. The single point reserved for settlement (with regard to which Mill favors us with his own opinions and conjectures) is a metaphysical question relating to the intimate constitution of all being. But on Agnostic principles all such subtle metaphysical questions are incapable of solution. On Agnostic principles, then, the Theistic, rather than the Pantheistic or Atheistic, so-

VOL. XXXII., NO 3.—2.

lution may be after all the one which corresponds with the reality of the case, although of course on Agnostic principles we are precluded by the limits of the human mind from ever finding out the *fact*. The sum is, that on Agnostic principles an humble and tolerant silence on religious questions, or else the most modest suggestions in the way of surmise or guess-work, is the only attitude which befits our men of reason; that on Agnostic principles Theism is just as likely to be in accordance with the facts, as Pantheism or Atheism; even though on those principles neither scheme may be formulated into a system of dogmatic science.

Our second argument, however, against Agnosticism, is, that its premises are untenable and false, and its general conclusion unwarrantable and monstrous. The first point under this head scarcely demands an elaborate discussion at our hands. The special propositions derived from Mansel, on which Mr. Spencer builds so largely, have already been considered in these pages, in a former article on that subject. But, as we have seen abundantly, the only logical ground-work for the entire fabric of Agnosticism is the empirical philosophy of Hume; and surely, at this stage of metaphysical science, it is hardly incumbent on us, and it is certainly not our intention in the present article, to go over all that thread-bare argument. If Hume's empiricism be "*la vraie vérité*," we are landed at once in the absurd contradiction that there is no truth at all, or none that can be known to be such. For if Hume's doctrine be the true one, there is no such thing as intuitive judgments, or intuitive judgments that are valid. But every process of reasoning aims at the production of mental certainty, and must, if not worthless, terminate in a final and decisive act of judgment. But this judgment, although the result of a discursive process, must, from the very nature of the case, be itself intuitive, and consequently invalid. It follows that Hume's didactic position, that all our knowledge is derived ultimately from sensible experience, leads remorselessly to Hume's sceptical position of the invalidity of all human knowledge. It might therefore have been argued under the preceding head that the Agnostic argument proves nothing, or it proves too much;

conducting us, as it has been shown that it does, to stark Pyrrhonism.

The point we make now is that premises which thus logically conduct us to untenable conclusions, according to the accepted canons which regulate the operations of the thinking faculty, must themselves be false. It is an absurd and almost laughable spectacle that is presented to rational beings by an empirical sceptic engaged in *argument* in favor of any proposition whatever: and the only palliation of his fatuous conduct that is possible can only be pleaded in certain cases, and is due to the circumstance that no matter what the conclusion may be, it is confessedly a doubtful one, and one which is not put forward in any other than a conjectural sense. It is, however, almost equally absurd (viewed from the same standing-point) to *argue with* the empirical sceptic. If all argument presupposes the existence and authority of the primary beliefs, or judgments, or notions, or cognitions, and their intuitive validity, it would appear to be impossible to engage in argument with the empirical sceptic without begging the very point in dispute. But that point ought never to be allowed to be imperilled by debate. The empirical philosopher has virtually surrendered his ground by entering the arena of discussion. As he has of his own option taken up the sword of argument, it is his righteous doom to perish by the sword of argument. The very notion, however, of such a contest is in itself preposterous. There must be a beginning as well as an end of all controversy.¹ There can be no race, or journey, that does not have a starting point as well as a goal. There can be no such a thing as a valid, or even sane, logic, without the original and authoritative assertion of the logical faculty, the mind, itself as to what is true

¹ . . . I should reply, that there are, and must be, in human nature, some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which therefore it is vain to attempt a rational account." Campbell's *Dissertation on Miracles*, London, 1834, p. 18. See also the same familiar proposition admirably elucidated in the tenth chapter of Dabney's *Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century*. Also see Porter, pp. 501, 502, for the true meaning of the description "first truths" or "primitive judgments"; as referring not to the order of time but of logical importance.

and false. But when this is once admitted, the debate, which should never have been begun, is brought to a peremptory termination. The only satisfactory method with the empirical sceptic is to convince him of the imperious sovereignty of the law of causation, as a law of objective no less than subjective validity, and of the intuitive certainty that every change is an effect, and that every effect must have not merely an *antecedent*, and not merely a cause in the secondary sense, but a first efficient and supreme final cause.¹ The vindication of Theism as against Agnosticism, then, so far as the truth of the premises is involved, is the same thing with the vindication of the intuitive philosophy as against empiricism, and of the true doctrine of causality as against the doctrine of mere priority or antecedence.

If we thought it desirable at this time to invade the lists of this contention and attack the fundamental principles on which the empirical philosophy is based, it would be easy to make good the assertion that the logic by which the empirical conclusions are drawn from the premises is not more faulty (indeed is scarcely so faulty) as is the metaphysics on which those premises themselves depend for their support. Empiricism in one of its extreme forms (as we have seen) would get rid of metaphysics altogether, as Comte attempted to do in the construction of his scheme of graduated sciences. But empiricism in all its forms, as has been abundantly evinced, rests upon a purely metaphysical foundation. What remains to be said on this point is, that the metaphysics underlying the empirical system is partly good and partly bad metaphysics; that in so far as it is good, it has no tendency whatever, when properly viewed, to sustain the allegations of the empirical sceptic, but on the contrary, has a fatal and overwhelming tendency to destroy them; and that in so far as the metaphysics is bad, the tendency, though favorable to the sceptic, is,

¹After all the disturbance made about it by such men as Darwin and Huxley, the explicit denial of final causes is no novelty in the world: it is as old as Lucretius:

“Nil . . . natum est in corpore, ut uti

Possemus: sed, quod natum est, id procreat usum.”

See Porter's sixth chapter and McCosh on “Positivism and Christianity,” for an adequate vindication.

from the nature of the case, wholly nugatory. The last part of this comprehensive statement is self-evident. If the first part of the statement be true, the inference is unavoidable that the sound metaphysics which is presupposed by the system of those who advocate the experience doctrine affords no justification for that system, but does afford the means by which the system may be triumphantly refuted. But it is conceded that the empirical philosophy denies the validity of the primary and intuitive judgments or beliefs. This *dictum*, however, of the empirical philosophy is manifestly at war with all sound metaphysics. The averment, therefore, which was just now made conditionally, may be made absolutely, and is true and incontestable, viz., that empiricism can find no refuge in sound metaphysics, but only a grave of logical destruction. That metaphysics rests on intuitive or *a priori* beliefs we say is manifest. This is true, as has over and over again been pointed out, of *all* sciences, even of the physical sciences, in which Agnostic empiricism makes its chief boast. This is fully admitted by the acknowledged masters of those sciences themselves, as for instance notably by Lavoisier, in a passage quoted and seemingly endorsed by Mr. Huxley.¹ The science of chemistry, for example, assumes the indestructibility of matter, and physics the uniform operation of gravity and other natural laws. This point was strongly presented by Campbell in his reply to Hume.² The very process of generalisation, from which every part of natural science derives its being, depends on the validity of memory and of the consciousness of personal identity. It has moreover been admirably shown, by Professor Bowen³ and others, that metaphysics is the only science which does not borrow its own postulates; and, the Harvard logician might have added, does not borrow those postulates *from* meta-

¹See Bowen's "Modern Philosophy," p. 269.

²See "A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles advanced by David Hume, Esq., in an Essay on Miracles," etc. By George Campbell, D. D., Principal of the Marischal College, Aberdeen. London. 1834. Part I., Section I.

³"Modern Philosophy," p. 168. Descartes compares the entire mass of human knowledge to a tree, of which metaphysics are the root, physics are the trunk, and the other sciences the branches.

physics: for by the very terms of the definition metaphysics is the science which treats of the first principles of *all* the sciences.

The only pretence of argument that has been put forward to sustain the empirical thesis (except the psychological one already considered), is that "science" in point of fact never has ascertained, and from the nature of the case obviously never can hope to ascertain, the reality of distinctively spiritual phenomena. The scalpel can never cut deep enough to reach the soul. All this we admit, if by "science" is meant material or physical science. The fallacy here is *ignoratio elenchi*. If, however, the term "science" be taken broadly, the argument flagrantly begs the question. The empirical reasoning is thus founded on a wretched and palpable sophism.

But it is not our purpose to go into the argument with the empirical philosophers. As in mathematics, so here: when a thing has been once established, it may afterwards be taken for granted. Otherwise "science" would never advance. Now, if anything ever has been notoriously established, and established *usque ad nauseam*, it is the falsity of the whole empirical groundwork and pretension.¹ It is not necessary to repeat the demonstration. Who would ever think of rearguing the earlier theorems of Legendre or Euclid? If it were judged best, however, to reopen the question with those astute sceptics, the limits of the present essay would not mark off a suitable field for the discussion. Happily all that is needed for the purposes of the present article is to prick the bubble of Agnosticism; and that bubble has been effectually pricked when Agnosticism has been shown to be but a disguise for materialistic atheism, or but another name for empirical scepticism; and thus nothing but a revival in a new and specious garb of the ancient and exploded dogmas of Democritus and Pyrrhon. Such has been the limited contention of the present argumentative effort.

¹See, for example, Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, Chapters I. and IV., and the main argument in Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy, and in McCosh's "Philosophy of the Intuitions"; also McCosh's "Defence of Fundamental Truth," *passim*. See too the masterly discussion in the first chapter of the fourth part of Porter's Human Intellect.

Having thus pointed out that the Agnostic reasoning is in violation of the plainest laws of the science of logic, and the Agnostic premises in glaring conflict with the first principles of the sciences of psychology and metaphysics, it is time that we should protest against the Agnostic *conclusion*, regarded in the light of its own intrinsic and monstrous absurdity as judged at once by reason and by revelation, by common sense and ethics as well as by theology. In the story of the Rosicrucians that is retold by Addison in one of the *Spectators*, the gigantic stone man rose up, as the adventurer, who had penetrated into the recesses of a mysterious cavern, approached him, and at length lifted his stone mace and with a terrific noise extinguished the lamp that had been the sole illumination. This is a true image. There is, as we admitted in our previous articles, a genuine and even a Biblical Agnosticism. "Touching the Almighty, we cannot find him out." There are undoubtedly very narrow boundaries to human thought. Philosophy itself has been defined by one of its greatest adepts to be "a learned ignorance." But against the pseudo-Agnosticism that built the Athenian altar to the Unknown God, and that now essays to lift its arm against the only light which is shining in the midst of the universal darkness, we would cry out in accents of alarm and warning. The reader of these pages no doubt remembers the stately and imposing terms in which Edmund Burke arraigned the culprit governor of India for his crimes and misdemeanors before the bar of the House of Commons. Were we masters of the same impressive eloquence, we should not hesitate to bring a similar arraignment against this gigantic and destructive system of imposture, fortified as it is, and rendered all but impregnable as it may seem to be, by so much of the so-called "science" of this superficial age. Nor shall we draw back from our duty because we cannot summon to our aid the lofty station and imperial genius of the English prosecutor. We not only oppose the basis of Agnosticism as a philosophic system, we arraign that system for high crimes and misdemeanors. We arraign it for its transparent shams and arrant hypocrisy. We arraign it for assuming the costume and the modulated accents of a friendly neutral, when in reality it is a deadly foe. We arraign it for coming like Joab

with words of amity, and then seeking to thrust its glittering weapon under the fifth rib. We arraign it as guilty of the *odium humani generis*. We arraign it as the enemy of man and God. We arraign it for its virtual or outright denial of all that gives value to the life here or hereafter; for its virtual denial of a God, of the soul, of immortality itself; for its outright or virtual denial of the ill-desert, and even of the existence, of sin; for its outright and even insolent denial of the Day of Judgment, of the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. We arraign Agnosticism as that portentous and malignant spirit which, as if in some blind phrensy, would pull down the pillars of Cosmos and bury the creation all in ruin—remanding it back to the realm and sovereignty of “chaos and old night”; nay, as that arch-criminal which under pretence of blindness, but with acutest vision, aims to blot out the Sun of Righteousness in the mid-firmanent and shroud the heavens of salvation with a pall of Cimmerian darkness; and which, if its fell designs could be accomplished, would gladly put an end to that blessed religion that one of the most gifted worldlings of the nineteenth century has pronounced “the last restraint of the powerful and the last hope of the wretched.”

HENRY C. ALEXANDER.

ARTICLE II.

SMITH'S CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITIES.

A Dictionary of Christian Antiquities, being a continuation of the "Dictionary of the Bible." Edited by WM. SMITH, D. C. L., LL. D., and SAMUEL CHEETHAM, A. M., Professor of Pastoral Theology in King's College, London. In two volumes. Pp. 2,060. Hartford: The J. B. Burr Publishing Company. 1880.

The previous works of Dr. Smith, on sacred and classical antiquities, have been so admirable in every way that the literary public are ready to receive with much favor whatever he may present for their acceptance. The scholarship which he has exhibited or evoked has been of such a high order as to challenge admiration; the plans of his former encyclopedic publications were so comprehensive as to cover every necessity; and a spirit of justice pervaded them, such as to disarm opposition. Especially, his "Dictionary of the Bible" is a store-house of sacred knowledge; and though a prelatial bias is evident in most of the articles involving Church polity, yet the subjects are usually presented with an absence of any apparent purpose, by suppressions or otherwise, to establish foregone conclusions. Hence it was hailed by ministers and students of all denominations and classes as a valuable and almost indispensable book of reference; scholarly, candid, and in a large degree trustworthy.

The work now before us has been looked for with much interest, and has found an entrance into hundreds of libraries, because of the satisfactory character of its predecessors. In many respects it answers every just demand. Like all Dr. Smith's previous issues from the press, this Dictionary is a thesaurus of information, and places within the reach of ministers and others, knowledge on a vast number and variety of subjects, which is indispensable to their comfort and success in study, and which they could not otherwise procure without heavy expenditure, or the ransacking of many volumes. For this much we cordially thank Dr. Smith and his collaborators.

But while with much pleasure we give the work this high commendation, we are not quite ready to place it along side of Dr. Smith's other books, in impartiality; nor do we find it at all times equally trustworthy, when subjects are considered which involve ecclesiastical issues. While many of the contributors are, in all respects, worthy of commendation, yet some of them occasionally lay aside the character of the antiquary, especially when considering questions of ritual and polity; and instead, assume the rôle of the sectarian, and become polemical. Of this we would have no right to complain, if Dr. Smith had only proposed to make an addition to the literature of his own denomination. But this Dictionary has been offered to the Christian public, on both sides of the Atlantic, not as a denominational reference book, but as a cyclopaedia of Christian archæology, intended to supply a want universally felt by ministers and intelligent Christians of all Churches. True, the contributors to its pages are generally from the Church of England; yet the presence among them of such Reformed divines as Dr. Pressensé of Paris, Dr. Milligan of the University of Aberdeen, Dr. Schaff of Union Theological Seminary at New York, and Dr. Stewart of the University of Glasgow, and of the Lutheran divine, Dr. Lipsius of the University of Jena, ought to have been a guarantee that the work was non-sectarian in its character and aims. But we find, to our regret, that the sectarian partisanship of some of the writers is glaring; and that this characteristic exhibits itself not only in their presentation of subjects which involve direct issues between prelacy and other forms of church order, but also in the nature of the information given or withheld. Some of these derelictions we will point out.

1. The article on "Angels of Churches," seems to be inserted for the opportunity it offers to present an argument for Episcopacy. The subject is unquestionably biblical, and was considered, in the "Dictionary of the Bible," in the article on the "Bishop." It certainly does not belong to the period "from the time of the Apostles to the age of Charlemagne," which this book professes to cover, unless its introduction was for the purpose of giving a history of opinion on the question in the early

ages of the Church. This, however, is not done, except on the point as to whether these angels were heavenly messengers. Instead, we first have a succinct presentation of an argument, which is given more modestly in the "Dictionary of the Bible," and is re-stated dogmatically in a succeeding article on the "Bishop," to prove that "angel of the Church" was a designation of "the chief minister of the New Testament," which chief minister, all the way through, so far as we have observed, is uniformly assumed to be a diocesan bishop. The article then proceeds :

"By Presbyterian writers, the angel of the vision has been variously interpreted: 1. Of the collective presbytery: 2. Of the presiding presbyter, whose office, however, it is contended was soon to be discontinued in the Church because of its foreseen corruptions: 3. Of the messengers of the several churches to St. John. It hardly falls within the scope of this article to discuss these interpretations. To unprejudiced minds, it will probably be enough to state them to make their weakness manifest. It is difficult to account for them, except as the suggestion of a foregone conclusion."

Now, this book professes to be simply and only "a complete account" of the antiquities pertaining to Christianity. But this article wholly omits all reference to the opinions of the Fathers on the subject, only giving the views of some of them on a side question, and barely alluding to a writer (Socrates) of the 5th century, but making no mention whatever of the Jewish synagogue, from which the title "Angel of the Church" came; and which, according to the acknowledgment of the ablest Episcopal writers, was the model of the Christian Church: nor does it present antiquities of any kind, relating to the question at issue. But in lieu of these, we have a so-called scriptural argument for Prelacy, followed by the above quoted caricature of the opinions of Presbyterians, which is only the more unjust from its total suppression of the true views of those it misrepresents. As to the argument, Prelacy is not proved, but taken for granted, or assumed; for there is not a shred of evidence, in any of the three articles above alluded to, that the bishops of which Ignatius and other primitive authors wrote, were diocesans. Admitting the validity of the argument, it only proves, after the assumptions of

the writers are thrown out, that the angels of the church were their chief officers, and, as Presbyterians have always believed, these chief officers were their pastors. Presbyterians or others who have suggested that by "the angel of the church" is meant "the collective presbytery," have considered the expression symbolical, and are at one with the article in the "Dictionary of the Bible," when it says: "The name may belong to the special symbolism of the Apocalypse." As to the second view assigned Presbyterians, it has never been held by them that the office of the pastor, who is the presiding presbyter, was to be discontinued; for they have always contended for the perpetuity of the pastoral office, as "the first in the Church both for dignity and usefulness." Moreover, the standards of the Presbyterian Church in this country state that one of the scriptural titles of the pastor is that of "angel of the church." Hence Presbyterians generally agree again with the writer in the "Dictionary of the Bible," who says the title angel may "have been introduced like *πρεσβύτεροι*, from the organization of the synagogue." Says Bishop Burnett,¹

"Among the Jews, he who was the chief of the synagogue was called *Chazan Hakeneseth*, that is, bishop of the congregation, and *Sheliach Tsibbor*, the angel of the church. And the Christian Church being modelled as near the form of the synagogue as could be, as they retained many of the rites, so the form of their government was continued, and the names remained the same."

The learned Grotius says :

"The whole polity or order (*regimen*) of the Churches of Christ was conformed to the model of the Jewish synagogue."

Bishop Stillingfleet in his "Irenicum" bears a similar testimony :

"That which we lay, then, as a foundation, whereby to clear what apostolical practice was, is that the Apostles, in forming churches, did observe the customs of the Jewish synagogue."

In like manner Dr. Lightfoot says :

"There was the public minister of the synagogue, who prayed publicly, and took care about reading the law, and sometimes preached, if there

¹ We rely on Dr. Samuel Miller for the correctness of our quotations from Bishop Burnett, and others. See his work on Ruling Elders, pp. 39-47, *passim*.

were not some other to discharge this office. This person was called the angel of the church, and the Chazan or Bishop of the congregation." "Certainly the signification of the words bishop and angel of the church had been determined with less noise, if recourse had been had to the proper fountains." "We may see, then, whence these titles and epithets in the New Testament are taken, namely, from the common platform and constitution of the synagogues, where *Angelus Ecclesie* and *Episcopus* were terms of so ordinary use and knowledge."

Even the "Dictionary of the Bible," p. 1399, says :

"The most prominent functionary in a large synagogue was known as the *Sheliach*, the officiating minister, who acted as the delegate of the congregation, and was therefore the chief reader of prayers, etc., in their name." "In him we find, as the name might lead us to expect, the prototype of the *ἄγγελος ἐκκλησιας* of Rev. i. 20 : ii. 1, etc."

These Episcopal authors, including the "Dictionary of the Bible," have as much "manifest weakness," it seems, as even Presbyterians! But without further criticism of these unfair statements, we remark that if it was deemed necessary to assault Presbyterians at all in such a publication, the writer should have ascertained what Presbyterian symbols say, instead of referring to unmentioned, and we may add, unmentionable authors. This kind of fairness is what we expect in a compiler of information, and even in a candid polemic. The suppressions are as unjust as the misrepresentations. Not only does he manufacture theories for Presbyterians out of his own fancy, but he withholds their true views, and suppresses all allusion to the synagogue, whose organisation sustains the Presbyterian position. The partisan object of withholding the fact that the titles of bishop and angel as well as pastor, elder, and minister, were official designations of the rulers of the synagogue, and were transferred to the elders, but *par excellence* to the presiding officer, *i. e.* the pastor, of a particular church, is rendered conspicuous by the attempt, instead, to derive the title angel from Mal. ii. 7, where the priest is called the messenger or angel of the Lord. But it cannot be pretended that this ever was an official title of the priest. Besides, he is called a messenger or angel of *God*, not of the *congregation*. An angel of God is God's *immediate* minister, a title wholly inapplicable to officers chosen and set apart by the Church, who are only *mediately*

his ministers. It is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to indicate this difference of relation in the titles of office conferred. Hence, the chief rulers of the synagogue were appropriately called by the official titles of angel of the church and bishop of the congregation. Now, why was this historical fact, and one moreover which belongs to the true antiquities of the subject, suppressed or omitted, while a fanciful illustration from Malachi which lacks concinnity is made prominent? The answer is easy. The Episcopal system is in imitation of the Jewish hierarchy, which is apparently favored by the priestly illustration from Malachi; whereas the whole theory of the apostolical origin of Prelacy is inconsistent with the true facts as to the constitution of the synagogue. But is this the way to write antiquities: to give such facts or fancies as may favor a given theory, and suppress whatever contravenes it?

2. The article on the "*Body*, in the sense contemplated by St. Paul, when he said of the Church, 'which is his body,' Eph. i. 23," is also on a biblical subject, and belongs to the period of the "Dictionary of the Bible." The object of its insertion here is seen in the introduction and endorsement of the sacramentarianism of Hooker, who teaches that "Christ and his Holy Spirit with all their blessed effects," are communicated in an incomprehensible way through the sacraments; and of Wilberforce, who says: "We are told in plain and indubitable terms that baptism and the Lord's Supper are the means by which men are joined to the body of Christ, and, therefore, by which Christ our Lord joins himself to that renewed race of which he has become the Head." Now, Hooker and Wilberforce did not live in the period professedly embraced in this book. Yet their views are given and endorsed, while not a word is said about the antiquities of the subject: for no ancient author, or council, or opinion, is mentioned or alluded to. The writer evidently introduces Hooker's and Wilberforce's views, in which the extreme doctrine of sacramental grace is taught, in order the more clearly to express his own. But what has this to do with antiquities, and why should such an article have a place in this book?

3. In the article on the "Lord's Table," we are told that "for

more than three hundred years after the institution of the sacraments, the altar is but once called a table in the genuine remains of Christian authors." But the article on the "Altar" says: *Τράπεζα*, a table; as *τράπεζα Κυρίου*. 1 Cor. i. 21. This is the term most commonly used by the Greek Fathers and in Greek Liturgies." Now, which of these articles are we to believe? The writers seem to be equally positive; and it is clear that their statements diametrically disagree.

4. The article on the "Bishop" is as remarkable for its one-sidedness as the corresponding article in the "Dictionary of the Bible" is for its fairness of scholarship. But what is more notable, statements presented in the work just named are flatly contradicted in the article now before us. It is very elaborate, its references are copious, and its vulnerable places too numerous for us in this cursory notice, to attempt to probe. At the threshold, however, it joins issue with the positions assumed in the preceding work. In it, p. 85, we read:

"As regards the *Apostolic office*, it seems to have been preëminently that of founding the churches, and upholding them by supernatural power specially bestowed for that purpose. It ceased as a matter of course with the first holders; all continuation of its existence (*cf.* 1 Cor. ix. 1,) being impossible. The *ἐπίσκοπος* of the ancient churches co-existed with, and did not in any sense succeed the Apostles: and when it is claimed for bishops or any church officers that they are their successors, it can be understood only chronologically, and not officially."

This is sensible and candid; but the present book begins with the opposing statement, p. 209, that the little bishop was

"From the earliest ages of the second century, and from St. Ignatius onwards, the distinctive name adopted as such in every language used by Christians . . . of the single president of a diocese, (*παροικία, διοίκησις,*) who came in the room of the Apostles, having presbyters, and deacons, and laity under him, and possessing exclusive power of ordination, and primarily of confirmation, with primary authority in the administration of the sacraments and of discipline."

And then, at the end of an elaborate argument to prove the above proposition from the Scriptures and from the Fathers, on p. 212, the writer says:

"The episcopate, then, is historically the continuation, in its permanent elements, of the apostolate," etc.

Here are two witnesses again whose testimonies are direct opposites. Which witness shall we believe? Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible," which says the Apostolate had no permanent elements, and hence that the Apostles had no successors "in any sense," and could have none in the nature of the case; or Dr. Smith's Christian Antiquities, which asserts that it had permanent elements, and that, *quoad hoc*, bishops are apostolical successors? The article before us professes to furnish us the antiquities of this subject. If there were no disputes as to the meaning of the patristic writings, then it would be proper for the annotator to present only his own understanding of the views of those authors. But when he knows, for certainly he ought to know, that all the Reformed Churches except the Church of England and its offshoots, interpret the Scriptures and the early Fathers in a very different manner, we have a right to complain that he does not candidly present their true opinions, or at least make known the fact of their dissent from his views. Presbyterians have always held that the bishop spoken of by Ignatius was not a diocesan but a parochial bishop; *i. e.*, he was not a prelate, but a pastor; and that the presbyters he mentions were simply and only what we for the sake of distinction and limitation call ruling elders; elder being the uniform translation of the word presbyter in the New Testament. In the same way do they understand others of the Fathers. Not only does this book fail to allow the Presbyterian views a place, but it advances sentiments antagonistic to those of the "Dictionary of the Bible," and also of such eminent prelatial writers as Whately, Bloomfield, Litton, Jacob, Alford, and a host of others; and yet there is no hint of this difference of opinion. Our author says the bishop was "the single president of a diocese (*παροικία, διοίκησις*)." *Παροικία*, however, is not a diocese, but a parish. In the early Church, the title bishop, originally belonging to all elders, was given to pastors who presided over single churches or parishes; but subsequently, as the Church deflected from its simplicity, prelacy crept in, assigning a diocese to the bishop; and so episcopacy gradually took the place of presbytery. The author of the article before us, however, does not permit the unwary reader to know that any

other views of the subject had ever been believed in or suggested besides those he maintains. In a writer professing to present the literature of the subject, such an omission is inexcusable.

In a running notice such as this, we cannot examine any of the articles in detail, nor can we even allude to all which involve points of difference between Prelatists and others. Indeed, all are not equally objectionable. For example, the article on "Priest or Presbyter," is not only very different in tone from this on the "Bishop," but it is as irreconcilable with it as is the article in the "Dictionary of the Bible."

5. The notices of the councils of the Church are necessarily very brief, but we would have been very glad to see fuller minutes than are ordinarily given. What determines the weight to be attached to the proceedings of lawful Synods are, the portions of the Church embraced in them, the numbers in attendance, and the fulness of the representation. Such facts are not often furnished. It would have been a very easy thing, and would have occupied very little room, to append to each council, as is sometimes done, the word, "General," "Provincial," or "Diocesan," as the case might be, with the numbers present. This would have added much value to the record; and it would have been a great favor to many who cannot consult large libraries. Even those who can do so would have deemed such chronicles valuable for the convenience of reference; and these are the very items we would expect to learn from a cyclopedia of church antiquities. Moreover, these facts have an important bearing on questions of Church polity; especially on the origin and progress of Prelacy. It is a troublesome matter for Episcopalians to account for the enormous number of bishops for example in Northern Africa, exclusive of Egypt, which in A. D., 411, was over 550; and in A. D., 484, after the rise of the Arian, Pelagian, and Donatist controversies, and in the midst of fierce persecution, was 475. Who can believe that these were diocesan bishops? Is it not clear that they must have been bishops of churches? A similar question arises from observing the numbers in attendance at other councils than those of Northern Africa; but in only a few instances are they noted by these writers. But our purpose is not

to discuss the subject; we only wish to show the importance of the statistics withheld. We may, remark, however, *en passant*, that no modern prelatial church has one-twentieth the number of diocesan bishops in proportion, that there were in Northern Africa in the 5th century, if those bishops were prelates. Either dioceses have grown enormously, or those were presbyter-bishops, *i. e.* pastors.

6. The condensed statements about the persons whose names are registered in the vocabulary are very inadequate for any valuable purpose that we can think of. In the "Preface" we find the following explanation of this matter:

"The names of persons are inserted in the vocabulary of this work, only with reference to their commemoration in martyrologies, or their representations in art; their lives, when they are of any importance, being given in the Dictionary of Biography."

The manner in which these names are inserted may be judged by the following example:

"IRENÆUS. 1. Hyacinthus. 2. Bishop, martyr under Maximian; 'Passio,' Mar. 25. 3. Theodorus. 4. Martyr at Thessalonica. 5. Bishop of Lyons and martyr under Severus; commemorated June 28. 6. Deacon, martyr with Mustiola, a noble matron, under the Emperor Aurelian; commemorated July 3. 7. Martyr at Rome with Abundius, under Decius; commemorated Aug. 26. 8. And Phocas commemorated Oct. 7."

The explanation quoted above does not cover the case. For though the insertion of the names was only for the limited objects stated by the editors, fuller details are needed to make the lists intelligible. The various persons can only be identified by such circumstances as the time and place in which they lived, the positions which they occupied, and the cause of their martyrdom or canonisation. It would require a minute acquaintance with church history and martyrology to enable one to recognise the saints, confessors, martyrs, etc., whose names are inserted. For in point of fact, though they are printed, and look us in the face, we are not often privileged to know who they were; and generally even the memoranda are wanting with which to distinguish between those of the same name. When they lived, when or why they were martyred, and what positions in life they filled,

are rarely stated. Frequently, but by no means always, persons are described as saints, confessors, martyrs, popes, bishops, presbyters, deacons, etc.; but sparingly are we told, when; more frequently, but rarely, where. As there are often twenty, sometimes thirty, and even fifty and sixty persons of the same name, these rolls are useless with no fuller statements than those given in the case of the eight Irenæuses, *ut supra*, which is a fair sample of the lists found in the book. Of the name Felix there are thirty-one. The devotee who should wish, in his worship to honor the martyr, confessor, or saint Felix, would be very much perplexed, we suspect, to know who his man was, and on what day to commemorate him, if he had no other means of ascertaining. All the thirty-one are without dates. We only know they lived between the days of the apostles and Charlemagne, or at least we infer so, from the period which this testimony professes to cover. Of them, three are recorded as saints, two popes, five bishops, four presbyters, and eleven other martyrs; while six have references to other names, and then there are twenty-four different days of commemoration. The catalogue of Maximuses, of whom they are sixty-two recorded, is on a similar plan. These are fair samples. A festival to commemorate St. John Smith would be as appropriate and as much calculated to excite the pious emotions and to animate the faith of those addicted to saint worship. Ignorance is certainly the mother of this kind of devotion, if such help can promote it; but in our Presbyterian ignorance, we should have supposed that even the *religieux* would want to have some faint conception of what saints they were commemorating, for whom they were praying, or whose intercession they were invoking. The Irishman, who, in the fervor of his devotions, cried out, "Holy St. Jerusalem, pray for us," spoke about as definitely and intelligently as he would have done if he had made the same invocation to St. Felix or St. Maximus. Surely it would not have seriously invaded the domain of the forthcoming Dictionary of Biography if there had been added, *e. g.*, to the name of the fifth Irenæus that he became bishop of Lyons A. D. 170, and that he wrote *V. Libri adversus Hæreses*, or simply that he was a Christian writer, with the date; and similar items

about every person named. This would not be biography, but the means of identification; and if the names are chronicled at all, it is but reasonable to ask that enough data should be furnished to indicate who they were.

Now, if the plan of the editors forbade this, their method has not been consistently carried out. For such *minutiæ* are found, here and there, throughout the work. Occasionally we come on dates, as in the cases of Ignatius, Hippolytus, Cyprian, etc., and of ten Gregories and seven Hilaries, we have the dates of five of each, and of eight of the sixty-two Maximuses. Generally the residences are wanting, yet occasionally they are not; for those of three of the Gregories, ten of the Maximuses, and five of the Hilaries are stated; and so of others. Moreover, Eusebius of Cæsarea is designated "the historian," as is also Hegeſippus, "circa 180 A. D." And then we often have full descriptions of persons represented in art. Now if there was uniformity in announcing these particulars in connection with the three or four thousand names nakedly presented to us for our bewilderment, it would have made the record intelligible and useful. As it is, however, the most of these lists of names are about as interesting and profitable as an equal instalment of an obsolete city directory.

7. The information on many subjects is very inadequate, and for that reason very unsatisfactory. In such a digest we ought to have the requisite knowledge in a nutshell, so as to save us from rummaging through many tomes to find it; and the value of the compend is graduated by its ability thus to aid the student. If it does not give the full and accurate information which is needed, it fails to accomplish the ends at which it professedly aims. Now the weight to be attached to the statements or opinions of writers often depends on the age of the world in which they lived; especially, in Christian antiquities, on the distance of their time from that of the apostles. But in quoting from them, more than half the time we find no minute of the date of their testimony. This would not be so objectionable and annoying, if, in connexion with the names of the authors in the appropriate places, we could learn the requisite facts. What is extra-

ordinary is, that authors, as such, are not mentioned in the vocabulary at all. If on consulting it, however, we succeed in finding the name (for frequently it is missing), we are not made much wiser for our trouble, because of the scantiness of the facts recorded. Besides, of several bearing the same name, there may be nothing by which to distinguish the one you are inquiring about; and after all, he may be missing; *e. g.*, among the seven Hilaries named there is no mention of "the deacon." In our examination so far, of the names in the vocabulary, we have found only two instances, already referred to, in which persons are noted as authors. Moreover, there is a similar defect in many articles relating to the customs, observances, ritual, polity, etc., of the Church, which furnish no means of determining when or under what circumstances the custom originated or the innovation was introduced. This is very unsatisfactory to the ecclesiological student who wishes to examine into the founding and development of the Church, and to inquire into the origin and causes of its deflections and aberrations. In such publications as this, we look for definite knowledge on the points involved in such investigations: but in this book it is often missing. Which innovations were synchronous, how far apart different customs originated, etc., it is impossible, in many instances, here to learn; which creates a great disappointment when any one has relied on this book as a companion in his studies. To illustrate.

(1) "All Saints' day" is an instance in point. On page 56, we are informed that "In the Eastern Church, a particular Sunday, the first after Pentecost, was appropriated in ancient times to the commemoration of all martyrs"; which, it is stated, afterwards became "All Saints' day." Now, when was that—how ancient? The answer is that St. Chrysostom tells about it. We turn to the title "Chrysostom" and read:

"CHRYSOSTOM, St. John, commemorated Nov. 13. Translation of his relics to Constantinople in the reign of the younger Theodosius, A. D. 435, Jan. 27. The Byzantine had, also, in more recent times, a festival of SS. Basil, Gregory Nazianzenus, and Chrysostom on Jan. 30. The Mart. Rom. Vet. and Mart. Usuardi place the Natalis of St. Chrysostom on Jan. 27, and do not mention the translation."

This is all we are told about St. Chrysostom; nothing indeed

to make him out as the author, nor as the bishop. Now, how is one who relies on this book for archaic knowledge to satisfy himself on these points? If, however, we fail to learn whether the festival of All Martyrs or All Saints took its origin from the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth century; and if we are not informed when Chrysostom, who first tells of it, lived, what position he occupied, what he wrote, or whether he wrote anything; at all events we have the satisfaction of knowing the year and the day, and under what emperor, his relics were translated to Constantinople! Now, we submit that the above statement about his relics trenches as much on the domain of biography as the writer would have done had he told us that Chrysostom was Bishop of Constantinople and a Christian writer at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. Moreover we hold that the latter information is far more important to the antiquarian student than the former. These facts indeed would have shown that there was no All Martyrs' or All Saints' day in the earliest ages, and that the primitive Church had no such observance. Indeed, the Greek Church only dates it from the latter part of the fourth century, and the Latin Church from A. D. 610. Why could not this writer have said so, without leaving the question in a maze of doubt?

(2) "Cloths of different kinds and various materials (in the earliest ages probably of linen only) must have been used in connexion with the celebration of Holy Communion, from the very earliest times. They were needed, partly for the covering of the holy table, and of the oblations, and of the consecrated elements," etc., p. 69. This is the introduction to the article on "Altar Cloths." An effort is thus made, apparently, to carry the custom of using altar cloths back to the "very earliest times," as a matter of necessity. But we deny that there was any altar in the "very earliest times"; and hence there could have been no "altar cloths." The origin of altar cloths does not seem to have been earlier than the latter end of the fourth century; and A. D. 370 is the earliest date named in this article. Of course a table was always decently prepared, according to the customs of the various nations, and the vessels properly cleansed. Cloths would

be used, but they were not ecclesiastical vestments or garments, and were not consecrated earlier than the date above given. If there is evidence of an earlier date, let it be produced; but unsupported assertion is not history.

(3) "Spiritual jurisdiction in matters of discipline, over clergy and laity alike, rested, in the beginning, both by scriptural sanction and primitive practice, with the bishop," etc. (p. 127.) As to the "scriptural sanction," there is considerable dispute; but we pass that by. As to the "primitive practice," the precise thing that it is important to inquire is, how "primitive" is this practice? What is the first instance of sole jurisdiction by a diocesan bishop? Or if that is not knowable, then what writer first tells of such a custom? In a word, what is the first reliable information on the subject? This is what a compendium of antiquities ought to set forth; not indefinite, unsupported assertions; and not guess-work.

(4) "Chrism," that is, "the sacred oil or unguent used in the celebration of baptism." we are gravely told St. Basil "derived from the earliest times, by unwritten tradition." Now, how many ages had this "unwritten tradition" travelled, before it reached St. Basil? In the vocabulary, we find five of the name of Basil, with no mention of what age of the Christian era any of them lived in; but we get a hint that "the great bishop of Capadocia" is the one we want to know about, as he is incidentally called "St. Basil." The article, however, proceeds to give "the earliest extant testimonies to its use," viz., those of Tertullian and Cyprian. Even this information has the usual defect; for it does not state that the first of these lived at the last of the 2d century, and the other, at and after the middle of the 3d century. Moreover, it ought certainly to state, that Justin Martyr, at the middle of the 2d century, describes the administration of baptism, but makes no mention of chrism or unction, and manifestly knew nothing of either. This would have given us something definite as to the time when this unauthorized addition was made to the institution of Christ, and as to how long this "unwritten tradition" had to travel to reach Basil, who was made bishop of Cæsarea, A. D. 370. But how could Basil call it an "unwritten

tradition," if Tertullian, nearly two hundred years, and Cyprian, more than a hundred years, before his time, wrote of it? Are not these testimonies interpolations?

This kind of disappointment constantly meets us, all through these two volumes. Careful details are given that are for the most part useless, even to those who mix up the saints with their devotions, while we seek in vain for exact knowledge to aid us in studying the rise and progress of error and innovation in the Church. This is especially true of subjects which relate to ritualistic customs or observances, rejected by anti-prelatists. The examples already presented have been taken at random from more than twenty articles with similar defects casually noted by us *inter alia*. The descriptions of these innovations are generally sufficiently full, and, we doubt not, are accurate so far as they go; and they are such as to satisfy the ritualist, whether papist or apist. But we often inquire in vain for the time at which they first intruded into Christian worship, or practice, and for the date of their first mention by Christian writers. This we must seek, if necessity requires, from other sources; and yet where shall we go for it, if not to a Dictionary of Christian Antiquities! The attempt, however, is often made, as in the examples already given, to create the impression, without any facts to sustain it, that the innovation is very ancient, coming from the Apostolic age, or immediately thereafter. Yet in a book of archæology such facts ought to be recorded as explicitly as possible. Now, this defect might have been remedied, at least in part, by inserting the names of all the ancient authors referred to, in the vocabulary, as we think undoubtedly should have been done, with the necessary facts succinctly stated. But as already seen, such data are but rarely furnished. Hence, the reason for inserting, in connection with the record of the events, the dates at which they occurred, only becomes the stronger; and for a like reason, the dates should always be given of the authorities referred to. This is sometimes done with much care, but generally the reverse is the case. Of course, it would be a grand thing, if all students and intelligent Christians could remember these historical dates and facts. If they could, however, they would have little need

for such compendia. But, the truth is, every student wants accurate books of reference, to help his memory, however good, and to be used as labor-saving machinery. For though his acquaintance with church history, martyrology, and patristic literature, may be fresh, he wants good books of reference to keep it fresh. But, encyclopedias have another important purpose, which is indeed their chief necessity and design; and that is, to furnish in a condensed form knowledge which otherwise would be inaccessible to all that class of educated and intelligent men, whose shelves are few, and who do not live within the reach of large libraries. Hence, the fundamental requirement is, that, on the branches of knowledge which they include, they should give full information, and be accurate in details.

Probably the reason why indefinite and hazy statements are presented on some of the subjects, is that there is no source of positive knowledge concerning them. This is unquestionably true in many instances. Then let the encyclopedist frankly say so, and that, at all events, would be something positive. If he cannot tell the full history, let him tell us precisely when reliable history begins. Some articles are written on this plan, and are very satisfactory; but so far as we have examined, the opposite is the rule. Archæologists are not expected to furnish knowledge, when none is attainable; and they should not affect to communicate it when they have none to offer. Above all, they should not endeavor to fasten on the primitive ages of Christianity an actual apostasy from apostolic simplicity, with no better evidence than their asseveration that this or that custom existed "in ancient times;" that there are "very ancient traces" of it; that it "must have been used from the very earliest ages;" that it was derived from "unwritten tradition;" etc., etc. We can make surmises and guesses ourselves. What we want in such a thesaurus is, all the positive knowledge on the respective subjects which is attainable; no more, no less; and if there is none, we want it to say so, and then stop.

Dr. Smith, who is the responsible editor, and on whose reputation the work has credence with the public, appears to be con-

scious that all his associates had not given evidence of that fairness which the public had a right to look for; and hence a sort of half apology is inserted in the "Preface." The Editors say:

"In treating of subjects like Church Government and Ritual, it is probably impossible to secure absolute impartiality; but we are confident that no intentional reticence, distortion, or exaggeration, has been practised by the writers in this work."

The Editors, doubtless, on examining their proof-sheets, found that some of their trusted co-laborers had in various places practised so much "reticence, distortion, or exaggeration," as to make them feel the necessity of acknowledging the injustice in advance, and of parrying attack by endorsing the integrity of purpose of those who had been the instruments of the wrong. For our part, we are not disposed to question the honesty of the writers of the objectionable pieces; or at least, we are willing to concede that the obliquity was more intellectual than moral; and that these defects were occasioned by narrow-mindedness rather than sinister design. Immersed in prejudice, as without doubt some of them were, they could not, of course, exercise that unbiassed judgment that ought to be conspicuous in every article. However learned these writers may be, in the sense of mere attainment, evidently they have not reached that high plane of scholarship from which they can look at a great subject *pro et con* in all its bearings with calm impartiality. Hence, unfortunately, on some important points, the antiquities are withheld, but in their place, we have assumption, dogmatism, and disquisition; and in other places, there are caricatures and misrepresentations, especially in the consideration of questions of order and ritual. Fortunately, only a few of the contributors and a limited number of the articles are of that character. The remainder of the two volumes, which includes five-sixths of their entire contents, we can cordially commend in these respects. Certainly, sectarianism is not so obtrusive and supercilious, and prepossession partiality is not so glaring and offensive, as in some articles which we have already referred to; and with regard to a large majority of the subjects considered, there would seem to be but little opportunity

for the display of either the one or the other. The work, assuredly, is the result of much learning and research; it has been prepared with immense labor; and notwithstanding the drawbacks, it is of great value.

ARTICLE III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RESURRECTION OF
JESUS CHRIST.

Humanly judging, it was a superhuman undertaking for a few Jews, poor fishermen of Galilee, and Saul of Tarsus, a disinherited son and recent convert; to establish the name and gospel of Jesus Christ in the chief cities of the Roman Empire, and so to establish them as to secure their eventual triumph throughout the whole world.

Here was a new thing upon the earth. There had been nothing like it in all previous history. There has been nothing like it in all subsequent history. No mind could deduce the idea of the actual person and career of Christ from the Old Testament Scriptures or from anything else. Those who took these Scriptures as the basis of their Messianic expectations, formed a totally different conception both of his person and his mission. Some time after his appearance in the world, there was found to be a marvellous congruity between the Old Testament statements and the living Christ of Galilee. They were the warp and woof of a divine fabric. The promises that ran through the Bible of a seed that should bruise the head of the serpent; of one in whom all the nations of the earth should be blessed; of a prophet like unto, but superior to, Moses; of a king, in comparison with whom David and Solomon were as nothing; of a priest before whom Melchizedek would pale—a priest upon a throne; of a Messiah who should be despised and rejected of his people, and suffer and die as an atoning sacrifice—all this became clear and vivid. But so intermingled and seemingly conflicting were these descriptions,

that no Jew, no Gentile, ever had a just conception of the actual, veritable Christ in his mind before his advent, and no god or goddess, no priest, no king, no hero, no teacher, no martyr, no mortal, was ever heard of, that bore resemblance to him. And since his disappearance from the world, all the "false Christs" that arose in Judea, all reformers and propagators of new religions, such as Mahomet, Swedenborg, Irving—all, of whatever country, name, or pretensions—have been so utterly unlike Jesus Christ as never rightfully to be named in comparison with him. He stands solitary and alone, alike in human history and in human mythology. He was an humble and obscure man, who wrought at the bench of a carpenter till he was thirty years of age, when he became a public teacher and reformer; proclaiming the highest morality ever taught on the earth; enforcing with utmost sanctions and personal example, supreme love to God, and a love to man like that to one's self; a love to the poor and neglected, to enemies and persecutors; honesty, integrity, and universal righteousness; courtesy, contentment, and chastity—all welling up from the secret life of the soul, from a new heart and a holy spirit. He inculcated a nobility, generosity, and magnanimity of character before unheard of, to be evinced in self-denials, self-sacrifices, and consecration to the good of others. And with all his personal humility and unearthly teaching, he boldly and persistently claimed to be the only Son and equal of the Eternal God—omniscient, omnipresent, and almighty; profoundly intimate, yea, one with the Father. He announced himself a king, the King of kings and Lord of lords, possessing all power, rule, and authority in heaven and on earth. The mightiest and proudest monarch and conqueror never dreamed of royalty so supreme, of dominion so vast and enduring. This strange, unique, before unconceived and inconceivable Person, spent three years in his ministry; a ministry filled with words and deeds of surpassing love, a love as incomprehensible as were either his person or his claims. By his strange and unhuman life he brought upon himself the enmity of priests and rulers and chief men of his people, which culminated in his arrest and trial before Pontius Pilate, followed by an ignominious death, and his burial in the sepulchre of Joseph of Arimathea.

Such a life, closed by such a death, was utterly unanticipated, and in itself is a dark and insoluble enigma. He had proved himself possessed of ample power to prevent his execution and death, but he did not use it. He calmly, for reasons all-commanding to himself, chose to suffer, to agonise, to die. As he said, "No man taketh my life from me. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."

Now, according to the Scriptures, this enigmatical life and voluntary death of Christ are of the very essence of Christianity: and yet peculiar and marvellous as were that life and that death, had the career of Christ closed with his burial, there could have been no intelligible Old Testament, no New Testament, no Church, no Christendom, no hope of heaven, no salvation for man. His name would speedily have perished from among men. A dead Christ could not make a living religion. A crucified Christ, mouldering in the tomb, never could have moved and shaken to its centre and revolutionised the Roman Empire, and on the ruins of its idolatry and pagan civilisation built up historic Christendom. A dead Christ could awaken neither faith, nor hope, nor zeal, nor sacrifice in his cause. Nothing but disappointment, dismay, and despair on the part of his friends, would follow his final destruction. His death would be a death-blow to any religion he might have proclaimed in his life.

Thus we reach the one conclusive, all-interpreting, all-powerful fact, that Jesus, crucified, dead, and buried, *rose* from the dead. He came out of the tomb a living, immortal man. A more stupendous, transcendent event cannot be conceived, and it is impossible to exaggerate its importance. The religion, civilisation, and progress of Europe and America, are founded upon it. It is an event which throws back its radiance upon the death, life, and birth of Christ, upon all the Old Testament types and prophecies and promises; an event which created the New Testament, and gave vitality to Christian morality and faith and hope; an event which is more and more changing the face of the world, and is destined to purify and bless the earth with peace, righteousness, and all prosperity, and to crown the race with everlasting honor and glory.

This event formed the staple and substance of apostolic discourse. It was specifically for their testimony to this fact, that the apostles were selected and trained. "Him God raised up on the third day, and showed him openly; not to all the people, but to witnesses chosen of God, even to us." When Judas had hanged himself, Peter declared that one must be chosen and ordained in his stead, "to be a witness with us of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus." The prominence thus given to this event was well and wisely ordered. The condition of the world was such, that, in laying the foundations of Christianity, it became absolutely necessary to insist upon and establish this as a regnant, outstanding, incontestible fact. It could not be treated as a subordinate and secondary matter.

There is abroad in the world a vast amount of thought and speculation, whose tendencies and statements are such as to unsettle the Christian faith by unsettling and upheaving its deepest foundations. It is entrenched in the broad and noble domain of science, and is put forth, enforced, and illustrated by minds of unusual power and culture. It has penetrated and impressed large sections of society through books and lectures, magazines and tracts, and newspapers and conversations. In its spirit and tone, it is exceedingly dogmatic and confident, often contemptuous and flippant. Its pretensions are enormous. It aims at nothing less than the overthrow and annihilation of the venerable fabric of Christianity, and to place itself on the very throne of the universe.

The leaders of the school of thought to which we now refer have one general drift, if not avowed purpose, and that is to get rid of a personal and living God, and so of Christianity, by showing that he is wholly unnecessary in the assertion of the stability, unvariableness, unchangeableness, and omnipresence, of what they call the laws or order of nature. These are accounted all-sufficient for all things, and, therefore, there is no place for God, or for Jesus Christ, as his only Son and our Redeemer. With them nature is all-inclusive. Anything beyond nature, anything above nature, anything other than nature, is denied as a sheer impossibility. Whether God, in the beginning, *created*

the universe in substance and in germ, and disposed it in its orderly motion and progress, is a question which puzzles and baffles most of these teachers. But the universe once existing and put into working order, they all agree that any interference with, any suspension, any alteration, of this order, is inadmissible. Providence and redemption are both excluded; and the Bible record of miracles and prophecies, of spiritual and eternal and divine revelations, the entire scheme of Christianity, is unreliable, unhistoric, legendary, and mythological.

Of course, if this absolute and universal proposition respecting nature and its laws could be established, if these men could prove their doctrine, there would be an end to our religion. If this proposition is true, there *can* be no real exceptions; apparent exceptions are only such in appearance, and must be explained away. We all agree in this. As the Apostle Paul, in an analogous case, argues, if the broad and absolute statement, "there be no resurrection of the dead," is correct, then it follows, inevitably, that Christ is not risen. But in both cases, the general and the specific, the proof is not yet produced. Such propositions, in their very nature, are incapable of demonstration. If all things, from the beginning of the creation, had continued to this day without interruption or change, this would not prove their inherent and necessary unchangeableness. The shining of a star ten millions of ages would not prove that that star would never cease to shine. If no man, not even Christ, had ever been raised from the dead, this would not prove that no one never would be in all the future. The mind of man is too limited to correct and arrange and pronounce judgment upon all the data requisite to such sweeping and momentous conclusions. And it is sad, inexpressibly sad, to see so many of our writers and speakers, so many of our bright and cultured young men and maidens, taken in the net of this pretentious, dazzling, and fascinating sophistry, that thus overrides and ignores the very first principles of logical reasoning.

Now, as we have seen, we are roundly, emphatically, told that a miracle, the supernatural, is impossible. To make this assertion is easy; to buttress the assertion with a great show of learn-

ing and plausible statement is very easy; but actually to prove it is another matter. If we can produce one miracle, a true, veritable, demonstrative, and divine interposition, which is above and other than the order of nature, this finishes and closes the argument against the supernatural. Its foundations are destroyed and the superstructure falls and crumbles. There is nothing more to be said in its defence. The confident and proudly asserted proposition is gone: and we claim the miracles of the Bible, one and all, to be just such divine interpositions.

In making this broad claim, we are met with the reply, that these miracles, so called, are not properly attested; that, having been wrought among a very ancient, very ignorant and superstitious people, incapable of scientific judgment upon them, they are without exception improbable, and that most of them are absurd on their face—in fact, that they are impossible. This is a common answer to the claim we make. It is worked up after this manner: certain of the recorded miracles are selected which, taken by themselves, look very improbable, such as the standing still of the sun and moon in the valley of Ajalon; the falling of the walls of Jericho at the blast of the rams' horns; the speaking of Balaam's ass; Jonah in the belly of the fish three days and three nights; the three young Jews in the burning fiery furnace. And we are asked, Are such things credible? Are they not simply ridiculous, if taken for truth? They can only be creatures of a bold fancy; exaggerations of a people who deemed themselves the exclusive favorites of heaven; they are like the myths and legends of unhistoric periods in other nations. And these, being thus disposed of, of course the Book that reports them is discredited as a sober and serious revelation from God, no better than the works of Plutarch, or Zoroaster, or Mohammed.

All this, which is supplementary to the fundamental scientific position of our adversaries, may be considered very shrewd and smart—a happy way of putting contempt upon the ablest and best minds of the last eighteen centuries. But is this sound reasoning? Is this a fair or honorable method of treating the foundations of that religion, which, with all its perversions and abuses, has been the mightiest power for good in human history?

The central miracle of the Bible, that which gives meaning, probability, and certainty to all the rest, and to all the teachings of the Book, is the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Strauss says "it forms the central point of the centre, the very heart of Christianity." And he justly appreciates the importance and magnitude of his task, when he adds, "Here we stand, at the decisive point where we must either retract all that has gone before, and give up our whole enterprise, or we must pledge ourselves to explain the origin of faith in the resurrection of Jesus without a corresponding miraculous fact." The whole life-work of Strauss, he himself confesses, fails, unless he succeeds in disproving this miracle. It is the one, the only, key to the Scriptures, the clue to a labyrinth which else is an utter maze and mystery, the light streaming through all the ages from the creation to the judgment, from Paradise lost to Paradise regained. This was the view of the Apostle Paul. Nothing in all the past, nothing in all the future, was of any value except as "Jesus and the Resurrection" gave it value. If this miracle could not be established, the Bible could not rightly command the obedience of men as the Book of God, "If the dead rise not," says he, "then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised, our preaching is vain and your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." As if he had said—nothing is, if this is not. Unless He was raised again for our justification, we are still condemned and lost. The whole argument for a divine religion is surrendered by the Apostle, if Christ was not raised from the dead; and he, with the most unshaken confidence, with the completest satisfaction of his reason, his judgment, and his heart, hinged everything, for time and for eternity, upon it. It is perfectly evident, that if Christ was raised from the dead, then the proposition that miracles are impossible is once and for all disproved. And next, all the miracles of the Bible are put upon their proper basis, and their peculiar character ceases to be an objection against them, and as they are part and parcel of an entire scheme of Divine Revelation, they become not only not difficult, but easy, of credit and acceptance.

Yea, and more: such an indispensable corner-stone is the resurrection of Christ, that if, previously, every other miracle of the Bible had been received, the failure to sustain this will cause the entire arch of divine revelation to fall to pieces.

What then are we to do in order to settle beyond all fair controversy, and to justify the faith of Christendom in the fundamental, all-verifying miracle of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ? How are we to hold and defend against all comers this most stupendous, transcendent, supernatural truth of our religion?

The thing to be proved is not simply that a man, named and known, tried and condemned, crucified and slain, as Jesus of Nazareth, was raised from the dead. This is all-important, absolutely essential; but it by no means concludes the case. For Lazarus, the widow of Nain's son, and others, might be proved to have been raised from the dead, thus demonstrating the intervention of divine power, but this would not establish our religion. A mere physical resurrection puts the seal of Divinity on no one. It does not prove the sanctity or the authority of its subject. It gives no validity to his previous sentiments or conduct. What we must establish is not only this, but that this man thus raised was the Lord of Glory, the Prince of Life, the incarnate Son of God, and man's Redeemer. The two are inseparable. Unless we can establish in an authoritative and unanswerable manner that the Resurrection of Jesus Christ declared him to be, what he claimed to be, and what the Old Testament Scriptures asserted him to be, God's only and co-equal Son incarnate, we fail in our effort. This was Peter's argument. They killed the Prince of Life, whom God raised from the dead. We think it will be made clear that without the Resurrection there can be no demonstration of the divinity of Jesus Christ, and without his divinity there can be no sure proof of his resurrection.

Moreover, the word *Resurrection*, when applied to Jesus Christ, means *immensely more* than it does when applied to any other persons alleged to have been raised from the dead. Theirs was a mere revivification or resurrection. They were still subject to infirmity and sickness and accident and pain and death. In fact they all died again. The true idea of the scripture doctrine

of the Resurrection is, that while it is a resurrection of the same body that was dead and buried, it is a resurrection to a new, a deathless, life. As Canon Westcott says: "It is not a restoration to the old life, to its wants, to its special limitations, to its inevitable close, but the revelation of a new life, foreshadowing new powers of action and a new mode of being. It issues not in death, but in the ascension. It is not an extension of an existence with which we are acquainted, but the manifestation of an existence for which we hope. It is not the putting off of the body, but the transfiguration of it." Neither can they die any more, said our Lord. The children of *this world* die, but the children of the Resurrection are the children of *God*, and therefore, are, like the angels, incapable of death. And so, Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more. Death can have no more dominion over him. Hence he is said to be the *first* that rose from the dead; the *first* fruits of them that slept; the *first* begotten of the dead; the *first* born from the dead. It was a resurrection that put him out of the category of mortality; that gave to his body, properties and qualities such as are described by Paul; making it incorruptible, glorious, powerful, spiritual, and immortal. The Resurrection of Christ is so prominent and paramount, so singular and transcendent, that all the other resurrections recorded in Scripture fade out of sight by its side. His is *The Resurrection—The Life*. This is what is meant when we speak of the Resurrection of Christ.

And yet again, the argument is apologetic and not dogmatic. It is intended as a demonstration to the human mind, as such,—to man, not as renewed and illumined by grace, not as depraved and alienated by wicked works, but to man as man, as a rational and moral being. Miracles are signs to them that believe not. And this stupendous, all-including, miracle has, preëminently this adaptation and power. We take the record as we find it, and treat it just as we treat any other record.

There are two lines of evidence, two factors in the argument, distinct and separate, yet mutually concurrent, and they together constitute a logical and moral demonstration of the highest conceivable order. Neither without the other is conclusive, but welded into one, they are irresistible.

These are: 1. The Testimony of the Witnesses; and 2. The foregoing Scriptures.

The former of these, in our argument on the subject, will first be considered. That testimony is positive, manifold, continuous, to the effect that Jesus Christ according to the flesh was raised from the dead. The honesty and integrity of the witnesses are unimpeached. The sincerity and strength of their convictions reached to the endurance of all manner of persecution and of martyrdom. Their competency as witnesses is a fair question of discussion, but on general grounds it must be allowed. And this brings us to the heart of the matter,—just what it was to which they bore witness. It is the popular method and common among preachers and writers to say that they witnessed to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. But this, while practically correct, is not strictly accurate and does not give the precise facts of the case. Omitting the subject of the harmonistic accounts of the resurrection with their difficulties, let us simply state the nature of the evidence that is given. It is that of the testimony of the human senses—of touch, hearing, and sight, appropriately reported and authenticated. These senses have to do only with sensible things—with the objects handled, heard, and seen.

That Jesus Christ lived in Palestine, a man among men, is known, just as we know that Alexander, Hannibal, Nero, Socrates, Plato, and Plutarch lived, each a man among men. Their fellow-men saw, heard, handled them; walked and ate and drank with them; and competent contemporary writers recorded their lives and deeds. We have not the least difficulty in believing their testimony. The person and life of Jesus Christ were evidenced in precisely the same way; only the records are far more authentic, and can far more easily be sifted, compared, and verified. On this point argument is needless. Those who deny the resurrection of Jesus Christ, admit in that very denial his existence and life before his death.

That he was crucified, died, and was buried, are facts known just as the fact of the death and burial of any other man is known. The proofs of death and burial are proofs to the senses of men, and they are so sure, so demonstrative, that probably

not one person out of a hundred million is buried when he is not dead. The evidences of the actual death of Christ are now, by the most extreme critical school, admitted to be full and complete, and by those with whom we are now dealing, no attempt is made to discredit the fact of his death any more than of his life: their whole argument turns upon the impossibility of his resurrection, and this because it would be a contradiction, a violation of inviolable laws. Nevertheless as we shall see, this impossible event was possible, and did actually occur: the dead Christ did live again; the buried Christ did come out of the tomb.

Now, this fact is known, precisely as the facts of his previous life, death, and burial are known—through the *senses* of those who bore witness on the subject; and the records of the evidence are received precisely as the records of the evidence of the existence of any man who lived in the past, are received.

No one of these witnesses pretends to have seen Christ rise from the dead. No one saw the reanimation of his dead body; no one saw the first signs of life; no one saw the process of the transcendent resuscitation and reunion of the soul and body. All this is beyond the range of any testimony that is offered or exists. We perfectly agree with our adversaries when they tell us “that it is not of the nature of human testimony to reach to the supernatural.” They cannot urge this more strongly than we do. But their urging it reveals the essential weakness of their position. They are fighting a man of straw. They totally misapprehend the *point* of the gospel evidence, the subject-matter of the New Testament attestations. They hold that a demonstration of the inadequacy of testimony to prove the supernatural cause, settles the whole question. On the other hand, we hold that it has nothing to do with it. The inscrutable *cause* of the resurrection is a very different thing from the fact of the resurrection, and it is on this and on this alone that the testimony bears. This, as the most cursory reading of the Evangelists shows, is all they profess to prove. Their testimony relates, simply and only, to the living presence, the actual existence among men, of Jesus Christ subsequently to his crucifixion, death, and burial. And what we affirm is, that on this subject the evidence is of the very

same kind, just as sufficient, just as conclusive, as is that of his having been previously a living man and his having died. All the narratives relate to this simple, sensible, most easily demonstrated fact. Christ was alive again after he had been dead. The miracle—the supernatural, causal agency that effected the resurrection—as we shall see, will take care of itself. Let us illustrate this.

Suppose that some of the members of a church, who had known their pastor for several years, had been absent from the place of their residence during the three weeks previous to a given Sabbath and had returned on the Saturday night preceding. They occupy their places on the Sabbath morning in the sanctuary. They see the form, the face, the motions, the gestures of their pastor; they hear and note his familiar tones and accents. His personal, living, real presence, is, to them, a fact beyond all question. They would take their oaths upon it the next day. No matter what might have happened to him during their absence, the evidence of their eyes and ears would be demonstrative to their minds that he was there, standing before and speaking to them. He might, like Paul, have been caught up to the third heavens during their absence. He might like Lazarus, or the daughter of Jairus, or Christ, have died; if he stands before them, accredited by their senses a living man, then he so stands, their indubitable, actual, living pastor. Should a thousand persons tell them that during their absence he had been struck dead, and that they had followed him to the tomb, it would not alter their convictions; they might doubt the declarations, but they would not doubt their senses. And if to Christ's contemporaries the very same proof, which thus compels the assurance and confidence that he, whom these parishioners had so well-known, is the very same person who preached on the Sabbath morning named, if that very evidence was given to them, only increasingly and from week to week, with additional, tangible, ocular, and audible signs and proofs, then, unless their veracity and competency as human hand and eye and ear witnesses, can be impeached, their testimony becomes conclusive,—demonstrative beyond all cavil.

Many things have been written on the fallibility and unreli-

ability of the testimony of the senses, and doubtless men have often been deceived, and have only thought they saw and heard and handled the objects they declared existed; but notwithstanding this, the evidence, the normal evidence, of the senses, within their own proper domain, is ordinarily infallible. The correction of mistakes is easy, and on most matters, on matters such as that now before us, there are no mistakes to be corrected. The actual existence of the houses, streets, trees, the horses, wagons, carriages, the men, women, and children we are conversant with through our senses, is undoubted, indubitable. Dead persons are known to be dead, and living persons are known to be living, and the simple statement of the fact by those with whom they are connected, settles the matter in all parts of the world.

The testimonial narrative of the resurrection of Christ, in his bodily form, is most simple, most natural, most satisfactory. We have not space to recite it. It is very noticeable that no other test than that of the senses—the senses of persons who had known him long and well and were fully qualified to identify him, is suggested. Eye witnesses, ear witnesses, hand witnesses, give their testimony. They saw, heard, and handled the man Christ Jesus, just as they had done for three years previously. They knew him during those forty days through the same senses by which they had known him during those three years. It is, in all the circumstances, utterly absurd to suppose that the man whom they thus recognised, was not the same Jesus they had known before, but a stranger imposing on them with prints of nails in his hands and feet, and a spear wound in his side. It is equally absurd to suppose that they saw and heard and handled, and talked and walked and ate and drank with a ghost, a human shadow, during those six weeks. Had they known nothing of his death and met him afterwards, it would be precisely the same. If some of his disciples had gone to Rome a few months before his crucifixion, and having heard nothing of his death, had returned during the forty days and met him at the Sea of Galilee, would they not be just as good, just as strong, just as reliable witnesses to his person and presence then as they were before?

Until the evidence of the common senses of men about things most palpable, most easily discerned and known, about the existence, presence, and speech of living human beings, and about the death and burial of such beings—until this, which lies at the foundation of everything connected with the life of man on earth, is done away with and made of no account, the fact of Christ's resurrection must stand. To deny that Jesus Christ was alive when so many men asserted his being actually present with, visible to, audible by them, is to overturn the foundations of all historical knowledge, and empty the past of all reality. The resurrection itself was not seen; the miracle itself could not be directly attested by the senses. The New Testament does not attempt to do anything more than to produce abundant evidence that Jesus Christ lived, died, and lived again; and these are external, material, sensible facts, each and all of them being verified by the senses of men. As Luke says, "He showed himself alive after his passion, by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God." This is all and this is enough. The miracle, the interposition of almighty power effecting the stupendous result, arresting and reversing the order of nature, is not the subject of human observation and testimony. This *is an inference* which the mind spontaneously, instinctively, and irresistibly draws from the facts observed by the senses. The laws of the mind compel the conclusion. We do not reason about it; we take it by an immediate, instant intuition. Did those women, those disciples, those apostles, those hundreds of his followers, did their eyes see Jesus Christ alive after his death, did their ears hear him, did their hands handle him? If they did, then *God* must have raised him from the dead. The miracle took place. By what right do men who accept the testimony of the senses to the fact of Christ's life before his crucifixion, turn about and impeach its validity to the fact of his life after his crucifixion? Either there is no evidence that Christ did live on earth at all before his death, or there is just as valid evidence that he did live after his death. Either Christ rose from the dead or he never existed on earth. Prove to us that he

ever lived among men, and we will prove that he rose from the dead by the same evidence. Deny that he rose from the dead, and we defy any mortal to prove that he ever appeared on the earth.

Thus far the way is clear; the proof full and decisive; the argument unanswerable, as to the corporeal resurrection of Christ. But now there comes in, what, at first sight, is a disturbing element. The question which we regarded as settled emerges again, and the *competency* of these human witnesses is brought into doubt. For we find them, in the same breath with their other testimony, witnessing to things pertaining to the risen Christ which hardly come into the category of the ordinary and usually accepted evidence of the senses. As long as that evidence goes to prove Jesus Christ to be precisely the same identical Jesus of flesh and bones and frame and physical properties and qualities he was before his death, it is justly available. But these same witnesses, with equal positiveness and assurance testify to an altogether unusual and utterly unparalleled condition of his humanity, preceding this by the assertion that two spirits, angels from the unseen world, in the form of young men, sat upon the stone at the door of the sepulchre, and spake to the women who first visited the tomb; they tell us that this risen Christ could, and that not by a miraculous energy, but in a way proper and natural to his body, by what Augustine calls "a certain ineffable facility of movement," appear and disappear without perceptible motion, could sit at a table and eat and drink and engage in conversation after a walk of several miles, and then suddenly, without a rustle or change of position, vanish out of sight, as by an invisible cap; that he could and did appear again and again, and without opening a door or taking a visible or audible step, or causing a disciple to change his place, make himself visible, standing in the midst of the room where the eleven disciples were seated, so that on the first occasion, "they were terrified and affrighted and supposed they had seen a spirit;" they took him for a phantom, a spectre, a shade. And in this most marvellous state of things he verifies himself to them by assuring them, "It is I myself," and making them handle his

flesh and bones, and ordering a meal to be prepared, eats with them fish and honey. And a week after, by a like apparition of himself to the eleven, he, "the doors again being shut," stands in their midst and salutes them, and presents to Thomas his pierced hands and open side, and says, "Reach hither thy finger and behold my hands, and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side," than which nothing could be more incredible, if the body of Christ was a simple natural body, such as it was before his death. Who could bear such a movement on his freshly pierced hands and side, the wounds being unhealed, undressed, and open? We read that on a certain occasion "he appeared," *εφανερώθη*, phantomised himself, "in another," a different, "form." The account of his appearance at the sea of Galilee seems to be after the same extraordinary manner, so that "none of his disciples durst ask him, Who art thou?" No hint is given of any place where he abode, of any house where he slept, or of his being in any way dependent on food or drink. He comes, no one knows from whence. He goes, no one knows whither. And at last having gone with his disciples to the Mount of Olives, he, without an effort, as by an inherent force, by a gentle motion, rises from the ground, and, contrary to all the known laws of nature, rises and still rises and moves upward till a cloud receives him out of their sight, and he is no more seen on earth by them; an angel informing them that he had gone into heaven, and Mark declaring that "he sat on the right hand of God." How he knew this he does not say. Such is the additional strange, astounding testimony of the witnesses to the resurrection of Christ, out of which both ancient and modern criticism has educed a vast amount of difficulties and self-contradictory explanations.

Now if these witnesses should have affirmed these things, of Lazarus, for example, or of any mere man, we venture to say that their testimony would not be received. Testimony to the simple and single fact that Lazarus or Christ was alive at any time after his death, is valid testimony; but testimony affirming the possession by Lazarus or Christ of a body whose properties were superhuman and at the same time human, subject to the

senses of other men and at the same time independent of them, alike visible or invisible, tangible or intangible, local or illocal, at his will, now here and now there without apparent motion, ascribing, in the language of theology, to the resurrection body of Christ, *invisibilitas, illocalitas, impalpabilitas*—such testimony would be received, not only with great incredulity, but it would go far to undermine their testimony to that which, in its own nature, should command confidence. As we have seen, such a body is the very body the Scripture idea of the resurrection implies and demands; yet the proof of it can hardly be reached in the same way that the fact of his resurrection in the very physical body in which he had lived before he died is reached.

To illustrate the difficulty now before us: We are sitting here together, say in the city of Chicago in the month of May, 1880. The door is opened—we turn our eyes towards it and see a white man enter and shut it. We watch him. As we look a sudden change passes over him. He becomes a negro. His skin turns black, his hair turns woolly, his nose becomes flat, his lips thick, his chin projecting. He is as clearly, palpably, a full-blooded negro, as he was, just before, a white man. We approach him, we examine him, we speak to him, and our convictions are confirmed. Now we go out and report this. We are honest men, sincere men, with no temptation to falsehood. We assert this transformation as a fact. Would we be believed? Would others be bound to believe us? If we told them that we saw a man enter the place and shut the door, and stand before us none would doubt us; but when we declare that we saw that man suddenly change into a perfect negro, even sensible men would hear us with a certain incredulity. There would be a temptation to treat our witness as we treat that of those “spiritualists,” who testify to the materialisation in the air of a departed spirit, whom we regard as, when honest, deceived. Our hearers would perhaps be reluctant to concede in our favor the rule of evidence (which is indisputably solid): that good and sufficient testimony proves any statements whatsoever which are not self-contradictory, or absolutely impossible. Hence it would be practically very important that our testimony should have the confirmation

of admitted predictions. Our supposed instance gives but an imperfect illustration of the force of the Apostolic testimony to Christ's resurrection; for we are not supposed to have died to seal our testimony to the event in Chicago, as the Apostles did. The witnesses to the resurrection sealed their title to be believed, notwithstanding the wonderfulness of the event testified. Still, the scepticism would be not unnatural. Hence the value of prophetic confirmation.

But now—and here we pass to the second line of evidence, viz., the testimony of the foregoing Scriptures—now suppose, that, in connexion with our testimony as to this strange and unprecedented event, a book should be produced which had been in existence a thousand years; a well known, extensively circulated, often quoted, most valued book; and that in this book it should be found written, that in the year 1880, in the month of May, six persons should meet in a room at a place called Chicago, in a country then undiscovered and unknown, and that while they were together, a man should enter the room, and standing before them would suddenly be changed into a negro. Such a record, the record of such a prophecy, in such detail, would at once change the whole aspect of our testimony. Unless it could be shown that we were dishonest men, making up the story on purpose, its truth would be instantly demonstrated to the mind. It would be divinely certified and established. Such a prophecy in such olden time, could not have come by the will of man. Only God could have foreseen and foretold the event. Our testimony would be verified beyond debate. The seal of God would be upon it. What was difficult of credit on our bare word becomes, not only a fact to be believed, but a fact which must be believed unless we would make God a liar. If this would be so in a simple and single effect like this, then, if we can find a book concerning Jesus Christ, a book written hundreds of years before his advent, and giving in minute detail times and places and circumstances as to his birth and ministry and sufferings and death and burial and resurrection, and giving them in such a way that by no possibility could the Evangelists and Apostles have made up the story of his life and death and resurrection to match the

foregoing ancient accounts, then our faith in the corresponding events when actually occurring and appropriately witnessed to and attested becomes not only rational and logical, but a religious duty; for that faith would rest not simply on human testimony, but on divine and infallible testimony. The Bible indubitably is such a book, and the Old Testament is justly styled the testimony of Jesus.

The resurrection of Christ as the only and eternal Son of God incarnate, (and it is only thus that it is worth our concern,) is dependent upon the foregoing Scriptures for its authentication and authority. That event, if standing by itself and witnessed to by the evangelists only, would present difficulties: but when combined with the Old Testament Scriptures, it becomes luminous and effective and conclusively, divinely, true. Faith in it is faith in God himself; and that which, at first sight, created doubts as to the entire story, becomes itself an absolutely essential part of the stupendous miracle. It is just as important to have proof of the true *resurrection character* of the body of Jesus, as it is to have proof of the simple fact of his corporeal revivification. It is the miracle of the eternal Son of God incarnate rising by the exceeding greatness of God's power in a body of immortal permanence, power, and glory, the pattern and the pledge of the like resurrection of his people. Consider those words of John: "When he was risen from the dead, his disciples believed the Scriptures." "For as yet they knew not the Scripture that he must rise again from the dead;" and hence the empty towel and the neatly laid clothes and the napkin folded by itself were no proofs to them of his resurrection. Our Lord declares that the Scriptures by themselves were all sufficient to demonstrate his resurrection. He said to the two disciples on their way to Emmaus, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses, and *all* the prophets, he expounded unto them in *all* the Scriptures the things concerning himself. No wonder, that after he vanished out of their sight, they said one to another, Did not our heart burn within us while he talked with us by the way, and while he opened to us the

Scriptures? And in the evening of that same day when he stood in the midst of the eleven, he told them, These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning me. Then opened he their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures, and said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem. And ye are witnesses of these things—not only witnesses of my resurrection, but of God's foregoing testimony to it. The strength and power of Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost consisted in the proof of the resurrection of Jesus to immortality and so of his divinity and Messiahship, not merely from the testimony of the witnesses, but, fundamentally, from the foregoing Scriptures "in which God had showed by the mouth of all the prophets these things," and especially, from the sixteenth Psalm. He closed his argument in these words: "Therefore, David, being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins according to the flesh, he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne; he, seeing this before, spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither his flesh did see corruption. This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses." And so at Cesarea, he said to Cornelius, of Jesus, "whom they slew and hanged on a tree: him God raised up the third day, and showed him openly. To him give all the prophets witness." This was the drift and overwhelming force of Stephen's testimony, bringing the Old Testament Scriptures to bear upon the fact of the risen and ascended Jesus.

This was the sum and substance of Philip's demonstration, from the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, to the eunuch. This was Paul's argument at Antioch. "We declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again; as it is also written in the second Psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." This was his argument

at Thessalonica. "And Paul, as his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and alleging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus whom I preach unto you is Christ." He declared to Agrippa that he said none other things than those which the prophets and Moses did say should come. And at Rome, he expounded and testified the kingdom of God, persuading them concerning Jesus both out of the law of Moses and out of the prophets. And in his sublime demonstration of the resurrection of Christ, in the fifteenth chapter of I. Corinthians, before he recounts the testimony of the eye-witnesses of the resurrection, he is careful to lay the foundation of their faith in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, by which that testimony is made vital and valid. "I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye received and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, unless ye have believed in vain. *For* I delivered unto you, *first of all*, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, *according to the Scriptures*; and that he was buried; and that he rose again the third day, *according to the Scriptures*." And he sums up this whole doctrine of the foregoing Scriptures, when he says to Timothy, "The Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation."

The subject is endless. It is insisted upon in the Gospels, in the Acts, in the Epistles, and in the Apocalypse. The foregoing Scriptures are the bed-rock of our faith in the testimony of the Evangelists and the Apostles. And it is worthy of note, that our Lord's ministry on earth, his whole life and work, are made largely dependent for their sanctions upon the Scriptures of the Old Testament. How often does he refer to them, quote from them, and establish his claims from their utterances? He proves his mission, his divinity, his incarnation, his authority, by means of them. His miracles, it is true, authenticated his supernal teachings and august demands to those to whom he spoke; but the foregoing Scriptures attest the validity of his claims, with a clear and shining witness, to all ages and peoples. "That it might be fulfilled," "it is written," and the like, are words which

illumine the pages of the Evangelists. And we know with what resistless logic he silenced the opposing Jews, and dispelled the illusions of their traditions and misinterpretations, by making those Scriptures testify against them and for himself. Their fundamental error consisted in "not knowing the Scriptures and the power of God." Being what they were, they were the testimony of God himself to him; as he declares, "The Father himself which hath sent me hath borne witness of me. And ye have not his *word* abiding in you. Search the Scriptures. They are they which testify of me. Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" A stronger assertion of our argument could scarcely be made. Such was the Old Testament Scripture in its testimony to Christ before his resurrection. And as the resurrection was the seal, consummation, and crown of his whole life, without which his advent and incarnation, his miracles and teachings, his sacrifice and death, would have been unavailing, so it is preëminently and most luminously witnessed to by that Scripture. This makes our faith in the resurrection of Christ to stand, not in the wisdom, the honesty, the fidelity, of human testimony, but in the omniscience of God; even the words of the Holy Spirit testifying by the prophets, beforehand, of the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow. This makes our faith not a human, but a divine, not an historic, but a supernatural, faith. For faith in the *supersensible*, in the *supernatural*, the divine, on the uninspired testimony of finite, fallible, men, cannot be a scientific, much less a religious faith. It cannot be saving. It cannot be acceptable to God. It cannot be binding on the conscience. It is at best a venture, an uncertain and presumptuous venture. Such testimony is too weak a basis to sustain the enormous weight of a divine revelation of spiritual, unseen, eternal things. We must "believe the Lord our God himself, if we would be established; we must believe his prophets, if we would prosper." If we would believe the Lord Jesus, we must first believe the foregoing Scriptures in their testimony concerning him. That was a weighty word of our Lord, "If I bear witness of myself, my

witness is not true"; and, "if ye believe not the writings of Moses, how shall ye believe my words?" This affords an invincible demonstration of the supreme, most transcendent, and all-essential miracle of the Bible. "This," as Calvin says, "creates a *conviction* which asks not for reasons; a *knowledge* which accords with the highest reason, namely, knowledge in which the mind rests more firmly and securely than in any reasons; such, in fine, the conviction which revelation from heaven alone can produce."

Take from the argument for the resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ this element, this factor, of the foregoing Scriptures; in other words, take out inspiration, and the testimony of the witnesses loses its force. That testimony cannot, by itself, sustain the burden. The divine witness in prophecy must be added. Either without the other fails. Only in the combination of the two is the fact established. And as in the incarnation, in regeneration, and in revelation, so in this fact of the resurrection of Christ, the divine and human are correlated and essential to the argument. It is as impossible to prove the divinity of the historic Christ without the incarnation as it is to prove the resurrection of the divine Christ without inspiration.¹

¹ Since the foregoing paper was written, an article has appeared in the April number of the PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW on the subject of inspiration, under the signatures of the Rev. Dr. A. A. Hodge, of Princeton, and the Rev. Dr. Warfield, of Allegheny, whose fundamental position contravenes the views we have presented. Their article maintains that "the general truth of Christianity and its doctrines must be established before we come to the question of inspiration," *i. e.*, "the fallen condition of man, the fact of a redemptive scheme, the general historical truth of the Scriptures, and the validity and authority of the revelation of God's will which they contain," must be proved to be verities before the question of the inspiration of the record, which gives them to mankind, is settled. The doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, Regeneration, Justification, Adoption, the Mission and Work of the Holy Spirit, the Resurrection of the Dead, and Eternal Judgment, must first be believed on human declarations considered apart from their inspiration. These writers add: "In dealing with sceptics it is not proper to begin with the evidence which immediately establishes inspiration, but we should first establish theism, then the historical credibility of the Scriptures, and then the divine origin

To constitute a true resurrection body, it was needful that both the sets of attributes and qualities ascribed to that of Christ should be present; while testimony that would be valid to the one would fail as to the other. The testimony as to Christ's being physically alive after his death is complete so far as it goes, and may be regarded as independent of inspiration; it is the testimony of the senses to a sensible object appropriately reported. But the testimony of the senses as to his being illocal, invisible, impalpable, immortal, fails to produce that certainty without which a true resurrection body cannot be affirmed. Wherefore, to this supernatural fact the foregoing inspired Scriptures, by their supernatural divine testimony, affords the link wanting in the chain of

of Christianity. Nor should we ever allow it to be believed that the truth of Christianity depends upon any doctrine of inspiration whatever.' (P. R., p. 227.) In like manner, the Rev. Dr. Patton, on page 371 of the same REVIEW, says, "The apologete may, and sometimes must, defend Christianity as a supernatural and revealed religion, on grounds that do not assume the inspiration of the Scriptures." This apologetic method of establishing Christianity on the basis of the credibility of the penmen of Scripture, considered simply as honest and candid men, has been recently maintained by such men as Canon Browne, Dr. Bannerman, and Dr. Cairns, as well as by the writers just named among ourselves. Men more earnest and true to the faith of the Church cannot be found, and it is with utmost diffidence, yet with strong convictions, that we question the soundness of their position. Their intention is most laudable, and wholly in the interest of the truth of God: the effort is to silence scepticism on its own ground. The point we raise, and which we hope will be thoroughly considered in the Church, is, whether more is not lost than is gained by the new method; whether, in putting inspiration into the background, we do not logically yield the whole matter of an authentic revelation of God obligatory on man, and sacrifice the very thing we aim to preserve?

