


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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

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ARTICLE I.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

The articles which we published in this REVIEW for October, 1878, and January, 1879, on the subject of the Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations, have encountered some criticism. Part of it is of so grave a character that we are under the necessity of replying. It is alleged that we are inculcating a "new theology," and that we are out of harmony with Calvin and the Calvinistic standards. We are sorry to be considered by any of our brethren as innovators in theology, for we profess to be genuine Calvinists and sincere adherents to the doctrines of the Westminster Confession; but we cannot say that we altogether regret the charge against us to the contrary, since it gives us the opportunity of still more fully vindicating the proposition with which we started—that the theory of Philosophical Necessity, as claimed by Edwards and the Determinist School to be one of universal and invariable application to all cases of moral agency, is out of accord with the Calvinistic system. We propose, in these remarks, in connexion with notices of the special difficulties which have been urged against our views, to show that we have taught the old theology—that we have maintained precisely the doctrines held by Calvin, and made symbolic in the Confessions

of the Calvinistic bodies. The assertion has been made by one of our respected critics that "the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous an advocate of Determinism as Edwards himself." We hope to be able to evince the great misapprehension of Calvin's views disclosed in this remark. We shall offer no apology for the fulness of our citations from his writings, since the specific nature of the allegation we are meeting demands that method of proof. To show that we are not departing from the tenets of the Reformer and the Reformed Churches, we must largely adduce their own testimony to the points under discussion.

1. It has been intimated that in affirming the power of otherwise determining, or liberty of contrary choice as to the alternatives of holiness and sin, for man in innocence, we have assigned it to him in his natural fallen condition. There are two ways in which the attempt might be made to prove this allegation: either by showing that in what we have written we have consciously and intentionally asserted the possession of the liberty of contrary choice as to sin and holiness by the unregenerate sinner; or that such a position is, notwithstanding what we have designedly said to the contrary, logically deducible from our premises.

We may safely appeal to our former discussion for proof that we expressly and repeatedly denied that such a power is possessed by man in his unregenerate condition, in relation to spiritual and supernatural things. It did not belong to the scope of that discussion to treat the subject of the will with professed reference to man's natural fallen estate. Its very end was to show that, assuming the inability of the unregenerate sinner to choose holiness, and the moral necessity upon him to choose sin, such could not have been his original condition, but must have been visited upon him as a penal infliction, in consequence of a decision for sin, which was unnecessitated and avoidable while yet he stood in innocence. And it was contended that, upon the supposition of such a decision by a will capable of determining itself *in utramque partem*, the complete bondage of the will under sin is a judicial result which was required by justice; but that any theory, which does not proceed upon that pre-supposition, furnishes an inadequate account of the freedom of the will, of the

genesis of man's present sinful and miserable condition, and of the righteousness of his punishment. In short, without such a supposition, it cannot be shown how man determined himself to that fixed moral spontaneity, which now with inevitable certainty he expresses.

We take occasion now to indicate more explicitly our views as to the state of the will in man's fallen and unregenerate condition.

We accept without qualification the teaching of Scripture, that the natural man is dead in trespasses and sins, and that before he can discharge a single spiritual function, he must be the subject of a miraculous and supernatural act, immediately performed by the Holy Ghost, by which he is made a spiritually living man. Believing, as Robert Hall says, that there are no degrees in death, we hold that the spiritually dead sinner is totally unable to do a spiritual act, or feel a spiritual emotion, or think a spiritual thought. This spiritual death extends to the whole man—to the understanding, the emotions, the conscience, and the will. There is no spiritual life in any of these faculties. The vases are still there, though cracked; but the precious liquor has all leaked out—the wine of existence is gone. Now we hold this to have been the instantaneous and necessary effect of the first sin, provided that sin was not the result of a concreated necessity of nature, but of an unnecessitated and avoidable decision of the will. In the case of a probationer, such as Adam was, the first deliberate decision of the will in favor of the good, apart from express covenant stipulation to that effect, would not confirm the soul in holiness. The intrinsic consequence of that first determination in favor of righteousness would be only to develop and strengthen the spiritual principle, but not to terminate the probation in an indefectible life. The habit of virtue would be to a certain extent consolidated, the character be advanced on the path of formation, but the contingency of fall would continue to throw its shadow before, and to warn the probationer against a failure to watch and pray. God did not tell Adam, that on the first day he refrained from eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, he should surely be justified and adopted. It was for

his gracious Maker to decide when the application of the test of character should issue in confirmation.

On the other hand, the first deliberate decision of the will in favor of evil would have the effect of at once confirming the soul in sin. This it would accomplish in two ways. In the first place, as life to the creature is the result of union and fellowship with God, and the very first sin would necessarily interrupt that communion, death must be the consequence. The soul cannot enjoy spiritual life which has broken its vital relation to Him who is the only source from which it is derived. The connexion is destroyed between the stream and the fountain of its supply. In the second place, the first instance of transgression would bring down upon the soul the sentence of the broken law, that judicial curse of God which withdraws original righteousness, renders the acceptance of personal obedience hopeless, and shuts up the sinner, without the intervention of grace, to perpetual continuance in sin and the doom of eternal death. As "every sin deserveth God's wrath and curse," and all mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, are legally guilty of his first sin, they are born into the world with the same judicial consequences inflicted upon them for that sin as were entailed upon him. From birth, then, all men, without the interposition of recovering mercy, are under the moral necessity of sinning. In their federal head and representative they determined the complexion of their moral dispositions, and the necessity of expressing them by the spontaneous acts of the will. We have no hesitation in using the language of Edwards in relation to the fixed connexion between a sinful nature and the acts of the will. We see no reason for softening the term *necessity*, which expresses that connexion, into the term *certainty*. What is the relation of a spiritually dead soul to voluntary acts of sin but a necessary one, so far as its own intrinsic energies are concerned? Augustine and Calvin ordinarily use this expression, as the following examples, among others, will show :

"Hence, in the view of our corrupt nature, Augustine hesitates not to call those sins natural, which necessarily reign in the flesh wherever the grace of God is wanting."*

**Institutes*. B. II., c. I., §11.

"Therefore if the free will of God in doing good is not impeded because he necessarily must do good ; if the devil, who can do nothing but evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily ; can it be said that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a necessity of sinning ? This necessity is uniformly proclaimed by Augustine, who, even when pressed by the invidious cavil of Celestius, hesitated not to assert it in the following terms: 'Man through liberty became a sinner, but corruption ensuing as the penalty has converted liberty into necessity.' The thing not obscurely expressed is, that he is under a necessity of sinning."*

We are even prepared to go further than some advocates of the doctrine of Determinism, and to assert that besides the inherent inability of the sinner, without regenerating grace, to perform spiritual acts, there is an external force, that is, an externally originated force, operating upon him which disables him spiritually. Principal Cunningham, for instance, after conceding some validity to the distinction between natural and moral ability, says :

"In accordance with these definitions and descriptions, it is contended that man may be said to have a natural ability, or to have no natural inability, to do what is spiritually good and acceptable to God, because there is no physical law, no superior controlling power, no external violence operating irrespectively of his own volition, that prevents him from doing it, or is the cause of his inability to do it," etc.†

Now the illustrious author forgot that the judicial curse of God is a superior controlling power, an external force, which is a cause of the unregenerate sinner's inability to do what is spiritually good, a force which deprives him of the ornament of original righteousness and drinks up the fountains of spiritual life. The shadow of God's frown strikes a death-chill into the seat of life, and incapacitates the surviving natural faculties for the accomplishment of spiritual ends. And this blighting and disabling influence is justly exerted upon the sinner, because when he had spiritual ability he recklessly and wilfully threw it away. He is a spiritual corpse because he committed spiritual suicide. Being dead, he can do nothing in the spiritual sphere to recover himself. He depends on the almighty power of Christ to infuse new life into his soul, and on the almighty voice of Christ to call him from the grave. He must be born again, or lie an abortion in

**Institutes*, B. II., c. III., §5. †*Hist. Theology*, Vol. I., p. 600.

the womb of death. He must be created anew in Christ Jesus, or remain forever in the category of spiritual nonentity.

It follows from what has been said as to the reign of spiritual death in every faculty of the unrenewed sinner's soul, that he has no power of contrary choice as to the alternatives of sin and holiness. His will is spiritually dead, and can therefore exert no act of spiritual choice. The liberty of spontaneity remains—the sinner pleases to sin. But the liberty of deliberate election between the spiritually right and the spiritually wrong is clean gone. The will is the willing slave of sin. It is under a bondage to sin which is all the more inviolable because it is the spontaneous choice of the soul. No slave is so bound as he who wills not to be free. As to this matter we tread exactly in the tracks of Luther, Calvin, and the whole body of the Reformed Church. We utterly deny to man in his natural fallen condition the power of contrary choice as to spiritual things, the freedom to go in the way of holiness or the way of sin, which we ascribe to man in innocence. That sort of freedom was lost by the Fall, and it is the only sort of freedom which was so lost.

It has, however, been said that although we did not consciously intend to affirm the possession of the power of contrary choice by man in his fallen and unregenerate condition, that position would logically result from the theory we maintained. In the absence of proof, we are at a loss to conceive how this can be established. We can perceive how upon the principles of the Determinist, the law which is applied to one case must be applied to all; we can see, that, his philosophic hypothesis requiring the denial to man of the liberty of a self-determining will, or of contrary choice, on the ground of its impossibility, *that* liberty must be denied to man universally, in all circumstances and relations, whether naturally or spiritually considered, whether contemplated as unfallen or as fallen. But we attempted to establish no philosophical theory of universal and invariable applicability to men. If we had, as we explicitly contended that man in innocence had the power of contrary choice as to spiritual things, we must have acknowledged that the unregenerate sinner also possesses it. With Augustine, Calvin, and the Reformed Confessions, we ascribed the power of

contrary choice to Adam in spiritual things, not in the sense of an essential and inalienable attribute of humanity, but as an accidental, separable, contingent quality. It was necessary, not to his make, but to his peculiar relation to God's moral government as a non-elect probationer, who was under covenant arrangements which supposed his ability to stand and liability to fall. His possession of such a power we endeavored to prove, not upon any philosophical principles, but by the testimony of Scripture and the common agreement of the Church in all ages. We have been charged with making the case of Adam peculiar and exceptional, so far as this matter is concerned, whereas what is true of Adam as to the will, it is contended on the other hand, must be true of the race. This is extraordinary. Surely there were some features in Adam's case which were totally unlike those of his descendants. Was each one of them a federal head? Was each required to perform personal obedience as the condition of justification and adoption? Had Adam been justified, would not all his seed have been personally justified upon precisely the opposite principle to his? Would they not have been justified by a vicarious righteousness imputed to them? Was Adam elected to stand in holiness as were the elect angels, and as are some of his descendants through the mercy of God? And are we to blame for regarding him as also an exception in being endowed with the liberty of contrary choice in relation to sin and holiness? Holiness, to the extent in which it existed in him, was not an essential, it was an accidental and contingent quality of Adam's soul. That is proved by the fact that it was actually lost after being possessed, and that it may, through grace, be recovered. If so, Adam's will must have been separably related to holiness. What is that but saying that he may have chosen to retain it or not? And what is that but saying that he had the power of contrary choice as to holiness and sin? The peculiarity of his position was that he was not confirmed while he was in innocence. His case was not like that of the non-elect unregenerate sinner, nor that of the saint in Christ Jesus. If, therefore, his case was exceptional, it could not, to the extent of its having been so, be reduced to a general law of equal application to all human cases.

Our principles, then, we claim, do not necessitate the logical inference that if Adam possessed the power of contrary choice in relation to spiritual things, it must, as to those things, be an essential property of the race.

Having thus concisely but explicitly shown the revolutionary change which the Fall occasioned in man's spiritual condition, a change in which the power or liberty of deliberate election between the contrary alternatives of sin and holiness was completely lost, so that the will by its own fatal choice is now under a bondage to evil from which only the Son of God by his grace can make it free, we deem it proper, in order to meet misconceptions and misrepresentations of our position, to repeat what we formerly said by way of caution in reference to the meaning of the terms *power or liberty of contrary choice*. We do not employ them as equivalent either to the terms *liberty of indifference*, or *liberty of equilibrium*, with which they ought not to be, but often are, confounded. For an exposition of the difference between them, we refer to Müller's work on the Christian Doctrine of Sin.* What we mean is the power of choosing between contrary alternatives—the power of otherwise determining. It is the power or liberty of the will to incline to one or the other of two opposite directions, to elect one or the other of two opposite courses. This is the power of contrary choice which we ascribed to Adam in innocence, and which we utterly deny to his descendants, in relation to spiritual things, while in their unregenerate condition. There is a difference which cannot be overlooked between the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of deliberate election between opposing alternatives. The former, we contend, was possessed by Adam not as a contingent quality attaching to him as an individual, but as a permanent attribute of the race. It consequently survived the storm of the Fall which wrecked the accidental holy qualities of Adam, and remained an imperishable, because an essential, property of human nature. If the spontaneity of the will were lost, the will itself would cease to be. When, therefore, the unregenerate sinner commits sin, he acts spontaneously. No compulsory force is exerted upon his will which drives it

*Vol. II., pp. 17, 21.

against its spontaneity. It acts from the necessity of that spontaneity, but not from the necessity of co-action. Spontaneous action and necessary action coincide in this case, precisely because the power of contrary choice—the liberty of deliberate election between the contrary alternatives of holiness and sin—is gone. The man goes only one way spontaneously, but he goes that way necessarily. He pleases to go that way, but he cannot please to go the opposite way. The liberty of spontaneity, then, existed in Adam in innocence, and it exists in man now. That sort of liberty was not lost.

But the liberty of deliberate election between sin and holiness is that liberty which Adam lost for himself and his posterity. No unregenerate sinner possesses it now in regard to spiritual things. It has vanished. We cannot here refrain from adverting to a consideration which, from a theological point of view, appears to us to be fatal to the theory of Determinism. The Church, following the plain teachings of Scripture, has always held that there was a *liberum arbitrium*, a certain free-will, which Adam possessed and which he lost when he lost himself. *Perdidit se et ipsum*. Now it is obvious that the liberty of spontaneity was not lost. It remains that the liberty of contrary choice was that which was originally enjoyed, and which was lost by the Fall. Principal Cunningham confessed his leanings to the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, but in an elaborate discussion designed to prove the neutrality of the Calvinistic Formularies in relation to the controversy between Necessitarians and their opponents, strangely makes this strong statement:

“The practice of distinguishing, in the exposition of this subject, between the freedom of man's will in his unfallen and in his fallen condition, and indeed of viewing it distinctively with reference to the different stages or periods of his fourfold state—as unfallen, fallen, regenerate, or glorified—has prevailed in the Church in almost all ages. These views were fully brought out and applied by Augustine. They had a place in the speculations of the Schoolmen, as may be seen in Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences, and in the Commentaries upon it. They were embraced and promulgated by the whole body of the Reformers, both Lutheran and Calvinistic. They have a prominent place in the writings of the great systematic divines of the seventeenth century. They have a prominent place in the West-

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minster Confession—the ninth chapter, entitled ‘Of Free Will,’ being entirely devoted to the statement of them. And what is in some respects peculiarly interesting, the doctrine of the loss of man’s free-will by the Fall, and of the servitude of the will of fallen man to sin because of depravity, was held by Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel, and their followers—the best men and the best theologians the Church of Rome has ever produced.”*

This is true and well said, however inconsistent with Dr. Cunningham’s leanings to Philosophical Necessity. Now we ask, what free will did man lose by the fall? Edwards and the Determinist school maintain that the sort of free will, if any, which man now possesses he always possessed—possessed before the fall; and that the sort of free will which he now has not, he never did have—did not have before the fall. He has lost no free will which he once had. That is clearly their doctrine, as might be evinced by an appeal to their writings, did our space permit. Spontaneity is the only species of liberty they allow, and that, according to their own teaching, is not lost. What freedom of the will, then, was lost? None, according to the Determinist theory. But the Scriptures and the Church alike teach that there was a free will which was lost by the fall. There is only one other kind—the liberty of contrary choice, the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives, or of otherwise determining. That, therefore, was the liberty which was lost; and, consequently, it was originally possessed. We call attention to this point as at once establishing our position, that Adam possessed the power of contrary choice, and proving the inconsistency of the Determinist doctrine with the teachings of Scripture and the consent of the Church.

Our statement would not be complete did we not add, that although the power of contrary choice in relation to spiritual things has been entirely lost, so that the unregenerate man is altogether destitute of it, it still remains in regard to things natural and civil, and, in a certain degree, to things merely moral. The power to stand or not to stand, to walk or not to walk, and the like; the power to yield or not to yield obedience to civil requirements; and the power, to some extent, to indulge or not to indulge cer-

**The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, p. 514.

tain immoral tendencies, to cultivate or not to cultivate certain merely moral habits: this power, in the natural and civil and merely moral sphere, cannot, we believe, be denied to men. Now this power, in the sphere designated, the Determinist denies to man. The sweep of his theory includes every possible case and relation of human agency. It excludes the possibility of the liberty of otherwise determining. It denominates it an absurdity and a contradiction. Intrinsically, it is an impossibility. When a man stands, he cannot do otherwise; when he walks, he must walk; when he yields obedience to civil government, he cannot decline to obey; when he swears, or drinks intemperately, he cannot, even in the early stages of the habit, refrain; when, like Socrates, he cultivates patience, or, like Scipio, continence, or, like Cato, probity, he acts necessarily, he could not do otherwise. He acts spontaneously in all these respects, but at the same time he acts necessarily—he could not otherwise determine. He has no power of contrary choice. The theory denies this power to man in every condition—to man as man; to man unfallen, fallen and unregenerate, regenerate, and glorified. We deny it to man as unregenerate, and with the further limitation—in relation to spiritual things. We also deny it to glorified saints, since they are determined by grace to holiness without any admixture of sin. In a word, the Determinist makes man as to his essence incapable of it as involving an impossibility; we represent it as a contingent power which may exist in some instances of human agency and not in others.

It is not our purpose to discuss these questions upon their merits, but, having stated our doctrine, to vindicate it against the allegation that it is out of harmony with the teachings of Calvin and of the Calvinistic standards. We design to show that the contrary is true, and that the position of the Determinist school, and not ours, is subject to the charge of being uncalvinistic. We do not concur with those who hold that the doctrines of Calvinism are not exclusive of the theory of philosophical necessity, as one of invariable and universal applicability to man; but shall endeavor to prove that both Calvin and the great Calvinistic symbols definitely take a side in this controversy, and that the

side, implicitly if not explicitly, opposed to Determinism. We have given the writings of Calvin a patient investigation in regard to this question, holding ourselves free to be impressed by the evidence we should encounter, whatever it might be, and we have risen from the search with the clear conviction that he held the views which we have expressed. We shall attempt, by quotations from his works, *usque ad nauseam*, to prove that he maintained the following positions: that the present necessity of sinning, which holds the will in utter bondage to spiritual evil, is grounded not in nature, not in man's original constitution as imperfect and defective, but in the corruption of nature flowing from the un-necessitated and avoidable decision of the will of Adam as the representative of the race in his first sin; that Adam possessed the liberty of contrary choice, or of otherwise determining, as to sin and holiness; that the present servitude of the will, if it could not thus be accounted for, could not be adjusted to our fundamental conceptions of the justice of God; that it is the penal result of a sin which man originally had the ability to avoid; and that men now possess the power of contrary choice in the sphere of things external and civil. If we can succeed in this endeavor, we shall have refuted the assertion that "the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards," and evinced the contrariety of his doctrines to that of Philosophical Necessity. We proceed to cite the words of Calvin:

"Many persons are surprised that Moses simply, and as if abruptly, relates that men have fallen by the impulse of Satan into eternal destruction, and yet never by a single word explains how the tempter himself had revolted from God. And hence it has arisen, that fanatical men have dreamed that Satan was created evil and wicked as he is here described. But the revolt of Satan is proved by other passages of Scripture; and it is an impious madness to ascribe to God the creation of any evil and corrupt nature; for when he had completed the world, he himself gave this testimony to all his works, that they were 'very good.' Wherefore, without controversy, we must conclude that the principle of evil with which Satan was endued was not from nature, but from defection; because he had departed from God, the fountain of justice and of all rectitude. But Moses here passes over Satan's fall, because his object is briefly to narrate the corruption of human nature; to teach us that Adam was not created to those multiplied miseries under which all his

posterity suffer; but that he fell into them by his own fault. In reflecting on the number and nature of those evils to which they are obnoxious, men will often be unable to restrain themselves from raging and murmuring against God, whom they rashly censure for the just punishment of their sin. These are their well known complaints, that God has acted more mercifully to swine and dogs than to them. Whence is this, but that they do not refer the miserable and ruined state, under which we languish, to the sin of Adam, as they ought? But what is far worse, they fling back upon God the charge of being the cause of all the inward vices of the mind, . . . as if the whole perverseness of our disposition had not been adventitious (*accidentalis*)."*

"I therefore readily subscribe to the exclamation of Augustine, 'O wretched free-will, which, while yet entire, had so little stability.'"†

"Fanatics torture this word *evil*, as if God were the author of evil, that is, of sin; but it is obvious how ridiculously they abuse this passage of the Prophet. . . We ought not to reject the ordinary distinction, that God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of guilt."‡

"But the only good ground which the Manichees have, viz., that it were impious to ascribe the creation of anything bad to a good God, militates in no degree against the orthodox faith, since it is not admitted that there is anything naturally bad throughout the universe; the depravity and wickedness, whether of man or of the devil, and the sins thence resulting, being not from nature, but from the corruption of nature; nor at first did anything whatever exist that did not exhibit some manifestation of the divine wisdom and justice."||

"At present, however, we confine ourselves to a consideration of our nature in its original integrity. And, certainly, before we descend to the miserable condition into which man has fallen, it is of importance to consider what he was at first. For there is need of caution, lest we attend only to the natural ills of man, and thereby seem to ascribe them to the Author of nature; impiety deeming it a sufficient defence if it can pretend that everything vicious in it proceeded in some sense from God, and not hesitating, when accused, to plead against God, and throw the blame of its guilt upon him. Those who would be thought to speak more reverently of the Deity catch at an excuse for their depravity from nature, not considering that they also, though more obscurely, bring a charge against God, on whom the dishonor would fall if anything vicious were proved to exist in nature. Seeing therefore that the flesh is continually on the alert for subterfuges, by which it imagines it can remove the blame of its own wickedness from itself to some other quarter, we must diligently guard against this depraved procedure, and accordingly treat of the

* *Com. on Genesis*, ch. III., Calv. Soc. Trans. † *Ibid.*, ch. III., v. 6.

‡ *Comm. on Isaiah*, ch. XLV. 7.

|| *Institutes*, B. I., c. XIV., §3.

calamity of the human race in such a way as may cut off every evasion, and vindicate the justice of God against all who would impugn it."*

"Paul never could have said that all are 'by nature the children of wrath,' if they had not been cursed from the womb. And it is obvious, that the nature there referred to is not nature such as God created, but as vitiated in Adam; for it would have been most incongruous to make God the author of death. Adam therefore, when he corrupted himself, transmitted the contagion to all his posterity."†

"The blame of our ruin rests with our own carnality, not with God, its only cause being our degeneracy from our original condition. And let no one here clamor that God might have provided better for our safety by preventing Adam's fall. This objection, which from the daring presumption implied in it is odious to every pious mind, relates to the mystery of predestination, which will afterwards be considered in its own place. Meanwhile let us remember that our ruin is attributable to our own depravity, that we may not insinuate a charge against God himself the author of nature. It is true that nature has received a mortal wound; but there is a great difference between a wound inflicted from without, and one inherent in our first condition. It is plain that this wound was inflicted by sin; and therefore we have no ground of complaint except against ourselves. This is carefully taught in Scripture. For the Preacher says, 'Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.' Since man by the kindness of God was made upright, but by his own infatuation fell away into vanity, his destruction is obviously attributable only to himself.

"We say then that man is corrupted by a natural viciousness, but not by one which proceeded from nature."‡

"If any one will dispute with God, and endeavor to evade his judgment, by pretending that he [the sinner] could not have done otherwise, the answer already given is sufficient, that it is owing not to creation, but the corruption of nature, that man has become the slave of sin, and can will nothing but evil. For whence that impotence of which the wicked so readily avail themselves as an excuse, but just because Adam voluntarily subjected himself to the tyranny of the devil? Hence the corruption, by which we are held bound as with chains, originated in the first man's revolt from his Maker."||

"But if the inquiry be as to the first man, he, when he was created in integrity, fell of his own accord: and thence it came to pass that by his own proper fault he brought destruction upon himself and his seed. Now although Adam fell and ruined himself and his posterity not without the knowledge, and so not without the ordination of God, nevertheless that by no means either lightens his fault, or implicates God in his crime.

* *Institutes*, B. I., c. XV., §1. † *Ibid.*, B. II., c. I., §6.

‡ *Ibid.*, B. II., c. I., §§10, 11. || *Ibid.*, B. II., c. V., §1.

For this is always to be considered, that of his own accord he stripped himself of the rectitude which he had received from God, of his own accord devoted himself to the bondage of sin and Satan, of his own accord rushed headlong to destruction. It is pleaded as an excuse for him, that his fall was decreed by God, and was therefore unavoidable by him. But voluntary transgression is sufficient and more than sufficient to ground guilt. Nor indeed is the secret purpose of God a proper and genuine cause of sin, but the free will of man. . . . When man discovers that the cause of his sin is within himself, what boots it for him to fetch a circuit and seek for it in heaven? The blame is obviously his own, inasmuch as he willed to sin. . . . The reason why God knowingly and willingly permitted man to fall by his own agency may be hidden from us, but it cannot have originated in injustice. This indeed must be held without controversy, that sin has always been hateful to him. . . . Although I say that he ordained it [the fall], I cannot concede that he was in a proper sense the author of it."*

"Pighius thus proceeds: 'If the apostasy of man is the work of God, the deliverance of Scripture is false, that all things which God made are good.' But I can righteously testify and frankly profess, that such a figment never entered into my mind. I everywhere assert that the nature of man was at first created in rectitude, so that the corruption, which he contracted for himself by his defection, could not be attributed to God; that the death, to which he, who had been competent to attain to life, had enslaved himself, was so induced by his own fault, that God cannot be regarded as its author. If I had ever said that it came to pass through the impulse of the Divine Spirit, that the first man alienated himself from God, and did not everywhere contend that he was impelled by the instigation of the devil and the proper motion of his own heart, I might perhaps deserve to be insulted by Pighius."†

"But what says Origen? [quoted by Pighius in his discussion of free will.] He pronounces those to be heretics who take away free will (*liberum arbitrium*) from man. If he speaks of the primeval condition of nature, he brings forward nothing which we ourselves cannot profess. If he makes no distinction between nature in its corruption and in its integrity, there is no pious man who will not affirm that he confounds the fundamental elements of the faith. . . . All the passages quoted by Pighius treat of man such as he was formed by the hand of God. As to the question, what he was after his fall and defection, they are altogether silent. . . . We, indeed, estimate man [in the discussion of the bondage of the will] not from the point of view of his creation

* *Consensus Genevensis*, Niemeyer's *Coll.*, pp. 267, 268. This is Calvin's *Tractatus de Æterna Dei Prædestinatione*.

† *Ibid.*, p. 268.

by God, but from that of the corruption which he contracted by his own proper fault."*

"When he would bring forward Tertullian, it is with the preliminary statement that his opinion concerning the freedom of the will is so clear that he who cannot see it must close his ears and eyes to the truth. But what is the sum of the testimony he adduces, except that man was created by God free (*liberum*) and having power over himself (*suæ potestatis*)? He is disputing against Marcion, whose opinion concerning the nature of man, as it is reproachful to God, so it is impious and profane. For he did not hold that man is evil by his own fault, but assigned the cause of his wickedness to God as the author of nature."†

"Nor indeed should Irenæus be heard, if, in opposition to the unanimous consent of the Church, he makes no distinction between nature corrupted and nature in its integrity: but if he only describes man as he was before the fall, it makes nothing against us, who refer the bondage of the will not to God, but to the fault of man."‡

"I come to Hilary: the first passage from whom describes the nature of man, without any mention of corruption. . . . But since, then, he had no other purpose than to deprive men of excuse, lest they throw back the blame of their sins upon God, it is no wonder if he recalls them to their first origin, where they may learn to accuse themselves and their own free will (*liberum arbitrium*) to which they owe it that they are evil."||

"He (Pighius) goes further: because Augustine would deny that any one sins in that which can by no means be avoided. He who examines the passage will see that he speaks concerning the beginning of sin, when indeed he will convince him that this necessity by which we are to-day oppressed had no other origin than the voluntary fall of the first man. . . . We place the origin of our depravity neither in creation, nor in the work of God, but in the fault of our first parent; because when he was created free (*liber*), he contracted his wretched condition of bondage by a voluntary defection."§

"He who can distinguish between the first condition of nature as created and the corruption which supervened in consequence of sin, will, with no great pains, free himself of all difficulty."¶

These passages—and we can produce others—superfluously show that Calvin habitually made a great distinction between the necessity of sinning in our present fallen and unregenerate condition and the free and unnecessitated sin of Adam. He denies that the two cases are susceptible of common predication. He

**De Servitute et Liberatione Humani Arbitrii*, Opp. fol. ed. Amstelodami, Vol. VIII., p. 133.

†*Ibid.*, p. 134. ‡*Ibid.*, p. 134. ||*Ibid.*, p. 134. §*Ibid.*, p. 158. ¶*Ibid.*, p. 169.

insists that it is vital to hold that the case of Adam was exceptional and peculiar. Now this is in the teeth of the Determinist theory, which is logically compelled to reduce the two cases to the same law. They both come under the law of the efficient control of the volitions by the dispositions of the soul, either con-created or congenital. Adam was as really under the moral necessity of sinning as his unregenerate descendants. Nature in either case determines to sin. But Calvin affirms again and again that the necessity of sinning flows from nature as corrupted by man's free action, and not from nature as created by the hand of God. If so, there was, before the act which originated the corruption, no necessity of sinning; indeed, as he says, the first sin was avoidable. This is so obvious that it need not be pressed. In this respect, therefore, we have followed precisely in the steps of the Reformer. Now let us compare with this clear doctrine of Calvin, that man's first sin did not necessarily originate from his natural make and constitution, the position of President Edwards, that without a hindering intervention on God's part, Adam's nature could not but certainly and infallibly lead to sin. We will give the great metaphysician's own statement of the case:

"Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions, although what is natural is undoubtedly necessary."*

"If by the author of sin is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow—I say, if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin. . . . And I do not deny that God's being thus the author of sin follows from what I have laid down." †

"Thus it is certain and demonstrable, from the Holy Scriptures as well as from the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that God permits sin, and at the same time, so orders things, in his providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission." ‡

"It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the world,

* *Inquiry*, etc., Pt. IV., §4. † *Ibid.*, Pt. IV., §9. ‡ *Ibid.*, Pt. IV., §9.

it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature as such, and should appear so to do, that it might not appear to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been if man had been made at first with sin in his heart, nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arose from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible that it did not arise from God, as the positive cause and real source of it."^{*}

Now let us look on this picture and then on that, and say whether they are the same. If so, contradictories may meet and kiss each other. Edwards says that sin resulted from the imperfect make of man's original nature; Calvin says that sin did not result from man's original nature. Edwards says that sin was rendered morally necessary by man's original nature; Calvin says that the moral necessity of sinning was not from man's original nature, but is now from his corrupt nature. So far the evidence does not sustain the proposition, that the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards himself, or that we have taught a new theology out of harmony with that of Calvin.

But it may be urged that Calvin and the Determinists agree that man at the first sinned spontaneously, and that they both hold that spontaneity is not inconsistent with necessity. To show, consequently, that Calvin maintained that Adam sinned voluntarily and spontaneously, is not to prove that he held that Adam did not sin by necessity. We proceed to adduce a class of passages which will effectually destroy this supposition, and show that the Reformer taught that Adam sinned by an election of his will which might have been otherwise; in other words, that Adam, besides spontaneity, had also the power of contrary choice, in relation to the opposite alternatives of sin and holiness. It will also be seen that the free will which Calvin ascribed to man in innocence, denied to fallen and unregenerate men as to spiritual things, and affirmed of men now as to natural things, is precisely that sort of free will which Edwards and the Determinist school pronounce impossible, contradictory, and absurd.

^{*}*Ibid.*, Pt. IV., §10.

"We must now examine the will, on which the question of freedom principally turns, the power of choice belonging to it, rather than to the intellect."*

"Thus the will (free will, if you choose to call it so,) which is left to man, is, as he in another place describes it, a will which can neither be turned to God, nor continue in God, unless by grace; a will which, whatever its ability may be, derives all that ability from grace."†

We have cited these passages to show that Calvin did not recognise the Determinist distinction between the freedom of the will and the freedom of the man, but in opposition to it, affirmed the residence of freedom in the will; and further, that as to the question under consideration, the ability of the man is exactly the ability of the will. In these respects, we have maintained the position of the Reformer in rejecting that of the Determinist. The free agency of the man is nothing different from the freedom of his will.

"It is proper to observe how these four things differ from each other: the will (*voluntas*) as free (*libera*), or bound (*serva*), or spontaneous (*spontanea*), or forced (*coacta*) . . . Freedom (*libertas*) and bondage (*servitus*) are irreconcilable, so that he who would affirm the one must deny the other. Hence, if the will of man is bound (*serva*), it cannot without impropriety be said to be free (*libera*). . . Where there is bondage (*servitus*) there is necessity. . . Now you perceive that spontaneous (*spontaneum*) and necessary (*necessarium*) can consist at one and the same time."‡

Here free will is palpably distinguished from spontaneity, and whereas spontaneity is affirmed to be consistent with necessity and necessity with bondage, and therefore spontaneity and bondage may consist; freedom (*libertas*) is declared to be inconsistent with bondage, and, therefore, with necessity. If, then, Calvin predicates free will of man in innocence, and of natural fallen man as to natural things, he does not mean the liberty of spontaneity which consists with necessity, but the liberty of deliberate election between contrary alternatives which is inconsistent with necessity. He clearly affirms that unregenerate men act spontaneously, when they sin necessarily. He as clearly denies that they have freedom of the will as to spiritual things. Spontaneity

**Institutes*, B. II., c. II., §26. †*Ibid.*, B. II., c. III., §14.

‡*De Servit. et Liberat. Hum. Arbit.*, ut sup., p. 133.

and free will are, therefore, by him contradistinguished from each other. Now the only kind of freedom which the Determinists allow to man, under any circumstances, is spontaneity. If, then, Calvin concedes a sort of freedom, which is not spontaneity, to man under certain circumstances, he holds a view diametrically opposed to the fundamental tenet of Determinism. Let us interrogate him on the point.

"The holy man [Irenæus] loudly protests, that man was not evil by nature, that is, by the creative act of God, but was made in the possession of free will (*liberi arbitrii*), and received a soul capable of good and evil. Since it is evident that he treats of the first estate of man while he was yet in his integrity, how does that make against us, who place the bondage of the will only in the corruption and depravation of nature? In a certain place Irenæus says among other things: Corn and chaff received their nature from their make; but man was made reasonable and in this respect like God, since free in his will (*liber in arbitrio*) and master of himself (*sux potestatis*) he himself was a cause to himself (*ipsum sibi causam esse*), so that at one time he might become corn, but at another chaff. Wherefore, says he, he is the subject of just condemnation. We [Calvin] affirm that this happened to us all, through the fall of our first parent, and hold that in this the whole Church agrees."*

"He [Pighius] quotes two passages from Basil, the former of which contains nothing else than a description of human nature, such as it was created by God, in order that men may be prevented from transferring the blame of their evils to God. At first, therefore, he denies that sin was innate (*innatum*, that is, concreated,) in the substance of man, but happened (*accidisse*) to him by his own fault; which we [Calvin] not only confess, but diligently maintain. Afterwards, he says that virtue is voluntary and not from necessity; but that free will (*liberum arbitrium*) belongs to us. Here Pighius shouts, as if the victory were won. But I [Calvin] deny that these words are to be understood of our present condition, but only show how man was made at his first origin. In express terms he explains what man was at his creation: he does not mention the corruption which ensued upon the fall; but when he wishes to assign the cause of wickedness, he thus speaks: 'Whence is man evil? From his own proper will. Whence the devil evil? From the same cause. For he likewise had a free life in himself, and a free will (*liberum arbitrium*) situated in him either of remaining with God, or of being estranged from him.' . . . But that I may keep silence, it is sufficiently clear that the nature of the soul is considered in its integrity, as ought to be done when definitions are furnished."†

**Ibid.*, p. 134. †*Ibid.*, p. 135.

"I deny that all those deliver a clear and established doctrine concerning free will (*de libero arbitrio*), who do not at the same time add what has perished of this liberty (*libertate*) through Adam's fall, and what believers may recover through regenerating grace."*

"They [Irenæus and Tertullian] therefore teach that man was created free (*liberum*): we [Calvin] do not deny that; but we affirm that he fell into slavery, because he degenerated from his first estate."†

"Pighius lays down the proposition, that man was made in the possession of free will (*liberi arbitrii*). We [Calvin] assent (*annuimus*); nor have we waited until he should demand this assent, but have always avowed it."‡

"Pighius subjoins a definition of sin there laid down [in a passage cited from Augustine]: 'That there is a will (*voluntas*) to retain or pursue what justice forbids, and thence it is a matter of choice to abstain (*liberum est abstinere*); although if there be no freedom (*si liberum non est*) neither is there will (*voluntas*)' . . . According to the testimony of the author himself, who certainly had the right to interpret what he said, this definition is not adapted to any other than the first sin of Adam; because, through his fall at first from the Lord we have been plunged into a miserable bondage. Hence infer with what face Pighius, with tragic outcries, taunts me with this passage. But Augustine says that 'the thing is familiar to all, that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who fails to do that which he could not do.' . . . At the same time he testifies that he is a perverse interpreter of his words who would apply this to all sins; that he indeed was not able to determine otherwise than that man could not be justly condemned, except he had sinned with a free will (*libera voluntate*); but that now a part of the condemnation is that bondage under which we are held captive in mind and will, until we are liberated by the gratuitous kindness of Christ."||

"We see here that a profane philosopher [Aristotle] confesses, 'that it is not always in the power of man to be good; yea, that he can be nothing but evil; and yet that what he is, he is through the will (*voluntate*) and not by violence: because in the first instance a free election (*libera electio*) was in his own power (*penes ipsum*), by which he delivered himself to the service and bondage of lust.' And indeed this is the proper philosophy of Christians, that our first parent at the same time corrupted not only himself but all his posterity, and that thence we derive the *habitus* which is rooted in our nature."‡

"Augustine says: 'The first man had not that grace which prevented him from willing to be evil, but he had grace, which, if he had willed to abide in it, would have prevented him, and without which even with free will (*libero arbitrio*) he could not have been good; but nevertheless through

**Ibid.*, p. 135.†*Ibid.*, p. 137.‡*Ibid.*, p. 139.||*Ibid.*, p. 140.§*Ibid.*, p. 153.

free will it was in his power to abandon it. . . Nor was the power of free will a small one, since he was so assisted, that without that aid, he would not abide in the good; but that assistance he might relinquish, if he so willed. . . Why then is Pighius angry with me, if I avail myself of the patronage of Augustine, which he so liberally offers me?"*

"We assert that the human race, having lost the liberty (*libertate*) which it had received at creation, fell into miserable bondage. In this condition of bondage, we deny that man is endued with the free (*libera*) power of choosing as well good as evil, so that he can apply himself to whichever alternative he pleases (*ad utrumlibet.*)"†

"He [Augustine, whom Calvin quotes with approbation] says: 'Free will (*voluntas libera*) with which he was created, was given to the first man without any sin, and he reduced it into bondage to sin; but our will when it was the slave of sin, was liberated by him who said: If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.'"‡

"Finally, I not less calmly than cheerfully acquiesce in this opinion of Augustine: 'That God, who created all things good, and knew that it more pertained to his almighty goodness to bring good even out of evils, than not to permit evils to exist, so ordered the life of angels and men that he might show in it, first, what their free will (*liberum arbitrium*) could do, then, what the kindness of his grace and the sentence of his justice could do.'"||

"Adam, therefore, might have stood if he choose, since it was only by his own will that he fell; but it was because his will was pliable in either direction (*in utramque partem flexibilis*), and he had not received constancy to persevere, that he so easily fell. Still he had a free choice (*libera electio*) of good and evil; and not only so, but in the mind and will there was the highest rectitude, and all the organic parts were duly framed to obedience, until man corrupted his good properties and destroyed himself. Hence the great darkness of philosophers who have looked for a complete building in a ruin, and fit arrangement in disorder. The principle they set out with was, that man could not be a rational animal unless he had a free choice (*libera electio*) of good and evil. They also imagined that the distinction between virtue and vice was destroyed, if man did not of his own counsel arrange his life. So far well, had there been no change in man. . . At present it is necessary only to remember that man at his first creation was very different (*longe alium*) from all his posterity. . . At first there was soundness of mind and freedom of will (*voluntas libera*) to choose (*ad eligendum*) the good.'"‡

"We grant that, as man was originally constituted, he could incline to either side (*potuerit ad alterutram partem inclinare*), but since he has

**Ibid.*, pp. 159, 160. †*Ibid.*, p. 161. ‡*Ibid.*, p. 176.

||*Consensus Gener.*, Niemeyer, p. 269. §*Institutes*, B. I., c. XV., §8.

taught us by his example how miserable a thing free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is, if God works not in us to will and to do, of what use to us were grace imparted in such scanty measure?"*

These passages clearly prove that Calvin affirmed for man in innocence the power of contrary choice—the liberty of inclining to either of opposing alternatives. He plainly—in *terminis*—declares that, although Adam freely elected to sin, he might have done otherwise—he might have elected to stand. If this be Determinism, white is black, or we are dazed. And if we are out of harmony with Calvin in holding that Adam had the power of contrary choice, we have not been able to follow a guide in a broad road at noon-day. The truth is, we derived our doctrine from him, in great measure, and have faithfully stuck to him until this hour. But, copious as our citations have been, we have not finished. We would sooner part with most things than our good Calvinistic name, and must exhaust the means we have of protecting it. We propose to show, by further testimony, that to the only freedom of will which Determinists allow, Calvin was unwilling to concede the title; that he threw contempt upon the liberty of spontaneity, and sharply distinguished it from freedom of will; that, besides spontaneity which in Adam was not fixed, there was that freedom of will which involves the power of otherwise determining; and that it was not spontaneity, but that freedom of will which is distinguished from it, which was lost by the Fall. If these positions can be made good, it will be seen that it is the Determinists, and not we, who are out of harmony with “the great theologian of the Reformation.”

Let us again hear Calvin :

“In this way, then, man is said to have free will (*liberi arbitrii*), not because he has a free choice (*liberam electionem*) of good and evil, but because he voluntarily does wrong, and not by compulsion. This is true: but why should so small a matter have been dignified with so proud a title? An admirable freedom (*egregia vero libertas*)! that man is not forced to be the servant of sin, while he is, however, a voluntary slave; his will being bound by the fetters of sin.”†

“Let us observe that the power of free will (*liberi arbitrii*) is not to be considered in any of those desires which proceed more from instinct

**Ibid.*, B. II., c. III., §10.

†*Ibid.*, B. II., c. II., §7.

(*essentia inclinatione*—determination of essence) than mental deliberation (*mentis deliberatione*).”*

“Thus such a free will (*tale liberum arbitrium*)—if you choose to call it so—is left to man, etc.”†

“The second step in the reasoning is vicious, because it leaps from voluntary (*voluntario*) to free (*liberum*); whereas we have proved above that a thing may be done voluntarily, though not subject to free choice.”‡

“What does Augustine here teach? That the will of man is indeed free (*liberam*), but only to evil. But this epithet [says Calvin] is not properly attached to it, since it is the slave (*serva*) of iniquity.”||

“They collect that sin can be avoided, if it is voluntary; and I deny the validity of the argument, because the inference is made from voluntary (*voluntario*) to free (*liberum*).”§

“I would call it free (*liberum*), if the term could be accepted among us as synonymous with spontaneous (*spontaneo*).”¶

“Let us define necessity. Pighius will not concede to me that it is a fixed and established stability, where a thing cannot be otherwise than it is. . . . Since he [God] continues stable, he is in some sense a necessity to himself—is not forced from without; nor does he even force himself, but spontaneously and voluntarily inclines to that which he does by necessity.”**

This last passage, especially, brings out the ordinary doctrine of Calvin, that spontaneous voluntary action may consist with necessity. He never opposes spontaneity to moral necessity. He only opposes it to co-action or compulsion—a force acting against the will. He explicitly distinguishes freedom of will (*libertas voluntatis*) from this spontaneity (*spontaneitas*.) He is unwilling to grant that the latter is any freedom of the will, in a proper sense. The specific difference between them, which he designates, is that spontaneity may consist with necessity, while freedom of the will cannot. Now as he constantly attributed freedom of will (*libertas voluntatis*), in his definite sense of it, to Adam, he affirmed for him, while in innocence, that exemption from necessity which is its differentiating property. He was free (*liber*) in the sense that he could choose either holiness or sin. He had the power of deliberate election between conflicting alternatives, not merely spontaneous dispositions. In a word, he had, according to Calvin, the power of contrary choice.

* *Ibid.*, B. II., c. II., §26. † *Ibid.*, B. II., c. III., §14.

‡ *Ibid.*, B. II., c. V., §1. || *De Servit. et Liberat. Hum. Arbit.*, p. 149.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 152. ¶ *Ibid.*, p. 152. ** *Ibid.*, p. 152.

On the other hand, the Determinist denies to Adam the power of contrary choice (Calvin's *libertas voluntatis*). The only form of action which he concedes to him is that of spontaneity—of doing as he pleased; and he maintains that it was of necessity that he pleased to sin. This, we urge, rejects the difference as to freedom of will between Adam and his natural fallen descendants, which is asserted not only by Calvin, but by the unbroken *consensus* of the Church. For if unregenerate men have the sort of liberty which Adam had, they are not different, but alike. No freedom of the will was lost, for there is none other, according to the Determinist, but that of spontaneity, and that is now possessed—a liberty inconsistent only with coercion, but not with necessity. What then, we ask, *was* lost?

If the answer to this demand be returned, that the spontaneous love of holiness was lost, and nothing remains but the spontaneous love of sin—the only answer possible, so far as we can conceive—we rejoin:

1. According to the Determinist, spontaneity and necessity always coexist. He who acts spontaneously acts necessarily. But if Adam, according to the supposed concession, had the spontaneous love of holiness, he was under the necessity of choosing holiness; otherwise his spontaneity, as motive, would not have controlled his volition. But he did not—he chose sin. He was then both necessarily and contingently related to holiness; which is a contradiction.

2. If he chose to sin—and he did—then, as his sin, according to the Determinist, was a necessity, since he could not have done otherwise, he was actuated by two necessary influences of contradictory character—the spontaneity leading to holiness and the spontaneity leading to sin. He was, therefore, necessarily determined to holiness and necessarily determined to sin: which is a contradiction.

3. If, to meet the difficulty, it be said, that Adam, like the regenerate man, had a twofold spontaneity—one leading to holiness and the other to sin, we reply: (1.) That the contradiction already emphasized emerges, namely, that as, according to the Determinist, spontaneity and necessity imply each other, Adam

would have been necessarily determined to holiness and sin at the same time. (2.) That such a dual spontaneity must either have been concreated with Adam or not. If it was concreated with him, it is admitted that God was the efficient producer of a spontaneity necessarily issuing in sin: which is monstrous. If it was not concreated with Adam, it was the product of his own agency, and then two difficulties emerge: *first*, that the will would have produced a spontaneity, which is contradictory to the position of the Determinist; for he makes motives efficiently control the acts of the will. Now he contends that the motives spring from the spontaneity of the soul. Consequently, the spontaneity efficiently controls the acts of the will. But according to the supposition in hand, the sinful spontaneity of Adam, as not concreated with him, must have been produced by an act of his will. What, then, efficiently controlled this act of the will? Nothing. The supposed act is, therefore, itself nothing, since it is an effect without a cause. And so the supposition is destroyed by the logic of Determinism. And yet, as we have before shown, this is the way in which President Edwards accounts for the introduction of the first sinful principle into a nature previously holy; that is, a way which absolutely contradicts his fundamental law, that the will cannot determine the principles of the soul, but is determined by them, and derives from them all the significance of its acts! This is, to us, something truly wonderful. It shows to what expedients a great intellect was reduced in the impracticable attempt to adjust the philosophy of Determinism to the critical, regulative, far-reaching case of the first human sin—the *peccatum originale originans*. It could not have been produced except by a preceding principle of sin; it preceded and produced that principle! It is caused by a sinful principle; it causes the same sinful principle! It is cause and effect at the same time. *Secondly*, if a twofold spontaneity—holy and sinful, was not concreated with Adam, it follows that a holy spontaneity which *was* concreated with him necessarily led to the production of a sinful spontaneity, which is an absurdity of absurdities, upon the Determinist scheme itself; or that the sinful spontaneity was produced by an arbitrary act of the will, which is equally absurd,

upon that scheme. *Thirdly*, the supposition of a dual spontaneity would suppose a schism in the moral nature of Adam, a fissure in his soul between two conflicting and irreconcilable principles, and that is an hypothesis which finds no countenance either in the teachings of Calvin or the *consensus* of the Church. It is the spawn of Manichæism. *Fourthly*, the hypothesis of a twofold spontaneity would be tantamount to that of contrary choice, which is rejected by the Determinist; for a holy spontaneity would incline the will in one direction, and a sinful in the opposite. The only difficulty would be that, on the principles of the Determinist, one set of motives would effectually neutralise the other, and the will would stand stock-still, like the ass between two bundles of hay. *Fifthly*, if the supposition of a dual spontaneity, holy and sinful, be discarded, a return must be made to a single one; and as the pious Determinist himself does not hold that a sinful one was created by God, the history of man must have begun with a holy spontaneity. Now, however feeble it may at first have been, as it exclusively occupied the territory of the soul, it must, upon the principles of Determinism, have controlled the will; and it seems impossible to show how, upon those principles, it could have been lost.

These considerations appear to us to prove conclusively that the attempt to bring the doctrine of the Determinist into harmony with that of Calvin, in regard to the sort of freedom which was lost by the Fall, breaks down; namely, by the supposition that both teach the loss simply of spontaneous holiness. For, in the first place, as we have shown, this supposition is, upon his own principles, incompetent to the Determinist. In the second place, he denies the existence of such a thing as freedom of the will, as internal to man—as a part of his subjectivity; whereas Calvin affirms it, and designates that as the freedom which was lost by the Fall. In the third place, Calvin maintained, what the Determinist cannot consistently do, the loss of a holy spontaneity by the Fall; and accounts for it on the ground of the possession by a mutable will of the power of election, by which it might determine to abide in holiness, or fall away into sin: a power of contrary choice which the Determinist utterly denies, and which,

in relation to the contrasts of sin and holiness, is precisely that freedom of the will (*liberum arbitrium*) which was lost by the Fall, and the loss of which has reduced man to the moral necessity of choosing only one alternative—the fatal one of sin. So far from having been as rigorous a Determinist as Jonathan Edwards, in regard to man in innocence, Calvin taught that in that estate he possessed a freedom of will other than that of spontaneity, and inconsistent with necessity; that is, the liberty of contrary choice, which the Determinist wholly denies. And in affirming that power in Adam, we, therefore, have trod in his footsteps. We have not, in this respect, maintained a theory which, as has been alleged, “is perfectly irreconcilable with his views.”

We pass on now to show by quotations from his works, that Calvin held the view for which we have contended, and for which we have been criticised, that the present disabled condition of man, in which his will is in complete bondage to sin, is to be accounted for on the ground of its being *penal* and not original.

“Thus they (philosophers) always presuppose in man a reason by which he is able to guide himself aright. From this method of teaching we are forced somewhat to dissent. For philosophers being unacquainted with the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of revolt (*defectionis pœna*), erroneously confound two states of man, which are very different from each other.”*

“For, when it is said that the sin of Adam has made us obnoxious to the justice (rather judgment; Latin: *judicio*, French: *jugement*) of God, the meaning is not that we who are in ourselves innocent and blameless are bearing his guilt, but that since by his transgression we are all placed under the curse (*maledictione*), he is said to have brought us under obligation.”†

“For since he [Augustine] had said, ‘that no ground of blameworthiness (*culpæ rationem*) could be discovered, where nature or necessity governs (*ubi natura dominatur aut necessitas*),’ he cautions us that this does not hold except in regard to a nature sound and in its integrity (*sanæ et integræ*); that men are not subject to necessity (*necessitati non subjacere homines*), but as the first man contracted it for them by his voluntary fault. ‘To us,’ says he, ‘nature is made a punishment (*facta est pœna*); and what was the just punishment of the first man is nature to us. Since therefore necessity is the punishment of sin, the sins which thence arise

**Institutes*, B. I., c. XV., §§6, 7. †*Ibid.*, B. II., c. I., §8.

are justly censured, and the blame of them is deservedly imputed to men; because the origin is voluntary (*voluntarium est principium*).’ Now then what cause has Pighius for scorning and deriding the solution furnished by me [Calvin]?’*

“Another question is, since God is the author of nature, how comes it that no blame attaches to God, if we are lost by nature? I answer, there is a twofold nature: the one produced by God, and the other is the corruption of it. This condemnation (*damnatio*) therefore which Paul mentions does not proceed from God, but from a depraved nature; for we are not born such as Adam was at first created, we are not ‘wholly a right seed, but are turned into the degenerate’ offspring of a degenerate and sinful man.”†

These testimonies might be multiplied, but our space is shortening, and those here adduced, though few, are sufficiently clear to prove that Calvin taught what we have inculcated—that the necessity of sin under which we now groan is not the result of our first natural constitution, but is a penal infliction upon us for having, by an unnecessitated decision of the will in Adam, dissolved the bond of life between us and God, and subjected ourselves to his curse. The remarkable passage which we have cited from his great treatise on the Bondage and Liberation of the Human Will, in which Calvin subscribes to Augustine’s opinion, is of itself sufficient to convince any candid mind that the Reformer was not a Determinist, and that we have faithfully stated his doctrine.

In proof of the generally admitted fact, that Calvin, like Luther and Melancthon,‡ held that man has free will—not merely spontaneity, but the liberty of contrary choice—in relation to things external, civil, and merely moral, we must content ourselves with producing a single but explicit utterance: “He (Pighius) says, that we had recanted half of our doctrine, because we attributed to man free will (*liberum arbitrium*) in things external and in civil business (*in rebus externis et civilibus negotiis*).”||

Here the distinction is drawn between things natural and things spiritual. What he absolutely denies in regard to the

**De Servit. et Liberat. Hum. Arbit.*, p. 151.

†*Comm. on Ephesians*, II. 3.

‡*Augsburg Conf.*, Art. XVIII., *Corp. et Syntag. Confessionum*.

||*De Servit. et Liberat. Hum. Arbitrii*, p. 123.

latter, he allows in respect to the former, namely, the power of otherwise determining or of electing between opposite alternatives. We have adduced abundant evidence from his writings to show that Calvin by free will (*liberum arbitrium*, or *libertas voluntatis*) did not mean spontaneity. He admits a spontaneous power of the will in the unregenerate, and denies to them freedom of will in the proper sense. In asserting, therefore, the existence in unregenerate men of freedom of will *quoad naturalia*, he must have designated a different freedom from that which he allows to them, and the same with that which he refuses to them, *quoad spiritualia*. What could that be but the liberty of election between contrary courses?

The point to which we here invoke attention is, that as Calvin affirmed for man the liberty of contrary choice in relation to *some* things, viz., things external and civil, he maintained a doctrine which is diametrically opposed to the position of the Determinist, that the liberty of contrary choice is impossible to men in relation to *any* things; and further, that as he asserted the existence of that power in man *now*, he did not consider it as a peculiar property of Adam. And so there is no support in his doctrine for the view, that Adam's case was so entirely removed from the field of our consciousness and observation that we are debarred from considering it as in relation to the question of the will. But here is a case which falls under the scope of present consciousness and observation; and we submit that the judgment of Calvin, as well as of the Reformers in general, was that this case exhibits the possession by man, under limitations, of the power of contrary choice. The truth is, that it is this power in the natural sphere which conditions, in great measure, the possibility of merely moral culture, and the penal inflictions of human government. The evidence from this particular quarter, then, fails to sustain the allegation that Calvin was a Determinist, and that we have taught doctrine inconsistent with his views.

The only consideration which seems to mar the completeness of the evidence which has been adduced as to Calvin's doctrine of the will, is that he lends an apparent countenance to the Determinist tenet, that the volitions are efficiently controlled, in the

last analysis, by the dictates of the understanding—the same substantially with the *lubentia rationalis* view of Turretin and others. In regard to this, we would observe:

1. That if Calvin did maintain that view, it was inconsistent with the great volume of his teaching in reference to the will. It would be a special hypothesis which could not be adjusted to the catholic genius of his views. We should therefore feel warranted in rejecting the special tenet, and accepting the bulk of his teachings, as representative of his true position.

2. That we have not discovered the terms, *lubentia rationalis*, nor any reference to the doctrine signified by them, in his treatise on Predestination, or in his discussion of the Bondage of the Will. If in the Institutes he alluded to the thing, although he did not use the name, it was done exceptionally and very slightly. But,—

3. We are decidedly of the opinion, after carefully looking into the matter, that Calvin, in the passage in the Institutes* in which he mentions the regulative influence of the intellect upon the will, did not have his eye upon the question of the psychological relation between the two faculties—the only one peculiarly considered by the Determinists—but spoke of the moral relation between them. The question before his mind was not, Is the will, in its acts, efficiently controlled by the representations of the intelligence? But it was, *Ought* the will, in its acts, to be governed by the judgments of the intellect? The case, we are satisfied, which Calvin was enforcing was this: the intellect gives the law of truth, as the conscience furnishes the law of duty. And as the will is under obligation to conform to the standard of morality erected in the moral nature, it is also bound to adjust itself to the standard of truth in the intellectual. This was the relation between the faculties instituted at creation, and so long as man stood in innocence, the will freely obeyed the law of truth in the intelligence and the law of duty in the conscience. And so ought it to be now, although it is vastly different. But if the psychological question had been propounded to Calvin, Is every act of the will, in fact, necessarily controlled by a dictate of the

* B. I., C. XV., §§. 7, 8.

understanding? he must, to have been logically consistent with himself, have returned the answer, that the first sin of man disproved such an hypothesis; for the first volition to sin could not have been efficiently caused by a holy judgment, and all the judgments of the intellect were, in man's primitive condition, conformed to the law of truth.

We close our citations from Calvin's works, in reference to the particular point before us, with a passage which is simply extraordinary, in view of the attempt to quadrate his doctrine of the will with that of Philosophical Necessity as held by President Edwards. It exhibits a radical difference, touching the very nature of the inquiry as to the freedom of the will, between these illustrious men. Let us hear from Edwards his statement of the case:

"The plain and obvious meaning of the word *freedom* and *liberty*, in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise. . . . To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense, if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper sense of words. . . . There are two things that are contrary to this which is called liberty in common speech. One is constraint: the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coercion, which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint, which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. . . . Let a person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom."*

Here with the formality of definition Edwards limits freedom to the unforced and unimpeded execution, in the external sphere, of our internal resolutions—the unhindered outward expression of our inward spontaneity. Now let Calvin state his view of the case:

"The power of the human will is not to be estimated by the event, as some unskilful persons are absurdly wont to do. They think it an ele-

**Inquiry*, etc., Pt. I., Sec. V.

gant and ingenious proof of the bondage of the human will, that even the greatest monarchs are sometimes thwarted in their wishes. But the ability of which we speak must be considered as within the man, not measured by outward success. In discussing the subject of free will, the question is not, whether external obstacles will permit a man to execute what he has internally resolved, but whether in any matter whatever he has a free power of judging and of willing. If men possess both of these, Attilius Regulus, shut up in a barrel studded with sharp nails, will have a will no less free than Augustus Cæsar ruling with imperial sway over a large portion of the globe.*

Is it not manifest that the identification of Calvin's doctrine of the will with the Determinism of Edwards cannot be effected? These two definitive statements of the very question at issue are as contradictory as are the members of the proposition: A is not Not-A. Either freedom is outward or inward. A middle supposition is excluded. We must make our election between the two contradictories. We go with Calvin; and we have gone with him all along.

We have admitted, in this discussion, that the only form of liberty allowed by Determinists is spontaneity. We speak here of the current doctrine of Calvinistic writers who in the main avow Determinist principles, who accept the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity with certain modifications of their own. Among these modifications is the view that he who has spontaneity has liberty. They do not disjoin free action and spontaneous action. On the contrary, they identify them. But such was not the unmodified position of the modern Coryphæus of that school. Edwards did not consider spontaneity, unimpeded subjective action, as freedom. He limited freedom to the external sphere, the unforced or unhindered carrying into outward action of necessary volitions. This is the only liberty he assigns to man. If that was Calvin's doctrine, outward and inward are the same. Our brother who alleges that Calvin was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards, and that our views cannot be reconciled with those of the Reformer, says: "The definition of freedom is ever before us in the plain proposition, that the person in question may act as he pleases." That is exactly the position of Edwards, but it is also

**Institutes*, B. II., c. IV., §8.

exactly the opposite of Calvin's. We are content to leave it to the judgment of the candid reader to determine whether Calvin and Edwards can be reconciled, and whether in differing from the latter we have not maintained the ground of the former.

The second branch of the allegation we are considering is, that in affirming the liberty of contrary choice, or of otherwise determining, for man in innocence, we have made an attempt to rehabilitate the Arminian theory of the will, and have inculcated a new theology which is in conflict with the articles of our faith as set forth in our standards. We regret that the room left us will allow only a brief answer to this allegation. We think that we are entitled, without discourtesy, to say, that, as in our articles on this subject we endeavored to fortify our position by citations from some of the most prominent symbols of the post-Reformation Church, the allegation now under consideration ought to have been accompanied by a disproof of the relevancy of the testimony we adduced. As that was not done, we call attention to the clear utterances in support of our views by the formularies of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches which are recited in those articles. We proceed to interrogate the standards which are distinctively Calvinistic in reference to the points in which it is charged that we depart from them. Those, the testimony of which we shall bring forward, are, the Gallic, the Scotch, and the Second Helvetic Confessions, the Canons of the Synod of Dort, the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, and the Westminster Confession. They will be admitted to be Calvinistic formularies.

Gallic Confession: "We believe that man, created in purity and integrity, and conformed to the image of God, fell away from the grace which he had received by his own fault (*sua ipsius culpa*). . . Likewise although he be endued with a will which is moved to this or that (*ad hoc vel illud*), nevertheless, since it is entirely captive under sin, he has absolutely no liberty to seek good, except as he may receive it from grace and by the gift of God."*

Here we notice: 1. That it is affirmed that man who had no imperfection in his natural make which could lead to sin, fell by his own fault. He could not, therefore, have sinned by a neces-

*Niemeyer, *Coll.*, p. 332.

sity of nature, as the Determinist maintains, and a necessity operating through a natural imperfection, as Edwards contends. He was by his natural furniture qualified to stand, and the inference is, that he might have stood if he had so willed: an inference which the Determinist utterly denies. 2. This passage intimates that a will which may incline in different directions, which was originally possessed by man, is yet possessed by him, but only as to things which are not good, in the sense of spiritual and saving. This cannot be reconciled to the Determinist view.

Scotch Confession; "We confess and acknowledge that this our Lord God created man, that is to say, our first parent Adam, in his image and likeness; to whom he gave wisdom, dominion, righteousness, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) and a clear knowledge of himself: so that in the whole nature of man no imperfection could be marked."

"We confess that the cause of good works is not our free will (*liberum arbitrium*), but the Spirit of our Lord Jesus."*

Here we see that the free will which man received from God at creation he lost by the fall, in relation to good works. This is opposed to the Determinist position, which, first, denies that man can possess, under any circumstances, a free will (*liberum arbitrium*), for it pronounces freedom of the will an absurdity; and, secondly, denies that man ever lost that which he could never have possessed.

Second Helvetic Confession: "We teach upon this subject, which has always produced many conflicts in the Church, that the condition or state of man must be considered in a threefold manner: In the first place, what (*qualis*—what sort of being) man was before the fall, without doubt upright and free (*liber*), who both had power to remain in the good, and decline to the evil (*qui et in bono manere et ad malum potuerit declinare*); but he declined to the evil, and involved in sin and death both himself and the whole race of mortals, as has before been said. In the next place, it is to be considered what man was after the fall. His intellect was not taken away from man, his will was not torn away from him, nor was he entirely changed into a stone or stock, but they were so altered and impaired in man, that they cannot any more do what they were able to do before the fall. The intellect indeed is obscured, but the will (*voluntas*) from having been free (*ex libera*) is made the servant of sin. For it serves sin not unwillingly, but willingly (*non nolens, sed volens*); for, indeed, it is said to be will (*voluntas*, willingness)

**Ibid.*, pp. 341, 346.

not unwillingness (*non noluntas*, not not-will). Therefore in regard to evil or sin, man was not forced (*coactus*) either by God or by the devil, but did evil of his own accord (*sua sponte*); and in this respect it is the product of a will most free (*in hac parte liberrimè est arbitrii*)."*

The third aspect of the subject relates to the regenerated condition of man, with which the present question is not directly concerned. This testimony is clear in reference to the possession by man in innocence of the power of contrary choice, of otherwise determining. He could have stood in the good, says this venerable standard; he could not have so stood, says the Determinist; for he did sin spontaneously, and his spontaneous action was necessary. We have adhered to the doctrine of this grand old formulary, which is not only thoroughly Calvinistic, but thoroughly Presbyterian.

We come now to the Canons of the Synod of Dort:

"Man in the beginning was created after the image of God with a true and salutary knowledge of his Creator and of spiritual things in his mind, and was adorned with righteousness in his will and heart (*voluntate et corde*) and with purity in all his affections, and so was holy in all his faculties (*totus sanctus*); but by the instigation of the devil and his own free will (*libera sua voluntate*) he severed himself from God, and stripped himself of those excellent gifts."

In the Rejection of Errors, appended to the chapter from which the preceding extract is taken, the venerable Synod, among other errors, "rejects that of those"

"Who teach: 'That spiritual gifts, or good habitudes, and virtues, such as goodness, holiness, righteousness, could not have had a place in the will of man when he was first created, and hence were not separated from it at the fall.' For this conflicts with the description of the image of God which the Apostle furnishes. Eph. iv. 24, where he represents it as consisting of righteousness and holiness, which certainly have a place in the will."†

Here this great Synod of Calvinistic divines affirm that man, at creation, had an ample furniture of gifts to enable him to meet the requirements of his probation. He was lacking in no part: he was *totus sanctus*. It is true that he was defective in the sense that he was not confirmed in holiness by the determining grace

**Ibid.*, p. 479. †*Ibid.*, pp. 708, 703.

of God, as we have before indicated; there was an intrinsic mutability in his will, as we shall see that the Westminster Confession specifies; but he had a sufficient supply of gifts and strength from grace to enable him to resist the tendency to evil which might arise out of this mutability of will and to overcome it. The difference between this view and that of the Determinist is, that in the one case no necessity of sinning is affirmed as springing from this defect, but, on the contrary, it is maintained that the mutable will might have chosen to stand in holiness; while in the other it is contended that, without the determining intervention of grace, the imperfection of man's constitution led of necessity, led unavoidably, "certainly, infallibly," to sin. It ought, moreover, to be noticed that the Synod makes the will itself a seat of spiritual gifts and a holy *habitus*, and clearly implies that, when spiritual life was lost by the fall, sinful dispositions inhered in the will. This is contrary to the regulative view of Determinism, that the will is the mere servitor and instrument of the other faculties, the dispositions of which lie back of it and efficiently control its acts. And if it be said that the will, in the nomenclature of the Synod, included the emotions, the answer is obvious: 1. That if that be so, the emotions are not represented as being, exclusively of the will, the subject of regulative dispositions; 2. That the language of the Synod explicitly distinguishes the heart (*cor*) from the will (*voluntas*), and consequently it could not have employed the term "will" generically, as synonymous with "active powers."

We cite next the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*:

"As 'known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world,' so in time, of his infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, he created man, the glory and crown of his works, after his image, and consequently upright, wise, and just; subjected him, when created, to a covenant of works, and freely promised him his fellowship, friendship, and life in it, if he should conduct himself obediently to his will. Moreover, that promise annexed to the covenant of works was not merely the continuation of earthly life and happiness, but chiefly the possession of life eternal and heavenly, that is, in heaven, if he should run a course of perfect obedience, a life to be passed, with unutterable joy, in communion with God, as well in the body as in the soul. . . None of us assent to the

opinion of those who deny that the reward of celestial blessedness was proposed to Adam in the event of his obeying God."*

We have here a glowing description of those glorious qualities with which man was magnificently endowed at creation, which makes it impossible to suppose that he had not power to stand in the service of his God. And yet this view, which we have also steadily maintained, is what the Determinist denies. He affirms that the sin of Adam was unavoidable. What contradictories could be more pronounced? Let it be noticed, also, how plainly the *Formula Consensus* intimates that Adam might have obeyed the Covenant of Works, and secured eternal life and bliss, which of course the Determinist refuses to admit, at least must logically refuse to admit. This perspicuous formulary unquestionably sustains our view—which we have proved to have been that of Calvin—that Adam had the ability to stand, although he was liable to fall; and that, as he might have stood, he possessed the power to have determined otherwise than he did, when he decided for sin.

We tire of adducing testimony which shows redundantly, that the *Consensus* of the Reformed Church is in the teeth of the Determinist philosophy, in its application to that sin from the womb of which all other sins are born, which deluged the earth with woes, and opened the gates of hell for myriads of our race. But the allegation, that we are out of harmony with our own formularies, must be met; and we conclude the appeal to symbolic authority with a testimony which, in our former discussion, we deemed too familiarly known to be expressly cited—that of the Westminster Standards:

"After God had made all other creatures, he created man male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image, having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept they were happy in their communion with God and had dominion over the creatures."†

**Ibid.*, pp. 732, 733. †*Conf. of Faith*, c. IV., §2.

“Having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it.”*

“Man in his state of innocency had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.”

“Man, by his fall into a state of sin and death, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation.”†

“Our first parents, being left to the freedom of their own will, fell from the estate wherein they were created, by sinning against God.”‡

“God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it; and endued him with power and ability to keep it.”§

It has been not unfrequently said that the Westminster Standards are neutral in regard to the question between Supralapsarians and Sublapsarians, and in relation to the controversy about Philosophical Necessity. We are not now directly concerned about the former of these affirmations, although indirectly we are; for we are thoroughly satisfied of the correctness of Sir James Mackintosh's opinion, that no Calvinistic Determinist can logically refuse to be a Supralapsarian; and the brother whose criticisms we are now considering is, we think, an instance of its truth. He supports his Determinism against theological objections, grounded in the Sublapsarian view, by boldly appealing to Supralapsarian principles. We admire his consistency, if we cannot his doctrine. He does not, as some others, avow a Sublapsarian theology and a Determinist philosophy, between which there is as much harmony as between Joab and Amasa.

We take issue, however, very distinctly with the assertion of the neutrality of the Calvinistic symbols in general, or of the Westminster Standards in particular, in reference to the Determinist controversy. Principal Cunningham has an elaborate discussion to prove this thesis. If we had room we would like to subject his argument to a searching examination, but we have not; and must restrict what we have to say further to a few concise comments on the passages cited from the Westminster Stand-

**Larg. Cat.*, Q. 17. †*Conf. of Faith*, C. IX., §§2, 3.

‡*Shorter Cat.*, Ques. 13. *Larg. Cat.*, Ques. 21.

§*Conf. of Faith*, C. XIX., §1.

ards, in which, we are confident, their inconsistency with the principles of Determinism, so far as the question of the will is concerned, will be made to appear.

In the first place, these standards unmistakably declare that man at first had freedom of will; that our first parents were left to the liberty or freedom of their own will; and that the will of man is endued with a natural liberty. Here it is plainly asserted that freedom or liberty is a property of the will. Now the Determinist flatly denies this. He contends that freedom is a property of the man, and not of the will. The man is a free agent, but the will is not free. Edwards ridicules the notion that the will can be free. Are we dreaming when we say that these views are palpably opposed to each other? Are is and is not the same thing? Is an affirmative proposition neutral in relation to its negative?

In the second place, the standards affirm that man in innocency had freedom to will and to do, etc. They assert the freedom of the man both in willing and in doing. Now the Determinist affirms that freedom or liberty consists only in doing as one has willed, not in willing and doing. We have already cited the definition of Edwards and the admission of our critic to prove this. Here, then, we have again two affirmations that are utterly opposed to each other.

In the third place, the standards expressly declare that man at first had power to fulfil or keep the law of God. The Determinist denies that he had such power. For if he had, he might have kept the law and been justified. But he was under a necessity of sinning resulting from the fixed operation of God's fore-ordaining purpose through the imperfection of his make. Man therefore could not have had a power to fulfil the law which might have defeated God's purpose. Now then we have the propositions before us: Man had power to keep the law; man had not power to keep the law. Can the former of these be neutral to the latter? Or can they agree? Only when *est* and *non est* can be reconciled or be neutral towards each other.

In the fourth place, the standards employ the terms liberty of the will, power of the will, ability of the will, interchangeably.

They evidently make no difference between them. But Determinists insist on a difference between ability and liberty. We encounter then another contradiction.

In the fifth place, the standards assert, as to man in innocence, that there was a possibility of transgressing, thus implicitly affirming that there was a possibility of not transgressing. The Determinist asserts that there was a necessity of transgressing. Here is another contradiction. The Determinist affirms the impossibility of not transgressing, which adds still another contradiction to the growing catalogue.

In the sixth place, the standards evidently represent the will, in consequence of its mutability—its liability to change, as the seat of the cause which produced the first sin. The Determinist denies this, but lodges the mutability primarily in the nature, extraneously to the will. The will must be held to be the mere instrument used by the other faculties; hence the origin of the first sin must have lain back of the will. In this we descry another contradiction. In fact, the standards take the common sense ground that the nature of the soul must include the spontaneous disposition of the will, while the consistent Determinist represents it as excluding that disposition. The will is no sharer of the nature; it is extra-natural, and the mere hand of the nature! We can see how the nature lies back of and influences the decisions or acts of the will—the volitions; but then the nature includes the *habitus* of the will itself. This is the view taken by the standards and rejected by consistent Determinists.

In the seventh place, there is an irreconcilable difference between the doctrine of our standards and that of Determinism, as expounded by President Edwards, in regard to the question whether man, in innocence, possessed the power of otherwise determining than he actually did, that is, the power of contrary choice in relation to the alternatives of holiness and sin. We need not state particularly the Determinist position on this question. It is familiar to all that it wholly denies the possibility of such a power. Edwards pronounces it absurd. Adam who did actually choose sin could not have chosen not to sin. His sin was unavoidable, as the result of a philosophical necessity oper-

ating through his spontaneity upon his will. This we have denied, and for doing so are criticised as being in opposition to our standards. Now let us collect the statements which bear upon the point: Man was made in the image of God, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, had the law of God written on his heart and power to fulfil it. So says the Confession in one place. In another it declares that God endued man with power and ability to keep the law. He had "the law of God written on" his "heart, and power to fulfil it." So says the Larger Catechism. Again, the Confession says that man had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; and further, that he hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good. Man had power to fulfil the law; power and ability to keep it; freedom and power to will and to do what was right; and ability of will to spiritual good—for if he has lost that ability, he must have had it to lose. Here, then is power, ability, freedom—more. ability and freedom of will, to choose holiness. He who can deny that the standards affirm that man had that power and freedom, can deny the plainest statements. But on the other hand, it is a fact that man did choose sin. How can the fact be accounted for? The standards say that being left to the freedom of his will, he fell; that his power to fulfil, to keep, the law was possessed under a possibility of his transgressing, because he was left to the liberty of his own will, which was subject to change; that he had freedom and power to will and to do what was right, mutably, so that he might fall from it. He might stand, yet he might fall; he might will and do right, yet he might will and do wrong; he might choose holiness, yet he might choose sin. When then he did sin, might he not have done otherwise? If so, although the terms *power of contrary choice* are not used—and we care for the thing, not the words—the power itself is so plainly asserted that he that runs may read. To sum up the matter: the standards say that Adam in innocence had the power of otherwise determining than he did; the Determinist says that he had not that power. The two doctrines are contradictory and mutually exclusive. We must make our election; and as, when we found Calvin and Edwards opposed to

each other, we went with Calvin, so now we go with the Calvinistic standards rather than with the Deterministic philosophy. The difficulty is not that we have departed from Calvin and the Calvinistic formularies, but that we have too faithfully employed their doctrine in regard to the determining effect of man's first unnecessitated decision of the will for sin upon human guilt and corruption—a doctrine which dissipates the metaphysical speculations of Determinism as the rising sun dispels a morning mist.

We close with two brief but striking testimonies from illustrious Calvinists, whose shoes we would be willing to bear. The first is from Dr. John Witherspoon, a successor of the great Edwards in the presidential chair at Princeton:

"It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their service: I mean moral and natural necessity—they say natural or physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not—at the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the invincible effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less natural nor less unsurmountable if it is from the laws of spirit, than it would be if it were from the laws of matter."*

The other testimony is from Dr. Thornwell, whose admiration for Calvin amounted to a passion, and who made the *Institutes* his text book of theological instruction.

"The theory of Edwards breaks down. (1.) It does not explain guilt: it does not rid God [of the charge] of being the author of sin. (2.) It does not explain the moral value attached to character. (3.) This theory explains self-expression, but not self-determination. Now a just view must show how we first *determine*, and then habitually express ourselves. In these determinations is found the moral significance of these expressions. Otherwise my nature would be no more than the nature of a plant. . . . The province of the will [in man's state of innocence] was to *determine*, that is, to root and ground these principles as a fixed nature. There was power to do so. When so determined, a holy necessity would have risen as to the perfection of our being. There was also the possibility of determining otherwise—a power of perverting our nature, of determining it in another direction. . . . In the moral sphere, and especially in relation to single acts, this freedom is now seen in man."†

* *Works*, Vol. IV., *Lecture on Divinity*, XIII., p. 89.

† *Coll. Writings*, Vol. I., pp. 250, 251.

We are not a Libertarian, nor do we pretend to erect a philosophy of the will. No Necessitarian affirms more positively than we do the dreadful fact of the necessity which holds the will of the unregenerate man in chains of bondage to sin. But we protest against the employment of this fact as a basis for a tremendous philosophical generalisation under which all the other facts of man's moral history—the fact of the first human sin and the fact of man's present agency in the merely natural sphere—are to be reduced. The scheme of Philosophical Necessity, especially in the hands of Edwards, is an instance of brilliant thinking, and owed its religious application to a laudable intention; but the Calvinistic Theology, grounding itself in the sure word of prophecy, may well say to the advocates of that system, *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis!*

We think we can, without arrogance, claim that we have proved: that Calvin was not "as rigorous an advocate of Determinism as Edwards himself"; that we have closely adhered to his doctrine of the will; that, in the views we have maintained, we have not contravened, but represented, the great Calvinistic symbols, and that, consequently, we have not inculcated "a new theology."

We had hoped to be able to discuss other points in the allegation (which we have considered only in one aspect), especially the indictment of us for not being Supralapsarians as well as Determinists, and for departing from Calvin and the Calvinistic standards in advocating Sublapsarianism, and the existence particularly of a permissive decree in relation to man's first sin. The consideration of these points we must reserve for another opportunity.

[NOTE.—We take occasion here to correct an error in the first Article of this series on the Will. It occurs on page 621, Vol. XXX.: "The question has often been discussed whether desire belongs to the feelings or the will. Hamilton, in his Lectures, which were his earliest productions, assigns it to the former category, but in his Notes to Reid, to the latter." Through inadvertency of some sort, "former" was placed where "latter" ought to have been, and *vice versa*. The reference is given in a foot note to the passage in Hamilton's Reid, which is: "This is virtually to identify Desire and Will, which is contrary to truth and our author's own doctrine." The intention was to say that Hamilton in his Lectures

assigned desire to the will, but in his Reid to the feelings. We were led to suppose this, because in his Lectures he classed desire with will, in contradistinction from the feelings, and in his Reid sharply discriminated desire from will. A more attentive examination of his position has convinced us that he made the Conative Powers generic, with Desire and Will contained under them as species; and, consequently, that in excluding desire from the feelings, he did not assign it to the will specifically, but to the Conative Powers: and that in refusing to refer it to the will, he did not class it with the feelings.]

J. L. GIRARDEAU.

ARTICLE II.

RATIONALISM IN THE CHURCH *versus* RATIONALISM WITHOUT.

Idleness, faithlessness to duty, and discontent, are prone to lay the blame of failure at the door of "the times"; to exalt the past at the expense of the present, and to croak over the degeneracy of these latter days as compared with the purity and power, the vigor and virtue of days gone by. The writer of this article in the outset distinctly disavows such a tendency. He firmly believes that men give tone to the times and not the times to men; that the human race, as a race, is as teachable, as ready to receive and apply the truth as it ever has been. Whenever a teacher rises up with the credentials of his commission in the truth of his message, in the earnestness of its delivery and in that self-abnegation of life which attests the singleness of his motive, he lacks not listeners, and one age gives as good audience as another. There are occasional exceptions to be met with here and there in the long line of teachers, whose excellence makes them the contemporaries of all time; all men claim them and all countries recognise them; but these are rare, and the exception is not so much in the pupils as in the teacher. The great average of the world is just as wise, just as pure as ever it was; and while some particular species of error may be more prominent in one age than in the preceding, yet on the whole, truth is equally as

powerful as in former times and even more so. If the querulous of each generation would view the whole battle-field, they would doubtless discover that, though some little squadron of error seems to have the advantage, yet the army of truth, *as an army*, is steadily and surely advancing from age to age.

Let no one therefore impute the sentiments expressed in this article to the tendency above alluded to. No comparisons are instituted between periods of time. The present only is examined, and charges are preferred against it without reference to the past, whether better or worse.

It is scarcely conceivable that any observant eye can have failed to notice the virulence of the scepticism of the last few years. The prevailing type seems to be a species of rationalism, or the disposition to use reason as the sole and satisfactory interpreter and expositor of all the facts presented in the nature or history of man. The supernatural element is discounted or entirely eliminated, and human reason essays by its own ingenuity to solve every riddle without reference to any supreme, sovereign, *personal* God. Unbelief is so protean in form, that there is nothing surprising in any shape it may assume. The object of this article is not to discuss rationalism from this quarter; being professedly and avowedly "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel," we need not be surprised to find them theoretically as well as practically "without God in the world." But when those who are, on the other hand, professedly in the camp of Israel, yet speak the language of Ashdod, surprise is natural. Better things are justly expected of them.

That not only soldiers but even *leaders* in the camp *do* use this mingled dialect is evident. There is a painful attitude of compromise and conciliation on the part of those who should give no uncertain sound in this conflict. The great burden of effort seems to be to reconcile and harmonise; and this, mark it, not the position of the enemy with the demands of dogmatic faith, but the reverse. Whenever there is a difference between the two, in the minds of these harmonisers the presumption is in favor of rationalism, and dogmatic faith must immediately rise to an

«explanation. Thus the enemy receives the lion's share in this compromise. Without learning from past experience that the arrogance of this rationalism grows with what it feeds upon, becoming more exacting with every concession, these conciliators are forever finding new harmony, inventing new methods of keeping the peace with this belligerent spirit, and seem entirely to have forgotten that "the wisdom which is from above is *first* pure, *then* peaceable." We have the Church assuming the humiliated position of a weather-vane to show from what quarter the hostile wind sets. Indeed, by examining the latest interpretations, readings, etc., of the Scriptures, one can almost determine the character of the latest assault made upon Christianity.

There are expositions advanced and defended, as consistent with God's Word, which would doubtless have astonished the Westminster Assembly beyond expression. It seems that there is hardly a theory too intrinsically absurd, too God-defying in its nature or effects, to find some professed champion of revelation to advocate its claims and invent some method of reconciling God's Word with it. They learn no lesson from the proverbial fickleness of these theories; though it hardly gives them breathing space between one adjustment and the demand for another. Scarcely have they reconciled one theory before a change of base calls for another exhibition of their ecclesiastical legerdemain. Such a course is calculated to bring the Word of God into profound contempt. If it means everything, it means nothing. Such treatment would give it about the coherency and force of the fabled Sibylline leaves, blown hither and thither by the winds and put together like the games of mutilated figures invented for the amusement of children. Given the existence of the God of the Bible, the personal, present Jehovah of his people—and all attempt to eliminate the supernatural is not only unnecessary but atheistic in tendency. It may recognise some species of God, but it owns no allegiance to the Lord God of Hosts. And yet how common is this attitude of conciliation and compromise with an infidel rationalism!!

I. Hear one of the latest expounders; one high in authority

and chosen by a great University to trace the hand of this living, personal God in the history of his people. In commenting on the rebuke the ass gave Balaam, he says:

"It is, however, worthy of observation that the words of the ass do not rise above the animal sphere; they are strictly confined to the region of animal perception or sensation. The miracle consists merely in the fact that by a divine influence or operation, the natural expression of animal sensation is made to acquire a modulation which gives it the character of the articulate sounds of human language. It is difficult to decide whether this modulation occurred already in the mouth of the ass, or in the ear of Balaam only; the decision, perhaps, depends on the answer to the question whether Balak's messengers were present or absent. If they were present, the modulation of the voice occurred in the ear of Balaam; if they were absent, that interpretation claims the preference according to which the modulated words proceeded from the mouth of the animal."

Which being translated into plain unvarnished English, means simply that the incident is as little miraculous as it could be, to be at all so; not *objectionably* miraculous even at its worst—"merely this" "animal sphere," "natural expression of animal sensation." The miracle consists merely in the fact that the animal, when struck, brayed; this braying was modulated somehow and somewhere so as to sound like human language. The whereabouts of this wonderful modulation is to be determined by the consideration whether there were *spectators* or not; if there were none, we may venture to place it in the mouth of the ass; if, however, there were spectators, this would be hazardous, and the modulation had better be confined to the ear of Balaam! When this wonderful feat of exposition is examined in the light of 2 Peter ii. 16, "But was rebuked for his iniquity, *the dumb ass speaking with man's voice* forbade the madness of the prophet," the laborious effort of the learned D. D. seems utterly futile; and the reader, while according him peculiar fitness to explain the *modus operandi* of this particular animal's exercise of speech, will doubtless excuse the task.

A comparatively recent work from a high source, which has received unstinted praise and has not yet met with the fair and just criticism which its gorgeous mosaic of excellence and defect merits, evinces the same tendency. In commenting on the miracle

in which the demoniac of Gadara was healed and the devils sent into the swine, it says :

“That the demoniac was healed—that in the terrible final paroxysm which usually accompanied the deliverance from this strange and awful malady, a herd of swine was in some way affected with such wild terror as to rush headlong in large numbers over the steep hillside into the waters of the lake—and that in the minds of all who were present, including that of the sufferer himself, this precipitate rushing of the swine was connected with the man’s release from his demoniac thralldom—thus much is clear, and knowing to how singular an extent the mental impressions of man affect by some unknown electric influence the lower animals—knowing for instance, that man’s cowardice and exultation, and even his superstitious terrors, *do* communicate themselves to the dog which accompanies him, or the horse on which he rides—there can be little or no difficulty in understanding that the shrieks and gesticulations of a powerful lunatic might strike uncontrollable terror into a herd of swine.”

Mark two phrases in passing: “in large numbers,” and the apparently careless, but suggestive addition of the words, “and even his *superstitious terrors*,” to “cowardice and exultation;” this addition certainly adds no force to the specifications already given, and how artlessly the insinuation is entered, “and even his superstitious terrors”! But to continue :

“It is true that the evangelists (as their language clearly shows) held, in all its simplicity, the belief that actual devils passed in multitudes out of the man and into the swine. But is it not allowable here to make a distinction between actual facts and that which was the mere conjecture and inference of the spectators from whom the three evangelists heard the tale?”

This language is too plain to need translation. Compare it with Luke’s account, in which it is said: “So the devils besought him, saying, If thou cast us out, suffer us to go away into the herd of swine. *And he said unto them, Go.* And when they were come out, they went into the herd of swine: and behold, the *whole* herd ran violently down a steep place into the sea and perished in the waters.”

The three evangelists agree in representing the devils as making this request and our Saviour as granting it. Hence the remark of the author is just, that the language of the evangelists “clearly shows that they held in all its simplicity the belief that actual

devils passed in multitudes out of the man and into the swine." Let the reader ask himself, Is Luke's account a narrative of what occurred, or is it the "mere conjecture or inference" of those from whom he "heard the tale"? Can an *inspired* narrative of events be a mixture of "actual facts" and "conjecture and inference"? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the very practical problem arises, where there is no distinction made in the text, how is the reader to draw the line? What part of this wondrous combination is myth, and what part is the word of God? If there are rocks undistinguished in this chart, of what value is it? It is of no avail to tell the mariner that it is *substantially* correct; there may be the fewest unsafe places as compared with the whole, but the freight is an immortal one, and the craft cannot afford to risk wreck; the issues are so tremendous and the value of the cargo so transcendent, that even the slightest risk becomes intolerable.