If the preceding argument on the resurrection of Christ is correct, then there is no "question of inspiration" to be raised. It demonstrates itself to the mind, just as does the miraculous element in the resurrection of our Lord. It is an immediate and necessary inference, and has all the force of intuitive truth. The difficulties we have urged as to the insufficiency of the testimony of the witnesses, by itself and apart from the foregoing Scriptures, to the resurrection of Christ, are in principle difficulties that pertain to all attempts to establish the supernatural by mere human testimony. A revelation from God may prove itself to the person

evidence, and makes that chain golden, binding heaven and earth, time and eternity, God and man, in indissoluble everlasting union.

The body in which Christ was raised was the very same individual, identical body in which he was born and lived and died and was buried. But a marvellous change passed upon it. It was more than transfigured. It was no longer a terrestrial, but a celestial, no longer a natural, but a spiritual, no longer an earthly, but a heavenly, body. New properties and qualities, a new life, a freedom from former limitations and dependence and subjection to natural laws and material conditions, signalised it. It was his own true human body, but it was incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, glorious, and immortal. It was competent by its constitution and transformation, like Moses and Elijah, to dwell, now in the highest heavens with angelic spirits, and now to stand on Mt. Hermon, subject to the very same laws of gravitation and physical relations, as were the three disciples who stood by their side. "The narratives," says Steinmeyer, "force us to infer a higher bodily organism, such as was needed by the Risen One in order to dispense the gift of the Spirit. They force us to infer a material body,

to whom that revelation is made. Inspiration is not in the case. His unattested declaration, by word of mouth or by writing, of that revelation, can only prove his own belief of its truth. It cannot command our faith in his faith of it. When Moses said to Pharaoh, "Thus saith the Lord." Pharaoh rightly demanded, "Shew a miracle for you." *i. e.* Give me a divine attestation of your divine authority.

The genuineness and authenticity of the sacred historical records are by no means equivalent to their *credibility*. This latter must be settled on other grounds. The whole question of the credibility of the records of alleged supernatural revelations must finally be resolved into supernatural attestations of the same. Apart from inspiration, they are so interwoven and penetrated with the supernatural, the miraculous, the unusual, the marvellous, that even ordinary historical statements must be corroborated by outside evidence to make them credible.

Drs. Hodge and Warfield say that inspiration is "fundamental to the adequate interpretation of Scripture." This is true beyond all question. An inadequate interpretation will not satisfy a sceptic or any one else. Scripture is its own interpreter. Otherwise Scripture ceases to be the supreme authority in matters of religion, and reason usurps its place. Strauss clearly saw this, and presented it with great force. (See "The Old Faith and the New," London. 1873, pp. 103, 104.)—T. H. S.

such as the Lord could appear to the disciples in. But they conjoin both kinds of characteristics so naively, intertwine them so firmly, and interweave them so closely, that their apparent contradictoriness did not occur to the narrators; but in fact there is no contradiction, for it is the same body which appears, and the same which retires into the invisible world." And Lange, in his *Life of Christ*, says, "He stood before them with a true body, and yet free as a spirit in his bodily movements; belonging to the *other* world, and yet endued with the powers and qualities of *this* world; belonging to *this* world, and yet possessing the attributes of the other, or rather as the perfected King of the great kingdom of God which exists in both worlds;" and we may add, in all worlds.

Such was the resurrection of Jesus Christ; and such is the nature and value of the evidence by which God establishes it. The two lines of evidence, divine and human, meet and blend and become the sun-like demonstration of the most marvellous event in the history of the universe: an event that proves the divinity of the testimony that described it in the preceding centuries, and so verifies the testimony of the witnesses who declared it when it took place; an event which makes the incarnation a necessity, and so an indubitable reality; an event which constitutes the shining orb of humanity, flooding heaven and earth with its radiance, illuminating the distant past and the eternal future.

In and of itself the argument from the foregoing Scriptures proves nothing till their fulfilment. The issue must confirm it. As our Lord, again and again, says, "I tell you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass, ye may believe." The authentication, by miracle, of the prophet at the time, is outside of the case in our apologetic argument. But when actually fulfilled, its divinity is established for the ages. The fulfilment verifies and ratifies the prophecy, and the prophecy verifies and ratifies the fulfilment. The foregoing Scriptures that were demonstrated in the crucifixion and burial of our Lord gave assurance of the foretold resurrection. But that resurrection alone made the demonstration complete that the salvation of God for man is recorded in the Bible; for, as we have already said, if

Christ be not raised, our preaching is vain, and your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. They also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished; and we of all men are most miserable. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept." "He was delivered for our offences." "He died for our sins." But "he rose again for our justification," without which resurrection his atonement would have been nugatory and valueless. His resurrection makes his ascension and session at God's right hand, and so his intercession and regnancy in glory, absolute certainties.

The body of Christ to-day, on the throne of God in heaven, is the very same body which was crucified by Pontius Pilate, dead, and buried. In all the visions of the Apocalypse, it is seen radiant in ineffable glory, but marked with the prints of the nails and the deep wound of the spear. And it is endowed with the same qualities and powers it possessed during the forty days of his resurrection life on earth. By its "resurrection power," it is capable of changing back again so as to be seen and handled by men, even as it was, when, like a phantom, it appeared and stood in the closed room at Jerusalem. The marks of the nails and the spear will be as evident to the sight and the touch as they then were. For by and by, this same Jesus who was taken up from the Mount of Olives on earth to the throne of God in heaven, shall so come in like manner as he was seen to go into heaven. Then every eye shall see him and every ear shall hear him, and the senses of men, infallible in their testimony, will re-verify the incarnation and resurrection of the Son of God in a local, visible, palpable form. The Lord himself, the very identical human Jesus, shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and the trump of God. Then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn; all kindreds shall wail because of him, and call on the mountains and rocks to fall on them and hide them from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, as they shall look on him whom they despised and rejected. And the believing and ransomed ones shall gaze adoringly upon their King in his beauty, and sing triumphantly the praises of him who washed them in his blood from their sins, and who receives

them to himself and changes their earthly and mortal bodies into the likeness of his own, and they too become incorruptible, spiritual, powerful, glorious, and immortal.

Thus the resurrection of Christ as the incarnate Son of God is the key that opens the treasure-house of divine revelations and stamps the seal of inspiration upon the entire sacred record from Genesis to the Apocalypse, even as the inspired record of the revelations stamps infallibility on the testimony of the Evangelists and Apostles to the resurrection of Jesus. This is not reasoning in a circle, but it is the creation of a circle which is continent of our whole religion. It relegates all questions of criticism, philosophy, and science to their proper domain, and leaves us the Bible as the sure word of God, inspired, infallible, authoritative, binding on the human conscience and understanding and heart, which ministers can preach and their hearers believe, without hesitation or distraction, amid all manner of opposition, from whatsoever quarter that opposition may come.

THOMAS H. SKINNER.

ARTICLE IV.

THE WORLD'S MARRIAGE LAW AND THE
DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER.

The interest which courts and congresses, officials and laymen, atheists and ascetics, are manifesting in the long-talked-of marriage of the "wife's sister," is a sufficient apology for a recurrence to this vexed theme. This is a wooing attended with more than feline discord. The damsel, with a change of the gender, might cry with Jeremiah, "Woe is me, my mother, that thou hast borne me, a man of strife, a man of contention to the whole earth." Royal families, parliaments, bishops, legislatures, church courts, secular and religious papers, are at variance touching this female. One of the Reviews declares that if she is not allowed to get married, the British Constitution must be changed and the House of Lords abolished, as it is now constituted.

The curious part of all this is that the lady herself has never informed the public that she is especially anxious to wed. She has never laden carts with mammoth petitions for a husband and had them driven into legislative halls. She has never mobbed cabinets, threatening vengeance if she was not married at once. She has never clubbed down inoffensive strangers with lectures on heterogeneity and philadelphic affinities. But none the less this most delicate question about her change of state is talked about publicly, with no more reserve than people talk about a transit of Venus. It will, perhaps, be considered that she has reached the lowest depth, when, as in the present case, she has fallen into the hands of one who, practically a misogynist, is verging towards sexagenarianism.

We indulge ourselves in this levity of introduction, knowing that it will be more than counterbalanced by a subsequent heaviness. A disquisition on law is attractive to few. Even clear-minded people often become confused when calculating the intricacies of relationship, and find difficulty in naming without hesitation the exact connexion between themselves and, let us say, father's wife's son's daughter's husband's sister. When

to the original difficulty is superadded the complication of an unusual system of calculation, the confusion is still greater. When limited space requires that the arguments should be presented in outline, instead of in full detail, it makes the labor of the reader still harder. We apprehend that unless moved thereto by a sense of duty, few will give this article a single perusal, and of this Spartan band, we fear but a small fraction will afford that more thorough study essential to full comprehension. Having as in duty bound given fair warning, reader and writer can proceed to their labor.

It is our purpose to examine the law which Moses has given touching prohibited degrees, with especial reference to the lawfulness of marriage with the sister of a deceased wife. The conclusions to which we may arrive depend altogether upon what is taught in the twelve verses beginning with the seventh of the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. Our inquiry will be rigidly limited to seeking the proper interpretation of this passage. The best preparation, on the part of reader and writer alike, for such a study of law as we propose, is to leave out of view all outside fancies, prejudices, and sentiments. It is to be remembered that neither scientific considerations nor domestic convenience have any bearing in fixing the decision. Many sins are excessively "convenient," but writers on morals do not consider that the existence of this element turns a wrong into right. Neither the advantage of having the aunt as a step-mother, nor the disadvantage of having in a sister a rival and possible successor, bears at all upon the only thing with which we have to do in this investigation. We are to find, or to try to find, what Moses commanded, and are not to trouble ourselves about what we think he should have commanded.

There are many who consider this passage less as a crystallised symmetrical form than, as we might say, an amorphous conglomerate—an irregular prohibition of various degrees, but not complete in its directions, and requiring to be supplemented from the light of nature, common sense, and sentiment. Against this idea, we assume—and this will be the only thing we shall assume in the whole discussion—that the law is a perfect one; that

every forbidden degree is named, or necessarily implied; and that the legislation is absolutely exhaustive. It is rightly assumed in the study of the Decalogue, that a perfect code of morals is enunciated, and all examinations of that table proceed on that hypothesis. The passage before us is the World's Marriage Law. Here are the rules given by God in the early morning of human history, to guide man in the formation of the most important of earthly relationships. Society, civilisation, religion, all of the good of earth, depends on the family. While the family itself, depends for its very existence on the regulations contained in the passage we are now considering. When we call it "The World's Marriage Law," we call it precisely what it is.

We assert next that it is a monogram. These twelve verses are God's one revelation on the marriage bond. In many of the teachings of the Bible, we must compare scripture with scripture, and only by a diligent search, can we learn the mind of the Spirit. The different authors and their different styles, the various topics discussed, the various shades of meaning which even the same expression bears in different connexions, are all sources of perplexity and confusion. Many passages seem perfectly clear until we find that their apparent meaning must be modified by other things said elsewhere. On the subject of forbidden degrees, the teaching of Scripture is not to be attained by a diligent search of many chapters and a close comparison of one with another. The right and wrong is enunciated in a dozen consecutive verses. The formula is well nigh as brief and exact as a summary of doctrine. Once enunciated it is dropped. If twice Moses alludes to what he here said, it is but an allusion. No later writer in Scripture was allowed to review these commands. Christ himself did not choose to enforce, vary, or speak of what his servant here proclaimed. We revert to the word we have used. These twelve verses are a monogram. They might be called the Dodecalogue of Marriage; the Twelve Commandments; the Finished Code. If our study here leads us to no sure results, we need look no further. There is nothing that can teach us.

The narrowness of the field which is to be searched encourages us to hope that a cautious criticism, dealing with plain state-

ments, told once in plain language, will enable us to attain a clear comprehension of these commands. The proverbial needle in a haystack could be found if the latter consisted of but twelve blades of grass. Nor need the seeker after truth despair of attaining absolute certainty. It may discourage an ordinary student, that men of the greatest goodness and learning have taken different views, and that the highest research has resulted in an endless round of statement and contradiction. But we are to remember that there has always been a disturbing element in the study. And that is, the profound impression which Gnosticism made on Romanism and Romanism on the world. This, combined with the horror of incest instinctive in northern nations, has "perturbed" the course of thought as one planet perturbs another, and reveals its own otherwise unsuspected existence by such a phenomenon. Yet more, in this especial discussion, the study has not been given to the law as a whole, but to one or two verses taken from their connexion. A college of *savants*, with one or two bricks before them, might dispute for ages about the shape of the building of which they were a part, while one with a fraction of their learning who visits the edifice has a correct idea of it. Had a very small portion of the talent and study which have been exhausted in disputes and wrangling, been given to the marriage monogram itself, we believe its difficulties would have been long since removed, and that every practical matter of which it treats would have passed from the limbo of uncertainties to the solid ground of absolute understanding. If we have any hope of assisting towards a better comprehension of the subject, it is because we may enable our readers to form an idea of the whole system.

It will be presently seen that in the passage under consideration Moses announces three distinct classes of prohibition. In the first verses, one-half of the whole, he names unlawful degrees of natural kindred. In the next three, he prohibits the widows of natural kindred. In the last two, he declares the law about the relations of the wife. The rules for these three classes are, with one exception, kept as distinct from one another as they are from the commands about the year of Jubilee. We copy the law as it stands, dividing it according to the different subjects.

THE LAW OF NATURAL KINDRED.

"7. The nakedness of thy father, or the nakedness of thy mother, shalt thou not uncover; she is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness.

"8. The nakedness of thy father's wife, shalt thou not uncover; it is thy father's nakedness.

"9. The nakedness of thy sister, the daughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be born at home or born abroad; even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover.

"10. The nakedness of thy son's daughter, or of thy daughter's daughter, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover; for theirs is thine own nakedness.

"11. The nakedness of thy father's wife's daughter, begotten of thy father, she is thy sister; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness.

"12. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's sister, for she is thy father's near kinswoman.

"13. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother's sister, for she is thy mother's near kinswoman."

Before transcribing the remainder of the law, we call attention to the solitary apparent irregularity of the whole table, which is the introduction of the wife of the father among natural kindred. We think there is a reason for this. Of all forms of incest that is unquestionably the most horrible which occurs between blood relations. Of all abominations of this black category, the most hideous is the crime to which the mother of Nero is said to have solicited her son. This arch horror is named first, and next to it is named an iniquity cognate to it. When Paul describes the atrocities of the heathen world, he tells of crimes at which nature itself revolts. He goes over details which literally sicken modern sensibilities. But after describing things unspeakable, he says that the especial crime of union with a father's wife was not so much as named among the heathens. Men who, as it appears to us, had sunk into depths of unfathomable vileness, turned with horror from such an approach to the direct line. We see that it is meet and right to introduce this especial crime, not among the comparatively smaller ones of the class to which it belongs, but in the enumeration of sins of blackest hue to which in turpitude it corresponds. We proceed to examine the remainder of the directions.

THE LAW FOR THE WIDOWS OF KINDRED.

"14. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's brother; thou shalt not approach to his wife; she is thine aunt.

"15. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy daughter-in-law, she is thy son's wife; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness.

"16. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness.

THE LAW OF THE WIFE'S RELATIONS.

"17. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter or her daughter's daughter to uncover her nakedness, for they are her near kinswomen; it is wickedness.

"18. Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister to vex her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other in her life time."

We wish to state in a few words the grounds on which we make the division we have suggested. If we can show that it is a correct one, we think we can also show that there is no element of uncertainty or confusion in the legislation we are examining. Provided only we can attain to the knowledge of what may not improperly be called the basic principle of the code, we can make any especial application we wish without difficulty. That there is such a principle, will be more and more evident as the student continues his researches into this passage. And that principle we can briefly state to be, reverence for the direct line, and bringing it into especial prominence. We are accustomed when computing relationship, to calculate degrees from individual to individual, while in this table and in Scripture generally, the direct line is made the origin, and it is used as the guide in estimating the nearness of consanguinity. The words "cousin" and "niece" do not appear in the Old Testament at all, and "nephew" but three times.

Our meaning can be best understood by pointing to the fact itself. We turn to the table and find that the step-mother is forbidden, and by necessary inference the step-grandmother. Now what precisely are the corresponding descending degrees? Every one will at once reply, step-children. We do not suppose that if a thousand men were asked to name the opposite of the step-

parents, one of the number would fail to name the step-daughter or step-granddaughter. But exactly here is the error. A step-child does not correspond to a step-mother. The table follows the direct line, and all the estimates are from this. The wife of the son, and not the daughter of the partner, is the descending degree as correlative to the wife of the father. The computation is not step-grandmother, step-mother, step-daughter, step-granddaughter, but grandfather's wife, father's wife, son's wife, grandson's wife. Turning now to the third class, we find that the step-daughter and step-granddaughter are named, the correlative ascending degree being not step-mother, but wife's mother. We can say generally that the table forbids the direct line and certain degrees from it, of natural kindred, the widows of the same, and the same of the wife's family. The more deeply the law is studied, the more clearly will its correspondence to this classification be manifest, and the more it will appear that this is the only possible way of accounting for the form in which it is given. The difference between this and our ordinary method of computation, has had much to do with causing confusion of thought about these ordinances.

There is yet another point which should be understood just here. A great many things may or may not be true, but whether they are or not, we have no right to assume them as axioms, and to put the law we are studying on a Procrustean bed, forcing it to agree with such preconceived fancy or fact. The especial reference is now to the theory always assumed as an undisputed truth, that the position of a man to his wife's kindred exactly and perpetually corresponds to that of his wife with his race. Unauthorised by Scripture and repugnant to every principle of physiology as this assumption is, the effort in this discussion has been less to comprehend what is told, than to torture the language into accordance with this unwritten higher law, which is put above the revealed will. Yet more, one has but to read over the verses to see there is a triple class of prohibitions, of natural kindred, widows of these, and wife's relations. It is assumed that what respects the latter is a mere emphatic repetition of a command given by necessary implication in the rules laid down for the

widows of kindred. Here are three distinct assumptions, that when Moses gave rules for the last two classes, he had but one in view; that when he was speaking of widows of kindred, he included wife's family; that each party to the marriage bond stands in an exactly equal relation to the family of the other. Surely, if we would learn the meaning of this venerable code, we have no right to approach it with such earth-born ideas. Our proper frame of mind is to assume nothing, fancy nothing, have no pre-conceived hypothesis, but to come with reverential effort to search, not for what we think it should teach, but for what it does actually teach. We cannot regard it as an assumption, if we accept it as it stands. As it divides itself into these three classes of prohibitions, we recognise three, and these we now proceed to examine.

THE LAW OF NATURAL KINDRED.

The degrees of natural relations enumerated in the law are those of mother and sister, granddaughter and half-sister, aunt by the father's and aunt by the mother's side. It will be observed that there are three couplets, and that each couplet is from a nearer to a more distant relationship. There are, in all, six specifications. Now of near natural kindred, a man can have but three orders. The direct line, the collaterals next to it, and parents' descendants. Of these three orders, two of each are named. The mother and granddaughter, the sister and half-sister, the maternal and paternal aunts.

There is in these verses the exhibition of another principle. Three times it is said that in certain cases named, relationship derived through women equals that derived through the man, and this has to be accepted as the law of natural kindred. The cases specified are taken one from each of the three degrees of possible near relatives, direct line, collaterals next to it, and parents' descendants, the granddaughter, aunt, and sister. These three examples cover the whole ground. This precision of teaching about a point we might think of not much importance, is a fresh indication that we are dealing with a rigidly exact law, intended to reach every possible difficulty, and that the legislation has in itself the key of its own interpretation.

And now proceeding to more minute examination, making no assumption but that this one code enacted for the world's guidance was intended to be a perfect one, we shall find that with all the certainty of a mathematical process we are led to necessary conclusions, and that there is no element of obscurity in this class of prohibitions.

But beginning at what might be called the fountain-head, we have an omission. The grandmother is not named. Yet if the law is perfect, she is surely and distinctly forbidden. We search in the commandments for the condemnation of this connexion and find that union with a granddaughter is interdicted. This leads us to an axiomatic rule for interpreting the code which is so simple we feel it is almost an impertinence to name it:

When one degree is forbidden, an equal degree is also forbidden.

Thus we understand why the niece is not named, this exclusion being conveyed in the prohibition of the aunt.

A more important omission is that of the daughter. And this has been especially named as indicating that the table was not designed to give a complete and exhaustive list of all forbidden degrees. We regard this rather as a proof of its rigid exactness. Of the three possible classes of kindred, it was designed to name two of each. The mother had been mentioned first. It was necessary to depart from the rule intended to be carried out, of naming two, or to omit the daughter in order to reach the more distant kindred in the direct line. Her name is not mentioned. But she is unquestionably and absolutely forbidden, if the law has indeed that perfection we claim for it. How is that prohibition announced? We find it in the fact that if the granddaughter is excluded, far more is her mother who is nearer. This leads us to another axiomatic rule for the interpretation of the code:

When a more distant degree is prohibited, the degrees intermediate are also prohibited.

The same prohibition is also conveyed in that of the mother, who is of an equal degree.

We need nothing but these two rules, which we suppose any man who is not an idiot will accept, and at once the "marriage monogram," as far as it applies to natural kindred, resolves itself

into a clear, full, rigidly exact law, in which nothing is left to influence. It includes both sexes. If a man cannot marry a woman, the woman cannot marry him. Leaving out the half-sister we present in tabular form the forbidden degrees:

OF NATURAL KINDRED

<i>A man must not marry his</i>	<i>A woman must not marry her</i>
$\frac{1}{4}$ Grandmother,	Grandson, ¹
$\frac{1}{2}$ Mother,	Son,
$\frac{1}{2}$ Daughter,	Father,
$\frac{1}{4}$ Granddaughter,	Grandfather,
1 Sister,	Brother,
$\frac{1}{2}$ Aunt,	Uncle,
$\frac{1}{2}$ Niece.	Nephew.

We call especial attention to the second column. We invite our readers to examine it carefully and ascertain whether it is possible to make any other correlation than that designated; if, for instance, the degree corresponding to the sister can be other than brother, and so on for the other specifications. Satisfied about this, the inquirer will see that in half the whole table the law is identical. The man is not to marry a certain woman, *the reverse being that the prohibited woman is not to marry him*. The important bearing of this will appear later. The whole discussion hinges upon it.

Proceeding in our examination we find the law of natural kindred who are prohibited can be expressed thus:

A man or woman must not marry in the direct line, with collaterals next to it, or with parents' descendants.

But beyond and above this, is a grand principle on which these specifications are based,—a principle of universal nature, that every living creature shall be half of one blood, and half of another. The legislation we are examining amounts simply to a prohibition of any departure from this law alike of heaven and earth. We announce as the final generalisation for forbidden

¹Whether *grandson* or *grandfather* should be written here, the second column expresses relationship identical with that of the first.

degrees of natural kindred, that no two persons shall unite when the sum of any one blood in the two exceeds one-half.

It does not properly belong to our subject, but all who have eyes must have seen the countless woes, the scrofulas, consumptions, blindness, and mental and moral insanity, prevalent in families where there is physical resemblance in type and feature between the parents. Distant relatives and even strangers may be, physiologically, brothers and sisters, and such unions entail a physical curse. The final residuum of the marriage law is, that union ought not to be contracted where there is such similarity.

The fractions which are written in the table show what portion of a man's blood is shared by the relative with whose name each is on line. These fractions have great bearing on the especial marriage in question, as we shall presently see. We need observe now only that grandmother and granddaughter have but half the blood in common with a man which his niece has. That niece, aunt, mother, and daughter are all equal, and yet have but half the common blood which a man's sister has with him. May we therefore conclude that it is better for a man to marry his granddaughter than his niece? And that this latter union is on the same footing as that with a mother? And that it would be only half as wrong to wed a mother as a sister, as the latter has but half the blood in common? The very questions are revolting, and need no answer. There is yet another principle, instinctive in humanity, which is not simply recognised in the marriage monogram, but is the very foundation upon which its rules are based. The iniquity of incest is not simply from the commingling of the same blood. This is a secondary consideration. The essence of the crime consists in its approach to the direct line. The sister and aunt, the daughter and granddaughter, are prohibited in the table, not because of nearness of blood, but because of nearness to parents. For the grandfather to approach his own granddaughter, and far more to approach his own daughter, would be to reveal his own shame. In other words, every prohibition of kindred not in the direct line, is directly or indirectly enforced by the nearness of the degree to this. We

have, then, an all-important principle set forth in this first class of directions, which, as we shall presently see, throws light upon the especial marriage we are aiming to understand. This principle may thus be expressed :

Commingling with the direct line is as distinct in its unspeakable turpitude from other incestuous connexions, as these are distinct from ordinary impurity. The very essence of the sin of incest consists in approach to the direct line.

We now proceed to the second class of prohibitions.

THE LAW OF THE WIDOWS OF NATURAL KINDRED.

From the logical precision, which can correctly be designated as mathematical, of those laws we have just been considering, we are encouraged to hope for a similar clearness of teaching in what is now before us. Our expectations will not be disappointed.

We are forced to see the sharp line of distinction which is kept up between this class of connexions by marriage, and that of natural kindred which precedes, and of wife's relations which follows. If any among our readers desire thoroughly to test the correctness of the mode of interpretation suggested, let him turn back to the two principles of the prohibition of equal degrees and nearer degrees, used in evolving the general law respecting natural kindred, and apply them to the elaboration of this second class. Let him also see for himself, if this second part of the code has any teaching about the three orders of natural relatives. And most of all, let him ascertain if, in making the descending degree of daughter-in-law, the son's wife, the reciprocal of the ascending degree of step-mother or father's wife, there is not a manifest departure from our ordinary mode of computing relationship, and a clear indication that the table is constructed on the principle of giving prominence to the direct line.

We feel assured that those who will take the trouble to go through the mental labor, will themselves reach the conclusions we shall presently announce. Proceeding with our examination, we call attention to the fact, that while in the first class the enumeration began with the nearest prohibited degree, and closed with the most distant, in this instance the distant relation is

named first. He begins the second class where he left off the former one, forbidding the connexion which was most remote. If it is true that when a far-off relationship is interdicted, the intermediate ones are likewise prohibited, this one enactment involves all who are closer. Had we nothing else to guide us, this one command is a distinct exclusion of the widows of all kindred nearer than an uncle. To avoid possibilities of mistake, however, there are other specifications.

It will be borne in mind that there are three degrees only of near relatives a man can have: the direct line, the collateral next to it, and the descendants of parents. These three had been designated in the case of natural kindred, by taking two examples of each. In the present class of prohibitions, one of each order is named—uncle, son, brother.

Applying to these specifications the two axiomatic principles, that a farther degree prohibited involves prohibition of one that is nearer, and that one degree forbidden excludes all equal ones, we can easily find the precise extension of this law of the widows of kindred. A grandfather is nearer than an uncle and is therefore necessarily excluded. A grandson is of a degree equal to the grandfather. The nephew equals the uncle in his relationship. Hence we can construct the table of the second class of prohibitions.

*A man must not marry the
widow of his*

Grandfather,
Father,
Son,
Grandson,
Brother,
Uncle,
Nephew.

*A woman must not marry
her husband's*

Grandson,
Son,
Father,
Grandfather,
Brother,
Nephew,
Uncle.

But issue is taken respecting the correlative prohibitions named in the second line. If a man must not marry a step-mother or grandmother, the correlation is asserted to be, that a woman is not to marry her step-father. If a man is excluded

from his daughter-in-law, this reads between the lines that a woman must not marry son-in-law. If a man is not to marry brother's wife, the woman is not to marry sister's husband. As before stated, the whole discussion hinges on this point, of what we shall call assumed reciprocity.

We said that in the degrees of natural kindred, the opposite to the man was the woman designated, and that no other manner of reversal was possible. We are able to show that in the present table there are four cases—all but those under dispute—which are necessarily reversed as we have reversed them. When we come to the third class, we shall find a similar mode of reversal forced on us. If we assume that the prohibition of brother's wife has for its reciprocity the prohibition of wife's sister, we make this assumption in the face of just fifteen instances—all but the very ones under dispute—in which unmistakably such mode of estimating the correlation is distinctly repudiated.

The step-grandmother and step-mother are forbidden, and it is assumed that the opposite to this is, that a woman is not to marry her step-father or grandfather. But this is a manifest error. It is a confounding of two classes kept absolutely distinct. The former are the widows of kindred. The latter are the relations of wife. And in the legislation given for these last, this assumed correlation is disproved. The step-father and step-grandfather are both named in that, their proper connexion. We must believe the same thing is repeated twice, or that the opposite in every case is the individual woman prohibited. There is no case of prohibition by implication in the table, unless it is assumed that the connexion about which there is disagreement is one. Against such a theory is the undoubted fact that seven examples in the first class, four in the second, and four in the third, prove the contrary. If in this rigid clear code of what might be called cameo finish, this violent irregularity and utterly diverse mode of procedure is without notice introduced, it must certainly be proved before it can be accepted. We hold that in every case the opposites are as given in the table, and that the verses which profess to give laws about the widows of kindred, give laws for these and

for none others. A reference to the list will show that a married woman occupies the same position with respect to her husband's family which he himself does. The law which forbids her union with these, extends exactly as far as that which forbids union with natural kindred. The general expression for the second class of prohibitions is, therefore:

No man shall marry the widows of those in his direct line, of collaterals next to it, or of parents' descendants.

We do not see how there can be dispute about this class of directions. He who runs may read. Nothing is needed to enforce that of which the obligation is already perfect or to explain that which cannot be misunderstood. Guarding this point, and stepping to a lower plane of research, there is a physical reason for the enactment made for the subject of this legislation. When God created the marriage relation he said: *They twain shall be one flesh.*

It was no figure of fancy, no hyperbolical imagery, no dim poetical unity, which was announced. The words are plain prose. They declare a matter of fact, as far from romance as a rule of arithmetic. The history of creation illustrates the reality, and subsequent revelation confirms that first teaching. The beautiful narrative that tells how Eve was built up for Adam, bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh, is an exquisite setting forth of what is true of all motherhood. She was the typical mother. What was true of her is also true of her daughters. The manner of the creation of Eve was no pretty fancy, valuable chiefly for stuffing out marriage services to requisite length. All motherhood repeats the wondrous story and experiences the miracle renewed. And every son of Adam can say to the mother of the child, "This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh."

The physical law to the existence of which we are alluding can be best understood by seeing its exhibitions in our "poor relations," as the animals are sometimes called. It is universally recognised. If the thoroughbred of the canine species has a litter which on the other side are "curs of low degree," and especially if this is her first litter, her subsequent ones will be tainted with cur blood, no matter how pure the later stock. It is

known that if a mare has been the mother of many mules, the colt that would otherwise have been pure, has mule marks and mule ways, which show that its blood has been tainted. If her colts were all of pure blood, it is known that, often, the last one will resemble the sire of the first, rather than its own. It is known that just as the research is carried on, the law stands out with more clearness. And that even in our own race, among the second set of children, there will not unseldom be one who resembles not so much the actual father, as the dead and buried father of the first set.

These phenomena are of too frequent recurrence to be considered accidental coincidences. They lead us to a law which he who runs may read.

The prenatal existence which for a time has with the mother a common circulation of blood, is only half her own. It is a being different therefore from herself. Its own growth and existence must be vastly modified by that life which she every moment imparts to it. But to a less degree, her own organisation brought into absolute community with an existence essentially differentiated from her own, must also be greatly influenced by that community. Dr. Carpenter, the highest authority of the generation on such points, after discussion of the subject, announces this general principle: the prenatal young of an animal, being necessarily different from herself, essentially modify her physical condition. On account of the comparative fixedness of her type, this influence is not perceptible in herself. Its existence is, however, unmistakably proved in the impress made on her later offspring. The fact that the last are assimilated to the first, when she is the only connecting link between them, and when the similarity is in traits inherited not from herself naturally, proves that an indelible change has occurred in her physical being, and that materially she has been made one with the young she bore. They twain shall be one flesh.

We consider that this physical fact throws light on an apparently strange contradiction in Scripture. Union with the widow of a brother is here absolutely forbidden, and penalties are denounced against those who violate that command. Yet, when

the widow was childless, this very union was made obligatory on the younger brother. We see now why there was a difference. What was incest in one case, was not so in the other. The seeming contradictions unite in a higher principle, and the two opposite directions are but different sides of the same truth.

We now proceed to the third and last class of prohibited degrees.

THE LAW OF THE WIFE'S RELATIONS.

In order to make assurance doubly sure, that our readers will see what we are examining, we again copy the law :

“17. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter or her daughter's daughter, to uncover her nakedness: for they are her near kinswomen: it is wickedness.

“18. Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her life time.”

We do not consider that the question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister depends at all upon the 18th verse, or the present translation of it; but before proceeding farther, we should inquire whether or not we are to accept that translation. If we allowed our intense desire to influence our judgment, we would introduce the marginal reading, contended for by some, and instead of having “wife to her sister,” should read, “one to another.” Thus it would be a distinct prohibition of polygamy, and would make the code complete in its extent as well as in its limitations. In the course of this investigation we were at one time glad to believe that the marginal reading is the correct one. A more thorough examination has forced us to abandon this idea. The phrase, “wife to her sister,” is the translation of a Hebrew expression, which is generally rendered “one to another.” But whenever this meaning is requisite, there is always an especial idiom in the original which is absent from this place. Hence even those most opposed to the marriage which our version appears to authorise, have felt themselves constrained to accept the present translation. There are other reasons in favor of this rendering, and the combined force of them is irresistible. The

word "sister" occurs five times in the passage in its ordinary meaning; and it is indeed passing strange, if here in the last verse, it is used in a different sense. Some weight must be given to the opinion of the rabbis, who consider the wife's sister to be designated. The phrase, "uncover the nakedness," is used in fourteen other places in this chapter, in all of which but one, where it designates a loathsome impurity, it has the specific idea of incest attached to it. It is almost impossible to believe that this, too, has a new shade of meaning. If it involves here, as we must believe, the idea of incest, this necessarily implies the correctness of our translation. It may be incestuous for a man to marry his wife's sister, but in no way could we attach this idea to simple polygamy. To read the verse thus amended, is to see it will not do at all. "Neither shall thou take one wife to another, to commit incest or loathsome impurity with her." That polygamy was prevalent with the Jews, that the parents of Samuel, and that Saul, David, Solomon, and multitudes of others practised it, is by no means a conclusive proof that none of them understood this verse to forbid plurality of wives. But it seems to us to be conclusive that when the inspired Malachi, closing the ancient revelation, reprov'd the priests for their violation of the law of monogamy, he appealed not to a distinct prohibition contained in this verse, which would have exactly suited his purpose, but to the inferential command given by the creation of one Eve for Adam. Making doubt still more impossible, Christ also, enforcing the same point, referred also to the history of the original creation. It is hard to resist the conclusion, that neither Jews, nor prophets, nor Christ himself, regarded this verse as a prohibition of many wives; and that the early as well as the later Hebrews understood it as applying to a wife's sister. The most learned and judicious of modern commentators approve the present reading. If we are regretfully forced to limit the application of the law to forbidden degrees, and do not find that recognition of monogamy for which we hoped, we must remember that neither apostles, nor prophets, nor Christ himself, gave any commands about this matter. They point to Adam and Eve as the world's model. That is enough. If this passage does not give that for

which we searched in it, it is because the law had already in another manner been enunciated for humanity, and there was no need of repetition.

We have endeavored to show the grounds for accepting the translation, "a wife to her sister:" but we repeat that we do not regard the lawfulness of the marriage in question as at all depending on that rendering. If our reading of the law has been correct, union with a deceased wife's sister is authorised, not by a disputed phrase, but by the whole of this legislation. Accepting the passage, however, as it stands, we find that a man is under perpetual obligation never to mingle with his wife's direct line. The second verse teaches that union with her sister while the wife is alive is incestuous. In the brief recapitulation of the law in Deuteronomy, the sister is named as representative of all collaterals, and so we may accept it here. The teaching is then clearly, that as long as the marriage tie exists, a man, because of his union with his wife, is one with her race. The necessary inference is, that with her death his position, unchanged with respect to her direct line, is changed with respect to her other relations. Bearing in mind that no outside light we can bring to bear should be allowed to influence by one iota the interpretation which the law gives of its own meaning, we may rightly inquire if any reason can be found for what at first may seem arbitrary distinctions, three in number—these being, a distinction which these verses seem to make between the position of husband and wife, a distinction between the relations of a living and dead wife, and a distinction between the collaterals and direct line of the wife.

We say first, that we have no right to believe that there is absolute equality in the position of the parties to the marriage contract as regards the family of the other. If it is alleged that the consensus of humanity establishes this equality, it can be replied that the consensus of humanity established the movement of the sun and stars, till a period comparatively late. Common sense is often common nonsense and common ignorance. When men learn the physiological facts bearing on this subject which have been discovered, the same common sense which made them

think that Moses made mistakes and is to be explained away, will make them glorify his words as being of superhuman wisdom. There is one legislation made for widows of kindred, and another for wife's relations. A difference is recognised between them for the simplest of all reasons; it actually exists. The law which teaches that there is an absolute change of relationship in one case does not teach there is such a permanent one in the other, because in point of fact no such change occurs. That is all. A woman is forbidden to marry her husband's kindred, because such union is not ideally, nor figuratively, nor sentimentally, but actually incestuous. The law does not forbid the collaterals of the wife, because such union is no more incestuous than marriage with one of the Antipodes.

If we find there is good ground in physical facts for the distinction which the law makes between husband and wife, we can also see why that which was incestuous at one time is not necessarily so at another. He who would limit the unity of the married state to that approximate physical identity to which we have alluded, understands little of the meaning of that high and holy relation which is the perpetual type of the bond which unites the Church to Christ. The lower and animal identity is the fleshly symbol of an ideal spiritual mysterious oneness of the soul. "He that loveth his wife loveth himself." And, again, "This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church." The spiritual unity in the higher nature is as real as the material one in the inferior, and as real as that between Christ and his blood-bought host. When a man who is not utterly degraded and debased has taken on him the vows of marriage, he feels that the union between himself and his wife is perfect. Her kindred are to him as his kindred. Her mother and brothers and sisters are his likewise. In many cases he identifies himself more with her family than his own, and centres his affections rather upon his connexions by marriage than on those by blood. Nor can he even distantly conceive of a different relation. We do not know whether most to pity or loathe the married man who would not shrink with horror unutterable from the thought of future union with her to whom he feels as to his own sister; because she is the

sister of his wife. Eventually the tie may be rent by death. He stands in a home made desolated. And not least of the elements of his agony in that dark hour, is the conviction that the bond which held him in loving union with her race is snapped in twain: that he is to them an outsider, and they to him; that the ties which he felt were as real as those which united him to his own kindred, have been broken. Affection may survive, but it is that which exists between friends, not that between members of one family. He is dismayed at the sudden revolution in his condition. Or if the stunning shock comes to him more gradually, still it comes to him at last. When time has healed the wounds, and he seeks for a mother for the orphans, he looks on his deceased wife's sister precisely as on any other lady. Once there was a close tie between them, but that is now as a dream of the past. If out of the old acquaintanceship another feeling emerges, it will be nothing strange. What attracted him in one member of a household will naturally attract him again. Men may have noble traits, and yet be destitute of much depth and intensity of affection; or they may not have a great deal of stability of feeling. We believe that there are many who are never able to forget the bond that once was, and can, therefore, never face the thought of a nearer one that might be. There are others whose natures are different; and these last we do not admire less, but the steadfast ones more. Scripture gives us many privileges, and in this, as in a cognate one, he who uses his liberty may do well, but he who refrains may do better. We regard it as a question of taste and sentiment, like any other alliance.

If it should still appear strange that the death of a wife should so essentially change the position of a man towards her family, it should also be remembered that such alteration of position is not confined to her race. He is on a new footing with all women. Adultery, as falsehood to his wife, is to him no longer possible. A thought which a little while ago would have been deadly evil, is now perfectly harmless. A look, a word, an act, which would have filled every one who knew him with horror, are now nothing at all. He has the right to indulge in new feelings, and prepare for new relationships now, whereas had he done this be-

fore, he would have been a monster. If the breaking of the bond has so changed his position to all women that adultery is not possible to him, it is not at all strange that his position has also changed with respect to a certain class, and that what was incest is so no longer. Why should this especial connexion not come under the otherwise general law? Why should a relationship be assumed to be in existence, when that which created it has passed away?

It yet remains to be shown why the law, which in this third class of prohibitions is relaxed for the collaterals of the wife, is still kept up in all its rigor with respect to her direct line. We find the explanation for this in the especial sanctity with which, throughout the whole table and throughout the race of man, this class of relationship is invested. The sin of commingling here, is a horror which stands apart from every similar iniquity. When *Edipus* found he had unconsciously been guilty of this abomination, he put out his eyes in the desperation of his horror, and his wife-mother slew herself. Nature and Scripture both teach that the direct line is a class in a class, an order in an order, a degree in a degree. Rather it is because of approximation to this, that there is any cognate sin. Between this relationship and all others, there is a great gulf fixed. This is the very holy of holies of earthly ties. It is this that binds us to God. Old Adam was the son of God, and through him we are all descendants. To pollute one of the links of that chain, is to be guilty of an iniquity which neither heaven nor earth can endure. For to pollute any link is to pollute also the first one. There is a yet more recondite consideration. The earthly family, as is shown by the Apostles, is not, speaking humanly, an original idea with God; he borrowed it from the divine family to which he is father. And thus any defilement of the direct line is defilement of that which represents him. And when a man has, by his union with his wife, stood in her line, and has been ideally and spiritually through her identified with it, to him it must ever be holy and revered as his own. No changing circumstances can cause any difference here. The outer court may be thrown open—the more distant tie severed. But in what is highest and nearest

of all connexions there is to be the sanctity of an eternal obligation.

Thus this simple logic of facts does not make the law clearer, for it cannot be more simple than it already is. It does not enforce its paramount obligations. But an earth-born fancy which has arisen about the code is dispelled by an earth-born fact. There is no contradiction in any point. The law recognises a difference between the position of a man with respect to his wife's relations and that of a woman with respect to those of her husband, for the simple reason that such a difference actually exists. It forbids union in her case, because such union is actually incestuous, not simply while her husband lives, but while she lives. It prohibits his commingling with her near kindred during her life, because his absolute unity with her makes her sister as his own. It does not forbid such union after the death of the wife, because the bond, which is permanent with her, is with him terminated when she dies. Again, the law is never relaxed in its application to her direct line, because the man by living union with his wife once stood in that line; so that to him it must ever be holy. During marriage the three classes stand on an equal footing in the sight of the law, because in point of fact the unity of the married relation makes that footing equal. The author of revelation limits the application of the law to the direct line of the wife after the marriage has ceased to be, because her collaterals have no longer any connexion, material, ideal, nor figurative, with the widower. What to ignorance appeared an inconsistency, to better knowledge prevents inconsistency. The research of three milleniums shows that this code, enunciated in the early morning of time, is perfection, alike in its extension and its limitation, its precision and its simplicity.

We now return to the two verses which constitute the law for the wife's relations. The wife's daughter and granddaughter are named. That is, the man is not to marry his step-daughter or step-granddaughter. The opposite correlative to this, is not that a woman should not marry her step-son, for this had already been named, but that she is not to marry her step-father. If a man is not to marry his mother-in-law, the opposite is not that the

woman is not to marry her father-in-law, for this has already been named, but that she is not to marry her son-in-law. The theory we called that of "assumed reciprocity," on which the exclusion of deceased wife's sister is based, breaks down at every point. We conclude that a man is never to marry in the direct line of his wife, and that commingling with her collaterals during her life is incestuous.

Two points bearing directly on the controversy are to be noticed. We saw that when Moses began the laws for natural kindred with the nearest degree and ended with the aunt who is most remote, he began the second where he left off the first, with the aunt. There was a reason for this, because in excluding the most distant, he excluded those who were closer. He ended the second class with brother's wife. Had he in passing to the third, begun as he did before, where he left off, he would, had he intended to exclude her, have named the wife's sister, and thus would have emphasised the prohibition of her direct line. The fact of his not doing so, creates a probability that this exclusion was not intended. Another point of far greater importance is to be noted. It has been to avoid offensive repetition of odious words, and not from oversight, that we have used the terms "marriage" and "widow." In most of the cases, the idea of marriage is too unnatural to be entertained, and in none of the others is it suggested. In this 18th verse wedlock is for the first time named. If we can infer aught from this, it is that in this last connexion, there may be, what can never be in the others, a time and a changed condition when this holy ordinance may be possible.

We encouraged our readers to expect that their investigation would be confined to these twelve verses, and that they would not be troubled with a comparison of different passages. We hope it will not be regarded as a violation of this promise if we point out that in the next chapter but one, there is a statement of the punishments to be inflicted for the offences named here. And in his last book, Moses briefly recapitulates this law. If we find that each of the three classes of prohibitions, which are so distinct in this chapter, are recognised in every instance, it makes assurance doubly sure that we have read the law aright. We think the

20th chapter of Leviticus recognises three classes of prohibitions as distinctly as the twelve verses we have studied, only in the second enumeration the crimes are named in the order of their turpitude and degree of penalty. We can trace here the principles which we found guiding the original enactment. Father's wife, son's wife, and wife's mother, are designated, and sin with any of them was to be punished with death. Here we have the correlation between the ascending degree of step-mother and descending one of daughter-in-law on which we have insisted. Sin with mother, daughter, granddaughter, or wife's daughter or granddaughter, is not named; but on the principle that the exclusion of a more distant degree involves the intermediate ones, these are all made the subject of a like legislation. The general law of penalty is perfectly clear. Commingling with the direct line, with the widows of these, or with wife's direct line, is forbidden under penalty of death. Sister, aunt, uncle's wife, and brother's wife, are the other connexions named. These necessarily involve parents' descendants, collaterals one degree from the direct line, and widows of these. But while three direct lines are distinctly prohibited, and two sets of collaterals, the collaterals of the wife are not excluded. Recapitulating the law in Deuteronomy 27th, Moses names the step-mother first, emphasising the exclusion of direct line and widows of kindred, next collaterals and parents' descendants represented by sister, and lastly the wife's direct line introduced through the wife's mother. We can say generally that in each of the three passages there is a distinct prohibition of the three direct lines of natural kindred, widows of these, and that of the wife. That in all the three, there is also prohibition of parents' descendants, in two of them, prohibition of collaterals next to the direct line, and in two of them prohibition of the widows of these; but in none is there allusion direct or indirect to the wife's collaterals, as being permanently excluded. The half-sister and granddaughter, wife's granddaughter and daughter, are named once each, the aunt and uncle's wife and brother's wife are named twice, the step-mother, sister, and wife's mother, are each named three times, but there is no allusion anywhere to the deceased wife's collaterals. Natural kindred are

named three times, widows of natural kindred are named three times, wife's relations are named three times; but with all the reiterations, there is no allusion direct or indirect, near or remote, by any probable or possible inference, to the deceased wife's collaterals. For them Moses legislated not.

We are to notice what at first appears to militate strongly against the views we have presented, but which we believe actually strengthens them. We allude to the argument drawn from the phrase "near kinswoman," which can be stated thus:

The aunt is forbidden because she is the mother's near kinswoman. Hence a sister is a near kinswoman. But the wife's daughter is forbidden because she is the wife's near kinswoman. Hence near kinswomen of the wife are excluded. But this the wife's sister is, by the very words of the law. Hence union with her is forbidden.

Now if the reader will turn to the three verses where the phrase occurs, he will find that in two of them it is used to indicate the outer limit of prohibition and the close of the class in connexion with which it is used. After naming mother, sister, granddaughter, half-sister, all nearer relations, the paternal and maternal aunts comparatively remote, the last of the degrees of natural kindred forbidden are introduced with this reason, "She is thy mother's, thy father's near kinswoman." If we supply the evident ellipses, the insertion of the words is in answer to a conceived objection. The aunt is so far distant she should not be excluded. Nay, replies the law, she is near to your parents. Now when in the two other cases of its appearance in the code, the words are used to indicate the utmost limit of the prohibitions, we are almost forced to accord the same meaning to it when it is used the third time. It is the terminal phrase here as elsewhere, and indicates that the direct line of the wife is the final forbidden degree. In just the same way would we account for the words which occur in the verse, "it is wickedness." No where else in the whole code do they appear. We do not from this infer that there is an especial wickedness in approaching the direct line of the wife, which does not exist in connexion with other forms of incest, such as that with a mother or stepmother.

We read in it rather an argument, a remonstrance. The final class of prohibitions may appear to some unnatural and far-fetched. The law emphasises its prohibition by making this statement. As though it said, "You may fancy there is no harm in union with these far-off connexions. But you are mistaken. It is wickedness." The two phrases must be interpreted by the whole tenor of the law, not the law by these—and such is the meaning they can easily bear of marking the terminal degrees.

We have interpreted this marriage law as applied to men. We wish now to submit the interpretation we have advocated to what may be called a crucial test. We will substitute the woman for the man, and see how the reversal will affect our findings. If there has been inaccuracy or irregularity of any kind in our conclusions, this procedure will at once make it manifest. It is evident a woman can have but three classes of connexions: her natural kindred, the kindred of her husband, and those to whom her position is changed by the marriage of certain of her family. She is not to marry in her own direct line, with collaterals one degree distant, or with parents' descendants. If herself married, she is excluded from her husband's corresponding relations. And of the third class, she is not to marry one who has ever stood in her own direct line. Thus while she is told directly not to marry her step-grandfather or step-father, she is by necessary implication proved by the two recapitulations of the code, forbidden to marry her son-in-law or grandson-in-law. The reversal of the process brings out more clearly the accuracy of the law and the correctness of the interpretation we have advocated.

Our readers cannot be supposed to have interest in our own mental processes, and it is from anything but egotism that we allude to the manner in which we have reached our conclusions. Many years ago, on what we now perceive to have been insufficient grounds, we were persuaded that the marriage in question was allowable. Later we had doubts. We began this examination of the law without the slightest idea where it would lead us. Our "sentiment" is contrary to the conclusions we have reached. Resolutely abstaining from commentaries or books on the subject, we studied the twelve verses of the Decalogue, hour after

hour, day after day, until at last out of its seeming confusion a beauty of order and perfection of teachings emerged, which, in a manner most imperfect, we have attempted to set forth. If this study of the passage shall be of service to any in assisting towards a better understanding of the law, we cheerfully acknowledge our obligations to the inspiration and suggestions of an article, masterly in some respects, which was published in the October number of this REVIEW, and which discussed this especial marriage. While we have felt ourselves forced to dissent from the chief conclusions reached by the author, what we learned of him has enabled us to learn of Moses, if indeed we have understood him rightly. It is hoped there is a higher ground on which all can meet, and that all desire not to carry a point or get the better in an argument, but to find the truth of God. There is a great Day when those who teach will find either that they have been countenancing incest abhorrent to God, or have "cursed where the Lord has not cursed," and have "forbidden to marry" which is the work of Anti-christ and a doctrine of devils. We are firmly persuaded that the law was intended to be plain in its every direction, and that it can be understood. And we hold, that any one who proceeds upon the hypothesis that it is exact and perfect, will as certainly reach the conclusions we have announced, as a mathematical calculation leads in every case to a similar result. Instead of the gratuitous assumptions, that the family of the wife is always on the same footing as the widows of kindred, and that a change of relation towards the first is not possible, and that when Moses was speaking of widows of kindred, he meant wife's family also, and that when he forbade a man to marry a wife's sister during the life-time of the first, it was intended only as a more emphatic repetition of a previous command that on no account was he ever to marry her at all,—instead of all these hypotheses and a few others besides, let a man come to the study of this law with the faith, surely not hard to exercise, that what God gave to guide the world, is given to be understood by the world, and that like his other works "He saw that it was good." The student will learn for himself that the prohibited degrees of natural kindred are those of the direct line, collaterals next to it,

and parents' descendants. The same law in perpetuity extends to widows of corresponding relations. The same law during married life extends to the wife's family. When a man dies, the bond that united his wife to his race still survives. When the wife dies, the tie which through her bound the husband to her family is severed. As he once stood in her direct line, that which is the holy of holies of earthly relationship must be forever forbidden. Her other kindred after her death are to him as outsiders. Such is the teaching of the law. Such the teaching of physiology. And to us it seems clearly to be the teaching of common sense.

WM. STODDERT.

ARTICLE V.

The Problem of Human Life Here and Hereafter. By WILFORD.
New York: Hall & Co. Second Edition, 1878.

This remarkable work was originally written in verse, the metre being that of *Hiawatha*. The first few chapters were for a time retained in verse, but the important part of the work has been rewritten, and appears in prose. The book has been repeatedly noticed in religious periodicals, and with almost universal commendation. The praise bestowed on it is fulsome in the extreme. One reviewer says: "This is the book of the age; and its unknown author need aspire to no greater literary immortality than the production of this work will give him; and thousands of the best educated minds, that have been appalled by the philosophical teachings of modern scientists, will 'rise up and call him blessed' . . . His logic is not only resistless but overwhelming, exciting alternately our pity and contempt for the helpless victims." Another says: "The wave-theory of light and of sound, as taught by Tyndall, Helmholtz, and Mayer, is shown to be most ludicrously absurd. . . . It is a wonder that the great scientists named and reviewed in it, and to each of whom the author has sent a copy, have not attempted to refute it, for it

certainly exposes them to the laughter and derision of all thinking men." Still another says: "Another striking mark of this portion of the work is the perfect fairness of the author [!]. He quotes the passages of the writings oppugned, and copiously, so that there can be no doubt in regard to the points which are made in reply and confutation."

Similar expressions might be quoted from scores of religious periodicals; and yet the book betrays almost incredible ignorance of well known historical facts, of familiar natural phenomena, and of elementary mathematical principles. In fact, it is the opinion of some, both scientists and theologians, that the author's object was to make money by means of a sensational work, or else that he labors under some mental aberration.

The theory which he *professes* to hold is that *mind* or *life* (which he identifies with *soul*) is an *immaterial substance*, and hence, as all substance is indestructible, the mind must be immortal; and to establish this theory, he finds it for some reason desirable to show that light, heat, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, and even *sound*, are all "*incorporeal substances*." He confines his investigation, however, chiefly to the nature of sound, to which he devotes one volume, entitled "*Sound Evolved*." He finds it necessary also to overthrow the evolution hypothesis, and this he attempts in another volume entitled "*Evolution Evolved*." It will be found, however, on reading the book, that his theory in reality makes both sound and mind material. This will be shown in the sequel.

The volume on sound is devoted chiefly to a criticism of Tyndall, Helmholtz, and Mayer.

He sets out by announcing (p. 74 of entire work) that the wave-theory of sound "has never been so much as called in question or doubted by a single scientific writer for 2,500 years, or since its origination in the time of Pythagoras." And yet, as every tyro in science knows, the Epicurean theory, as set forth by Lucretius, (less than 2,000 years ago,) was that sound is a substance passing off from the sounding body. In fact, the theory of Lucretius, both as to sound and as to mind, is essentially the same as that of our author, only Lucretius is more consistent,

and does not *profess* to hold that they are *immaterial* substance, but extremely *attenuated* substance.

That this is really "Wilford's" view, we shall now demonstrate, not merely to show the identity of his theory with that of Lucretius, but to show that *he makes mind material*.

In the first place, he puts it in the same category with sound, and the entire volume on sound would be totally irrelevant if he did not. He says (Preface, p. iv): "And since science has determined that no substance in the universe can be annihilated, there must, therefore, be deduced a scientific basis for the immortality of the soul, if life and mind should be conclusively shown to be substantial entities." Again (p. v): "If the wave-theory of sound is really a fallacy in science, then nothing remains to be accepted but the hypothesis that sound consists of corpuscular emissions, and is therefore a substantial entity, as much so as is air or odor; and if sound is thus absolutely proved to be a substance, *there cannot be the shadow of a scientific objection raised against the substantial or entitative nature of life and the mental powers.*" (Italics his.) So again and again he maintains that life is the analogue of sound, and repeatedly he claims to believe that they are both the direct counterpart of the physical organism; for it must be borne in mind that by "substance," in the passage just cited, he claims to mean "immaterial or incorporeal substance." (See p. 122.) But on p. 76 he says: "Sound thus produced is claimed in this (his) hypothesis to be a *finely attenuated substance*, (italics ours,) which is radiated from the sound-producing body," etc. But is a "finely attenuated substance," an "*immaterial*" substance? On p. 77 he proposes to show that "sound consists of substantial *atoms*," and he frequently speaks of sonorous "*atoms*," "*corpuscles*," and "*particles*," and actually speaks of them as varying in size, dividing, becoming "sparse," &c. And yet he holds that they are *immaterial*, or *incorporeal*. An "incorporeal corpuscle" is a remarkable entity. All these names of ultimate (or next to ultimate) particles are used exclusively to denote particles of *matter* by all scientific writers, and are so defined in our dictionaries, general and scientific. This would not be worth mentioning but for the fact that

he himself appeals to dictionaries in criticising others, as with reference to "elasticity," on p. 168, where, by the way, he errs (see Webster). At another place (p. 136), after assuring us (correctly) that *odor* consists of *material* particles, he gives an instance of its being extremely attenuated, and then speaks of its being "not so tenuous, *probably*, as sonorous substance," etc. There could, of course, be no comparison at all, if one is *material* and the other *immaterial*. Once more (p. 230, after speaking of the action of *material* odor): "Is it not reasonable and every way consistent, to assume, as I have done, that sound likewise is an emanation of substantial corpuscles, also unrecognisable save by a single sense," etc. Many other proofs could be given that his theory in reality makes sound *material*, and consequently makes mind also *material*, as his whole argument places them in the same *substantial* category. Presently, however, *direct* proofs will be produced to show that he regards the mind as *material*.

To resume his discussion of sound: he sees the difficulty of explaining the phenomena of sound by his theory. For instance, why does a sounding body cause another body in its vicinity to sound, when it can vibrate at the same rate, as in the case of strings or tuning-forks in unison? Here is his explanation: "I assume that there is a veritable sympathetic attraction [!] potentially existing in every sound-producing body which has or may have a unison or synchronous vibration." And in other places he maintains that these vibrations of bodies apparently produced by sound, are *not* caused by the force of the sound substance, but are merely incidental to it. He seems to see that this is nonsense, and so he seeks an analogy; that is, he attempts to illustrate by means of another phenomenon *which has not been explained*. He says (p. 80): "We know, further, that this magnetic substance [he had just spoken of the magnet], whatever it is, passing from the poles of the solid steel magnet, will not act in the slightest degree *on any other body except iron* [ital. ours], which alone responds to it sympathetically," etc. Here we have the "sympathetic" theory. And now he proceeds to show that no one attempts any further explanation: "Scientists do not pretend to explain why magnetic currents will move a piece of iron

and nothing else," etc. Such ignorance it would be difficult to parallel in print. Every intelligent boy, in these days, knows that various substances are attracted by the magnet, some of them (such as nickel and cobalt) with considerable power. In fact, some hold that all substances are either attracted or repelled (diamagnetic) more or less by the magnet.

As to his arguments against the wave-theory and his criticism of the statements of scientists, every thing of any importance that he says is fallacious. It is impossible to discuss all his arguments, or even a considerable portion of them, in a brief space. We shall merely mention a few by way of illustration. On p. 90, he says: "The velocity of such waves [those caused by a tuning-fork] cannot, by any possibility, exceed the velocity of the moving prongs which impell them." (Emphasis and spelling his.) He then shows that the prongs move in some instances not more than *seven inches a second*, whereas sound travels over *a thousand feet a second*, and proceeds to indulge in wild exultation over Tyndall and Helmholtz. But he overlooked the fact that when a body presses ever so slowly for a moment upon an elastic substance like air, the portion pressed acts upon another portion and that upon another, the condensation travelling at a rate dependent, not upon the velocity of the pressing body, but upon the physical properties of the body pressed. Suppose you had a tube a mile long, and should push a piston into one end of it *one-tenth of an inch* in the seventieth part of a second: a section of the air one-tenth of an inch long would issue from the other end; but *when* would it do it? "Wilford's" law would have it issue two or three hours after the piston was inserted: but in fact it would issue in about five seconds. If the piston is pressed in and suddenly withdrawn, a movement to and fro of a portion of the air will result, which movement will travel to the far end in the same way. So in the free air, only the "wave" (as it is called), not being confined to a tube, spreads out as it goes, and this leads to a decrease in the condensation. If sound, however, were a substance, as "Wilford" claims, we could see a reason for its moving at a rate determined by the velocity of the body which starts it. This argument of "Wilford," in addition

to resting upon ignorance, is directly against his own theory and in favor of the wave-theory.

Our author makes some attempts to overthrow the wave-theory by means of mathematical calculations. One of these calculations (p. 137, ff.) is based upon the theory that the heat of condensation causes an increase of about one-sixth in the velocity of sound. A discussion of this question would require much space. "Wilford's" treatment is laughable, as any one who is not already familiar with the subject will see by referring to the very passage of Tyndall which "Wilford" criticises. Tyndall in fact warns against the blunder into which "Wilford" has fallen. Another calculation (p. 132) is based upon total ignorance of several physical laws. He calculates the force which the locust must exert to cause *four cubic miles of air* to vibrate, and makes it *sixteen thousand million pounds*; but he forgets, *first*, that a wave once made moves of itself, and the locust has nothing more to do with it (conservation of force). *Secondly*, he forgets (p. 132, second column,) that the air is in a sort of equilibrium, and that to disturb it does not require great force. If an immense pair of scales had millions of tons on each arm, *perfectly balanced*, a locust could cause both masses to move. *Thirdly*, he overlooks the fact that the motion of particles of air caused by the locust rapidly *decreases* as the distance increases. He should have confined his calculation to a very small cylinder of air, so that the motion might be uniform. He says that two mathematicians assisted him in his calculation, but he lacks confidence in them, as their results did not agree! *Finally*, he imagines that the air waves are "*hurled*" by the locust's legs, and inquires how this can be done when the waves travel four thousand times faster than the legs. The principle which he here ignores has already been explained.

On p. 163 ff. occurs a blunder stupendous beyond conception; and it is elaborated and presented under various forms. He maintains that in applying the law that light, heat, sound, etc., decrease as the square of the distance, it makes a great difference what *unit* of distance we employ. He quotes Tyndall as saying that if the unit of distance be a *foot*, the intensity of

sound at *two feet* will be *one-fourth* as great, at *three feet*, *one-ninth*, and so on; and then he adds: "Why did not this careful physicist, if he is as careful as he is reputed to be, adopt *meters*, or *rods*, or *inches*, or *furlongs*, or *miles*, or *leagues*, as his *measure*, instead of 'feet'? Possibly we shall find out the reason after a little. Had he employed *rods*, for example, as his *measure* for determining this decrease in loudness as the square of the distance from the sounding body, in the place of *feet*, we would find the sound of the steam siren at a distance of ten miles diminished in loudness only the 10,000,000th instead of the one 2,000,000,000th, as recently seen to be the case when 'feet' were employed as the measure," etc. He then substitutes *inches* for feet, and says: "Then, instead of finding the sound at the ten-mile station possessing the 2,000,000,000th of its original intensity, as it necessarily must have when 'feet' are employed, it actually possesses but the one 400,000,000,000th as much intensity as at the start, or, in other words, it is but the one 200th as loud as it would be by adopting 'feet' as the measure." Once more he takes a *half mile* as the unit, and proceeds: "At *two half miles* from the instrument the intensity of the sound would be but *one-fourth* what it is AS IT LEAVES THE SIREN (small capitals ours); at *three half miles* the intensity would be but *one-ninth*," etc. In this last sentence we see clearly what his trouble is. If *half miles* be the unit, at *two half miles* the intensity will be *one-fourth*, not of "*what it is as it leaves the siren*," but of what it is at *one half mile*. So in the other cases assumed (employing "Wilford's" round numbers): if we take rods, the fraction will indeed be two hundred times larger than if we take feet; but the *unit of intensity* will be *two hundred times smaller*. Similarly, if we take *inches* instead of feet, the fraction will be two hundred (accurately, 144) times smaller, but the unit of intensity will be just as many times larger. Let the ratio of any unit to another be n . The intensity for the small unit, at a given distance, will be represented by a fraction n *square* times smaller than that which represents the intensity at the same distance for the large unit; but the unit of intensity for the small unit of distance is n *square* times *greater* than that

of the large unit of distance. This makes the intensities at the given distance always the same for all units of distance. In fact one unit can be expressed in terms of another. What is a *half mile*, for instance, but *half of a certain unit*—a mile? And what is an inch but one-twelfth part of another unit—a foot? But “Wilford” continues to expand his blunder, and applies it to light as coming from the sun; and what makes it supremely ludicrous is his intimation that Tyndall has committed himself “to a fallacy in science of which he will be ashamed as long as he lives.” (Lest we be misrepresented, let us call attention here to the fact that the law of intensity varying inversely as the square of the distance would be strictly true for *all* distances only if the light, heat, etc., *proceeded from a point*, which is practically an impossible case. The nearer we approach a *large* source of light after getting close to it, the less accurate the result of the formula would be; but if any school-boy ten years old in the land cannot see and understand the correctness of the general principle, our school-system is in sad need of reform.)

One of the reviewers whom we quoted at the outset commends our author for being *fair*, and says that he gives such full quotations that we cannot be misled. That *fairness* should be praised as a “striking mark,” strikes one as being rather strange; but let us see if our author deserves even that praise. A man may be unfair through ignorance, or carelessness, or misrepresentation. We shall give one out of numerous instances, and let the reader decide to which class it belongs. “Wilford” maintains that according to scientists wave motion in air is *exactly similar* (using the words literally) to wave motion on water, and to prove this he makes quotations from a scientific writer. He then proceeds to establish *differences* between the two processes, thus pretending to convict scientists of error. *But he omits sentences where differences are carefully pointed out by the author whom he quotes.*

On p. 160, he calls attention to a difference between the effect upon a water-wave and that upon an air-wave, produced by an obstacle; and says that this “alone condemns the atmospheric wave-theory of sound, since *every physicist who has written on the subject* (italics ours) tells us that water waves and atmospheric

sound waves are *exactly alike*. We do not exaggerate by italicising the last two words of the preceding sentence. A single citation from Professor Helmholtz, the leading physical investigator of Germany, will fully sustain this assertion." Here he gives the following quotation from Helmholtz's "Sensations of Tone," pp. 14, 15: "The *process in the air is essentially identical with that on the surface of water.* * * * The process which goes on in the atmospheric ocean about us is of a *precisely similar nature.* * * * The *waves of air* transport the tremor to the human ear *exactly in the same way* as the water transports the tremor produced by the stone." That looks quite satisfactory as it stands; but before filling up the gap, let us observe that if Helmholtz did literally say this, it would not follow that *no* physicist ever taught anything else. To be perfectly "fair" with our fair author, we give another passage. On p. 237 he says: * * "Physicists (without realising the ruinous result to their theory) constantly refer us to the undulations produced on the surface of water as *exactly similar* to sound-waves produced in the air, and hence also in any other substance. I do not exaggerate by saying *exactly similar*, but mean what the words literally imply. *As this is essential to my argument*, which I mean shall be so fortified at this particular point as *to admit of no answer* (italics ours). I will now prove by Professor Helmholtz—the highest living authority on physical science—that sound-waves in air and water waves are 'essentially identical,' of a 'precisely similar nature,' and travel '*exactly in the same way!*'" Here follows the quotation given above (Sensations of Tone, pp. 14, 15), *with the same omissions*, a little of the immediately preceding context being given. He then points out some more "differences" between sound-wave motion and water-wave motion. Once more, on p. 318, our author quotes this same passage from Helmholtz, *still making the same omissions*, and then proves (what he calls "an important scientific discovery,") that whilst sound-waves all travel at the same rate, large waves on water travel faster than small ones, or as he expresses it, "that wave-velocity *is always and exactly* in proportion to the wave-length, or distance from crest to crest;" and adds that, as far as he knows, *no writer on sound has*

observed it. We now give the passage from Helmholtz, restoring and italicising some of the *omitted* sentences: “ * * * The process in the air is essentially identical with that on the surface of the water. *The principal difference consists in the spherical propagation of sound in all directions through the atmosphere which fills all surrounding space, whereas the waves of water can only advance in rings or circles on its surface.* * * * *On the free surface of the water, the mass on compression can slip upwards, and so form ridges; but in the interior of the sea of air, the mass must be condensed, as there is no unoccupied spot for its escape.*” Then comes a discussion of a page in length, and then the rest of “Wilford’s” quotation. Again, *Sensations of Tone*, p. 44, we find: “On the surface of the water, *waves of unequal length advance with unequal velocities*, so that if they coincide at one moment so as to be difficult to distinguish, at the next instant one train pushes on and the other lags behind, so that they become again separately visible.” Helmholtz then shows that in air it is different. Again Helmholtz, in his *Popular Lectures* (p. 88), says: “When various simple waves concur on the surface of water, the compound wave-form has only a momentary existence, *because the longer waves move faster than the shorter.* * * But when waves of sound are similarly compounded, they never separate again, *because long and short waves traverse air with the same velocity.*” Now let the intelligent reader judge whether “Wilford” (who quotes from the immediate vicinity of p. 44, and quotes from pp. 14, 15, omitting the sentences in question,) failed to read Helmholtz consecutively, or grossly misrepresented him. It is amusing, by the way, to observe how “Wilford” got at his law of wave-velocity. He found that a wave *one inch* long (from crest to crest) moved *two feet* in a second, and that a wave *ninety feet* (1,080 inches) long moved *sixteen feet* in a second; whence he concludes that the velocity is *exactly proportional* to the wave-length, repeating and emphasising it; that is, 1 is to 1,080 as 2 is to 16! Then comes his shout of victory: “At least one-half of this wonderful book, *The Sensations of Tone*—a work which cost the author so many years of brain-struggle, and evincing a profundity of thought and mathematical formular-

isation without a parallel in modern scientific research—is based alone on the fundamental assumption already quoted (!), that there is a complete similarity—an absolute parallel—between the action of sound-waves and water-waves. which, *by the law thus demonstrated*, is mercilessly scattered to the four winds. No reader can suppose, for a moment, that had this great investigator of science *been aware of this law of wave-velocity*, as so fully shown, that he could have repeatedly declared, as the fundamental principle of the wave-theory, that water-waves and atmospheric sound-waves are ‘essentially identical,’ ‘precisely similar,’ and travel ‘exactly in the same way.’” (Emphasis ours, grammar his.)

These are fair specimens of “Wilford’s” method of criticism and of scientific investigation. As a matter of fact the question of the velocity of water-waves, as well as of sound-waves, is familiar to every tyro in physics or mechanics. The results of some of “Wilford’s” experiments on water-waves were probably modified for want of sufficient depth of water.

But we must pass on to his “*Evolution Evolved*,” and shall have to be very brief for want of space. This volume is more harmful than that on sound; for the latter contains scarcely anything but absurdities, and could do no harm, but for the fact that it has unwisely, may criminally, been identified with the cause of religion. But the volume on Evolution unfortunately contains some of the familiar objections to Darwinism; and yet along with these it contains such fallacies as are likely to give our young men, who possess more intelligence than sober reflection, a contempt for all they find in the book, including the sound objections to Evolution. Yet, on the whole, it is better that one should even be thus affected, than that he should *accept* all that is in this volume (on Darwinism). We can only illustrate by an example or two.

First, let us examine his view of the nature and origin of life. We have already quoted him as attempting to show by his whole investigation of light and sound, that life, like them, is a *substance* and hence *must* be immortal since “no substance can be annihilated.” Now as to the origin of life, he says, (p. 472):

“. . . As organic life is a substantial entity and could only come from a pre-existing fountain of life, hence the solution is clear that the life and mental powers of *every organic creature* originated primordially as *infinitesimal atoms of God's own self-existent vital and mental being.*” This clearly makes the lower animals immortal, and makes *their* life as much as that of man “the breath of God.” But, strange to say, he elsewhere denies that animals are immortal, as distinct beings. On p. 471 he says : “There is no reasonable or scientific ground for supposing that a longing anticipation of and a universal aspiration for a life beyond death could have been thus made an indestructible part of man's mental organism were there no such a possibility as a future life in the divine economy of the universe. This blank capacity for unlimited cultivation and eternal advancement in knowledge *becomes the guarantee of man's immortality,*—while the lower animal, having no such a capacity *as a tilte-deed* to a future life, gives back at death the mental and vital drop of its essential entity, which, instead of being annihilated or in any sense lost or blotted out, exists forever,” etc. And so, after all our hope of conscious immortality,—the only immortality which distinguishes our hope from that of a large sect of the heathen—results, not from our life, mind, or soul being a “substance,” but merely from our “longing anticipation of and universal aspiration for a life beyond death.” But some do not anticipate it, and the “aspiration” is by no means “universal;” what then? Are some men reabsorbed like the lower animals?

Moreover, those “atoms” of God's being which constitute life seem to render all life a part of God. Since these atoms cannot multiply, and cannot assimilate other atoms to themselves, without converting foreign substance into a portion of God (a manifest absurdity), a considerable amount of these “atoms” must have been imparted to Adam to supply the whole human race, particularly as parents seem to retain a reasonable portion of their share after producing children. And still we seem to be as full of life as ancestors. Besides, these “atoms” (ultimate particles of *matter*) seem to materialise God himself, to say nothing of their making life material.

It is remarkable, too, that this life-substance, composed of

divine atoms, should be so different in different animals. Darwin is puzzled at the offspring of animals inheriting instincts and even habits of the parents, and desires even an imperfect answer. "Wilford" says he will "give him a *perfect* answer." And then he informs the world "that the life and mental powers of every living creature constitute a perfect incorporeal yet substantial organism, as real as the one composed of blood, bone, and muscle, and that inheritance from the parents by the offspring comes solely through such intangible entity." Even the *merinos* (he says) transmit "the characteristic of fine wool to their offspring *exclusively through their mental and vital structures*"! And still their life is composed of divine atoms! But how is it with plants? They, too, impart their characteristics to plants springing from them, not only as in the case of woolly sheep producing woolly sheep, but as in the case of a black sheep imparting some of his color to his offspring. Compare the effect of the pollen of red corn falling on the pistils (silk) of white corn. Is this the result of "immaterial life" too, and if so, is it composed of "divine atoms" destined to be reabsorbed? Darwin's question were better unanswered.

There is another striking peculiarity of the human mind, or soul, according to our author. Its substantial (though "*incorporeal*") nature enables it to possess "organic structure," by which souls can "see, hear, taste, and smell." In fact, they are "incorporeal bodies," (!) and can "clasp hands with the angels, can play upon a harp," and can even "shout hosannas." (These expressions we take at second hand, not having the first volume within reach. See p. 61.) Now, as they are "immaterial substance," evidently more "attenuated" (as "Wilford" expresses it) than sound (which our author's theory really makes material), and as sound emanates from them when they shout, is there not danger of their shouting themselves entirely away? And to think of it! They can strike harp-strings, which set up a vibration and start the "emanation" of "sound corpuscles." All such speculations are harmful at best; but when they involve such contradictions and absurdities as these, those who commend them to our favorable consideration, do the cause of religion inconceivable damage.

One more point. "Wilford" is himself an Evolutionist of as objectionable a type as Darwin. He objects to Darwin's explanation of the origin of rudimentary organs, as of legs in the boa-constrictor; and writes thus: "I am now prepared for the hypothesis by which these so-called rudimentary organs may be rationally and logically as well as scientifically accounted for, which the reader has, no doubt, ere this, clearly anticipated. It is, that such abnormalities are the direct result of the mental impressions of mothers, reënforced and accumulated through countless generations, caused by the want of or necessity for such organic structures." Here we have as clear a case of Evolution (be it Darwinian or not) as one could imagine. In this way he accounts for the origin of rudimentary teeth in bovine animals, rudimentary legs in whales and large serpents, etc. So an animal actually by a sort of mental strain "evolves" a rudimentary organ. But the step from a rudimentary to a *perfect* organ is surely less than from nothing to a rudimentary organ. Why then did those animals not finally develop perfect organs? Or will they some day accomplish this? And why may not most of the organs (whether rudimentary or perfect) of all animals have been developed in this way? The fossils fail to show it, and that is all; and this same objection (merely historical) to the *Darwinian* hypothesis being removed, it is no more "a crusade against religion" (as "Wilford" calls it, p. III., Preface) than is the hypothesis of "Wilford," carried to its rational conclusions.

We have written this article (by request), not in any sense to defend scientific doctrines (such as that of the nature of sound), or hypotheses (such as that of Evolution), against the ridiculous assaults of "Wilford." The former need no defence, and as to the latter, the Evolution hypothesis is unfortunately rather helped on than checked by his book. We have written solely with a view to showing that the book is totally unworthy of the praise bestowed upon it, and with the hope that this notice may at least induce some men to reflect before they recommend it as overthrowing the "scepticism of modern science," thus misleading the ignorant and prejudicing the intelligent against religion.

M. W. HUMPHREYS.

ARTICLE VI.

COSMIC VAPOR.

1. Cosmic Vapor having come to the front as an explanation of the totality of things, it is opportune to inquire what we are to understand by the totality of things, what Cosmic Vapor is, and what claim it can show to be regarded as the author of the universe.

First, then, as to the material universe, somewhere in the midst of which we find ourselves. We live on the surface of a globe so large that it surpasses the conceptions of its inhabitants, yet so small in comparison with the rest of the universe, that, if earth were annihilated, it would hardly be missed more than a grain of sand from the beach of the ocean.

Of the surrounding portion of the universe there may, of course, be vast districts from which no light has reached us, and of which we know nothing whatever. We say "may be," and then pass on to consider the part of the universe, if part it be, that is accessible to our intelligence. On such a theme one must be nothing, if not scientific; although it would seem to be the dictate of common sense, rather than of science exclusively, not to expatiate too largely on things of which we know nothing, and whose very existence is questionable; while on the other hand it may be wise, and certainly is modest, to acknowledge that the totality of things may not come under our purview.

We are in a forest of worlds, and in the direction of the Milky Way can by no means see our way out of the maze, though our sun is apparently doing his best to get us out on one side that is toward the constellation of Hercules. We have often turned the telescope to the Milky Way and the adjacent sky. In some places we see a multitude of small bright points, and back of them a luminous haze. No telescope made by man has ever penetrated through this haze. The larger instruments, however, multiply the number of bright points; in other words, they resolve more of the Galaxy into separate stars. In other places brilliant cohorts of stars appear to leap forth from their ambush:

VOL. XXXII., NO. 3—8.

as near the dividing line of Scorpio and Sagittarius in the south, and in the sword handle of Perseus in the north. These are seen by the naked eye as condensations, more or less distinct, of the general nebulosity.

Then there are several fine constellations in the Galaxy, as Cassiopeia, Cygnus, Aquila, and Scorpio; and not far away, the splendors of Lyra, Delphinus, Taurus, Orion, and Sirius, are visible in our latitude. In the far south α Centauri, and α and β of the Southern Cross gleam out like jewels from a diadem of down. For a century past the view has been gaining ground among astronomers that there is a stratum of stars whose length and breadth several times, if not very many times, surpass its thickness. We are in this stratum, and can see out above and below in the direction of the thickness, but not in the level of its length and breadth. It is reasonable to suppose that such gorgeous suns as Vega, Sirius, Betelgeux, and Aldebaran, lying so near the apparent level of the Milky Way, are really in the stratum, but are comparatively near us, and are merely displaced by viewing them from our stand-point. In fact Vega and Sirius are among the nearest fixed stars.

Leaving the stratum we come into the region of the nebulae, some of which can be resolved into stars, while others are composed of incandescent gases. The latter are the true nebulae; the former are star clusters. Mr. Cleveland Abbe has studied Sir John Herschel's catalogue, and Prof. Newcomb in his Popular Astronomy (p. 460) gives the following result: "Imagine a belt thirty degrees wide extending around the heavens, including the Milky Way, and reaching fifteen degrees on each side of the central circle of the Milky Way. This belt will include nearly one-fourth the surface of the celestial sphere, and if the stars or nebulae were equally distributed, nearly one-fourth of them would be found in the belt. Instead, however, of one-fourth, we find nine-tenths of the star clusters, but only one-tenth of the nebulae."

It seems, then, to be pretty well made out, that the material universe consists of a countless multitude of worlds arranged in a tolerably thin, irregular stratum, reinforced by contiguous star-

clusters on each side of the main layer; while outside of these lie scattered masses of glowing gas as far as Lord Rosse's colossal telescope can penetrate into space, and probably much farther. Nearer home, we have our own solar system, admirably adjusted, wonderfully poised, and flying through space at a rate not yet sufficiently ascertained; we have our earth describing a spiral such as would be made by a helix coiled about an oblique cylinder with an elliptical base. We have a superficial crust of a world on which to live, move, and have our being. This abode is exquisitely adorned with fountains and streams, with lakes and seas, with the grandeur of mountains and the goodliness of vales. It is clothed with grasses and flowers, shrubs, and trees, endogens and exogens, in measureless profusion and infinite variety. It is inhabited by innumerable kinds of animated beings from the radiata to the vertebrata, from infusoria to elephants and cetaceans, from the mollusk to man. Yes, to man towering above the rest, striving to understand them all, striving yet more to understand himself, ever asking whence he is, and whither he is going, palpitating with thoughts that wander through eternity, crying out for Somewhat to worship and to trust; aglow with poetry and heroism, love and hope; ever dissatisfied, ever self-reproachful, ever longing for the unattained, and miserably failing to find it in the finite, or winning it, if at all, in the Infinite alone.

2. *Competitors for the place of Author.*

(a) A God would be an adequate cause: a Being of sufficient wisdom to plan the universe, and sufficient power to execute a plan so august. There must be power somewhere; and who knows but it may reside in One Being. Intelligence may have produced the order and the glory everywhere manifest. If it be not a necessary cause, yet it is at least a sufficient cause; and if there should prove to be no other sufficient cause, intelligence may turn out to be the one necessary cause. And this intelligence may be a quality of the same Being in whom the power dwells; intellect and force combined in Him as in us, yet to an inconceivably higher degree in Him. This hypothesis will gain strength if it be once admitted that mind exists as well as matter;

for matter cannot create or beget mind; and if mind exists at all, it must have existed from eternity, which brings us back to theism, as before.

There are some very great advantages in the theistic solution, above all others that have been proposed. Many of the wisest, most sober, judicious, and virtuous of men, have unalterably held it to be the only solution possible. They have spurned from them every other solution as absurd in theory and mischievous in tendency.

(b) Chance would appear to have had a few adherents among the ancients; but the moderns are ashamed of their deity. Says Whewell in his *Bridgewater Treatise*, "Laplace has attempted to calculate the probability that it (the solar system as permanent) is not the result of accident. . . . He finds that there is a probability far higher than that which we have for the greater part of undoubted historical events, that these appearances are not the effect of Chance. 'We ought, therefore,' says Laplace, 'to believe with at least the same confidence, that a primitive cause has directed the planetary motions.'"

Prof. Huxley also turns his back on this now abject divinity, and tells us that nobody worships at his shrine. In truth FORS is a blind old god; blind and deaf, dumb in all articulate speech, staring stupidly into vacancy out of his sightless eyeballs, without love or hate, sense or reason; and the only wonder is that any devotee ever bowed before his altar.

(c) Cosmic Vapor is set forth in our day as the rival claimant instead of Chance. The point of this whole article is that we are shut up to a choice between God and Chance. If Cosmic Vapor has any just claims to be considered the author of all things, by all means, let them be allowed. We come, then, to consider what is meant by Cosmic Vapor, whether there is now or ever has been such a thing, and what part, if any, it has taken in the production of the orderly universe in which we live.

3. Immanuel Kant, the famous metaphysician of Königsberg, after a profound study of the works of Sir Isaac Newton, propounded what has since been denominated the Nebular Hypoth-

esis. Prof. Newcomb quotes him as saying, "I assume that all the materials, out of which the bodies of our solar system were formed, were, in the beginning of things, resolved in their original elements, and filled all the space of the universe in which these bodies now move." Kant seems to have held that the material universe was limited in extent, and that in the beginning there was a chaos of particles, perhaps of atoms of matter, from which by mutual attraction and withal repulsion, the worlds were evolved.

Laplace modestly suggested that the solar system might have arisen, not out of absolute chaos, but from a central sun surrounded by an immense fiery atmosphere. This atmosphere, consisting of intensely hot vapor rotating slowly about the axis of the central sun, would cool by radiation, then contract, then by the recognised laws of motion rotate at an accelerated speed. Then again he thought the bounding layer would in the course of ages acquire such a velocity as to overcome the centrifugal force, and, as it were, tear loose from the rest of the vapor within. Or perhaps it may be said that the outer layer would become self-sustaining, and the subjacent portions of the vapor would tear loose from it. The ring of matter thus separated would gradually aggregate into a globe. Or the process might be repeated on a smaller scale and thus satellites be formed. Or even a revolving ring might be tardy in consolidating, and maintain its annular structure after the formation of a central spherical mass, as we see in the rings of Saturn. Thus planet after planet and satellite after satellite would be formed, and the central sun would contract through the ages by this process, but continue to be the source of light, heat, and attraction.

"But where," said Napoleon, "is the place for God in all this?"

"Sire," replied Laplace, "there is no place for a God in my system!"

This hypothesis, timidly put forth at first, has received some corroborations from advancing science.

Sir Wm. Herschel made some reflecting telescopes of higher

powers than had been used before, and began the study of the nebulae. Some of these he considered as masses of glowing vapors, others as masses in which the process of condensation had begun; and others still, as those in which that process had been finished, and the vapor made up into worlds. So that every stage of the evolution was exhibited in the sky.

This view received a shock when Lord Rosse's mammoth reflector was turned on some of the phosphorescent vapors and resolved them into stars; while it brought to light new nebulae unseen before, which even it could not resolve. It thus seemed most probable that we merely lacked optical power in order to resolve all the nebulae, and the vapors appeared about to be swept from the firmament. Then came Wollaston and Fraunhofer, Bunsen and Kirchhoff, Huggins and Secchi, with their little magician of a spectroscope, and interpreted the mysterious symbols that had been for centuries showered upon us in vain from suns and nebulae. In August 1864, Mr. Huggins directed his telespectroscope to the nebula 4374 of Herschel's catalogue, and was greatly surprised at finding a spectrum of three bright bands, indicating that the nebula was composed of luminous gas. By comparing these lines with those of terrestrial objects, he ascertained that the nebula contained nitrogen and hydrogen. Prosecuting his researches, he found twenty nebulae of the same description and among them the Annular Nebula in Lyra, the Dumb-bell Nebula, and the Great Nebula in Orion. A few of them, however, exhibit in addition a faint, continuous spectrum, such as is given by incandescent solid or liquid bodies. It has occurred to us that this last mentioned fact may be due to the presence of the solid or liquid bodies not only *in*, but beyond, or this side of the nebulae.

In nearly forty others Mr. Huggins found continuous spectra, without the absorption lines which arise when the light of an incandescent solid or liquid body passes through a cooler surrounding vapor of the same materials with the body within. In this second list we find the long-known nebula in Andromeda, which we have so often and so wonderingly examined with the telescope, though to the casual observer it is an unattractive object. (Mr.

Huggins thinks it possible that there may be absorption lines so faint as to be indivisible.)

While, then, nebulae of the second class are composed of solid or liquid bodies, it may be regarded as established that those of the first class do consist, some in part it may be, and others wholly, of luminous gas. Vapor then exists, whether worlds are made of it or not.

The next question is, what evidence the heavens afford of the transmutation of vapor into worlds; so as to entitle it to the name of Cosmic or Cosmo-Chaotic Vapor; a vapor which from a chaos becomes a cosmos. The forms of the nebulae sometimes approach regularity, sometimes are wildly irregular and even "fantastic." Of the latter the Great Nebula in Orion is a sample. We have often examined it with the 6 in. Alvan Clark refractor of the University, through which it presents the appearance of a vague, formless luminosity dying away by imperceptible gradations into darkness, except near the intensely black window-shaped space adjacent to the trapezium. The edges of this are somewhat sharp. The Crab Nebula in Taurus, we have seen once or twice. The outline in our instrument is a tolerably regular oval, but in Lord Rosse's great reflector it shows a number of projecting arms which may justify its articulate designation. The spiral nebulae, however, do look as though some kind of rotation were in progress. Noted among these is the one in Canes Venatici (H. 1622). It is hard to believe that any of these are in equilibrium. Indeed, notwithstanding the difficulty of drawing correctly the outlines of objects so indistinct, and the fact that the recent improved telescopes give different appearances of the same objects from those furnished by the earlier and inferior instruments, it still seems highly probable that real changes have been detected in the forms of some of the nebulae. Newcomb cites as instances η Argus and the ω Nebula (H. 2008).

The next point is that in some cases we find rings of nebulous matter. We have more than once examined the Annular Nebula in Lyra (57 Messier; between β and γ). It is of a nearly elliptical shape, luminous throughout, but very faint in the interior, the outer part forming a bright oval belt. Herschel's 60 $\frac{1}{2}$ and

854 have a nucleus and several imperfect rings. In some, two nuclei are found; in others, a pretty well defined, or "planetary", nucleus surrounded by a ring. Drawings of these may be seen in Schellen's Spectrum Analysis.

This brief statement presents in a nutshell the argument for the actual formation of globular masses out of the luminous gases in space.

There are two objections to be considered. The first lies against the theory as an explanation of *all* the cases. Only a few of the nebulae exhibit what may be called a tendency to spherical consolidation. The second bears against the production of worlds like our sun or its planets. The annular nebula in Lyra, both in the ring and in the gauzy interior, yields the spectrum of nitrogen only. Others show nitrogen and hydrogen as the Planetary Annular Nebula in Aquarius, the Stellar Nebula (H., 450), and the Spiral Nebula (H., 4964).

It may be rejoined that some of the spectral lines may be absorbed by the interstellar ether, as Huggins suggests; or that further study and improved instruments may reveal other lines. We evidently need more facts. The sum of the matter, we take to be this: if the Almighty chooses to make worlds, meteors, or comets in this infinitely slow and difficult way, none of us need object. No living man can offer anything more than a conjecture on the subject. Atheists of our day would do well to imitate the modesty of Laplace. Evolution may require an Evolver, and that Evolver may be a personal God.

4. "It is related of Epicurus," says Whewell, "that when a boy reading with his preceptor these verses of Hesiod:

Ἦτοι μὲν πρόπιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' ἑρρίστερονος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
Ἄθανάτων.

"Eldest of beings Chaos first arose,
Thence earth wide-stretched, the steadfast seat of all
Th' Immortals,"

the young scholar first betrayed his inquisitive genius by asking, 'And Chaos whence?' When in his riper years he had persuaded

himself that this question was sufficiently answered by saying, that chaos arose from the concourse of atoms, it is strange that the same inquisitive spirit did not again suggest the question, 'And atoms whence?' And it is clear that however often the question 'Whence?' had been answered, it would still start up as at first. Nor could it suffice as an answer to say that earth, chaos, atoms, were portions of a series of changes which went back to eternity."

We make the passing remark, that Hesiod's conception of the *Χάος* may have been derived by tradition from the Mosaic account: The earth was (TOHU VA BOHU) without form and void; more literally, as the words are nouns, desolation and emptiness. (LXX. *Ἄδρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος.* Vulgate: *Inanis et vacua.*)

It is more to the point to say that Epicurus's question was the most natural one in the world. Not only natural, but wholly unavoidable. Again, it is impossible to halt at Laplace's landing. A glowing sun, surrounded by a fiery vapor enormous in its extent and world-producing, is as truly a phenomenon to be accounted for, as the present state of the solar system. It cannot have existed from eternity, and if it sprang into existence by the fiat of Deity, atheism is at once consumed in its own fires. Kant's conception is more plausible, but needs modification or re-statement. For, why have not the planets and the suns all grown old and cold like our moon? Matter must have always, even from everlasting, had its attractive force. It ought then to have consolidated and cooled off ages ago, unless one of three things were true. For it will be observed that Newton's great Law of Gravitation includes just three principles: (1) Universality, since every particle of matter attracts every other; (2) A direct ratio: directly as the mass of each; (3) An inverse ratio: inversely as the square of the distance. In accordance with this we have three alternative suppositions before us: (1) That the particles of matter were infinite in number and diffused throughout immensity; hence their mutual attractions so counterbalanced one another, that the resultant infinitesimal excess of one attraction over all others drew one particle to another in endless ages. Thus if four particles, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, were on a straight line, we must hold

that the attraction of *b* and *c* for each other will infinitesimally overpower the remaining forces, and bring *b* and *c* together in an infinite time. (2) That the particles were originally separated from each other by infinite distances. (3) That a finite amount of matter was resolved not only into its "elements," but into infinitesimal atoms, so that the masses would approach one another by infinitesimal advances in finite times. These seem to be the only three suppositions at all admissible. If even these appear extravagant and visionary, it is not our fault. We are trying to accommodate the materialists, and find a resting-place for the soles of their feet, if resting-place there be. If there be none such in all their philosophy, let them abandon it and find soul-rest with us in God.

5. Whence is this chaos? The question will not down. Let us take the third of the above hypotheses as far the simplest, and the least incredible of the three. As we cannot go back to the beginning of eternity, which has had no beginning, let us take any given epoch, say a thousand million of years ago. The atoms are in motion, very slow motion it may be, but real. I suppose that the atoms are infinitesimal, like the monads of Leibnitz. If heat be the motion of the particles of a body among themselves, heat can scarcely exist yet. The "fire-mist" has not been produced. Matter exists, matter infinitely subdivided, and moving with insensible velocity.

Still the inexorable question returns: Whence is the chaos?

The human race have given several answers to this, as that

(1.) It was created *ex nihilo* by the Eternal One, the Self-existent Spirit whom we denominate God, *i. e.*, the Good. This is clearly the doctrine of the Bible.

(2.) Perhaps it was an emanation from Him; of his substance originally, but now differentiated from his individualism, as the light, on the Corpuscular theory, is an emanation from the sun.

(3.) Or it may be self-existent, and lie plastic in the cunning hands of the All-wise and Almighty Artificer.

(4.) Or self-existent, but rebellious, defiant, resisting the Demiurge who would fain fashion it into order and beauty; the source also of all moral evil.

(5.) Or itself, the alone entity, monistic, God, attaining to self-consciousness only in man, as the Pantheists assert.

(6.) Or wholly phenomenal, and based on no underlying substance, as the Idealists, whether Theistic or otherwise, affirm; yet backed in some way by a personal or an impersonal spirit, or by Force with or without a Spirit.

(7.) Or self-existent, eternal, imperishable, without God or soul of man, remorseless, pitiless, an inchoate machine, animated by undying FORCE, and self-evolved under the iron rule of stern-eyed FATE.

Men have indeed sought out many inventions, and will fly any whither to escape from the presence of the LORD.

6. Let us consider the seventh, which is the Materialistic theory.

Matter must have possessed its "potencies" from everlasting, if it has existed so long, and if there has not co-existed with it a spirit capable of endowing it with needful properties. How came it to number among those potencies the principle of attraction? Without this there would have been no permanent worlds. There are countless chances to one against the atoms drifting into any regular figure by Epicurus's fortuitous concourse, and again countless chances against their remaining in it. So that all the moderns, from the time of Newton, clamor for attraction as one of the universal properties of matter. But why should it have been a property of any particle of matter? Every one knows that matter cannot exist without the properties which philosophers call primary, such as extension, mobility, figure, etc., but there is no *a priori* reason why one of its properties should be attraction; and yet, further, that this attraction of gravitation should appertain to not one or two, but innumerable particles; and once more, that the attraction should obey any one law, as the inverse square of the distance. On the doctrine of probabilities, the chance that every particle of matter should agree with every other in this particular is almost infinitely less than that a die thrown a million of times should invariably turn up an ace. Magnetic attraction is very limited in its range. Steel can be

permanently magnetized; soft iron only temporarily. Why should not this attraction be as wide-spread as that of gravitation?

Again, different kinds of matter have very different properties in other lines. To confine our attention for the present to gravitation, we should guard against the error that *mass*, in the formula "directly as the mass," means quantity of matter. Equal quantities of gold or platinum, iridium or osmium, have a far greater attractive power, than of hydrogen or oxygen. Every element of the sixty-five known has its own specific mass. So that they gravitate very differently in this respect, while they unvaryingly exhibit the other feature of "inversely as the square of the distance." As our globe is now constituted, the intensity of gravity at London is 32.182 feet: that is, a body will fall, in one second, about 16 feet 1.09 inches (Deschanel.) But if it were a globe of gold or platinum, a body would fall much faster; still, as now, the attraction would be four times as great at one million miles distance from the centre as at two million. Why is this? It was either a lucky accident, or it is due to the will and the wisdom of a higher power.

The more we reflect upon the Law of Gravitation, the more wonderful it appears. The two opposite kinds of electricity are kept asunder in a Leyden jar by a thin partition of glass. Light penetrates the glass, but is arrested by a thin plate of metal. Gravity spurns all checks and pierces through solid worlds. Thus when our moon or a satellite of Jupiter is in eclipse, and the light of the sun is shut off (almost wholly) by the intervention of the planet, the force of the sun's gravitation suffers no diminution. Imagine our condition in terrestrial matters if this were not the case. Our floors would arrest the attraction of the earth; our persons, our furniture, the bricks in our houses, would become lighter than air. Not even out-of-doors could we stay on our planet, for the attraction of the globe would be cut off by a superficial shell only a few inches thick. Everything would go spinning off the earth, and the earth itself would fly into pieces. Yet this law existed long before Life made its appearance. It

was one of the "potencies" of Matter by which it was to make itself into worlds.

7. A separate section may be devoted to the law of "inversely as the square of the distance." This was largely discussed in the last century, and is considered at some length by Whewell. The sum of what he says is this: 1st. So far from its being a necessary property of matter, this law was never dreamed of until modern times. 2d. The distinguished mathematician Clairaut, who did so much in the development of Newton's doctrines, denied that the law was true, because the apsides of the moon made a complete revolution in half the time called for by Newton's theory; *i. e.* in nine years instead of eighteen; and it took a long while to rectify the mistake and show that fact and theory coincided. 3d. While Newton shows (*Principia*, Prop. 64) that if the force of gravity *increased directly* as the distance, the planets would describe ellipses, yet gravity in bodies at the earth's surface would cease to exist, and an utter subversion of all terrestrial things would ensue. 4th. Among conceivable inverse laws, any diminution of the attractive force greater in ratio than the cube of the distance would cause a planet to describe a spiral, and hence either to fall into the sun or to whirl out into space farther and farther forever. 5th. Although the very laborious calculations necessary to estimate the perturbations on various possible suppositions have not been made, the stability of the system, and the moderate limit of the perturbations, would not, so far as we know, be obtained by any different law. By the existing law the orbits of the planets return quite regularly into themselves; there is simplicity in place of confusion.

We add the following considerations. By the Tenth Proposition of the *Principia* we learn that if the attractive force were directly as the distance, the sun would be in the centre, and not in a focus of the ellipse; and that all the planets would perform their revolutions in the same time, which indeed is easily deduced from the principle that the forces are as the squares of the velocities divided by the radii of the circles, or even more readily from the principle that the central forces are as the

radii of the circles divided by the times of one revolution. The velocities of all the planets would be enormously increased by this, especially of Uranus and Neptune, and to no good purpose, possibly to very bad purpose.

The fourth point we have quoted from Whewell will bear some modification. By Newton's Ninth Proposition, if the centripetal force be inversely as the cube of the distance, the orbit will be a spiral cutting all the radii vectores in the same angle. Mathematical readers will recognise in this the famous *Spira Mirabilis* or *Logarithmic Spiral* of Bernouilli. It would seem that a force greater than the inverse cube of the distance might produce some other spiral. In a word, Whewell has under-stated, rather than over-stated the case.

It is worthy of notice also that by the rule of the inverse square, all possible orbits are conic sections, and their equations are of the second degree only. This has been of signal service to astronomy. Equations of the first degree represent straight lines. The simplest curves are represented by equations of the second degree. If the orbits had been curves of the fourth or higher degrees, like the *lemniscata*, or the *limaçon*, or any other of the odd looped puzzles of mathematicians, or some queer transcendental form, when would the human race have mastered the subject? As it is, the problem has been hard enough, and never was solved until Kepler and Newton grappled with it; although the Greeks had invented all the conic sections eighteen centuries or more before Newton, knowing of course nothing about their astronomical utility.

To sum up this part of the subject. Everything resembles the skilful planning of a most ingenious mechanician, thoroughly understanding the business in hand. Everything is as unlike as possible to caprice, ignorance, accident. That any one particle of matter should attract a whole universe to its remotest bounds, and according to a law so unlike other laws, so marvellous, so simple, so necessary to the order and permanence of the system, that particles in number beyond computation should be subject to the same law in this particular, while differing so widely where utility would be subserved by the variation, points unmistakably

to wisdom and will. Taking the lowest empirical ground, there is well nigh an infinity of chances in favor of theism. Mark specially that evolution cannot in any wise account for the existence of forces and laws previous to evolution. Suppose that force acting according to law evolves form, order, beauty, utility, life even. Whence the force? whence the law? They are the cause, not the effect of evolution. No! We must choose between God and Chance. There is no third alternative.

8. Given, then, the Law of Gravitation, and in addition Newton's three Laws of Motion and all his Corollaries from them; in order to produce a single solar system by force under these laws without any subsequent oversight or direction, the particles must have been pre-arranged with the most admirable skill. The adjustment would have taxed a Divine wisdom. If God did make the solar system thus, he set before himself a problem of superlative intricacy. The orbits of the planets were to be nearly in the same plane; or if the inclination should be great, say as much as 34° , which is the case with Pallas, the second asteroid discovered, the weight of the body must be insignificant. The larger planets must be much more distant from each other than the smaller. The unavoidable perturbations must be so admirably arranged as to be self-corrective. But these depend upon the original collocation of the particles, upon the inverse element of the law of gravitation, and also upon the masses of the particles and their direct influence; none of which things have any causal connection with the collocation, and can in no way have determined it. Nor can the mutual adjustment of collocations and laws have been brought about by evolution, because they preceded any and all evolution. Hence we are driven back again to the same issue as before, and must choose between God and Chance. As even Laplace has said that Chance can not have been the author of the solar system, that author must have been God.

And if a God is needed for one solar system, what wisdom must have been requisite for the establishment and maintenance of such a cluster as that in Hercules, or 47 Toucani described

by Herschel as "a most glorious globular cluster, the stars of the fourteenth magnitude immensely numerous * * * *
 * compressed to a blaze of light at its centre"; or H., 3,504: "The noble globular cluster ω Centauri, beyond all comparison the richest and largest object of the kind in the heavens. The stars are literally innumerable"?

If there was no God, the problem was solved by blind Chance, who, without knowledge, skill, or sense of grandeur, surpassed all human wisdom by infinite stupidity.

9. An inconceivably vast portion of the self-existent and eternal matter, however, does not condense into worlds. It fills all the interstellar spaces, and may extend far beyond the outmost orbs or nebulae. We borrow and abbreviate a Greek word for a name, and call this apparently imponderable substance *ether*. If it had possessed that well-nigh universal property of gravity, it would, in the lapse of the infinite ages, have accumulated about the suns and the planets, leaving impassable voids between. But while it is not attracted by other kinds of matter, it is capable of being agitated by them in a most astonishing manner. Either the motion of the particles of molecules among themselves, or that of particles attracted toward each other by gravitation, was communicated to the slumbering ocean of ether, and then Force said to Matter, "Let light be", and light was! Yet not by the sudden and magnificent outburst indicated by the Hebrew prophet, but rather by infinitesimal dimness of beginnings. Nor yet by any sort of beginnings exactly, for there never was a beginning of light, but a coeternity of light with matter; and the dazzling sun-throbs of the Present faint indeed upon the far stretches of the boundless Past, but never absolutely die away.

According to Huyghens's theory, *i. e.*, the now generally accepted undulatory theory of light, the vibrations are transverse to the lines of radiation from the centre. Roemer first found from the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites that light came from the sun in about eight minutes. Deschanel puts its velocity at "about two hundred and ninety-eight million metres per second, or one hundred and eighty-five thousand miles per second. As the circum-

ference of the earth is only forty million metres, light would travel seven and a half times round the earth in a second." He may well say, "A velocity which may fairly be styled inconceivable."

The ether consists of inexpressibly numerous atoms differing from other sorts of matter where it was desirable that they should differ, and, without concert or perception, plan or knowledge, agreeing with each other in prodigious elasticity, extraordinary repulsion, and uniformity of wave speed, and of direction when unimpeded or when reflected, but uniform change of direction when refracted. There are light rays, heat rays, and actinic rays, all bound together in one pearly or golden beam, but to some extent separable by glass prisms, rock-salt, and other media.

Let us notice specially the light rays. In red light the number of vibrations striking the eye in a second is about four hundred and fifty billions; in violet, eight hundred billions" (Schellen). This is nearly the same as Professor Tyndall's estimate. It is to be remembered that by billion here is meant a million of millions, not a thousand millions; 450,000,000,000,000 and 800,000,000,000,000. Deschanel gives three hundred and ninety-two and seven hundred and fifty-four millions of millions. It was necessary, therefore, in order that our eyes should see the different colors from red to violet that a medium should be pre-existent, capable of producing from four hundred to seven hundred or eight hundred millions of millions of vibrations in a second. Again, we say, if the capacity, "potency," or call it what you will, had not been in each and every one of numberless individual atoms from eternity, there would have been nothing to evolve. How far ahead sees the blind god, Chance!

It is not within the scope of this article to dwell particularly upon life, either vegetable or animal; but it may be remarked here, that life could not have existed on our planet but for light, solar heat, and actinism. How could the molecular vibrations of interstellar ether produce the eye? How could light make the cornea, the crystalline lens, the sclerotic coat, the choroid with its black lining, the iris with its double set of muscles, and its variable opening?

VOL. XXXII., NO 3.—9.

10. The heat evolved by the condensation of the cosmic vapor affects different substances very variously. As the process of cooling goes on, some of them solidify, others liquefy, still others continue in a state of vapor, while there is a multifarious passing to and fro on the part of some substances from one to another of these states. For instance, the oxygen and nitrogen of our atmosphere are mixed, but not chemically combined. They form an upper sea of about one hundred to one hundred and ten miles in height. If they should combine, universal death would ensue. If they should liquefy or solidify, it would be equally disastrous. Yet oxygen forms about one-half of the solid crust of the globe; nitrogen appears in various nitrates in the plants, in the lean flesh of animals; but there *chances* to be such a supply of these that the overplus constitutes an atmosphere. The oxygen is diluted with about four times its amount of nitrogen. Without this dilution our bodies would consume, and unextinguishable conflagrations would sweep the earth. But dilution implies that one of the ingredients, as here the nitrogen, should lack certain properties possessed by the other. Thus the nitrogen will enter a blast furnace in company with oxygen, and reissue unscathed and without having formed a single combination. Is there not design, foresight, selection here?

Now, as to the mass of both these elements of our atmosphere: if there had been much less, their weight would not have sufficiently repressed evaporation; our most humid climates, as at present, would be dry and parched, compared with the excessive dampness that would have arisen. If there had been much more, the evaporation would have been insufficient, deserts would have been the rule, not the exception; and the healthful breeze would have been converted into a tornado.

Again, the amount of each had to be adjusted to its own specific gravity, which brings in the size and weight of the earth. There is, then, a wise adaptation of the specific gravity of oxygen and nitrogen to that of the sixty-three other elements composing the earth, and also of all their amounts. This must have been arranged by a wise Creator, or by Chance in the eternal properties of matter. Evolution cannot have effected it. The evolution of what, pray?

A highly interesting phase of this subject is that of human language and music. These depend entirely upon the presence of an atmosphere, and in their perfection depend upon an atmosphere constituted as ours actually is. In an atmosphere of hydrogen, music would be almost or quite impossible. Everything would have to be reërranged, at all events, and we do not know that music would be possible even then.

Apropos to this, we have lately seen, in the office of a medical gentleman, a human skull remarkably well prepared as an anatomical specimen. One thing particularly struck us: the thick and very hard bone back of the ear had been so ingeniously sawn, as to exhibit *in loco* the delicate little *incus*, *stapes*, *malleolus*, and *annulus*—the anvil, the stirrup, the hammer, the ring—so well known to every student of otology. How is it conceivable that the vibrations of the air should ever produce these four singular and wonderful little media of hearing? No room for evolution here. It was a God, or else Chance, that constructed the ear; and without hearing, what would men have been? What, too, without vocal organs suited to address the ear, and meaningless and useless if the ear were not?

Nor should we omit the consideration of the lower animals, who have need of voice and hearing, as well as man. The Scriptures beautifully represent the Infinite One as hearing the cry of the young ravens for food; and one charm of earth would be lost to man if the feathered warblers had no early song. The air moreover is their home, to which they are so wonderfully adapted. We could almost be willing to rest the theistic argument upon the wing of a kestrel, so charmingly described by the Duke of Argyll in his *Reign of Law*. To take our own view of the case: Oxygen and nitrogen, uncombined in the air; oxygen and nitrogen combined in the wing; total result, a little bird's heart thrilling with ecstasy in the atmosphere, which is its Heaven.

11. Hydrogen is a gas with which oxygen combines more readily. If the two are intermixed, an electric spark or the smallest flame at once brings about a chemical union with the development of an enormous amount of heat; so that if earth

should ever plunge into a hydrogen nebula, it would be wrapped in a sheet of fire, and the aërial heavens would pass away with a great noise. According to the recent speculations, there was a time in the remote past when the two gases were heated so highly that the force of repulsion prevented them from uniting. At our present ordinary temperatures, their affinities are not strong enough to effect a union. But there may well have been some intermediate point at which the two gases would combine.

Why hydrogen should combine so easily with oxygen, when nitrogen will not, must be due to the will of a Creator or else to Chance. The same alternative is presented to us, when it is asked why the product is water, a liquid at ordinary temperatures, and not a gas, like ammonia, formed by hydrogen and nitrogen; or again, why water is a nearly universal solvent; why it is not acrid, like the several compounds of oxygen and nitrogen; how it is converted into vapor at so surprisingly different temperatures, and can thus form clouds and be borne from the ocean to the land, to water and replenish the earth, making vegetable and animal life possible? How, too, has it happened that we have just so much water and no more? Much more would have flooded the continents now, as in the early geological periods (if Dana may be trusted). The upheaving power of the internal heat, it seems, has sufficed to elevate not only the mountains, but the plateaus and the plains. There was then an adaptation between the amount of the water and the inner fires, as there is between the surface of the water and that of the land. Much less water would have left earth arid; but the amounts of the hydrogen and the oxygen not otherwise to be used and hence available for water, must have been weighed out before water was evolved.

Its convertibility into ice at 32° Fahrenheit, or 0° Reamur and Centigrade, and the greater lightness of ice than water, have often been referred to. These came by design or by the luckiest of accidents.

12. It appears to be the common opinion of geologists that in the carboniferous period, the mammalia could not live on the earth owing to the excess of carbonic acid in the atmosphere.

The late formation of carbon, monoxide or di-oxide (CO , CO_2) can be accounted for by supposing that at a very high temperature the repulsive force of heat was too great to admit of combination between carbon and oxygen. In our day a bit of charcoal might be exposed to oxygen for centuries and not oxidize. But there was an intermediate temperature passed through in the process of cooling, at which carbon and oxygen would combine, as has been said of hydrogen under the preceding head.

Both compounds CO and CO_2 are deadly poisons if inhaled in sufficient quantity. But then they are food for the plants. Besides nitrogen vegetation needs little more than water and carbonic acid. Hence the vegetable world stepped in and relieved the air of its poisonous foreign substance. The vegetable then became food for the animal, and the shell fish secreted carbonate of lime which forms so large a part of the earth's crust. Much of this may have occurred before the carboniferous period proper. In that period—if we may believe the speculations of the geologists—immense tree ferns, rushes, and a few other plants, flourished in broad savannahs on the margins of marshes; fronds, bark, trunks of trees, fell, were submerged, were overwhelmed with mud and sand, and losing their oxygen, and much, sometimes nearly all, of their hydrogen, were stowed away as bituminous or anthracite coal. This is certainly an interesting speculation, and may be founded on fact. If a Deity were preparing earth for the abode of the mammalia, and particularly of man, it would be a sagacious measure thus to remove a poison and to turn it into food. The evolutionist may confound his own understanding in this case, being bewildered by the introduction of life, that mysterious potency. As before remarked, it is foreign to our present purpose to discuss the evolution of life from dead matter. It is consonant to that purpose to say that the laws of combination between oxygen and carbon, and the suitability of the compound to enter into a cell, and to develop other cells, as also to destroy animal life, by inhalation, are all older than life; older than everything save God and Chance.

The permanency of the world systems is provided for by methods already noticed. The permanency of the animal king-

dom is secured by its relations to the vegetable realm. When a plant dies, the oxygen of the air is busy reconverting its partially oxydized carbon and hydrogen into carbonic acid and water. These compounds are borne away to living plants for their nutriment. Thus the vegetable system might go on performing its revolutions, with a prodigious amount of carbonic acid in the atmosphere. It has been ordained, however, that a considerable amount of the carbonic acid and water shall pass into animal organisms first, and be exhaled by the aid of ever-busy oxygen. Yet this would be only retarding or hastening the return of those elements to the inorganic world, and need not affect the equilibrium of the general system. But man has been burning fuel and light-producing substances for several thousand years, and for the past century has been using the coal deposits of an earlier geologic period. If the abstraction of the coal from the surcharged atmosphere was necessary to enable the mammalia to breathe the air, and we return it to the atmosphere by household fires, factories, mills, and locomotives, shall we not endanger the purity of the atmosphere? This is partly a quantitative question. As to the qualitative aspect, the tendency must be toward the deterioration of our atmosphere unless vegetation be stimulated so as again to withdraw the poisonous element. Now this may be accomplished by a general increase of the world's population, and the cultivation of larger areas of earth's surface. So well has the All-wise Creator,—or else the blind god—adjusted matters for us.

It is interesting to note that a very small amount of carbonic acid is always in the air; less than one per cent., yet absolutely necessary to the continued existence of the vegetable kingdom. We have purposely omitted any mention of the ammonia ($H_3 N$), also in minute quantities diffused throughout the atmosphere. This is an essential ingredient of the protein compounds, or—as the phrase goes,—of protoplasm, the foundation of those carbon compounds. Why nitrogen should have had an affinity for hydrogen, no man can say. If it had not had it, there could have been no protoplasm, no cereals, no mammals certainly, and no evolution of the human race.

13. The weight of the earth.

Whewell, M'Cosh, and others, have remarked upon the adjustment of the weight of our globe to its vegetable productions. Any great increase of its attractive force would have broken down plants that now stand erect. In drooping flowers we find the pistil longer than the stamens, so that the pollen *falls* upon the stigma of the pistil and fecundates it. An instance which has often occurred to us, is that of our common grains, in which the stalk would be too weak to hold up the heads except for two provisions: 1st, the stalk is tubular, so as to get the greatest rigidity out of the material employed; 2d, it is stiffened by silex extorted from the soil in nature's laboratory. If the earth were much smaller or its specific gravity less, these provisions would have been unnecessary. There is here then a relation between the mass of the earth and the humblest stalk of grain.

The birds also have their adaptations to the mass of the earth, to the mass of the atmosphere, and to the specific gravities of both. The little humming bird, that animated gem of our Western continent, flitting about our honeysuckles, and poising himself at the mouth of their delicate cups, is a marvel of calculation. The contriver of his tiny body and wings must have known somewhat of dynamics. As the Duke of Argyll has pointed out, how wonderfully this wee creature succeeds in solving his problem of the equilibrium of forces! To keep poised mid-air is about the hardest thing a bird attempts to do. And then his colors, so exquisite singly, and so exquisitely blended!—linking him with the sun, whose light his plumage analyses, and flashes back to us in gorgeous tints. Man, too, is of due size and weight. A few overgrown monstrosities exemplify the inconvenience of any great increase; and dwarfs, likewise, of diminution. Prof. J. R. Young in his *Analytical Mechanics* says: "We accordingly find men of enormous magnitude, as O'Brien, the celebrated Irish Giant, to be so weak that they are scarcely able to walk about." Writers on Mechanics all teach that there is a limit to the strength of materials.

Again, on the surface of a globe as heavy as the sun, a man of ordinary size here, say 150 lbs., would weigh 4,200; a horse of 1,000 lbs., 28,000.

Man is adapted, then, to the weight and size of our globe, and to the size and strength of other animals. Whence this adjustment of men (and animals too) to the weight and distance of the molten masses of earth's interior? Could impersonal evolution have known the weight and the distance? It would be a weak evasion of this to say that only the fittest survive. Have men ever existed in any large numbers, of a size materially different from what we see now? There is no proof of such a vagary. The fittest have not survived the less fit. There have been no less fit to be survived.

Besides the mass of the earth, let us notice the length of our day, which is manifestly adapted to animals of various kinds. The moon keeps the same face always toward the earth, excepting of course the small changes due to libration. Why might not the earth have kept the same face always presented to the sun? Or have had a day of ten hours like Jupiter and Saturn, or of three or six months? This depended on laws and collocations antedating evolution. Why was our orbit an ellipse of so small eccentricity as to be scarcely distinguishable from a circle? How came its axis to be inclined to the plane of its orbit, thus giving us the advantages of the seasons? Why was it not parallel to that plane? But we forbear.

14. The most wonderful thing of all has not yet been touched. In the original, or, if you please, eternal laws, potencies, and adjustments, there must have been an intelligent or unintelligent arrangement for the generation of human thought. The audacity of Materialists just here has no bounds. It is better for the cause of truth, however, that they should come out boldly and say what they believe. An eminent American physiologist, for instance, says that it is not proper to call the brain the organ of the mind, because the brain produces the mind. A frequent mode of statement is that the brain *secretes* thought, as the liver does bile. Then it follows that man is a mere machine, wholly irresponsible for his actions; and that the direst fatalism is the only true philosophy. Indeed, Mr. Huxley says he would as lief be wound up every morning like a watch or a clock as any

other way, if he were only wound up so as to run right during the day. But as to rightness of running, it must be observed that, on materialistic principles, there is no moral right in the universe; again, that men will run as they are wound up to run, regardless of any consideration of any sort of rightness, and that robbers, murderers, and debauchees desire no more comfortable doctrine.

Let us look at the brain and see what its elements are, and how they are put together. The anatomists, the chemists, and the microscopists, have examined the brain with the most commendable care. As far back as 1812, Vauquelin made a quantitative analysis, as follows: Albumen 7 per cent.; cerebral fat, viz., stearine 4.53, elaine 0.70, *i. e.*, together 5.23; phosphorus 1.50; osmazome 1.12; acids, salts, sulphur, 5.15; water 80. In all, 100. The most recent analyses differ very little from this.

In 1835, M. John analysed the gray and the white matter separately, with this result: Of the white substance, in 100 parts: water 73, albumen 9.9, white fatty matter 13.9, red do. 0.9; osmazome, lactic acid, and salts, 1; earthy phosphates 1.3. Total, 100.

Gray substance: water 85; albumen 7.5; white fatty matter 1; red do. 3.7; osmazome, etc., 1.4; earthy phosphates 1.2. Total, 99.8.

His analysis of the whole brain gave the items, in the same order, thus: 77, 9.6, 7.2, 3.1, 2, 1.1. This brain was that of an insane patient.

Gray's Anatomy gives from Lassaigne almost the same: White substance: water 73; albuminous matter 9.9; colorless fat 13.9; red do. 0.9; osmazome and lactates 1; phosphates 1.3. Total, 100.

Gray substance: 85.2, 7.5, 1, 3.7, 1.4, 1.2. Total, 100.

Gray succinctly describes the brain as albumen floating in water.

Now as to the structure of the organ. We may omit the cerebellum, which no one seems to regard as connected with thought. The cerebrum constitutes much the largest part of the brain. The outer coat, which is quite a thin one, is of gray matter; and

is called the cortical layer, vesicular neurine, the hemispherical ganglion. Enveloped by this is the white matter of tubular formation, the tubes being so small (from $\frac{1}{2000}$ to $\frac{1}{4000}$ inches in diameter) as to require a microscope of 300 magnifying power. Ehrenberg used a power of 800, but that may have been on the sympathetic nerve. Considerable masses of gray matter, however, are found in the interior parts of the white portion, as also in the medulla.

If the brain thinks, what part of it does the thinking? The tubular structure indicates the conveyance of something, whatever it may be. This is Solly's view, and appears to be the general impression. Whether thoughts of great magnitude can pass freely through such extremely delicate tubes, we leave to others to determine.

Let us go then to the gray, cortical layer. It is very hard to believe that water ever thinks: water, which is more abundant in the gray than the white matter, surprising as this fact is. It is also very hard to believe that fat thinks, whether it be colorless or red. Stearine, margarine, and oleine, are familiar names to the chemist, and occur in a remarkably curious series of the hydro-carbons, but can hardly be classed among the thought-producers, although useful where light and heat are desired.

The Materialists have pitched upon the phosphates as the true fountain of thought; the phosphates of the gray, cortical layer—or if you please, the sevenfold cortical layer. "No phosphorus, no thought," is their apothegm. Phosphorus may be without Thought, since there is a large amount of phosphorus in our bones, which are never said to think. But Thought cannot be without phosphorus. Proof: Solly, a staunch Immaterialist by the way, gives a case of a lean, consumptive-looking preacher, who taught school all the week and preached twice or may-be thrice on Sunday. Every Sunday night his urine was highly charged and colored with tri-phosphates. On Monday this abnormal condition began to diminish, and by Tuesday or Wednesday the patient was himself again. The prescription was, Rest and Recreation.

This is a sample fact. Every thought, feeling, or volition, is

accompanied or followed by the disorganisation of particles of the brain. This may be true; but the Materialists hold that some motion of the molecules of the brain is thought, feeling, or volition. Let us then go down into a vesicle of the gray matter. It is a minute sack—round, oval, angular, pyramidal, or otherwise in form; a thin membrane enclosing little granules, and they again surrounding a transparent nucleus or nucleolus. Eureka! It is the spinning, dancing, whirling, or indescribable gyrating of the minute particles of phosphorus with, over, under, around, and beside each other or minute particles of other elements, that produced the pathos of King Lear over his lost Cordelia; the hesitation, the murderous resolve, and the guilty terrors of Macbeth; the frenzy of Othello, and the perplexed speculations of the sorely distraught though sane Hamlet, in the brain of William Shakespeare! Mayhap the caudate vesicles—for such there are—produced Shallow, and honest Bottom, and Caliban; even though Man is not now externally a caudate Mammal. This potency of circular, elliptical, spiriform, or ineffable gyration of thoughts, of emotion, of will, of fear, sorrow, mirth, passion, or ecstasy, must have existed in phosphorus from all eternity. Again, we say, if the Almighty had striven to set before Himself a problem of the uttermost intricacy, we cannot conceive how He could have surpassed this. Indeed, it appears to us wholly insoluble even by Divine wisdom and power. But the blind god, Chance, has no difficulty with it. *He* solves it without intending to do it; without trying to do it, or knowing that he has done it.

The Theist adores the celestial Wisdom that planned the mind of our great dramatist, and learns somewhat of the depth of meaning in the inspired saying that Man was made in the image of God; while the absurdity of the materialistic view surely passes all bounds.

15. There is something exalted in a true Christian Theism. The first of all things was not matter, but mind; not a chaos of atoms, but a glorious spirit; one, self-conscious, and, beyond expression, strong and wise and good. He is the Creator of matter, and of finite mind; Himself before the universe, and greater

than the universe, all the beauty and all the grandeur of which are but shadows of the uncreated beauty and grandeur that are in Him. When the Hebrew sage inquired by what name he should designate Him, He answered, "I am He who IS; I AM the ever-existent; tell them I AM hath sent you." All other being flows from His being. But when He lifteth up His hand to Heaven and sweareth by Himself, He saith, "I LIVE, saith Jehovah of Hosts." All other life floweth from His life. To the devout believer, not only earth, but the heavens also become a temple. Earth is the Holy Place thereof; and the crimson blue and golden sky of evening, the curtain separating the Holy Place from the Holy of Holies. To him, too, when night has drawn this curtain aside, the pearly light of the Galaxy seems a Shekinah over the Mercy Seat, a symbol of the presence of Deity in the Most Holy Place.

But vast as this spacious temple is, will God indeed dwell therein? Behold the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain Him. Jehovah hath said that he would dwell in the thick darkness. So it was before Matter and Light were. So it is even now, although this island-universe has arisen out of the shoreless gulf of Night, whose waters still enfold it on every side. So it shall be, world without end; for the infinite spaces that environ Matter and the Day, will forever be the abode of the Eternal, as they have been in the ages past.

Here, then, is a Being that we can worship now and evermore. Not only now, but evermore. For there is not a point in space so distant but God is there and also beyond; not a moment in time past when he did not exist, and also before it; and not a moment in time to come, when he shall not be, and also continue to be thereafter. So there is no height of wisdom, truth, and grace, no depth of condescension, pity, and love, that it hath ever entered, or can ever enter, into the heart of man to conceive, but the same and yet greater heights and depths are in God. Archangels veil their faces at the view of his majesty and his excellency, and cry one to another, "He is holy! Heaven and earth are full of his glory." Yet materialism would blot out this beauty of holiness from the universe.

Let us examine *its* temple. Let us force an entrance into its penetralia, for we cannot say its most holy place. What shall we say of the deity hidden behind the foul curtain? hidden there though his flamens deny that he is there! Let us drag forth to the light, the blind, idiotic, howling god whom his own servants despise. IT, the author of this magnificent cosmos! IT, the father of our spirits!

Yet between these two we must choose. There is no other alternative: we must take the Lord our God, or Chance.

L. G. BARBOUR.

ARTICLE VII.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1881.

This Assembly, it is surmised, has left an extremely pleasant impression upon the minds of its members. The little "Mountain City" of Staunton, Va., as its inhabitants love to call it, is at all times a pleasant place to visit. Situated in the middle of the "Great Valley," midway between the Blue Ridge and North Mountain, it presents the tourist, in its bold and rounded hills, endless undulating surface, and distant but majestic mountain-ramparts, a landscape to whose perfect beauty nothing is lacking, except the contrast of the level azure of a Swiss lake. As though to greet the great convocation with a cheerful welcome, the country clothed itself in all the glory of summer verdure, combining the greenness of the North of England with the brilliancy of an Italian sky. Nor were the good people behind their country, in the hospitable reception extended to the visitors. The doors of the beautiful homes of all denominations were thrown open without distinction. All that a cordial, but unpretending, hospitality could do, was combined with mountain air, and propitious weather, to make the season of the Assembly's sittings enjoyable.

A representation absolutely full would have given one hundred

and forty-eight commissioners. Of these there were present on the first day one hundred and sixteen; and during the whole sessions, one hundred and thirty. Precisely at 11 a. m. of May 19th, the Moderator, Dr. Thos. A. Hoyt, of Nashville, ascended the pulpit. A great audience filled the spacious and commanding church. The text of the opening sermon was Gal. i. 6 and 7, and its subject was the duty of preaching only that system of truth known as the "doctrines of grace," as the only one revealed in the gospel. This glorious system was unfolded, in constant contrast (as the text suggested) with the other schemes of religion erroneously deduced from the gospel. The "doctrines of grace" exhibit their supreme excellence in these four respects:

I. In that they alone do full honor to the Holy Scriptures, asserting their full inspiration in consistency with the personality of their writers; and thus claiming for them supreme and absolute authority; while admitting the beautiful adaptation of their humanity to the human soul. The "doctrines of grace" also recognise the distinction between natural and revealed religion, and between the general contents of Scripture, all of which are authoritative, and the special truths of redemption; while they alone recognise all the declarations of the word, and successfully combine them into a compact and logical system.

II. The "doctrines of grace" cohere fully with the revelation God has made of his own essence and personality. They convert the mystery of his Trinity in Unity from an abstraction into a glorious practical truth, by connecting man's redemption essentially with the several persons and their relations and functions. And while all lower theories of redemption must needs mutilate God in some of his perfections in order to permit man's escape from his doom, the gospel plan not only permits, but requires, the highest exercise of all the attributes which make up God's infinite essence.

III. The "doctrines of grace" portray our fallen nature in colors exactly conformable to human history, and the convictions of man's guilty conscience. And they propose to deal with the fallen soul in the way most conducive to its true sanctification and salvation, by enforcing the holy law, in all its extent, as the

rule of the Christian's living; while they quicken into action the noblest motives of love and gratitude, by bestowing an unbought justification.

Thus, IV. These doctrines embody the only salvation suited to man's wants, and worthy of God's perfections. It is a salvation righteous, holy, honorable to God, which yet bestows on sinners an assured, ineffable, rational, and everlasting blessedness. Hence the high and holy duty, enforced as much from the tremendous necessities of lost souls as from the rights of Jehovah, to know no other gospel than this, and to preach it always and everywhere.

The preacher, evidently furnished with the advantages of a thorough preparation, and untrammelled by notes, delivered this great body of vital truth in language elevated, classic, and perspicuous, supporting his words by an utterance and action of graceful dignity. As he expanded side after side of the glories of the true gospel, the hearer's soul was raised higher and higher towards the level of the angelic anthem: "Glory to God in the highest; and on earth peace, good-will to men!" Our Redeemer-God was brought near in his full-orbed glory; his severer attributes harmonised, but undimmed, by his benevolence and mercy. Man fallen was placed in the dust and ashes of humility. Man redeemed was lifted to a hope and bliss as honorable to God, the giver, as precious to the receiver. "Mercy and truth met together: righteousness and peace kissed each other."

The new Assembly then proceeded to organise itself by the unanimous election of Dr. Robt. P. Faris, of St. Louis, Mo., as Moderator, an honor well earned, and skilfully and worthily borne, and of the Rev. Geo. A. Trenholm, of South Carolina, as Temporary Clerk.

The body quickly gave an earnest of its purpose of work, by resolving to proceed at once, in the afternoon, to hear the reports of the Executive Committees. These exhibited advancement, except in that work of fundamental importance, Home Missions. It is safe to take the money given by the churches to these evangelical agencies as an index of the interest and prayer expended on them. Instead of the \$10,000 which the previous

Assembly found to be the least measure of the urgent wants of the Home Missions' work, and which it asked the churches to bestow, the Committee receive for this cause \$18,526. If the contribution to the kindred work of the Evangelists' fund, \$10,958, to the Invalid fund, \$10,248, and the sum of about \$4,000 supposed to be spent in Home Mission work by Presbyteries not in connexion, be added, we get, as the aggregate devoted in our Church to home work and charities . . . \$43,732

The gifts to Foreign Missions were	59,215
An encouraging increase of \$11,000.	
The gifts to the Publication Committee	8,009
The gifts to candidates for the ministry	10,335
The gifts to the Colored Institute	2,000
And those to colored evangelists	597

Thus the total of these contributions was \$123,888

This is less than an average of one dollar from each of our reported communicants.

For some years past, the General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church, which also meets by precedent on the third Thursday of May, has sent to ours a simple greeting in the form of a telegram. To this our Assembly has usually responded in the same terms. On the second day of the recent sessions, Dr. Adger, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Correspondence, proposed that our Assembly should take the initiative, by sending, without delay, the usual message. This, to his surprise, evoked one of the most animated debates of the session. No opposition seemed to be made to the intercourse itself, while kept within the bounds of a simple recognition and expression of good wishes. But it was argued that the injuries and detractions put upon Southern Presbyterians by that Assembly, and never yet withdrawn or repaired, made it improper for us to take the initiative in such messages. Our Commissioners to the Baltimore Conference in 1874, sustained by our Assemblies, had declared that the withdrawal of false accusations was an absolute prerequisite to the resumption of any fraternal relations. But the action proposed to-day was a departure from that righteous and

self-respecting resolution. Moreover, it would be misunderstood as indicating a purpose in us, of which it is presumed no Southern Presbyterian could for a moment dream, to retreat from that position, and to approach a dishonorable and deceitful reunion made at the expense of truth and our own good name. It was urged that the separate independence of the Southern Church was a great boon, mercifully bestowed on her by God at an opportune time; when that laxity of discipline and doctrine now so prevalent, began to invade the Presbyterian Church of the North and of Scotland. This independence, then, is not to be regarded as an expression of our pique or revenge; but as a holy trust, in a solemn and unexpected way bestowed on us by the divine Head of the Church, as a necessary bulwark for his vital truth among us. Its jealous maintenance by us, therefore, is not to be treated as a prompting of ill-temper; for this is an odious and slanderous travesty of the facts. The line of action hitherto pursued by our Church is, rather, the simple performance of a solemn duty to God and his Church and truth. And the slightest tendency towards the betrayal of this independence is to be deprecated.

It was replied by the other side: That our Assemblies had never, on account of the unatoned injuries of the other Church refused all official intercourse with it; but from the first had responded to such civilities as might pass between us and any other denomination; that the ground taken in 1870, when an exchange of delegates was asked, was, that this especial mark of community of church-order and affection could never be extended, until false accusations against us were withdrawn; that the only question here raised, whether our Assembly shall send the first telegram, instead of answering theirs, is really a very trivial one, having no significance except that which would be given it by a refusal under existing circumstances; that our Church's separate independence was indeed a priceless trust bestowed on her at an opportune time (as the protestants have well said); and that we and they are altogether at one in not tolerating the slightest thought of its surrender. Our Church stands now where she has always stood; we take no step forwards, and none backwards.

The latter views prevailed, and the Assembly authorised the Committee on Foreign Correspondence to send the usual formal greeting to the Northern Assembly sitting in Buffalo, N. Y., only thirteen dissenting. In due time, the usual response came from the other body; and so the matter ended. But Dr. Mullally, of Lexington Presbytery, and a few others, entered their protest, stating in substance the above arguments; to which the Assembly replied with the views advanced by the majority.

The transaction for which this Assembly will probably be most remembered, was the final disposition made of the two counter-reports on "Retrenchment and Reform" in the Assembly's Committees. On the third day, these were taken up; and the Rev. A. C. Hopkins from Winchester Presbytery, chairman of the Committee, was heard on this and a subsequent day, at great length, in defence of the majority report. The Rev. S. T. Martin, the author of the minority report, also spoke in defence of his suggestions in an excellent spirit, and with great ingenuity and force. That he had prejudiced the success of the few practical amendments in our methods, which he really urged, by taking too wide a range of discussion, and by asserting other doctrines and changes which the great body of the Church dread as revolutionary—this had now become obvious to the amiable speaker, as it had all along been obvious to his friends. He now attempted to parry this adverse effect, by pleading: That when called by the Assembly to lay his whole mind before the churches for their discussion, he had but acted conscientiously, in speaking out the whole system of thought on our church-work, which honestly commended itself to his judgment. But now, when he was come to proposing amendments in that work for the Church's adoption, he should limit himself to those few changes which were generally obvious and confessedly feasible. And he claimed that members ought now to weigh each of these proposals on its own merits, and unprejudiced by other unpopular speculations (as others might deem them) in which he might be nearly singular. This claim, evidently, was no more than just. But it was equally evident, that members were unable to rise to the dispassionate level of this equity; and that the hearing of Mr. Martin

was prejudiced by the previous opposition to his more extreme views, even when he urged his most reasonable proposals.

These, he now limited to two: 1. As to aiding education for the ministry, he proposed that an Assembly's Committee of Education should be continued, but that it should perform its brief duties without a paid secretary. These duties should be only to receive remittances from the stronger presbyteries and distribute them among the candidates of the poorer and weaker. As for the rest, the selection of candidates suitable to be aided, and the raising of money to aid them, should be left, where the Constitution places it, with each presbytery. But the Assembly should advise presbyteries which have, for the time, no candidates, and those which have wealth, to contribute to the weak presbyteries, through the Assembly's Committee.

2. As to the work of Evangelism and Home Missions: that there shall be, as now, a Committee and Secretary of Home Missions. But each presbytery shall collect its own funds, and manage its own Evangelistic and Home Missions' work. The Assembly, however, shall enjoin all the older and stronger presbyteries to send to the Central Committee a given *quota* of all their collections for this work (say one-tenth, or one-fifth), that this agency may have abundant means to aid and push the work of church-extension and missions in the weaker and the missionary presbyteries.

The chairman, Mr. Hopkins, on the contrary, moved the Assembly to resolve, that the present system was substantially perfect, and needed no modification, except in slight details of exact responsibility. After long debate, resumed for several days, the Assembly finally voted under the previous question against all amendments by a great majority—only eight adhering to Mr. Martin.

The current discussion on this matter has been made so familiar to Presbyterians through their newspapers, that it will not be again detailed here. Another great question was unavoidably mingled in this discussion, by the Report of Dr. Girardeau's Committee on the Diaconate, also made, by order of a previous Assembly, on the morning of this third day. The whole contents

of that thorough Report will not be stated here; the readers of the REVIEW have already seen the substance of it in the articles of Dr. Girardeau, in our January and April numbers. Of course, all in the Assembly were ready to admit that the deacon is a scriptural officer; that every fully organised congregation should have deacons; that his office is distinguished from the presbyter's by its functions, which are, not spiritual teaching and rule, but collection and distribution of the church's oblation. But the positions of Dr. G.'s Committee excited the opposition of many, on these following points (which are the points especially involved in the discussion on "Retrenchment and Reform"): The Committee held that, in the fully organised Church, the distinct separation between presbyterial and diaconal functions was obligatory and proper, not indeed for the true being, but for the best being, health, and ulterior safety of the Church. Many others held, that presbyters are also *ex officio* deacons, and may always assume, in addition to their proper teaching and ruling functions, diaconal functions, if convenience and policy seem to dictate it. But especially, the Committee held that diaconal functions extend beyond the concerns of a single congregation, when many congregations are acting concurrently in matters of oblation and distribution; even as the local presbyter assumes rule over the Church at large, when he sits in a superior court. But the opponents of the Committee held that the functions of the diaconate can never extend beyond the local concerns of a particular congregation. Hence it follows, that when many congregations, or the whole Church, engage jointly in oblation and distribution, not a deacon, but a minister, shall perform this general diaconal work. Of course, the doctrine of the Committee contains the corollary, that these treasuryships and distributions also should be, like the congregational, in diaconal hands, where the Church is fully and correctly organised. Then, qualifications and functions will be properly connected. Presbyters, supposed to be qualified and called of God to spiritual functions, will not be diverted and perverted from their proper duties to financial affairs—for which they are notoriously often disqualified. Financial affairs will be put into the hands of men not called of God

to the higher and heterogeneous work of preaching or ruling, but specially selected for their experience in handling money. This is the point of connexion between Dr. Girardeau's Report and the views of the minority on Reform; for one of the strong points of the latter had been, that the treasuryships of the Assembly's Committees ought to be committed to deacons.

The Assembly, moved by pressure of business and an evident distaste for the discussion, resolved formally to postpone the consideration of the Diaconate to next year; but none the less, the argument on these points was unavoidably mingled with that on Mr. Martin's resolutions. Dr. Girardeau, finding his positions assailed by high authority, with the most technical weapons of logic, deemed it necessary to defend them technically, as well as popularly and scripturally, in his Report. He did both with eminent success. But as his written argument will be given to the Church, and as we now only attempt a brief review of the Assembly's own debates, we shall not follow Drs. Lefevre and Girardeau in their formal printed arguments. The opponents of the Report placed much stress on the fact that the apostles continued to perform diaconal functions, (as Paul, Rom. xv. 25, 26,) after the appointment of deacons in Acts vi. A venerable member amused the house by saying, that Judas, an Apostle, was treasurer of the apostolic family by the Saviour's own appointment, and denominating him "St. Judas," he asked why he was not as well entitled at that time to the prænomen as St. Matthew? If we ascribe to this citation of Judas's treasurership the value to which alone it was entitled, that of a pleasant jest, then its sufficient repartee would be in saying, that this jumbling of spiritual and diaconal functions turned out wretchedly; as the money was stolen, and the officer disgraced. So that the example weighs on Dr. Girardeau's side. But if the instance be advanced as a serious argument from precedent, then the answer will be, that Judas, when treasurer of the Saviour's family, *was not an apostle*, but only an apostle-elect. He was only in training for that high office.

In arguing from the example of Paul, that the minister's office includes the right to diaconal functions in the settled state of the

Church, it was strangely forgotten that the apostles were purely extraordinary officers of the Church; they could not have any successors. The very reason for the temporary existence of such extraordinary offices was, that the frame of the new dispensation might be by them instituted when as yet it was not. From this simple fact follow two consequences. One is, that these founding officers must, initially, exercise all the organic functions of all necessary church officers. The other is, that when they had once established the full organism, no other officers could regularly claim to do the same from their example. Thus, in order that there might be a regular order of priests in the Church under the dispensation of Sinai, Moses, the great Prophet, must for the nonce exercise the priest's office in consecrating Aaron and his sons. But after Aaron and his sons were consecrated, Moses never presumed to sacrifice again. Nor did David. And when King Saul dared to imitate the argument of our brethren, by engrossing the inferior office of priest, he was cursed of God for the intrusion. I. Sam. xiii. 8-14.

Again, when it is argued that the presbyterial office is still inclusive of the diaconal, there is a strange oblivion of the third chapter of I. Tim. There, the Apostle is, plainly, ordering the frame of the Church for post-apostolic times. He provides for equipping the Church with two distinct orders of officers, elders and deacons. As the qualifications are distinct, so the functions. There is no more evidence here, that in a fully developed Church an elder may usurp diaconal functions because he has been made an elder, than that a deacon may usurp presbyterial functions because he has been made a deacon. The result of a scriptural view is then: that in a forming state of the given church, the officers who are properly commissioned to initiate the organisation, must for the time combine in themselves their own and the lower functions. But *the very object of their instituting the lower organs is*, that in due time the functions may be separated, and the anomalous mingling may cease; that the church may have its orderly and safe ulterior growth. Thus, an evangelist, preaching the gospel *in partibus infidelium*, must, at first, exercise the function of examining and admitting adult converts as full members

in the visible Church. Strictly, *this is a sessional*, not a *ministerial* function. But there cannot be a session until after there is a membership; so that the evangelist is obliged to do it. But now, does it follow that every pastor, who has a session, may properly usurp this sessional function? By no means. There is not an intelligent session in the land which would tolerate such systematic intrusions.

In the next place, that Christ and the Apostles designed diaconal officers not only for the local, but the combined functions of oblation and distribution of larger parts of the Church—this follows naturally from the truths conceded to us. The Apostles did institute the diaconal office. They did assign especially to them the official management of oblation and distribution. They did assign to the presbyters the distinct functions of spiritual teaching and rule. They did command the churches to exercise the “grace of giving” statedly. And it is admitted that whenever a given congregation, as a body, exercised this grace, the receiving and distribution went naturally into the deacons’ official hands. But now, both Scripture and Providence call the many congregations to joint exercises of this grace of giving. Why does it not follow, that the receiving and distribution should still fall into diaconal hands, representative of the joint congregations? How does the circumstance that many congregations, instead of one, are now exercising this grace, make it right to break across the distinction of offices, which was so proper in the single congregation, and to jumble functions which were there so properly separated?

But this is not a human inference. • The New Testament unquestionably gives instances of general deacons, other than the twelve, who managed this duty of oblation and distribution, not for one church, but for many. A member did, indeed, attempt during this debate to argue from II. Corinthians, viii. 18–23, that a preacher of the word was intrusted with the diaconal function as soon as the oblation was a general one of many churches; but his argument was a mere begging of the question. He *assumed* that this “brother . . . chosen of the churches to travel with” Paul and Titus, “with this grace,” was a preacher. This was

the very point he should have *proved*. But no man can prove it. On the contrary, it is obvious that this "brother" was a general deacon. Not a single trait or title of evangelistic or preaching office is given him by Paul. He is "chosen of the churches" for the express purpose of "travelling with *this grace*;" that is to say, to collect and disburse the general oblations. He is not a presbyter, but (v. 23) a "messenger" of the churches (a commissioner, ἀπόστολος.) The use of this title catches our brethren in the jaws of this sharp dilemma: either they must hold with us that ἀπόστολος is here used of these general deacons in the lower and modified sense of financial commissioners of the churches; or else they must open wide the door to the prelatial argument, *by admitting many Apostles* (in the full sense) besides and after the Twelve. The Twelve are always "Apostles of Christ"; these general deacons are "apostles (commissioners) of the churches." We have another example in Epaphroditus, Philippians ii. 25, and iv. 18, unquestionably a deacon of that church, and called their "apostle" and λειτουργός to Paul's necessities. We also have probable cases in the Romans Andronicus and Junia (or Junius), Romans xvi. 7. Thus, the fact that this alms-receiver-general for the churches enjoyed "a praise throughout all the churches," instead of proving that he must have been a noted preacher, only shows how much better the primitive churches understood and honored the general deacon than the Christians of our day do.

The formal remission of the discussion of Dr. Girardeau's Report to a future Assembly, produced one result, which it would be discourteous to charge as premeditated. His powerful voice was silenced in this debate, inasmuch as he was not a regular member of the Assembly. Hence but little of the truth was heard on his side, which, if advanced with clearness, would have given a very different aspect to the debate.

It would be exceedingly erroneous to suppose that the vote of almost the whole Assembly against a minority of eight, is an index and measure of the unanimity of our Church in the position that our methods of committee action need and admit no amendment. Many side influences concurred particularly against

Mr. Martin and his propositions at this time. The discussion of desirable betterments is by no means ended, as time will show. This was made perfectly obvious to the observer, by such facts as these: that a part of Mr. Martin's principles were and are openly advocated by many men of the widest experience and influence; that after the vote, very many who voted with the majority were heard to admit that *there is room for amendments*, and that they should and must be introduced, in due time, and each upon its own merits.

Dr. Adger, for instance, announced himself, not as a revolutionist, but as one who desired to *conserve* and *improve*. He disclaimed all sympathy with the cry for *retrenchment*—he wanted more liberal expenditures. Our Church can give and ought to give every year one million of dollars. His position was equally removed from that of the rash innovator and from the arrogant and fulsome assumption that all our present methods are too near perfection to be amended. Against adopting that egotistical position, there rises in protest these great, solemn, and sad facts: that by present methods we only succeed in drawing from all our churches \$123,000 for all the Lord's work (outside of pastoral and church support), which is less than one dollar for each member; and that our present agencies yearly afflict our hearts with the complaint that half our congregations neglect all coöperation! Is this so satisfactory? Is this to remain our best attainment? And whereas all criticism has been deprecated, as tending to destroy confidence and utterly cripple existing agencies, it turns out that this year of sharp criticism has shown a considerable, though still an inadequate progress! No; free discussion is the healthy atmosphere of a free Church. The surest way to arrest effort and paralyse confidence is to choke down the honest questionings of Presbyterians by a species of bureaucratic dictation, and to leave an angry mistrust brooding in silence. But our churches cannot be so dealt with; they will think and speak independently.

Power conferred on our agencies is not a subject of dread. Power is efficiency. Power is life. Power is work. But the thing always to be watched is combination, or centralisation of

power. Our present methods, notwithstanding all the safeguards of our former wisdom, suggest grounds of caution in these three particulars: *First*, That they transfer so much of the Church's home-work (education, home missions, &c.) to the Assembly. It is the Assembly's agencies which must do everything. True, they are, by their rules, all required to act in concert with the presbyteries; yet they are the Assembly's agencies; to the Assembly they are responsible; from it they derive their existence; to the extension of its prerogatives they instinctively lend all their practical weight. Hence, the Assembly has rolled over upon it too many of the functions which the Constitution assigns to Presbyteries. There is too much blood in the head, and not enough in the members. Financial and executive work, which should be left to its proper local agencies, when thus drawn into the Assembly, disqualifies this supreme court for its higher and more spiritual duties of conserving the doctrinal and moral purity and spiritual life of the Church. So preoccupied is the Assembly with these engrossments of executive detail, that it has no time nor taste for other questions touching the very life of the souls of its people. But if our system hinders the efficiency of the Assembly, it likewise damages all self-development in our lower courts. The work of the Presbyteries being assumed by the Assembly, those bodies will not and cannot be expected to take its responsibility on them. Why need the Presbytery bestir itself to raise funds for its candidates or its own Domestic Missions, when there is a great central Committee of the Assembly anxious to do all that for the Presbyteries which coöperate, and ready to its power and almost beyond its power to meet every call properly made upon it?

But *secondly*, the fellow-feeling natural to these executive agencies, as children of a common mother, results in a combination of influence for each other and to resist criticism. It is not meant to charge the conscious formation of any corrupt "ring-power." The honorable disclaimers of secretaries and committee-men are fully allowed, when they declare that they have made no overt compact to defend each other. Doubtless this is perfectly true; but the tendency to combination is uncalculated and

unconscious ; and therefore the more a subject of solicitude. It is not the fault of the men—they are good men and true, honorable and incapable of calculated usurpations ; it is the fault of the system. Yes, you have an established system of central agencies, all which have a common life, and when you touch one of them, all of them feel and resent it. What is there in the nature of the case to make it certain that your education work, for example, is arranged in the best possible way ? And yet if it is proposed to make any changes therein, your Secretary of Foreign Missions and every other Secretary will be found quick to come forward in defence of the established system.

But *thirdly*, while power is good, and while our *powers* might be acknowledged to be all right in themselves considered, surely it cannot be maintained that it is well to concentrate so many of them in one corner of the Church. Last year at Charleston a strong effort was made to separate two of them ; but to every observant eye, there was a rallying of the forces which effectually prevented it. Now, do you imagine that the Church is satisfied or going to be satisfied about this ? Let this Assembly vote that *all shall remain as it is*, and will that prevent the Church from repeating, in due time, her dissatisfaction with this concentration of so much power in so few hands or in one corner of our territory ?

The history of the discussion against "Boards" in the old Assembly (at Rochester, in 1860, and previously,) might be instructive to us now. All of us admit that the old Board system was vicious ; even unconstitutional. Yet all amendment was resisted, when urged by Dr. Thornwell and others, by just such arguments as we hear to-day, against admitting even the smaller modifications prompted by the lights of experience. Dr. Thornwell was voted down, as we shall be to-day, by a very large majority. But only a few years elapsed, when lo ! the Northern Church adopted his very principles. The old Boards of one hundred members were swept away and Executive Committees of fifteen put into their places, but wearing still the name of *Boards*. The vanquished became the victors. It may be so, to some extent again. For our present methods still retain some of the evils which Dr.

Thornwell then objected against the old ones: too much tendency to centralisation; the atrophy, through disuse, of those smaller limbs of the spiritual body, the lower courts; and the transfer of diaconal functions out of diaconal hands. Dr. Adger then advocated the two measures moved by Mr. Martin.

The Rev. Mr. Quarles, of Missouri, in a long and able speech, also urged, in addition, these points: That it seems almost farcical to send a presbytery's home missions money to Baltimore, in order to send it back, at that Presbytery's demand, to pay its home-missionary; and to expend the Church's money in providing for this useless migration of money checks, and in paying treasurers to do such business as this. But unless the presbytery's will, which the rules of the Home Missions' Committee seem so fully to recognise, is to be resisted, such seems to be the useless nature of our proceeding, on our present plan. Nehemiah, when he would arouse the householders in his defenceless town of Jerusalem to contribute to the building of a common wall, combined general patriotism with personal affections, by calling each man "to build over against his own dwelling." The Assembly should imitate his wisdom. The way to do this is to leave local enterprises more to local agencies and affections. Christians will give more to help *this known destitute church*, in their own Presbytery, than they will give for that vague impersonal thing, "the general destitution," a thousand miles off. Hence, it was claimed that Presbyteries acting for themselves have usually acted with more vigor, and raised more money, than those connected with the Assembly's Committee; while they have been prompt to contribute a certain portion to that committee for its frontier work.

The advocates of the majority were frequent in characterising Mr. Martin's motions as visionary, as grounded in mere theory, and as unsupported by experience; while they claimed that theirs were sustained by the experience of seventeen years' success. This boast laid them open to a pungent rejoinder, from the damaging effect of which they seem to have been spared mainly by the forbearance of their respondents. It might have been answered: that the desire for these betterments was in the fullest sense practical and experimental, being grounded, namely, in

very melancholy and pointed experiences. For instance: under the present boasted system, contributions to education had fallen from fourteen or fifteen thousand dollars, gathered under another system, and that, in the days of the Church's poverty, to nine or ten thousand now. Last year, the Assembly solemnly told the churches that Home Missions *must have* not less than \$40,000 this year, or most critical losses would result. The excellent Secretary afflicted us by telling us that the churches only gave him \$18,000 for Home Missions. But these same churches have given \$59,250 for Foreign Missions. It is impossible to ascribe to our people an ignorance of the plain truth, so eloquently put by Dr. Hoge, in his Home Missions' address: "That this cause cannot be second to any other, because the home work is the very *fulcrum* of the levers by which all our other agencies seek to work for the world's salvation." Hence, their failure to respond, their seeming depreciation of the home work under the foreign in the ratio of 18 to 59, must be ascribed to the defects of our present method. And especially did the history of the Publication Committee give us a most awakening experience. For there we saw an important and costly interest committed precisely to our present boasted methods, and utterly wrecked. An eminent divine was called to usurp the diaconal functions of an accountant and distributor, for which events proved him wholly unfitted, while he sunk into abeyance those preaching duties for which he was so richly fitted, called, and ordained. The result was the total insolvency of an agency which should have been profitable and prosperous, an insolvency which was only prevented from becoming flagrant by renewed and onerous special contributions exacted from the churches. And the most significant part of this experience is in the fact that, while our present methods, claimed to be too near perfection for criticism, were maturing for us this astounding calamity, the voice of faithful warning, uttered for instance by the excellent elder, Mr. Kennedy, of Clarksville, was rebuked by precisely the arguments appealed to by the majority of to-day! "Oh! fault-findings were mischievous. They repressed contributions. They hampered meritorious officers. They impaired confidence. They

should be rebuked by the actual censure of the Assembly." One would think that such an experience, so recent, should have inculcated more modesty in the majority.

There are a few more instructive thoughts bearing upon our present modes of aiding candidates for the ministry, which were not uttered in the Assembly. The education-collection is, confessedly, the unpopular collection with the churches. This every pastor experiences; and the scantiness of the returns attests it. But, on the other hand, we find that there is no object of philanthropy, for which it is so easy to elicit liberal aid, as to educate *a given and known deserving youth* for usefulness to his generation. The two facts, when coupled together, show that we have not yet gotten hold of the wisest method. Our present method makes it hard to do what, supposing our candidates to be really meritorious, the generous Christian heart of our men of wealth would make exceedingly easy. The money which, in all proper individual instances, comes easiest, we now make to come hardest. The mistake is obvious. Instead of presenting to the Christian heart the known concrete case of the highly deserving young brother, we present that impersonal and suspected abstraction, the unknown body of "indigent candidates." In fine, the aid rendered should, in each case, be grounded, not on the candidate's indigence, but *on his merit*. It should be given him as the well-earned reward of diligence, self-improvement, and self-devotion. It would then stimulate and ennoble the beneficiary, instead of galling him.

We venture to predict that the Church will finally concur in these conclusions, as to the various subjects agitated:

1. That unpaid Committees without paid Secretaries can never maintain in their vigor our various agencies for the world's conversion. There will be too strong an application of the old maxim: "What is everybody's business will be nobody's business." Such an attempt would be too wide a departure from that ordering of human nature and Providence, which fits the energetic few to lead, and the many to follow.

2. To direct and energise one of these works, as executive

head of its committee, is a work neither prelatie in its claims, nor derogatory to the ordination-vows of a preacher of the word. But the mere diaconal functions attending these agencies should be transferred, as fast as practicable, to the more suitable hands of deacons and *deaconesses*; the latter furnishing the Church the most quick, intelligent, and economical service, probably, in this direction. Thus the Secretaries will be released from pursuits heterogeneous from their calling, to devote their energies to their proper evangelistic tasks in organising the spread of the gospel by tongue and pen and press.

3. Some of these works, as that of Foreign Missions, will always be mainly under the control of the Assembly, by its Committees. But those home enterprises, in which the Presbyteries can act directly, should be remitted to them. This will economise expense, prevent undue centralisation, and leave the hands of the secretaries, who will still be needed, free to do work more useful to the Church than the engrossment of functions belonging to the Presbyteries.

4. An economy which would prove "penny wise and pound foolish" would be the poorest economy. Yet, it is a sacred duty of the Assembly to see that working-expenses are reduced to the lowest safe *ratio*; because the money handled is sacred, in most cases the gift of poverty and self-denial, to God; and every dollar, needlessly diverted to the mere expenses of administration, is so much taken from the salvation of perishing souls.

The Assembly of 1881 was happy in having but one judicial case before it. This was the appeal of Mr. Turner, of the Central church in Atlanta, against the Synod of Georgia. He had been cited by his Session to answer to charges of fraud and untruthfulness in the prosecution of his secular business. The testimony adduced did not substantiate these charges. But the Session deemed that there was such proof of heedlessness as justified a serious admonition. In this admonition Mr. Turner acquiesced. A few days after, he asked his dismissal to join the Methodist communion. The Session refused this, on the ground that he was not "in good standing," inasmuch as ad-

monition leaves the admonished member somehow in a species of probation with the Session as to his standing, to be continued virtually at the Session's option; and that even a member in good standing cannot demand dismissal to another communion as a right, but must ask it of the option and courtesy of the Session. These were the points raised by the appeal. In both, the Assembly properly decided against the lower courts. It held that a mere admonition is a species of Church censure which completes and exhausts itself when administered, if received with docility. To hold the contrary, virtually raises it to a higher grade of censure, that of indefinite suspension, at the option of the Session. But this is a distinct, and a graver censure. To construe an admonition thus would punish the culprit twice under the same indictment, and the second time without trial. As to the second point, the Assembly decided, with those of 1839 and 1851, that no member of the Presbyterian Church can claim, as of right, a "letter of dismissal" to another communion; but a member who is "in good standing," is always entitled to a "certificate of good standing," whenever he asks it. If he is found to have used it to institute membership in another denomination, then his name is simply to be removed from our rolls. And this is not an act of resentment or censure; but simply the logical sequel, with us, of his own exercise of inalienable private judgment, in electing another church-connexion.

The interests of Columbia Seminary filled a large place in the attention, and a larger in the heart, of the Assembly. The important points in the Directors' Report were:

1. The request that the immediate government of the Seminary be remanded to the Synods of South Carolina, the Assembly retaining its right of review over its proceedings, and a *veto* over the election of professors and teachers. This was unanimously conceded.

2. The Directors propose to reopen the Seminary in the autumn, with at least three professors. They brought the gratifying news, that a large part of the endangered or suspended investments have been regained, that thirty thousand dollars have

been actually paid in for new investments, besides numerous subscriptions still outstanding; so that the institution will have the use of a cash endowment of \$ from this date; which, besides the Perkins foundation, will liberally support three other professors. The Assembly, of course, cordially encouraged the Board to go forward, and reopen the institution at once.

3. The Directors, in conjunction with the Presbyterian church in Columbia, now vacant, have formed and do now submit to the Assembly the purpose of recalling Dr. B. M. Palmer from the First church in New Orleans, to the professorship of Practical Divinity in the Seminary, and the pastorate of his old charge. The Board regards these as essential parts of their own plan. Everything, in the first place, cries aloud for the immediate reopening of the Seminary, chiefly the great and growing destitution of ministers in the South and West especially; but also the progressive loss of influence for the Seminary as long as it remains closed; the dispersion of the students of divinity of those sections, and their resort to institutions without the bounds of our Church; the evident use made of this season of suspension to undermine the independence of our beloved Church. It is, therefore, vital that the Seminary be restored to activity.

But, in the second place, the same considerations demand that it be restored to a vigorous activity. A feeble existence would prove wholly inadequate to gain the vital ends in view. Hence it is for the highest interests of the Church, that her best men and best talents be devoted to rehabilitating this school of pastors. But from this point of view, every eye and every hand points naturally to Dr. Palmer, the former professor, the ex-pastor of the Columbia church, as the one man who is able to give the necessary impulse to the Seminary. He has labored long and hard in the most onerous pastoral positions; his experience is ripe; his age has reached that stage when his bodily vigor, adequate to many more years of efficiency in the more quiet, academic walks, may be expected to flag under the enormous strains of a metropolitan charge such as his. This consideration goes far to counterpoise our sense of his great importance to New Or-

leans and the Southwest, and our sympathy with the grief of a bereaved charge there.

These views, eloquently advanced by the representatives of the Seminary, Drs. Girardeau and Mack, proved so influential, that the Assembly approved the action of the Board in electing Dr. Palmer, by a large majority; the dissentients being the immediate representatives of the city and Synods which would lose him. But while the Assembly cordially sanctioned Dr. Palmer's return to the Seminary, should his own sense of duty lead him thither, its courtesy towards his church and immediate associates in the Southwest prevented it from applying any urgency to his mind.

Two other topics claimed the attention of the Assembly, in connexion with theological education, which were despatched during the later sessions of the Assembly. One was the report brought to that body by the representatives of Columbia Seminary, touching the resort of many of the candidates to seminaries without our bounds. Drs. Girardeau and Mack stated that, when compelled to close the Seminary for a time, they had urgently exhorted their pupils to resort to Union Seminary in Virginia, as their natural and proper place, and as offering them the most efficient instruction, until their own school was reopened. Six had done so, but fifteen had resorted to Princeton Seminary. Indeed, adding those in other Northern and Scotch institutions, we find this anomalous state of affairs: that about one-third of all our candidates in their theological course received, last winter, their tuition from institutions of the denominations which have chosen to take the positions of accusers of our Church and opposers of its cherished principles!

It appeared also, that in every case, so far as known, inducements had been held out to these candidates, in the form of money-assistance, to leave their own institutions. A very specious explanation was given, indeed, of this measure. It was said that several of the scholarships in Princeton Seminary had been endowed, in more prosperous times, by Southern donors, and that it seemed magnanimous for the North, rich and powerful, to offer the incomes of these foundations to the children of the South, in

their poverty. This offer was coupled with no condition whatever, nor requirement of adhesion to the Northern Church.

Of the latter fact there can be no doubt; the managers of this measure are too adroit to commit so useless a blunder. They understand too well the force of Solomon's maxim, that "a gift blindeth the eyes of the wise." They appreciate the silent, steady, but potent influence of association, on mind and character; and expect that the young, ill-informed, as the young men and women of the South already are, of the historical facts, the rights, the injuries, and the true position of Southern Christians, will surely absorb all the contempt for those principles they desire, during a three years' immersion in a sea of unfair and erroneous literature, preaching, and conversation. It is a safe calculation that, if we are stupid enough to allow the enemies of our Church to train its leaders, we must be soon undermined and destroyed. Some who have acted in this matter may warmly disclaim such views; and their disclaimer may be candid. We are far from surmising that there are no men, in the Church of our assailants and conquerors, really generous and magnanimous towards us. But various shades of motive may mingle. A professor naturally desires the *eclat* of numbers. Princeton naturally desires to retrieve her prime position in her own Church, now eclipsed by her New School rival, Union Seminary in New York; and as Princeton's commanding numbers were largely recruited, in the days of the Alexanders, from the South, she desires to gain the land now, by drawing students from the same fields. But that Northern Presbyterians do approve and practise these seductions of our candidates from the more insidious motives, we should be silly indeed to doubt, in the face of such proofs as these: that we find officers of our own Church, disaffected to us, furnished in advance with these bids for our candidates, and authorised to buy, in the open market, any corner; that we hear Northern ministers openly profess the purpose, and boast that five years of such success as the last will seal the overthrow of the Southern Church; that those who are laboring to reinstate Columbia Seminary have actually met opposition to their pious and holy enterprise, inspired from this source, and by the undoubted motive of under-

mining our Church through the final destruction of this institution. The insolence of this latter tactic, especially, inspires in every right mind nothing but indignation; and we profess none of that unchristian hypocrisy, which pretends to make a virtue of suppressing its honest, manly expression.

Now it might appear at the first view that there is a remedy for this counterplotting, which is of the easiest possible application. This would be, to advertise all our candidates, that they have no earthly occasion to go abroad in order to receive any such assistance as they ought to desire in paying for a theological course. Their own institutions are abundantly able to give this assistance to all comers. No young man who deserves to be helped has ever found it necessary to leave a Southern Seminary for lack of suitable pecuniary assistance. The Boards and Faculties stand pledged that none such shall ever go away from this cause. If, then, money is the inducement, the Church might say to all its candidates who need this species of help: "Here is the money ready for you at home. There is no occasion to go abroad for it."

Why does not this suffice? For two reasons: Our Church wisely places a limit upon the amount of aid given to each one; because, regarding the candidate's exercise of personal energy, independence, and self-help, as essential *criteria* of fitness for the ministry, she ordains that her candidates shall be *assisted* and *encouraged*, but not *bodily carried*. Her own officers, professors, and directors are bound to obey this excellent rule. But these bidders for our candidates from without disregard it, and offer larger pecuniary inducements. Thus the double injury and insult is wrought of breaking down a rule which our Church has wisely established, and of interfering between her and her own children. The other reason is suggested by the whisper, that the student who goes abroad also gains a much easier time: he reads easier text-books; less research is exacted of him; slighter examinations await him; looser scholastic and ecclesiastical restraints are held over him. Thus, after a course of light and superficial study, he can return to his mother-church (unless a fatter salary and more distinguished position invite him to desert

her wholly) and still pass for a learned theologian, in virtue of that peculiarly Southern tendency to esteem "*omne ignotum pro mirifico*." Now, we avow that, to our mind, the latter inducement appears more degrading and mischievous than the former. Thorough study, diligent labor in the theological course, righteous responsibilities—these mean, simply, more efficiency in the pastoral work and in saving souls. The man who has a desire to evade these in order to secure an easier life with more superficial results, proves by that desire, that *he is not fit to preach Christ's gospel*. The man who really desires to glorify him, desires to glorify him much; and he will never pause to barter away a portion of his Saviour's honor for this ignoble self-indulgence.

It was, therefore, with a timely wisdom, that the Assembly took action on this matter. It did not advocate the narrow spirit which, pronouncing our own culture in every case, all-sufficient for ourselves, refuses the aid of the learning of other peoples and countries altogether. But it declared that, as to those who may properly go abroad to complete their culture, the suitable time is, after they have grounded themselves in the principles and scholarship of their own land. The Assembly therefore urgently requested the presbyteries not to allow any candidates to go abroad into the schools of other denominations until they have completed the course offered them in their own seminaries.

A most important modification in our theological education was also proposed in a strong memorial from Bethel Presbytery, S. C. This proposed, in substance, that, while the present *curriculum* of preparation should be retained and even extended for such students as desire and have time for it, an English course of theology, exposition, and history, shall be taught for others, without requiring either Latin, Greek, or Hebrew. This, of course, contemplated the licensing and ordaining of ministers upon this English course. The main plea urged was from the extent of the harvest and fewness of reapers. The comparatively slow growth and small numbers of the Presbyterian body were ascribed to the difficulties our system imposes on the multiplication of ministers; while the rapid growth of the Immersionists, Metho-

dists, and others, was accounted for by the facility with which pious and efficient men can rise to the ministry in those communions. It was urged also, that such an English course, added to piety, zeal, and good sense, would suffice to give us thoroughly respectable and efficient pastors. There was even a virtual attack upon the more learned training; where it was charged that it led the students rather around about than into the Bible, which should be the pastor's great text-book, and that our classical candidates, while well posted in the languages, were often found by their presbyteries more ignorant of their English Bibles than intelligent laymen.