In another place, the same author says:

"We must here follow that (order) given by St. Luke, both because it appears to us intrinsically probable and because St. Luke, unlike the two previous evangelists, seems to have been guided, so far as his information allowed, by chronological considerations."

"So far as his information allowed"!!

Again:

"Under the dark shadow of the trees, amid the interrupted moonlight, it seems to them that there is an angel with him."

"It seems to them"!!

Again:

"An earthquake shook the earth and split the rocks, and as it rolled away from their places the great stones which closed and covered the cavern sepulchres of the Jews, so it seemed to the imaginations of many to have disimprisoned the spirits of the dead, and to have filled the air with ghostly visitants, who after Christ had risen appeared to linger in the Holy City."

How shamefully weak and trifling does this pretty piece of word-painting seem when placed side by side with the plain simple statement of *fact* made in the Scriptures: "And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the

holy city, and appeared unto many." The author obviously offers his sentences as a mere paraphrase of the inspired narrative; yet observe the labored effort to explain away the supernatural element so plainly contained in the Bible account. The scepticism is rather insinuated than honestly pronounced. To read it is like inhaling the subtle and perfumed breath of a miasmatic atmosphere. The reader will not be surprised to find that this author never loses an opportunity to throw a contemptuous fling or a covert insinuation at "orthodox theology"; terming it variously "cold," "hard," "denunciatory," "pharisaical," "unreasoning," "unspiritual," "narrow, stolid prejudice," etc., etc.

II. Another evidence of this tendency to eliminate the supernatural in deference to man's reason, is seen in the explanations of the New Birth given in some quarters. God's agency is reduced to a minimum, and man's exalted. Regeneration, as explained by some professedly evangelical teachers, is simply reformation. What has been considered by the *consensus* of truly evangelical teachers as the Bible idea of regeneration, a new birth, a new creation—the "being born not of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God"; the being "created in Christ Jesus unto good works"—is openly scouted as fanaticism, emotional frenzy, animal excitement, and regeneration is made about equivalent to ecclesiastical connexion. When referred to the teaching of the Scripture, they respond: True, the Bible uses strong language if strictly interpreted, but such interpretation is unnecessary. It is mysterious, incomprehensible, humbling to man. Objection will constantly be made to it, and this must be taken into account in any system which is addressed to the enlightened understanding of man. Hence these eminently considerate explanations. We have a religion which man will not be inclined to cavil at. When the imperious human understanding asks doubtfully, if not contemptuously, How can these things be? instead of answering the question, *as Christ did*, by a re-announcement and reinforcement of the truth, however mysterious, these obliging champions proceed to show that these things do not "be" in any offensive sense; that what some fanatics call

regeneration is merely "a half hour's excitement in a hot meeting-house."

And here may be observed a striking instance of the inconsistency of error. Closely allied to this position, which owes its very existence to a deference to rationalism, we find rationalism sorely tried by a religion of superstitious sacramentarianism, beginning with *baptismal regeneration* and ending with the *real presence*, practically, if not theoretically, taught. Every principle of a sound and consistent rationalism would repudiate and scorn such absurdities. Still, there is presented this strange heterogeneity of obsequious deference to reason in one department, and in another department of the same faith, reason asked to accept, swallow, and digest principles which, it would be easy to show, invalidate every deduction of this same reason, render scepticism inevitable, and introduce the chaos of lunacy into the world of man's mind. And what is the result of this compromise? It is, that here, as everywhere else, the truth is vindicated, which declares that the foolishness of God is wiser than men and the weakness of God stronger than men; a spectacle of large communion rolls, upon which are the names of many who not only are not converted, but even ridicule the idea. This unnatural coalition produces worthy fruit, and its offspring is an infertile hybrid, "having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof." An opiate has been administered, which places men in a slumber of security from which nothing can arouse them. The sword of God's word falls blunt upon this terrible coat of mail woven out of ecclesiastical connexion. Being "in the church," such warnings and appeals as are addressed in the Scriptures to the unconverted, apply not to them. Taught that they are cured, they of course take no medicine, and their case is practically hopeless. Imposition of hands has usurped the functions of the Spirit of God; and the ghostly farce has sealed the ear, closed the heart, and soothed the conscience.

III. The same course has been pursued with reference to prayer. Here the supernatural element is equally incomprehensible, and hence equally distasteful. Objections arise grounded

on the character of God, his immutability not to be changed by man's desires, his omniscience not needing man's reminders; on the stability of nature and the predetermined course of events, not to be affected by human breath. To meet these objections, we have the usual course resorted to. The compromisers are equal to the emergency, and the result is what is styled the Subjective Theory. Say they, True, it is inconceivable how God, his character being such as it is, and the course of nature being what it is, can be affected by the petitions of men. But then it is not necessary to hold any such view. Prayer is effective, and indeed is a mighty power, a great nourisher of Christian growth, but its effect is subjective; an exaltation of soul in the act of prayer, a lifting of it up to higher aims and nobler feelings, a soother of sorrows and a strengthener of virtues, by means of this spiritual elevation. It is like a golden chain, on which we hang and draw ourselves towards the throne of God; the little boat pulling on a line draws itself towards the mighty vessel, but it is the tiny boat that moves, not the mighty vessel; so with frail, feeble man, *he* moves really nearer to God, but God is immovable. No effect in him, no change in nature, is necessary to explain the real power of prayer, but an effect in the soul of him who prays, a change in the spiritual condition of the suppliant.

"Lord, what a change *within us* one short hour
Spent in thy presence will prevail to make!
What heavy burdens from our bosoms take,
What parched grounds refresh us with a shower!
We kneel, and all around us seems to lower:
We rise, and all, the distant and the near,
Stands forth in sunny outline brave and clear;
We kneel—how weak! we rise—how full of power!"

All of this is very beautiful, very comforting, and very true, as far as it goes. It is, however, but half of the truth; and without the other half, is not the truth at all. When combined with the scriptural view of prayer, it is fruitful of peace, comfort, and strength; when alone, it is a withered branch. So far from being sufficient in itself, it derives all its force from the truth of the Objective Theory. For the merest tyro can prick this beautiful bubble, blown for the delight of rationalism, by simply asking,

How can prayer have this effect upon a man who believes that this is all? Does not this comfort, this elevation of soul, arise from the very faith that rests itself in the Bible teaching that God is the hearer of prayer?

Dissipate this "illusion," as these expositors would term it, and it is like taking the spectator behind the scenes and showing him the machinery which manufactures the thunder and lightning; revealing the prosaic homeliness of that which, when painted and be-spangled and set off by the glare and glitter of gas, throws the audience into paroxysms of enthusiasm over its beauty. You have robbed it of its romance when it appears weighed by the pound and measured by the yard. If this subjective theory is a sufficient explanation, then the reproach, Ignorance is the mother of devotion, is just. Any thoughtful man feels that comfort purchased at the price of self-deceit is dearly bought. It is true that rationalism scoffs at prayer in any scriptural sense of the term, but it is surely better to let it scoff than to attempt to conciliate it by any such compromise as this. Better even to join with it in ridicule, than virtually to take the ground that prayer is a comfortable delusion, a mummery to be encouraged and defended, because it affords peace to those who engage in it—a peace which is the offspring of delusion, a comfort which is in proportion to the ignorance of the superstitious devotee.

IV. The same tendency is again brought to light by the discussion growing out of the latest freak of a sensational age, the presence of the female evangelists, who infest certain portions of the country. Society, religious and irreligious, arrays itself *pro* and *con*. Of course, the irreligious care nothing for the teachings of the Scriptures. But the minister who desires to utilise the sensation created and reap the advantage of whatever is going, finds it incumbent upon him to explain his position and reconcile this new monstrosity of petticoats in the pulpit with the teachings of Paul. It is, indeed, a hard task; but hard as it is, it would be a still harder task to conceive anything which these reconcilers would give up as irreconcilable.

A learned argument is constructed from the word used in the

passage, "I suffer not a woman to teach." But common sense, not to say a sound scholarship, blows this defence too high to be seen with a telescope. If the word "teach" means *babble*, why the declaration at all, in the first place? In the second place, why restricted to woman? Are women alone interdicted from *babbling*? Judging from this interpretation, it is to be inferred that the prohibition applies not to men, and that its defenders maintain it upon personal grounds. Thirdly, common sense asks, Of what is the immediate context (1 Tim. ii. 9-14) treating? of the character of preaching, or of the relation of the sexes and certain restrictions arising from sex-distinctions?

When this interpretation fails, resort is had to the theory of "degrees of inspiration." The very name by which this theory is baptized is prophetic of its absurdity. How can there be any such thing as degrees of inspiration? Can one passage be less inspired than another, if inspired at all? This obvious absurdity, however, is based upon certain passages in which this same Apostle *distinctly disavows* authority, and states that he speaks not of commandment, but by permission; giving merely his own opinion, which he says is not to be binding upon any one. With a strange convenience, these "degree" interpreters extend this exception, "But I speak this by permission and not of commandment," to the passage under consideration, and that, too, *as authoritative a passage as any in his writings*.

But if this resort also fails, then the defence is built upon the *temporary* force of the declaration. Times have changed, say they, and though the Apostle did really prohibit female preaching in his day, the prohibition is not binding now under such circumstances as those of the present day. Without laying stress upon the reason assigned for his prohibition by the Apostle himself in the next verse ("For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression"—which bases the prohibition upon a rather permanent distinction), attention is directed to the danger of such a position. If the Bible is out of date in one portion, why not in another? If man is allowed discretion to sit in judgment upon one express declaration, and declare it antiquated, why may not

another exercise the same discretion, with reference to some declaration which stands in *his* way? You have the wedge entered; the camel's nose is in the tent, and according to the old Arab proverb, you may get ready to vacate the premises in the camel's favor. What can the preacher, who gives such a view, say when one of his inconsistent members parries, in the same manner, the force of such declarations as, "The friendship of the world is enmity against God;" "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him"?

But the crowning argument, the imperative necessity for this compromise, is the apparent success of this new species of preaching. But even were it successful, beyond the shadow of a doubt, it would still be easy to see that this could not constitute an argument against a divinely inspired command. God's providence is not our rule; he acts *sovereignly* when and where and how he pleases. We are taught that he causes even the wrath of man to praise him. It is his province to overrule even wickedness to his glory. His rule is his sovereign pleasure; *ours is the inspired Bible*. So that even were the success of such preaching a demonstrated fact, it would still prove nothing in this discussion, except the sovereignty of God. Man, however, has not the data by which to judge the success or failure of this movement; eternity alone can furnish it. The presumption is against the success. This much merely in passing; there are but two propositions in an argument upon this question: Is the Bible inspired? Does the Bible forbid a woman to preach? The first question is unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. Then it is humbly submitted, that the arguments to be used in the second are *purely exegetical*; the authorities are grammars and lexicons, not any success resulting from the work, whether such success be fancied or real. The exegetical argument ought to be satisfactory, conclusive, and final, to all who hold the theory of inspiration in its integrity.

Any appeal to the effects of such preaching is an implicit surrender of the inspiration of the Scriptures. It manifests a weakness in the knees on this fundamental article in the Christian faith. To all such appeals, the firm adherent to this fundamental

doctrine will respond, I do not doubt the piety of these ladies, I do not impugn their motives, I do not underrate their eloquence or ability; but *my* guide is God's word; in my opinion, it distinctly forbids them the performance of this function, and believing this, I cannot endorse the movement. There is no appeal to me from the word of God.

Of course such a position will raise the cry of unenlightened, harsh, narrow bigotry; but the Christian minister should be able and willing to endure this. If he allows such a cry to frighten him out of this stronghold that is afforded by an unwavering, unhesitating adherence to God's inspired Bible, he is then at the mercy of every freak and fancy of this essentially sensational age. He has thrown overboard his compass; his course will be according to the whim of every new wind of doctrine; he may reconcile himself to the position of drift-wood, to a course as wild and uncertain as the vagaries of error.

V. But the attitude of religion towards physical science is a more striking illustration of this tendency than any previously presented in this article.

Were it not so serious and important a matter, it would be amusing to see the gymnastics through which certain interpreters go, to reconcile this branch of the opposition. It is doubtless amusing to the infidel. The first chapter of Genesis has been converted into a perfect circus ring for these performances, and commentators vie with each other in agility. The deadest of all dead languages proves to be exceedingly living and plastic in their hands. Just consider the number and variety of interpretations that have been offered to conciliate science.

Concerning these theories of "reconciliation," Prof. Huxley is reported to have said in New York, in his lecture on *The Untenable Hypotheses*:

"In the first place, it is not my business to say what the Hebrew text contains and what it does not; and in the second place, were I to say that this was the biblical hypothesis (creation in six literal days), I should be met by the authority of eminent scholars, to say nothing of men of science, who, in recent times, have absolutely denied that this doctrine is to be found in Genesis at all. If we are to listen to them, we must believe that

what seems so clearly defined as days of creation—as if very great pains had been taken that there should be no mistake—that these are not days at all, but periods that we may make just as long as convenience requires. We are also to understand that it is consistent with that phraseology to believe that plants and animals may have been evolved by natural processes, lasting for millions of years, out of similar rudiments. A person who is not a Hebrew scholar can only stand by and admire the marvellous flexibility of a language which admits of such diverse interpretations. Assuredly, in the face of such contradictory authority upon matters upon which one is competent to form no judgment, he will abstain from any opinion as I do; and in the third place, I have carefully abstained from speaking of this as a Mosaic doctrine, because we are now assured upon the authority of the highest critics and even dignitaries in the Church, that there is no evidence whatever that Moses ever wrote this chapter or knew anything about it."

It would be a digression from the purpose of this article to enter into any statement or discussion of these interpretations. When they fail to give satisfaction, then resort is had to the general character of the writings and writer as an apology for the statements contained in the opening chapters of Genesis. The special attention of the reader is invited to this resort. Vague reference is made to "the early age," "period of childhood," "undeveloped character of knowledge," etc. Under this specious guise we are insensibly educated to consider Moses as a sort of *semi-barbarian*, well informed *for his times*, but still uncultured, ignorant, and even superstitious. He gave the account of creation in general vogue in his day; indeed, no other would have been understood. Science was yet in the loins of its parent, and it would be unreasonable to expect anything like a statement consistent with scientific truth. When one reads so interminably of the inadequacy, incorrectness, etc., of the "Mosaic idea;" the many apologies made for the ignorance, the crudeness of his notions, he is tempted to ask, In what sense can this account of creation be called the Mosaic idea? *Is it Moses speaking, or God?* Was Moses merely putting on record the curious absurd fancies of an unenlightened age, or was he the mouth-piece to declare the word of the Lord God? Were God's ideas crude? Was Jehovah in his childhood at that time, waiting for the illumination of this wonderful science? Did God publish an account

which was false to fact and put it into man's hands as *his inspired word*?

The books of Moses run like a thread through the Old Testament Scriptures. Reflect upon the frequency of quotation, reference, illustration, or allusion, all pointing to some portion of the Pentateuch. Let any one attempt to expunge from the Old Testament every verse depending for its force upon the books of Moses, and he will be surprised at the havoc he has made in his Bible. These writings have as much connexion with the rest of the Bible as the first five chapters of Arithmetic have with the science of Mathematics. Blot out addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division from Arithmetic, and what would become of the rest of it? Further: Is not this semi-barbaric venter of crude notions amply supported by the New Testament? The Pharisees were constantly confronting our Lord with the sayings of Moses and endeavoring to establish contradiction, or at least conflict, between the doctrines of the Pentateuch and his teaching. How easy it would have been for him at once finally and forever to have emancipated himself from these difficulties by fixing the status of Moses according to the views of these modern conciliators; their theory would have been eminently in point. Instead, however, of pursuing this simple and easy course, he, on the contrary, sustains Moses always. "For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me." Our Lord quotes from Moses, and Moses alone, in repelling each assault of the devil against him in the wilderness. Strange that the devil did not impugn the authority of those writings then as he has done since. We see Moses on the Mount of Transfiguration as representative of one the three great dispensations. During the walk to Emmaus, *after his resurrection*, in expounding the Scriptures concerning himself *he begins with Moses*. And strongest of all the testimonies, in one place he says: "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

How then is the Bible to be sustained if Moses is discredited? What department of it, history, narrative, or precept, does not depend upon the authority and credibility of Moses? Underrate

the Pentateuch, and you underrate the whole Bible; undermine the authority of Moses, and you undermine that of Christ. Our Lord vouches for Moses on all occasions, and the candid student will be driven to the conclusion that *Christ and Moses stand or fall together*.

These sentences have been penned to little purpose if their practical character is not evident, and hence any extended or detailed application is deemed unnecessary. However, it may not be amiss to indulge in a few reflections by way of concluding the subject.

The first thought suggested by an examination of these theories is, *cui bono?* Admit that they succeed in the work undertaken, *i. e.*, that the explanations are satisfactory, where is the advantage? Does any one believe that rationalism, with the way thus cleared, will be any more ready to receive the gospel, any the less hostile to its Great Author? Every one at all acquainted with the human heart knows that these objections are the merest pretexts behind which carnality entrenches itself. To remove a *pretext* is no advantage whatever. When the Holy Ghost shakes a soul with the conviction of personal sin, these barricades are levelled with the shock, and we see and hear no more of them. Until this power comes, to destroy one series of outworks is but to clear the way for the immediate erection of another. The Christian heart needs no such processes of reconciliation, and the infidel rationalist is not bettered by them. Even if satisfactory, they are of no avail; but they are notoriously unsatisfactory. They are even derided by those to whom they defer. The extract from Prof. Huxley, quoted above, is a fair sample of the spirit in which such overtures are received. In political circles it is said that to throw a candidate on the defensive is to ruin his prospects. Has not Christianity been on the defensive long enough? The world is flooded with apologetic literature of this sort. It is a question for serious reflection whether on the whole, taken in its length and breadth, apologetics has not been of more injury than benefit to the cause. We find no trace of it in the Scriptures. Consider the difficulties with which those Scriptures had to con-

tend, the condition of mankind to whom they were addressed. Polytheism was enthroned in the high places of the earth, and the world was one great pantheon of idol worship. Every nation had its numerous priesthood, generally, the influential, cultivated, noble class of the people. Every city had its splendid temples and its complicated ritual. Every tree and fountain had its peculiar divinity. Art and science, education and refinement, culture and influence, power, civil and military, all were arrayed on the side of idolatry. Wherever there was any philosophy or literature, it was the handmaid of this all-prevalent system of gods many and lords many. It was completely inwrought into the very national life of every people upon the face of the earth excepting only a nation of liberated slaves. The Bible coming into such a world, encountering such opposing influences and prejudices, without one word of argument, apology, compromise, or conciliation, contradicts the universal sentiment of mankind by opening with the sublime declaration, "In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth." And the rest of it is consistent with its opening sentence. We find no argument, no compromise, no conciliation in it from beginning to end. It lays down truths, inculcates doctrines, and states as facts mysteries which mock the profoundest intellect with its inability to comprehend them. Yet wherever it has gone, men have acknowledged its authority and bowed beneath its sway. Sadduceeism was rampant in Christ's day and repeatedly plied him with its difficulties; on what occasion did he ever manifest the slightest deference to its rationalism? His own disciples came to him more than once with questions of curious, interesting speculation, such as, "Are there few that be saved"? When did he ever fail to turn their attention from such topics to the practical concerns of religion by such replies as, "Strive to enter in at the strait gate"?

May not the defenders of the faith learn a lesson from the structure of the Scriptures and the example of the founder of the religion which they essay to defend? Perhaps the cause would be benefited by a little more of the *fortiter in re* and a little less of the *suaviter in modo*. If the Bible is the word of God, the Christian can afford to stand by it from beginning to end; indeed,

he cannot afford to do less. If, however, it is not the word of God, the more quickly it is thrown entirely overboard, the better. In either case, half-way allegiance is the poorest policy.

There are some minds for whom this species of speculation has peculiar fascination. Before becoming intoxicated with it, it is well to look ahead and see the terminus of the path which seems so inviting and innocent in the beginning.

If the reader will consult the practical issue of the various popular and apparently plausible theories, he will discover that however innocuous their beginnings appear, their issues are perilous. However compromising *they* are, logic is uncompromising; these unguarded conciliations, so heedlessly given and so laboriously defended, are the beginnings of a course of reasoning the end of which is oftentimes fatal. They are but the premises of conclusions from which the devout believer would shrink in horror. The enemies of the faith are not slow to perceive this and to press such conclusions to the detriment of the cause. Theoretical and harmless as they seem, they soon become intensely practical. He who accepts their guidance may find, alas! too late, that they lead him to an empty grave, and can but exclaim in the anguish of despair, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him."

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

ARTICLE III.

ELECTION.

The doctrine of Election has in the ears of many persons a very harsh sound, because not viewed by them in its true light. It will not do to compare God with ourselves. We must not divest him of sovereignty, nor seek to limit his authority over his creatures, nor forget that he has a right to make one vessel to honor and another to dishonor. The difficulty with opponents of the doctrine of election frequently is, that they either do not perceive or do not feel that men are condemned rebels, having no title to God's mercy. They seem not to be aware that the Almighty is under no sort of obligation to extend favors to sinful man, and that if one of the fallen race be saved it must be only through infinite compassion on the part of the sovereign Jehovah. The doctrine of election is the doctrine of free grace.

The Apostle Paul tells Timothy (2 Tim. i. 9) that "God hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." Here is the doctrine of electing grace. God has saved his people, calling them with a holy calling, and that not according to their works. They were chosen of God, not from any merit foreseen in them, but according to his own purpose and grace. The idea of their salvation originated with God. The ground of it was in him. Free and sovereign grace chose them for its object. It was given to them in Christ Jesus, and that before the world began. So then salvation was provided in the mind and purpose of God for his people before they were created, before they began to act as free agents.

But let us proceed to the examination of this subject under the direct light of the word of God. Our *first* endeavor will be to show *that this doctrine is true*. And this we shall hope to establish by the use of two arguments. (1.) The doctrine is found in Scripture. See Acts xiii. 48: "And when the Gentiles heard this they were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord: and as many

as were ordained to eternal life believed." The number that believed was limited to the number that had been ordained to eternal life. See 2 Thess. ii. 13: "Because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation." See also Romans ix. 11: "For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth." Also look at the 17th and 18th verses: "For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." Consider also Ephesians, i. 4. 5.: "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will."

These passages of Scripture we deem sufficiently specific on this subject to prove the doctrine incontrovertibly. And to what higher authority can we go to establish any doctrine? Would we resort to human reason or to the corrupt desires of men, rather than the revealed will of God? All the particular predictions respecting the people of God prove this doctrine. Wherever the future prosperity of the Church and its final triumph is asserted the principle of election is involved.

(2.) Again, this doctrine is proved from the perfections of God. All men must admit that God is infinite in all his perfections. This is declared by the word of God, and it is the language of all nature around us. If this is true, then God has all wisdom and knowledge. His knowledge extends to every minutia of all his works. Everything from the first has been ordered by infinite wisdom, so that there is no need of alterations or amendments in the original plans which God has devised in carrying on his works. They are just such as he intended them to be from the first, and they are now and ever will be according to his direction. God has all power and is able to execute his plans according to his original intention. They cannot be otherwise than he

intended them, or he must be impotent. He has not made any alterations, for then he would not be immutable, and it would also argue imperfection in his original design. For instance, God determines to create a world for his own glory, and devises a plan. Now if everything does not come to pass in that plan according to his first intention, God was either unable to execute his intention, or his plan was imperfect. Either of these conclusions is absurd and sinful. If anything took place or entered into the plan which God did not intend, then God did not know this before, or he could not prevent it. If God, then, is a perfect God, all things have and will come to pass according to the counsel of his own will.

God must have seen the final end of all things before creation. No man, it seems, would deny this truth. But, if this be true, then he must necessarily have beheld every circumstance that was to intervene between the beginning and the end. He must have seen all the causes which were to operate in bringing about the grand consummation. Great ends are brought about by many small and complicated causes. But if one of the small causes is wanting, the whole work may be changed in its operation, and a very different end may be produced from what was first intended. God knew that some would be saved and some lost. He knew who they were, by what means they would be saved, and how the means would operate. And as God has the ordering of all things, none would be saved without him. It is his grace that saves any.

In the *second* place, we shall show that this doctrine is *consistent with justice and goodness*.

No sinner has a right to be saved. It would be absurd to say that a rebel against God is entitled to his favor or approbation. As sinners, all men are under the sentence of condemnation, and justly deserve everlasting punishment. They are not able to restore themselves to the favor of God, neither if they were able are they willing. Justice requires that they should perish. God was, in the first place, under no obligations to make an atonement for our fallen race. It was infinite mercy in him to make any provision for our deliverance. All that are saved, therefore, through

the atonement, are saved by sovereign grace. Salvation is great mercy to those that are saved, and no injustice to those who perish. If all would have been justly banished forever from the presence of God without the atonement, the salvation of a part thought it is no injustice to the rest. Mercy to some is no injustice to others. This is especially true when we remember that sinners are averse to pardon through a crucified Saviour. Let us endeavor to illustrate this by example. Suppose a monarch makes a feast to which he invites his subjects. The monarch knows beforehand that all the people of his realm have an unreasonable prejudice against him, and will not come to the feast. Notwithstanding, he makes all things ready and invites them indiscriminately. Not one man comes to his entertainment. It is not the monarch's fault, he has done his part. Their not coming grows out of a deep-rooted dislike of him. They were not entitled to his favor in the first place, and in the second they reject and treat with contempt his offered kindness. Every man must say that the monarch might in justice cut them off from his favor forever. But he loves his subjects, and feels anxious to favor them. He would see them comfortable and happy. He is determined to have some of them at his feast, and condescends to go personally and persuade a portion of them to lay aside their hatred and come and partake of his bounty. He is not bound to go to any of them. If he visits a few, this does not lay him under obligations to the rest. His mercy and goodness to some does not entitle the rest of the undeserving to his favor. This is especially true when all might have enjoyed his favor, if they had such a disposition. The invitation was sent to all and that honestly.

Now God in great mercy to our race has, through the death of his beloved Son, made an atonement which is rich and full. It is sufficient in value to redeem a lost world, and he freely offers salvation. He calls upon men everywhere to repent and believe the gospel. But men are totally depraved, and not one will of himself choose to be saved by Christ. The human race to a man rejects the gospel, and that, too, because of their enmity to God. Now, what does God do farther? He determines never-

theless to save a part of the family of man. He sends down the Holy Spirit, and subdues the opposition which exists against himself and inclines some sinners through love to him to embrace the gospel. God is not bound to overcome any prejudice that may exist against himself, and whenever he does it, it is an exhibition of great mercy on his part. We see then that sinners perish in their own wickedness. It is their own fault. They reject offered mercy. God saves some through his special grace, and condemns others to endless perdition through his strict justice.

In the *third* place, this doctrine is not *inconsistent with free agency*. On the contrary, the agency of man is involved in his happiness or misery. God addresses men as free moral agents. He calls upon them to repent, to believe, to seek, and to knock. Salvation is promised to none but those who will obey him and embrace the gospel. If God leaves men to act under the influences of their own corrupt hearts, they will freely and perseveringly continue in impenitency. On the contrary, if he regenerates their hearts, they will freely embrace the gospel. If a man finds that the truth of God's word produces no effect upon his agency, so as to lead him to believe and repent willingly, he has no right to expect to be saved. God declares that such shall perish.

Again, the doctrine of election does not hinder men from believing. It is not this doctrine that prevents men from embracing the gospel, but it is their own corrupt hearts. Election must have the very opposite tendency. It must lead men to despair of themselves, and hope in God through Christ, the only scriptural ground of hope. Suppose there were an army on the bank of a river, and they found that the enemy, in far superior force, was just behind them and would destroy every one that remained on that side of the river. Suppose they were reminded that if they attempted to swim the stream, some would perish and some escape. Still, would not every man plunge into the water without hesitation? If they remained on the bank, all must inevitably perish or be captured; if they attempted to swim, some would be saved. The Bible teaches that some are saved and some lost. None are saved who neglect entirely the means of God's appointment; some of those who use them are certainly saved. Will not every man

commence the work? Will not all who understand and believe this doctrine use the language of the penitent believer:

"I can but perish if I go;
I am resolved to try:
For if I stay away, I know
I must forever die."

Again, the man who determines to do nothing because of election, perverts the doctrine.

Election is not intended to excite the resentment of men. It is designed to encourage them to come directly to God through Christ for salvation. Sinners are plainly informed that they are in a helpless condition, and that their whole and only dependence for help is in God. This is a doctrine of grace, and ought to be received as such. It informs sinners that God in his mercy and goodness does save some, and that none are able or willing to save themselves. Not knowing whom God will bless, all are encouraged to seek his favor. God calls upon all men everywhere to repent and believe the gospel; and promises that he that seeks shall find, and to him that knocks it shall be opened.

Again, if we could convince men that they were dependent upon the electing grace of God for salvation, they would give up self-dependence and their own works, and go to God for help.

This seems to be the great difficulty in the way to the conversion of sinners. They cannot dispossess themselves of self-dependence. They cannot be made to believe that they are lost and ruined, and must forever remain so if God does not save them independently of their own merit. We need not fear, if we convince men of the truth of the doctrine of election, that they will fold their hands and do nothing. Those who do not believe the doctrine may present it as an excuse for their not seeking the favor of God; but those men who truly believe it at heart can never rest satisfied until they obtain some evidence of their being interested in God's elect. Conviction as to the truth of this doctrine, it seems to us, must needs strike men with immediate alarm and throw them into a state of despair as to their obtaining salvation by their own works; and would lead them, like the humble convicted publican, to say, God be merciful to us sinners.

And then they would seek salvation in the Lord Jesus Christ according to God's appointment.

This doctrine a humiliating one. Sin is the cause of any of the human family's perishing. The fact that some are lost notwithstanding the plan of redemption, is an evidence that we are obstinate sinners. All the human family justly deserve to be banished forever from the presence of God. Even those that are saved have not one particle of merit, and have not the least claim upon the mercy of God. And shall we not feel humbled when we take such a view of our race as this? To discover that our sin is so degrading and so criminal as to deserve eternal punishment; to find that it is of such a deep dye that nothing less than the blood of Christ can atone for it; and after all, to see that our depravity is so deep-rooted that even when salvation has been purchased at so dear a rate, no man will of himself accept of it, is sufficient to sink us into self abhorrence and disgust. We have great reason to cast ourselves low at the foot of the cross.

This doctrine ought to drive us from every other dependence to the mercy of God through Christ. The man who believes this doctrine can no longer have any confidence in himself. He will at once give up all self-dependence. He will feel that none are able or willing to help him but God. His consciousness of guilt will convince him that God cannot extend mercy to him consistently except through the mediation of Christ. This will be his only hope. So long as a man feels that he has strength and ability himself, he will never go to Christ. Before the sinner will believe on the Son of God for salvation, he must be brought to despair of every other dependence.

This doctrine gives all the glory of our salvation to God. This is a strong evidence of the truth of this doctrine. It exalts God to the highest honor and glory, and sinks man into the lowest depths of shame. Man will deserve no praise for his having been saved. On the contrary, he will be engaged in giving all the glory to God. That grace which extended to his case will be a theme of an endless song of praise. If God had not had thoughts of mercy towards him, he must have perished. If God had not pursued him in his mercy, he would never have accepted offered

pardon. Surely the heart of every Christian must expand in love and gratitude to God when he contemplates the infinite and special love of God towards him. The man who knows the perverseness of his own heart, and sees and feels that God has subdued and sanctified it through the influences of his Spirit, must be filled with love and gratitude. He must be ever willing to join in the song of glory to the Lamb.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CONVERSION AND RESTORATION OF
THE JEWS.

It cannot be denied that the Scriptures teach that a time is coming when the Jews shall generally acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah—a time when it will be more difficult to find a Jew who is not a Christian, than it is now to find a Christian who is a Jew. But the future general conversion of the Jews, as taught in the Scriptures, is one thing; the future restoration of the Jews, as a distinct and separate nation, to the land of Palestine, is quite a different thing. The one does not follow as a consequence of the other, as many persons seem to suppose. In regard to these questions, which are so entirely distinct from each other, there is much confusion of ideas; and out of this confounding of two very different things much error has arisen, and is constantly being propagated.

It will be of great value to all honest seekers after the truth, especially in view of some questions which are at present subjects of earnest controversy, and which are greatly agitating the minds of many thoughtful persons, if what the Scriptures teach in regard to these two questions, can be distinctly set forth; and if it can be shown that questions, which at first sight seem to be so intimately involved in each other, really have no necessary connexion, either logically or as matters of revelation. It is especi-

ally important to have some clear, certain, and well defined view of the doctrine of Scripture concerning the second question, viz.: as to whether the Jews shall be restored, as a distinct and separate nation, to their ancient country. This question is of the greater interest, because of the bearing which it has upon the Pre-Adventist controversy, which, from age to age, has more or less agitated the Church; which has produced more than one schism in the Church, and which, in recent times, has been carried on with an earnestness and bitterness greatly disproportioned to the importance of the question itself as an article of either faith or practice. In fact, as regards the whole Premillenarian or Pre-Adventist controversy, let it be settled either way, it may still be asked, What has been gained in the way of growth in grace, or for advancing the life of God in the soul, or for elevating the standard of practical piety among believers?

It cannot be questioned that every truth revealed in God's word is important, and it is plain that all of his people should diligently search the Scriptures, that they may know the truth, for the truth shall make them free. The general proposition, moreover, cannot be denied: that in proportion to the clearness of our views of all revealed truth, will be the symmetry, proportion, and beauty of our Christian character, and the efficiency of our lives of Christian service. But all truths are not equally important. There are some subjects about which there may be the widest difference of opinion among the people of God, and yet neither of the differing parties be worse or better than the other, either as to present attainments in the spiritual life, or as to future rewards in glory.

It may well be asked, therefore, in regard to the practical bearing of the whole Pre-Adventist dispute, What good can come of it? Suppose two persons, both of whom have really and truly fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before them in the gospel; both believing, with like precious faith, in Jesus Christ as the only Saviour of sinners. Now suppose that one of the persons believes in Pre-Adventism and the other does not; what advantage has the one over the other? Pre-Adventism is true or it is not. If it is true, is he who believes it not, thereby any

worse than the other? or is he who believes it, consequently any better Christian than the other? Is there anything in the bearings of the question, either as a matter of faith or practice, and especially as regards its influence on the every-day life of the Christian, which gives the Pre-Adventist a superiority, in any way, over his Christian brother, or which makes the one a more active and useful servant of Christ than the other? These questions ought to be deeply pondered by those who make this the leading thought of New Testament revelation, and who think that a pure gospel cannot be preached unless their notions concerning the second coming of Christ are made both the warp and woof of all gospel ministration.

It would be well for those who make a belief or disbelief in Pre-Adventism the shibboleth by which to test, not only the soundness in the faith, but the reality of the piety of their brethren, to remember how the Apostle Paul once disposed of this question. He says, when writing to the Thessalonians upon this very subject: "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent [*i. e.*, get any advantage over] them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain [unto the coming of the Lord] shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with these words" (1 Thess. iv. 15-18).

Now, in this passage, the Apostle plainly teaches, amongst other things, that the dead in Christ, many of whom had probably never heard or thought of the second coming of Christ, and who, therefore, could not have had any theory in regard to it, should not be any worse off than those who should actually be alive at his coming; and that those who were still alive at the time of the Apostle's writing were not to trouble themselves with the question as to whether he was to come quickly or not, but were to comfort one another with the thought, that, whether they died before he came or were alive at the time of his coming, they should

alike be forever with their Lord. In neither event should one gain any advantage over, or be excelled by another, where both alike were true believers in Jesus.

If, therefore, there can be no difference as to the future rewards of God's believing people, whether they are believers in Pre-Adventism or not; if the belief or disbelief in this theory does not make Christians better or worse, or necessarily detract from or add to their faithfulness in the discharge of duty, or to their growth in grace or increase of Christian activity in this world; it may well be asked, Why make the subject a matter of controversy at all? In answer to this pertinent question, it is sufficient to say, that the fact is, that many of those who advocate the doctrines of Pre-Adventism, assume to have attained, in consequence of their belief, such a superiority over their brethren; make such lofty pretensions to superior learning; speak in terms of such pious deprecation concerning those who differ from them, and frequently bring such grave and sweeping charges against those ministers of the gospel who do not make this subject the staple of their preaching; and, besides, exhibit towards all other Christians so much of the "Stand aside, for I am holier than thou" disposition, that the opponents of Premillenarianism are constantly compelled to enter the lists of discussion, not only to vindicate themselves, but also to show that a knowledge of the true principles of biblical interpretation is not confined to the Pre-Adventist champions, and that a saving knowledge of the truth will not die with its advocates. When, therefore, those who do not believe in this doctrine, are, in fidelity to their Divine Master, forced into such a controversy, it is not surprising that they sometimes "carry the war into Africa," with a determination which fills their antagonists with holy horror, and such a wholesome fear of dreadful disaster to their pet theory and darling system as to cause them to put on the air of persecuted martyrs.

The controversy is one which has over and over again been forced upon the Church, and in recent times it has, from various causes, gained such a factitious importance, exhibited such a virulence of proselytism, and put on a dress of such magnificent pretensions, that no lover of the truth can remain indifferent to

it, or shrink away with apathetic unconcern, from its assaults, assumptions, and encroachments.

Now, as to what the Scriptures teach concerning the first question we are to consider, viz., the future general conversion of the Jews, there is a passage in the Epistle to the Romans, which settles this question beyond all controversy. The whole argument of the Apostle in this passage turns upon the fact of such conversion, which he asserts and proves by more than one citation from the Old Testament prophecies, which he quotes as referring to and predicting this blessed result. He says: "For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits: that blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved: as it is written, There shall come out of Sion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob: for this is my covenant with them when I shall take away their sins. As concerning the gospel, they are enemies for your sakes; but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes. For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance" (Rom. xi. 25-29).

Here the Apostle distinctly declares that there is a future period when all Israel shall be saved. The rejection of Israel had been general, but never universal. There was always a remnant according to the election of grace. But this general rejection is to continue until the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in. Then the people of Israel shall also be brought in, and then there shall no longer be any distinction of Jew and Gentile, but all shall be one in Christ Jesus.

But no one will contend that there is any necessary or logical connection between the general future conversion of the Jews, and their restoration, as a distinct nation, to their ancient country. Without some direct, special, and unmistakable revelation to that effect, we would, on the contrary, be entitled to argue that such a restoration must be impossible. For, as the conversion of the Jews must evidently take place by producing in them like precious faith with that of the Gentiles who believe in Christ, there must be necessarily a merging of them as Christians with

the Gentiles, or of the Gentiles with them, and a consequent abolishing of all national distinctions, as indicating any superiority of some Christians over others. In fact the Apostle distinctly asserts this, not only in the passage already quoted, but also in Rom. x. 12, where he says, "For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him." And as regards this matter of conversion, in Col. iii. 11, he says, "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all and in all." And again, in Gal. iii. 28, we read, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." There are various other passages in the New Testament to the same effect; all showing that under the gospel dispensation, the distinction of privileged races or nations is entirely done away—and the only Israel of God which by him is recognised as such, comprises all those, and those only, who believe in his Son. So far, therefore, as the matter of conversion is concerned, we have as much right to expect from anything taught in the New Testament as a consequence of such conversion, that the Gentiles will be settled in the land of Canaan, as we have to look for a restoration of the Jews, as a distinct nation, to that land. It does not at all follow, that because a time shall come, when the Jews shall generally become Christians, they shall therefore be restored as a separate and distinct nation, or a peculiar people of God, to the land promised to their fathers. A restoration to their native land is not necessary in order to complete their restoration to the favor of God. Their future conversion may take place without any such local restoration. It is very surprising how the truth has been obscured by the constant confounding of these two questions. One of them has often been brought forward as a proof of or a consequence of the other; yet it must be apparent to the most careless thinker, that they have no necessary logical connection whatsoever. It may be true, as both the Old Testament and New Testament Scriptures distinctly teach, that there shall be a future general conversion of the Jews; but we must look for independent evidence before we

can conclude that the Scriptures also teach a future restoration of the Jews, as a distinct nation, to the land of Palestine. The conversion of a scattered and apostate race does not involve a restitution to that race of all their ancient and peculiar circumstances, either political or local.

The future general conversion of the Jews being freely admitted, and having been fully established as a truth undoubtedly taught in the Scriptures, let us now see whether there is any independent evidence to show that the Jews shall also, at any future period in the history of the Church, be reëstablished in their native land. This question is the more important, not only because of its deep intrinsic interest, but also because of its bearing upon the Pre-Adventist controversy, to which due attention shall be given hereafter. For the present, it will better advance the interests of truth, to consider the question as one which is to be received or rejected according to the teaching of Scripture, irrespective of any after inferences or uses which may be drawn from it, or to which it may be applied.

The simple question which we have now to consider is this, viz., Do the Scriptures teach that, at any future period, the Jews, as a separate and distinct nation, shall be restored to the land once occupied by their fathers ?

In seeking to settle this question, the first thing that strikes us, is the total silence of the New Testament upon this subject. Of course, it is not argued that this silence is, of itself, a conclusive answer against the restorationist; but when we remember that we must naturally look to the New Testament for all important particulars concerning the future condition of the New Testament Church, there is a significance in this silence which cannot be overlooked; and which, taken in connection with other undisputed facts, raises a presumption, which, if it does not amount to a demonstration, does at least make it imperatively necessary that the affirmant in this case shall give some satisfactory explanation of a silence so strange. The restorationist must show why it is that no mention is made by our Saviour or his apostles of what, if true, must have been a matter of great in-

terest to the whole Church, and of special importance to the Jewish people.

Our Saviour and his apostles predict with great clearness and precision the destruction of Jerusalem and the utter dispersion of the Jewish nation; and, also, the discontinuance of the ceremonial system of the old dispensation, and they show that all this was to take place in fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies. They teach and show that the establishment of the gospel dispensation presupposes and necessitates the waxing old and vanishing away of the dispensation which preceded it; that the old was only a type of the new; that the new was to be the glorious development, enlargement, and complete fulfilment of all that was typified in the old. But they never give the slightest intimation that there was to be a revival or restoration of any of the peculiar and distinctive features of the old economy. The reason of this is plain. Every one must see that a type and its anti-type cannot subsist and be in force at the same time. Besides, if ever any part of the old dispensation or economy, after having been abolished, was again to be revived, the New Testament writers must not only have been cognisant of so important a fact, but we cannot suppose that they would have withheld the knowledge of it from those to whom, if it had been any part of God's purpose of grace, that knowledge must not only have been on many accounts very important, but must also have been a great stimulus and encouragement. It will be seen at once, that such a purpose revealed to them, and such a hope set before them, must have had a controlling influence upon the people of God, especially upon the believing Jews. But the gospel dispensation, and the dispensation which foreshadowed, prefigured, and typified it, cannot be supposed to be in force at one and the same time without doing violence to the laws of thought, of logic, and of common sense, and running counter to the whole tenor of New Testament revelation. One dispensation must give way to the other. If the gospel dispensation superseded that which went before it, as the sacred writers distinctly and abundantly teach, then, if any part of the old dispensation is to be revived, the gospel dispensation must itself, in turn, be so far superseded.

And if such were to have been the case, we can no more conceive that the original promulgators and heralds of the gospel would have concealed the fact, than we can conceive that they could have been ignorant of it. But a restoration of the Jews, as a distinct nation, to the land of Palestine, would be, in so far, a return to the dispensation which has been superseded by the gospel;—if, therefore, it had been a part of God's purpose of grace, it must have been known to our Saviour and to his inspired and accredited ambassadors; and, if known, they could not have fully proclaimed the truths relating to the scheme of redemption without giving some intimation of the fact that there should be such a restoration. If it had been known to them, their silence concerning it is therefore not only incomprehensible, but it is actually misleading, and lays their ministry open to the suspicion of deficiency and imperfection. But let it be remembered, that the New Testament will be searched in vain for any intimation that there is to be a restoration of the Jewish people, as a distinct and separate nation, to the land occupied by them before the dispersion. The inference from this silence, against such a restoration, is therefore well nigh irresistible.

Now, it may be replied to all this, that a sufficient reason for this silence is found in the teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures. For, it may be argued, that the prophecies of the Old Testament so clearly and repeatedly foretold the final restoration of the Jews to their native land, and these predictions were so well known to the people, that no one ever doubted that the restoration would be accomplished;—therefore, it was not at all necessary to reassert a fact which was so generally recognised, and considered as settled and undisputed. Consequently, so far from this silence being an evidence against the restoration, it is, on the contrary, one of the strongest proofs in favor of it. That is to say, the truth was so clearly taught in the Old Testament Scriptures that it required not even the slightest confirmation or re-statement in the New. This answer seems, at first sight, both plausible and convincing; but upon examination, it will be found to be a begging of the very question at issue. Besides, it will be shown that it proceeds upon an entirely erroneous principle of

prophetic interpretation, and that, if it proves anything for the restorationist, it proves too much. Let us turn then to the evidence. Let us examine the prophecies relating to this matter. There are many referring to the point under discussion. It will be sufficient to consider one or two of those which seem to foretell in the strongest and clearest manner such a restoration as that which is contended for.

It ought, however, to be noted, that there is a class of prophecies which speak of a return and resettlement of the Jews in their own land, which evidently refer to their delivery from a then present or from a future captivity, and which have long since had their fulfilment. Such, for example, are many of the prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others. More particularly in Jeremiah xvi. 14, 15, we have the following explicit statement, viz.: "Therefore, behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that it shall no more be said, The Lord liveth that brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt: but, The Lord liveth that brought up the children of Israel from the land of the north, and from all the lands whither he had driven them; and I will bring them again into their land that I gave unto their fathers." Similar predictions are found in the 24th, 30th, and 32d chapters of Jeremiah, and also in the 43d and 44th, and various other chapters of Isaiah—all of which prophecies relate to a deliverance and restoration long since accomplished; but there is no reference in any of their prophecies to a restoration which was to follow the dispersion after the coming of Messiah. Yet even such prophecies as these, wrested from their connexion by the superficial or prejudiced reader, have often been cited as if they could only refer to the final and permanent restoration of the Jews to their ancient country.

But there are other prophecies which undoubtedly refer to a time long after the coming of Messiah and establishment of his kingdom, and to the close of the gospel dispensation, and which plainly have reference to God's dealings with his ancient people, after the predicted total destruction of Jerusalem and utter dispersion of the Jewish nation; prophecies, moreover, which are couched in terms almost precisely similar to those already quoted,

and which still speak of a gathering of the ancient people into their own land, and speak of this gathering as final and permanent. The decision of the question under discussion is therefore to be determined by the answer to another question, viz. : *How are these prophecies to be interpreted?*

Let us take, by way of illustration, the prophecy in the 12th chapter of Zechariah, which will probably be admitted by the advocates of the theory of restoration to be one of the strongest and clearest proofs that in the latter days the Jews, restored to their own land, shall hold a permanently separate position in the Church. It is not necessary to quote the chapter entire. It can easily be referred to; and any one who will read it carefully, must at once admit that if this prophecy is to be interpreted literally, the question is decided in favor of the restorationist. There are also, be it remembered, many other prophecies of a similar nature, apparently just as strong and clear as this, in support of the same theory. And it must be said about all of these prophecies, that, if the only true principle of prophetic interpretation is that the words used must always be taken in the literal and obvious sense, then the question in dispute must be determined affirmatively, and we must accept all the consequences of such a conclusion. But if this principle of interpretation is adopted, and is to be applied in the case of these prophecies, let us follow it out and see to what results it will lead. If we adopt the principle, we must accept its legitimate results.

There is a canon of interpretation which, if it never has been formulated before, is so plain that, as soon as stated, it will commend itself to the common sense of all students of the prophecies. It is this, viz. : Where the leading features or principal points in any prediction are to be understood in a literal sense, then all the minor points subordinate to the principal ones in that particular prophecy, must also bear a literal interpretation. Now, if this rule should be applied to the prophecy under consideration, it will be seen that the prophecy proves too much; for such results will follow that not even the restorationist can accept them. For example, if the prophecy is to be taken in a literal sense as to what it says concerning a restoration of the Jews to their own

land, it must also be taken in a literal sense as to what it says concerning the minor points which are to accompany that restoration. We cannot, without violating all sound rules of interpretation—without an arbitrary handling of the word of God deceitfully, and without a complete stultification of ourselves—say that one part of what is here predicted concerning the restoration means exactly what it says, and another part of it does not exactly convey such meaning.

But if this and other similar prophecies prove that in the latter days the Jews shall be permanently restored to their own land, as a nation separate and distinct from all other believers in Christ, then they also prove that the old organisation as to tribes and families shall be restored; that the material temple shall be rebuilt in a style of higher magnificence than ever before; that the Levitical priesthood shall be revived; that there shall be a re-institution of the bloody sacrifices and pompous ceremonial of the ancient worship; and that all the nations of the earth shall go up every year, to Jerusalem to worship, and to keep the Feast of Tabernacles. Now is there any one who does not see how contrary all this is, not only to the general tenor, but to the express teaching of the New Testament Scriptures—yea, and how it sets the Old Testament in opposition to itself? On this point Dr. Patrick Fairbairn has some words which are so pertinent and forcible that it is scarce possible to conceive how they can fail to carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind. He says: “The notion (*i. e.* of the restorationist), in this form of it, stands in direct antithesis to the whole genius of the New Testament dispensation, and to some of the most explicit statements, also, of New Testament Scripture. If anything be plain in the gospel of Jesus Christ, it is, that everything there assumes a spiritual character and a universal aspect, as contradistinguished from the local and fleshly. Foreseeing this, the prophet Malachi had said that in the coming age, ‘incense and a pure offering should in every place be offered unto the Lord;’ and our Lord himself announced to the woman of Samaria the approaching abolition of all local distinctions. ‘The hour cometh when neither in this mountain, nor yet in Jerusalem, shall men worship the Father;’ that is, shall

not regard worship rendered in those places as more sacred or more acceptable than worship paid elsewhere. The law with all its limitations of time and place, its bodily lustrations and prescribed services, was for the nonage of the Church, and in form falls away, remains only in spirit, when the Church reaches her maturity. Such unquestionably is the argument of the Apostle in his Epistle to the Galatians, and it would surely be to run counter to all sense and reason, if, when the farthest extreme from the nonage condition is attained, the nonage food and discipline should return." (Fairbairn's *Typology*, Vol. I. Appendix E, p. 396.)

It may be added as a further proof, that this was undoubtedly the teaching of Paul, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews he distinctly declares that the leading feature of the old economy, *i. e.*, the system of sacrifices in atonement for sin, was done away with at the coming of Christ. For in comparing and contrasting the sacrifices of the Mosaic dispensation with the sacrifice of Christ, he says: "For by one offering, he (Christ) hath perfected forever them that are sanctified (or the redeemed ones)." From this and from many other passages in the same Epistle, it is clear that the Apostle considered that no more bloody sacrifices were to be offered, or ought to be offered, after the one great, all-sufficient, atoning sacrifice of the Lord Jesus. Heb. x. 14.

There is another passage in the works of the distinguished author already quoted, which may well be pondered, as bearing directly upon the point under discussion. In his work on Prophecy, he says: "Now prophecy is not to be verified by halves: it is either wholly true in the sense in which it ought to be understood, or it is a failure. And since God's providence has rendered the fulfilment of the parts referred to manifestly impossible on the literal principle of interpretation, it affords conclusive evidence that on this principle such prophecies are misread. In what it calls men to believe, it does violence to their reason; and it commits the word of God to expectations which never can be properly realised." (Fairbairn on Prophecy, p. 281.)

The fact is that those who contend for the principle of historical literalism as the only sound maxim of prophetic exegesis, are not

only compelled constantly to contradict themselves and to overturn their own theories and deny their own conclusions, but they are also forced to reject many things which are legitimate consequences and conclusions from the principle. They not only find themselves constantly proving too much for their pet theories to bear, but they also put a weapon into the hands of Jewish unbelievers, which is, as against themselves, trenchant and irresistible. For, if all the prophecies concerning the Messiah himself are to be taken only in a strictly literal sense, then the Jew is right when he says that Jesus of Nazareth cannot be that Messiah, and Messiah is yet to come. For Jesus of Nazareth never did, in any literal sense, as was predicted concerning Messiah, sit upon the throne of David. "He never did set up any Jewish kingdom, and instead of finding joy and peace and union from his presence, the Jewish people only then began to experience their greatest troubles and their widest dispersions." Yet the Evangelists declare that the very things here mentioned as predicted concerning the Messiah, found their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth. The principle of literal interpretation could not, therefore, even in his case, have been the only sound principle of prophetic interpretation.

No better service could be done for the Church of the present day, in which the loosest and wildest notions widely prevail upon this whole subject of the proper interpretation of the prophecies, than a restatement, in some popular form, of the true principles of prophetic exegesis, with full illustrations showing the application of those principles.

In default of any such thoroughly exhaustive treatise, the attention of the reader is called to a few maxims laid down by that prince of commentators and most profound of Biblical students, Dr. Addison Alexander. In the introduction to his work on *Isaiah* he says:

"1. All prophecies are not predictions, *i. e.*, all the writings of the prophets are not to be regarded as descriptive of future events. The contrary error, which has arisen chiefly from the modern and restricted usage of the word prophet and its cognate terms, has generated some of the most crude extravagances of prophetic exegesis. It has been shown already, by an historical and philological induction, that the scriptural

idea of prophecy is far more extensive, that the prophets were inspired to reveal the truth and will of God in reference to the past and present no less than to the future. In Isaiah, for example, we find many statements of a general nature, and particularly exhibitions of the general principles which govern the divine administration, especially in reference to the chosen people and their enemies or persecutors.

"2. All predictions or prophecies in the restricted sense, are specific and exclusive, *i. e.*, limited to one occasion or emergency, but many are descriptive of a sequence of events which has often been realised.

"3. All predictions, whether general or specific, are not to be literally understood. The ground of this position is the fact, universally admitted, that the prophecies abound in metaphorical expressions. To assert that this figurative character is limited to words and clauses, or at most to single sentences, is wholly arbitrary, and at variance with the acknowledged use of parables, both in the Old and New Testaments, in which important doctrines and events are presented under a tropical costume, throughout a passage sometimes of considerable length. These facts are sufficient to sustain the negative position, that the prophecies are not invariably clothed in literal expressions, or in other words, are not to be always literally understood.

"4. The prophecies are not to be always understood in a figurative or spiritual sense. The contrary assumption has engendered a vast motley multitude of mystical and anagogical interpretations, sometimes super-added to the obvious sense, and sometimes substituted for it, but in either case obscuring the true import and defeating the design of the prophecy. The same application of the laws of common sense and of general analogy which shows that some predictions must be metaphorical, shows that others must be literal.

"The prophecies, therefore, are not to be expounded on the general principle, that either a literal or a figurative sense must be assumed wherever possible.

"To set aside the obvious and strict sense wherever it may be done without absurdity, is forbidden by the very nature of the difference between literal and figurative language. That which is regular and normal must at times assert its rights, or it becomes anomalous.

"On the other hand, to claim precedence for the strict and proper sense in every case is inconsistent with the fact that symbols, emblems, images, and tropes, are characteristic of prophetic language. In a word, the question between literal and tropical interpretation is not to be determined by the application of invariable formulas.

"The question whether any prophecy is strictly a prediction, and if so, whether it is general or particular, literal or figurative, can only be determined by a thorough independent scrutiny of each case by itself in reference to form and substance, text and context, without regard to arbi-

trary and exclusive theories, but with due regard to the analogy of Scripture in general, and of other prophecies in particular, especially of such as belong to the same writer, or at least to the same period, and apparently relate to the same subject." Alexander on Isaiah, Introduction to Vol. I., pp. 17, 18.

If this article should serve no other purpose, it will not be without value for having called attention to these rules of prophetic exegesis. The controversy which is pending upon this whole subject threatens the Church with great disaster. Our younger ministers will be thrown into the thick of the fight and will have to bear the brunt of the battle. They will be better able to keep the banner of Truth afloat if they can rally round it fortified by principles of interpretation so sound and clear, and which are of such general application in the interpretation of so large a portion of the Word of God as the prophetic writings.

Dr. Alexander drew up these maxims with especial reference to his work on Isaiah; but the student will see at a glance, that, if well grounded, they are not to be restricted in their application to the writings of a single prophet, but must control the interpretation of prophecy in general.

As specially applicable to the question under discussion, the writer has ventured to formulate another canon of prophetic interpretation, which has already been suggested, viz.: Where the leading feature or principal points in a prediction are to be understood literally, the minor points, subordinate to the principal ones in that particular prophecy, must also have a literal interpretation.

Now, when this rule is applied to the prophecies which make mention of a restoration of the Jews in the latter days, it will follow, that if the leading fact of a restoration is to be taken literally in such predictions, the minor and subordinate facts connected with it must also be taken literally; and if so, then the restorationist theory is hampered with inferences, so far as it depends upon a strict and literal interpretation of the prophecies in which it is mentioned, which render it absurd, or impossible, or both impossible and absurd at the same time.

It is, for example, simply absurd, or worse than absurd, in the light of New Testament revelation, to suppose that there is ever

to be a renewal of the bloody sacrifices of the old dispensation at any period of the new. Such sacrifices were to cease, and did cease forever when the one great Sacrifice which they prefigured was offered up on Calvary. If other sacrifices are necessary since the one offering of Christ, then his sacrifice must have been defective, imperfect, or insufficient, and we must believe that the blood of Jesus Christ *cannot* cleans efrom all sin. Again, it is utterly impossible that the old arrangement of tribes and families shall ever be renewed as it formerly existed. Many of the tribes have totally disappeared. The families are scattered and broken up—many of them have entirely died out, and of those which remain the genealogical records have been lost or destroyed, so that such an arrangement in the old order is utterly impossible. Still further, it is both absurd and impossible to suppose that all the nations of the earth shall hereafter be required to go up every year to worship at Jerusalem and to keep the Feast of Tabernacles. Yet all these things the literal interpretation of the prophecies which speak of a restoration requires us to believe if we are to believe that the restoration itself is to be taken in a literal sense. The conclusion at which we arrive, therefore, is, that the Old Testament prophecies do not teach any such restoration of the Jews as that which is claimed; and that the New Testament, in which we must look for every essential and important particular concerning the future condition of the Church, being utterly silent as regards any such restoration, the theory cannot be true and must be given up. On every sound principle of disputation we might here rest the case, and say to the restorationist: Your claim or theory is not simply *not proven* by anything in the Old or New Testament Scriptures, but it is *disproven* by the constant and unbroken tenor of the teaching of both.

But it will be said, These prophecies are certainly not an utterly meaningless and vain collection of empty words, and if not, the fulfilment of them must as surely be looked for as that of any other predictions in the Word of God. How then are they to be interpreted? In what direction and upon what principles are we to look for their explanation? These are fair questions, and cannot be ignored in such a discussion as this. The answer

to them, however, does not require a very complicated or tedious process of investigation or induction. There are certain principles and facts which are applicable here, the truth of which is so well established, and which are brought out into so clear a light by the teaching of the New Testament, that the mere statement of them must carry conviction to the minds of all except of those who are determined to see in the Scriptures nothing which makes against their own preconceived notions, wishes, or prejudices.

It might be answered briefly and comprehensively to these questions, that if the prophecies under consideration will not bear a literal interpretation, they must be taken in a figurative or spiritual sense. And here the question arises, What consistent spiritual sense can be put upon these prophecies which will give us any satisfactory explanation of them?

Now, it is a fact which will not be disputed, that in the development of God's purpose of grace to a lost world, from the time of the calling of Abraham and the choice of his descendants as a peculiar people, to whom should be "committed the oracles of God," the covenant and promises were not restricted to the natural seed only of Abraham, but, from the first, looked forward to a spiritual seed of which the natural was the type. The distinct language of the first promise to Abraham is, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." This representative and typical character of the natural Israel is a prominent feature even of the old dispensation; and as they were themselves a type of the spiritual Israel, so also the inheritance which they were to possess was a type of that which should come into the possession of the whole Israel of God whom they prefigured. A thing is never a type of itself. And to say that the converted Jews, as a distinct nation, must in the latter days come into full and permanent possession of the land of Canaan because their former possession was incomplete and was typical of such a restoration, is to say that a thing is a type of itself, than which nothing can be more absurd. Besides, nothing is clearer from the general current and tenor of even Old Testament teaching, than that the natural Israel was typical of the spiritual Israel, and that the inheritance possessed by the former was typical of a far more

glorious inheritance destined to the latter. Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's day, and he saw it and was glad, although he never entered into actual possession of a foot of the land promised to him and to his seed. And we are told concerning the Old Testament saints, who all died in the faith, that in confessing that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth, they declared that they sought a better country, even a heavenly country, and a city which God hath prepared for them. Who, then, are the spiritual Israel? Can any reader of the New Testament hesitate to admit that, without any distinction of Jew or Greek, or any other distinction of race or nation, it comprises all true believers in the Lord Jesus Christ, these and these only?

In his "Outlines of Theology," p. 455, Dr. A. A. Hodge has thrown together the Scripture evidence upon this point. The passages to which he refers are, for convenience, here given *in extenso*, the particular references being placed in order at the close of the quotation.

"In the New Testament Christians are called Abraham's seed—'And if ye be Christ's then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise.' They are also called Israelites—'For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature. And as many as walk according to this rule, peace be on them and mercy, and upon the Israel of God.' In another place we have these conclusive words—'Wherefore remember . . . that at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world: But now in Christ Jesus, ye who sometime were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us: having abolished in his flesh the enmity even the law of commandments contained in ordinances: for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace: and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby: and came and preached peace to you which were afar off and to them which were nigh. For through him we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father. Now therefore ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God.' Christians are also said to be comers to Mount Zion. 'But ye are come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem,' etc. 'But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all.' Christians are also called the Circumcision. 'For we are the circumcision which wor-

ship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh.' 'In whom ye also are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ.' And again, Christians are called Jews. 'I know thy works, and tribulation, and poverty (but thou art rich) and I know the blasphemy of them that say they are Jews but are not, but are of the synagogue of Satan.' "

"The New Testament teaches us also that there is a Christian priesthood and spiritual sacrifices. 'Ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God by Jesus Christ.' 'But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people.' 'I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your reasonable service.'" Gal. iii. 29; Gal. vi. 15, 16; Eph. ii. 12—19; Heb. xii. 22; Gal. iv. 26; Phil. iii. 3; Col. ii. 2; Rev. ii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 5, 9; Rom. xii. 1.

Now it would seem to be impossible to misunderstand the bearing of this testimony of the New Testament Scriptures. It plainly teaches that under the gospel dispensation, so far as the people of God are concerned, there is to be no distinction of Jew or Greek, of race or nation, but that all are to be one in Christ Jesus. The prophecies, therefore, which refer to a restoration in the latter days must refer to the future condition of the whole Church of God, the spiritual Israel, of which the natural seed was the type, and to a destined inheritance of which that possessed by the natural Israel was also a type. Whenever reference was made in Old Testament times to the future condition of the Church, it could only be expressed in Old Testament phraseology, *i. e.*, "by means of those persons, places, and ordinances of the old economy which were typical of the new." The only consistent interpretation, therefore, which can be given of the prophecies which have been under consideration, is the spiritual, *i. e.*, that which regards them as predicting the future purity, extension, and prosperity of the whole Christian Church, the true Israel of God; and not that which confines them to a prediction of the mere local restoration of a small portion of that Church, *i. e.*, the converted Jews, to the land promised to their fathers. In other words, to adopt the language of Dr. Fairbairn, "the proper meaning of these prophecies, so far as they bear upon the

future of the Jews, is to be made good simply by the conversion of the people to the Christian faith, and their participation in the privileges and hopes of the Church of Christ;" in which we may add, they will stand, as believers, on precisely the same footing as all other believers. One of these privileges is unquestionably a sharing in the destined inheritance of the people of God, forfeited by the apostate Jews, but to which the converted Jews shall all be admitted. This restoration and readmission to forfeited privileges shall take place when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have been brought in, for then "all Israel shall be saved."

It is not at all necessary for the purposes of this argument to enter into a discussion concerning the nature or locality of that inheritance to which the believing Jews, as a part of the Church of God, shall be restored. It must undoubtedly be that of which their former inheritance, forfeited by unbelief, was the type. It will suffice for the present to say, that there is strong reason for believing that all the prophecies relating to this point, as well as all the other prophecies concerning the final future condition of the Church in respect to local habitation, shall find their complete fulfilment in the full and permanent possession by the Israel of God of the "new heavens and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness." In this, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who have never yet possessed the inheritance promised to them as well as to their seed, shall, with their spiritual seed, *i. e.*, all the saints of God redeemed in Christ Jesus, dwell forever in their glorified state, and so forever be with their Lord. Whilst we need not infer that the people of God, whom Christ has redeemed, shall be restricted for residence to any limited portion of the regions of the blessed, there is very strong evidence to show that a part, at least, of the final inheritance of the Israel of God is to be the very earth, regenerated and restored to far more than its pristine beauty, in which they sinned and toiled and suffered, but which with them, and for them, shall have been rescued and redeemed from the dominion of Satan and the taint of sin. Here, with him that loved them, and gave himself for them, they shall live and reign forever and forever. This is not mere speculation; yet it becomes us, upon this as upon all other points concerning

the unrealised future, not to attempt to "be wise beyond that which is written." However this question may be settled, it has been shown, if the reasoning of this article is at all valid, that neither the Old nor New Testament Scriptures give any warrant for the belief that there is, in the latter days, to be a permanent restoration of the Jews, as a distinct and separate nation, to the land of their fathers; and much less is there anything to prove that the converted Jews shall, in any future period of the Church, have any preëminence in honor or Christian influence over any other portion of the people of God.

The bearing of this discussion upon the Pre-Adventist or Pre-millenarian controversy is most important; and if the conclusions which have been reached are correct and legitimate, they will go far towards shaking the whole Pre-Adventist system of biblical interpretation, and towards showing, at least, how badly that system holds together when brought to the test of Scripture truth.

It is well known that hardly any two modern Pre-Adventists agree in regard to all the minor features of their system. A hundred different and conflicting notions have been, from time to time, put forth and defended by one or more of the advocates of the theory. But if, at any time, any of these notions should be exposed or exploded by being brought to the test of reason or common sense or Scripture, forthwith some other champion springs up to hurl the charge of ignorance or presumption at the assailant, and to show that the doctrine has been misunderstood. But nearly all the modern Pre-Adventists are strongly pronounced restorationists. It is a prominent and essential feature in nearly every school of modern Pre-Adventism, that in the latter days the Jews are, as such, to be restored to their own land; and that, as a nation, in the millennial times, they are to have a "certain preëminence in honor and Christian influence beyond what shall be possessed by any other people in Christendom." Now it is not asserted that the other points of the Pre-Adventist system must necessarily be untrue because this one is false. There might be no such restoration of the Jews as is claimed, and yet other points of Premillenarianism *might* be true. But when a school of theorists or thinkers makes so much of a

particular point in a system as is made of this, and when this is shown to be without foundation in reason or Scripture, we are entitled to argue that the whole system, of which this is so prominent a feature, and in which this feature is magnified into such importance by its advocates, is open to grave suspicions. Instead of being so palpably true that those are to be looked upon with pity or contempt who do not believe it, the system itself must be of exceedingly doubtful truth, one of the prominent and essential features of which can only be maintained by adopting principles of interpretation which have been shown to be utterly unsound. And, if the other points in the system depend upon similar principles of prophetic exegesis and biblical interpretation, then we are entitled to argue concerning it, "*Falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus.*"

EDWARD MARTIN.

ARTICLE V.

THE SABBATH OF THE STATE.

Circular of the "National Liberal League." 1878. 12mo., pp. 44. D. M. BENNETT, N. Y.

Third Annual Congress of the National Liberal League. Cincinnati, 1879. Pp. 115, 12mo. D. M. BENNETT, N. Y.

This infidel association has been for three years vexing the public horizon as an evil portent. The publications noted above are its authoritative exponents. The moral and religious complexion of the society may be seen in these facts: That Col. Robert Ingersoll, of Illinois, is the manifest coryphæus of the whole crew; that D. M. Bennett, the chosen publisher of these and all their other documents, is at this time in prison, under a conviction of the not too scrupulous courts of the United States, for violating their statutes against sending blasphemies and obscenities through the United States mails; that the most impious and blatant atheists in the country are members; that the foulest impieties seem always to have been most applauded in their

“congresses”; and that their first professed object is to drive the Bible and the Sabbath out of the land.

Another instructive feature of this agitation is, that the survivors of the original anti-slavery society, of Garrison and that ilk, now reappear in this atheistic movement, like uneasy corpses airing their unsavory persons from the grave. These, like Parker Pillsbury, and the President, Elizur Wright, expressly connect the present movement with the past, and claim for it the same success by the same means—thus verifying the truth that the abolition movement was and is essentially infidel and disorganising. This “League” scarcely disguises its communism and its assault on property. Its arguments are the very same by which the original abolitionists assaulted the constitution and laws which protected the property of the South. Thus again is illustrated the fact that abolitionism is virtual agrarianism. The new progeny of the old heresy will, in due time, convince the anti-slavery plutocracy of New England and Britain of their folly, by showing them that the same arguments which were suited to overthrow our right to the labor of our lawful bondsmen, are equally good to destroy their rights to their lands, factories, mines, ships, warehouses, and incomes.

Another lesson impressively taught by the new movement is the perilous and destructive nature of the political philosophy now in the ascendant in this country. The philosophy of this atheists’ league is precisely that briefly described in the last Number of this REVIEW, as underlying the demand for the ecclesiastical and social equality of women. It seeks authority by perverting those “glittering generalities,” to which the Declaration of Independence has familiarised the American ear; that “all men are by nature equal, and inalienably entitled to liberty,” etc.; that “all just government is founded in the consent of the governed”; and that taxation and representation should go together. In our last Number the distinction was drawn between the sense in which these propositions are true (in which they were held by the founders of our Republic), and that in which they are false. There is a sense in which men are naturally entitled to liberty; that is to say, to the privilege of doing, unimpeded by civil law, all

those things which they have a moral right to do. But in the sense of these radicals, with whom "liberty" means absolute independence of will to do whatever they please, no creature of God is "born free"; but all are by nature subject to his sovereign will, and to the civil, domestic, and ecclesiastical authorities under which his providence has placed them. There is a sense in which all rational men are equal, which is, that, however different the specific personal rights assigned by God and the laws to the superior and inferior ranks in civil society, the inferior has an ethical title to his smaller circle of privileges, identical with the title of the superior to his larger privileges. But in the sense of these radicals, men are not by nature equal, but are made by God endlessly unequal in their strength, ability, energy, sex, providential position, and consequently in their natural rights. All just government is founded in the consent of the governed, in this sense: that the commonwealth as a whole has an inalienable right to choose its own political connections, rulers, and forms of administration; that when these are imposed against the will of the commonwealth in all its orders and forms of expression, this is conclusive of their injustice. But the radical notion is, that allegiance originates in a "social contract" of individuals, so that it is unjust for a ruler to govern any soul who has not had an opportunity to vote for him. Whereas the simple fact is, that every soul is put under civil government by the ordinance of a sovereign God, without any option of his own. Radicalism holds that no one can be righteously taxed who does not vote. The founders of our States only asserted that maxim of the British constitution, that a parliament in London ought not to tax commonwealths in America which were unrepresented in it in any form.

Now, the two facts deserving of solemn attention from every thinking man, are these. Such is precisely the political philosophy which this "League" lays down as the basis of their whole structure, and on which they logically rear conclusions, the establishment of which would imply the utter and anarchical overthrow of American institutions; but such is also identically the philosophy of abolitionism, the philosophy implicitly held by the editors and politicians and party which have been dominant in

the country for nineteen years, and which is everywhere expounded as the doctrine of Republicanism. It is the philosophy of the frantic "leveller" Lilburn, whom the enlightened founders of English liberty in the days of the Commonwealth themselves put in the pillory and the prison, while they had his book burned by the common hangman, which is now everywhere preached and accepted in this country under the name of liberty. What can come of such inculcations? Whither must the people drift who receive them without question? This radical league tells us. From this philosophy they deduce women's suffrage, agrarianism, and an atheistic social order.

Another observation will strike the reader of these documents: that these abolitionists now with one mouth declare the condition of the Northern hireling laborer as far more oppressive than that of domestic slaves. Thus, p. 85, their condition is that of a "wages' slavery", under which they are "poor and down-trodden." P. 88. "The laboring classes are working under a despotism far more tyrannical than that of the slaves of the South." "The Republican party was grand enough to unshackle four millions of negro slaves; but now it is cruel enough to put these working classes under chains far more torturing than those borne by the blacks." P. 99. "On the one hand, the bonanza or railroad king of six millions of dollars a year, bribes corrupt politicians to keep his twenty or thirty thousand white slaves in subjection by the aid of unjust laws and bayonets; and on the other, the half-starved wage-slave exists on an average of one hundred and fifty to three hundred dollars a year." If, then, the special friends of hireling labor and apostles of abolition may be believed, all the truths uttered by Southern defenders are confirmed: that our system of labor was more humane than the hireling system substituted for it, and more promotive of the laborer's welfare; that domestic slavery was not the only form for subjecting the laborer to the will of his employer, but only one form among many, and perhaps the most philanthropic; and that the overthrow of Southern institutions would prove to be very far short of the real abolition of bondage.

But, in justice, it should be added, that the laboring classes in

the United States have doubtless real grievances. Not only is it inevitable that human nature, being what it is, greedy and selfish, shall view the enormous disproportion of conditions which has grown up in this country with discontent: it is, in a certain sense, just that it should. In an ethical point of view, the disparity is illegitimate. The gains of the great capitalists are inordinate, and the luxury and waste of their living mischievous and wicked. Legislation ought not to be so framed as to make these enormous accumulations, and this more than regal luxury, easy. Certain it is, that this condition of extreme inequality is not consistent with a permanent republican constitution of society. The communistic remedy will doubtless prove more fatal than the disease, especially to the poor, for whom it is pretended to be offered. But none the less does the fearful truth remain, that the present organisation of society and business is impossible as a permanency, and that this vast, festering, suffering proletariat, sinking ever deeper and deeper into vice, hatred, and destitution, and sundered more and more widely from every domestic tie with the employing class, by the hireling system, is not going to coexist peaceably beside this ruthless plutocracy, ever wresting the legislation of the country to pile up their invidious wealth higher, and to lavish it before greedy, starving eyes, more selfishly. The wealthy class in the North will be wise to read the handwriting on the wall—to moderate their aims, and to use the wealth already acquired more wisely and humbly. Else the reign of terror will come. It will not stay, indeed; for riches and intelligence, though cautious and in appearance cowardly, while the deadly issue is forming itself, yet always defend themselves successfully and conquer, when once it is inexorably joined. But *how* shall the fever-fit of communism pass? By the bayonet hired by riches? Or by a Christian, patriotic use of wealth, and a return to honest, equitable legislation and administration? History answers: probably not by the latter way. Then it must be ended by the former; and that means also the end of free and equal institutions, not only for the crushed proletariat, but for the whole society.

The Liberal League, while coquetting with the most outrageous communists, yet announce their "general object to be the *total*

separation of Church and State." They ground their movement in these facts: That the Constitution of the United States formally neither names nor recognises any God or religion as its basis of right, and that it forbids any establishment by the Government of any religion; that the most of the State constitutions are similar in this respect; and that the spirit of American institutions makes men of all religions and of no religion perfectly equal before the law. Hence they demand:

That all Church property shall be taxed like other property.

That education shall be committed to the State's control, shall be compulsory and universal, and shall be absolutely secularised; and every species of religious worship and inculcation excluded from all state schools, high and low.

That the religious oath shall be utterly banished, and replaced by a simple affirmation under the penalties of perjury.

That all Sabbath laws shall be absolutely repealed, and that no restriction shall exist preventing any act of government or secular pursuit of citizens on the holy day as on any other day. And the League ostentatiously employs Sunday as the day of its most noisy meeting.

That no government, State or Federal, shall concur in any religious act whatsoever, recognising any divine government, nor have any chaplaincy, nor appropriate any money to any pious use.

That the right of free utterance, by speech and publication, and through the United States mails, shall be restored to atheists and blasphemers, under the plea of liberty of speech and the press.

That women be invested with all the rights of voting and holding office possessed by men.

The League asserts, as its fundamental principle, that natural morals are a sufficient basis for secular society and guarantee of public order, prosperity, and righteousness. That is to say, it proposes to *reconstruct society on a merely atheistic basis*; and claims that the sacred name of *religious liberty* authorises their doing so.

It is evident that the issue will be practically joined with this atheistic party, first upon these two points: the secularisation of all state schools, and the repeal of all Sunday laws. Our subse-

quent discussion will be limited, for lack of space, to the Sunday question. This, however, will raise the main principles as to the nature of free civil government, upon which the whole movement turns. The public has been familiar with the infidel argument against Sunday laws of the state. Its whole force is in the assumption that Sunday is solely a Christian institution, and should therefore be left, like baptism and church-going, to the conscience and optional preference of those who desire to observe it. They say that as the state is a purely secular and non-Christian organism; and as State and Church are declared independent, and the Constitutions of the United States and the States forbid that any citizen shall be prejudiced in any way, in person or estate, on account of his religion or his non-religion, it is as unjust for the state to prevent any man's amusements or work on the Sabbath, when he believes in no Sabbath, as to fine or persecute him for his religious opinions.

This audacious argument has aroused a multitude of answers from the Christian side; some of which have not been either discreet or logical. It is obvious, at a glance, that with the atheist, the rationalistic Jew, the German infidel, and sometimes even the European Lutheran, any pious declamation concerning the reverence of our Christian fathers for the Lord's day and its supposed glories and sanctities count for nothing. If these assailants are to be silenced, it must be by other arguments than these. Some have reasoned, that the majority is entitled to rule; and because Sabbatarians are in the majority in the United States, they are entitled to make the minority respect their Sabbath. On this ground, whenever a state shall show a majority of atheists, it will be right for that government to abolish the Sabbath. Sometimes it is argued, that there is no injustice, because the Sabbath laws lay no restriction on the doings of the infidel but such as are laid on all the citizens. If the Protestants who use this sophism lived in a Popish state, where the laws compelled them to desist from legitimate labors and amusements on all those "saints' days" which we Protestants thoroughly disbelieve and despise, they would see little solace in the fact that their superstitious Popish neighbors all were idle on the same days. These Protestants

would find the intrinsic injustice in this, that the religious superstitions of others were made a pretext to restrain them, who believed them false and groundless, from acts to which they were naturally and morally entitled. This is precisely the ground assumed by our infidels against Sabbath laws of the state. We hear the argument, again, put thus: although Church and State are independent, yet the American is a Christian people. The country was settled by Christians. The great majority are Christians now. Hence it is right that the dissentient or the immigrant should submit to the Christian features of the society whose hospitality he receives. If he does not like them, let him go away. But unfortunately for this argument, it is the state which enforces these Sunday laws; and the state declares itself non-Christian, and it invites these dissentients to become citizens, covenanting with them solemnly that as citizens they shall incur no inequality or loss of civil right by reason of their religious views. Now, if a man has a natural and secular right to live without a Sabbath, this objection is formidable. Once more: it is argued, Christians have a civic right to observe the Lord's day, if they believe it their duty; and hence it is a merely secular duty of the state to stop all such employments and amusements of the unbelievers as would disturb the Christian observances. The infidel answers, that it is at least as much the business of the worshipper to take his pious assembly out of the way of the worldly one, the military band, or the clanging factory, as it is the business of the worldling to take his band or factory out of the way of the pious assembly. And this the more, because the infidel believes that the Sunday work and amusement are reasonable and useful, and the worship foolish and vain.

A more tenable plea is found in the laws of nature, as exemplified from social experience. It can be experimentally proved that the bodies of men and domestic animals, and the social affections, habits, mental health, virtue and domestic welfare of human beings, call for a hebdomadal rest. Hence, even if we take the restricted view of the commonwealth which makes it the institute for realising only secular order and justice, this truth authorises the state to enforce a Sabbath rest and secure its blessings for

the dependent classes of human beings and the helpless beasts. It is a prerogative as proper and righteous as when a state abates a nuisance hostile to hygiene, or forbids the working of minor children and servants beyond a humane number of hours per day. But this step brings us, in fact, to the threshold of what is the true argument for Sunday laws by the state.

While the American state is not positively Christian, no state can rightfully be atheistic. The doctrines of redemption are not the necessary basis of the validity of a state: witness the fact that the Bible recognised the validity of the authority of Rome, a pagan empire; and that every sound jurist in Christendom recognises the validity of Mohammedan states. But Theism is essential as the basis of civil government. Atheism, if prevalent, would leave civic authority logically baseless. The legitimate state exists only by virtue of the will of God as Maker and providential Ruler; and therefore can ground its authority only in its recognition of him. But the Sabbath, while in its special aspect a commemorative institution of redemption to the believer, *is also, in its prior and general aspect, an ordinance for man, as a moral creature, instituted for the race in all times by God, as Maker and Ruler.* The truth which is overlooked by both parties, and which is vital to our argument, is this: that the Sabbath now serves two purposes: with the believing part of the race included in Christ's spiritual kingdom, it is a gospel means of grace; but none the less is it to mankind at large what it was first given for, *an essential institute of that natural theism and that personal, social, and domestic righteousness, on which civil society rests as its foundations.* How fair and consistent this view is, will appear when we show that the Sabbath was ordained for man before he needed any redemption. This purpose of its original institution remains immutable, through all ages and dispensations. After man fell, and God in his mercy set up the spiritual kingdom of redemption, the other use of the Sabbath, as a redemptive ordinance, was superadded. Hence it will follow, that no human being has a natural or civic right either to atheism or to live without a Sabbath. These are simply natural iniquities, subversive of social morals as really as incest or murder, though

not so greatly. Here, then, is the cardinal sophism of the infidel plea against Sabbath laws, that he has assumed the privilege of neglecting the Sabbath to be, so long as he professes no Christian conscience, *his natural right*, unjustly restricted by another's erroneous conscience, like the natural right to labor and to recreation; whereas it will be shown that Sabbath observance is, for every human being, a moral obligation of natural theism and social order.

First, then, it is to be shown that theism is essential to the grounding of the state as a valid authority over men. Here we come directly into collision with the *πρῶτον ψεύδος* of the infidel party: that natural morality and intelligence are the "basis of secular government, and the adequate guarantee of public order, prosperity, and righteousness." This is expressly denied. It is asserted, on the contrary, that the fear of God and the sanctions of his law are the only adequate basis and guarantee.

The first proof advanced is one which carries little weight with men who glory in despising the lights of history and experience, but which all sensible men appraise at a prime value. There never has been a permanent civilised order in the world, founded on atheism. The only notable experiment was that made during the French Revolution, when for a short time, at the darkest period of the "Reign of Terror," atheism was in the ascendant. The result is too well known for comment. It was too bad even for *Robespierre*, who found it necessary to cut off his atheistic comrades' heads. All the thinking men of all ages and schools, Pagan and Christian, have usually judged atheistic principles inconsistent with any moral order. All the best ethical writers, of all ages and schools, have grounded their moral systems in man's responsibility to God. So essential is religious belief to any moral order, that erroneous belief has always been better than none; theism, under the form of polytheism, was always a cornerstone of such heathen commonwealths as ever became civilised or great, like Egypt, Tyre, Rome, Athens; and in these, when belief declined, the national virtue and greatness went down with it. If our modern destructives would find actual instances of societies founded according to their ideal, they must look among the mis-

erable human herds of the Hottentots or Australians. Experience offers no other verification of their theory.

Secondly. Civil government cannot be safely based without theism; because there is no explanation of the origin of the civil ruler's moral right, or of the moral obligation of allegiance, or of the right of property, without a God and his ordinance. Let the jurist begin without a God, with any theory of "a social contract," or any such invention as prevailed from Hobbes to Rousseau, his logical structure proves an absurd card castle, demolished by the first touch of reason. There is no way in which the duty of allegiance and obedience to the civil magistrate can receive a moral foundation, save from the ordinance of God, the Maker and Sovereign Proprietor, instituting it. There is no tenable account of the right of property, except in God's gift of the earth and its goods to man as his rational tenant. For the well-informed reader, there is no need of repeating the proof. He will recall, for instance, Paley's demolition of the theory of social contract.

Thirdly. A practical argument is found in our experience of human nature. It is corrupted from its origin. Man is naturally a sinner, selfish, unjust, heedless, and passionate. It requires all possible restraints to prevent his breaking out into such disorders as are destructive of social well-being. Take away the restraints of the divine authority, the fear of future penalty, the hope of reward, and the average man becomes an uncontrollable rebel against duty. There have been self-controlled virtuous atheists? Perhaps. Still the principle holds that "one swallow does not make a summer." The exception does not destroy the rule. Your average atheist, from the Hottentot up to Tom Paine, is not noted for morals. The decent atheists are usually men who are shielded from temptation by a careful rearing, comfortable wealth, and wholesome surroundings. But the majority of human beings for whom governments legislate, are exposed to poverty and strong temptations; and the general result is, that then moral principles, unsupported by religious convictions, give way.

Fourthly, and chiefly. The species of atheism which prevails in our day, involves also materialism. In this it is consistent.

The argument which banishes spirit from the human person must also, if carried out, banish the Infinite Spirit from the universe. The history of human opinion shows that this is a true maxim: *Nullus spiritus in microcosmo, nullus Deus in macrocosmo*. But it is simply impossible that materialism can sustain any theory of real moral obligation, virtue, or merit. The popular and practical argument for this assertion—than which there is none more conclusive—is, that beasts have no ethics, and can have none; and materialism makes man an improved beast. The sound philosopher reaches the same conclusion in a more analytic way, by observing that if all of man is material, then no motives in man can be generically different from animal instinct. Rational free agency is impossible, because man acts only from animal impulse; and there is consequently no room for a true moral responsibility. The history of opinion proves the same fact; for Materialists, when they attempt to write ethics, always resolve the moral motive into selfishness, desire of applause, or some lower appetency. If there is no God, then of course there can be no responsibility higher than the social; for there is no one to whom responsibility can bind. There can be no imperative standard of duty or obligation asserting any moral supremacy over the individual will; because the only other intelligent will is that of the fellow-creature, which is no higher than, and just as fallible as, the will to be regulated by it. Of course there can be no future responsibility; and every moral restraint arising from it is broken. There can be no sacredness about the human person or life; but the murder of a man would be as the killing of a beast. It is indisputable that the Apostle expresses the legitimate ethics of atheism: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Is not this precisely the philosophy of Elizur Wright, the President of the League? P. 83:

The perfection of human nature is when the spiritual in man has the profoundest reverence for the physical; worships it in fact with every offering that can contribute to its highest health and the perfect development, in their due time and order, of all its marvellous faculties and functions. Every such act of worship reacts on the conscious mind itself, and fills it to overflowing with good will. This is virtue; this is the highest happiness. There is no charity which does not begin at home.

Charity is like gravity, which acts inversely as the square of the distance. Who wrongs his own body will wrong everything and everybody else.

It has been said by Christian moralists that even the atheist, if he would make a correct analysis of the facts of consciousness, would be led to recognise the moral distinctions and obligation. This may be admitted conditionally. If it could be that the atheist should so analyse the functions of conscience as to recognise these truths: that the simple judgments of right and wrong are primary and necessary intuitions; that they are rational; that they are immutable; that the judgment of obligation attending this intuition is no mere modification of association, or of self love, or of the love of applause, or of sympathetic harmony; but is itself an integral part of the necessary truth—then indeed he might be both atheist and recogniser of morality. But it is certain that no consistent atheist will ever make this correct analysis of the moral consciousness; there is an inevitable reason in his theory why he will not. *Obligation implies an obligator.* Who; where is he? The shortest and simplest examination shows that it cannot be merely the fellow-creature, nor civil government. Let a man deny that there is a God, and he finds no obligator. Then, it is logically impossible he should construe obligation aright. It is unavoidable that in his blind analysis he shall pervert this intuition of obligation, which points essentially to a God, into some imagined modification of some lower feeling. And let it be repeated: the consistent atheist is always a materialist. If man is only material, then this other feeling which is transmuted to simulate what the atheist calls judgment of obligation, be it what it may, cannot be anything higher than an animal sensibility. Thus the very possibility of moral, rational obligation is gone. *Atheism cannot be moral*, save by an utter inconsistency. Our writers, when asserting that even the atheist would find a basis for morals if he would analyse consciousness correctly, supposed that they were thereby paying an honorable tribute to the value of these moral intuitions. Their motive was good; but their words were none the less misleading; they gave us but an imaginary, hypothetical *dictum*, whose condition is impossible to be realised.