The Committee on Seminaries, to whom this overture was sent, could not but find that it proposed a virtual change in the Constitution. It therefore recommended the Assembly to answer: that the object of Bethel Presbytery could only be gained by moving the presbyteries, in the orderly way, to change the constitutional rules for trying candidates for licensure and ordination. The friends of the overture, in order to evade this fatal objection, then moved the Assembly in due form, to send down the proposition to the presbyteries for their vote. This the Assembly, after debate, declined to do by a vote of 55 to 37.

To the aspiration for a more rapid way to multiply ministers, no pious heart can fail to respond: it is but the echo of our Saviour's words: "Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest." But to multiply them by encouraging those who feel the call to content themselves with an inefficient and shallow preparation, is another thing. In making a comparison between the growth of our Church, and of those who permit an uneducated ministry, large allowances must be made for the instability of a very large part of the accessions counted, and even of the congregations organised; the heterogeneous nature of those large communion rolls; and the mixture and incorrectness of the doctrinal views held. If these deductions were made, it would not appear so plain, that the solid growth of these denominations is so much more rapid than of our own. Again, the change proposed would place us substantially in the attitude, as to a learned ministry, held by the Cumberland Presbyterians. It is, then, the plainest dictate

of practical wisdom, that we shall ask ourselves whether we should gain by exchanging our present condition for theirs. Again, the standard of devotion set up by Christ for every Christian, and especially every minister, is that he shall not only purpose to serve his Lord, but serve him *his best*. Hence, the preliminary question for every man called of God must be whether the classical and biblical training prescribed in our Constitution is really promotive of a minister's *best* efficiency. If it is, the same devotion which prompts him to preach at all must prompt him to desire this furniture for preaching better; and if it is attainable, must prompt him to acquire it. But the position taken by our Church is, that to every man called of God to preach, *it shall be attainable*. She will help all who are worthy of help. Nor has her pledge to do so been yet dishonored. Here, then, is the ideal which we would present, in place of the one so graphically painted in the Bethel overture: That aspirations of good men to preach should be as frequent and as readily multiplied among us as among Immersionists or Methodists: but that the teeming crowd of aspirants should be led, not to a rash and ill-furnished entrance on their public work, but to this best preparation; while the unstinted sympathy and help of their brethren should make their entrance into a learned ministry just as practicable for every one of them, as the entrance into an unlearned ministry is to the Immersionist—that is, supposing in all the aspirants a true zeal and devotion. And without these, their aspirations would prove deceptive, under every system.

The contrast between the candidate pretending classical training, but ignorant of his Bible, and the plain man of God, mighty in his English Scriptures, contains an illusion. How comes that classical scholar to leave the Seminary ignorant of his Bible? Is a knowledge of the languages of inspiration, in its nature, obstructive of Bible knowledge? Surely not! Then the imperfect result must be due to the fact, that this classical man has indolently neglected his better opportunities to know his Bible. Now, will the offering of another man worse opportunities ensure him against indolence? Suppose the student of this two years' English course infected with a similar negligence to that detected

in the classical student? Where will the former's line of acquirement be? When his indolence shall have sunk him relatively as far below his lower standard, will not his acquirements be contemptible? In a word, the expectation claimed is founded on a tacit assumption that, while many candidates pursuing the learned course, are unfaithful to their better opportunities, and so exhibit inferior results, all the candidates pursuing the lower course will be models of exemplary fidelity and industry. Does the Church see any guarantee of such superior spiritual principles in these men, in the fact that they have deliberately elected a less perfect way of serving Christ in the pulpit? We confess we do not.

A similar illusion harbors in the argument so often drawn from the primitive preachers ordained by the Apostles. These, it is said, were but plain, sensible, business men, soundly converted, taught of the Holy Ghost, and set apart to preach without other qualifications than these, with Christian experience and "aptness to teach." They were required to study no foreign language, no *curriculum* of science. We grant it. Let us represent to ourselves such a good plain man, in Ephesus, ordained during Timothy's days there; probably, like Alexander, a mere coppersmith. But this plain good man had as his vernacular the Greek language, one of the languages of inspiration. He was, by his own experience, practically conversant with that whole set of events, of miracles, of religious ideas and institutions, pagan and Jewish, which are perpetually involved in the explication and illustration of gospel truths in the Scriptures. Here, with his long experience of divine grace in his own heart, his reputation for devout piety and integrity, and his forcible gift of utterance, was his sufficient furniture for the pastoral office.

But now, let us remember that to us of this nineteenth century that Greek language is a dead, a learned language. All those facts and ideas which constituted that man's practical, popular intelligence, are to us now *archæology!* They are the science of antiquity. How much study of the classics and history will it require to place a sprightly American youth simply on a level, in these respects, with that plain Ephesian? We may find an answer by asking, were that Ephesian raised from the dead among us

to-day, only furnished with his Greek language and ideas, how much study would he have to undergo to become equal to this American youth in his mastery of the English language and our contemporary knowledge? Does the most thorough Seminary course put its graduate on a level with that good Ephesian brass-smith, in his Greek and his Asiatic archæology? We wish it did. We devoutly wish we could reach that level.

But does the apostolic example, in ordaining a plain Greek artisan, permit us to fall below it?

One of the most responsible tasks of the Assembly was to receive and digest the remarks of the Presbyteries upon the Revised Directory for Worship. It was found that sixty-six Presbyteries had complied with the last Assembly's order to examine and amend it. A few had expressed their wish that the work should be dropped, and their preference for the old Directory. Evidence appeared, that some of the sixty-six judged the same, but examined and amended the Revision only out of courtesy to the Assembly. All the reports of Presbyteries having been referred to the Revising Committee, that body, with commendable diligence, immediately digested them, and made the following Report:

The Committee appointed to revise the Directory of Worship hope that they are able now to present the Revision in a much improved form. Their effort last year was, of course, only *tentative*. They were well aware that all they could produce of themselves must only serve as a basis on which it must be for the Presbyteries to build—a skeleton into which they must breathe life, and which they must cover with flesh and clothe with beauty. A number of the Presbyteries have devoted themselves with zeal and ability to this business; and the work under their skilful manipulations will be found, the Committee trust, much more acceptable to the Church.

The changes made at the suggestion of the Presbyteries are numerous. The chief ones are an alteration in the order of the last four chapters, and the omission of all forms, except the one prepared for a funeral occasion where no minister is present. All forms having been omitted, your Committee do not think it necessary to retain the Note about Forms, which many Presbyteries desired to have inserted in the body of the Directory. As the Committee has left out the forms, it has left out the note.

We have to report that a copy of the Revision, as it now stands, is

ready for the Assembly to dispose of as it may judge best. The Committee very respectfully suggests that if this body can afford the time necessary, and consider it advisable, the Revision in its present form be now read aloud, that the Assembly may judge of the improvement. But if, on the other hand, this be not the pleasure of the body, your Committee would then suggest, that the Revision be recommitted to be printed, and one copy sent to every Minister, one to every Session, and two copies to every Clerk of Presbytery; and that the Presbyteries be directed to take up the work again for a fresh examination, and report the results to the next Assembly.

(Signed)

JOHN B. ADGER, Chairman.
B. M. PALMER,
THOS. E. PECK,
J. A. LEFEVRE,
G. D. ARMSTRONG,
W. W. HENRY.

The Assembly gave the Revision this direction.

Committee of Foreign Correspondence reported :

1. An overture from Holston Presbytery asking that appointments to the General Presbyterian Council be distributed more equally through the Church, at least one to each Synod; and that Synods make the nominations.

The Committee recommended the Assembly to answer that it had no power to regulate the action of the Assembly of 1883 which has to make these appointments; but might express the opinion that they should be distributed so as to represent our Church; and that Synods might be invited to nominate.

2. A request from the Council aforesaid for a small standing committee, with which Clerks of the Council could correspond. The Assembly appointed its two clerks.

3. An overture from Synod of Texas, asking the Assembly to appoint a committee to confer with a similar committee of the Northern Assembly so that the two Churches might avoid conflicts in their labors in Texas.

The Committee recommended, that the Assembly express its earnest desire that brethren of the Northern and Southern churches in Texas should endeavor to avoid such conflicts, and cultivate peace; but refer all such questions back to our Presbyteries in Texas, to whom they properly belong; at the same

time recommending the Synod of Texas, in a way merely advisory, to seek to promote the ends of charity and edification.

4. The Committee nominated for principal delegate to the General Synod of the Reformed Church the Rev. Miles Saunders, and for alternate delegate the Rev. John A. Scott.

5. A telegram being committed to this Committee from the Young Men's Christian Association of the United States and British Provinces conveying Christian greeting to the Assembly and referring it to Eph. i. 3, the Committee reported an answer conveying to the Association the Assembly's Christian salutations and referring the Association to Eph. i. 4 and 5. Objection was made to the answer, as likely to prove offensive, and it was recommitted. Subsequently the Committee reported, that on further reflection, it had grave doubts whether the Assembly ought to exchange formal salutations with any other than *ecclesiastical* bodies; but that as in this particular case, the matter had gone so far, it recommended that the Assembly should reply by "commending the Young Men's Association to the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ."

Upon the subject let us remark: 1. That the doubts of the Committee appear to us to have a good foundation. If we are to go outside of ecclesiastical bodies with this exchange of salutations, where is it to stop?

2. It seems to us that if an answer were to be given to the greetings of the Association, none could have been more *apropos* than what the Committee prepared at first. The objection to it was, that a Calvinistic passage of Scripture could not be quoted to a body in which there might be some Arminians without offence. To this the answer is pertinent: (1) That the Association is not a body of Methodists; (2) That Methodists receive that passage of Scripture as not contradicting any doctrine held by them, having their own way of expounding it, and that in fact, for the Assembly to signify by its action that a Methodist body could not tolerate two verses of one of Paul's epistles, was to be indeed offensive to those Christian brethren; (3) That if the Committee of Correspondence had gone about to hunt up that passage, the objections made might have applied; but that, as

the young men had quoted only the first verse of the passage, stopping short where there was no period, there could be fairly found no ground of complaint for our merely completing the quotation, and returning them the remainder of the passage with our salutations.

We must add, however, that this whole business of shooting off passages of Scripture at one another is not to our taste.

Our readers know that certain Deliverances of the Louisville and Charleston Assemblies, respecting cases *in thesi*, led to some discussion in the Synod of South Carolina, out of which grew an overture to the Assembly. This asked the supreme court, substantially, to declare that propositions drawn "by good and necessary consequence" from the constitutional law of the Church by our supreme court, have the binding force of law until constitutionally repealed. On this overture, the Committee on Bills and Overtures made a report on Friday night. On Saturday morning the Rev. Dr. Palmer offered the following paper in place of that acted upon by the Assembly the previous night, regarding the overture from the Synod of South Carolina. It was fully discussed by Rev. Drs. Lefevre, Mullally, Hoyt, Pratt, Molloy, Armstrong, Davies, and Shanks, and was adopted by an almost unanimous vote. The paper reads as follows, viz. :

"To the overture from the Synod of South Carolina the Assembly returns answer that all just and necessary consequences from the law of the Church are part of the same in the logical sense of being implicitly contained therein. The authority of this law is, however, twofold. It binds all those who profess to live under it as a covenant by which they are united in one communion, so that there is no escape from its control, except by renouncing its jurisdiction; and it binds because it has been accepted as a true expression of what is revealed in the Holy Scriptures as infallible truth.

"The consequences deduced from it cannot, therefore, be equal in authority with the law itself, unless they be necessarily contained within it, as shown by their agreement also with the Divine Word."

This debate showed that harmony of opinion has not yet been reached on this vexed question. The paper finally adopted is a compromise, and is still ambiguous. It says, consequences de-

duced from the Constitution must be shown to be necessarily contained in it, by their also agreeing with the Divine Word. But the question whether the deductions so agree is itself a question of construction. The difficulty reappears. Its obstinate reappearance, after the almost unanimous compromise, indicates that a church government at once free and Presbyterian (as opposed to the mere advisory action of congregational associations) cannot be excogitated, without admitting the principle claimed by the South Carolina Synod. Let us, however, glance at the debate. The side opposed to the overture cannot be better set forth than in the remarks of Dr. Lefevre.

Dr. Lefevre, in several short speeches, fully admitted that a just inference from given propositions was truly involved in the propositions themselves, but denied that logical inferences from the laws of the Church, as contained in our standards, were themselves laws and binding on the ecclesiastical conscience with the authority of the standards themselves. He affirmed that it is the doctrine of our Confession and of all Protestant Churches that nothing can be made *law* in the Church but the Scriptures themselves, and immediate consequences justly derived from them. He contended that our standards were indeed a system of propositions justly derived from Scripture and adequate for their purpose—that is, to be a bond of ecclesiastical union—and therefore binding the consciences of all those who have covenanted together on this basis, so that their only escape from the obligation is by withdrawal from our communion. But he contended that the standards were, by universal concession, not pure and complete truth, like Holy Scripture, but necessarily somewhat deficient and disproportionate, and therefore unfitted to serve, in turn, as satisfactory premises for new conclusions having the authority of *law*. These new conclusions not only might be, but in many cases would be, more deficient and disproportionate and far less conformable to Scripture than the propositions from which they were drawn. The full and strict authority of the law must stop with the law itself, or we shall have an endless concatenation of logical inferences, at each successive step

farther and farther removed from Scripture, until at last we are as far from the Bible as Rome herself.

In this there is unquestionable force. This right of construing a constitutional covenant *may be abused*; it may be so exercised as to infringe the spiritual liberty of members. But the compromise admits, even Dr. Lefevre admits, that the power to construe is unavoidable, to some extent. Where, then, is the remedy? Where the ultimate protection for the member's rights and freedom? In his privilege of seceding whenever he feels himself vitally aggrieved, seceding without molestation or persecution. This is the principle, too much neglected in the discussion. The principles of our Constitution are: that we acknowledge our Synods and Assemblies, like all others, to be uninspired and fallible; that each man's entrance into our particular branch of the Church-catholic is his free act, and that he has an inalienable right to go out of ours into some other branch, at the dictate of his own conscience; for we never held that our branch is the only valid one; that when a member exercises this right of secession, we have no right to restrain him by any civil pain or penalty whatsoever, nor to revenge his departure by any excommunication from the Church-catholic, nor by any denunciation even. Hence, if a church, in the exercise of its unavoidable power to enact and interpret its own constitutional compact, should "err in making the terms of communion too narrow; yet, even in this case, they would not infringe upon the liberty or the rights of others, but only make an improper use of their own."

That the safeguard of the member's liberty is *here*, and not in the denial of a right of construction to the supreme court, appears very simply from this fact. All admit that the express propositions of our Constitution have the binding force of law on us, while we remain Presbyterians. But it is just as possible for a fallible church court to err in enacting a proposition, as in stating an obvious corollary. This is indisputable. Suppose the former error committed, where is the shield of the member's liberty? Ultimately, only in his right of unmolested secession.

But that the supreme court *must possess* a power of construc-

tion of the articles of the constitutional compact, whether liable to abuse or not, may be made exceedingly clear. The only alternative is Congregationalism. The Constitution itself gives this power: "to *decide* questions of doctrine and order regularly brought before it." The strictest opponents of the validity of "*in thesi* declarations" admit it; for they concede that when the Assembly sits judicially and interprets an article of the Constitution *in hypothesis*, its decision is law. But surely, the Assembly's passing into its judicial functions has no influence to make its logical inferences infallible. It may also err *in hypothesis*; yet, it is admitted its conclusions *in hypothesis* are law. This granted, the admission that the Assembly may err *in thesi* is not sufficient to prove that such conclusions cannot be law. Again, it is an admitted maxim, that "the meaning of an instrument is the instrument." Who shall deduce that meaning? each one for himself, or that court which the constitutional compact has set up as the common umpire? Again, that the Assembly must have some such power of construction appears thus: the propositions set down expressly in any constitution, however detailed, must be limited in number. But the concrete cases of human action to be judged thereby are almost infinite in number, and endlessly diversified in their particular conditions. Hence there must be a process of construction, to be performed by some court, in order to show whether these varied cases come under the principle of the law. Again, in point of fact, our Constitution, in the fullest details of the larger Catechism, fails to mention many actions which no church court in Christendom would now hesitate about disciplining. Under the Sixth Command, it does not prohibit duelling nor obstructing the passage of a railroad car. (The Westminster Assembly had never dreamed there would be railroads.) Under the Eighth, it does not mention forging bank checks, nor trafficking in "futures" in a stock or cotton exchange, under the head of "wasteful gaming." Yet rumor says, that in one of our church courts, a member was censured for buying "cotton futures." But our Book does mention "usury" as against the Eighth Commandment; and every church court allows its members to take usury up to *six per cent.*! Now, it

may be replied, that in all these cases it is perfectly clear to every mind the actions named are or are not breaches of the principles of the commands. This is true. Yet *they are not expressed* in our Constitution; whence it is clear that some constructive process of logic is employed to bring them under it. It is a constructive process which is obvious and conclusive; and therefore it gives a valid law. Just so. But every court, exercising its power of construction, will hold that its process is equally logical. So that we come again to the inexorable issues: that this right of construction *must be conceded* to the supreme court, and yet that *it may be abused*. Well, what does this mean? Simply, that no institution, not even our Presbyterianism, can become a perfect machine in human hands; but that this Presbyterianism, liable to possible perversion, is better than Congregationalism; and that, if the "worst comes to the worst," the scriptural safeguard for our spiritual liberty is to be found, not in the corrupting license of Congregationalism, but in the individual right of withdrawal.

The Assembly signalled its close by creating a new Synod, that of Florida. Let us hope that this measure will give all of that impulse to the cause of Christ in the "flowery land" which its advocates hope from it.

At 2½ o'clock p. m. Saturday, the sessions were finally closed, and the members began to disperse to their homes. The next Assembly meets in Atlanta, Ga.

R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Revised Version of the New Testament. Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York.

On the 20th of May last, the curiosity of the English-speaking people as to the final result of the Revision of the New Testament, raised to a high tension by delay, received its gratification. Thos. Nelson & Son, on behalf of the English University presses, began at 1 o'clock a. m. the promised sale. In four days, amidst scenes of unwonted excitement, sale was made of 400,000 copies. The ocean telegraph states, that one million copies were sold in London in about the same time. This enormous sale, with the universal discussion of the revision in the newspaper press, is referred to as a splendid evidence of the vitality of the Christian religion in our day, and of the power of the Bible. Of course, the revision of no other book could excite such attention. But the popular furor is rather an evidence of that Athenian trait, fostered by the prurient civilisation of Britain and America, the craving "either to tell or to hear some new thing." It remains to be seen whether, after curiosity is sated, the Scriptures will be more read or more obeyed than before. To make this result permanent, something more is required than a literary enterprise: the power of the Holy Ghost.

Seemliness requires us, of course, in this the next number of our REVIEW after the appearance of the new revision, to take some note of it as a literary event. Our purpose is not detailed criticism; of this even village weeklies give specimens. We only aim to signalise some facts concerning the revision, for the guidance of intelligent readers.

1. The work originated eleven years ago, in an action of the "Convocation of Canterbury," (the Episcopal Convention of that Province of the Anglican Church). This raised an Old Testament and a New Testament Committee of Revision. The latter is the one with which alone we have now to do. It contained twenty-five members, with Ellicott, Bishop of Gloucester, as chairman, of whom nineteen were Episcopal dignitaries, and six "Dissenters." Af-

VOL. XXXII., NO. 3—12.

terwards it was judged proper to secure American coöperation. To this end, Dr. Philip Schaff, of the Union (Presbyterian) Seminary in New York city, was invited to London; and on conference with the British Committee, was authorised to select an American Committee to examine the work of the British, and report and exchange criticism. Dr. Schaff selected some nineteen or twenty divines in his corner of the country representing the Congregational, Northern Methodist, Immersionist, Northern Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Unitarian, and Quaker sects. These continued the species of coöperation allowed them, until the completion of the work.

It is obvious from this statement, that, effectively, the revision is not an American, but exclusively a British work. Only a part of the American Churches, and a very small section of the country, were represented in the work, even in this nominal manner. Second, these local representatives seem to have been selected by Dr. Schaff—doubtless on conference with other gentlemen, but by no ecclesiastical authority, and by no standard but that of convenience and his estimate of their scholarship. And third, these so-called American revisers were not allowed coördinate authority with the British Committee. It appears that they were allowed to suggest criticisms, which the British Committee rejected or adopted as to them seemed good; while the American Committee had no power to reject the British decisions. Consequently, a large part (perhaps the most, if secrets were divulged) of the suggestions of the Americans appears only in the form of an appendix.

2. A revision naturally falls into two parts: the more correct ascertainment of the Text to be translated, and an amendment of the translation itself. The Committees have taken in hand the first of these tasks, with vigor. They give us a Text which boldly departs from the *Textus Receptus*. The salient trait of their work here is, that, as to nearly all the important and contested "various readings," whose genuineness has been and is subject of debate among competent Biblical critics, the Committees have arrogated to themselves the prerogative of deciding, and deciding on the side of innovation. Two of these contested passages

have indeed, been allowed to stand: the history of the woman taken in adultery, John viii. 2-11; and the closing words of Mark's Gospel, xvi. 9-20. But of the other readings which the scholar recognises as classical and undecided topics of debate among critics, the most are decided for the innovators: the omission of the Doxology from the Lord's Prayer, Matt. vi. 13; the excision of Philip's answer to the Ethiopian, Acts viii. 37; the suppression of the word "God," Acts xx. 28, where the Received Text teaches us that the Church was purchased with divine blood; the suppression of "God" in 1 Tim. iii. 16, "God manifested in the flesh;" the excision of the three witnesses in Heaven, 1 John v. 7; the suppression of the angel's agency at the pool of Bethesda, John v. 4, etc.

This journal, foreseeing the danger of too rash an innovation in our Received Text, foreshadowed by the spirit of the Revisers, endeavored to sound a note of caution in its number for April 1871, (on Tischendorf's Sinai Codex). It was there shown that the canons of excision on which the school of critics now in fashion proceed with unquestioning confidence, are neither demonstrated nor safe; that the ages assigned to the leading uncial manuscripts were rather surmises than proofs; that the general maxim, an Uncial is more ancient than a Cursive, was not certain; that the rule for valuing the internal evidence in favor of or against a reading, "the difficult reading has the preference," is unfounded and deceptive; that the clear internal marks of sectarian tamperings, in the case of the important doctrinal various readings, were not duly pondered. The fears there expressed have been verified. Decisions have been made against the Received Text, in cases where the critical debate is still undecided; and that, in cases of cardinal importance. Nor are the grounds of these innovations always stated with candor, in their justificatory publications. For instance, in 1 Tim. iii. 16, the *θεός* is changed into *ὁς*, thus suppressing the name of God in the text, "Great is the mystery of godliness, *God manifest in the flesh*," etc., and making it, "mystery of godliness who was manifest in the flesh," etc. But our revisers, after changing the Greek, do not translate as we have just written, as their own

change should have required: they paraphrase, "mystery of godliness: *he who* was manifest," etc. This is but an expedient, unwarranted by their own preferred text, to cover from the readers' eyes the insuperable internal evidence against reading the relative $\theta\epsilon$ instead of $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$; that, for the relative there is no antecedent in the passage. So they intrude an antecedent! Yet this does not give them, still, a tenable sense; for Christ is never called by Paul the mystery, or blessed secret, of godliness. It is the doctrine about Christ which he always so calls. Nor are the defenders of this innovation even candid in their statement as to the testimony of the MSS; when they say, no old Uncial has $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. The Alexandrine indisputably has it now. True, the bar in the circle, which differentiates the *theta* from the *omicron*, is said to have the appearance of fresher ink. Yet it is confessedly an open question, at least, whether this fresher ink may not be the mere replacement of the original ink of the bar, which was found to have scaled off (a thing which is known to happen to old parchment MSS). This is every way most probable; so that the *prima facie* evidence of the Alexandrine MS. is for $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$.

From this specimen, the reader may judge on the principle (*ex pede Herculem*) how the Text is handled. But there is a graver general objection against the authority arrogated to decide what is the true text against that hitherto accepted by the Church: it is an authority concerning the correctness or incorrectness of whose exercise the Revised Testament provides no *data* for the reader's judgment. But the Biblical critics who guided the revisers to make these innovations in the text, are not Popes. The rest of us Bible readers have not lost the right of private judgment, as to this or any other point. If the Greek Testament which the Church has seen fit to use, is to be changed, we are entitled to have the supposed (critical) grounds for that change spread before us, for our judgment. The Revised Testament condescends to give no such grounds. Is it said, such critical matter would be a wholly unsuitable annex to a popular Bible? Just so; and therefore the power arrogated in this matter is wholly unsuitable for the Revisers. There is an essential difference between this exercise of

power and that of amending a translation: that in the latter case, the *data* of comparison and judgment go along with the amendment, at least to every educated man in the Church who has in his hand a Received Greek Text. That text is the umpire, and the reader can compare with it the old translation and the new, and judge for himself which is the more faithful. But upon the plan pursued by these Revisers, *the Church will have no Textus Receptus* of the Greek; *i. e.* unless she be willing to accept it on the "*ipse dixit*" of the Revisers. This is in substance the objection made by the most learned and conservative critics of our Southern Church, against the plan of *Lachmann's* text—a plan thoroughly revolutionary in its tendency, however executed in his particular hands; a plan of which these Revisers seem especially enamored.

Once more: this over-innovating spirit as to the *Textus Receptus* is manifested by the unduly depreciatory strain in which the Revisers now represent its merits. The members of the last Assembly will recall a notable instance of this tone in the remarks made before it in commendation of the Revisers' work. We were told that the *Textus Receptus* was virtually the text settled in Erasmus' latest edition; and that it was now known that he had collated but five or six cursive MSS. of no antiquity and of small authority. Such was the whole showing made for it! And every member of the Assembly can bear witness that the popular impression made and apparently designed, was, that our received text had all along been almost worthless as authority, and only right as it were by chance! Now here we charge a *suppressio veri*. First, it was not stated that the subsequent editors, as, Stephens, who matured the *Textus Receptus*, had the advantage of collating the great "Complutensian Polyglot," edited at royal expense, under the auspices of the first scholar of his age, Cardinal *Ximenes*, from the collation of Spanish and Vatican MSS.; and therefore checking or confirming the *Erasmian* text by independent witnesses from a different part of Christendom. Next, there was a suppression of this all-important fact: that, since the development of the vast critical *apparatus* of our century, the *Textus Receptus*, whether by good fortune

or by the critical sagacity of Erasmus or by the superintendence of a good Providence, *has been found to stand the ordeal amazingly well*, has been accredited instead of discredited by the critical texts. So slight were the modifications in its readings clearly determined by the vast collations made by the critics of the immediately preceding generation, (collations embracing every one of the boasted uncials, except the Sinai MS.,) that of all the important various readings, only one, 1 John v. 7, has been given up to excision by a unanimous consent of competent critics. Now, the state of facts is this: The question is, of the correctness of the *Textus Receptus*. The standard of comparison is the result of the most prudent and extensive collations. The evidence of correctness is simply in the agreement of that result with the received text. If there is that general agreement—as there is—the question of time, whether the text was printed before the result of the collation, does not touch the evidence. Now, our charge is, that this history of the results of the critical work of the age is suppressed in order to disparage the received text. It is well known that after Griesbach, a critic of a revolutionary temper, had issued his text, departing widely from the received one, the steady tendency of later critics, as Hahn, Scholz, etc., guided by wider collations and better critical evidence, has been to return towards the *Textus Receptus*, on many of the readings where Griesbach had departed from it. And now, it is credibly stated that Tischendorf's latest edition, as compared with his earliest, exhibits the same tendency. His first impulse, while excited by his discovery of the Sinai MS. was adverse; but the leaning of his riper experience was more favorable. He also found the "old wine was better."

2. We have left ourselves little time or space for the second branch of the revision, improvements in the translation itself. That a number of the changes are improvements, is undisputed. Under all the heads promised by the Revisers—removal of obsolete archaisms; observance of uniformity in rendering the same words and locutions whenever they occur, in the same way; conforming Hebrew names to the Old Testament spelling; correcting positive errors, and supplying omissions of King James'

version, and removing ambiguities therein—praiseworthy improvements have been made. Two only will be mentioned: Acts xx. 28, ἐπισκόπους, indisputably identified with πρεσβυτέρους, is translated “bishops,” instead of “overseers.” In John viii. 34, Luke xvii. 7 (margin), Titus i. 1 (margin), etc., the word “servant,” which had become ambiguous, meaning in modern English no more than *employé*, is replaced by “bond-servant.” This brings out the true logic of the passages.

But there are other places where greater accuracy or clearness is needed, in which the errors of the old version are perpetuated. Thus: Luke and the apostles always use the two words *οἶκος* and *οἰκία* in precise conformity with their classical meanings. Literally and materially, *οἶκος* is the particular dwelling or apartment occupied by the head of the family and his wife and children; tropically it is the family proper, the parents and their own offspring. Literally, the *οἰκία* is the whole curtilage or premises of the proprietor; tropically, it is the whole household, including slaves and dependents. See this accurate distinction beautifully followed, in both senses, Acts xvi. 31 to 34. But Acts xvi. 15 (Lydia's case), Acts xvi. 32, this distinction is wholly lost in the new version. In 1 Cor. i. 16, and 1 Cor. xvi. 15, the new version exactly reverses the true meaning; making the Apostle do precisely what he says he did not do. What Paul says is, that he baptized the *οἶκος*—house, family proper, of Stephanas; and that his *οἰκία*, household, slaves, and dependents, “addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints.”

In Acts xxvi. 28, 29, the old version: “Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian,” is emasculated by a paraphrase, which is not really a translation: “With but little persuasion thou wouldst fain make me a Christian.” If this has any meaning, it represents Agrippa as either ironically, or resentfully, charging on Paul the insolence of desiring and attempting to make him, the king, a follower of the Nazarene, by slight and trivial persuasions. Now, we submit that this is not the idiomatic force of ἐν ὀλίγῳ; that there is not in the tense or construction of the verb, πείθεις, trace or hint of a conditional proposition; and that the meaning is absolutely out of joint with the following verse.

In Matt. xvi. 26, the famous text on the worth of the soul is spoiled, by reading: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own life?" The advocates of this change admit that *ψυχή* often unquestionably means "soul." But they appeal to that canon of interpretation, that two meanings must never be ascribed to the same word in one context; and then they appeal to the 25th verse, where *ψυχή* is (in the old version as well as the new) rendered, necessarily, "life." "Who-soever will save his *life* shall lose it," etc. But, we reply: the canon is not of universal force, as witness 1 Cor. iii. 17, where *φθειρει* is rendered both "defile" and "destroy," in the same verse. True, the new version, even here, endeavors to carry out its rule: "If any man *destroy* the temple of God, him shall God destroy;" but it is done by outraging the context, and sacrificing the Apostle's true meaning. We reply again, that the rendering of *ψυχή*, by "life," in Matt. xvi. 25, is not necessary. Calvin renders it by *soul*, all through the passage. This is entirely tenable, and, indeed, gives a finer shade of meaning to our Saviour's words. And last, the rendering of *ψυχή*, by "*life*," in the 26th verse does not express our Saviour's meaning. Since the full worldly prosperity, which is contrasted with redemption, implies continued life, he would not have represented the man who *lost his life*, as having "gained the whole world."

But perhaps the most lamentable change is that of 2 Tim. iii. 16. There, the old version correctly renders: Πᾶσα γραφή θεόπνευστος, καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, etc., "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," etc. The enemies of the Bible have long sought to defraud us of this evidence of full inspiration, by making it read: "Every Scripture inspired of God is also profitable," etc. The poisonous suggestion intended is, that among the parts of the "Scripture," some are inspired and some are not. Our Bible contains fallible parts! the very doctrine of the Socinian and Rationalist. This treacherous version the Revisers have gratuitously sanctioned! They have done so against the recorded testimony of their chairman, Bishop Ellicott, Com. on 2 Tim. They have done so against the clear force of the context and the Greek idiom. For there is no doubt, with the

careful reader, that the *πᾶσα γραφή* are meant by Paul to be the *ἱερὰ γράμματα* of verse 15, which unquestionably mean the whole Old Testament Scriptures. Second: Paul leaves us, confessedly, to supply the copula. But it must be supplied between *γραφῆ* and *θεόπνευστος*. "Every Scripture *is* inspired of God," and not between *θεόπνευστος* and *ῥηθίμος*. For this latter construction would make the first adjective qualify the subject, "every Scripture;" and the second adjective would be the predicate of the proposition. Now, it is, at least more natural, that the conjunction *καί* should connect adjectives in a similar construction. Put the copula, as our old version does, after "Scripture," and both the adjectives are predicates, and thus suitably conjoined by the conjunction. Here again, "the old is better."

In conclusion, the Revisers have evidently yielded too much to the desire for change. There is a multitude of needless emendations, of which the least that can be said is, that they are no improvements. The changes have been calculated to average two for each verse of the Gospels and Acts; and three for each verse of the Epistles and Apocalypse. Is this a revision or a new version?

R. L. DABNEY.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We shall, in the pages which immediately follow, make the experiment of giving a somewhat more systematic view than usual of the doings of the booksellers and publishers during the past quarter. Whether we pursue this course on any future occasion is a matter of doubt; and in such preliminary and exceedingly cursory notices as these random jottings, orderly arrangement is perhaps not to be vehemently desiderated.

We shall first take up the broad subject of theology and the religious life; and the first book that presents itself as we approach the counters is a very timely rejoinder¹ to four blatant infidels. The emptiest of these pretentious sciolists is Frothingham, the most learned is Adler, the most notorious is Ingersoll, and the ablest and most ribald is Tom Paine. When the Bishop of Llandaff replied to Paine's "Age of Reason" and Gibbon's chapter against Christianity, he at the same time effectually disposed of their arrogant successors: but Bishop Watson's treatises are not much read now; and besides, every new phase of scepticism demands a fresh and appropriate refutation of its own.

There are many who do not know the prescriptive right that Presbyterians have to the greater part of the English Book of Common Prayer.² Much, and that the choicest portion, of the Anglican Liturgy antedates the Anglican Church; nay, for the matter of that, antedates the Reformation. The forms of the Church of England were submitted to the contemporary theolo-

¹The Age of Unreason: Being a Reply to Thomas Paine, Robert Ingersoll, Felix Adler, the Rev. O. B. Frothingham, and other American Rationalists. By the Rev. Henry N. Braun. 12mo., 116 pp., paper, 50 cents. Martin B. Brown.

²The Book of Common Prayer, and Administration of the Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church, as amended by the Presbyterian Divines in the Royal Commission of 1661, and in agreement with the Directory for Public Worship of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Edited, with a Supplementary Treatise, by Charles W. Shields, D. D. 12mo, 800 pp., \$2. A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

gians of Switzerland, and among others to Calvin himself, for the expression of their judgment, and were on the whole approved, or tolerated, after certain changes had been introduced by the divines of Geneva. If we are to have a liturgy at all, by all means let us have the liturgy of the Fathers. The author of the most interesting chapters in "The Life and Epistles of St. Paul" now appears in the field of apologetics, with an argument¹ relating to the book of Acts. For reasons already hinted at in these pages, we are opposed to all consolidated harmonies of the Gospels.² Dr. Geikie is the same who wrote the life of Christ, and is one of the most competent guides that any one could have amidst the intricacies of Biblical research³ and discovery.

We have lately said our say about F. W. Robertson and his sermons.⁴ He was a most attractive creature personally and by reason of his pathetic biography, and was a man of sterling scholarship and genius, and a man of rare nobility of feeling and character; but was radically unsound on some of the most vital points in theology. The pastor of the First Presbyterian church of New York is a trustworthy advocate,⁵ as well as an able and eloquent representative, of the Presbyterian Church in this country. Bishop Penick, of the Protestant Episcopal Church, once resided, if our memory is not at fault, in Liberia, but is now attached to the diocese of Cape Palmas. A friend who has

¹ Evidential Value of the Acts of the Apostles. By Dean Howson. 12mo, 150 pp., \$1. E. P. Dutton & Co.

² The Gospel History: Consolidated Gospels, with Notes Original and Selected. By James R. Gilmore and Lyman Abbott. 16mo., 840 pp., red edges, \$1.75. Fords, Howard & Hulbert.

³ Hours with the Bible; or, The Scriptures in the Light of Modern Discovery and Knowledge, from the Creation to the Patriarchs. By Cunningham Geikie, D. D. Illustrated. 12mo. 512 pp., \$1.50. Jas. Pott.

⁴ The Human Race, and Other Sermons: Preached at Cheltenham, Oxford, and Brighton. By the late Rev. Frederick W. Robertson, M. A., Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton. 12mo., \$1. Harper & Brothers.

⁵ The Mission of the Presbyterian Church: A Sermon Delivered at the Opening of the Second Council of the Presbyterian Alliance, at Philadelphia, September 23, 1880. By the Rev. Wm. M. Paxton, D. D. 16mo, 36 pp., paper, 10 cents. A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

read it vouches for the goodness of his little book,¹ which is "all about Jesus." There is possibly room for still another attempt to reconcile the record of Moses² with the disclosures of physical science. Since Paley's era the subject of natural theology has been vastly enlarged and has assumed altogether new aspects. The present work is strongly recommended by its authorship.³ Dr. Schaff's little contribution to the "Ecce Homo" controversy⁴ is one of his happiest efforts. The force of the argument is increased by the array of testimonies extorted from the adversary. We have seen a number of books on the topic of heavenly recognition,⁵ and they have all favored the view that such recognition will take place. The surprising thing is that such discussions should be needed. We maintain that under so broad a description as "The Religions of China,"⁶ Buddhism ought to have the place of prominence; we question, indeed, whether Confucianism is, properly speaking, a religion at all. Ritualism is a term of rather vague popular significance. The exact boundary lines have been laid down, however, in the courts of law. The precise amount and nature of ceremonial that is authorised by long usage and church sanction can also be best ascertained by reference to the legal decisions.⁷

¹ More than a Prophet. By Charles Clifton Penick, D. D., Bishop of Cape Palmas. 12mo, \$1. T. Whitaker.

² The Mosaic Record and Modern Science. By L. T. Townsend, D. D. Square 12mo, 86 pp., 75 cents. Howard Gannett.

³ The Principles of Natural Theology. By John Bascom. 12mo, \$1.50. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

⁴ The Person of Christ: The Miracle of History. With a Reply to Strauss and Renan, and a Collection of Testimonies of Unbelievers. By Philip Schaff, D. D. New edition. 12mo, 293 pp., \$1.25. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁵ Recognition in Heaven. By the Rev. M. Rhodes, D. D. 18mo, 132 pp., 50 cents; gilt, 75 cents. Lutheran Publication Society.

⁶ The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism Described and Compared with Christianity. By James Legge. 12mo, 320 pp., \$1.50. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁷ The Ritual Law of the Church of England as exhibited by Recent Decisions in Ritual Cases. 16mo, 71 pp., paper, 15 cents. Evangelical Knowledge Society.

Dr. Bevan is one of the several trans-atlantic ministers who have accepted calls to Northern pulpits, and is the present incumbent of the well-known Brick church in New York, formerly under the joint charge of Dr. Spring and Dr. Wm. J. Hoge. Dr. Bevan's Sermons¹ were mentioned in our April number. The highly respectable source from which the elaborate work emanates that has been recently issued by Messrs. J. C. McCurdy & Co. on the varied corroborations of the truth of Scripture,² affords presumptive indication of its excellence and value. An original and epigrammatic London preacher and author has hit upon a truly fortunate title for his latest volume.³ The attention now given to the labors of the revisers must whet the interest in everything pertaining to the early versions. The very first of these in English, and the very first vernacular Bible in modern Europe, is the great work of that sarcastic, but humane, teacher, who has been styled "The Morning Star of the Reformation."⁴

The services are conducted in the Scotch church, Regent's Square, London, in such a way as to point to the eminent fitness of Dr. Dykes for the task he has taken in hand in this little guide to family devotions.⁵ We have more than once hitherto pronounced favorably upon the Commentaries of Dr. Henry Cowles.⁶ If the Dr. Washburn who now writes on the Commandments⁷ be

¹ Sermons to Students and Thoughtful Persons. By Llewelyn D. Bevan, D. D., LL.D. 12mo., 345 pp., \$1.25. D. Appleton & Co.

² The Testimony of the Ages; or, Confirmations of the Scriptures from a Variety of Sources. By Robert W. Morris, D. D. 8vo, 1,000 pp., \$3.75: half Turkey, \$5.25. J. C. McCurdy & Co.

³ These Sayings of Mine: Pulpit Notes on Seven Chapters of the First Gospels, and Other Sermons. By Joseph Parker, D. D. With an Introduction by Chas. F. Deems, LL.D. 8vo, 306 pp., \$1.50. I. K. Funk & Co.

⁴ John Wycliffe and the First English Bible. An Oration by Richard S. Storrs, D. D. 8vo, 85 pp., paper, 50 cents. A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

⁵ Daily Prayers for the Household. By S. Oswald Dykes, D. D. 12mo. 270 pp., \$1.25. Robert Carter & Brothers.

⁶ Luke, the Gospel History, and the Acts of the Apostles. With Notes Critical, Explanatory, and Practical. By the Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. 12mo, \$2. D. Appleton & Co.

⁷ The Social Law of God: Sermons on the Ten Commandments. By Dr. Washburn. A New Edition, with a Sketch of the Author's Life and Work. 12mo, \$1.50. T. Whitaker.

the same who, a year or two ago, contributed his part to the so-called "Symposium" in the *North American Review* on "Inspiration," what he utters should be accurately weighed before it is accepted. Probably what he now has to say is not justly liable to censure. Mr. Spurgeon puts Young¹ as far above Cruden as Cruden himself was above all who preceded him as makers of Scripture Concordances; and it is plain, in addition, that the man to whom we are thus indebted for the Analytical Concordance, is the man of all others to give us the Supplementary Analytical Treasury.² Nor does it well admit of debate that the same indefatigable scholar is a good man to give us the "Biblical Notes and Queries,"³ and, what is still more remarkable, "A New Version of the Holy Bible."⁴ The busy pastor of "The Church of the Strangers" has rendered service to a multitude of persons by lifting up his voice lately in behalf of daily worship in the household.⁵ Crutches are good things, and so are books of illustrations;⁶ but he who can do without these artificial helps is better off than is he who has to use them. The Sunday-School Union is to be thanked for setting before the people in a cheap and readable form the meaning, the scope, and the limitations of the work of Biblical revision.⁷

The one book that has riveted all eyes during the last few weeks, and the book that has attracted to itself incomparably more wide-spread and more earnest scrutiny than any other that

¹ The Analytical Concordance to the Bible. Fourth revised edition. By Robert Young, LL.D. 4to, 1,090 pp., \$3.65. I. K. Funk & Co.

² The Analytical Bible Treasury: Being Appendixes to the Analytical Bible Concordance. By Robert Young, LL.D. 4to, \$4. *Ibid.*

³ Biblical Notes and Queries. By Robert Young, LL.D. \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴ A New Version of the Holy Bible. By Robert Young, LL.D. 8vo, 750 pp., \$4. *Ibid.*

⁵ The Home Altar: An Appeal for Family Worship. With Prayers and Hymns, etc., for Family Use. By the Rev. Charles F. Deems, D. D., LL.D. New edition. 12mo, 282 pp., 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁶ The Preacher's Cabinet: A Handbook of Illustrations. By the Rev. Edward P. Thwing, A. M. A new edition. 2 vols., 12mo, 144 pp., paper, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

⁷ Revision: Its Necessity and Purpose. Fourth revised edition. 12mo, 192 pp., 50 cents. The American Sunday-School Union.

ever was printed, is the Revised New Testament.^{1 2} This is not the place in which to make a formal critical examination of a publication at once so universally familiar and so unspeakably important. We content ourselves with the expression of the confident hope that the spirit and manner in which the task has been executed will prove to have been in the main extremely conservative, and of thanks to God that this revision has become already, and is destined to become still more in future, a potent instrumentality for the diffusion and dissemination of the seed of the inspired word. Every one acquainted with the English language is now more than ever before disposed to read in his "own tongue the wonderful works of God." Dr. Roberts's companion volume³ is an admirable performance, and besides being an almost indispensable introduction to the revised Scriptures, is an exceedingly useful *vade mecum* in certain branches of biblical literature. The variety and inexpensiveness, as well as great beauty, of the editions offered for sale leave nothing to be desired, and silence the malevolent whisper of detraction. The force, the terseness, and the popularity of "Barnes's Notes" have long been fully recognised. Mr. Barnes's theology has been justly condemned on some points, but is less conspicuous, especially in its distinctive peculiarity, in his exegetical volumes than in his professedly controversial writings. We should say that his "Notes

¹ The New Testament. Revised Version. Authorised editions. 32mo. paper, 18 cents; cloth, 23 cents; French morocco, 65 cents; Venetian morocco, 80 cents; Turkey morocco, \$1.75 and \$2.50; Levant morocco, \$4. 16mo. cloth, 55 cents; French morocco, \$1.50; Turkey morocco, \$2.25; Levant morocco, \$5.25. 8vo. cloth, \$1; Venetian morocco, \$1.80; Turkey morocco, \$3.25 and \$4.50; Levant morocco, \$7.50. 8vo. cloth, \$2.50; Turkey morocco, \$7; Levant morocco, \$10. 8vo. cloth, \$4; Turkey morocco, \$10.50; Levant morocco, \$16. I. K. Funk & Co.

² The New Testament. Revised Version. Authorised editions. 16mo., 375 pp., paper, 30 cents; cloth, 40 cents; extra cloth, 50 cents; morocco, \$1.25; Turkey morocco, \$2. N. Tibbals & Sons.

³ A Companion to the Revised Version of the English New Testament. By Alexander Roberts, D. D. With Explanations by a Member of the American Committee. 16mo, 224 pp., 75 cents; paper, 25 cents. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co.; I. K. Funk & Co.

on Daniel"¹ and on Job² are preferable on this score, as well as on certain other grounds, to his "Notes on Isaiah."³ It will be noticed, however, that Mr. Barnes was progressive rather than conservative in his view of the famous disputed passages in Job. By the bye, Mr. Barnes was never willingly addressed as "Doctor" during his life-time.

The Newark theologian has proved himself more than a match this time for the Archbishop of Baltimore.⁴ The neological tendencies and views of Professor Robertson Smith, of Aberdeen, and the Church censures to which he has been subjected, have lent an adventitious importance to the opinions of that learned, skilful, insidious, and dangerous heresiarch.⁵ "Nevertheless, the foundation of God standeth sure." A bulwark in front of the outer defences of the Christian system has been erected in the form of a historical argument involving a criticism of the eighteenth century infidelity⁶ by that grand old champion of the faith who is regarded as at once the pillar and the ornament of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland—Dr. John Cairns, so well remembered by those who attended the Council in Philadelphia.

We now approach the subject of Philosophy, including Metaphysics and all the immediately related branches. Under this and the subsequent heads, however, we shall study brevity. We lead off with the simple mention of Mr. Farrar's critique on "the father of political economy,"⁷ as he has so often been called. Mr.

¹ Notes on Daniel. By Albert Barnes, [D. D.] 12mo, \$1.50. R. Worthington.

² Notes on Job. By Albert Barnes, [D. D.] 2 vols., 12mo, \$3. *Ibid.*

³ Notes on Isaiah. By Albert Barnes, [D. D.] 2 vols., 12mo, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴ The Faith of our Forefathers: An Examination of Archbishop Gibbon's "The Faith of our Fathers." By the Rev. Edward J. Stearns, D. D. 12mo, 380 pp., \$1; paper, 60 cents. T. Whitaker.

⁵ The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism with Notes. By W. Robertson Smith, M. A. 12mo, \$1.75. D. Appleton & Co.

⁶ Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century. The Cunningham Lectures for 1880. By John Cairns, D. D. 8vo, \$4.20. Scribner & Welford.

⁷ Adam Smith. By J. Farrar, M. A. (English Philosophers.) 8vo., \$1.25. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Leslie Stephen ¹ is one of the most acute, accomplished, courageous, and narrow-minded of contemporary writers. He belongs to the extremest school of what is known as the "advanced thought" of England. His critical and literary essays are especially deserving of occasional perusal, but everything he writes is marked by large information, bold independence of opinion, and incisive vigor of diction. Sir William Hamilton ² for erudition, and for perspicacity and massive strength, as well as nimble elasticity of intellect, is one of the prodigies of all the ages. Had his synthetic powers equalled his analytical, he might have been a second Aristotle. The name of Bascom ³ has already been uttered with respect in this article. Bishop Berkeley ⁴ was at once the pioneer idealist, a great philosopher, and a master of elegant and idiomatic English. After Bacon, the most influential thinker of the century was unquestionably the author of "The Art of Free-thinking." ⁵

The school of English materialists is represented by the names of Hartley and James Mill, whose views are discussed by an expert in such matters and in an octavo volume. ⁶ As Berkeley was the first to announce the doctrine of subjective idealism (though not under that name) in England, so was Fichte ⁷ the first to promulgate this destructive hypothesis (though by a different method, and in the use of another nomenclature) in Germany. Personally, Fichte was a man of lofty and winning character.

¹ Sir William Hamilton. (English Philosophers.) By W. H. S. Monk. 8vo, 192 pp., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

² English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. By Leslie Stephen. 2 vols., 8vo, \$8. *Ibid.*

³ The Science of Mind. By John Bascom. 8vo, 192 pp., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁴ Berkeley. With a portrait. By Professor A. Campbell Fraser, LL. D. (Philosophical Classics, edited by William Knight, LL.D., M. A.) \$1.25. J. B. Lippincott & Co.

⁵ Descartes. By Professor Mahaffy. (Philosophical Classics, edited by Wm. Knight, LL.D.) With a portrait. Crown 8vo, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁶ Hartley and James Mill. (English Philosophers.) By Professor G. S. Bower. 8vo, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁷ Fichte. By Professor Adamson. (Philosophic Classics for English Readers, edited by Wm. Knight, LL.D.) With a portrait. 12mo, \$1.25. J. B. Lippincott & Co.

The name and career of this earliest champion of Teutonic pantheism furnishes the theme of discourse to Professor Adamson. The name "Stille" also has a German sound about it. It would appear that he takes sides with the Necessitarians¹ in the great controversy as to the extent and origin, as well as nature, of causation. As closely related to philosophy, we may consider political and social science, and economics. The "cause" of liquor prohibition² is gaining new adherents every day. We are not as yet written down amongst the converts, but we are open to conviction. Whatever may be said against Mr. Royall's³ "tone," little, we suspect, can be said against *his facts*, and nothing, we are persuaded, can be insinuated with any semblance of truth against his honesty, his intelligence, his information, or his manly courage. Why not "Chinese Immigration"⁴ also in its political aspects? The question as to the propriety of interdicting Chinese immigration is largely implicated with the question as to the propriety of maintaining or repealing the Burlingame treaty. We confess we are sick and tired of the Irish Land League, and the other native measures of redress.⁵ We admit the wrong, but protest against the remedy. The extent and degree of the evils complained of, though the evils exist and are considerable, have also, we believe, been much exaggerated and unduly harped upon.

Under the wide topic of general literature, we take up first history and biography. Such a classic as Macaulay⁶ is beyond

¹ Universal Necessity. By W. Stille, Ph.D. Crown 8vo, 35 pp., paper, 25 cents. C. Witter.

² The State and the Liquor Traffic. By Ezra M. Hunt, M. D. National Temperance Society.

³ Reply to "A Fool's Errand." By William L. Royall. Third edition. With sixty-four pages of new matter. 12mo, 160 pp., paper, 40 cents. E. J. Hale & Sons.

⁴ Chinese Immigration, in its Social and Economical Aspects. By George F. Seward. 8vo, 430 pp., \$2.50. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁵ The Irish Land Question. By Henry George. 16mo, 85 pp., paper. D. Appleton & Co.

⁶ A History of England. By Thomas Babington Macaulay. A new edition. 2 vols., royal 8vo., 2,300 pp., \$3; sheep, \$4; half morocco, \$5. W. T. Amies.

the reach even of the most imposing criticism. It is our humble opinion, however, that the work will live more as a noble specimen of English than as an unvarnished recital of facts, or as a trustworthy exposition of principles. We know of scarcely any writer since Thucydides who combines so remarkably as Mr. J. R. Green ¹ the power of compression and historic fore-shortening, with critical insight, graphic portraiture, and unaffected weight and simplicity of style. We refer chiefly to his "*short*" history. We must, notwithstanding, utter a *caveat* against Mr. Green's religious attitude, and the shallowness and flippancy of some of his strictures on the Calvinistic Reformers. Mr. Green's posture in relation to this matter seems to be almost identical with that of Erasmus, More, and the friends of "The New Learning." Guizot's History of France is the best that has yet appeared in English, and the abridgment ² will make it still more available to the bulk of English readers. Carlyle's Frederick is the great thing to read on "Fritz" and his time. The next best thing on the subject (at least after allowing for its size) is Macaulay's famous essay. Intermediate between these, on the score of fullness, is the narrative by Mr. Longman in the "Epochs" Series. ³ The history of Greece by a Greek ⁴ is furnished by the Appletons. The smaller work of Mr. Steele ⁵ may fitly accompany and supplement the larger work of Mr. Rawlinson on a kindred subject. Mr. Froude in his history of England under Elizabeth makes ample acknowledgment of the tyranny exercised over Ireland:

¹ A History of the English People. By John Richard Green. 2 vols., 1,400 pp., \$1; half Russia, \$2. The American Book Exchange.

² Outlines of the History of France. By Francis P. G. Guizot. Abridged and edited by Gustave Masson. Second edition. Illustrated. Svo, 620 pp., \$3. Estes & Lauriat.

³ Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War. By F. W. Longman. (Epochs of Modern History.) 12mo, \$1. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁴ A History of Greece: From the Earliest Times to the Present. By T. T. Timayenis. With maps and illustrations. 2 vols., 12mo, \$3.50. D. Appleton & Co.

⁵ A Brief History of Ancient Peoples: With an Account of their Monuments, Literature, and Manners. By I. Dorman Steele. 12mo, 350 pp., \$1.25. A. S. Barnes & Co.

but in later publications he has made a mortal foe of every Irishman.¹

As a connecting link between history and biography, we insert the last instalments of Prince Metternich's Memoirs,² which have already been sufficiently signalled in these casual references. We merely add that there is too much pudding to the plums, and the pudding is not always easily digestible. If Mr. Froude has raised up a cloud of enemies by his diatribes against the Irish and against a pure Christianity, he has not fared much better with the posthumous reminiscences of the great literary dictator and iconoclast of England in the nineteenth century.³ These *ana* are not thought to be worthy of the grim old Scotchman, or even fairly to represent him. Mr. Froude claims, however, that the responsibility rests wholly on Carlyle, and that his editor is but executing a sacred trust in publishing these materials. The "Great Singers"⁴ of Europe, and the average lawyers⁵ of a part of the southwestern portion of North America, both come in for a share of attention at the hands of readers who relish anecdote and personal gossip. After Middleton's and Farrar's lives of Cicero, we now have another and still more popular, though less important, one by Anthony Trollope.⁶ The private life of the historian of civilisation, and afterwards of France and England,

¹The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century. By James Anthony Froude. New edition, with a Supplementary Chapter. 3 vols., crown 8vo, gilt top, \$4.50. Charles Scribner's Sons.

²The Memoirs of Prince Metternich. Vols. III. and IV., 1815-29, containing particulars of the Congresses of Laibach, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Verona, and the Eastern War of 1829. Edited by his son, Prince Richard Metternich. Translated by Robina Napier. 2 vols, 8vo, 682, 650 pp. \$2.50 a volume. *Ibid.*

³Reminiscences. By Thomas Carlyle. Edited, with a Preface, by James Anthony Froude. With silhouettes. 8vo, 550 pp., gilt top, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Great Singers. Second Series. Malibran to Titjens. By George T. Ferris. 18mo, 60 cents; paper, 30 cents. D. Appleton & Co.

⁵The Bench and Bar of Mississippi. By J. D. Lynch. 8vo., 540 pp., sheep, \$10. E. J. Hale & Son.

⁶The Life of Cicero. By Anthony Trollope. 2 vols, 12mo, 347, 346 pp., \$3. Harper & Brothers.

is here delineated in the most alluring colors,¹ and must have been all that his fervent admirers could have wished. The great English surgeon² and the great English lexicographer³ are this quarter made the subject of biographical eulogy and criticism. The unpretending brochure of Mr. Waller has an especially attractive title-page. "Time doth not stale the infinite variety" of the moods and phases in which we find it possible to contemplate the author of *Rasselas* and "The Vanity of Human Wishes."

From biography the transition is easy to other and more varied forms of literature. The pressure of our limits does not, however, allow us to do more than glance at the assortment of new volumes of this description. The fountal sources of our mother tongue⁴ are getting to be more and more studied by scholars, and with more and more of enthusiasm and enlightened zeal. The great writers are like nature in this, that they reward the most patient and repeated scrutiny. Of all such writers (we refer, of course, to uninspired writers), Homer and Shakespeare^{5 6} are the two which most resemble nature in this particular as in some other things. Few of our men of learning and thought have deserved better at the hands of discerning readers than the late Professor Lieber;⁷ and notwithstanding certain aberrations of opinion and sympathy on his part, the people of the South are still not unwilling to claim a modest share in his honorable fame. Mr. Hall

¹ Monsieur Guizot in Private Life. 1787-1874. By Mme. de Witt. Translated from the French by M. C. M. Simpson. 8vo, 360 pp., \$2.75. Estes & Lauriat.

² John Hunter, the Father of Scientific Surgery, with an Account of his Pupils. By Samuel D. Gross. With a portrait. 8vo, 106 pp., \$1.50. Presly-Blakiston.

³ Boswell and Johnson: Their Companions and Their Contemporaries. By J. F. Waller, LL.D. 184 pp., 50 cents; paper, 25 cents.

⁴ A Syllabus of Anglo-Saxon Literature. By J. M. Hart. 8vo, 69 pp., paper, 50 cents. R. Clarke & Son.

⁵ Shakespeare: His Mind and His Art. By Edward Dowden. 12mo, \$1.75. Harper & Brothers.

⁶ Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity. By Paul Stapher. Translated from the French by Emily J. Curdy. 12mo, \$4.80. Scribner & Welford.

⁷ The Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber. 2 vols., 8vo, \$6. J. B. Lippincott & Co.

(perhaps we should say "Doctor" Hall) has chosen a most suggestive and fruitful theme for a volume which is issued by the Osgoods.¹

From criticism to poetry we pass by an almost insensible gradation. We welcome and applaud the new "Library" of devotional songs and metrical pieces.² The accomplished skill of the collectors assures the quality of the things here miscellaneously heaped together. The idea of minute classification in editions like that of Mr. Foster³ is not so much to our taste; but all decent dictionaries and capable cyclopædias are to be hailed with satisfaction. We have known scholars, and good and ripe ones too, who preferred the "Georgics"⁴ to all the other writings of the fastidious and elegant Roman who was also the author of the *Æneid* and the *Eclogues*. Certainly the labors of the field and the rustic life in general have never been so delightfully portrayed by any bard, or indeed by any pen. We are glad to have a thesaurus of the best English sonnets;⁵ albeit the restrictions that are imposed on the best sonnet in any language do not admit of the loftiest attainments in the way of excellence. "Miss Muloch" (as she is still most widely recognised) is equally good in prose and in verse.⁶ We close our list by directing the regards of our readers to the poems of that gifted and sainted woman, Miss Havergal.⁷

¹ *Aspects of German Culture*. By G. Stanley Hall, Ph. D. 12mo. 320 pp., \$1.50. James R. Osgood & Co.

² *The Library of Religious Poetry: A Collection of the Best Poems of all Ages, with Biographical and Literary Notes*. Edited by Philip Schaff, D. D., and Arthur Gilman. Illustrated. 8vo, 1,004 pp., \$5. Dodd, Mead & Co.

³ *Cyclopædia of Poetry*. Second Series. Embracing Poems descriptive of the Scenes, Incidents, Persons, and Places of the Bible. Also Indexes to Foster's Cyclopædias. By the Rev. Edward Foster. 8vo, 748 pp., \$5: sheep, \$6. Thomas W. Crowell.

⁴ *The Georgics of Vergil*. Translated by Harriet W. Preston. 18mo. 153 pp., \$1. James R. Osgood & Co.

⁵ *The Treasury of English Sonnets*. By A. David William. 8vo, 480 pp., gilt top, \$2.50. R. Worthington.

⁶ *Thirty Years: Being Poems New and Old*. By the Author of "John Halifax, Gentleman." 16mo, 520 pp., gilt top. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

⁷ *The Complete Poems of Frances Ridley Havergal*. Square 16mo. 464 pp., \$1.75: gilt edges, \$2. E. P. Dutton & Co.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW

Is published Quarterly, in January, April, July, and October.

TERMS.—Three Dollars per Volume, payable in advance. Single numbers, One Dollar.

☞ All business communications should be addressed to the Proprietor, JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C. No subscription discontinued until a special order is given, and all arrearages are paid, or after the first number of a volume is published.

☞ A few complete sets of the back volumes can be had at Three Dollars per volume. Single back volumes, when they can be furnished without breaking a set, Two Dollars per volume.

☞ Ministers of the Gospel, and others, who shall obtain three new subscribers, and remit the regular price, (Three Dollars each,) will be entitled to a copy of the REVIEW for one year, or, if they so prefer, one dollar for each new subscriber.

☞ Subscribers changing their Post Office are requested to give immediate notice of the same to the Publisher; or their REVIEW will be sent to their former office.

☞ The Editors of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW think it is due to themselves and to their subscribers to announce that they do not endorse in every particular what is uttered in their pages. Each author is responsible for the views he expresses. This is a matter of convenience where there are minor differences between editors themselves, or between them and their brethren. Free discussion, too, is important to the interests of truth, if kept within just limits. These limits must be strictly observed. Editors would be worthy of censure, should they allow opinions to be expressed, subversive of any doctrine of the gospel; nor would it be becoming to allow their own views, or those of their contributors, to be rudely attacked in their own pages.

Their desire is, to make the REVIEW worthy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States—the representative of its views and its literature, the means of disseminating sound doctrine, and a stimulus to the genius and talent of our ministers and people.

THE
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

Vol. XXXII.

OCTOBER, MDCCCLXXXI.

No. 4.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. OUR CHURCH POLICY.—SHALL IT BE PROGRESS OR PETREFACT- TION? By the Rev. J. A. QUARLES, Lexington, Mo.	597
II. THE DIACONATE AGAIN. By the Rev. Professor J. L. GIRARDEAU, D. D., LL.D., Columbia, S. C.,	628
III. A CENTURY OF A PRESBYTERY. By Professor J. T. L. PRESTON, LL.D., Lexington, Va.,	665
IV. GOD'S MARRIAGE LAW.	682
V. REMISSION OF SINS IN IMMERSION. AND THE BOOK OF THE ACTS. By the Rev. Dr. WM. STODDERT, D. D., Cumberland Co., Va., .	706
VI. THE SOUTH VINDICATED FROM THE CHARGE OF TREASON AND REBELLION. By the Rev. Dr. Wm. E. Boggs, Atlanta, Ga., .	743
VII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.	797—805

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1881.

With the address of each subscriber, we now print the date of the last number for which he has paid. For example, those who have paid in full for the current volume—Vol. XXXII.—will find after their names, "Oct. '81," which means that they have paid for the October number of 1881, and of course for all preceding it. If any one has paid for all past volumes, and one dollar on XXXII., he will find "Jan." or 'Jny, '81 and 25c.;" which means that he has paid for the January number of 1881, and 25 cents on the April number. And so in other cases.

Those who have not paid for the current volume will confer a favor by forwarding the amount due to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C.

In compliance with the wishes of many friends, it is announced that hereafter, *as a general rule*, the names of writers for this REVIEW will be attached to their articles, and the initials of each to the critical notices.

The REVIEW will continue to be, as it has always been, an open journal, favoring free discussion within limits. More than ever it is desired to make it a representative of our whole Church, as its name imports, and a faithful exponent of the Calvinistic Theology and the Presbyterian Polity.

Communications for its pages may be addressed to JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C., or to ROBERT L. DABNEY, Hampden Sidney, Virginia, or to JOHN B. ADGER, Pendleton, South Carolina.

A more generous support by Southern Presbyterians would enable the proprietor to make the work more worthy of its name.

[Entered at the Post-Office at Columbia, S. C., as second-class postal matter.]

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

VOL. XXXII.—NO. 4.

OCTOBER, MDCCCLXXXI.

ARTICLE I.

OUR CHURCH POLICY—SHALL IT BE PROGRESS OR PETRIFICATION?

ARE THERE TO BE NO CHANGES?

Of the five grand divisions of revealed truth—Theology, Anthropology, Soteriology, Ecclesiology, and Eschatology—it is well known that the faith of the Church as to the first three has been definitely settled. As to the latter two, it is different. Questions of eschatology have furnished the basis for the wildest vagaries and speculations: while in church polity the deviations from the scriptural standard were early and are radical.

The mind of the Church is not yet determined even as to the fundamental questions of ecclesiology; for we have the monarchic, aristocratic, republican, and democratic policies, all maintained and practised to-day. Within the limits of these radical theories there are variant and discordant opinions. This is seen in our republican Presbyterianism. The mother Church of Scotland has never had but one theology; she has had, however, two books of discipline. In this country we adopted neither of the Scotch formularies, but took the English Westminster, and modified it. Under this we had repeated, prolonged, and bitter controversies. We have revised, developed, pruned, and greatly improved it in our present Book of Church Order. But

it is manifest that the thoughtful and progressive element in the Church is not yet satisfied. No one wishes to change our Confession of Faith or Catechisms; but there are many who believe that we have not yet succeeded in developing and perfecting a pure scriptural Presbyterianism.

The reason for this unsettled state of belief as to ecclesiastical questions is not difficult to find. Matters of theology, anthropology, and soteriology, are fundamental and essential to salvation. They are therefore fully and clearly revealed. Church polity, while important to the perfection of belief, is not of the essence of saving faith. It has pleased the inspiring Spirit accordingly to make it less fully the matter of direct revelation, and to leave it largely to the sphere of "good and necessary consequences."

The issues involved in Retrenchment and Reform are partly of principle and partly of expediency. The former are the more important, and require the more careful discussion, because they are fundamental and determinative of the practical issues involved. Moreover, these theoretical points lie at the root of the ecclesiastical tree, and their determination involves the perfection of our Presbyterian system.

There are questions here of order, and questions of jurisdiction. The first relate to both of the orders of church officers, the deacon and the bishop.

As to the DEACON, there are issues as to his functions and as to his sphere. As to the *functions* of the deacon, is he merely an almoner? Do his duties relate exclusively to the care of the poor? Or, on the other hand, is he the financial officer of the Church, to whom all of its secular affairs are to be committed?

I. The teachings of the Scriptures are to be first consulted. There are probably but three passages in which the deacon, as an officer of the Church, is distinctly referred to. Two of these are Phil. i. 1, and 1 Tim. iii. 8-13. As bearing upon the issue now before us, these texts teach an important truth, that deacons and bishops are *distinct* officers. The pertinency of this will appear as the discussion proceeds. In accordance with this, the Westminster Form of Government, Chap. VI., declares that "the

Scriptures clearly point out deacons as distinct officers in the Church." There are two orders of officers in the church. It is not a mere distinction of grade, but of order or office.

The classic passage, however, is Acts vi. 1-7. 1. That the officers here chosen were deacons, is the traditional, the catholic, and the present interpretation. Moreover, the word deacon is twice used in the original. "The daily ministrations" is the daily deaconing. "To serve tables" is to deacon tables.

The passage may not have been primarily designed to set forth the institution of the office, but merely as an introduction to the martyrdom of Stephen, as Olshausen and others contend. Indeed, this may not be the original appointment of deacons. It is most probable that it was not. Who was it that, prior to this, had done the daily ministering, and of whom complaint was made to the apostles? Surely it was not the apostles, as some think. The murmuring was by the Grecians against the Hebrews. It is therefore decidedly probable, as the new deacons were Gentiles, that the distribution had before been made by Hebrew deacons. However all this may be, the passage is the divine record of the appointment and functions of the deacon.

2. The text teaches, as do the others where the deacon is referred to, that deacons and bishops are distinct officers. No truth can be plainer than this. Here they are set forth not only as separate, but as strongly contrasted offices.

3. The *raison d'être* of the deacon is here clearly stated to be to relieve the bishops of duties which they could not properly discharge.

4. The reason why the bishops required this relief was not simply, nor mainly, because they had not sufficient leisure. It is not merely because they had other duties, but because those other duties were not germane. The contrast is between the duties. Their calling was a different and a higher one. They could not leave it for the serving of tables.

5. The functions appropriate to the bishop, as distinct from the deacon, are prayer and the ministry of the word.

6. *The whole passage is typical and representative.* The apostles here confessedly represent all ministers. The deacons

here represent all deacons. The congregation represents all congregations. The election of the deacons by the people represents the republican principle in the organisation of the church. Ordination of the deacons by prayer and the laying on of hands, represents the ordination of all church officers. The neglected Grecian widows represent all the needy Hellenists. The needy Hellenists represent all of God's poor of every age and country. No one will dispute any of these statements. If, then, in these seven particulars, this passage is typical, are we not bound to believe that the care of the poor is itself a typical, representative, illustrative function? That it was the purpose of the divine Spirit in this to embody and represent all similar work; to set forth the deacon as the relief of the bishop from all financial or secular concerns of the Church? The conclusion seems irresistible.

7. The object of the appointment of the deacon was to relieve the other officer of the Church. This is clear. Is not the management of the finances of the Church as incompatible with the duties of the ministry as the care of the poor? Is it not even more so? Must not the deacons therefore be intrusted with it?

8. There are manifestly two classes of officers in the Church. There are also two classes of ecclesiastical functions, the purely spiritual, and the secular or financial. Now, can it be the divine arrangement that the bishop shall discharge all the purely spiritual functions and a large share of the secular also? Or, can it be, as asserted by Dr. Lefevre, that no provision has been made for the discharge of these necessary ecclesiastical, secular functions, outside of the care of the poor? Is it not as clear as light, that the two classes of functions correspond to the two classes of officers; that the bishops are to attend to the spiritual, and the deacons to the secular, affairs of the Church?

9. The same conclusion may be reached on the very ground of those strict constructionists, who would limit the diaconal functions to the care of the poor. Who are the Lord's poor? Are widows, orphans, the destitute, alone? Are not the Lord's ministers—candidates, licentiates, ordained—who have consecrated themselves to his service, and have surrendered all earthly

avocations or means of support? Are not the Lord's missionaries, foreign and home, who have denied themselves the comforts as well as the luxuries of life, and who are dependent for their bread upon the sustenance of the Church? Are not all the Lord's churches and enterprises which, in the very nature of the case, can be sustained only from the contributions of his people? In a word, are not all of the Lord's people and causes that are destitute of secular means of support? If, therefore, the deacon was appointed to administer the finances of the church for the benefit of the Lord's poor, to him must be committed the collection and distribution of *all* the charitable contributions of the people.

II. So far in discussing the functions of the diaconate, we have had constantly in view the teachings of the Scriptures. We now turn to the standards of the Church. In the masterly report made to the Synod of South Carolina on THE DIACONATE, and published in this REVIEW, January, 1880, pp. 130-133, will be found extracts from The Discipline of the Reformed Churches of France, The First Book of Discipline and The Second Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland, and from the Acts of the Free Church of Scotland, all asserting the common belief, as substantially stated in the Second Book of Discipline: "Their (the deacons') office and power is to receive and distribute the whole ecclesiastical goods."

The record of our Church is not so satisfactory. It shows growth, however. Every intelligent Presbyterian knows that the state of opinion and the practice of the American Church, on the diaconate, are not at all what they ought to be. There are large sections of the Church which are corrupted with Congregational views and practices. This was manifest in the discussions of the Peoria Assembly, 1863, as to the Old School Presbyterian Church of the North at that time. Trustees and committee-men occupy the place which properly belongs to the deacon.

Both our old Form of Government and our new state that, to the deacons "may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the church." While this language is not

what we think truth requires, yet, if the deacons may properly manage the temporal affairs, and it is no where said that any one else may, it surely indicates that they are the officers for the work. To those who believe that what is not commanded is forbidden, these compromise expressions are out of place in a book professedly founded on the word of God.

Our new Form of Government has made an advance on the old in the statement, Chap. IV., Sec. 4, § 2. that the duties of the diaconal "office especially relate to the care of the poor *and* to the collection and distribution of the offerings of the people for pious uses, under the direction of the Session." Here it is distinctly asserted that the functions of the deacon are not limited to the care of the poor, but extend to all offerings for pious purposes.

III. It is shown by extracts from their writings, in the Report to the Synod of South Carolina, before mentioned, that the standard theologians and ecclesiastics have been agreed upon this point, that the deacons are the divinely ordained financial officers of the church, and that their functions are not exhausted in the care of the poor. Such were the views, as there set forth, of Eusebius, Origen, Sozomen, Calvin, Steuart of Pardovan, Alex. Henderson, Dickson, Juno. Owen, Lightfoot, Ridgeley, Samuel Miller, Thos. Smyth, and, *facile princeps inter pares*, Thornwell. Says Thornwell, Vol. IV., p. 201: "It must be perfectly obvious to every candid mind, that the entire secular business of the Church was intrusted to the deacons."

As to the *sphere* of the deacon, the question is more interesting, because it is newer and more warmly contested. The one party asserts that the deacon's sphere is exclusively congregational; that he can be officially employed by the Session, but not by the Presbytery or any of the higher courts. The other view contends that, while his work is primarily and mainly congregational, he can and should be used, if needed, by any of the higher courts

I. We Presbyterians have always contended that the Church, under all dispensations, has ever been essentially the same. This is our unanswerable argument with the rejectors of infant

baptism. When, however, we have gone back of the Christian era to find the officers of the Church, we have sought for them in the synagogue, and not in the temple service. This has been done to strengthen ourselves in opposing the papal priesthood. This is unnecessary, and puts us to a great disadvantage in the argument. The temple service was manifestly the service of the old economy for at least fifteen centuries. Indeed, its essentials go back to our first parents. The synagogue is not known nor recognised in the Old Testament; at any rate, not until the return from the captivity. To plant ourselves, therefore, on the synagogue exclusively, and in opposition to the temple, is to admit that our system is not countenanced by the leading features of the old ecclesiasticism.

It is doubtless true that the synagogue is the connecting link between the temple and the *ecclesia*; and that the *ecclesia* is more like the synagogue than the temple. Still there is such a general correspondence between the *ecclesia* and the temple as to justify a reasoning by analogy from one to the other.

Timid brethren will say, No, and start back affrighted; but there is no danger. Let us stand by our fundamental position, that the Church has ever been essentially the same. But this, it is said, makes the modern minister a priest; for the bishop of the New Testament must correspond to the priest of the Old. This is even so. What then? The altar, a victim, transubstantiation? By no means. The priest of the temple was the official leader of its worship. The chief act of worship in the temple was the offering of sacrifices. These sacrifices were typical and prophetic. As soon, therefore, as the prophecy was fulfilled in the appearance and sacrifice of the Antitype, then, of course, they became an anachronism. But the worship of Jehovah has not ceased. The temple has simply become the church, and the priest the minister of the sanctuary. There is nothing dreadful in this.

If the bishop had his prototype in the priest, who, under the old economy, represented the deacon? If there were no diaconal functions to be discharged, then there was no deacon. If there were, then he must be in the old Church as well as in the

new. What have we learned to be the functions of the deacon? The administration of ecclesiastical finances. Was there no such administration under Moses? Has the Church in this world ever been able to do without the purse? It has always been the law, that "they which minister about holy things should live of the temple," and "they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel." Who were the Old Testament deacons? The Levites, manifestly; for, 1. They had charge of the tabernacle or temple, its vessels and its offerings. 1 Chron. ix. 23, 27-29. 2. They had charge of the temple treasury. 1 Chron. ix. 26. 3. They were the tithe-gatherers and distributors. Neh. x. 37, 38.

If the Levite of the temple finds himself in the deacon of the New Testament, then, as the Levite was an officer of the general Church, so is also the deacon.

It is an objection to this argument that it is novel. On that account it is presented with diffidence; and yet we do not see why it is not altogether sound.

II. There is a significance in the connexion between the deacons and the apostles. Acts vi. 1-7. It was not an ordinary bishop whom they were appointed to relieve, but the apostles, the general officers of the primitive Church. We do not lay much stress on this, and yet it is not without its force, as indicating that the deacons are capable of being employed in the general as well as the congregational work of the Church.

In this connexion we shall venture to make a suggestion by way of conjecture. May not Mark, Luke, Tychicus, Epaphras, and others, have been apostolic deacons, attending upon Paul in order that they might discharge diaconal functions in connexion with his general apostolic work? He says expressly of Mark, that he was profitable to him for the deaconship. 2 Tim. iv. 11.

III. This question of the propriety of using the deacon for the general work of the higher courts is settled by the fundamental fact of the unity of the Church. This is an essential element of Presbyterianism. Based upon this is the principle, that any court of the Church has a right to command the services of any member or officer within the limits of its jurisdiction. There are

only two limitations to this: the ecclesiastical capacity of the party commanded, and his conscientious convictions. A member is a member of a particular church and of the general Church. An officer is an officer of a particular church and of the general Church. A member may not be directed to do an officer's work: nor a deacon a bishop's; nor a bishop a deacon's. But a member may be directed by any church court, to whose jurisdiction he belongs, to do any church work of which he is capable. Any bishop may be similarly directed by any of his superior courts. Just so the deacon. If a Presbytery needs a deacon, it has a right to call upon any deacon of any of its churches. If a Synod, it can do the same. So the General Assembly.

IV. There is another way in which this can be as clearly seen. It is found in the principle, that sphere is co-extensive with function. If Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies, are lawful courts, as we all believe, and if they have diaconal work to do, as they have, then who shall do that work? If diaconal functions go up with the courts, in their ascending series, shall not the deacon go along in order to discharge them? If the Lord gives the higher courts deacons' work to do, he certainly designed that the deacon should do it.

V. We do not call any man master, and yet in divine truth, as in scientific truth, there are great differences amongst men. Some have a talent for one branch, some for another. Some improve their natural talents to the utmost, and others neglect what little capacity they may have. There is nothing degrading in bowing to mental kinghood. There are men whom not to respect and venerate would be disloyalty to truth and to God. It is not their name, their wealth, their ancestry, their position, that we admire, but that, in the heraldry of heaven, they are written princes, kings, emperors, in the domain of truth.

In the department of ecclesiology there are two men in our American Church who tower as giants amongst their brethren. Naturally gifted, they improved their powers until such manifest superiority was theirs, that their brethren, with one acclaim, have placed the crown of royal authority upon their brows, and defer to them as masters of ecclesiastical law. The first of these

is the most venerated man that our Southland Church has ever known; whose writings on Church law are the most valuable contributions in the English tongue. The other is the hero of the Act and Testimony, of the struggle of 1837-8; the Kentucky giant, who won for the Church the great battle of the eldership. There is another, yet living, who well deserves a place by the side of these: the author of the ablest paper ever presented to our General Assembly, and who is doubtless destined to do for the deacon the same work that Breckinridge did for the elder.

Now is it not a significant fact that these three men, the leading ecclesiastical jurists of the Church, agree in considering the deacon an officer of the general as well as of the local Church? It is incredible that they could all be mistaken.

We shall quote from but one of the three; and from him only because it was denied, on the floor of the Assembly at Staunton, that he held such views. Dr. Thornwell was not in the habit of speaking or writing in an indefinite way. His convictions were clear and decided, and the expression of them unmistakable. From much more that he says on this point, we select the following: We "must either admit that the Presbyterian Form of Government is unscriptural, or that deacons may act for Presbyteries as they act for their particular congregations." Vol. IV., Page 200.

It is urged in opposition to this view, and in favor of the purely congregational sphere of the deacon:

1. That the deacon is ordained over a particular congregation, and therefore his duties are limited to that congregation. This was the objection urged by Dr. Hodge, in his famous controversy with Dr. Thornwell. It was triumphantly met by Dr. Thornwell by the simple statement, that this was equally true of the elder. We may add that the same is true of the preacher. All ordinations, as our new Book says, are "a special charge" and "to the performance of a definite work." This, however, does not prevent the higher courts from using the elders and preachers for the functions to which they are ordained. Nor should it preclude a similar use of the deacons.

It is no answer to this to say that elders and ministers are

members of the higher courts, and are, therefore, subject to their call. Because, deacons are not members of the Session, and yet are confessedly to be used by it. Nor are elders and ministers always members of the higher courts which employ them. Our secretaries and clerks, permanent and stated, are seldom members of the General Assembly. Membership is not necessary.

2. It was urged by Mr. Hopkins, before the Staunton Assembly, that our Form of Government, Ch. IV., Sec. 4, §2, places the deacons "under the direction of the Session"; and that this impliedly forbids their employment by the higher courts. Although presented with emphasis by an intelligent gentleman, this objection amounts to nothing; for it cannot be doubted that such a thought never entered the brain of the eminent revisers of our Book, nor into the mind of a single presbyter who voted for its adoption. The clause has a meaning, clear and unmistakable, and it simply affirms the subjection of the diaconate to the presbyterate; and this, whether in the congregation, the Presbytery, the Synod, or the Assembly.

3. There is, however, one objection which is so unanimously and persistently presented by the opposition, that it ought, at least, to have force. It is the custom of the Church. We are a conservative people. It is the glory of our Zion that we are such. The Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies of our fathers, did not employ deacons, therefore we should not do so.

We are as proud as our brethren of the conservatism of our Church. We would not be, like the Athenians, always clamoring for some new thing. Change for the mere sake of change is always to be deprecated. No change for the worse should, of course, ever be made. But are all changes evil? God is perfect, and therefore it is an element of his perfection that he does not change. This world is not only undeveloped, but it is full of evil. What greater calamity could befall it than to be petrified just as it is? No more maturing of the good! No more eradication of the evil!

"Weep not that the world changes,
Did it pursue a changeless course,
'Twere cause to weep."

The Chinese are the most conservative people on the earth. They worship their ancestors. Shall we take them for models? A true conservatism consists in a steadfast loyal adherence to the truth. For truth alone is worthy of conservatism. If we are in error, let us change to the truth. If our views or practices are crude and partial, let us seek a fuller and rounder development of our system. May the Master forbid that our Church shall ever claim for itself infallibility, or run into the ruts of a conceited unchangeableness! Let the word be, Progress not Petrification.

This argument, moreover, is shut out of this discussion by the well-known fact, that our Southern Church, at its birth in the Assembly of 1861, under the leadership of Thornwell, adopted the very principle for which we contend. In the constitution for the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, it was then provided that it should consist of nine members, "Three of whom, at least, shall be Ruling Elders, or *Deacons*, or *private members of the Church*."

As far, then, as the deacon is concerned, it is certain that his proper functions embrace all the financial, secular, temporal, concerns of the Church; and that his sphere is coextensive with his functions, that diaconal work is to be done by the deacon, whether under the direction of the Session, the Presbytery, the Synod, or the General Assembly.

Touching the order of the BISHOPS, two questions emerge: 1. As to their functions; and 2. As to their jurisdiction.

Do the *functions* of the bishop embrace those of the deacon? Is a bishop also a deacon? Does it pertain to his order or office to discharge diaconal duties?

I. Let us consult the Scriptures. 1. Acts vi. 1-7. The language as well as the spirit of this passage is decisive. It is a direct issue as to function between the two orders or offices of the Church. There were diaconal duties to be done, and the issue is fairly made whether or not the apostolic bishops shall discharge them. If they undertake them, or if they demur on any ground than official incompatibility, then the passage is not un-

favorable to ministerial diaconates. But they refuse to perform these duties that properly belong to the deacon; and they base their refusal on the ground that these duties do not pertain to their office, that their functions are altogether different. Here are two kinds of church service brought together in marked distinction from each other, almost in contrast with each other. The one is the ministry of tables; the other the ministry of the word. Now shall the bishops fulfil both of these ministries? No, say the apostles, ours is the ministry of the word, and it is not reason that we should leave it to serve tables. "Look ye out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint to *this business*. But *we* will give ourselves continually to prayer, and to the ministry of the word. Verses 3, 4. Could the separation of function between the two orders be presented in a clearer, stronger light? The bishop is to serve the word; the deacon is to serve the tables.

But Dr. Robinson, in his letter to the Staunton Assembly, having learned the language of Canaan, calls this "heresy," and seeks to evade the force of this clear text by a criticism on *οὐκ ἀρεστόν ἐστίν*. He declares that *ἀρεστόν* means simply, *pleasant, agreeable*; and his idea, as we understand it, is, that the apostles refused these diaconal duties merely because they were not pleasant or agreeable to them. He certainly deserves the honor of originality in this interpretation. No exegete before him has given it, and no one that comes after him is likely to do so. Bloomfield translates, "It is not meet or proper," and defends it from the Septuagint. Addison Alexander: "*Not reason*, literally, *not pleasing*, acceptable, agreeable, *i. e.*, to God or to Christ, and to us as his vicegerents. The idea of *right* or *proper*, although not expressed, is necessarily implied." Dr. Edward Robinson: "To be well, right."

But Mr. Hopkins said at Staunton that the pivot word in this passage is "daily" in the first verse. He thinks that the apostles did not refuse to do deacon's duty except as a regular daily business. There is some force probably in this. An apostle might discharge diaconal functions in an emergency, or in a small way, so as not to interfere with his own legitimate work.

This would be allowable, and is quite a different thing from the bishops' leaving the word of God to serve tables in a daily ministration. But unfortunately this does not help Mr. Hopkins; for he was contending for regular ministerial treasurerships, involving the "*daily* ministration" of finances.

We would suggest to Mr. Hopkins that there is another word in this passage that it may be well for him to notice. "Look ye out among you seven men * * whom we may appoint over this business; but we will give ourselves *continually* to prayer, and to the ministry of the word." 3, 4. Here the distinction between the two classes of functions is strongly marked. The seven are to attend to "*this* business; but *we*" to ours, and a different business. Let special attention be given to the word "continually." The ministerial work is a different work, and requires the constant uninterrupted energies of him who undertakes it.

This passage settles the question, and leaves it without a reasonable doubt that the two orders, bishops and deacons, have two classes of duties corresponding, each distinct from the other; that the deacon is not to leave the service of tables to undertake the ministry of the word, nor the bishop to leave the word in order to serve tables.

2. Let us look at Acts xi. 30 and Rom. xv. 25-28. These passages seem inconsistent with the teachings of Acts vi. 1-7, and are presented by our opposing brethren as showing that the apostles did do deacon's work. But (1), this was not necessarily a part of the deacon's duty. In both cases the apostles are the messengers by whom the charitable funds of the Gentiles are sent to the poor saints at Jerusalem. It is not a diaconal function to carry funds from one place to another. This may be done by a servant, by a private member, by one not a Christian. In our day, we use the express and the mail for the purpose. It is not difficult to understand why Paul seemed to covet this work. He was the apostle of the Gentiles; he was an apostate from Judaism. As such he was bitterly hated by the Jews and suspected by the zealous Judaistic Christians. Yet he loved his people devotedly, Rom. ix. 3. He was anxious to remove this preju-

dice against himself, and to bring about a kindlier state of feeling between the Gentile and Jewish Christians. For these reasons he took a special personal interest in these charitable collections. But the collections were doubtless made by the deacons, under his exhortation, and he carried them to Judea. (2) Again, as to these two passages, even admitting that it was diaconal work which the apostles did in these instances, it proves nothing against our position. Paul and Barnabas were preachers, earnest devoted preachers, who made full proof of their ministry. They did not leave the word of God to serve tables. This charitable work, this carrying of funds for the poor was with them merely incidental and extraordinary, and did not interfere with the regular prosecution of their apostolic labors. They certainly were not ministerial treasurers.

3. Dr. Theodorick Pryor, whose venerable form, earnest piety, genial good humor, and ready wit, no member of the Staunton Assembly will soon forget, presented what he considers an unanswerable objection to the view here advocated, in the fact that Judas was the regular treasurer of the apostolic college. To add force to his statement, the Doctor canonised the traitor and called him *St. Judas*. Never before was Judas dubbed a saint. As to this: 1. It is an unfortunate prototype that our present ministerial treasurers have. Ordinary bishops claim the eleven as their representatives, and do not object to giving up Judas to those who serve tables. 2. Judas was not a church treasurer. He was simply the treasurer of the apostles, as a band of men who had agreed to live together and to have a common purse. 3. Judas was never an apostle, in the true sense of the word. None of the twelve entered upon their apostolic ministry until the day of Pentecost. They were not apostles, because they were not qualified as such. The apostolic work was threefold: to organise the Christian Church, to complete the canon of Scripture, and to bear witness to the resurrection. Judas never took any part in any of these things. As long as our Saviour lived, the twelve were only apostles in anticipation; under his personal care, that they might be fitted for their work. Their condition was similar to that of our theological students in the Seminary; and Ju-

das's relation to them was exactly like that of a student caterer or treasurer of a mess club of theologues.

4. There is another class of passages presented by Dr. Lefevre in his article in this REVIEW of April, which are thought to militate against the doctrine here advocated. There are many of these passages. Indeed, the New Testament abounds with them. "Jesus Christ was a minister (Gr., deacon) of the circumcision." Rom. xv. 8. "Who is Paul, and who is Apollos, but ministers (deacons) by whom ye believed?" 1 Cor. iii. 5. "Thou shalt be a good minister (deacon) of Jesus Christ." 1 Tim. iv. 6. In these texts, Christ, Paul, Apollos, and Timothy are all said to be deacons. This seems very clear, and certainly presents a plausible case for the opposition.

But, 1. The apostate angels are called deacons. "It is no great thing if his ministers (deacons) also be transformed as the ministers (deacons) of righteousness." 2 Cor. xi. 15. Civil rulers are called deacons. "For he is the minister (deacon) of God to thee for good." Rom. xii. 4. Private Christians are said to be deacons. "She arose and ministered (acted as a deacon) unto him." Matt. viii. 25. Angels are said to be deacons. "Angels came and ministered (deaconed) unto him." Matt. iv. 11. Now if the first-mentioned passages prove that Paul, Apollos, and Timothy, were official deacons, these equally prove that angels, private Christians, civil rulers, and demons are also official deacons. 2. Paul calls himself the slave of Christ. "Paul, a servant (*δοῦλος*, slave) of Jesus Christ." Rom. i. 1. Christians are said to be sheep. The Master calls himself a vine, and his people branches. Was Paul a slave? Are Christians sheep, or branches? Is Christ a vine? No; every child understands these expressions as figurative; so are those above, where Paul, Apollos, and Timothy are called deacons. 3. The word "deacon" in the New Testament has two well-defined uses: as a general term, meaning *servant*; and a specific technical use, to designate the second *order* of church officers. In the former sense it is synonymous with *church officer*, and is applied to both orders. As so used, bishops are indeed deacons, or Christ's official servants. In its restricted meaning, it is applied only to the order of deacons.

II. In opposition to the doctrine of two orders with two separate and mutually exclusive classes of functions, there is the Scotch theory that the higher office includes the lower. This is a very simple and beautiful theory. The deacon is a private member and a deacon. The elder is a member, a deacon, and an elder. The preacher is a member, a deacon, an elder, and a preacher. It was stated on the floor of the Assembly that Dr. Lefevre was regarded as the ablest advocate of this theory in our Church. We therefore quote from his article in this REVIEW, April, 1881, page 349: "The meaning, taken in extension, of the proposition, 'the higher ecclesiastical order *includes* the lower,' is the one for which the writer is contending, . . . that *the presbyter, besides his own personal nature, has the nature also of the deacon.*" As man, the higher intensive conception, includes animal, the lower, so does bishop include deacon; *i. e.*, every bishop has, in addition to his own official functions, those of the deacon. According to this view and its logical illustrations, as man and animal sustain to each other the relation of species and genus, so do bishop and deacon. Bishop is the species, as the higher intensive conception, and deacon is the genus. Bishop is a species of the genus deacon, just as man is a species of the genus animal. Let it be observed that these logical technicalities have been injected into this discussion by the distinguished Baltimore divine, and that we are simply following him, using his own illustration.

We deny that there is any such relation between bishop and deacon as between species and genus, or between a higher and a lower concept of the same series. For, 1. No genus ever becomes concrete except in an individual of one of its own species. Now, if deacon is the genus, we ask for a concrete individual deacon. If the reply is, that we find him in the ordinary deacon of our churches, then we interpose the further logical objection, that no species is ever cointensive with its genus; for species must equal the genus *plus the differentia*. Now, if deacon is the genus, it cannot at the same time be one of its own species; and if it is a species, it cannot be the genus. But, according to Dr. Lefevre's reasoning, deacon is the genus. If genus, then to

VOL. XXXII., NO 4.—2.

what species do individual ordinary deacons belong? To the species, deacon? Then we have deacon both as species and genus of the same classification, which is logically absurd.

2. Again, this theory, if true, would go too far, and prove more than its advocates believe; for every species not only may have, but *must* have, the essence of its genus. When a man ceases to have the qualities of an animal, he ceases to be an animal. So, if a bishop ceases to exercise the functions of a deacon, he ceases to be a deacon. Man must be an animal, and so a bishop must be a deacon. Now what is the generic idea of the deacon? Plainly, as a church officer, it is the care of the poor and the administration of the financial concerns of the church. The bishop is said to be a deacon, an official deacon, a deacon just like the seven chosen in the 6th of the Acts. As such, he must have the generic idea of the deacon; he must officially look after the poor; he must be the financial officer of the church. Does Dr. Lefevre believe this? Do any of our opposing brethren? Is it an *essential* part of the bishop's office to discharge diaconal duties? The theory perishes by its own logical absurdities.

3. The true relation between these two orders or offices is quite simple and clear. It is not that of species and genus, but of co-ordinate species of the common genus, church-officer. It seems strange that Dr. Lefevre should have seen this, and yet at once have lost sight of it. He says (page 344): "Church-officer is the common name of presbyters and deacons." If he had held to this, he would have steered clear of all difficulties. But he immediately forgets it, and ever afterwards ignores it. Bishop and deacon are not higher and lower orders, considered as species and genus, but simply in the sense that the separate and distinct functions of the bishop are of a higher dignity than those of the deacon. As man and monkey are both species of animals, but man is the higher of the two.

III. This theory of the involution of all the church-power of order in the bishop, is an old one; as old as the rise and sway of priestly domination. In the middle ages, the priests were the teachers, doctors, lawyers, and magistrates. In the Church,

there were no scriptural elders or deacons. The priests were everything. The Reformation was a protest and a revolt. God did not intend the people to be ciphers. He has work in his vineyard for all to do. The bishops are the leaders, but only leaders. It is his wisdom not to concentrate into a monopoly, but to divide and extend his work until every hand shall find some needful useful thing to do. The Church is beginning to realise this. There are indications that, in some directions, the tendencies are extreme, as in lay-preaching and women-preaching. But the idea is a true one. It has the divine approval; and one of its most wholesome manifestations is to be seen in our Church in the lifting up of the ruling elder and the deacon to a higher and broader plane of usefulness, and the consequent disburdening of the ministry of unnecessary incumbrances, that it may give itself wholly "continually to the ministry of the word and to prayer."

IV. We present here an extract or two from Thornwell: "The generic idea expressed by the word (deacon) is that of *servant*. In this wide sense it embraces a great variety of classes distinguished from each other by the different nature of their service, but agreeing in the common property of service. The whole generic idea is found in each species, whether composed of private individuals, inspired apostles, ministers of the word, dispensers of alms, or rulers of the church; all, without exception, are deacons, because all, without exception, are *servants*. This word, however, is restricted for the most part as a title of office to a particular class, in which, however, the whole generic idea is found and very conspicuously presented. The generic meaning remains unchanged, and the definite title simply applies it to a particular kind of service." "Here an office (that of deacon) notoriously instituted for the express purpose of protecting preachers from secular affairs, undergoes a transformation," etc. Vol. IV., pp. 109, 122.

As to the *jurisdiction* of the bishop, the discussion may be more brief. To the bishop are given two kinds of power: of order, and of jurisdiction. His powers of order are distinctly set forth in our Form of Government, Chap. II., Sec. II., § 2:

“Preaching the gospel, administering the sacraments, reproofing the erring, visiting the sick, and comforting the afflicted.” Upon the principle, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, no powers but those which may be properly brought under one of these several heads, can be exercised in our Church by an individual bishop.

All other powers that belong to the bishop are those of jurisdiction, and pertain to him jointly with other bishops, and are to be exercised by them, not severally, but only as organised into the recognised courts of the Church.

These principles are so clear and simple, that no one will gain-say them. We divide, however, as we come to apply them to the Secretaries of our Assembly Committees. The power of governing others, the power of administering the general concerns of the Church, are manifestly powers of jurisdiction and not of order. Have such powers been intrusted to our Secretaries? Are they practically exercised by them? Do they discharge the functions of metropolitan bishops? Are they overseers of the general work of the Church? It is not asserted that they wield these powers unwisely or oppressively. The Episcopal churches of this country might congratulate themselves, should they have such judicious and in every way acceptable bishops. The simple question is, Are they in reality bishops of the general Church? They may not be. But if they are, then :

1. There is no authority for them in our Presbyterian government.

2. The King of Zion has seen fit to withhold such authority from any individual bishop, for wise and sufficient reasons. We of the border States, left in connexion with the Northern Church until after the war, have had occasion to see the wisdom of this. Dr. Janeway, the Secretary of Domestic Missions, wrote to our missionaries that their appropriations should be withheld, because they did not come up to the standard of loyalty. For these acts, he is known by us as Pope Janeway.

3. If our present system necessitates the practical making of prelatial bishops, it must be erroneous.

We do not consider it a satisfactory reply to this, that the Secretaries are simply the organs of the Executive Committees.

Because, while this may be nominally true, it is not true in fact. The Secretaries, if we are not mistaken, are in reality the power of these Committees. As Dr. Thornwell said, we do not object so much to the name as to the thing.

Let us read what he said about these officers under the Board system, where they sustained, so far as we can see, the same relations to the general work of the Church that they do now. "The parity of the ministry," says he, "is a fundamental principle among all Presbyterians. Whatever differences superior piety, learning, and talents, may make in the *man*, we allow no difference in the *office*. We tolerate no official authority in one minister above another. Our system does not admit it. But the fact is unquestionable, that the various officers of our Boards are invested with a control over their brethren, and a power in the Church, just as real and just as dangerous as the authority of a prelate." Vol. IV., p. 156.

The jurisdiction of the bishop introduces us to the *jurisdiction* of the *courts*. Here it will not be necessary to do more than enunciate the general fundamental principles of our system, as there is no division of view upon these as theoretical questions.

I. Our church courts are *graded*. They begin with the parochial presbytery, the Session, and go up, through the provincial and synodical presbyteries, to the General Assembly. Thus we have Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies.

II. Our courts are *representative*, according to their grade, of all the church below them. Their authority to act is by virtue of their representative character, which Dr. Thornwell properly makes one of the essential distinctive characteristics of our system.

III. Their power of jurisdiction, as it widens, is not cumulative, but collective and appellate.

1. It is *not cumulative*; *i. e.*, the Presbytery has not the power of a Session, as well as of a Presbytery, over its constituent churches. The Synod has not the powers of a Session and of a Presbytery, as well as of a Synod, over its territory. Nor has the Assembly the aggregate powers of all the courts over

the entire Church. The most important powers of original jurisdiction are lodged with the Session and the Presbytery. Each of the courts may, as our Constitution declares, "possess inherently the same kinds of rights and powers;" but it has been found "necessary that the sphere of action of each court should be distinctly defined;" and, consequently, "the jurisdiction of these courts is limited by the express provisions of the Constitution." Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. II., §§ 3, 4.

2. The power of the higher courts is *collective*, so far as *original* jurisdiction is concerned. David Dudley Field, in a recent article in one of the Reviews, has thus interpreted our civil government: That the individual is free in his own individual sphere, and comes under the control of social law only in his relations to others. That the States are free and sovereign in their own sphere, and have control of all affairs that pertain in common to the entire State. That the National Government is limited, therefore, to those matters which are general and concern all the States. Whether he be right or not, this general principle prevails in the relations of our graded courts. The Session attends to the concerns of the particular congregation. The Presbytery, to what is common to the churches of its district; and so with the Synod and the Assembly. The exact language of our Constitution is: "The Session exercises jurisdiction over a single church; the Presbytery, over what is common to the ministers, sessions, and churches within a prescribed district; the Synod, over what belongs in common to three or more Presbyteries; and the General Assembly over such matters as concern the whole Church." Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 2, § 4.

3. Beyond this original jurisdictional power of the higher courts, which is limited to what is common to their entire territory, they possess *appellate* jurisdiction. That they may be appellate, it is necessary that they shall not have original jurisdiction over the same questions. If the Assembly should attend to sessional or presbyterial business, what becomes of its appellate power over the same? The higher courts are appellate. They do not possess, and should not exercise, the powers of the

lower courts. But, possessing the power over the powers of the lower courts, they should hold themselves free to discharge the duties involved in this relation of superintendence.

In a Church covering an extensive territory, as ours does, there is need of a strong centralising influence, which shall hold the remotest parts true to the unity of the organisation. This is freely admitted. Such an influence we have in our system of graded courts. The tendency, however, of all central power, in Church or State, in every age and country, has been to magnify and fortify itself at the expense of the just rights of its subordinates. We must have strength, but not at the price of liberty. The central power will usually take care of itself. The practical need is to watch that central power, and to protect the rights of the peripheral extremities.

Having now discussed the principles of Church polity, involved in the effort which was made for Retrenchment and Reform, we are now prepared to apply those principles to the consideration of the PRACTICAL ISSUES involved.

There can hardly be a doubt that the real issues were obscurely seen, if seen at all, by the great mass of our presbyters. They were probably not presented in the press, the Presbytery, and the Assembly, as clearly as they should have been. Let it then be distinctly understood that the real practical issues were—

I. Negatively. 1. Not the personal character of the Secretaries, nor their official fidelity and efficiency. If there is a Presbytery or a presbyter who is displeased, or in any way dissatisfied, with a single one of our Secretaries, such a fact has never come to our knowledge. All acknowledge their eminent fitness for the positions which they respectively fill, and their zeal and efficiency as officers.

2. Nor was the efficiency of their official advisers, the Executive Committees, the question at issue. There was some dissatisfaction a few years since with the Committee of Publication; but it was not general nor did it continue long. If any criticism has ever been offered, it has been, not of what the Committees have done, but rather of what they have not done. Some per-

haps may have thought that the Committees should pay more personal attention to the matters intrusted to them, and not to leave them too exclusively to the Secretaries. But, however this may be, it was not the zeal, the fidelity, or the efficiency of the Committees that constituted the issues of the question. For if any brother had been at all sceptical upon this matter, the facts and figures presented by Mr. Hopkins were sufficient to convince him that the business, in all of its departments, had been economically and most satisfactorily transacted.

II. Positively, the real issues were : 1. Whether the deacons or the bishops should discharge the fiscal duties of what Dr. Leighton Wilson calls our "central financial agencies." If the work of our Secretaries and Executive Committees, outside of Foreign Missions, is, as Dr. Wilson says, "little else than financial," then, according to the powers of order as we have seen them, the bishop is not, and the deacon is, the proper officer to whom it should be committed. Bishops, as financial officers, are out of their sphere and within that of the deacon.

If, however, these duties are largely administrative and governmental, then they belong to the sphere of the bishop, and not to that of the deacon. Indeed, if they are at all administrative or political, they cannot be intrusted to the deacon, for he is not a ruler of the Church. If they are partly financial and partly governmental, then the financial portion, if it demand a separate officer, should be intrusted to the deacon, and the rest be committed to the bishop.

If Dr. Wilson's view of the matter is correct (and he ought to know, and doubtless does), then our Secretaries (except of Foreign Missions), every one of whom is a bishop, is engaged in the daily ministrations, the continual service of tables ; discharging, as bishops, the functions of deacons.

2. The main practical issue was, whether the Assembly or the Presbyteries should directly manage the evangelistic work of the Church.

(1.) With regard to this, we were all agreed that the strong help the weak ; and that consequently there should be a central treasury under the control of the General Assembly. We could

not assume any other position, without ignoring the fundamental fact of the unity of the Church, and denying the force of the injunction, that they who are strong should bear the infirmities of the weak. There is more work to be done in the weaker Presbyteries than in the stronger. It would surely be the extreme of folly that the Presbyteries should be so isolated in their work that the able could not help the feeble.

Moreover, those who were in the minority actually advocated that a larger percentage of the contributions of the churches should be sent to the central treasury than did the majority. According to the present rule, every Presbytery is free to draw from the central treasury every dollar that it puts in. As proposed by the minority, twenty per cent. of the contributions of the Presbyteries should be sent to the central treasury for the benefit of the feebler portions of the Church.

(2.) The Foreign Mission work manifestly belongs to the Assembly. These missions are not conducted within the limits of the jurisdiction of any Session, Presbytery, or Synod; and are not, therefore, subject to the control of any of these courts. They are a concern of a whole Church; the outgrowth, the expansion of the entire body.

(3.) The remainder of the evangelistic work, except a part of Publication, as clearly pertains to the Presbyteries. This is true as a matter of principle; and it is true as a matter of expediency.

a. This work belongs to the jurisdiction of the Presbyteries. It is conducted within their bounds, and by men subject to their authority. What is the necessity or propriety, therefore, of thrusting the Assembly in between the Presbytery and its own evangelists, pastors, colporteurs, or candidates? The Assembly has nothing in the wide world to do with these things, except as the custodian and distributor of the percentage forwarded to its treasury for the weaker Presbyteries.

b. It is more expedient that each Presbytery should conduct its own evangelistic work, because it will develop all parts of the Church more thoroughly and rapidly, by teaching self-reliance. There will be a livelier sense of responsibility on the part of

each Presbytery, when it realises that the work within its bounds is to be done by it. A greater pride and interest will be taken as each feels that it is master of its own field.

c. Virginia's great theologian, at the Knoxville Assembly, enunciated a pregnant truth when he said, "*a concrete case is stronger than an abstract cause.*" Never was profounder wisdom crystallised into a happier expression. All the force of this apothegm is in favor of the direct management of the evangelistic work by the Presbytery. Take the case of a candidate for the ministry, or of an evangelist, or of the pastor of a weak church or group of churches, or of a congregation struggling to erect a house of worship—who does not see that in each and every one of these cases two dollars can be more readily raised for them, as specially in need of help, than one dollar can for the abstraction of education, or sustentation, or evangelistic fund? Not only do we have here the difference between a living case and a dead abstraction, but also the benefit of a home case as distinguished from a foreign one. The Education cause is an abstraction. The Assembly's Executive Committee is hundreds of miles away. But here is a Presbytery, one of whose young men offers himself to the ministry. He is known, loved, appreciated. He is one of us. It is clearly our duty to stand by him. Would not the case of that young man bring five dollars where the Education cause would bring two?

The writer of this was a pastor for fifteen years, the happiest of his life. Part of that time was when we in Missouri were not connected with any Assembly, North or South. The whole responsibility of cultivating our field was thrown upon us. It was fight or die, work or starve. During this period, the church which he served undertook to supplement the salaries of two brethren who were cultivating the missionary fields of the Presbytery. It was done with far greater ease and pleasure than one-half of the amount could have been raised for the Sustentation cause. Here are the Minutes of the Synod of Missouri for the years 1869 and 1872, while we were isolated and independent. They show that this Synod raised in 1869 for the various evangelistic causes, outside of congregational, the sum of \$44,331, a large

portion of which was for Westminster College. In 1872, when there was no such special call, and when the times had become stringent, the Synod raised, for purposes outside of the particular congregations, an aggregate of \$16,281. The Minutes of the Assembly of 1878 show that this same Synod, now connected with the Assembly, raised for the same purposes only \$4,180; in 1879, only \$3,642; and in 1880, only \$6,099. The Synod of Missouri raised less for the evangelistic causes during the three years of 1878, '79, and '80, when connected with the Assembly and working under its Committees, than in the single year of 1872, when the work was done immediately by the Presbyteries. Less in three years on the Assembly plan by over \$2,000 than in a single year of the Presbytery plan! Truly a concrete home case is more potent than an abstract foreign cause.

d. Economy is urged in favor of the home plan of evangelistic work. It has been unfortunate, perhaps, that this point has been allowed undue prominence to the ignoring and banishing of far more important considerations. Economy, however, is always a virtue, and, in the Lord's work, it is clearly a sacred duty. In a sense we may do what we will with our portion of the goods that the Lord intrusts to us; but his share, small as it is, must be administered with the most scrupulous care. Just here we note a great mistake made by Dr. J. L. Wilson in his excellent review of the Minority Report. He charges that the main purpose of the Minority seemed to be to spare the people from giving to the Lord. In this he has misapprehended completely the point made by those whom he criticises. The economy urged was in the administration of the Lord's funds, in order that they might yield the largest possible results, and not for the purpose of lessening the contributions of the people. The Minority believe that the people do not bring more than half the tithes into the storehouse; that they should be urged and encouraged to bring them all in; and that one strong inducement to this end would be the most careful and judicious expenditure of what is contributed. If the people see that their money (as they are prone to regard it) is used economically and productively, they will be encouraged to give it more freely. Evangelically,

sation by the direct management of the Presbyteries would be more economical than the present plan. We, therefore, urge it as one of the reasons, not the main one, why the Lord's plan, as we believe it, should have been tried, at least in the department of Education.

e. Analogy leads us to favor the Presbyterian management. How are the poor of our communities supported by the civil government? It is not by every man putting all his earnings into the public treasury, that each may receive back what the central treasurers shall think wisest and best. Each family takes care of itself, and pays a definite tax, so much per cent., for the support of the poor. How is it in the Church itself? If it is necessary or wisest that all the church evangelistic funds should go to the central treasury, to be thence distributed, why not carry out the principle and demand that all church moneys shall be thrown into the common fund? No, you say at once, let each congregation support itself so far as it can; for it will save expense and labor to the central treasury. Just so with the evangelistic work; let each Presbytery take care of itself, and it will manage its own funds more wisely, and will save much cost and trouble at the Committee rooms.

We believe that the way in which our Committees manage these matters is without a parallel in the financial administrations of the civilised world. Here we are, a border missionary Presbytery, twelve hundred miles from Baltimore. Every dollar we give must be returned to us. Yet our evangelist, as he takes up the collections, which are really for his own support, is required to send them to our Presbyterian treasurer at Kansas City, who in turn forwards them to Baltimore; whence they are returned, on a backward trip of over a thousand miles, to the very place from which they came!

"The king of France, with forty thousand men,
Went up a hill, and so came down again."

Surely common sense business men ought to avoid such folly as this.

f. We shall close this review by some extracts from the published writings of Dr. Thornwell. We do this, not only because

of the profound reverence which our Church has ever felt for the views of this great man, but also because a well known divine in the Staunton Assembly, as we are told by the papers, "warmly and tenderly defended the memory of the lamented Dr. Thornwell, whose name has often been used in this debate, and asserted that, if that silenced voice could be heard, no word would be uttered in favor of any change in our present plans. Our scheme of Foreign Missions is strictly the work of Dr. Thornwell, well done and thorough." One would suppose that such a speaker was quite familiar with the views of Dr. Thornwell. But it is easy to show that he either never knew them, or is blessed with a very treacherous memory. There is not an important position in this paper which cannot be sustained by copious and unmistakable quotations from Dr. Thornwell. Indeed, upon the important controverted points, we have been at pains to show that we had the backing of this great name. We are now, however, upon the practical issues involved, and we propose to prove that here Dr. Thornwell went *further* than we have dared to go.

We accept the issue presented by his defender (?), and shall set forth, in his own words, Dr. Thornwell's views as to the manner in which he thought the Foreign Mission work should be conducted. It was his view that it should be *directly by the Presbyteries*. The first question was as to the appointment of the missionary and assigning him his field of labor. This he contended should be done by the Presbytery. Says he: "Look at the following grant of power to the Board of Foreign Missions in the 4th Article of its Constitution. 'To the Executive Committee, etc., shall belong the duty of *appointing* all missionaries and agents; of designating their fields of labor; to authorise all appropriations and expenditures of money,' etc. [Exactly the same now granted to our Executive Committee.] * * Here is unquestionably the power of judging of the qualification of ministers—their fitness for particular stations; and here is a right conveyed to control and manage and direct their labors. Turn now to the Constitution of the Church, Ch. X., Sec. 8, Form of Government. * * Here the same powers, in part,

are evidently granted to two different bodies—in the one case, they are granted by the Constitution, in the other by the Assembly. The Assembly unquestionably had no right to take from the Presbytery its constitutional authority, and to vest it in any other organisation.” Vol. IV., pp. 152-3.

The next point he considers, is the support of the missionaries; and he maintains that this also shall be done directly by the Presbyteries, without the intervention of any central Assembly treasury or Committee. “In the first place, the Constitution expressly provides that the judicatory sending out any missionary must support him. In the second place, the Book provides that our churches should be furnished with a class of officers for the express purpose of attending to the temporal matters of the Church; and these deacons might be made the collecting agents of the Presbytery in every congregation, and through them the necessary funds could be easily obtained and without expense. For transmission to foreign parts, nothing more would be necessary than simply to employ either some extensive merchant in any of our large cities, who, for the usual percentage, would attend to the whole matter, or a committee of deacons appointed by the Assembly for the purpose.” Vol. IV., p. 154.

A third point with Dr. Thornwell was, in contributing to a central fund and leaving the appointment of missionaries to a central committee of the Assembly, unsound men might be sent forth as missionaries, and he be compelled to support them. “It is idle to say that we must have confidence in all our Presbyteries: the experience of the past teaches us too plainly that we should have no confidence in the flesh, and that Presbyteries are sometimes as mischievous as any other bodies. This difficulty would be obviated by carrying out the provisions of our Book. The Presbytery that sends a man *would know him*; the churches within its bounds would know him, and consequently would know what they are supporting. If the Presbytery that sends him should be unable to support him, it can call upon a neighboring Presbytery, to which it is perfectly well known, for assistance.” Vol. IV., p. 166.

Perhaps the reader is wearied with these quotations. We

shall present but one more. "Before closing this article, I wish to present a few additional considerations showing that the Presbyteries ought to take the whole business of missions into their own hands." Vol. IV., p. 212. He then gives and elaborates four arguments in favor of this view.

We now appeal to the judgment of the Church and of all candid men, to decide whether "the defender of Dr. Thornwell" knew of what he was talking at the Staunton Assembly. We wish it to be understood, moreover, that we do not quote these views of Dr. Thornwell as approving of them, for we do not. We believe that Foreign Missions is properly the work of the Assembly, and not of the Presbyteries. But if Dr. Thornwell thought that the Presbyteries ought to conduct Foreign Missions, *a fortiori* he believed in remitting the rest of the evangelistic work to them.

We were in the minority. So was Dr. Thornwell at Rochester. Dr. Breckinridge was in the minority in opposing the reception of committeemen as delegates to the Assembly. We were in the minority in advocating our new Book of Church Order, when it was first presented to the Presbyteries. The opposition had the majority of votes; we content ourselves that we had the majority of the truth.

J. A. QUARLES.

ARTICLE II.

THE DIACONATE AGAIN.

At the meeting of the Synod of South Carolina in 1877, a discussion occurred in regard to the best method of raising funds in behalf of the Theological Seminary at Columbia. It was maintained by some of the speakers that it would be wise to employ, for this purpose, the divinely appointed agency of deacons. On the other hand, it was contended that this view involved an abstract theory of the diaconate which had no practical value; that the apostles discharged diaconal functions, and that, consequently, ministers may now legitimately collect money for ecclesiastical purposes, and are the most efficient agents who could be employed for that end. This debate occasioned a motion, which was carried, that a committee be appointed to report at the next meeting of the Synod upon the nature and functions of the diaconate.* This motion was not made by one of the appointees, and had no intended relation to the question of "Reform," as bearing upon the general administrative policy of the Church.

The committee were of opinion that they were not expected to perform the supererogatory task of merely re-stating the common places of the subject. Accordingly, they laid down, without expanding them, those views of the diaconal office which, as they are almost universally accepted by Presbyterians, may be regarded as assumptions; and, desiring to avoid a superficial treatment of a subject which had undergone but slender discussion, they proceeded to consider, with some thoroughness, the doctrinal aspects of the diaconate, together with the practical inferences deducible from them, concerning which either immature conceptions or differences of opinion were presumed to exist. Charged by ecclesiastical authority with the performance of a responsible office, they addressed themselves to the patient and candid investigation of a matter concerning which their own views needed a

* The Committee were, the Rev. J. L. Girardeau, Rev. J. L. Martin, and W. T. Russel, M. D.

completer development. The result of their labors was a report, in three sections; the first of which was presented to the Synod in 1878, the second in 1879, and the third in 1880. These papers were, at the request of the Synod which took no further action about them, and through the courtesy of the Editors of this REVIEW, published successively in its pages, in January, 1879, January, 1880, and April, 1881. In addition, there was also published in the REVIEW, for January of this year, an independent discussion of the importance of the office of deacon, the rhetorical complexion of which is due to the fact that it was the substance of a discourse delivered by request to some of the deacons of the Presbytery of Bethel at Blackstock, S. C.

Nearly all of the distinctive positions maintained in these papers were subjected to a formidable assault in two articles contained in the April number of this REVIEW, from the pen of our acute and learned brother, the Rev. Dr. J. A. Lefevre. This is not altogether to be regretted. Opposition to known truth is always to be lamented; but men are fallible, and it is especially by means of controversy, conducted in accordance with the rules by which it should ever be regulated, that the truth receives its clearest illumination and meets its surest establishment. If we have advocated the grievous errors which the reviewer imputes to us, we pray that he may succeed in refuting them. If we have held the truth, it will be more firmly rooted by the shaking which the storm of his criticism has given it. "Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook, it shines;" provided, as some one has suggested, the light be not shaken clean out. We confess that we were not without apprehension that our torch would be blown out by the fierce blast in which it flared. We had some difficulty in catching our breath and keeping our foothold. The reviewer displays so great a familiarity with logical weapons and is so evidently conscious of expertness in their use, that we hardly wonder at our own bewilderment, or at his confident claim "to have overthrown" our "positions, so far as logic is concerned." The array of Scripture passages, too, which has been marshalled against us, is portentous, and one would be apt to think that the least regard for inspired authority should, in view of this mass

of evidence, induce in us a speedy abjuration of our errors. But it sometimes happens that one does not know what his assailant sees clearly—that he has been beaten, and ought, in order to save what remains of life, incontinently to surrender. Such, we reckon, must be our ignorance. For, having somewhat regained our equilibrium, and having reconnoitred our ground, we have concluded to hold it even against odds so heavy. The presumption may seem to be against us, but the battle is not always to the strong.

In dubbing us as “reformers,” the distinguished reviewer well knew the force of the epithet he used. But it was hurled at the wrong mark. We worked in the interest of no party, and for no partisan ends. We simply contended, in the discharge of a duty imposed upon us, for what was conceived to be scriptural truth touching the office of the deacon, and, as a practical consequence, the conformity of the policy of our Church to that truth. That is “the head and front of our offending;” and if it attach to us the title of reformers, we shall not refuse the reproach.

In replying to the arguments of the reviewer, we shall consider them as reducible to the following points: first, the position maintained by us that the higher office of presbyter does not, in a regular condition of the Church, include the lower office of deacon, is illogical; secondly, that the same position, and others, held by us, are unscriptural; thirdly, that as the Church, as Church, is wholly ecclesiastical, ecclesiastical officers, as such, including deacons, cannot legitimately be appointed to the discharge of secular functions; fourthly, that the appeal to authority in behalf of our views is invalid. We shall, in part, invert the reviewer’s order as to the first two of these points, and begin by considering the question of the scripturalness of our position that the higher office of presbyter does not include the lower office of deacon; and for this obvious reason: unless the precise meaning of the term *deacon* is settled, any discussion concerning the logical classification of church-officers must be involved in utter confusion. Now, the significance of that term can only be ascertained by an appeal to Scripture usage. If, upon examination of that usage, it be found that the term is employed in two

distinct senses, everything in the progress of the argument will depend upon the question in which of these senses the term is used. If one party affirm of the one sense what his opponent denies of the other, it is plain that confusion must result and no end can be reached. First, then, comes the question of Scripture usage, and afterwards that of logical relations.

I. We have carefully examined the reviewer's articles in order to discover whether he considers the term *deacon* and its cognates as employed in Scripture in one ecclesiastical sense, or in two. We have failed. Sometimes he clearly seems to hold for only one sense. And lest, through infirmity, we misrepresent him, let us hear him speak for himself. After distinguishing between two "secular" senses of the term—the one wide, meaning servant as discriminated from slave, the other narrow, signifying table-servant or waiter, he proceeds to say:

"Let it be remembered at the outset that the name can never lose the odor of the thing which it represents: and, therefore, that our search for the ecclesiastical significance of these terms must start with the idea of service as opposed to rule, and that, too, service rendered to the body immediately in distinction from service rendered to the spirit. This notion is the very soul of the word, and the word must die forever the moment it loses its soul. Bishop and presbyter, on the contrary, with their cognates, are words of authority and dignity, and into what region so ever they are transferred, bear with them always the insignia of rule."¹

We certainly gather from this statement that the reviewer maintains these two things: first, that the term, ecclesiastically related, is univocal—that it has but one sense, that of service distinctively rendered to the body, and that it is abusively employed, when used in any other; secondly, that as this service is opposed to rule, the presbyter, when he rules, does not serve as deacon. He may "deacon," but not as ruler. Further the reviewer says:

"The search for the ecclesiastical meaning of the word also starts out with an *a priori* conviction of the impropriety and violence of distinguishing the office of the presbyter from that of the deacon by the *scope* or objects of their official powers. They both equally care for persons and things—things both in and apart from their personal relations. The principle of discrimination lies in the fact that the one occupies the place of ruler and the other that of servant in the same house."²

¹ S. P. REVIEW, April, 1881, p. 356. ²P. 366.

We cannot understand this passage. What *a priori* convictions have to do with defining church officers, we are unable to see. But how with any convictions we can define them, without considering the object-matter about which they are concerned, passes our comprehension. We must abandon the basis of definition almost universally assumed—we must discard the object-matter. What then? Why, we must take functions as the principle of discrimination. One class of officers discharges the function of rule, the other that of service. Now, how can you discriminate the function of rule from that of service, if you drop out of view the object-matter about which the respective functions are concerned? The reviewer may tell, but we cannot. But, moreover, the ruler, according to the reviewer, is a deacon, since all church-officers are deacons. It follows that the presbyter, as ruler, is discriminated from the presbyter as deacon by the fact that he occupies two places in the Lord's house: in the one place he rules, in the other he serves. He is not Christ's servant when he rules, he is his servant only when he cares for the bodies of the poor. This, we say, it tasks our understanding to apprehend. But there is one idea which we get from this utterance. It is, that the diaconal function is one and the same, as discharged by all church officers. There is but one sense in which they are deacons, that of ministers to the bodies of the poor. The preacher does not, as preacher, perform the functions of deacon: neither does the presbyter, as presbyter. It remains that the only sense in which they can discharge those functions is that of service to the bodies of the poor. The passage does seem to teach that clearly. Let us again hear the reviewer upon this point:

"Christ himself, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, all 'deacon,' whatever else they do: all hold a 'diaconate,' whatever else they hold: all fill the office of deacon, whatever other offices they fill—all *are deacons*."¹

"It is important, too, to note that, whenever mention is made of the particular work which the apostle and others performed in virtue of their status and functions as *deacons*, it is always *the care of the poor*."²

This is as explicit as language can make any statement. It

¹ P. 357.

² P. 359.

is proved by these quotations that the reviewer attached but one sense to the scripture term *deacon*—that of a minister to the bodies of the poor. All church-officers are deacons, because all are distributors of alms to the poor. The presbyter, as deacon, performs precisely the same function as the deacon proper.

But while the reviewer thus clearly contends for only one sense of the term, he, with equal clearness, shows that there are two :

“The widest secular sense of *deacon* is simply that of *servant*, as distinguished from *slave*, and is translated servant or minister ; and its derivatives, *service* or *ministry*, in the corresponding signification. . . . A narrower secular meaning of deacon often occurring in the New Testament, is that of table-servant, or ‘waiter,’ as the word is now used ; the verb and the noun having the same limitation of meaning. . . . As examples of the transition of the words from the general sense of *servant* to that of *waiter*, may be quoted the following passages.”¹

“It is time, however, to pass on to the religious and ecclesiastical sense of the words, which will appear in self-evident light, if the following passages be examined. . . . The inspection of these passages will reveal that ‘deacon,’ ‘diaconate,’ and ‘to deacon,’ have a religious sense exactly parallel with their secular sense, to wit, that the deacon *serves* in religious things, and is bound to a religious *service*, and performs it as an act of religion, both in the general sense of service and in the special one of *caring for the poor saints*. But whether the service is rendered to the soul or the body or the man, whether it is a service in spiritual or temporal things, it is a *religious* service, performed under authority by duly appointed agents of the church.”²

In these statements it is held that the term in question has, as a secular one, two senses, a wide and a narrow ; that the same distinction in signification obtains in the term, as an ecclesiastical one ; and the two senses are expressly contradistinguished from each other—the one being “general,” as designating a servant, and the other “special,” as signifying a servant who cares for the poor saints. We cannot see how it can be disputed that here two senses are maintained—the one wide and general, the other narrow and special. But if that be so, as we have seen that the reviewer contends for only one sense, and that the narrow one, and as the main drift of his argument supposes the existence of only that sense, we are obliged, however reluctantly, to say that self-

¹ P. 355.

² P. 357.

contradiction emerges. We must ask, "Under which king, Bezonian?" The reviewer cannot hold to both these positions: there is but one sense; there is more than one sense. We might fairly deem ourselves discharged from the further consideration of an argument which refutes itself by involving an inconsistency so pronounced. Let us, however, give the reviewer the benefit of his intentions. Two suppositions are possible: either, he intended to advocate but one sense, namely, the narrow; or, he intended to advocate two senses—the wide and the narrow.

Let us suppose that he designed to maintain but one scriptural sense of the term, namely, the narrow one. It is conceded by all Presbyterians, and it is explicitly admitted by the reviewer, that the term, in that sense, designates a church-officer charged with the duty of distributing alms to the poor. Now, as the reviewer has abundantly and unanswerably shown from Scripture, all church-officers are deacons. But as, according to the supposition, the term is susceptible of but one sense, namely, that of a distributor of alms to the poor, it would follow that all church-officers are distributors of alms to the poor. They are deacons, and, whenever they act as deacons, they discharge the function of distribution. When the preacher preaches, he does not "deacon;" when the presbyter rules, he does not "deacon;" only when he distributes alms to the poor, does he "deacon." As a deacon, he is a distributor; his deaconing is distributing; his office of deaconship is the office of distribution. This is not a mere supposition; it is exactly the view which the reviewer announces in certain parts of his discussion. He contends, as we have seen, that ruling and deaconing are opposed to each other.

Now, as it is always unpleasant to oppose the views of a brother beloved, we greatly prefer, on the supposition of this being his position, that he should himself destroy it. From the host of Scripture passages, which he has elaborately collected to prove that all church officers are deacons, we select a few which, a mere glance will serve to show, subvert this theory of only one sense of the terms under consideration. "Peter says of Judas, 'For he was numbered with us and had obtained part of this

diaconate.'” Does not this mean ministry? Can it possibly mean distribution of alms to the poor? Did all the apostles carry the bag, as did Judas? “He (Paul) asks, ‘Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but deacons, by whom ye believed?’” Is it supposable that Paul meant to say, that it was by means of himself and Apollos, as distributors of alms, faith was wrought in the Corinthians? Must not deacons here signify preachers of the gospel? “Our sufficiency is of God, who hath made us able deacons of the New Testament.” Can this mean able distributors of alms of the New Testament? “I speak unto you Gentiles, inasmuch as I am the apostle of the Gentiles, I magnify my deaconship.” “Seeing we have this deaconship, as we have received mercy we faint not.” “God hath given to us the deaconship of reconciliation.” “I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the deaconship.” It is simply out of the question that deaconship in these passages can have the narrow sense of the office of distributing to the wants of the poor. We marvelled when we encountered the reviewer’s remark: “Paul’s apostleship ‘to testify the gospel of the grace of God’ included a deaconship, and therefore, when he reached Jerusalem, in the presence of all the elders ‘he declared particularly what things God had wrought among the Gentiles by his deaconship.’” And our wonder increased to astonishment when, just after these citations from Scripture and others like them, he goes on to say: “It is important, too, to note that whenever mention is made of the particular work which the apostle and others performed in virtue of their status and functions as deacons, it is always the care of the poor.” What then, in the name of reason, is the general work which they performed as deacons, and which is discriminated from the particular work of caring for the poor? According to the reviewer, it cannot be preaching, it cannot be ruling, it is not distributing. What then can it be? We are unable to guess. The passages of Scripture adduced by the reviewer himself refute the position that there is but one sense in which the term *deacon* and its cognates are used. The reviewer is a mighty man of war; but, like Saul, he has fallen on his own sword; and if one

should be asked to finish the fatal work, he need only employ as a weapon to perform that mournful office the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church, that the word *deacon* has in Scripture a wider and a narrower sense. That surely ought to give the *coup de grace*; and its administrator might not be improperly be entitled "a *deacon* of God, a revenger to execute wrath," (Rom. xiii. 4.)

If we may follow the example of the reviewer in transferring the word without translating it, we submit that the passages referred to make it evident that there is a didactic deaconship as well as a distributing deaconship. The apostles and other ministers were deacons of the gospel in the precise sense of preachers of the gospel. They deaconed in the very act of preaching the gospel. It was not that their preaching office overlapped and involved a deaconing office, but their preaching office was itself a deaconing office. They were deacons as preachers. In a passage quoted by the reviewer, Paul says to the Ephesian elders: "None of these things move me, neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy, and the ministry (deaconship) which I have received of the Lord Jesus, to testify the gospel of the grace of God." Here the apostle states the very purpose for which he had received his deaconship. It was not in order that he might distribute relief to the poor, but it was in order that he might testify the gospel. It was not eleemosynary, but didactic deaconship—a ministry of instruction. Let us look at the fifteenth chapter of Romans, one of the places of Scripture relied on to show that the apostles acted as deacons, in the special sense of the term as distributors of alms. Even were it conceded that the passage, in one part of it, shows that the apostles did act as distributors—the proof of which, however, cannot be produced from it—it is certain that in another part it proves the existence of a widely different sense of the word *deacon*. "Now I say," observes Paul, "that Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision (deacon of the circumcision) for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers." It will not do to say that the meaning here is, that our blessed Lord was made a minister (or deacon) of the old economy for the relief of the

bodies of the poor; particularly when Paul says that he was made a deacon "for the truth of God." What has a distributing deacon, according to the Presbyterian conception of the office, to do with a public, authorised ministration of the truth? We would detract nothing from our previous recognition of the consolatory fact that the Lord Jesus was, in the days of his flesh, a compassionate minister of relief to the temporal sufferings of men. We have ventured to say, that "as the great Deacon of Israel, he declared that he came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and illustrated the noble unselfishness of that utterance by the untiring dispensation of healing to the suffering bodies of men." But to say that his ministry (deaconship) was exhausted in the discharge of these temporal offices would be an instance of extravagance which no zeal for a theory could justify. In the very utterance just cited, our Lord goes on to announce, that in the performance of this philanthropic ministry he would "give his life a ransom for many." He deaconed when, as a piacular victim, he rendered satisfaction to divine justice for our sins. Did he, in dying, deacon for the redemption of the body alone? But, it may be said that in contending for a narrow sense of the word as the only one, the reviewer refers to an ecclesiastical signification as applicable to the officers of the church. This will not avail, for he expressly argues that Christ himself, as well as the officers of his church, was a deacon; and as according to him, the word can no more part with its essence, as expressing service to the body, than the body can part with the soul without dying, Christ's deaconship must have been solely a ministry to bodily wants. But if this be inconsistently denied, as denied it must be, it is admitted that his deaconship was susceptible of more than one sense; which would be fatal to the hypothesis that the word has only a narrow sense.

Let it, however, for the sake of argument, be assumed that the reviewer speaks of the word as possessing a sole, special sense, only in relation to ecclesiastical officers. It will be allowed that, after the day of Pentecost and the organisation of the Church, the apostles were ecclesiastical officers. Now we have already seen that, in the light of numerous passages of Scripture adduced

by the reviewer himself, it is wholly illegitimate to consider the deaconship of the apostles as restricted to the special sense of ministry to the body. But, let us go with him to what he terms "the classic passage on this subject: Acts vi. 1—6." From that passage it can be proved not only that there are different senses of the word, but that these senses are contrasted with each other—that they symbolise functions which are incompatible with one another. Let us take the reviewer's own representation of the case: "The Grecians murmured that their widows were neglected in the 'daily deaconing'; and the apostles declared to the church, that it was not right for them 'to deacon tables', at the cost of neglecting the word of God; whereupon the seven were elected, and ordained, and charged with this business; and the apostles, thus relieved, adhered to or persevered in 'prayer and the deaconing of the word.'" Now, we ask, whether the term *deacon*, as applied to tables, is not used in one sense, and the term *deaconing*, as applied to the word, is not employed in another sense? Let it be observed, that it is not said or implied that in preaching the word the apostles included deaconing to the body, but it is said that they deaconed the word. In preaching the word they discharged a deaconing which is expressly contradistinguished from the deaconing of tables. And we ask further, whether, upon the face of the passage, and upon the reviewer's own showing, the two functions of deaconing tables and deaconing the word are not pronounced incompatible with each other? The reviewer explicitly admits the apostles' declaration that it was not right for them to commingle the two sorts of deaconing. The apostles said—and the reviewer concedes that they said: It is not right for us to deacon tables; our duty is to deacon the word. The reviewer says: It was right for the apostles to deacon tables, because the greater office of deacon of the word included the lesser office of deacon of tables. We say: It is not right now for deacons of the word to deacon tables; and *therefore* the greater office cannot so include the less as to make it legitimate, when the office of distributing deacons is filled, for the ministers of the word to discharge the functions of that office. The reviewer says: It is right now for deacons of the word to deacon

tables, even when the office of distributing deacons is filled, *because* the greater office must include the less. Our theory has been censured as unscriptural. We are willing to rest the decision of the question, which of these two theories is a necessary inference from this "classic passage" of Scripture, with the unbiassed judgment of the Lord's people.

We think it has been proved by an appeal to this passage and to the reviewer's own construction of it, that the word *deacon* is used in two different senses, and that these two senses are placed in opposition to each other. The general idea of service underlies them both, but they respectively indicate contrasted and incompatible kinds of service. The conclusion from all that has been said upon this point is, that the hypothesis of one ecclesiastical sense only, as conveyed by the word *deacon* and its cognates, has no support from the language of Scripture.

Let it, in the next place, be supposed that it was the intention of the reviewer to maintain two ecclesiastical senses of the word as employed in the New Testament. Let us see, what, upon this supposition, he would give up. He would give up his position that the "very soul," the essence, of the word is the notion of "service rendered to the body immediately in distinction from service rendered to the spirit." He would be obliged to admit that in the one sense, there may be a deaconing to the spirit as well as a deaconing in another sense to the body. And this he does admit, when, speaking of diaconal service, he says: "Whether the service is rendered to the soul or the body or the man, whether it is a service in spiritual or temporal things, it is a religious service."¹ That is true; but how a service which, from the nature of it, can only be "rendered to the body immediately in distinction from service rendered to the spirit," may be "rendered to the soul or the body," as it passes our ability to comprehend, we leave to the acuteness of the reviewer to determine. One or the other; if two senses are allowed, only one sense is given up.

He would also give up his determination of "the ecclesiastical significance of these terms" as expressing "the idea of service as

¹P. 357.

opposed to rule." For while it is evident that the service of distributing alms to the poor is a different one from the service of ruling, it is equally evident that if there be both a wide and a narrow sense, the service designated by the general sense would not be opposed to rule, but might be expressed through it. The ruler, although not a distributing servant, would be a ruling servant. But this would be to give up the very core of the reviewer's theory, which is, that the presbyter is a distributing servant (or deacon in the narrow sense), though not such as he is a presbyter. That is to say, if he allow two senses, he must abandon his vital position that the presbyter is a deacon only in the narrow sense of a distributor to the wants of the body. This must hold true, unless there be a sort of diaconal service which is neither expressed in preaching, nor in simple ruling, nor in distribution. If there be such a diaconal service, our reduction is inconsequent. But it is one the existence of which we are unable either to think or believe. We have argued upon the supposition—the only reasonable one in the case—that the reviewer regards diaconal service as opposed to preaching as well as ruling.

He would, moreover, give up the logical position that inasmuch as, in the quantity of intension, the presbyter includes the deacon in the sense of distributor, so, in the quantity of extension, the presbyter must be included under the deacon, in the same sense. For to hold that because the presbyter, in the first quantity, includes the deacon in one sense, therefore in the second quantity, the presbyter is included under the deacon in another sense, would be a specimen of logic which we could not impute to one so thoroughly versed in that science.

He would, furthermore, give up his grasp upon the issue—would convict himself of an *ignoratio elenchi*. What is the precise question at issue? It is, whether the higher offices of preacher and ruling elder include the lower office of the deacon, considered in the narrow sense of a distributor of alms. That is the question of which we took the negative. We never dreamed of denying, we never did deny, that the presbyter is a deacon, but that he is a deacon so and so considered. At the outset of

our discussions, we formally laid it down that the property of ministry or service as generic enters into all church-offices, that all church-officers are ministers or servants of Christ and the Church. Not expecting that our statement of the offices would be challenged by a Presbyterian, we did not deem it necessary to say that the terms ministry and ministers were synonymous with the terms deaconship and deacons in their wide signification. Taking these latter terms in that restricted sense in which they are now almost invariably employed by Presbyterians, we argued to show that the presbyter does not include the deacon in that limited sense. This position the reviewer denies; and this position, accordingly, it was incumbent on him to disprove. But if he elaborately attempt to prove that in a wide sense presbyters are deacons, he spends his strength for naught, he but "carries coals to Newcastle." Every passage of Scripture adduced by him in which the terms are used in a wide and generic sense only goes to establish what we admitted. And it is a mere waste of time, in controversy, for one of the contestants elaborately to prove what the other concedes. If, then, the reviewer really maintain two senses of the terms under consideration, he, to that extent, damages his argument, which should have undertaken merely to prove that the presbyter includes the deacon in the narrow sense; and, in that case, he would have been restricted, in his collection of Scripture testimonies, to those passages in which the term *deacon* and its cognates are used in the narrow sense. That he does maintain two senses has been clearly shown. In this we fully concur with him, but it is impossible to see how it helps his cause.

But while we contend for two senses of the terms, a general and a special, it deserves to be considered that a closer analysis reveals the existence of one general, sense and three special senses. As general, the term is the symbol of a general notion which collects under it all kinds of service, but specifies no particular sort of service. In this sense, all church officers—preachers, ruling elders, and deacons—are alike; they are servants of Christ and the Church. The preacher is a preaching servant, the ruling elder a ruling servant, the deacon a distribu-

ting servant. But when the preacher preaches, he performs a special kind of service which is distinguishable from those discharged by the ruling elder and the deacon. When the word, therefore, is used to designate this particular sort of service, it passes from the general to the special sense. When, for example, the apostles said, We will give ourselves to the service of the word and not to the service of the tables, they evidently contrasted one special form of service with another special form. The general notion of service was in one case limited and specialised by the particular function of preaching, in the other by that of distributing. The preacher, the ruling elder, and the deacon (proper), are all servants in the general sense, but at the same time each is a servant in a special and narrow sense. There are then three special senses of the terms, corresponding with the three distinct kinds of service performed by the three classes of church officers, as they are distributed by our Constitution. Why, then, have the terms passed into technical designations of the distributing officer and his functions? Because, we conceive, the functions of preaching and ruling do not, in themselves, express the idea of service, but of its opposite—authority. The acts of teaching and ruling imply the superiority of the teacher and the ruler to those who are taught and ruled. It is not so with the function of distribution. In itself considered, it expresses inferiority and service. Hence it is with propriety that he is technically termed deacon, a servant; he is emphatically a servant and nothing more. There is no other idea suggested by his office.

Now it is obvious, that while every church officer includes in himself the general attribute of service, the special function of service discharged by each officer excludes that of every other officer. The preacher, as preaching servant, is not ruling servant nor distributing servant; and the ruling elder, as ruling servant, is not preaching nor distributing servant. This plain distinction the apostles affirmed, when they declared that because they were preaching servants, it was not proper for them to act as table-servants. Preaching and ruling deacons are not *ex officio* distributing deacons.

We have thus shown, first, that the reviewer's argument is inconsistent with itself, because at times it maintains that there is but one ecclesiastical sense in which the word *deacon* and its cognates are employed in Scripture, and at other times that there are two; secondly, that on the supposition that he intended to maintain but one sense, the view is untenable; and, thirdly, that, on the supposition that he designed to maintain two senses, he involves himself in concessions fatal to his argument, and, moreover, to the extent of his asserting a wide sense, his reasoning is chargeable with irrelevancy, as proving what we had formally admitted.

There is, however, one part of the argument derived from Scripture testimony which, in itself considered, we acknowledge to be relevant to the question at issue. It is that in which, regarding the term *deacon* in its narrow and special sense, he endeavors to prove that the apostles and elders discharged strictly diaconal functions, and that, therefore, the higher office includes the lower. It is remarkable that this which was the main thing to be proved is despatched in a few sentences. In reference to this point we have to say, that the arguments which were employed by us to disprove the position that the apostles, after the Church was organised, acted as distributing deacons, are not noticed by the reviewer. We are, consequently, under no necessity to repeat or fortify them. But as the reviewer cites certain places of Scripture as so indubitably sustaining his view that he righteously asks how any one can dare to dispute it, we will briefly give the reasons of our temerity. Upon the passage in the sixth chapter of Acts, he says: "Manifestly the apostles before the ordination of deacons performed these functions as part of their pastorate."¹ Manifestly there is no proof that can be furnished for this assertion. It behooved him, before speaking so confidently, to disprove the position of those who argue that there must, previously to the appointment of the seven, who, if we may judge from their names and the reason of their appointment, were Hellenists, have been Hebrew dea-

cons who served the Hebrew Christians. Suppose we ask, whether the apostles may not have regarded it as unreasonable for them to leave the word of God and serve tables before the appointment of the seven? The question is at least worthy of consideration. But supposing that the apostles did perform strictly diaconal service before the seven were appointed, did they perform that service afterwards? No; they refused. And if they affirmed that it was not right for them to act as deacons proper, after deacons proper were certainly in existence, how, we beg to know, does their example prove that it is right for ministers of the word to act as deacons, when deacons are in existence? We submit, then, that it is not as manifest as the reviewer thinks that the apostles ever did act as deacons proper, and that it is perfectly manifest that they did not act as deacons proper after such deacons were appointed. But, argues the reviewer, there is proof that the apostles did, after this, act as deacons proper toward the poor saints, and that, too, in this very city of Jerusalem where there certainly were such deacons in office. If, indeed, the Scriptures prove this, they would prove that in Jerusalem where the apostles declared that it was not proper for them to deacon tables, they did that improper thing. Antecedently to an examination of the passages construed as proving this extraordinary fact, we would be slow to accept such a construction. Can it be that Paul, because he was not there when the apostles made the declaration referred to, did not feel himself bound by it? Hardly would any one espouse such a supposition.

Let us look at the proofs. We select the strongest passage as a specimen. "Paul says (Rom. xv. 26), 'But now I go to Jerusalem to deacon unto the saints, for it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem.'" Now, first, how did Paul get this contribution? Did he act as deacon proper in collecting it? He did not. 1 Cor. xvi. 2: "Upon the first day of the week, let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gathering (*σολήαι*, collections) when I come." Did he act as deacon proper in distributing it?

He did not. Acts xi. 29: "Then the disciples, every man according to his ability, determined to send relief unto the brethren which dwelt in Judea; which also they did, and sent it to the elders by the hands of Barnabas and Saul." No doubt in this case also, as well as in that of Antioch, the apostle carried the contribution to the elders at Jerusalem. Now, if the apostle deposited the contribution in the hands of the elders, it is clear that he did not distribute it—that he did not do the improper thing of deaconing tables. But it is not at all likely that the elders distributed it. It was their province to direct the distribution; it was the duty of the deacons to do the distribution. So that between the apostle and the actual recipients of the bounty came the elders and the deacons. He was two removes from the distribution. So far there is not a particle of proof that Paul acted as deacon proper. Oh, but it is declared expressly that he went to Jerusalem to deacon to the saints! Very true; but we have seen that there are two senses of the word deacon; and that Paul did not deacon in the narrow sense, is proved by the fact that the elders were in the habit of receiving contributions from other places. Paul ministered to the poor saints by carrying the money to their elders in Jerusalem, but there is no proof that he deaconed to them by putting it into their hands.

But did not Paul act as deacon proper by carrying the money to Jerusalem? We see no reason for such a supposition. When a church now sends through the mail money to the relief of a sister church in a distant place, are the mail-agents deacons? Or if, for cautionary reasons, it be sent by the hands of a trustworthy messenger, must the messenger be a deacon? And should the messenger be a minister, does the office he discharges prove him a deacon? When, then, the Achaian and Macedonian churches sent money to Jerusalem by the safe hands of an apostle, did that prove him to be a deacon proper? Against this supposition we plead the apostolic declaration: "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables." We must hold with the apostles even though the reviewer differs from them. They said that it was not "reason," or, as the reviewer puts it, not "right," for them to serve tables. The reviewer thinks it was.

VOL. XXXII., NO 4.—4.

Doctors differ ; and we will be pardoned for leaning to those who are inspired. Such is the unanswerable proof which one dares not dispute, that the apostles acted as distributors of alms, and therefore that the higher office of presbyter includes the lower office of deacon !

It has been sufficiently evinced by this discussion that, if there be a valid argument from Scripture against our position, the reviewer has not presented it. We rest in our former conclusion, that, in a formed and regular condition of the Church in which all the offices are filled, the higher offices of preacher and ruling elder do not so include the lower office of deacon as to make it legitimate for preachers and ruling elders to discharge the functions of deacons. We have admitted that, in an irregular condition of the Church in which there are no deacons, it is not only warrantable but necessary that such of the higher officers as exist should perform the functions properly pertaining to deacons. Where deacons exist, we insist upon conformity to the distinctly enunciated principle of the apostles, that spiritual officers should be confined to spiritual functions, and temporal officers should alone be assigned to temporal.

II. We next encounter the reviewer's argument upon purely logical grounds to overthrow the position, that the higher office does not include the lower, and to establish the opposite doctrine. He promised us the rattle of the dry bones of logic. We will not deny that the bones were dry, nor that their rattle astonished us ; but we trust that we were not slain by them, though wielded by a giant. What little strength we have left will be exerted to prove that we are not dead. We shall not attempt to follow the reviewer in all the sinuosities of his subtle ratiocination, but shall seek to be guided by one or two plain admitted rules, as criteria of the correctness or fallacy of the conflicting arguments.

At the outset, we assume that the reviewer allows a logical classification of church-officers, and only objects to the use we have made of it. He says : "Church-officer is the common name of presbyters and deacons." The common name symbolises the generic concept, church-officers, under which fall the narrower concepts, presbyters and deacons. We are entitled, then, to

treat the wider as a genus and the narrower as species. For it is plain that the general concept, church-officers, does not merely collect under it individual church-officers, but classes of officers. The concepts presbyter and deacon collect individuals into classes, and are therefore lower genera or species. We have then church-officers as the genus under which presbyters and deacons are contained as species.

We admit what the reviewer has said, that logic does not directly deal with the truth or the falsity of the matter which it uses. But in religious questions, it is of the last importance that the matter be true; and as the question under consideration is one of that nature, we are bound to look to material truth. Logic, therefore, is by no means the only instrument we employ in this inquiry. Our inferences may be ever so correct, logically, but if the matter of the concepts and the judgments be untrue, we will only be logically conducted to religious error. Logic would be content with arbitrary symbols representing the respective church-officers, but we could not. We must know *what* these symbols represent, or in a question like this, logic becomes impiety. Happily for us, we have, in the present instance, a sure guide as to the truth of the matter involved. The word of God tells us what the church-offices and church-officers are, and what are the attributes and functions which belong to them—both the objects denoted and the marks which they connote. It gives the concepts of the real things, and their real properties and functions. In a word, it furnishes the matter both in the quantity of extension and that of intension.

But this is not all which Scripture does: it gives us a good deal of the logic also. It furnishes a classification of church-officers. It distributes them into the two general classes of extraordinary and ordinary officers. Then taking the class of ordinary officers, it gives us the classification of them which we have adopted and incorporated, as it was our duty to do, in our Constitution. Else, how did we get the classification? On what other authority could we have made it? Using the principle of function as a basis, it collects teaching officers into one class, ruling officers into another class, and distributing officers into still

another. And, as Presbyterians think, it proceeds further, and groups ruling officers into a class under which are coördinated the two classes of presbyters who preach and presbyters who only rule. And then it goes on to lay down inferences, which grow out of this classification of officers and this distribution of functions. It is true that it does not use the technical terms of logic, but its procedures are logical. Would we charge it with being illogical? Although no little ridicule in high quarters has been poured on the employment of the terms of logic to express this scriptural classification of church-offices, we fail to see why, in a formal and thorough-going discussion, in which clearness and accuracy are certainly important qualities, they may not, under proper limitations, be used. These terms also serve the office of preventing tedious circumlocution. But whatever may be the expediency or in expediency of using them, we have, owing to the nature of the argument in hand, no option but to employ them. We are shut up to this, or to silence.

Our Constitution distributes the general class, church-officers, into the three special classes, ministers of the word, or, to use one term, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons. We shall continue to call the general class a genus, and to denominate as species the three classes which, although discriminated from each other, are collected and coördinated under it. Usage has distinguished between these special classes of officers as higher and lower, or greater and less. We shall not pause to vindicate these distinctions, but assume them as generally admitted. The question before us is, whether the higher (or greater) offices of preacher and ruling elder include the lower (or less) office of deacon. The reviewer affirms, we deny. Taking then the class church-officers as a genus, and the lower classes, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons, as species contained under it, we lay down, in the first place, the rule: that, in the quantity of extension, each species is included under the genus, and that, in the quantity of intension, each species includes the essential attribute of the genus, together with at least one peculiar attribute of its own, and excludes the peculiar attributes of every other species contained with it under the same genus. As we suppose that the validity

of this rule will not be challenged, we may proceed to apply it to the case in hand. Each of the species is included under the genus: consequently, each of the species, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons, is included under the genus church-officers. That this will hardly be disputed will be evinced by simply translating the proposition into ordinary language: each of the special classes, preachers, ruling elders, deacons, is included in the general class church-officers. But each of the species includes the essential attribute of the genus: so, each of the species, preachers, ruling elders, deacons, includes the essential attribute of the genus, church-officers. Now, what is that essential attribute? It is agreed that it is ministry or service; words which are generally translations of the original word which is literally rendered deaconship, although sometimes of another (*λεγειονομία*). As these terms *ministry* and *service* are synonymous, they will be used interchangeably; and let it be borne in mind that we qualify them by the adjectives, ecclesiastical and official. It is ecclesiastical, official ministry or service, which is the essential attribute of all church-officers. The term ministry or service, expressing this essence of the genus, we have employed, and still employ, in a wide and general sense. But we have shown that the reviewer sometimes uses them in that sense, and sometimes in a narrow and special sense as designating the distributing ministry or service of the deacon. To avoid confusion we must proceed first upon the supposition that he employs the terms in two senses, a general and a special, and secondly upon the supposition that he uses only one sense, the special.

First, then, let us suppose that he employs the terms in the general sense to express the essential attribute of the genus, church-officers, and in the special sense to designate the attributes of deacons as one of the species contained under the genus; that is to say, that the terms in the general sense indicate the generic conception of ministry, without reference to any particular kind of ministry, and, in the special sense, the specific conception of ministry as a distributing ministry. Now, acting upon this supposition, let us proceed to apply that part of our rule which demands that the essential attribute of the genus

should be included in each of the species contained under it. The essential attribute of the genus, church-officers, being ministry considered generally, it is included in each of the species, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons. The preachers are ministers, so are the ruling elders, and so, the deacons. All include the attribute ministry, and therefore all are ministers. But each of the species must be distinguished from every other species by at least one peculiar attribute, which is thence denominated a specific attribute. Now what are the peculiar attributes of these species? That of preachers is preaching, that of ruling elders, ruling, that of deacons, distributing. Each species includes the essential property of ministry, but each, in addition, possesses a specific property of its own. This specific property stamps the peculiar kind of ministry which attaches to each of the species.

Let us go on further, to apply the final element of our rule: each species excludes the peculiar attributes of every other species contained with it under the same genus. According to this requirement, the species, preachers, excludes the peculiar attributes of the other species, ruling elders and deacons; that of ruling elders excludes the peculiar attributes of the other species, preachers and deacons; and that of deacons excludes the peculiar attributes of the other species, preachers and ruling elders. But we have seen that the peculiar attribute of deacons as a species is distributing. The species preachers and ruling elders must, consequently, exclude the peculiar attribute of distributing. By this short, clear, process we reach the conclusion that the higher (or greater) offices of preachers and ruling elders do not include the lower (or less) office of deacons. Let it be observed, that preachers and ruling elders include the deacon, considered in the general sense of minister; that is, they include the essential attribute of deaconship, contemplated in the general sense of ministry out of connexion with any particular kind of ministry. But at the same time they do not include the deacon, considered in the special sense of a minister charged with a special function; that is, they do not include the specific attribute of distributing, as a particular kind of ministry. This conclusion is certainly

enforced by the rule under consideration, on the supposition that preachers, ruling elders, and deacons may be treated as species contained under the genus church-officers; and on the supposition, further, that the word *deacon* and its cognates are used in both a general and a special sense.

The reviewer charges us with confounding the logical quantities of extension and intension, or at least with leaving out of account the latter quantity. What we said in this relation was briefly put. We will be more full and definite. In the quantity of extension, objects are denoted. Well, in that quantity, the objects here denoted are church-officers; and since preachers, ruling elders, and deacons, are particular kinds of church-officers, they as objects are, in the same quantity, included under the genus. In the quantity of intension, attributes are connoted in objects. When objects compose species, the first attribute which must be designated as their mark is the essential attribute of the generic objects which is included in them. In addition to this, there must be other attributes as marks, which as being peculiar distinguish one species from another under the same genus. Well, we hold that, in the quantity of intension, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons, include the essential attribute of ministry (in the general), and in addition, possess peculiar attributes which distinguish them one from another as species. All these attributes, the essential and the specific, make up the connotation of their marks.

Thus we show, that, in the quantity of extension, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons (proper), are included under deacons, as generic ministers; and that in the quantity of intension, preachers, ruling elders, and deacons, all, include the deacon, as generic minister, but that, in the same quantity, preachers and ruling elders exclude the deacon, as specific minister. We neither confound the quantities, nor omit one of them.

But it may be said that as the deacon includes the essential attribute of the generic class, church-officers, and the other officers include the same attribute, they must to that extent include the deacon. Yes, to that extent; but to that extent, the deacon, for the same reason, would include the other officers; and that would be proving too much. But what sort of inclusion would that be?

It amounts only to the possession of a common property by all the officers, and that a generic one indicating no definite kind of ministry. The question is, Do the other officers include the peculiar property of the deacon—do they include the deacon as distributor, so as to make it legitimate for them to distribute? The answer is, no. They exclude the deacon, as distributor. The opposite view leads to contradiction. For, if the other officers include the deacon, as distributor, they include his peculiar and specific attribute of distributing, which would then of necessity be a common and generic attribute. The same attribute would at the same time be both peculiar and common, specific and generic.

In order to set this matter in a clear light we will employ the illustration repeatedly adverted to by the reviewer. The species man and brute are included under the genus, animal. Consequently, the essential attribute of the genus, viz., animality, is included in each of the species. But who would say that because animal is included in man, therefore the species, brute, is included in the species, man? What makes man and brute species relatively to each other? Their specific marks. One of those characterising man as contradistinguished from the brute is the faculty of speech—he is a speaking animal. One of those characterising the brute is dumbness—he is a dumb animal. Now to say that the brute is included in man is to say that he is, as dumb, so included. And then by virtue of this conclusion we have man a dumb, speaking animal! The same fallacy is perpetrated when we say that one species of church officers is included in another species. Because the genus church officer is included in the preacher, it does not follow that the species ruling elder and deacon are included in him, or because church officer is included in the ruling elder, it does not follow that the species deacon is included in him, If we affirm that the preacher, as such, includes the ruling elder, as such, we maintain that the preacher is a church officer who only preaches and only rules; for preaching only is the peculiar mark of the preacher, and ruling only, that of the ruling elder. But that would involve the same contradiction as saying that man is a speaking animal who is dumb. If we take the ground that the preacher, as such,

includes the deacon, as such, we hold that the preacher is an officer who only preaches and only distributes. If we say that the ruling elder includes the deacon, we say that the ruling elder only rules and only distributes, that he is only a ruler, and no ruler. If it be urged, that the preacher also rules, we simply deny. The preaching elder preaches and also rules, but the preacher and the preaching elder are not one and the same. The preacher never rules. When he preaches, he only preaches; when he rules, he only rules. As preacher he belongs to a different specific class from himself as ruling elder. But we shall encounter that question further on.

Up to this point the argument has proceeded upon the supposition that the reviewer employed the term deacon, with its cognates, in more than one ecclesiastical sense; that the wider was used as generic, and the narrower as specific. We hold that to be the scriptural usage, and have therefore developed at length the inferences deducible from it. But the supposition is more probable that the reviewer used the terms in only one ecclesiastical sense. The general strain and tenor of his argumentation sustain that supposition, while some of his explicit utterances appear to represent it as the only possible one. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the case as regulatively affected by that supposition. The narrow or special sense of diaconal ministry, according to the reviewer, is the distribution of alms to the poor. The deacon, whenever he appears, is the distributor of alms to the poor. Now as Scripture denominates all church officers deacons, and their ministry a deaconship, it would follow necessarily that all church officers are distributors, and their ministry a distribution of alms to the poor. According to this view, the primary and fundamental idea of all church office is that it is a diaconate in the definite sense of ministry to the bodies of the poor. Other church offices are secondary and superinduced upon this original and fundamental office of a distributing deaconship. Whatever else, holds the reviewer, any church officer may be, "all are deacons"—deacons in the sense of distributors of relief to the poor. One special sense thus obviously becomes the generic sense in which all church officers are to be taken. The re-

duction, then, is this : deacons, or distributing church officers, constitute the general class—the genus ; the essential attribute is official distribution : *under* this genus are included the special classes—the species, preachers, ruling elders, deacons ; and, of course the essential attribute, official distribution, is included *in* each of the species. The preacher is official distributor, with the superadded property of preaching ; the ruling elder is official distributor, with the superadded property of ruling ; the deacon is official distributor, with no superadded property. In this reduction, the deacon would be simple distributor, as in that of preachers and ruling elders under the class, presbyters, the ruling elder is simple ruler.

Now, it must be admitted that if this classification of church officers be correct, the fact is at once established that the diaconal function of distribution is included among the functions of all church officers. The essential attribute of distribution would necessarily belong to them all. And we pause here to call attention to the great, the controlling, importance of our views as to the classification of the officers of the Church, in their bearing upon the relations of church offices and church officers to each other, and upon their respective places in the economy of the Church. Brethren may make sport of this as “hair-splitting,” but it is hair-splitting, the consequences of which run through the whole administrative policy of the Church. It is thinking, ay, and abstract thinking too, which determines, and from the nature of the case must determine, practice both in the ecclesiastical and in the secular sphere. Some creed is absolutely indispensable. Returning to the theory under consideration, we hold that it is wholly incapable of justification.

In the first place, the validity of the theory rests entirely upon the proof that the Scriptures use the term deacon and its derivatives in a single sense, that of distributor and distribution of alms to the poor. It has been already shown by a citation of his own language that the reviewer allows of two senses—a general and a special. But to the extent to which he concedes two senses, he crucifies a theory founded purely upon a sole sense. Now the Scriptures *do* employ the terms in two senses—wider and nar-

rower; and, therefore, the theory based upon the existence of only one sense falls to the ground as unscriptural. For the proofs of this position, as it would be tedious even to recapitulate them, we refer to the discussion under the preceding head.

In the second place, it is pure extravagance to maintain that the distributing office is radical and fundamental, and that the other offices presuppose it and are superinduced upon it. It is not a scriptural conception, that, either in the order of thought or of time, the distributing deacon preceded the preacher and the ruling elder. Is it not as plain as day that the preacher of the gospel came first, that believers, as constituting the material of the church, must, upon a reception of the truth preached, have been first collected before provision could be instituted for their bodily wants? The order, beyond question, was the gathering of professors of the faith by means of preaching, and then the organisation of a government over them, and the making of systematic provision for their temporal necessities. This theory would represent the apostles and other ministers of the church as distributing to the bodily wants of poor saints, before they existed as saints—an extraordinary prolepsis, it must be confessed!

In the third place, as, according to this theory, the essential attribute of distribution is included in the offices of preaching elder and ruling elder, those officers are bound by virtue of their ordination vows to perform the essential and indispensable function of distributing alms to the poor. It is not enough to say that they may; they must. It is not a case of potentiality, it is one of binding duty. As preaching elders are essentially rulers, they are obligated to discharge the function of rule. Their duty is to be in sessions, in presbyteries, in synods, and, when appointed, in assemblies, and to take part actually in their proceedings. So, if preaching and ruling elders are essentially distributors, they must perform the actual duty of distribution. There is no escape. But this is not the Presbyterian conception of their offices. If it be, innumerable preaching and ruling elders are living in the habitual neglect of duty and infraction of ordination vows.

This theory of the reviewer is all the more remarkable, as he says, in regard to the passage in the sixth chapter of the Acts: "It is conceded on all hands, that we have here the history and occasion of the institution of the diaconate." But, according to the reviewer's theory, the apostles were deacons in the sense of distributors. "Manifestly," says he, "the apostles, before the ordination of deacons, performed these functions as part of their pastorate." Well, then, the apostles discharged the duties of a distributing diaconate, but they instituted a distributing diaconate when they called on the people to elect the seven. There were distributing deacons before that time; there were none before that time! No, the reviewer will say, this is a misapprehension of my meaning; what I mean is, that a special class of officers was for the first time set apart to the function of distribution alone. But that could not be the institution of an office which, according to him, existed before. Allowing this exposition, however, did not these holy men continue to perform their essential and inalienable function of distributing to the wants of the poor? Oh, no, rejoins the reviewer, they retired from the discharge of that duty, and contented themselves with seeing it well done by others. "The apostles declared to the church that it was not right for them to 'deacon tables' at the cost of neglecting the word of God; whereupon the seven were elected and ordained and charged with this business; and the apostles, thus relieved, adhered to or persevered in 'prayer and the deaconing of the word.'" "They, therefore, by the guidance of the Holy Ghost, moved, and the church adopted the motion, to appoint distributing agents for the efficient performance of this duty of the body towards the poorer members; while they themselves kept the general oversight and control of the work."¹ Remarkable utterances! All church officers, whatever else they may be, are distributing deacons. The apostles were distributing deacons. The essential function which they had to perform was distributing alms to the poor. But they declared that it was not right for them to discharge this radical and essential function. So they rolled it off upon others who were appointed to perform it, and

¹Pp. 362, 363.

retired from its burdens carrying with them the consciousness of a diaconal potentiality slumbering in their breasts. But complete recession from essential duties did not become apostles, and so they compensated for their neglect of this work by keeping a presbyterial "oversight and control" of it. That is to say, they continued to perform the duties of deacons by discharging those of presbyters! For the oversight and control of strictly diaconal ministration belongs to rulers, and not to deacons as distributors.

Enough, we think, has been said to show the untenableness of the extraordinary theory, that all church officers, as distributing deacons, constitute a general class under which as special classes all particular church officers may be reduced. Of one thing we feel satisfied, that if the doctrine of the inclusion of the lower office in the higher shall ultimately prove triumphant, it will not ride to victory on the shoulders of a theory that hops on one leg—the leg of a sole scriptural sense of the word deacon.

We have thus endeavored, in reply to the reviewer's arguments, to show that the higher (or greater) offices of preaching and ruling do not include the lower (or less) office of distribution. But there is a view of this particular question which still remains to be considered. It is, that if it were conceded that these offices are, in themselves considered, mutually exclusive, they may nevertheless be regarded as coexisting in the same officer. The functions of no two of them could be discharged at the same time by the same person, but the same person could discharge them at different times. For example, while preaching and ruling are mutually exclusive functions, yet the offices of preaching and ruling coexist in the same officer—the preaching elder. In this way the preaching elder includes the ruling elder. Why may not, in the same way, the preaching elder and the ruling elder include the deacon?

This seems to oppose a serious difficulty to the doctrine for which we contend, and, although we have not seen it formally expressed, fairness and regard for the truth demand its consideration. It is necessary here to recall attention to the state of the question under discussion. As it was represented in the first article of this series, it "is not, whether the higher officers, when

they are the only existing officers, may discharge the functions of the lower who are wanting. In that case, it is conceded that they not only may, but ought to, discharge these functions. Where no deacons can be obtained, the elders ought to perform diaconal duties." We have not resisted the view, properly restrained, of a "virtual" comprehension of the lower office in the higher *officer*. What we have opposed is the comprehension, either virtual or actual, of the lower office in the higher *office*: ruling is not included in preaching, nor is distributing included in either preaching or ruling. Attention is again cited to the fact that the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church on this subject has not been uniform. It is idle for the reviewer, while depreciating the appeal to authority, to assert that he maintains "the old view." There were several old views. There was the old view of the English Puritans, of a virtual inclusion of the lower in the higher office, so that, in an irregular condition of the church in which no deacons exist, the higher officers may perform their functions. There is the old view of the Scotch Church, of an actual inclusion of the lower in the higher office, so that in a regular condition of the church in which deacons exist, the higher officers may discharge their duties. And there is the old view of the French, Belgic, and Dutch Churches, of an actual inclusion of the higher office in the lower, so that in a regular condition of the church, in which all the officers exist, deacons may sit in church courts and perform the functions of the presbyter. As between the views we lean to the English, properly qualified; qualified, for instance, in this way: not that the lower office is virtually comprehended in the higher office, but that it is virtually comprehended in the higher officer. The question is not as to that doctrine, so qualified. Of course, we reject the Continental doctrine, as above stated. That, too, is out of the question. We also deny the Scotch doctrine, and it is as to that doctrine the question existed, so far as the previous part of this discussion is concerned. The question is not now whether the higher office includes the lower office, in a normal condition of the church.