Much of the unbelief of our age is pantheistic. The same charge must be made against the pantheism which now prevails: that it is virtual atheism, and cannot have a consistent morality. One reason is, that it denies a personal God. But man's common sense always views obligation as binding to a personal will. To say that there is no personal God is practically to say that there is no obligator. And secondly, if pantheism is true, then it is idle to talk of any standard of right and wrong controlling any human will from evil, for that evil will is God's will. The divine will, being identified with all other wills, embraces and sanctions all the evil, as truly as the good. In this form also, atheism cannot be moral.

Thus the prime error of these infidels is refuted which asserts that "natural morality," unsustained by either natural or revealed religion, is adequate for the purposes of society. This is positively false, as is proved by experience and reason. But the state is a moral institute. Its law professes to be a rule of moral right. Its legitimate ends are to protect the well-being of society, by upholding moral right between men. Hence the state cannot be atheistic, and exist safely. It must seek its foundation in theism, with its doctrines of responsibility to God, and divine rewards and punishments. It must derive its warrants from God; or else it retains no valid power over the conscience.

It follows from this truth, that he who assails the being and moral government of God thereby attacks the very existence of the state. He should no more have the privilege of doing his atheistic work, than of attacking the family, which is the secular or earthly foundation of civil society. Both state and federal governments claim the right to ordain monogamy as the only wholesome condition of the family institute, and to uphold it by punishing bigamy with pains and penalties. In doing this, the government rightly scorns the pretext of the Mormon, that polygamy is one of his religious tenets, and that, therefore, his religious liberty is infringed if he is restrained by corporeal penalties from practising it. The state has an equal right to restrain the public propagation of atheism and the blasphemy of Almighty God. Of course, we all recognise the inviolability of the rights

of conscience, and the irrelevancy of corporeal pains as an agency to propagate truth in the love of it. But while assigning the widest possible scope to liberty of thought, and removing the limit of it to the outermost place consistent with beneficial existence of society, we can say no less than this: that the right of the state to exist must imply its right to preserve the essential conditions of its own existence; and that, to this the narrower claims of individuals must, so far, give place. For instance: private creditors of a commonwealth have a right to be paid the just amounts of the debts due them. Few personal rights can be plainer. But if circumstances arise, as foreign invasion or domestic insurrection, in which the whole possible revenues of the state are necessary to maintain its own organic existence, then the jurist says that the right of the private creditor to payment must lie in abeyance. Because, if the state betrays its own existence, for want of those revenues, the creditor loses his right forever by the annihilation of the very personality of his debtor. In like manner, if the propagation of atheism destroys the foundation of the state's existence, this pretended right to freedom of thought in teaching atheism is superseded by the state's right to exist. She has the civil right, as a secular institute, to suppress this personal license. Hence it appears: so far from the federal government's being guilty of any oppression, in refusing to permit her mails to be used to carry blasphemous or atheistic documents, or attacks upon the purity of domestic life, this is the *minimum* of duty she owes to herself and her constituents. The only debatable question is, whether she ought not to do more. But, they cry, the government may, under pretext of this duty, carry her intrusions farther, and invade the proper liberty of thought of the citizens. If she does so, she will go wrong; and that will be the proper time to protest. If just and necessary powers are to be withheld because they may be abused, then no power whatever could be conferred on the state.

It has thus been shown that the maintenance of theism is the essential foundation of civil government. The constitution of the United States was, therefore, wrong, in that it omitted all reference to Almighty God as the source of its powers; and that

of the late Confederate States was right in doing so. The reader is now at a point of view whence he can understand the concern of the commonwealth with Sunday laws. The observation deserves to be repeated: that the Sabbath was first given to man, before he needed any redemption, by God as his natural Creator and Ruler. As such, it is an institution of God's natural dominion over mankind, an institution of natural theism and social morals. In this aspect the Sabbath belongs to the race, under all ages and dispensations, and is as obligatory on Pagan and Moslem as on Jews and Christians. Man fell; and God was pleased to institute, in the hand of his Son our Messiah, a spiritual kingdom of redemption, for the justification and sanctification of believers; a kingdom independent, under the new dispensation, of civil governments; and he was pleased also to employ the Lord's day, in this spiritual kingdom, as an ordinance of grace and redemption to saints. *This latter application has in no sense superseded the primeval one.* This is the truth which the assailants of Sunday laws, and even the Lutheran theology, overlooks. The whole plausibility of their argument comes from this omission. If, then, it can be repaired by the establishment of our thesis, their sophism is exploded.

This error has, unfortunately, borrowed no little strength from the mistake made by the early Reformers, and especially the Lutheran, concerning the Lord's day. They taught (see Augsburg Confession) that the Sabbath had never been anything more than a Jewish, positive, and typical command; whence it passed away, of course, at the vanishing of the old dispensation, like all other Jewish shadows. The Lord's day therefore, if observed under the new dispensation, can have no other basis of authority than the ecclesiastical recommending a seemingly holy day, and the secular law ordering a wholesome police regulation. It is easy to foresee how infidels, attacking the divine authority of the day, would avail themselves of this theological error. In fact, a mass meeting of infidel anti-Sabbatarians in one of the great American cities, exhibited the monstrous alliance of a Lutheran minister of the gospel joining his false exegesis with their license to overthrow God's day. Now the proof of our thesis corrects

this theological error as well as the infidel argument. By proving that the Sabbath command was ante-Levitical, was moral, was universal, and was perpetual, we effectually dispose of the false position, that it was abrogated with the shadows of the old dispensation. This REVIEW (Oct. 1857) contained an exhaustive discussion of this phase of the question. Referring our readers to that Number we shall now touch the heads of the argument as briefly as our object permits. And our thesis as to the original institution of the Sabbath will be established by three proofs: ancient tradition, sacred history, and the physiologic and psychologic testimony of man's nature itself.

The oldest of the traditionary testimonies is that latest discovered by Assyrian research. The cuneiform writings, along with their history of the flood, distinctly testify that primeval men observed the seventh day as sacred time and by divine appointment. The oldest of the Greek poetic theologians is Hesiod. He is quoted as saying (*Dierum*, line 6th): "The first, the fourth also, and the seventh is a sacred day." And again: "The seventh day once more, the splendid dawn of the sun." And Homer: "The seventh day then arrived, the sacred day." Again: "The seventh was sacred." "The seventh dawn was at hand, and with this all the series is completed." Thus also writes Callimachus the poet: "It was now the Sabbath day, and with this all was accomplished." Again: "Yea, the seventh is the parent-day." Again: "The seventh day is first, and the seventh day is the complement." The elegies of Solon, the Athenian legislator, also proclaimed the seventh day as more sacred than the rest. Josephus against Apion (II. 40), says: "There is not any city of the Grecians, nor any of the Barbarians, nor any nation whatsoever, whither our custom of resting on the seventh day hath not come." Allowing for the exaggeration of the controversialist, we still find evidence here of a widely-spread usage. It must have been rather the remaining effect of primeval custom and law than recent imitation of the despised Jews. Philo, the learned Jew, nearly contemporary with the Christian era, calls the Sabbath *εορτή πάνδημος*. To such testimonies as these should, in justice, be added the numerous proofs of the observance of

stated holy days, such as the new moons, among the most ancient pagans. These, though not in all cases coincident with the Old Testament-Sabbath, still confirm its original authority in two ways: they are evidently inaccurate imitations of it lingering among the growing twilight of polytheism: they are practical admissions of the truth that, in order to continue such a creature as man religious, he must have a stated religious day.

Let it be understood that we, of course, do not advance this traditional proof as sufficient, by itself, to establish the divine authority of the Sabbath. But it raises a strong probability. Taken with the proof that follows, it shows that God, in creating man, appointed him a sacred day. The appointment was for a long time observed as a world-wide institution. The separation of apostate parts of the race from the Church in the lineage of the "sons of God," did not by any means terminate their observance of the day. But the decline in the proper observance of the day evidently hastened the spread of idolatry. And when the observance of the sacred day was totally lost in any tribe, then monotheism and the knowledge of the true God were also lost. The necessity of Sabbath-observance, as the great school of natural theism, is thus illustrated by the state of the whole pagan world in this historical fact. Wherever there has been no weekly sacred day, there has been *neither pure monotheism, nor a single instance of a civic order combining civilisation and constitutional liberty*. Let the instance be produced. Paganism has presented us a certain degree of civilisation, with despotism; or a certain rude freedom, with savagery, as among our Teuton ancestors described in Tacitus' *Germania*: that is all. Our modern infidels vainly flatter themselves, that if they can banish the Sabbath, they will have a reign of rational atheism. (They know very well, that by banishing the Sabbath they will destroy Christianity.) But they are utterly mistaken. "That which hath been is that which shall be." Human nature is still human nature. The condition they will inevitably have, will be, not rational infidelity enthroned, but rank superstition, fetichism, polytheism, pagan hierarchy; and their Sabbathless society will prove itself capable, not of republican freedom, but only of the

species of gigantic despotism which ruled in Egypt and Chaldea, and which cemented the stones of the pyramids and the hanging gardens of Nebuchadnezzar with the blood of the "proletariat." The commonwealth taught by history claims that she has a right to maintain the Sabbath, because she has the primary right of self-preservation, and God and his Sabbath are the corner-stones of her being. She sees that constitutional liberty has only been made possible for modern ages, as reformed Christianity has given back to the European races the theism and the holy day which God gave the race at its beginning.

The civil legislator, in appealing to the Bible as his second witness to this fact, uses the book, not as the gospel of redemption, but as the authentic and inspired history of God's original constitution of human society. It is not forgotten that it is the trick of our opponents to set this witness aside with the easy assertion that the Bible, and especially the Old Testament, is mythical. This is no place to go into the full argument for its authenticity, nor is it necessary. The assaults upon its historical credit we simply denounce as impertinences. That battle has been long ago fought and decided. The true history of the race, the real scholarship, the intelligent virtue, are with the Bible. These renewed pretences, that it is discredited by any later researches, are shallow and unwarrantable. They are especially unworthy of respectful treatment at this day, when the marvellous results of Egyptology and the Assyrian explorations have shed a flood of confirmatory light on the sacred history, and when the proud waves of sceptical physical science are retreating from its bulwarks of truth in confessed defeat.

Authentic history is the chief guide of legislation, next to the eternal principles of right and wrong. The Old Testament is the most authentic of ancient histories, and it is, for the legislator, of most fundamental importance; because it is the only history in the world that gives the foundation facts of God's organisation of human society. No commonwealth can be safely reared, save on these foundations. If it be built on others, it must fall, because the very laws of nature and Providence are against it. Now, the sacred history tells us that the Maker

founded human society on *obedience to himself*; and he being essential righteousness, this was to found it on righteousness. He raised two buttresses for it in Paradise, the family and the Sabbath; and man's lapse from that first state did not supersede, but only enhance, the necessity of these two supports. The family was to provide moral nurture for the members of society; the Sabbath was to perpetuate that theism and knowledge and fear of God, which are the essential condition of all social welfare as well as future salvation for sinners. Thus, the Sabbath was originally no Jewish or Levitical ceremony; but the institution of the race, given to them in their first parents, even before their need of redemption had emerged. "The Sabbath was made for man." Gen. ii. 2, 3. God blessed and sanctified the seventh day, at the end of the very first week. For whom did he sanctify it? Evidently, for Adam and Eve. Gen. iv. 3 (margin). The seventh day was evidently observed for religious worship and oblation by the human family, when we next hear of them as sinners. Gen. vii. 2, 10 (margin). God enabled Noah, even in the awful crisis of the approaching deluge, to complete his entrance into the ark against the sacred day. Gen. viii. 10, 12. Noah observes the seventh day's division of time, while still shut up in the ark. Gen. xvii. 12. The male child must be circumcised one week after its birth; showing that this division of time by the sacred day still prevailed in Abraham's time. Gen. xxix. 27. The usual length of a wedding-feast in the days of Jacob was a week, which shows that the Sabbath was still in use, at least as a division of time, in Mesopotamia, after it was becoming idolatrous. In Gen. i. 10, we find that a week was the duration of a funeral mourning in the days of Joseph; and that for the Egyptians, as well as the Hebrews, Exod. xii. 15 teaches us that before the Sabbath commandment had been given on Sinai, a week was the length proper for a solemn religious festival. In Exod. xvi. 25, still before the giving of the Decalogue, two supernatural exceptions weekly were made to the regular ordering of the *manna*, to insure Israel's keeping the Sabbath. It fell on six days regularly; but none fell on the seventh. That which was kept over for a day, uniformly putrefied; but that which was kept over from the sixth for the food of the seventh, did not putrefy.

So, when we come to the Mosaic legislation proper—Exod. xx. 8–11—the command to sanctify the Sabbath begins: “Remember the Sabbath day,” showing that it was no new institute, but an old one, only requiring more faithful observance. So, while the ritual commands have often a reason assigned for them from some particular event in the Hebrews’ own history, as the Passover, from the sparing of their first-born in Egypt, the reason assigned for the Sabbath is as universal as the race of man. But the conclusive evidence is, that foreigners and pagans being among the Hebrews, were required also to observe the day. Indeed, it was made the Hebrew magistrate’s duty to enforce the observance of it on the “strangers that were within his gates.” See also Nehem. xiii. 16 and 21. This is most significant, because foreigners were not only not required to observe the ritual ceremonies peculiar to the Hebrew religion, but were forbidden. No pagan could participate in the paschal feast until he had become a Jew. Thus God teaches his Church to teach the world that the Sabbath is not only obligatory on believers, as members of the kingdom of redemption, but also on men simply as subjects of the kingdom of nature. This evidence of sacred history is crowned by the fact that when the coming and sacrifice of Christ had superseded all the merely ceremonial reasons for the observance of the Sabbath as a type, still the apostolic Christians did not cease to sanctify the holy day. It was, indeed, moved forward to the first day, the commemoration of the resurrection and Pentecost; but the whole moral obligation of the Sabbath was, by inspired precedent, transferred to the “Lord’s day.” And the authority of the last of the apostles, John (Rev. i. 10), consecrated this as the sacred day of the Redeemer of the world.

Now, a cavil may be attempted from this change, thus: the Sabbatarians have conceded that the spiritual kingdom of redemption and the secular commonwealth are independent. Then this cardinal event in redemption should have no effect in changing the usage of the state. The latter, if it retains any Sabbath, ought to cleave to the seventh day. Indeed, since the Christian Church believes that the completion of Christ’s sacrifice has superseded the typical reasons for the seventh day, the correct con-

clusion would be that the state also should cease to regard the seventh without taking up the first. This is the answer: that typical reasons for sanctifying the seventh, even during the typical period of the Church's history, were only a part of the reasons. Hence, though these were satisfied, the others remained, and men in all ages still have the same reasons to keep God's original Sabbath which the man in paradise had, and which the men before Abraham and Moses had. Hence, all that could be fairly inferred would be this: that while the Church moved over its observance to the first day, the state should retain its original day. But why should this discrepancy be kept up? Why embarrass the obligatory observance of all Christian citizens, by making that first day secular which their Redeemer compels them to make sacred? Church and state are independent, but they are not hostile. The state, the organ of earthly righteousness, need not be so jealous of the Church, the organ of spiritual salvation, as to refuse to act with her in this one non-essential point, when that God, who is both Creator and Ruler, and also "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," honored his risen Son by transferring the original Sabbath to his resurrection-day.

The third proof of our proposition is that presented by man's body and spirit themselves. The experimental science of physiology has evinced that man's body and nerves were created by their Maker a seven-day clock. To secure their best endurance and working, they must be "wound up" weekly by the Sabbath-rest. Yea, God has written the same law on the constitution of the very brutes which he has given to man for servants. The wayfarer who rests one day in seven, progresses farther than he who presses on seven days. The army which rests on the Lord's day marches farther, in the long run, than the one which moves seven days in the week. The team which does its task on the Sunday is worn and broken down, while that which is permitted to keep the Sabbath-rest continues fresh and healthy. The body of the human being who observes the rest is, other things being equal, more healthy, efficient, and long-lived, than that of the Sabbath-breaker. The same rules hold of the health of the spirit. Let the tension of worldly care and business, of study, or

of executive tasks, be continued through the seventh day as well as all the six, and the poise of the faculties is lost, the spirit becomes feverish, the emotions are exasperated, the soul wears itself out by its own friction. For the intelligent and candid reader these facts need only be intimated. He knows that they are too numerous and authentic to be disputed. It is thus seen that he who "made the Sabbath for man," made man for the Sabbath. The creature and the institution are fitted to each other. This is a perfect proof that our thesis is correct in asserting the Sabbath rest to be an institution coeval with the race, and designed for the whole race, under all dispensations.

But when we come to the moral argument, we find it yet more conclusive. Let the reader again be reminded that we claim it, not as it might be constructed on the higher ground of man's redemption and sanctification, but only from the position of man the rational, moral member of the secular but moral institute, the commonwealth. Let us resume the points established: that civil government is moral, and founded in moral obligation; that the only basis of morals and obligation is Theism, the knowledge and fear of the true God of creation and providence, of his will as the prime rule of right, and of his righteous rewards and punishments; that a holy day reserved to him is the only sufficient means to preserve among men, especially as fallen, that knowledge and fear. The last point might be powerfully argued from experience alone. Where has there ever been a people who, after wholly deserting the Sabbath, have retained (not to say Christianity, but even) a healthy Monotheism? History tells of none. Islam is Monotheistic, and hence the Moslems have ever been more effective, civilised, and triumphant than the Polytheists near them; but this is because Islam has a *quasi* Sabbath, its holy Friday recurring weekly, and devoted to the worship of God and the study of the Koran. Again do we remind our destructive "progressives" that there is no safe guide for legislation, outside the law of righteousness, save experience. The experience of all ages is against them. Man's nature remains the same. "Like causes produce like effects." Hence, when they demand that we shall discard the sure light of experience and plunge into their

perilous novelties, they are guilty of an impertinence whose arrogance can only be equalled by its injustice.

But the least *modicum* of practical wisdom shows us that our proposition cannot but be true. Man is a finite creature and a creature of habits. Hence *he never does anything effectually, save as he has stated times for doing it.* Life is full of homely instances of this rule. Savages eat such food as chance brings them at irregular times. But it is presumed that no people ever dined well who did not have a regular dinner hour. Courts of justice must have their court-days. Merchants must have their hours of exchange. Banks must have their "discount days." So, if there is to be any instrumentality to keep alive the knowledge of God, it must have its stated season allotted to it, or it will be forgotten. Thus it comes about, that, when the Sabbath is lost, true religion is lost. There is also a vital connection between the family, that other bulwark of society, and the Sabbath. A day of rest from secular pursuits is necessary to enable the parental and domestic influences to come into effectual play. While the working-day world flows on, it absorbs parents and children in its stream, and indeed, usually separates them by their avocations, so that they are almost strangers to each other. In every civilised community, the majority of the people must be toilers. But the wealthy and self-indulgent are in most cases equally absorbed by the equally exacting demands of pleasure. To bring parents and children together, this turmoil of work and amusement must be bidden to cease. A sacred leisure must be provided and protected from the temptations of gain and pleasure, in order that parents and children may be truly reunited around the hearth, the true altar of well-ordered society. There the sacred influences of parental love may play effectually, and the virtues of a moral and pious home be diffused. No where is there a better and more truthful statement of this connection than in the "Cotter's Saturday Night" of Burns. Without a Sunday, there would have been no such Saturday night, with its blessed humanising and restraining influences.

To sum up, then: it is admitted that every man ought to enjoy

the fullest liberty of thought compatible with the ends of government, and that the secular state ought to be separate from, and independent of, the Church, pursuing as its proper object the protection of the earthly rights of the people. If the Christian Sabbath were nothing but an ordinance of the spiritual kingdom and means of redemption, then the state should leave its enforcement, as it properly does that of the Christian worship and sacraments, to the persuasions of the Church. But while the day is this, it is also another thing: the necessary support of that natural Theism, domestic virtue, and popular morality, which are the foundations of the state. The state is from God, exists by his ordinance, holds its powers by delegation from him, and has no other basis for the righteousness it seeks to enforce between man and man than his will. On the basis of atheism, there can be no stable structure either of ethics or government. Hence the state's right to exist includes her right to protect these essential conditions of her existence, and to enforce that outward observance of the Sabbath rest, which alone makes the inculcation of God's fear and of public and private virtue practicable, through those distinct, but friendly, coöperative agencies which God has ordained to keep men in his fear, the family and the Church. Every true statesman knows that unless the suitable conditions of public and private morality exist in the people, no statecraft, no constitution-making, can create or preserve a prosperous free commonwealth. In this sense, the statesman alone cannot make a state. Divine providence must contribute its essential coöperation, through those other institutes which are as truly ordained of God as original and as independent as the state itself: the family and the Church. Wise statesmen have learned from experience that the state's tinkering with these, in the way of persecutions of heresies, state endowments, and such like expedients, only cripples their ability for good. But this is no reason why the state should rashly overlook or deny the vital value of their training-work to its ends; or should so wield its secular power as to deprive them of the suitable means and opportunities for doing their all-important functions. On the contrary,

the state is bound so to enforce outward rest and quiet, and the cessation of secular labors and public amusements, as to honor God's natural ordinance, and to give the allied institutes, the family and the Church, their proper opportunity for doing their work on the people.

R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DIACONATE.*

II. Secondly, we proceed to consider the scope of the deacon's functions. Under this head we design to treat the question of diaconal functions as terminating on, 1. The care of the poor; 2. The management of ecclesiastical stipends, goods, and property; 3. Collections for congregational purposes, and for the temporal support of the benevolent enterprises and the institutions of the Church; and 4. The service of the Lord's table.

FIRST. The subject of the care of the poor is distributable into three parts: the care of the poor of the Church; the care of Christian strangers; and the care of the poor of the world.

1. We will briefly consider the relation of the deacon to the poor of the Church. It is usual to regard it as the chief function of the deacon to care for the poor—that is to say, as his chief specific function. Generically considered, his office is concerned about all the temporal interests with which the Church has to do, as we hope to show under another head. As donations are spontaneously made, and legacies left, to the Church, he is the receiver; as money is to be raised for various purposes, he is the collector; as funds and property are to be kept and administered, he is the treasurer and manager; and as relief is to be extended to the poor, and stipends paid to church-officers and agents, he is the distributor. While, therefore, distribution is his principal

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and, it may be, designative function, it is by no means his only function. He is the temporal officer of the Church, appointed by Christ's authority; and consequently, all which strictly comes under the denomination of ecclesiastical temporalities falls under the scope of his functions.

As the fact that the deacon sustains an official relation to the poor of the Church is conceded on all hands, there is no need to discuss it as if it were a moot point; but taking it for granted, it may be proper to glance at some of the principles which underlie the diaconal office in this its prominent feature, and note a few of the practical inferences which may be deduced from them.

(1.) The first principle which may be mentioned as fundamental to this office is that of the unity of the Church, as expressed in the fellowship of temporal suffering. Conceived as invisible, the Church is one by reason of a spiritual life derived from Christ her Head, infused alike into all the members of his mystical body by the vitalising power of the Holy Ghost, and uniting them not as a mechanical aggregation of parts, but as a living and organic whole. Conceived as visible, and as capable of manifesting her inward life by corporal association, the Church is one as a communion of saints in the joint participation of the ordinances of God's appointment—a united worship at his altar, a common hearing of the preached gospel, and especially a holy fellowship around the sacramental board. Conceived as a visible institute susceptible of governmental organisation and polity, the Church is one by virtue of the representative principle, beginning its grand activity in the primary assemblies of Christ's professing people, uttering itself through the medium of their free suffrages, and expanding in the majestic sweep of its influence from the parochial presbytery through a correlated series of courts to a possible culmination in a supreme Œcumenical Assembly. Conceived as the suffering body of Christ, a company of pilgrims through a scene of discipline to a heavenly home, the Church is one by the fusing power of an all-pervading sympathy. So far as this sympathy is related to spiritual distress, it finds its legitimate expression through the tender and consolatory ministrations of the pastoral office; so far as it is connected with temporal want,

it meets its provided channel of expenditure in the humble but Christ-like office which was filled by the illustrious proto-martyr of the Christian Church. The deacon's function is grounded in the Church's unity of suffering. It becomes him, therefore, as the representative alike of the sympathy of Jesus for his afflicted brethren and of that of his body for its needy members, to put the material tokens of that sympathy, with loving gentleness, into the hand of the poor believer. It is easy to see that if the deacon's office were thoroughly employed, in accordance with its beneficent spirit and design, such a thing as the communistic agitation which is the great fret of secular society would be rendered impossible in the Church. The clamor of the discontented Hellenists was at once silenced by the increased vigor of diaconal ministrations. The Church is a sacred brotherhood; and if dissatisfaction arises in its bosom in consequence of a disproportionate possession of worldly goods by its members, the deacon is the appointed, and, if he use his office well, the efficient, mediator between the rich and the poor.

(2.) Another principle which grounds the office of deacon is love; in that form of it which is usually denominated charity. As discharging the function of instruction, the Church is a school; as propagating the Christian faith and inviting the nations to partake of the blessings of redemption, she is a missionary college; as performing the office of rule, she is a government, a polity—the city of God; as related to temporal want, she is an asylum for the poor and the sick, offering the advantages and conferring the benefits at once of an almshouse and a hospital. Contemplated in this last aspect, the Church not only acts as the minister of sympathy to the afflicted members of the body of Christ, but, we think, also, more generally, as the almoner of charity to the suffering and needy members of the family of man. She is by her very constitution an eleemosynary institute, and according to the extent of her means, receives as beneficiaries upon her charity every real and worthy child of want. Like redemption, in which she is founded, she bestows her benefactions upon the whole personality of man, body and soul alike, and ex-

tends her compassions, through her diaconal organs, as well to the sinner as the saint.

(3.) A third principle which underlies the deacon's office is the duty resulting from the perpetual presence of the poor in the Church. The poor, said our Master, ye have always with you. As there is no community in which the gospel is not needed by the spiritually poor, so there is none in which the Church's help is not a boon to the temporally poor. A church in which there are no poor would do well to raise the question, whether it does not lie outside the pale of God's election. For, "hath not God chosen the poor of this world rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom, which he hath promised to them that love him?" Christ's poor relations will ever be found where Christian organisations exist, and the nominal church which neglects to provide for them confesses itself apostate.

(4.) A fourth principle in which the deacon's office is founded is the necessity of a permanently operative official obligation, which will render certain the performance of charitable offices by the Church. Christ has not left this matter to the option of his people. The voluntary principle would not have answered, as experience has shown. Its efforts are spasmodic, its fruits but Jonah's gourds. The enthusiasm which springs out of it like a flame, burns vehemently to-day and to-morrow is cold. Possibly if the Church were a society grounded in commutative justice, and her so-called charities had been the *quid pro quo* payments upon life insurance contracts, she might have continued to exist as an organisation for mutual relief. But the free unbought ministration of charity, such as that which the Church bestows, never could have flowed on an unceasing stream through the centuries, concurrently with that of human want, had not the infinite wisdom of her Head provided against the contingency by the appointment of an officer whose business it is, under the solemn sanctions of ordination vows, to extend gratuitous relief to the poor. The duty of the Church to elect the deacon, and the obligation of the deacon to Christ, are the guarantees that diaconal functions will not fail to be discharged.

(5.) Still another principle which may be noticed as lying at

the root of the deacon's office is the unreasonableness of mingling spiritual and temporal functions. They are incongruous, and hence one of the grounds of necessity for the office of deacon as distinct from that of the minister of the word and the other kind of pastor—the ruling elder. But as this has been previously considered, we will not dwell upon it here.

In regard to the question, how the deacon may assist the poor in addition to the extension of pecuniary relief, we simply present one or two citations which are deserving of attention. From an Act of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland “anent the duties of Elders and Deacons, and on the management of the Secular Affairs of Congregations,” 1845, we extract the following clauses: “II. Respecting the peculiar duties of deacons:— . . . 4. That they watch over the education of the children of the poor” [that is, the congregational poor mentioned under a preceding head].

Lorimer, in his work on the Deaconship, says:

“In most towns there are a variety of institutions for the relief of disease, such as dispensaries, infirmaries, etc. To meet particular wants at certain seasons of the year, there are societies for clothing and fuel. There are also friendly societies and provident institutions for accumulating the savings, not, perhaps, of the poor, but of classes which may become poor. There are schools, too, for the education of children—the Sabbath and week-day school for all; the evening class for those whose education has been neglected. By making himself master of all the means of humane, literary, economical, and religious good in his district or town, and becoming acquainted also with the respective managers, an intelligent deacon may do much to prevent poverty and suffering, and greatly mitigate them where they exist.”*

There are other special offices falling under the general consideration of the care of the Christian poor, which we cannot enlarge upon in detail; such as the extension of counsel to them as to their little temporal interest, the provision of seats for them in the house of God, helping them to places at the communion-table, in fine, all the courteous attentions which the heart of the true deacon would prompt him to render to the representatives of the Master's poverty on earth.

*P. 71.

2. A few words, next, require to be said in regard to the functions of the deacon's office as terminating on the care of Christian strangers. Kindness to strangers is dictated by the instinctive feelings of nature, as is sometimes beautifully and touchingly evinced in the customs of barbarous tribes. This natural duty is reënfined in the Scriptures, and as an element of Christian ethics, guarded by the most solemn and impressive sanctions. "For the Lord your God is God of gods, and Lord of lords, a great God, a mighty and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward; He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment. Love ye, therefore, the stranger; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." And from the wonderful and affecting account given by our Lord of the procedures of the last Judgment, we gather that some will then be surprised to learn that, in providing for strangers on earth, they had entertained unawares not angels, but the blessed Master himself. "I was a stranger, and ye took me in." "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." But this office which is obligatory on the private believer is eminently incumbent on the Church, acting through her official organ, as the exponent of her charity. We add a passage from the learned Dr. John Lightfoot, in which is exhibited the practice in this matter of the Jewish Synagogue and of the Apostolic Church; and an extract from the Second Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland, as a specimen of what ancient practice was, and what modern ought to be. Says the great English scholar :

"It may be observed from hence that strangers and travellers were entertained in a place near the synagogue (compare Acts xviii. 7) which was a public Xenodochion, or receptacle of strangers, at the charge of the congregation; which laudable custom, it is almost apparent, was transplanted into the Christian churches in those times: as compare such passages as those, Heb. xiii. 2; Acts xv. 4. And possibly those Agapæ, or 'feasts of charity,' spoken of in the Epistles of the Apostles, are to be understood of these loving and charitable entertainments of strangers. 'These are spots in your feasts of charity, when they feast with you

feeding themselves without fear.' False teachers, travelling abroad undiscovered, and being entertained in these public receptacles for strangers, and at the public charge, would find here a fit opportunity for themselves to vent their errors and deceptions. In this sense may Gaius very properly be understood as 'the host of the whole church', as being the officer, or chief overseer, employed by the Corinthian church for these entertainments: in which also it was almost inevitable but some women should have their employment: according to which custom we may best understand such places as these: 'Phœbe, a servant of the church at Cenchrea, she hath been a succorer of many'; 'Mary bestowed much labour on us.' Rom. xvi. 1, 6; 1 Tim. v. 9, 10."*

The passage from the Second Book of Discipline is: "The same Canons [the ancient] make mention of a fourfold distribution of the patrimony of the Church, whereof . . . the third [part was applied] to the poor, sick persons, and strangers."†

The following Canon of the Reformed Church of France suggests cautionary measures, to be taken in the assistance of strangers, which merit consideration:

"To prevent those disorders which daily fall out by reason of certificates given unto the poor, every church shall endeavour to maintain its own; and in case any one be constrained through the urgency of his affairs to travel, ministers shall examine, with the greatest care in their Consistories, the just causes of his journey, and thereupon shall give him letters directed to the next church, lying in the straight way by which he must go, specifying his name, age, stature, hair, and the place whither and the cause of his travel, and the assistance which was given him; nor shall the date of the day and year be omitted; which letters the church he is directed to shall keep by it, and give him others unto the next; and all certificates formerly given shall be torn to pieces."‡

3. In the next place, the question arises, whether the functions of the diaconate terminate on the poor of the world, as well as on the poor of the Church?

There has not been much discussion of this subject, so far as we have been able to discover, although some difference of opinion has existed in regard to it. We venture to support the position: that deacons, as official organs for the ministration of ecclesiastical charity, ought, when warranted by the ability of the church,

* *Works*, London, 1823, Vol. III., p. 274.

† Chap. IX., §4; Dunlop's *Confessions*.

‡ Quick's *Synodicon*, Discipline, Ch. IV., Can. IV., p. 29.

to extend relief to the poor of the outside world. Before stating the reasons which we have to offer in behalf of this view, we cite a few testimonies in its favour :

Voetius, the distinguished Dutch writer on Presbyterian polity, speaking of deacons, says : "That they may exercise beneficence towards all men, especially towards those who are of the household of faith."*

Dr. Timothy Dwight, of New England, gives a striking quotation from the Emperor Julian, known in ecclesiastical history as the Apostate :

"If Hellenism [that is, the religion of the heathen] does not prosper according to our wish, it is the fault of those who profess it. Why do we not look to that which has been the principal cause of the augmentation of impiety [that is, the Christian religion]: humanity to strangers, care in burying the dead, and that sanctity of life, of which they make such a show? It is a shame that when the impious Galilæans [that is, Christians] relieve not only their own people, but ours also, our poor should be neglected by us. . . . It having so happened, as I suppose, that the poor were neglected by our priests, the impious Galilæans, observing this, have addicted themselves to this kind of humanity; and by the show of such good offices have recommended the worst of things [that is, the Christian religion]; for, beginning with their love-feasts, and the ministry of tables, as they call it (for not only the name but the thing is common among them), they have drawn away the faithful to impiety."

In regard to this passage President Dwight remarks :

"We have here the strongest evidence, that the ancient Christians, down to the days of Julian, maintained the charity of the gospel to their poor and suffering brethren, and to strangers also. . . . It is plain also, that in the view of this emperor, this charity was a primary reason why Christianity prevailed in the world. For he exhibits his full conviction that it was impossible to spread heathenism by any other means than a strenuous imitation of this excellent character. The justness of these opinions is in my view unquestionable."†

Lorimer, in his work on the Deaconship, has the following remarks :

"The leading duty of the office is unquestionably the care of the poor. Here a question, however, arises, what poor? Is it the general poor

* *Eccles. Polity*, Vol. III., p. 496.

† *Theology*, Sermon. CLV.

of the community, whether religious or irreligious, or is the office intended only for the Christian poor? This is a very important inquiry. There can be no doubt that the poor members of the congregation are the *peculiar* objects of the deacon's care, and are, it may be, entitled to a higher provision; but the question is, Is the deacon to exclude all other poor from his special regard? . . . Besides her own poor, she [the Church] is surrounded with many poor who do not belong, by living membership, to her communion. . . . There is no authority in Scripture for restricting the donations of the deacon to poor *communicants*. . . It is an honorable light in which Christianity is presented, when she appears as the friend of the poor, even those who do not make a profession of religion."*

These testimonies serve to show that we are not promulgating a new and peculiar view when we express the opinion that the Church should, through the deacon as the almoner of her charities, so far as her circumstances will permit it, extend relief to the outside poor.

To this position it may be objected, that injustice would be done to the needy and suffering members of the church—that bread would be taken from the children's mouths and given to strangers and aliens. To this we reply that the qualifications appended to the proposition we have submitted, provide against such a contingency. The poor of the Church ought to be preferred before the poor of the world. But where both can be helped without injustice to needy communicants, both ought to be helped.

It may be objected, in the next place, that the Church is not able to provide relief for both classes of the poor; that the outside poor are a great multitude who would speedily drain her resources; in short, that the thing is impossible. We answer, that we have only contended for such a discharge of this beneficent office as would consist with the Church's ability. If she cannot, she cannot; that's all. But if she can, she ought, to the extent of her ability, no more.

It may be objected, in the third place, that State provision is made for the poor, and that the Church would perform a superfluous office in attempting to relieve the wants of those who are

*Chap. VII., pp. 66, 67, 69.

able to draw from the treasury of the State. To this it may be replied: First, that the same objection would in part hold against the relief of the Church's poor, since they are equally with other poor entitled to State provision. Secondly, the Church poor are not debarred from participating in the State provision because the Church relieves them; why should the State poor be excluded from Church provision because the State relieves them? Thirdly, the payment of a State tax for the poor is a mere duty exacted upon penalties; but God requires charity freely bestowed. The Church is the organ of that charity, and the deacon the hand of the Church. If, therefore, it is true that the members of the Church contribute to the payment of the tax, that fact does not exempt them from the obligation to be also charitable to the poor. That obligation is independent of all human provision for the poor. It is imposed by God himself.

The following considerations, concisely stated, are offered in justification of the view which we have advanced:

(1.) The genius and spirit of the gospel, as a scheme of redemption for the souls and bodies of men, freely offered to all who will avail themselves of its provisions, are in favor of it.

(2.) The precepts of Scripture enforce it, both of the Old and the New Testaments. "And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not make clean riddance of the corners of thy field when thou reapest, neither shalt thou gather any gleaning of thy harvest; thou shalt leave them unto the poor and to the stranger: I am the Lord thy God."* "And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee, then thou shalt relieve him; yea, though he be a stranger or a sojourner."† The touching parable of the good Samaritan, with its lesson, "Go and do thou likewise," and the apostolic exhortation, "As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith," may be taken as plain examples of New Testament instruction on the subject. The fact that these precepts are specially addressed to individuals, makes no difference. We have long accepted the principle that

*Lev. xxiii. 22.

†Lev. xxv. 35.

the duty of charity which is incumbent on the private believer is emphatically and eminently imposed upon the official organ of the Church's alms.

(3.) We plead the example of the Lord Jesus in support of this view—a consideration which, if there were room, might be impressively expanded. It must suffice to say, that no suppliant for bodily help ever left his presence unblest. The fact of need was enough to secure his help. The members of the Church in which he was born were not the only recipients of his charity. The daughter of the Syro-Phœnician woman—a member of a foreign and accursed race—was rescued by his mercy from bodily degradation and torture, as well as from Satanic oppression of mind. The inference is obvious. The Church is, in a sense, the representative of his charity in the midst of an afflicted world, and the deacon is the agent of her benefactions.

(4.) As the Church gives the gospel, containing spiritual relief, to all men indiscriminately, so, as far as it is compatible with her ability and circumstances to do so, ought she to extend temporal and bodily help to all. We recognise this principle in the admitted legitimacy of rendering charitable assistance to the heathen, as, for example, to the Chinese who recently suffered under the ravages of famine; and we do not hesitate to raise collections in our churches for the relief of our fellow-citizens of all classes, irrespectively of religious relations, who may be crushed down by calamity, as, for instance, those who suffer from the dread visitation of pestilence.

(5.) The view under consideration seems to be enforced by the principle of reciprocity. Some persons of the world, who are *not* poor, help the Church by the free contribution of their means; why should not the Church help some persons of the world who *are* poor, by the bestowal of her charities.

(6.) The effects of such a practice, particularly if generally adopted, would effectually vindicate it against all objections. If the Church would extend temporal relief somewhat as she affords spiritual; if all churches, of all denominations, would do it, what splendid results would be reached! What impressions for good would be made upon the masses of the outside-world, who are ever attracted more by the palpable benefits of material bene-

factions than by the viewless blessings of a spiritual religion ! What a check would, moreover, be given to Socialism, that tremendous threat to modern society ! And let it not be said that the Church would thus practically offer bribes to the outside poor to draw them into her communion, and would purchase her conquests by her gold. It is difficult to see how the bestowal of charity upon those who remain outside of the Church can be any greater inducement to a profession of religion than the fact that only those who are inside the Church can be beneficiaries upon her bounty. If any bribe, if any solicitation, there be to outsiders, it would seem to be more fairly imputable to the invitation : Come in among us, and then we will help you. But the ascription of any such motive to the Church, on what plan soever she proceeds, is utterly unfair and unjustifiable. It is the old slander of the Church that she won the heathen by her largesses. No doubt her extension of help to the poor would have a tendency to attract them to her communion ; but that would be an incidental and not an intentional result.

In connexion with this aspect of our subject, it is proper to advert to the question, What ought to be the course pursued by the Church as to the diaconal administration of relief to the suffering, in seasons of heavy public calamity, such as the prevalence of a destructive pestilence ? It has been said, in the tone of criticism, that at such times the eleemosynary agencies of the Church melt away. The subject is a difficult one, and merits a more thorough discussion than the limits of this report will afford. We venture only a few suggestions. In the first place, it would be utterly unfair to infer, from the fact that at such times the organised efforts of particular churches within the circle of the supposed calamity come to a temporary close, that the Church neglects to furnish assistance to the stricken community. On the contrary, we have no doubt that the amounts collected for that purpose by churches outside of the suffering territory constitute a considerable part—we are not prepared to say precisely what part—of the general fund derived from all sources for the relief of the needy. They go, however, with sums contributed from secular sources, into the hands of secular administrators, and so are sunk out of view as churchly contributions.

In the second place, the question presses, Ought the diaconal functions of churches so circumstanced to be suspended? We are disposed to think that the deacons, as well as the minister and elders, ought, if possible, to remain at their posts; and even if the ordinary and stated meetings should be interrupted and the collections consequently arrested, they should continue their offices of love to individuals, and should act as channels through which the contributions of outside churches and persons might be distributed. The deacons of all the Presbyterian churches in a community ought, in such seasons, to combine into a working committee, and we think should form a further union with official committees from the churches of all other Protestant denominations. This consolidated committee would constitute the medium of distributing Church contributions from every part of the land to the needy of all classes, without distinction as to religious faith. And as further combination would probably be necessary, this general committee of the Churches might cooperate with whatever secular organisation controls the distribution of relief, for the accomplishment of an end made common by a universal affliction. Two results at least would flow from such a course of action: a serious effort would be made, in accordance with her sacred vocation, to operate in an organic capacity for the relief of the suffering; and the reproach would be removed that she vanishes with her whole apparatus of ordinances and agencies before the onset of a public calamity.

In the third place, if the Church suffer her organised and official methods of work to lapse in the presence of severe public trials, it is not surprising that the means and the energies of her members should flow into secular channels, and that thus the honor be lost for her which might otherwise be won. Other organisations would receive the credit of what her own members achieve, and the glory of her Lord be tarnished. If, on the other hand, when these official methods are in operation, members of the Church should expend in secular channels the energies and the money which ought to be employed in the furtherance of ecclesiastical ends, and then turn and rebuke the Church for inefficiency, they kiss their mother and betray her to her foes.

SECONDLY. We pass on to the discussion of the question, whether the deacon's office includes the management of the stipends, revenues, goods, and property, real and personal, of the Church. Our Book of Church Order, Form of Government, Chapter II., Section IV., Article IV., says of deacons: "To them also may be properly committed the charge of the temporal affairs of the Church"; and in Chapter IV., Section IV., Article II.: "To the deacons also may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the Church." We are free to admit that this does not enforce the obligation to make the deacons curators and managers of church property. But it sanctions such a measure. There is nothing in the terms of the Constitution to hinder any particular church from adopting such a course. The way is clear for it to do so, as far as any constitutional bar is concerned. We are not prepared to say, with some, that the word "properly" contains a recommendation of the committal of church property to the care and management of deacons. The language of the law seems, in view of the known practice of many churches, to imply that the opposite course is not improper. It has the effect of making the question an open one, to be determined according to the judgment of each particular congregation. We regret that such is the construction which we are constrained to put upon the terms of the law. We would have had it otherwise if we could; we would have greatly preferred the mandatory "ought to be" of the Memphis Book of 1866 to the permissive "may be" of that which we have adopted. But so it is; and we avail ourselves of the option in the matter which is allowed to the churches, and the absence of all constitutional obstacles in the way of argument, to show the reasonableness and the scripturalness of the committal of the whole property of the Church to diaconal administration. We begin by citing in favor of this view testimonies from Church standards and eminent theologians.

The Discipline of the Reformed Churches of France, Chapter I., Canon XLIII. :

"No pastor, under the title of pastor, shall be permitted to possess an inheritance: but in case his stipend or any part thereof were assigned

upon some particular tenement, rent, or revenue, the whole shall be administered by the deacons, or other persons commissioned and ordained thereunto by the churches; through whose hands the minister shall receive his pension, that so all suspicion of covetousness may be removed, and lest by such worldly cares he should be diverted from the weightier duties of his calling.*

The First Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland:

Chapter VIII., § 3: "We require the deacons and treasurers rather to receive the rents than the ministers themselves. . . . We think it expedient that common treasurers, viz., the deacons, be appointed . . . to receive the whole rents appertaining to the kirk."

Chapter VIII., § 8: "The receivers and collectors of these rents and duties must be the deacons or treasurers."

Chapter X., § 11: "The office of deacons, as before said, is to receive the rents and gather the alms of the kirk, to keep and distribute the same."

The Second Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland:

Chapter VIII., § 3: "Their [the deacons'] office and power is to receive and distribute the whole ecclesiastical goods, . . . that the patrimony of the kirk and poor be not converted to private men's uses, nor wrongfully distributed."

Chapter IX., §§ 1, 3: "By the patrimony of the kirk, we mean whatsoever thing hath been at any time before, or shall be in times coming, given, or, by consent or universal custom of countries professing the Christian religion, applied to the public use and utility of the kirk. So that under the patrimony we comprehend all things given, or to be given, to the kirk and service of God, as lands, buildings, possessions, annual rents, and all such like, wherewith the kirk is endowed, whether by donations, foundations, mortifications, or any other lawful titles of kings, princes, or any persons inferior to them; together with the continual oblations of the faithful. We comprehend also all such things as by laws or custom, or use of countries, have been applied to the use and utility of the kirk; of the which sort are teinds, manses, glebes, and such like, which by common and municipal laws and universal custom are possessed by the kirk. . . .

"The goods ecclesiastical ought to be collected and distributed by the deacons, as the word of God appoints, that they who bear office in the kirk be provided for without care or solicitude. In the apostolical Church, the deacons were appointed to collect and distribute whatever was collected of the faithful to distribute unto the necessity of the saints, so that none lacked among the faithful. These collections were not only of that which was collected in manner of alms,

*Quick, Synodicon, Introd., p. 24.

as some suppose ; but other goods, movable and immovable, of lands and possessions, the price whereof was brought to the feet of the Apostles. This office continued in the deacons' hands who intermeddled with the whole goods of the Church ; ay, and while the estate thereof was corrupted by Antichrist, as the Ancient Canons bear witness."

The Free Church of Scotland, Act anent the Administration of the Secular Affairs of the Church and the Appointment of Deacons, 1843:

"4. In addition to these general boards of administration [that is, for the Church at large], there must be local bodies to take charge of the secular affairs of particular congregations. For this purpose, and on various and very important grounds, the Committee cannot hesitate to recommend that this administration should be exclusively vested in deacons chosen by the congregation, to be conducted in accordance with such general regulations as may be agreed to by a subsequent Assembly.

"While the ultimate object to be kept in view is to have a sufficient body of deacons for the administration of secular affairs in each congregation, the Committee are aware that in some instances it may be impossible immediately to accomplish this ; and in the meanwhile they would suggest that in such cases elders might be allowed to attend to these matters in addition to their own peculiar duties ; every exertion being made, however, that the period during which they should continue so burdened should be as short as possible."* [The Committee's Report was adopted.]

Act anent the Duties of Elders and Deacons, and on the Management of the Property and Secular Affairs of Congregations, 1844:

"II. Respecting the peculiar duties of deacons: 1. That they give special regard to the whole secular affairs of the congregation."†

"The following extract," remarks Willson, in his *Essay on the Deacon*. "from a 'Catechism on the Government and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church,' compiled by Presbyterian divines in Britain, and which has had a large circulation in the Scottish churches and in the Presbyterian Synod of Ulster, shows that the doctrines advocated in this *Essay* are taught in these churches. The quotations which follow are from the third edition, Glasgow, 1838, Chapter I., Quest. 15: 'What are the ordinary church officers appointed by Christ? Ans. Presbyters or elders (called also bishops or overseers) and deacons. Quest. 31: For what duty were they [deacons] appointed? Ans. To manage the temporal

*Acts of the Free Church for 1843.

†Acts of the Free Church for 1844.

affairs of the Church, and especially to attend to the wants of the poor, in order that the Apostles or teachers might give themselves continually to the ministry of the word.' '*

These references are sufficient to show that, whatever may have been the defects of their practice, the doctrine of the various branches of the Presbyterian Church, as expressed in their formularies, has been to a great extent in favor of committing to deacons the management of all ecclesiastical goods. The difficulty is that the practice has, in great measure, been out of harmony with the doctrine of the Church—an inconsistency which tends to bring the doctrine itself into contempt. It is true that the law of our own Church has not been explicitly developed in the direction of that of the French and Scottish Churches; but it is to be hoped that the spirit of inquiry which now appears to be aroused in regard to the subject will issue in bringing our Constitution, in this respect, into harmony with that view which has been set forth in the purest standards of Presbyterianism. The Scotch and American Presbyterian Churches ought, in relation to the Diaconate, to be governed by the full and positive utterances of the First and Second Books of Discipline rather than by the inadequate and unsatisfactory statement of the Westminster Form of Government.

We go on to adduce the opinions of distinguished theologians:

Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History*: "These seven approved men were by prayer and the imposition of the hands of the apostles ordained deacons for the public administration of the Church's affairs." †

Origen: "The deacons preside over the money-tables of the Church, as we are taught in the Acts of the Apostles." ‡

Sozomen, the *Ecclesiastical* historian: "The deacon's office was to keep the Church's goods." §

Calvin: "Nor was the case of deacons then [during the Nicene period] different from what it had been under the Apostles. For they received the daily offerings of the faithful, and the annual revenues of the Church, that they might apply them to their true uses; in other words, partly in maintaining ministers, and partly in supporting the poor." ||

"Now let the deacons come forward, and show their most sacred distribution of ecclesiastical goods." ¶

**The Deacon*, p. 37, footnote. †*Lib. II., C. I.*

‡Treatise 16th upon Matthew, quoted by Willson. §Quoted by Willson ||*Institutes*, B. IV., C. IV., §5. ¶*Ibid.*, B. IV., C. V., §15.

“But the deacons have the treasures of the Church to dispense, that is to say, such as are wholly dedicated to God, and ought not in any wise to be applied to profane uses. . . For the goods of the church, as we call them, ought to be applied no other but to the use of the Church, that is to say, to find the ministers, to find school-masters, which serve to preserve the seed of the Church, and such other like things, and specially to find the poor.”*

Voetius, in his great work, *The Ecclesiastical Polity*: “Hither refer all those special modes of acquiring which Zepperus indicates in the place cited and others to be prudently thought out by the deacons.”†

Steuart of Pardovan: “By the ninth chapter of the Policy of the Kirk, deacons were not only to collect and distribute the ordinary alms, but all the church-goods, teinds, etc., and uplift and pay to the ministers their stipends. This were indeed a work proper for their office, an ease to the minister, and would prevent much noise and offence that is raised, when charges to make payment are given, either at their own instance, or in the name of their assignees or factors.”‡

Alexander Henderson, one of the illustrious Scotch Commissioners to the Westminster Assembly, in his *Treatise on the Government and Order of the Church of Scotland*, quoted by Lorimer:§ “Their [the deacons’] main duty is to collect, receive, and distribute not only the alms for the poor, but the whole ecclesiastical goods, which are not assigned and appointed for the maintenance of particular persons.”

Samuel Rutherford, another renowned Commissioner from Scotland to the Westminster Assembly, and Professor of Divinity at St. Andrews’, in his *Due Right of Presbyteries*: “I cannot well deny but it is apparent from Acts vi. 4, that the apostles themselves were once those who cared for the poor; but I deny that hence it follows in the case of fewer poor that the office can return to the pastor, as to the first subject, except you suppose the intervention of a divine institution to place it again in the pastors; and considering the afflictions of the churches, the object of the deacons’ ‘giving’ and ‘shewing mercy,’ as it is Rom. xii. 8, cannot be wanting, as that the church’s fabric be kept in good frame, the poor, the captives of Christian churches, etc., be relieved.”¶

David Dickson, an “influential member of the Reforming Assembly, 1638”: “But the deacons not a little aided by their ministrations; for they took care respecting the salary of ministers, and the necessities of the saints, and distributed the public goods of the church.”

“The official treasurers of the church are referred to [Rom. xii. 8—‘he that giveth’]; those who distribute the goods of the church, and the contributions of the faithful, for the public uses of the church.”**

* *Sermon 24 on 1 Timothy*, quoted by Willson. † Vol. III., p. 501.

‡ *Collections*, p. 31. § *The Diaconship*, p. 85.

¶ London Ed., pp. 160, 163: quoted by Willson.

** *Expositio Epistolarum*, 1645; quoted by Willson.

John Owen, in his *Treatise on the True Nature of a Gospel Church*: "Whereas, the reason of the institution of this office was in general to free the pastors of the churches who labor in the word and doctrine from avocations by outward things, such as wherein the church is concerned, it belongs unto the deacons not only to take care of and provide for the poor, but to manage all other affairs of the church of the same kind; such as are providing for the place of the church-assemblies, of the elements for the sacraments, of collecting, keeping, and disposing of the stock of the church for the maintenance of its officers and incidences, especially in the time of trouble or persecution."*

Dr. John Lightfoot: "And therefore it is no wonder if the apostles were so circumspect in their election and so observant in their ordination. For these seven were to take this work of the apostles out of their hands, and to dispose of the stock of the church."†

"The function to which the deacon was appointed by the apostles was to manage the pecuniary affairs of the church, and especially to preside over the collections and disbursements for the poor."‡

The London Ministers, authors of the *Divine Right of Presbyterian Church Government*: "The deacons being specially to be trusted with the church's goods and the disposal thereof, according to the direction of the Presbytery, for the good of the church," etc.§

Ridgley, in his *Body of Divinity*: "Others [that is, other church-officers besides pastors and ruling elders] who have the oversight of the secular affairs of the church, and the trust of providing for the necessities of the poor committed to them, who are called deacons."||

Dr. Samuel Miller, of Princeton: "It is a great error to suppose that deacons cannot be appropriately and profitably employed in various other ways, besides ministering to the poor of the church. They might, with great propriety, be made the managers of all the money-tables, or fiscal concerns of each congregation: and, for this purpose, might be incorporated, if it were thought necessary, by law, that they might be enabled regularly to hold and employ all the property, real and personal, of the church."¶

Dr. Thomas Smyth, of Charleston: "All the Reformed churches agree in believing that the Scriptures clearly point out deacons as distinct officers in the church, whose business it is to take care of the poor, to distribute among them the collections which may be raised for their use, and generally to manage the temporal affairs of the church."**

Dr. Thornwell, in his *Argument against Church-Boards*, remarks: "The Book provides that our churches should be furnished with a class of

*Chap. IX., *Works*, Goold's Ed., Vol. XVI., p. 147.

†*Works*, Lond., 1823, Vol. VIII., p. 107.

‡*Ibid.*, p. 249. §P. 184. ||Phila. Ed., Vol. II., p. 553.

¶*Essay on Ruling Elder*, p. 244. ***Presbytery and Prelacy*, p. 242.

officers for the express purpose of attending to the temporal affairs of the church."

In the *Argument for Church-Boards Answered*, he says: "But it seems that deacons are to be intrusted with nothing but the care of the poor. Is the Reviewer yet to learn, that the common method of instruction pursued in the Scriptures is to inculcate general truths by insisting on their particular applications, rather than dealing in abstract statements? Our Saviour teaches the doctrine of a special providence, by pointing to the fowls of the air, the lilies of the field, and the hairs of our heads. Just as in the contemplation of the works of nature we rise to the abstract from the concrete, the general from the particular, so in the book of Revelation we are often to pursue the same process of cautious and accurate induction. When our Saviour is asked, Who is our neighbor? he gives no formal and elaborate definition; he simply states a case, and from that case the principle may be gathered. The Decalogue itself can be proved to be a perfect law only by admitting the principle that 'under one sin or duty all of the same kind are forbidden or commanded'—many of the precepts containing only examples of a large class. As, then, it is frequently the method of Scripture to teach by example, where is the impropriety in supposing that the attention to the poor enjoined upon the deacons was intended to include the whole department of secular business with which the church was to be concerned? It is certain that the reason assigned by the apostles for ordering their election applies just as strongly to the collection and disbursement of funds for one purpose as for another. Their purpose was not to get rid of attending to the poor, but to get rid of secular distractions. 'It is not reason,' said they, 'that we should leave the Word of God and serve tables . . . But we will give ourselves continually to prayer and the ministry of the Word.' What would they have gained by divesting themselves of the care of the poor, and continuing to be perplexed with the collection of funds for all other purposes? It must be perfectly obvious to every candid mind that the entire secular business of the church was intrusted to the deacons; that one specific duty is mentioned, in accordance with the general method of Scripture, as a specimen of a class, and that the reason of the appointment determines the extent of the duties imposed."*

To these names might be added those of distinguished commentators, who, in their exposition of the sixth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, take the ground that the seven were deacons, and that the scope of their functions included the administration of all the secular affairs of the Church. It is true that the learned Vitringa, in his great work on the Synagogue, maintains the view that the seven were not deacons, such as those

* *Collected Writings*. Vol. IV., pp. 154, 200, 201.

permanent officers whom Paul addressed in his letter to the Philippians, and whose qualifications he describes in his first Epistle to Timothy, but were simply "stewards" appointed to meet the emergency in the affairs of the infant Church by the discharge of an extraordinary and temporary function.* This opinion, although ingeniously defended, is manifestly paradoxical; for, "although," as Dr. Addison Alexander remarks, "the title *deacon* is not used in this passage, nor indeed in this whole book, yet the judgment of the Church has in all ages recognised this as . . . that office, the continuance of which in other places and in later times is inferred from 1 Tim. iii. 8, 12; Phil. i. 1; Rom. xvi. 1."†

We have, it is believed, adduced sufficient authority from the past to show that we are very far from innovating, in contending for the position, that the management of all ecclesiastical goods and property ought to be committed to the deacons, as officers of Christ's appointment. The French and Scotch Formularies of Government, and the great names which have been mentioned as supporting this view—among which shine those of Calvin, Henderson, Rutherford, Owen, and Thornwell—must be confessed to carry with them to Presbyterians a heavy presumptive weight. It is the practice of the majority of our churches, under what we must consider the unhappy license furnished by the language of our particular Constitution, which has been characterised by novelty; and in abandoning it for that which is advocated in this paper, we would return to the older and the better paths.

Having endeavored to remove the difficulty by which this question is likely to be encumbered, at its very threshold, to wit, that the practice for which we contend would involve a departure from prescriptive usage, and be liable to the charge of novelty, we proceed, under the limitations of a necessary brevity, to adduce arguments in favor of the committal, wherever it is practicable, of the care and management of all ecclesiastical stipends, goods, and property to deacons. And in entering upon the discussion it is expedient that we take with us, as regulative data,

* *De Synagoga Vetere*, Lib. III., Pars II., Cap. V.

† *Comm.* on Acts vi. 6.

certain great principles concerning which there is, among ourselves at least, no dispute, but which, in doubtful cases of ecclesiastical practice, it is always needful to restate and confirm; such, for instance, as these: That the Lord Jesus, as he is the sole Priest, by whose blood the salvation of the Church was purchased, so, also, is the sole Prophet whose instructions she is to hear, and the sole King whose authority she is to obey; that he has left none of the real wants of the Church unsupplied, but has made ample provision for them all; and that as she has a temporal as well as a spiritual side, is composed of the bodies as well as the souls of his people, he has in his word secured her interests in both these relations; that without a warrant from his word, which is the constitutional law of the Church, either explicitly given in it or derived from it by good and necessary consequence, no element can lawfully exist, no office be established, no measure be adopted, within the whole extension of the ecclesiastical sphere; that a good and necessary consequence—a logical and therefore legitimate inference from facts, statements, principles, in the divine word—is, with us, formally acknowledged to be of equal authority with the word itself, and when declared to the Church bind her conscience and enforce her practice; that there ought not to be a union of secular and ecclesiastical organisations, or an admixture of secular and ecclesiastical authority in the administration of any affairs which properly come under the denomination of ecclesiastical; and that, on the other hand at the same time, there are natural and civil rights which should not be trespassed upon by ecclesiastical prerogative or requirement—the natural and civil right, for example, of the owners of property to control its management and use. We shall mainly follow the line of these principles in developing the considerations we have to submit.

1. The applicability of these principles to the case in hand must depend upon the definition of the things under consideration, namely, stipends, goods, and property. If they are ecclesiastical, they fall under their scope; if not, they lie outside of it. It is plain that we cannot define in this case from the nature of the things, in themselves considered, for the simple reason that

in their own nature they do not differ from precisely similar things employed for secular purposes. A church-building, for example, does not, in itself, differ from a building devoted to secular uses, as is proved by the fact that it may be, under certain circumstances, alienated from its original purpose. It may become a school-house, or a ware-room, or a place of public meetings of any character whatsoever. We must look, therefore, for a ground of definition to something peculiar to these things and predicable of them alone. That distinctive mark is the end for which they are employed. That end is ecclesiastical. Salaries of ministers, church-buildings, church-lands, church-revenues, all derive their denomination from the end upon which they terminate. And as the end is ecclesiastical, and that gives them their peculiarity which discriminates them from all other kinds of property, all other sorts of things, we properly call them ecclesiastical things, and assign them to the temporal department of the ecclesiastical sphere. They are things set apart and devoted to the service of God as conceived under the idea of the Church. Let it be observed, then, that the things of which we speak are ecclesiastical as contradistinguished from secular things.

(1.) This being granted, it follows that the appointment of trustees, or committees, other than the ordained officers of Christ's house, to take care of and manage these ecclesiastical things, is an infraction of the first principle signalled, viz., that the Lord Jesus is the sole Prophet, whose instructions we are to hear, and the sole King, whose authority we are to obey. For man's wisdom and man's authority ground the appointment of such officers, and consequently usurp the place of Christ's wisdom and Christ's authority. Officers of purely human creation are set over ecclesiastical and devoted things which fall under the control of Christ within the limits of his Church. His wisdom is impugned and his will disregarded.

If this view be just, we are discharged from the necessity of considering the injurious effects, the dangers, the want of guarantees for a safe administration of church funds, accruing from the substitution of humanly appointed agents in the place of the ordained officers of Christ's house. The great principle which we

have erected as a standard is sufficient to settle our practice, since it binds our conscience. If its applicability to this case is valid, we need no other argument. The law of our King is enough—we adore and obey. Those who wish to see the argument from expediency ably handled may consult the Essay of the Rev. James M. Willson, of Philadelphia, to which allusion has already been made.

(2.) If we discard deacons and place other officers, of man's call and appointment, over the temporal things of the Church, we violate the second principle, which we acknowledge to control our practice, to wit, that the Lord Jesus has left none of the wants of the Church unsupplied, but has made ample provision for them all; and that as she has a temporal as well as a spiritual side, is composed as well of the bodies as the souls of his people, he has in his word secured her interests in both these relations. It is certain that if our Lord did not in the appointment of the office of deacons make provision for the care and administration of the temporal affairs of his Church, he has made no such provision. He has appointed no guardian of her secular interests, no officer of finance, no treasurer of his kingdom, if the deacon be not assigned by his authority to that office. It is not conceivable that this omission to provide by Christ's own instructions for the complete welfare and efficiency of his Church would have occurred. And the case involves, we cannot forbear to think, an insult to his wisdom and his love for his people, when it is supposed necessary to invoke human wisdom to supply the defect, and human authority to create the absent and needed office.

(3.) But if the question be, by what right these extra-ecclesiastical agents are appointed to administer ecclesiastical affairs, we encounter the third great principle which we have assumed, the neglect of which is one potent reason why the Church so soon developed a tendency to abandon the purity of an apostolic condition, and let in a flood of errors and corruptions into the departments of doctrine, government, worship, and distribution; and that she has repeated the same disastrous course, whenever it has pleased God to interpose with his recovering and reviving grace, and lifting her from the mouth of the grave as by a resurrection

power, to give her a fresh start and invite her to a new career of obedience, prosperity, and glory. We allude to the mighty principle, that without a warrant from his word, which is the constitutional law of the Church, either explicitly given in it, or derived from it by good and necessary consequence, no element can lawfully exist, no office be lawfully established, no measure be lawfully adopted, within the whole extent of the ecclesiastical sphere. Now, where is the warrant, express or implied, in the Scriptures for Trustees, or Committee-men, appointed by men apart from and to the exclusion of the ordained officers of the church, to administer its temporal affairs? To say that, in the absence of a scriptural warrant, their appointment is authorised by necessity, is to say that the Saviour has left his Church incompletely equipped for her work, nay, for the protection and conservation of her own existence. To say that a secular corporation has the right and authority to make these appointments, is either to invalidate and deny Christ's authority in the ecclesiastical sphere, or to except the stipends, goods, and property of the Church from the category of ecclesiastical, and reduce them to the denomination of merely secular things. We have but little doubt that this last supposition lies at the root of the practice against which we are contending. We do not impute to those who cheerfully support the institutions of the Church, a conscious and deliberate intention to cast any discredit upon Christ's wisdom or authority, or upon the offices which he has created. But we have seen that the things which are usually assigned to the care of secular trustees and committees, are really ecclesiastical things, and that, consequently, they cannot be legitimately treated as secular. If this could only be distinctly apprehended, there can be little doubt that the incongruity would be clearly perceived of putting secular officers over ecclesiastical things, or of extending divinely ordained officers from their proper sphere, by filling it with those of man's election. But if no warrant can be pleaded from Scripture for the existence of these extra-ecclesiastical officers within the ecclesiastical sphere, what is left us, but to change our practice in this matter and conform it wherever practicable to the requirements of the Word?

(4.) If the question be pressed, by what warrant from the Scriptures the management of church-property should be committed to deacons, we ground our answer in the fourth principle to which we have adverted, namely, that a good and necessary consequence—a logical and therefore legitimate inference from facts, statements, and principles contained in the divine word—is, with us, formally acknowledged to be of equal authority with the word itself, and, when declared to the Church, bind her conscience and enforce her practice.

In the first place, it is admitted that the deacon was divinely charged with ministration to the temporal relief of the poor. The sixth chapter of the Acts definitely settles that point. The office of the deacon, therefore, is concerned about a temporal business in which money and provision of other kinds for the maintenance of the body must be handled and managed. Now if, as we have already argued, the Head of the Church could not have left her unprovided with officers whose duty it would be to look to her temporal interests, and administer her secular affairs, we are constrained to infer that he who was certainly charged with one department of secular duties, would be appointed to the discharge of all such duties. Reasoning from the analogy of the deacon's office as related to the temporal relief of the poor, contemplating its very genius and spirit, the inference is a legitimate one, that whatever other function of a temporal character was to be performed for the benefit of the Church, would be imposed likewise upon him who was designated and known as the temporal officer.

In the second place, this inference is immensely enhanced by the reason assigned by the apostles for not yielding to the solicitation of the Hellenist believers that they would personally superintend the daily distribution of relief to the poor: "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God, and serve tables." It is perfectly legitimate to infer that this reason holds good in regard to all business of a temporal or secular kind. We have already heard Dr. Thornwell arguing that the apostles would have gained little by divesting themselves of the care of the poor and continuing to be perplexed by the management of other secular affairs. Indeed, it was not attention to the relief of the

poor to which they objected, but the distractions resulting from secular business, of which the ministry to the poor was a part. The case must to his judgment have been very clear, to impel him to say: "It must be perfectly obvious to every candid mind that the entire secular business of the church was intrusted to the deacons."

In the third place, the concurrent judgment of the Church, which cannot be affected by the opinions of a few exceptional thinkers, like Vitranga, has been that the officers whose election is narrated in the sixth chapter of the Acts, were deacons; and that the officers whom Paul afterwards addressed under that title, and whose qualifications he furnishes, were charged with the performance of the same functions. That being so, it follows that, if our inferential reasoning has been valid, the management of the temporal business of the Church ought, on scriptural grounds, always to have been committed, ought now to be committed, to the hands of the deacons.

(5.) If the ground be taken, that the non-communicating members of a congregation, who are contributors to its support, or donors of church property, have a right to joint control, through officers in whose election they have a voice, with the officers of the church; or that a corporation, composed partly of communicating members of a church and partly of non-communicating attendants, may elect trustees representing both these elements—the secular and ecclesiastical—we meet the case with the acknowledged principle, that there ought not to be a union of secular and ecclesiastical organisations, or an admixture of secular and ecclesiastical authority, in the management and administration of any affairs which are properly denominated ecclesiastical. None among us would hesitate to apply this great principle to a union of Church and State, for the accomplishment of ecclesiastical ends; but what essential difference is there between that case, and the case of the coexistence and coöperation of communicants and non-communicants for the management of ecclesiastical property, and, therefore, for the attainment of an ecclesiastical end, except that one is enacted upon a larger, and the other upon a smaller scale? Let the principle which we here hold up to notice be

faithfully applied to all cases, and it will exclude the coalition of secular and ecclesiastical authority as well on the narrow theatre of particular congregational societies, as on the wider one of the Church as an organic whole. It does not constitute any valid objection to this view, that the influence and power exerted by the secular element in an ecclesiastical corporation is professedly and actually limited to the merely temporal interests of the Church; for, first, we have seen that the temporal things of the Church are ecclesiastical things, and that there are officers of Christ's appointment whose function he has ordained to terminate on those things, and to whom alone they ought therefore to be intrusted. Secondly, those who exercise a controlling influence over the temporal interests of the Church, have necessarily, from the intimate relation between them, some power, it may be at times, commanding power, in regard to the spiritual. Thirdly, the tendency, growing out of the possession of power by imperfect human beings, is from the professed control only of temporal matters in the first instance, to the assertion of a right to interfere in the management of spiritual. He who holds the purse wields power, and they who manage the property of the church hold the purse.

2. There would be some flaw in this discussion of the subject, if it logically necessitated the denial of their rights to the non-communicating adherents of the Church; for we have admitted the principle, that there are natural and civil rights which should not be trespassed upon by ecclesiastical prerogative or requirement—the natural and civil right, for example, of the owners of property to control its management and use. It is incumbent on us, therefore, to show that the committal of church-property to diaconal administration would involve no infringement of these rights.

Either the property in question belongs entirely to the church, or it does not. If it does, the corporation which owns the property is numerically coincident with the body of the communicants. It is plain that the committal of its property to the management of deacons would involve no violation of its rights. For, first, the election of deacons would be the act of the body which, personally considered, is the same with the corporation,

and the choice could always be made with a regard to their qualifications to discharge financial trusts of so grave a character. And, secondly, there could not possibly result a sacrifice of rights by the subjects of Christ's kingdom in consequence of paying obedience to his requirements. Surely, if a corporation consist only of communicants, it should, as there would be no bar to its doing so, make the deacons the trustees to whom its property would be committed.

If the property does not belong to the church, but to a corporation composed partly of communicants and partly of non-communicants, then we may urge the consideration, that, for the reasons already mentioned, this state of things should be discontinued. The non-communicating members of such a corporation should pass over all their original rights in the property to the church, and consent that where it is practicable the corporation legally holding it be limited to the communicants. As this would be a purely voluntary act on their part, there could be no infringement of their rights. In favor of the adoption of such a course, we submit an additional consideration derived from the provision embodied in our new Book of Church Order, touching the electors of pastor. The non-communicating pew-holders, or subscribers to the support of the church, although contributors to the salary of the pastor, are excluded from the privilege of voting at his election. Their rights of property are in a certain sense implicated; but it was deemed proper that those rights should give way before the principle that only those who are spiritual are qualified to vote for a spiritual officer, and only those who are the professed subjects of Christ's rule are entitled to vote for an officer of his kingdom. The non-communicants who contribute to the support of a minister really pay for a religious benefit to themselves, their families, and the community of which they are members, and if they feel that they get not value received, if they are dissatisfied with their relations to the pastor and the church, they are not bound: they can remedy the difficulty by withdrawing. It is, of course, always optional with them to stay or go. So, reasoning from analogy, the non-communicants, who contribute towards the erection of a church-edifice, or the maintenance

of a church-organisation, are not by that fact invested with a right and title to vote in the election of those who manage the property of the church. What they contribute ought to be considered, not as retained under their control, but as given, freely given, to the church, and as therefore passing out of their hands and beyond their direction. In case of dissatisfaction, measures of redress are open to them, and failing those, they can get rid of the difficulty by withdrawing from connexion with the ministrations of the church. The circumstance that they have no voice in the election of deacons, need no more militate against their attendance at a church whose temporal goods are managed by those officers of Christ's appointment, than should the fact that they do not vote at the election of pastor prevent their cordial reception of his spiritual instructions.

It may be objected against this view, that the church has a civil side, and that acting in that relation, she may, in combination with those who are not church-members, elect officers and discharge functions, not strictly ecclesiastical. Here the great distinction to be noted is in regard to the *ends* contemplated. Where the ends are purely civil, such a combination is warranted in order to compass them, and secular agents may very properly be appointed with a view to their attainment; but where the ends are ecclesiastical, none but the church should act in reference to them, and none but ecclesiastical officers should undertake their accomplishment. In those cases, for example, in which a congregation as a collection of citizens or subjects of civil government seek redress at law, or by an appeal to the civil magistrate, for an infraction of those civil rights which they enjoy in common with their fellow-citizens, it acts in the capacity, not of a church, but of a civil society, seeking purely civil ends, and may appoint non-ecclesiastical agents and adopt civil and secular means to attain those ends. But where the ends are ecclesiastical, and the congregation acts in the capacity of a church, as in the case of property for religious purposes—buildings, lands, rents, stocks, etc., it ought to commit the attainment of those ends to ecclesiastical functionaries. This distinction, once clearly apprehended, removes many of the difficulties by which the investiture of the

deacons, as church-officers, with all the powers and responsibilities connected with the care of church-property is embarrassed.

It may be said that the very definition of the deacon's office is, that it is concerned about temporal objects and temporal ends, and that therefore the distinction vanishes between agents appointed to act in behalf of a congregation for civil purposes and the deacons who are elected for temporal. But, in the first place, civil and temporal are not convertible terms. That which is civil is temporal, it is true; but that which is temporal is not necessarily civil. And in the next place, only the proximate end of the deacon's office is temporal; the ultimate is ecclesiastical—ecclesiastical, we say, though not spiritual.

These reasons are, we conceive, sufficient to show that church property ought not to be held and managed by a corporation composed partly of communicants and partly of non-communicants; and that the latter should acquiesce in the administration of the property by the church through her own divinely ordained officers. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that where there is not a sufficient number of male members of a church to render this course practicable, necessity justifies the management of church property by secular persons who are interested in the support of gospel institutions.

But, if these reasons should be deemed inadequate, and there should be congregations, which, availing themselves of the terms of the constitution, choose to retain corporations partly spiritual and partly secular, we proceed to submit considerations which should induce such corporations not to elect secular trustees, or executive committees, but to elect the deacons of the church their trustees or executive committees.

(1.) These corporations might with great propriety show deference to the appointments of Him who is Head and Lawgiver of that society with which their members are pleased to connect themselves as professed worshippers and hearers of the gospel.

(2.) The communicants who are members of these corporations are bound to conform to the requirements of Christ. They cannot without guilt violate his appointments and substitute for the officers of his ordination others created by themselves. Conse-

quently, against the alleged rights of the non-communicating property holders must be offsetted the duties of those who are communicants; and as the rights may be waived while the duties cannot, the rights of the non-communicants ought to yield to the obligations of the communicants. If this were done, as equity requires, the care of church property would always, where practicable, be lodged in the hands of the deacons. They would be elected its trustees.

(3.) The contribution of their means for ecclesiastical purposes, or the holding of ecclesiastical property by non-communicants, is not with a view to the reaping of pecuniary profit, but to secure moral and religious advantages to themselves and their families, which can only be obtained in connexion with the ordinances of the church. And, looking at the case from this point of view, we remark:

In the first place, the risk of temporal loss cannot ordinarily be any greater in consequence of committing the property to the care of church officers who may not only be sued at law, but are directly responsible to ecclesiastical authority for the manner in which they discharge their trusts.

In the second place, no gain but one purely religious being contemplated in the holding of church property by non-communicants, that end cannot be defeated by intrusting it the care of ecclesiastical officers.

But, in the third place, it is more probable, on the other hand, that religious benefit will be secured by connexion with a church which pays a strict obedience to the laws of Christ, and refuses to substitute officers of man's creation for those of his appointment. The purer the church, the greater the advantages to accrue from sustaining it.

(4.) The transference to other hands of duties which belong properly to the deacons has generally led to their merely nominal existence, if not to their obliteration, "In most Presbyterian denominations throughout Great Britain, Ireland, and America," says Dr. David King, in his able work on Presbyterian Church Government, "such deacons are generally dispensed with, and the charge of ecclesiastical funds is divided between elders and managers, or allied agencies." This statement has a sting in

it to the heart that honors the laws and appointments of Christ. Ought we not to see to it that any of our own churches which may have failed to elect deacons, should proceed, if it be possible, to supply the defect, and that the temporalities of the Church be committed to the hands of Christ's appointed officers? When will we conform our church order to the pattern showed us in the New Testament? It is a solemn remark which Willson makes in his Essay, that the deacon and the trustee have never for any considerable time coexisted in any denomination of Christians. Which, then, will we retain?

Hitherto we have spoken on the supposition that the communicants of a church, or the communicants and non-communicating supporters of a church, constitute the body corporate for the legal holding of church property. But the deacons themselves may be made the corporate body, as Dr. Samuel Miller, of Princeton, suggests. We will not undertake to decide between the incorporation of the communicants with the deacons as trustees on the one hand, and the incorporation of the deacons on the other. What we urge is that one or the other of these two plans be adopted, to the exclusion of a mixed corporation partly spiritual and partly secular; or, failing that, that a mixed corporation should elect the deacons as their trustees.

If the deacons be made trustees, and the management of church property be committed to their hands, it deserves to be remarked that the checks against a maladministration of it would be more ample than upon any other scheme. For, in addition to their legal responsibility, the deacons could be prosecuted for official delinquency before the bar of the Session.

It is proper to observe that in case the deacons are made the trustees of a corporation, they would lie under an obligation to present to that body periodical fiscal accounts, and reports of their proceedings in reference to the property committed to them. If they are themselves constituted the body corporate, they would have to report their proceedings and render their accounts to the church, in its congregational capacity, as holder of the property under their care.*

*It gives us pleasure to say that there is a church in this Synod—

THIRDLY. We propose briefly to consider the functions of the deacon as terminating on collections for congregational purposes and for the temporal support of the benevolent enterprises and the institutions of the Church.

By collections for congregational purposes, we mean all collections made for the purpose of meeting the necessities of the particular church in which they are lifted, apart from those for the relief of the poor—those, for example, for salaries of the minister and sexton, and for current expenses. By collections for the temporal support of the benevolent enterprises and the institutions of the Church, we intend to designate those made both for the maintenance of the benevolent schemes of particular churches such as missionary Sabbath-schools and congregations, and asylums for the poor; and for the benevolent schemes and institutions of the Church at large—such as Home and Foreign Missions, education of needy candidates for the ministry, publication of religious literature, support of invalid ministers and the indigent families of deceased ministers, theological seminaries, and the like.

The legitimacy of employing the deacon in the discharge of secular ecclesiastical functions in addition to his care of the poor, has already been considered under the head of the management of church property. The general conclusion there reached covers the specific case in hand. If the deacon's office is legitimately employed in relation to all the temporal affairs of the Church, it is of course legitimately employed in relation to the raising of collections for congregational and benevolent purposes. There is no need, therefore, to discuss the question in the special aspect of it before us. It is, however, worthy of remark, as something curious, that those who objected to the extension of the deacon's functions to the care of church property, on the ground that he was appointed to attend to the relief of the poor,

that of Abbeville—in which, by a Constitution drafted by that able lawyer, our late lamented brother, Col. Thomas C. Perrin, the body of communicants is the corporation, and the deacons the trustees. It is to be hoped that all our churches will, where it is practicable, adopt this plan.

did not appear to see that in sanctioning his employment in raising all the collections of the Church, they were inconsistent with themselves, and had, indeed, abandoned the ground on which they stood. If the deacon was by virtue of his appointment restricted to the care of the poor, the church had no right to use his services in making collections for other purposes. But the practice of our Church has long since settled that question as a practical one. Deacons are universally employed among us to take up collections for all purposes. We are gratified, too, in being able now to say, that our Constitution also settles the question and confirms our practice. It says, Form of Government, Chap. II., Sec. 4., Art. IV.: "To the deacons belongs the administration of the offerings for the poor, and other pious uses;" and in Chap. IV., Sec. 4, Art. II.: "The duties of this office especially relate to the care of the poor and to the collection and distribution of the offerings of the people for pious uses." There can, therefore, no longer be any doubt that the deacons are our constitutional agents for making collections for all purposes.

1. We would call attention to the *negative* bearing upon our practice of this declaration of the Form of Government in regard to the duties of deacons. It is admitted that the Constitution binds us because, as we believe, it represents the law of Christ as enounced in the New Testament Scriptures. The duties, consequently, which the Constitution assigns to deacons are, we believe, those which the law of Christ imposes upon them. But these duties are obligatory upon them as a distinct class. They are distinctive of, and peculiar to, that class. They can, therefore, be the duties of no other class, on the supposition that the one exists to which they are authoritatively attached. That is to say, if there are deacons in a church, no other officer is called or empowered, under ordinary circumstances, to discharge their peculiar functions. The minister and the ruling elder are not entitled to perform them. They have their own appropriate duties assigned them by divine authority. So have the deacons. It would, therefore, be illegitimate, in a regular condition of the church in which deacons have their place, for the minister and elder to leave their own functions in order to discharge those

of the deacons. Every one should stand in his own lot and perform the duties which belong to it. These views must hold good, unless it can be proved that the higher office includes the lower, so that while it is not competent for the lesser officer to discharge the functions of the greater, the greater may perform those of the lesser. We can conceive no other ground upon which it can be urged that the minister and elder may do the work of the deacon, while the deacon is limited strictly to his own. In a previous part of this discussion, we endeavored to show that this doctrine of the inclusion of the lower office in the higher, in a regular condition of the Church, cannot be sustained by an appeal to Scripture, or to the consent of the Church, or to rational considerations. But if it be untenable, it remains that the peculiar duties of the diaconate cannot be transferred to other church officers, or to special agents. This we conceive to be the constitutional and scriptural view; and if so, it needs no reinforcement from human arguments. When the Lord speaks, let all the earth keep silence. But the importance of our compliance with the divine will in the premises, may be evinced by a few considerations.

In the first place, it is obvious that where the principle of a division of labor can be employed, so that different functions may be assigned to different laborers, and so that by virtue of this distribution experts are thrown together for the accomplishment of the ends to which they are peculiarly adapted, and so, moreover, that a facility for performing certain kinds of work is increased by an habitual and exclusive devotion to it of a particular class, greater efficiency would be attained by a working organisation, and higher results in every way would be reached, than by jumbling officers together, and, to use a homely but forcible aphorism, making the peculiar function of one class attach to all, so that "what is everybody's business becomes nobody's."

In the second place, the principle of responsibility lies across the path of this doctrine, that other officers or agents may discharge the functions of deacons. If the deacon is made to feel that no one but himself can perform duties which belong to him alone, his sense of responsibility, if he be a true man, will operate

in full force ; but if his functions may be discharged by others, his responsibility is divided, it is shared with others, and his sense of it must be proportionably decreased. And it will equally follow that those who depart from their own peculiar vocation to act as the deacon's substitutes, cannot have that powerful conviction of accountability which is one of the surest guarantees of efficiency. No officer can profoundly feel responsibility for functions to which he is conscious that he was never ordained, and which he never bound himself, by the vows of ordination, to fulfil. Throw his full responsibilities upon the deacon alone, and he will be sure to rise under them. Divide them with others, and you dwarf him.

In the third place, we may derive instruction in this matter from the analogous case in the past of a substitution of special agencies for pastoral ministrations, in the effort to advance the benevolent enterprises of the Church. Time was when it was deemed necessary for paid agents to circulate among the churches in order to stimulate them to the duty of beneficence. The Church had the grace to discard that system, and the results have been gratifying. We are slow to learn. Why should we not refuse to thrust out the deacon from the work to which he is called, as well as the pastor and the elders from theirs? When we shall thoroughly trust and use the deacon, if ever we shall, we will find that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men."

2. Let us next look at the *positive* bearing upon our practice of the constitutional requirement, that the deacons shall raise and distribute all collections for pious uses. There are two modes of making collections: first, from congregations during the services of the sanctuary, and as an element of public worship; secondly, from individuals by special application, apart from the public services of the Church. What the function of the deacons is in regard to the first of these methods of collecting, it is not necessary to inquire. Our practice is sufficiently settled to render discussion needless. But the same is not true in reference to the second mode of collecting—by special application to individuals. Here, we think, our practice is defective, and we desire

to indicate a way in which the defect may be remedied. We are unable to see why the deacons should not be as exclusively employed to make one sort of collections as another. They ought not, as has been shown, to be thrust aside, and in our practice, they are not thrust aside, by other agents, in making the public collections in the house of the Lord. Why should not the deacon discharge his own duties also, in respect to the collections made from individuals? We see no real ground of difference between the two cases, and therefore think that they ought practically to be brought into unity. Now we lay down the proposition, that the deacons are congregational agents for making collections not only for congregational purposes, but for general benevolent objects, and that this holds good in relation to collections from individuals in behalf of those general objects. Let us illustrate this position by reference to a particular case. We will suppose that a theological seminary, under the care of our Church, is in need of pecuniary help. We will suppose also that every Presbytery, within the scope of country from which the institution might legitimately expect to derive its support, recommends or enjoins the Sessions of its churches to present the case, as an extraordinary one lying outside of their regular schedules of causes, to individuals for their contributions. Now let the deacons of each church, all or some of them, be directed by the Sessions thoroughly to canvass the congregations, and the communities, so far as accessible, in which the churches exist, for the purpose of securing contributions to the support of the institution,—that would be an instance which would elucidate our meaning. Ascend from the particular to the general, and you have the principle for which we are contending in its application to general objects of benevolence, viz., that when it is sought to bring them before individuals for their contributions, they should be intrusted for that purpose to the hands of deacons as officers appointed by Christ with reference to all the financial necessities of his Church. We strongly urge the adoption of this course.

We would not be understood as advocating the exclusion of other agencies, contemplating the attainment of the same end, provided they be confined to their own appropriate spheres.

There is need, in regard to such objects, of instruction, exposition, and appeal. The educated mind, the trained speaker, are demanded for the discharge of such offices. The apostles and their fellow-ministers stirred up the churches to contribute to the relief of the poor saints at Jerusalem; but the apostles did not make collections either from churches or individuals. We are not called upon to discuss the question whether such a preliminary office should be discharged by pastors in their regular ministrations, or whether it might not be more appropriately assigned to special agents, particularly under extraordinary circumstances, as, for example, when an endowment is sought for an institution. All that we strive for, is, that the collections should be made by deacons, with that minute, thorough-going canvassing of a congregation and community which only such a method could possibly compass. Whatever a single individual might or might not accomplish, let this be done, and there is hardly a person within the limits of our congregations who might not be approached, and have the opportunity presented to him of giving his contribution. Here, then, we have Presbyteries approving and enjoining, pastors instructing and exhorting—perhaps special agents adding their stirring appeals—Sessions ordering the collections, and the deacons making them. The system seems perfect. It may, it will, in consequence of human imperfection, prove practically defective; but we verily believe it to be the best which can be conceived, and for the simple reason that it is God's system. Duty and policy alike urge us to its complete adoption.

FOURTHLY. This discussion of the scope of the deacon's functions will be concluded with some remarks upon the question, whether they terminate upon the Lord's Table.

It is by some contended that the office of deacon includes the service of three tables: the table of the poor, the table of the minister, and the table of the Lord. We confess our inability to perceive why the Lord's table should be embraced in this classification, except that the mere name, *table-service*, is made generic, including under it the specific service of every sort of table. There is really no analogy between the Lord's Table and the other tables, which would lead to its being reduced to unity with

them as falling to the care of the deacon. It would properly belong to that officer to provide the table itself, and then, as occasion requires, to provide also the elements to be placed upon it; for the reason that the moneys of the church are committed to his hands, and whatever in the preparation for the sacrament involves expense, would naturally fall to his charge. But this having been done, what else remains which would belong distinctively to his office? It is admitted that the administration of the sacred ordinance is restricted to the minister of the word, by reason of the analogy between the teaching function of the sacrament and that of preaching. As, moreover, the administration of the ordinance contemplates spiritual ends, the deacon as a temporal officer is debarred from it. The only remaining thing to be done is the actual transmission—the handing—of the elements to the communicants. Now, can it be shown that the manual transmission of the bread and wine from the officiating minister to the recipients pertains so peculiarly to the deacon's office that others are precluded from undertaking it? We think not, for the following reasons:

1. The only place in Scripture, so far as we know, which is supposed to warrant the threefold classification we have mentioned is that in the sixth chapter of the Acts, recording the arguments used by the Apostles for the election of the seven: "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables." But it is evident that the Apostles could only have meant the tables from which the bodily wants of the poor were supplied, and those on which the money or the goods of the church were laid—the provision tables and the money tables. Otherwise they must be understood as having transferred the sacramental table with the others to the sole care of the deacons, and as having asserted that it was an unreasonable thing for them, and by parity of reason, for all ministers of the word, to serve the Lord's Table. The argument is invalid, from the fact that it proves too much.

2. We do not know of any other passage of Scripture from which a good and necessary inference can be derived, making it the peculiar duty of deacons to distribute the sacramental ele-

ments. The question would be settled, could such an inference be indicated. In its absence, we are left to be guided by the nature of the case, and by the analogy of the deacon's office. Now the end contemplated in the distribution of the bread and wine at the Lord's Supper is not the nourishment or refreshment of the body; and as the function of the deacon terminates on the body, there would seem to be no special reason why he should, to the exclusion of others, circulate the elements. This function does not come under the head either of the care of the poor, or of the care of moneys, or of the care of property; and these exhaust the scope of the deacon's duties, unless some scriptural evidence exists for another head—the service of the Lord's Table.

3. It is often the case that the communicants themselves in part transmit the elements from one to another. This is as much a distribution of them as the deacon may be supposed to perform; and if it belongs to the deacon alone to distribute them, the passage of them by the hands of the recipients would be an unwarrantable intrusion upon the diaconal office. But could it, on scriptural grounds, be arrested for that reason? In all probability, if we are at liberty to form an inferential judgment in the matter, this was what was actually done in apostolic times. It is almost, if not entirely, impossible to see how the Corinthian communicants could have become drunken at the Lord's Supper, if Paul had instructed the church that the deacons ought to distribute the elements.

4. The opinions and practice of the Church have been too uncertain and conflicting to furnish any satisfactory argument from ecclesiastical authority and precedent in favor of charging the deacon alone with the duty of distributing the elements at the Supper. We furnish specimens of this difference, which are sufficient to illustrate our position:

Justin Martyr, the early father, in a passage in his *Second Apology*, which is often quoted, says that in his time the deacons distributed the sacramental elements to the people.

Bingham, after citing this passage of Justin Martyr, proceeds to say:

“The author of the *Constitutions* likewise, describing the manner of the

ancient service, divides the whole action between the bishop and the deacon; appointing the bishop to deliver the bread to every communicant singly, saying, 'The body of Christ!' and the deacon in like manner to deliver the cup, saying, 'The blood of Christ, the cup of life!' This the author under the name of St. Austin calls the proper office of the deacons' order. Yet it was not so proper to their order, but that they were to depend on the will and license of the bishops and presbyters, if they were present; as is expressly provided in some of the ancient Councils, which forbid the deacon to give the Eucharist in the presence of a presbyter, except necessity require, and he have his leave to do it."*

Steuart of Pardovan says:

"They [the deacons] may be employed to provide the elements. to carry them, and serve the communicants at the Lord's table."†

As an offset to the testimony of Justin Martyr, that of Origen is as often quoted to the effect that "the deacons preside over the money-tables of the church."

Rufinus said that when there was no presbyter present the deacons might distribute the elements of the Lord's Supper.

Aymon, in his Acts of the National Synods of the Reformed Churches of France, gives this decision of the National Synod at Lyons, 1563:

"As to the question which has been referred to the Brethren of Geneva, whether the pastors only should distribute the bread and the wine to the people at the table of the Lord, they have answered: That it would be very well if they would do it, and that they would do it at all times; but the thing appearing impracticable at present, and still more so for the future, if God should multiply the number of believers, that it would not be unsuitable for the deacons and elders, as the arms and hands of the ministers, to distribute the sacramental elements, after their consecration, to the people who are too far from the minister to be reached by him."‡

The same author gives the following decision of the National Synod at Vertueil:

"Our brethren having proposed a doubt, to wit, whether any person except the minister of the gospel may deliver the cup to the people in the sacrament—the Synod, after duly weighing the reasons on both sides of the question, do decide, That the fourteenth article decreed by the

**Antiquities*. Vol. I., p. 253. †*Collections*, p. 31.

‡*Synodes Nationaux des Eglises Réformées de France*, Tom. I., p. 57.

Council of Lyons should remain in force, namely, that none other than the minister, if possible, should deliver the cup."†

He furnishes also this decision of the National Synod at Privas:

"This body . . . confirms the judgment rendered by the National Synod of St. Maixent, which shows that the elders and deacons, in case of necessity, may distribute the cup, but without speaking."*

It seems exceedingly probable that in the early Church the custom of the distribution of the sacramental elements by deacons originated in the hypothesis, which very soon began to prevail, that the diaconal office subordinately involved the preaching function, and that the deacon ought to be, in a peculiar sense, an assistant of the bishop, as the presiding officer of the presbyterial college came to be exclusively called. It is easy to see how, under the influence of such a view of the diaconate, the deacon was employed to assist "the bishop" in the administration of the Supper. Sometimes, as we have heard Bingham saying, the bishop distributed the bread and the deacon the cup. This looks very much like the recognition of a teaching prerogative as belonging to the deacon, grounding his participation with the bishop in the dispensation of the elements.

While, therefore, we cannot perceive that either Scripture, or the analogy of the deacon's office, or the consentient practice of the true Church, would lead us to conclude that it is a distinctive duty of the deacon to distribute the elements at the administration of the Lord's Supper, neither do we see any just reason why he may not assist the minister in the manual circulation of them; provided, that function is not considered as proper to him by virtue of his containing in himself the germ of the preaching office. For, it is not, so far as we know, made obligatory on any other officer than the minister, strictly speaking, to distribute the elements—that is, to give them from the table to the people; and we see no reason why elders and deacons may not, after the sacramental action of distribution has been done by the minister, unite in merely passing the elements about among the communicants without the use of any words; or why, in the absence of elders and deacons from a church, some reputable private mem-

**Ibid.*, p. 74. †*Ibid.*, p. 415.

ber may not be called upon to render this service of love to his fellow-communicants. Where there is no male member of a church, the transmission, as well as the distribution, in the first instance from the table, would devolve on the officiating minister, as a servant of the Church for Jesus' sake. Lest, therefore, it should be regarded as peculiarly imperative upon either the elders or the deacons to discharge this service, we would express the judgment, that, in the ordinary practice of our churches, both classes of officers should take part in its performance; for it does not distinctively appertain to the elder any more than to the deacon. Decency, order, and convenience, make it expedient that some particular persons should be charged with the circulation of the elements among the communicants; and the church-officers, without distinction, would, we think, most appropriately be called upon to assist the minister in putting the elements into the hands of all the recipients, especially those remote from him. We concur in the opinion, already cited, of the "Brethren of Geneva"—and Calvin was alive when that judgment was rendered*—that, the distribution of the sacramental elements properly belongs to the minister; but that after he has distributed them from the table, the mere manual transmission—the handing—of them among the communicants should be jointly performed by the elders and deacons.

*This judgment was adopted by the National Synod of Lyons in 1563, and Calvin died in 1564.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

A Critical and Doctrinal Commentary upon the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans. By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary. N. Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743-745 Broadway.

This is a work of rare merit. It is peculiarly acceptable to all who love the great doctrines of grace, based on a "gratuitous justification," in these times, when so many who "profess and call themselves Christians" "are carried about with every wind of doctrine," many who "will not endure sound doctrine," and even ministers, who do not heed the apostolic admonition to speak "things which become the doctrine according to godliness." Indeed, at any time those who desire to be "nourished up in the words of good doctrine" will gladly welcome any well intentioned and well accomplished effort to explain, advocate, and illustrate the teachings of this great Epistle of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, so long and so highly admired for its well established value in presenting the most profound and pious declarations of the gospel scheme of salvation; an Epistle which Dr. Shedd truly declares "contains all the elements of both natural and revealed religion," so that "the human mind need not go outside" of its teachings "to know all religious truth" (Preface, p. viii.). It may be true, that to very many, the first thought respecting a new commentary on the Epistle to the Romans may be expressed in some such language as this: "What! another work on the Epistle to the Romans? Why this waste of time and labor and money? Do not the theological libraries already abound with such books?" But the thoughtful mind will regard the subject with different sentiments; whatever estimate may be placed on the labors of the past and the venerated writers who have so ably instructed the Protestant world for three centuries, yet in every generation, some peculiar modes of thought are developed in the minds of learned and pious men, whereby clearer views of

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truth are often set forth ; and on the other hand, men who "have sought out many inventions," by which cavils and objection to divine revelation are adduced, need to be met and put to silence by those "who vindicate the ways of God" in new methods of presenting the truth.

Dr. Shedd has given us a remarkably concise, yet minute, and also a satisfactory, explanation of the words and sentences of this Epistle. He appears to have left nothing needing exegesis untouched. His spirit is every where manifested to be that of earnest piety and implicit confidence in the inspired teachings, and an adoring reverence for the author of Divine Revelation. While closely critical, he is guarded never to allow mere human authority to rule his criticism. He is not contented to show, most clearly, the scope and general instruction of the Apostle's words, but, by diligent and careful examination into the precise signification of those words, he gives yet clearer and more accurate exposition. To those who have formed loose habits of reading the Scriptures, or who, while daily readers of the word, are not thoughtful or studious readers, many passages remain misapprehended or not clearly apprehended, and some, indeed, not at all apprehended. By others, "the sense of Scripture," as interpreted by the symbols of some Church, or as handed down through stereotyped forms of exposition, the propriety of which they feel too reverential of authority to question, is confidently accepted as incontrovertibly correct ; while yet others, in the spirit of a dead conservatism, have decried all critical examination of God's word as not only needless, but as eminently fraught with danger as well to the student himself as to those who may follow the results of his labors. And it is acknowledged that the admirers of German Rationalism and unscrupulous criticism have been often severed from the faith and spread their crude opinions greatly to the injury of the unwary. But our generation has been blessed with many who knew how to handle the tools of criticism, not only with safety to themselves, but benefit to the inquirers after the teachings of God's word. Among many of less note, Dr. John Eadie of Scotland, Dr. J. A. Alexander and (now) Dr. Shedd of our own country, have been eminently suc-

cessful in turning the weapons elsewhere used to the injury of truth, to defend the truth; and have used the labors of German lexicographers, grammarians, and critical commentators, to fit themselves for interpreting the word of God on the principles of a sound exegesis, while exposing the errors and inconsistencies of men who, contrary to the requisitions of sound critical science, have often perverted the meaning of the Bible. Each of the three scholars just named has his own peculiar mode of presenting the results of his careful and accurate study of the word of God, both in the language of the Old and in that of the New Testament. But in all we trace the judicious use of a "learning" which, while making its acquirers "mad," because they misapplied their own acquisitions, has made these scholars eminently wise to set forth truth. How have we seen, with mingled surprise and joyful satisfaction, obscure places made clear, the plain yet plainer, and texts long shrouded in words of exposition which rather concealed the light, made to sparkle as brilliant gems, under the teaching of these masters in Israel! Judiciously investigated etymologies, idioms, and even particles, have given results in grammatical and logical interpretations, which have invested many portions of the Scriptures with rich and edifying instruction hitherto undiscovered. The work before us, and also those of the other Christian scholars named, are eminently fitted to be the teachers of teachers, not only as excellent models of what commentaries ought to be, and how the Bible should be studied by those fitted for such study even in less measure than these writers, but also as providing germs of thought, which intelligent students can, with God's blessing, develop into means of successful teaching of others. Not only ministers, but intelligent and educated elders and laymen, parents and Bible and Sabbath-school teachers, will find both stimulus and instruction. There can be no doubt that in our age unusual facilities for a study of the Bible abound, in the form of "Guides," "Introductions," "Histories of the Bible," and "Lives of Christ," with other works of similar character. They are published in volumes, in quarterly and monthly and weekly periodicals. And all this is cheering. But it must be confessed, as to the bulk of such

publications, there is one common and sad defect: they are, to a great extent, too little the fruits of wise, pious, and accurate scholarship, which can prosecute an independent study of the Bible. This does not imply, by any means, such an independence as some such works profess, illustrated in differing from others, apparently simply for the sake of differing or putting forth works in which the true things are not new, and the new things seldom true; but those, the authors of which have learned by diligent study to discriminate between right and wrong views, and are able to give, on right interpretations, a reason for their faith. Too many of these popular works resemble the heavily loaded wagons which follow in the ruts of their predecessors, often rendering bad places worse, and seldom failing, more or less, to injure the good. If our young ministers and candidates would undertake the thorough study of such a work as this, or those of the authors above named, and bring to their pulpits and to the press the sound scriptural teachings inculcated, popularised for the public ear, not only would their "profiting appear to all men," but all men would "profit" by their teachings.

Dr. Shedd has proved himself, however, to be as finished a master in exposition as in exegesis. In the Epistle to the Romans, he has had a field of study far more difficult than those of either of the scholars who have been associated with him in the foregoing remarks.

This Epistle has long been the battle-ground between Calvinists on the one hand, and Arminians and Pelagians on the other. And among Calvinists there have been variant views on some of its salient passages. Dr. Shedd has performed his task with eminent ability, and on all the fundamental doctrines taught in our standards utters the "words of truth and soberness." Man's depravity, God's method of "gratuitous justification," the process of sanctification, the safety of God's people, based both on God's sovereign electing love, and the union of the believers with Christ, the great principles of the divine government, the adorable wisdom, power, and mercy displayed in God's dealings, are all fully presented and ably advocated. On the 14th verse of the fifth chapter of Romans, there is presented a view of the sin

of those "over whom death reigned from Adam to Moses," which is not consonant, in the details of its explanation, with the prevailing teachings of Calvinistic interpreters and theologians. Dr. Shedd with others accepts the persons of whose sinning the apostle speaks, verse 14, to be "infants", and presumably, he means such as die in infancy, since he predicates of them the impossibility of sinning against both the written law (*i. e.* of Moses, not yet revealed,) and the law of conscience or unwritten law; for in ii. 14, sin against that is predicated only of adults. But infants would be incapable of sinning by *actual transgression* as well of the Eden law as of any other. "Death reigning" over them implies that they sinned. Dr. Shedd says that their sin was *identical* with that of Adam. This seems to be not a matter of exegesis, unless it is because the opposite of *similitude* is *identity*. But even granting that, Adam's sin was "actual transgression," and the "similitude" relates, in the judgment of the bulk of interpreters, to that and not to the law violated. The difficulty of the case, then, is really this: to decide *how* infants could be sinners, for their subjection to death proves they were. Of the various modes of explaining *how* they are sinners, that which contemplates this condition to be the result of a union with Adam seems the most satisfactory. Dr. Shedd differs, impliedly, as to the nature of that union, but as fully as other Calvinists avows his belief in it. This is not the place, nor is there space here to discuss the question, which, perhaps, after all, is rather one of speculation. and, however answered, is immaterial while the clearly revealed *fact* is distinctly accepted.

The structure of this commentary affords occasion for a most unqualified commendation in two aspects. The "Introduction" is a pattern of conciseness with a fulness adequate to its legitimate purposes. It occupies only *five* pages, or *one eighty-eighth part* of the volume; and Preface (eight pages) and introduction together, only *one thirty-fourth*. Stuart's Introduction to his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, is fully one-half of the work; on Proverbs, about one-third; and on Ecclesiastes, one-third. Dr. Shedd has "honored this custom", derived by Prof. Stuart from Germany, by its "*breach*" and not "observance."

Prolix introductions are of little real utility. The reader is so long occupied with "being introduced" that he is in danger of forfeiting the results, as the writer of losing sight of the real purpose of such an essay. Dr. Shedd has also claims to the gratitude of his readers, for keeping the Greek text almost constantly in parallel progress with the commentary, by having it printed along the top of the page, so that his readers are relieved from the trouble of looking back several pages to refresh their memories of the context of words under discussion.

While thus commending this work, we take the liberty to offer some few suggestions respecting what are deemed faults of omission.

1. As Dr. Shedd takes up word after word (or in clauses) for exegetical discussion, the Greek text almost solely is quoted. Now there are many readers both male and female who would be every way prepared to appreciate explanations of the author's meaning in the Greek words, were the corresponding English translation added; and thus the circulation and value of the work might be greatly increased.

2. It would have been very much to the edification of all readers, had the writer presented, at the opening of the several discussions, the *first*, *third*, *fifth*, and *ninth* chapters, a compact analysis and scope of each division. The half-page of Introduction, in which he presents us a kind of brief table of contents, might have been better, if fuller, say, by a page or two more. The value of such summaries to a young student especially is incalculable.

3. In quoting parallel and confirmatory passages, Dr. Shedd is exceedingly happy in frequently presenting just enough and no more. But it is respectfully suggested, that in *all* cases in which references are made simply by chapter and verse, one or more of the passages referred to ought to be as fully quoted as will evince the pertinency of the reference. But few readers pay attention to the writer's directions to "see", "consult", or "compare", and so derive little or no benefit by passages noted merely in figures. In all efforts to interpret God's word, nothing is lost, and much may be gained, by a judicious use of Scripture to explain Scripture.

The perusal of this commentary has proved very suggestive.

1. It is pleasing to see how harmoniously agree the results of the most careful criticism, conducted on correct principles, applied to the original language of the sacred writers, and those results secured by men of the Reformation, led by Calvin, in modes of study of which minute criticisms formed a less prominent part. Further, our faith in the great doctrines set forth in the symbols of the historical churches of the Reformation is confirmed, when we see in such works as this that the great growth of the science of Biblical criticism has but tended to develop in the proper study of God's word, not only the fact that that science has intrinsically no tendency to foster scepticism and engender cavil, but has served to make plainer and clearer the revelations made to us in the Bible. It has not been many years since, on the one hand, the advocates of increased attention to the critical textual study of the Old and New Testaments were warned against the pernicious results of such study as illustrated in the rise and influence of Rationalism; and on the other, not a few rather superficial scholars were decrying the works of commentators such as Calvin, Poole, Scott, and Henry, on the allegation that till the advance made in Biblical criticism no one could interpret Scripture on right principles. But we now see how piety and good sense combined with adequate knowledge of the original languages but serves only more fully and satisfactorily to set forth the fundamental doctrines of the fathers of our Protestant Churches. They may have been led, under the general principles of the divine government developed with sufficient clearness, to feel justified in the structures of the symbols they have left us. But now the more the Bible is rightly studied, the more clearly are those truths exhibited.

2. Here appears the utter folly and ignorance of all the prating of men of (so called) "advanced thought" about the necessity of re-forming standards of faith, liberalising theology, and discarding as "old and ready to vanish" our opinions on inspiration, eternal judgment, the person of Christ, his expiation for sin, and the atonement which it was made to secure.

3. Here, also, is seen the absolute necessity of increasing,

rather than diminishing, the demands on candidates for the holy office, that they be diligent students of the word in the languages in which God revealed it, so that for themselves they can set forth a faith derived, not of man, nor by man, but of God's inspired word. A theology so obtained will stand all tests and survive all attacks. The purity of the Church is, after all the help derived from sound standards and right discipline, dependent on an intelligent apprehension of the truth on the part of those appointed to preach; for such, under God's Spirit, will love it and so preach it, as to save themselves and those who hear them, who by the Word and Spirit of God may be imbued with a true spirituality and led in the paths of true holiness.

B. M. S.

Evenings with the Doctrines. By NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D., Author of "Friends of Christ," "Christ a Friend," "Communion Sabbath," etc., etc. Revised edition. Boston: D. Lothrop & Company, Franklin Street, corner of Hawley. Pp., 447, 12mo.

This book contains the substance of familiar lectures delivered in the Essex Street church, Boston, on successive Tuesday evenings in the winter of 1858-9. The stereotype plates of the work having been destroyed in the great fire at Boston in 1872, a revised edition is here presented to the public which faithfully reproduces the original text. Dr. Adams lived until the 6th October, 1878, and maintained to the end unchanged the sound orthodox theological views of his whole previous life.

With peculiar pleasure we hail such a book as this, coming to us from New England. We have discovered in its pages nothing which Old School Presbyterians would consent to blot. If there be many people in Massachusetts and the other Eastern States holding these views, the defection is less prevalent in the land of the Pilgrims than we had supposed.

There are seventeen lectures, or evenings: *God, Divine Revelation*, and *The Trinity*, being the subjects of the first three. Two more are devoted to the *Deity of Christ* and one to the *Deity of the Holy Spirit*. The next two treat of *Man*. Then follow

three on *The Atonement*. After these, we have one each on the concluding topics, viz., *Election, Regeneration, Perseverance, Christian Perfection, The Intermediate State, and Retribution*. These lectures, handled in an original yet simple and plain way, which every class of readers, from the most cultivated to the least intelligent, may read with interest and delight, constitute a very valuable compendium of popular theology for both young and old readers.

We have been especially delighted with the second lecture, which is on *Divine Revelation*. Dr. Adams makes the Bible to stand alone among books. Audubon's "Birds of America" is a wonderful production, but all would soon tire of it, just as they would of "the myriad-minded Shakespeare," if old and young had to study either from year to year continually. Christians of all countries take up that book every morning before they go to their day's work, and at night again repair to this marvellous book. What must the book be to furnish the minds and hearts of intelligent people and people of every degree of capacity with such exhaustless supplies of thought and emotion! And all who love it find it appropriate to every time and condition. The young married pair begin their wedded life with reading it in their new home; it is the only book which is admitted stately on festive occasions; it is in place at funerals; it is not a solemnity for a Christian to swear on any other book; it furnishes texts for all the pulpits of Christendom Sabbath after Sabbath; it has been the occasion of more volumes in various departments of knowledge than any other book; it has filled the picture galleries of the Old World with more productions of art than have been occasioned by any other volume, whether of history or poetry. And never before had this book such a hold upon the universal mind of man as now, judging from the extent of its present circulation. After yet more fully setting forth the wondrous perfections and powers of this book, Dr. Adams, reasoning from effect to cause, argues that God would not have allowed such a book, under his name and with his asserted sanction, to acquire and exert any such influence unless it had proceeded from him.

To the proposition which he derives from a variety of consider-
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ations, that the Bible is a communication from God to man, there are natural and obvious objections, which Dr. Adams proceeds to state and to meet in a convincing and satisfactory manner. One of these is from the variety of styles in the different books which make up the Bible. The author says, if God should inspire all the singing birds on the first of May with some sudden joy and give them all a new song, we should not expect the canary to sing precisely like the nightingale. Another objection is, that there are things in the Bible which cannot be read and should not be read in public, nor even before a family. Dr. Adams says so there are in the statute books of every state and in the dictionaries and in the books of domestic medicine. Other like objections are met in the same felicitous manner. And then a variety of positive evidences are produced proving the divine inspiration of the book. We cannot particularise these, but content ourselves with expressing our satisfaction with the ground maintained by this New England divine, that "as to the nature of inspiration and the degree in which the Bible is inspired, we shall find that the highest theory is the most easily maintained." J. B. A.

A Commentary on the Catholic Epistles. By JOHN T. DEMAREST, D. D., Minister of the Reformed Church of New Prospect, N. Y. New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America, 34 Vesey Street. 1879. Pp., 650, 8vo.

Dr. Demarest is a scholar, and this work affords abundant proof of it. To each one of the Catholic Epistles he furnishes an Introduction, giving its history (which he traces back to the beginning), and showing the solid grounds for our confidence in its genuineness. Then he points out the scope of the Epistle, and gives an analysis of its contents, and discusses the place and date of its writing and the parties addressed. And to all this he adds a full account of the literature and criticism which each Epistle has occasioned and drawn forth. After this he presents us with an elaborate commentary on every section and verse.

The volume is redolent of its author's earnest and pious spirit, and no reader can fail to be benefited by it. But it is a book

for the student rather than the ordinary lover of the word. One thing, however, excites our wonder. It is that a learned author like Dr. Demarest, publishing in the great metropolis, New York, would be content to give all words quoted from the original in English letters. This is a great blot upon the otherwise admirable getting up. We must add, in candor, that it does not appear to us that criticism can be Dr. Demarest's strong point. We have seen other kinds of production from his pen that impress us more favorably than what he gives us here of minute verbal discussion. This sort of work appears to blunt the point of his pen, and take the sparkle out of his style. Historical disquisition, or theological discussion, suits his genius better than this kind of slow, tedious, toilsome examination of text and context, which is enough to make any but the born critic heavy and prosaic. J. B. A.

The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston. By his Son, WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1878. 8vo., pp. 755.

This massive and beautiful volume is a prime contribution not only to the history of the Confederacy, but of America. It is the pious offering of his eldest son, the heir of his papers and correspondence; long known himself as an advocate, soldier, professor in Washington and Lee University, and author. As General Johnston's career was intimately connected with some of the most important events in the growth of the United States, this full and careful biography, by so competent and correct a hand, gives the reader the best narrative, known to us, of these. We have here an intelligent description of the Black Hawk war; of the birth and growth of the Republic of Texas; of the Mormon heresy, and the expedition of the United States troops to Utah to enforce the laws; as well as of the war of Secession.

General Johnston was by birth a native of northern Kentucky, by education a student of Transylvania University and of the West Point Military Academy, and by profession a soldier. Stationed at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., in his earlier days, he naturally took part in the Black Hawk war, in which he was adjutant of Gen. Atkinson, the commander of the United States forces.

A few years after this the declining health of his first wife led him to resign his place in the army, just when he might have expected well-earned promotion. The death of this lovely lady by pulmonary disease left him bereaved; and his active spirit naturally reverted to that profession for which he was so evidently born and fully trained. But it was for the United States "a piping time of peace," and it was not possible for him to regain his place in her little army. The young republic of Texas was then struggling into independence; a multitude of adventurous Kentuckians, including two of Col. Johnston's brothers, were there. He determined, therefore, to devote himself to that cause. Leaving his motherless children in safe homes, he went to Texas, became a citizen—as he continued to be until his death—and offered her his sword. The battle of San Jacinto was over; but the war with Mexico was dragging its slow length along. He soon rose to be commander of the little army of the republic, and, in the next administration, her secretary of war. He was an ardent advocate of annexation, though the immediate effect was to dissolve the government of the republic and consign him to private life. He had now married again. His official life was too pure and public-spirited to result in additions to his wealth; on the contrary, it had consumed the most of his private estate. In the Mexican war, which was occasioned by the annexation, promotion was mainly determined by partisan reasons, and Col. Johnston's eminent experience and fame were postponed to the advancement of politicating colonels. But he raised a volunteer regiment in Texas himself, and commanded it for six months, when it was disbanded against his protest. He took a brilliant part in the affair of Monterey, with which his share of the Mexican war ended.

He now returned to the care of his helpless family. The next years were spent in strict retirement on his Texan farm, where he labored with his own hands, with all the dignity of a Cincinnatus, for his daily bread. The great enlargement of the domain of the United States after the Mexican war called, however, for an increase of the standing army. He had been appointed to the laborious duty of paymaster of forces, which he performed with

his usual spotless integrity. He now received a tardy recognition of his merit by an appointment from President Pierce as Colonel of one of the new regiments of cavalry. Two years' service followed in western Texas. His next and most important service was the command of the army sent to Utah to maintain the authority of the laws in that insolent and murderous dependency. Here his chief contest was with the elements. By the fault of others, the march of the column was delayed until autumn, and was overtaken in the Rocky Mountains by winter. Col. Johnston's heroic devotion, fortitude, and wisdom, saved the army from frost and famine amidst the insulation and horrors of an alpine winter, and early in the ensuing summer he led it scathless to Salt Lake. There his firmness and prudence re-established the reign of law without the firing of a gun. After a wearisome and inactive command of two years, he was allowed a furlough, and spent the summer of 1860 in the bosom of his family, a sagacious but silent observer of the gigantic tempest then brewing. A few months before its outbreak he went to San Francisco as military commandant of the Pacific States. As soon as his State—Texas—seceded, he resigned his commission and retired to southern California.

The universal detraction and falsehood which then became, and has since continued, a main weapon of sectional warfare, did not fail to reach him. He was accused of a ridiculous conspiracy to detach the Pacific States, and of other preposterous sins; and measures were silently provided to kidnap him and carry him off to some Northern dungeon. This at last determined him to hesitate no longer, but to cast his lot with his adopted State. His only way to reach Texas was by the overland route through the deserts of Arizona. This journey he made in midsummer, at the head of thirty companions, under a burning sun, and amidst the ambushes of the Apaches and the United States troops. Immediately on his arrival in Texas he went to the capital of the Confederacy—Richmond—and was hailed as the most important accession to the Southern cause. He was at once put in command of the Western campaign, with a frontier extending from the mountains of West Virginia to Indian Territory. Thenceforward,

his career is too well known to need recital; including the defence of his vast line against huge armies and fleets, and with means utterly inadequate, for six months; the fall of Fort Donelson, the evacuation of Tennessee, the concentration at Corinth, and the battle of Shiloh.

Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston's is the noblest and most pathetic figure in our history. Stonewall Jackson was his equal in purity, courage, heroism, and military genius. He also fell in the arms of victory; but he had been cheered along to the supreme sacrifice by unvarying success and the applause of his people. The campaign of Gen. Johnston was a picture of steady disaster, bringing upon him the unjust and senseless abuse of the men he was giving his life to protect, until that blaze of glorious triumph, his first and his last, in whose flame he was consumed. Yet this disaster was due to no fault of his own—no defect of devotion, diligence, self-sacrifice, or genius. He had been thrown, by the very confidence of the country, into the post of most deadly peril. Before him was the deliberately organised strength of the great Northwest, gathering for nearly a year, unshaken by any such disaster as that of Manassas. Behind him were States wrapped in the insane security of vain confidence, postponing all effort commensurate with their need, withholding the resources absolutely essential to defence, and yet demanding of him an impossible task. Too magnanimous to disclose his country's weakness, yet perfectly aware of the desperate nature of the task expected of him, he worked on, doing all that one man could do, and calmly bearing the stings of undeserved reproach. The disasters with which he was blamed were wholly due to the apathy and neglect of the populations which should have supported him, or to the inexorable force of circumstances. During weary months he silently endured, while reorganising his shattered forces; and we can imagine, how, under that calm exterior, the energies of his lion-like heart were gathering, like a brooding tempest, for the Titanic crash which was to clear his fame at once and overwhelm the invader. After weary waiting the hour came; and the hosts gathered at the spot pointed out by his military sagacity months before. He delivered his mighty blow, which, as long as his

arm was nerved to guide it, drove the enemy, and his detractors, like chaff before it. On the very crest of the wave of victory he sank, his life sapped by the hemorrhage of an insidious wound.

When his remains were prepared for the grave, three wounds were found. Of these, two, which carried no peril to his life, must have been very painful, yet he had given no sign. The stoicism of duty and the exaltation of his spirit made him endure them without a word. Of the third, from which his life was rapidly ebbing away, he was doubtless unconscious. The first knowledge that his warfare was ended came to him in the faintness of approaching death. Silently confessing the presence of the invincible conqueror, he sank into the arms of Gov. Harris, his devoted attendant, and so passed away. What were the parting thoughts that occupied this mighty soul? Of the beloved family, separated from him by the breadth of a continent? Of his detractors? Of his country? Of his God? Doubtless of all these; and we love to believe that the last throbs of that grand heart were animated with a lofty joy that the race was now run, the accusations refuted, the long agony ended, the task of duty accomplished, the triumph forever his. An unworthy country might suffer defeat; his victory was final.

Every trait of Gen. Johnston's body and spirit was noble. To a bodily presence as commanding as that of Washington were added a sagacious and statesmanlike mind, a perfect courage, an impregnable self-command, and the sweetest Christian charity. The loftiness and independence of his morals raised him above all the arts of the politician. His favorite motto was: "In God's great hand secure I stand." In this we have the explanation of that consistent virtue and grand serenity which bore him through the adversities and toils of an unrequited life.

The son has executed his pious task faithfully and judiciously. Conscious of the delicacy of his relations to the subject, he has preferred to let events, and the words of others, portray his father's career, and give the measure of his greatness. Out of this honorable reserve arises the only blemish of his work. Parts of the narrative are thus rendered rather compilations than di-

gested compositions, and thus they lose something of that succinctness, order, and movement, which the author's literary skill would doubtless have given them. The events are stated with fairness, and the motives of enemies estimated with great moderation. Our verdict may be expressed in the wish that every young man in our country might study this book until his whole soul was enlarged with the conviction that it is infinitely nobler and better to live the arduous, self-denying, unrequited life, and die the tragical death, of Albert Sidney Johnston, than to succeed by the ways in which success is now mostly won. R. L. D.

A Voice from South Carolina. Twelve Chapters before Hampton; Two Chapters after Hampton. With a Journal of a Reputed Ku-Klux, and an Appendix. By JOHN A. LELAND, Ph. D. Charleston, S. C.: Walker, Evans & Cogswell, Nos. 3 Broad and 100 East Bay Streets. 1879. Pp. 231, 16mo.

Major Leland is a Presbyterian ruling elder who has passed more than a half century in this wicked world, but has maintained a high character for every civic and Christian virtue. Nevertheless, he was one of the Ku-Klux *so called*; was apprehended at Laurens C. H. in 1870 on a charge of "conspiracy and murder," (though at the very time of the alleged offence he was busily discharging his duties as President of the Laurens Female College,) and on this charge imprisoned for weeks, with other reputable citizens, in the common jail at Columbia, and handcuffed to be taken thence to Charleston for trial; one of the Government's convenient negro witnesses testifying on oath that he was on the ground where the murder was committed, from breakfast till dinner, and that he was shooting and "cussin' and swearin'" all the time, for he saw him shoot and heard him "cuss." Whoever would like to see a picture of the dark days in South Carolina would do well to get and read this little book of the Presbyterian Ku-Klux ruling elder. J. B. A.

The Familiar Correspondence of Charles Dickens. Edited by his Daughter and Sister-in-law. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1 Vol., large 12mo. Pp. 526.

This collection includes letters from the opening of his literary

career almost to the day of his death. Those who value his novels will find much to interest them, because the letters not only give many traits of the author's character, but many incidents illustrative of the conception of his stories. They are here enabled to trace the first hints and the growth of his plots, and the expansion of his designs and powers as a novelist.

The letters throw no new light on his personal character. Those who admire him as a man of genius and as a philanthropist, will have their opinion confirmed by the letters. They are entertaining, perspicuous, varied, and never dull. To the more careful and judicious reader, they disclose a temper egotistical, greedy of money and applause, self-sufficient and absolutely godless. The smart "snob" is revealed underneath, notwithstanding the varnish of affected *bonhomme* and cheeriness, which was as truly the author's cant as religion was that of Mr. Chadband. He lashed with the scorpion whip of his satire all those who he supposed perverted the sacred professions of Christianity to selfish or sordid purposes. His creed was, that philanthropy and good fellowship are the sacred thing; they were his only religion. And in this religion of benevolence he was as truly a life-long canter as any of his caricatures. His cant was eminently profitable to his pocket. He left a large fortune, of which no inconsiderable part was gained from the Americans whom he ridiculed, by his lecture-tour in the United States. The most animated and eager of all his letters are those in which he describes to English friends, with infinite gust, the quantity of money he gained, and the absurd flunkeyism, flattery, and venality of the people who gave it to him.

R. L. D.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The approach of the holidays filled the shelves of the booksellers with the literature of infancy and with pretty pictures and gay bindings. The new volume¹ by Herbert Spencer is, however, in no sense milk for babes. The new philosophy having accepted from Comte the conception of a religion without a God (though it is not *the same* religion with Comte's, and is even less entitled to the name) now enriches us with a system of morals in which can be discerned only the shadow of a conscience. The ability and industry of the author must be conceded. These "Early Christian Primers" were a most happy thought, and are, so far, well executed. This initial volume² is peculiarly valuable; though for extrinsic rather than intrinsic reasons. In our judgment "The Queen Anne Revival," as it is called, is a wholesome one; and bating some offences against modern canons, the papers of Steele, Budgell, Addison, and their *confrères*, are unequalled as models of superficial but useful entertainment briefly conveyed in the best English of great masters.³ It was a good idea to write on the shorter Epistles of the New Testament,⁴ and a skilful pen has taken it in hand.

There has been a sharp correspondence between the editor of Appleton's Alphabetical Guide to New York and Charles Dickens, Jr., who had previously brought out a similar guide to London. The first notion of a tourist's dictionary is admitted to have

¹The Data of Ethics. Being the first part of the "Principles of Morality." By Herbert Spencer. 12mo, 288 pp., cloth, \$1.50. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

²Early Christian Literature Primers. Vol. I. The Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists, A. D. 95-180. By the Rev. George A. Jackson. Edited by Professor George Park Fisher, D. D. 16mo, cloth, 60c. *Ibid.*

³The Spectator. With Prefaces Historical and Biographical. By Alexander Chalmers, A. M. New edition, carefully revised. 6 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$12. *Ibid.*

⁴The Shorter Epistles, viz., of Paul to the Galatians; Ephesians; Philippians; Colossians; Thessalonians; Timothy, Titus, and Philemon; also of James, Peter, and Jude. By the Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. With Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical. 12mo, 500 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

originated with Mr. Dickens, and is certainly a capital one. The only sound objection to a Dictionary of New York¹ is that there is so little to put in it. Mr. Deshler's Afternoons² would seem to have been spent, in part, not only with dead poets, but with a living friend, whose name is not wholly new in letters, and who, it has been surmised, afforded the reason of being of this book. The latest biographer of Edmund Burke³ has an exhaustive knowledge of the subject, and is judged to have done his work in many respects in the most satisfactory way. The defective view taken of the splendid Englishman by his somewhat *heavy* countryman, is due to a congenital defect of insight. Motley's account of the doughty Netherlander⁴ has already been extensively noticed in the columns of this REVIEW. The history is one of unquestioned importance, but diffuse, and not wholly unprejudiced on certain points. Mr. Rolfe's annotated plays^{5,6} of Shakespeare, separately issued, are finely judicious. Othello is the tragedy which should, and perhaps does, show most the maturity of the author's genius. It is delightful to see reproduced in cheap yet decent form the choice works of Cowper, Macaulay, and Scott.^{7,8,9,10,11}

¹Appleton's Dictionary of New York and its Vicinity. A Guide on a New Plan; being an alphabetically arranged *Index* to Places, Societies, Institutions, Amusements, and innumerable matters upon which information is daily needed. With maps of New York and vicinity. Square 12mo, paper, 30c. *Ibid.*

²Afternoons with the Poets. By C. D. Deshler. Post 8vo, cloth. Harper & Bros., New York.

³Burke. By John Morley. 12mo, cloth, 75c. *Ibid.*

⁴John of Barneveld. By J. L. Motley. New edition. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$4. *Ibid.*

⁵Othello (Shakespeare's). Edited by W. G. Rolfe. 16mo, cloth, 70c. *Ibid.*

⁶Shakespeare's Twelfth Night. Edited by W. G. Rolfe. 16mo, cloth, 70c. *Ibid.*

⁷The Task. By William Cowper. 32mo, paper, 20c. *Ibid.*

⁸Hallam's Constitutional History. By Lord Macaulay. 32mo, paper, 25c. *Ibid.*

⁹The Lay of the Last Minstrel. By Sir Walter Scott, Bart. 32mo, paper, 20c. *Ibid.*

¹⁰Marmion. Ditto. 25c. *Ibid.*

¹¹The Lady of the Lake. Ditto. *Ibid.*

The great deficiency of Andrews' Latin Dictionary¹ has been in the matter of the obsolete etymologies. This evil is, we doubt not, cured in the new edition of the Freund-Andrews lexicon now set before us by the Harpers. The classical work of this firm may nearly always be relied upon; and Professor Short and Mr. Charlton Lewis are men not likely to have overlooked any considerable improvements that could be made in this indispensable table-companion of every Latin student. Mr. Lewis was formerly a professor of mathematics; and is now a leading member of the Greek Club in New York. A fascinating theme² has been selected by him who follows the titled daughter of Lord Erskine in telling us all about the valley of the Inn and the snowy crags that frowned and smiled on Andrew Hofer. Mr. Walter Besant has earned the thanks of plain readers, and of good men and women, by the excellent way in which he has been serving up for them famous foreign viands according to domestic receipts. Even Rabelais³ has been purged of his grossness, which fully accounts for the smallness of the volume. Ticknor's⁴ name has just been added to those of Poe and Hayne and Mrs. Margaret Preston, as one of the list of Southern names that have been half audibly pronounced by the charmed circle in Beacon Street. There is a sweet and manful spirit of true poesy breathing through his posthumous stanzas.

Swedenborg had better not be read; but *if* read, he had best

¹Harper's Latin Dictionary. A Latin Dictionary founded on the Translation of "Freund's Latin-German Lexicon." Edited by E. A. Andrews, LL.D. Revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten, by Charles [it should be Charlton] T. Lewis, Ph. D., and Charles Short, LL.D., Professor of Latin in Columbia College, New York. Royal 8vo, 2,033 pp., boards, uncut, \$8.50; full sheep, \$9.50; half leather, \$10.50; full Russia, \$12.50. *Ibid.*

²Tyrol and the Skirt of the Alps. By George E. Waring, Jr. Illustrated. 8vo, cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

³Rabelais. By Walter Besant, M. A. Edited by Mrs. Oliphant. Being the eighth volume of "Foreign Classics for English Readers." 16mo, cloth, \$1. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

⁴Ticknor's (Frank O.) Poems. Edited by K. M. R., with an Introductory Notice of the author by Paul H. Hayne. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

be read in a compendious form.¹ The signal argument against "the New Church" is not that it requires the surrender of one's sound senses, but that it embodies a religion that appeals only to the cultivated. It is at once interesting and instructive to listen to a Fellow of the Royal Society² discoursing in simple terms on subjects that he may be supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with. What a pity that *some* of these Royal Society men will be continually branching out into metaphysics and dogmatic theology! It is curious to take up a history of these united commonwealths that is written from the point of view of a Wesleyan professor in Georgia.³ Lieutenant Conder⁴ has made what he could of Josephus and the Apocrypha: though the first Book of Maccabees covers much of the ground in a manner that makes the path of the compiler a rather thorny one.

Mr. Besant has a subject in the great Huguenot Admiral that might well fire the heart of any Protestant. Coligni,⁵ it would appear, has waited long for a good biographer: and the effort in the present instance is in miniature. Bacon's Essays⁶ will never grow stale or dull. They are the quintessence of English wisdom expressed with the utmost brevity. Whately's Notes left "ample

¹A Compendium of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg. By Samuel M. Warren. Second and revised edition. With a Biographical Introduction by the Hon. John Bigelow. With fine portrait from steel. 8vo, extra cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

²Lectures on Popular and Scientific Subjects. By the Earl of Caithness, F. R. S. Delivered at various times and places. Second enlarged edition. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³History of the United States. By Joseph T. Derry, Professor of Ancient and Modern Languages in the Wesleyan Female College, Macon, Georgia. With illustrations. New and revised edition. 12mo, half roan, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁴Judas Maccabæus and the Revival of the Jewish Nationality. By Lieut. C. R. Conder, R. E. Vol. III. of the New Plutarch: Lives of those who have made the History of the World. 16mo, 220 pp., cloth, \$1. G. P. Putnam & Sons, New York.

⁵Coligny and the Failure of the French Reformation. By Walter Besant. Vol. II. of the New Plutarch: Lives of those who have made the History of the World. 16mo, 230 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁶Bacon's Essays. With Introduction and Notes by Henry Lewis, M. A. 12mo, 350 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

room and verge enough" for new comers. Mr. Rossiter has done well to give us a systematic explanation of the terms used in science;¹ whether the word science be taken in the narrow or the broad sense. We like picture-books, and we like dictionaries: we are not so sure, though, that we like them mixed together. Bayard Taylor's one great work is his translation of *Faust*. No one in England or America was better fitted to write what is needed about German literature.² The author of "*Tartuffe*" comes nearer to Shakespeare (wide as is the interval between them) than any other French dramatist.³ The Oxford prize essays⁴ are more apt to be safe than to be exciting. This one favors free trade.

The epochs of the future⁵ can be but dimly discerned by the seers of the present: it is none the less true that approaching events, like advancing bodies, are preceded by their shadowy counterparts. *Quere*—In the new periods will men have ceased to repudiate their honest debts, and to believe in wholesale theories of evolution? The life of Sir Rowland Hill⁶ was devoted to the cheapening of British postage. Our self-styled aristocrat is said to have given us two most diverting duodecimos⁷ on the way to behave and the way to talk when one chances to get into good company. Professor Henry Baird⁸ is the youngest son of the

¹The Illustrated Dictionary of Scientific Terms. By Wm. Rossiter. 8vo, 350 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

²Studies in German Literature. By Bayard Taylor. 8mo, cl., \$2.25. *Ibid.*

³Molière's Dramatic Works. By C. H. Wall. 3 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$4.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Facts and Fallacies of Modern Protection. By B. R. Wise. Being the Oxford Cobden Prize Essay for 1878. 12mo, cloth, \$1. Scribner & Wellford, New York.

⁵The Coming Era. By Alexander Calder. 8vo, cloth, \$4.20. *Ibid.*

⁶Sir Rowland Hill. A Biographical and Historical Sketch. By E. Edwards. 16mo, boards, 40c. *Ibid.*

⁷Manners and Tone of Good Society; or Solecisms to be Avoided. By a Member of the Aristocracy. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁸Society Small Talk; or what to say, and when to say it. By a Member of the Aristocracy. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁹The Rise of the Huguenots of France. By Professor Henry M. Baird. With Map. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. I., 605 pp.; Vol. II., 697 pp.; cloth, gilt top. \$5. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

late Robert Baird, the European traveller. The father was one of the preceptors of Dr. J. A. Alexander. The son enjoyed singular opportunities in early youth of acquiring certain of the modern languages. He afterwards pursued his studies in the University of Athens. Still later he was *facile princeps* in a private Arabic class at Princeton. For years he has been Professor of Greek in the University of the city of New York. The result of all this and much other preliminary training are the two octavo volumes now just placed upon their counter by the Scribners. The New York critics say that in this noble account of the French Huguenots Mr. Baird has availed himself of the entire mass of accessible literature on the subject, and has worked up his materials in the best historical method and in a felicitous artistic form. The only true and valuable faiths are "Old Faiths";¹ but *all* old faiths are not by any means valuable or true faiths. The most important of the true are inestimably precious, whether presented in well known or in novel forms. Novelty of form, where there is no sacrifice of substance, is of course a recommendation to the jaded readers of the day. Sargeant Prentiss was, after Patrick Henry, in the judgment of a multitude of intelligent people, the most brilliant natural orator this country ever produced. John Randolph was of course transcendent in his way; but his way was absolutely unique. Prentiss's life² is one of the most interesting works we ever read. The two sons of Cornelia and two other potent Romans occupy a new volume³ in the convenient "epoch" series.

We have already had our say about Lange;⁴ which is now finished. It is a book of *reference* for *scholars*; very disappointing

¹Old Faiths in New Light. By Newman Smyth. 12mo, 391 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

²Memoir of S. S. Prentiss. By George L. Prentiss, D. D. 2 vols., 384, 581 pp., 12mo, cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

³The Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla. By A. H. Beesly, M. A. "Epochs of Ancient History." 16mo, 231 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴Lange's Bible Commentary. Vol. XXIV., completing the work. By Dr. P. Schaff, general editor. Numbers and Deuteronomy. Translated by the Rev. A. Gosman, D. D., and the Rev. S. T. Lowrie, D. D. 8vo, 470 pp., cloth, \$5; sheep, \$6.50; half calf, \$7.50. *Ibid.*

often, very tantalising always. Lange is learned, but Lange is long-winded. The volumes, and even the parts of the volumes, are of most unequal merit. The book, like Thackeray's "Bovillabaisse", is "a hotch-potch of all kinds of fishes." We rejoice that the volume on Deuteronomy has fallen into such sound and godly, as well as scholarlike, hands as those of Dr. Gosman. We own up to a distaste for books of imaginary travels filled with a mixture of real and imaginary science. Such were the former works of that gifted *raconteur* for the young—Jules Verne. This exceedingly sprightly author now condescends to a delightful compilation¹ of genuine narratives. The only trouble is that the element of captivating *fiction* is still rather obtrusively suggested. We are told by a man of culture that Page's life of the Opium-Eater² leaves a grateful flavor behind it. De Quincey was nothing if not a man of genius and a man of letters. He was, moreover, "a scholar and a ripe and good one"; a philosopher; a political economist; a rhapsodical essayist; and a master of the most difficult sort of English style. Emerson³ began as a Pantheist, but is at length half-endorsed by Joseph Cook. A product of Carlyle, he is yet marvellously original, and has exerted a wide and baleful influence. Hawthorne⁴ has points in common both with De Quincey and with Edgar Poe. In some respects he is a finer literary artist than either of them. There are strange contradictions in him: an intense spirit of the most insulated New Englandism in his stories, and yet the broadest charity and conservatism in his politics; a weird and often sombre gloom about the atmosphere and *dénouements* of his recitals, and yet the most limpid and wholesome freshness and breeziness in his manner of

¹The Explorations of the World. Famous Travels and Travellers. By Jules Verne. With more than one hundred full-page engravings. 8vo, 472 pp., extra cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

²Thomas De Quincey. His Life and Writings, with Unpublished Correspondence. By H. A. Paige. New edition, at reduced price. With portrait. 2 vols. in one, crown 8vo, 772 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

³Complete Works of R. W. Emerson. "New Fireside Edition." 5 vols., 16mo, cloth, \$10. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

⁴Complete Works of Nathaniel Hawthorne. "Fireside Edition." 12 vols., 16mo, cloth, \$20. *Ibid.*

writing. And so on. The standard work on the Reformation under Calvin,¹ as well as the standard work on the Reformation under Luther and Zwingli, is that of D'Aubigné, and has already been mentioned among recent publications. The price is here reduced one-half. Dr. McCosh's great work² is "The Divine Government." We are sorry he has receded from his impregnable position in "Typical Forms." Latterly in Dr. McCosh's books cogent argument is sometimes replaced by scarcely so cogent, though very dogmatic, assertion. Dr. McCosh is, however, a vigilant and able defender of the faith.

The biographer of McCheyne contributes another welcome book of devotion.³ His more poetic brother Horatius next comes forward with an account of Mr. McAll's mission to the workingmen of Paris.⁴ We have next a true story in prose about certain Huguenots. There were kings before⁵ Agamemnon: so there were (as we have said before) reformers before Luther and Melancthon, and Zwingli and Ecolampadius. There was also many a dark day before the sunburst of the sixteenth century. The author of "A Southside View of Slavery" was a profound theologian as well as an orthodox and influential preacher. A safer guide could hardly be found to go with us amongst the dogmas.⁶ The lives of devoted missionaries⁷ are a great stimulus to struggling as well as to apathetic Christians. The honeyed accents of the venerable and manly and fair-minded Dean

¹D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin. New Edition. 8 vols., cloth, reduced from \$16 to \$8. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

²Dr. McCosh's Works. Uniform New Edition. 5 vols., 8vo, reduced from \$15 to \$10. *Ibid.*

³The Brook Besor. By the Rev. A. A. Bonar. 18mo, 120 pp., cloth, 50c. *Ibid.*

⁴The White Fields of France. By the Rev. H. Bonar, D. D. 12mo, 130 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁵Times before the Reformation. 16mo, 350 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶Evenings with the Doctrines. By the Rev. Nehemiah Adams. New and revised edition. 12mo, \$4. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

⁷A Consecrated Life; or Portraiture of Edward Delmont Kelley, Missionary to Burmah. By his Wife. 12mo, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

of Westminster¹ do not atone for the painful laxity of his creed. The Rev. Phillips Brooks, after startling Philadelphia with what seemed to be the extreme of doctrinal liberality, has begun to make the impression in Boston of what there appears to be the extreme of doctrinal moderation. "German without Grammar or Dictionary"² strikes us much as "a gun without lock, stock, or barrel." The older³ methods of studying the worthy authors of England were doubtless susceptible of undefined improvement. The world is now agreed that the author of "Prometheus Unbound" is an enchantingly musical verse-maker,⁴ as well as a beautiful scholar and a poet of high but audacious, and obscure, thought and splendid imagination. Shelley's was a fine and generous nature, sadly marred by contact with the rude iconoclasm and controlling will of the author of "Political Justice." Blair's poem on "The Grave"⁵ is rightly esteemed one of our religious classics. It may be found entire in "Scotia's Bards." He who sang the pleasures of memory⁶ is hardly so much esteemed now as he was in the earlier part of his own great life-time. The fate of his poetry is in defiance of his own celebrated line—

"Our blessings brighten as they take their flight."

Keble's "Christian Year"⁷ is worth all twice-told that the Tractarians ever wrote in prose. Farrar's "St. Paul"⁸ deserves ampler

¹Thoughts that Breathe. From Dean Stanley. Introduction by the Rev. Phillips Brooks, and biography by the Compiler. 16mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

²German without Grammar or Dictionary. By Dr. Zur Brucke. xx., 262 pp., cloth, \$1.25. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

³A New Method for the Study of English Literature. By Louise Maertz. 12mo, limp covers, interleaved, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴Poetical Works of P. B. Shelley. 3 vols., 16mo, cloth, \$3. James Miller, New York.

⁵The Grave. By Robert Blair. Steel plates by Blake. 4to, cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁶Poetical Works of Samuel Rogers. 4to, cloth, \$3.75. *Ibid.*

⁷The Christian Year. By John Keble. 4to, cloth, \$3.75. *Ibid.*

⁸The Life and Work of St. Paul. By the Rev. F. W. Farrar. 2 vols., 8vo, 1,400 pp., cloth, \$6. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

notice in these columns. Macaulay's *Essays*¹ are, we are disposed to think, his most dazzling, though not his greatest, performance. Fleetwood's *Life of Christ*² is safe and sound after all modern efforts, and has much not easily to be found elsewhere. Mrs. Beers is the last (and we suppose the just) claimant of the *Song of the Potomac Sentinel*.³ Mr. Garner's historical work⁴ is a reduction of the material that was heaped together by such writers as Pridaux. His work on sacred Introduction⁵ is likely to prove a useful compend. Colonel Robert Ingersoll⁶ needs to be answered in the interests of those who are ignorant of his intrinsic worthlessness. The so-called pre-historic remains⁷ in various parts of this and other countries afford matter for endless search and profound reflection. Dr. Southall and others have abundantly exposed the fallacious grounds on which rests the theory of the antiquity of the human race. The "mounds and their makers" is a subject of unusual interest.

"Narcissus"⁸ is, we take it, the celebrated freedman of that name of the first century. The tale, we should say, belongs to the same class with "Clement of Rome;" though without the

¹Miscellaneous Essays and Poems. By Thos. B. Macaulay. 3 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$3.75. Thos. Y. Crowell, New York.

²Life of Christ and the Apostles. By the Rev. John Fleetwood, D. D. 12mo, 464 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³All Quiet along the Potomac, and other Poems. By Ethel Lynn Beers. 12mo, cloth, extra, \$1.75. Porter & Coates, Philadelphia.

⁴Connection of Sacred History. By the Rev. James Garner. 12mo, 499 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Religious Newspaper Agency, New York.

⁵Biblical Literature, History, and Biography. By the Rev. James Garner. 12mo, 454 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁶Reply to Robert G. Ingersoll. By the Rev. S. V. Leech, D. D. 8vo, 18 pp., paper, 20c. *Ibid.*

⁷The Mound Builders. Being an account of a remarkable people that once inhabited the Valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi, together with an investigation into the archæology of Butler County, Ohio. By J. P. Maclean. Illustrated with over one hundred figures. 12mo, 233 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Robert Clark & Co., Cincinnati.

⁸Narcissus. A Tale of Early Christian Times. By the Rev. W. Boyd Carpenter. 12mo, 346 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Pott, Young & Co., New York.

polemical intent of that work, in this respect resembling Moore's "Epicureans." The ethical system of Confucianism¹ and the religious system of Taouism have exerted their sway so widely as to merit the consideration of this little volume. Dr. Halsey's book² on the æsthetic charms of Scripture has long ago taken its place amongst the best works of its description. Archbishop Gibbons's³ forte is not discourse, but administration. There is much new and interesting matter in this impartial and skilful biography⁴ of the arch-traitor of the Revolution. Ingersoll and Moses!⁵ A mote and a mountain.

The fauna and flora of the old world⁶ is a theme for the imagination as well as for the reason. The urus was in Germany in the days of Cæsar. We are taken with the idea of Mr. Menteith, and mean to get his book:⁷ but there is a sort of quackery in all such pretensions as are made in his title. "Leaders of Our Church Universal"⁸ is a series of short biographies comprised in three octavo volumes, covering the whole

¹Confucianism and Taouism. By Robert K. Douglas. With maps. 16mo, 287 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

²Literary Attractions of the Bible. By the Rev. L. J. Halsey, D. D. 12mo, 441 pp., cloth, \$1. Presbyterian Board of Publication, Phila.

³The Faith of our Forefathers. An Examination of Archbishop Gibbons's "Faith of our Fathers." By the Rev. Ed. J. Stearns, D. D. 12mo, 380 pp., cloth, \$1. T. Whitaker, New York.

⁴The Life of Benedict Arnold: His Patriotism and his Treason. By Isaac N. Arnold. Crown 8vo, 444 pp., cloth, gilt top, \$2.50. Jansen, McClurg & Co., Chicago.

⁵Ingersoll and Moses. A Reply. By the Rev. Saml. Ives Curtiss, D. D. 12mo, 118 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶Natural History of the Ancients. By the Rev. W. Houghton, M. A. Crown 8vo, 240 pp., \$1.75. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., New York.

⁷Five Languages without a Master. By A. H. Menteith. Comprising: "French without a Master," in six Lessons; "German without a Master," in six Lessons; "Spanish without a Master," in four Lessons; "Italian without a Master," in six Lessons. New edition. 8vo, 400 pp., cloth, \$2; or each one separately in paper 40c. each.

⁸Leaders of Our Church Universal. Vol. I.—Earlier Leaders. Vol. II.—Later Leaders—Europe. Vol. III.—Later Leaders—America, Asia, Africa, Oceanica. 3 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$1.50 each. Congregational Publishing Society, Boston.

period from the days of the Apostles to the present era. The writers are from both sides of the Atlantic, and it is simultaneously published in German and in English. The foreign editor is the celebrated Doctor and Professor. Piper of Berlin. One of the American and Presbyterian names is, we observe, treated of by one of our Virginia ministers. The "Travels of Alter and Ego"¹ is capitally done and richly deserves preservation.

¹The Travels of Ego and Alter. An Epistolary Narration of a Tramp through the Old Dominion. By Peyton H. Hoge and Howard K. Bayne. Svo. 52 pp., paper, 25c. West & Johnston & Co., Richmond.

At about 5 o'clock yesterday morning George Kendall, a farmer, living near Manlius station, was aroused by a bright light shining into his bedroom window. He arose, and looking out, saw that the story-and-a-half dwelling occupied by Miss Alberline Havener, near by, was in flames.

all the poison I got from Pollic, but it did not kill them. Three that had the sheep fever are dead. I gave the poison to them last Saturday, and now to-night, the 14th, I shall have to take the axe and kill them. Just think of it—to kill them. How I feel. I am about sick. It seems as if I could hardly drag.

An interesting lecture upon his personal experience and observation as a political exile to Siberia was delivered by M. Bachrach at the Young Men's Hebrew Association hall. He briefly alluded to the cause of his exile and participation under Garibaldi in the last Polish

by a man who would lose \$100,000 if he didn't cover the money or other fellow took the stuff. A week not, and then was

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ARTICLE I.

LECKY'S HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS.

History of European Morals. From Augustus to Charlemagne.
By WM. EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, M. A. Third Edition,
revised, in two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

It may seem rather late in the day to notice this work of Mr. Leckie—a work which has been for years before the public, and has passed through several editions in this country as well as in England. But the fact that new editions are demanded is evidence that the book continues to be read, and if still read, its statements and arguments ought still to be subjected to critical examination.

Certainly it is no light undertaking which Mr. Lecky sets before himself. His history extends over a vast tract of time; and whilst it passes by changes merely political or social, it presents that aspect of the European world, the faithful portraiture of which requires of the historian the exercise of some of the noblest and rarest qualities of intellect and heart. To be satisfactory, such a history must embrace an accurate delineation of the moral facts which gave its own character to each of the successive periods constituting the whole term surveyed; and what involves far greater difficulty—it must explain these facts, bring-

ing to light their real, perhaps recondite, causes, and pointing out their significance.

It is of special importance that the historian of morals be himself possessed of a right theory of morals; thus only can he determine the correctness of the systems he reviews, or properly estimate the moral states of the ages he describes.

Now to some qualifications of a historian of morals Mr. Lecky can certainly prefer a just claim. His intellect is vigorous. His learning is extensive. To his views respecting what may be regarded as the foundation-principles of a moral system, we certainly will offer no dissent. But with all this, we must express the conviction that he has failed to give a satisfactory history of morals from Augustus to Charlemagne, that the tendency of his work is rather to evil than to good, to becloud the mind with error rather than to dissipate its darkness by the rays of truth.

In the natural history of morals Mr. Lecky informs us quite clearly what he regards as the foundation of moral distinctions, and what the faculty by which these distinctions are discerned. Contrary to the views of the great body of recent writers with whose estimate of Christianity he seems most nearly to agree, he holds that moral goodness consists in conformity to duty. Thus he says:

"Just as pleasure and pain are ultimate grounds of action, and no reason can be given why we should seek the former and avoid the latter, except that it is the constitution of our nature that we should do so; so we are conscious that the words right and wrong express ultimate, intelligible motives, that these motives are generically different from the others, that they are of a higher order, and that they carry with them a sense of obligation." (Vol. I., pages 70 and 71.)

Again, he gives, as one of the propositions maintained by the school with which he agrees, that our will is not governed exclusively by the law of pleasure and pain, but also by the law of duty, which we feel to be distinct from the former, and to carry with it the sense of obligation. (*Ib.*, page 99.) Now in these passages he implicitly condemns the Benevolence-theory of Hutcheson and of the New England divines, as well as the selfish system of Hobbes and Paley and the Utilitarianism of Hume and Bentham. Yet he does not directly reject the system of Benevo-

lence; and, indeed, counts its advocates as allies in the great contest with the utilitarians.

Almost as a necessary consequence of his doctrine concerning the distinguishing quality of moral acts, Mr. Lecky holds that the faculty by which moral distinctions are ultimately recognised, is an intuitive and not inductive faculty. On page 99, Vol. I., he gives us the second of the fundamental propositions embraced by his school:

“That the basis of our conception of duty is an intuitive perception; that among the various feelings, tendencies, and impulses that constitute our emotional being, there are some which are essentially good, and ought to be encouraged, and some which are essentially bad, and ought to be repressed.”

It is true, indeed, that in the attempt to reduce all schemes of morals to two generic theories, that of the Utilitarian and that of the Intuitive school, our author has fallen, perhaps unavoidably, into some ambiguities of expression, and into some inaccuracies of statement. For example, that school of moralists from whose views he dissents, he calls the inductive moralists; that school whose tenets he approves he calls intuitive moralists. As belonging to this latter class, he reckons Hutcheson, with Cudworth, and Reid with his followers, of the Scotch school.

But it is only through an ambiguous use of the term *intuitive faculty* that these writers can all be regarded as maintaining that moral distinctions are perceived by such a faculty. Discounting other acceptations of the term, the faculty of intuition sometimes means that power by which we directly perceive objective realities, whether external or internal, whether material or spiritual. In this sense, the faculty embraces the two powers of consciousness and sense-perception. But intuition sometimes designates the faculty through which we discern first or transcendental truths, sometimes called truths of common sense; such, for example, as that there must be a cause for every event, that the whole must be equal to the sum of its parts, etc. The first class are sometimes spoken of as empirical or real intuitions, the second as rational or formal intuitions. Corresponding to these two sorts of intuitions, writers who agree in maintaining that the science

of morals is not a mere science of induction, or indeed a science of mere reasoning of any kind, differ among themselves respecting the character of the intuitions by which its truths are perceived. Some, with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, maintain that they are discerned by what these writers call a "moral sense," distinguished from the external senses mainly by the difference of its objects. Others, with Cudworth, Price, and Dr. A. Alexander, hold that, underlying all recognition of moral distinctions, there is an intuition of reason, at once dissimilar from sense-perception and from reasoning or the elaborative faculty. With this latter class Reid ought to be ranked, though he does use and defend the *term* moral sense. Now if we understand him aright, Mr. Lecky not only denies, in opposition to the utilitarian school, that the faculty by which moral distinctions are perceived is simply the faculty of induction, but he also maintains that it is a faculty of rational or formal, as distinguished from empirical or real, intuition.

This view of the nature of moral goodness and of the faculty by which it is recognised, Mr. Lecky defends with real ability. The system of selfishness in all its forms he attacks with a logic of merciless severity. As might be anticipated, few, if any, of his arguments are entirely original; but arguments which have been employed by others he presents in a new light, and with fresh illustrations. He unveils the process through which the purely Selfish theory of Hobbes is transformed into the Utilitarianism of Bentham, and shows how it is enlarged and supported by the aid of Hartléy's doctrine of Association. Moreover, he shows most clearly that in none of its modifications is it free from objections the most fatal and conclusive. These objections must be passed by, as we have not space to exhibit them fully; and a bare enumeration of them would be of little interest. Indeed, to one moderately acquainted with the discussions of the system, such an enumeration would contain nothing new. But two points adverted to in this part of the work we will take time to present. One of these is the argument that utilitarianism in what the author calls its "theological form"—the utilitarianism which teaches with Paley that there is no intrinsic difference between

right and wrong, but that we ought to do good simply from a regard to our own everlasting happiness—that this utilitarianism is really subversive of natural theology. “Without the concurrence of a moral faculty,” he says, “it is wholly impossible to prove from nature that supreme goodness of the Creator which utilitarian theologians assume.” After much that is striking in support of this supposition, he gives in a note the statement of Coleridge: “The one great and binding ground of the belief of God and a hereafter is the law of conscience.” (Vol. I., pp. 54 and 55.) On the next page our author adds these impressive words:

“The lines of our moral nature tend upwards. In it we have the common root of religion and of ethics; for the same consciousness that tells us that, even when it is in fact the weakest element of our constitution, it is by right supreme, commanding, and authoritative, teaches us also that it is divine. All the nobler religions that have governed mankind, have done so by virtue of the affinity of their teaching with this nature, by speaking, as common religious language correctly describes it, to the heart; by speaking, not to self-interest, but to that divine element of self-sacrifice which is intent in every soul.”

In this estimate of what may be called the theological importance of conscience, Mr. Lecky has the concurrence of the soundest Christian writers.

At least as well deserving special note as the foregoing, is the reply given by our author to one of the most specious objections ever urged against the intuitional character of the moral faculty, an objection which may be urged with still greater force against the doctrine that moral goodness or virtue is an indefinable quality. Says the objector:

“If we possess a moral faculty through which we intuitively discern the difference between good and evil, and determine what it is which possesses the one character and what the other, then it follows that there can be no diversity in moral judgments—the act regarded as wrong by one man will be regarded as wrong by every man; and the act approved by one will be approved by all.

“But observation teaches directly the contrary—that there is no such uniformity in the moral decisions of men. We see gladiatorial shows regarded by the Romans of the early Empire as innocent and even praiseworthy, whilst we know them to have been horribly cruel and wicked.

Until very recently Suttee was practised in British India without a suspicion of its iniquity on the part of those who performed it. We know that theft was thought praiseworthy by the ancient Spartans, and incest innocent among the ancient Persians. Where then is this infallible teacher, this inward monitor which tells every man what is right and what is wrong?"

Now to this, the most formidable objection to intuitive morals in every modification of the system, many replies have been offered, nearly all of which possess some value, but nearly all fail of being completely satisfactory. Thus, it has been said, that the moral sentiments of men are often better than their deeds, and that it would be unsafe to suppose a people really to approve all the acts they constantly commit and even loudly defend. This is doubtless true; but there are manifestly wicked acts to the commission of which there appears no motive except the conviction of their goodness.

Why should the Hindoo widow expose herself to all the horrors of a death amid the flames of the Suttee, if she did not think her act righteous? Why should she be encouraged to perform the rite by the best and most loving of her relatives, unless they supposed this sacrifice of herself to be noble and praiseworthy? Again, it has been said by one of the wisest and best of men, that if all the circumstances of a proposed case were presented to a person whose moral faculty was in a sound condition, he would infallibly reach a correct estimate of its character. It may be sufficient to reply, that no man living is in such a moral state as to secure from him a right decision in every case of moral conduct in which his judgment might be solicited, however intimate his knowledge of the circumstances.

Once more. Some maintain that our moral decisions are only erroneous when the true bearing of the acts contemplated is not apprehended; that in every such instance the end proposed is right, and the error consists in a wrong selection of means for its accomplishment. When, for example, the heathen tortures himself with the hope of pleasing God by his sufferings, his readiness to endure bodily agony in order to please God is right. He only errs in supposing that a Being truly divine can be pleased at the self-torture of his creatures. When again, the Chinese kills his

infant daughter, his act results from the just conviction that it is his duty to seek the well-being of his offspring. His error lies in the belief that he has a right to employ murder as the means of effecting that end.

But the objection referred to, though partially removed by these methods, is far more perfectly met by the consideration urged by Mr. Lecky, that the doctrine of moral perceptions does not necessarily imply the existence of some mysterious agent, like the demon of Socrates, which gives specific and infallible information in individual cases. The gift of such information the author denies; but declares that writers of his school "contend that it is a psychological fact, that we are intuitively conscious that our benevolent affections are superior to our malevolent ones, truth to falsehood, justice to injustice, gratitude to ingratitude, chastity to sensuality, and that in all ages and countries, the path of virtue has been towards the higher and not towards the lower feelings." (Vol. I., p. 99.) We are persuaded that every man, accustomed to read his own consciousness, will recognise the truth of these statements. It may be confidently asserted that no human being of sufficient intellect to apprehend the meaning of gratitude, justice, and benevolence, would fail to see and acknowledge their superiority to the opposite dispositions. True, he may be unable to determine whether a certain act has been dictated by benevolence or by selfishness; whether in an individual case, the conduct recommended by benevolence ought to be preferred to the conduct demanded by a strict regard to justice; or whether in some one instance, veracity might not be properly sacrificed to expediency; but never, for one moment, would he hesitate to say that in our conduct we ought to observe the requisitions of gratitude, of benevolence, and of justice, in every case determining their relative claims through the consideration of the special circumstances of that case.

And here, by the way, we find the answer to the objection to the doctrine that moral goodness is an undefinable quality immediately discerned—an objection based upon the unquestionable fact, that moral science admits of progress; that there may be and that there has been an improvement in the moral sentiments

of mankind—an objection urged by Jouffroy with such force and speciousness against the moral system of Price. It is, indeed, hard to escape this objection, if we hold it to be the moral quality of individual actions that we intuitively discern. But if it be the moral character of dispositions which is supposed to be determined intuitively, there is nothing in the doctrine inconsistent with the progress of moral philosophy. As science advances, we become better informed with respect to the ultimate influence on human happiness of a particular course of conduct, and thus perceive that benevolence—regard to the good of others—prohibits acts at one time supposed perfectly consistent with its dictates. Again, as the relations of men and all that these relations involve become more perfectly known, the duties growing out of them are better understood, and justice is seen to require that to which she may at one time have appeared to present no valid claim; and so, when more perfectly acquainted with the feelings of our fellow-men and their conduct towards us, we may see that gratitude is due to some persons who had not been thought to deserve it.

But while the teachings of Mr. Lecky respecting the nature of virtue and the faculty by which moral qualities are discerned may be successfully defended, there are still important questions of morals his decision of which cannot be accepted. One of these is the notion of the moral superiority of a state of celibacy to a state of marriage. Another is the judgment, that certain practices, among them polygamy and gladiatorial shows, though “they may be wrong now, were not so once, and when an ancient countenanced by his example one or another of these, he was not committing a crime.” (Vol. I., p. 110.) The limits proposed for this article do not allow a refutation of these opinions—an omission to which we consent the more readily, as we presume that the views expressed by the author will hardly gain the assent of any of our readers. Indeed, in his advocacy of celibacy the author is well refuted by the principles laid down by himself. (Vol. I., p. 115.)

The following remarkable passage is quoted by Mr. Lecky from “*Anglican Difficulties*,” a work of Cardinal Newman :

“The Church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from

heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions upon it to die of starvation, in extremest agony, so far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, though it harm no one, or steal one poor farthing without excuse.”*

This passage, with perhaps others of a similar import, suggests a question which we give in the words of our author, “whether the disparity between the different parts of our being is such that no material or intellectual advantage, however great, may be rightly purchased by any sacrifice of our moral nature, however small?” The question thus proposed is argued by Lecky at considerable length, but with no very satisfactory results. The whole discussion, we must say, betrays some confusion of thought—a confusion only partially concealed by ambiguities of expression. The above, the author tells us, is the question which divines express by asking whether the end ever justifies the means; and the negative of this question he appears to think identical with the proposition “that an undoubted sin, even the most trivial, is a thing in its essence and its consequences so unspeakably dreadful, that no conceivable material or intellectual advantage can counterbalance it” (Vol. I., pp. 110–111)—a proposition from which he unequivocally dissents. But this proposition and the negative of the preceding question are very different theses. That which is justified is no longer sinful. If in any case, therefore, the means are justified by the end, these means cease to involve sin even “the most trivial,” and there is no “undoubted sin” committed. For that which, but for the end accomplished, would be an immoral act, in view of that end becomes moral. If then the end justifies the means—a proposition, however, which, in the sense of the Romish writers generally, we utterly deny and abhor—if the end justifies the means, then the means as justified are right.

When the author maintains, as he seems to do, that an undoubted sin, continuing to be such, may be counterbalanced by

*The above statement is reaffirmed by Newman in his “*Apologia pro Vita Sua*” (p. 272); and understood as he probably understood it, the proposition admits of defence.

intellectual or material advantage, he may be conceived to intend either of two things: first, that an undoubted sin may be morally good even when it is an undoubted sin, by reason of intellectual or material advantages which flow from it; or he may mean that an undoubted sin may be followed by consequences, intellectual or material, so beneficent as more than to counterbalance any evil consequences, material or intellectual, which it shall produce. Now the first of these notions is a sheer absurdity. Sin and moral goodness are contradictories of each other—the one is a negation of the other. They, therefore, cannot be predicated of the same act any more than white and black can be predicated of the same subject. But if the author means to say that a greater material or intellectual good may, in a given case, come from the doing of an immoral act than from its omission, he utters a proposition that few would be so hardy as to deny, and few would think it worth while to assert. Certainly it is a proposition which no intelligent believer in the Christian Scriptures would hesitate to accept. Nay, if we receive the Scriptures we must believe that the highest moral good has been the consequence of the most immoral acts. The betrayal, the condemnation, the crucifixion of Jesus were necessary conditions of all the holiness existing among fallen men.

The most serious blot, however, upon the work of Mr. Lecky is not found in his decision of any question of moral science, but in the representation he gives of one of the chief agents in the production of the moral changes he describes. That agent is Christianity; and it is Mr. Lecky's estimate of Christianity—of Christianity in itself, in its evidences, and in its influence—against which we feel bound to protest. Not indeed that Mr. Lecky seeks to discard the religion of Christ. On the contrary, this religion seems ever to be before his mind, and its character as compared with other systems of religious belief, and its influence as distinguished from other principles, are matters which he seems to be constantly revolving. Yet Mr. Lecky is evidently no believer in Christianity. Not only does he rigidly abstain from everything which might be regarded as an expression of faith in our religion—in this respect appearing in favorable con-

trast with Hume and Gibbon, who, to the disgust of their readers, so often apply honeyed epithets to the faith they would destroy—but he indicates his disbelief, or at least his scepticism, in words that can scarcely be misunderstood. But though, as will presently be seen, we cannot acquit Mr. Lecky of responsibility for his religious opinions, it is not of his unbelief that we would now complain, so much as the want of fairness which seems to mark his portraiture of Christianity and the moral effect of its teachings.

True, Mr. Lecky tells us in his preface “that he has endeavored to carry into his investigations a judicial impartiality;” and perhaps he may have been guilty of no conscious want of candor in the formation or expression of his opinions; but that he has allowed himself to fall under the influence of prejudices unfavorable to Christianity, and that, whether consciously or unconsciously, these prejudices have gravely colored his representations, can scarcely be doubted by the attentive reader of his book. Mr. Lecky does not, indeed, forget that he is the historian of morals, and not the historian of the Church. He formally compares, then, systems of morals, and not systems of religion. Yet the tendency of his discussion is as plainly to destroy the confidence of his readers in the religion of Christ as in the philosophy of Epicurus; and it is hard to resist the conviction that in much of his reasoning he feels himself to be the champion of the religion of doubt rather than of the philosophy of moral intuitions.

Thus, a charge repeatedly alleged by Mr. Lecky against Christianity is, that it announces the doctrine that “theological error necessarily involves guilt.” (Vol. 1., p. 395.) The reception of this doctrine by Christians he regards as one of the main causes of the persecutions of which they have been guilty. Now necessarily to involve guilt Mr. Lecky would probably acknowledge to be a phrase of about the same significance as the phrase “necessarily sinful,” and if so, he charges Christians with holding that, in the entertainment of any theological error, in any circumstances whatever, the unbeliever or misbeliever is sinful. Now this doctrine, we make bold to say, has never been accepted by the Christian Church, Protestant or Roman Catholic. Chris-

tians do indeed hold that men are responsible for their belief, but they likewise hold that this responsibility is measured by the means within reach of each individual to secure freedom from error and to form a right belief. Men will not be held guilty for the failure to receive any doctrine of revelation, however important, if that doctrine has never been made known to them. There are no truths more important than those of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement; but does any one suppose that an American Indian, living before the discovery of our Continent, would be held guilty on the ground of not believing in a Triune God, in an Incarnate Saviour, or in redemption through his blood? The distinction between avoidable and unavoidable error is one which commends itself to the reason of man, and is recognised by the whole body of Christian people, Romish and Protestant. Thus it is held by Romish theologians, and even by those of the most extreme views. Probably no expositor of the doctrine of their Church is regarded as more authoritative by Romanists than St. Alphonso Liguori, and by no one is this distinction more clearly recognised than by this writer. Thus, in his *Theology*, Lib. I., Tract. 2, Cap. 4, in reply to the question, "*An ignorantia invincibilis excuset?*" He answers, "If invincible, it excuses; because no one sins except by a voluntary act, but this presupposes knowledge. But if vincible and culpable, it does not excuse."* To the same effect see Lib. I., Tract 1, Ques. 5. Peter Dens, whose *Moral Philosophy* has long been a text-book in the Popish Seminaries of Ireland, when discussing vices opposed to the faith (Sec. 48), describes infidelity as "threefold: purely negative, privative, and positive or contrary. The first infidelity is also called involuntary, the two others voluntary. He asks further, "What is purely negative infidelity?" and replies, "It is the want of faith in him who has heard nothing of the faith nor been able to hear it, or to whom the faith has certainly not been sufficiently proposed." The 49th Section treats of the kinds of

* *Resp.* "Si sit invincibilis, excusatur; quia nemo peccat nisi actu voluntario; hic autem cognitionem præsupponit. Si autem sit vincibilis et culpabilis, non excusatur; qualis est cum poteras et tenebaris scire aut discere et in mentem veniebat dubitare: nec studuisti intelligere."

infidelity which are sinful and the degrees of guilt to be attached to them. "Privative and positive infidelity are both sin. Purely negative infidelity is not sin. Thus the heathen commit no sin in failing to believe the gospel, as it is not possible that they should believe owing to their ignorance of it."*

Among the very latest and certainly one of the ablest defenders of Romish doctrine is Cardinal J. H. Newman. This eminent writer extends the benefit of the above distinction even to a class of Protestants. In his work, "*Apologia pro Vita Sua*," 5th edition, p. 369, he says: "And so a baptized Christian external to the Church who is in invincible ignorance is a material heretic and not a formal." With such testimonies from Romish theologians to the non-culpability of invincible error, it may seem almost a work of supererogation to quote Protestant writers to the same effect. One testimony, however, of the latter class we will give. It is from the Moral Science of Dr. A. Alexander, pp. 66 and 67. "On this subject," he says, "our appeal must be to the unbiassed judgment of mankind; and we think the verdict will be that error which *might have been avoided* and *ignorance which is not invincible* do not excuse."

It seems then that the real doctrine of Christian moralists respecting theological error is not that all such error is sinful, but that that theological error which is voluntary, avoidable, vincibile, by whichever name you call it, may be justly regarded as sinful, or, as perhaps Mr. Lecky would prefer to express it, morally wrong. Now is there anything shocking or unreasonable in the doctrine that, in this sense and to this extent, men are responsible for their religious belief? So far from it, it is a doctrine that plainly commends itself to the common sense of our race. Whatever our theories, we are *obliged* really to hold men responsible for opinions the grounds of which it is in their power to examine. We are conscious of the conviction that men are as certainly bound to believe rightly as to act rightly. We are

*Not having access to the original work of Dens, I quote from "A Synopsis of the Moral Theology of Peter Dens, as prepared for the use of Romish Seminaries, and translated from the Latin of the Mechlin edition of 1833."

responsible for our actions because they are the expression of our characters—of the state and temper of our hearts. We are responsible for our opinions because they too are the expression of character, and are determined by our dispositions. A man's acts are not the *perfect* expression of his character; for they are greatly modified by his circumstances, especially by his ability or the contrary to carry out his inclinations into practice. So, a man's opinions do not perfectly reflect the dispositions of his heart, because they are modified according to the native strength of his intellect and to the degree of evidence that may lie within his reach. But so far, and only so far, as they are alike the result of the state of our hearts, are we responsible for our actions and for our beliefs.

And of all this we hold that every thinking man has an intimate conviction, though this conviction may never have been the object of distinct consciousness. And so, we often see the very men who at one time condemn this doctrine of responsibility for belief, not only as false, but as the source of dire evil, at another, affirming this same doctrine and establishing its truth. Of all this we find an illustration in Mr. Lecky. The tenet that theological error necessarily involves guilt is one of the two dogmas, to the combined influence of which he traces "almost all the sufferings that Christian persecutors have caused, almost all the obstructions they have thrown in the path of human progress." (Vol. I., p. 195.) And these obstructions he deems extremely great, and these sufferings extremely severe. Still this very Mr. Lecky asserts the responsibility of man for his opinions, and even specifies "two cases in which an intellectual error may be justly said to involve, or at least to represent, guilt. In the first place, error very frequently springs from the partial or complete absence of that mental disposition which is implied in the love of truth. In the next place, it must be observed that every moral disposition brings with it an intellectual bias which exercises a great and often a controlling and decisive influence even upon the most earnest inquirer. If we know the character or disposition of a man, we can usually predict with tolerable accuracy many of his opinions." (Vol. II., pp. 191-2.) Very

true throughout, and containing very satisfactory proof—though by no means all the proof at hand—that intellectual error may be sinful. But if intellectual error of any kind may involve guilt, why not that species denominated theological error? Why should error respecting the science of Theology be less sinful than error respecting the science of Sociology, the science of Anthropology, or any other branch of human knowledge? Theology is the science of God—in its wide sense, the science of the nature of God, of his relations to his creatures, and of the duties of his intelligent creatures consequent upon these relations. Surely one might be tempted to suppose this, of all others, the very science which it would be incumbent upon man to explore, and in which avoidable error would be of all error the most criminal and the most fatal. If such knowledge be attainable, ought we not most earnestly to seek the knowledge of that Being who alone possesses infinite excellence, to whom our obligations are the most varied and weighty, and to whom, as a necessary consequence of our relations, our supreme duty is owed? If avoidable error of any kind be criminal, must not theological error be criminal? We should think so, and thus, strange to say, thinks Mr. Lecky. Two dogmas he notices the very thought of which appears to fill him with intensest indignation, and which draw from him the severest denunciations.

These dogmas he regards as atrocious, for he declares “that in the form in which they have been often stated, they surpass in atrocity any tenets that have ever been admitted into any pagan creed.” “Such teaching,” as his representation of these doctrines, he avers, “is in fact simply dæmonism, and dæmonism in its most extreme form.” (Vol. I., p. 96–7.) Whence, in the opinion of Mr. Lecky, do such judgments proceed? Why, they come, not from a weak head, but from an evil heart. Thus, he says, the materials from which the intellect builds are often derived from the heart, and a moral disease is, therefore, not unfrequently at the root of an erroneous judgment. (Vol. II., p. 193.) It is not, then, the belief that intellectual error may involve moral guilt that the author regards as so blameworthy, for this is his own doctrine; nor, as we have just seen, is it even the tenet that

theological error may be of this character, that he would denounce; for in such a statement again he would condemn himself. Wherein then lies the difference between his own views on this subject, and that doctrine of the Church which he looks upon as so false and injurious? He and *Christian* writers alike admit that the theological error which can be referred to mental weakness or want of light, is guiltless. He and these alike maintain that the theological error which springs from an unsound state of the heart, is guilty. Where then, we repeat, is the point of divergence between their opinions concerning this question of responsibility? Why, just here: Mr. Lecky appears to think it inconceivable that any moral disease could produce in man the disposition to receive the notions on religious questions entertained by himself and his school, yet thinks that the supposed errors of Christians can be readily traced to such a source. The inclinations from which wrong belief proceeds, he tells us, are such as these: the love of ease, the love of certainty, the love of system, the bias of the passions, the asseverations of the imagination, as well as the coarser influences of social position, domestic happiness, professional interest, party feeling, or ambition. In most men, the love of truth," he proceeds to say, "is so languid, and the reluctance to encounter mental suffering is so great, that they yield their judgments, without an effort, to the current, withdraw their minds from all opinions and arguments opposed to their own, and thus speedily convince themselves of the truth of what they wish to believe." (Vol. II., p. 192.) No doubt the principles named above possess real potency; no doubt their influence has sometimes prevented men from entering upon a careful and candid investigation of the grounds of their belief, and led them to smother doubts which at the moment they could not summon the evidence to dissipate. Possibly all this may, in some cases, have prevented merely speculative believers in Christianity from throwing away their dead faith and passing over to the camp of the infidel. This mode of retaining one's hold on Christianity we do not defend, nor do we believe that the universal adoption of such a method of dealing with doubt would be favorable to Christianity. Christianity—the pure Christianity of the Scrip-

tures—is not wholly or chiefly on the defensive; she is not merely guarding her own entrenchments, but with firm tread and banner displayed, she is advancing into the territory of the enemy. Her weapon is the truth; and to be effective that weapon must find its way through the intellect to the heart of man. Just so far as the bias of passion, love of ease, or any other of the forces enumerated by the author, hinders this penetration of truth into the soul, it impedes the progress of Christianity and delays her triumph. But may not men nurtured in the bosom of the Christian Church and early instructed in the doctrines of the Christian creed, be brought by the power of principles, at least as discreditable as those above enumerated, to renounce the faith of their fathers? May not intellectual vanity, the desire to appear a bold and original thinker, or intellectual pride, the desire to *be* such a thinker, have their influence? Nay, is it not possible that a darker feeling than either of the foregoing, lurking low down in the depths of the heart, perhaps even beneath the region of distinct consciousness, a feeling of enmity to the religion of the Bible and to the God of the Bible, may be “the moral disease which lies at the root” of this unbelief? In the language of another, may they not be “against religion because religion is against them”? May they not say in their hearts, “I cannot believe the God of the Bible is the true God, for I cannot accept him as my God.” Now, upon the theory of the Christian, if you choose to call it theory, the theory that the God of the Bible is the true God, all-perfect, ever blessed and glorious, our Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer, must it not be sinful to reject the revelation given by this God because our hearts and our lives are opposed to his law and his character? Must it not be moral disease of a hideous kind which lies at the root of *this* unbelief?

Closely connected with the charge that Christianity regards theological error as sinful, is the further imputation, that “in Christian times the theological notion (has prevailed) that the spirit of belief is a virtue and the spirit of scepticism a sin.” (Vol. I., p. 366.) Again, in Vol. II., p. 194, the author says: “Exactly in proportion, therefore, as men are educated in the inductive system, they are alienated from those theological systems

which represent a condition of doubt as sinful, seek to govern the reason by the interests and the affections, and make it a main object to destroy the impartiality of the judgment." (See also Vol. II., p. 189.) It is rather hard to say whether Mr. Lecky brings this charge of impeding the progress of knowledge by the inculcation of a spirit of credulity against the Christianity of all ages and of every shade of doctrine, or against Romish and Mediæval Christianity only. If the latter, we do not feel specially called on to controvert the accusation. We believe, indeed, that within those limitations there is some ground for it, and moreover, that the enmity betrayed by the Romish hierarchy, alike to scientific and to theological investigation, tended powerfully to excite that revolt against its authority which assumed the name of Protestantism. Still, even in Mediæval times and among devoted sons of the Church, individuals were not deficient in the spirit of cautious inquiry even as to the claims of Christianity itself. Thus the old monkish historian, William of Malmesbury, speaking of Edwin, King of the Northumbrians, says: "He was inferior to none in prudence: for he would not embrace even the Christian faith till he had examined it most carefully; but when once adopted, he esteemed nothing worthy to be compared with it." (Eng. Chronicle, p. 46, Bohn's ed.)