But the precise question now is, whether there is an actual in-

clusion of the lower office in the higher office ; whether, in a regular condition of the church, the mutually exclusive offices of presbyter and deacon are comprehended in the same man, so that, deacons existing, presbyters may perform their functions? Does the person who is presbyter include the deacon, as the person who is minister of the word includes the elder? In supporting the negative of this question we present the following considerations:

First, it cannot be proved by direct Scripture testimony, or by good and necessary consequence from it, that the persons who are preachers and ruling elders so include the deacon proper, as to legitimate their performance of his functions in a regular condition of the church. If this could be done, the question would be conclusively settled. If the Lord, in his sacred word, says that the offices of presbyter and deacon coexist in the same persons, we bow to his authority. Let that be proved to us, and there will be an end of controversy. Now, the word does explicitly say that the offices of apostle and presbyter coexisted in the same persons. The Apostle Peter puts that beyond question in these words: "The elders which are among you I exhort, who am also an elder."¹ Show us a passage in which an apostle says, I am also a deacon, that is, a distributor, and we close the discussion, so far as the comprehension of the deacon proper in the apostle is concerned. This cannot be done. But it is said that the apostles discharged the functions of the deacon proper, and from this fact the inference is necessary that they comprehend in them the deacon proper. We have denied that this can be proved from Scripture and have given reasons for the denial, which, so far from having been refuted, have not even been considered. The peculiar function of the deacon proper is distribution. The proof of that is found in the sixth chapter of Acts. The deacons were appointed to serve tables. This function Presbyterian formularies call distribution. Now let the proof be produced that the apostles, in the organised condition of the church, served tables—that they performed the function of distribution. It cannot be done. And, until it is done,

¹ 1 Pet. v. i.

we hold that the inference is groundless that the apostle comprehended the distributing deacon.

This is not all. It cannot be proved by explicit testimony of Scripture that the person who is presbyter comprehends the deacon proper. There is no passage which affirms that the presbyter is also deacon, as distributor. And still further, there is no passage which says that presbyters performed the function of distribution, from which the inference might be drawn that they comprehended the deacon proper. If there be, where is it? Is it that in which it is stated that Paul and Barnabas took the alms of the church of Antioch to the elders of the church at Jerusalem? But where is the proof that the elders distributed this contribution? There is none. If the elders at Jerusalem distributed, why were deacons appointed to distribute? If more distributors were needed, why were not more elders appointed on the supposition that elders distributed? Do elders distribute now, when they order a collection and direct the deacons to distribute it? No scriptural proof, either explicit or inferential, can be adduced for the position that he who is presbyter is also deacon proper.

Secondly, it can be proved by the explicit testimony of Scripture that, after the appointment of deacons, they who were apostles did not so comprehend the deacon proper in themselves, as to legitimate their performance of the distributing function. Once more we refer to the sixth chapter of Acts, and we must refer to it *usque ad nauseam*, as Luther said about his preaching justification by faith alone. The apostles declared that it was not reason that that they should leave the word of God and serve tables. Of course, then, they did not serve tables, or, what is the same thing, perform the function of the distributing deacon. Brethren who maintain that, after this, the apostles did perform the function of distributing deacons, seem to forget that they charge those "holy men of God" with leaving the word of God to serve tables, and so with violating their own rule and neglecting their own duties. As men, they sometimes erred in practice. Paul says that Peter dissembled at Antioch, and Paul himself had a sharp contention with his brother Barnabas; but surely

they did not err, as apostles, acting in their official capacity. Did they leave the word of God to do the collecting at Antioch and Corinth? Did they leave it to do the distributing at Jerusalem? We are confident they did not. Our doctrine files no indictment against the apostles for inconsistency. It harmonises their official acts with their avowed principle. To say that they had no time to serve tables when they uttered that declaration, but that they may have had time afterwards, looks very much like trifling with the subject. Did they ever get time to discontinue prayer and the ministration of the word? And as there were deacons at Jerusalem, and no doubt at Antioch and Corinth also, was there any necessity which required them to serve tables in those places? The proof is clear that the apostles did not, in a regular condition of the church, perform the duties of the deacon proper.

That presbyters may, in a regular condition of the church, perform the functions of deacons, and that, therefore, they who are presbyters are also deacons, is an inference derived only from analogy; for there is no direct Scripture proof of the position. If the apostles, in a regular condition of the church, discharged those functions, so may presbyters; and if that fact proved the apostles to be deacons, for the same reason, are presbyters proved to be deacons. But we have shown that there is no such fact. The ground opens beneath the analogy, and the inference tumbles with it into the chasm. On the other hand, if the apostles did not perform those functions, and there be an analogy between their case and that of presbyters, the inference would go the other way—then may not presbyters discharge them.

The view which we are combating proceeds upon analogy in including the deacon proper in those who are preaching and ruling elders. The apostle was also an elder; therefore, the preacher is also an elder and the elder is also a deacon proper. But it deserves to be considered, that we have a surer warrant than this for including the elder in him who is preacher, namely, the explicit statements of Scripture. There are passages in which the Apostle Paul expressly teaches this view. One is his salutation to the Philippian church: "Paul and Timotheus, the

servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons: grace be unto you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ."¹ Another is that, in which, writing to Timothy, he describes the qualifications of bishops and deacons.² A third is that in which he reminds Titus of his duty to ordain elders in every city, and in setting forth their qualifications urges their necessity for the reason that a bishop must possess them. "For this cause left I thee in Crete that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, as I had appointed thee. If any be blameless, the husband of one wife, having faithful children, not accused of riot, or unruly. For a bishop must be blameless," etc.³ In this last passage, Paul identifies presbyters with bishops. Whatever then is affirmed of bishops is affirmed of presbyters. The bishops of the Philippian church were presbyters; the bishops whose qualifications are given in Timothy were presbyters. Their status and qualifications are the same. Now did the apostle embrace preachers in the class bishops or presbyters? Yea, answer all—Prelatists, Independents, and Presbyterians. Clearly then the apostle included in the same officer the preaching and the ruling office. The elder is thus plainly proved to be included in him who is preacher. Did the apostle embrace ruling elders simply in the class bishops or presbyters? Nay, answer Prelatists and Independents; yea, answer Presbyterians. They are with preachers included under the general class bishops or presbyters. The one subordinate class rule and also preach; the other rule and do not preach—they rule only. The essential attribute of rule is included in him who is preacher, and in that sense he who is preacher includes the elder. But the peculiar and differentiating property of preaching characterises the preacher, and that of ruling only, the ruling elder. These offices therefore exclude each other—the preaching office does not include the ruling office. But the ruling office co-exists with the preaching in the officer who is preaching elder.

The question now is, How will you include the deacon proper in him who is presbyter? If with preachers and ruling elders

¹Phil. i. 1.²1 Tim. iii. 1—13.³Tit. i. 5—9.

he belonged to the class, presbyters, he would be a presbyter with the peculiar property of distribution; and then preaching and ruling elders would include him as ruler, while excluding him as distributor. But the apostle assigns deacons to a different class from presbyters, a class differentiated by peculiar qualifications fitting them for the discharge of peculiar functions. They who are presbyters neither include deacons as rulers nor as distributors. The positive weight of these passages is against the inclusion of deacons, as distributors, in the officers who are presbyters. The only conceivable way in which such an inclusion can be effected, is the extraordinary one of the reviewer, namely, by making deacons, as distributors, a still higher class than presbyters, by making them indeed the highest class, coincident with church officers, and including under them the two subordinate classes, presbyters and deacons. In that case, as presbyters would include the essential attribute, distribution, descending from the generic class, distributors, they would in that way include the deacon. But this is a desperate shift, without the least support from Scripture, as has been proved under the first head of this discussion. The theory of the inclusion of the deacon in the presbyter must throw itself back into the arms of apostolic analogy, the last consolations of which we commend to it in its extremity.

Thirdly, we again press the unanswered argument from ordination. Neither the preacher nor the ruling elder is ordained to perform the function of distribution. If he were, as ordination is always to a definite work and imposes a solemn obligation to its discharge, he would be bound actually to perform the duties of the distributing deacon. But he neither discharges them nor is expected to discharge them. He is, therefore, not ordained to perform them. If, however, the preacher and the ruling elder include the deacon, they must when ordained as preacher and ruling elder be also ordained as deacon. But they are not. If it be said that they are implicitly ordained as deacons, since the higher office includes the lower, ordination to the higher being virtual ordination to the lower, we reply: that it has been unanswerably shown that the higher office does not include the

lower. From a Presbyterian point of view it is unwarrantable to affirm that preaching includes ruling, and ruling, distributing. Nor can they be implicitly ordained as deacons because the higher officer comprehends in himself the lower office. Implicit ordination, that is, ordination to an office to which no allusion is made in the ordaining act, would be a curious anomaly. It may be said that that is done in the ordination of the minister of the word, that he is implicitly ordained as ruling elder. We cannot admit it. He is explicitly ordained to the pastoral office, and that embraces the functions of ruling elder. No; preachers and ruling elders are not ordained to the office of distributing deacon, and that fact disproves the position that they include that office.

We have overpassed the limits assigned us, and must suspend the discussion at this point. We have endeavored to show not only that the lower office of deacon proper is not included in the higher *offices*, but that, in a regular condition of the church, there is no actual inclusion of that office in the higher *officers*. There remain to be considered the reviewer's positions in regard to the relations of presbyters and deacons, as orders, and the nature of the church as excluding a secular element.

ARTICLE III.

A CENTURY OF A PRESBYTERY.¹

The Presbytery of Lexington, Virginia, possesses in an unbroken series of volumes, a complete and exact Record, without omission or mutilation, of each session of the Presbytery, from its separate organisation in 1786, down to the present time.

Impressed with the value of these Records, and the importance of the secure preservation of them, the Presbytery ordered that they should be transcribed, and the transcript be deposited in the Library building of Union Theological Seminary, Hampden Sidney, Virginia. Thus, should either the original or the copy be lost by any casualty, the Records would still exist. This example of prudence may well be commended to all our Presbyteries.

Lexington Presbytery has a noble ancestral lineage in the line of the true succession. She is the eldest daughter, if not the youngest sister, of Hanover Presbytery. Hanover formed part of the Synod of New York; the Synod of New York came forth from the Church of Scotland. The Kirk is the offspring of the Reformation. The Reformation goes back to the Apostolic Church, and the Apostolic Church finds its head-spring in the covenant with Abraham.

When a man who has reached the closing period of life, reviews his career, he perceives that his daily routine has been more potent, whether for good or ill, in forming his history, than the few more conspicuous acts by which his life may have been signalised. To rouse his household to early industry, to bow at the family altar, to go forth to his labor until the evening, to provide for those dependent upon him, to exercise aright his authority and influence at home and in society, to improve his daily opportunities for doing good, by speech, act, and example, furthering the good and resisting the evil, and steadily to walk in the fear of God—these and such like are the items on life's

¹Records of the Presbytery of Lexington, Virginia, from 1786 to 1881.

ledger which mainly make up the sum total. And when he returns thanks for the covenant blessings of God, providential and spiritual, they seem to have come down, not by sudden descents, but by continuous diffusion, as the daily sunshine and the nightly dew.

In this aspect, the history of the life-time of a good man is strikingly analogous to the history of a Presbytery. In the inconspicuous routine of a Presbytery, the intelligent and observant eye will perceive fuller proofs of the real value of its work, than in its struggle with the crises of its history. To one reading over consecutively the Records of Lexington Presbytery, its proceedings recorded in identical forms, become a little monotonous: the opening sermon; the election of a Moderator; the reports from churches, pastors, and committees; the appointment of supplies; the reception and licensing of candidates; the ordination and installation of ministers; the sending of commissioners to the General Assembly, and other such work. On the other hand, the attention of the reader is at once aroused, when an appeal comes up for decision, or page after page is filled with some notable trial of a minister, the consideration of a great question of Church polity, or a struggle between parties or sections. Yet in reality these latter matters are far less essential than the former. The one exercises, it is true, an important influence on the history of the Church, but the other constitute its life. It is the routine work of the Presbytery that represents the preaching of the everlasting gospel; the labors, prayers, and self-denial of faithful ministers; the worship and sacraments of the Church, with all the means of grace, the happiness of the family; the guidance of the Christian's life, his triumphant death, and his hope of glory through the covenant well ordered and sure; the diffusion of the Bible; the sanctification of the Sabbath; the restraint of iniquity; the purification of society; the extension of Christ's kingdom, and the coming of the Millennium. Were it not for these things, the word crisis would be unmeaning, and martyrs would be suicides.

The act of the Synod of New York, by which Lexington Presbytery was brought into existence as a separate organisation,

is dated 1786. A document so old and so important possesses sufficient interest to justify its being given here:

“*In Synod, at Philadelphia, May, 1786.*”

“The Synod divided the Presbytery of Hanover into two Presbyteries—one by the name of the Presbytery of Hanover, the other by the name of the Presbytery of Lexington; the latter bounded by Redstone and Donegal Presbyteries on the north: by the southeastern ridge of the Appalachian chain of mountains on the east and south, and by the New River on the west: consisting of the Revds. Jno. Brown, Wm. Graham, Archibald Scott, Jas. McConnell, Edward Crawford, Benjamin Erwin, Jno. Montgomery, Wm. Wilson, Moses Hoge, John McCue, Saml. Carriek, and Saml. Shannon.

“Synod appointed the Presbytery of Lexington to meet at Timber Ridge church, (built 1776.) in the county of Rockbridge, on the last Tuesday of Sep. next, and the Rev. John Brown to be Moderator, or, in his absence, the senior member present.”

[*Extract from Minutes of Synod.*]

This was only three years after the close of the War of Independence, one year before the formation of the Constitution of the United States, and two years before its adoption by the State of Virginia.

Within the period since elapsed, our country has increased its population from four millions to fifty millions, and its power, wealth, and national importance in a still higher ratio. Three wars have occurred—that of 1812, the Mexican war, and the Civil war. Slavery has been abolished, the Presbyterian Church has been twice divided and once reunited, while the change of modes of thought and social habits has fully kept pace with the changing conditions of other things.

The bounds originally assigned by the Synod to Lexington Presbytery, included the territory now occupied by four Presbyteries—Winchester, Lexington, Montgomery, and Greenbrier. The date of the first statistical reports is 1819, thirty-three years after the organisation of Presbytery, within which time the territorial limits had been restricted, especially by the setting off of Winchester Presbytery. The reports as recorded, give sixteen ministers, fifteen churches, and fourteen hundred and forty-two communicants. The four Presbyteries mentioned above, now covering about the same territory, reported to the General As-

sembly, in 1880, one hundred and nine ministers, one hundred and fifty-five churches, and twelve thousand nine hundred and eighty-six communicants.

During the ninety-five years of its existence, Lexington Presbytery has licensed one hundred and twelve ministers to preach the gospel. The second name on the roll, is that of Archibald Alexander—October 1st, 1791. With comparatively few exceptions, all these names are worthy of reverential and grateful remembrance and of honored mention. We can record only a few of these most widely known in the Church. William Hill, George Baxter, Conrad Splece, William Turner, Daniel Baker, (received from Winchester, but ordained by Lexington Presbytery,) and William S. Plumer, who was taken under care of Presbytery, in 1824, and so continued till 1826, at which date, having passed satisfactorily the most of his trials for licensure, he was, at his own request, transferred by them to the care of the New Brunswick Presbytery.

The Presbytery has furnished to the foreign field three ordained ministers—Samuel R. Houston, George W. Leyburn, and M. Hale Houston. To its Princeton Seminary is indebted for its illustrious President, Dr. Archibald Alexander, and Union Seminary, Virginia, is under like obligation for two Presidents—Dr. George A. Baxter, and Dr. S. B. Wilson, while two of its present Professors, Dr. B. M. Smith and Dr. R. L. Dabney, though not licentiates of Lexington Presbytery, were, at the time when they were severally transferred to the Seminary, presbyters of that body. Dr. Plumer was Professor in Alleghany and afterwards in Columbia Seminaries.

These statistics are but a few salient points which map out the general history of the Presbytery. As if standing on some prominence in the great Valley within which lie its geographical limits, one should say: There is the beautiful Blue Ridge on the east; yonder tower the Peaks of Otter; on the west you behold the North Mountain with its picturesque outlines, the House Mountain, the Jump Mountain, and Elliott's Knob; here flows the North River, which, having by its unassisted energy cut through the North Mountain, presently unites with the Upper

James, and bursts the Blue Ridge at Balcony Falls; and yonder, northward, flows the Shenandoah, hastening, an eager auxiliary, to join the Potomac in its assault upon the Appalachian chain at Harper's Ferry; there the Natural Bridge which, unique in its sublimity, gives name to the County in which it is found; while Wier's Cave and the Caves of Luray reveal their subterranean wonders to the delighted tourist. Here is the University town of Lexington not heretofore greatly known, but destined to secure imperishable remembrance as holding in solemn custody the graves of Lee and Jackson. Midway along, is the ambitious little city of Staunton, and at the farther limit, the old historic town of Winchester.

But these notices inform us rather, where the Valley of Virginia is, than what it is. To know it aright, we need to descend from the eminence, and traverse its limestone vales and swelling hills, well watered as the land of promise, to see its grass-covered farms, to visit its villages, colleges, schools, and churches, and above all, to know its hardy, honest, virtuous, and brave population. Then indeed will we begin to realise that, of a truth, it is a heaven-favored land.

So when in speaking of a century's work of Lexington Presbytery, we tell how it has occupied its territory by planting churches, how many ministers it has sent forth, and how it has borne itself in the periods made critical by the agitation of large questions—religious, moral, social, and political: this is not to weigh and estimate its work, but only to furnish *indicia* for such an estimation.

The ultimate question is, how well has it accomplished the part assigned to it as an instrument in the conversion of souls to Jesus Christ, in the promotion of personal piety and family religion; this primarily and directly, and secondarily and consequentially, how strongly has it operated upon society for its purification and advancement? To this question, as to the extent of its influence, no prudent man would venture a dogmatic reply.

The writer of this article, with an intimate and life-long acquaintance with Lexington Presbytery and the territory which it occupies, can only express the solemn judgment, that, allowing

for the imperfections of everything not perfectly sanctified, this Presbytery has been steadily faithful to its trust, and that the Church of Christ has been the most potent existing instrument for influencing for good the character of this population, for *almost a hundred years*—more potent than the civil government, with its laws, its courts, and its ministers of justice; more potent than education or any of the other factors of advancing civilisation; and that of all the branches of the Church of Christ in the Valley of Virginia, the Presbyterian has been most influential, as represented by this Presbytery, which has had a separate existence for nearly a century.

The regular work of every Presbytery, recurring at its semi-annual meetings, consists in the main of the supervision of its churches and ministers, maintaining sound doctrine and Scripture polity, exercising Christian discipline, requiring and enforcing the support of the Church at home, and aiding in its extension within and beyond its own limits. The Records of Lexington Presbytery exhibit exact and scrupulous attention to these subjects. The names of the members present and those absent, are duly recorded, and the absentees always render their excuses at the first after meeting at which they are present. Candidates are very solemnly received under care of Presbytery, and have full parts of trial assigned to them. The following, for example, is the Record of the receiving of Archibald Alexander, October 27th, 1790:

“Information was made by a member, that Mr. Archibald Alexander, of Lexington, desired to be taken under care of this Presbytery, as a candidate for the gospel ministry; and Presbytery having a favorable account of his moral and religious character and literary accomplishments, introduced him to a conference, in which, having a narrative of his religious experience, and of his evidences of faith in Christ and repentance toward God, together with his call and motives, to the gospel ministry, and a specimen of his skill in cases of conscience—Presbytery having considered the same, do approve thereof, and agree to take him under their care as a candidate for the gospel ministry.

“Mr. Alexander is appointed, as part of trial, an Exegesis on the following theme: ‘*An Fide sola justificamur*’; and an Homily on this theme: ‘What is the difference betwixt a dead and living Faith?’ to be delivered at our next.”

It may be remarked that the Latin of Lexington Presbytery before 1800, was not always classic, and occasionally a mere layman is puzzled in the interpretation thereof—*e. g.*: the theme assigned to Matthew Lyle, 1791, is, “*An originale peccatum detur*”?

Mr. Alexander was further examined for his licensure, in the Languages, and Sciences of Geography, Astronomy, Natural and Moral Philosophy, Criticism, and of his knowledge of Divinity. Also, he had been required to deliver a popular sermon from the verse in Jeremiah—“But the Lord said unto me, Say not, I am a child.” The assignment of this text seems to have been not without a touch of grave humor, as the candidate was still under age, and of a very youthful appearance. It seems singular that candidates upon their first application to Presbytery, should be called on to give “a specimen of their skill in cases of conscience.” This was regularly done in the early years of Presbytery. Presently it disappears, and doubtless wisely. Perhaps it might not be amiss if something of like nature should be introduced into the final trials for licensure.

The matter of ministerial support has always been a difficult and delicate one. The Presbyterian method of securing it, seems to be the best as yet devised. It is a reasonable mean between arbitrary interference on the one hand, and utter neglect on the other. The Presbytery does not prescribe what a particular church shall pay its minister, but it undertakes to enforce compliance with all stipulations once entered into. To do this requires, as every Presbytery knows, fidelity, firmness, and prudence. It is obviously a corresponding function of Presbytery, to see that the minister is faithful in the discharge of his reciprocal duties.

Lexington Presbytery, at its first meeting in 1786, took this matter into serious consideration, and adopted the following plan, which, though crude, goes to the root of the matter. It was resolved:

“1st. There shall be a committee or committees of Presbytery annually appointed, consisting of two ministers and two elders, any two of whom, when met, shall be capable of doing business, who shall go to the differ-

ent churches under our care, who have for the time being, or may have had, a minister settled with them, as the case may require.

“ 2d. * * *

“ 3d. That when the committee and congregation are met, one of the ministers shall preach a sermon, either adapted to the occasion, or upon some other subject, as prudence may direct, and after the blessing is pronounced, the committee shall then require the minister of that church to withdraw, and when he is gone out, shall inquire of the Session what harmony subsists between the minister and his people—whether he has been faithful in the discharge of his duty—whether his public discourses are calculated to afford light to the understanding, to awaken the secure conscience, to comfort and relieve the distressed, and to build up believers in the most Holy Faith.

“ 4th. That the committee shall inquire of the committee, elders, or whatever description of men are intrusted with that business, a state of their salary and of what arrears are due from the congregation—shall take a list of the names of all the delinquents, with the sum due from each, and the years annexed to their respective names, which statement shall be certified by one or more of the above description of men of said churches, which shall be by the committee laid before the next succeeding meeting of Presbytery.

“ 5th. If defects appear, the committee are to inquire whether they have arose from a default in the people, or neglect in the minister; and the committee shall give the minister or congregation, such advice, counsel, or direction, as to them shall seem proper, and make report accordingly to next Presbytery.”

These ordinances illustrate the view then entertained, as to what kind of sermons ought to be preached, and cast a side light upon the directness with which Presbytery exercised its supervisory functions.

This plan was after some years substituted by a less cumbrous one—that of annual Reciprocal Reports required to be made by each Session, and each minister separately to Presbytery. This mode continues to the present time, and its efficacy and importance have been established by the experience of the greater part of a century.

(Let us here record, to the singular honor of a plain country church in the midst of the mountains, that Windy Cove Church for the whole term of its century, has *never in a single instance*, been reported to the Presbytery as delinquent for the smallest arrears of preacher's salary !)

The authority of every Presbytery is frequently invoked in matters of discipline by appeals brought up from the Session. Of this difficult business, Lexington Presbytery had its full share. The earlier records show more of it than the later. Sessions were stricter then than now, and church censures were regarded more seriously. The questions involved were, however, for the most part, essentially those which still present themselves.

Dancing vexed the righteous souls of our forefathers. After a hundred years, their descendants are wrestling with it still. *Quousque tandem!* The first year after its organisation, the Presbytery sustained the action of the Session of Halls Church, suspending William Alexander because he encouraged a dancing school. The records of 1798 contain a minute upon the subject which is worth copying here as illustrative at once of the severity of the opinion then held, and as a specimen of the reasons presented in its support.

“The Pres’y finding by the information of a member, that dancing-schools, and the practice of dancing at marriages and other gatherings of young people, are becoming customary in the bounds of some of our churches, and likely to become so in other places, the Presbytery, viewing such practices inconsistent with the interests of Religion, the increase of useful Knowledge, and the purity of Morals, do hereby declare their concurrence with the Catechism of our Church, in prohibiting dancing, which part in our Catechism we conceive agreeable to the Holy Scriptures; and do request their ministers and churches under our care, to be careful in withstanding all such practices. The Presbytery view persons indulging in the above practices, censurable.”

Appended to the above is the following:

“I do dissent to the above Minute.

JOHN McCUE.”

In 1841, the modification of the general tone upon the subject is indicated by the following Minute:

“Resolved, That Presbytery views with sorrow the increased prevalence of *dancing* in families and by persons connected with our churches, and that our Sessions be admonished to guard against its encroachments, and promptly correct offences.”

And all this before “round dances” had been invented! It is believed that at present, Lexington Presbytery is on this subject fully in accord with the General Assembly, as far as the mind of

this venerable Supreme Court can be ascertained from its deliverances heretofore uttered.

Intemperance gave the trouble in those old days which it always has done, and was dealt with faithfully in individual cases, while concern was frequently expressed because of its prevalence. Temperance societies are warmly approved of in 1828. How the Church was to deal with the making and vending of ardent spirits seems not to have been more exactly defined at that day than it is at present. A Pastoral Letter of solemn admonition upon the subject, was addressed to the churches, but it does not appear that discipline was enjoined. There is no notice of theatres, operas, horse-racing, nor card playing. These worldlinesses had not as yet flowed over the Appalachian chain to vex the quiet churches of the happy valley.

In all appeals from the actions of Sessions, often involving strong personal animosities, the prudence and moderation of the Presbytery is as notable as its fidelity. It seems to have been the prevalent custom, whenever the circumstances would allow, not to decide such matters at their first coming up, but to postpone them to a subsequent meeting. Many cases thus postponed never appear again on the Records. Six months' time for reflection and prayer was often enough to cure the flagrant animosities of the parties, or a committee sent by Presbytery, by its influential advice, would adjust the difficulty. These solemn Minutes penned by hands that long since have mouldered into dust, seem to us now dispassionate enough; but the matters they record aroused tumults in hearts, in families, and in churches, that were quieted only by the stillness of the graveyard. Alas! for poor human nature! Blessed be Christ for his Church, that lays its restraining, healing hand upon poor human nature!

Neglect of family worship is made a matter of discipline; catechising the congregation is made a regular part of pastoral duty reported upon to Presbytery; and the service of fasting was held to be important, as it is not by any means at the present day.

In the early days, the act of ordaining a minister was "by the imposition of hands, with fasting and prayer;" and at the semi-annual communions of each congregation, the Friday before

the Lord's Day was a day of general fast in the congregation.

The appointment of supplies to destitute regions within the bounds of the Presbytery, was a regular part of each meeting; and those who know the difficulties, even with improved facilities of travelling, in the more remote and mountainous portions of the Presbytery, cannot but admire the fidelity of the Presbytery and of the individual ministers in doing the work of Domestic Missions.

We have been giving specimens of what we have called the *routine* work of the Presbytery, engaging its attention at each of the semi-annual meetings—enough (possibly more than enough; for we ought not to expect that the reader will feel the interest the writer does in these details), to exhibit the faithfulness of Lexington Presbytery in the discharge of the work committed to it. And so from year to year, this good work has gone on bearing its annual fruit.

But this quiet, peaceful, steady-going body is fully competent for emergencies when they arise. It has been required to meet all the great religious and moral controversies which have emerged during the past century.

In its very first years the Slavery question to consider; afterwards, Abolition; the subject of "Bodily Exercises;" Revivals, New School Doctrines, and New Measures; the Rescinding Resolutions and their Consequences; the Civil War; and the Division of the Presbyterian Church. Upon all these and some other similar questions, the stand of the Presbytery has been uniformly firm, consistent, and wise; moderate and prudent in what it has done, and not less so in what it has forborne to do. On its Records are found some of the best papers which these extraordinary occasions called forth.

Also upon practical matters of vital importance to the growth of the Church, the action of the Presbytery has been judicious and efficient. Domestic Missions from the very first; the Bible cause early; Foreign Missions in their time; Distinct Ecclesiastical organisation as against Voluntary association; Education for the Ministry, and Union Theological Seminary; Tract distribu-

tion and religious periodicals, along with all the other developments of Christian activity.

With reluctance we deny ourselves the pleasure of illustrating by extracts from the Records, the acts and doings of Lexington Presbytery on these important subjects. Prudence and want of space alike forbid. A brief reference to the slavery question may be allowed.

As early as 1815, the Presbytery was greatly harassed on this subject by the Rev. George Bourne. Mr. Bourne was from England, and had been, without sufficient care, admitted as a member of the Presbytery in 1812, and with surprising want of caution, had been sent as a delegate to the General Assembly of 1815. There he made a most violent assault upon the institution of slavery, and uttered very offensive slanders against his own Presbytery. Being called to account for these, he denounced all slave-owners as *thieves, kidnappers, monsters, who ought to be ejected instantly from the Church.*

His course was so violent, and his language so abusive, that he was deposed from the ministry. This same Presbytery had, in 1800, licensed in regular form, as a preacher of the gospel, and invested with all the rights and privileges of a presbyter, John Chavis, a black man—"Presbytery considering that, like their Heavenly Father, they should be no respecter of persons." We believe, though we cannot so affirm, that John Chavis was the first colored Presbyterian minister ever licensed in the United States, possibly in the world. We are sure that he was the first licensed in Virginia.

At the Session of April 28th, 1820, this Minute appears:

"The following Resolutions were offered for the consideration of Presbytery, viz.:

"*Resolved*, That this Presbytery view with the deepest concern, the late amendment to the Act in the Virginia Laws, which prohibits slaves from attending Sunday schools, to be taught to read the Word of God, and the principles of Religion.

"*Resolved*, That in the opinion of this Presbytery, said Law is at direct variance with the commandment of God, which requires all to 'Search the Scriptures.'

"On motion, *Resolved*, That the above Resolutions be referred to the next Synod for their consideration."

Again and again, the Presbytery expresses its solicitude at the moral and religious condition of the slaves, recognises to the full its obligation to labor for their welfare, and urges its ministers to preach to them, and provide oral instruction for them in Sabbath schools, and presses upon the conscience of all Christian masters and mistresses the duty of considering them members of their families, for whom God has made them specially responsible. Yet was the Presbytery always strong and steadfast in its opposition to fanaticism on the subject of slavery. In 1835, the following *Resolution* was unanimously adopted:

“That this Presbytery views with deep concern, and decided disapprobation, the course of the Abolitionists at the North, as an officious and obtrusive intermeddling with the concerns of others, as tending directly and inevitably to the dissolution of these United States, as hazarding the peace and even the lives of the citizens of the Southern States, and as increasing the evils which it is their professed object to remove.”

With great prudence and a true view of its proper functions, the Presbytery ever kept itself out of the domain of political contention. At different periods of its century life-time, it saw the country violently agitated by the struggle between Federalists and Republicans, Nationalism and States' Rights, and by Presidential contests. Yet the reader would never suppose, as he looks over these serene records, that we had fought through one war with Great Britain, and another with Mexico. Certainly the Civil War, that arrayed one section against another, and for a time disrupted the Union, that upturned our social institutions, and devastated our land, while it brought death, misery, and destruction into almost every family, was too direful in itself, and of necessity of too direct a bearing upon the Church to allow of silence. But even during the years between 1861 and 1865, the Records of Lexington Presbytery, if blurred by tears of anguish, are unstained by a drop of blood. We think the strongest terms to be met with, are contained in the following Resolution—1861—initiating a separation from the Northern General Assembly:

“Whereas the Government of the remaining United States is now waging a cruel and, as we think, an unconstitutional and unjust war upon
VOL. XXXII., NO 4.—6.

us, for the purpose of our subjugation, we do not see how it is possible to continue our ecclesiastical relation with those Presbyteries in the United States with which we were formerly united in a General Assembly, inasmuch as the great majority in these Presbyteries approve of the war that is now waged upon us, as is manifest from the debates and votes in the last General Assembly. This, we believe, must so alienate us from each other, that we cannot cordially and successfully co-operate in building up the Church of Christ."

Even to this *Resolution*, one member of the Presbytery entered a dissent, upon the ground that Presbytery had no right to decide upon the constitutional question involved in the war. Perhaps the Presbytery was in error; perhaps the Rev. Mr. Irwin was right in his dissent; but allowing this, who does not feel that to censure what is here said, is to imply high praise for what is left unsaid!

But the real spirit of the Presbytery is more forcibly illustrated by a single act recorded on its Minutes, than could be done by pages of encomium. This is the record of it:

"April 20th, 1861. A request was presented by the Rev. George Junkin, D. D., for a dismissal from this Presbytery to unite with the Presbytery of Philadelphia. The request was granted, and the following paper was adopted as expressive of the feelings of this body.

"That the long and interesting connection of Dr. Junkin with this Presbytery, during his incumbency as President of Washington College, has filled us with deep convictions of his pious and earnest attachment to the interests of our beloved Zion.

"Though not a pastor, he has done much pastoral service, and though much occupied with the business of college, has been most earnest and untiring in his efforts for our cause in this region. Following him with our warmest expressions of affection to his new home, in the Church to which he has devoted his whole life, we commend him with earnest prayer, to the blessing of God, in that period of his ministerial history which is yet before him."

This distinguished divine, known, admired, and beloved throughout the Presbyterian Church in the United States, had, twelve years before, been called to the honorable and important position of the Presidency of Washington College, Lexington, Virginia. Here he had fixed his domicil; here his sons and his daughters had married; here he had buried his dead, and here he himself had expected to live and die. But he had ever felt

a passionate devotion for the American Union ; he regarded it as the greatest work of human wisdom and unselfish patriotism. He deemed it favored of God, and believed that it was to be the great instrument in furthering the wide purposes of Divine Providence for advancing the liberty and happiness of mankind, and for establishing the kingdom of Christ throughout the world. So believing, with supreme honesty and courage he obeyed his convictions, and could not abide with a people who, as honest and as brave as himself, were hazarding all that makes life dear to man to dissolve that Union. He resigned his Presidency, separated from his family, took solemn leave of his dead, by faith walked the path that his conscience pointed out, and with an honorable safe-conduct from Governor Letcher of Virginia, passed the lines, and cast in his lot with the North. All this was known to his Presbytery, as dutifully he applied for his dismissal. All was known, but nothing that spoke of differences was uttered in that body. But remembering only his faithful service as a minister, and the pleasant Christian communion they had enjoyed with him, with tender sorrow and with heartfelt prayer, they send him with a blessing to labor in his lot, in the common Church of Christ. When Paul and Barnabas parted in contention, their causes of difference were much less ; their want of charity, much greater.

But we must not allow our own interest in the theme to lead us beyond bounds. We have need to remind ourselves, that we are not writing a history of Lexington Presbytery, but only illustrating its characteristics, and even of these only a few of the most prominent.

The picture we have imperfectly sketched, is that of a company of serious, industrious, God-fearing men working steadily under the conditions of their times, according to the spirit and the form of the Presbyterian Church, accomplishing a fruitful work from year to year, and exhibiting all necessary reserved power to meet extraordinary demands in critical periods. Let us call it, in modest terms, a *successful Presbytery*.

And now, if we ask, to what it owes its success, for a hundred years, the answer is neither hard to give, nor far to seek.

It owes it, under the divine blessing, to its steady adherence to the *doctrines and polity of the Presbyterian Church.*

Of the conformity of Presbyterian doctrine to the word of God, of its vitalising power in the hearts of believers and its practical efficiency in forming the character of individuals, communities, and nations, it is not necessary here to speak. To this doctrine, Lexington Presbytery has invariably adhered. No minister within her bounds was ever tried for heresy; no congregation has ever been dissatisfied with sound doctrinal preaching. In the New School controversy, she furnished, in the person of Dr. Baxter, one of the ablest and most influential supporters of the Old School body; and in the separation, only one minister and a part of one church went over to the New School.

The Presbyterian polity is the true type of a representative Republic, and fully establishes the theoretic perfection of this form of government. A Republican Government can fail in practice only when wanting one or both of the conditions postulated for its existence—wisdom and virtue in the constituent body. To the Church, these, limited only by human imperfection, are secured by its divine Head.

The two distinctive features of the polity of Presbyterianism as an organisation are, the parity of the ministry and its ascending hierarchy of authoritative courts, from the Session up to the General Assembly. In her ministry are no Prelates, no Priests, no Deacons, but her Bishops are brethren all. The polity of parity secures against oppression and allows no arrogance. It would be impossible for this to be exemplified more clearly than it is by the records of Lexington Presbytery. The younger members are as frequently Moderators and Commissioners to the General Assembly, as the older ones; and the Elders as well, are welcome to more consideration than they ordinarily care to avail themselves of. From a superficial perusal of the minutes, no one would know who were the leading members of the Presbytery fifty years ago. True, the observant reader, familiar with our system, will notice that upon important subjects some names occur oftener than others; but this is not the prerogative of rank, but the recognition of ability to serve the Church. Even the

title of D. D. does not make a presbyter a Rabbi. In fact, the Presbytery of Lexington supported its dignity for twenty-seven years without the aid of this honorary title, the first name to which it is attached being that of George A. Baxter, Sept. 30, 1813.

The other feature of our polity—a hierarchy of authoritative courts—requires exact supervision over ministers and churches; and thus secures soundness in doctrine, consistency in discipline, and general uniformity in modes of worship. How faithful Lexington Presbytery has been in discharging this part of its functions, and with what success, we have already seen. Yet in the last mentioned particular—uniformity of worship—it is noticeable how, with admirable good sense and without contention, the Presbytery adapted itself to the changing conditions of society. Within our own recollection, no instrumental music or organised choir would have been tolerated in our churches. The Communion was always administered at a series of tables. We well remember a venerable, old time elder of our own church, denouncing the modest choir as nothing better than a “*thay-a-ter*,” and the Communion in pews as “all the same as a *‘tay-party!’*”

With difficult self-restraint, we forbear illustrating other particulars in the history of Lexington Presbytery. We fear our readers will think that we have allowed our fondness for our theme to lead us along too far already. Perhaps the charge is just. It certainly would be, if what has been written, concerned only the Presbytery of which the writer has been so often a member, and which we so truly love and reverence. But what is true of a large section of a uniform aggregate, is true of the whole. What is characteristic of Lexington Presbytery is characteristic, with unessential differences, of every faithful Presbytery; is characteristic of the Presbyterian Church. And in exemplifying the history of this Presbytery, the heart has swelled with, we trust, not unallowable pride, at the thought that Presbyterian doctrine and Presbyterian polity is everywhere the same, and everywhere working out the same results, till we realise fully, and reiterate to ourselves again and again, the outburst of one of our Presbyters, Dr. McFarland, when as Moderator of the old Assembly,

in welcoming a delegate from the Dutch Reformed Church, he grasped his hand and exclaimed: "God bless every man who loves the Shorter Catechism!" Let us formulate the pious ejaculation into a dogma, and affirm with truth: Every man and every Church *is* blessed of God, that truly receives and heartily loves the teachings of God's word as embodied in the Shorter Catechism. Nor is the dogma weakened, if thus expanded: It embraces every one who loves the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and in truth.

We prize above all other Churches, our own, as most scriptural and most favored of God; but we recognise as true sister Churches, many other denominations as part of the Church Universal on earth, founded by and on the same Lord, taught by the same word, guided by the same Spirit, and joint-inheritors of the infallible promise of future universal dominion on earth and final incorporation into the Church triumphant above!

J. T. L. PRESTON.

ARTICLE IV.

GOD'S MARRIAGE LAW.

In the July number of this REVIEW an article from the pen of the Reverend Dr. Wm. Stoddert, of Cumberland County, Virginia, bore the title of "The World's Marriage Law, and the Deceased Wife's Sister." In the body of the article, the author intimates that the topic was suggested to him by a paper on "The Law of Marriage" which appeared in these pages just a year ago.* But as Dr. Stoddert's article, (which is probably the most able argument that could be presented on that side,) takes precisely the opposite ground, it seems to be incumbent upon the unhappy writer of the October paper to review his foundations, and to build more carefully, while he endeavors to set forth God's law as touching the main matter, to wit, the

*SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, Vol. XXXI., No. 4, Article 2.

marriage of a widower with his deceased wife's sister. For while the former paper essayed to deal chiefly with this special alliance, it also presented some underlying principles, upon which the "Law of Marriage" was based in all cases. No doubt these principles were vaguely stated, as Dr. Stoddert does not appear to have considered them in his review, or in the general scope of his article.

There is a proverb extant, which says, "The onlooker sees most of the game;" and, it is probable that the author of "The World's Marriage Law" is therefore most competent to discuss this question, as he avows himself "a practical misogynist," and, as if to show either the security or the hopelessness of his position, he adds, "who is verging towards sexagenarianism." In this condition, it seems to be eminently proper that he should at the outset announce that he discards "all outside faucies, prejudices, and sentiments," while he confines his attention to a rigid examination of the law. A shallow thinker might suggest that the man who had not made the *principle* of the syllogism a study, would be a bad professor of logic. But there is a faculty of the mind, by which men reach conclusions, without the laborious processes of logic. So the misogynist may be able to define a law of marriage, upon naked principles of ethics, without wasting time upon such frivolities as "sentiment," of which he had no personal experience. The fact that this vague exercise of the mind, called sentiment, (by the consensus of all civilised humanity.) enters largely into the whole life of the marriage relation, does not weigh a feather in a cold-blooded examination of mere law.

In his opening sentences the author presents some postulates that may be admitted in a general sense, but which may be properly questioned, if pressed to an undue extent. For example, he asserts that the "World's Law of Marriage" is all contained in the single passage of Leviticus xviii. 7-18:

"Here are the rules given by God in the early morning of human history, to guide in the formation of the most important of earthly relationships. Society, civilisation, religion, all of the good of earth, depends on the family, while the family itself depends for its very existence on the regulations contained in this passage." (Page 471.)

His second postulate reads as follows :

"The right and wrong is enunciated in a dozen consecutive verses. The formula is well nigh as brief and exact as a summary of doctrine. Once enunciated it is dropped. If twice Moses alludes to what he here said, it is but an allusion. No late writer in Scripture was allowed to review these commands. Christ himself did not choose to enforce, vary, or speak of what his servant here proclaimed. * * * These twelve verses are a monogram. They might be called the Dodecalogue of Marriage: the Twelve Commandments; the Finished Code. If our study here leads us to no sure results, we need look no further. There is nothing that can teach us." (Page 471.)

Admitting these statements, in a wide sense, to be true and fair, they are still unfair and misleading, if they are intended to shut off all debate beyond their limits. The fact that these twelve rules were laid down by God, "in the early morning of human history," can never destroy the other fact, that there was an earlier hour in that morning—*twenty-five centuries earlier*—when God established the marriage relation, and announced its fundamental law: "These twain shall be one." And as Adam was undoubtedly under the sway of the Decalogue while in the garden, albeit unable to violate the most of its later specifications, so was he under the domination of the Dodecalogue, though Eve had no sister for him to marry. And supposing—for the sake of the argument—that Eve had died, and had left a sister, it is not at all certain that the disconsolate widower would have married her. And, very likely, the consensus of civilised humanity, (which the author rather derides,) would look for another sleep for Adam, and the withdrawal of another rib, instead of the unnatural union of Adam with the sister of Eve.

This *caveat* is filed just here, because the original law—whatever it might have been, or whatever it may be as revealed to the race—exceeds in dignity and in force of obligation the specifications of the Dodecalogue, codified twenty-five hundred years later. For instance, the Dodecalogue forbids the marriage of brother and sister, yet the sons and daughters of Adam must have contracted these marriages. And it must have been the holy, wise, and good purpose of God that made such unions proper *then*, though they were incestuous thereafter. These first

postulates, therefore, may not be accepted in too sweeping a sense.

Still, the general statement is true, in so far as it affects the present argument. The Church and the world have no other marriage law than this Dodecalogue—considered in its true aspect as a mere law of prohibitions. And the Church has no formulated law forbidding the marriage of sister with dead sister's widower, other than the sixteenth verse of Leviticus xviii.: "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife. It is thy brother's nakedness." And this proposition is amply sustained by the very first "axiomatic rule for interpreting the Code," as presented by Dr. Stoddert, on page 477: "When one degree is forbidden, an equal degree is also forbidden."

To prevent misunderstanding, and for the sake of perfect fairness in this debate, it must be noted here, that the author makes his axiom to apply only to degrees of consanguinity. In fact, the only difference between Dr. Stoddert and the present writer, is in the scope of this excellent axiom, and the present object is to show the reasons for giving this axiom a wider application. The author limits it to blood relations. May it not be extended to read: "When one relation is forbidden, the correlation is also forbidden"?

The author would reply to this, that the correlation to "brother's widow," which is forbidden in the 16th verse, is "husband's brother." But if he will admit *both* the axioms as stated, a third may be constructed to read thus: "Where one relation is forbidden, the opposite relation is also forbidden."

The ground upon which this proposal is made, is the fact that the relation subsisting betwixt a man and his wife's sister, is exactly equal to that subsisting betwixt a woman and her husband's brother. The author admits that these degrees are identical during the *life-time* of the parties. And unless it can be shown that the death of the wife destroys a relationship in one case, which the death of the husband does not do in the other case, the law of the 16th verse forbids the union under discussion. Therefore, the strongest point that Dr. Stoddert presents, is exactly in this direction. He asserts in plain terms that the death

of a husband does not change the wife's relationship to *his* family, while the death of a wife at once releases the husband from the prohibitions of the Dodecalogue, as affecting *her* kindred. This proposition is literally the last ditch on the wrong side of this discussion. Look for a moment at the sweeping force of the author's postulate:

"We say, first, that we have no right to believe that there is absolute equality in the position of the parties to the marriage contract as regards the family of the other. If it is alleged that the consensus of humanity establishes this equality, it can be replied that the consensus of humanity established the movement of the sun and stars, till a period comparatively late. Common sense is often common nonsense and common ignorance. When men learn the physiological facts bearing on this subject which have been discovered, the same common sense which made them think that Moses made mistakes, and is to be explained away, will make them glorify his words as being of superhuman wisdom. There is one legislation made for widows of kindred, and another for wife's relations. A difference is recognised between them for the simplest of all reasons: it actually exists. The law which teaches that there is an absolute change of relationship in one case does not teach there is such a permanent one in the other, because in point of fact no such change occurs. That is all. A woman is forbidden to marry her husband's kindred, because such union is not ideally, nor figuratively, nor sentimentally, but actually incestuous. The law does not forbid the collaterals of the wife, because such union is no more incestuous than marriage with one of the Antipodes." (Pp. 487-8.)

The present writer has had many opportunities for conferences with learned Jewish Rabbis upon this and cognate topics. And he has never found one who did not distinctly differentiate the sexes, in the matter of obligation to the seventh commandment. The most acute thinker, and most accute speaker, among these Jewish friends, said in so many words, "that the seventh commandment did not affect the male sex at all, except in its prohibition of another man's wife!" Now, supposing the Dodecalogue to be based upon the Decalogue, (which most theologians admit to contain the whole possible sum of moral obligation,) then the conclusion of the author under review stands upon precisely the same ground as the conclusion of the Rabbi. The gospel seems to teach a different conclusion, and the gospel only revives the original obligation under which God created Adam and "built up"

Eve. And the Dodecalogue could, in the nature of the case, do no more than formulate and codify the original law. This law was written upon the nature of mankind; woven into warp and woof; modifying and controlling the thoughts and intents of the heart. And if Adam had lost Eve, and (to make a very violent supposition) had then sought an alliance with her sister, it is highly probable that he would have been expelled from Eden on the instant. And very probably, the "consensus of humanity" would say: "Served him right!" If the moral obligation affecting marital relations rests upon mankind, it seems more coherent to say it rests upon womankind *ipso facto*; because "Isha" was included in "Ish," and it was God's decree that pronounced Ish and Isha one flesh. And the "consensus of civilised humanity" affixes the same obligation upon a daughter to "honor father and mother" as that resting upon a son. The command, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," is usually considered to prohibit the coveting of a neighbor's husband. The differentiating the responsibility of the sexes under the Dodecalogue will not coherently apply to the 16th verse: "Thou shalt not commit incest with thy brother's wife," (or widow,) unless it can also be shown to apply to the 12th verse: "Thou shalt not commit incest with thy father's sister," and thus leave the daughter at liberty to marry her uncle. The following quotation from the article under review will show the curious contrasts in the mind of the author:

"If we find there is good ground in physical facts for the distinction which the law makes between husband and wife, we can also see why that which was incestuous at one time is not necessarily so at another. He who would limit the unity of the married state to that approximate physical identity to which we have alluded, understands little of the meaning of that high and holy relation which is the perpetual type of the bond which unites the Church to Christ. The lower and animal identity is the fleshly symbol of an ideal spiritual mysterious oneness of the soul. 'He that loveth his wife loveth himself.' And again, 'This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church.' The spiritual unity in the higher nature is as real as the material one in the inferior, and as real as that between Christ and his blood-bought host. When a man who is not utterly degraded and debased has taken on him the vows of marriage, he feels that the union between himself and his

wife is perfect. Her kindred are to him as his kindred. Her mother and brothers and sisters are his likewise. In many cases he identifies himself more with her family than his own, and centres his affections rather upon his connections by marriage than on those by blood. Nor can he even distantly conceive of a different relation. We do not know whether most to pity or loathe the married man who would not shrink with horror unutterable from the thought of future union with her to whom he feels as to his own sister, because she is the sister of his wife. Eventually the tie may be rent by death. He stands in a home made desolate. And not least of the elements of his agony in that dark hour, is the conviction that the bond which held him in loving union with her race is snapped in twain; that he is to them an outsider, and they to him; that the ties which he felt were as real as those which united him to his own kindred, have been broken. Affection may survive, but it is that which exists between friends, not that between members of one family. He is dismayed at the sudden revolution in his condition. Or if the stunning shock comes to him more gradually, still it comes to him at last. When time has healed the wounds and he seeks for a mother for the orphans, he looks on his deceased wife's sister precisely as on any other lady. Once there was a close tie between them, but that is now as a dream of the past. If out of the old acquaintance-ship another feeling emerges, it will be nothing strange. What attracted him in one member of a household will naturally attract him again. Men may have noble traits, and yet be destitute of much depth and intensity of affection; or they may not have a great deal of stability of feeling. We believe that there are many who are never able to forget the bond that once was, and can, therefore, never face the thought of a nearer one that might be. There are others whose natures are different; and these last we do not admire less, but the steadfast ones more. Scripture gives us many privileges; and in this, as in a cognate one, he who uses his liberty may do well, but he who refrains may do better. We regard it as a question of taste and sentiment, like any other alliance.

“If it should still appear that the death of a wife should so essentially change the position of a man towards her family, it should also be remembered that such alteration of position is not confined to her race. He is on a new footing with all women. Adultery, as falsehood to his wife, is to him no longer possible. A thought which a little while ago would have been deadly evil, is now perfectly harmless. A look, a word, an act, which would have filled every one who knew him with horror, are now nothing at all. He has the right to indulge in new feelings, and prepare for new relationships now, whereas had he done this before, he would have been a monster. If the breaking of the bond has so changed his position to all women that adultery is not possible to him,

it is not at all strange that his position has also changed with respect to a certain class, and that what was incest is so no longer. Why should this especial connexion not come under the otherwise general law? Why should a relationship be assumed to be in existence, when that which created it has passed away?" (Pp. 488-490.)

It would be difficult to construct sentences more eloquent or more emphatic than those in the foregoing quotation which describe the unity of the marriage relation. One would suppose, from reading the first half of the passage, that a union so intensely real, moral, mental, and sentimental, could not be broken even by the destructive hand of Death. And one marked peculiarity of the passage, is the careful avoidance of reference to the emotions of the female half of this ineffable union. If the author were arguing for the legality of a widow's marriage with her husband's brother, the absence of reference to *her* emotions, during the happy years of her first marriage, would not be so remarkable. But this sort of second-hand alliance is expressly forbidden in the Dodecalogue, which only left a possible loophole for widower and wife's sister, by failing to *state* the plain converse of the law of the 16th verse. And as the whole passage is partly a requiem over the soul of the departed, and partly an invitation to the bereaved widower to seek consolation in a union with her surviving sister, it would only have been polite, to say the least, to intimate that she also was a rather important factor in the *first* arrangement. And a very important omission is that of the first wife's preference for her own sister, when selecting her own successor on her death-bed. It is true—the cases are extremely rare in which dying wives have made such a selection, but a hint of her *probable* preference would have terminated the sentence better; and (if unquestioned) this *pro forma* statement would have been what the world calls "a clincher."

It is proper to say, in this connexion, that a large part of the controversy upon this topic, is due to the ignorance of mankind as to the true status of woman. No doubt this is partly, and perhaps mainly, due to the fact that the divine legislation almost uniformly deals with manhood, and where woman is specifically mentioned, it is in cases of offences that are peculiar to the sex.

Another reason is the undoubted subordination of the woman to the man. And this is so distinctly recognised that the domination of the husband is made to shield her from penalties that would otherwise have followed her acts; as in the matter of *vows* for example. "She is bound by the law of her husband," as Paul expounds it in the Epistle to the Romans. But without referring to the oft quoted encomium, that "woman was last at the cross, and first at the sepulchre," it is safe to assert that woman holds a very high rank in the estimation of God. As briefly suggested in the former paper on "The Law of Marriage," God "built up" the first woman under special solemnities. He quitted "creation" with the creation of Adam. He had pronounced all the steps that led up to man "very good." And he made man as "very good" as it was possible—reverently speaking—for divine power to make him. He had made him in his own image, and thus exhausted the possibility of creature excellence. It was not possible for God to resume the work of creation when he had completed the capstone, and "entered into his rest." And if he *had* created another "image and likeness" as an helpmeet for Adam, it would only have been another Adam. The moral obligation under which God formed the woman, was simply the concurrent force of his glorious attributes of wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. He had created angels before he created man, but they did not bear his image and likeness, and therefore they are not husbands and fathers. The author of "The World's Law" makes this point very clear on page 490. And it is very curious that he should on page 483, where he beautifully describes the formation of Eve and her oneness with Adam, attribute this oneness to her motherhood instead of her wifehood. It is perhaps the most curious postulate in the argument. Because the Scripture narrative very clearly sets forth the fact that the unity was based upon her name "Isha," and was solemnly commenced before the birth of Cain. "Bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh." And, in fact, the scope of the primal announcement, and the formal investiture of the woman with her high title, tended directly to exalt the wifehood above maternity. "*Therefore*"—that is, because of the one-

ness implied in the name, Isha,—“shall a man leave his father *and his mother*, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they shall be one flesh.”

The exhortations of the gospel also perpetually recognise the dignity of wifehood, and the command to wifely duties is always coupled with the command to the husband to render due honor to the wife, and this without reference to maternity. It is far from the present argument to detract from the high station of the mother; but the honor and dignity of motherhood, since the days of Eve, have *depended* upon wifehood.

But this strange postulate was indispensable to the argument under examination. If it can be shown that God meant *motherhood* only, when he said, “They twain shall be one flesh,” a large part of the author's ingenious argument will be established. It may not be amiss to say here, that the present writer's attention was naturally attracted to this article, because it was in some sort a review of his own paper printed a year ago. And, of course, he perused Dr. Stoddert's article with special care and study. Not once or twice, but five times, and each successive time with increased interest and pleasure. But it was only at the last reading, that this subtle suggestion (using the word in its complimentary sense) was revealed in its legitimate bearing and consequence. To avoid all chance of misapprehension, the entire quotation is given, beginning on page 483 :

“When God created the marriage relation, he said: ‘They twain shall be one flesh.’

“It was no figure of fancy, no hyperbolical imagery, no dim poetical unity, which was announced. The words are plain prose. They declare a matter of fact, as far from romance as a rule of arithmetic. The history of creation illustrates the reality, and subsequent revelation confirms that first teaching. The beautiful narrative that tells how Eve was built up for Adam, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, is an exquisite setting forth of what is true of all motherhood. She was the typical mother. What was true of her is also true of her daughters. The manner of the creation of Eve was no pretty fancy, valuable chiefly for stuffing out marriage services to requisite length. All motherhood repeats the wondrous story and experiences the miracle renewed. And every son of Adam can say to the mother of the child: ‘This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh.’

"The physical law, to the existence of which we are alluding, can be best understood by seeing its exhibitions in our 'poor relations,' as the animals are sometimes called. It is universally recognised. If the thoroughbred of the canine species has a litter which on the other side are 'curs of low degree,' and especially if this is her first litter, her subsequent ones will be tainted with cur blood, no matter how pure the later stock. It is known that if a mare has been the mother of many mules, the colt that would otherwise have been pure, has mule marks and mule ways, which show that its blood has been tainted. If her colts were all of pure blood, it is known that often the last one will resemble the sire of the first, rather than its own. It is known that just as the research is carried on, the law stands out with more clearness. And that even in our own race, among the second set of children, there will not unseldom be one who resembles not so much the actual father, as the dead and buried father of the first set.

"These phenomena are of too frequent recurrence to be considered accidental coincidences. They lead us to a law which he who runs may read.

"The prenatal existence which for a time has with the mother a common circulation of blood, is only half her own. It is a being different therefore from herself. Its own growth and existence must be vastly modified by that life which she every moment imparts to it. But to a less degree, her own organisation brought into absolute community with an existence essentially differentiated from her own, must also be greatly influenced by that community. Dr. Carpenter, the highest authority of the generation on such points, after discussion of the subject, announces this general principle: the prenatal young of an animal, being necessarily different from herself, essentially modify her physical condition. On account of the comparative fixedness of her type, this influence is not perceptible in herself. Its existence is, however, unmistakably proved in the impress made on her later offspring. The fact that the last are assimilated to the first, when she is the only connecting link between them, and when the similarity is in traits inherited, not from herself naturally, proves that an indelible change has occurred in her physical being, and that materially she has been made one with the young she bore. They twain shall be one flesh.

"We consider that this physical fact throws light on an apparently strange contradiction in Scripture. Union with the widow of a brother is here absolutely forbidden, and penalties are denounced against those who violate that command. Yet, when the widow was childless, this very union was made obligatory on the younger brother. We see now why there was a difference. What was incest in one case, was not so in the other. The seeming contradictions unite in a higher principle, and the two opposite directions are but different sides of the same truth." (Pp. 483-485.)

Now, considering the author's opening announcement, "that he was going to assume nothing except that Leviticus xviii. 7-18 was a complete and perfect Law of Marriage," there seems to be a respectable quantity of assumption in the foregoing passage. Notice the order. First, motherhood is the thing that makes the unity. So clearly is this proposition in the mind of the author that he actually repeats the formula and applies it to mother and infant—"they twain shall be one flesh." This is certainly not found in Scripture, if it is found in Doctor Carpenter. And unfortunately it is not true in *any* sense that involves the idea of identity. The physical fact is not questioned. Indeed, physically considered, the descendant of a woman, removed by ten generations, is more certainly "bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh" than her husband can possibly be, unless he is also her father. But God pronounces and proclaims the identity in one case—basing it upon marriage and nothing else—while he does not hint at this or a similar identity in the other, or in *any* other. Second, the resemblance, which is admitted to be only occasional, and *ipso facto* a variation from the general rule, is treated in the argument as if it were the usual and predominant consequence of maternity. Third, this occasional and variable physical fact, which may or may not appear in any given case, is cited to account for God's failure to prohibit marriage betwixt widower and wife's sister, while he does prohibit the corresponding union betwixt widow and husband's brother. Fourth, the triumphant conclusion is reached that this physical fact accounts for the enactment of the Levirate law, which *commands* the very marriage that is forbidden in Leviticus xviii. 16. And this Levirate law is only operative where the dead brother's widow is childless. Where is the scripture that says or implies, even remotely, that this childless widow did not bear children who died before their father? The whole intent of the Levirate law was, not to insure maternity to any given woman, but to preserve the name and inheritance of the holy seed in the holy land, by insuring paternity to a given *man*, who died childless. Any one who will take the trouble to compare Leviticus xviii. 16 with Deuteronomy xxv. 5-10, will be led to *another* law "which he who runs may

VOL. XXXII., NO. 4.—7.

read." The simple truth is that the last law (forty years younger than Leviticus) was local, tribal, *clannish*, and of limited application and duration. It would have been *incestuous* for any other than a son of Israel to contract a Levirate marriage! If this Dodecalogue is all the author claims for it, "the *World's Law*" is binding on the whole race. The Levirate law touched no man of the race except the sons of Jacob.

The title to this Dodecalogue is objectionable, because it is not a "marriage law" at all! It is a law of prohibitions which do not include the opposite duties. It does not refer to marriage at all, except in the eighteenth verse. It neither commands nor forbids marriage, except in this short verse; and logical thinking seems to compel the conclusion reached by Dr. Lindsay, that this verse was added to warn the sons of Jacob against their progenitor's sin. "Thou shalt not *marry* thy wife's sister even during her life-time," (as if union with this sister after the wife's death had already been forbidden in verse sixteen,) "for that also is incestuous!" This is as near the correct rendering as English idioms will allow, according to the best Hebrew authorities within the reach of the present writer. In the other eleven verses the word is always "incest" and nothing else. It is not the violation of the Seventh Commandment. That has its own word. It is not indiscriminate intercourse that does not violate the marriage law. That also has its own word.

In the next place, the distribution of the Dodecalogue into three tables, though extremely acute and ingenious, and although fortified by the finest logic in this superbly logical article, is still open to objection. First, this triple division is open to the very serious objection that it begs the question. That is, the entire argument rests upon the correctness of this division, and the whole law *had* to be thus partitioned off to escape the fatal force of verse sixteen, "Thou shalt not commit incest with thy brother's wife." And the application of the converse proposition, "Thou shalt not commit incest with thy sister's husband," is perverted by slicing off the seventeenth and eighteenth verses, and making them "the law of the wife's relations." On page 477 the author announces the obvious axiomatic rule, "where a more distant de-

gree is prohibited, the degrees intermediate are also prohibited." And if this rule will apply to all parts of this triple code, then the prohibition of verse seventeen, "Thou shalt not commit incest with a woman and her daughter, nor her son's daughter, nor her daughter's daughter," certainly specifies more distant degrees than that of sister. A woman is more certainly of one blood with her sister than with her own child, and four times nearer than she is to her grandchild. This would settle the question, by the author's own axiom, unless he means to limit the axiom to the "direct line." And if he does, why? One more quotation from Dr. Stoddert's article is needed :

"But beyond and above this, is a grand principle on which these specifications are based, a principle of universal nature, that every living creature shall be half of one blood, and half of another. The legislation we are examining amounts simply to a prohibition of any departure from this law alike of heaven and earth. We announce as the final generalisation for forbidden degrees of natural kindred that no two persons shall unite *when the sum of any one blood in the two, exceeds one-half.*

"It does not properly belong to our subject, but all who have eyes must have seen the countless woes, the scrofulas, consumptions, blindness, and mental and moral insanity, prevalent in families where there is a physical resemblance in type and feature between the parents. *Distant relatives, and even strangers, may be physiologically brothers and sisters,* and such unions entail a physical curse. The final residuum of the marriage law is, that union ought not to be contracted when there is such liability." (Pp. 478 and 479.) The italics are not in the original.

It is safe to say that no reader can fail to be charmed with Dr. Stoddert's article. It has many elements of excellence. It is obviously ingenuous and fair. It is also highly ingenious, and at one reading, most people, not previously interested in the discussion, would consider his argument unanswerable. And if his premises be admitted, there is no escape from his conclusions. But there are two criticisms that may be presented, with becoming modesty; and with them, this paper will conclude.

Objection first: The logic of "The World's Marriage Law" does not endure rigid analysis. Sir William Hamilton says: One premise must agree in quality, and the other in quantity, with the conclusion of the true syllogism. But "The World's

Marriage Law" deals in variable quantities and qualities. It begins with a clear definition of the nature of incestuous unions, basing the rule of prohibition on clearly cut axiomatic principles, and these principles are founded upon blood propinquity. Yet in the sentence just quoted, he remorselessly throws this axiom overboard, and directs that physical likeness, even where there is no trace of consanguinity, is nature's prohibition; and that the violation of this law entails all sorts of physical, mental, and moral ills upon the progeny of such marriages. Suppose you imagine a case. A man of blonde complexion, with regular features and that sort of auburn hair that is usually called "red," marries a woman of Caucasian blood, with the same physical characteristics, the result is apt to be a sort of "blind stagers" in the offspring of this ill-mated pair. One may come from the extreme northern limits of the Indo-European race, the other from the far south, with no indication of blood relationship since the scattering of the race on the plains of Shinar, four thousand years ago. Yet this marriage would be potentially incestuous, in so far as it affected progeny.

Now apply this reasoning to the Law as announced in Leviticus xviii. If you are to decide the point by examination of the physiological resemblance or identity, you can find a hundred cases where the resemblance is wanting in children of the same parents. The writer knows two men who are twin brothers. The elder is blonde, effeminate, nervous, sensitive. The younger has black hair, black eyes, swarthy complexion, and is rugged in person and mind, and, strangely enough, neither the one nor the other bears any distinct resemblance to either father or mother. They "bred back" to some remote ancestors, in divergent lines, and are now in their manhood as much unlike as any two men you could find of totally different families. Not only is there no indication of twinship, but no man in the world would dream of calling them related.

Another postulate that will not endure scrutiny, by the light of this Dodecalogue, is the other italicised maxim, that "the sum of any one blood *in the two*, shall not exceed one half." This would sometimes include first cousins in the list of prohibited degrees.

Mr. Montague marries Miss Capulet, and the pair have a son. Miss Montague marries Mr. Smith, and these have a daughter. Now each of these young people have exactly one-half Montague blood, and the *sum* of these two bloods is two-halves Montague, and if they marry, their progeny will be *whole* Montague. They are three-fourths more nearly related than the original Mr. Montague was to his grandmother. They are twice as nearly related as Mr. Montague was to his sister. So it must needs follow, that both Miss Capulet and Mr. Smith, are eliminated from the equation, and *both* become minus quantities. And the fatal fact remains, that the Dodecalogue did not legislate for them, or for their progeny, at all!

Another postulate on page 478 commits suicide. It reads: "This" (that is the Dodecalogue) "is a clear, full, rigidly exact law, in which nothing is left to inference. *It includes both sexes. If a man cannot marry a woman, the woman cannot marry him.*" The italics are not in the original.

Now here is a law which includes both sexes in such a sense, that it does not apply to the woman after another woman dies. That is all. In the form of double application given, it is exactly equivalent to an exposition of the 8th Commandment which should say: "If a man cannot steal a sheep, the sheep cannot be stolen by the man."

Referring to the illustration on a preceding page, touching the blood relationship subsisting between Montagues of the second generation, it may be noted that Dr. Stoddert's argument in one place is destructive of one of his axioms in another. He says, as an axiomatic rule, "that a man may not marry a woman when the sum of any one blood *in the two* exceeds one-half." This is all right, so far as the Dodecalogue goes, and clearly allows the marriage of first cousins. But in the supposed case of the Montague and Capulet marriages, you may enlarge the conditions. One Montague has a son, who "breeds back" into the Montague line. The son presents the physical and mental characteristics of his father, showing little or no trace of his mother's blood. Still, he is *literally* one-half Montague and one-half Capulet. Miss Montague has a daughter, who also "breeds back" into Mon-

tague blood, so that she and her cousin (the son of Montague) may present the physical likeness subsisting between brother and sister. Now, by the terms of the Dodecalogue these may marry. But by Dr. Stoddert's showing in another place, this physical resemblance will breed all sorts of physical and mental ills in the progeny of the pair. The Dodecalogue would have been sufficient if the Montague youth had bred back in the Capulet line, and if the Smith maiden had bred back in her father's line. Any one who will take the trouble to look can find multitudes of examples among the children of their acquaintances *in both directions*. In one case the marriage is right; in the other, the marriage is horrible—what the author would call “physically incestuous,” though perfectly legal under the Dodecalogue.

Now, God does not *legislate* in that way. It is quite conceivable that the marriage of first cousins *may be*, as a rule, a curse upon the progeny that follows. But God does not forbid *that* marriage, though he does forbid a marriage where no trace of consanguinity exists. It is, therefore, idle to build an argument upon law in one case, and upon physical resemblance in the other. And the axiom referring to the half proportion of blood in man and wife, is totally valueless on the physical side, because there is no known case where a child bears *exactly* equal likeness to both its parents. You can recal cases, if you will take the trouble, in which the son of a married pair is remarkably like his mother, while the daughter of the same pair closely resembles her father.

But in the discussion of the law, as affecting the deceased wife's sister, the matter of progeny has no place. There is no hint of consequences to progeny. Even in Leviticus xx. 20, 21, where a man is forbidden to marry his aunt or his brother's widow, the only reference to progeny is the prediction that there shall be no progeny. “They shall be childless.” And perhaps the whole difficulty in the way of perfect agreement among all Christians is this constant tendency to overstep God's command in the investigation of the phenomena of God's providence. God does not say cousins may not marry; but experience shows that such marriages are, as a rule, bad. God does say a man may not marry his wife's

sister; but experience shows that such marriages are highly prosperous and good. As the English law is maintained by the votes of the spiritual peers in the House of Lords, the assertion is prompt, that "priestly domination derides and tramples upon the native rights of man." As neither the English law nor God's law prohibits the marriage of cousins, the assertion is prompt, that both God's law and the Church law are behind the age, while common sense and experience combine to prove the forbidden marriage good and the permitted marriage bad. There is the whole argument.

While there are passages in the article under examination that are emphatic and eloquent in portraying the mental and moral nature of the marriage relation, still the drift of the argument is constantly physical and physiological. There is always a triumphant appeal to "common sense" when the non-relation of the deceased wife's sister is assumed. The paper printed in the October number of 1880 contained some brief hints touching the inherent sacredness of this tie, and appealed rather to the "consensus" of cultivated Christian humanity than to the letter of the law in Leviticus. It also presented very full quotations from Dr. Lindsay, Professor of Sacred Languages and Biblical Criticism to the United Presbyterian Church in Great Britain. And those quotations (SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, Vol. XXXI., No. 4, pages 660-662) seem to meet every point presented in the article of last July upon "The World's Marriage Law." The effort of last year was to show that the evil of marriage with a deceased wife's sister was based rather upon the original institution than upon the prohibitions specified in Leviticus. And without intending to reproduce that argument, it may be said that the mind refuses to entertain the proposition, that a wife's death changes her husband's relationship to her kindred. Such a proposition may bear the scrutiny of physiology, but it will not endure the instinctive recoil of sentiment. The oneness was a factitious unity, if it subsides into duality with the last expiration of the wife. The point made by the author, that "violation of the marriage law, as affecting the dead wife, is no longer possible," is a faulty point. Because "she is not dead, but sleepeth."

The suggestion, that a marriage with the sister-in-law comes to be regarded as possible and proper, *after time heals the bereaved husband's wounds*, is of no value. He might lawfully marry her an hour after the wife's death, if he could lawfully marry her ten years later. "It is only a matter of taste and sentiment."

So the second criticism relates to the essential carnality of the argument, which appears in many phases. It is seen in the suggestion, that maternity, and not wifhood, is the token and test of the unity of the marriage relation. As if Abraham and Sarah were not "one flesh" during their long union, before the birth of Isaac. And upon this same plane, the unity which the widower escapes, clings remorsefully to the widow as long as she lives. The sexes are thus differentiated upon purely physiological grounds, by an argument essentially carnal; without the slightest hint of a possible mental, *sentimental*, spiritual unity, predicable, perhaps, of woman far more emphatically than of man. The consensus of Christian humanity will endorse the superior intensity, constancy, and devotedness of the wife, as compared with the usually *selfish* affection of the husband. And this selfishness of manhood, often verging upon brutality, even where the *average* amount of manly love is found, is the more apparent by contrast with the self-abnegation that usually characterises the womanly love. Like the attitude of the Church to Christ, woman constantly presents her body and her soul a living sacrifice, and no less a sacrifice, because it is her reasonable service due to him who is constituted her lord. In one of his minor essays, Henry Rogers illustrates the contentment that may dwell with the man of low sensibilities by comparing him with the bovine lord of the pasture field. He represents the animal—"our poor relation," as Dr. Stoddert calls him—as saying: "I have this grass, and the companionship of this cow. What do I lack?"

In conclusion, it is proper to say that the present effort is not "to get the better in an argument," but to discover the truth. It is not the desire of the writer to curse where God has not cursed, or to advocate a doctrine of devils by "forbidding to marry" where God has made no prohibition. But rather to inquire whether or not this repulsive marriage is included in the

abominations that brought down God's curse upon the Canaanites, and made their land to "spue them out." The hideous deformity of Mormonism is not so much in the polygamous marriage, as in the very sort of marriage herein condemned. A Mormon marries a woman and her daughters, the more the better, and derides the idea of incest, because whatever identity there may be in the blood of his wives, he, at least, bears no relationship to any of them. And he derides all law, civil or ecclesiastical, that forbids his beastly unions, upon the ground that the ultimate object of marriage is to multiply progeny. Maternity is the first thing, not wifehood.

Once more. In this discussion the writer has fought under disadvantage, because he has been called to measure swords with an equipped theologian and a practised debater. The article he has ventured to review bears too many marks of power to escape notice, and these are not calculated to awaken self-confidence in the mind of the debater on the other side. It is like the temerity of the duellist who should brave the ponderous battle-axe of Cœur de Lion with nothing more efficient than the slender rapier of modern times. There is no doubt that a writer whose main conclusions are assailed, naturally feels inclined to enter the lists again; but the consciousness of great disparity in equipment and prowess is very apt to breed modesty, and to restrain the utterance of dogmatic sentences. It is true that the standards of the Presbyterian Church have fallen into the same anti-physiological error, and distinctly forbid the marriage of a widower with any kindred of his deceased wife who would be prohibited if they were his *natural* physiological kindred; and the conviction that these brief suggestions are faulty in logic and diction is modified by the certainty that the general *doctrine* herein imperfectly presented, is endorsed by an authority so venerable.

Since the foregoing was prepared, the writer has received the following memoranda from a very prominent theologian of the Presbyterian Church. Some of the points were suggested in the article on "The Law of Marriage" which appeared a year ago; but presented in this compact form, the argument very forcibly concludes the present paper.

“Levit. xviii. 18, is supposed, as literally construed, to *imply* the lawfulness of marrying a second sister, after the death of the first. The *direct* force of the verse as thus construed, is to regulate, and thus by implication, *legalize polygamy*. Its scope would be: ‘The man who wishes a plurality of wives may take them, provided only he does not take two blood-sisters simultaneously,’ as Jacob did Rachel and Leah. And the argument against this is, that it is supposed two blood-sisters married to the same man *will quarrel*, as did Rachel and Leah. This construction of Lev. xviii. 18, is fatally overthrown by these points:

“1st. It implies a permission, sanction, and regulation of polygamy. But this the Old Testament never does, I assert, *quicunque vult*. To charge such allowance is an insult to its inspiration. Dr. Hodge’s concession here, (Vol. III., p. 381,) is fatally *corrupt*. No man after making it, can substantiate the plenary inspiration of the Pentateuch.

“2nd. The logic of the supposed prohibition is absurd; and it is an insult to Moses to suppose it used by him. That the polygamous man must not take two sisters, *because they will quarrel!* Did not Peninnah and Hannah quarrel more than Rachel and Leah? The supposed argument is historically false, unnatural, and illogical.

“3d. This construction would put verse 18 into fatal contradiction with verse 16. All expositors, even Dr. Stoddert, have to admit this rule of exposition: ‘That when a given connexion is excluded, the *counterpart connexion* is *ipso facto* excluded;’ else the whole law is one-sided. Half the sins of incest would be unprohibited. Now then: ‘The man may not marry his brother’s wife;’ *ergo* ‘the woman may not marry her sister’s husband.’ This effectually excludes the man’s marriage of the sister of his deceased wife. Dr. Stoddert tries to break the force of this objection by saying: (a) The Levirate Law, (Deut. xxv. 5, etc.,) authorises this marriage. But that case was purely exceptional; and an exceptional ground was assigned for it: to supply an heir to the childless deceased, and thus preserve the land entail symmetrical. (b) Dr. Stoddert urges that there is a physiologic reason for making a difference between brother’s wife and sister’s

husband: that maternity permanently assimilated the mother to the man, but not *vice versa*; so that a brother's widow is literally *akin* to the surviving brothers, while a sister's husband remains of no kin to surviving sisters. But this evasion is worthless; for 1st, did Scripture recognise it, its precept would be limited by this *proviso*: 'A man may not marry a brother's wife who has borne a child to the deceased brother; but if she have borne none, he may.' But Scripture does not limit the prohibition thus, whence it appears that Scripture does not recognise this imaginary physiologic law. 2d. The law is not proved; all that can be said is, that in some lower animals, later progeny resemble the sire of earlier. Such a mere animal result, *if uniformly true*, would be no basis for great moral legislation.

"4th. The social and ethical reasons equally forbid the marriage of a man to his deceased wife's sister, and to his deceased brother's widow. The man, or woman, who enters the intimacy of the family circle by marriage, becomes socially and *morally* son or daughter to that family, and brother or sister to all its sons or daughters. This new and holy relation should put the idea of marriage, present or future, as completely away as between natural relatives.

"The great moral argument for the anti-incest laws, viz., that the intimacies of domestic *life and love* may be sacredly fenced off, applies here, just as strongly as anywhere else. The comfort of the young wife demands this law; otherwise, she must either sever herself from the society of her unmarried sisters, or regard them as, in the bosom of her own house, her rivals and future supplanters in her husband's love.

"Dr. Stoddert, prompted by the purity of his own character, fully recognises all this. He says, while the first sister lives, her husband must sacredly regard himself as the brother of her sisters, and cherish towards them an own brother's sentiments. But he claims that all this terminates with the death of the first wife; his fraternities die too, and he becomes as far off from the sisters as any other male acquaintance. Dr. Stoddert's honorable concession here is fatal to his argument. *Do* all the fraternities die with the death of the wife? No. If sincere, they

survive. Dr. Stoddert's supposition is wholly unnatural and untrue. The *practical objections* to such marriages would all remain in full force in Dr. Stoddert's hypothesis. The young sister in the married woman's home would be just as much a prospective rival and supplanter. See the powerful argument here of Dr. N. L. Rice on the McQueen case.

"5th. The literal construction of Lev. xviii. 18, being thus made impossible, the other, the orthodox one, remains. In 'neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, etc.,' the word *sister* is to be taken not merely for blood-sister, but in the wider sense of national sister, *fellow-Hebrewess*. This sense is (a) exactly confirmed by the parallel usage of 'brother.' In a multitude of places the words 'thy brother' mean 'thy *fellow-Hebrew*' (including, of course, our brothers). (b) Thus read, the verse contains an explicit prohibition of polygamy. This we claim as a strong argument in favor of the construction, because it thus completes the marital law, which Moses would have else left fragmentary. Because it construes Moses as in express harmony with God in Genesis, with Malachi, Chap. ii. 15, and with Christ. Is it objected that we ought to construe the whole passage in Lev. xviii. as concerned only with *degrees* of affinity? No. For verses 19 and 20 proceed immediately to legislate on topics not concerned in the question of affinities at all. The right conception of the passage as a whole is: that it is the *world's marriage law*. And it is not complete until, after settling the matter of affinities, it also forbids polygamy and adultery, verses 18, 20. Dr. Hodge, Vol. III., p. 415, does indeed mention this argument, which I account an affirmative one, as an objection. 'If this explanation be adopted,' he says, 'the passage contains an explicit prohibition of polygamy, *which the law of Moses permitted.*' But the very thing I deny is that the law of Moses did permit polygamy. The admission is Rationalistic and Socinian.

"(e) Our construction gives an honorable account of Moses' argument, 'to vex her, etc.' Instead of putting into Moses' mouth the false and puerile argument that two blood-sisters, married at once to the same man, will quarrel worse, it represents

him as referring in a way worthy of a statesman to the great moral instinct of woman, implanted by her Maker, which refuses to divide her husband's affections in that holy, exclusive relation, with any rival, blood-sister or not.

“(d) But, to look at Dr. Hodge's other cavils: (1) That the words in question (*isha el acothah*) never mean ‘one to another,’ except when preceded by a plural noun, which is not the case in verse 18. I reply: First. The cavil is minute and inconclusive, if its premise is true. Why should the presence of a plural noun be essential to the occurrence of a meaning so thoroughly idiomatic in Hebrew? Second. I do not render *acothah* ‘another.’ I render it ‘sister,’ in that thoroughly idiomatic frequent sense of *national sister*, sister Hebrewess, fellow-descendant of Israel. But (2) ‘it is unnatural to take the words “wife” and “sister” in a sense different from that in which they are used throughout the chapter.’ I reply: They are not used in the literal sense throughout the chapter. Thus: In verses 17, 19, 22 and 23, ‘*isha*’ does not mean ‘wife’ but ‘woman.’ (3) ‘The ancient versions’ and the ‘modern commentators’ agree with this rendering. I reply: How much were they not under the influence of corrupt Rabbinical and Socinian or Rationalistic objections?

“Having thus proved that verse 18 does not sanction marriage with a deceased wife's sister, we base ourselves on verse 16. There, by the law of unavoidable interpretation, it is clearly forbidden.”

The case might rest here, were it not that the integrity of the main argument in this discussion, demands a “cavil.” The first four points are well made and accurately presented. But the fifth and last proposition will not bear scrutiny. In the first place, the 18th verse of Leviticus xviii. never had any proper bearing upon the controversy touching the *dead* wife's sister. It relates to the living wife's sister only, and no fair interpretation meets the case except that already suggested, to wit, that the evil example of Jacob is here reprehended, and Moses only shows that incest is as really committed while one sister *lives* as after she dies. In the next place, it is weak and inconsequent to

make the discrimination betwixt "wife" and "woman." The honored name, "*Isha*," means primarily "wife," and a wife must be a woman. Again, the summary throwing overboard of ancient versions and modern commentators is like the position of an eminent Baptist debater, who asserted that βαπτίζω meant "to immerse," and *nothing else*; naively adding, "although *all* the lexicographers disagree with me!" Again, the enlargement of the word "sister" to "national sister" is self-destroying. It would imply that polygamy might be allowed if the man took one Hebrew and one Canaanitish woman!

The final stand on the 16th verse is undoubtedly the only possible stand; and all of Dr. Stoddert's argument proceeds upon the faulty statement of the correlation. The present writer is doubly unfortunate, in having to "cavil" at *any* proposition from so able an ally. But common fairness in debate seemed to demand this modest *caveat*.



ARTICLE V.

REMISSION OF SINS IN IMMERSION, AND THE BOOK OF THE ACTS.

That phase of faith which general use identifies in name with Alexander Campbell, but which in its own communion is associated with the official title of the Founder of Christianity, has become a conspicuous fact in America. It is moulding public opinion by an attractive literature, an able press, and by an army of trained disputants; and its actual if not relative growth is perhaps more rapid now than at any previous period. There are many things about this great body which must elicit the admiration even of those who dissent most thoroughly from the doctrines generally taught in it. It is well that multitudes have been influenced to range themselves under the banner of Christ, as has been the case. There is frequently to be found a

type of Christian character as lovely as earth can exhibit, a large-hearted catholicity, unfortunately made more conspicuous by its shining contrast with a narrowness of sectarianism which is far more common. It is impossible to accord too much praise to the educational zeal that is manifested. Better still, there is an especial gift, shared to the same extent by no other body of Protestants, of uniting the different classes of society. With them we constantly see "the rich and the poor meet together." For their bold witness against that odious and misleading terminology, of which "getting religion" and "getting through" may be cited as examples, they deserve the thanks of Christendom. Most of all, they are often diligent students of the Bible. If this searching of the Scriptures is too often perverted into a mere looking for clubs for controversy, and if to the other pleasant things we have named there are reverses, we can still rejoice that there is so much good, and that so many of the fruits of the Spirit are produced.