If, however, Mr. Lecky means to say that the Bible or those who receive the Bible as their sole rule of faith, inculcate a spirit of blind credulity, discourage investigation, and have thus impeded the progress of true science, we utterly deny the charge in all its parts. Not a verse of Scripture can be adduced which, properly interpreted, would be seen either to discourage the use of reason in the formation of our beliefs, scientific or theological, or to favor the reception of a faith at the bidding of blind credulity. On the contrary, we find the writer of the book of Acts commending the Bereans "as more noble than those of Thessalonica" because they searched the Scriptures daily to see whether the teaching of an apostle was true; and so the Apostle Paul, in writing to the Thessalonians, exhorts them to "prove," that is to test, "all things, and to hold fast that which is good." (Thess. v. 21.)

Protestant divines of the highest character are found constantly to encourage men to look well to the grounds of their faith. They maintain that we must not accept our religious opinions on trust, but that we are bound to subject even those long entertained and received from parents or most trusted friends, to searching examination. Thus, Dr. A. Alexander declares that "No doctrine can be a proper object of our faith which it is not more reasonable to receive than to reject. If a book claiming to be a divine revelation is found to contain doctrines which can in no way be reconciled to right reason, it is a sure evidence that those claims have no solid foundation and ought to be rejected." (Ev. of Chris., Chap. I. See *ib.*, Chapter III.)

The same excellent writer says in his *Moral Science* (Chap. IX., p. 67): "Suppose a man to have been educated in a wrong system of religion and morals: he is responsible, because when arrived at the years of maturity he should have brought the opinions received by education under an honest examination. The more difficult it is to divest ourselves of prejudices thus imbibed, as it were with the mother's milk, the more necessary it is that, under the influence of a sincere love of truth, we should with impartiality, diligence, and resolution, endeavor to do so. The prevalence of error in the world is very much owing to the neglect of this duty. This neglect arises from culpable indolence, from a desire to remain in agreement with the multitude or with our parents and teachers, from aversion to the truth, and an unwillingness to deny ourselves and incur the inconvenience and persecution which an avowal of the truth would bring upon us. But none of these reasons will justify us in adhering to opinions which are detrimental to ourselves and others or contrary to our moral obligations." So the illustrious Butler (*Analogy*, Part II., Chap. VII.), after advising his readers to write down all the facts and arguments within their reach, favoring the truth of Christianity, adds these words: "Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down what he thought made for the contrary side."

In perfect agreement with the views of the eminent divine just quoted, we may safely declare are the recorded opinions of the great body of Protestant writers. It is the doctrine of these

writers generally that God has given to man reason to enable him to discern the truth ; that a necessary condition of the exercise of reason in the cognition of truth is the presence of evidence, even as an indispensable condition of bodily vision is the presence of light ; that the man who believes without adequate evidence and the man who disbelieves in despite of adequate evidence, are alike unreasonable. These statements, indeed, we suppose will be denied by few thoughtful persons, Romish or Protestant. And certainly we may draw from them the important corollary, that the Christian has no special interest in claiming for credulity a place among the virtues. If the evidence of the truth of Christianity is adequate, and the contrary must not be assumed gratuitously, it is the unbeliever who is the credulous man. A very moderate acquaintance with the principles of logic will make this evident enough. For by these principles credulity and incredulity are obviously but phases of the same intellectual vice. By the laws of logical opposition the disbelief of a proposition is tantamount to the belief of its contradictory ; then if of two contradictories the more probable be denied, the less probable is affirmed, and the man who incredulously rejects that which is proven, credulously accepts that which is not proven. In the words of Archbishop Whately, "To deny or to disbelieve a proposition is to assent to or to believe its contradictory, and of course to assent to or maintain a proposition is to reject its contradictory. Belief, therefore, and disbelief are not two different states of the mind, but the same, only considered in reference to two contradictory propositions. And consequently credulity and incredulity are not opposite habits, but the same, in reference to some class of propositions and to their contradictories." (*Logic*, Book II., Chap. II., Sec. 3.) The Archbishop adds in a note, "And there may even be cases in which doubt itself may amount to the most extravagant credulity. For instance, if any one should doubt whether there is any such country as Egypt, he would be in fact believing this most incredible proposition : that it is possible for many thousands of persons unconnected with each other, to have agreed for successive ages in bearing witness to the existence of a fictitious country without being detected,

contradicted, or suspected." All this commends itself to the common sense of mankind. And in the light of the principle involved we can at once explain a fact often regarded as the result of some mysterious law of human nature—the fact that the most pronounced unbelievers are not unfrequently among the most credulous of men. One illustration our author himself gives us. "It was the belief of the Romans," he tells us, "that the stroke of lightning was an augury and its menace was directed especially against the great. Augustus used to guard himself against thunder by wearing the skin of a sea-calf. Tiberius, *who professed to be a complete free-thinker*, had greater faith in laurel leaves." (Vol. I., p. 367.) Indeed, it is very hard to determine whether the famous Augustan age was most remarkable for superstition or scepticism.

And on reflection we shall find that we call the same mental act an act of credulity or incredulity, as we have regard to the evidence in view of which a judgment is accepted or to the evidence in opposition to which its contradictory is rejected. Some hundred years ago Lord Orford (Horace Walpole) published his "Historic Doubts concerning Richard III." The purpose of the treatise, as we remember it, is to show that the popular notions concerning Richard are highly erroneous—that he was not only a prince of great courage and capacity, but also a man of fair moral character, fully equal in this regard to the average of English sovereigns. Walpole supports his view with very specious and ingenious arguments—arguments which might lead a weak and incautious reader to the adoption of his conclusions. A man is incredulous in the refusal to acknowledge the sufficiency of proof which nine-tenths of the sane men in the world declare abundantly sufficient: He is credulous in yielding conviction to evidence which by an equal portion of our race would be regarded as wholly unsatisfactory. Is it not a possible thing that the man who rejects the claims of Christianity may be thus equally obnoxious to the charge of credulity and incredulity?

But suppose this credulous unbeliever as to the crimes of Richard, when referred to certain alleged facts in proof of the monstrous wickedness of the king, proof which had been declared

by men of the keenest intellect and most thorough acquaintance with English history to be perfectly irrefragable, coolly to reply that facts of this kind ought to be regarded "as more properly a subject of derision than of argument"; that recorded as they were in the reign of princes of the House of Tudor and by friends of that dynasty, "this very circumstance would be full of proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination." (See Hume's *Essay on Miracles*.) Now what would be thought of the mental fairness of such a reasoner, and what the value of his judgment respecting the character of Richard? Would not every one regard the temper thus exhibited as affording the most satisfactory explanation of the credulity or incredulity, call it which you will, of the historical critic? Yet a striking parallel to all this may be found in the treatment given to the argument from miracles by that prince of sceptics, David Hume, some of whose words, though with a new application, will be recognised by many of our readers in the above extracts. This argument from miracles, most effective as it has been counted by very many of the ablest and best men whose lives illustrate a long course of ages, is based upon facts which Mr. Hume thinks should be rejected, and rejected without examination. In all which our author seems to agree with Mr. Hume. In the course of a discussion of what he himself styles "the broad question of the evidence of the miraculous," he describes the "common attitude of ordinary educated people" on this subject, and describes it as "an attitude not of doubt, of hesitation, of discontent with the existing evidence, but rather of absolute, derisive, and even unexamining incredulity." Now we do not say that Mr. Lecky explicitly asserts that the miracles of Scripture are among the reported wonders which are regarded with this derisive incredulity, nor do we say that he declares in so many words his participation in the incredulity described. Still, we are persuaded that few can read what he has written on this topic without the conviction Mr. Lecky means to include himself among the incredulous, and these miracles as among the proper objects of such incredulity.

This incredulity which shuts up the mind against all evidence, which declares that evidence regarded as amply sufficient by Bacon, by Newton, by Butler, and by very many of the best and ablest men of our generation, to be the proper subject of derision rather than of argument—this incredulity seems to our author, as to Hume, very philosophical when applied to a belief in miracles. But should some doctrine of the new philosophy become its object, would it not at once be transformed into the grossest credulity? Suppose, for example, the Darwinian doctrine of development to be proposed for the first time to a community of Christian people; suppose the scientist advocating the theory not only to repeat the argument so often given to the world by Mr. Darwin and his friends, but in addition, to offer evidence such as they have never pretended to possess; for example, the evidence afforded by a succession of fossil remains of beings in every stage of development, from the mollusk to the man—fossils which the lecturer professed often to have seen and examined; suppose the statements of this scientist corroborated by men of known intelligence and veracity, who should declare that though they had never seen the fossils, they had satisfactory evidence of their existence. But the persons addressed listen to all this with the most stolid incredulity, utterly refusing even to inquire into the evidence proposed, while they justify their contemptuous indifference by declaring that neither they nor their fathers had ever seen such fossils as those described, but that they had seen lying lecturers, that the theory bore absurdity on its very face; for that man is too unlike a monkey, not to say a mollusk, ever to have descended from him, and that, finally, the notion advocated is contrary to Scripture, and therefore must be false. Now it may be safely asserted that an incredulity of this type would be regarded by the whole tribe of scientists as but another form of the grossest conceivable credulity. But let us compare it with the credulity of those who regard the Christian miracles as “proper subjects of derision rather than of argument.” For convenience sake, let us take but one of these miracles, and it shall be that one, the evidence of which is most patent to all, and in determining the character of which the learned and the comparatively unlearned,

the believer and unbeliever, possess most nearly the same advantages. Let the *phenomena* presented in the past history and present condition of the Jewish people be accepted as the matter of this miracle. Now we say that only a monstrous credulity could receive the acknowledged facts of this case as the result of merely natural causes, and regard the hypothesis that they have been brought about by an extraordinary exercise of divine power as the proper "subject of derision rather than of argument." He must be a very ignorant man who does not know thus much about the Jews, that for nearly two thousand years they have lived without a country, without a polity, without a head; that during this period they have been scattered throughout all nations, yet have never been swallowed up and never lost their distinctive character; that during all this period they have been everywhere the objects of scorn and contempt; a by-word and a hissing, and during a great part of it have been the objects of fierce hate and of ruthless persecution; and yet, that so far from being wasted away or destroyed, they have, unlike the burning bush on Sinai, put forth fresh leaves and branches in the midst of the flames; that thus, this day they are more numerous, more wealthy, and more powerful than in that fatal time when they first placed themselves in battle array against the armies of Vespasian. Now we conceive that Mr. Lecky might find it rather hard to account for all this and for much more that concerns this strange people, except on the hypothesis that the God in whom it seems Mr. Lecky believes has exercised over them a special oversight. He must be, indeed, a very credulous man, if he believes that the history and present state of the Jews can be accounted for by a simple reference of such causes as seem ordinarily to determine the events which make up the life of a nation. But suppose him successful in swallowing all such improbabilities, even then the trials of his credulity have only begun. On any theory that Mr. Lecky would be willing to accept, the anomalies presented in the state and history of the Jews are, indeed, inexplicable in themselves, but the difficulty of their solution is increased tenfold by their relation to another kind of facts. This class of facts belongs to the miracles of prophecy. Very rightly does David

Hume say, towards the close of, his celebrated "Essay on Miracles," "Indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation." Now we feel quite confident that Mr. Lecky, if questioned, would himself admit that very much more is predicted in our Scriptures concerning the Jews than what we have stated above; that these predictions were made previously to the days of Titus and of Adrian, when the Jews were dwelling at peace in their own land. Nay, he would probably admit that some of them were uttered more than a thousand years before the first stone was hurled by the catapults of Titus against the walls of the Holy City. And is Mr. Lecky credulous enough to believe that these wonderful facts—facts in themselves almost as wonderful as any miracles of Scripture, and many of them before their occurrence seemingly inconsistent with each other as well as separately improbable—can he believe that these facts were foreseen and predicted by any wisdom less than divine? Surely it is the infidel rather than the Christian who ought to assign to credulity a high place among the virtues.

In one respect the belief of Mr. Lecky bears favorable comparison with that of Hume. If we understand him, Mr. Lecky believes in a God. Hume seems to have had no such faith. Indeed, speculatively he believed in nothing but in the consciousness of the passing moment. Hume, therefore, did not accept the possibility of the miracles, for he did not acknowledge the existence of an Author of nature who by a mere change in the mode of his operations could effect what we call a miracle. Mr. Lecky believes in a God, and, accepting the logical consequence, declares that miracles are not impossible. Believing, then, that miracles are possible, with such evidence as that to which we have just referred, existing much of it, as it were, before his eyes, he believes that no miracle of prophecy has ever occurred. Now we cannot help thinking the infidelity of Hume somewhat less unreasonable, though somewhat more criminal, than the infidelity of Lecky. Admit the existence of a God of infinite perfection, and you have relieved revelation of its chief difficulties, both as to evidence and to matter. Then you have admitted the existence

of a cause most adequate to produce miracles; and the occurrence of miracles is a question to be determined, as other facts, by the evidence to be adduced in each supposed case. Admit the existence of a supreme God, and you admit that the existence of the phenomena presented in the condition and history of the world is reconcilable with the assumption that the God ruling the world is infinite in every perfection; and thus you are obliged to admit the utter futility of objections brought against revelation from its recognition of certain principles of the divine administration which alike appear in nature. This last statement, as our readers know, is the foundation of the argument of Butler's immortal work. An incident narrated of his father by John Stuart Mill we regard as eminently illustrative at once of the logical consistency of the elder Mill and of the irresistible cogency of the argument of Butler. It seems that early in life James Mill was a Presbyterian and orthodox. But on the ground that some of the doctrines of Scripture were irreconcilable with his notions of God's character, he became a Deist. After this change, he read Butler's *Analogy*, and was at once convinced that the objections to our religion on which he had relied, were as potent against Deism as against Christianity. The result was that he became an Atheist, and as an Atheist lived and died. Certainly in this last change he was logically consistent; and yet who can be an Atheist without doing utmost violence to the very laws of his nature? Certainly one might say with Bacon, "I would rather believe all the fables of the Talmud and Alkoran than that this universal frame of nature exists without a Creator."

We have already transcended the limits proposed for this paper without touching on many topics suggested by Mr. Lecky, and on which we wished to say something. Eminent among these is his general treatment of Christian evidence in its several departments. Thus much we are willing to admit in conclusion, that while the evidence of Christianity, internal and external, ought to be convincing to every rational mind, it is still possible for men really to doubt and even really to disbelieve. If there exist that "moral disease" of which we have spoken; if through its power men desire to find that the Scriptures are false; if they

occupy their minds with the difficulties rather than the evidences of revelation; if they cavil against God's word and government, and seek to bring their fellow-men to hate them both, they may be given up to "strong delusion to believe a lie." Thus is the Bible a test of our moral condition as well as a medium of the mind. So Grotius, as quoted by Butler, says: "Ut ita sermo evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur."*

There is a sense, indeed, in which those words of Hume, intended to convey a sneer, suggest a mournful truth. "Our most holy religion," he says, "is founded on faith, not on reason." Not, as we have already seen, that our religion does not commend itself to the highest reason—to reason unclouded by sin. But as the vision of the diseased eye may fail to see what ought to be most apparent, so the reason of the sin-sick soul may fail to discern that truth of Christianity which the veriest child, if enlightened by God's Spirit, would recognise.

J. M. P. ATKINSON.

*This term "Lydius lapis" had been applied to the Gospel by Calvin in his Commentary on Acts, Chap. xvii. 11.

ARTICLE II.

THE ACTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF 1879 ON
WORLDLY AMUSEMENTS.

Overture No. 5—From the Presbytery of Atlanta, asking the Assembly for definite instructions upon the following points, to wit :

I. Are the deliverances of 1865, 1869, and 1877 on the subject of worldly amusements to be accepted and enforced as law by judicial process ?

II. Are all the offences named in them to be so dealt with, or are exceptions to be made ?

III. Are the deliverances of all our Church courts of the same nature and authority, so far as the bounds of these respective courts extend ?

In answer to these questions the Committee recommend the adoption of the following minute :

I. This Assembly would answer the first question in the negative, upon the following grounds :

1. That these deliverances do not require judicial prosecution expressly, and could not require it, without violating the spirit of our law.

2. That none of these deliverances were made by the Assembly in a strictly judicial capacity, but were all deliverances *in thesi*, and therefore can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory.

3. That the Assembly has no power to issue orders to institute process, except according to the provisions of Book of Discipline, Chapter VII. in the old, and Chapter XIII., Section 1, in the revised Book ; and all these provisions imply that the court of remote jurisdiction is dealing with a particular court of original jurisdiction, and not with such courts in general. The injunctions, therefore, upon the sessions to exercise discipline in the matter of worldly amusements, are to be understood only as utterances of the solemn testimony of these Assemblies against a great and growing evil in the Church. The power to utter such a testimony will not be disputed, since it is so expressly given to the Assemblies in the Form of Government, Chapter XII., Section 5, of the old, and in revised Book of Church Order, Form of Government, Chapter V., Section 6, Article VI.; and this testimony this Assembly does hereby most solemnly and affectionately reiterate.

In thus defining the meaning and intent of the action of former Assemblies, this General Assembly does not mean, in the slightest degree, to interfere with the power of discipline in any of its forms, which is given to the courts below by the Constitution of the Church ; or to intimate that discipline in its sternest form may not be necessary, in some cases, in order to arrest the evils in question. The occasion, the mode, the degree, and the kind of discipline, must be left to the courts of original

jurisdiction, under the checks and restraints of the Constitution. All that is designed is, to deny the power of the Assembly to make law for the Church in the matter of "offences," or to give to its deliverances *in these* the force of judicial decisions.

II. The second question, which is, "Are all the offences named in the deliverances of 1865, 1869, and 1877 to be dealt with in the way of judicial process, or are exceptions to be made?" needs no answer after what has been said in answer to the first.

III. In answer to the third question, relative to the nature and authority of our different church courts, this Assembly would say that the nature and authority of all our church courts are the same so far as the bounds of these respective courts extend, subject, of course, to the provisions for review and control of the lower courts by the higher. The power of the whole is in every part, but the power of the whole is over the power of every part.

The perplexity about the nature of the deliverances in question has arisen from confounding two senses in which the word discipline is used in our Constitution. One is that of "judicial process," the other is that of inspection, inquest, remonstrance, rebuke, and "private admonition." (Form of Government, Chapter IV., Section 3, Article IV.) The one is strictly judicial or forensic; the other is that general oversight of the flock which belongs to the officers of the Church, as charged by the Holy Ghost with the duty of watching for souls. The one cannot be administered at all except by a court of the Church; the other, while it is a function of that charity which all the members of the Church are bound to possess and cherish for each other, is yet the special and official function of the rulers, to be exercised with authority toward those who are committed to their care. In the judgment of this Assembly, great harm is done by the custom of identifying, in popular speech, these two forms of discipline, or, rather, by forgetting that there is some other discipline than that of judicial process. Many an erring sheep might be restored to a place of safety within the fold by kind and tender, yet firm and faithful efforts in private, who might be driven farther away by the immediate resort to discipline in its sterner and more terrifying forms. The distinction here asserted is recognised in the Word of God, and in our Constitution, for substance at least, in the directions given for the conduct of church members in the case of personal and private injuries. (See Chapter II., Article III., of the old Book of Discipline, and Chapter I., Paragraph 4, of the revised; also Matthew xviii. 15, 16.) If scandal can be removed or prevented in such cases, more effectually oftentimes, by faithful dealing in private with offenders, than by judicial process, it does not appear why similar good results may not follow from the like dealing in the matter of worldly amusements. (Minutes General Assembly, 1879, pp. 23-25.)

This action was before the Church for more than seven months before any serious assault was made upon it. The paper reported by the Committee on Bills and Overtures was read deliberately and distinctly twice, and the last paragraph three times, before the vote was taken, and then, after a slight verbal amendment, the whole paper was *unanimously* adopted (see printed Minutes, p. 23). The Chairman and other members of the Committee were amongst the most determined opponents of worldly amusements, and of the same complexion were many of the most intelligent members of the Assembly, men of nerve as well as of conscience, who had never been known to shrink from bearing their testimony and giving their vote for what they believed to be right.

Yet, from the tone of some criticisms that have recently appeared, the impression would be gotten that the Assembly was a trimming, time-serving body, which betrayed the interests of truth, set itself against the current of the teaching of the acts of previous Assemblies, and dishonored the Saviour before the world. We propose to show that the Assembly did no such thing.

It is not our purpose to follow the critics through all their discussions. They quote largely from authors, in Latin as well as in English, to prove what no Presbyterian denies, if the passages cited be taken in the sense of their authors. They spend a great deal of time in showing the evil of *dancing*, which the Assembly, indeed, says not one word about specifically, but yet condemns by implication, by "solemnly and affectionately reiterating" the testimonies of previous Assemblies. They insist upon the duty of obedience to the Assembly on the part of the lower courts, without attempting to define the conditions and limits of that obedience, except in the most general terms. Their statements tend to produce the impression, whether they intended it or not, that the Assembly discountenanced the exercise of discipline in the matter of worldly amusements, though, in this very paper, it cautions the Church against such a misconstruction, and intimates that discipline, "in its sternest form," may be necessary in some cases in order to arrest the evils in question.

What then is the question, and the only question in fact, which the Assembly was asked to make a deliverance about? It was not one touching the evil of worldly amusements, or the duty of applying to them the discipline of the Church. It was not one concerning what action the Scriptures required, or what the principles and rules of the Church of Holland as expounded by Voeetius demanded, or what the principles and rules of the Kirk of Scotland as expounded by Principal Cunningham made necessary. None of these; but simply a question of law in our own Church—"the Presbyterian Church in the United States"; the question whether the Assembly has the power "to make law for the Church in the matter of 'offences,' or to give to its deliverances *in thesi* the force of judicial decisions." It had been contended by some that the deliverances of the Assemblies of '65, '69, and '77 obliged the courts of original jurisdiction to discipline for dancing, that is, to exclude every church-member convicted of dancing from the privileges of the Church; that these courts had no discretion, that they were not allowed to interpret the law of the Church for themselves, but must accept the interpretation of the Assembly, albeit that interpretation had not been given in the investigation of a judicial case regularly brought up (*i. e.*, *in hypothesi*), but as an abstract and general proceeding (*in thesi*). It was contended by others that the above named "deliverances" did *not* oblige the lower courts; that these courts have a power of judgment, both as to law and fact, given them in the Constitution, with which the Assembly cannot directly interfere; that the power of the whole Church is in every part (Session, Presbytery, etc.), and that, therefore, the judgment of the part is constructively the judgment of the whole, and is valid as such until constitutionally set aside; that, therefore, the authority of all our church courts is the same, so far as their bounds respectively extend, or within the sphere of their jurisdiction; and, lastly, that, while the higher courts are invested by the Constitution with the power of "review and control" over the lower, this power is not a power *directly* over the part, but over *the power* of the part—that is to say, the power of judgment in the part can only be overruled and set aside by a *judicial decision* of the higher

court upon a cause regularly (legally, constitutionally) brought up from a lower; and that until such a judicial decision has been constitutionally rendered, the power of judgment in the courts of original jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, remains intact. These are the principles contained in the answer to the third question of the overture from the Presbytery of Atlanta (Assembly's Minutes, p. 24).

The reader will observe that the overture has reference only to matters of "offences" and discipline; and the Assembly's answer confines itself to those points. The question is one which concerns the administration of *law* by our courts, and not the making of *regulations* in matters of detail; it is a question belonging to the *diacritic* or *judicial* or *disciplinary* power of the Church, not to its *diatactic* or *arranging* power.

Before proceeding to vindicate the action of the Assembly, we beg leave to remind our readers that the principle here involved is one of immense importance. It lies at the root of all the struggles between the advocates of a constitutional government and the advocates of an "absolutism." The forms of constitutional government and of absolutism, both in Church and in State, have varied indefinitely; but the essence of the struggle has always been the same. Abstracted from its accidental forms, the question has always been, whether the power of the whole is over every part, or only over the power of the part—whether the whole is simply a great wheel, of which the parts are only spokes, or whether it be a wheel of which the parts are *also* wheels, each having a sphere and movement of its own, yet moving in subordination to the movement of the great wheel. It was the question between the Ultramontanes and the French in the Middle Ages, as to the relation of the Bishop of Rome to all the other bishops: the man of Rome contending that as he represented the whole Church and was the supreme bishop, all the inferior bishops derived all their authority from him, and were to be governed absolutely by him; that they had no rights which he was bound to respect, because none which he had not given and which he could not in his sovereign pleasure take away; the bishops contending that their office was created by Christ, and its rights and

duties defined by him; that they were subordinate to the man of Rome only in the way of appellate jurisdiction, or of general review and control. It was the question between the bishops and the rectors in parts of the Episcopal Church of the United States some years ago: the bishop asserting that by virtue of his being the highest officer in the Church, he contained in himself all the rights and functions of the rector of a parish; and that when the bishop was "visiting" a church, the rector might be suspended from his office for the time, if it so pleased the superior. It was the question between the Northern Assembly of 1866, at St. Louis, and the Louisville Presbytery, as to the famous (or infamous) *ipso facto* order concerning the "Declaration and Testimony" ministers of that Presbytery: the Assembly maintaining virtually the power to lay down the law on the subject, and to execute it, because the Presbytery was a "smaller part," and the Assembly was the whole; the Presbytery maintaining that, as small a part as it might be, it was a part with the power guaranteed to it by the Constitution of "judging ministers," both as to the law and the facts; and therefore that the Assembly had been guilty of a usurpation of power. It was the question between the Federal or Consolidation party on the one side, and the States Rights party on the other, in the antebellum politics of the United States: the States Rights party contending for the power of the parts (in this case the States), and resisting the attempt on the part of the Federal Government to override that power without regard to the provisions of the Constitution. The great question in the Convention that framed that Constitution was essentially the same, how to strengthen the whole, and at the same time so to preserve the power of the parts, and to such an extent, that the liberty of the people might be safe. Hence the distribution of the powers of government; hence the distribution of the power of legislation, a Senate and a House of Representatives, the one founded on the principle of a *numerical* majority, the other on the principle of a *concurrent* majority; the one acknowledging the power of the whole, the other protecting the power of the parts.

This is the principle of the Assembly's paper: that the courts

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of original jurisdiction cannot be directly interfered with by the General Assembly, in their power of judgment as to law or fact; that to these courts "must be left the occasion, the mode, the degree, and the kind of discipline, under the checks and restraints of the Constitution."

We have thus endeavored to state clearly the real and only issue between the advocates and the opponents of the Assembly's action. A great many side issues have been introduced by its assailants. Hence we must repeat "the state of the question" once more: Does the same force belong to the deliverances *in thesi* of the higher courts, as to their judicial decisions? Do the two classes of decisions regulate and determine the administration of discipline in the same way and to the same extent? Or, to express the same thing in other words, does the interpretation of a law by an appellate court—the interpretation being given *in thesi*—bind a court of original jurisdiction in such a sense as to deprive it of its power of judgment as to the meaning of said law, and compel it to accept and act upon the interpretation of the appellate court as the law of the Church? If we understand the assailants of the Assembly, they would answer positively and emphatically in the *affirmative* to this question. The General Assembly of 1879 answers it clearly and *unanimously* in the *negative*; and, we think, truly and righteously, for the following reasons:

1. The Constitution of the Church, by the very fact that it is a constitution, creates a presumption in favor of the Assembly's answer. There was a time in the history of our Church when it had no written Constitution. The first Presbytery (the "General Presbytery") had none, and there seems to have been none until the "Adopting Act" in 1729, when "the Synod" had been in existence for twelve years. Even after the Adopting Act had become the law of the Church, and the standards of the Westminster Assembly had been accepted as its Constitution, a wide difference was acknowledged as to the binding force of the doctrinal standards and the standards of government and discipline. "The Synod," in 1729, simply pronounce "the Directory for Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Church, commonly

annexed to the Westminster Confession, to be agreeable in substance to the word of God, and founded thereupon; and therefore do earnestly *recommend* the same to all their members, to be by them observed, as near as circumstances will allow and Christian prudence direct." (Baird's Digest, p. 6.) According to the same authority, this state of things continued down to 1788, when the "Synod of New York and Philadelphia," in preparation for the formation of the "General Assembly," formally adopted, after amendment, the standards of government and discipline. Up to this date, therefore, the highest court ("the Presbytery," "the Synod," "the Synod of New York and Philadelphia,") seems to have been practically omnipotent, or practically impotent, according to the temper of ministers, elders, or congregations. Such a condition became of course intolerable, and it was felt to be necessary to have a constitution, an instrument which should *constitute*, should put together, the parts in some definite relations, should define and distribute the various powers and establish the checks and balances. It was necessary to have some more definite rule than vague references "to Steuart of Pardovan, and the Acts of Synod," to regulate discipline and the form of process in the church courts. (See Minutes of the Synod of New York and Philadelphia for 1786, cited in Hodge's History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, Part I., p. 214.) This was done in 1788.

Now our position is that all this creates a presumption in favor of the Assembly of 1879, and against its assailants. For, according to the Assembly, the courts of original jurisdiction *have* an original jurisdiction guaranteed to them by the same constitution under which the Assembly itself acts; while according to the opposite side, the Assemblies of preceding years intended to stretch their hand over Synods and Presbyteries, and annihilate the original jurisdiction of the Sessions, at least as to the interpretation of the law; exactly as we might suppose "the Synod" of 1721 to have done, if the Sessions of that day were willing to have their original jurisdiction annihilated. Our fathers of 1721 might have argued that all the courts of the Church were presbyteries, and therefore that each was entitled to exercise all the

functions of a scriptural presbytery; but that the unity of the Church required the submission of the parts to the judgment of the whole, absolutely and without limitation, saving only the inalienable rights of conscience. And we see not how such a conclusion could be resisted in the absence of a constitution, by which certain rights should be guaranteed to the parts. Accordingly, we find "the Synod" exercising the powers of a classical Presbytery. (See Hodge's History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, Part I., pp. 229, 230.) This leads us to observe,

2. That such a distribution of powers to the parts, and definition of the relation of the whole to the parts, we find actually made for us in our Constitution; and our second position is that no original jurisdiction is given to the General Assembly or the Synod in the matter of discipline by our Constitution. The courts of original jurisdiction are the Presbytery and the Session; and in the case of the Presbytery, this jurisdiction is restricted to a particular class of objects—ministers of the gospel. All other members of the Church are under the jurisdiction of the Session. It is asserted, indeed, that the Assembly has some original jurisdiction in the matter of discipline, and the Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 6, Art. VI., is quoted in proof of it, which contains these words: "The General Assembly shall have power . . . to *decide* in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline." According to the critics, "decide" means (and must mean) bring to an issue or conclusion in any way the General Assembly may see fit; for example, by deliverances *in thesi*. The General Assembly has only to fulminate its decree, when it is informed of any controversy going on in any part of the Church, and the business is done, the controversy is *decided*. This is obliged to be their interpretation of the clause; for if they concede that the decision must be made only in certain ways, or according to certain rules, then the inquiry immediately arises, "in *what* ways," or "according to *what* rules?" And the only possible answer to this inquiry is, the ways and rules prescribed in the Constitution. (See Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 2, Art. IV.: "The jurisdiction of these courts is limited by the express

provisions of the Constitution.”) This necessary limitation is expressed in a subsequent clause of the same Article, in connexion with “schismatical contentions, etc.” It was necessary there no more than here. We were present in the Committee of Revision when that limitation was put in, and have a very distinct recollection that it was proposed because that clause in the old book was without the limitation (expressed) and had been made the pretext of the infamous “*ipso facto*” order of the Assembly of the Northern Church in 1866, by which the original jurisdiction of the Louisville Presbytery over its ministers had been overridden and annihilated. But whether expressed or not, it must be understood. If it is not understood, our Book is either a mass of nonsense or an instrument of intolerable tyranny. If the clause means what the brethren on the other side assert, then the Assembly may decide a judicial case, if it choose, by a deliverance *in thesi*.

It is evident, however, that the meaning of the clause is simply this: that the Assembly is the court of *last resort*. The Presbytery is a court of appeals, but it cannot *decide* a controversy, because an appeal may be taken to the Synod; and the Synod cannot *decide* it, because an appeal may be taken to the General Assembly; but the General Assembly *decides*, because there is no higher tribunal. That this is the true interpretation will be evident to any one who will compare Form of Government (of the *old* book), Chap. X., Art. VIII., and Chap. XI., Art. IV., with Chap. XII., Arts. IV., V. The doctrine of that Book is that the three courts of the Church which have appellate jurisdiction are the Presbytery, the Synod, and the General Assembly; but that the difference between the General Assembly and the other two is that it has the power to “decide” all controversies judicially, so that these controversies “can no further go.” And if this is the meaning of the clause in the old book, we suppose its meaning will be conceded to be the same in the new.

Further, the “controversies” of this clause are not mere debates or discussions between *any* parties in the Church, but legal or forensic controversies, carried on, according to the forms prescribed, in the courts of the Church by “parties” in the technical

sense. Otherwise, it would be absurd to speak of any court *deciding* a controversy. A debate in the Church will go on, until the disputants are satisfied or tired out. But a controversy before the courts cannot go farther than the Assembly; it must be decided there. The debate may still go on as before, but the legal controversy must stop, unless the lower courts venture to arraign the Assembly, and complain to that court of its own acts.

Another provision relied on by our opponents in this question is that of Chapter XIII., Section 1, of the Rules of Discipline—"General Review and Control." In reference to this the Act of the Assembly of '79 very justly says that the provisions of this section "imply that the court of remote jurisdiction is dealing with a *particular* court of original jurisdiction, and not with such courts in general"; and, therefore, a general order from the Assembly to the Presbyteries or Sessions to institute process would not be constitutional. The Assembly might have added, 1. That the heading of the whole chapter ("Of the modes in which a *cause* may be carried from a lower to a higher court") shows that a judicial process and a judicial act are the things spoken of, not deliverances *in thesi*; and 2. That the provisions of Section 1 provide for the appellate court only in its action on the court *next* below. (See Subsec. 1, 5.) The General Assembly has no power, in any case, to order a Session to institute process. It may order a Synod, and, since the Presbyteries are the constituent bodies of the Assembly, it might, by straining the Constitution a little, order the Presbyteries to institute process; but there is no color of pretext in the Constitution for the exercise of such power over the Session, except in deciding a cause judicially. Can any instance be produced from the records, or Digest of the General Assembly, of an *injunction*, in the matter of discipline, addressed to a Session, or to the Sessions in general, before 1869? If it can, let it be produced.

We repeat, then, that the Assembly has no original jurisdiction in the matter of discipline. Now what is the "jurisdiction" of a court? The very word means a declaration of the law, according to its etymology (*ius dicere*), and suggests that to declare the

law is one of the functions, the prime function of a court. To deprive a court of this function, then, is to deprive it of jurisdiction; and in denying to the General Assembly original jurisdiction in the matter of discipline, the Constitution *eo ipso* denies to it the *original* power of declaring the law in an authoritative manner, in the sense of jurisdiction. Such an authoritative declaration, such jurisdiction belongs to it only as a court of appeals, or of last resort. On the other hand, if the Assembly assumes the power which is claimed for it, the courts of original jurisdiction are converted into mere commissions for taking testimony; for the functions of declaring the law and of fixing the penalty have been assumed by the Assembly, and the only function left is that of finding the facts.

3. Once more: the principle of the Assembly's paper is clearly sanctioned by sound reason. The court which is trying a case, which has all the circumstances before it which modify the act or acts charged in the indictment, is in a better condition for understanding the law than a court which is not trying the case, but is looking at the law in an abstract way. And most assuredly the court first named is in a far better condition to graduate the censure according to the degree of criminality than the other. What is a judicial interpretation of a law but an interpretation in connexion with a given case? Does the law against "lascivious" dancing apply to *this* case? Is *this* a case of "lascivious" dancing? This is the question that the court has to decide; and no court has a right to say that *all* dancing is lascivious, any more than it has a right to pronounce all stage plays lascivious. The Church, indeed, might in her fundamental law have forbidden (whether she had the right before God and his word to do so, is not now the question) the square and the round dance as equally lascivious, as she might have forbidden the stage-plays of Addison and those of Congreve, Wycherly and Farquhar as equally lascivious; and she might have pronounced *any* act of dancing or the reading of *any* of these plays to be a sufficient reason for the exclusion of any of her members from her privileges. In such a case there would be no occasion to exercise the art of interpretation. But when she has used the words (Larger

Catechism, Q. 139) "lascivious songs, books, pictures, dancings, stage-plays," it is as certainly implied that there may be *some* dancings and stage-plays that are not lascivious as that there are some books and pictures that are not. Now what are and what are not, the courts of original jurisdiction are better judges, when pronouncing judgment in actual process, than any court can be which is sitting in judgment upon the abstract question. So our Constitution virtually says, and so the General Assembly of 1879 virtually says.

We confess to a great astonishment that brethren should insist that deliverances *in thesi* have the same force as judicial decisions. The two classes of acts are reached by processes wholly different. A deliverance *in thesi* may concern a subject which has never been before the Church or any of its courts; may be "sprung" upon the Assembly by some ardent and eloquent member, and carried by his personal influence and eloquence. A judicial decision by that court necessarily implies discussion in at least *two* of the lower courts (in a cause originating in the Session, it is implied that the matter has been discussed in *three*) before it is called to decide. The cause is represented on both sides by counsel, who are fully heard; and the members of the court next below are heard, etc., etc.—all circumstances which give assurance that the matter has been fully discussed by those most competent to do it. Further: the deliverance *in thesi* is apt to be sweeping and general. The judicial decision is upon a case, is interpreted by it, and is applicable only to similar cases. The responsibility in delivering a judgment in a judicial case will be more sensibly felt by the members of the court, because they are not only interpreting the law, but are judging a brother and are determining his ecclesiastical status, perhaps, even, the complexion of his eternal destiny. It is to remind the members of the court of this very solemn responsibility that the provision is made in the Rules of Discipline, Chap. VI., Art. XII. Why this emphatic discrimination between the judgment in a judicial case and a deliverance *in thesi*, if the two are of the same force and effect? And why, again, is the appellate court forbidden to reverse the judgment of an inferior court even upon a formal review of its records,

if it be *only* a "review," and not a judgment of the appellate court upon appeal or complaint? (Rules of Discipline, Chapter XIII., Sec. 1, Art. IV.) And yet brethren contend that the Assembly may by a sweeping deliverance *in thesi* virtually do what the Constitution says that it shall not do even on a deliberate "review," even in a single case, unless that case come before the court in the way of appeal or complaint!

It will be a dark day for our Church when it shall decide that an accidental majority in a General Assembly may make law for the lower courts in a deliverance *in thesi*. The General Assembly of 1834 was a New School body; that of '35 was Old School; that of '36 was New School; and that of '37 was Old School again. How know we that such a very pleasant alternation may not occur again? We know it may be said that all this might happen even in judicial decisions; and that in point of fact one of these Assemblies *did* decide the same judicial case in contradictory ways at the same sessions. It has been also alleged that the Assembly of 1879 decided one way by its paper on "Worldly Amusements," and another way by its approval of the Records of the Synod of Georgia. Granting this for the sake of argument (we think it a mistake), what do this and the other instances prove? They prove that the Assembly is in any case a fallible body; and this again is a reason for giving it all the aids above enumerated as belonging to a judicial process to help it in coming to a decision. In other words, a fallible body is less likely to fail (where the interpretation of the law is in question) in a judicial decision than in a deliverance *in thesi*.

Now it may be said, that if this view be just, then the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction ought to be final, as being more likely to be just than even the judicial decisions of the appellate court. The answer is that if the government is to embrace more than one congregation; if the idea of the unity of the Church is to be realised on any larger scale than that of a single *coetus fidelium*, there must be appellate jurisdiction, and a power given to some higher court to "*decide*" all controversies. This is the reason why a "judicial decision" of the General Assembly becomes law and continues to be law, until a contrary

decision is rendered by the same court—law, in the sense of a regulator of the exercise of discipline in the courts below.

This is a sufficient answer to the objection. A fuller answer would be found in a general exposition of our theory of government and of the usefulness of our system of courts; but for such an exposition a volume would be required. None of our readers are unreasonable enough to expect such an exposition here.

4. The principle of the Assembly's paper is also sanctioned by the practice of the civil courts. We are aware that prejudice exists against analogies from this source; and we acknowledge that harm has been done by not taking into account the differences between the nature and ends of the civil government and those of the ecclesiastical. But there are some principles and methods which all governments must recognise, if they would secure justice and liberty. A single glance over the old Book of Discipline is sufficient to convince anybody that our fathers borrowed largely from the forms of process in the civil courts; and a careful comparison of the new Book with the old will show that in the new there has been a greater approximation to those forms than in the old. Whether this feature of the new Book be an improvement or not, is a question about which brethren will differ in opinion; but the fact is certain, and might be copiously illustrated if we had the time.

Now what is the practice of the civil courts? Is a court below bound by an interpretation of a law which has been given *in thesi* by the Supreme Court? Does the Supreme Court give any such interpretation? Is any decision of that court, as to the meaning of the law, not given in judgment upon a case, binding upon the courts below?

But it is said the analogy will not hold. The courts of the State are *only* courts; while the courts of the Church are invested with legislative powers. If by legislative power is meant the power to make laws as distinct from *diatactic* regulations, we deny such a power altogether even to the Church as a whole, much more to any of her courts. Christ is the only Lawgiver, and the power of the Church is only "ministerial and declarative." If *diatactic* regulations are meant, then our answer is, as we said

before, that we have nothing to do with that kind of power in this discussion, except so far as the Constitution itself is in great part a result of the exercise of that power. Besides, all courts, civil and ecclesiastical, exercise a power of this sort. We see not, therefore, what the objection means, or why the courts civil and the courts ecclesiastical are not in exactly the same predicament as to the matter in question. In both, the law is behind the courts, both are acting under the law, and in both systems the courts of original jurisdiction have the right to interpret the law for themselves, until a judicial decision of the highest court shall *decide* the matter.

5. Lastly, the Assembly of 1879 is sustained by its predecessor of 1877. Being asked by the Presbytery of Atlanta to interpret "the law of the Church concerning worldly amusements, as set forth in the deliverances of the Assemblies of 1865 and 1869," the Assembly gives the following as a part of its answer: "The extent of the mischief done depends largely upon circumstances. *The church Session, therefore, is the only court competent to judge what remedy to apply.*" (Minutes, p. 411.) Now, why should the Assembly of 1879 be censured for doing exactly what its predecessor had done? We know of no Assembly, indeed, which has gone beyond exhortation and admonition to the Presbyteries and Sessions on this subject, except that of 1869.

Since we began to write, our attention has been called to the action of the Synod of South Carolina on this subject, from which it appears that "many have understood the action of the General Assembly as favoring indulgence by church-members in worldly amusements." This ought to surprise nobody who has any experience of the weakness of mankind. The Assembly does, indeed, "solemnly reiterate the testimonies" of its predecessors against indulgence in these amusements; but this goes for nothing with extremists, who meet in the conclusion that the Assembly, though pretending to utter or to reiterate solemn testimonies, is really in favor of the thing testified against. This conclusion is derived by both extremes from the fact that the Assembly condemns a particular method of dealing with the subject. One extreme considers dancing and other worldly amusements so

firmly lodged in the practice of church-members that nothing but the weight of the Assembly's mandate compelling the Sessions to suspend and excommunicate offenders can dislodge it. The other extreme, the offenders themselves, agree with the first in this view, and both conclude that, as the Assembly has refused to issue any such mandate, and refused upon the ground of the want of power, indulgence is granted. This is not the first time that church courts have been subject to misconstruction. They have been charged with favoring indulgence in strong drink, because they refused to say that all use of liquor as a beverage was a sin, and that all who retail liquor are unworthy of a place in the Church. Perhaps the time will come when the Assembly will be asked to decree the moral obligation to the tithe, and that all church members who shall be convicted of paying less, shall be turned out of the Church. If it should refuse, then the tithe men may unite with the men who give nothing in asserting that it is "favoring indulgence" in the luxury of giving nothing to the cause of God.

We hope our brethren will not be frightened into taking unconstitutional ground by such clamors. The Sessions who are unfaithful in their duty on this subject, can find no comfort in the act of the Assembly; for that act leaves their responsibility intact, leaves it where it was before, leaves it where the Constitution has put it; that act refuses to relieve the Sessions of their responsibility by transferring the responsibility to the Assembly. The Sessions who are unfaithful will find in the Assembly's act no cover for their unfaithfulness in a cloud of dust such as would certainly be raised if the Assembly were to embody the views of its critics in a deliverance. They are brought face to face with their responsibility, and are given to understand that there must be no shirking or dodging. At the same time, the Assembly's deliverances *in these* have given all the moral support to the Sessions that could be reasonably demanded.

We have said enough, we think, in the way of explanation and of positive argument, to vindicate the wisdom and righteousness of the Assembly's act. We propose now to consider an argument upon which the brethren on the other side seem to rely with

great confidence for sustaining their position concerning the powers of the General Assembly. This argument is drawn from the acts of "the Council of Jerusalem" as recorded in the 15th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles.

The argument seems to be this: The Council of Jerusalem issued a decree, an authoritative direction, an injunction, to the believers among the Gentiles to abstain for a time, through motives of charity towards their Jewish brethren, from the use of their Christian liberty in certain matters. *Ergo*, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States has the power to pronounce *in thesi* all dancing between the sexes to be "lascivious and therefore sinful," and to require that this deliverance be accepted and enforced by the courts of original jurisdiction in the way of judicial process, not for a time, but always. Now the connexion between these two propositions is not very obvious. One cannot help thinking that the last of the two is the conclusion of an extended *sorites*, of which there are many links missing. We confess we are too obtuse to find out what these missing links are. Meantime, while we are waiting for them to be pointed out, we shall attempt to show that there is no legitimate connexion whatever between the acts of the Council of Jerusalem and the special power claimed for the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States by those who are opposed to the act of 1879.

We shall take no advantage from the opinion held by many learned men, that the decree of the Council of Jerusalem was given by inspiration of the Holy Ghost (Acts xv. 28).

This was the opinion of Dr. Thornwell, as we heard from his own lips; so, also, Dr. Addison Alexander: "'To the Holy Ghost and to us,' the natural and obvious construction is that the Apostles and those joining with them in this act, claim for their own decision a divine authority, as having been suggested or inspired by the Holy Ghost. Nothing can therefore be inferred from this phrase, with respect to the authority of Councils and their canons, except so far as they are known to be under the same guidance and control" (Comm. on the Acts, xv. 29).

This interpretation would make short work of the debate; for

we suppose the most extreme champions of the Assembly's authority are not prepared to assert that its decrees are inspired in the high sense of being the rule of faith and practice. We give the brethren on the other side the advantage of the assumption that that ancient council, although consisting in part of apostles, had no other guidance of the Holy Spirit (at least in kind) than is enjoyed by our General Assembly; that in both the most ancient and the most recent of Assemblies, the conclusion is reached under this guidance by arguments drawn from Scripture and providence, from what God has said and from what he has done. Supposing this to be so—

1. Our first remark is that the Council of Jerusalem can furnish no warrant or model for our General Assembly, for the simple reason that it was not a General Assembly; that it was not a body of representatives from the whole Church. Indeed, there is not a particle of evidence that there was any "Church" in the apostolic age, in the sense of "the Presbyterian Church in the United States." The word *church* is never used in the New Testament, in the singular number, of an organised visible body of professed believers more extensive than such a body within the limits of a single city. The passage in Acts ix. 31, even according to the oldest MSS. and the modern editions, does not necessarily mean anything more than the mass of the followers of Christ. The word in that place may have the same sense as in the phrase "visible Church catholic," in our Confession of Faith, C. 25, Art. 2. which had been in Art. 1 defined as consisting of "all throughout the world that profess the true religion." In the place in Acts, it is a part only of this visible Church which is described, those who professed the true religion "throughout Judæa, Galilee, and Samaria." The reader will please observe we have only said that such a Church as ours *did* not exist, not that it could not have existed. The principle (*ratio*) of such a Church existed, and was exemplified or realised on the scale of a single city, say Jerusalem; but the time had not yet come when its exemplification on the scale of a province or nation was demanded. Now if no such Church existed, of course there was no General Assembly of such a Church, and the Council of Jerusalem was no such body. Ac-

cordingly, there is no evidence that any body of Christians, beyond the city of Jerusalem, was represented in the Council. Paul and Barnabas were present, indeed, and gave an account of what the Lord had done by them among the Gentiles; but they do not seem to have taken any part in the debates. It would have been unwise in them to have done so; for it was *their* work which gave rise to the question before the Council; and the very reason why Paul did not decide the question by his apostolic authority, and why a *Jewish* Council was called to decide it, was, that it was a question which concerned the liberty of the Gentiles from the Levitical yoke. If this liberty could be recognised by the Church at Jerusalem, the headquarters of Judaism, and by a council consisting exclusively of Jewish Christians, then the peace of the Gentile churches was secured against Judaising impostors who pleaded authority from the Church at Jerusalem. There ought not to have been, therefore (as there were not), any Gentile element in the Council. Even Paul and Barnabas, though Jews, had become too much identified by their work with the Gentile churches to admit of their taking part in the proceedings of the Council, without imminent danger of impairing the moral influence and effect of its decisions. They could not "represent" the church of Antioch, since their special relation to that church had ceased, after they became missionaries. If Antioch was represented at all, it was by the "certain others" (Acts xv. 2) who went up with Paul and Barnabas; but for the reasons above given, it is almost certain that it was not represented, and that the Council was purely Jewish.

The case in the 15th of Acts was not analogous, therefore, to a case of "reference," in our own Church, by a lower court to a higher. The Church of Antioch (Session or Presbytery) sustained no such constitutional relation to the Church in Jerusalem, as the Session of the Central church in Atlanta, or the Presbytery of Atlanta, sustains to the General Assembly. And this leads us to observe—

2. In the second place, that the Church of that age had no written constitution at all like that of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Hence we cannot argue from the one to the

other, when treating a question of constitutional law in our own Church. The question with us is not what powers a General Assembly might have had, where there was no constitution; or what powers might have been conferred upon it by a constitution; but what powers belong to it by virtue of *the* Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. It will not do to argue merely from the scriptural powers of a church court, of a presbytery, of this Presbytery at Jerusalem. All the courts of our Church are presbyteries ("congregational," "classical," "synodical," and "general"), and are all of equal powers and the same powers, until a distribution of powers is made by a constitution. Hence, if we argue direct from the Court of Jerusalem to the General Assembly of our own Church, upon the ground of the scriptural powers of a presbytery, we can argue direct to *any* of our courts, and make the decrees of all equally authoritative. But the moment you bring in the fact of a constitution, in which the powers are distributed, the whole state of the question is changed. Hence we cannot argue from the powers of a body not acting under a constitution, to the powers of a body acting under one; nor from the powers of a General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland to the powers of our own Assembly.

It may be asked, Why did the cities of Derbe, Lystra, Iconium, and others, as well as the "brethren of the Gentiles in Antioch, and Syria, and Cilicia," to whom the decree of the Council at Jerusalem was addressed, submit to that decree? The answer is easy for those who hold that decree to have been inspired and to have been acknowledged to be such. For those who hold that the decree was uninspired, that the assembly at Jerusalem was simply the Presbytery of that city, with the addition of the apostles sitting merely as Presbyters, the answer would be more difficult. It would probably be either that the decree had received a subsequent apostolic sanction (of Paul or of some other), or that it was submitted to by voluntary consent. In the case of Antioch, there would be an implied consent in the very act of sending the question up to Jerusalem to be decided. On either supposition, the brethren on the other side of the question which is concerned in the present discussion, will receive little aid or comfort.

On the first, the difficulty is, that we have no apostles. On the second, their cause is given up, because the authority of the Assembly is made to rest on consent. If it should be said that the consent of the lower courts is implied in accepting the Constitution, then the whole difficulty returns. The very question we are discussing is, whether the part, because it is a part, is subject to the whole, because it is a whole; or whether the power of the part is subject to the whole under conditions clearly defined in the Constitution. The other side cannot be allowed to beg the question.

3. Once more: conceding for the sake of argument that the decree of the Council at Jerusalem was accepted as binding, though uninspired, by all the Gentile believers, still we contend that the claim set up for the General Assembly to lay down the law *in thesi*, and to enforce it by judicial process, is unsupported by the doings of that Council. The claim set up for the Assembly is in regard to "offences," and the power asserted for it is the power to make law for offences, or at least to interpret the law so authoritatively in regard to them as to compel the courts of original jurisdiction to institute judicial process.

Now, this is a power of *discipline*, the power of declaring the law of Christ, and of inflicting the censures which he has ordained for sin. No such power was exercised by the Presbytery at Jerusalem. It exercised the *dogmatic* power in declaring the will of Christ in regard to the liberty of the Gentiles; and the *dia-tactic* power in regard to the use of their Christian liberty in certain things, but they exercised no *diacritic* or disciplinary power. Turretin, indeed, represents them as so doing in denouncing the Judaizers as "subverters of souls." But this denunciation is simply a corollary from the dogmatic decision, and the decree itself is a direction in regard to indifferent matters, with one exception. This exception has been a source of perplexity to interpreters of every grade and class, save those of the Greek Church. That Church has held the decree to be of perpetual obligation. The Papal body and the Reformed Churches have held that it was temporary and provisional, with the exception before named.

Now this is one of the characteristics of the objects of the dia-

tactic power, that they are liable to change. The moral law is unchangeable, and the infraction of it is always sin: and sin is the proper object of discipline. But the diatactic power is exercised about "circumstances" which are variable, about modes of doing things, about restraints upon Christian liberty, etc. Hence, Turretin, in the passage referred to, gives as an example of this kind of power the decree of the Council of Jerusalem touching the eating of blood, etc.

In order, therefore, to make this decree parallel with the deliverances *in these* of the General Assembly, these last should be interpreted as referring to matters of Christian liberty, and as temporary restraints upon it. Are the brethren with whom it is our unhappiness to differ willing to take that view of them? Of course not. Why, then, ring the changes upon the Council of Jerusalem?

But it may be asked, May not church members be disciplined for the violation of diatactic regulations? We answer, Never *directly*. The disregard of such regulations may occasion so much scandal as to make the disorderly person liable to the censures of the Church. (See Confession of Faith, Chap. XX., entitled "Of Christian Liberty and Liberty of Conscience," specially Art. IV., where our faith on this subject is laid down.) The discipline is administered for the scandal, rather than for the violation of the rule itself. The Session of a church appoints the hour of eleven o'clock Sunday morning for public worship. One of the members of the church refuses to attend church upon the pretext that there is no divine authority for holding service at that hour; that 9 a. m., 12 m., and 3 p. m., and perhaps "candle lighting" (Acts xx. 8), are the only hours that have the warrant of Scripture example for public worship. Such a member would no doubt be disciplined; but it would be for despising the divine ordinance of public worship. So it is easy to imagine the practice of dancing or liquor-selling to be attended with such scandal as to require the Session, in faithfulness, to subject the actors to discipline. We add our conviction that there are such scandals, and that there are Sessions which are delinquent in their duty in regard to them. We earnestly hope that our de-

fence of the independent jurisdiction which belongs to them will not be construed into an approval of their unfaithfulness.

The exposition which has been given of the nature of diatactic regulations will serve to show the irrelevancy of a great deal that has been said and quoted on the other side. Nobody denies that the General Assembly has original jurisdiction in certain matters; that it may issue "injunctions" which the Courts below are bound to obey. For example, it has the power "to institute and superintend the agencies necessary in the general work of evangelisation." This implies some system in collecting the revenue by which the work is to be maintained; and the Assembly has a right to regulate the details of the collecting and disbursing of the needful funds, and to issue "injunctions" in regard to them. We are far enough from denying to the Assembly the exercise of authority. We only deny that it has a certain kind of authority; and to refuse steadily to recognise any authority which has not been given to it in the Constitution, is the most effectual way to strengthen the authority which *has* been given to it. They are the real enemies of the Assembly's authority who would make its power absolute. If the Assembly assumes the powers of the Sessions, then one of two things will almost certainly occur: either the Sessions will rebel, in defence of their constitutional powers; or, they will consent to become ciphers, and their work will not be done at all. It is as certain as anything can be that the Assembly cannot discharge the judicial functions of the Session. Why, then, attempt them? We believe the Act of 1879 was a wise, just, and wholesome Act, and earnestly hope it will not be reversed.

Before concluding this article we propose to notice some of the arguments, or methods of argument, used on the other side of this question. And

1. The argument *ad invidiam*. The position taken by the Assembly of 1879 is stigmatised as virtual Independency. "If the authority of the Assembly," it is said, "be confined to judicial cases, then this is the only wall that separates us from Independency. Throw down that narrow partition, and we are all at once embraced in a common fold." Upon this singular statement we remark—

(a) We are not aware that any defender of the Assembly's act has said that its "authority is confined to judicial cases." We have asserted its diatactic power as laid down in the Constitution. We have not denied its dogmatic power. This power is asserted in the Constitution, as is the last named, for *all* the courts, and of course for the highest also. So also the power of exercising discipline is claimed in a general way for all the courts. (See Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 2, Art. II., first sentence.) The ground upon which all these powers are claimed for all the courts is then stated in Article III. But now the difficulty arises, that if all the courts have the same original powers, how is confusion to be prevented? This question is answered in Article IV., and admirably answered. We wish we had the space to quote the whole of it. We must quote a sentence or two: "It is necessary that the sphere of action of each court should be distinctly defined." "The jurisdiction of these courts is limited by the express provisions of the Constitution." "Although each court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters specially belonging to it, the lower courts are subject to the review and control of the higher courts, in regular gradation. Hence these courts are not separate and independent tribunals; but they have a mutual relation, and every act of jurisdiction is the act of the whole Church, performed by it through the appropriate organ." If this is Independency, then the act of the Assembly is Independency, for it is exactly in the line of these sections and articles of the Constitution.

(b) The statement that the power of ultimately deciding in judicial cases, according to Rules of Discipline, Chapter XIII., is "a narrow partition, and that when thrown down, we and the Independents are all at once embraced in a common fold," is both amazing and amusing. It is very much like saying that the narrow partition of rationality is the only thing that separates us from the brutes, and if this were thrown down, we all, men and brutes, should at once be embraced in a common fold. Abolish the specific difference in any case, and the species is of course "embraced in the same fold" with the genus. Now, in the matter of discipline, the acknowledgment of appellate jurisdiction in

a court higher than the church Session is precisely the specific difference by which Presbyterianism is distinguished from Independency as expounded by John Owen.

(c) It is very easy to bandy epithets. We might charge the assailants of the General Assembly with Popery with as much justice as they charge us with Independency. What is Popery, but making the Pope the *fountain* of all law, without regard to the rights and powers of the lower bishops, assembled in council, or otherwise? If the Assembly is made the *fountain* of all law, without regard to the rights and powers of the courts of original jurisdiction, have we not a poly-headed pope?

2. It is argued that if the doctrine of the Assembly of 1879 be sound, it is useless to overture it on any subject. "Of what value," it is asked, "the answers to the hundreds of overtures sent up to the Assembly," if they have no binding authority? The answer is, if these overtures refer to matters over which the Assembly has original jurisdiction, the answers *have* binding authority; and in regard to other matters, is it nothing to have the judgment of the Assembly as to the meaning of a law, in the way of instruction, as a guide and help to the lower courts? Does not everybody know that it was common in the Reformation era for the Church of one country to ask the judgment and advice of the churches and learned doctors and universities of other countries? If the "advice and instruction" of the Assembly are of no account, why does the Constitution take the trouble expressly to provide for such "advice and instruction"? (See Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 6, Art. VI.) It seems we have a higher opinion of the Assembly's moral weight than the brethren who are set for the exaltation of its authority. We heartily wish the Sessions would heed its instructions and warnings in reference to worldly amusements, and administer discipline, both private and public, as circumstances may demand.

Brethren must be content to leave this matter of discipline, as to original jurisdiction, where the Constitution has placed it, with the Presbyteries and Sessions. What more vital to the purity and prosperity of the Church than the admission of men to the ministry and of members to the Church? These are matters be-

longing to the Presbyteries and Sessions, and in one sense (since it is easier to keep unworthy people out of the ministry and the Church than to get them out after they are in) more important than the discipline of exclusion. Indeed, a great deal of the discipline, in the sense of exclusion, is occasioned by the facility with which persons are admitted to the Church and the ministry. Many pastors and Sessions are now employed in turning out members who were brought in by the drag-net and machinery of itinerant "revivalists." Now does anybody believe that the General Assembly could manage this evil by laying down, authoritatively, the terms of communion? Pass what "laws" it may, the character of the pastors and elders, after all, will determine the character of the Church; and the character of the pastors and elders will be determined by the habitual training to which they have been subject, not by the acts of the Assembly; by the continual dropping, not by the occasional deluge.

THOS. E. PECK.

ARTICLE III.

CITY EVANGELISATION.

I. The MOTIVE for City Evangelisation might seem to be diminished from the discovery of a modern publicist that human life dies out in great cities in five generations. If the gospel is spending itself upon a sinking mass, and the country is the fountain-head, and the streams of population are flowing inward, and settling downward, so that country life lasts, and city life perishes, and that by a calculable period of decline, it might seem best to evangelise the country; we mean by that to accentuate the work in that great mother-region from which the masses of the city must be ultimately derived. This does, beyond a doubt, give motive for country work, and stimulate on its separate account the rural ministrations of religion.

But there is another incident which soon falls into the calculation which gives an opposite turn to the question of importance. The flow of population inward does not prevent the flow of influence outward; and this, in the instance of large cities, is of the most controlling kind. France may make Paris, but Paris can unmake France. And, on this continent, more than across the ocean, the country is open to the influences of the town. We have no country manners hereditary and fixed, and that are not moulded by metropolitan ways. We have no Provence or Yorkshire. The country is the alert worshipper of city tastes. And when we have discounted the newspaper, and what it can effect; and fashion, and what it can ordain; and amusement, and what it can fashion; and morals, and the way they can penetrate from the whole region of city life into the wide open room for country imitation, we see at a glance how little the country influences itself, and how much it opens itself to the print of what the city may teach it in religion and in morals.

II. As to the INSTRUMENTS of city work, we cannot take anything for granted even there.

Nine tenths of the men who look at such questions would think, as soon as such work is talked of, of "Homes" and "Ragged-schools," and of such missionary tasks as are to overtake heroically the lowest forms of the great mystery of sin.

We are convinced this impulse is a mistake.

A rich Englishman devoted his life to finding out how God operated in building up his kingdom. He examined a wide field; and his question was, How God *did* direct the mode of evangelisation, and what were the actual means resorted to for the heaviest results. His first question was, where Christians finally were to be found: or where, for the most part, they reported themselves, no matter how they were converted. He soon found they resorted to the church. He examined, therefore, a multiplicity of registers of the church; fixing no limits to his inquiry; taking in all churches, and taking in their oldest registers; and taking in the broadest extent of field, with no limitation whatever except to evangelical creeds. He reached the most defined results. There were scarce any of the lowest masses in all the regis-

ters he was able to investigate. The number of the people saved from the most degraded class, unless indeed they had sunk there in one life-time, as might often be the case, were hardly worthy to be considered in calculating the gains of the Church. Why should we start at this? Has not God made promises? Is there to be no reward of the parent? Is there to be no value in centuries of labor? Let us make no pause, however. This man spent his life upon the question. And with that best of all evidences, fact, he found that, in a wide compass of a British Isle, scarce a convert could be hunted up that was not in some way the child of the Church—rescued by training, not so much by snatching or sudden work. And, therefore, the old man's verdict was, that the mode of evangelising any where was by building the Church; by making it act up to all its God-given appliances for training; by allowing it no chance to buy off by payments of money; but by making it, like the prophet Elisha, put its body on the body of the child, and its mouth on his mouth, and its hands on his hands, and let the very communion of the saints be the atmosphere for the propagation of religion.

III. So, then, our conclusion: *The very best means of evangelising cities is to give the utmost prosperity and growth to the churches of God.*

Nor let it be imagined that, in teaching this doctrine, we are meaning to teach that the Church is already doing the solid part of her duty. Let it not be dreamed that we are meaning to release men from "ragged-schools," and from that sort of far-down labor. Above all, let it not be supposed that we are relaxing the self-denials of the Church. The great doctrine we wish to teach is, that there are forms of self-denial which God intended for his people, and which he chastens them for not conceding, which have to do eminently with city work, and which would reach down to the lowest masses in their influence.

Let us illustrate by a supposition. Dr. — is the pastor in a provincial city. He has the only church of his denomination. It is large, and has been twice built greater, and would be enlarged again but for the conviction that it would then be too large for the care of the pastor. Dr. — is a scholar, and,

among all the ministers who know him, ranks among our most honest and pious preachers. Nobody doubts that if his duty were well thought up, or if his brethren had been acting upon it as the habit of their body, he would do it, cost what it might of imagined sacrifice. But, as it is, a great self-denying act that would be the very thing for that city, and that would reach its lowest masses, he would be horrified by, if it were so much as proposed. His church is a contributor to all the schemes, and seems all full of love and good works, and, on a polling of the lists, would stand as one of the very highest, both as to pastor and flock; and yet there is one deep sacrifice that they have never imagined, and which is just that high thing that God demands of their devotion.

What can it be?

They have their missionary scheme, and have a chapel some distance out, which they design as a church; and it floats in their minds that they are blessed in their fidelities as a people. And yet we know of no excuse for the state they are in except that which makes their case appalling, viz., that they are patterns of the Church in almost all like places in every part of the land. They are just in circumstances to glory and be proud, and dote upon schemes that patronise the weak and miserable, when their own deep debt is never paid, and when their truly self-denying task is never approached, or thought up to as of their religion.

Now, what is that task?

It is, boldly to cut their church in two, and make another of a first class kind out of half the people and half the property, as a deliberate division.

What a sight that would be!

But the pastor says, "It would be insane. The proposal sounds well, but grave people distinctly condemn it. It is better to have one strong church than two weak ones. We have enough weak churches. And, moreover, let the one get thoroughly strong, and then we can make sure another."

We go to the elders. They satisfy us, they think, at once. "We give our pastor but \$1,500. We are sure he thinks it ought to be \$2,000. But we give him all our pew rents. It is mad-

ness to think that we can divide when we are just beginning to suppose that before long we can support our minister."

Now, there could not be a case better fitted to exhibit the proper mode of city evangelisation.

Let us look at these pew rents. They are lower than in many of our feeblest churches. Let us look at the pews. All the eligible ones are rented. Let us go out among the people. They tell of the sacrifices in planting that church, and how the old villagers gave and labored; but the new comers are finding everything now very comfortable. You go to the pew-agent. He thinks he has never positively turned anybody away, but he finds it not necessary to go after anybody to take his seats; and, indeed, all people are not likely to be suited by any one minister; and he confesses, that some families that properly belong with them have never come with them. Now, the chapel! "Oh," he says, "that is across the stream. It is hard to keep that up. You see, sir, *that* takes our money. And, as it is a town over there, and without many of our people, the every-fortnight work does not seem to be enough. They go off to other churches. Besides, sir, men are proud these days, and come across the bridge, and join the more fashionable meetings. I am not sure that chapel will ever make anything. They say they never do among larger churches."

Now here is the man to cross-examine. Let us begin.

You say, sir, that your only scheme for extension is not likely to come to much. Let us suppose another. Suppose your own main church were cut in two, and your people were harmoniously to separate; and with a right royal good will were to divide the property. "Oh, sir, that ——" But wait. Suppose they did it. "Yes, sir, but they couldn't do it." Then let me ask this question. Suppose your church should burn down, could you build it again? "Yes, sir, we would have to do it." But how have to, if you couldn't? "Oh, sir, the motive would be so much greater." There, now, is the point! What the Church needs is motive. What the Church wants is zeal for great acts of self-denial. What the Church imagines, that she is showing great zeal in ragged schools and missionary chapel condescensions, is all

a mistake. The true self-denial is to step down from her high estate, and sunder her own body for the extension of the kingdom.

But to proceed. Suppose you had half your present pew-renters, would you give your pastor less than \$1,500? "Oh, I don't think we could. He could not live on less." Have you any rich families? "Oh, yes, several." Do they pay extraordinarily high pew rents? "No; not near so high as the — people, and they are a struggling new church." Now let me renew my question. Suppose the division made. Suppose it to have been a work of prayer and great generous self-sacrifice. Suppose a site to have been fixed, and a new church erected. Suppose the whole body united to bring this about. Suppose after calm religious search as to who should go and who should stay, all questions were settled, and the new flock were fully half, in money and in men. Suppose the new church consecrated. Now, tell me, do you think the old church would give less to their pastor? "I think not." Do you think its younger members would be less active than before? "I think, more active." Do you think you, as pew agent, would be as easy about your list? "Oh, no; I would have to stir myself." Do you think the new people would give less salary than you? "Well, no; I have been thinking that, in calling a minister to a town where Dr. — is so much beloved, they might have to give more." Then *you* would give more? "Well, I am not sure we would not." Then, as to the whole town, would not two partially empty churches have to work more vigorously to bring in the masses of the people? "I think they would have to." And, having parted amicably, they would work with more generous emulation, would they not? "Oh, I think so." And now, what about your pastor? As the most able men are in danger of being discarded by their people; and, instead of an increased support, are in danger of being rejected altogether, tell me one thing more. If he had been at the head of all this movement; and had been the remarkable promoter of it, and hero of the whole, would that seat him more in your city? and, from the echo of it from other points, and the admiration of it all through the State, and the blessing of it from the Great Head on high, would he not be apt to be cherished to the very

last, and to have the higher love of his flock, and the higher peace in his work, and, indeed, a better support than in his present mode of cherishing his people? We will not stay for an answer.

And yet this will not be done in that city. Is it not time to say it ought to be? God may be cursing us for just this defect. Would it not be noble if a church revival were begun, in which not individual Christians gave themselves to Christ, but whole organisations; and if, instead of the frequent result of churches being born out of feud, they were born out of peaceful grace, whole divisions of a flock exiling themselves for the Redeemer?

But let us take a more complicated case. Dr. — is pastor of a down-town church. It is losing people. It has a real estate of half a million. It was built by men scarce heard of now in the shifting city. This handsome property the law puts into the present hands, and, without a doubt of their right, the present pew-holders mean to make a church of it in the region where they live. Query—Have they a right? As God looks at it, is this property theirs, to meet a family want in the fashionable region where they dwell? We believe it is, if the city has no use for it in its great and hungry desolations. But if a “Tabernacle” could be built that would hold 3,000 people, and worship could be kept on just where the fathers spent their money; or if two or three churches, thus coming to be sold, could capitalise their amounts and support some Guthrie or Spurgeon, as well as build the “Tabernacle”, we should say they ought certainly to do it. In the eye of God it cannot be strictly right for the modern-rich to take the churches where they have latterly rented-in, and turn them into cash to build their own personal worshipping-places two full miles away.

Another habit would inaugurate a totally new life in modern cities. Suppose the wealthy built their own churches. Suppose that, instead of digging into these *caches* that have been left by old citizens many streets away, they counted them as consecrated, and left them for the more general interest. Suppose that Presbyteries had a right to say what should be done with these old estates. Suppose it became incumbent to ask just what was the best thing to do to propagate the Church.

What a change from our present system?

It might then appear that "Tabernacles" were not the thing. It might even be that *no* down-town preaching would be listened to. It might even seem that dwellers down-town *would* get into the cars and ride up. It might be that dwellers east or west *would* get into the cars and ride inward. It might be found that as the actual want of the mass, churches well up and well in, must do all the work. This might be as it might appear. First rate minds might find all this out. Certainly there is *some* line of growth; and we say the great hope of evangelising cities lies in the extension of the Church; and the great method of extension is where the Head of the Church is honored; where the parent honors the daughter in giving birth to a church by giving it richly of its own life; where the birth of a church is made a great act, and, therefore, a great sacrifice; where prospered pastors repay the mercy of God by parting with their ablest people; where a pampered flock does not soothe itself with visions of mere chapel-work, but boldly confronts the need of heavier liabilities itself in order that it may divide its strength for some new and equal congregation.

Does not God point to this thing? Our wards die upon our hands; or, if they live, they are perpetual infants. They take no church roots. They do not pass the category of mere mission-places. They may prosper far out in distinct fields of their own; but there they are like missions anywhere. For *city* missions, chapels have had no gratifying results; and the reason is, that they are not the birth that God asks of his people.

Nor can anything be made of the defence that the difficulty is pride. Of that we have no doubt. But then remember that the whole difficulty that calls for a church at all is sin in some form. We have no doubt that these suburban people are too proud to accept just what you are doing. But then, do they not inherit something from their would-be parents? Is there not pride at both ends of the line? And would it not tend to cure it, if the great church set the divine example? if she humbled herself in becoming a mother? if she gave her daughter some of her noblest things? if she brought her near? if she chose for her a good place like

her own? and then came to her? Would not that be a sight to see? And would not the fragrance of such a history as that illustrate the faith, and give the cause new power to make an impress divinely upon the men of the city?

But we must finish. This is our mode for city evangelisation.

We would be consulting men, not churches. We would be providing for men, not individual interests. We should be studying the interests of the city, not this or that communion. And then, as it would be the order of our life not to have entirely full or overgrown churches, strong pastors would have room to work. The rich would no longer say to the poor, We have no need of you; but there would spring a desire to gather in all comers to the church; and, indeed, a rule that the parish where it stands shall be searched and gone through with after its people.

Then would spring all forms of ancillary labor. Reformatories and Ragged-schools would be in the very bosom of the work. Mixed assemblies would be more the habit, as in Catholic cathedrals. The church would be nearer to her subjects. There would be less worthlessness, for there would be more church and less ruin creeping within her bounds. The different assemblies of believers would live more lovingly together; and, as with all high work, which in the end lightens itself by its very effects, the task of overtaking vice would grow less troublesome and less the cause of vital despondency.

ARTICLE IV.

THE "HIGHER LIFE" DELUSION.

1. *Holiness as Demanded and Provided by the Gospel.* By J. F. B. TINLING, B. A. Millard Tract Repository.
2. *Faith's Training College Lectures, 1878.* Millard Tract Repository.
3. *Out of Darkness into Light.* By ASA MAHAN, D. D. Millard Tract Repository.
4. *The Christian's Secret of Happy Life.* By H. W. S. Millard Tract Repository.
5. *Work for Jesus, the Experience and Teaching of Mr. and Mrs. Boardman.* Millard Tract Repository.
6. *The Gift of God.* By THEODORE MONOD. Millard Tract Repository.

It is not our purpose in this paper to discuss the question suggested by the title in its strictly theological relations, or to consider its claims on a basis of original investigation by subjecting it to the recognised criteria of truth. That has been satisfactorily done elsewhere and by other parties.* The time has passed for the apprehension of danger to the Church from this source; but the rise, and for a time, rapid progress of this phase of religious thought, ought to go into history as a phenomenon of the times. In the nature of things this particular type of error is short-lived. If, as some of its advocates have boasted, "it is taking," it has an equal merit in the "trick of dying out." The reason is obvious. It cannot survive the most friendly scrutiny, and it is too phenomenal to escape it. It is possible for theological errors that have no immediate or special connexion with the outward life to maintain themselves for long periods of time against the most convincing logic. They may lie in the chambers of the soul securely entrenched behind the meshes of sophistry, woven by a glib tongue or a sharp and racy pen. But the case is very different when the appeal is made to the logic of facts in everyday experience and observation—facts which are so

*The "Higher Life Doctrine." By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia. 1877.

patent as to challenge the scrutiny of all. Unfortunately for this old error, it peeped forth in an age when the empirical method was all but deified, and the result was, that like Simon the son of Gior, it was captured before it had doffed its grave clothes. Of all theological tenets, none come more directly within the scope of personal observation than this. When professions of superior attainments are made before the public and the public credence is challenged, then to the public it becomes simply a question of fact. Public sentiment must forever abide by the principle enunciated by our Saviour when he said, "By their fruits shall ye know them." If a man would have the people believe that he is free from sin, he must give them some better evidence than his own assertion. In fact, to those who have made human nature a study, and who have had much experience with men, profuse professions of goodness or purity of motive have a sinister face on them, and rather excite suspicion. No class of men on earth are so innocent as the guilty, they themselves being the judges. Rev. Andrew Fuller relates an instance of a minister of the Church of England who had been appointed chaplain to a certain charitable institution, where his constant business would be to visit and converse with persons who by their own misconduct were reduced to the most deplorable condition. On receiving his appointment he thought within himself, "I shall have one advantage, however; I shall not have to encounter a self-righteous spirit." His astonishment was great, when entering on his work, to find no less pharisaism among these dregs than among the most refined and cultivated.

It will be said that we misrepresent these Higher Life brethren: they are very humble; they do not claim any merit or goodness of their own; they are the farthest removed from pharisaism—in fact they are conspicuously humble. We answer: Yes, they are *conspicuously* humble. And this reminds us of old St. Bernard, who says of humility, that "it is of all graces the chiefest, *when it does not know itself* to be a grace at all." The affectation of humility is often confounded with the reality. Humility is known by all to be one of the cardinal Christian virtues, and it will not do for any to give it a quit-claim in the creed. We have to

say with regard to the claim of humility just what we have said in reference to the claim of sinlessness: men will judge the claimants by their fruits, and men have our Lord's warrant for it. Judged by its fruits, the Higher Life is a delusion. It has furnished a renewed demonstration of the patriarch's words: "If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me. If I say I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse."

Let us notice some of the characteristics that accompanied the appearance of this error. We do not speak of it as the rise and development of any new doctrine, the product of our times, but simply as a phenomenon in the religious life of the age.

I. First of all, there was a manifest disingenuousness, in endeavoring to escape identification with an unpopular and condemned heresy of the past. They would have had us believe that this was something altogether new; some great truth that had lain buried for eighteen hundred years under the rubbish of a barren ecclesiasticism, and was just now brought back to its place in the Christian system. If one intimated that it was in substance the old doctrine of perfection, they would exclaim in indignation, *Procul, O procul!* Dr. W. E. Boardman tells us that he will be wiser than the Oberlin brethren, who were so indiscreet as to call their attainments "Christian Perfection," or "Entire Sanctification." "They greatly erred," he says, in this. He tells us in one of his Training College Lectures that he intended first to put forth his publication, "The Higher Life," under a different title, but was prevailed upon by his friends in Boston to abandon it; and that he now sees that such a title as he at first intended "would have been a great clog to the book." We are left to conjecture what the intended title was; but this statement, taken in connexion with his criticism of the Oberlin brethren, is significant. Against this reflection upon the wisdom of the Oberlin terminology, the Rev. Asa Mahan, D. D., vigorously protests in the following language: "But is it not well, since people are so much prejudiced against the word *perfection* and kindred terms, to avoid their use? To such questions my reply is ready: I give place by subjection to such prejudice,

no, not for an hour." The adoption of new names for old things, the avowal and then the partial retraction, the qualification, the equivocation—these are some of the marks that accompany the rehabilitation of error. A careful analysis of the system will discover two points of apparent divergence from the old form of the doctrine. 1st. Most of the advocates of the movement do not claim absolute perfection, but only that they are free from all *conscious* sin. 2d. The method by which this state is reached is by a single act of faith. To adopt the language of one of the old Marrow divines, it is an effort to "leap from the lap of Delilah into Abraham's bosom." The old way was by a growing conformity to God's holy law through the helping grace of Christ, till perfection was reached. It cannot be said that on either of these points there is any improvement. For as to the first, there was in the old form of the doctrine an intelligible, definite standard of holiness; but in the new a wavering, shifting, *convenient* standard—*conscious* sin! In the old, the law was recognised and honored; whereas from the new it is practically displaced by being subjected to the whims and moods of mysticism. One of the worst features of the system in its present form is its sympathy with Plymouthism, in disallowing the law its proper significance in the Christian system.

As to the second point of divergence, the one all-sufficient reason for preferring the old is the fact, that in it the idea of the Christian life as a *growth* is preserved; in the new, sanctification is practically confounded with justification, and a wide door is opened for the Romish error of "infused righteousness." It thus impinges upon one of the fundamental principles of Protestantism. It is easy to see, however, why those who dream of a sinless state in this life, would prefer the modern phase of the doctrine. The law of God, as a fixed, perfect, unalterable standard spiritually interpreted, is a very uncomfortable thing for a man professing perfection. Not so a variable, uncertain quantity, like *conscious* sin. And so as to the method, a single leap, a single act of all-conquering faith, is much more "taking" than the old plodding way of gradual and growing conformity to Christ. But as to substance, it is the old error rehabilitated,

with such variations as it was thought would relieve apparent difficulties that environed the subject. "No, it is not the doctrine of perfection; it is the 'Higher Christian Life.' (One of its advocates, when he found this phraseology becoming unpopular, said he preferred to call it the 'life more abundantly.')

It is perfection to be sure, but perfection in Christ." And who ever thought of perfection out of Christ? Pelagius himself declares that he did not.* "I anathematize the man who thinks or says that the grace of God whereby Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, is not necessary for us every hour and every moment, and also for every act of our lives, while they who disannul it deserve everlasting punishment." Such was the language of Pelagius to his friends on the doctrine of perfection. To be sure he was disingenuous, as Augustine shows. He deceived the Synod of Jerusalem into an endorsement of himself, whereas, had they known his true sentiments, would have rejected them with abhorrence. So we have said there was a disingenuousness about the Higher Life movement. Take an illustrative case. One of their most effective advocates was asked by a number of friends privately if he had really said that he was free from sin. He took occasion to answer their inquiry publicly a few days afterwards, when he declared that he had not said that he was perfect, but that he was free from all conscious sin. His friends seemed satisfied. But what did they think a few days later when he publicly declared (it was April fool's day), "I am as perfect as my Father in heaven is perfect, and no April fool at that." This lack of consistency on the part of the advocates of nascent heresies is one of the most uniform lessons of history; and there is no more fatal sign of serious departure from acknowledged orthodoxy. James Arminius was very far from holding perfection out of Christ. In answer to the charge against him, that he held the sentiment "that it is possible for the regenerate in this life perfectly to keep the law of God," he says: "To this I reply, though these might have been my sentiments, yet I ought not on this account to be considered a Pelagian, either partly or entirely, provided I had only added that they could do this by the grace

*Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Writings, Vol. II., p. 3. T. & T. Clark.

of Christ and by no means without it."* Arminius seems not to have known that Pelagius had asserted this in language stronger than his own. Such being the language of all heretics on this subject, what boots it for them to tell us now that their perfection is in Christ? They speak and write as if no one had heard of the grace of God in Christ before them.

II. Another sinister aspect of this movement, is the repugnance to all scientific definitions, and formulated conceptions of truth. Some of their most popular and voluminous writers make haste to tell us that they are not theologians. One of them introduces us to the study of one of the most important of theological questions in these words: "This is not a theological book. I frankly confess I have never studied theology, and do not understand its methods nor its terms."† Suppose some one who treats a disputed question in physiology that has an important bearing on health, should introduce his paper in such a way as this: "This is not a physiological book. I frankly confess I have never studied physiology, and do not understand its methods nor its terms." To whom would this be a recommendation? Only of course to those who repudiated physiology *as a science*. Another hastens to tell us that he does "not intend to quote any man, whether living or dead," and that he does "not know much about theology." This dislike for formulated systems of truth they share with the Plymouth Brethren and the so-called liberal tendencies of the age. The "analogy of the faith" is an unknown quantity in their method of dealing with Scripture. To them there seems something cold-blooded and profane in crystallising sacred truth into such shape as to deserve the name of system. Now, this unwillingness to subject one's tenets to the focus-light of scientific statement is one of the plague-marks of error. It is the plague-smitten limb that shrinks from the knife; it is the diseased eye that dreads the light. Hence the hue and cry against "man-made creeds," etc., always means something more than a pious reverence for the very words of the Spirit. It means serious de-

*Arminius's Works, Vol. I., p. 255. Nicholls & Bagnall's ed., 1853.

†"Christian's Secret of a Happy Life." By H. W. S. Introduction.

parture at some point from the symbolic consensus of evangelical Christendom. It means unbridled and irresponsible license in the interpretation of the words of the Spirit. This is an old trick of demagoguery that is about worn out. Whenever this old familiar sound about "man-made creeds" is heard, it is time for the rattle of ecclesiastical padlocks—the ecclesiastical burglars are about. Frederick Robertson mentions the singular fact about those who clamor most for a system of salvation by works, that of all men in the world, as a rule, they have least of them. He might have added that another singular thing is the fact that those in the ranks of Protestantism who clamor most about man-made creeds and books, and call most loudly for the Bible, pure and simple, are as a rule those who have least biblical knowledge. Truth has certainly nothing to fear from exact definitions and systematic arrangement, for in the nature of things it must be consistent and harmonious. But there are certain minds that seem incapable of conceiving truth as related. Each truth is treated as a segment by itself apart, and is never thought of as related to other segments in forming the circle. Now, any truth so stated or exhibited as to put it entirely out of its proper and scriptural relations, is like the segment, swollen out of all proportions, till the circle is broken up; so that that which stated with just limitations is truth, stated without limitation is untruth. Here lies the danger from all hobbies; it is this that converts many of them into partial errors and some of them into dangerous heresies. The enthusiast takes his favorite segment, caresses it, dotes upon it, till in his affections it is magnified into such dimensions as to equal the whole circle; and now, inflated with pride of opinion, rather than have it pared down to its first and original dimensions, would part with all the circle.

This tendency of some minds in theological inquiry is analogous to one of the "peccant humors" of learning enumerated by Lord Bacon, wherein "men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they have most admired, or some sciences which they have most applied; and given all things else a tincture according to them, utterly untrue and improper." And Cicero makes humorous allusion to the

same weakness, when upon finding a musician who defined the soul to be but a harmony, says that the fellow was only true to his art. Now this crusade against scientific theology, ignores the fact that all truth is correlated, and therefore essentially systematic. It is no more certain that a segment of a sphere is a part of and sustains fixed and definite relations to the sphere, than that every truth is a part of and sustains fixed and definite relations to a system of truth. Any method of investigation that proceeds on a different basis must result in a dislocated and fragmentary knowledge. Whenever the mind comes to formulate truth, as at some time it must do, it will be very much like the uninitiated boy with his block house. If he finds a piece that does not fit just where he puts it, he throws it out and goes on to build. This done, of course he finds before he is through there are a number of pieces that will not fit; and his house is scarcely built before it tumbles down. The idea now dawns upon him that every piece has its place, and *must be put in its place*, if the house is to stand. Let us observe for a while our Higher Life brethren trying to fit their block into the temple of scriptural truth. They give us some passages in which we are exhorted to perfection; then they expand upon the all-conquering power of faith, telling us that the holiness demanded in the gospel is just what every child of God may, through faith in Christ, attain unto. But now here comes the seventh chapter of Romans. How will they make that fit? Why, it won't fit at all; woe worth the day that seventh chapter was written! It is their special horror. What will they do with it? Like the petulant boy, they simply throw it out and go on to build. And on this wise one of them did it: after describing in a tragical way the escape of Paul from Damascus, heaping anything but flattering epithets upon him for going down under the wall in a basket at the dead hour of night, and reproaching him for moral cowardice, he goes on to tell us of his flight into Arabia, and the unspeakable meanness of his feelings over the "basketing." "Now," said he, "it was while Paul was down in Arabian darkness that the seventh of Romans was written." It is just to say that we do not believe the advocates of this error would, as a class, resort to

such a fatal device as this; but it ought to serve as a terrible warning to all enthusiasts against taxing their ingenuity to reconcile the immutable word of God with a pet idea.

We have spoken of the opposition to formulated truth as a species of demagoguery. We hope that in so doing we have not overstepped the bounds of charity. It is hard for us to believe that an intelligent man is not able to distinguish between the Protestant and the Romish theory on this subject. To suppose that a man cannot distinguish between the creed as a *norma normans* and as a *norma normata*, is to impeach his intelligence. The creed in the Romish Church is the *norma normans*; in the Protestant Church it is the *norma normata*, and as such is both legitimate and indispensable. But the truth is, that no people are more creed-bound than those who professedly renounce creeds. The warning of Theodore Monod to the London Conference of 1876 was certainly timely. "Neither let us seek the glory of our system. This applies to us very directly and definitely at this time. Of course we have been ready to say that others were seeking the glory of their systems; but then we may at the same time be seeking the glory of our own system, if it be a system." We cannot refrain from saying here, that those addresses of Theodore Monod, entitled "The Gift of God," are free from the blemishes that so generally deface the Higher Life literature.

What has been said thus far of the characteristics of the movement, it shares in common with most heresies of the modern era in Church history. We proceed now to a more distinctive and very marked peculiarity, but not a more attractive one.

III. Of all the things which render piety seriously defective, none is more repulsive to a chastened Christian sentiment, or more alien from the spirit of the gospel, than spiritual pride. It is as "dead flies in the ointment of the apothecary." Self-inflation is unseemly enough in the ranks of worldly society, and there is an unerring Nemesis presiding over the fates of those who exalt themselves above measure. That man is irretrievably doomed to the whipping-post of public criticism who abandons

himself to a habit of self-praise. How much more offensive must such a spirit be in that kingdom where humility is of all virtues the chiefest; where he that is least is greatest; where the beatitudes are pronounced upon the "poor in spirit," upon the "meek;" where each is taught to "esteem other better than himself"! Yet it is against this very principle that our Higher Life brethren are conspicuous offenders. First, in the claim to superior light, above all their brethren of the past or present. For eighteen hundred years the Church has been in the dark on the doctrine of sanctification! They have found a truth which Augustine, and Calvin, Turretin, Chalmers, Hodge, Thornwell, and the innumerable host of learned and godly men that have adorned the Church, never found! Their contempt for the ponderous tomes of theologians and commentators knows no bounds. These are human productions, and therefore not worthy of notice. Do they ever think how future generations will, should they be under the same infatuation, treat their human productions? There seems to be something fascinating to small minds in the thought of independence of human opinions. Indebtedness to others, for a thought even, seems to compromise their originality. They should learn here too, that there is a difference between independence and the affectation of it. It may be stated as something not needing demonstration, that the man who has no regard for the judgment of his fellow-men, who are equally learned and candid as himself, is endowed with poor judgment. One of the most salutary effects of sound learning is to inspire us with respect for the opinions of others and make us cautious with our own. But the suspicion never dawns upon one of these brethren that possibly he is mistaken, that possibly those before him knew something of the subject of which he treats. No inspired prophet ever seemed more certain of the truth of his message. There is something almost startling in the cool assurance with which they ask us to "lay aside all preconceived opinions," by which we suppose they mean we must disown the results of all our former investigations, whether right or wrong. The necessary implication of such a request is, that the opinions in question have been formed through ignorance or prejudice. They are assumed in

the outset to be wrong. Now if all this is to be quietly assumed, what need of further investigation? Suppose we say to them: "It is a poor rule that will not work both ways; you must lay aside all your 'preconceived opinions,' *i. e.*, assume that the Higher Life doctrine is founded on a fallacy, that through ignorance and prejudice you have erred, and are therefore not the ones to instruct us on this subject!" And why may we not? Where did they get presumptive right to fairness and thoroughness on this subject?

The truth is, there is something bordering very closely upon the claim of special illumination by the advocates of this doctrine. They nowhere claim inspiration, yet they use language that involves something very much like it. If one of their speakers could be held strictly responsible for his utterances, a claim to special illumination could be certainly made out. In answer to every argument drawn from Scripture against his theory, he replies with serenest confidence: "My dear sir, the Spirit hath taught me this." There is something in certain forms of utterance running through their literature we scarce know how to interpret—something

"Wavering, fitful, uncertain,

As the shadow that shakes o'er a luminous curtain.

Vague, flitting, yet forever impressing

The shape of some substance at which you stand guessing."

They would indignantly repudiate any claim of inspiration. Now, whether there be any ground for the suspicion or not, that they indulge thoughts of some special illumination, there is certainly an arrogance, a confidence in themselves, a compassionate regard for their brethren "in the dark," which amounts to downright rudeness, and is a gross offence against Christian charity.

But by far the most serious phase of this question, theologically considered, is the claim to conscious sinlessness. Terrene perfection is a dream that in one form or other has haunted the minds of some men in all ages. Political perfectibility was not only dreamed of in the ideal Republic of Plato and the political romance of Sir Thomas More, but was seriously indulged by the philosophical radicals of the last century. The peculiar charm

about this theory has never been more strikingly exemplified than in Condorcet, who wrote his sketch of the progress of the human mind, in which he predicted the removal of all social and political evils, and the establishment of peace, virtue, and happiness over the whole earth, while he was hiding to escape the fate of the Girondists. How melancholy for his faith the fact that he at last escaped the guillotine only by suicide! William Godwin too, whose first wife was a celebrated champion of "woman's rights," advocated the perfectibility of the human race amid poverty, peril, and despair. We can only wish that human depravity would allow us to share such prodigious faith; but there is something unutterably sad in the hiatus between the theory and the facts. So in the religious sphere, the dream has haunted some in almost every epoch of the Church. But is it not somewhat startling, after such experiments as we have had with the human race, and especially under Christian influences for so long a time, and under some of the most favorable circumstances, to have a man in Boston, not forty years ago, as he stood dressed in garments of undyed cloth (Lambson by name), proclaim himself from a platform a "sinless man"? And now, our astonishment is only changed to amazement, when called upon to listen to this claim, not from the lips of some solitary romancer or ascetic dreamer, but from intelligent men and women, who look us squarely in the face and tell us that they have not indulged in any conscious sin for months and years! Aye more; that it is not the privilege of a few highly favored ones to whom the Lord has given gigantic faith, and whom he has anointed with the oil of consecration above their fellows, but that it is within the reach of *all*.

We repeat what we said in the beginning: this is simply a question of fact. What are the facts? Let us not forget our Lord's injunction, "Judge not, that ye be not judged." We do not say that those professing the "higher attainments" are any worse than those in the "lowlands," as a class. What we say is, that, so far as can be seen, they are as a class no better. There is one principle that must not be overlooked here, if we would avoid falling into too much severity in our criticism of those who

are engaged in this movement. The principle to which we allude is exemplified in the laws that govern painting with reference to crudity of color. It is well known that crudity of dulness is always less offensive than that of brilliance. A painter can be crude in browns and grays, and yet pass muster, even obtain a medal, but to be crude in warm colors is absolutely fatal; because it is more phenomenal, obtrusive, and hence intolerable to refined sensibility. Thus a man who exhibits himself in the moral world, decked in warm, brilliant colors, at once intensifies his faults. The popular instincts pronounce it a crudity; and the moral perspective is at once changed. Vices, which the people were content before to leave in the dark back-ground, dimly visible through the veil of clarity, now march imposingly to the front and become obtrusive. Did the patriarch mean something like this when he said, "If I say that I am perfect, it shall even *prove* me perverse"? If, therefore, the advocates of this system object to the public sentence as invidious and uncharitable, the answer is that it is a sentence which they have provoked. They have challenged the public credence, and made a sharp inevitable issue as to a matter of fact pertaining to themselves; and hence have no right to complain. It is a universal principle of law, that *if* a man creates danger, he must not complain of the result upon himself; if he makes a whirlpool and gets caught in it, he has nobody to blame but himself. We must notice one symptom which has accompanied the movement that is always damaging, viz., the strong tendency to indulge questions of casuistry. One discovers the use of tobacco to be "an enormous sin," another finds the use of tea and coffee unbecoming in Christians, while another is mortally offended at the styles of dress worn by men and women, and dons the Shaker costume in part. When our Saviour would indicate one of the plague marks of Pharisaism, he said, "Ye tithe mint and rue and all manner of herbs, and pass over judgment and the love of God." As on the high churchly side, the disposition to forsake the weighty matters and be consumed upon trifles was an evidence of overstrained and unhealthy ecclesiasticism, so on the ethical side, the abandonment of great

and strenuous moral questions and rushing into the vortex of casuistry is an evidence of overstrained and false pietism. This trick of the devil in decoying the soul into trifling uncertainties and blinding it thus to the great moral issues of its being, reminds one very much of the method by which the inhabitants of Oude destroy the tiger. When the leaves fall they sprinkle a paste such as bird-lime along the path the tiger is likely to pursue, and then retire in ambush. The tiger treads upon the leaves, they stick to his paw, he attempts to remove them by rubbing his paw on his face, this transfers them to his face; he puts his paw on the ground, and in a moment renews the effort to remove them from the face; this of course transfers more leaves and removes none; thus at every successive effort to remove the nuisance, matters become worse, till at last he is blinded and rolls in helpless rage on the ground, and the hunters dispatch him. Had he been content to leave the trifle on his paw, it would never have troubled him. So men are often blinded by trifles and points of casuistry; when if they had been content to leave them where they belong, they would never have disturbed the most enlightened conscience.

But how do these trifles appear in the light of the following carefully worded confession from one of the leaders of this movement? He is speaking of the dangers of following the supposed leadings of the Holy Spirit, and thus allowing Satan to inject his inspirations:

"This is the secret I believe of some of the worst forms of fanaticism into which consecrated people have ever been led. Suppose, for instance, a circle of Christians, led into the idea that now through the baptism of the Spirit they are warranted in expecting to be led in all things, by looking to the Spirit, not to Christ, and receiving from the Spirit impulses and impressions. Suppose them to gather from time to time, male and female together in the dim twilight of gas-burners or lamps, and to sit in circles by the hour hand in hand waiting for impressions and impulses—will they not be very likely to get them? Will there not be danger that that old serpent the devil shall come in with his suggestions? Will the flesh have nothing to impress upon the waiting ones? Would it be any wonder if impressions and impulses should come, to do things which never could come from the Son of God? Impulses and impressions, which are not only not from the word of God, but are wholly repugnant to its

precepts? Have we not heard of such things? And shall we not look the peril of this hood-winking, counterfeiting, and imposing, fairly in the face?"*

Those whose ears have been shocked by reported incidents of certain Higher Life gatherings will understand the reference. Unless we are misinformed, a Presbyterian elder who had been led into enthusiastic endorsement of the movement, went home from one of these gatherings and committed suicide out of remorse for having encouraged it. Be it far from us to bring those brethren as a class under suspicion of gross immorality; we mention these things only to show that there are some dangerous points about the system, and that unless very carefully guarded, there are certain tendencies fraught with fearful possibilities.

Another direction in which these people have failed to impress the public with the conviction of "higher attainments" is in the line of business dealings. While professing freedom from all conscious sin, some of them have been guilty of the most cold-blooded sharp practice in business life, such as most of those in the "lowlands" would scorn to use. As an illustrative case: one of them came to a Southern city and succeeded in making quite a number of converts, having impressed them with her piety. In company with one of her converts she went to the office of a dentist, where she had some work done. As she was leaving the office, the workman presented his bill. She replied, "The Lord will pay that." He modestly answered that that was not his way of doing business. With the utmost complacency she told him that the Lord paid all her bills, and to the Lord he must look. The result was he had to force the claim from the father of the unsuspecting disciple, who had introduced her as a responsible party. Another illustrative case was the young man who entered the study of a New York pastor, professing sinlessness. He was a book agent, and in the course of an hour told three distinct lies, and left the room white with rage. It is needless to multiply examples. Suffice it to say, that so far as it is to be regarded as claiming the "higher attainments" in *practical godliness*, it is a *failure*—the facts of observation do not substantiate

*Faith's Training College Lectures, pp. 52 and 53. 1878.

it. One of their own converts gave utterance to the public sentence upon this subject when she said that she wished on some public day she could go upon the street and proclaim from every corner—"the Higher Life is a humbug."

There are other blemishes that have marred the progress of this movement, but we cannot enlarge upon them here. We may mention them but nothing more. Intolerance and fanaticism are inseparable companions to spiritual pride. It has never been our misfortune to meet with a people so deaf to argument and so impatient of opposition. Their indifference, if not opposition to church organisations, as being carnal, worldly, and opposed to the spirituality of the gospel, is not a well defined principle of action among them, so much as a tendency, a leavening element, silently but surely at work.

In conclusion: let no one suppose that this error is of an innocent kind, inasmuch as it seems to err on the side of piety. We cannot but regard it as a baneful doctrine. The unavoidable effect of embracing the holiness delusion is to destroy repentance and confession. Hence we never hear them confessing sins or praying for forgiveness. There is something appalling about this. As a man grows in holiness, he becomes more sensible of his sins. This is what the good old Marrow divines meant by saying that a man grows *downwardly* as well as upwardly, downwardly, *i. e.*, in humility. This is manifest not only from the scriptural view, but also from common sense; because his conscience becomes more vigilant and sensitive to the touch of sin. Destroy humility and you take away the soil in which the graces of the Spirit flourish. When this "Higher Life" idea takes possession of the mind, true sanctification is seriously hindered, if not totally arrested. The unholy fires of fanaticism scorch and stifle the graces of the Spirit; the conscience becomes diseased and fails to bring sin to remembrance, and spiritual inflation ensues. How can there be any healthy development or real progress while the mind is in such a condition? Said a novice, who was much fascinated with the idea of sinlessness, one day to a trained theologian: "I wish I could get you out of your confused notions about sin." Alas! there is the explanation of much of

this twaddle about sinlessness; totally inadequate views of the nature and extent of sin; of the nature and extent of God's law; of the depravity of man and the holiness of the law. Did they have such views of these questions as the inspired writers, they could join one of them in saying from the bottom of their hearts, "I have seen an end of all perfection, but thy commandment is exceeding broad;" and they would count themselves happy could they only join in the modest avowal of another, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect; but I follow after if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

HARVEY GLASS.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST.

Second Coming of Christ. Pre-Millennial Essays of the Prophetic Conference, held in the church of the Holy Trinity, New York City. With an Appendix of Critical Testimonies. By NATHANIEL WEST. *Ναὶ ἔρχομαι ταχὺ. Ἀμήν. Ἐρχου, Ἐβριε Ἰησοῦ.* Chicago: F. H. Revell, 148 and 150 Madison Street, Publisher of Evangelical Literature. 1879.*

Besides the opening address of the venerable Dr. S. H. Tyng, Sr., and three addresses of a practical and devotional character, this volume contains twelve elaborate essays which discuss under

*Besides the authors and books referred to, we have been greatly helped in the preparation of this article by our correspondence with honored brethren, especially our former preceptors at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, who, while not assenting to all the positions advocated, have kindly aided us by suggestions. Our acknowledgments are also specially due to the Rev. H. B. Pratt, Winnsboro, S. C., who placed at our disposal the results in part of his own thinking on this subject.

as many different heads various questions touching the Millennium and the Second Advent. An exhaustive review of them is impossible within the limits assigned to this article. Their scope may be indicated and most of the points discussed may be adverted to in a consideration of three propositions.

First. The Lord Jesus will return to the earth personally and visibly to establish his perfected kingdom of glory.

Second. Previous to this return the conversion of the entire world to him is not to be expected.

Third. This return, with the accompanying general resurrection and judgment, will introduce immediately the final and glorious state of the Church.

The first of these propositions is stated and defended in an essay by the Rev. S. H. Tyng, Jr., D. D., the rector of the church in which the Conference met. He maintains the catholic doctrine on this subject by arguments familiar to all intelligent believers, and shows conclusively that nothing short of this personal and visible coming in power and glory exhausts the testimony of the Word of God concerning it.

A part of this essay is devoted to a discussion of the principles of interpretation. Dr. Tyng very properly rejects the notion that there is in God's Word an "esoteric sense between the lines and beneath the letter." He also affirms the law of Bishop Newton, "that a literal rendering is always to be given in the reading of the Scriptures unless the context makes it absurd." He seems to endorse the views of Pre-millennialists generally who emphasize Hooker's canon: "When a literal construction will stand, the farthest from the letter is commonly the worst." No objections can reasonably be made to these canons, if by "literal" be meant that interpretation which gives the author's meaning, as distinguished from the meaning imposed by the allegorising methods of Origen and modern spiritualists. But if "literal" be used as opposed to "figurative," then it is needful to define with care what the literal sense is. This is often so difficult as to render general rules of interpretation like those quoted above useless. Most terms which express abstract relations and general conceptions were originally used of material things. Are we to inter-

pret in every case "right" by "straight," and "holy" by "whole," unless restrained by some manifest absurdity? There may be no difficulty now in knowing what our brethren mean when they speak of "our beloved Zion." But the case may have been otherwise when "Zion" was taking on its figurative connotation. To say that in every place in the Bible we are to take "Judah" and "Jerusalem" literally is simply to beg the question in dispute. "Blessed are ye poor"; "Woe unto you rich." A literal construction of these expressions will stand. Is the farthest from the literal the worst? What every interpreter of language wishes to discover is the meaning intended by the user of it. This is not to be done by the application of general rules of interpretation. In Isaiah ix. 6, 7, we read: "For unto us a child is born," etc. In his "Last Times" Dr. Seiss says that here "the literal meaning is evident"; that "Christ as a great prince is literally to reign upon the throne of David in real empire over all the world" (p. 116). The question is, does not Dr. Seiss put more into this passage than the literal meaning warrants? Literally it means that a child would be born to sit upon the identical material throne that David sat upon, to rule over a nation exclusively of Jews. Is this all that Isaiah meant? If he meant anything more than this, then some of the terms must be understood figuratively.

If it be granted that the literal meaning could be ascertained, it often involves the interpreter not only in absurdities, which faith might receive, but also in contradictions. Compare Isaiah ii. 2, 3, which literally interpreted teaches that all nations shall go up to the Lord's Temple, with Zech. xiv. 21, which asserts that the Canaanite shall no more be there, and with Ezek. xliv. 9, where God says no stranger *uncircumcised in flesh* shall enter into his sanctuary. As Dr. Charles Hodge says, the torch of the literalist is an *ignis fatuus* which no one can consistently follow with safety and comfort. If deprived of this torch, much that Pre-millennialists see in the millennial age fades from sight. The only value of the aforesaid "canons" is in the assertion of principles opposite to those of the allegorists and spiritualizers, the outcome of whose method is illustrated in the interpretation

given to 1 Sam. vi. 10 by a good Baptist sister. Reading that the Philistines, when they sent the ark back to Israel on a cart drawn by cows, kept the calves at home, she learned from this latter circumstance that infants were not to be baptized. In the direction of such interpretations as this, the farthest from the literal is the worst.

It is evident that the actual meaning of any given passage is to be ascertained by the laws of grammar, by the context and scope, by due regard to what is called the "personal equation" of the author. In the explanation of God's Word the analogy of faith cannot be wholly ignored. Pre-millennialists, as well as their opponents, when occasion demands it, appeal to this analogy. Indeed, "the analogy of the faith" is only a general formula for those principles of interpretation dictated by common sense which Augustine signalised, viz., that the meaning in doubtful phrases is to be determined by that which the Scriptures elsewhere settle; that what is tropical must be interpreted by what is plain; that which is obscure must be explained by what is clear. It must also be remembered that in presenting their prophetic pictures, the prophets—as the Saviour in his parables—filled up the outlines with details taken from the customs of their own times. They describe New Testament and final Messianic glories by means of imagery drawn from their own dispensation. When we interpret these pictures, the essential truth is to be seized; the imagery and drapery are to be discounted. In Joel's day as in Peter's, the ordinary methods by which the Spirit's power was manifested were in dreams, visions, and the prophetic gifts. When the prophet describes the Pentecostal effusion of the Spirit's power, he says that young men and maidens would prophecy and that old men would dream dreams. For a similar reason, Isaiah predicts the honor and glory of the latter day by means of pictures of an immense number of sacrifices, of wild beasts feeding together in peace, and so forth. To expect the effusion of the Spirit's power now to be manifested by means of the gift of tongues; to expect "the gathering of the flocks of Kedar" and the "ministry of the rams of Nebaioth" to form part of the glories of the Redeemer's perfected kingdom, is just as absurd as to ex-

pect from the parable of the Prodigal Son that every sinner who returns to God will have given to him by his heavenly Father a literal pair of shoes, a literal gold ring, and be entertained at a literal feast, at which a fatted calf will be literally killed and eaten.

The importance of these remarks touching the principles of interpretation will appear as we proceed. In his essay on "The Kingdom and the Church," Prof. L. Lummis, of Monson, Mass. asserts "that the Jews had full warrant to expect a king as literally such as was David and Solomon, and a kingdom as literally such as was theirs" (p. 177). He is led by his "literal" principles to assert that the Church is in no objective sense the kingdom; that there will be no kingdom until Christ comes in glory to inaugurate it; that the New Testament Church is not the same as that of the Old. Ample refutation of all this might be gathered, if need be, from admissions in the volume before us, as well as from other pre-millennial writings. It is enough for present purposes to refer to the remarks of Joseph Mede, the "*Magnus Apollo*" of Pre-millennialists, on the kingdom described by Daniel in the second chapter of his prophecy; and better still, to Acts ii. 34-36; v. 29-31, *cf.* Heb. x. 13, where we are taught that Jesus as Messiah has a present sovereignty; that his kingdom has already been set up. The thirteenth chapter of Matthew contains seven parables, which authoritatively contradict Prof. Lummis, and suggest the true view of the whole subject. They are not mentioned in the essay. They describe the present state of the Church on earth, and tell us that Christ's kingdom is like "a grain of mustard seed," "leaven," and so forth. There is some difference between a grain of mustard seed and a mustard tree. The kingdom of heaven is like the one at its inauguration and like the other at its consummation—a distinction of which Prof. Lummis is apparently ignorant.

The views of this essayist and the principles of the literalist school of interpretation may alike be disregarded, and yet the first proposition remains true. Christ has now a kingdom on earth, contending with the powers of darkness. The King in his glorious and visible person is absent. He is coming. When he

comes, his last enemy will be destroyed, and his triumphant kingdom will be established in power and glory forever.

In Polano's "Selections from the Talmud" is the following:

"There was once a man who pledged his dearest faith to a maiden beautiful and true. For a time all passed pleasantly, and the maiden lived in happiness. But then the man was called from her side, he left her; long she waited, but he did not return. Friends pitied her and rivals mocked her; tauntingly they pointed at her and said, 'He has left thee; he will never come back.' The maiden sought her chamber, and read in secret the letters which her lover had written to her, the letters in which he promised to be ever faithful, ever true. Weeping she read them, but they brought comfort to her heart; she dried her eyes and doubted not.

"A joyous day dawned for her; the man she loved returned. . . . Israel, in misery and captivity was mocked by the nations; her hopes of redemption were made a laughing stock; her sages scoffed at; her holy men derided. Into her synagogues, into her schools went Israel; she read the letters which her God had written, and believed in the holy promises they contained."

Such is, indeed, the situation of the true Israel. Such should, in obedience to the Bridegroom's instructions, be her true course. Let her read the letters he has written and doubt not, for he says: "Surely I come quickly."

"Christ's Coming—Is it Pre-Millennial?" is the title of an Essay by the Rev. S. H. Kellogg, D. D., of Allegheny, Pa. Like a skilful debater, Dr. Kellogg begins by a careful statement of the question. He tells first what it is not; and in doing so wisely disencumbers himself of the greater part of the pre-millennial burden. He then states the question as follows: "Does the word of God teach that, prior to the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ, we are to look for the conversion of the world to him, and a prolonged season of universal peace and prevailing righteousness, or does it teach the contrary? (P. 50.) In asserting the latter alternative, Dr. Kellogg assumes the ground covered by our second proposition. He supports his position by the following arguments: (1) The silence of the New Testament touching any such period. (2) The object of the gospel dispensation as stated in Acts xv. 14, and Matthew xxiv. 14. (3) The declared imminency of Christ's coming. (4) The foretold condition of the

Church up to the period of the advent. (5) The scriptures which expressly exclude the expectation of a conversion of the world prior to that event, *e. g.*, 2 Thess. ii. 1-8. (6) The New Testament teaching concerning the conversion of the Jews. (7) The passages which teach that the Church's triumph is synchronous with Christ's coming.

The Essay entitled "A Summary of the Argument in Defence of Pre-Millenarianism," by the Rev. Dr. J. T. Duffield, of Princeton, covers substantially the same ground. The argument as a whole appears to be sound and unanswerable. There may be excrescences, some points may not be well taken. These may be omitted, and yet leave the main position untouched. Thus far the plain texts are on the side of the pre-millennialists.

This article, and especially all that follows, is written with an overwhelming sense of the difficulty and importance of the subject. If for the sake of brevity qualifying words are omitted, it is hoped no one will construe the absence of these as indicative of arrogance or dogmatism. We are conscious of neither, and disclaim both.

Drs. Kellogg and Duffield lay stress upon the alleged imminency of the Second Advent and the repeated commands to watch for it. The force of this argument is greatly overestimated, and may be retorted against the pre-millennial theory. All agree that before Christ comes certain events must occur. The gospel must be preached among all nations for a witness. This was true in Paul's day as in ours. This truth did not prevent the apostle from watching for the Lord's return, nor does it prevent us. The "day" which the Apostle Peter commands us to look for is placed by Dr. J. H. Brookes, of St. Louis, at the close of the Millennium ("Maranatha," p. 528). This admission shows how precarious are these commands to watch as grounds upon which to deny a millennium before Christ comes.

Dr. Kellogg also argues from the alleged national conversion of the Jews. The argument depends mainly upon the assumption that Romans xi. 26 refers to our Lord's second coming. On exegetical grounds alone we infer that this celebrated passage refers

to the first advent. It is a coming from or out of Zion (*ἐκ Σιών*).^{*} The second advent is emphatically a coming from heaven to or for Zion. The apostle puts himself at the stand-point of the prophet, and for this reason uses the future tense. In verse 31 he connects the salvation of the Jews with that of the Gentiles so as to make the latter means, the former end. As the Gentiles have obtained mercy through the unbelief of the Jews, so through the mercy extended to the Gentiles, the Jews shall obtain mercy. All this shows that Paul has regard to the incarnation and to the conversion of the Jews by agencies then set in motion. So far from sustaining Dr. Kellogg, this passage favors his opponents, and is quoted by them to prove and to describe a millennium prior to the advent. If the Scriptures clearly taught that there was to be a conversion of the world to Christ before he comes again, this passage would give force to the testimony. In the absence of such teaching the meaning of "all Israel shall be saved" remains an open question. Dr. C. Hodge (*Theology*, Vol. III., p. 807,) says, "Whether this means the Jews as a nation, or the whole elect people of God including both Jews and Gentiles, may be doubtful." Calvin taught that "all Israel" means all the elect.

But even if this passage and others teach a national conversion of the Jews and a national restoration to their own land, it does not follow that the whole world will be converted before or at that time. Palestine is now open to the Jews as it has not been since the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. They are returning to it in great numbers. Moreover, they no longer execrate the Nazarene, even if they do not worship him. Who can tell how soon Paul's prediction as the Spirit meant it to be understood may be realised, and yet the world remain as ungodly as ever?

Before presenting the arguments which sustain the second proposition, we must beg the reader to remember that the question

^{*}The apostle's statement sustains this remark, though the passage in Romans varies from the LXX. and the E. version of Isaiah. The Hebrew expression (*Isa. lix. 20.*) is a general one and may indicate almost any sort of relation. (*J. A. Alexander.*) The Greek preposition plainly reveals the apostle's construction of it. *Cf. Ps. xiv. 7.*

is not one respecting the evangelisation of the world, but respecting the conversion of the world and its subjection to Christ as Lord. In a true sense the United States is evangelised. It is a Christian nation; but it is very far from being, as a nation, a part of the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. In denying a millennium before Christ comes, we use the term as it is described by the Rev. Dr. David Brown, of Glasgow, in his very able book entitled, "Christ's Second Coming: Will it be Pre-Millennial?" and in Scott's Commentary on Rev. xx. 4-6.* Against the theory that there will be such a millennium, Dr. Kellogg's arguments (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), noted above, are sound and conclusive. Pursuing a different arrangement, we note

First, That the Scripture doctrine of Election forbids the expectation of a conversion of the whole world to Christ prior to his return. The Word informs us that God's purpose of mercy unto salvation does not regard the world at large at any period of its history before the second advent, but only a people chosen out of it. To Abraham and his seed is the promise. Jesus says: "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." "I am not come to send peace, but a sword." There is no intimation of a change of purpose during the present dispensation. The fulness of the Gentiles must indeed come in, but the Apostle James said at the Jerusalem Council that "God is visiting the Gentiles" (not to convert them all, but) "to take out of them a people for his name." Paul: "Christ gave himself for us that he might deliver us from this present evil world." (Gal.

* Dr. Brown, though insisting that the Millennium will not be a state of unmixed righteousness, gives as its leading features: a universal diffusion of revealed truth; universal reception of true religion and unlimited subjection to the sceptre of Christ; universal peace; much spiritual power and glory; the in-bringing of "all Israel"; the ascendancy of truth and righteousness in human affairs; great temporal prosperity. (Carter's Edition, 1879, pp. 424-439.) To the same effect is Edwards's History of Redemption. (Period III., Part VIII.) Scott's language is less guarded. "Pure Christianity in doctrine, worship, and universal holiness will be diffused all over the earth"; "all idolatry, impiety, etc., with all other evils . . . will be restrained"; "godliness, righteousness, peace, purity, and love will render the earth in some measure like heaven itself."

i. 4.) Passages like these might be multiplied almost without limit.

Stress is laid on the great commission, "Go make disciples of all nations, baptizing them," etc. These words do not affirm a conversion of the world. They might be regarded as implying a universal outward reception and profession of the gospel, if the implication were not excluded by other scriptures. The conversion as recorded by Mark implies that there would not be a universal reception of the truth. The parables of the mustard seed and leaven (if we reject the pre-millennial gloss) teach a universal diffusion of the gospel, and might imply a universal saving reception of it. The implication, so far as the present dispensation is concerned, is prohibited by the parable of the tares uttered apparently at the same time and for the express purpose, among others, of forbidding the Church to expect a millennium before the return of Christ. Until that event many are called, but few are chosen.

Second. All the scriptures which describe the state of the Church before the second advent forbid the expectation of a conversion of the world before that time. Is that state ever one of peace? Is the Church ever to go hand and heart with the world? Is the distinction between them ever to be obliterated? Is there not to be between these two a perpetual separation in character, condition, and destiny? The Word utters no uncertain sound in answer to these questions. The saints, during the absence of their Lord, are ever to have tribulation; they are to be separate from the world and hated by it. They are ever to move in a path divergent from that pursued by the world.

Dr. Brown (*ut supra* pp. 394 *et seq.*) endeavors to avoid the force of these testimonies by noting the definition of "the world" as given in 1 John ii. 16. The lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, will beset men during the millennium, only they will well nigh universally rise superior to the assaults of these adversaries. We have no right and no desire to deny that a time may come when men on earth much more numerous than now will rise superior to the assaults of sin. Concerning a millennium which is "only this and nothing more" there need be

no dispute. But such a millennium does not correspond with Dr. Brown's description, nor will such a state realise the predictions which he employs to sustain his views. Isaiah ii. 2-4, Psalm lxxii. 7-11, may be cited as specimens of the passages quoted by him and others in this connexion. That these scriptures teach the universality of Christ's dominion on earth is not denied. The question is, when will the predictions be fulfilled? It is argued, for example, from the 72d Psalm that, when the kingdom of Christ is fully set up after the advent, there will be no kings nor distant nations to bow to him. But surely this argument presses the mere imagery of the picture too far. The whole description is based on the glories of Solomon's reign. The figures are taken from the circumstances attending that happy period in the history of the chosen people. To argue that this prophecy must be fulfilled during the present dispensation because it is said that kings shall bow to Christ, and that distant nations shall serve him, is to proceed upon those literal principles of interpretation which Post-millennialists are the first to repudiate. Those and similar expressions are employed to describe the universality and completeness of Messiah's dominion. They exclude the idea of anything short of a universal heart-reception of Christ extending to every part of the earth, and to every one of its inhabitants: a state of things not to be expected, according to Post-millennialists themselves, until Christ comes.

The truth seems to be that Post-millennialists, as even more glaringly Pre-millennialists, misinterpret these Old Testament prophecies. The references to them by Christ and his apostles show that they do not predict a millennial reign, but the final, perfected, and glorious state of the redeemed Church. After his resurrection Jesus told his disciples that all things which were written in the law and in the prophets and in the Psalms concerning himself must be fulfilled. "Then opened he their understanding that they might understand the scriptures" (Luke xxiv. 27, 44, 45). There can be no doubt that these scriptures are in large part the prophecies so often quoted in this millennial controversy. Examination will shew that only a small proportion treats of the humiliation of Christ. What then do these inspired

and accredited commentators tell us about them? "The times of the restitution of all things" are the times, according to the Apostle Peter, of which "God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began" (Acts iii. 19-21). Here is a distinct assertion that these grand Old Testament prophecies refer not to any millennium before the second advent, nor to any semi-beatific state after it, but to the glories of the final and perfected state of the kingdom. To the same effect is 1 Pet. i. 3-13.* The apostle affirms that the prophets testified concerning the sufferings of the Church respecting Christ and the glories that should be revealed at the day of his appearing (*cf.* verses 3, 7, 11, 13). To the same effect are many expressions lying on the face of these prophecies—expressions pointing not to a temporary, but to an endless state. "They shall learn war no more"; "thou shalt weep no more"; "violence shall no more be heard in thy land." How incompatible are all these intimations with a state ending in a loosing of Satan and its terrific consequences!

It is not practicable in this article to give a full discussion of Rev. xx. 1-10. Nor is it important to do so. This passage is quoted on both sides in this controversy. Conflicting interpretations without number rise about it, giving perpetual testimony as to its difficulty and signal warning against all dogmatic assertions concerning it. This much seems to be certain, *viz.*: if the Word of God elsewhere clearly teaches that there is to be but one literal resurrection of the bodies of men, then this passage must be construed accordingly. There is nothing in it that necessarily and categorically contradicts those other scriptures. On the other hand, if the Word elsewhere clearly teaches that there is to be no universal reign of Christ and his saints on earth before he comes without sin unto salvation, then this passage must be harmonised with this teaching. It does not assert in unmistakable terms that the reign of the saints with Christ for a thousand years is to be over the whole earth, or that it is to be brought about by present gospel agencies. The right course, therefore, for us to pursue is to ascertain, if possible, the mind of the Spirit as it is indicated in other and plainer scriptures, and then to interpret this passage

*The Greek of verse 11 is, τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας.

in harmony with them. To us the arguments against the literal interpretation of this passage are overwhelming. These are partly exegetical, but mainly are based upon what we understand the Scriptures elsewhere to teach in the clearest and most emphatic terms, as will appear, we hope, in the discussion of the third proposition. At the same time it is equally clear to us that the figurative (or mixed) interpretation of Post-millennialists is carried too far when they construe this passage as teaching a universal conversion of the world and subjection to Christ. The considerations, again, are partly exegetical, but mainly the plain testimony of other parts of the Word. As to the binding of Satan, the Apostle Peter tells us that the fallen angels have already been delivered into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment. This incarceration has not yet issued in a conversion of the world, though at least eighteen hundred years have elapsed since it took place; it is, therefore, by no means certain that the binding of Satan for a thousand years, prophesied by John, will do so (*cf.* Rev. xii. 9-11). As to the reign of the saints with Christ, it does not necessarily mean more than some signal enlargement of the Church through gospel agencies (*cf.* Rev. xii. 11), such as was seen at the time of Constantine, at the Reformation, and such as may yet be seen in the future in still larger measure, though the world remain unconverted and wickedness prevail; even as was the case when Athanasius, and again when Luther, flourished. On exegetical grounds it appears that this contested passage *may* only give a symbolical account of the impartation of new and larger measures of spiritual life to the Church, and its consequent enlargement through its own revived testimony and the restraints imposed upon the devil and his followers. If other scriptures fully sustain the second proposition of this article, then this interpretation, or one similar to it, *must* be the correct one. In addition to the passages and groups of texts already referred to, we add another class.

Third. All the scriptures which explain the method by which the world is to be subdued to Christ forbid the expectation of a conversion of the world before he comes. The earth is to be the Lord's. The question is, how is this result to be accomplished?

The answer is so plain that he who runs may read. Not by the conversion of all, but by the conversion of some and the destruction of the rest; this, too, down to the time of the advent. We are told that the heathen are to be given to Christ for his inheritance (Ps. ii. 8). This seems to mean that he was to save them; but it is immediately added, "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron," etc. Christ has already received this inheritance. All power has been given him in heaven and earth (Mat. xxviii. 18). He has received this power, not that he might give eternal life to all flesh, but to those given him by the Father (John xvii. 2). At the name of Jesus every knee shall bow—all knees, living and dead, in earth, heaven, and hell (Phil. ii. 9–11). When? Paul tells us at the judgment seat of Christ (Rom. xiv. 10, 11). These two passages refute the pre-millennial gloss that the judgment here spoken of is a judgment of believers only, and the post-millennial theory that every knee will bow to Christ before he sits upon his judgment throne. *Then* every knee shall bow, but not until then.

The analogy of all God's dealings thus far with the Church and the world is strictly in accord with this view. In the days of Noah the visible Church came into possession of the earth. How? By the destruction of her enemies. The Church was saved and the world for the Church was saved by water (1 Pet. iii. 20). Similarly as to the promised land—the type of the final inheritance. The Church took possession, the wicked were cut off. "The meek shall inherit the earth"; "the tabernacle of God shall be with men"; all the glories portrayed by the old prophets shall one day come to the kingdom of Christ. When and how? "When he ariseth to shake terribly the earth" (Is. ii. 19). In the day of the Lord's coming "the heavens shall pass away with a great noise"; "the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up." "Nevertheless we look for a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness" (2 Pet. iii. 10, 13; see Prov. ii. 21, 22; Ps. xxxvii). Then and by these means will the kingdom come and God's will shall be done in earth as it is in heaven. To this agree the final words of Isaiah's prophecy. All flesh in the new

heavens and in the new earth shall come to worship before the Lord. "And they shall go forth and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die; neither shall their fire be quenched." Similarly the closing scenes of the Apocalypse: "Blessed are they that wash their robes* that they may have right to the tree of life and may enter in through the gates of the city. For without are dogs."

Much that has already been presented is in direct support of the third proposition. If the Old Testament prophecies concerning the future glory of the kingdom of Christ refer to the final state of the redeemed then the main support of the pre-millennial scheme, in so far as it involves a reign of Christ on or over the earth for only a thousand years, is swept away. Such a reign is asserted by the Rev. Dr. C. K. Imbrie, of Jersey City, in an essay entitled "The Regeneration." By this term he means "a great and blessed change in reference to this earth and the race upon it." It comprehends "the glorious appearing of the great God our Saviour to accomplish' it; "the resurrection by him of his departed saints, and the rapture of his living saints to take part in his dominion over the living nations; the overthrow and expulsion of all forms of evil from the earth; the binding of him who is the prince of evil; the repentance and restoration of Israel in honor and holiness to their own land; the outpouring of the Spirit on all flesh that shall be spared from God's signal judgments sent on the earth; the removal of all physical evils as well as moral; the renewal of the earth to more than its original beauty as the blessed home of the race; finally, at the close of the millennium period, the resurrection, judgment, and condemnation of the wicked dead; the casting of Satan into his own place of punishment; the destruction, last of all, of death, and then the establishment on the earth of the redeemed forever" (p. 115).

This account of "The Regeneration" by Dr. Imbrie is pre-millennialism presented in its fairest form and most consistent features. Much of it may be harmonised with the view of "The Regeneration" which sees in it the final state of glory. Indeed,

*Revised Text, Rev. xxii. 14.

there is scarcely more than an intimation in the essay that the kingdom then fully set up is not an everlasting kingdom, the glory not an everlasting glory. The passages cited, the arguments advanced, the descriptions given, for the most part go to show that it is an endless age. "The race on earth, then made holy, will continue in perpetual generations" (p. 166). "The curse shall be removed from the earth itself, and inanimate creation made to participate in the joys of the 'sons of God'" (p. 167). "The overthrow and expulsion of all forms of evil from the earth" (p. 115). "The renewal of the earth to more than its original beauty as the blessed home of the race" (*ibid.*). "'From generation to generation they shall come up to Jerusalem to serve the Lord.' 'For all the ends of the world shall worship God.' So testify Isaiah and all the prophets" (p. 168).

These are specimens, and suggest at once that this view of the Regeneration is intolerably inconsistent with itself. The curse is removed, but death remains! All evil overthrown and expelled from the earth, except Satan, who "is not completely overthrown until its close" (p. 168). "They 'who knew not God and obeyed not the gospel' and died in their sins must be cast out from God forever. But the race, as a race, is redeemed and sees at length all the nations of the earth walking with God." "The Regeneration will be a blessed change affecting the whole earth and the race living upon it. The long winter has indeed stripped off the foliage and made it for a long time look like waste and barren. But the reviving spring is soon to come and bring forth a 'summer' of glory, forever—Luke xxi. 30" (p. 167). Yet after a thousand years, Satan is to be let loose, and in the personal presence of the glorified King will deceive those nations who are 'walking with God! Was ever a more inconsistent scheme advocated by Presbyterian doctors of divinity?

This view of the Regeneration is as truly, but not perhaps so glaringly, inconsistent with the Scriptures. It involves "a plain distinction between the nations living in the flesh during the Regeneration, and the saints raised from the dead. The one class reigns with Christ, the other does not." This distinction, Dr. Imbrie says, is drawn by the Scriptures. The passages cited are:

Dan. vii. 13, 14, 18, 27; Gen. viii. 12-17, 7*; Joel iii. 20; Isa. lix. 21, compared with Luke xx. 34-36 (pp. 112, 113). The reader is urged to examine these and other passages in order that he may see upon what slender grounds this important distinction is said to be scriptural. The Old Testament passages sustain it only when interpreted according to those extreme literal principles which we have seen could not be consistently applied. New Testament passages are wholly wanting. There is not a hint given by Christ personally nor by any one of his apostles in their Epistles of any such distinction. If Matt. xix. 28 be taken literally, we are still left without any evidence that any other than the twelve tribes of Israel are to continue in their perpetual generations. But does this passage teach that the Jews are to continue forever on the earth perpetuating their race by physical generation? Is there a hint in it that the twelve tribes are anything but the elect of Israel over whom in some sense the apostles are to rule? Is there a hint that the apostles are above the earth and the tribes on the earth; that the tribes are in the flesh, and that the apostles are not?

Yet more conclusively it may be urged that the Scriptures promise this exaltation to thrones to *all* who suffer with Christ (2 Tim. ii. 12); to him, whoever he is, that overcometh (Rev. ii. 26; iii. 21). These passages teach, and others without number teach or imply, that all Christ's people are kings and priests unto God; all are to have crowns and are to sit on thrones; and that, while there are to be distinctions as to the measure of their reward, there is to be none as to the kind of reward, and most emphatically that there will be no such distinction as the pre-millennial scheme supposes. Dr. Imbrie's account of the Regeneration is, therefore, to be rejected. It is inconsistent with itself and with the word of God.

The conversion of the Jews after the second advent is presented by Pre-millennialists as a complete refutation of the third proposition advanced in this article. That there is to be such a conversion is taught in the Essay on "The Gathering of Israel," by Bishop W. R. Nicholson, of the Reformed Episcopal Church.

* This is a mistake, clerical or typographical. It should be Gen. ix. 12-17.

The argument may be thus stated: No one will be converted during the final state of glory. But the Scriptures teach that some Jews will be converted after the second advent. Therefore the second advent will not immediately inaugurate the final state.

The question is as to the truth of the minor premiss. The passages which Dr. Nicholson quotes from the Old Testament to show that the bulk of this people are to be restored to their own land, and converted, some when Christ comes, and some after that event, can be regarded as teaching this only when interpreted upon extreme literal principles. It would require a volume to examine in detail all the passages referred to. But this is not necessary. Let the reader examine Zech. 12th, the 11th, 49th, and 66th chapters of Isaiah, and endeavor to interpret them consistently on these principles. He will have Jews coming to Zion on the literal shoulders of Philistines; though in the flesh, they shall not hunger nor thirst, yet kings and queens shall nurse them; and in their humiliation before Israel, Gentiles shall lick up the dust at their feet.

To prove the future restoration of Israel, Dr. Nicholson cites from the New Testament Rom. ix. 4, 5; xi. 1; Luke xxi. 24; Matt. xix. 28. and says, "Let these instances suffice;" "other citations might be given, especially almost the whole of the great prophetic Apocalypse" (pp. 227, 228). The unprejudiced reader of these texts will think our Essayist easily sufficed with proof texts. Equally barren is the whole essay of proof drawn from the New Testament that any Jew is to be converted after Christ comes. The only passage quoted is Rom. xi. 26, which we have seen teaches the contrary. Pre-Millennialism, therefore, so far as it relies upon the supposed future return of the Jews, has no adequate scripture warrant.

The Rev. H. M. Parsons, the pastor of the LaFayette street Presbyterian church, Buffalo, N. Y., has an Essay entitled, "The Present Age and Development of Antichrist." Antichrist he regards not as an abstract principle of evil nor a myth. The Papacy is a conspicuous representation of the spirit of Antichrist, but there is to be "a more concrete future fulfilment, springing out of present and patent channels of blasphemy and corruption,"

which "will be seen in the literal temple yet to be built in Jerusalem" (p. 217). It is the person described as the Little Horn and as the King of Fierce Countenance by Daniel, and as the Beast in the Apocalypse.

The only present concern we have with this essay is the use made of its conclusions by Pre-millennialists. Antichrist, it is argued, will be destroyed by Christ at his second coming. But he must be destroyed before the millennium. Hence the second advent must be pre-millennial. Substitute the final state for the millennium, and the argument is sound. Where is the passage that proves that any one is to be converted after the destruction of Antichrist? But of what need is there of a millennial age if no one is to be converted in it? Daniel says that the Little Horn is to be destroyed and then the *everlasting* kingdom is to be set up. The King of Fierce Countenance shall come to an end in the days of Michael the Great Prince: then "shall be delivered every one that shall be found written in the book," *i. e.*, all the elect. All whose names are not written in the book of life shall worship the Beast (Rev. xiii. 8). It is clear that when Antichrist is destroyed in his "future concrete fulfilment" there will be no further need of the preached gospel or of the means of grace. Be this Antichrist what he will; be it destroyed by gospel agencies or by the glorious appearing, the result is the same. His destruction will be followed immediately by the setting up of the perfected and everlasting kingdom of Christ.

The scripture testimony concerning the resurrection is confidently advanced in support of the pre-millennial theory and in refutation of the proposition now under discussion. This is done in the essay by the Rev. A. J. Gordon, D. D., of Clarendon Street Baptist church, Boston, Mass., entitled "The First Resurrection." He thus states the two theories on this subject: "The first theory is that of one resurrection, embracing as its subjects all who have died from the beginning of the world to the hour of the sounding of the last trumpet: and the second, that of two resurrections, distinctly separated in time, and totally different, both in respect to their subjects and their issues" (p. 78). Dr. Gordon asserts this second theory. He examines particularly Rev. xx. 4-6.

Then follows a discussion of 1 Cor. xv. 21–25, to show that the words involve an assertion of an interval of time between the resurrection of “them that are Christ’s at his coming,” and “the end.” This is succeeded by a presentation of the passages alleged to teach an eclectic resurrection. The opposing force of 2 Tim. iv. 1 is sought to be avoided by an appeal to the revised text, and of John v. 28, by rendering *ᾠρα*, “era.” Finally, Dr. Gordon seeks to show how his view harmonises all the passages of the New Testament which discourse of the resurrection—how they are at once so fragmentary and yet so supplementary of each other. The essay concludes with a long discussion of the practical bearings of the subject.

The reader is referred to what has already been advanced touching Rev. xx. 4–6. In addition it may be remarked, that Dr. Gordon is not more successful in his attempts to fasten a literal interpretation on this passage than his predecessors. He makes no allusion to the justly celebrated discussion of this text by Dr. Brown. He selects for refutation the comment of Bishop Wordsworth, who quotes Andrews, Leighton, and Lightfoot. These are great names, but a candid examination of the two discussions will shew that Bishop Wordsworth’s argument is neither so able nor so exhaustive as Dr. Brown’s. Thus Bishop Wordsworth advances the fact that John says: “I saw the *souls* of them that were beheaded,” etc., to prove a figurative resurrection. This argument Dr. Brown wisely repudiates. In refuting this argument Dr. Gordon is wasting his strength. The same remark is true of other points. In his affirmative argument, Dr. Gordon relies on very insufficient grounds to sustain his views. Thus, he argues that since *ἐκθαυ* “cannot according to scripture usage be applied to man while dispossessed of the body,” this passage must teach a literal first resurrection. We reply, grant the usage, and still the argument is not good, for the resurrection might be figurative, and yet the men living in virtue of it might be living in the flesh, so that *ζῶω* would be properly used to describe them. But Dr. Gordon does not correctly state the usage. It would be unreasonable to expect to find many passages where this word is used of men dispossessed of their bodies, since the references to

such men in an active or blessed state are exceedingly few. But in 1 Thess. v. 10 there is a distinct affirmation that those who sleep in Jesus are alive—*εἴτε γρηγοροῦμεν, εἴτε καθεύδωμεν, ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν*. The figurative use of ζῶω, *i. e.*, to describe spiritual life, is common. Heb. xii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 24, *et similia*.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject further. Enough has been advanced to show how impossible it is to build a theory on this vexed passage. Pre-millennialism must stand or fall by means of other scriptures.

Dr. Brown denies that Luke xx. 35; Phil. iii. 11, etc., imply an eclectic resurrection; but a careful examination of all the passages cited by him in proof of his denial will serve to show that so far Dr. Gordon is right. See Winer's Grammar, p. 188. Even in Rom. i. 4 the meaning is that Christ's claims are authenticated not so much by his personal resurrection *per se*, as by "the resurrection of the dead," of which he is the author, and of which his own resurrection is the great exemplification. But on the other hand, Dr. Gordon makes an unauthorised use of the distinction. When speaking of the resurrection absolutely and generically, the New Testament writers use one phrase; when they speak of the resurrection of individuals they use the other. The expression *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν* is never used of the resurrection of the wicked as distinguished from that of believers. This general phrase is used throughout in 1 Cor. xv., although the resurrection of believers is prominently in the Apostle's mind, because he is discussing the *doctrine in thesi*. The expression *ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν* (Phil. iii. 11: *ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν*), describes the resurrection of individuals, and is used of believers to teach that their resurrection differs in its ground, its accessories, and results from that of the wicked. Paul is anxious to attain unto the resurrection from among the dead, not because it is to be a thousand years before the resurrection of unbelievers, but because it is to be by Christ unto glory, and not unto shame and everlasting contempt.

Even more inconclusive is the argument built upon the adverbs of time in 1 Cor. xv. 23, 24. "Every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterward (*επειτα*) they that are Christ's at

his coming. Then (*eira*) cometh the end. The argument is: Since *eneira* marks a period of at least eighteen hundred years, it is natural to infer that *eira* indicates a long period between Christ's coming and the end! The only plausibility in this argument grows out of the fact that *we* happen to know that eighteen hundred years have elapsed since the resurrection of Christ. But the Corinthians did not and could not know that so long a time would elapse between the resurrection of Christ and that of his people. How, then, could Paul's original readers have made this precious discovery touching the force of *eira*? If there be any such meaning in this word as Dr. Gordon and his pre-millennial brethren would have us believe, it is in some "esoteric sense between the lines and beneath the letter." Paul did not see it; his Corinthian converts did not see it. The reader, learned or unlearned, unbiassed by a theory, sees in this passage only a plain statement that when Christ comes the whole body of the elect who are in their graves will be raised up. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." The second "all" refers either to the totality of the race, or to the totality of the elect-dead.* In either case the pre-millennial gloss is disproved.

In John v. 28, 29, Dr. Gordon insists that "hour" means "era." Certainly there is no need to claim that it means literally sixty minutes by the clock. Be it long, be it short, in duration, there is not a scintilla of proof that there is one resurrection at the beginning and another at the close of the hour. If the word mean "era" as in 1 John ii. 18, then Jesus asserts that the resurrection of the just and the unjust will go on continuously throughout this period—a quite different thing from the pre-millennial gloss. So of Dan. xii. 2. Dr. Gordon accepts Tregelles' peculiar view of this text. Bishop Wordsworth on it says: "The dead who sleep in the earth in all countries of the globe, from the time of Adam, will indeed be an immense multitude; but this

* The word elect is used in this article to describe the whole body of those finally saved. Pre-millennialists make no provision for the resurrection of those converted after Christ comes. There must be none such, or they must never die, though living in a state where "Death remains."

multitude, however great, will be awaked in a moment by the Judge from their graves and summoned to his judgment seat, and each will receive his final doom for everlasting bliss or woe." (Commentary on Daniel.) The fact is, these two passages are exactly parallel and contain a distinct affirmation, clear and unmistakable by unprejudiced readers, of a general resurrection both of the good and of the bad in some general sense synchronous. Dr. Gordon's view of the resurrection has, therefore, no adequate Scripture foundation, and with it falls the entire pre-millennial scheme.

The same is true of the pre-millennial view of the Judgment. This is presented in an Essay by the Rev. Dr. J. T. Cooper, of the United Presbyterian Seminary, Allegheny, Penn. After a preliminary account of the use of the word, of the persons judged, and so forth, he indicates the following order of judgments: (1) Christ's secret coming for his saints; the resurrection of the believing dead, the transfiguration of living believers, their rapture, judgment, and reward. (2) The gathering of Israel in part, the second advent, the full return of the Jews, their judgment, extending providentially over the whole period of the rapture, and the grand arrival of Christ with his saints. (3) The judgment of the nations. (4) The millennial period. (5) The resurrection and judgment of the wicked dead at the end.

In opposition to this view of the Judgment, it is not necessary to maintain that the judgment "day" will consist of the time consumed by the earth in making one revolution on its axis; nor that there may not be several distinct stages in the procedure of the final Judgment. The question is, Do the Scriptures teach that there is to be one judgment of the just and another of the unjust, separated by a millennial period during which men are to be converted and saved? There is no space here, nor need, for an extended examination of passages. Let the reader note carefully Matt. x. 32, 33; *cf.* Mark viii. 38; Matt. xvi. 24-27; John v. 28, 29; Acts xvii. 31; Romans ii. 5-16; 2 Cor. v. 9-11; 2 Peter iii. 7-12; and find an answer for himself to the above question. These passages teach the catholic doctrine of one grand general judgment of all people, the living and the dead.

We are not disposed to emphasise any passage in the Revelation, but if Rev. xi. 15–18, xx. 11–15, do not describe a general, a universal, and a final judgment, it would be hard to frame language that does.

We have now, very cursorily, indeed, but we think fairly, passed in review all the Essays of this volume which impugn the position covered by the third proposition of this article. The result is that the scripture teaching concerning "The Regeneration," the conversion of the Jews, the destruction of Antichrist, the Resurrection, and the Judgment, does not overthrow, it supports that proposition. On the contrary, the Scriptures afford no adequate support to the pre-millennial view of these subjects. With these peculiar views falls the entire pre-millennial scheme, in so far as it postulates a millennial reign of Christ after his second advent, other than his final and everlasting reign of glory.

It remains only to state the two lines of argument which are relied on to sustain affirmatively the doctrine of the third proposition.

First. The plain unequivocal statements of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles, teach in the clearest manner that (the entire body of the elect will be complete at Christ's coming; that the object of the Word and sealing ordinances, as regards both saints and sinners, will then have been accomplished; hence that the latter, together with the intercession of Christ and the work of the Spirit for *saving* purposes, will cease. The work of grace is done; the full enjoyment of glory begins. Here the plain texts are all against the Pre-millennialists.

The only possible way to break the force of this argument, so fully elaborated by Dr. Brown (*ut supra*) is to deny that the Bride of Christ is composed of all those given to him from the foundation of the world. For this denial there is no good scripture warrant. There is not in the New Testament a single plain assertion to the effect that any one will be converted after Christ comes.

Second. The positive assertions of the Word that at Christ's coming all will be raised up, judged, and rewarded according to their works *with their everlasting destiny*. See 2 Thess. i. 6–10. If those who know not God, who obey not the gospel, are at Christ's

coming to be punished—as Paul says they are to be punished—with *everlasting destruction*, then nobody will be converted, either Jew or Gentile, after the second advent. Equally clear is the testimony of Peter in his second Epistle. At Christ's coming the heavens and the earth as they now are will dissolve and disappear; out of the essential elements a new heavens and a new earth will be formed wherein dwelleth righteousness. For this all the elect look and wait.

In a word, the New Testament teaches that when (the decree of election shall have been executed;) when those chosen in Christ, and given to him before the foundation of the world, shall have been effectually called, then come the advent, the resurrection, the judgment, the renovation of the earth, and the final glory—all of which in a general sense are synchronous, though they doubtless will occur successively and perchance in the order named. To this teaching agree the Old Testament prophecies as they appear on their face, and as they are expounded by the apostles.

There is a sense in which Christ's peculiar reign over his people will not be everlasting. At least this seems to be hinted in 1 Cor. xv. 24–28. Be this as it may, the kingdom and state will be perpetual. Even if, in some sense, the delivery of the kingdom to God the Father by Christ closes his mediatorial work, yet the work itself with all its glorious results will remain forever. The only point to be noted here is that "the end" which this "delivery" brings about, follows immediately upon the salvation of all the elect and the destruction of the last enemy, events which synchronise with the second advent.

The reader acquainted only to a limited extent with the history of this millennial controversy will notice at once that the theses maintained in this article are not new, however new the second of them may appear to the bulk of the Church of the present day, which has accepted almost without question the Whitbyan theory of a millennium of some sort before Christ comes. In the volume before us there is a long and learned essay on the history of the pre-millennial doctrine, by the Rev. Dr. N. West of Cincinnati, who acts as editor for his brethren. He begins with a description of "Christian Chiliasm," to which many Pre-millen-

nialists would urge serious objections, especially the clause about the "beggarly elements of Judaism." Post-millennialists will not object to it, except that it is *Chiliasm*. Dr. West claims a *consensus* of the apostolical fathers and the apologists of the Ante-Nicene age for the millennial doctrine as he states it. Church historians differ on this point: mainly because of the difference in their views as to what the doctrine is. Gieseler, for example, sustains Dr. West. Hagenbach asserts that neither Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Tatian, Athenagoras, nor Theophilus of Antioch, teaches the doctrine (Vol. I. p. 215). If one may judge by the extracts given in this volume, Barnabas taught a quite different Chiliasm from that advocated at the Prophetic Conference, and the language of Polycarp and Clement might be adopted now by Post-millennialists. The testimony of Irenæus as to the *history* of the doctrine up to his own time is involved in doubt on account of an uncertain text.

At its best estate the historical argument has no special value in this controversy. At one time the doctrine as stated by Dr. West was prevalent. So be it. So also was Arianism; so also was the doctrine when it contained "the beggarly elements of Judaism," which Dr. West repudiates. Chiliasm in some form or other has been the doctrine of many good and able men in many of the ages of the Church. It has never been the doctrine of the Church.

It is more important to show that Dr. West's attempt to foist pre-millennialism into the Westminster standards is ingenious rather than conclusive. He says it is not a corollary imposed on these standards; it is "implicate in the very warp and woof of the symbol itself, an immediate conclusion without a middle term, the rejection of which is an open abandonment of the Reformed ground, and an open assault upon the Westminster Confession" (p. 373). This is strong language. The argument to support it runs thus: The judgment of the Beast is pre-millennial. The Beast is the same as Antichrist. Hence the judgment of Antichrist is pre-millennial. But his judgment is by the personal Parousia of Christ. Therefore this Parousia is pre-millennial. Every Reformed symbol that makes the Pope Antichrist and the

Parousia of 2 Thess. ii. 8 literal, teaches by good and necessary consequence that the second advent is pre-millennial. But the Westminster Confession so teaches. Therefore it teaches pre-millennialism (pp. 375, 376).

The fallacy in this "adamantine chain" is twofold. First, as to the last premiss: the Westminster Confession does not teach that the Parousia of 2 Thess. ii. 8 is the second advent. It quotes 2 Thess. ii. 4 to show that the Pope is Antichrist; but when it speaks of Christ's coming to judgment it refers to 2 Thess. i. 7, 8. The avoidance of the *second* chapter of second Thessalonians in Chapters XXXII., XXXIII., is marked, and apparently was designed to forestall the argument which Dr. West has so ingeniously elaborated. Second, as to the first and succeeding premisses: the Standards are not committed to the view that the judgment of Antichrist is pre-millennial, for they teach nothing whatever concerning a millennium either before or after Christ comes. If pre-millennialism be in this symbol, it is there "in some esoteric sense between the lines and beneath the letter." Dr. West's corollary is "imposed upon," it is not "implicate in the warp and woof of the symbol itself."*

Dr. West is much nearer right when he asserts that the doctrine of a millennium before Christ comes has not the *consensus* of the Fathers. There seems to be but little doubt that the theory now so prevalent in the British and American Churches is comparatively modern. Whitby gave it his sanction. Scott's Commentary and Edwards's History of Redemption gave it currency. It seems to be clear that the wisest of the Reformers repudiated both the pre-millennial and the modern post-millennial theories. Calvin regarded the former as a chinnera and did not hold the latter, which Luther asserts to be a falsehood forged by Satan that he might darken sound doctrine. The Westminster Confession is committed to neither view, and certainly by implication rejects pre-millennialism. So far as the history of opinion may be gathered from the creeds, the theses maintained in this article

*It is needless to give extended proof of this. Note besides Chapters XXXII. and XXXIII., Larger Catechism, Questions 87-90, with proof texts on all.

have been held by the Church from the beginning. The catholic doctrine is that all the elect are to be effectually called. Then Christ will come, and with his coming will come the general resurrection, the general judgment, and the final glory. The creeds know nothing of a millennium before or after the second advent.

In the last place, attention must briefly be called to the essays and addresses of this volume which discuss the relation of pre-millennialism to Christian doctrine and practical life. One of these is by the Rev. J. H. Brookes, D. D., pastor of the Walnut Street Presbyterian church of St. Louis. There is much in it that calls for criticism. Dr. Brookes writes as if no one but a pre-millennialist had any real faith in the second advent, or was influenced in his Christian life by the expectation of it. It is easy to insinuate charges of this sort, and very difficult to prove them. Dr. Craven, pastor of the third Presbyterian Church of Newark, N. J., exhibits a different and a better temper. In his address at the Conference he said, "I charge not those who disagree with me with being the slothful servants who say our Lord delayeth his coming. That would be slander" (p. 469).

In the first part of his essay, Dr. Brookes quotes, under one hundred specifications, a large number of texts to show that the second advent of our Lord forms in the New Testament the basis of every argument, appeal, exhortation, and warning addressed to Christians. Some of these texts are apt, and some are not. Enough are pertinent to justify the assertion that the doctrine of our Lord's return "runs like a golden cord through the entire New Testament, from beginning to end, touching every doctrine, binding every duty, arousing, consoling, directing, guarding, inspiring the believer at every step of his pilgrimage" (p. 293).

Dr. Brookes claims that pre-millennialism "illustrates and manifests the unity of the Church with a distinctness to which the post-millennial theory can lay no claim" (p. 296); that it "alone vindicates the divine honor and sovereignty" (p. 297). He styles the opposing view as the "post-millennial heresy" which "disparages the gospel and the work of the Spirit by forcing the conclusion that they are unable to reach the end they

were ordained to attain" (p. 298). In making these assertions Dr. Brookes displays defective information and faulty logic. Pre-millennialism postulates an intolerable distinction between those who are converted before, and those converted after Christ comes. Dr. Brookes says the Church on earth consists "not simply of the number in any one generation who have been linked by the Holy Ghost to the risen Christ, but of the entire number of believers between the ascension and return of our Lord" (p. 296). The "Church on earth" is a phrase of doubtful meaning. The definition which Dr. Brookes by implication assigns to Post-millennialists is not adopted by them to define either the visible or the invisible Church. In neither aspect of it is the Church composed "simply of the number in any one generation who have been linked by the Holy Ghost to the risen Christ." Dr. Brookes's definition manifestly regards the true invisible Church. It cuts off all who believed before Christ came, and all who will believe after he comes (of which latter class there will be some according to Pre-millennialists). The catholic doctrine is that this true invisible Church "consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ, the head thereof" (Confession of Faith, XXV., 1). This definition manifests the unity of the Church with distinctness; Dr. Brookes's definition destroys it.

It is God's purpose to convert the world by gospel agencies, it will be done, notwithstanding the fact that "the churches planted by apostolic hands and watered with the blood of martyrs" have long since perished. The question is concerning the contents of God's purpose. All who accept the Augustinian theology and eschatology believe that God's purpose will be accomplished, and his honor and sovereignty vindicated. Dr. Brookes's claim for his theory on this subject is simply arrogant.

There is some reason for his claim that pre-millennialism has a special relation to the curse and its removal. But let it once be granted that the redeemed and renovated earth is to be the home of the glorified Church after the final judgment, and all ground for the claim is removed.

It is to be admitted, with Dr. Brookes, that the notion now so

prevalent that the world is growing better, that its spirit is becoming more like the spirit of Christ, has had an unhappy effect on the Church. But it is not true, as Dr. Brookes intimates, that Post-millennialists banish the sovereignty of God in the bestowal of grace from their theology, and throw men upon their own resources for salvation; that they obscure the doctrines of justification, sanctification, and inspiration. Undoubtedly there is a large and an increasing number of men calling themselves Christians who are heterodox on these subjects. They believe that the world is growing better under the continued influences of religion and civilisation. But their heterodoxy is not due to their post-millennialism; rather the reverse.

There is also a number of writers, many of whom are Pre-millennialists, who hold some peculiar views touching justification and sanctification. If we may judge from this essay, Dr. Brookes is one of them. If he means that pre-millennialism has a special relation to the theory which admits no distinction between justification and sanctification in the sense of a cleansing process, implying a gradual ascendancy of the new man over the old, we have no zeal to question the accuracy of his statement.

Dr. Rufus W. Clark of the Reformed Church, Albany, New York, has an essay on "The Hope of Christ's coming as a motive to holy living and active labor," which contains a full and pleasing restatement of the first part of Dr. Brookes's essay.

The volume closes with three brief addresses and the critical appendix, which do not call for special mention.

It is evident that the views presented in this article are not liable to the strictures so vehemently laid by Pre-millennialists on the directly opposing theory. They have, indeed, to bear the charge of making little or nothing of a millennium of any sort. As the Word of God has little or nothing to say of a millennium, this does not appear to be a very serious charge.

It may be urged that these views involve a great limitation (apparently) to the number of the elect, as compared with the number of the non-elect. In reply, it can only be said, that this is a matter about which men know little, and certainly should

not dogmatise. We are assured that Christ shall see his seed and shall be satisfied. This assurance should satisfy us.

The attentive reader will not fail to notice that it is the doctrine of election which brings order out of this millennial chaos, and holds men down to sober views concerning the second advent. It refutes at once the expectation of a conversion of the world before Christ comes, as well as the fantastic conception of a millennial kingdom after his advent, partly on earth and partly above the earth; partly good and partly bad, with intolerable distinctions between Jew and Gentile subjects, between believers converted before and those converted after Christ comes. It enables us to see how, according to the Scriptures, the second advent is to the Church in every age an event ever impending, yet always uncertain; for no one knows or can know when the whole number of the elect shall be effectually called. To say that it is literally very near, or literally very far off, is alike presumptuous. It effectually confutes the eager, feverish expectations of Premillennialists, some of whom seem to regard the fact that they expect, with some degree of confidence, the arrival of Christ before to-morrow morning as the most satisfactory evidence that they are in a state of grace, as well as the doubts and sometimes the scoffs of those who say, Where is the promise of his coming?

To those who may think that too much importance is assigned to this too often derided doctrine of election, it is remarked, that no emphasis is here laid on the *grounds* upon which the decree of election proceeds, which is the real battle field in the election controversy; but only upon the fact that there is such a decree. This fact accounts for the fixedness of the day of Christ's return—a day known only to the keeper of the Book of Life. If the number of the finally saved be uncertain and contingent on the mere will of sinners, then there would seem to be no reasonable limit to the extension of the gospel dispensation. Should Christ come to-night or a million of years hence, he might in either case cut off some who, had he delayed his coming, would perhaps have been saved. His delay is caused only by the fact that God is not willing that any who have been given to him should perish. Be, therefore, the grounds of election what they may, the fact

that there is an election, fixing definitely in the knowledge of God the whole number to be finally saved, is the only point pressed.

Finally, it is important to notice that this view of the second advent agrees with those scriptures which make this event the great and blessed hope of the Church. Before Christ comes no believer will receive his full reward (1 Pet. v. 4, *et similia*). Those who die before he comes are absent from the body and present with the Lord. This state, compared with the tribulations of the earthly conflict, is one of peace and rest, but according to the Scriptures far inferior to the blessedness of the perfected kingdom. As to their entrance upon this final state of glory, all believers from Abel to the last child of God brought to repentance and faith stand upon a common platform. The first is not made perfect without the last. (Compare Heb. xi. 39, 40, with 1 Thess. iv. 15-18.) Hence the pertinency of those passages written for the benefit of the whole Church, which are designed in every age to incite God's people to work, to pray, and long for, and so to hasten the day of Christ's return. Not dying and going to heaven is the blessed hope of the Church, but the glory that shall be revealed when Christ comes (Titus ii. 13).

The modern Church has substituted another and a subordinate hope for this blessed and glorious one. For the individual, it is dying and going to heaven; for the Church at large, it is the conversion of the world. The effect has not been a healthy one. It is said, the doctrine that the world is not to be converted by missionary effort will greatly lessen, if it do not paralyse, the Church's zeal. The answer is, *first*, if it be God's truth, then this doctrine must sanctify and not paralyse. *Second*. Those who have believed it, viz., the early Church, the Reformers, modern Premillennialists (notably the Moravians), have not been deficient in missionary spirit. *Third*. The other theory prevails in England and America, and has prevailed for more than one hundred years. Confessedly during this period, as compared with the preceding century, there has been a great advance in missionary enterprise. This advance can be traced to causes other than the prevalence of the Whitbyan Theory. But what now is the actual state of the case? It is this: in spite of all appeals from ministers and in-

junctions from church courts and councils, not one-half of Christ's professed people give a dime to Foreign Missions, while multitudes openly declare they have no zeal for this cause. Instead of anything like a conversion of the world, we have Romanism extending its deadly heresies in the best parts of Christendom; we have infidelity, ritualism, and formalism in the churches; we have God's ministers and people giving countenance to a godless, Christless humanitarianism, with Sabbath breaking, covetousness, and intemperance abounding in and out of the Church; we have God's people begging money of God's enemies to do God's work; we have in many places the crowning infamy—the Church using the nefarious practices of the gambler to raise funds to convert the world! Surely, on grounds of expediency alone, it may be worth while to return to the faith of the apostolic Church on this subject; to reinstate as the object to be looked and longed for, the glorious return of our Lord, as the only as well as the blessed Hope of a tempest-tossed Church.

If believers would look to the coming of Christ as the time of their full reward; if they would remember that then and only then will the graves which contain their dead open and open outward to give back their beloved friends to their embrace; that only then will they be permitted to sing the triumphal song over death (1 Cor. xv. 54); that only then will they be permitted to sit on thrones crowned as kings; if they would remember that all this glory waits for the *evangelisation* of the world, it would seem reasonable to suppose that they would set themselves in earnest to accomplish this work, which is comparatively easy to be done. With the blessing of God the Church may hope soon to preach the gospel among all nations for a witness. The conversion of the world is a work of quite different character. God could, indeed, accomplish it as soon as the other. Has he promised to do this? His providential dealings seem to endorse the view here taken of the teaching of his word. There can be no doubt as to the duty of the Church to preach the gospel to all nations. Let the Church once be possessed of the idea that when she has done this, she has fulfilled the condition required of her for the coming of Christ and the consequent glory, and we may hope to see

the zeal of the early Church revived. What does it matter if we suffer trial? Our present sufferings are not to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us at the coming of the Lord. What does it matter if millions of treasure be soon spent and thousands of precious lives surrendered in heralding the gospel? The coming of the glorious day will be hastened. Those who long for the time when, not the mixed glories of a millennium, but when the transcendant blessedness of the eternal reign of Christ shall be realised, will surely give and work and pray for the fulfilment of the only antecedent conditions, viz.: on the Church's part the evangelisation of the nations; and on God's part the gathering of the elect out of every kindred and tongue, of which the preaching of the gospel is the divinely appointed means.

E. C. GORDON.

ARTICLE V.

CLASSICAL REVISION OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT.

Classical Revision of the Greek New Testament, Tested and Applied on Uniform Principles, with Suggested Alterations of the English Version. By W. MILLAR NICOLSON, M. A., D. Sc. (Edin.), once Fellow and Tutor, and lately Classical Examiner in the University of Edinburgh. Πάντα δοκιμάζετε· το καλὸν κατέχετε. 1 Thess. v. 21. Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London; and 20 South Frederick Street, Edinburgh. 1878. XI., pp. 148, slender duodecimo.

It is not to be doubted that the translation of the original Scriptures by William Tindale into the vernacular English, noble as it was, admitted of improvement, and in point of fact was on the whole greatly improved by subsequent revision. This improvement reached its maximum in what is known as the Authorised Version of King James, and which remains, altogether aside from its virtues as a translation, the glory and crown of English

literature. As a mere version it is, like every other human product, in some respects defective; yet as combining the seemingly opposite excellences of a version and of a vernacular classic, it is unrivalled and unapproached in any tongue. As a mere version, however, its peculiar merits and felicities have been recognised by scholars of different ages and various nationalities. Even its apparent mistakes are apt to be due to a change in the language, or else to the superior erudition or subtle suggestiveness of the venerable scholars who are responsible for the work. No one in his senses would blame these learned men for saying that David (1 Sam. xvii. 22) left his "carriage" in the hands of his armor-bearer; or that Paul shook (Acts xxviii. 5) off the venomous "beast" into the fire at Melita. It is not known to so large a class of readers, perhaps, that "good man of the house," in Luke xii. 39, is merely old English for "householder." A much smaller number are acquainted with the fact that *ἔγνων τί ποιῶω* in Luke xvi. 4, which evidently conveys the idea, "Eureka! I have hit upon it. I see now what I ought to do," is correctly rendered in the idiom of the day by the words, "I am *resolved* what to do"; a form of expression which might appear to mean, "I have made up my mind," but in reality means "my *doubts* are resolved," and is so used repeatedly by the contemporaries of Shakespeare. We have often known the A. V. to be taken sharply to task for translating the phrase *μὴ γένοιτο*, which occurs so often in Paul's writings, "God forbid." And yet a glance at the Septuagint and Hebrew, by the light of Gesenius's Lexicon, would go far to show that there are two sides to that question. We repeatedly find ourselves coming back to King James, after weary excursions in other quarters, for that rendering of a hard word or knotty sentence which after much discussion and long dubiety wins our approval as the best solution of the difficulty. A notable instance in point is that of Philip. i. 7, from the word "because"; where the connexion of the clauses is the one advocated by Erasmus, Calvin, Alford, and Bishop Lightfoot, in preference to that favored by the Greek Commentators and Meyer, and where the word "inasmuch" happily determines the relation of the principle.

After all, however, it must be conceded that even if not
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“faulty” (p. 3) to the degree some imagine, the version, considered as a mere version of the Greek, may be amended and ought to be amended. It does not follow that it would be worth while to substitute such an amended version for the one already in the hands of the people. The differences are for the most part so minute that they would in many cases pass unnoticed, if attention was not specially called to them. Professor Nicolson's work is marked by sound scholarship and the manifest results of patient industry. The author is no novice (as his title shows), though, as we chance to know, a comparatively young man. He is a valued pastor of the Free Church, and has travelled and resided in Italy, Greece, and Palestine. Everything betrays the practised “Grecian” and the man of reverential piety.

This book is the result of twelve years of strictly independent study. All merely theological prepossessions have been held in abeyance. During the progress of the research the author deliberately refused to avail himself of the side-lights furnished by the other revisers and the critical commentators; though afterwards, and before going to the press, he sometimes consulted their volumes. With the large body of eminent men who are now engaged in the effort to better the work of the translators appointed by King James, Dr. Nicolson has no connexion whatever, and is in entire ignorance as to their results. He was for some time a pupil of Dr. Leonard Schmitz, the erudite rector of the High School of Edinburgh, and early imbibed from that eminent man a taste for exact philological studies. We have accidentally learned that Dr. Nicolson is a fast friend too of that great Greek scholar, Dr. Veitch, and that this marvel of accuracy read the proofs of this volume. Somewhat more than twelve years ago, on returning from a year's tour (and sojourn) in the classic and sacred territories, and after paying close attention to the spoken Romaic and Arabic, as well as the Italian, such questions as these suggested themselves: “How far were the writers of the New Testament influenced by the rules of classic syntax? Would it be possible to apply the rules of the Greek prose which Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato wrote, to writings of the first century of the Christian era? How far can signs of decay and deterioration

be traced in their style and vocabulary? What light does the modern Greek dialect, as spoken at Athens, throw on any peculiarities of diction in the Greek Testament? Would it be possible, and if so, advantageous, to search out and classify the departures on the part of the several translators from the exact and literal translation of moods and tenses, etc.; and, at the same time, to discover and collect instances in which they have accurately rendered those same forms of expression, so that the latter might serve as foundations on which to base the corrections of the former?"

The work now under examination embodies the fruits of these twelve years of microscopic study. The upshot (as might have been augured) is the same announced by the highest scholarship of our time as the upshot of still more profound and extensive labors, viz., that the difference between the Old Greek and the New Testament from the Hellenistic idiom (or dialect) is considerable, but yet surprisingly less than "dull fools suppose." This is especially true in the use of the moods and tenses, and also of the cases, and the prepositions, and other particles, though there is a marked absence of forms of speech which are familiar in the older usage. Mr. Nicolson, it will be seen, is much more of a purist than a Hebraist; albeit in strictness he is neither, and occupies a position not far removed from the middle ground taken by Ernesti and so tenaciously held by Winer. In the admirable "Grammatik" of Alexander Buttman there is a discernible tendency towards a Hebraistic reaction, though it is controlled within the limits of good sense and sound learning. We do not remember having noticed in the pages of Mr. Nicolson any references or allusions to Buttman or to Winer, or even to T. S. Green; although the Grammars of Clyde, Schmitz, Donaldson, Curtius, and Madvig, were thoroughly consulted on certain points. The following remarks, however, show a competence to deal with the so-called deterioration in New Testament Greek:

"It is not really inconsistent with my main contention to admit that there *are* signs of deterioration in New Testament Greek. But these have been unduly exaggerated in number and importance. The web of the language used is fair, though a stray thread here and there may be out of harmony. With a collection before me of aberrations from the pure

classical standard, which I have vigorously sought out and classified, I reiterate the position laid down at the outset, that the Greek of the New Testament is in the main of a high order, and conforms for the most part to the rules of classical Greek. . . . Were any one to trust to dictionaries merely, or glossaries of foreign words, and lists of aberrations from the Saxon standard, he might maintain that the ordinary English of to-day is mainly and almost exclusively foreign. The Saxon element would be regarded as swamped by the immensely greater number of words of foreign extraction. . . . In a similar way I would seek to guard against a corresponding fallacy in respect of the Greek of the New Testament. No doubt it must be conceded that it is not *throughout* up to the mark of the Greek of the golden age of Greek literature. But much less is it to be summarily treated as merely on a level with late Hellenistic, or with the modern Greek or Romaic. Further, it is superior to the Greek of the Septuagint. In this, as in every other such case, it is unfair to take advantage of sundry blemishes, and parade them as though they were characteristic of the whole—

‘Velut si

Egregio inspertos reprehendas corpore naevos.’”

If we take Attic Greek as our standard of excellence, these words need little qualification. Viewed, however, not only as the vehicle of divine thought—and divine thought in its amplest and clearest expression—but also simply as a literary vehicle that has become itself ennobled by the very thought which it was fashioned to express, the Greek of the New Testament may be justly regarded as superior to that of Thucydides or Plato.

This book is rich in tabular views of the conditional forms, the prepositions, etc. The form *εάν* with the subjunctive is for some reason omitted, and *εἰ* with the optative is taken too much *au sérieux*. The meaning of *εἰς* is altogether too much restricted.

After his Introduction, the author reviews the deflections of the A. V. from literal accuracy in the matter of the tenses. Instances are adduced where the Greek Present is misrendered by the English Perfect: where the Greek Present is wrongly rendered, as an Aorist; where the Greek Perfect is correctly rendered in King James; where the Greek Perfect is confounded with the Present; where the Greek Perfect is confounded with the Aorist; where the Greek Aorist is rendered by the Perfect, the Pluperfect, etc.; where the Greek Aorist is correctly rendered; where

the Greek Aorist is rendered by the Perfect; and by the Present. An interesting chapter is devoted to the Imperfect Tense, and a brief one to Hypothetical Sentences: The Imperative Mood comes in for a due share of attention. The ambiguity of the version in relation to the Genders of Adjectives, etc., is considered. A chapter is given to the cases of Nouns, and another to the Definite Article; and instances are cited where the article is wrongly omitted in the A. V., and others where the article is wrongly inserted. Paronomasia is finely treated under the head of "Play upon Words." The Greek Prepositions are severely and somewhat stringently analysed. They are conveniently classified and tabulated by the author under five heads. Careful notice is taken, too, of the use of Pronominal Adjectives and Adverbs; and of Conjunctions and Particles. Regard is paid to the alleged misrendering of Attributes and Predicates, and to alleged mistakes or failures in the way of Apposition. The signs of deterioration in the New Testament Greek are here taken up and dealt with in the manner already pointed out. Particular instances of deterioration are discovered in the Tenses and forms of Verbs; in Accentual Pronunciation; in approximations to modern Greek; in Latin words; and in Hebraisms. Donaldson's distinctions between Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Predicates, are clearly expounded, and there are some curious observations on the subject of Itacism. The Appendix is made up of seven valuable Excursuses; and there is an Index at the end of the book of the passages referred to during the course of the investigation. Excursus A is a very learned and ingenious, rather than convincing interpretation of 1 Cor. xv. 29—"Baptism for the dead." Excursus B is an able exposition "of some passages in which the Relations of Death to the Christian are described, but whose meaning is obscured by inaccuracies of translation." The result is the vicarious theory contended for by Haldane and Shedd, on the sixth of Romans. Excursus C is a short and interesting disquisition on the Superscriptions on the Cross. The view is that they were written by a Greek, a Roman, and a Jew; and that it is the Jewish form which reads, "Jesus the Nazarene." Excursus D discusses Mark ii. 26; answers Alford, and illustrates the

view that Abiathar was not then *priest* by imaginary (or real) parallels from the lives of Wellington and Nelson. Excursus E is a rather unsatisfactory explanation of Col. i. 24. Excursus F is a little monograph on the use in the New Testament of the Native Dialect in Palestine, containing some charming words about *Talitha Koumi*. Excursus G is an erudite and very persuasive commentary on the terms *μυστήριον*, *τελειοῦσθαι*, etc.

There is no occasion to give examples of the proposed translations where we agree to their exactness. While some of them are altogether new, most of them do not differ materially from those suggested by Trench, Ellicott, J. B. Lightfoot, Eadie, and the other accepted revisers. In many instances we feel called upon to take exception to the proffered novelties. This, however, is only because we have to take exception in such instances to the Procrustean rigor of the criterion applied, as well as to the austere literality of the method of the criticism. It must be borne in mind, too, that the author sets out with a query as to the probable fruits of an inquiry conducted under such narrowing restraints. With this concession, we must still maintain that a large number of Mr. Nicolson's strictures on the translations of the Aorist are at once superseded, if we recollect the latitude of reference which is accorded to that tense by the highest scholarship of the age; and further, that the deviations are in many cases mere accommodations on the part of the A. V., for the sake of familiarity or elegance, to the genius of the English tongue. Mr. Nicolson, and others besides him, seem to have forgotten that *if* one aim of King James's commissioners was to make a just version, another was to furnish the English-speaking world an incomparable classic. A rigid literal and verbal nicety in all cases would in some cases have defeated that object by marring the characteristic raciness of the idiom.

The same general strain of remark will apply to the treatment of *eis*, of the article, etc. In many cases the author's indictment against the Version as to the these points is unquestionably made out; but in such cases, he will commonly be found to have been anticipated by other revisers. The force of the Greek *Imperfect* is finely shown in many passages where the A. V. is at

fault; yet in other passages the felicity of the older rendering could not be surpassed. Thus the blind man seems to have *kept on* begging (Luke xviii. 35). There is a graphic word-painting of the Ascension in Luke xxiv. 5. The Jews *kept on* persecuting Jesus (John v. 16). Pilate *kept on* seeking (John xix. 12). The gaze referred to in 2 Cor. iii. 7 was a *fixed* gaze. So the prayer and praise of Paul and Silas in the dungeon was less or more *protracted* (Acts xvi. 25). The *contemporaneous* betrayal of our Lord may perhaps be suggested in 1 Cor. xi. 23. So in Luke xiv. 42, the tense showed that the hinderers *failed*. (Compare Gal. i. 23.) The *persistence* of the thief on the cross is indicated at Mark v. 32; and, it may be, the *pressure* of the Pharisees in Luke vii. 36. The boat of the fishermen was not "filled" but "*filling*", in Luke xiii. 23. The hunger and want of the prodigal may have been of some *duration* (Luke xv. 16); and the father have expostulated *earnestly* with the elder brother (Luke xv. 28). The author aptly says (on p. 35) that "what might be termed the Pre-Raphaelite minuteness of word-painting in the original often disappears, and is replaced by a prosaic indefiniteness in our version." It must be remembered, however, that in such an expression as "he beat the boy," the word "beat" in English might be intended in the sense of the Imperfect or of the Aorist. Rightly understood, it is fully as graphic as "was beating." Mr. Nicolson would have done well, too, if he had more distinctly recognised the practice of Greek writers of freely interchanging the Aorist (the tense of relation) and the Imperfect (the tense of description) in narrative prose. It does not always do in such cases to insist much on the idea of *continuance* in the past tense. The analytical or paraphrastic imperfect, as it has been called, is much more frequent in the New Testament than in the classics, and had come to be used to put stress on the idea of duration, where that was needed. The reluctance of the demons may be referred to in Mark v. 10, and the extended distribution of the bread in Mark viii. 6.

We think our author has failed to appreciate the precise shade of difference between the bare imperfect in verbs of wishing and the optative with α . (Compare Acts xxv. 22; xxvi. 26; John xix.

29; Philemon 13, and Rom. ix. 3.) It has been marvellously overlooked by writers on both sides of this vexed question that in Acts xxvii. 29 the key of the passage is set, so to speak, in past time; whereas in Romans ix. 3 the key is in present time. A reference to past time in the place in Romans would doubtless have been indicated by a *πότε*, or still more probably by a simple Aorist. (Compare Chrysostom on Heb. xi., quoted on p. 41: "*Τάχα τις ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἐβόηλετο εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὥστε*—infinitive.")

The definite article should have been given in the A. V. at Luke xviii. 5—"the little children; at John xii. 13—"the branches of the palm-trees" ("*i. e.*, which lined the way in profusion"); at v. 24—"the grain of the corn;" at xii. 36—"the light;" at ch. xiii. 11—"he knew the betrayer," *i. e.*, the one who was betraying him; at xiv. 2—"the Iscariot;" at xx. 1—"the Magdalene;" at xviii. 3—"the band;" at John viii. 5—"the Nazarene;" at Rom. iii. 8—"the access" [rather, the introduction (which we have)]; at Tim. i. 7—"the good warfare;" at vi. 12, 13—"the good warfare;" at Heb. xi. 8—"the good fight;" at v. 8—"the crown of righteousness;" at James iii. 6—"the world of iniquity;" and at 1 Peter v. 4—"the amaranthal crown." (Compare 1 Peter iv. 11, John [*passim* in his Epistles—the Antichrist], Jude 10, Rev. xii. 14 ["the great tribulation"], ii. 10, xxi. 1 ["and the sea no longer exists"], and Luke viii. 41 [perhaps] where the article may be omitted in the Greek merely because it would stand in the predicate.) The article in Luke vii. 1, possibly points to the white marble synagogue of which the ruins were recently discovered by Lieut. Wilson, and inspected just afterwards by Mr. Nicolson. "The cloud" mentioned at Luke xii. 3, is the well-known cloud that rises from the Mediterranean and was seen by Elijah's servant from the top of Carmel. "The account" in xi. 2, was the one regularly demanded (or expected) in such cases. "The everlasting habitations," at v. 9, in contrast with the transient ones opened to the steward. Luke xvii. 17, ought to have been rendered "were not the ten healed?" The Pharisee, at xviii. 11, contrasts himself with "the rest of mankind." The English at Matt. i. 23, should be "the origin." At Matt. xxvi. 5, and Luke xxiv. 26 etc., read "the Christ" (*i. e.*

the Messiah); and at Matt. xxiv. 32 (compare Mark xiii. 28), "learn *the* parable from the fig-tree." In Mark, at ix. 23, the phrase "*the* 'if thou canst'" takes up the words the man had just used himself. The version of 1 John v. 19, should probably be "In *the* wicked one" (Compare verses 18 and 19). So too, it is most likely, should be the rendering at John xvii. 15, and in the Lord's Prayer. We cannot accept the view tentatively put forward in this book that "*the* sea" in Rev. xx. 1 is the one mentioned before, at iv. 6, or that "*the* brother" at Rom. xvi. 23 may be the brother of Erastus. We have long been somewhat inclined to our author's view of the article before *μεσίτης* at Gal. iii. 20, viz., that it should be rendered "*the* Mediator." He does not seem to allow any option; whereas we regard the authorised version at this place impregnable from the attack of mere grammarians. We do not favor the allegorical view of Luke xi., 21, 22, which is urged by Alford, and argued plausibly from the definite articles by Dr. Nicolson. The literal version of τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ at Luke xviii. 13 is "*the* sinner;" but we incline towards the meaning, "sinner that I am," rather than "the chief of sinners," (as in 1 Tim. 15). We are surprised the learned author did not call attention to the unfortunate omission of the articles in the fifth of Romans, where we should be careful in several instances to translate "*the* one," "the many," etc. In Luke v. 32 (and the parallels) he justly remarks we should render the word *δικαίους* simply "righteous" [persons, or beings]. In Matt. xxvi. 74, Mark xiv. 68, 72, and in the best text at Luke xxii. 40, to be exact we must read, "*a* cock crew." He might have added Luke ii. 12, where the rendering of *βρέφος* should be "*a* babe;" contrast verse 16, where τὸ βρέφος is correctly rendered "*the* babe." So in Luke xviii. 36, it should be "*a* crowd;" in John xiv. 27, "*a* woman;" at 1 Cor. x. 4, "continued to drink out of *a* rock." We must demur, however, to the remainder of the sentence which our author accepts from the authorised version, "*which* followed them," where the anarthrous participle would rather suggest "as it followed them." A curious inconsistency is pointed out at the top of p. 59. We venture to think that both Mr. Nicolson and Bishop Lightfoot have

been misled by classical models in their view of νόμον without the article, in such places as Romans ii. 13, v. 12, and xiii. 10. Ellicott, Meyer, and Winer may be consulted with advantage *in locis*. Romans xx. 12 should read simply "books were opened." Our author differs from Alford and the authorised version, and agrees with Ellicott and Meyer in pressing the rule about the anarthrous πᾶς at Eph. iii. 15. Will he, unlike Ellicott, do the same with the approved text at Eph. ii. 21? We have found nothing to require a more delicate handling than the use of the article in the New Testament, and, for the matter of that, in Greek generally. The author does not seem to be aware that proper names (*i. e.*, of persons), and words used like proper names, in the New Testament do not *require* the article, though they are very often found with the article. Indeed, Madvig* extends this rule even into the domain of the classics. Its application to the New Testament, though sometimes practically neglected by J. B. Lightfoot, is insisted on by Winer, A. Buttmann, Meyer, and Ellicott, and relied on by Lee on Inspiration, and West on the *descensus ad inferos*. Alford holds a kind of intermediate view as to νόμος with or without the article, at least as occurring in the book of Romans.