The student of Church history who knew that like causes produce like effects, could have predicted before Mr. Campbell left the Presbyterian Church in 1812, that a revival of Pelagianism was at hand. The eighteenth century, the age of the infidels, had culminated in the French Revolution. The teaching that the world could never be happy till Atheism should be universal, and that morality to be practical must be founded on self-love and interest, bore its legitimate fruit in that carnival of crime, when, as Macaulay says, the gutters of the streets of Paris ran to the Seine foaming with the best and noblest blood of France, when populous cities were turned to deserts, when no mercy was shown to age or sex, when babies torn from the breast were tossed from pike to pike along the Jacobin ranks, when a few short months had sufficed to degrade France below the level of New Zealand. In spite of the deductions of sensational philosophy, it was branded on the heart of humanity that there was a God. A great religious excitement, which in its intensity was like that which followed the preaching of Peter the Hermit, and in its extent was as wide as Christendom, attested how thoroughly the nations had learned the awful lesson. In America especially, there was what

is yet known as "the Great Revival"—a movement signalled by the exhibition of phenomena which to this day are inexplicable alike to the physiologist and the theologian. Bodily exercises of the wildest and most amazing nature were prevalent, and these in many cases occurred against the volition of those affected. Ignorant and fanatical men stirred the emotional nature still more deeply, and often lashed excitement into frenzy, by congregational exhibitions, and a variety of measures, most appropriately called machinery. The effect on American Christianity still survives. The settled tendency of the preachers and hearers alike, to look for spiritual influences in the so-called revivals, the constant effort to get up excitements, and to confound these with the workings of Him who is not the author of confusion, are the present reminders of former days, the legacy bequeathed to the middle and end of the century by its early years. If the system, modified as it has been by time, is felt to be abhorrent to good taste, common sense, and the word of God, we can easily understand how, at an earlier period, it must have repelled and disgusted multitudes. The house was swept and garnished for the new "Reformation;" and although this movement did not begin in the West, it found there its most congenial home, and flourishes to-day chiefly in the ground burnt over by the old revival. The natural result of the implied teaching that saving faith is a shock of celestial electricity, conducted to the patient by the groanings and outcries of those around, and exhibiting its presence by hysterical jerks and wild shouts, was the prevalence of the belief that saving faith was an intellectual assent, exhibiting itself by saying that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. The reaction from the idea that the Holy Spirit like Baal was to be summoned by jumping up and down, and shrieking to the skies and working a congregation up to maddening excitement, was the idea that the Spirit wrote the Bible, and that in writing it, "all his power which can operate upon the human mind is spent," that "all his converting power is exhibited in the divine record."¹ The natural consequence of insisting on an "experience" stretching through days and weeks or years, was the belief that there was

¹Christianity Restored, pages 350, 351.

no experience at all. So the movement began. So it keeps on. Its strength to-day is in the unscriptural methods of the churches. In the inevitable reaction which pervades a community burnt over by a religious excitement inaugurated and kept up by any means except the simple preaching of Christ, the "Disciples" make their entrance. When their cause appears to be languishing, a brush-fire frenzy in a neighboring church will make them flourish as the green bay-tree. The "mourners" who did not "get through," and those who, "powerfully converted," doubt the reality of the process through which they have passed, are alike ready to lend a listening ear to the pleasing information that their failure was due to their superior intelligence, which could not be imposed on by the teachers of a spurious Christianity. To these are joined the many who, standing aloof, note what is going on.

The Calvinistic system is chiefly abused in practice by those who reject it theoretically. Sometimes in Presbyterian churches, more frequently in those of other denominations, we have seen "mourners" crowded around the altar in all the mental anguish into which they can be stimulated, and have heard the assurance that this purely physical result was the "convicting" power of the Spirit. Converting power is waited for as men becalmed expect a wind. "Professions" generally occur in the moment that intense waves of excitement pass over the congregation, but most rarely during the dinner hour. We knew once of a most successful "work of grace" conducted in the hottest of weather, in which the presiding minister strictly forbade the fanning of the penitents, as he thought they "got through" better when very warm. While we hold that the revival which is produced by a present Spirit, through the preaching of Christ, is the glory of the Church, with all our ministerial experience we cannot be in one of these scenes of confusion without for a little season doubting the truth of Christianity, of our own participation in its benefits, and of everything else, except the odiousness of the scene itself.

While we are in full sympathy with our "Christian" brethren in opposition to physical and sympathetic religious excitements, we are forced to inquire whether that especial reaction in

belief and practice with which they are identified is reasonable, scriptural, or safe. Belief in the actual remission of sins in the act of immersion may be called the key of their ecclesiastical position, the one rallying point around which they all gather. In the intense development of individualism which their system tends to produce, the varieties of belief are as

"Thick as the autumnal leaves that strew the brooks
In Vallambrosa."

And it is impossible to point to any controverted doctrine about which there is not a practically boundless diversity of opinion. But there is one banner which all bear aloft, one trumpet which peals no uncertain note, one cry in which all the herd join, which is "baptism for remission of sins." If God actually grants pardon in the act of immersion, this is the greatest fact on earth. If he does not, the most dangerous of possible mistakes is to look for salvation where God has not told us to look.

It is a startling fact that this doctrine, vaunted as new, is simply a reversion to Romanism. That apostasy has as its foundation stone the teaching that all sins, actual and original, are washed away in baptism. In one case as in the other, any private Christian may perform the rite, without which the soul might die unforgiven. In one as in the other, there is the gathering on the Sabbath, with chief reference to the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The Greeks, the Armenians, and well-nigh every other form of apostate Christianity, believe in the actual remission of sins in baptism. One of Mr. Campbell's early disciples forsook him and carried the doctrine to the Mormon herd of swine, who still glory in it. Instead of this being a belief lost by the Church at large and restored by the "Reformers," there is hardly an apostate Church in eighteen centuries which has not held it. All this proves nothing except that there is no novelty about this doctrine, and that in the past it has been linked with every form of false Christianity.

A chief source of mischief in this controversy, has been the ignorant and prejudiced misrepresentations of the belief in question. These are not simply a tacit admission that the real arguments which support it are too strong to be faced, but are intrinsically

dishonest. It is not true, as often alleged, that the "Campbellites" made a saviour of water. They insist that unless there is a change of heart exhibiting itself in faith and repentance, a thousand baptisms would be of no avail. Where these graces exist, God has taught men to expect his gracious pardon in this, the first act of obedience.

Proceeding to give the usual proof relied on to establish this conclusion, to many points of which proof we profoundly object, it is said there is a grandeur of beauty and simplicity in this ordering which brings it into correspondence with human need. When a child has rebelled against an earthly father, the parent always requires some external act, as a token of submission. The thing itself may be small, but the child is in a state of rebellion till he does it, and cannot be restored until he has shown by this performance that he has come back to his right mind. There is nothing in water. God might have directed the speaking of a word, the movement of a limb, a hundred different things, none of them would be of avail in themselves, and water is of no avail in itself. The obedience to a direct command, is alone of value; and in this first act, God and man alike extend pardon to the rebel.

The book of The Acts especially reveals the "conditions" on which God gives remission of sins. While incidental expressions elsewhere throw light on the subject, the Gospels describe events before the introduction of the new order, and the Epistles are to believers, but this book has for its chief object to show how the lost is found, how the rebel becomes a child. The New Kingdom was opened on Pentecost. Heaven had been preparing earth for that day from the hour that Adam left Paradise. Prophets had seen its glories in the distant future. It was the inauguration day of the Lord Jesus as king of men. As those before had gazed forwards towards it in rapt expectancy, so to the end of time, the Church must look back to it with reverential study. A number of sinners, guilty of the blackest crime of earth, asked the great question which the Lord had commissioned the apostles to answer. The question was, "What shall we do?" The reply was "Repent and be baptized for the remission of sins." It is alleged

that this direction settled the point for the ages, and that the words uttered in this crisis of human history, show that it is God's will to pardon in the first act of obedience.

While this command is the key of the position, it is strengthened by other histories. The blasphemer and persecutor who was stricken down, and who asked the Lord what he would have him do, was told to go into the city and it should be told him. He went in, and was directed to arise and be baptized and wash away his sins. Another narrative tells of Cornelius, devout, fearing God, giving alms, praying always, but with all these shining graces not accepted, for he was told to send for Peter who would tell him how he and his house could be saved, which showed he was unpardoned up to that time.

It is alleged, and in our opinion conclusively proved by Mr. Campbell and other scholars, that when, in the original, baptize is connected with *in* it necessarily involves a change of place or condition, and if so, it is inferred that to be baptized into remission, teaches that God pardons in that ordinance.

Furthermore, it is believed that the exact confession is recorded which every candidate for baptism must make—a confession of that grand central truth proclaimed by angels, apostles, martyrs, and to which the Church is to bear eternal witness that “Jesus Christ is the Son of God.” It is taught that he who says this from the heart, has all the preparation needed for receiving that rite in which pardon is accorded.

The “brethren” hold that the “sects” have utterly perverted the teachings about the Spirit. That divine Person is not given to outside sinners, for Christ expressly says the world could not receive him. As Peter makes the promise that after baptism He should be imparted, this teaches that baptized Christians only enjoy these influences. Whichever side has lost the truth about this tremendous point, must be fundamentally wrong, and needs indeed to be restored to Christianity.

It is said that some years ago in Kentucky, there was a public discussion between a “Christian” brother, and another minister. Before an immense audience, the former said that his opponent would not tell sinners, who asked what they must do to be saved

what the apostles told them. The minister interrupting him, indignantly denied the charge, and was met by the question, "If a man was to ask you how to be pardoned, would you tell him to be baptized for remission of sins or to be baptized and wash away his sins?" We believe there was no reply.

We are far from endorsing many points in these statements, and have merely desired to present them as we have often heard them. As the book of The Acts is appealed to, we cheerfully agree to let the question be decided according to its teachings, and especially those of the second chapter. Vast import must be attached to the words with which the gospel was introduced to man, and such language interpreted according to its natural meaning, as understood by those who heard it, must be accepted as final. The idea which those received from it can be conceived only by picturing to the mind a society which has no counterpart on earth.

When God began to set up his Church more formally amongst men, the first step was to isolate the selected individuals from national, social, and family connexions. A Syrian was directed to travel towards the setting sun. The pilgrim began his journey but halted on the way, and half of a century elapsed before he stood in the promised land. Here for three generations the family remained without local or social ties, when they were called into another country where they were to abide for centuries. At the end of this period a code of laws was given, which, just as they were obeyed, kept them distinct from all other nations. The policy of separation was likewise furthered by limiting for two centuries the call to one individual, who thus apart, not simply from the world but from his own brethren, must have profoundly felt his own isolation. The growing effect of this influence can be seen in Esau's marriage with a Canaanite, and in Esau's nephews slaying the Canaanites for striving to marry their sister. It was not till this isolation had been partially effected, as it was in the fourth generation, that the expansion was permitted. It would be long to tell through what moral and social code; through what wars, subjugations, and exiles; through what burning words of prophets and splendid deeds of kings; through

what recital of deliverances in the past and promises of manifestation yet more glorious in the future, the slow training went on until the race was thoroughly separated from ordinary humanity. To the result intended by God, human corruption added other elements. While they rightly regarded themselves as God's peculiar people, they wrongly looked on others as dogs, as vile, as unclean, as not to be touched without contracting pollution. They considered that their pure Jewish blood gave them a claim to the favor of heaven, and that each new act of obedience increased the debt. The young ruler who, as he thought, had kept the law from his youth up, and the Pharisee who thanked God he was not as other men, were types of the nation. It was, we believe, Rabbi Ben Simeon who said that "there are not upon the earth twenty-four such men as our father Abraham; but if there were, I and my son would be of that twenty-four. If there were but twelve, I and my son would be of that twelve. If there were but six, I and my son would be of that six. If there were but two, I and my son would be those two. If there were but one, I should be that one."

There was yet another element which helped to keep the race apart from all others. A splendid series of promises gathering through the ages had taught them that the grand events which had marked their early history were but preparations for a grander deliverance, when a glorious King should descend from the skies to rule over them, to subdue their enemies, and to set up a world-wide empire. As their national pride was humbled, they looked forward with more burning anxiety and intensity of longing to him whom they expected to scatter their foes and to rebuild their desolations. There was no Sabbath worship which did not refer to him, no synagogue or temple-service which did not kindle their zeal afresh, no deep study of the Scripture which did not have for its object to hasten the day of that coming, no event in their lives which was not in some way connected with that expectation. If they heaped rite on rite, if they added burden to burden, if they multiplied the restrictions touching the Sabbath, they were stimulated by the pitiable delusion, that if the whole nation should be righteous for but one day, the Messiah

could descend. This intensity of belief and desire, although in an obscure province and among a hated people, had impressed itself on the empire. The chief of Roman poets, in an immortal eclogue, delighted the court of Augustus by an exquisite adaptation of the Jewish hope, which he adroitly used to flatter at once the imperial family, and the yet more imperial people who had elevated that family to supreme power.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that all the God-given revelation and God-appointed worship were allowed simply to minister to Pharisaic pride, to Sadducean mockery, or to dreams of political supremacy. Paul announces that the gospel was preached to Abraham. The host in the desert drank of the spiritual rock, which was Christ; and they also had the gospel preached to them. The Old Testament Scriptures are declared by the New, able to make men wise unto salvation, through faith in Christ. If Israel was a peculiar treasure and people unto the Lord, a kingdom of priests, a holy nation; if the Lord called it by name and said he was its Saviour, and if all this was true in an earlier and darker day, we must believe that the fuller teachings about the coming of Christ produced later fruits of holiness. Zacharias and Elisabeth, Mary and Joseph, Simeon and Anna, Nathanael and the hosts of others, who joyfully welcomed Christ, showed that there was more than a remnant in the land who followed the faith of the national heroes. A larger proportion of the Jews in foreign countries, removed from the formalism prevalent in Jerusalem, would naturally serve God with more holiness. And as the Israelites impressed on all their own belief of a coming Saviour, the instances of faith recorded among the Gentiles are not extraordinary.

It is evident that there were holy Jews, and that when these accepted the gospel, they accepted no new doctrine, they subtracted nothing from their old faith, they added nothing to it. They merely understood that the expected Messiah had come and that Jesus was he. That wide divergence between the law and the gospel which eventually emerged, was of slow growth. It was nearly twenty years after Christ had arisen that "the brother of the Lord" taught that there was no relaxation of the Mosaic law

for the Jew. It was after Saul of Tarsus had been preaching the gospel for the fourth part of a century and after he had written those magnificent expositions of the relations between the two covenants found in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, that, as Farrar expresses it, he consented to live with four paupers in the chambers of the temple; to pay for sixteen sacrifices and meat offerings; to stand with these, while the priest offered four he-lambs of the first year for burnt-offerings and four ewe-lambs for sin offerings, and four rams for peace offerings; and to look on while the priests took four sodden shoulders of rams and four unleavened cakes out of the four baskets, and four unleavened wafers, anointed with oil for a peace offering. It was only five years earlier, after he had been ridiculed at Corinth, rejected in Pisidia, and left for dead in Lystra, because of the hatred he inspired among the Jews, that he took on himself the vow of the Nazarite, that he allowed his hair to grow, and when the time had expired, cut off his locks and carefully preserved them until he went to Jerusalem, for the purpose of having them burnt in the temple under the sacrifice of the peace offerings. If he who represented the revolt against legalism recognised to the latest period of his life the temple service and worship, it is not strange that the original twelve had neither the ability nor desire to lower the claims of the law for the sons of Abraham. Lange (on Acts 2d) covers the whole ground when he says :

“The primitive Christians did not even remotely entertain the thought of founding a sect, or organising a religious communion that should essentially differ from that of the old covenant, and withdraw them from the latter. On the contrary, they participated with as much zeal as any others in the services of the temple.”

This learned and impartial statement is sustained by well-nigh every page in the New Testament which everywhere shows that the day of the gospel, after its first breaking, by slow degrees only substituted its fuller blaze for the symbols of Judaism.

One of the great objects of the Book of Acts is to describe the manner in which God's people scattered in various folds, were gathered under one banner, as they had been already nominally or really under one Shepherd. Seven histories, each represent-

ing a different class, are given, in an order corresponding to the general plan of beginning with that class which was highest in legal or actual righteousness, and ending with that esteemed lowest. These seven histories all describe the manner of the transfer of God's professed and faithful servants into the New Kingdom. After this we have the gospel preached to the outside sinner. And two more examples, ten in all, show the relation between the Church of Christ and the disciples of John. With these the circle is completed and the narrative closes. If in such a number of instances, we shall not be able to attain absolute certainty respecting the greatest of all questions,—how can man find pardon—revelation is vain, examples and teachings are naught.

1. There was an especial fitness in the arrangement that the gospel should first meet what the old covenant produce that was highest in legal or best in actual righteousness. The place was in the holy city, the dwelling of God. The day was the first of the week, the opening of a great solemnity. It was kept as a Sabbath. It was believed to be the anniversary of the giving of the law at Sinai. It was the feast of the finished harvest. Burnt offerings, sin offerings, and peace offerings, had been appointed in token of pardon and sacramental union, and then what the Lord had called a sweet savor had been multiplied until they outnumbered the half hours of the light. On such occasions as these Jerusalem almost forgot that she was a captive. Everything combined to add to her glory. The city had begun to be the seat of splendor and of empire, at a period not far distant from those wanderings of Æneas, which centuries later were to result in the founding of Rome. It was there that David had been strong and Solomon had been magnificent, that hero had brought the spoils of nations and prophet had uttered deep sayings. Above all, it was the place which Jehovah had selected for his earthly abode. Here, for nearly a thousand years, with but one brief interruption, he had been worshipped with rites which were of hoary antiquity before the city had been built, and which he had appointed for a cause, which, ages older than themselves, was to endure till moons should wax and wane no more. The streets were thronged with visitors whose far off homes were amid the

ruins of dead empires or in the capital of the great living one, who shivered in the snows of the north or were burnt by the sun of the tropics, who lived among half-tamed savages, in the wildness of nature, or were familiar with scenes made immortal by prowess of hero, pen of historian, or tongue of poet. Hope long deferred had not made the heart sick, for at any moment they thought the Christ long-desired might appear, and the glories would be revealed, which were to dim the splendors of the past. It was felt that God was still with his people; and so he was, in a way they did not regard. If that guilty city in her Pharisaic bigotry and Sadducean mockery had rejected her King, there was a faithful remnant even in Judea, and there were multitudes from other lands, to whom the gospel, preached by anticipation, had not been preached in vain. Many holy men were in Jerusalem that day. The presence of numbers of these doubtless represented the anxious thought and painful preparation of years. They had prayed all their lives with their faces towards the city, and had longed to engage in the solemn services of the temple. With the sons of Jacob were others, who, born pagans, had given up their own faith and people to serve the God of Israel, and had now come long journeys over sea and land to worship him in the outer court beyond which they were not to advance.

Chrysostom said that the presence of these visitors in Jerusalem was a sign of their piety. The Spirit has, however, not left us to inference respecting their character. They were, as a class, holy men, as the word with which they are introduced teaches. That word unhappily translated "devout" implies pious reverence. Its usage can be understood from a few examples. The Old Testament closes with a promise that the Lord kept a book of remembrance for them that "thought on his name." Solomon tells how the Lord preserves the way of "his saints," and how the word is a shield to them that "put their trust in him," and that he is happy that "feareth alway," while Nahum says he knows those that "trust" in him. In the New Testament we are told of Simeon who was just and "devout." In Hebrews, Noah, the first person of the race to whom the term righteous is applied, "moved with pious foresight," prepared the ark. Let us serve God acceptably

with "godly fear." Christ in the days of his flesh was heard for his "godly fear." The words in quotation are translations from the same root, and then what a high religious character is affirmed by the original. So the early Fathers of its synonym: "Piety" is an action which follows God (Clemens, A.). It is "piety" when one looks to the one and only God, and orders his life according to him (Eusebius). "Piety" is the mother of all the virtues, the beginning and the end of all virtues (Gregory, N.). In his work on the synonyms of the New Testament (Leipsic, 1829,) A. Tittman compares this with the word applied to Cornelius, and says "Εὐλαβής (used in Acts ii.), is a pious man who is ruled by a knowledge of the divine holiness, and fears lest he should feel (*sentiat*) anything against the divine will; εἰσεβής is he who shows this piety in his acts. Hence the first "is piety which rules the soul itself. The other is the strength in the life itself." In other words, the gospel was first proclaimed to those who had the highest actual righteousness as well as to those who had the highest ceremonial righteousness of the law.

While in the Sabbath stillness of the morning the crowds were going towards the temple, there was heard that awful note which strikes the ear when many waters roar, when great hosts tread, when a mighty wind rushes. The sound seemed to "strike" at a certain point, which was the room where the disciples were assembled. It is probable that these in a divine ecstacy left the house and went into an open place, and gave utterance to lofty ascriptions of praise, exalted strains of worship, the revelations of heavenly vision, the utterances of unseen wonders. As the holy strangers came to the place, each one heard the accents of his childhood, the tones that took him across weary wastes of desert and of sea, of years and of changes, back to the scenes of early days. Thus each had a token that the miracle was for him. Not only was the tongue familiar, but those who were themselves true servants found a chord in their own souls answering to the wonderful things of God which were spoken. The mob looked on the whole as a drunken exhibition. Charges to this effect soon calmed the disciples and excited an indignant protest from Peter. Seeing the mixed character of the crowd, he called both

inhabitants and visitors to witness that this was a fulfilment of prophecy. Then speaking to the citizens only, he reminded them how Jesus had done divine works among them, how they had put him to death, and told them that this they were seeing was the proof that he was the Messiah.

Those who felt themselves guilty were filled with horror. They had been called *brethren*, an acknowledgment that they belonged to the same cause as the speaker, and they used the same form of address, asking what they must do.

They were told to repent. It is clear this command could have reference only to the especial sin committed and to those who had committed it, and that it was not addressed to the large number present who were now in dumb amazement, hearing about these things for the first time. We have always regarded that as a queer old lady who had great self-abasements and internal anguish and sore repentings because of Adam's sin, and we cannot think that this extraordinary exercise of repenting for other people's doings was the first thing commanded in the new dispensation. That word was to the murderers of Christ.

To the outsiders, and embracing all present, it was commanded to be baptized for, or unto, remission of sins. The words, "repent" and "be baptized," are of different numbers and persons, and this indicates that they were addressed to different classes, if the connexion so suggests, as it does in the present case. The latter command means whatever those who heard it naturally supposed it to mean.

The Jews for fifteen centuries had been familiar with the expression, and there was probably not a man present who did not at once understand it. There was hardly a service at the temple, or a religious act at home, of which the direction was not the repetition. Although they believed they were the beloved, accepted children of God, they were continually falling into visible separation from the congregation, to which they were to be visibly restored through some visible rite or ceremony. If they touched defiled garments, if in the street they had unconsciously come in contact with one himself defiled, if the water that was poured on their hands was unclean, if they handled a dead body, if they

mourned for a near relative, they lapsed into ceremonial defilement, and were to get back into their lost position, not through a divine act, but through a divinely appointed human ceremony. When they baptized themselves after their return from the market; when they baptized their household and kitchen furniture; when they washed their persons and their clothes after touching a dead body, when they performed the endless actions prescribed for legal purification, they understood it was their visible position, not their actual acceptance with God, which was changed through the ordinance. It was not simply that their ritual did not bring an outside sinner into a state of pardon; it would have been death for an outside sinner to have participated in it. The crowds who heard Peter, each one of whom was, or believed himself to be, the beloved servant of God, must have understood that by the bodily act commanded, they were not, for the first time, to be received as sinners, but were to be brought into a new visible condition.

Mr. Campbell has conclusively established the fact, now widely accepted alike by scholars and theologians, that "to baptize into" always involves a change of condition. The expression occurs some twelve times in the Bible, and always with this idea of a change of position of the recipient. John baptized into repentance, transferred into a state of visible profession. To be baptized into the Trinity, into John's baptism, into Paul, into Christ, into his death, into one body, into Moses, in each instance necessarily involves a change in the individual himself, not in another being. As in all the other cases, "baptism into remission" is not a change in the heart of God, but in the position of him who receives it; and not a man who heard Peter could for a moment have had any other idea than that so familiar to him, that, already an accepted servant of God, he was to be transferred into a new condition, not by divine pardon, but by the visible act.

Of all monstrous dreams that ever disported before human fancy, there was never a wilder one, than the notion that in this phrase of four words, the apostle announced to the most churchly of all communities on which the sun ever shone—the community which up to that moment was God's only visible Church on earth

and had been this for two millenniums—that they were outside sinners, on a footing with the Gentile dogs whom they would in a moment have rent asunder if they had dared to enter the court of the Jews in the temple; that the wrath of God was on them and that their sins had never been pardoned. To believe this fantasy is to believe that with one fell blow Peter overturned Moses, the prophets, the synagogues, the temple ritual, the prayers, the sacrifices, the services of nearly two thousand years. It is to believe that the apostle announced that the God-given system which in its every detail preached the gospel, and of which Christ did not destroy a jot or a tittle, because it testified of him, left its votaries on the same footing as those who had never heard of Jehovah.

The amazing thing about this most stupendous of revolutions is, that if it occurred, it began without objection and advanced without notice. Christ said he came to fulfil the law, but because he seemed slack in some respects, the Jews rejected him. He told them that their fathers, to whom God had spoken, were themselves called gods, and that they, the sons, were the children of the kingdom; but because he taught that Gentiles also might be accepted and Jews rejected, they slew him. Seven weeks later, it is dreamed, they learn without a murmur that their fancied advantages are a myth; that their belief in their own acceptance with God which, up to that moment, had been their ruling principle, is a delusion; that they are outside sinners, on a level with the Gentiles. This is supposed to be the constant preaching of the apostles to a people so jealous of their religious privileges, and their position as God's people, that fifteen years later, Peter withdrew from Gentile converts for fear of Christian Jews, and nearly fifteen years after that Paul was hardly rescued from death, because it was rumored he had introduced outsiders into the temple. That apostle signed his own death warrant, when he told the mob he had been sent to the Gentiles. Such was the madness of religious zeal and exclusiveness. Yet we are asked to believe that, in a record of thirty years, they utter no remonstrance, although they are always told that they are on an equality of condemnation with the worship-

pers of Jupiter and Juno. In fact, this neglect of all changes instituted in these four words is never heard of any more either from friend or foe. He who thoughtfully puts himself in the midst of that religious life which seethed in Jerusalem when the gospel was first preached, and who can believe that Peter taught his hearers, many of whom were holy men, and all of whom were God's professed servants, that up to that moment they were unpardoned sinners, has a faith that can remove the Himalayas.

If any of those received on the day of Pentecost were already faithful servants of God, they had been previously looking to the coming Christ, and had through him been pardoned before they came to Jerusalem. All present believed themselves already accepted, and none could have understood that then, for the first time, they were to be made true servants. Nothing was more familiar to them than changing their ceremonial condition through a bodily rite; nothing stranger than the idea, that in such rite an outsider became a child. Whenever the phrase "baptize into" occurs, it implies a change of position, not of John, or Moses, or Paul, but of the person baptized; and here as elsewhere it does not teach a change in the heart of God, but in the visible external condition of the subject. These four points are independent, conclusive, and unassailable, and each one alone is ruinous to the theory that Peter taught that actual forgiveness is accorded in baptism. We picture to ourselves the frenzy of wrath with which this most bigoted of communities would have learned that they were regarded as unpardoned sinners. And when there was no protest, no objection, no opposition, we know of a surety there was no such teaching.

2. The Samaritans were a people, so to speak, embedded in the very heart of Judaism, and were the rabid votaries of a rival faith. As the Jews loved Mt. Zion, so these loved Mt. Gerizim. The multiplex widow of the well began to enter into controversy with Christ himself as to the merits of their respective faiths. The Samaritans, although corrupt and darkened, still worshipped the God of Moses, were looking for a Messiah, and were in no wise on the footing of the Gentiles. The gospel was preached to them by Philip, but before this many of them may have been

truly accepted. In a darker time, there had been seven thousand faithful; and that very man, whose kindness to the wounded stranger has been the example to the Church for all ages, may have been one of those baptized. However this may be, the people were professed servants of God, and as such they believed themselves accepted by him. About this, there can be no dispute.

3. We read next of a proselyte of the gate. The treasurer of Queen Candace, high in position and authority, in his heathen home, had become a servant of Jehovah, and showed his zeal by making a long journey to worship in his temple, where his humble place was in the outside circle. Returning home, he was reading the Scriptures aloud, either in the exercise of the devotional spirit which had taken him to Jerusalem, or as some suppose to instruct the driver. It is not hard to see why this good man, leaving the country perhaps to return no more, was, so to speak, caught on the way and instructed. There is an especial reason why the history is recorded. The eldest son of Noah had been called to the gospel, and now the second one is welcomed. The descendants of the third are introduced later. This worthy African, in hair, color, and features, was no doubt in full correspondence with his brethren who are now with us. (See *Lange in loco.*) He was joined by Philip, who, although the Civil Rights Bill had not been passed, sat with him in the chariot and began to teach him. While this was proceeding, the disciple saw water. Exclaiming, "What doth hinder me to be baptized?" he stopped the vehicle and descended without waiting for Philip's consent. Without a recorded word on either side, the rite was performed.

There is a volume of teaching in the fact that the man did not think it necessary to ask permission to be baptized. A Jewish worshipper already, looking for Christ, he had only to accept Jesus and receive the badge of discipleship. There is no more correspondence between the confession required of this faithful servant and that which an outside sinner should give, than there is between the transfer of a member from one church to another and the experience of a converted Turk.

When the baptism was over, Philip was miraculously snatched

away, and the Christian went on his journey rejoicing. This joy is cited as a proof that he had learned that his sins had been remitted in the ordinance. It is also possible that he was rejoicing in the doctrine of the immaculate conception revealed to him, or in the truth touching the use of leavened bread as between the Eastern and Western churches. But it is much more probable that when a man has accepted an all-important teaching on insufficient evidence, and enjoys a miraculous confirmation of his faith, that his rejoicing is for this assurance.

It is understood by scholars that the 37th verse is a bungling forgery, a mere human addition inserted to supply a fancied omission. It is hard to say whether the man who thus aimed to improve the narrative as given by the Spirit, would have laughed or wept, if he had known that the trap he set about the fourth century would entangle a large section of the Church in the nineteenth, and that his bungling emendation would be repeated on the other side of the world by hundreds of thousands, who would imagine that by so doing they were restoring apostolic usage and rebuking a degenerate Christianity. A grimmer joke was never perpetrated.

4. Up to the hour when he was smitten down in the way, the history of Saul of Tarsus was that of a self-righteous Pharisee. As soon as he learned his dreadful mistake, he put himself under Christ with the question, "Lord, what will thou have me to do?" In that moment of submission, repentance, and faith, the Lord said to him: "I have appeared unto thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of these things thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee; delivering thee from the people, and from the Gentiles, unto whom *now I send thee*, to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me." We cannot argue with him who contends that he who was thus made an apostle was at the moment under the wrath of God, whose unrepealed sentence of everlasting death was on him. We honor Mr. Campbell for his bold utterance on this point. (Debate

VOL. XXXII., NO. 4.—9.

with McCalla, p. 135.) "Paul's sins were really pardoned when he believed, but he had no solemn pledge of the fact till he washed them away in the waters of baptism."

5. That is a pretty fancy which would identify Cornelius with the centurion who testified at the crucifixion to Christ's divine nature, but such belief has no historical basis. He is called a "godly" man, for the word rendered "devout" is elsewhere translated. "The Lord knoweth how to deliver the 'godly.'" "O man of God, follow after 'godliness!'" The original is *εὐσεβής* (already examined) meaning a man who shows piety in his acts. Cornelius feared God. He taught his family, he gave much alms. He prayed to God always. The life was one which would glitter in the churches to-day. Like the rest of the land, he was doubtless looking towards the coming Christ. Spite of all, it is asserted that he was an unsaved sinner; because he was told to send for Peter, who would tell him "words by which he and his house could be saved."

If this is sound inference, we can prove that Timothy all the Ephesian churches, and the college of apostles, were in a state of wrath and condemnation. Paul tells Timothy to give heed to the directions he had received, for "in so doing thou shalt both save thyself and those that hear thee." Peter tells the apostles and elders, "We believe that through the grace of the Lord we shall be saved, even as they"—that is, the Gentiles. Before Cornelius heard the gospel, he was a holy, accepted man. The great difference between his condition before and after the visit of Peter, was, that before, he had been looking forwards to the Messiah, and afterward he looked back to him. Mr. Campbell says he would probably have been saved had he died without hearing the words brought from Joppa, (*Debate with Rice*, 497,) but denies he was saved as a Christian. Such language conveys no idea. There is one name given under heaven whereby men are saved; and he who looks forwards to him and he who looks back to him, stand on one rock of salvation. Unless Cornelius was an exception to all others of the land and of the age, he had only to change his faith from one expected to one manifested. That he would have been lost if he had rejected the

higher light is true, and so, supposing that to happen which never does happen, will any true servant of God be lost if he becomes a rebel. That he was "saved" by what he heard is true, and every believer is also saved by every fresh act of service.

Had we no account of his baptism, we know that Cornelius was not taught that his sins were pardoned when he "obeyed," and that such was not really the case. But such account is given. Peter was speaking to the assembly and said, "To him give all the prophets witness, that whosoever believeth in him *shall* receive remission of sins." A peculiar Greek construction gives the idea not simply of futurity, but of necessity, of certainty, of the assured undoubted result of remission. It *must* be. This is a point of vast importance in this controversy. Just here we also call attention to another point on which a volume could be written and to which we can only allude. The language quoted to prove actual remission of sins in baptism, was always addressed to Jews, never to Gentiles. The latter might have misunderstood it, the former were trained to the use of such expressions, and knew that a change of visible position only was implied.

As the words were spoken, "To him give all the prophets witness, that whosoever believeth on him *must* receive remission," the Spirit, as at Pentecost, fell on the hearers. Then the baptism took place. We are either to understand that sins are not actually remitted in that rite, or that the godly Cornelius on whom the Spirit had descended, and who had miraculous gifts, was a condemned sinner until he "obeyed" the gospel.

To escape the force of this narrative, it has been said that, had not the Spirit been given, Peter could not have baptized Gentiles, or excused himself for so doing, when he was called to account by the other apostles. His own instructions left him no choice as to his action, and his perfect vindication would have been just as well secured by a post-baptismal outpouring. The crisis was more momentous than that of Pentecost itself, and was identified with that in its teaching, that to Gentile as well as Jew, the baptism of an adult meant not a sinner pardoned, but a Jew formally received into God's family.

6. The five histories examined were all connected with the Holy

Land. The scene now shifts and we have five others which occurred in heathendom. The first carries us to the central table land of Asia Minor, and to that one of the sixteen cities named after one of Alexander's great successors, which was distinguished as Antioch of Pisidia. Situated on a great inland route, it was a place of large traffic, and Romans, Greeks, Jews, natives, and merchants from many lands met in its streets. We are here for the first time, in this book, introduced into the synagogue; and it is best here to describe that service with which the early Church was identified, and from which our Protestant worship and polity have been generally copied. The worshippers sat on a bench running around the room, which thus brought every man to face the central pulpit. On the side of the house next to Jerusalem was a closed chest in which were kept the sacred writings. On entering the worshippers put on the four-cornered *tallith*, after the manner of a scarf or veil. The prayers were recited by an officer, after which the Scripture was, by the minister, handed to the reader, who read the section appointed for the especial Sabbath. These lessons were at all times of a length which would appal a modern congregation. On the last Sabbath of the year, with a prudent desire to be ahead of the devil, who, as they feared, would report them to heaven as having done only what they were obliged to do, they read the portion not only of that day, but also that of the first Sabbath of the new year. After the reading, an opportunity was given for speaking words of teaching or comfort, and then came the closing benediction. God's people worship him now according to the same general manner with which they worshipped him on the banks of the Euphrates twenty-five centuries ago.

It was in such a place that, on the first Sabbath of his sojourn in the city, Paul entered. Putting on the Jewish *tallith*, he announced himself to be a Jewish worshipper, and as such was recognised by the elders who invited him to speak. The address, interesting as the first of Paul's recorded speeches, briefly alluded to ancient prophecies about a Christ. These were fulfilled, John being the witness, in Jesus, who, although put to death by the Jews, arose from the dead, was seen of many who were even

then proclaiming him in the Holy City, and was now announced as the expected Messiah. Through him all believers are justified from all things from which they could not be justified by the law of Moses.

This last expression does not teach that Paul regarded himself as before a company of unpardoned sinners. He calls his hearers *brethren*, a term used often and applied to professed servants of God. He addresses the proselytes as those that fear God. Of the several Greek words translated "fear," the original in this place is one often used, and always implies that holy fear which, while it is the beginning of all wisdom, disappears at last in perfect love, as a star in the sunlight. At the close of the meeting, many of the Jews and proselytes followed the speaker desiring to hear more. Not one had received the rite, and Paul, instead of telling them that until they obeyed the gospel and were baptized for remission of sins they were unpardoned rebels, told them—shade of Campbell—to *continue*, yes, CONTINUE in the grace of God. We must leave this point until some hero of faith shall show how people can be in the grace of God, and at the same time condemned sinners.

A few days after this lamentable failure on the part of Paul to teach *restored* Christianity, he was driven out of Antioch by women, to whom is applied this thrice unhappy English adjective "devout." This is here made to represent a third Greek word which sometimes implies an evil worship, always an inferior one, and was a technical expression designating a proselyte, but conveying no shade of moral or religious character.

7. It was twenty years after Pentecost that two unknown strangers landed at Philippi, in Europe, and began the Christian conquest of the West. About the spot was an especial significance. It was there that three generations back the little all of grand and virtuous which the earth had produced, fighting for liberty, met human iniquity incarnate in Mark Anthony, battling to crush humanity under an eternal despotism. It was there that Brutus met his evil genius, that he and Cassius had lost the battle and the world, and that the last of the Romans fell. It was there that human hope died and human progress was buried. The

loathsome Tiberius, the mad Caligula, Claudius the hog, Nero the matricide, and the capricious and cruel despots who were to follow, were henceforth to be the objects of human worship and the causes of human misery, until civilisation and imperialism alike should expire in protracted throes of death and with such wide-spread ruin and wretchedness as the earth has never seen at any other period. It was at Philippi that the last battle for liberty and happiness was fought and lost. It was at Philippi where on European soil were first heard the notes of what was to make the old world new, until at last—

“Tears washed the trouble from her face.
 She changed into a child,
 ‘Mid weeds and wrecks she stood, a place
 Of ruin, but she smiled.”

On the Sabbath the visitors went to the humble place of prayer on the banks of the Gangras outside of the gate, and there they met a few women with whom was held the first recorded Christian service on the continent. Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's, the Madeleine and Notre Dame, St. Peter's and the other Basilicas at Rome, the Cathedral at Cologne, the church of St. Sophia in Constantinople, and tens of thousands of other edifices built for God were in the future, as the results of that humble gathering.

Among those present was one who like the visitors was a stranger. A heathen by birth, she had left her own faith to serve the true God, and had united herself with his people. She had no doubt been taught to look for the coming Saviour. When she went to the synagogue that morning, she heard that he had been revealed, and at once was enrolled in his cause. She, like the other cases we have examined, was simply transferred from one cause, in which she had probably already found salvation through faith in a coming Saviour; to another cause, where she continued to find salvation through faith in the same Saviour revealed.

8. It was in that same place, identified with the blasted hopes of a ruined race, that a more glorious victory was to be won. If old Sinai shook, and if her lightning flashes and thunder peals proclaimed a present God, it was fitting when a more mighty

manifestation of glory should be made, when the first fruits of a continent, and in one sense of the world, should be brought in, that nature should once more thrill in her inmost being. It was a night of terror and convulsion, when stout hearts that did not fear death, exceedingly feared and quaked because it was felt that God had come on the wing of the storm and with the tread of the earthquake. It was on such a night that the gospel accomplished its greatest possible achievement, that it won its supreme victory, that it touched its highest triumph. The seven cases given show how beginning in the centre of Judaism it expanded out circle after circle, ending with that class of professed believers esteemed lowest, the Gentile female proselyte. One more conquest only was possible, and that was made at midnight in the jail of Philippi, when the first fruits of Europe met the gospel of Asia, when the first recorded meeting took place between out-breaking sin, and the power that was sent to conquer sin.

It is hard to conceive of a more finished result of Roman cruelty and hardness than is found in the Philippian jailor. Two prisoners with flesh bruised, lacerated, bleeding, were put under his charge, one of whom was a man in feeble health who had just had a severe spell of sickness. Without a sentiment of pity, he thrust them into the hell of feter and loathsomeness reserved for the vilest criminals. In mere wantonness of cruelty, he put their feet in the stocks, so that they were forced to lie on their wounds, raw and unwashed, and slowly hardening. When he thought his own life was forfeited, he was ready to plunge into that dark kingdom of Pluto and into the hell of the suicides, the horrors of which had been described by Virgil fifty years before. Cruel as a savage, stern as a stoic, he learned there was a God, not so much through the convulsive throes of the earth, as through the greater miracle of the words of pardoning love which intervened to stay his suicidal hand. He who dared death, came trembling before his prisoners; and there was seen what perhaps never occurred again in the twenty-four centuries of Roman sway, the jailer prostrate before the wretched outcasts he had in charge. From his lips came the question never before recorded in the history of Christianity—the question with which the air

of earth shall echo till all the ransomed host shall be saved to sin no more: "What shall I do to be saved?"

For, of the earth, earthy, dead in trespasses and sins, with soul suited to his cruel office, there had suddenly flashed on him a light from another land. The abyss of his own heart was revealed to his horrified gaze. The blackness of his own life and nature loomed up in his sight, and he knew that he was lost. Casting himself in his terror and self-despair into the slime and foulness of the dungeon, he asked the bound prisoners to lead him from the perdition into which he had sunk.

And it is just here and nowhere else that we have the words which the apostles spoke to sinners, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved."

We are to remember that this direction was given to one in the very uttermost of darkness and ignorance; that this man was the representative sinner, not only of that continent which leads the world, but of the world itself. The answer made to his question and the promise joined to it, are for the ages. If the transfer of God's ancient people from God's ancient cause to the New Kingdom was an era in time, and if the bringing in of righteous Gentiles was another era, the conquest of this outside sinner, whose case is the only one recorded, is a crisis greater than either. It stands for the ages in the unmistakable precision of its teaching.

To confound the condition of this man with that of any before received into the Church, is an error so palpable, that it is amazing that wise and good scholars should have fallen into it. It is said that as nothing is mentioned of repentance, so nothing is said of baptism for remission of sins, and that both were enforced. We rather hold that both were omitted to be named by the apostle. The man was prostrate, trembling, awakened to his lost condition, and did not then need to be exhorted so much to repentance as to faith. When he is informed that belief in Christ will save him, if language has any meaning and words convey any idea, he is taught that in the exercise of such faith and in nothing else, he is to look for pardon. Before one o'clock that morning he was assuaging the wounds he had aggravated, and at the same time

was probably receiving instruction. In the jail that night, he and his family accepted the badge of discipleship. He rejoiced after his baptism, not because he had been baptized, but, as the Greek teaches, because he believed.

9. The eight histories given show how the gospel began in the very heart of Judaism and ended in the ingathering of one whom Paganism itself pronounced lost. It remains but to show its relation to another great movement. A figure so conspicuous in one generation as John, would in that next to it naturally have a following of the two classes—of a remnant of living disciples, and of those who knew him by report. An account of the transfer of these closes this history.

In the 18th of Acts we are told of one who was not a Christian and yet was preaching Christ. He is described as mighty in the Scriptures, instructed in the way of the Lord, fervent in spirit, teaching diligently the things of the Lord, speaking boldly in the synagogue, but knowing only the baptism of John. The word translated "be instructed" is used seven times by the Spirit and implies nothing beyond pure intellectual perception. Apollonius understood as a Jew, who knew as John did, that the Messiah was at hand.

It is possible that he had seen John and had been baptized by him. Also that he was one of the sailors who assisted Caligula in his imagined conquest of England. Also that he had visited India and there learned the ten Avatars of Vishnu, the twelve thousand names of Buddha, and the three hundred and sixty million Hindoo gods. Also that his grandmother was that Charmione who waited on Cleopatra, and said her mistress had done well in killing herself, and followed that commended fashion. Of all of these, however, his baptism by John is most improbable. If we accept this, we must believe that a man so fervid, gifted, and learned, listened to and perfectly understood the teachings of John that Christ was at hand, and that for more than twenty years he gave no attention to the fulfilment of promises which were the theme at once of his anxious thought and delighted study. While it is perfectly natural to suppose that a learned Jew, living in another land, whose attention had not been aroused,

should pay no attention to an obscure movement among the lower classes in Jerusalem, it is simply impossible to believe that one whose heart was burning with zeal, should live in such an atmosphere as that of Alexandria, and be able to stop his ears to what must have been repeated continually. That city was the key of the East, the chief mart of the world's commerce, the resort of the merchants of all lands. Besides, it was one of the chief intellectual centres of antiquity. There was the school of mathematics in which Euclid was believed to have taught that science of geometry which originated along the banks of the Nile. There was the school of philosophy which later developed into that system of Neo-Platonism which represented the exhaustion of antique thought and the dissolution of ancient systems, and which prepared the way for what was later and better. There was that school of Jewish theology of which Philo was at once the head and the most splendid representative, which aimed to harmonise the loftiest attainments of Grecian thought with divine revelation, and which is by some supposed to have left its trace in the introduction to the Fourth Gospel. It is, we repeat, impossible to believe that an anxious man could live in such an intellectual centre more than half an active life-time, and have heard nothing of a system for which he was so well prepared, that he eventually accepted it largely from the lips of a woman. Everything indicates that Apollos, who was probably a young man when we first hear of him, had learned the teachings of John many years after that prophet had slept in his bloody grave; that animated by zeal he soon went abroad to tell what he had just heard, and that thus he met those who taught him that John had gone and Christ had come.

No man in his senses will contend that Apollos preaching a coming Christ was an unpardoned sinner up to the time of his meeting Aquila and Priscilla. When received into the Church, he was or was not baptized. If he was not, why was an exception made of him alone of all men, when those who had certainly been baptized by John were required to accept the Christian rite? If he was not baptized, Christian baptism is not necessary for the remission of sins. If he was baptized, he was certainly a saved

man before he received the ordinance, and again baptism is not for actual remission.

10. If the case of Apollos gives the *coup de grace* to the theory, the tenth and last history grinds the broken bones thereof to powder. A number of Jews, perhaps faithful at first, became disciples of John. They moved later to Ephesus, where they heard of Jesus, accepted him, and were received into full fellowship by other Christians, although they had never "obeyed" and were in a state of wrath. This was twenty-three years after Pentecost. When they came up with other disciples from some cause, Paul suspected an irregularity, and asked if they had received the miraculous influences of the Spirit when they became Christians. They told him they had not known at the time of their first belief, that these had been given. Still more amazed, he asked about their baptism. Finding it was that of John, they were directed to accept the Christian rite, and then received miraculous gifts.

If sins are pardoned in this ordinance, we are to believe that these old men, faithful perhaps all their lives, disciples of John, believers on Christ, and identified with his people, were all the time unpardoned rebels, living under God's curse. If it is said they were pardoned when baptized by John, they were not pardoned a second time when they entered the Church; and if not, God does not remit sins in the moment of baptism.

To recapitulate the result of our search of the ten histories examined, nine describe the change of the faith of God's professed servants from a Christ expected to a Christ revealed. Six of the nine instances are of men certainly saved and pardoned before they received the rite in which it is claimed pardon is given to all. Leaving out the day of Pentecost, six histories are about the race of Noah's oldest son, one about his second, and two about the third. The only outside sinner whose case is recorded, was told that if he believed, he should of a certainty be saved. In not one of the ten histories is there the remotest hint that sins are actually remitted in baptism. In every one of them, the contrary is clearly shown.

To notice very briefly another point. On Acts ii. 38th is

imposed the hard task of sustaining two fundamental doctrines. Christ had declared that the world could not receive the Spirit, and as Peter in this verse promises he shall be received after baptism, it is held he is given to the Church only. We do not envy the feelings of him who has been proclaiming this doctrine, after he has spent, let us say, half an hour over a concordance in the examination of it, and discovers, as he must do, that he has fallen into what is little better than a clerical error.

The point can be made perfectly clear. Several words, as *shed, pour, fall on*, are employed in describing the descent of the Spirit, and among these two are chiefly used, one of which, looking towards God, is giving, the other, referring to man, is receiving. The first occurs many times, and as all influences, whether miraculous or gracious, are the gift of God, it designates either of these. The second, when used in this connection, involves an especial receptivity on the part of the individual, and in the Acts *always implies miraculous influence*. In John, we find that Christ, alluding to the gift of Pentecost, spoke concerning the Spirit which believers should receive. In prophetic figure, he breathed on them, and said, Receive the Holy Ghost. In his last words, he told them they should receive the power of the Holy Ghost. He himself, as Peter says, received of the Father the promise of the Spirit and shed down the influences of Pentecost. The baptized Samaritan received the Spirit only through the laying on of the hands of Peter and John, which conferred on them miraculous power. It was then that Simon Magus offered money for the gift that those on whom he laid hands should also receive superhuman endowments. When the gospel was first preached to the Gentiles, they "received" the Holy Ghost as did the apostles at the beginning, speaking with tongues. The twelve disciples of John, after Christian baptism, "received" the Holy Ghost through the laying on of hands, and spoke with tongues and prophesied. The expression occurs nowhere else in the historic books. Let the reader turn to the dozen places where the phrase is repeated in John and Luke, and no shadow of doubt can rest on his mind that it refers to miraculous gifts conveyed through the apostles, and to them only. It is enough to cause a shudder of horror, to

think of promises made from thousands of pulpits, that the Spirit should be received after baptism, when Christ made no such engagement. Eternity only will reveal how many trusting to this false hope, have, spite of conscious unfitness, been deluded into entering the Church, to their everlasting undoing.

Many who do not follow arguments are convinced by apt illustrations, and the alleged glory of simplicity about the doctrine of the remission of sins in baptism wins multitudes. God forgives as earthly parents do; and as these always require an act of obedience, so he demands such. We believe that the chord which vibrates in the heart of the earthly parent is in full unison with that which, touched by everlasting love, breaks out in the music of mercy from the bosom of the All-Father, and therefore he does not wait for a physical act. If an earthly parent could see the rising self-reproach, the deep contrition, the purpose of full submission arising in the child, the soft tide of affection would at once sweep over all barriers. He who could know such feelings and be still relentless, is a tyrant, not a father. Ten generations of Protestants have accepted Luther's formula that justification by faith as held or rejected is the mark of a falling or a rising Church, and it can be seen that there is an essentially corrupting and lowering tendency in the Romish and pagan doctrine, that the favor of heaven is given not in connexion with a mental state, but when this mental condition exhibits itself in some bodily service. The horror of sin is flashed on the heart. In self-loathing despair the man looks to the skies and sees the awful figure of eternal majesty. In full purpose of obedience, and sorrow for sin, he comes to the feet of his Maker; but there is no response to his childlike trust, no pity for his deep contrition, the unrepealed sentence of everlasting death is still denounced. He withdraws from the presence and performs a bodily act. He may call it obedience, but never did he do a thing in which personal profit and safety was more the motive. He comes back to find the face that was black with wrath illumined with smiles, the heart that was burning with anger melted in love, the sentence of death turned to the promise of life. An earthly child would turn with loathing and horror from such a parent. When

men bring themselves to believe that God acts in a manner which they would regard as despicable in a sinful weak creature, they are accepting an error which in its deadly poison will eventually be a new proof of the truth of Luther's formula. The boast is often made, that persons in deep anxiety about their spiritual condition would at once be calmed if they were assured that pardon would be accorded in the act of baptism. Nothing more bitter and biting was ever alleged against a cause than this defence. It means that, while the "Christian" agrees with all, that faith and repentance are the only things of importance, and that baptism is valueless except as preceded by these graces, that system turns the mind from the state of the heart before God and causes it to depend on a bodily act. Nor could it be otherwise. If a hundred steps are named, the especial prominence and interest must always be given to the one in connexion with which pardon is accorded. If this is believed to be faith, then faith will be of chief interest. If it is believed to be baptism, then in mental view "the greatest of these is" baptism.

As already suggested, the errors we have noted are largely the reaction from the unscriptural belief and practice of other Churches. Saving faith is often described in the pulpit in a manner which leaves the hearer in hopeless confusion, and which makes him think he must believe over again in some inexplicable manner what he has been believing all his life, and that in so doing he will receive pardon. When it is once fairly asked, whether, when a sinner submits to him as a child to a father, the Lord defers pardon until the act of baptism, or whether he pardons in the moment of submission, all must see that the simplicity, the beauty, the glory, and the naturalness are in the last. We especially commend to our readers a close study of the only logical and precise definition of the distinctions between saving and historical faith, with which it has been our fortune to meet. We much regret that limited space forbids us to transcribe it. It will be found in Dabney's Lectures, Chap. 49, IV., 4.

These pages have been penned in no spirit of controversy. Brought into personal contact, for the first time many years ago, with the system now received, the writer was moved by the

plausible arguments, novel to him, which were advanced, and was perhaps unconsciously influenced by the fact that he had friends, noble and dear as earth affords, in that communion. He returned to the study of the book to which he was especially directed, and read and listened to the strongest arguments represented, careless, provided he found the truth, where he would be led. The result of his search is now given, and the reader can judge whether the book to which appeal is made sustains the doctrine, or whether that doctrine commends itself to reason. If sins are not actually remitted in the act of baptism, one of the greatest curses which has befallen American Christianity is the spirit of the heresy which points men to a way of salvation which God has never taught. It is simply appalling that in this nineteenth century, in the very heart of Protestantism, and with an open Bible, a large section should deliberately return to one of the most detestable dogmas of Romanism, and should base this perversion on an error so crass as confounding the bringing in of outside sinners with the transfer in the apostolic age of professed servants of God from one God-given cause to another. It is almost enough to make one despair of humanity to remember that this gross oversight, which can be detected by simply reading the ten narratives, was the teaching of no ignorant enthusiast, but of one of the strong men of the century, a prince among financiers who died worth more than a million, an original thinker, some of whose views have become the property of Christendom, a profound scholar, a voluminous author, an orator of highest style, an acute controversialist, conspicuous as an educator and a journalist;—his life's work gathering around such a central doctrine, and this with such a basis. It is almost enough to raise a doubt as to the possibility of understanding the Scriptures, when we think of the great body which has followed these teachings, with its learned ministry, its able press, its colleges, its universities, and its authors, reading this very book of Acts for a half century and failing to understand its plainest teaching; rejecting the belief of the Church of all ages respecting the most awful of divine teachings, the influence of the Spirit, and falling into this error from the oversight of not examining the few connections in which

the word occurs: aiming to restore primitive Christianity by selecting as a profession of faith a passage which every scholar knows to be a bungling forgery, and which, if genuine, could only by as ludicrous a misapplication as ever fell from the beak of parrot, be put in the mouth of any but a Jewish worshipper; aiming to unite Christendom under a title which, however all now glory in it, was a nickname invented by witty heathen, never endorsed by the Spirit, and in the usurpation of that title virtually unchurching all other believers; protesting against the "sects," and of all Protestant bodies the most sectarian; reacting from the theology of the Middle Ages, by making such a return to Romish doctrine as had never occurred in the centuries since the Reformation; preaching continually about that "New Kingdom" which is declared to be righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, so as often to stir up a partisan spirit, and bitterness, and prejudice, and disputation which would darken a campaign in politics; professing to simplify the gospel, and, by restoring Christianity, to cure unbelief, and too often producing on outsiders an indescribable deadness and indifference, and too often maiming for life the religious element in those who have been enticed into their communion by the specious promises that in baptism they would be pardoned and would receive the Spirit, and who have found, after entrance, that it was a despotism. Other churches with rigid examinations and close scrutiny of candidates are filled with unworthy members. Here men are told that the faith needed before baptism is (*Religion in America*, 502) "believing what is testified of Jesus," which devils certainly exercise, that a confession repeated by every lost spirit is the only external manifestation of change of heart required; that pardon referred to contrition and loving trust is accorded to a physical act; that gracious help, withheld from the lost sinner in his darkness and sore need, will be received by the pardoned saint; and that other Churches exhibit a degenerate Christianity. More artistic arrangements to induce self-deception could not be devised. In any Church it is hard to make unworthy members see their condition; whereas with the Romanist, the communion services are made the chief, and often the only objects of the sabbath gathering, the

chances are desperate. In the early Church, long was the probation, extending over months and years, thorough the preparation, and clear the proved fitness of the catechumen, before he was allowed to join in the highest of mysteries. Saints who were in deaths daily, knowing not but that before another Sabbath they would be wearing the martyr's crown, communed weekly. And yet even with these, in churches founded and presided over by Apostles, familiarity deadened the soul to the awful significance of the holy rite, and brought danger, disease, and death. This history gives no authority for making the most sublime and sacred of rites a common thing to men who are directed to enter the church with no holiness except of their own creation, and to expect no spiritual influences until after baptism. Still less does it encourage that shocking practice of allowing private members to celebrate what is called the Lord's Supper, but which many think to be merely a hideous, although unintentional, mockery. It was not without scriptural ground that Protestants, after fairly testing it, abandoned the early usage. When all the Churches, as now, swarm with unsaved sinners and inconsistent Christians, to multitudes frequent communions are as the upas tree, poisoning the spiritual life. As good food will often kill a diseased person, so every repetition of the act by one unprepared, means greater hardness of heart, blindness of mind, and searing of conscience. The outer signs that the poison is doing its fell work, are a Pharisaic desire to proselyte, a bitterness of sectarianism manifesting itself in abuse of "the sects," an expression familiarly used by Romanists, Greeks, Puseyites, and all other forms of false Christianity, and an immovable assurance of being personally accepted of heaven, and, ecclesiastically, of being in the only right way. Christ seems to point out eating and drinking in his presence as one of those sacred privileges, which, abused, will make even workers of iniquity, whose doom is perdition, rise from the grave with confident expectation of salvation. A few of exalted piety are helped in their holy lives by this frequency of communion. But this is no reason for inviting the many to eat and drink what in multitude of cases will be "damnation."

We have written so severely about errors sometimes found in our own Church, that we hope we shall not be considered as harsh in what we now write of others. We regard it as the highest praise to say that, if we have thrown any light on any passage of Scripture, we are sure that none will be so thankful as the many noble men and women of that belief which we are reviewing, who desire only to find God's will and to walk in it. We solemnly believe there are fatal errors in the system. We also believe that the unscriptural methods of other Churches are largely responsible for this movement. When those abuses shall be corrected, we believe that the many of this name who are holy, and the many who are wise and learned, will bring this great body doctrinally into line with the free Christian thought of all ages. Until this shall be done, and the destroying errors have been abandoned, the awful warning of God is uttered, "Come out of her, my people."

WILLIAM STODDERT.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SOUTH VINDICATED FROM THE CHARGE OF
TREASON AND REBELLION :

Being the Substance of an Address before the Survivors' Association of the 6th Regiment S. C. V., at their Reunion in Chester, S. C., August 4th, 1881. By WM. E. BOGGS, late Chaplain of the same.

COMRADES AND BROTHERS : Time, that spares nothing that is human and mortal, has evidently been making his mark upon you since we parted on our return from the fatal field of Appomatox. Gray hairs are shining on many a head. Ever-deepening furrows are being scored on cheek and brow. And, as I look once again into your faces, after the long interval of sixteen years—years burdened with public griefs and humiliations—the pathetic words of Burns come unbidden into my mind :

“John Anderson, my jo, John, when we were first acquent,
Your locks were like the raven, your bonnie brow was brent ;
But now your brow is beld, John, your locks are like the snow :
But blessings on your frosty pow, John Anderson, my jo.”

The old command would hardly be able, I imagine, to face, as of yore, the icy winds of Centreville and Manassas Junction, or to bear the fierce sun of summer in the trenches of Petersburg. Some of you, I am glad to see, give ample evidence of better fare than you had when our good friend, Capt. Love, dealt out three-fourths of a pound of musty corn-meal, and a gill of thin sorghum molasses, while you dreamed of “hard tack” and raw bacon as of luxuries fit for a king !

So far as the activities of this life are concerned, my brothers, it is clear that many of us have seen our best days. We shall soon be falling into the “sere and yellow leaf.” Death is thinning our ranks, even in these days of peace. Only to-day have I learned with pain that our beloved comrade, Capt. W. S. Brand, of Company K, is to be with us no more in these reunions. A brave and devoted soldier of his country, we can also say of him, what is far better now :

“Soldier of Christ, well done!
 Rest from thy loved employ;
 The battle fought, the vict'ry won,
 Enter thy Master's joy.”

Thus, my comrades, are we made to realise
 “That our hearts, though stout and brave,
 Still, like muffled drums, are beating
 Funeral marches to the grave.”

It is to be hoped that we are getting ready for a sweet rest when the march of life is done, and for a joyful awakening at the *réveille* of the great day.

Right glad I am to meet you, comrades, after these long years of separation. The sight of your faces brings back many a stirring recollection of the days “that tried men’s souls.” Many a time have I watched you as you moved down to the conflict, until the white shroud of battle hid you from my anxious eyes. Some here present I may have lifted, mangled and bleeding, from the field to the surgeon’s table, where probe and knife had their terrible work to do. We have stood together by the hastily-dug grave, as we wrapped some brave boy in his blanket, that he might rest in the bosom of that mother for whose sake he was willing to die. And how can we ever forget those hours of holy worship—sometimes in the solemn twilight, sometimes by the flickering glare of bivouac fires; and again in rude sanctuaries built by your own hands, along the lines of entrenchment. Methinks I can almost hear at this moment the rich clear voice of Capt. Brand leading the volume of praise that swelled from your hearts to the God of our fathers. I trust that you will not seek his blessing less frequently or fervently in your peaceful homes, than you did then, in camp and field and hospital. And how many times, as I have pored with swelling heart over the deeds of heroes rehearsed in story and in song, have I recalled that memorable 9th of April, when you learned that, overwhelmed by sheer numbers, the grand Army of Northern Virginia had fought its last battle. How often, when far away from you, have I seen in imagination those faces covered with dust and blackened with the smoke of incessant battle, over which tears of agony had made their long furrows. And amid the horrible excesses of

“Reconstruction,” I have often found myself repeating the old saying :

“Woe waits a country, when
She sees the tears of bearded men.”

Our commander has just been good enough to say that you have watched my career with pride and pleasure. It was kind in him to say it—kinder still in you to feel it. No man, I am sure, in the old organisation, has more cause to love it than I. Coming to you, as Gen. Bratton has truly observed, a youth, fresh from college, you received me as the ambassador of Christ. It is true, as you were told by our commander, that I have seen pretty hard service since I left you. But nothing gave me half the uneasiness, amid the pestilence-tainted air of Memphis, that I suffered for my brave comrades in Virginia, when I seemed to feel in my heart the thud and crash of every shot that drew blood from you. My labors, I may say truly, have everywhere been rewarded with kindness and affection. Grave thoughtful men and devout women have chosen me as their spiritual teacher. But no church can ever take the place that you, my first flock, “the church in the wilderness,” as I may call you, have ever held in my heart. And when, at my own fireside, I shall speak of your brave deeds to my own bright-eyed boys, a father’s ambition can ask no more for them than that, should they ever be put to the test, they shall deserve as well of our reunited country as you did of the South.

But, comrades, while we thus revive old associations of the camp and battle-field, there are certain questions which invariably come into view, along with these memories. They are questions of the right and the wrong, which underlie and interpenetrate the history of our old regiment, of the armies to which it belonged, and of the whole country and cause for which you battled. There are persons amongst us who are nervous about any allusions to these questions of right and wrong. “It is all past now,” they say, “and let the dead past bury its dead issues.” Fear gives emphasis to such reasonings with the timid. *But questions of principle can never be buried.* Like Banquo’s ghost, they come forth again, and will not down at any man’s bidding. And,

whoever else may decline to face these questions, it is certain that you and I cannot afford to decline. They are questions of *honor*, which deeply affect us. It is known to you that multitudes of good men, not only in the United States, but throughout Christendom, hold our conduct to be tainted with foulest wrong. The glory of our arms is sullied, they say, by treason and rebellion. The charge has been heralded forth to the world by the trumpet-tongued press for these twenty years and more. The historian, applauded wherever the English language is read, for his eloquent and accurate rendering of Liberty's struggles in other lands, has given the weight of his name to the accusation. The jurist, in learned disquisitions upon the structure of the Federal Government, has asserted it. The splendid eloquence of Webster has given it the widest currency in men's thoughts. While poets, in sweetest strains have canonized our conquerors, as the champions of law and of humanity. You cannot, if you choose, avoid this question of principle. Your children must meet it as a part of the history of our country. It is thrust upon their attention in the political discussions of the day. And if their assertions can be made good—if we were banded together in a vile conspiracy against law and order; if we fought to sustain a social system, the essence of which was unchristian and inhuman oppression to the helpless African—then is it true not only that we deserved our crushing defeat, but also the tenfold greater humiliations and oppressions which the so-called peace brought with it; and besides all this, we richly merit an immortality of shame. There is a fearful responsibility in the sight of God and before the bar of public opinion, which rests *somewhere*. Every drop of blood shed in that unhallowed strife cries, like Abel's, from the earth which drank it in. Every tear of broken-hearted womanhood, every pang inflicted upon orphaned children, asking in vain for fathers whom they should never again behold, charges sin at somebody's door. If it be at mine, I wish to know it. I believe in that supreme judgment-seat before which we must all stand to answer for the deeds done in the body. I would not wish to meet God before I had repented and been forgiven, if I have so sinned. You feel as I do in this matter. It is ne-

cessary for us, then, to review the grounds of our past action that we may settle, each for himself, what is our present duty. We are agreed, my comrades, in the opinion that neither courage nor success can establish the righteousness of a cause or atone for the wrong of it. Robbers and pirates have been as brave as Hector. Conquered Poland weeps over the grave of Kosciusko. Mere numbers cannot make that to be just which in the one man were a wrong.

More than this. I hold that every element of truth and right which entered into our conduct, is to be cherished as a sacred heritage for our whole country, and for civil liberty all the world over. There is a power in truth and right, which is not altogether of earth.

"Truth crushed to the earth shall rise again,
The eternal years of God are hers :
And on the eternal throne 'tis writ—
‘ Magna est Veritas et prævalebit. ’"

Roman poets sang how captive Greece subdued, by the power of thought, her haughty conquerors. If we are true to the right for which you perilled life and limb, if we bear with dignity our painful reverses, if we cultivate genuine respect for the honest intentions of those who, through error of judgment, as we believe, opposed us, we may find yet that peace no less than war has its victories. The invaluable right of local self-government, of "community independence," as Mr. Davis aptly expresses it, the sovereignty and independence of the States, as contrasted with and opposed to the centralisation of extra-constitutional powers at the Federal Capital—this was the great end at which we aimed in seeking to separate from the Union. And had it pleased God to give us success, the resulting blessings would have been freely shared with all our associates.

This claim of ours to be in the right, to be suffering for a good cause, will, of course, subject us to expressions of contempt, and perhaps also to grave suspicion, on the part of the dominant faction. This burden, also, we must bear manfully and in good temper. We can only disclaim all thought of enforcing our theory by an appeal to arms, and let our conduct continue to

vindicate us with all candid observers, in the future, as it has done, under terrible provocations for the past sixteen years. Let coercion have been ever so contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution in 1860, still we have been coerced. And now, as a minority, in the power of an irresistible majority, we can only protest against misjudgment, by making our appeal to the better instincts and the more fully informed judgment of the American people. We gave up all thought of further trying our differences by battle when we laid down our arms sixteen years ago. But, of course, we have had credit, with some people, neither for common honesty nor for common sense. The sturdy bear who has just been feeling, on flank and throat, the claws and teeth of the catamount, may be expected to keep a sharp eye upon the thicket where his maimed adversary lies panting. But one can see that the epithets "rebel" and "traitor," which were wont to be served up for us piping hot, morning, noon, and night, are fast growing to be the especial bone of certain toothless old hounds who try faithfully to make up in snarling and growling for the inability to bite.

You, my comrades, have rested all this while in the interpretation of duty which our beloved Lee announced when he sheathed his sword at Appomattox. There is a pretty story abroad concerning an interview between the General and some of the fiery young officers, in which they proposed that, instead of surrendering the army, he should allow it to disband, so that as many as possible might escape from the coils of the anaconda and maintain an active resistance. One can imagine the old hero smiling sadly upon his courageous children, while he said in substance: "Gentlemen, it becomes us to look at this matter as Christians. It would be a sin to promote the useless waste of life. The course which you propose would carry violence to many a peaceful neighborhood where the war has not yet gone. It would fill the land with bands of hungry and desperate men, who must live by plunder. Some of you might go to 'bushwhacking.' But it does not suit a man of my years. I shall surrender to Gen. Grant."

Can you not recall our great commander as he appeared that

day when he reviewed our corps at Gordonsville, just as you were returning from your campaign in East Tennessee to your old place in the "Army of Northern Virginia?" It seems that a picture of him is photographed in my memory, as he sat upon his old iron-grey steed, majestic as the Phidian Jupiter, in form and feature the model of manhood, his great, dark eyes flashing like disks of fire, as he surveyed your lines. You remember how you broke over the rules of military discipline. The thunders of cannon and the bugle's loud call had prepared you to expect him. But when he was once more before your eyes, the command, "Present arms!" was not very literally obeyed. The mighty tide of passionate love to your trusted leader was running too high to be expressed in set forms. You tossed your hats into the air, and the wild "Confederate yell," so often heard above the din of battle, burst from your heaving bosoms until the hills rang again. Fifteen thousand men thus signified their willingness to put their lives in his hands, with the same trust with which, when they were babes, they had reclined in the loving arms of their mothers. I remember turning to my friend, Col. Venable of the General's staff, to say: "Don't you know *that* makes the old hero feel good to the very bottom of his heart?" "No, B.," he replied, "the General is not thinking of that now. He knows what sort of a reception they are to meet, poor fellows, at the hands of other people." And when I turned to scan that noble countenance as he gravely uncovered, in response to your enthusiastic greeting, as well as I could see through eyes that were dimmed with mist, there was no flush of warrior's pride, on cheek or brow. The features were as calm as marble, and the firm lips seemed as though they had never smiled.

This was, as I remember, the 4th of May, 1864. The next day, you will recall, Ewell's guns at Germania Ford, awoke the echoes of the Wilderness. And on the 6th you were in the thickest of that bloody struggle, which shifted with scarcely the intermission of an hour, around our right flank, until foiled in every onset, the enemy broke in tumultuous surges against the entrenchments of Richmond, and you had hurled him back once

again, panting and bleeding, from the crest of Gaines's Mill, whence you had driven him with the bayonet just two years before.

Yes, comrades, our General set us an example of enduring in silent dignity, in manly patience, those evils which the passions that are excited by war usually accord to the vanquished. It seems unaccountable to us that the brave men of the North should have condescended to heap upon us such useless indignities and oppressions as the "Reconstruction" period developed. One would have imagined that they would not so readily have suffered political demagogues, who had never smelled burnt powder, to use them as tools of revenge and oppression against their countrymen, whose courage, constancy, and evident honesty of purpose, whatever they might think of your judgment, had won from them a generous recognition while you stood, foot to foot, on the hotly contested field. You doubtless have heard with sorrow the effect which these unhappy events seemed to exert upon the dutiful soul of Gen. Lee. That same sympathy which made him insensible to the throbs of a gratified ambition, when, at Gordonsville, the wild transports of your enthusiasm, showed how you were ready to die at his bidding, also laid upon him the great burden of his afflicted country. There seems to be abundant evidence that his great heart bled silently all the while. Scorning to utter his complaints to man, he doubtless pleaded for us before that Lord to whom he had looked, in Christian faith, for guidance in those days when he felt the responsibility of holding in his hands the lives of brave men and the destinies of his country. There seems to be no doubt that these oppressive griefs hurried him to his death. A few—very few—even among his enemies, have taken it upon them to attempt to detract from the just fame of the greatest name in the military annals of America. The press tells us that the *one* has made this blunder, whom least of all men it becomes so to speak. But of that individual, it may be said, as Talleyrand observed to the Parisian beauty who asked him how she should manage to get rid of her troublesome admirers. It was her misfortune to have bad teeth. And the bitter reply to her inquiry was: "*Madam, you have but to open*

your mouth." Lee's fame is beyond the reach of detraction. It is part of the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon race. And the great world applauds our bard, when, in his exalted enthusiasm, he says :

"Never hand waved sword from stain so free ;
Nor a truer brand led a braver band ;
Nor a braver died for a fairer land ;
Nor fairer land had cause so grand,
Nor cause had a leader like LEE."

Comrades, I am thoroughly persuaded of your capacity so to master the details of this controversy as not only to be able, not only to satisfy the demands of your own consciences, (which doubtless you have done,) but also to be ready to give to your children, and others who claim it, a reason for your faith; and that in such a manner as to vindicate the living and the dead from the charge of rebellion and treason.

I well remember the keen zest, and shrewdness too, with which around the camp-fire, you entered into discussions upon the issues of the war, the policies of the rival governments, and the conduct of public men. I remember how you relished the biting wit of the *Richmond Examiner*, while you dissented from many of its conclusions. I do not forget that, when your General of Division (whom you greatly liked and admired) was suddenly placed at the head of the Western army, you gravely shook your heads, while you said, "The President has spoiled a good lieutenant to make a poor captain." You had taken the gauge of the man, and knew better than the ablest men at a distance just what our Major-General could do, and what he could *not* do. Mr. Davis himself is far too sagacious an observer of men, not to do homage to the unprejudiced instincts of the private soldier. A friend, who had good opportunities to learn what occurred in the higher governmental circles at Richmond, repeated to me this observation of our accomplished chief: "I receive," he said, "two conflicting opinions touching Gen. [Stonewall] Jackson. The one comes from many scientific soldiers, the other from the rank and file of his army. As for myself, I believe the rank and file to be nearer the truth." You come of a stock among whom the attribute of *individuality* is probably more highly developed than elsewhere

in the United States. The presence among you of a race held under subordination, tended to develop self-reliance and individuality in you. Hold fast to your inherited traits, and judge for yourselves in this great controversy. Do not allow the strong current of hostile opinion to drown you out. You have the best of helps in forming your judgment. Mr. Stephens first, and now, of late, Mr. Jefferson Davis, have laid us all under lasting obligations by their masterly defence of the honor of Southern men. I trust that you will not fail to study the "War between the States," and especially the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government." Its pure classic English, its exhaustive learning, logical argument, and devoted patriotism, will go forth among thinking men as a fitting protest against hasty and harsh judgment of us. Let your children become familiar with that able discussion, and they will be in no danger of growing ashamed of the cause for which you contended, or of the manner in which you acquitted yourselves.

I propose offering some suggestions in the way of stimulating and guiding your inquiries into a subject that so nearly not only concerns your honor, but one that involves—so the fathers of the Republic have testified—the very foundations of American liberty, the *corner-stone* of the whole system.

The Secession movement, then, may be viewed from either of these two standing-points: *first*, it may be regarded as an attempted revolution; or, *secondly*, it may be treated in special relation to the Federal system set forth in the Constitution, and the Union of States based thereupon. Let us take our view from each of these standing-points, in their order.

1. And *first*, regarded as an attempted revolution in the existing Government, we may claim that Secession was morally justifiable upon the same grounds as justified our fathers in separating from the British Empire. For this solemn step our fathers pleaded the wrongs inflicted upon them by the British Government, and the inalienable rights of freemen; and, relying upon the justice of their cause, they were willing to appeal to arms. After years of suffering, victory crowned their efforts, and they were acknowledged as independent. The "right of

revolution" in this case is admitted by all Americans. It depends entirely upon certain *moral* and *political* considerations, which our fathers set forth in the famous *Declaration of Independence*. But, in later times, a somewhat different statement has been made. For example, Mr. Lincoln, speaking in his place as a member of Congress in 1848, uses these words: "Any people anywhere, being inclined and *having the power*, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a sacred right—a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. Nor is the right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people *that can*, may revolutionise, and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this, a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionise, putting down a minority, intermingled with or near about them, who may oppose their movements. Such minority was precisely the Tories of our own Revolution. It is the quality of revolutions not to go by old lines, or old laws; but to break off both, and make new ones." Cited by Mr. Stephens.

You will be able to see more readily, by means of the words which I have emphasised, that *physical force* is here introduced as if it were an essential element of this inalienable natural right. It is an element, of course, which can rarely, if ever, be ascertained without bloodshed. According to this, it would follow as a necessary inference, that our fathers were somewhat hasty and premature in basing an *undoubted* claim upon such moral and political considerations as are found in their great manifesto, inasmuch as, on the 4th of July, 1776, it was clearly impossible for mortal man to say whether or not they had "the power" to enforce it. Judge Black of Pennsylvania seems to take similar ground touching Secession. It was, he thinks, a revolutionary proceeding. We ought to have admitted it, and to have expected the consequences—which of course means an appeal to arms, that it might be decided which of the two parties had "the power." It would be quite difficult, I imagine, to show, according to this theory, that George III. did any wrong in opposing our fathers

with fire and sword, notwithstanding the usual considerations set forth in their manifesto to the world, since only in this way could it be known whether or not the "rebels," as he termed them, had "*the power.*" Mr. Greeley was far more consistent with moral reasoning when he thus expressed himself in the *New York Tribune*, under date of November 9, 1860: "The telegraph informs us that most of the Cotton States are meditating a withdrawal from the Union, because of Lincoln's election. Very well; they have a right to meditate. . . . And now, if the Cotton States consider the value of the Union debatable, we maintain their perfect right to discuss it. Nay, we hold, with Jefferson [in the Declaration of Independence], to the inalienable right of COMMUNITIES to alter or abolish forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious, and if the Cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede may be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless; *and we do not see how one party can have a right to do what another party has a right to prevent.*" [Italics mine.]

Our fathers certainly acted on the theory of Mr. Greeley, not on that of Mr. Lincoln and Judge Black. Indeed, it seems impossible for them to have acted at all, if they had attempted to carry out this theory of revolution. How far this erroneous view may have, in the end, united the "War Democrats" and Mr. Lincoln in the wicked and cruel policy of King George, it might be curious to investigate. But my purpose requires that we rather turn our consideration to the reasons which prompted us to separate from the General Government at Washington. And as we do so, let it be remembered all the while, that the men of 1860 acted, according to Jefferson's theory, as "*communities,*" not as mobs. These State governments were as orderly in their movements as were the revolutionary governments in 1776. They were as able to conserve the great needs of government—the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property—as were those set up by their fathers in the preceding century. It was not as disorderly mobs of individuals that the seceding States moved, but as orderly

“communities.” What but ambition and lust of power tempted King George to coerce the colonies? He did not propose, by his war of subjugation, to confer blessings upon them which they were madly throwing away. He did not propose to advance the cause of humanity. What more did our brethren propose by coercion in 1860?

First, then, like our forefathers, we had the long-standing grievance of an unjust and burdensome system of taxation.

We need not stop now to discuss what was once such a prolific theme for popular declamation, the *Fishing Bounties*. The plainness of the issue and the sort of absurd injustice of subsidising, under pretext of creating a navy, what had become one of the great sources of wealth in the Northeast, used to excite your disgust. The Southern farmer could not be brought to see why he should work all day in the blazing sun, to be rewarded by the price which his produce could command in an open market, while another could not sit in his own boat and catch fish unless the Government consented to pay him for the virtuous work, over and above the ample proceeds of a gainful calling.

But, leaving these funny little peculiarities out of the account, I go on to observe that the Constitution authorises Congress to levy taxes in order to pay the public debts and “provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” But common sense can see, unless the mind be utterly warped by local feeling or self-interest, that Congress had gone far beyond the just interpretation of that provision. They had, for a long series of years, persisted, through the votes of an interested majority, in laying taxes on foreign imports, not only for revenue, nor even to foster feeble domestic enterprises until they could become self-sustaining—a very doubtful expedient, at the best—but had continued, by high tariffs, to throw the heavier burdens upon the agricultural districts, until the great bulk of wealth had been accumulated around these manufacturing centres. You saw a privileged class of capitalists thus created at your expense, for you were paying immense sums to them over and above the cost of such goods in England or France, and the cost of carriage hither. For example, until a very recent date, there was a heavy tax on

quinine of foreign manufacture. What was the result of this "protective tariff?" Simply this, that in neutralising the malaria of your climate, the South, chiefly, has paid many millions of excessive profit to Powers & Weightman, the American manufacturers, of Philadelphia. It is hard to believe that any sane man, however blinded he might be by local feeling or self-interest, could really believe that the protective tariff was, for the most part, really laid "for the general welfare of the United States."

Against its grossly injurious and burdensome features you had for years protested in Congress through your Representatives. Your illustrious Calhoun had affixed to the system the brand of legalised robbery and spoliation. But money and sectional interest had found means to continue, under forms of law, to transfer the proceeds of your toil to other men's pockets. Promises of amendment were often made, to be as often broken. And evidence exists that agitations about slavery and the territories were successfully resorted to, in order that under cover of your love of peace and of the Union, the screw might be turned upon you the more tightly. Thus, under the mask of irrational constructions of the Federal compact, South Carolina and the agricultural States were as truly taxed without their own consent as ever the colonies had been.

Secondly, there was the great grievance of the exclusion by partisan and unconstitutional legislation of the South from a fair proportion of the common property in the territories. It has been claimed, of course, that slavery being the creature of local or municipal law, it was competent to Congress to exclude it from the public domain. But the Supreme Court, in the famous "Dred Scott case," after solemn deliberation declared, seven judges to four, that Congress had no such power delegated to it by the Constitution. The public domain being the joint possession of all the States, it was held by this venerable tribunal that any citizen of any State had the right to enter that domain with his property. It belonged in part to his own State. And it was declared to be the duty of Congress to protect such residents in the enjoyment of their property, until such time as the territory might be duly organised into a State, whereupon the people

might say whether or not they would have slavery. This is the Constitution. But by partisan legislation, the free States had managed to obtain for their people in various ways the lion's share of the common property. The Missouri Compromise, without authority of constitutional grant, having fixed the line of $36^{\circ} 30'$ as the northern boundary to which we might go with our property, and a great slice having been in this way clipped off from the Louisiana purchase (contrary to our solemn treaty with France touching that territory), and afterwards a slice taken from Texas in the same manner, this agreement, into which the South had reluctantly entered for the sake of peace, was rudely broken when the admission of California was under discussion. Our associates then refused to extend the line of $36^{\circ} 30'$ to the Pacific Ocean, because it did not suit them. And when Kansas was being prepared for an early admission, emigrant societies among our associates brought the greater wealth and population of the North to deprive us of that territory. Thus while, at the formation of the Union, the preponderance of territory lay with the South, partisan legislation and extra-legal societies had absorbed about three-fourths of all public territory. And from this two evils resulted. *First*, a stigma was put upon the owners of slaves. And, *secondly*, the preponderance of the other section was so greatly increased as to leave us wholly at their mercy. This result was generally acknowledged, I believe; and by many of our friends we were urged to trust to the generosity of that section who had showed so little consideration hitherto.