The authorised version is sometimes at fault in the matter of *the genders*; and, indeed, the Greek is by no means always unambiguous. In John vi. 60 [not "6"] αὐτοῦ, after ἀκούειν, would refer in the classic Greek to Jesus, who had just uttered the σκληρὸς λόγος. In the latter idiom, ἀκούειν it would seem may take the genitive either of a person or of a thing. This is a mere question of pronominal reference, and does not, as it happens in this instance, raise a doubt as to the gender. The question in 1 Cor. iv. 13, as to πάντων turns upon the gender of that word. The point is more uncertain there, and in Titus i. 8, than at Romans xii. 16, where the author rightly prefers the neuter gender; the *reference*, we think, may notwithstanding be, at least in part, to men: "Not minding the lofty things, but carried away with (attracted by) the humble things' (or *lot*)." Tischendorf's reading at Col. iii. 6 (for which there is a formidable

* Madvig, *Syntax*, p. 14, § 13, (a). Rivingtons, London, Oxford and Cambridge, 1873.

weight of authority) would determine the gender of *οις* in verse 7 to be neuter and not masculine. We are half disposed to yield to the author's rendering at Col. i. 18—"that he might have the preëminence among all." We are not equally prepared to give in to the new, though conjectural, version at James i. 13, "neither can he be tempted of evil *men*."

We do not remember to have seen the hint anywhere that the *τις* in 1 Tim. v. 8 is *feminine*, and refers to the *τις χήρα* in verse 4. The idea has occurred to us in reading the naked text, and sheds a new and curious light on the passage.

Mistranslations of case are not infrequent. Several familiar examples are given on p. 47. At Jude 14 our author would render, "Enoch prophesied *to* these." We differ from Dr. Nicolson in the impression he has that in Gal. v. 5, 16, 25, *πνεύματι* is an ethical dative—"unto the Spirit." We incline to the view (not mentioned in this book) which takes *πνευματικοίς* in 1 Cor. ii. 13 as a masculine form. Compare iii, 1. Dr. Nicolson understands Acts xxvi. 28 in the sense of the authorised version; this, we need not say, is extremely doubtful. We do not coincide in the opinion which makes *ταπεινός* "humble" in James i. 9, etc., as it is almost certainly in Matt. xi. 29. The author is tenacious of the strict meaning of *γίνεσθαι* throughout the New Testament (see pp. 68 and 69). The mistake is again pointed out of translating "this *fold*" instead of "this *flock*," in John x. 16. The remark on p. 70 as to the latitude of expression allowed the sacred writers to convey their meaning, must be rigorously explained, and accepted even then with caution.

The author very properly renders the word "exodus," and not "decease" in Luke ix. 31; and refers to the exodus of Moses but not to that of Elijah [in the LXX]. Why not, too, he queries, have it "transfigured," in 2 Cor. iii. 10 and Rom. xii. 2 (compare Exodus xxxiv. 30), as well as in Matt. xvii. 2 and Mark ix. 2? He also felicitously brings together the *κατακνήσεις* in Luke ix. 58 with the *σκηνᾶς* of verse 33; and so in the parallels. And he renders Acts ii. 26, where the cognate verb is used, "My soul shall encamp (or nestle?) in hope." He is clearly right in rendering *ὁ λύχνος* in Luke xi. 33, "the *lamp* (or candle)": "the

lamp of the body is the eye." With Dr. Samuel Cox, and a host more, he prefers to read at John iii. 3, "begotten *from above*." Much of the point is missed by translating "labor not," at John vi. 27, instead of "*work not*." Our author intimates a fine nexus between Luke xii. 50, Acts xviii. 5, 2 Cor. v. 14, and Phil. i. 23, by translating in all the passages *συνέχω* "constrain."

Shades of meaning, *nuances*, suggested by the context, are yet inevitably sacrificed by so uniform a procedure. Dr. Nicolson contends, and with justice, that "the two thieves" at the crucifixion were two *robbers*; but does not stop to remember that the English word had a wider acceptation early in the seventeenth century than it has now, and that the authorised version should not be blamed. Neither does he disclose acquaintance with the fact that the mistake in Matt. xxiii. 24 of rendering *δεδίχοντες* "straining *at*" instead of straining *off*" (or *out*) was a misprint in the original edition, for which the revisers should not be held responsible until it can be shown that they were also the final proof-readers.

We were much gratified to perceive that precisely the view of the word *δοῦλος* and its cognates, for which Dr. Dabney was so roundly scored by a deceased minister of Canada in the pages of the *Catholic Presbyterian*, is quietly taken by Dr. Nicolson in this volume, as will be evident from his translation "enslaved and slave" at John viii. 33, and similarly in Gal. iv. 18, and 9, and the other places. (See p. 63.) The same view, so obviously the true and only one, is and always has been taken by all scholars who cared for their reputation, unless, perhaps, by some in Caledonia and British America. We are pleased to see that the accomplished and gifted author of this masterly treatise is hemmed in by no insular or continental prejudices in matters of pure philology.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The Sacraments of the New Testament, as Instituted by Christ.

By GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Norfolk, Va. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. 1880. Part I., pp. 232; Part II., pp. 314. 12mo.

This is a timely discussion. Twenty years ago the author published that part which is entitled "*The Doctrine of Baptisms*," except the portion appropriated to the subject of Baptismal Regeneration. He has now presented also the careful examination of the other "Sacrament," the "Lord's Supper as set forth in the Word of God."

The author gives three features of the "aim" which he has proposed in this publication: (1) That it shall be thoroughly *scriptural*; (2) That it shall be adapted to the present state of the controversies in Christian Churches; (3) That it shall be adapted to the comprehension of the average English reader. With this brief statement of the "aim" proposed by the author, may be added a more extended explanation of each aspect of the discussion, as presented in the work itself, including in this the author's own views.

1. The subject discussed is eminently scriptural. "Sacraments" are of divine institution and revelation. They belong to the scheme of redemption. They have no basis in natural religion as a scheme of doctrine or a teacher of duty. Hence any discussion based on expediencies, or the fitness of things, or the results of speculations on the relations of God and man—any *a priori* process of reasoning, suggesting what *man* thinks God ought to have instituted or revealed, the modes and subjects, the nature and benefits of sacraments, according to the teachings of human reason—are all simply outside the purpose and plan of such a discussion. The authority of the "primitive Church," as set forth even in the "Ante-Nicene Fathers," is a mere human teaching, not especially valuable by antiquity or proximity of its

expounders to the time of the apostles; for during that time while Paul yet lived, not only had the gospel itself been so corrupted that the teaching of some was pronounced "another gospel, which is not another," but a perversion (Gal. i. 6, 7); but the holy sacrament of the Lord's Supper itself had been grossly misapprehended and corrupted. Dr. Armstrong has fully verified his "aim" in this aspect. He has collected and presented, under appropriate headings, the entire teachings of Scripture on both sacraments. Of course others may possess equal reverence for Scripture and make as full quotations, and yet so interpret the sacred revelation as to mislead the reader. Hence our author has not only given his own interpretations and sustained them by trustworthy critical examinations of the terms used in the original languages, but he has also subjected the language, in which opposing views are presented, whether on personal responsibility or that of ecclesiastical organisations by their symbols, to careful and searching investigation. How fully and ably he has done this, can be only ascertained by an examination of the volume. He has thus sustained his claim to teach only what the Scriptures teach, either in express terms or by fair inference. True, many not only of his own, but other churches, may except to some of his "inferences," as for example his view of John's baptism. There may also be some question raised as to the correctness of his views on the question whether baptism necessarily precedes the access of a believer to the Lord's table. But we apprehend there will be decided satisfaction as to all his teachings, which are fundamental on the doctrines of baptisms, by all not wedded to what Dr. Dale calls "The System." Without any pedantic or other offensive display of learning, Dr. Armstrong has showed a clear perception of the right use of language in his full illustrations of the senses which words acquire in passing from a usage to describe *secular* things to that which describes *sacred*. Especially is this true, and generally accepted as such by scholars, as to those words adopted from classic Greek to present subjects of purely divine revelation, and of which the heathen writers had no conceptions; such as "church" by a word before used only to mean "assembly." "Martyr," in Church History, is a sufferer

in Christ's cause; formerly it only meant "witness." "Presbyter" or "elder" is a church officer; formerly only an "old man." As "old men" in the patriarchal times were rulers, then, when tribal and national organisations emerged from patriarchal, the same word was employed to denote a ruler. And this occurred in civil government as well as ecclesiastical. Thus, "senator" from Latin "senex," "old man"; and from the same we have in modern languages "seigneur" and "signor." "Pastor" in Greek and Latin means a shepherd, but in ecclesiastical language a church officer. These illustrations might be much extended, but enough have been given. Now "circumcise" and "baptize" are words of the same history. In ancient languages *circumcise* meant only to *cut around*; then in religious use to denote a rite which symbolised purifications. Hence "to circumcise the heart," "circumcision of the spirit," "the circumcision" for the people who practised the rite. So *baptize*, in literal use, to overwhelm with water; then tropically, to express the act of being *subject to an influence*, and then especially of subjection to purifying agencies, and so *baptism* expressing *purifications*. Thus the dispute of the disciples of John and the Pharisees (John iii. 22-26) "about purification" is mentioned in connexion with the record of John's baptizing; and the "vessels of water" (John ii. 6) are mentioned as connected with "the manner," or literally, "according to the purification" of the Jews; evidently (for the contents were insufficient for immersion) for the use of those needing water for the various religious purifications prescribed by Moses' law and in constant practice in our Saviour's time. The foregoing abstract of Dr. Armstrong's method of argument is a pertinent specimen of the plain and direct mode of discussing the "Doctrine of Baptisms" which everywhere characterises his work, and is as clearly exhibited in the able discussion of the other sacrament, the Lord's Supper.

2. The first sentence in this article is suggestive of the second aspect of Dr. Armstrong's "aim," as fully carried out as that just presented. He proposes a discussion "adapted to our times"—*timely*. However fully the "Doctrine of Baptisms" has been presented, both in the interests of Immersionists and Affusionists,

it is eminently true that new arguments of assault on Pædobaptist views and new grounds of defence are continually presented. Discussions, thorough and exhaustive a century ago, do not fully meet the necessities of our time. Dr. Dale's voluminous and learned work, in four octavo volumes, might seem ample to cover the entire ground of defence, and conclusive in its able exposure of the one-sided scholarship, the prejudices, and the perverse misapplication of Scripture, which have for years distinguished the advocates of "The System." But this work is not *popular*. It does not reach the modes of thought and the sentiments of the masses. If properly studied by all our ministers and its methods presented in a popular style, it is calculated to be indefinitely applicable to all phases of the Baptist controversy and extensively useful. Dr. Armstrong, however, by different and shorter methods, has done for the masses what Dr. Dale has done for scholars. His discussion is fully abreast with our times, and it would be an interesting spectacle to witness how those who are ever ringing the changes on "Baptize means to dip, always to dip, and nothing else but dip" of Dr. Carson, can meet the arguments and illustrations of Dr. Armstrong to show, that in its *religious* sense, it means "to purify, always to purify, and nothing else but to purify"—*i. e.*, to express the act of putting one in a typically or symbolically purified state, suggestive, in mode and scripturally sustained exemplification, of the *religious purifying* of which the Holy Spirit is the agent and the man receiving "the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost" is the recipient.

3. Equally pertinent to our times is Dr. Armstrong's brief but conclusive refutation of the idle prating, whether of Campbellites, Ritual Episcopalians, or the example and ally of both, the Papists. If "the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the unclean," could only avail to "the purifying of the flesh," but had no power "to purge men's consciences from dead works to serve the living God," how shall the sprinkling of a spoonful of water now "purge men's consciences"—aye, renew and sanctify the "heart deceitful above all things and desperately wicked"?

4. In his discussions with Christians who differ conscientiously from himself, and even with the Papists, our author is ever scrupulous in his courtesy. Towards the advocates of immersion we cannot but think he goes farther than any rights they can claim would entitle them, in uniformly conceding to them the name they arrogate to themselves exclusively of "Baptists." We confess that here we should be less amiable and yielding than Dr. Armstrong. These Christians object strongly to "baptize" as a rendering of the Greek term; they insist that it means nothing but "immerse;" an influential part of them have even insisted on a new English Bible, in order to get rid of this naughty and ambiguous word, "baptize." We should say to them, "Nay, gentlemen, you cannot 'eat your cake and have it, too.' If 'immerse' is the word, then you should be called 'Immersionists,' or if it suits you better, 'Dippers,' all 'through the chapter.'" They have no right to expect us to concede the name "Baptists" to them; because the very name is an assumption of the position that immersion alone is baptism; and that all undipped persons are wholly unbaptized. But *that is the very thing in dispute*. We cannot seem to concede it without stultifying ourselves. The policy of the Immersionists, in arrogating the name, is as shrewd as it is unfair. By its perpetual and admitted use, they make the impression on the unthinking that they are the only denomination of Christians which really obeys the Saviour's command to baptize. Is this just to ourselves? Nay, we are the true Baptists, and they are the Immersionists or Dippers.

Dr. Armstrong is peculiarly strong, while fair and courteous, upon the topic of "close communion." Here he meets the Immersionists on their own ground, and inflicts on them a total overthrow. He shows that they do not, as is so often assumed, reason from their premises as Presbyterians do from theirs. Immersionists often endeavor to break the force of the just feeling against the uncharitableness of "close communion" by saying: "We cannot be blamed for merely reasoning consistently from our premises"! True: but they *are to be blamed* for taking up premises which are neither true nor just; and which, when consistently carried out, lead to unchristian conclusions. The Jews

presumed that Jesus of Nazareth was guilty of religious imposture and blasphemy. From this presumption it followed most logically, that by the law of Moses he should be punished capitally. Yet these Jews were murderers! Their guilt was not that they reasoned consistently from their premises, but that they took up wicked premises to reason from.

“No unbaptized person should approach the Lord’s table.” “Nothing but immersion is valid baptism.” Let it be granted, for argument’s sake, that the regular inference hence must be close communion: so Immersionists say. But there is another set of premises, from which no Christian mind or heart can dissent, as Dr. Armstrong has shown. From these it follows inevitably, that he whom God accepts in Christ should not be excluded by the ministers of Christ’s Church. To the gigantic and sanctified intellects of a Mason and a Robert Hall this argument was irresistible. Now, when one argues regularly to two irreconcilable conclusions, this is the clearest proof that his positions were in part wrong. So it is here; immersion is not the only valid baptism; Christ himself disclaims it by giving every mark and blessing of the visible Church to us Baptists who are not dipped.

Wise men have often said that logical results, however disclaimed and deprecated, will always work themselves to the surface in the end, where their premises are obstinately held. It is obvious that the dogma, “Nothing is valid baptism but immersion,” logically unchurches every Church and every Christian in the world, except the dipped. This is the uncharitable and odious position which some years ago was known as “Old Landmarkism,” held by a few bigoted Immersionists, deprecated and disclaimed with an amiable inconsistency by the more pious and enlightened of that denomination. But the natural fruit of the evil root is rapidly growing. Their journals now say, that not one-fourth of their churches or preachers would recognise the ordination of the holiest, most learned, and useful Pædobaptist. The logic is perfectly regular from its false starting place: that “nothing but immersion is valid baptism.” Then, none but the dipped are baptized. Baptism regularly and ordinarily initiates church membership. When all the members are unchurched, no church

is left. No man can be an officer in a commonwealth of which he is not even a member. Hence there is no candidate capable of ordination, and no church to ordain him. Yes, the shocking, the unchristian conclusion is inexorable. While sorry that any Christians should thus pervert Christian truth, we are yet glad for the sake of the truth that Immersionism is thus unmasking itself. It is our just policy to invite it to do so, for then the Christian world will see the bald enormity of the result. It is this: that here, in all parts of Christendom, are societies of undipped Christians, who are indisputably on the road to heaven, who are doing more than the whole immersed world to lead others to heaven; who exhibit every Christian grace; (except zeal for dipping!) whom Christ himself has owned as his by giving them every endowment and blessing which he bestows on his dipped churches; from whose bosom a continuous stream of ransomed souls is ascending to the Church on high; but yet they are not Churches at all, because they have not seen the force of the dipping logic, forsooth! Has Popery itself done anything more sectarian, more uncharitable, except when she burned her dissenters? The first principle which leads good men like the Immersionists regularly to this monstrous issue cannot but be evil.

5. In his discussion of the sacraments, both of baptism and the Lord's Supper, our author attacks and refutes the doctrine of the Papacy, that the sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, by the act performed. Dr. Armstrong, however, gives a fuller and more complete refutation of this great error of Rome, whether as indicated and held within the pale of the Romish Church or by those who follow her, though not, by profession, of her. This discussion is preceded by a definition of the *mass*, both of the word as a derivation from *missa*, a formula used for dismissing assemblies, and then as applied to denote the religious service itself. Afterwards it came to mean the observance of the Lord's Supper as an expiatory service; that constituting the central part of the whole service of worship, and so "by excellence" taking the name. This definition opens the way to discuss the nature of the sacrament as held to present (not *re-present*) "the body, blood, and divinity of our Lord." This discussion is both schol-

arly and able, and the author, while bringing the subject to the comprehension of the popular mind, draws successfully on Papal authorities and clear interpretations of Scripture to refute the whole scheme which Romanists of this century have been endeavoring to render palatable to the common sense and culture of English speaking people. He refers to and quotes ten or twelve authorised expositions of Papal doctrines, from the "Catechism of the Council of Trent" to the "Faith of our Fathers" by Archbishop Gibbons of Baltimore, published in 1879. It is impracticable in the limits of this article to present even a brief intelligible outline of the argument. But it is exceedingly desirable that our ministers and elders and the private members of the Protestant Churches in our country, should avail themselves of this excellent summary of the true way to make an "end of controversy" with Romanists in this day, when that Church is changing its tactics, and instead of approaching men with fire and faggot, preparing to cajole and win by fair speeches and sophistical reasoning. "The Word of God is still 'quick and powerful.'" With a free pulpit and a free press, and an open Bible, it is lamentable to notice how poorly many of our people are informed of the teachings of their own Protestant Confessions, and how inadequately "well read" and properly "learned in the Scriptures" to meet the emissaries of the apostate Church. With such means as our religious liberty gives us, we have only to know and love the truth and zealously unite in diffusing it to others, to defy the arts, as our fathers did, the power of Rome. B. M. SMITH.

ARTICLE VII.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

The charge has been made against our views, as maintained in former discussions in the pages of this REVIEW, touching the will of Adam in relation to his first sin, that they are out of harmony with the doctrine of Calvin and the Calvinistic standards. It consisted, in substance, of two particular allegations: 1. That our position that the first sin of man was the result of an unnecessitated and avoidable decision of the will, as contrary to the theory of Determinism or Philosophical Necessity, was uncalvinistic. This allegation we endeavored to refute in the last number of this REVIEW. It was shown, by a very full reference to the writings of Calvin and the Formularies of the Reformed Church, especially the Westminster standards, that in departing from the Necessitarian philosophy as applied to the first sin of the race, we had closely adhered to the great Reformer and the Symbols of the Calvinistic churches. We venture to express the hope that the exposition then elaborately furnished will call attention to the difference, so little noticed and yet so important, between Calvinism as a doctrinal system and the philosophical hypothesis of Determinism.

2. The second allegation is, that we have been equally uncalvinistic in our position in regard to the relation of the divine decree to the first sin of man. This we promised, with the leave of Providence, to consider at some future time, and we now proceed, in reliance upon God's help, to redeem the pledge. It is necessary, in order to avoid confusion and misapprehension, to clear the way by stating the points in reference to which there is no controversy between our critic and ourselves. It were worse than idle to contend about issues that have only an imaginary existence. We both profess to be Calvinists, and, as a matter of course, there must be much ground which will be conceded to be common betwixt us.

In the first place, there is no dispute between us in regard to

the scope of the divine decrees. We both accept the statement of the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, in which the decrees of God are defined to be "his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his will, whereby, for his own glory; he hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass"; and also hold that whatsoever he has fore-ordained "he freely and unchangeably fore-ordained." We differ, it appears, concerning the nature of this fore-ordination; our critic considering it as exclusively efficacious, and we distributing it into efficacious and permissive. There is a corresponding agreement and difference touching the scope of God's providence, as executive of his decrees.

In the second place, there is no difference between us in reference to the absolute and sovereign nature of the divine decrees as related to the acts of creatures. Whether they may be conditioned one by another is a question which has not so far been raised in this discussion. Particularly is there no divergence of view in respect to the absolute and unconditional nature of the special decree of Election; both maintaining the position, that it is in no degree grounded in, or conditioned by, the foresight of faith and good works and perseverance in the same. We would be at one in asserting that this decree is wholly efficacious. Nor is there any disagreement as to the fact of Reprobation; but there is, as to its relations—we affirming that the sin which it supposes was permissively, our critic, that it was efficaciously, fore-ordained; in other words, we denying, and he affirming, that the first sin was necessitated by the divine decree.

In the third place, we have no controversy either as to the fact or the scope of the divine fore-knowledge, both holding that it includes all things—beings, events, and acts. The difference between us concerning the relation of God's fore-knowledge to his decrees will enter into the matter of the ensuing discussion.

In the fourth place, there is no debate betwixt us—although our brother has intimated the contrary—in regard to the extension of the principle of cause to every event that has occurred or can occur. We agree that an uncaused event would be equivalent to the contradiction of an uncaused effect. We have never dreamed of denying, and in our previous articles expressly said

that we did not deny, that everything which comes to pass must have a cause for its existence. We differ as to the nature of second causes: we affirming that some are necessary and others are contingent, and the reviewer obliterating this distinction and maintaining that all second causes as media through which the divine efficiency exerts itself are characterised by necessity. He limits the term *contingent* to events, and by a contingent event understands one which has no cause. We extend the term to causes, and by a contingent cause mean one which may or may not produce a particular effect; and by a contingent event, one which may or may not be produced by its appropriate cause. The Confession of Faith asserts that the "contingency of second causes" is not taken away by God's eternal ordination, but rather established.*

Let it be observed, then, that we do not differ as to the scope of God's decrees as terminating on whatsoever comes to pass; nor as to their absolute nature as related to all beings, acts, and events; nor as to the scope of the divine knowledge as embracing all possible and actual things, past, present, and future; nor as to the extension of the law of cause to every thing which begins to be, either in the realm of matter or in that of mind. Let us look now at the precise state of the question which remains to be discussed. In the prosecution of the argument intended to show that the Determinist philosophy, or, as it is frequently termed, the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, breaks down in its application to the first sin of the race, and therefore fails to ground the guilt of mankind and to acquit God of the imputation of being the author of sin, we were led to consider the relation of the divine decrees to the Fall. We maintained that God neither decreed efficiently to produce the sin of Adam, nor efficaciously to procure its commission, nor to render it unavoidable by a con-created necessity of nature; but that he decreed to permit it; so that while he did not determine to prevent it, which he might have done, he, in that sense, willed its occurrence rather than its non-occurrence; yet so moreover that it was committed by a free, that is, an unnecessitated and avoidable decision of man's will. The reviewer

* Chap. III., § 1.

arraigns the orthodoxy of this position, by denying the legitimacy of the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees, by affirming that all decree is efficacious and necessitates the occurrence of every thing which begins to be, and by contending that unless all events were made certain by efficacious decree, some events would be uncertain to God himself, and his foreknowledge of them would be impossible. The exact question, therefore, in the continuation of our defence, is, Have we taken uncalvinistic and untrue ground in contending that God, in decreeing to permit the first sin of man, did not *make* its occurrence certain, or, in other words, did not necessitate its commission?

We propose, first, to vindicate the distinction, which the reviewer impeaches, between efficacious and permissive decree, particularly as applicable to man's first sin. It is impossible to mistake his position in this matter. He charges that we take refuge "under the cover of permissive decrees"; attempts explicitly to prove that "the notion of" permissive decrees is inconsistent with the doctrine of fore-ordination, and the fact of the certainty of future events; and boldly maintains the view that the will of God is the sole efficient cause of all that comes to pass. Whatever may be our difference with him, we must give him the credit of consistency in the maintenance of this tenet. He does not profess sublapsarian principles and use supralapsarian arguments. He intrepidly plants himself on the unmodified ground of the Necessitarian in philosophy, and the Supralapsarian in theology. The argument is short and lucid. God is the efficient cause of all things; sin is a thing; therefore, God is the efficient cause of sin. It is true that he endeavors to disjoin the moral quality of sin from the act of sin, and thus to represent man as the author of the quality, and God as the author of the act. Fairness compels us to accredit to him this distinction; and we shall notice it in a subsequent part of these remarks. But at present we must "stick to our last"—the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees, which we affirm and the reviewer denies. We regard it as vital, and he as worthless. We shall adopt a brief, but conclusive method of proving that we are not uncalvinistic upon this point. If we can succeed in showing,

by an appeal to their own writings, that the distinction in question is held, not by the host of Sublapsarians—that would be conceded—but by the Supralapsarians themselves, we will have fairly proved that the reviewer has not even a minority of Calvinists on his side. This we proceed to do. Our first reference is to one who may be taken to be among the Supralapsarians what Leibnitz pronounced Hobbes to be in relation to the Nominalists—*nominalibus ipsis nominaliorem*. We need scarcely say that we allude to the learned Moderator of the Westminster Assembly—Dr. Twisse. We give several passages so as to show that we cite his catholic doctrine:

“1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine: In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity [unbelief], or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the world in the state of original sin, of leaving this original sin uncured in them, and last of all of damning them for their sins, etc.

“2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants' tenet [tenet], I answer: Many of them do not maintain that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foresight of God precedent rather; as appears by the British divines their *Theses de Reprobatione*, and Alvarez professeth the same. The denial of grace and so the permitting of natural infidelity to remain uncured they make consequent (as it seems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity they make the foresight of infidelity subsequent; and this foresight of infidelity they make precedent to Reprobation, as it signifies the decree of damnation. And thus far I agree with them: that in no moment of nature, or sign of reason, did God ordain any man to damnation but for sin; and consequently in no moment of nature, or sign of reason, did the decree of damnation go before the foresight of sin or infidelity.”*

“I willingly grant that the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the means, that not only precede but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sin is the means of damnation; we say rather that permission of sin is the means, whence notwithstanding it follows not that sin shall come to pass unavoidably, but rather avoidably, whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinful act is a natural thing, and undoubtedly man hath free will as to do, so to abstain from doing, any particular act. And albeit God hath

**Riches of God's Love*, Oxford, 1653, Bk. I., p. 69.

determined that these particular sinful acts (instance the particular outrages committed against the holy Son of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel) shall come to pass by his permission; yet seeing withal he hath ordained them to come to pass contingently, that follows that they shall come to pass in such a manner as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass; otherwise they should come to pass not contingently but necessarily."*

"All that he [Dr. Twisse's opponent] hath to say to excuse his shameless crimination . . . is only this, that our divines maintain the decree of damnation to precede the foresight of sin. Yet this is untrue of the most part of them; who permit both the foresight of sin original before reprobation from grace, and of sin actual before the decree of damnation. I willingly confess, for my part, that I concur with neither; and if I should, I would withal make the decree of permitting of sin to precede the decree of damnation, for which I see no reason; but yet I do not make the decree of permitting sin to follow the decree of damnation. I hold these decrees to be simultaneous, thus: that God at once decrees both to create men, and to suffer them to fall in Adam," etc.†

"God will have the good things of the world, whether natural, moral, or spiritual, come to pass by his working of them; only evil things he will have come to pass by his permitting them."‡

It is not our business to attempt a reconciliation of Dr. Twisse's contradictory statements—that sin when permitted is avoidable, conceived either in relation to man's free will or to God's decree, and that at the same time it must come to pass in consequence of God's permission. All that we wish to show is the fact, that this eminent Supralapsarian recognised and enforced the distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees—between God's working and permitting—a distinction ridiculed by our reviewer. Our next witness shall be the celebrated William Perkins:

"Sin is governed of God by two actions: the first is an operative permission. I so call it because God partly permitted sin and partly worketh in it. . . . Every quality or action, so far forth as it is a quality or action, is existing in nature and hath God to be the author of it. . . . In respect of the breach of the law itself, God neither willeth, nor appointeth, nor commandeth, nor causeth, nor helpeth sin, but forbiddeth, condemneth and punisheth it; yet so as withal he willingly permitteth it to be done by others, as men and wicked angels, they being the sole authors and causes of it. And this permission by God is upon a good end: because thereby he

**Ibid.*, Book II., page 24. †*Ibid.*, Book II., page 30.

‡*Ibid.*, Book II., page 55.

manifesteth his justice and mercy. . . God's second action in the government of sin is, after the just permission of it, partly to restrain it more or less, according to his good will and pleasure, and partly to dispose and turn it," etc.*

"The inward cause [of sin] was the will of our first parents. . . But it may be objected that if Adam were created good, he could not be the cause of his own fall, because a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. *Answer*: I. Freedom of his will is fourfold; first: freedom to evil alone. This is only in wicked men and angels, and is indeed a bondage. The second is freedom to good alone; and that is in God and the good angels by God's grace. The third is freedom to good in part, joined with some want of liberty by reason of sin; and this is in the regenerate in this life. The fourth is freedom either to good or evil indifferently; and this was in Adam before his fall, who, though he had no inclination to sin, but only to that which was acceptable to God, yet was he not bound by any necessity, but had his liberty freely to choose or refuse either good or evil. And this is evident by the very tenor of God's commandment, in which he forbids Adam to eat the forbidden fruit; and thereby showing that he, being created righteous, and not prone to sin, had power to keep or not to keep the commandment; though since the Fall both he and we after him cannot but sin. Wherefore Adam being allured by Satan, of his own free accord changed himself, and fell from God. Now then as the good tree changed from good to evil brings forth evil fruit, so Adam by his own inward and free motion changing from good to evil brings forth evil fruit.

"As for God, he is not to be reputed as an author or cause any way of this sin, for he created Adam and Eve righteous, endued them with righteous wills, and he told them what he would exact and what they could perform. . . Some may say, Whereas God foresaw that Adam would abuse the liberty of his will, why would he not prevent it? *Answer*: There is a double grace: the one to be able to will and do that which is good; the other to be able to persevere in willing and doing the same. Now God gave the first to Adam and not the second; and he is not to be blamed of us, though he confirmed him not with new grace, for he is debtor to no man to give him so much as the least grace; whereas he had already given a plentiful measure thereof to him. . . There is a double liberty of will. One is to will good or evil; this belongs to the creature in this world, and therefore Adam received it. The other is to will good alone. That he wanted, because it is reserved to the life to come. . . Although he [God] did foresee man's defection, yet is he free from all blame in not preventing it. For with him there be good causes of permitting evil. And though God be no cause of man's fall, yet must we not imagine that it came to pass by chance or fortune, whereas the least things that

* *Works*, London, 1635, p. 156.

are come to pass with God's providence. Neither was it by any bare permission, without his decree and will; for that is to make an idle providence. Neither did it happen against the will of God, he utterly nilling it, for then it could not have been, unless we deny God to be omnipotent. It remains therefore that this fall did so proceed of the voluntary motion of Adam, as that God did in part ordain and will the permitting of it."*

"We must make distinction between sin in itself and the permission thereof; and between the decree of rejection and actual damnation. Now the permission of sin, and not sin itself properly, is the subordinate means of the decree of rejection. For when God had decreed to pass by some men, he withal decreed the permission of sin, to which permission men were ordained; and sin itself is no effect, but only the consequent of the decree; yet so as it is not only the antecedent, but also the efficient and meritorious cause of actual damnation."†

We next cite two brief but explicit passages from the learned Dr. Gill:

"Everything that comes to pass in this world, from the beginning to the end of it, is pre-ordained; everything good and bad: good, by his effective decrees, that is, such by which he determines what he will do himself, or shall be done by others; and evil things, by his permissive decrees, by which he suffers things to be done; yea, things contingent, which with respect to second causes may seem to be or not be, as the free actions of men."‡

"The decree of election may be distinguished into the decree of the end, and the decree of the means. The decree of the end, respecting some, is either subordinate to their eternal happiness; or ultimate, which is more properly the end, the glory of God. . . The decree of the means includes the decree to create men, to permit them to fall," etc.||

The only other British theologian who shall be summoned to testify is the able and rigid Supralapsarian—John Brine:

"God decreed to condemn no man but for sin, or without the consideration of sin. And though sin certainly follows upon God's decree to permit it, his decree to permit it gives not being to it, and therefore he is not the cause of it. . . The being of sin follows upon God's will to permit it. 'Tis not what he effects, but what he permits, and therefore though its being is certain yet men act it freely and without any compulsion. . . God's decree of the being of sin gives not being to it, and therefore God cannot justly be considered as the author of it. The divine decree to permit man to sin has no influence upon his will in sinning. . . Though sin certainly follows upon God's decree of the permission of it, yet the

**Ibid.*, pp. 160, 161. †*Ibid.*, p. 238.

‡*Body of Divinity*, London, 1796, Vol. I., p. 255. ||*Ibid.*, p. 267.

will of man freely and not necessarily chooses sin. . . He [Baxter] adds, 'God suspends his own operation, so as not to necessitate the will.' This is very impertinently observed; for it is not apprehended [by Supralapsarians] that the will is necessitated to make the evil choice it does in sin. . . God must have willed the being of sin . . . but, as we say, with a will permitting, not effecting."*

Even Theodore Beza, one of the few continental Supralapsarians of note, grants, to some extent,† the distinction in question. He opposes an unwilling permission of sin on God's part—and in this all Calvinists would agree with him—but appears to allow a willing permission: "For even," says he, "if you should betake yourself to permission, the only asylum of some in this discussion, you must come back to this, either to deny the omnipotence of God if he unwillingly permitted, or to confess that he willed to permit (*volentem permisisse*)."‡ The absurd doctrine, that the Almighty unwillingly permits anything to come to pass, we relinquish to the tender mercies of the Supralapsarian. Beza may rend it to his heart's content. And so with the tenet of a bare permission—*nuda permissio*. But the question is, whether even the Supralapsarians did not acknowledge a distinction between a decree to effect and a decree to permit. And that Beza, uncompromising as he was, conceded that distinction even in the relation of decree to the sins of the wicked, let the following passage testify. After justly exploding the distinction between permission and will (*permissio et voluntas*), he says:

"It remains, therefore, that what he permits, he wills to permit. . . God hardens whom he will, not indeed by engendering (*ingenerando*)

* *Works*, London, 1746, Vol. I., pp. 311, 327, 334, 337.

† "The Supralapsarians have always been a small minority among Calvinistic divines, and have had to defend their views against the great body of their brethren. . . In addition to Beza the most eminent men who defended Supralapsarian views in the sixteenth century were Whitaker and Perkins. . . Supralapsarianism has not again been advocated by any very eminent theologian in England except Twisse. The eminent men who most elaborately and zealously defended Supralapsarianism in the seventeenth century were Gomarus, Twisse, and Voetius. . . That the great body of the members of the Synod [of Dort] were Sublapsarians is certain." Cunningham's *Reformers*, pp. 363, 366, 367.

‡ Comm. in Rom. xi. 11.

some new wickedness in them, in like manner as he efficiently produces (*effects: efficit*) new strength in the elect whom he changes; nor even by compelling them, since no one sins except willingly: but first indeed by more and more abandoning them already corrupt, and then by efficaciously delivering them, as a most righteous judge, to the lusts of their own hearts and also to Satan.'*

It would be as well a needless task as an infiction upon our readers to cite the authority of Sublapsarian theologians or formularies in support of the distinction between a decree to effect and a decree to permit. We have sufficiently proved that it is a Calvinistic determination, by showing that it was held even by the Supralapsarians themselves; and in the light of this fact we confess that the allegation that we have been uncalvinistic in maintaining it, passes our comprehension, except in accordance with the adage, *lucus a non lucendo*—we are uncalvinistic for agreeing with all Calvinists!

But it will be said that although the Supralapsarians allowed the distinction between effectuation and permission, they, at the same time, held that the decree to permit the first sin was necessarily followed by the commission of that sin. We do not deny that such a position was maintained by most if not all of them; on the contrary, we cannot see how it could be logically avoided as a consequence from their fundamental and characteristic assumption, that the decree to elect and reprobate preceded the decree to create. If, as they hold, God determined to glorify his mercy and justice in the salvation and destruction of men before they were conceived as created or fallen, creation and the fall were necessitated in order to the attainment of that end. Hence it is, we presume, that the two late American theologians, Hodge and Thornwell, threw out of account the element of permission in their estimate of the Supralapsarian scheme. Their analysis and discussion of that system would be unfair, were they not justified in treating as an illogical and irrelevant interjection into it of a merely nominal permission of the Fall. Their statement of the order of the divine decrees from the Supralapsarian point of view was: Predestination, Creation, the Fall, Redemption, and Voca-

**Com. in Rom. ix. 18.*

tion; not Predestination, Creation, Permission of the Fall, etc. All their arguments against the scheme are based upon the supposition, that it involves the necessitation of the Fall as a means to an end. Still it must be admitted, that the Supralapsarian divines themselves expressly contended for the decree to permit the Fall. We have, therefore, legitimately quoted them as distinguishing formally between the decree to effect and the decree to permit. It is not our purpose, just at this point, to expose the fatal contradiction which emerges in the very bosom of the scheme; nor to refute the scholastic hypothesis by which its advocates endeavored to remove that contradiction and to reconcile permission with necessitation, namely, that God efficiently produced the act of the first sin as a positive entity and therefore good, but he permitted man to produce the evil quality which belonged to the act. We design just now to examine Calvin's position in regard to this matter, both because it is a question intrinsically interesting to every Calvinist, and because it bears directly upon the intimation that we have departed from his doctrine.

We take occasion here to say that while we cherish the profoundest admiration for the writings of the illustrious Reformer, and rejoice when we can support our positions with the weight of his great name, we cannot regard his works as exclusively the norm of Calvinism. Connect the latter part of the sixteenth century with the seventeenth, as he himself does in another place, and we concur with Dr. A. A. Hodge, who, in his very able work on the Atonement, in speaking to the question, What is Calvinism? says: "The title Calvinism has—whether with propriety or not, nevertheless as a fixed fact—been given to a definite system, which possesses an identity of character and of history independent of any single man that ever lived. . . . We lay it down, therefore, as a canon, which no student of historical theology will care to deny, that the common consent of the Reformed Churches during the seventeenth century, as witnessed in their creeds and in the writings of their representative theologians, is the standard of Calvinism."* We are obliged to as-

* Pp. 391, 392. We are of opinion that his remark in reference to Calvin that "all the world knows that as a predestinarian he went to the length of Supralapsarianism" needs to be qualified.

sign to the writings of Calvin a principal place as a factor in the production of the system which bears his name; but one's difference from some of his doctrines does not necessarily rule the dissentient out of the Calvinistic ranks. We have shown that we have inculcated precisely his views in regard to the freedom of the will. We now proceed to inquire what was his position as to the order of the divine decrees, and as to the object of predestination, so far as man is concerned. Was Calvin a Supralapsarian or a Sublapsarian? Whatever may be the interest which may be conceived to attach to this question, it is one the consideration of which the requirements of this discussion exact from us. Nor are we reluctant to encounter it, from the conviction that it is obsolete and needless. We by no means think so. Calvin, we are satisfied, has been greatly misunderstood and misrepresented. It is of consequence that his opinions, especially in regard to the subject of the divine decrees, constituting as they do, to a large extent, the differentiating element of the Calvinistic body, should be clearly understood and exhibited. We are inclined to think that much confusion and much trouble would have been saved, if Calvin's doctrine had always been distinguished from that of his contemporary and successor, Theodore Beza. Indeed, we think it questionable whether, if Beza had not taught Supralapsarianism at Geneva, Arminius would have been bold enough to inculcate Arminianism at Leyden. We have been led to think so from an attentive examination of the Conference between Arminius and Francis Junius. Even Dr. Cunningham, although, as we have seen, he considered the controversy of but little consequence, could use such language as this; "Beza, then, in his explicit advocacy of Supralapsarianism, went beyond his master. We do not regard this among the services which he rendered to scriptural truth; especially as we are bound in candor to admit, that there is some ground to believe that his high views upon this subject exerted a repelling influence upon the mind of Arminius, who studied under him for a time at Geneva."*

The question is not a new one. It has been discussed by

* *Reformers, etc.*, p. 366.

Sublapsarians, Supralapsarians, and Arminians; by the first two of these classes from a desire to possess the support of Calvin's authority for their respective views, by the last for the purpose of bringing his name into public reproach. But canvassed as it formerly was, we have our doubts whether the evidence in the case was exhaustively presented. At least the sublapsarian claim to Calvin's support can be more amply sustained than by the citations from his writings which were collected by Turretin. It may be expedient, for the sake of clearness, to state the difference between the supralapsarian and the sublapsarian doctrines. The peculiar position of the Supralapsarian is, that out of the mass of men conceived as not yet created, but as to be created—*ex pura massa*—God from eternity predestinated some to salvation and some to destruction. The peculiar position of the Sublapsarian is, that out of the mass of men conceived as already fallen and corrupt—*ex corrupta massa*—God from eternity predestinated some to salvation and some to destruction. There is a third position held by some Supralapsarians, namely, that the object of predestination was man conceived as created, but not yet fallen. But the main issue is between the advocates of the first two which have been mentioned. We begin our attempt to show that Calvin held, although not nominally, yet really, the sublapsarian doctrine, with the well known passage from Turretin :

“That Calvin followed the opinion received in our churches touching the object of predestination can be very clearly collected from many places, especially in his book *On Eternal Predestination*, p. 978. ‘When the discussion is concerning predestination,’ says he, ‘I have always steadfastly taught, and to this day teach, that it begins hence: that all the reprobate, who died and were condemned in Adam, were justly left in death.’ And afterwards: ‘It becomes us to touch upon this question only sparingly, not because it is abstruse and hidden in the inmost recess of God's sanctuary, but because an idle curiosity is not to be promoted, of which excessive speculation is at once the nursing and the nurse. The discussion of the other part is attended with greater profit, namely, that from the condemned offspring of Adam God elects whom he pleases, and whom he pleases reprobates. Upon this doctrine, which contains in itself the assertion of the corruption and guilt of human nature, I the more freely insist, as one which is not only more conducive to piety, but one also which is more strictly theological.’ So *Institutes*

Book III., Ch. XXII., §§1 and 7, and Ch. XXIII., §3: 'If all are chosen out of the corrupt mass, it is no wonder that all are subject to condemnation.' So also he thinks that Paul in the ninth chapter of Romans speaks of the corrupt mass, in commenting upon which passage, among other things, he says: 'It is true that the proximate cause of reprobation is, that all are accursed in Adam.' In this judgment of the great theologian, which corresponds with Article XII. of the Gallican Confession, and also with the deliverance of the Synod of Dort, we entirely concur, and are of opinion that all who would think soberly ought to concur."*

To these testimonies we add others, in order to show that these were not exceptional utterances of Calvin, but represent his uniform teaching.

"He [Pighius] laughs at Augustin and those like him, that is, all the pious, who imagine that God, after he had foreknown the ruin of the whole human race in the person of Adam, destined some to life and others to destruction."†

"But Pighius still insists that they [the reprobate, according to Calvin's doctrine] were made, not found, worthy of destruction; as if indeed it were true, that I teach that those who perish were destined to death in the eternal purpose of God, of which the reason is not apparent. I answer, that here three things must be taken into consideration: first, that the eternal predestination of God which determined what would come to pass concerning the whole human race, and concerning every individual man, was fixed and decreed before Adam fell; in the next place, that Adam himself was devoted to death on account of the desert of his defecation; lastly, that all his posterity were so condemned in the person of him already ruined and shut up to despair, that God might adjudge worthy of the honor of adoption those whom he thence gratuitously elects."‡

"Paul taught that out of the ruined mass (*ex perdita massa*) God elects and reprobates those whom he pleased." §

"It can scarcely happen, indeed, but that the human mind should be agitated when first it learns that the grace of God is denied to so many of the unworthy as he pleases, and in like manner granted to the unworthy. But we should remember that since all had been condemned with equal justice, it would be by no means right or just that God should be bound by law so that he should not have mercy upon any whom he pleased."¶

*Loc. IV., Ques. IX., S. XXX.

†*Consensus Genevensis*, Niemeyer, p. 253.

‡*Ibid.*, p. 267. §*Ibid.*, p. 269. ¶*Ibid.*, p. 270.

In the treatise on Eternal Predestination, from which we have made the foregoing quotations, Calvin more than once cites with approval passages from Augustin in which the sublapsarian doctrine is expressly maintained. We have, however, thought it sufficient to adduce his own opinion. But he also does the same thing in his great discussion of the Bondage and Liberation of the Human Will in answer to the Romanist Pighius. We give an instance or two:*

“From the mass of perdition which was constituted through the first Adam none could be separated, except because they have this gift which they receive from the grace of God. Moreover whom he elected them he also called.”

“Those who will not persevere, and so will fall from faith, are not separated from the mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God, and therefore are not called according to his purpose.”

We give a few passages from his Commentaries:

“Let this, therefore, be the first proposition, As the blessing of the covenant doth separate the people of Israel from all other nations; so also the election of God discerneth the men of that nation, while he predestineth some unto salvation and other some unto condemnation. The second proposition is, That there is no other foundation of that election than the mere goodness of God, and also mercy, since the fall of Adam. . . Therefore, when he saith that both of them [Esau and Jacob] had then done neither good nor evil, it is also to be added, which he presumeth, namely, that both of them were the sons of Adam, by nature sinners, endued with no crumb of righteousness.”†

“How childish is the attempt to meet this argument by the following sophism: ‘We were chosen because we were worthy, and because God foresaw that we would be worthy’! We were all lost in Adam; and therefore had not God through his own election rescued us from perishing, there was nothing to be foreseen.”‡

“It may be asked, As Adam did not fall before the creation of the world, how was it that Christ had been appointed the Redeemer? for a remedy is posterior to the disease. My reply is, that this is to be referred to God’s foreknowledge; for doubtless God, before he created man, foresaw that he would not stand long in his integrity. Hence he ordained, according to his wonderful wisdom and goodness, that Christ should be the Redeemer, to deliver the lost race of man from ruin.”||

“Whereas the whole human race deserves the same destruction, and

* *Opp.*, Amsterdam, Vol. VIII., p. 155. † *On Rom.* ix. 11, Calvin Society’s Trans. ‡ *On Gal.* i. 4. || *On 1 Peter*, i. 2.

is bound under the same sentence of condemnation, some are delivered by gratuitous mercy, others are justly left in their own destruction."*

We have, we frankly admit, encountered a passage which cannot be adjusted to this body of testimony. It occurs in Lecture CLXX. on the Twelve Minor Prophets, being a commentary on Malachi i. 2-6.

"As to reprobation, the cause of it is sufficiently manifest in the fall of Adam, for, as we have said, we all fell with him. It must still be observed that the election of God is anterior to Adam's fall; and that hence all we who are rescued from the common ruin have been chosen in Christ before the creation of the world, but that *others justly perish though they had not been lost in Adam*; because God appointed Christ the head of his Church, in order that we might be saved in him, not all, but those who have been chosen."†

We confess that we are puzzled as to the meaning of this passage. The first part seems to teach the sublapsarian doctrine, and the last, if it mean anything, the supralapsarian. We do not see how either party to the controversy can claim the passage as in its favor.

We have attentively considered Twisse's elaborate and ingenious argument in opposition to the claim of the Sublapsarians, fortified by citations from his writings; that Calvin held their view;‡ and while we have been obliged to admire his profound scholastic learning, and have gained from his discussion valuable information in reference to the distinctions concerning the divine decrees which entered as important elements into the controversies of the time, we have failed to be convinced by his reasoning. In the first place, Twisse seems to have been compelled to limit himself to a negative criticism of the passages from Calvin which the Sublapsarians adduced in favor of their doctrine. There seemed to be few, if any, positive testimonies to the supralapsarian view which it was in his power to cite. The presumption, arising from this consideration, is certainly against him. In the second place, there is, to our mind, an intrinsic weakness in the arguments he urges which could only be fully exhibited by such a

*On Gen. xxv. 23.

†*Commentaries*, Calvin's Society's Trans., Vol. V., p. 479.

‡*Vindiciæ, De Prædest.*, Lib. i., P. i., C. ii.

protracted analysis of them as we have not the space to furnish. We give one specimen. He distinguishes between election and reprobation as eternal and as temporal, the latter being the execution of the former.* Having introduced this distinction he uses it to blunt the point of the passages in which Calvin seems to enounce the sublapsarian view of an election and reprobation in the order of thought presupposing and proceeding from the fallen mass of mankind, by simply construing Calvin's words as having reference to temporal and not eternal election and reprobation. And of course it would be admitted on all hands that the execution of those decrees in time presupposes a fallen mass out of which the elect are called, and in which the reprobate are judicially left. But, 1. The temporal execution of these decrees must correspond with their eternal idea in the divine mind. We see not how anything is gained by the distinction. 2. The temporal election of which Twisse speaks cannot be distinguished from calling. The office discharged by them is the same; and surely Calvin was wont to discriminate between an eternal election and a vocation in time. 3. We fail to apprehend the distinction between Twisse's temporal election and reprobation, and the providential execution of the eternal decrees of election and reprobation. Decrees and providence are, in a certain sense, confounded. 4. The analogy of Calvinistic usage does not sanction the distinction under consideration, and that usage, we are apt to think, was stamped by Calvin's writings. In the third place, Turretin, in the passage cited above from his *Theological Institutes*, says that Calvin held the opinion received in the Reformed Churches—that is, the sublapsarian. It seems almost impossible to conceive how the uniform type of doctrine concerning predestination in the Reformed Churches could have been sublapsarian, had not Calvin sanctioned that view of the decrees. The great majority of the divines who sat in the Synod of Dort were Sublapsarians, and the same was true of those who composed the Westminster Assembly, of which Dr. Twisse himself was the Moderator, until his death devolved that office upon

* "Hæc Calvini verba de electione temporali, quæ nihil aliud est quam æternæ electionis executio." etc. *De Prædest.*, L. i., P. i., C. ii.

another. It seems wholly improbable that, in the course of a century, only a few exceptional theologians of the Reformed Church represented the opinion of the great doctrinal leader of that body, while the mass of the ministers and churches had abandoned it. So far as to the question of Calvin's Sublapsarianism.

It cannot be expected that one would find this question nominally and expressly handled in the formularies that antedated the Synod of Dort, for the reason that it had not up to that time assumed definite shape. We are aware that they have been claimed by some Sublapsarians as favoring their doctrine; but regarding their testimony as incapable of being clearly pleaded on either side, we refrain from citing it. The Canons of the Synod of Dort are sufficiently explicit in relation to the question. Says Canon VII. of Chapter I.:

"Election is the unchangeable purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, from the whole human race, fallen by its own fault from primeval integrity into sin and destruction, according to the most free pleasure of his own will, out of mere grace, he elected to salvation in Christ a definite multitude of individuals, neither better nor more worthy than others, but lying with others in a common misery."*

Canon X. of Chap. I. says that election consists in this: "That he [God] called some certain persons out of the common multitude of sinners," etc.†

Canon I. of the same Chapter says:

"Since all men sinned in Adam, and were made subject to the curse and death eternal, God would have done injustice to none if he had willed to leave the whole human race in sin and under the curse, and to damn them on account of sin."‡

In its "Rejection of Errors" the Synod specifies that of those.

"Who teach: That God of his mere righteous will decreed (*decrevisse*) to leave no one in the fall of Adam and in a common state of sin and damnation."||

Here Twisse's distinction cannot be pleaded between the eternal decree to leave, and the temporal leaving of, men in the fallen mass. The Synod in rejecting the error, namely that God decreed to leave no one in the fallen mass, affirmed the op-

* Niemeyer, p. 694. † *Ibid.*, p. 695. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 693. || *Ibid.*, p. 700.

posite truth, to wit, that God did decree to leave some in the fallen mass; that is to say, the eternal decree of reprobation, in the divine mind, presupposed the decree to permit the Fall.

The striking testimony of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* Dr. Charles Hodge, in discussing the subject of Supralapsarianism,* did not deem it necessary expressly to cite, as he seemed to regard it as well-known that it contains "a formal repudiation of the supralapsarian view." But as the question before us is concerned about the doctrine of the Calvinistic standards, we feel bound to quote the language of that great formulary:

"Before the foundations of the world were laid, God, in Christ Jesus our Lord, formed an eternal purpose, in which, out of the mere good pleasure of his will, without any foresight of the merit of works or of faith, unto the praise of his glorious grace, elected a certain and definite number of men in the same mass of corruption (*in eadem corruptionis massa*), and lying in a common blood, and so corrupt in sin, to be, in time, brought to salvation through Christ the only Sponsor and Mediator, and through the merit of the same, by the most powerful influence of the Holy Spirit regenerating, to be effectually called, regenerated and endued with faith and repentance. And in such wise indeed did God determine to illustrate his glory, that he decreed, first to create man in integrity, then to permit the fall of the same, and finally to pity some from among the fallen, and so to elect the same, but to leave others in the corrupt mass, and at length to devote them to eternal destruction."†

So much for the testimony of those pronounced Calvinistic formularies, the Canons of the Synod of Dort and the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*. The Westminster Standards, we are prepared in candor to admit, do not seem to us explicitly to affirm the sublapsarian doctrine. We think, however, that they imply it. As an offset to the opinion of Dr. Cunningham, that there is an "omission in the Confession of any statement that might be fairly held to contain or to imply a denial of Supralapsarianism,"‡ that of Dr. Charles Hodge may be mentioned, who, after

* *Syst. Theol.*, Vol. ii., p. 317. † Niemeyer, p. 731.

‡ *Reformers, etc.*, p. 369. We have a profound respect for Dr. Cunningham, as one of the greatest men that the Scottish churches have produced, and owe him a special debt of gratitude for his masterly discussions of church questions; but to "err is human," and we have sometimes been obliged to pause and examine his statements. For instance, in his *Historical Theology* (Vol. I., p. 82), he attributes to Calvin the doctrine

observing that Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, was a zealous Supralapsarian, but that the great majority of its members were on the other side, says: "The symbols of that Assembly, while they clearly imply the infralapsarian view, were yet so framed as to avoid offence to those who adopted the supralapsarian theory."* He then proceeds to adduce passages from which, in his judgment, the sublapsarian doctrine is logically deducible.

But let it be supposed that the Westminster standards are neutral in regard to this question, that is to say precisely, that they leave the question an open one, whether the object of election and reprobation was man considered as unfallen or considered as fallen,—let this be supposed, and it will follow that one who holds the sublapsarian view, as we do, could not be adjudged to be out of harmony, as to that matter, with those standards. And it will further be true, that, as those Calvinistic formularies which speak professedly upon the question are sublapsarian, and the great body of Calvinistic theologians take the same view, he who maintains the sublapsarian doctrine is positively in harmony with the standards of Calvinism. Supralapsarianism has never been made symbolic, while Sublapsarianism has been definitely incorporated into some of the Calvinistic Confessions. Upon what ground, then, can it be fairly maintained that we have inculcated a "new theology," involving a departure from the standards of Calvinism?

It will perhaps be asked, Why this attempt to prove Calvin and the Calvinistic confessions to have been sublapsarian? First, because we have in the preceding discussion occupied sublapsarian ground, and in this respect our agreement with Calvin and the Calvinistic standards is made apparent; secondly and chiefly, for the reason that if Calvin and the Calvinistic symbols are proved to have been sublapsarian, the presumption is a powerful

"that Christ descended into hell—in this sense, that after death he went to the place of the damned, and shared somehow in their torments;" whereas the fact is that, in one of the most eloquent and affecting passages of the Institutes (B. II., C. XVI., §§ 10–12), he expressly contends that Christ descended into hell in this sense—that he endured the pains of hell during his last passion in the garden and on the cross.

* *Syst. Theol.*, Vol. III., p. 317.

one that they could not have maintained the supralapsarian position, that God by his efficient decree necessitated the commission of the first sin. If Calvin was a sublapsarian in one respect, it is likely that he was in all. And if upon investigation it be discovered that while he held the sublapsarian order of the divine decrees, he also taught the supralapsarian doctrine that God so predetermined the first sin that its production became a necessity, as a means to an end, it will be shown that the Reformer was inconsistent with himself, and we would be at liberty to elect which of the incongruous doctrines we would receive. The consequence would be that neither the Sublapsarian nor the Supralapsarian could be said to be out of harmony with his teachings. We are entitled, then, to carry with us this presumption, in further inquiring whether the doctrine that the first sin was made necessary by efficacious decree was held by Calvin, and is a normal element of the Calvinistic system. This we understand the reviewer to affirm; and accordingly he pronounces our position upon this point novel and heterodox, namely, that God did not by an efficient decree necessitate the first sin, but that his foreordination of it was permissive.

In order that the issue may be distinctly apprehended, and that it may appear that we do not misconceive the reviewer's doctrine, we quote his own words:

"The apprehension of certainty in relation to the future implies, to our created intelligence, a pre-determination."

"According to the laws of thought with which we ourselves are endowed by the Creator, we cannot conceive of certainty which is not established by antecedents. But before creation all antecedents must have been in the mind of the Almighty. His volitions, therefore, are the fountains of his creative acts. His purposes alone established the certainty of these wonderful events. Resolutions formed by an infinite mind must be accompanied by a positive assurance of the acts to which they relate. This consciousness is not the result of calculation or inference. It is not an impression of overwhelming probability, but an intuition that the purposes of such a mind, unrestricted by conditions, will be fulfilled. The purpose is a cause of infinite efficiency, and the effect is immediately apprehended as a certain result."

"The certainty and necessity of all events within the scope of God's foreknowledge must include even the volitions of his creatures. . . Sin

sustains a twofold relation : a moral one to the motives that have actuated the culprit, and an historical and providential one to the decrees of God. It is the moral relation which imparts to it its true heinousness. The historical relation has no moral features, but simply connects it as a link with the vast chain of antecedents and consequents which the wisdom of God has established. This is the best rational solution which our minds can frame consistently with our premises."

"What kind of a cause do we mean when we speak of the cause of volition? God is the only First Cause recognised by theistical philosophers. We must therefore mean that our inquiry refers to a second cause. But second causes are always in their turn effects. Now this theory [the one criticised] makes the second cause of volitions a new first cause. It supersedes the Deity."

"Attention should first be directed to the decree itself. This is called a purpose, and a purpose implies active volition. . . We are expressly informed that 'God executes his decrees in the works of creation and providence.' It was his purpose, therefore, not only to permit others to execute them, but to provide for them by acts of his own. The creation of man was one of the means he employed for this end, and the condition and circumstances in which man was placed were according to his wise foreordination. The object of the decree was the end, the subsequent acts were the means. Now if the end was certain, as the object of God's decree—one of the all things that come to pass—the decree and the means must have been efficient. There is no escape possible. The efficiency of the decrees of God is as certain in the one case as in another. In some cases it is direct, as when he said, 'Let there be light, and there was light.' In other cases it is through his own appointed means, as when Adam fell. The efficiency of the means is essential to the certainty of the result."

These statements show the reviewer's doctrine to be: that all divine decrees are efficient; that all events, being efficiently decreed, must be effected by God; and, consequently, that Adam's first sin, as it was an object of efficient decree, was necessary and unavoidable, and was, in a certain sense, effected by God himself. In short, God is the sole efficient cause in the universe, and all second causes are but means through which he effects his purposes. Now is this the doctrine of Calvin? We are aware that it is imputed to him by his enemies, and the changes endlessly rung upon it. But if it be his doctrine, we have read him to little purpose. In the attempt to settle this question, the path must be cleared of irrelevant issues.

In the first place, the question is not whether the Reformer held the relation of the divine decrees to all events that come to pass. Of course he taught that, and every Calvinist believes with him. It would be a mere waste of time to talk upon that point. Let us then think it away.

In the second place, the question is not what Calvin taught as to the relation of the divine decrees to the sins of the wicked. We insist upon it, that that question, as irrelevant, be not involved in the discussion. That Calvin held that efficacious decrees, in a sense terminate on the sins of the incorrigibly wicked, we have already freely conceded, and expressed our assent to his doctrine on the subject. The significance of this consideration would be destroyed, if indeed Calvin recognised no difference between the relation of the divine efficiency to the sins of the wicked and the first sin of a being previously innocent. But we have shown, in a former discussion, that he did emphasize the difference. We are not alone in that view. Scott, the able Continuator of Milner's Church History, saw the distinction and signalled it as necessary to an intelligent judgment in regard to Calvin's teaching concerning the relation of God's efficiency to sin.* But if what the Reformer taught as to the influence of decree upon the wicked be left out of account, the great bulk of his writings on the subject of election and reprobation will lie beyond the pale of the present investigation.

In the third place, the question is not, whether Calvin held that God, through the natural constitution which he conferred upon Adam at creation, necessitated the commission of his first sin. In our article in the last number of this REVIEW we proved, by copious citations from his works, that he did not hold that view, but that, on the contrary, he maintained that God gave him a nature and endowed him with grace which amply capacitated him to stand in holiness and win eternal life for himself and for his seed.

In the fourth place, the question is not, whether Calvin inculcated the view that God's foreknowledge of the first sin proved its certainty as an historical event. That a necessity of infalli-

*Vol. III., p. 583.

bility, as it has been sometimes termed, or a necessity of consequence, as at other times it has been denominated, existed between God's foreknowledge of the sin and its occurrence—that such a necessity was held by Calvin, and by Calvinists in general, there can be no doubt; and therefore there need be no discussion as to that matter. For that is a species of necessity which is related to knowledge and not to causal efficiency. The knowledge of the event being supposed, its certainty follows as a logical consequence; but the knowledge exerts no productive influence in bringing the event to pass. The question, therefore, is not, whether the occurrence of the first sin was, in relation to God's all-perfect knowledge, necessary in the sense of being infallibly known, or in the sense of a logical consequence from the proposition: God foreknew the occurrence of the sin.

What then is the question? It is, precisely, whether Calvin's doctrine was, that God efficaciously decreed the first sin, and whether, by consequence, he, in pursuance of that decree, providentially effected it? As we have no disposition to state the question disadvantageously to the reviewer, let us narrow it still further: Was it Calvin's view that God decreed to effect, and therefore providentially effected, the first sin, regarded as an act, an entity, or, as the reviewer expresses it, an historical event, while he permitted man to infuse the bad quality into the act, or to fail in producing the good quality which ought to have been attached to it?

We will first adduce and examine the most prominent passages in his works which seem to place him on the affirmative of this question. We will begin with those which appear to teach that God decreed to create man for destruction.

“It is impossible to deny that God foreknew what the end of man was to be before he made him, and foreknew, because he had so ordained by his decree.”*

“Though, by the eternal providence of God, man was formed for the calamity under which he lies, he took the matter of it from himself, not from God, since the only cause of his destruction was his degenerating from the purity of his creation into a state of vice and impurity.”†

“Those therefore whom he has created for dishonor during life and

**Institutes*, B. III., C. XXIII., §7. †*Ibid.*, §9.

destruction at death, that they may be vessels of wrath and examples of severity, in bringing to their doom, he at one time deprives of the means of hearing his word, at another by the preaching of it blinds and stupefies them the more.'*

It must be admitted that in these passages the language of Calvin is not perfectly definite; and as we were not his private secretary we have no desire to dogmatise in regard to its meaning. But it is fair to interpret him in these utterances in accordance with the whole analogy of his teachings; and guided by that canon, we are led to the opinion that the evidence, as a whole, does not favor the view that he here maintained that God first decreed to condemn men for their sins, and then decreed to create them for that purpose—that is, that in the divine mind, the decree to condemn preceded the decree to create. In support of this construction of his language we submit the following reasons:

In the first place, we have seen that Calvin really taught the sublapsarian view of the order of the divine decrees, and the object of predestination. This was his catholic doctrine. If so, he would be inconsistent with himself, if, in the passages cited, he inculcated the opposite view. The presumption is against that supposition—so strongly against it that the language of these extracts must be shown to be unambiguous in order to sustain it. But that this is difficult to be done will appear from our next consideration.

In the second place, it is far from evident that by the term *create* which is the hinge of his meaning in these passages, Calvin means *decree to create*. When the Reformer says that God foreknew the end of man, before he *made* him, it does not follow that he meant to say that God foreknew the end of man, as one of salvation or destruction, before he *decreed to make* him. The two propositions are very different. And it must also be borne in mind that Calvin treated the hypothesis of the traduction of souls with contempt, and held tenaciously that of their immediate creation. If that view be taken into connection with his doctrine of the federal imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity, it is clear that he maintained that God creates the descendants of

**Ibid.*, B. III., C. XXIV., §12.

Adam, as qualified by the guilt so imputed to them. This "he foreknew" before their actual creation; in this light, "man was formed for the calamity under which he lies," and "was created for dishonor during life and destruction at death." This is at least a possible construction of his language in these utterances; and as it brings him into harmony with himself in his general teaching, it would seem to be a fair and legitimate construction. But if it be, there is no necessity to interpret him as meaning that God created man, as innocent, in order to glorify himself in his destruction; and then it would not follow, that he meant to affirm that the divine decree effectuated the sin and ruin of man. He seems to imply—at least he may have implied—that God decreed to create mankind, as guilty in Adam, and therefore as "vessels of wrath and examples of severity." There is certainly a distinction between a decree to create unto destruction men conceived as guilty in a representative, and a decree to create the representative, conceived as innocent, unto destruction. That distinction, we think, Calvin affirmed.

In the third place, if the several contexts from which these passages have been extracted be closely examined, with an eye to the whole analogy of Calvin's doctrine, we think that the construction which we have intimated will be seen to be not without justification from at least a part of their contents. A regulative conception in his mind, in reference to the case of reprobated beings, appears to have been that of subjects of government condemned by a judge, whose sentences proceed upon the presupposition of guilt. For example, he says expressly: "Let us in the corruption of human nature contemplate the evident cause of condemnation (a cause which comes more closely home to us) rather than inquire into a cause hidden and almost incomprehensible in the predestination of God."* On the other hand, Calvin held another regulative conception, namely, that of the sovereignty of God in ordaining whatsoever comes to pass; and when he speaks under the influence of that conception, he appears to teach that God causally determined the occurrence of sin in the first instance.

**Institutes*, B. III., C. XXIII., §8.

The question, whether these two apparently conflicting classes of utterance can be harmonised, will be considered as we proceed.

In the fourth place, it would be easy to cite numerous passages in which Calvin, in answer to the acute antagonists who pressed him with the objection that he made God the author of sin, maintains strenuously that evil did not come by creation. If so, how could he have consistently taught that God decreed to create man for evil? Many of these passages we have already adduced, and therefore will not now cite them.* We have before us two remarkable statements to the same effect, in the treatise on the Bondage and Liberation of the Will, but our space does not permit their insertion.† Bishop Davenant, a member of the Synod of Dort, and one of the brightest ornaments of the Church of England, in defending the illustrious Reformer against the criticisms of the Jesuits, says:

“I affirm that the opinion of Calvin is most truly contained in these two propositions: 1. That the consideration of a foreseen fall did not occur to God when predestinating as a cause. . . 2. The other proposition which I oppose to the censure of the Jesuits, and which I assert to be according to the mind of Calvin, is this: The consideration of sin foreseen offered itself to God when predestinating, by way of an annexed condition, which is inherent in all whether elect or reprobate. . . Blind is the man who sees not that the corrupt mass in these cases [in passages from Calvin and Augustin] is the ground of predestination, so that from it are selected vessels of honor through election, and in it vessels are left to dishonor through reprobation.”‡

We take Davenant's meaning to be, that Calvin's doctrine was: that, strictly speaking, there was no cause of predestination but the good pleasure of God's sovereign will; for he may have decreed, or may not have decreed, as he pleased, to create man, to permit the fall, and from the mass of mankind, conceived as fallen, either to save all, or to doom all to perish, or to elect some to salvation and to reprobate others—to the glory of his name. He was a cause to himself. Neither foreseen merit nor demerit in the creature was a cause of his sovereign determination. But on

*SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, January, 1880.

†*Opp.*, 1667, Vol. VIII., pp. 126, 127.

‡*Determinationes*, Allport's Trans., Quest. 26.

the supposition that he pleased to decree as he did, the conception of the fall conditioned, and, in that sense, grounded in the divine mind the decrees of election and reprobation. The common guilt and ruin of mankind, induced by their own fault, were presupposed in the determination to save some and leave others to perish. This, we take it, was Calvin's meaning when he said, as he was wont, that corruption was the cause of condemnation. It did not efficiently produce, but it conditioned, the decree to condemn.

We must, however reluctantly, arrest the discussion at this point, in the hope that a favoring providence may enable us to complete it at another time.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Holy Bible according to the Authorised Version (A. D. 1611), with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation, by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. COOK, M. A., Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. New Testament, Vol. II., St. John—The Acts of the Apostles. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway. 1880. Pp. 534, royal 8vo.

In the year 1863, whilst the war of the States of this Union was at its height and the country and the Church amongst us were absorbed with its terrific demands, the blessings of peace were enjoyed by our mother country, and the Speaker of the House of Commons consulted with some of the bishops of the English Church as to the best way of supplying a want long felt in that communion, viz., "a plain explanatory commentary on the Bible, more complete and accurate than any accessible to English readers." And so Church and State were united, and are held forth in the advertisement as united, in the origination of this work, which is, of course, a great recommendation for it to all the members of the Anglican body. The Archbishop of York then undertakes to organise a plan for producing such a work, to be performed by scholars amongst the clergy, selected for their biblical learning.

The great object was to put "the general reader" in "possession of all the information requisite to understand the Holy Scriptures, and give him as far as possible the same advantages as the scholar and supply him with answers to objections resting upon misrepresentations of the text."

The authorised version is retained without alteration, with the marginal references and renderings; but in all cases there are given amended translations of passages proved to be incorrect in our version.

Canon Cook has conducted the work as general editor, in consultation with the Archbishop of York and the Regius Professors of Divinity of Oxford and Cambridge.

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The Old Testament, in six royal octavo volumes, has been completed by the labors of several of the Bishops, Archdeacons, and Canons of the English Church, and these six volumes have been republished in this country by the Scribners at five dollars a volume in cloth. Two volumes of the New Testament at same price have also been issued, and the remaining two are in press.

Besides Bishops of the American Episcopal Church who commend very highly the execution of the work, there are published rather laudatory notices of it by Drs. Shedd and Jacobus, and by Prof. Ch. A. Aiken, D. D., LL. D., of Princeton. The last named says, "As a compendium it will be prized by many who have access to more exhaustive commentaries, and will furnish helps fresh, solid, and sound to many who have no access to or leisure for using the more extensive storehouses of Biblical learning. Dr. Shedd examined the first volume of the Old Testament and pronounced it "a superior work." Dr. Jacobus said "the notes themselves are brief, often meagre, and commonly too cursory for the popular need . . . but this work will fill a place not wholly occupied by any that has preceded it," etc.

The volume before us contains a Commentary on John, with an Introduction to that Gospel, both by B. F. Westcott, D. D., Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, and Canon of Peterborough, and a Commentary and Critical Notes on the Acts by William Jacobson, D. D., Bishop of Chester, and an Introduction to that book by the general editor, Canon Cook.

We have not had opportunity to see any other volume of this work except this single one. It appears to us not exactly what was said at the outset to be the thing desired and aimed at, namely, a *plain explanatory* commentary for the *general* reader. It is, so far as *criticism* is concerned, of course, necessarily in advance of the commentaries on the Bible hitherto accessible to the general English reader; because since the days of Henry, Scott, and even Clarke, great labor and much learned research have been devoted by biblical scholars in various lands and languages to the study and exposition of the Scriptures. But if the general English reader shall betake himself to this Bible Commentary for a *plain explanatory* account of the meaning of

the Scriptures. We are of opinion, judging from the volume before us, that he will find his expectations disappointed. For there is vastly more display of learning and of critical acumen, vastly more of reference to the Fathers, to the old Manuscripts, and to the words of the original Greek, than the general reader ordinarily will be able to apprehend or to relish. We must also endorse what Dr. Jacobus said, that the notes are in general very meagre and too cursory for the popular need. They are, moreover, expressive of altogether too much mere scholarly refinement for general English readers. Hence we find Bishop Potter, of New York, when called on for his commendations of the work, saying it is "for our students of Divinity, our clergy, and for a large class of general readers." This is not what was proposed. Not a *class* of general readers was had in view, but the general reader who was distinguished carefully from the scholar, with whom this work was to equal that general reader in point of advantages so far as possible. "Our students in Divinity and our clergy" were not thought of at the outset, yet the work proves to be adapted to them and not the general English reader. We cannot deny that to all the uses of the class named, Henry's Exposition, or Scott's Commentary, (the one a Dissenting, the other a Church of England, minister,) appears to us far better adapted than the one before us. In a modest "*Meeting House*" in Chester repose the remains of Henry, and my lord the Bishop of Chester lives in that town, we suppose in a palace; but dead Henry will for all general English readers long outlive by his Exposition of the whole Bible what Chester's lordly bishop has written on the Acts. As for Thomas Scott, we have no idea that this new Commentary will ever be found more complete and accurate than his immortal work.

Comparing the two parts of this volume together, we give the preference decidedly to Canon Westcott's portion of it.

Our readers may like to know how Bishop Jacobson understands Acts vi. 1-6 of the institution of the Deacons. He holds that as it was "the multitude who complained," the selection of the Deacons "was in this instance left to the popular voice." "But this was not a permanent arrangement. In the Pastoral

Epistles, when their functions had become more spiritual, the Deacons were to be appointed, not elected." "In the Pastoral Epistles there is no reference to their being charged with any secular ministrations." "The believers generally chose them. The selection is attributed by the Church to divine inspiration in our Collect for the Ordering of Deacons. In the first instance this was a special appointment to supply a special and urgent need. . . . If the ministry of the Word was not originally assigned, the office must have been very much modified, and very soon. St. Stephen taught at Jerusalem and St. Philip made the gospel known in Samaria. St. Paul uses *διανομία* of his own ministry, and applies *διάνομος* to himself and to the Apostles generally."

And how does he understand the Elders or Presbyters whom Paul in Acts xx. 28 addresses by the title Bishops? He says, "The Presbyters, therefore, while the Apostles lived were *Episcopi*, overseers. But the Apostles, in foresight of their approaching martyrdom, having appointed their successors in the several cities and communities, as St. Paul did Timothy at Ephesus and Titus in Crete, A. D. 64, four years before his death, it was thought well to keep that name proper and sacred to the first extraordinary messengers of Christ. And in the very next generation after the Apostles it was agreed all over Christendom at once to assign and appropriate to the successors of the Apostles the word *Episcopus* or Bishop."

This extraordinary statement Bishop Jacobson quotes without comment from "Bentley's Remarks on Free Thinking"; it would be a hopeless task for him to undertake to prove it from veritable Church history.

J. B. A.

The Emotions. By JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL. D., President of Princeton College; Author of "Method of Divine Government;" "Intuitions of the Mind," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway, 1880. 12mo., pp. 255.

We have here another book from the prolific pen of Dr. McCosh, and he seems to have no idea of stopping. He tells his readers that he hopes to treat of Conscience and Will in another little volume, and intimates that he may issue a "separate work"

on the hypothesis of Evolution. We admire the industry and fertility of the distinguished author; but we have often questioned with ourselves whether he might not now, as his evening shadows are lengthening, accomplish more by carefully revising and perfecting the works which he has already produced, than by adding fresh ones to their number. We are disposed to doubt the continued vigor of the creative power after a certain time of life has been passed. The very analogies of nature would seem to show that the mature wisdom of age should be employed in consummating the labors of an earlier period, rather than in the origination of new productions. We intend, however, to pass no hostile criticism upon any of the books of Dr. McCosh. We have read, and still read, his works with interest and profit. To two of them we have given special attention. We remember to have been impressed in our youth by the high encomiums pronounced by a profound writer in this REVIEW upon the "Method of the Divine Government." He could scarcely have paid it a finer compliment than he did in comparing it, in its spirit, to the great work of Bishop Butler on the same general theme, with the remark that it possessed an advantage over the Analogy in its more evangelical comprehension of man's sinful condition and of the principles of redemption. Especially have we been struck by the masterly discussion of Conscience in that work. A positive advance was made in its treatment, by the author's bringing to bear upon it the common sense philosophy of the Scottish school. The fact was called into notice that the fundamental laws of morality lie at the root of the moral judgments, as the fundamental laws of belief are latent in the ground-forms of the intellectual processes.

The discussion of the Will, particularly in its relation to the divine efficiency, was hardly so happy. Something appeared to us to be lacking so far as definiteness of conception and self-consistency were concerned. If the treatment of conscience could be made fuller, and that of the will more perfect, we venture to suggest that an office more useful to posterity would be discharged than by independent discussions of those topics, however valuable in themselves they might be. We have long felt the wish that

so noble a work as "The Divine Government" might attain the highest perfection to which the great abilities of its author can advance it. It deserves, we think claims, his last hand.

The other work to which we alluded is the "Intuitions of the Mind." In this book Dr. McCosh has contributed materially to the development of the Scotch Philosophy by an endeavor to analyse and classify the fundamental principles of thought and belief. Some of his observations we have found eminently suggestive. He has more fully than any writer with whom we are acquainted elucidated the validity of our faith-knowledge, and discriminated our faith-judgments from those of the elaborative faculty. This is a territory which demands more thorough investigation than has yet been given to it. There is still great haziness hanging over the region where our thought-judgments and our faith-judgments approach each other. And if Dr. McCosh should more formally and completely develop the profound hints which are contained in the "Intuitions of the Mind" in reference to those questions, he would go far towards maturing the results of some of the most important principles of that school which has been illuminated by the splendid names of Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton.

The book before us is strongly marked by that combination of philosophical analysis and statement with pertinent illustrations drawn from imagination, science, and history, which constitutes so conspicuous a feature of the author's work on the Divine Government. There is no reader of intelligence, however unaccustomed he may be to metaphysical technicalities, who will find it dry and uninteresting. The special cases by means of which abstract truths are reduced to practical exemplification, are so appropriate and so vividly and happily stated, that entertainment as well as instruction is afforded at every step in the progress of the exposition. In one or two instances, however, the author employs illustrations which reveal the fact that he did not intend to address a circle of readers coextensive with the limits of this land. There is a certain class of them, however restricted they may be, to whose taste, to say the least, his book would have lost none of its attractiveness by the absence of such allusions. But that,

we presume, is matter of small concern to one whose reputation is in no degree dependent upon their suffrage. Still a professedly philosophical work, we take leave to say, would not be apt to suffer, in the estimation of the republic of letters, in consequence of possessing the attribute of catholicity. A contempt for the feelings of Frenchmen might be expected in a patriotic speech by a German professor, but his taste would be questionable should he give it expression in a calm metaphysical treatise.

In the Preface, Dr. McCosh intimates his dissatisfaction with the ordinary treatment of the feelings and emotions in books of mental science. He objects to the term *feeling* as "very vague and ambiguous," and deems it desirable to separate the emotions from the feelings, and "to have a renewed attempt to give an analysis, a description and classification of them, as distinguished from other mental qualities." We concur with him in regarding it as important to make and to emphasise such a distinction. If, however, he means that the term *feeling* should cease to bear a generic signification, including *emotion*, we are not clear that the criticism is just. We can think of no word wide enough to embrace all the phenomena which it is usual to group under the term *feelings*, if that term be discarded. In the present state of the language, it would be hard to improve upon Sir William Hamilton's terminology.

The author analyses emotion into four constituent elements: first, appetences which are the springs in which it originates; secondly, the idea or phantasm which calls forth and conditions it; thirdly, excitement with attachment and repugnance; and fourthly, the organic affection, or the impressions made by it upon the organs of the body, and reciprocally made upon it by the excited states of those organs. We have some doubt whether a strict analysis would assign the last of these to the nature of emotion, so far as the affection of the bodily organs is concerned. Dr. McCosh very properly insists upon the necessity of keeping apart psychological and physiological investigations, and of distinguishing between mental emotion and nervous sensibility. But the incorporation of organic affections into the very nature of mental emotions would seem to endanger the maintenance of

these just distinctions. Might it not be better to treat organic affections as concomitants of emotion, rather than as constituent elements?

Book First of the treatise is occupied in an exposition of the four elements of emotion which have been mentioned. It contains many striking observations. As a specimen we give a passage occurring in his treatment of the second, which is worthy of consideration by that class of public speakers who aim at stirring the emotions of their hearers in order to induce them to take action in regard to the subject enforced upon their attention:

“Our doctrine admits an application to the art of rhetoric, as showing how feeling is to be excited. We are never, indeed, to neglect the more important task of enlightening and convincing the understanding in the view of impressing the sensibility. If the judgment is not convinced, feeling will be merely like the fire fed by straw, blazing for a time, it may be, to be speedily extinguished, with only ashes remaining. But in order to secure consideration by the understanding, or when the understanding has been gained, it may be of advantage or it may be necessary to interest the heart. Now we have seen in what way the feelings are to be gained. No man ever stirred up feeling by simply showing that we ought to feel. Still less will it be roused by high sounding exclamations, such as “how lovely,” “how good,” “how sublime.” Commonplace orators shout and rave in this way, without exciting in the breast of those who listen to them any feeling, except it be one of wonder, how they should seem to be so warm when they are saying nothing fitted to warm us. A steady tide will be raised only where there is a body like the moon attracting the waters. He who would create admiration for goodness must exhibit a good being performing a good action. He who would draw out compassion must bring before us a person in distress. He who would rouse indignation must expose to us a deed of cowardice, deceit, or cruelty. Or, if he would stir up gratitude he must show us favors conferred upon us.” (Pp. 49, 50.)

We fully subscribe to the author's strictures upon those systems of religion or morality which abstract moral excellence from its existence in a living personal Being, and appeal to the love of the good rather than to the love of God. He very justly remarks that “unless we place before the mind a living, acting, benevolent God, the affections will not be drawn towards him”; and that “the injunction or recommendation of virtue in the abstract, as was done in so many of the pulpits, and by so many of the ethical

writers, of Great Britain in the middle of the last century, is found to be utterly powerless upon the heart, character, and conduct" (p. 49).

Book Second contains a classification and description of the emotions. They are reduced to two classes: first, those directed to animate objects; secondly, those called forth by inanimate objects. In treating of those embraced in the first class, he professedly follows the division of Dr. Thomas Brown into Retrospective, Immediate, and Prospective Emotions.

Book Third is devoted to what the author denominates Complex Emotions, which he distributes into two kinds: Continuous Emotions, and Motives swaying masses.

This work challenges attention not only by the ability which characterises all the productions of its distinguished author, but by the fact that it contributes to the supply of a real demand—the demand for thoroughgoing discussions of the emotions apart from the intellect, the will, and the conscience. Such works as those of Alison and Burke do not profess to be more than partial. Dr. McCosh covers the whole field of the Emotions.

The mechanical execution of the book is all that could be desired.

J. L. G.

Socialism. By ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company, 1879. Pp. 111, 12mo.

This little Essay on a great and extremely difficult subject is smart, pretentious, flippant, unsatisfactory. We quite agree with "some of the many critics who have noticed the book" when they "say it does not solve the social problem," as the author tells us they have said. It is divided into four parts: 1. Socialism in general; 2. Communistic Socialism; 3. Anti-Communistic Socialism; 4. Christian Socialism.

Dr. Hitchcock knows very well how to express himself. If he would devote a half score of years to the study of the question he briefly disposes of in these few flashy pages, we should no doubt have something worthy of his theme and of himself; but the Essay as it stands impresses us as a very shallow production.

There are two points which we must signalise. Dr. Hitchcock

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uses this language on page 28: "Still more account is made of the Pentecostal Communism of the Apostolic Church. It is idle to deny it, as some have done. The Apostolic Communism, to be sure, was not obligatory and absolute, but voluntary and might be partial; still it was communism." This is a slanderous charge against the apostles which we call flippant and shallow. There was no common ownership in the Jerusalem church, but only a common use, parties freely giving what they chose for the relief of the necessities of the body.

Then on page 24 we have a different sort of specimen, where Dr. Hitchcock deliberately justifies Lynch law executed on tramps; but we suppose, not if the tramps are black in color and commit their outrages at the South. It makes a great difference, of course, whose is the ox that is gored. J. B. A.

The Mohammedan Missionary Problem. By the Rev. HENRY H. JESSUP, D. D., for twenty-four years Missionary in Syria. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1334 Chestnut St. Pp. 138, 16mo.

This is a discourse delivered before the Northern General Assembly in 1879 by the Moderator of the body. It has been rewritten by him and enlarged. The reader will find it replete with most important and interesting information. The author, rightly we have no doubt, anticipates the best results from the Anglo-Turkish treaty. The British protectorate over Asiatic Turkey is God's instrument for extending light and liberty and truth over all that region. J. B. A.

Metaphysics: A Lecture. By S. S. LAWS, D. D., Professor of Metaphysics in the University of Missouri. 12mo, pp. 93.

The author calls his work by the modest name of "A Lecture." If delivered as such, it has evidently since grown by valuable accretions, almost to the dimensions of a volume. The author's object is to define the department of inquiry which is termed "Metaphysics;" and to give a historical view of its progress. He regards it as the science which transcends all particular sciences, whether of matter or mind; and which determines the

very conditions of all other sciences. "The real problem which metaphysics undertakes to solve, is this, the nature and ultimate conditions of our knowledge, in its last analysis." Of the proposed schemes, Dr. Laws delineates for his students : I. Nihilism, as taught by Pyrrho, Hume, and Fichte. II. Realism; which is, 1. Unitarian Realism, taking the form of Idealism, Materialism, or Pantheism. 2. Dualistic Realism, spurious and legitimate. The outline is then concluded with a strong assertion of Theism as the culmination of all metaphysics. This comprehensive sketch is illustrated with a profusion of learning. It is very valuable to the student for its perspicuity and discrimination. It gives, in this small compass, a just history of philosophy. R. L. D.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Whilst not altogether an airy banquet, the cold and other baked meats, and *hors d'œuvres*, furnished forth to us this quarter by our obliging friends the publishers, are not of a quality to meet the highest exigencies of a substantial as well as varied and appetising meal. At the head of the list we place Mr. Allibone's valuable collection of prose quotations,¹ the companion volume to the author's kindred repository of excerpts from the poets. The two books mixed together would be a far more comprehensive work of the same sort than Calvin Colton's "Great Thoughts by Great Authors," and would not offend by juxtapositions like these: "Shakespeare, Colton, Bacon, Locke, Milton, Colton." Dr. Bedell has no doubt given us a useful book on the Pastoral Science.² A cyclopædia of incidents, allusions, etc., and even of "plots" like that of Dr. Brewer,³ if exact and tolerably full, is sure to be in place on the library shelves. We fear "Brewer" is not conspicuous for nice accuracy.