Thirdly, we had the great grievance of persistent attacks by our associates upon that species of property, for the protection of which special guarantees had been given in the Constitution—guarantees without which, it is well known, the Union would never have existed at all. These attacks were of two sorts. Citizens of the States associated with us, availing themselves of a freedom of access to our borders growing out of the Union, had repeatedly sought to incite servile insurrections, regardless of those attendant horrors, arson, murder, and lust, which history

warned them to expect. And when the infamous John Brown, of Kansas notoriety, his arms red to the shoulder with Southern blood shed there, attempted to invade Virginia, his just punishment, after fair trial under the law, was received with demonstrations of public grief in the North. Minute guns were fired, bells tolled, churches draped in mourning, and the South denounced by the ministers of religion, because forsooth Virginia declined to allow the assassination of her people.

But even this was as nothing. The raid of Brown being duly investigated, evidence was found showing—so said the Investigating Committee of the Senate—that eminent citizens of sister States had furnished to Brown's band the armament with which they had invaded Virginia. This, however, was not the worst. The Senate in that Report solemnly called upon these States, in strict accord with their oaths in making the constitutional compact, to provide against such infractions of the public peace, urging this plea with the consideration that if these States failed to do it, *there was no adequate means in the power of the General Government for remedying the evil.*

But what effect might be expected from such States when they themselves, in strange forgetfulness of their engagements, had already passed the "Personal Liberty Bills," which were notoriously and avowedly intended to render null and void the constitutional stipulations which guaranteed the rendition of fugitive slaves! Thirteen of the States, if I remember aright, had set themselves to obstruct the operation of the covenant which they had made with one another and with their Southern sisters. While at the same time, with an obliquity of purpose and of perception, rare in modern history, each of them continued the form of requiring her Governor, Legislators, Judges, and other officials, to bind themselves by oath to observe the Constitution, *which she would yet punish him for doing*, in this one particular!

It was this fearful instance of covenant-breaking which, as all know, brought Mr. Webster into disfavor in his own State, as elsewhere in the North. For with heroic fortitude he planted himself boldly in the breach and thundered his denunciations of the wrong. And when he came as an honored guest to Capon

Springs, Va., in 1851, he said, in allusion to these "Personal Liberty Bills," as he had said in Buffalo and elsewhere :

"How absurd it is to suppose that when different parties enter into a compact for certain purposes, either can disregard any one provision, and expect, nevertheless, the other to observe the rest ! I intend, for one, to regard, and maintain, and carry out, to the fullest extent, the Constitution of the United States, which I have sworn to support in all its parts and all its provisions. It is written in the Constitution :

"NO PERSON HELD TO SERVICE OR LABOR IN ONE STATE, UNDER THE LAWS THEREOF, ESCAPING INTO ANOTHER, SHALL IN CONSEQUENCE OF ANY LAW OR REGULATION THEREIN, BE DISCHARGED FROM SUCH SERVICE OR LABOR, BUT SHALL BE DELIVERED UP ON CLAIM OF THE PARTY TO WHOM SUCH SERVICE OR LABOR IS DUE."

"That is as much a part of the Constitution as any other, and as equally binding and obligatory as any other upon all men public or private. And who denies this ? None but the Abolitionists of the North. [This was spoken before thirteen States had passed the "Personal Liberty Bills."] I have not hesitated to say, and I repeat, that if the Northern States refuse, wilfully and deliberately, to carry into effect that part of the Constitution which respects fugitive slaves, and Congress provide no remedy, the South is no longer bound to observe the compact. A bargain cannot be broken on one side and still bind the other side."

Now, it is true that many of the good people of the North were, at the time of the passage of the "Personal Liberty Bills," in perplexing circumstances. At the formation of the General Government, slavery existed in all of the thirteen States which had been colonies of Great Britain, with the doubtful exception of Massachusetts, where it is possible that it had ceased within a short period previous. And when domestic slavery ceased in the North, it had been because of climate and soil, not from sentiment. But a great change had taken place in men's minds then, and many had come to look upon bond-service as an unlawful relation.

True enough, as it happens, this opinion is totally inconsistent, as anybody with half an eye can see, with the moral standard of the Old Testament, or of the New. Bond service is unquestionably recognised as a lawful institution not only in the political regulations of the Jewish State, but in the Decalogue itself—the "manservant" (Heb. *ebed*) and "maidservant" (Heb. *amah*) of the Fourth and Tenth Commandments being clearly slaves.

The Apostles not only admitted slaveholders into the Christian Church, as all who read the New Testament know, but they freely treat of the reciprocal duties of masters and slaves (Gr. *douloi*), without so much as a suspicion in their minds that the relation was an evil in itself.

Paul, indeed, went so far as to send Onesimus, a runaway slave whom he found in Rome, back to his master, Philemon, who, it seems, was Paul's friend, living in Western Asia. The Apostle, while interceding with the master for the offender, freely admits the wrong, and binds himself, as his surety, to see that Philemon shall be compensated, if he shall see fit to claim it, for the time lost by the bondman while absent from his work, mentioning certain moneys of Paul then in Philemon's hands.

All this, of course, is familiarly known. But then our countrymen were not amenable to man for any misconstruction of God's law or of his revelation. And I see not how they could be excused from following the dictates of conscience, even when it is a misinformed conscience. All, indeed, are bound to seek light, and to correct mistakes. But so long as conscience condemns a thing, the man is bound to forbear. Mr. Webster, therefore, as it seems to me, was not altogether justified in putting the law of the land above the private conscience, as I understand him to do in some of his supremely brave utterances against the excesses of abolitionism. The law of the land cannot warrant a man in doing what he, at the time, holds to be a sin. In that case he can only submit to the penalty; he cannot obey the mandate.

But the abolitionist's great wrong was that he absolved himself from the covenant, in so far as he saw fit, and yet held us bound, on peril of our lives, by whatever part of it he had left. "The restoration of fugitive slaves is a wrong," he said, "and therefore I will not do it. But you shall keep the part that I approve, or I'll kill you, if I can." John Quincy Adams was correct, in 1839, when he proposed to abrogate the whole compact in order that two new governments might be formed—the Northern one free from the sin of slaveholding, as he was pleased to think it. And if a man's conscience could not wait for such a result, the remedy was at hand. He could do as our fathers

did when they left behind them laws that they could not conscientiously obey, and came to the New World. They could go to Canada. But to abrogate at option a part of the compact which has become distasteful to me, and then require my confederate to keep the rest, is as false in principle, as it is tyrannical in practice.

Lastly, all these evils, crying aloud for relief, assumed a hopeless and remediless aspect on the election to the Presidency of Abraham Lincoln, a sectional candidate, on a sectional issue, and by a strictly sectional vote. In 1858, upon a public and solemn occasion, he had said, that the Union could not be perpetuated "half free and half slave," that is, slaveholding. No relief surely could be expected where he could control. And the dark outlook was rendered more hopeless when men discerned as his destined chief minister and adviser that Wm. H. Seward who had proclaimed an "irrepressible conflict" between abolitionists and Southerners; while to us he had declared: "We have beaten you in the territories, and we will follow you into the States."

Now, when we calmly review all these wrongs and provocations, adding to them the fierce denunciations that for years had poured upon us from the partisan press and from the orators of abolitionism, does it not seem to you that, upon the ground of the inalienable "right of revolution," we had the same justification as the Boston patriots had when they threw the tea into the sea? I see not how one party of revolutionists can be justified, and the other condemned. Comrades, if your ancestors and mine, who mingled their blood at King's Mountain, deserved the tribute which was accorded to them in the Centennial of last May, if George Washington and his associates merited the praise which America is ready to bestow at Yorktown in October, then you cannot be justly stigmatised for following their example. They are not patriots because they happened to succeed. You are not rebels because you were overpowered, after your heroic exploits had illustrated the name of the Confederate army.

2. But we have vantage-ground in seeking to justify our course as Secessionists, of which it is next proposed to avail ourselves. *We have a right to claim that in rescinding their own acts, by*

which the Constitution was adopted and the Union formed, the States exercised that inherent sovereignty which belonged to them, according to the treaty with Great Britain, wherein the thirteen colonies were acknowledged as free and independent States. This inherent sovereignty they did not surrender when they delegated certain powers to the General Government as their common agent. And, being the sovereign authorities, united by a Federal Compact, it necessarily devolved upon each of them to judge for itself, in the last resort, of all alleged violations of such a Compact, and to determine the best remedies for the same. The power that delegates is competent to recall. And the act of your State, in revoking her grants of power to the General Government, was as orderly and valid as the one by which she ratified the Compact and entered the Union.

As bearing directly upon this proposition you will find the following historical facts :

1st. Before the war of the Revolution there were, speaking in general terms, between the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, thirteen colonies acknowledging obedience to the British Crown, but having no special bond of civil union among themselves. Special agreements had been entered into by some of the New England colonies for mutual defence against the Indians, but they had been voluntary, local, and limited to this purpose. Each colony had its own government, organised under its own royal charter. Each had its own customs, religious establishments, and internal administration. Thus they were diverse in origin, in customs, and in their interests. The claim of Judge Story and others to have formed a bond of political union between these colonies, existing prior to the War of the Revolution, has not commended itself to persons acquainted with the facts of their history.

2nd. The colonies, conceiving themselves to be wronged by the British Government, sent delegates to a convention or Congress at Philadelphia in 1774 for conference and mutual advice. In this conference each colony acted as a separate political body. This the manner of voting showed most conclusively. For, regardless of the number of representatives sent,

and of the population represented, each of the colonies cast *one vote*. A formal declaration of the Rights of the colonies having been made, this body recommended that another, of like nature, be called to meet May 10th, 1775, and then dissolved.

3rd. The colonies acting upon this suggestion, the second Congress of their delegates met at the time suggested. And finding that all measures of redress for the people, as British subjects, failed, they declared that the only remedy was for all the colonies to throw off their allegiance to the British King, and declare themselves independent. A manifesto to this effect, stating their grievances, and declaring themselves to be free, was prepared, and on the fourth of July, 1776, it was signed and published to the world. It is known as the American Declaration of Independence. But to base the political unity of the colonies on this manifesto is to overlook several fundamental facts, such as these: *First*, that for some time after the declaration had been prepared, it could not be signed and published by the delegates, until each delegation had received specific instructions to do so from its own State government; and upon being separately instructed to that effect, each delegation did sign, by authority and in the behalf of its own *State*, as they now termed themselves. Some of the governments delayed to take action, day after day, and yet this great step had to wait upon their pleasure. *Second*, in fact, several of the colonies had *already set up revolutionary governments*, before the Declaration of Independence was authorised by them; some taking care, however, to say that the revolutionary governments were only to last until accommodation could be had with the King. *Thirdly*, this "Declaration" was not of the nature of an *organic law* at all, but only had the force of a *manifesto*, addressed to the civilised world. *Fourthly*, the delegates of the colonies, or States, showed their appreciation of this, by proceeding at once to draw up "Articles of Confederation," having the force of organic law, which would really unite the States into a Confederacy. These points are all patent upon the face of our history, and have been, as Mr. Stephens shows, embodied in the decisions of our Supreme Court—"War between the States," Vol. I., pp. 76-81. The verbal analysis, offered by Mr. Everett

in his New York speech, showing, as he imagined, from the Declaration of Independence, that the "good people of these colonies" are "one people," is seen to be a mere quibble, not only violating the laws of language (Mr. Davis), but also so conflicting with the testimony of history as to be debated by any one acquainted with the facts.

4th. Pending the signing of this manifesto, a committee had been appointed (June 11th) to draw up such articles of confederation as would unite the Colonies, or States, in a league for their common defence. This was to be *law*, indeed, the fundamental law of the Confederation, and not a mere "declaration," or appeal to the civilised world. On the 12th of July, eight days after the signatures had been affixed to the manifesto, this sketch of the first constitution was reported to the Congress. It bore as its title this significant legend: "*Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.*" And, after giving the name and style of the league to be the "United States of America," the instrument went on to say in the second article: "*Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederacy expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.*" These articles were approved by the Congress, Nov. 15th, 1777, and by some of the States in the following year. But the process of ratification was only completed March 1st, 1781, Maryland having for years refused to adopt or be bound by them. One more decisive fact completes this hasty examination. The delegates of a State in the Congress varied at option, but each State had *one vote*, as well Delaware with her population of 60,000 and Rhode Island with 70,000, as Pennsylvania with 400,000 and Virginia with 750,000. Surely these facts show how much more correct was Mr. Webster's judgment as to the nature of the government set up by these "Articles of Confederation," than was that of Judge Story or Mr. Everett, when, replying in the Senate to Mr.

Hayne, in 1830, he admitted that the Confederation was just what the name implies, a *league* or *compact*, between separate, independent political bodies, uniting only in certain respects, and for specified ends. But the great Senator himself fell into a most egregious error in 1833, when, in his famous speech on "The Calhoun Resolutions," he based his argument for the fundamental difference between that form of government proposed by the Convention of 1787 and the oldest one, on the word "*Constitution*;" for, as Calhoun was able to show, the records of that day, the resolution of the Congress advising the holding of a Convention in 1787, and the enactments of the States agreeing to do it, are thickly sown with the word "Constitution," "Federal Constitution," "Constitution of the Confederation." And his accusation that the terms, "compact," and "accede," as employed by the great Carolinian, were new inventions, introduced "for a purpose," fell to the ground when history was called to testify as to the terms used by Washington and his contemporaries.

In full keeping with these facts, it remains to be mentioned, that, when at length the war ended with a treaty of peace, the British Government acknowledged each of the Colonies by name as "*independent States*." And in the fifth article of the treaty, Congress agreed to *recommend* earnestly to the Legislatures of the respective States to exercise the privileges of sovereignty, by ordering the restitution of estates "to real British subjects," etc.

5th. But, as might have been anticipated, experience began by and by to discover some very serious defects in the details of the Articles of Confederation. The chief of these had respect to the mode of raising revenue for the General Government. No power to levy taxes having been conferred on it by the articles, the General Government was left to apportion out the estimated expenses, and then make a requisition upon each State for its share. The carelessness, or the jealousy, of State officers, was in this way working serious detriment to the Confederation, by leaving it helplessly in debt, while chafing and hard feelings began to appear. This was the course of matters in similar Confederacies, as in that of the United Netherlands. The ob-

vious cure was to consolidate the thirteen States into one. And there were good and great men, like Hamilton of New York, Morris of Pennsylvania, Randolph of Virginia, and Pinckney of South Carolina, who were for it. And Madison leaned in that direction, but without going so far. But the plan adopted, as we shall see, was to adhere to the old plan of confederation between independent States, while giving to the General Government, as their common agent, certain enlarged powers, among which the most important was that of dealing directly with citizens instead of making requisition on the States.

At various times during the war, Congress, moved by its difficulties, had petitioned the States for power to regulate trade, but without success, inasmuch as no plan could be devised upon which *all* were willing to unite, as required by Article XIII. of their compact. It was this source of trouble chiefly that finally led to the General Convention of 1787, wherein the present plan was drafted, and by whom it was recommended to the several States for their ratification.

We have now reached the most important epoch in the constitutional history of our country ; for here, if anywhere, the States agreed to merge their sovereignties into one great State. A sort of skirmishing has been undertaken by Judge Story and Mr. Everett, to establish a basis for the consolidation theory farther back than this. But Mr. Webster having expressly repudiated such a line of defence, in his reply to Hayne, this Convention has become the battle-ground where the question is to be decided as to the nature of our Government.

First, then, as to the *origin* of this General Convention. In 1785, Mr. Monroe having again raised in the Congress the question of asking the States to delegate to the General Government power to regulate trade, it was deemed more prudent that the movement should begin with the States. And accordingly, the General Assembly of Virginia, under the lead of Madison, issued a call for a Convention of the States at Annapolis, Md., Sept. 16th, 1786. But only four other States having accepted the invitation, the body, after recommending the call of another, to meet in Philadelphia on the second Monday in May, was dis-

solved. In the resolution, the following objects were proposed for the Convention of the States at Philadelphia: "To take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to *report* such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the same."

The scope of this action having been made so wide, they gave as a reason for it, that upon reflection, the power to regulate trade (which was needed to give the General Government assured stability) was found to be so connected with the system as to require other changes to be made.

Their recommendation being duly reported to their own States, and a copy sent to the Executives of the other States and to Congress, that body passed a resolution endorsing the movement, "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures such alterations and provisions therein," etc.

Thus we see that the object proposed was the amendment of an existing Constitution, and that the power of the General Convention was *advisory*. It was to "report" to Congress and the Legislatures, according to the provisions of Article XIII., and only after *every* State had approved, would any changes become effective.

Meanwhile, before Congress had acted (on January 21, 1787), several of the States had appointed delegates. Others followed, and on the second Monday in May, twelve States being present by their delegates, the Convention was organised by the election of Gen. Washington as its President. Rhode Island declined to take any part. Before the Convention had assembled, however, Jefferson seems to have sketched, in a letter to Madison, written from Paris, the outlines of the division of the General Government into three departments—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. And by degrees, too, the thoughtful statesmen of that day began to catch glimpses of the plan of remedying the fric-

tion between the General and State Governments, by giving to the former power to act *immediately on the citizen*. In this way revenue could be assured and collision escaped. The idea can be traced to the speculations of Montesquieu, who had proposed it as an expedient for a Federal Republic, or composite government, made up of several units that were independent states in all except certain delegated powers.

The enactments of the various Legislatures show that the delegates derived all authority from their respective *States*. And this was made clear also by the manner of voting, each State, the smaller as well as the larger, being allowed a *single vote*, no matter how many delegates it might have.

It soon became evident that there was great diversity of opinion as to the best plan for removing the existing evils. Luther Martin, an able delegate from Maryland, has left his account of the parties. One, he says, was for merging the several States into one great State. Another was bent upon obtaining increased weight in the General Government for the larger States. The third, about equal in numbers to the other two combined, *was for the Federal system already in force*, but with enlarged powers. This highly intelligent testimony from an active member of the Philadelphia Convention, is totally opposed to the interpretation of Webster. And the controlling majority of the Federalists is made more apparent when we remember that the second party of which he speaks were only seeking some such recognition of the population of a State as was provided for by representation in the lower House.

Very early in the sessions opportunity was given for a test vote. Randolph of Virginia introduced a series of resolutions, the first of which insisted upon the necessity of a "National Government." And in the series this expression was repeated twenty-six times. But upon motion of Mr. Ellsworth of Connecticut, these words were stricken out in every instance, and the old title, "Government of the United States," substituted in its place. In advocating the change, Ellsworth said that he wished it to go forth that the Convention proposed the amending of an existing government, not the creation of a new one.

One of the most important steps taken by the Convention was the determination to go beyond their instructions in one important particular. It is certain that at first it was proposed to go by the plan of passing amendments prescribed in Article XIII. of the old Constitution; that is, after being approved by the Congress, they were to be submitted to each State Legislature, and only when approved by *every one* of these, could a change be made. This unanimity was now clearly out of the question, for one of the States had refused to be present in Convention. It was therefore recommended, as now found in Article VII. of the amended Constitution, that "*the ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.*"

It was in this Article that Calhoun found his unanswerable argument showing that the Constitution is a compact "between the States" ratifying it. It shows, besides, these important facts: (1) that the act of each State alone could bind its people; and (2) that provision was herein made with all deliberation for the *secession* of nine of the States (each acting as above shown, for itself only) from the existing Union, in order that they might form another, and, as was believed, a better, under the new Constitution. And in order the more readily to give effect to this departure from the plan first contemplated, it was proposed that the ratifications of the States should be made by the people in Convention, rather than by the Legislatures, who, acting by delegated authority, were one degree lower than the people.

This innovation upon the appointed method set forth in Article XIII., awakened, as might have been anticipated, suspicion and criticism. It was charged with being a proposal to commit a breach of good faith. "How can you expect us to accept the pledges exacted by the new Constitution," they said, "when, in making it, you will disregard former pledges which are equally sacred?" To this objection Madison replied in the *Federalist*, to this effect: "It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the Articles are mutually conditions of each, other; that a breach of any one Article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach committed by either of the parties

absolves the others, and authorises them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to such delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time was, when it was incumbent on us to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictated."

To this statement of the case, the keen objectors of that day found no satisfactory answer. And the argument once admitted, as an explanation of the first union of the States, shows the wisdom of Mr. Webster in parting company with Judge Story, as he did in his reply to Hayne in 1830, when he so explicitly admitted that union to have been a league. We shall see how his mighty intellect erred, when, contrary to the recorded testimony of its framers, he tried to make the new government appear to be of an entirely different *species*, instead of being of the *same* species with new grants of power.

But this departure from the plan of amending the existing Constitution laid down in Art. XIII., necessitated a change in the mere phraseology of the preamble to the amended Constitution which, though deemed by the Convention to be of a trivial import, has, principally through the misinterpretations of Mr. Webster, proved to be a fruitful source of evil in later times. The preamble as first written was in these words:

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the government of ourselves and our posterity."

This preamble had been *unanimously* adopted by the Convention. No change of opinion regarding the "people" who were to "ordain" the Constitution is even hinted at as taking place. But inasmuch as provision had afterwards been made for any *nine*

States to leave the old, and form the new, government, it being plainly impossible to say certainly which of the thirteen would avail themselves of the provision, there was a manifest impropriety in retaining all the names of the States. Therefore, in the revision, the preamble was so altered as to be conformed to Art. VII., by writing, *We the people of the United States.*"

The change, indeed, as Mr. Stephens observes. ("Constitutional View of the War," etc., Vol. I., p. 138.) was made by a "*sub-committee on style*," whose business it was to see that all parts of the document corresponded as to phraseology. They reported, of course, to the Convention, and, in adopting their report, it ordered the verbal change to be made. But that it involved a change of principle—such a fundamental change of their opinions as to the *parties about to make the compact*—history sternly denies. "We the people of the United States," as interpreted by the history can only signify, "*We the people of each State so united.*" The most valued argument of Webster and his school is based upon a misconception of the facts furnished by this history.

But the discussions in print, and before the several State Conventions, shed further light upon these controverted words, "We the people of the United States." In the Virginia Convention the keen intellect of Patrick Henry had scented danger in the phrase, and he demanded the reason for saying, "We the people of the United States," instead of "We the States." Madison, "the father of the Constitution," thus answered him :

"Who are the parties to it [the Constitution]? The people—but not the people as composing one great body; but the people as composing *thirteen sovereignties*: were it, as the gentleman [Mr. Henry] asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it; were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this State without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, as it is, *no State is bound by it, without its own consent.*"

Mr. Henry still continued to urge objections; but as he did not again recur to this one, it is fair to judge that his difficulty was

relieved by the unanswerable logic of Madison, which sweeps from the field Mr. Webster and his party, as well as Mr. Henry's difficulty.

In the "Federalist," No. XXXIX, he meets objections in exactly the same way: "That it will be a Federal, and not a National act, as these terms are understood by objectors, the act of the people as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the *majority* of the people of the Union, nor from that of a *majority* of the States. It must result from the *unanimous* assent of the several *States that are parties to it*, differing in no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction," [*i. e.* the "ordaining and establishing" of the revised Constitution,] "as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a *sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.*"

Thus Madison, "the father of the Constitution," though personally favoring a strong central government, is totally opposed to Webster's view of "the people in the aggregate" being the parties who "ordain and establish their constitution." He not only denies that construction, but completely refutes it by citing the facts in the case. Mr Davis is fully sustained in saying that it was Webster's fate to revive the current objections which had been urged at first against the Constitution by its enemies, and to impose them upon himself and others as the true exposition of the document. For this great error he has obtained from ill-informed partisans, dazzled by the splendors of his genius, the title of "the great Expounder of the Constitution."

The Convention having completed its revision, "reported," as it had been instructed to do, to the Congress, and in due time their recommendations were laid before the States in their separate conventions. It was here, as Madison observed, that the real work was to be done which was to give legal authority to the new compact: "It is time now," he wrote in the "Federalist," No. XL, "to recollect that the powers [of the General Convention] were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the Convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed."

The ratifying acts of the several State Conventions, as they are spread *in extenso* upon the pages of Mr. Stephens, are of prime importance to the correct understanding of this question. An examination of them will show that in every instance, these Conventions understood that the Constitutional draft was now "proposed" to them, and that the act of each, in ratifying or rejecting, would bind the people of its own State exclusively. "We the deputies of the people of the Delaware State for and in behalf our constituents, fully, freely, and entirely, approve of, assent to, ratify, and confirm the said Constitution." "In the name of the people of Pennsylvania . . . the delegates of the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . do, in the name, *and by the authority of the same people*, and for ourselves, assert to and ratify the foregoing Constitution for the United States of America."

The debates in the various State Conventions are invaluable helps in determining the interpretation put upon their own handiwork by the great men who acted as the agents of the States. And especially in the Conventions of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York, were the debates instructive, not only because of the ability of members, but because their sentiments were nearly equally divided on the question of adopting. Massachusetts cast 187 votes for it, and 168 against it. Having, perhaps, sufficiently anticipated what was said in the Virginia Convention, it may be

well to sample the resolutions and debates in that of New York. The Convention of the Empire State, in the very act of ratification, like several of the other States, embodied in formal declarations, its sense of the compact, and of the limitations under which it was willing to adopt it. Among these declarations, explanatory of the sense in which New York ratified the Constitution, are these: "That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people, and that Government is instituted by them for their common interest, protection, and security."

"That the powers of government may be re-assumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, *remains to the people of the several States*, or to the respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the Constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution: but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution."

Other declarations follow, relating to *religion, the militia, standing armies* in peace and war, *trial by jury, the right of search, public assemblies, freedom of the press, elections, ex post facto laws, writs of error, process against a State, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, &c.* The enactment then goes on to say:

"Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the aforesaid Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution will receive mature consideration, We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of the State of New York, do, by these presents, assent to, and ratify the said Constitution."

In the discussions Chancellor Livingston said:

"The gentleman from Dutchess appears to have misapprehended some of the ideas which dropped from me. My argument was that a Republic might very properly be formed *by a league of States*, but that the laws of the general Legislature must act, and be enforced, upon individuals.

I am contending for *this species of government*. The gentlemen who have spoken in opposition to me have either misunderstood or perverted my meaning; but, sir, I flatter myself, it has not been misunderstood by the Convention at large."

"If we examine the history of the Federal Republics, whose legislative powers were exercised only in" (on?) "States, in their collective capacity, we shall find in their fundamental principles the seeds of domestic violence and consequent annihilation. This was the principal reason why I thought the old Confederation would be forever impracticable."—Ell. Deb. Vol. II., p. 215, 274; cited by Stephens.

Again. "But, says the gentleman, our present Congress have not the same powers. I answer they have the very same. . . . Here the gentleman comes forward, and says that the States are to carry these powers into execution; and that they have the power of non-compliance. But is not every State bound to comply? It is true that they have broken, in numerous instances, the compact by which they were obligated: and they may do it again; but will the gentleman draw an argument from the facility of violating their faith? Suppose there should be a majority of creditor States, under the present government; might they not combine, and compel us to observe the covenants by which we had bound ourselves?"

Mr. Williams having objected to the indefinite terms, "*common defence*" and "*general welfare*," holding that they might be so construed as to cover the abolition of State governments, Hamilton replied that the State Legislatures were effective barriers against such dangers. From such a body as the Legislature, he said, the spirit of opposition would be communicated to the people, and thus the very structure of "the Confederacy" provides against such evils. "*The States*," he said "*can never lose their powers till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties. These must go together; they must support each other, or meet one common fate.*"

Such language in the enactments themselves, and in the explanatory debates, can leave no doubt as to "the people" who entered into the compact being the people of the States respectively.

The principal conditions to their acceptance of the Constitution were afterwards, upon the concurrent demands of several of the States, embodied in the 10th and 11th Amendments to the Constitution. But it deserves especial consideration just now,

that New York and two other States, Virginia and (when at length she consented to enter the Union) Rhode Island, expressly stipulated the right of the people to resume the powers delegated in this Constitution to the General Government. Virginia declared: "The powers granted under this Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be *resumed* by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury." New York: "The powers of the government may be re-assumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness." Rhode Island: "The powers of government may be resumed by the people whensoever it may become necessary to their happiness."

The circumstances make it clear who "the people" are that can "resume" their grants of power. The only people that ever granted are the people of each State, acting separately, in their State Conventions. The preceding question: Shall Virginia adopt or reject? of itself explains all. Had the State Convention of either of these States refused to ratify, that State would have remained out of the Union, as indeed Rhode Island *did* remain out for fifteen months, after the eleven had set up the new government. The argument of Madison, altogether composed of undeniable facts, completely silenced Henry's difficulty on that point. But, in the very paragraph in which New York provides for the resumption of her delegated powers, as above mentioned, she aptly defines her own conception of "the people," who can recall the grants by saying: "Every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, REMAINS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SEVERAL STATES, or to their respective State Governments, to whom they may have granted the same." These words define "the people" who can resume the grants. They are the only people who ever have delegated power; for, as before shown, the Philadelphia Convention could delegate nothing whatever. It could only recommend that such action be taken by the States respectively.

Now, it was in full view of such explanations as had silenced the objections advanced by Patrick Henry and others about

“We the people,” that John Marshall, afterwards the *great* Chief Justice of the United States, observed in the Virginia Convention, of which he was a member, replying to further objections against the liability of the abuse of its powers by the General Government :

“We are threatened with the loss of our liberties by the possible abuse of power, notwithstanding the maxim, that those who give may take away. It is the people that give the power, and can take it back. What shall restrain them? They are the masters who give it, and of whom their servants hold it.”—Ell. Deb., Vol. III., p. 233, cited by Stephens.

It was the people of Virginia that were then discussing whether or not they would “give.” Art. VII. of the proposed Constitution provided for setting up the new government whenever so many as *nine* of the thirteen States should ratify, and it was to be composed “between the States so ratifying,” not between the recusants and the ratifying States alike.

According to these clauses, then, the resumption provided for was to be exercised by States assembled in Conventions. *The reserve of power lies with them*—so says New York. Of course, the law of reciprocity extends the same discretion to their co-equal associates, the other States.

Another fact bearing upon this question, Who are the parties to the contract? Eleven States, having ratified the Constitution, the amended form of government was set up between them, March 4th, 1789, Washington being unanimously chosen President. This was about one and a half years after the rising of the Philadelphia Convention, Sept. 17th., 1787. But two of the States had refused to ratify. They accordingly formed no part of the new Union, but remained by themselves, as separate, independent political bodies—North Carolina for nine months, Rhode Island for fifteen. They were friendly, but foreign powers. And as such Rhode Island formally entered into correspondence with “the eleven United States,” as she correctly styles them, in the curious paper copied by Mr. Davis, “Rise and Fall,” Vol. I., pp. 112, 113.

In all this there is no place found for the ratification of “the people in the aggregate.”

Thus, when the calcium lights of history are turned fully upon them, the speculative notions and verbal criticisms embodied in Webster's wonderful speech "On the Constitution," are shown to be mere optical illusions and unsubstantial shadows—the "*idola specus*" of Lord Bacon. Mr. Calhoun had no difficulty in vindicating, by the history, the strict propriety of all the terms against which his mighty antagonist had trained his heaviest guns. The word "*compact*," as applicable to the Constitution, and "*accede*," (whether or not it be the correlate of *secede*, as Webster thought it,) are found in the writings of Washington, and others who helped to frame the instrument. And the term "*Constitution*," upon which Webster laid so much stress, as affording the crucial test for clearly discriminating between the old "Articles of Confederation" and the plan proposed by the Convention of 1787, is shown to have been as freely applied by the fathers to the former as to the latter. The resolution of Congress, advising the revision, expressly terms the "Articles" a "*Federal Constitution*." The enactments of the twelve States that consented to take part in the General Convention, are thickly sown with the very word "Constitution," as applied the old system. The massive links of the elaborately wrought chain crumble into dust at the touch of Calhoun's hand. And, he was fully warranted in holding Webster to the damaging admissions which he had made, when he acknowledged that the older system was a "league" of independent States.

It is no impeachment of Webster's splendid abilities, when we thus seek to correct his conceptions of the Constitution by appealing to the testimony of the men who made it. The era of the Revolution might boast of a constellation of statesmen worthy to inaugurate a new epoch in human government. Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton have, as statesmen, had no superiors in American history. And surely they would be better able to interpret their own words and to declare their own intentions than even a Webster could be.

The errors of such a mind might furnish a striking moral to that philosophy which enjoins caution and humility upon all men. "I remember"—so Mr. Webster is reported as saying—"to have

heard Chief Justice Marshall ask counsel, who was insisting upon the authority of an act of legislation, '*if he* thought an act of legislation could create or destroy a fact, or change the truth of history?' 'Would it alter the fact.' he said, 'if a legislature should solemnly enact that Mr. Hume never wrote the History of England?' The argument as to the limits set to human power finds illustration in the Senator's attempts to expound the Constitution so as to make it accord with his own doctrine of a consolidated government into which the sovereignties of the States had been merged. Mr. Webster once said, perhaps with something of rhetorical exaggeration, that the war of the Revolution was fought upon a "*preamble*"—thereby meaning the preamble to the Boston Port Bill, in which George III. claimed the right to tax the Colonies at his own pleasure. Alas! it is probably nearer to the truth that Mr. Webster, beyond all others, helped to inaugurate a far more bloody war, in which hundreds of thousands of his countrymen were to perish. And his misconstruction of the words, "We the people of the United States," in a "*preamble*," was a potent element in the direful result. Like the dragon's teeth sown by Cadmus, his words—great man and true patriot though he was—have borne a harvest of violence and blood.

Webster lived to grow wiser. Mr. Stephens sustains this position by ample testimony, as it seems to me. No formal rejoinder to Calhoun's reply was attempted by Webster. And, though a vote was not reached upon the question in debate between them in 1833, yet, in 1838, Calhoun was able to carry all his positions by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. In 1839, Webster is found arguing before the Supreme Court upon Calhoun's principles rather than those held by him in 1830-3. And in 1851, at Capon Springs, Va., speaking to the toast, "*The union of the States*," he freely applies the term "*compact*," as explanatory of the nature of the Constitution, and even the word "*bargain*." "A bargain," he said, "cannot be broken on one side and still bind the other side." "If the Northern States," he proceeded, alluding to their passage of the "Personal Liberty Bills," "refuse wilfully and deliberately to carry into effect that part of the

Constitution which respects the restoration of fugitive slaves, and Congress provide no remedy, the South would be no longer bound to observe the *compact*."

Five years later—1856—the Senate confessed in its solemn appeal to the recusant States, that Congress, without their aid, could provide no effective remedy. But ere that announcement was made, Daniel Webster had passed away, like his great associates Clay and Calhoun. We cannot say, therefore, what course he would have advised, if he had been alive in 1860. The fact of a great change of opinion, however, is made clear by Mr. Stephens. Unfortunately for the country, Webster's influence was chiefly exerted while he held the opinions announced in 1830-3. And so it is, to borrow the words of the greatest of poets :

"The evil that men do lives after them ;
The good is oft interred with their bones."

It only remains that we examine in this cursory manner what provision, if any, appears in the new Constitution for the surrender by the States of their "sovereignty, freedom, and independence," as asserted for them in the first Constitution, and admitted by Mr. Webster ; and, having done this, to see wherein, if at all, authority is given to the General Government to coerce a State.

So far as Webster himself is concerned, it would seem that he is on our side, on the principle of "a good and necessary inference." For, acknowledging candidly that the States came out of the old Union under the "Articles of Confederation," as independent political bodies that had been united by a *league*, he also dwelt at another time upon the fact that nothing whatever is said in the Constitution about sovereignty. Now, when these two facts—and such they are, beyond a doubt—are brought together under the Tenth Amendment, what follows of necessity? That portion of the Constitution, be it remembered, reads thus :

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Major—All powers not delegated to the United States, etc., are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Minor—But nothing whatever being said about sovereignty, which they certainly possessed before forming this Constitution, it is not delegated to the United States.

Therefore—Sovereignty is reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

But, as Mr. Davis observes, Webster seems to have had a sort of double obscuration of vision with regard to the *governments* (General and State) and the *people of a State* in Convention assembled. All of our American *governments*, as he earnestly states the case, are *limited* to the exercise of certain powers delegated to them. None of them, therefore, is *sovereign*. But from this it does not follow, as he seems strangely to have imagined, that the term "sovereign," or "sovereignty," borrowed from the feudal times, as he says, is totally inapplicable to our *system*. In this he is followed by Motley. Both of them overlook the fundamental difference between the delegated powers of a *government* and the original undelegated powers of the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. This *people*, speaking in their Conventions, is the fountain of all delegated powers of the *governments*, under our system. And in denying, or seeming to deny, the applicability of this title to such a *people*, Mr. Webster shot wide of the mark. For not only does Article II. of the old Confederation meet him with a square denial, by applying the very word "sovereignty" to the States, but, as Mr. Davis observes, the language of the fathers is thickly sown with the term, showing that they had deliberately appropriated the term, feudal though it was in its origin. Mr. Davis gives the language of the people of Massachusetts, assembled in Convention to frame her Constitution :

"The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the Province of Massachusetts Bay, do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a free, *sovereign*, and independent body politic, or State, by the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

So speaks the State which was so ably represented by Webster; the birth-place, too, of the historian of the Dutch Republic. Probably neither had read the testimony.

Alexander Hamilton ("Federalist," No. LXXI.), speaking of the exemption of a sovereign from liability to be sued at law, save at its own consent, says: "The exemption, as one of the attributes of *sovereignty*, is now enjoyed by every State in the Union.

Madison (in the "Federalist," No. XL.) says of the principles of the old Confederation: "Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States shall be regarded as independent *sovereigns*? They *are* so regarded by the Constitution proposed."

So also speak Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, Roger Sherman, and Oliver Ellsworth; their words being cited by Mr. Davis ("*Rise and Fall*," Vol. I., p. 144). They certainly have the start of Mr. Webster, and possession, which is said to be "nine-tenths" in law, is by Horace, with universal assent, put a degree higher:

"Usus penes quem et jus et norma loquendi est."

If now, in the light of all these testimonies, you will apply the canon of the Constitution, as found in the Tenth Amendment, where is *sovereignty* lodged but with the people of an organised State, who can make and unmake governments; who can delegate powers and recall them?

This Amendment, be it remembered, was introduced on the demand of many of the States, jealously regarding the possible encroachments of the General Government. And if any of us can entertain a doubt whether "the people" of that amendment be those of "the States respectively," or those of the whole territory *en masse*, let him examine the phraseology of New York, as she makes the adoption of this very provision the condition of her ratification. There he will see the people of a State discriminated from the State Government, to which the people may have delegated a portion of their powers, to be exercised for their good.

Applying the same test to the question of coercing a State, in its political capacity, we have but to ask, *Where does the Constitution delegate any such power to the General Government?*

Early in the Convention of 1787 it was proposed that such power be given to the General Government by the States, each in its own Convention, the General Convention at Philadelphia having, as we have seen, power to *recommend* only. The motion was made that the General Government have power “*to call out the forces of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duties under the Articles thereof.*” This was coercion, pure and simple.

Now, what reception was accorded to this proposition? Mr. Madison observed that “a union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as the dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system might be framed as might render this recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed.” This was adopted *nem. con.*, that is, none opposing. Every such proposition subsequently introduced, or hinted, met the same fate.

Oliver Ellsworth, an influential member of the General Convention, speaking afterwards as a member of the Connecticut State Convention, said :

“This Constitution does not attempt to coerce *sovereign bodies, States*, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such bodies but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.”—Elliott’s Debates, Vol. II., p. 199, cited by Mr. Davis.

Mr. Hamilton, in the Convention of New York, declared :

“To coerce the States is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised What a picture does this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with a non-complying State : Congress marching the troops of one State into the bosom of another Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed toward a government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself—a government which can exist only by the sword? But can we believe that one State will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream—it is impossible.”—Elliott’s Debates, Vol. II., pp. 232-3, cited by Mr. Davis. “Rise and Fall,” Vol. I., p. 178.

But alas for us! that we should have seen this ugly dream a dreadful reality. The "Empire State" suffered herself to be made "an instrument of coercion," when she forsook the counsels of her greatest statesman, centralist though he was, for the devious ways of Wm. H. Seward.

In the Convention of Virginia, that same Edmund Randolph who at Philadelphia had moved the adoption of a "National government," thus expressed himself:

"What species of military coercion could the General Government adopt for the enforcement of obedience to its demands? Either an army sent into the heart of a delinquent State, or blocking up its ports. Have we lived to this, then, that in order to suppress and exclude tyranny, it is necessary to render the most affectionate friends the most bitter enemies, set the father against the son, and make the brother slay the brother? Is this the happy expedient that is to preserve liberty? Will it not destroy it? If an army be once introduced to force us, if once marched into Virginia, figure to yourselves what the dreadful consequences will be; the most lamentable civil war must ensue."—*Ell. Deb.*, Vol. III., p. 117, as cited in "Rise and Fall," pp. 178–9.

Now, in the light of such an array of testimony by the great and good men who framed this Constitution, men of various shades of political opinion, let us again ask where is the power delegated by the States to this limited General Government, for employing force against a State, "in its political capacity?" The bond reads:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

And as moving in this very line of construction, though not expressly naming military coercion, let us read the 11th Amendment:

"The Judicial powers of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."

If they may not be judicially coerced, how much more not by war!

The procedure of the States in the very act of "ordaining and

establishing" the new Constitution, finds a place in this exposition. Art. VII. made express provision, as we have seen, for the *secession* of any nine of the thirteen States in order that they might establish the new government. And accordingly, when after some delay, eleven of them had one by one, withdrawn and reunited, the new government was set up by the election of Washington to be the President. Two of the thirteen States declined to take part in this action, and remained, one for nine months, the other for fifteen, entirely separate from the new government—Rhode Island taking occasion meanwhile to address a note to "the eleven United States," the note being received with the formalities usual to such foreign correspondence. Now, mark the argument suggested by Mr. Davis: *Either the eleven, acting one by one, seceded from the two, or else the two, declining to follow them, seceded from the eleven. In either case there was an act of secession, which was deliberately provided for in the Constitution itself.*

We have heard Madison's justification of this secession on the double ground of necessary exercise of inherent power, (which is sovereign,) and of violations of the "*federal pact*," which left all parties to it free to do as they choose. Madison was perfectly consistent in applying his doctrine of the rights of the States to the case of Virginia's protest against the Alien and Sedition Acts of Congress. His elaborate "Report" to the General Assembly of his State in 1799–1800, shows him to have held the very principles upon which we acted in 1860. Jefferson had taken the same ground in the "Kentucky Resolution," drafted by him in 1798. [See App. D. and E. to Vol. I. of Stephens' "Constitutional View of the War," etc.] The "Report" made a sensation in that day, and drew forth angry remonstrances. But Mr. Stephens notes the significant fact that each of these great Virginians was seated for two terms in the Executive Chair which Washington had filled before them.

Time fails us to consider now the concurrent opinions of many great and good men in New England. You will find ample evidence of this in Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens. Of these, the action of the Hartford Convention deserves special notice. They,

indeed, incurred unnecessary odium by making a move toward dismemberment in the very midst of a great war with England. But, barring this feature of their action, they were representative men of high character.

The State of Massachusetts, too, has a special record bearing on the doctrine of States' Rights and the lawfulness of Secession. She was first to move for the Hartford Convention in 1814. When the Louisiana purchase had been effected in 1803, she threatened to withdraw. And in 1844 by solemn act of the Legislature she again declared that "The project of the annexation of Texas, unless arrested on the threshold, may drive the States into a dissolution of the Union." And on the 22d of February, 1845, she passed the following resolution: "And as the powers of legislation granted in the Constitution of the United States to Congress, do not embrace the case of the admission of a foreign State, or foreign territory, by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admission would have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts"—cited by Mr. Stephens, "Const. View of the War," etc. Vol. I., pp. 510,511. The difference, as Mr. Davis aptly says, between ourselves and them is that while they were content with asserting their right, we acted on ours.

Mr. Stephens, however, calls our attention to the curious fact that the General Government had, for many years prior to 1861, *itself inculcated the doctrine of Secession*, by having its agents, the instructors of the Military Academy at West Point, use, as a text-book in the classes, Rawle's Exposition of the Constitution, which goes to the whole length of showing just how the solemn step should, in case of necessity, be taken. (*Ibid.*, p. 505.) Hence if Davis, Lee, Johnston, and their associates, sinned in holding that the secession of their States, being a lawful act, carried them out of the Union, they can point to their instructions at West Point and say: We were so taught by authority of the General Government.

Webster, indeed, seems to have imagined that in his famous speech on the Constitution, he had effectually barred the door against the alleged right of secession, by showing that it could

never be put into exercise without perjury. Each member of a State Legislature, he said, all Judges and other officers, being required to take oath to observe the Constitution of the United States, are thereby bound to perform all duties enjoined upon them by the Constitution. The elections for President, Senators, etc., *must* therefore occur as ordered by the Constitution. State officials, being constrained by their oath, have no choice but to see it done. And so the government must go on *in perpetuo*. Mr. Davis (as also Mr. Stephens) very correctly exposes the double confusion of thought betrayed by this argument of the great orator—the confounding of the limited powers of a State government with the unlimited sovereignty of the people thereof, acting in their conventions; also the delegated powers of the General Government with the same sovereignty. Now it may be very safely, so far as we are concerned, conceded that Webster's argument is conclusive as to the discretion of a State *government*, though in this Hamilton is against him. But it does not, by any means, follow that the *sovereign people* are thereby estopped. The power which delegates is competent to recall, as in all unlimited partnerships. The citizen became connected with the General Government solely through the act of his State. So long as his State continues to ratify the compact, so long he is bound thereby. But his sovereign having formally annulled the compact, the subject is free from it. The act by which your sovereign, *the State, speaking in her convention, repealed her former ratification of that compact was the exercise of an undelegated right—a right, therefore, which, by the express language of the Tenth Amendment, is reserved "to the States respectively, or to the people."* The Constitution distinguishes clearly between the two forms of power, each of which is in popular language termed a "State"—the delegated powers of the *government*, and the original fountain, the *people*. The distinction had been clearly made in the Philadelphia Convention, and on that distinction, Art VII. had been based.

When, therefore, my comrades, you obeyed the voice of your sovereign State in leaving the Union, you acted in strict conformity to law; you kept your faith with every man. And when,

further, you took up arms to defend your sovereign, you did no more than your bounden duty. The bloody war was, on your part, one of self-defence. You asked only to be let alone in the discharge of that duty. Brothers of the Sixth Regiment! look upon that faded, tattered banner, that floats above our heads, preserved to us by the accident of being already too old for service when we surrendered our arms at Appomattox. A "conquered banner," it may be called, because it was overwhelmed by tenfold odds. I see upon it the names of "Williamsburg," "Seven Pines," "Gaines' Mill," "Frazier's Farm," "Second Manassas," and "Sharpsburg." I see it to be rent with hostile shot. Some dark stains may be on its folds too. But, comrades, they are the sacred drops of patriot blood, which hallow, but cannot defile. There is no spot of dishonor upon thee, thou emblem of a fallen, but upright people, of a cause "lost," so far as the bloody arbitrament of the sword could avail it, but dear to our saddened hearts as the memory of a buried love. Dear old banner! What memories it recalls of strong hands that bore it amid the crash and roar of battle, until they relaxed in the pangs of dissolution—of eyes that strained after it, as it floated amid eddying clouds of smoke, until the films of death blotched it out! Our brave comrades!

"On Fame's eternal camping-ground,
Their silent tents are spread;
And glory guards, with solemn round,
The bivouac of the dead."

In the name of history, whose ample testimony is before you; in the name of the fathers of the Republic, whose words have been cited; in the name of the Constitution, which they framed, and have interpreted for us, I declare, impugn it who will, that they died, true men, valiant warriors, and devoted patriots, martyrs in the defence of truth and right!

Having thus, as I humbly claim, shown that no taint of dishonor attaches to our Association, let me, in conclusion, make a few suggestions relating to our duties as Southern soldiers and as American citizens.

And, first, let me say that we, of all men, need to cultivate the virtues of *patience and charity towards those who differ from us*. I have proved that in all your controversy with our

Northern brethren, you were in the right, as to moral principle and political privileges. But you know that a good cause can be ruined by the spirit and temper in which it is defended. In my heart I feel that herein lay one of our chief defects in days gone by. We allowed ourselves to become too much embittered by their conduct. We learned to dislike, and then to despise, our opponents. The land was filled with boasts of what we would do. Such feelings are sure to prove bad counsellors. It is not very safe to underrate one's enemy and overrate one's self. This we did to a great degree. And I have often thought of the wise man's saying: "Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty look before a fall." This scornful feeling helped us to jeopardise our just cause, by rushing unprepared into the war. In vain sagacious men like Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens cautioned us of the danger. We said there would be no war. We called such as they, "too slow." Had we been a little less confident, had we respected other men's determination and fighting qualities, had we cautiously armed ourselves beforehand with the best weapons to be found in the world, where would we have stood to-day? We would have been free and victorious. Let us learn to respect other people's manhood as well as our own. They have wronged us deeply. But it may be said of them—at least of the great mass of the Northern people—as the great Apostle said of himself: "They did it ignorantly through unbelief." They proved their sincerity by their willingness to suffer. Let us, then, respect those convictions, however erroneously founded we may know them to be. Let us reverence their manhood, and try to be glad that they have never passed through such agonies as defeat and "reconstruction" brought to us. Our provocation was great, and it is great now. I remember the sluices of calumny and abuse. My blood will boil yet when I see it in print. Success does not always make people lovely, especially toward such as they may dislike and, perhaps, somewhat fear. We have had a plenty of such treatment to bear. But if patience, self-control, and charity for others, were needful for us when we were strong, how much more so now, in our defeat! We claim to be witnesses for a great principle—the right of local self-government; for the di-

VOL. XXXII., NO. 4.—13.

vision of power, as a protection against the corruptions which have ever developed from centralisation in other republics. The taint has shown itself fearfully in our own country. The record testifies that the fathers of the Republic held this principle to be the corner-stone of our institutions. With one voice the great men of that day assent to the declaration of Alexander Hamilton, when in the New York Convention, he said, as you have already heard: "*The States can never lose their powers till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties. These must go together; they must support each other, or meet one common fate.*"

So spake he whom Mr. Davis with good reason seems to regard as the greatest intellect of his age, though it abounded in great men. The signs of the times seem to give to his words something of the forecast of prophecy. As the territory is developed, wealth will increase at an ever-accelerating speed, and with it the temptation to, and the ready means of, that political corruption which ruined Rome, as it had Babylon, Persia, and Alexander's successors. The hope for us seems to lie in a clearly defined division of powers, in the right of States to oppose an effectual check to the absorption into itself by the General Government of functions not delegated to it by the original compact. We can no longer battle for the heritage. War is no longer dreamed of as a remedy by sane men among us. We must be content to plead before the better judgment of the majority. It is their interest as well as ours. Time is a great reconciler. The soft water-drop wears away the hard stone. We will probably be treated to a dose of scorn, if we claim to be in the right. Some persons think we should be very humble and grateful that we are allowed to live at all. But no matter. Let them feel so, if they will. Let us hold fast to the truth, and testify as we have opportunity. The great writers of the South are doing it nobly. There is no telling what changes can be wrought by fidelity to our convictions. Think what the Abolitionists accomplished by unswerving adhesion to their notions of right. They were despised, they were in the minority, but they triumphed. See the influence of Mr. Calhoun's fidelity upon the mind of his

noble antagonist. See Mr. Webster, upon the most solemn occasions, reverting to the very positions which he had challenged, and using the very words to which he so bitterly objected. In patience we possess our souls. Truth is a mighty power. It proved itself so on two great occasions in American history before our trouble culminated. The aggressions of the Federal Government were, as Mr. Stephens shows, checked by the firm opposition of Virginia, led by Jefferson and Madison, about the opening of this century. They were checked again, as he thinks, by Calhoun, between 1830 and 1840. Let truth be heard again: and let the voices of her witnesses be gentle and full of good-will to all men. If the principle was worth risking our lives for, as we believed, let us bide our time, and it may yet assert itself in the convictions of the American people. In any event, we can but do our duty.

Next, let me put in a kind word for the children of Africa, whose fate has been so strangely blended with ours. They were, as all admit, the best servants in the world under the old arrangement. We went off to the war, leaving aged parents, defenceless wives and little ones, largely dependent on them. They were wonderfully faithful to the trust. I have never heard of a single instance of deliberate cruelty on their part toward the thousands who were in their power. We had a number of them with us in camp. They were faithful and kind to us. Many a man's life was saved on the battle-field and in the hospital by the fidelity of his black servant. Not one of those attached to our Regiment, so far as I know, ever deserted his master for freedom in the enemy's camp. I am glad to see many of them here among us to-day. I am glad to know that their names have been enrolled along with ours in the Survivors' Association, and that they are wearing the badges of their old masters' companies. Comrades, these good-natured colored men have been more sinned against than sinning. Brought hither from the wilds of Africa by the greed of white men, chiefly from old England and New England, without their own choice, they have been set free, and enfranchised, without seeking it. They must be either more or less than human to have escaped all the tempta-

tions put in their way. It was impossible that their simple minds should fail to be greatly disturbed by such sudden and surprising changes. And as they have been all along used as the "cat's paw" to serve the partisan ends of white men, so they came very near being used by carpet-baggers and other thieves to destroy whatever had been saved from the wreck of the war. But they were hardly more conscious of the horrible evils wrought by their votes, than the little child is of burning down his father's house, while he played with the fire. Putting myself, as far as I can into his place, I very much doubt whether the more determined white race of the North or the South would have done as well. Let us be patient with our black brother. It has pleased a good Providence to make us his greatest benefactors in the past. While others have tampered with his safety in the accomplishment of selfish ends, or in the exercise of sentimental philanthropy, God has made his relations to us to be his greatest blessing. They came to us debased savages, the naked worshippers of *fetiches*, the dupes of Obi-men, and of Gre-gre women, some of them being caters of human flesh. Under our tuition they were taught the habits of order, decency, and industry. Under us they forsook their bestial idolatry. Hundreds of thousands of them, more, indeed, than have been won to Christ on heathen ground by all the devoted missionaries of Christendom, have become sincere worshippers of the God of heaven. We did not do for them, as our bondmen, all that we ought. We were greatly hindered by the intermeddling of conceited busy-bodies. But we might have done more. Let it not be said that our hearts are turned to stone by evil circumstances.

First of all, we must be *just* to them. I know that many among us have been tempted by the fact that they once were our bondmen, and were wrongfully taken away from us. But remember, we have *consented* to the will of our conquerors. It is so in the record. We have solemnly and deliberately said, They shall be free. Let us not forswear ourselves. Let us promise fair wages, and then pay *what* we promise, and *when* we promise. This is God's law. He says: "The wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night, until the morning." He shall not be

kept waiting even one night after it is due. If any body must go unpaid for a while, let him wait that can best afford it, not the poor laboring man.

And, then, be kind to the black man in his troubles and afflictions. Visit him in his sickness and sorrow, as Christ tells you to do. They are full of sympathy when we are in trouble. I never had a great grief in my home that they did not weep with me.

Help him to guard the sanctity of his humble home, to protect the character of his wife and daughter.

You know far more than he does. Give him a kind word of friendly counsel, when he is in the mood to receive it. Do him a favor whenever you see the chance. I do not see why strangers should come from a distance to teach our colored peasantry. We taught them when we owned them. Many of our most gifted ministers spent their lives preaching to them. My first lessons were received in my father's house along with the colored servants. The first work I ever did, even before I was your Chaplain, was to teach a Sunday-school of colored people. Our great hero, Stonewall Jackson, for years taught a colored Sunday-school in Lexington, Va.

Again, let me urge upon every Confederate veteran, the duty of building up the waste places of our beloved South. One of the greatest things that Macaulay records of Cromwell's invincible old "Ironsides," is, that when peace came, if you saw a grave-looking man who was a little more energetic and industrious than his neighbors, you might be sure he was one of Oliver's old soldiers. Let us be like them. We have bonds of sympathy with them. For after their mighty leader had been laid under the sod, the bloody beastly Stuarts came back, and with them such corruptions as are rarely seen outside of pandemonium. But they were patient and true, until, by and by, the Prince of Orange came, and liberty was forever established. Be like them; and it may be that, by and by, our countrymen at the North will come to our help, and undo, as far as they can, the evil which they have done.

Our beloved commander set us the example in this, as in every-

thing else that is manly and noble. During the war, friends of his family secretly made up the funds with which to buy a home in Richmond for his venerable wife, and her daughters, driven, as we all know, from their ample possessions which they had inherited in part from George Washington. But when he heard of it, he assured them that such a course would pain him deeply—that nothing could induce him to think of accepting it. If any had more than they required, let them, he suggested, give it to the suffering soldiers, or donate it for the defence of the country. When, in the universal scarcity of the war, luxuries were pressed upon him, he said: "Send these things to my men in the hospitals." And when the war had ceased, he was offered a commercial position which guaranteed to him a salary of \$10,000 per annum, he declined it, saying: "I cannot earn the money in a business which I have never mastered." "Yes; but General," they said, "we don't wish you to *work*. Your name will bring us the custom, which will pay your salary." "If that be so," was his reply, "I cannot afford to become responsible to those who would trust to my management, unless I knew exactly how to protect their interests." And so he preferred to accept a small salary as an instructor of our boys. How proud, my comrades, we should be that General Lee did not fall under the censure of Holy Writ, when it says: "The king by judgment establisheth the land; *but he that receiveth gifts overthroweth it.*"

Improve your methods of farming. Bring back to their pristine fertility these old red hill-sides, all riven and torn by bad tillage. They have in them the elements that will insure your success, if only you will do it wisely and patiently.

Do this good work for your own children. Said a wealthy manufacturer the other day to a friend of mine: "I hope your people in the South will take warning by us here in Pennsylvania. Fifty years ago much of our land had been exhausted, as yours is, and it was sold at five or six dollars an acre. Strangers came in and bought it. They cultivated it wisely, and now you could not buy that land for \$100 an acre."

Build cotton-mills, and be independent. I am glad to see you are doing so. The United States Census shows that mills in the

South average $22\frac{1}{2}$ per centum on investments. Be prudent as well as energetic. You have all the needed water-power; you have the climate; you can save cost of transportation both ways and handling. Be independent, and get back some of the wealth which Protective Tariffs have squeezed out of you.

When you exercise that solemn responsibility of American citizenship—the calling of men to discharge official responsibilities through your votes—be sure that you call none who cannot be trusted. The men who stood by you in your troubles are those who will serve you, not for the “loaves and fishes,” but for love.

A real “Union man,” one whose judgment and conscience having decided against the lawfulness of Secession stood up for his own convictions like a man, we can all admire, and, if capable, vote for, always provided that we do not thereby sacrifice the great principle of local self-government. But the turncoat and trimmer is, like Ephraim of old, “unstable as water, and will not excel” in any good work. Trust him not. He will betray you, whenever it serves his purpose.

Finally, build upon and cherish your Southern *homes*. There lies the secret of your power. As I have wandered amid the splendors of Northern cities, looking at their shipping, their factories, massive buildings, and mighty railroad systems, I have often said to myself: You excel us far in all that pertains to material civilisation. But there is one product in which we have never been surpassed by you, and that is *the quality of our men and women*. In *that* we have held our own, not to say more, from George Washington to his heir, Robert Edmond Lee. And such men as Albert Sidney Johnston and Stonewall Jackson, attested, when the trial came, that the old heroic stock had not decayed. Let who will gainsay it, I hold that such men are formed in God’s school—the *Christian home*. And I believe that much of that fearful decline in the character and intellect of public men in other parts of the country nowadays, is due to a breaking down of that great, primitive, divine institution, more essential than either Church or State—the *family*. It is a matter of pride to me, as a Carolinian, that so soon as you wrenched

your "Prostrate State" from the avaricious grip of thieves and carpet-baggers, you rescinded their divorce law, and went back to the old colonial record, which says: "What God has joined together, let not man put asunder." The rule that denies all divorce is, perhaps, a little too severe. But infinitely better to be that, than to turn marriage into licensed impurity, as is being done in parts of the United States to-day. Hold fast to whatever is right in your old traditions. Maintain your individuality. Don't consent to be absorbed. An eminent gentleman in Boston, who has had no hand in throttling the South—and there are thousands like him at the North—said to a friend of mine not long since: "You are in the right so far; but the great danger is that the South will give way, and lose her *individuality*." It is a friendly warning. Let us take it.

And now, my brothers and comrades, during all the years in which I was your minister, you will bear me witness that I never, even on one occasion, gave you politics instead of the gospel. I adhere to that rule yet, when I undertake to preach. But to-day, I am speaking as a citizen and Southern soldier, not as a minister of the gospel. But I cannot sit down until I add one word of the old sort: May Almighty God bless you all, now and forever more!

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The past quarter's instalment of new books opens at the name¹ of the great master of German historico-critical exegesis. The addition to the series of translated volumes is a boon not only to every merely English student, but to others. It is the fashion now-a-days to laud Meyer with unstinted eulogy. He is certainly the prince of grammatical commentators, just as Calvin is the prince of theological commentators. In erudition too, Meyer is unequalled, and in a certain sort of dogged logic has plainly no superior. His fairness and candor, too, are in general unimpeachable. But his theory of inspiration is fatally unsound, and his Lutheranism of the pseudo-liberal, semi-rationalistic type. Professor Charteris² has condensed and improved upon the standard thesaurus of early testimonies to the canonical books by Kirchhofer. It is more accurate than Lardner. Dean Howson comes before us again, and this time with an attractive as well as characteristic study³ in apologetics.

The Bible Commentary⁴ needs no further endorsement at our

¹Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. By H. A. W. Meyer, Ph. D. Epistles to the Ephesians and to Philemon, translated by the Rev. Maurice J. Evans, B. A. The Epistles to the Thessalonians (in the same series), by Professor Gottlieb Lünemann, translated by the Rev. Paton J. Gloag, D. D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1880.

²Canonicity. A Collection of Early Testimonies to the Canonical Books of the New Testament, based on Kirchhofer's "Quellensammlung." By A. H. Charteris, D. D., Professor of Biblical Criticism and Antiquities in the University of Edinburgh, and one of Her Majesty's Chaplains. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1880. 8vo, pp. cxx., 484.

³The Evidential Value of the Acts of the Apostles (the Bohlen Lectures, 1880) by the Very Rev. J. S. Howson, D. D., Dean of Chester. 16mo, pp. 186. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1880.

⁴The Bible Commentary: New Testament, Vol. III. The Epistle to the Romans, by the Rev. E. H. Gifford; Corinthians, by Canon Evans and the Rev. Joseph Waite; Galatians, by Dean Howson; Ephesians, by

hands than the statement that it is a work of ability and value, and is orthodox according to the most approved orthodoxy of the Church of England. Professor Austin Phelps is one of the most gifted ministers of New England, and his work on the preparation and delivery of sermons¹ is, we doubt not, among the best of its class. The venerable author of "The Law of Love" has chosen the highest view-point from which to survey the domain of Christian ethics.² Few men were better, or so well, fitted, to discuss this general subject. There are, of course, questions in the theory of morals where divergences of opinion almost inevitably arise. Mr. Nicoll's so-called biography of our Lord³ does not come into competition with the other lives of the Saviour. The narrative element and the critical element are both markedly absent from this book; which is, however, a devout and useful volume. "The Critical Handbook"⁴ (like most of Draper's publications) is a work of practical utility in and out of the seminary class-room. The memorial volume⁵ brought out by our beloved brethren the Methodists is full of valuable matter, and contains some little very pardonable and very harmless self-glorification. The great movement here chronicled forms one of the most con-

the Rev. F. Meyrick; Philippians, by Dean Gwynn; Colossians, Thessalonians, and Philemon, by the Bishop of Derry; Timothy and Titus, by the Rev. H. Wace and the Bishop of London. 1 vol., 8vo, \$5. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

¹The Theory of Preaching; or, Lectures on Homiletics. By Professor Austin Phelps, D. D. 1 vol., 8vo, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

²The Law of Love, and Love as a Law; or, Christian Ethics. By Mark Hopkins, D. D., LL.D. A new edition with important additions. 1 vol., 12mo, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

³The Incarnate Saviour: A Life of Jesus Christ. By the Rev. W. R. Nicoll, M. A., Kelso. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner & Welford. 1881.

⁴The Critical Handbook. A Guide to the Study of the Authenticity, Canon, and Text of the Greek New Testament. By E. C. Mitchell. Illustrated by Diagrams, Tables, and a Map. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1880. 12mo, pp. v., 151.

⁵The Wesley Memorial Volume: or, Wesley and the Methodist Movement, judged by nearly 150 writers, living and dead. Edited by the Rev. J. O. A. Clark, D. D., LL.D. 8vo, pp. 743. New York: Phillips & Hunt, etc., etc. 1880.

spicuous epochs in the history of the Church. The life of Livingstone¹ was one career of broad-minded and broad-hearted Christian heroism. With every possible advantage in his subject, Dr. Blaikie could not well have failed to give us a good biography. The celebrated discourses on the Bampton foundation are of unequal merit, but are sure to be learned and nearly sure to be of striking ability. Mansel, Bernard, Liddon, Mozley, and others, have made themselves monuments in this way. The Lectures of 1880² are an elaborate argument from history in favor of the Episcopal pretension. Among the various editions that have lately appeared of the New Testament one of the most useful and convenient is the "Variorum,"³ where the places liable to change are indicated to the eye by the style in which the text is printed. The Oxford prize essay on the Philosophy of Natural Religion⁴ has met with just approbation at the hands of critics whose approval is worth having.

Professor Given's treatise⁵ on the basis and import of scripture truth is a production of sound orthodoxy, and one otherwise worthy of its distinguished author. The same keen pen which twenty years ago defined for us the relations between the finite and the infinite, now undertakes to mark off the relations of science and

¹The Personal Life of David Livingstone, LL.D., D. C. L., etc. By William Garden Blaikie, D. D., LL.D., New College, Edinburgh. With portrait and map. 8vo, pp. 504. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1881.

²Bampton Lectures for 1880. The Organisation of the Early Christian Church. By the Rev. E. Hatch, M. A. 8vo, cloth, \$3.50. E. & J. B. Young & Co., Cooper Union, Fourth Avenue, New York.

³The Variorum New Testament. Just issued [July] by Eyre & Spottiswoode. Price 85c: by mail, 93 cents *Ibid.*

⁴The Philosophy of Natural Religion. An Essay in Confutation of the Scepticism of the Present Day, which obtained a prize at Oxford, November 26, 1872. By the Rev. William Jackson, M. A., F. S. A., author of "Positivism," "Right and Wrong," etc. Cloth, 8vo, 400 pp., \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵The Truth of Scripture in connection with Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon. By John James Given, Ph. D., Professor of Hebrew and Hermeneutics in Magee College, Londonderry. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1881. 8vo, pp. viii., 370. New York: Scribner & Welford. Price, \$3.60.

religion.¹ We observe that the respected lecturer has latterly expressed himself on the questions about *the will* in terms which betray a noticeable departure from the Edwardean system. "Fragments of Christian History"² are *fragments* indeed. They are indeed such fragments, or *dissecta membra*, as the members of the human body would be without the vital organs. The point of view is the low humanitarian and naturalistic one, which leaves much to reverence in it, but nothing to adore. "It is the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out."

Dr. Bruce has chosen a deeply moving theme for his exertions on certain aspects of the Saviour's work,³ and is to be congratulated on a successful treatment of the subject. The Boyle Lectures for 1877 and 1878⁴ richly deserve a place side by side on the shelves with their predecessors of the same valuable series. The Lectures on Christianity and Natural Theology deserve perhaps a specially prominent mention. Since Paley's time the dimensions of the field of Natural Theology have been vastly augmented; but the principles laid down and so ably elucidated in Paley's little volume, though they have been greatly enlarged and more widely illustrated, have not been overthrown, but have, on the contrary, been confirmed by the results of subsequent investigation and of contemporary thought. There is some novelty in a book⁵ which unites sound views of Christ and salvation with a multitude of grave errors, such as the annihilation of the wicked and the abrogation of the Sabbath.

¹The Relations of Science and Religion. The Morse Lectures, 1880. By Henry Calderwood, LL.D. New York: Robt. Carter & Bros. 1881.

²Fragments of Christian History to the Foundation of the Holy Roman Empire. By Joseph Henry Allen, Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1880.

³The Humiliation of Christ. By A. B. Bruce, D. D. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, and Scribner & Welford. New York.

⁴The Manifold Witness for Christ. Part I. Christianity and Natural Theology. Part II. The Positive Evidences of Christianity. Being the Boyle Lectures for 1877 and 1878. By Alfred Barry, D. D., D. C. L., Principal of King's College, London, Canon of Worcester, etc. 8vo, pp. 22, 400. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1880.

⁵Eternal Purpose: A Study of the Scripture Doctrine of Immortality. 12mo, pp. 325. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1881.

The almost romantic Christian interest once attaching to the name of Henry Martyn,¹ the Senior Wrangler and missionary to India, has not yet grown cold. Fitly bound up with Dr. Bell's little memoir are similar brief lives of the pious statesman who so admired Pitt, and of the sainted author of "The Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul." It was the melancholy privilege of him who now makes this record to hear in Old St. George's in Edinburgh one Sunday afternoon the last sermon but one ever preached by the illustrious ecclesiastic of the Free Church² whose dying efforts had, in the providence of God, just saved that Church from a second disruption. The gigantic head was covered with wavy white hair, and the small nervous hands clutched the forward part of the pulpit cushion: the voice was like the monotone of a distant surf. The sermon was in large part a masterly and graphic *résumé* of recent events in and out of the Scotch Assemblies. These memorials by Dr. Wilson and that worthy successor of Dr. Candlish, Principal Rainy, are to be treasured by all Presbyterians. Dr. Morris's Theological Outlines³ present one phase of the New School views.

There is something exceedingly awakening to the curiosity in this book on "Illusions;"⁴ when one has become aware that Mr. Sully has nothing to say of unhealthy or even of decidedly abnormal, illusions. The discussion, too, is not medical, but psychological. It is said to be a work of unusual interest. Blind

¹Henry Martyn. By the Rev. Charles D. Bell, D. D. William Wilberforce. By John Stoughton, D. D. Philip Doddridge. By Chas. Stanford, D. D. 12mo vols., bound in cloth. Price 75 cents each. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1881.

²Memorials of Robert Smith Candlish, D. D., Minister of St. George's Free Church, and Principal of the New College, Edinburgh. By William Wilson, D. D., Minister (*Emeritus*) of St. Paul's Free Church, Dundee. With concluding chapter by Robert Rainy, D. D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. 1880.

³Outlines of Lectures on the Christian Doctrine. Printed for the use of Students in Lane Theological Seminary. By Edward D. Morris, D. D.

⁴Illusions: A Psychological Study. By James Sully, author of "Sensation and Intuition." etc. (International Scientific Series.) 12mo, cloth, price \$1.50. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Kitto's Illustrations¹ are not invariably a safe dependence, but are generally so, and are very instructive and extremely captivating to the popular taste. "T. L. C." has² the knack of turning off capital newspaper sketches; fortunately their pronounced egotism does not seriously affect their spiritual flavor or detract much from their purely literary excellence. Dr. Winslow of Bath was a profoundly experimental writer of the best English school. His work on the Holy Spirit³ is admirable. His "Midnight Harmonies" is no doubt delightful.⁴ We are glad to find very young women for once called "girls,"⁵ and to see them provided with so much more than used to be given them that is good for them to read.

The writings^{6,7,8,9,10} of the late Dean of Westminster cannot

¹Kitto's Bible Illustrations. New editions, with Index, in 8 volumes, 12mo. 1881. \$7. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

²The Cedar Christian, and other Practical Papers and Personal Sketches. By the Rev. Theo. L. Cuyler, D. D. 24mo, pp. 215. 1881. *Ibid.*

³The Inquirer Directed to the Work of the Holy Spirit. By the Rev. Octavius Winslow, D. D. 12mo, pp. 300. 1881. *Ibid.*

⁴Midnight Harmonies; or, Thoughts for the Season of Solitude and Sorrow. By Octavius Winslow, D. D. 24mo, pp. 250. 1881. *Ibid.*

⁵Wise Words and Loving Deeds. A Book of Biographies for Girls. By E. Conder Gray. Small 8vo, pp. 415. 1881. *Ibid.*

⁶The History of the Jewish Church. With Maps and Plans. By A. P. Stanley, D. D., Dean of Westminster. Vol. I.—From Abraham to Samuel. Crown 8vo, \$2.50. Vol. II.—From Samuel to the Captivity. Crown, 8vo, \$2.50. Vol. III.—From the Captivity to the Christian Era. With Maps. Crown 8vo, \$2.50. Westminster edition of the History of the Jewish Church. Handsomely printed on superfine paper, and tastefully bound. 3 vols., 8vo. (Sold in sets only.) \$9. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁷(By the same.) The History of the Eastern Church. With an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History. 1 vol., crown 8vo, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁸(By the same.) Sinai and Palestine. 1 vol., crown 8vo, \$2.40. *Ibid.*

⁹(By the same.) The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D., late Head-Master of Rugby School. 2 vols. in one. Crown 8vo, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

¹⁰(By the same.) Christian Institutions. (The authorised edition.) Essays on Ecclesiastical Subjects. Student's edition, 1 vol., crown 8vo, 75c. Library edition, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

well be fairly judged at this moment: for if judged at this moment they have to be judged in the deceptive though alluring and pensive light shed upon them by his gracious personality and his recent death. His *magnum opus* will probably be held to be "The History of the Jewish Church;" but his master-piece was his Life of Arnold. Arthur Penrhyn Stanley was a bundle of contradictions. There was much in him to admire and even love, but also much to deplore and condemn. He was thoroughly Low-Church as to polity, but in doctrine and sympathies he was Broad-Church of the Broad-Church. It is an incontestable fact that the gangrene of continental Rationalism had made sad inroads into his theological system, if he could be said to have a theological system. He was an exquisite rhetorician, never a scientific theologian. His "Sinai and Palestine" is very charming, but not always trustworthy. As a preacher, he tickled the ear and gratified the taste, and sometimes moved the feelings.

We are, on the whole, somewhat pleased that ex-Professor Robertson Smith, lately and perhaps still of Aberdeen, has put down in black and white (or simply in black) what has been judged by the Scotch Church to be his very objectionable views in Biblical Criticism. His learning in his special department (and particularly as a Semitic scholar), his fascination as a teacher of youth, his adroitness as a polemic, and his apparent sincerity and earnestness, do not in any degree mitigate, but the rather enhance his offence in surrendering important parts of the citadel to the enemies of the faith. Professor Smith's arguments are not new, but are fortified by all the help afforded by the latest rationalistic and neological researches. There is of course in these twelve lectures¹ by an acknowledged expert a great deal that is exceedingly valuable: but the good that is in them is more than neutralised by their mischievous tendencies. These lectures will receive more thorough overhauling in the columns of this REVIEW. The well-known author of "Primitive Culture" is undoubtedly a

¹The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism, with Notes. By W. Robertson Smith, M. A., recently Professor of Hebrew and Exegesis of the Old Testament, Free Church College, Aberdeen. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

writer of more than ordinary talents and attainments. In this new book on "Anthropology"¹ he treats the subject broadly, and follows reverently in the footsteps of those treacherous guides, Mr. Herbert Spencer and Sir John Lubbock. The attractive life that has lately appeared of that high character and brilliant preacher and writer, Horace Bushnell, imparts an additional and an even more persuasive charm to his eloquent remains. Some of his books^{2,3,4} are now once more on the counters of the salesmen. Dr. Bushnell is superb when he is right, but "pity 'tis" he is more than half the time wrong. His "Christian Nurture" is deplorably erroneous, and in his work on the Atonement, like Dr. John Young and other like-minded Trinitarians, he brought forward again (but in a more vulnerable form than ever) the shattered "moral influence" view of the Socinians. Mr. St. George Mivart's last contribution⁵ to the science of natural history is what might be expected of so great a *savant*. The journals of Selah Merrill⁶ are stamped with the seal of official authorisation and approval.

"Orthodox theology" is getting to be more and more a thing of yesterday.⁷ To one who is both theoretically and practically

¹Anthropology: An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilisation. By Edward B. Tylor; D. C. L., F. R. S., author of "Primitive Culture" and "The Early History of Mankind." With seventy-eight illustrations. 12mo, 448 pages. With Index. Cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

²Work and Play. By Horace Bushnell, D. D. (Vol. I., of Literary Varieties.) 12mo, \$1.50. Charles Scribner & Co.

³The Moral Uses of Dark Things. By Horace Bushnell, D. D. (Vol. II., Literary Varieties.) 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Building Eras in Society and Religion. By Horace Bushnell, D. D. (Vol. III., Literary Varieties.) 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Cat. An Introduction to the Study of Backboned Animals, especially Mammals. By St. George Mivart. 200 illustrations. 584 pages, 1 vol., crown 8vo, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁶East of the Jordan: A Record of Travel and Observation in the Countries of Moab, Gilead, and Bashan, during the years 1875-1877. By Selah Merrill. Archaeologist of the American Exploration Society. With illustrations and Map. 1 vol., 8vo, \$4. *Ibid.*

⁷The Orthodox Theology of To-Day. By Newman Smyth, author of "Old Faiths in a New Light." 1 vol., 12mo, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

unacquainted with nautical matters, the movements of even the smallest sailing vessels have an air of no little mystery about them. That mystery is so far as is possible cleared up in the serviceable manual recently put forth by a master in the United States Navy.¹ We like to read about "Woman's Handiwork"; and especially rejoice when we discern the appearances which demonstrate its introduction into "modern homes."² This is a book not only of printed words, but colored plates.

It is conceded by English and Northern authorities of the highest pretension that ex-President Davis's plea³ for the Confederacy is the weightiest that has yet been made, that its main argument is one of dignity and singular power, and that the entire scope of the volume, whether in its narrative or polemic portions, discloses a profound acquaintance with constitutional law and an intimate familiarity with the political history of this and other countries. The argument in favor of the abstract right of secession under the Constitution as it existed in 1861 is an argument that never has been answered. As is well known, Mr. Davis is a man of strong prejudices and frank methods of expression. It is natural in these circumstances that there should have been private discussions, as well as public differences, which have left their traces upon this apologetic chronicle, and which will continue to make one impression upon one class of minds and another upon another. The "Bronze Age,"⁴ as it is styled,

¹The Sailor's Handy-Book and Yachtman's Manual. By E. T. Quilts, Master, U. S. Navy. 1 vol., 16mo, 620 pp., blue roan, red edges. With colored plates and many illustrations. \$3.50. *Ibid.*

²Woman's Handiwork in Modern Homes. By Constance Cary Harrison. With illustrations by George Gibson, Mrs. Wheeler, Miss Dora Wheeler, and others, and five plates in colors. 1 vol., 12mo, \$2. *Ibid.*

³The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. By Jefferson Davis. Two vols., 8vo, 707 and 808 pages. With numerous illustrations (including two portraits of Mr. Davis) and eighteen excellent Military Maps. Price per vol., cloth, \$5; library, \$6; half-turkey, \$7. The work is divided into four parts, as follows: Part I., Political Narratives; Part II., The Constitution; Part III., Secession and Confederation; Part IV., The War. (First edition of 25,000. Second edition in press. Sold only by subscription.) D. Appleton & Co., Publishers.

⁴The Ancient Bronze Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great

possesses an equal interest for those who would assign a very early pre-historic date to the rudiments of human culture and those who uphold (as we do) "the recent origin of man." The figment of a stone age in the tertiary or even in the quaternary period, is now pretty well exploded among sound reasoners. As Dr. Southall and others have triumphantly shown, the conclusion is in part a deduction from false or exceedingly uncertain and unnecessary premises, and still more largely a monstrous *non sequitur* from true and admitted premises. Dr. Evans, the author of this book, is considered something of an authority on these matters. We fancy Mr. Guernsey is the former editor of *Harpur's Magazine*. If so, we would say he was qualified to write intelligently either about Carlyle or Emerson.¹ There is no one of our generation who has said more terse and memorable things than Disraeli. It was a good idea to collect some of these sayings in a little volume.² Madame de Rémusat's entertaining, but scandalous, memoirs, will be sure to effect a rapid sale for these familiar letters.³ Talleyrand's Correspondence, of which the publication has been delayed so long, ought certainly to be one of the most important historical memorials of the century.⁴ It is interesting that they should appear at the same time with the

Britain and Ireland. By John Evans, D. C. L., LL.D., etc., author of "The Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain." With five hundred and forty illustrations. 1 vol., 8vo, 509 pp., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

¹Ralph Waldo Emerson: Poet and Philosopher. By A. H. Guernsey. (Published by arrangement with Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., publishers of Emerson's Complete Works.) A companion volume to Carlyle—"his Life—his Books—his Theories." By the same author. Appleton's "New Handy-Volume Series." 18mo, cloth, 75c.; paper, 40c. *Ibid.*

²The Wit and Wisdom of Benjamin Disraeli, K. G., Earl of Beaconsfield. Collected from his Writings and Speeches. 12mo, cloth. Price, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³A Selection from the Letters of Madame de Rémusat to her Husband and Son. 1804-1814. Edited by her grandson, Paul de Rémusat, Senator. With a portrait of Madame de Rémusat. Uniform with "Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat, 1802-1808." 12mo, cloth. Price, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁴The Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and Louis XVIII. during the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815. With Preface, Observations, and

records of his eminent antagonist, Metternich. "Turkish Life in War Time"¹ is a title that suggests a good book for boys. It may, however, be only suited for full grown men. The rage for what may be denominated Russo-Turkish literature is not so prevalent as it was a year or two ago. Professor George Rawlinson knows more about the beginnings of history² than he does about the proper adjustment of contemporary races.

Notes, by M. G. Pillain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Paris. 1 vol., crown 8vo, with Geographical and Descriptive Index and Steel Portrait. \$1. (If ordered to be sent by mail, 17 cents must be added for postage.) Third edition. Charles Scribner's Sons.

¹Turkish Life in War Time. By Henry O. Dwight. 1 vol., 12mo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

²The Origin of Nations. By Professor Geo. Rawlinson, B. A. 1 vol., 12mo, with maps, \$1. *Ibid.*

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW

Is published Quarterly, in January, April, July, and October.

TERMS.—Three Dollars per Volume, payable in advance. Single numbers, One Dollar.

✍ All business communications should be addressed to the Proprietor, JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C. No subscription discontinued until a special order is given, and all arrearages are paid, or after the first number of a volume is published.

✍ A few complete sets of the back volumes can be had at Three Dollars per volume. Single back volumes, when they can be furnished without breaking a set, Two Dollars per volume.

✍ Ministers of the Gospel, and others, who shall obtain three new subscribers, and remit the regular price, (Three Dollars each,) will be entitled to a copy of the REVIEW for one year, or, if they so prefer, one dollar for each new subscriber.

✍ Subscribers changing their Post Office are requested to give immediate notice of the same to the Publisher, or their REVIEW will be sent to their former office.

✍ The Editors of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW think it is due to themselves and to their subscribers to announce that they do not endorse in every particular what is uttered in their pages. Each author is responsible for the views he expresses. This is a matter of convenience where there are minor differences between editors themselves, or between them and their brethren. Free discussion, too, is important to the interests of truth, if kept within just limits. These limits must be strictly observed. Editors would be worthy of censure, should they allow opinions to be expressed, subversive of any doctrine of the gospel; nor would it be becoming to allow their own views, or those of their contributors, to be rudely attacked in their own pages.

Their desire is, to make the REVIEW worthy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States—the representative of its views and its literature, the means of disseminating sound doctrine, and a stimulus to the genius and talent of our ministers and people.