We are much struck with the method of answering Darwin that has been proposed to himself and carried into operation by a Philadelphia solicitor. It is to admit *the facts* and deny *the inferences*; and to confine himself exclusively to the data presented and relied on by the English naturalist. This is precisely the method at times adopted by Dr. Southall in his cogent refu-

¹Great Authors of all Ages. Being Selections from the Prose Works of Eminent Writers from the Time of Pericles to the Present Day. By S. Austin Allibone, LL.D. 8vo, extra cloth, \$5; library sheep, \$6; extra cloth gilt, \$5.50; half calf gilt, \$8; Turkey antique, \$10. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

²The Pastor. Pastoral Theology. "Experientia Docens [*sic*], Docet, Docuit." By the Right Rev. Gregory Thurston Bedell, D. D., Bedell Professor of Pastoral Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Ohio. 12mo. *Ibid.*

³The Reader's Hand Book of Facts, Characters, Plots, and References. By E. Cobham Brewer, LL.D. Crown 8vo, 1,184 pp., half morocco, \$3.50; sheep, \$4; half calf, \$5. *Ibid.*

tation of Sir John Lubbock and the other advocates of a remote, as well as civilised, stone age. It is the sole method of the Pennsylvania barrister in the book lying before us.¹ Nothing interests us more than the application by a sound lawyer of the principles which govern the reasoning which is addressed to courts and juries to other kinds and fields of argumentation. Dr. Hosack's merciless examination of Froude's account of Mary of Scots is a case in point: and here we have another. No books of the same reputation were ever more open to the charge of palpable inconclusiveness than those of Darwin. The real defence of the scheme has been done by others: such as Huxley and Hæckel. "The Faith of our Forefathers,"² a trustworthy champion of Christianity, felicitously announces his purpose of confronting the insidious adversary.

A good and pious man may often be led widely astray in his efforts to predict the future.³ The wood-cuts in "Punch" never become antiquated. This edition,⁴ however, is one *de luxe*, and of course out of the range of most of our Southern buyers. Braham's wonderfully clever and often laughable comicalities are illustrated by some of the same humorous draughtsmen.⁵ We like it, that our booksellers are taking their clients back so often nowadays

¹The Refutation of Darwinism, and the Converse Theory of Development, based exclusively on Darwin's Facts, and comprising Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses of the Phenomena of Variation; of Reversion; of Correlation; of Crossing; of Close-Interbreeding; of the Reproduction of Lost Members; of the Repair of Injuries; of the Reintegration of Tissue; and of Sexual and Asexual Generation. By T. Warren O'Neill, Member of the Philadelphia Bar. 8vo, extra cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

²The Faith of our Forefathers. An Examination of the "Faith of our Fathers." By Ed. J. Stearns, D. D. Third edition, revised. 12mo, 380 pp., cloth, \$1; paper, 60c. T. Whitaker, New York.

³Thoughts on Great Mysteries. From the Writings of Frederick William Faber, D. D. With an Introduction by J. S. Purdy, D. D. 12mo, cloth, gilt top, \$1.25 *Ibid.*

⁴English Society at Home. By George Du Maurier. Sixty Drawings, printed on India paper, from the collection of "Mr. Punch." Super-royal 4to. cloth gilt, \$16. Scribner & Welford, New York.

⁵The Ingoldsby Legends. New illustrated edition. Thirty-two plates by Cruikshank, Leech, etc. 12mo, cloth, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

to the incomparable springs of uninspired literature.¹ The real "Lothair" was not deterred by fear either of the Pope or of the Premier from putting the Breviary out of monk's Latin into scholar's English.²

Lord John Russell once defined a proverb as "the wisdom of many, the wit of one;" which was the wittiest and the wisest thing that Lord John ever said. It might stand for a description of the immortal work of Æsop.³ Where else in all the domain of letters can we find such an instance of *multum in parvo*? The old Greek is as preëminent as a fabulist as Bunyan is in allegory or Thucydides in history. La Fontaine bears a relation to Æsop somewhat like the one that Dryden does to Chaucer. Preachers need such helps as Mr. Bertram has essayed to give them in this volume;⁴ but to resort to them too freely is to endanger, if not to sacrifice, their originality. The author of the History of Scotland has not succeeded so well in his picture of the time of Marlborough and Addison. The book⁵ is positively heavy. With such a theme this was unpardonable. Oh that Buckle⁶ had had faith! That and humility of judgment were all he lacked. He was a prodigy of erudition to an extent that would have ravished Dominic Sampson. We thought there was an abatement of the Nile overflows. We are glad we were mistaken.⁷

¹Stories from the Greek Tragedians. By A. J. Church. Illustrated. 12mo, cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

²The Roman Breviary. Translated by the Marquis of Bute. Two vols., thick 8vo, cloth, \$16.80. *Ibid.*

³Æsop's Fables. Fac-simile reprint in type and binding of the edition of 1669. Imperial 8vo, \$8 net. *Ibid.*

⁴A Homiletical Encyclopædia. Illustrations in Theology and Morals. Selected and arranged by R. A. Bertram. Royal 8vo, cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁵A History of the Reign of Queen Anne. By John Hill Burton. Three vols., 8vo, cloth, \$13.50. *Ibid.*

⁶The Life and Writings of Henry Thomas Buckle. By Alfred Henry Huth. With portraits on steel. Two vols., 8vo, cloth, \$10.50. *Ibid.*

⁷Nile Gleanings. Concerning the Ethnology, History, and Art of Ancient Egypt, as revealed by Egyptian Paintings and Bas-Reliefs. By Villers Stuart. With fifty-eight colored and outline maps. Imperial 8vo, cloth, \$12.60. *Ibid.*

This¹ is not the "art of embroidering *discourse*," to which a bright-witted Virginia engineer used to refer, and at which it is said he was an adept himself; but the art of embroidering more tangible material. The work of Penelope in the *Odyssey* was something like it, but the work of the two sisters in Shakespeare upon the same "sampler" was the thing itself. Every day adds to the stock of the world's knowledge in comparative grammar and etymology;² and the day may not be distant when the phenomena of the Shemitish tongues will be embraced under a law as rigorous as that of Grimm. At present there is nothing thoroughly satisfactory beyond the boundary of the Indo-Germanic group. We are all bound to honor Dr. McCosh for his great services to the cause of theology, of apologetics, of metaphysics, of logic, and of psychology. We regard him as a safer guide in pure philosophy³ than in the ground that is common to natural and supernatural science. His admirable work on the Scottish Philosophers has been extensively lauded in the pages of this REVIEW. We are glad to see the illustrious name of President Woolsey associated with an articulate and masterly refutation of Socialism in all its schools and phases.⁴ We mean to give the book a more careful examination in an early number. The appearance of Metternich's autobiography⁵ has revived the flagging interest in the history and character of Napoleon. The book is of the highest value, but is rather meagre in the way of

¹Handbook of Embroidery. By L. Higgin. Published by authority of the Royal School of Art Needlework. With sixteen page illustrations, many of them in colors, by Walter Crane, Wm. Morris, and others. Crown 8vo, \$2. *Ibid.*

²Introduction to the Science of Language. By the Rev. Archibald Henry Sayce. Two vols., 8vo, \$10. *Ibid.*

³The Emotions. By James McCosh, D. D., LL.D., President of Princeton College. Crown 8vo, 264 pp., cloth, \$2. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁴Communism and Socialism. By Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL.D., lately President of Yale College. 12mo, 320 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Autobiography of Prince Metternich. Edited by his son, Prince Metternich. With a Chronological Table and Minute Index prepared especially for this edition. Two vols., 8vo, cloth, \$5. With portrait and fac-similes. 440 pp. and 648 pp. *Ibid.*

ana. The great man dwindles very much morally, and in some other respects dwindles perceptibly, as viewed through the glasses of the astute foreign *diplomat*. Such revelations of the conqueror of Europe are of kindred interest with those of Philip, and Elizabeth, and Mary Stuart, which before our day were shut up in the dusty archives of Simanca. The second volume of the Bible Commentary¹ was consigned to excellent hands. We are especially gratified to have a Commentary on John's Gospel from the author of the best book ever written in English on the Canon of the New Testament, and the author too of the noble article on the New Testament in Smith's Bible Dictionary. Dr. Robinson's title² seems to have been suggested by one of Trench's books on the Gospels. Such investigations on a theme so hallowed, so precious, and so inexhaustible, as well as so fascinating, are meeting with more and more encouragement. We are deeply impressed with the candor and independence, no less than with the solid ability and thorough information of our great botanist.³ Even he, however, does not seem to appreciate fully the conditions of the dispute between the Christian theist and the deistical as well as the atheistic evolutionist. There are many who could wish that General Grant would continue his entertaining travels⁴ for four years longer.

The decisions of the Supreme Court⁵ of the United States in the better days of that tribunal are fast becoming a historical, as well as legal, curiosity. There are few more admirable studies

¹The Bible Commentary. New Testament. Vol. II. St. John by Canon Westcott, D. D.; The Acts, by the Bishop of Chester. 632 pp., cloth, \$5; sheep, \$6.50; half calf, \$7.50. *Ibid.*

²Studies in the New Testament. By the Rev. S. C. Robinson, D. D. 12mo, 324 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³Natural Science and Religion. Two Lectures delivered to the Theological School of Yale College. By Asa Gray. Crown 8vo, 111 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴General U. S. Grant's Tour Around the World. By L. T. Remlap. 8vo, 497 pp., cloth, \$2. German edition, 8vo, 497 pp., \$2. J. Fairbanks & Co., Chicago.

⁵United States Supreme Court Reports. Vol. CXIX. (Otto, Vol. IX.) Sheep, \$4. Little, Brown & Co.

than the growth of the unwritten Constitution of Great Britain.¹ The opinion is gaining ground in various quarters that it would be as well to draw the pen through the written articles which make up our own Constitution. The celebrated coach-and-four has found an easy highway through their most important provisions. Madame de Rémusat's *Memoirs*² have kindled the Napoleonic ardor awakened by the life of Prince Metternich to a blaze. The lady-in-waiting to the lovely, the unfortunate, the innocent, but (if we are to take the word of this lady) the frivolous, even if magnanimous, Josephine, kept her eyes open and set everything down in black and white. There is as much gossip here as in the De Sévigné letters, or the St. Simon memoirs, or those of Greville. All such books are nuts alike to the lovers of history, the analysts of character, the purveyors of anecdote. We find here many feminine judgments and picturesque descriptions. At first she was awed by Bonaparte and almost worshipped him. Even Bonaparte, however, did not always remain a hero to the lady-in-waiting. The account she gives of him is fully as bad as that given by Scott and Lockhart. Prof. Johnston's book is capital good reading.³ Dr. Maudsley's work⁴ on Mental Pathology is also high authority in *that* department, and is particularly attractive on the subject of "hallucinations of the senses." The only drawback is that the author is an unbeliever, and though hardly so aggressive or offensive as some of them, an out-and-out materialist. We are sick and tired of the "Botanic Garden" of the older

¹Fifty Years of the English Constitution, 1830-1880. By Sheldon Amos. 12mo, xxxii., 495 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

²Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat. 1802-1808. With a Preface and Notes by her Grandson, Paul de Rémusat, Senator. Translated from the French by Mrs. Cashell Hoey and John Lillie. In three volumes. Vol. I., 8vo, paper, 50c. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

³The Chemistry of Common Life. By the late Prof. James F. W. Johnston. New edition, revised, enlarged, and brought down to the present time, by Arthur Herbert Church, M. A., Oxon. Illustrated with maps and numerous engravings on wood. 12mo, 592 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴The Pathology of Mind. Being the third edition of the Second Part of "The Physiology and Pathology of Mind," recast, enlarged, and rewritten. By Henry Maudsley, M. D. 12mo, cloth, 580 pp., \$2. *Ibid.*

Darwin and the Natural Selection of the younger one.¹ This craze about evolution is already beginning to have its day. We have already said our say about the disheartening refusal of the multitude to read anything but compendiums, primers, and handy volumes. It is as though people were to push their chairs back from the dinner table, and go away with their hunger unappeased, because the food was not in small dishes, cut up into small bits, and sugared, spiced, or made tempting with cayenne or *caviare*. It is not so bad, however, when the *plat* served is from Macaulay.²

Critics are not sure whether the eminent doctor who has just become the panegyrist of the brute creation³ is in earnest or is laughing in his sleeve. We shrewdly opine that he is a *bona fide* lover of our dumb relations (?), and in all likelihood a follower of Darwin and Wallace. Whatever his prepossessions and his crotchets, his *facts* are of the greatest value and interest. The common judgment is that the so-called biography of Dickens is really an account of the obligations of the great novelist to one Mr. Forster. Viewed in that light the book is all that any one could wish. Forster should have been content with Macaulay's mild eulogium upon his life of Goldsmith. Chapman & Hall were Dickens's original publishers, and theirs is still the best English edition, and is in some respects better even than the Riverside edition.⁴ Dr. Hickok⁵ always seemed to us to have everything to say and not to know how to say it. A man of undoubted profundity

¹Erasmus Darwin. By Ernst Krause. Translated from the German by W. S. Dallas. With a Preliminary Notice by Charles Darwin. With Portrait and wood-cuts, 12mo, cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

²Lord Macaulay, his Life—his Writings. By Charles H. Jones. No. 50 of Appleton's "New Handy-Volume Series." Cloth, 60c.; paper, 30c. *Ibid.*

³Mind in the Lower Animals in Health and Disease. By W. Lauder Lindsay, M. D., F. R. S. E., etc. Two vols., 8vo, cloth, \$4. *Ibid.*

⁴Forster's Life of Charles Dickens. The Life of Charles Dickens. By John Forster. Forming the concluding volume of Chapman & Hall's Household edition of the Works of Charles Dickens. With forty illustrations. Sq. 8vo, cloth, \$1.75; paper, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁵A System of Moral Science. By Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., LL.D. Revised with the co-operation of Julius H. Seelye, D. D., LL.D., President of Amherst College. 12mo, 288 pp., cloth. Ginn & Heath, Boston.

and originality such as he was ought to have learned to express himself in intelligible English, and not in a disagreeable technical jargon.

We are glad to see this valuable work on Roman Literature¹ taken in hand by two such competent men as the Amherst Professors. Peter Bayne has this time² hit upon one of the most interesting subjects in the world, and as important as interesting. The one flaw in several good arguments from the life and character of Jesus is that they fail to elude the Arian subtleties by urging the testimony of the Saviour's own lips. As to Mr. Bayne himself, he is perhaps the most agreeable writer now in Scotland, after Carlyle, (and who would ever think of calling Carlyle agreeable?) and of late has been writing charmingly about the Stuarts and Falkland. Since he took the portfolio of "The Witness" out of the dying hands of Hugh Miller, Mr. Bayne has grown more lax in his theological attitude. We imagine nevertheless that he is a sincere believer in the deity of Christ. Whatever may be said as to his poetry viewed at large, Tennyson's songs³ are simply delicious. One of the princes of American letters now dead is fitly honored by one of the first of American *litterateurs* now living.⁴ Strange to say, he contributes his sketch to Morley's series of "English Men of Letters"! "And why not for a British stream demand the Chickahominy?" The new book of Sporting Adventures⁵ is dull by the side of Lord Dunraven's. The question which has so long been discussed by such men as Heyne, Wolf, Lachmann, Nitsch, More, Grote, Froude, Geddes, Bonitz, and Packard (in the first number of Gildersleeve's *American Journal of Philology*) and in the editorial suggestions

¹A Brief History of Roman Literature, for Schools and Colleges. Translated and edited, from the German edition of Bender, by Professors E. P. Crowell and H. B. Richardson of Amherst College. *Ibid.*

²Testimony of Christ to Christianity. By Peter Bayne. 16mo, cloth, 75c. N. Tibbals & Sons, New York.

³Tennyson's Songs, with Music. Edited by W. G. Cusins. 4to, cloth, \$5. Harper & Bros., New York.

⁴Hawthorne. By Henry James, Jr. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵Sporting Adventures in the Far West. By J. M. Murphy. Illustrated. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

in this volume,¹ seems insoluble. The twofold distinction advocated in common by Grote and Geddes, is, on the eminent authority of Professor Packard, surmised to be one of *compilers* of previous existing epic lays. This is, as it appears, substantially the old Wolfian view over again. There is a disposition on the part of some not only to neglect but to decry Southey.² His character and life everybody admires. His poems were extravagantly magnified at one time, but there is a tendency now to belittle them unduly. They are monuments of learning, of industry, of taste, even where not monuments of genius. Southey's prose, in his best works, is equal to any after that of "glorious John." Mr. Richard A. Proctor once observed to a travelling companion that the American astronomers were perhaps superior to the British. Professor Newcomb is one of the best of those; and his text-book³ is in the judgment of experts the most satisfactory as it is also one of the latest. Mr. Mackenzie has done a good thing creditably.⁴ We again revert to Mr. Rolfe's fine comments on Shakespeare.⁵ We notice the issue of the second volume of J. P. Lange's "Materialism,"⁶ a work which has excited much attention in Germany. Mr. Joseph Cook writes too fast.⁷

It is well to know that the author of the "Life of Goethe" and of the "History of Philosophy" was (like George Smith and Emanuel Deutsch) a man of society no less than of books. It is not amiss, therefore, that he should consider problems of living,

¹The Origin of the Homeric Poems. A Lecture. By Dr. Hermann Bonitz. Translated from the Tenth German Edition, by Lewis R. Packard. Sq. 16mo, cloth, 75c. *Ibid.*

²Southey. By Edward Dowden. 12mo, cloth, 75c. *Ibid.*

³Popular Astronomy. School Edition. By Simon Newcomb, LL.D., Professor U. S. Naval Observatory. With 112 engravings and five maps of the Stars. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴The Nineteenth Century. A History. By Robert Mackenzie. 4mo, paper, 15c. *Ibid.*

⁵Shakespeare's King John. Edited, with Notes, by William J. Rolfe, A. M. Illustrated. 16mo, cloth, 70c.; paper, 50c. *Ibid.*

⁶History of Materialism. Vol. II. By J. P. Lange. 8vo, cloth, \$3.50. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

⁷Labor. By Joseph Cook. 12mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

and not alone problems of thought.¹ Lewes began as a strict Positivist; but like his eminent coadjutor in France, M. Littré, he "enlarged his brief" before he was done. It is sad to think of the number of choice spirits that have been sucked in by the vortex of refined and semi-pantheistic materialism. What we have just said has special reference to the buoyant and vivacious, and also rather encyclopædic, genius which may have informed some of the pages of George Eliot, and not to the author of "The Divine Problem"² and "The Rational (?) View."³ It was usual enough formerly for quaint old writers to burden the title page with descriptive commentary on the book that followed it. Now, on the contrary, long title pages augur emptiness, conceit, or effrontery; or else something odd about the man, or it may be despair of getting one's self read otherwise. We should be glad to think that in the case of Mr. McComas the extravagant initial page was a necessary bid for readers on behalf of a pair of books at once so bad and so poor. It is a refreshment after this to turn to the next two on our list. The first is a sterling treatise of the good old sort by one of the most solid, most engaging, and most edifying of the Nonconformist divines.⁴ The second is a popular statement by a scholar and minister of the characteristics of

¹Problems of Life and Mind. Third Series. By George H. Lewes. 8vo, cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

²The Divine Problem. A Unique Theory of Universal Being and its Evolutions, and of the Problem of Divine Life, Intelligence, and Beneficence they Involve and Unfold: in which God, Nature, and Man are harmonised in the Absolute Good, and Sin, Suffering, and Death are at once Reconciled with the Divine Beneficence and the Aspirations of the Human Soul. By E. W. McComas. 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. John W. Lovell, New York.

³A Rational View of Jesus and Religion. Embracing an Examination of the Origin and Rationale of Religious Beliefs and of the Claims of Supernaturalism and Revealed Religions; and a Solution of the Mysteries enshrouding the Christian Faith, and the Birth, Life, Character, and supposed Miracles and Resurrection of its Founder. By E. W. McComas. 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Walking Worthy of God. By the Rev. John Flavel. With an Introduction by Major D. W. Whittle. Sq. 16mo, 42 pp., pamphlet, 15c. F. H. Revell, Chicago.

the Evangelist Matthew,¹ and intended for the benefit of plain but devoted readers who are in their way unlicensed teachers. Macaulay's estimate of Hallam² is as just as it seems generous. Macaulay could be generous to all but foes. Hallam is as just, himself, as Rhadamanthus. He never descends, either, to the tinsel which even Macaulay and Froude have not always disdained. It is a pity that such strong meat should not be suited to the babes who lap the watered milk of our current literature. Let all our readers try to lay hands on the life of that grand old missionary, hero, and orator, Alexander Duff.³ We have written so lately of Canon Liddon,^{4,5} of his depth of thought and width of reading, of his eloquence, of his earnest piety and essential orthodoxy, but of his ritualistic leanings, that we say no more. Mozley has also been presented as the author of the brilliant Bampton Lectures on Miracles. His sermons⁶ must be a treat to any who relish vigorous original thought and sound theology, expressed by one who knows something of human nature, and something too of the power of the English language. Mrs. [or Miss] Marshall had perhaps better have said "The Cathedral Towns of England,"⁷ unless she means really to confine herself to the most important centres of trade and opulence; in which case her book is robbed of half the attractiveness it might otherwise possess. Professor Hopkins's "Old England" and the guide books leave little

¹The Gospel According to Matthew. An Essay for Bible Readers and Sunday-School Teachers. By the Rev. James Morris Whiton, Ph. D. Sq. 12mo, 42 pp., cloth. W. A. Wilde & Co., Boston.

²Hallam's Complete Works. New Unabridged Edition. 6 vols., crown 8vo, 800 pp., cloth, \$7.50 a set, or \$1.25 a volume. A. C. Armstrong, New York.

³Life of Alexander Duff, D. D. By Geo. Smith, LL.D. 2 vols., 8vo, 1,100 pp., cloth, \$3.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Sermons by Canon Liddon. Second Series. 220 pp., \$1.75. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

⁵Sermons by Canon Liddon. First Series. New Edition. 300 pp., \$1. *Ibid.*

⁶Occasional Sermons. By the Rev. J. B. Mozley, D. D. 270 pp., \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁷The Cathedral Cities of England. By Emma Marshall. 12mo. 360 pp., \$1.50. Robt. Carter & Bros., New York.

more to be said. Roger Ascham¹ is a name to conjure by; and the Church of the nineteenth century still occupies a defensive and apologetic² attitude. The "Chautauqua Text Books" are to be received with approval. Keil and other able men have put a somewhat new light on Jonah's motives and character.³ Dr. Chadwick's thesis,⁴ in his Donaldson Lectures, is ostensibly much the same with Mr. Peter Bayne's in his new book noticed in this fugitive summary. Dr. Pressensé is not only a Protestant theologian, but a Frenchman. It follows from these statements, as well as from his well ascertained character for those qualities which combine to make a good thinker and writer, that these personal reminiscences⁵ of famous men will be found amusing and valuable.

Whether the name which comes next on our catalogue is that of a *savant* or a sciolist we adventure no opinion; but if the writer be indeed in quest of "the Truth," we need hardly remind him there is a way of which it is asserted on the highest authority, "that the wayfarer though a fool, need not err therein."⁶ Robert Ingersoll is Tom Paine *redivivus* without Paine's force, and with a smattering of coeval information and a strong tincture of the current lingo. Dr. Denslow's book⁷ on the modern worshippers

¹Roger Ascham and John Sturm. Glimpses of Education in the Sixteenth Century. "Chautauqua Text Book No. 17." By Professor W. J. Phelps, A. M. 24mo, 53 pp., paper, 10c. Phillips & Hunt, New York.

²Christian Evidences. "Chautauqua Text Book No. 18." By John H. Vincent, D. D. 24mo, 59 pp., paper, 10c. *Ibid.*

³Jonah, the Self-Willed Prophet. By Stuart Mitchell, D. D. 12mo, 247 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁴Christ Bearing Witness to Himself. Being the Donaldson Lectures for 1878-9. By George A. Chadwick, D. D. 12mo, 184 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁵Contemporary Portraits: Thiers, Strauss compared with Voltaire, Arnauld de L'Ariège, Dupanloup, Adolphe Monod, Vinet, Verney, Robertson. By E. De Pressensé, D. D. 12mo, cloth, 400 pp., \$2. *Ibid.*

⁶Civilisation: Is its Cause Natural or Supernatural? An Inquiry by a Wayfarer in Search of the Truth. 8vo, 140 pp., paper, 50c. Charles H. Marot, Philadelphia.

⁷Modern Thinkers: What they Think, and Why? By V. B. Denslow, LL.D. With an Introduction by Robert C. Ingersoll. With eight Portraits. 12mo [sic], cloth, \$1.50. C. P. Farrell, Washington, D. C.

of Reason is such a one as Ingersoll *et id genus omne* favor. The great preacher whose iron gateway is near "the Elephant and Castle" is after all the great master of English in our day; he can charm the University men from Cambridge and at the same time bewitch and guide (as who but he) the artisans of London and the ploughmen of Surrey fields.¹ Carlyle has been the most potent secular teacher of our generation. Every Southern heart will respond to General Beauregard's appeal for General Hood's orphans.² The military narrative must be itself one of importance. Mr. Brock is wonderfully *up* on all matters about Virginia.³

¹John Ploughman's Talk: or, Plain Advice to Plain People. By Chas. H. Spurgeon. On the Choice of Books. By Thomas Carlyle. Both in one number. "Standard Series No. 1." 4to, 32 pp., card manilla cover. I. K. Funk & Co., New York.

²Advance and Retreat. Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies. By Gen. J. B. Hood, lately Lieutenant-General Confederate States Army. Published for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund. With portrait and maps. 8vo, 360 pp., \$3; sheep, marbled edges, \$3.50; half morocco, \$4; turkey morocco, gilt edges, \$5. G. T. Beauregard, New Orleans, La.

³Richmond as a Manufacturing and Trading Centre; including a Historical Sketch of the City. By R. A. Brock, Cor. Sec'y Virginia Historical Society. 8vo, 92 pp., 50c. J. W. Randolph & English, Richmond, Va.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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JULY, MDCCCLXXX.

ARTICLE I.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEADING POINTS OF THE SYSTEM OF ALEXANDER CAMPBELL.

I. Mr. Campbell proposed, as his main enterprise, to remove the evils of "sects," by gathering a Christian communion without any creed of human construction, with no other bonds save faith on Jesus Christ as Saviour, and obedience to his laws. That is, every one must be admitted, were this basis laid down consistently, not only as member, but teacher, who *says* that he believes and obeys the Scriptures. Mr. Campbell, misapplying the words of John xvii. 20, 21, says that only two conditions are necessary for the conversion of the world: *Truth and Union*. He deems that the reason why Truth has not done its work is to be found in the divisions of professed Christians. Of these he regards human creeds as causes, instead of results. He strictly requires us to show a divine command or authority for their composition, and for the exaction of subscription to them; and he charges that, failing in this, if we exact such subscription, we are guilty of most criminal usurpation and will-worship. He urges that, to add a human creed to God's word, as a test of correct doctrinal opinion, is virtually to make the impudent assertion that the uninspired creed-makers can be more perspicuous than the Holy Ghost. But on the contrary, since men uninspired are

all fallible, their creeds will inevitably differ from each other, in differing from the Truth; and in these differences, factiously supported by their several partisans, is the grand source of the divisions which have so weakened Christianity. Moreover, these human compositions being the work of men and parties, are fondled by their authors with the selfish pride of paternity, and they become the shibboleths of religious factions and bones of contention. The simple remedy for this brood of mischiefs, he deems, would be a return to what he supposes was the apostolic basis, union and communion upon the Word of God alone, without human creed, and the requirement of nothing but the fundamental points of belief on Christ as Saviour and obedience to his commands. The mission of Campbellism, then, is to absorb all sects into this one apostolic communion, and thus to prepare the way for the *millennium*. The usual charges are also freely made by him and his followers, that subscription is an infringement of spiritual liberty, a remnant of Popery, etc.

The most obvious method will be to define, first, the proper use of human creeds; for thus the most of these views will be obviated, and the objections will fall away of themselves. It is true that the Roman and Greek Churches always, and some Protestant sometimes, have used creeds in connexion with religious tyranny and persecution. To all such uses we are as strongly opposed as Mr. Campbell. We accept and are responsible for only the following view of their use. As man's mind is notoriously fallible, and professed Christians who claim to hold the Scriptures, as they understand them, differ from each other notoriously, some platform for union and coöperation must be adopted, by which those who believe they are truly agreed may stand and work together. It is the only possible expedient, in the absence of an inspired living umpire (such as the Pope claims falsely to be), by which fidelity to truth can be reconciled with coöperation. A creed, then, is such a means for enabling Christians to understand each other. It is a human exposition of what is supposed to be the exact meaning of the Scriptures; and differs from those usually delivered from the pulpit only in being more carefully and accurately made by the assistance of many

minds. Its setting forth is an exercise of the Church's ordinary didactic function. It must advance nothing which its compilers do not honestly suppose to be fully sustained by the Scripture; and no authority is claimed for it, in any respect, save that which they believe is communicated by the Word of God. It is set forth, not as Mr. Campbell rashly asserts, to *anathematize* dissentients, a thing which our Church never does, but to give a rallying point for those who are in accord, without which they could neither efficiently coöperate in spreading the gospel nor enjoy profitable Christian communion. And further, as the apostle has commanded us to receive into the school of Christ "those who are weak in the faith," for purposes of instruction, even this modest application of the creed is made only to the rulers and teachers of the Church, except as to those fundamentals which Mr. Campbell himself would exact.

1. We argue, then, in the first place, that the Presbyterian Church now offers to the whole world precisely that basis of union which Mr. Campbell professes to desire. We ask of *lay members* no profession save of faith on Christ and obedience to his laws. That more *should be* asked of those who aspire to the responsibility of teachers and rulers among us, we shall show. In truth, we carry out Mr. Campbell's plan more sincerely than he does himself. For it is notorious, that, whatever profession one might make of agreement in faith and obedience, if he only asked to receive baptism by affusion, he should be strictly refused. If, after submitting to immersion, he should ask the same sacrament for his infant children, he should be expelled.

Mr. Campbell would reply to the first point, that according to the Scriptures affusion was not baptism, and its performance in that way was not "obedience to Christ." He would say that one's baptizing his infant children was not Christianity, because they cannot believe that Christ is the Saviour of the world. But one may believe that affusion is, according to Scripture, baptism; and that the parent's faith, according to Scripture, entitles the infants to baptism; and he may claim that he has examined the Scriptures as honestly as Mr. Campbell. Now Mr. Campbell cannot maintain on his own principles that he is entitled to con-

strue the Bible and another man is not. This would be Popery. Yet his construction of the Bible, which is nothing but a human creed, is applied as a test of church communion to exclude another, notwithstanding his profession that he accepts the terms of salvation required by Mr. Campbell, as he honestly understands them. Here, then, Mr. Campbell does the very thing which he condemns. According to his own confession he does it in the most objectionable form, for he has admitted that an unwritten creed, used for creed-purposes, would be worse than a written one. And this is obvious, for the written one is more fair, stable, and intelligible than the unwritten. The latter gives room for endless misunderstandings, wranglings, and inequalities.

The application of this simple touchstone, then, shows that the Campbellite is utterly inconsistent; that he as truly has a human creed as we. And this inconsistency is indeed inevitable. Christian union in the same denomination is impossible between men divided by certain differences. Such differences are inevitable while human reason remains fallible. Protestants admit no pope, no infallible human umpire. The only conceivable alternative is the distribution of Christians who are agreed into denominations upon the basis of human creeds. Campbell's self-contradiction was, then, fated.

2. Mr. Campbell himself remarks, in his "Christian System," page 103, that if the result of his reform should be only to add another to the number of the sects, it would be every way to be deplored. This was the predestined result, and it has notoriously been accomplished. The body he has formed possesses every sectarian feature in its most exasperated form. The Campbellite is usually known as an ecclesiastical Ishmaelite. Their leader was more divisive, more denunciatory, more exclusive, than any of the sects he reviled. He excluded more Christians from Christ's Church than are excluded by all the avowed creed-holding Churches in America; Christians who, according to their professions, were already upon his platform of faith, baptism, and obedience. And the societies founded by him, while independent in church government, hardened at once into a religious denomination of rigid bigotry.

That Mr. Campbell's is virtually a creed-holding Church, is confirmed by several evidences. For instance, he himself, in the very introduction to his "Christian System" (page 10), says, that, "admonished from the extremes into which some of our friends and brethren have carried some points, I undertake this work with a deep sense of its necessity, and with much anticipation of its utility in exhibiting a concentrated view of the whole ground we occupy," etc. Here we have the very purposes of a creed avowed. He then tells us that his work will be divided into three parts, of which the second is, "*The principles on which all Christians may form one communion.*" What is the statement of these but a human creed? For, of course, these "principles" are simply *those on which Mr. Campbell supposes* "all Christians may form one communion." It is equally obvious that in putting forth his "Christian System" he designed and expected it to have more force than an expression of his personal opinion; he hoped it would be a doctrinal basis of agreement to his sect for the heterogeneous complexion of which he felt so much concern. He designed it, in other words, for a creed.

Another incident exhibits the same fact, that his societies are, after all, based upon a creed. A Dr. Thomas, (an Englishman,) a professed member and preacher of his sect, began to teach materialism, the sleep of believers' souls until the resurrection, and the annihilation of infants and unbelievers. Mr. Campbell (very properly) travelled all the way to Amelia County, Virginia, called him to account, exacted of him a written agreement to preach these doctrines no longer; and, on his breaking over this, published to the world his exclusion from Mr. Campbell's communion. These measures naturally and necessarily resulted in the formation of a separate sect of "Thomasites," or "Disciples," who not only hold a distinct communion, but actually re-immersed Campbellites! Now Thomas and his party all the while professed the platform which Mr. Campbell exacts of men, held believers' immersion with all the strictness he could desire, and declared that they believed just what was in the Bible. Yet Mr. Campbell had some standard of measurement other than that declaration by which he extruded them. What was it? Evidently nothing else

than his nuncupative creed: a thing which he himself confessed is worse than a written one. These instances show in the most conclusive manner how impossible it is, practically, for a Christian communion to be really formed on the no-creed basis. The inevitable force of necessity has at once driven from it the very "comprehension" which was to make it its chief glory.

3. But let us now resume the facts noted: that all nominal Christians are ready to declare, "We believe what the Bible teaches"; that yet they differ so much that it is preposterous for them to coöperate in the same communion; and that each man, in ascertaining the concord or disagreement of others with himself, resorts to *his construction* of what the Scriptures mean. This construction is obviously *his human creed*. Mr. Campbell makes a weak attempt (*Christian System*, pages 18, 109) to escape this, by saying that the testimony of the Apostles gives us, as fundamentals, only a set of "facts" (*facta*, things done). "But all these modes of faith and worship are based upon a mistake of the true character of revelation, which it has long been our effort to correct. With us, revelation has nothing to do with opinions or abstract reasonings; for it is founded wholly and entirely upon *facts*. There is not one abstract opinion, not one speculative view, asserted or communicated in Old Testament or New." Mr. Campbell immediately refutes this preposterous statement himself. For, after making a similar one on page 18th, he adds: "These facts reveal God and man, and contain within them the reasons of all piety and righteousness." . . . "The meaning of the Bible facts is the true biblical doctrine." Now what are those "reasons of piety and righteousness *contained in the facts*"? this "*meaning*" of them, which is the true biblical doctrine? They are precisely those principles which he had just before stigmatised as "abstract opinions" or "speculative views." To pass from the facts to them, requires that very work of construction whose inevitable result is a "human creed," *i. e.*, human in terms of expression, though still scriptural and divine in substance, if we construe faithfully. So, on page 111: "The power of any fact is the meaning. . . . All moral facts have a moral meaning," etc. Then, to make men experience the power, we must construe

the meaning to them. So that we are again led to the same despised "speculative" truths. But it is not true that the Scriptures state only "facts." What is 1 John iii. 4, for instance, but a general abstract *definition* of sin? What shall we make of the doctrinal Epistles, or of the sermons of Christ and the Apostles, with their numerous principles, logical processes, and definitions? We conclude, then, that, were it true the Scriptures contained only facts, Mr. Campbell's inference against doctrinal systems would, by his own confession and practice, be false; but, secondly, that the assumption is glaringly untrue.

4. To all our pleas for the utility of creeds, for bearing our testimony to truth, as we conscientiously understand it, or for ascertaining our harmony with those with whom we propose to coöperate in the gospel, or for guiding the instruction of gospel-pupils in sound doctrine, Mr. Campbell's cavil is, that these pleas arrogantly assume that our creed-makers are able to be more perspicuous or correct than inspiration; which is profane as well as false. If, argues he, we revered the Scriptures as we should, as the work of the Holy Ghost, we should wish for nothing more: these would be to us the *ne plus ultra* of correctness, perspicuity, and certainty.

One answer to this is, that it proves too much. By the same reason, Mr. Campbell should never have found occasion to draw up his "Christian System"; he should never have composed any exposition of the Sacred Scriptures or sermon; his whole testimony and work as a church teacher should have been in citing men to the words of Sacred Scripture and simply reading it to them. We might retort the same cavil, with the same bitterness: "Mr. Campbell, why do you presume to expound Paul or the Saviour? It implies the arrogant assumption that you can be more perspicuous or correct than they"! A second answer is this: Mr. Campbell says his belief is precisely what the Bible teaches. We declare that our belief is precisely what the Bible teaches. Yet he and we are notoriously disagreeing! We now present a second statement of our doctrinal beliefs, which is, to us, an equivalent one: "We believe just what the Westminster Shorter Catechism teaches." Thereupon Mr. Campbell parts company

with us. He knows so well, and everybody else knows so well, that he does not believe with our Catechism; that he does not pretend it. His resort is, on the contrary, to fight it. Our Catechism has, therefore, demonstrably, some fitness to detect and unmask the doctrinal differences between these two professed Bible believers which the Bible has not. And one reason of this fitness is, that our Catechism *is* human. Did Mr. Campbell recognise it as inspired, he would mask his real disagreement from it, as he does his real disagreements from God's word, under his expositions; he would say of the Catechism, as he does of the Bible: "Oh, I believe just what it teaches, provided it be expounded aright" (*i. e.*, expounded as he wishes it to mean). But now that our Catechism claims to be only a human and fallible work, he is bold to reject it; and thus his disagreement with the truth, as we understand it, is disclosed.

This evident fitness of the creed for this work does not at all imply a superior skill or perspicuity of its authors over the sacred writers. Scripture was designed by God for a different end: to be the ground of all creeds, and the rule of faith for all ages. It is no derogation to the supreme excellence of Scripture to say, that something else better answers a particular end for which Scripture was, in its very nature, not designed nor adapted. If it were, then no preacher or teacher could ever consistently give his exposition of Scripture; he should rather read to the people the words of Scripture themselves, as being better adapted than his words. Another illustration may be found in that *ascertainment* of the construction of statutes, which is made by the adjudications of courts. All civilised people value such judicial expositions of the statute, and attach some authority to them. This is not because judges are better masters of law language than legislators, but because in all language general enough for a statute of general application, a possibility of ambiguity is inevitable. But when an issue is raised, in a concrete case, as to the meaning of the statute, and settled by some agreed umpire, that ambiguity is excluded. In a word, erroneous interpretation, or competing interpretations having *actually presented themselves*, any intelligent person can then select terms and frame a statement which

shall settle the point raised. Further: lapse of time and flux of current usage cause a need of new definition for words of older date or of a dead language. This definition contemporary words can give. Thus, "atonement," in the English of Sir Thomas More and Henry VIII., was at-one-ment. Among modern Calvinists it has come to mean "penal satisfaction for guilt." This ability to define by more recent terms arises not from their superior intrinsic accuracy, but from the circumstance that their meaning is at the time technically settled. These remarks explain the utility of human expositions and comments, and they equally justify human creeds. Thus, Mr. Campbell believes "immerse" is more unambiguous than "baptize." Hence he gives us his human (Latin) word for the inspired one. That is, he gives us here his human creed as a substitute for the word of Scripture. In a word, a creed is a concerted *exposition of Scripture* upon its more important points, made for certain purposes of edification. Now, if those purposes are lawful (as we have shown), this species of exposition is also lawful, unless it can be proved that all exposition by man is unlawful.

5. This leads us to notice the plea, on which Mr. Campbell lays so much stress, that Christ has *not authorised* the rulers of the Church, by any revealed precept, to make human creeds and demand subscription of them. But God has expressly enjoined Church rulers to *guard the doctrinal purity of* the Church, and especially of its teachers (Gal. i. 8, 9; 1 John iv. 1; Rev. ii. 2; Titus i. 9-11; 2 Tim. ii. 1; i. 13; Heb. xiii. 9; 2 John 10). If it be practically found that this cannot be done without drawing up a human declaration of what is the pure doctrine—as was the case with Arius—then the obligation involves the right to employ this expedient. So, the Church is commanded to teach. If experience shows that this involves the building of houses to teach in, then the Church rulers properly apply a part of the people's oblation of their substance to brick and mortar. The charge of usurpation of power to the detriment of the spiritual rights of Christ's people is further completely dissolved, when we observe that the proper use of creeds (for which alone we contend) does not authorise us to persecute any who differ from our creed, how-

ever extensively, nor even to unchurch any who differ from it in things not fundamental. Of all these latter, Methodists, Lutherans, Immersionists, Episcopalians, etc., we only determine, by the application of our creed, that they are not of *our denomination* in the Church. We cordially recognise their places in Christ's Church catholic; we recognise their ordinances and discipline; we join them in every act of Christian fellowship and love consistent with the testimony which our consciences constrain us to bear. We neither desire nor attempt to estop their liberty in serving God after their preferred way. And against even those who, like Pelagians and Unitarians, deny the vitals of the faith, we hurl no *anathema*; we aim no persecutions: we only bear our testimony, and leave them to their Master in heaven. Thus, the employment of this human expedient does not assail or infringe any man's liberty, but only protects our own.

Here again, Mr. Campbell is fated to illustrate the falsehood of his own cavil in the most crushing way. He will scarcely assume that the Bible (written by the Holy Ghost in Greek) contains any precept to translate the word *baptize* by the Latin word *immerse*, and to exact of all Christians an agreement in this definition as the strict term of their admission to the Church of Christ. But this is precisely what Mr. Campbell does with a ruthless severity and tyranny unknown outside of Rome. For he not only repels the Christian who demurs from this application of his human creed from his Campbellite communion, but excommunicates him from the Church of Christ!

6. Mr. Campbell's chief objection against creeds is that they are divisive. His favorite weapon is an exposition of our Saviour's prayer, John xvii. 20: "That they also may be one in us; that the world may believe," etc. He says that we are here taught, 1. That "*the testimony of the apostles is the only and all-sufficient means of uniting all Christians;*" and 2. That "*the union of Christians with the apostles' testimony is all-sufficient and alone sufficient to the conversion of the world.*"

Such is his formal *creed* on this point. It is unscriptural and false in both its members. Christ expressly defines the union or oneness which was desired as conducive to the world's believing,

as a *spiritual oneness*. Mr. Campbell blindly degrades it into an ecclesiastical and formal union. Christ does not say that the "apostles' word" was to be "the only and all-sufficient means of uniting all Christians" in any sense; least of all in Mr. Campbell's sense. He prays for the spiritual oneness of all who were to believe through the apostles' word, by his very prayer shewing that *the oneness would require something else than their "word" to constitute and preserve it*. And moreover, when Christ refers to their word as a means of their believing, has he authorised Mr. Campbell to say that it can only be such means when not presented in the form of one species of exposition called by Mr. Campbell "*human creed*"? We trow not. Had Christ been speaking of organic union at all, he would never have said that the apostles' testimony was all-sufficient for it (so long as human creeds were kept away). For the apostles' testimony *did not unite all profess'd believers in their own day!* Nor in the two hundred years following, when Mr. Campbell is very certain Christendom was innocent of creeds. Again, it is false that a universal union, conjoined with the New Testament, is sufficient for the world's conversion. One proof is, that multitudes have lived in such lands as Scotland, where the population was homogeneous, so that while they had the New Testament teachings they were utterly unconscious of any adverse influences arising from denominational divisions, because they were conversant with none. Yet those people were not converted! Mr. Campbell would exclaim that one of his conditions was lacking: the New Testament was *not* faithfully taught them. Ah, sure enough, it was put into their hands unaccompanied with Mr. Campbell's "human creed" of "immerse." Again, there are neighborhoods in this country, where Mr. Campbell's teachings are so triumphant that "the sects" are as thoroughly exploded and contemned as though they were annihilated. Does everybody get converted there? This absurd proposition is Pelagian. It ignores the deadness of sinner's souls, and the necessity of sovereign grace above all *means*, however good.

In proceeding with the question whether creeds are divisive and retard the world's conversion, let us expressly concede that

all persecutions and uncharitableness, all unchristian dogmatism and bigotry, all angry abuse, all arrogant exclusiveness and unchuraching of those whom God receives, have this tendency. This is not because they imply denominational distinctions, but because they belie the Christian spirit and so dishonor Christ and grieve his Holy Ghost. And we know of no one man who has done as much of this mischief as A. Campbell in our day. He has displayed more arrogant dogmatism, more uncharitableness towards dissentients, more railing and harsh judgments towards sincere followers of Christ; he has divided more congregations peaceful before his incursions; he has aimed totally to unchurch larger multitudes of creditable Christians, only for dissenting from his human shibboleth of immersion, than any one this side of Rome. Here, again, he gives himself the most pungent refutation. He is the "no-creed" reformer; and he has created more division in American Christianity than any man on the continent!

But that the orthodox creeds of Christendom have not produced the divisions, is demonstrated by this fact: there were divisions before there were creeds. Mr. Campbell says the Nicene was the first. Epiphanius, in the fourth century, enumerated eighty heresies, the most of them before Arius. Mr. Campbell evidently mistakes an effect for a cause. Human creeds are the results (in some form the inevitable results) of religious differences. The causes of those differences must be sought far deeper in the infirmities and blindness of man's head and heart. And the remedy for these differences must accordingly be found in a deeper cause than the mere removal of creeds. As long as the carnal mind is enmity against God, his method of redemption will be misunderstood and differently understood. The prompting to formulate these competing views in creeds is the result, not the cause, of the mental disease. Men differ in a similar manner about anything which concerns their passions and interests. It is, for instance, notoriously thus about politics. Mr. Campbell should hold, that instead of parties making platforms, platforms make parties; and that the only and all-sufficient means of securing civil concord and power is for all political principles to be

sunk, and for virtuous citizens to vote promiscuously for any and every candidate of safe or of mischievous opinions, who *says* that he reveres the Constitution.

Mr. Campbell argues, with some show of plausibility, that creeds stimulate the spirit of dogmatism and faction, in that they give points around which pride of opinion crystallises itself. The creed-makers are touchy and sensitive about their work because of the pride of paternity. The adherents acquire a factious spirit by associating their symbol with the selfish feelings of party. We reply, that the infirmities of human nature have doubtless abused a lawful expedient here, as they abuse more or less everything which man employs. No ordinary mortal can draw up an exposition of Sacred Scriptures without feeling the same pride of paternity and jealousy. No man can be a vigorous and successful leader in the Church without having *his person* become such a rallying point of faction, far more than any abstract creed. Certainly Mr. Campbell has not done so. The substitution of a creed in place of a personal leader is the wisest expedient known to man for attaining the wholesome and righteous position of "Principles, not Men," which is the very watchword of enlightened liberty. Since Mr. Campbell's no-creed party has exhibited the very results of division, dogmatism, faction, and strife, in the most deplorable degree, we think that the most feasible way to lessen them is to have a carefully prepared creed, and present *that* as our view of the Scripture meaning, instead of a personal party leader.

7. We object (in order to take the aggressive) that a communion of Christians collected on the "no-creed" principle must be what is popularly known as a "Broad Church." This Mr. Campbell both confesses and boasts as to his communion. He depletes in one place that in his connexion "almost all kinds of doctrine are preached by all sorts of men." Not very consistently he often justifies and glories in the fact that his *is* a "liberal" Church in tolerating great diversity of opinion under a union in a few fundamentals. Barton W. Stone, one of his most powerful coadjutors in Kentucky, was an Arian, if not Socinian, to his end. Others of his preachers were Pelagians. A few were pro-

fessed Unitarians and Universalists. A few were and are evangelical and orthodox. Thus every legitimate objection against the Broad-Church theory is applicable here. (1) It is impossible for a broad or no-creed Church to be a faithful witnessing-body for the truth. But this is a prime function of the Church. Ps. lxxviii. 5, 6; Is. lix. 21; 1 Tim. iii. 15; Rev. xii. 17; and especially John xviii. 37. The Church is a "candlestick," Rev. i. 20. And if any further evidence is needed, it is found in a very short deduction. What is the Church for? The end of its corporate existence is "the gathering and perfecting of the elect." This is effected through the instrumentality of the truth. It would seem, then, as clear as any deduction that the Church should bear a corporate testimony for the truth. Hence, as the ministry and rulers of the Church are her only corporate agency, the official testimony of each minister is a part of that corporate testimony, and each one is officially responsible for the *tolerated* official testimony of the others. Now, if the Church or an officer thereof performs the witnessing duty merely by saying, "We testify whatever the Bible means," it is naught. For notoriously all errorists save infidels, all Papists, Socinians, Universalists, and Campbellites, concur in saying so. It amounts to absolutely nothing. To give any *edge* to our testimony, we must be provided with an answer to the question, "*What do you regard the Bible as meaning?*" What can that answer be but a virtual creed? Mr. Campbell might admit the necessity of meeting the question, and attempt still to say: "Let the answer be each minister's faithful exposition of Scripture." This will not do. So the Broad-Churchman says: "Let each minister have liberty, *in the same tolerant community*, to utter his own full and honest testimony to what he deems the truth. So truth will have as full opportunity to correct error as though they were separated into hostile camps." We reply: this scheme is impracticable and self-destructive. For, on this plan, where is the *corporate testimony* of the Church as a whole? On this plan one's official responsibility for the official testimony of the comrade whom he helped to clothe with this office-power, is preposterously and wickedly betrayed. On this plan the collisions of truth and error

would assuredly become more bitter, provided there were any sincerity of conviction, when occurring in the bosom of the same communion. The only condition which would make the real application of a Broad-Church theory possible is a faithless indifferentism. And in fact, there is no communion on earth consistently broad. Certainly not Mr. Campbell's. He could tolerate Arianism, Pelagianism, Universalism, and could thus betray the very foundations of God's honor; yet he was not "broad" enough to tolerate baptism by affusion. Thus the pretended Broad-Churchism only results in betraying fundamental truths to stickle for some formalistic error and in expelling for some unimportant point those whom God accepts, while embracing those whom God abhors for their denial of essential truth.

(2). It is impossible for a Broad Church to be "a pillar and ground of the truth," which is the Church's function, because of the logical interdependence of the Christian system. The enemies of orthodoxy suppose that they are uttering a sneer when they say that it is "remorselessly logical." This quality, if taken in its true sense, is its glory. Any system which is true must have its parts interdependent. Hence, when one truth is surrendered, however minor, some risk is incurred of the undermining of all the others. The dropping out of one stone from the abutment may loosen the key-stone of the arch itself. While we heartily admit the distinction between essential and non-essential truths, we can only concede, as to the non-essential error which impugns the latter, that, though it does not, like fundamental error, subject its victim to the necessity of destruction, it certainly creates some liability to pass on to the fundamental error, and so to perdition. Hence no sound Christian can be willing to give it ecclesiastical rights, as Broad-Churchism does.

In conclusion, the "no-creed" position of Mr. Campbell prejudices most mischievously the investigation of truth. By stigmatising the orthodox propositions as "human creeds" he has steered the minds of his followers against the scriptural arguments on which the truth rests. This outcry, with most of his people, has been sufficient to condemn in advance all that is distinctive of Presbyterianism.

II. *The Rule of Faith.*

Campbellism, like all other types of Anabaptism, betrays its dishonest interest in denying the existence of a gospel and Church in the old dispensation. This denial is unavoidable to rid themselves of *infant membership* in the Church. The Campbellite is bolder and more consistent in his error than the evangelical Immersionist. The former admits the inspiration of the Old Testament, and yet roundly denies that it is a rule of faith for us. Their authors use such language as this: "The former Testament is abrogated." "The authority of the Old Testament has ceased." "It is no book of authority to teach us what to do." "The gospel is not found in it except in type and promise—precisely the forms in which it cannot have authority." The purposes of God in inspiring the Old Testament writers are represented as these. As the development of the true religion was necessarily gradual, the Old Testament was designed to give delineation of the imperfect or partial religion given to earlier ages. It contains historical preliminaries which assist us in understanding the completed religion, the gospel, now that it has come. It presents a record of God's moral government of the race. It contains types and promises of the coming salvation, designed for the instruction of the New Testament age. It reveals permanent and useful moral principles.

The arguments by which this error is sustained are such as these: that the two Testaments contain not *two dispensations* of the same religion, but *two different religions*; for thus they understand the two *διαθηκαι*, misquoting such passages as Heb. viii. 13; that a new testament *supersedes the old*; that a "will is not of force until after the death of the testator;" that when the three disciples, on the mount of transfiguration, proposed to set up three tabernacles, one for Moses, one for Elijah, and one for Jesus, the divine voice answered: "This is my beloved Son, hear him;" meaning thereby to prohibit their attending to the teachings of the law and the prophets, represented in Moses and Elijah, and to recall them exclusively to Christ.

These positions, when coupled with the fact that the ancients were sinful and guilty in the same sense as we, obviously consign

them all to perdition, if consistently urged. And here is a sufficient and damning evidence of their falsehood. For we know that there are Old Testament saints redeemed (see for instance Heb. xi.) by divine testimony more certainly than we know New Testament saints are. The motive of these representations is, not only to get rid of infant membership, but of all distinction between the visible and invisible Church, of salvation without immersion, of all recognition of Old Testament sacraments, in order to escape those decisive condemnations of the *opus operatum* in baptism, which are contained in such passages as Rom. ii. 26-29, 1 Cor. x. 1-5.

In refutation of this heresy let us present briefly a few plain points. First. The same God would not have two religions for sinners of the same race. The depravity and guilt to be provided for are the same. The obstacles are the same. The divine perfections to be reconciled are the same. Hence we conclude, *a priori*, that there is but one religion for sinners published to this world. To this agree the Scriptures. Acts iv. 12; Gal. iii. 7, 8; Rom. iv. 5, 6, and 11; iii. 30. The faith of the ancients (Heb. xi.) is the model of our gospel faith, etc. Now, then, whatever is said of the "two covenants," *δύο διαθήκαι*, etc., must be understood of two dispensations of one promise. For the adoption of the phrase, "two covenants," "new covenant," and "old covenant," the Campbellite has no authority above an uninspired version; and it is perfectly manifest that our translators used the word in the sense of two phases of the one covenant.

Secondly. The notable argument from the idea of a "testament" or will is exploded in the same way. It is the same word, *διαθήκη*; and there is no good critical authority for translating it in the places where it is written, "new testament." The single passage, Gal. iii. 17, is by itself abundantly sufficient to explode this notion, where the apostle argues precisely the contrary, that the *διαθήκη* which was first confirmed with Abraham could *not* be disannulled by a subsequent one. Again, suppose a subsequent testament *repeats* the larger part of the provisions of the previous one—how then?

Thirdly. The asseveration that the Old Testament contained

the gospel only in type and promise is *false*, and the inference that in those forms it could not have authority is silly. Is the precept, "Kiss the Son," only a type or a promise? Or this of Is. xlv. 22, "Look unto me, and be ye saved"? And a promise, we assert, is precisely the form in which the gospel does have authority. Abraham's faith, the model of the gospel faith by which we are saved, exhibits its virtue precisely in this, that "he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief." Promises are precisely the things which the New Testament holds forth to our faith now. Types, explained by such promises as we quoted from the Old Testament, are admirably adapted to authorise and confirm faith.

Lastly. Our Saviour and his apostles sufficiently refute this wretched error by commanding us to search the Old Testament for our salvation. Jno. v. 39; Acts xvii. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 6, etc. They must be hardly bested, indeed, to shun the hated truths of infant membership, etc., when thus driven to fly into the face of God's word. Their evasion is to say that the Old Testament is useful for the historical illustration of the gospel, when once that gospel is revealed in the New. Mr. Campbell, who is less rash and candid than his followers, says: "The old was so full of the doctrine of the new institution" that the apostles "apply everything they quote from the law, the prophets, and the Psalms, to the Messiah, etc. . . . Every one, then, who would accurately understand the Christian institution must approach it through the Mosaic," etc. Now surely, common sense would say that illustrations so full of the gospel as these must teach the gospel! For whom did these Old Testament institutions and promises first illustrate the gospel? The Campbellite would answer, with the Remonstrant of the seventeenth century, only for the readers of the New Testament age. But this is expressly contradicted by God. His word declares that by means of those Old Testament teachings the fathers exercised the same faith and grasped the same salvation as ours.

The New Testament is admitted to be more valuable than the Old, in that it gives a history of the fulfilment of a part of that which the Old had promised, and in that it goes into more per-

spicuous details. For this we should be thankful; but we must by no means make it a pretext for throwing away any part of the revealed rule of faith.

III. *The Campbellite doctrine of the Trinity.*

Mr. Campbell, while illustrating his contempt for the learning and opinions of the Church, by the repudiation of the terms "consubstantial," "eternal generation," "procession," and even in one place ("Christian System," page 124-5) of the word "Trinity," yet proposes to be orthodox as to the proper divinity of the three persons. He signalises the insincerity of his professions, as to the distrust of human speculation, by making a lame revival of the scholastic *rationale* of the personal relations, saying that the Word is in God as speech is involved in thought, and that the Holy Ghost is related to God as man's spirit or soul is to his person. And he seems to speak many honorable things of the Holy Ghost as the "immediate author and agent of the new creation and of the holiness of Christians." The characteristic of his trinitarian theory is, that, while he admits an eternal personal relation between the Father and the Son, he denies that it is one of eternal generation. The second Person, according to him, is Son only as incarnate. His previous name should be only that of "Word." "Before the Christian system, before the relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost began to be, his rank in the divine nature was that of the WORD OF GOD."

In refutation of this error it is sufficient to refer here to the general argument for the eternal generation of the Son in the simple fact that Scripture should have chosen this pair of words, *The Father* and *The Son*, to express the relation between two persons of the adorable Trinity. There must have been a reason for the choice of these terms—there must be something corresponding to the well known meaning of this pair of names, else eternal truth had not employed them. Of course that meaning must be compatible with God's immateriality and eternity. It must be stripped of all elements arising out of man's corporeal finite nature and temporal existence. In the baptismal formula, in the apostolic benediction, and in all such passages as Matt. xi.

27, Luke x. 22, Jno. v. 22, x. 33-37, Rom. viii. 32, the name *Son* is so used in immediate connexion with the name *Father* as that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the one is *reciprocal* to the other. The Son is evidently *Son* in a sense answerable to that in which the Father is *Father*. The two first passages enumerate the three Divine Persons as making up the Godhead in its most distinctively divine attitude of receiving the highest acts of our worship. The other passages bring to view acts wherein the Father and the Son mutually share honors which are essentially divine. If the *paternity* is something characteristic and permanent, so is the *filiation*. If the Father is eternally *Father*, the Son must be eternally *Son*.

IV. Again, the Campbellite theory of the "Application of Redemption" is so stated as to disparage the forms and nomenclature of theology as much as possible. This dress of the new theory is due, perhaps, partly to ignorance and partly to the desire of contemning the existing learning of the Church. It may be stated, in brief, that the result of all is a combination of Pelagianism with an *opus operatum* theory of baptismal redemption. It is virtually contained in the following propositions:

1. All the terms by which other Christians suppose the application of redemption to be denoted, Mr. Campbell declares, mean a "change of state," or a "change of relation," and *not a change of character or moral quality*. This, he holds, is as true of the terms, *new birth, regeneration, adoption, sanctification, redemption*, as it is of the term, *justification, or remission*. And, like other Pelagians, he limits justification to remission. The grounds on which he holds this definition seem to be these: (1.) That all these terms are predicated interchangeably of the saved; whence he seems to infer, with evident sophism, that they are synonymous; and as justification and adoption are indicative of a change of relation, so must be the rest. (2.) That the word *regeneration* (*παλιγγενεσία*) occurs but twice in the Sacred Scriptures—Matt. xix. 28, Titus iii. 5; in the former place meaning "a change of state," or dispensation of the Church; and in the latter, being defined by baptism. (3.)

That personal regeneration is described by "new birth"; but birth does not change the nature of the *fœtus* which existed before as a *human* embryo (not equine, canine, etc.), and is at birth only introduced into a new state. Of the second ground, We remark that this is a mere verbal quibble, grounded in the fact that modern Christians have happened to adopt the English word "regeneration" as the equivalent, not of *παλιγγενεσία*, but of what Sacred Scripture calls *γενᾶσθαι ἄνωθεν*. How obvious this is, appears when we remind Mr. Campbell that the Westminster Confession, which he so hates, does not use the English word with this ambiguity, but calls the spiritual change "effectual calling." Where, now, is his argument? But in Titus iii. 5, the regeneration, or *παλιγγενεσία*, is the spiritual change. For the "washing of regeneration," or, as Mr. Campbell will have it, *bath* (*λουτρόν*), is explained by the "renewal of the Holy Ghost" (*ἀνακαίνωσις*), which is unquestionably a spiritual change. As to the last ground, that also is a wretched quibble; for, unfortunately for Mr. Campbell, the word in the Greek is *γενᾶσθαι*, which expresses *begetting* rather than parturition, the origination of existence, and not a change of state.

Mr. Campbell argues, speculatively, that all these terms must express change of state merely, because a change of character or moral quality must be the result of the motives which the change of state presents. That is, the privileges and blessings of the Christian state are the efficient causes of the affections of the Christian character. The well-informed student will see at a glance the affinities of this view with Arminianism. It is essentially a Pelagian theory of regeneration by the power of motive primarily.

No well-informed student needs to look far for the proofs of the utter unscripturalness of all this definition. Nothing is more clearly settled by the Word than that, while justification changes the legal relation, quickening and sanctification revolutionise the character, or introduce and propagate a new moral character. Man's ruin includes two main parts, depravity and guilt; his remedy in the gospel includes the two corresponding parts, justification and moral renovation. Again, the latter is also described as a quickening of souls *dead in sin*, an illumination, a "begetting

from above," a "new creation unto good works." The result in which it everywhere issues is *holy character*. But we feel that we almost insult the reader by seeming to judge argument needful against this absurdity. Such texts as these may be advanced against it with peculiar force: Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Deut. xxx. 6; Ps. li. 10; Eph. v. 26; Matt. v. 8; Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10; Rom. vi. 5, 6; 1 Thess. v. 23.

2. All Campbellites teach that this change of state, by which the man is brought into *the saved state*—call it forgiveness, repentance, conversion, or what you please—must be instituted *in order to* the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus *Richardson*, "Principles of the Reformation," pages 74, 75: "The notion that the Spirit may be received before faith, is vague and unscriptural." It is not until the heart is purified by faith that the Holy Spirit may enter to dwell therein." "Peter taught, 'Reform and be baptized [Christian System, page 64] for the remission of sins, and you shall (then) receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.'" Their main reliance is upon the words of John xiv. 17—"*whom the world cannot receive*"—which they understand to teach that a man must be converted from the world before he can be subjected to spiritual influence. Says Richardson, with astonishing effrontery: "It is nowhere stated that the Holy Ghost was *given* to any one to make him a believer or a child of God." The reader will be reminded at once of such passages as Eph. i. 19 (to us-ward who believe); ii. 8-10; John vi. 63, 44, and 45; xvi. 8; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5; Rom. viii. 7, 8, 14, 2; 2 Cor. iii. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 14; Heb. x. 29; 1 John v. 1; and most expressly, 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9; ii. 12.

But, if the Holy Ghost is not the agent who first inworks faith, who or what is? Their answer is, the gospel. Here they misapply all such passages as the parable of the sower (1 Cor. iv. 15; 1 Peter i. 23). That is, saving faith is, according to them, the effect of gospel inducement alone, operating upon the will; and thus, all their seeming concessions that the Holy Spirit is the agent of the new creation, are reduced to this miserable evasion: that he inspired the Apostles and Evangelists, who thus give us an authentic gospel offer, to be the sufficient and sole cause of faith.

But, before we pursue this branch of their error, let us look farther into the absurd idea, that the sinner must be converted without the agency of the Holy Ghost, in order that he may be sanctified by that agency. The whole scheme is a crude mass of self-contradictions. The heart must be made pure by conversion, in order, forsooth, that this pure Agent may come to dwell in it. But a little before we were taught that conversion was only a change of state, and not of character or quality! Again, conversion and sanctification are generically the same kind of work, related as are germination and growth. Conversion (in the sense of regeneration) introduces the spiritual life, sanctification nourishes it. Now, if a divine agent is needed to nourish and enlarge it, *à fortiori* is he needed to introduce it. (See, here, Campbell's follies.) My instrumentalities, *e. g.*, can do a great deal to nurture a plant which has life; they can do nothing at all to originate that life where it was not. Again: these authors recognise the fact that God "purifies the heart by faith." Now, if faith is a function of spiritual vitality, how comes it in a dead soul without an adequate *external agent*? Again: according to this wonderful invention, the agency of the Holy Ghost, which in conversion is only indirect and instrumental (like that of the preacher), should in sanctification become immediate. But they do not, in fact, believe in *any* immediate agency of the Holy Ghost anywhere; and *the only spiritual influence which their system recognises is moral suasion*. Common sense will pronounce on the preposterousness of this whole scheme by raising a simple question: If a converted man needs the Holy Ghost *to grow in grace*, how much more must an unconverted man, dead in trespasses and sins, need him *to get into grace*?

3. The next proposition settles the nature and genesis of faith as the simple and natural result of the moral suasion of the gospel. Here, again, their teachings are a jumble of contradictions; but the practical result is Pelagian. Campbell begins by distinguishing between *belief* and *trust*, and teaching very correctly that saving faith includes the latter. But he ends by flouting the distinction between historical and heart-faith, though he himself had illustrated (Christian System, page 52-3) that difference cor-

rectly. Richardson says that faith must embrace Christ for salvation, and that in his threefold offices of Prophet, Priest, and King (page 31). He thus teaches a truth utterly destructive of his own scheme. For, to embrace a Saviour from sin to holiness must imply a true appetency of will for holiness and against sin. But in order for this, the native appetency for sin, which is the regular law of the sinful will, must have been revolutionised. These writers usually claim great credit for teaching, that, according to them, "the object of faith is not a doctrine, but a person;" and they falsely charge us with the contrary. But when they come to expound what is involved in this trust on the person of Christ, they necessarily introduce the *doctrines* concerning him, which characterise him as a saving person, just as far as we do; only not correctly.

Mr. Campbell deems *authentic testimony* the sole efficient of faith. Let us remark, in passing, his inconsistency in exalting the value of what he calls "fact" over truth, and direct testimony over doctrinal deduction, with his own Pelagian and rationalistic scheme. If testimony is the sole efficient of faith, by virtue of its rational inducement, as he teaches, then why might not doctrinal deduction also produce it? But it is Mr. Campbell's delight to flout doctrinal truth as worthless in comparison of testified "fact." Now deduction may, when logical, establish as firm an intellectual conviction as testimony can. If Mr. Campbell supposes that testimony produces conviction by a non-logical process, he is ignorant of its nature. Thus, Mohammed testifies, as positively as Jesus, that he will give heaven on certain terms. Why does Mr. Campbell believe Jesus and discredit Mohammed? This question is the touchstone. The answer is, in order to give credit to testimony the *credibility* of the witness has to be weighed. And that is a logical process. The ascertainment of Christ's credibility is *a doctrine*, a *truth* reached by logical process, and it is *in order to* all influence of the facts testified. Thus, if testimony can generate faith, so can doctrinal dogma; so can logical speculation, if it is correct speculation. For it may *present inducement* as convincingly as testimony. Now, Mr. Campbell urges, very correctly, that doctrine does not prove adequate to

generate saving faith. This proves that neither testimony nor doctrinal deduction is the efficient of faith; the cognition of them (a rational process in both cases) is only the *condition* by which the Holy Ghost generates faith.

Mr. Campbell's philosophy about faith, then, is the following: He believes that in every case of sense-perception the *object* perceived is the efficient of the affections of soul evoked instead of the mere occasion. ("Christian System," p. 114.) The same law, he proceeds to teach (p. 115), "holds universally in all the sensitive, intellectual, and moral powers of man." "All our pleasures and pains, all our joys and sorrows, *are the effects of the objects of sensation, reflection, faith, etc.,* apprehended or received, *and not of the nature of the exercise of any power or capacity with which we are endowed.*" This astounding piece of psychology is the corner-stone of his whole theology! He proceeds to illustrate his false principle thus: When the eye looks on a pleasing or repulsive scene; when the ear listens to melody or discord; when the nostrils smell a rose or carrion; when the palate tastes the sweet or bitter; when the fingers touch ice or fire; the pleasure or pain of sense is due exclusively to the nature of the *object*, and not to the manner or nature of the sensational perception, which in each pair of objects was the same. So, says he, when we pass to the inner man, it is not the nature of the recollection, reflection, belief, but *the object* represented, which is the exclusive efficient of mental action. A father hears (credibly) that a lost sheep is found, that a lost son is restored. The assent to the testimony is of the same kind. Why does the latter news produce more emotion? The cause is solely "in the nature of the facts believed." He asserts that the same law is universally true of the will—that the *objects* on which the affections exercise themselves are the sole causes inducing us to action. The consistent conclusion of all is, that objective inducement presented in the gospel is the sole, the sufficient, indeed, *the only possible efficient* of faith and spiritual affections!

Thus Mr. Campbell, after making it the business and malignant pleasure of his life to libel and revile the Church as founding its faith on human speculation instead of God's testimony, as he

charged, returns and founds his whole system of religion upon a miserable, exploded, and stupid speculation, of a purely human and anti-christian psychology! To this wretched philosophy, falsely so-called, and which he does not even presume to sustain by a single proof-text, he must then proceed to wrest and force the Sacred Scriptures by such license and dishonest violence of exposition as we have seen.

Every scholar sees here, at a glance, the psychology of the sensualistic schools. The occasional cause is mistaken for the efficient. Object and *effect* so exclusively occupy his attention that the SUBJECT is wholly omitted! It should have given Mr. Campbell some pause, in this absurd analysis, that one result of it is utterly to overthrow, not only that self-determination of will to which he holds, but free-agency itself. The deduction is very short. For, if the objective is the whole efficient of desire and volition, then, supposing the object presented, the volition is mechanically necessitated. Appetency and volition are the physical results of the perception of the object, just as pain is of a blow. Mr. Campbell has shown himself ignorant of the cardinal distinction between subjective *motive* and *inducement*. When Mr. Campbell's instances are inspected, we see that where contrasted objects are presented to any sense, as the beautiful and ugly, etc., etc., the *objects* are the *occasions* of the pleasure or pain: but a *subjective sensibility* is the true *cause* or efficient. The beautiful landscape pleases the man of taste, it is viewed with indifference by another. Why? As Mr. Campbell asserts, there is no difference in the method or perfectness of the visual perception in the two men. Why do not like causes produce like effects here? The perception *is not the cause*, but the *occasion* of the æsthetic pleasure. The true cause is in a subjective sensibility possessed by the man of taste. So, when the father hears of a restored son and a recovered sheep, the *cause* of the greater joy at the former is *parental affection*; the news is the *occasion*. And, in like manner, when the gospel was preached by inspired men, "and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed," while others did not, it was because the former had a subjective appetency (inwrought by the Holy Ghost) which *caused* their

wills to embrace Christ. When Mr. Campbell says we trace the effect to "the manner or nature of the faith," he states the issue falsely. We trace it to the *à priori* subjective character of the heart or moral appetency. And as these we know are by nature for sin and against holiness, it is morally certain that the soul unquickened by the Holy Ghost will not believe with the heart. The well-informed reader will scarcely need a demonstration of the falsehood of this whole philosophy. But, we repeat, such a proof is seen in the fact that the scheme is inconsistent with the maxim that "like causes produce like effects." Were the objective the true *efficient* of the mental state, the same objects should always produce the same states. But note that this is not true, either in the case of senses or æsthetic or moral affections. The same objects educe different effects, or none, from different men, according as their characters vary. This shows that the true efficient is the character and not the object.

It is obvious that, upon the Campbellite scheme, saving faith can be conceived of as no other than *temporary faith*. Take notice, it arises, say they, in advance of any work of the Holy Spirit. It is the effect purely of gospel inducement, as acting upon the natural heart. No better description of temporary faith could be given. It is equally obvious that no consistent Campbellite is a believer in the doctrine of total depravity or inability of will in the natural man to spiritual good. For surely faith, by which a man "passes from death unto life," is a spiritual exercise and a choice of spiritual good. The argument is conclusive, that if faith is an embracing of Christ for salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel, and if the carnal mind is enmity against God, faith can only be put forth by that heart in which the Holy Spirit has wrought his renewing work. Accordingly we find Mr. Campbell saying many seemingly scriptural things about the fall and universal sinfulness; but he does not believe that man's will is totally alienated from God. And many of his comrades preach on this point the most unblushing Pelagianism.

Another result of this view of faith is to make man decide his own religious destiny solely by his own self-determination.

Sovereign grace is exploded. Man believes solely from the efficiency of gospel inducement, without any work of the Holy Ghost. So the "obedience of faith," which is immersion, is the choice of the natural man. To this remission is pledged, and the Christian state with all its privileges is now fully inaugurated. There is no election, save the general purpose to bestow reconciliation and grace on the immersed believer.

4. The fourth and last proposition defines Mr. Campbell's idea of the nature of the Holy Spirit's operation in grace. The reader will recall the deceptive and inconsistent statement, that the Holy Ghost is given only *after* conversion. It will appear that Campbellism really holds to a spiritual work as little after as before. The statement sometimes made by its exponents is the semi-Pelagian one. Sometimes they speak in terms which might have been used by Claude Pajon and his school. But in other places they speak out more candidly as simple Pelagians. Thus, Mr. Campbell ("Christianity Restored," pp. 350, 351): "As the spirit of man puts forth all its moral power in the words which it fills with its ideas, so the Spirit of God puts forth all its converting and sanctifying power in the words which it fills with its ideas." Again: "When we think of the power of the Spirit of God exerted upon minds or human spirits, it is impossible for us to imagine that that power can consist in anything but words and arguments." There is no uncertainty here. That this is the real view of Campbellism is shown by its thorough consistency with their doctrine of faith and repentance. It is precisely the scheme of Pelagius and Socinus. In technical language it is the theory of conversion *by moral suasion alone*. Mr. Campbell, in his debate with Dr. Rice, defends it, 1st. By the shallow philosophy already exposed, inferring hence that *objective inducement is the only moral power* which can operate consistently with man's rational constitution. 2d. By the fact that no converting or sanctifying power is ever seen apart from Bible truth. 3d. By the fact that all the exercises and views of converted people reproduce the conceptions of gospel and spiritual things found in the Scriptures, and no others. 4th. That as every case of spiritual life is generically the same, whatever is essential to

one case is essential to all. From this very just premise Mr. Campbell attempts to draw the illogical conclusion, that, if God regenerates one case (say an infant) without the understanding of the truth, he *must renew all cases without it!* He infers hence that on any other scheme than his of mere moral suasion, all ministrations of the word are wholly useless. 5th. By the fact that God, Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the apostles, always ply men's soul with gospel inducement; and by the numerous passages in which *truth* is spoken of as the instrument, like this: "Sanctify them through thy truth," etc.

The reader will see at a glance that all this is a very good argument to prove that the truth is the *ordinary instrument*, and ordinarily an essential instrument of conversion; but as an argument to prove *that moral suasion is the only form of spiritual power in the case* (the real issue), it is naught. The refutation of the whole is in one word of the Holy Scriptures, Ps. cxix. 18. To produce actual vision in a blind eye, there must be first the curative agency and then the light. So to produce spiritual vision, the soul must be supplied with truth, the intelligible medium; but access must also be made for it to the blinded soul by direct spiritual power.

It may be profitable also to note the points made by Dr. Rice in his reply. He argues first and fundamentally from total depravity, proving the fact irrefragably, and showing that an almighty operation, other than moral suasion, is needed in such a heart to open it to such suasion. He then shows that this direct operation, though mysterious, *is possible*, 1. By the fact that God at first *created man upright*. 2. That God influences the minds of men in other and secular actions by his secret providence, as in Ex. xxxiv. 24, Prov. xx. 1, etc. Dr. Rice's next argument is that if conversion is only by moral suasion, then all infants and idiots must be damned. By this point Mr. Campbell felt himself much pressed. He at length resorts to the supposition that (as he gloried in asserting the salvation of all infants dying in infancy), while his theory of moral suasion alone compelled him to admit they left this world unrenewed, they must, therefore, be purified by some immediate operation in the next

world. This he calls their "physical regeneration after death"; and he says it is effected by divine power, as the "change" will be wrought on those who are alive at the resurrection. Dr. Rice should have pressed Mr. Campbell here with this obvious surrender of his fundamental ground: that any other moral power than suasion is *impossible*, consistently with the rational constitution of mind. What difference does it make, in theory, whether this almighty change, over and above moral suasion, is in this world or the next? This is enhanced by remarking that as "grace is glory begun, so glory is but grace perfected." The system of grace in the militant and triumphant Church differs only in degree. Our advocate did press him so that he was driven to assume the ground that infant depravity is only corporeal! and is removed by the bodily resurrection!

Dr. Rice argues, in the fourth place, that if regeneration were by moral suasion alone, there would be no such thing in gospel lands as intelligent and wilful rejection of the gospel; but all unbelief would be accounted for by ignorance or misconception.

In the fifth place, he refers to that class of passages which teach a gracious operation *in order to* the saving apprehension of the gospel; such as Jer. xxxii. 39; Ezek. xxxvi. 26-7; Ps. cxix. 18; Luke xxiv. 45; Acts xvi. 14. In the next place, he argues from the fact that repentance and faith are *God's gifts* (1 John v. 1; 1 Cor. iii. 6; Acts v. 31; 2 Tim. ii. 25).

Mr. Rice's seventh point was, that, on the theory of moral suasion, it is unreasonable to pray for new birth, either our own or another's. God has no power save that deposited in the gospel: and the only rational thing to do is to ply the soul with its inducements. This point is sustained by two facts: that it actually presents itself in the teachings and corollaries of some of Mr. Campbell's followers; and that many of them do, in fact, pre-empt all such prayers.

Dr. Rice's eighth argument is from the *phenomena* of genuine revivals, where we see the gospel, known before, but inoperative, suddenly assume an unwonted efficiency (as means) to revive Christians and quicken sinners. This new effect implies a new power. He then closes his argument by claiming that at least

nine-tenths of the reverent and thoughtful readers of the Bible, in all ages, have believed that it teaches the doctrine of a special divine influence above moral suasion.

V. With Campbell's theory of the application of redemption is closely connected his doctrine touching the effect of baptism. None need to be told that, as to the *mode* of baptism, he is an immersionist of the strictest sect; and as to the *subjects*, he denies infant baptism with violence. But there is nothing in his treatment of these points not already familiar in our controversy with other immersionists. We therefore simply refer now to the usual discussions, except upon one particular. Mr. Campbell pays an unwitting tribute to the force of our argument for infant membership from the Abrahamic covenant. He does this by his endeavor to evade it; which is, by teaching that God made two compacts with him: one secular, the other spiritual (*Christian System* p. 134). Mr. Campbell labors to separate these parts of the Abrahamic covenant. To the one he refers temporal and political blessings, and to the other religious blessings. He then intimates that circumcision was the badge of the secular covenant only. It is easy to retort this piece of dishonesty, to the overthrow of his own cause. For if there were two covenants with Abraham, then circumcision was undoubtedly the sign and seal of the spiritual. See Deut. x. 16; xxx. 6; Rom. iv. 11, 12; Gal. iii. 7. And that it was not a sign expressive of or coincident with God's secular favor and the possession of the land of Canaan, see Deut. xxviii. 64; Rom. ix. 6, 7.

As to the *design* and *effect* of baptism, the Campbellite theory is substantially the *opus operatum* one. It cannot be said to be "baptismal regeneration," because with them the new birth is not a change of spiritual character, but only of state: a passing from condemnation to pardon. This is *effected*, according to them, in baptism. They say that the immersion of an unbeliever would, indeed, procure no remission, but that sins are *pardoned through faith and baptism*. A favorite formula with them is: "Sins are remitted to believers in the act of baptism." Errett, page 73: "It is the appointed means through which the assurance of par-

don is actually bestowed." Campbell, in his debate with Dr. Rice, was allowed to state his proposition, "Baptism is for the remission of sins," ambiguously. He uses the preposition "for" in the sense of "*in order to.*" His true doctrine may be defined from his *Christian Baptist*, pages 416, 417: "At the very instant our bodies are put under the water, our former or old sins are all washed away, provided only that we are true believers."

Campbellite writers usually illustrate their doctrine thus: a man may be elected or appointed to an office of authority and trust; but he does not exercise its functions or enjoy its emoluments until the oath of inauguration is taken. Up to that moment official acts by him would be illegal. After that moment they are legal. Again: the sentiments of an immigrant may be thoroughly attracted to the United States, and his residence fixed there for life; but until he takes the oath of naturalisation, he does not possess any right of citizenship. Two people may be thoroughly united by affection; but until the marriage ceremony is performed, their cohabitation would be illicit. Thus, says Campbell, this side of baptism, the believer is in one state, that of condemnation; on the other, he is pardoned, adopted, and saved. It may be perceived at a glance that these instances present a false analogy. Were they only applied to explain why and how the outward or formal privileges of the visible Church connexion are suspended on baptism, they would be relevant. But when the thing in question is our spiritual state, and that before an omniscient God, where all is of grace, and the gospel term is an inward principle, faith, the case is very different. Such loose analogies are worthless against the express promises of God. It should, however, be said, in justice, that like the Romanists, they make baptism only the formal cause of remission, and teach that the meritorious cause is Christ's sacrifice.

They claim, with much clamor, that the Reformed divines and symbols, and especially the Westminster and the Thirty-Nine Articles, teach their doctrine; and that we have really forsaken our own standards on these points. Their supposed proof is, that the Confessions say baptism is not only a sign, but a *seal* of the remission of sins, our engrafting into Christ, etc. It seems hard

to make them see that they have leaped from one idea to another wholly different, in thus confounding the attestation by a sacrament, of a *blessing already conferred* on terms entirely non-formal and spiritual, with making the sacrament the essential term for conferring the blessing. To our minds the difference is clearly enough expressed in the words of Paul: circumcision was to Abraham a *seal* of the righteousness of the faith *which he had yet being uncircumcised*. Every one sees that the spragistic nature of the sacrament is destroyed by assigning it an *opus operatum* power. For visibly to effect a work is one thing; to attest its performance by an invisible agent is a different thing. As fruition excludes hope, so the former supersedes the latter.

The Campbellite writers also speak great things of the superiority of their system, as giving to the convert a palpable and express assurance of his forgiveness, conditioned on a definite act, instead of a mystical state of feeling called "supernatural faith." Thus Errett: "The sects, upon this subject, believe neither the Scriptures nor their own creeds. This seems to be owing chiefly to the fact, that a particular theory of spiritual operations, which has gradually almost monopolised the minds of the Protestant community, makes the assurance of pardon to rest on certain feelings, or upon what are thought to be supernatural visions, or special spiritual communications. The attempt is thus made to *transfer the office of baptism, as the remitting ordinance, to vague emotional or mental impressions*; and to effect this purpose, the connection of baptism with remission of sins is totally denied." The reader sees how unscrupulous is this misrepresentation, stigmatising the *scriptural faith* to which forgiveness is promised by God, the simplest of acts of soul, the most carefully defined in the Sacred Scriptures and distinguished in the case of the true believer by definite fruits and the witness of an infallible Spirit: as "vague emotional impressions." But, further, these men admit fully that the immersion of an unbeliever would not effect the remission of his sins! Faith, then, as well as immersion, is the essential term of pardon. And without the faith the immersion would be naught! So that they, as much as we, must "make the assurance of pardon rest on certain feelings." Thus, Simon

Magus "believed and was baptized," yet, according to Peter, he was "in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity." To settle that matter, everything turned upon the nature of Simon's pretended faith. So absurd is this pretence in their mouths. We should like to know whether it is not more comfortable to infer our assurance of pardon from a scriptural faith, wrought by the Spirit and answering in nature and fruits to *his* revealed marks, than from the shadowy dividing line between a temporary faith wrought by moral suasion on the natural mind, and the miserable sham called believing with which so many thousands have gone through Campbellite immersion to return immediately like the sow to her mire.

Mr. Campbell argues that his ritual scheme of forgiveness is in strict conformity to the Protestant belief, that no faith justifies save the faith that works. James ii. 22, etc. The act of submitting to immersion, says he, is that *test work* in which, when faith culminates, it actually justifies. This act of dipping is that "obedience of faith" (Rom. xvi. 26) made known to all nations by the gospel. Those expositors are most probably correct, who make the faith a genitive appositive, so that faith itself is the obedience. But let us adopt the other construction; and the Sacred Scripture everywhere else will teach us that the obedience which proceeds from faith is that whole career of holy living which flows from a "faith working by love." When Mr. Campbell would substitute for this life-long fruit, in the meaning of such passages as that of James second, *one easy, cheap, ritual act*, he most wretchedly degrades the plan of salvation and the sanctifying energy of true faith.

His scriptural argument for his water justification consists in part in an attempt to identify immersion and conversion, and the new birth, as different terms for the same thing in the New Testament. This absurd license of interpretation he supposes will enable him to press into service all the texts where conversion and regeneration are connected with remission. Its refutation is easily effected by showing that the ideas of conversion and new birth are as well known in the Old Testament, where, according to Mr. Campbell, there is no Christian baptism, as in the New Tes-

tament; that in both they are notoriously spiritual works (Matt. xiii. 15) as opposed to ritual; that Christ rebukes Nicodemus because, being an Old Testament scribe, he was not familiar with the idea of the new birth; but he could not be expected to know anything of water baptism as a gospel sacrament; that in Acts iii. 19, conversion is the sequel and fruit of *μετένοια*; and that according to the Apostle John (1 John v. 1), *all who believe* are already born of God, while Mr. Campbell himself makes believing the necessary prerequisite of baptism; whence it follows that the new birth precedes baptism is not identical with it.

Mr. Campbell has, of course, his proof-texts. They are such as John iii. 5; Acts ii. 38; xxii. 16; Mark xvi. 16; Gal. iii. 27; 1 Pet. iii. 20; Titus iii. 5; Luke iii. 7; Acts x. 14; Eph. v. 25, 26. These are the texts which he regards as strongest. He uses them precisely after the same perverse fashion in which Romanists and ritualists employ them to prove the *opus operatum*. The solution is easy. The sacramental union between the element and the grace naturally leads to the employment of the name of the symbol to describe the grace symbolised. Take, for instance, John iii. 5, 6, the context proves that Christ was not intending *the sacrament of baptism* by the words, "born of water and the Spirit," because that sacrament was not yet appointed, and Nicodemus could not have been rebuked for not understanding it. The force of the words is, "Born of that which the water of purification represents, the Holy Spirit." So, when Peter speaks of "repenting and being baptized in the name, etc., for the remission of sins," he cannot mean to make baptism as important as repentance, for he mentions it no more in any subsequent address. But had it been so essential, he could not have honestly omitted it. Mr. Campbell tacitly assumes that "for" means here "in order to," whereas this preposition of most extensive use (*εις*) may mean "for commemoration of." When Paul says, "We are saved by the washing" (or if you please "bath," as Mr. Campbell says, *λουτρόν*) of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, he does not mean that water baptism is that regeneration, but on the contrary, in strict accordance with the sacramental language of the Bible, *we are saved by that spiritual*

cleansing which washing with water represents. When the Apostle Peter says, "Baptism saves us," he immediately guards himself against Mr. Campbell's idea by disclaiming it: "Not the putting off of the filth of the flesh, but the *ἐπερώρημα* of a good conscience towards God." But it is unnecessary for us to go farther in detail.

The correct statement of the scripture view of baptism is of itself a reply to much of the above pretended argument. It is a *positive ordinance* enjoined by God for his glory in the Church's edification. One of those edifying uses is to be a badge of profession separating the visible Church from the world of the ungodly. Here the illustrations of the marriage-ceremony and naturalisation oath are germane. To the outward, formal privileges of the visible Church baptism does immediately introduce us. Secondly, it is a *didactic ordinance*, teaching several central truths of the gospel by admirably expressive symbol, in the most pungent and impressive manner, as our separation from the world and engagement to be the Lord's, the cleansing of our *guilt* by Christ's blood and our *corruption* by his Spirit. Thirdly, it is a *sphragistic ordinance*, not only sealing our vow to God, but, if our hearts are faithful, sealing his gracious promises to us; and thus, through the Holy Ghost, greatly strengthening both our devotion and our faith and assurance. In this way baptism is very useful and necessary to the Church and edifying to the person. It is a plainly enjoined and important duty. Therefore its wilful neglect must be a sin. This sin, if unrepented, will be (just like any other wilful sin) a sure index and occasion of the soul's ruin. But we deny that water baptism is the *essential* term of salvation in any such sense as is faith. In the words of Turretin: "*Non privatio, sed contemptus damnat.*"

As the Campbellite doctrine is not identical with the Romish *opus operatum* theory, but has its own phase, we submit an outline of an argument, partly new, in refutation of it.

1. Mr. Campbell is inconsistent in not extending the *opus operatum* dogma to both sacraments. He makes the Supper merely a commemoration. But his own principles of exposition, applied to the sixth chapter of John, for instance, would

prove sacramental grace far more clearly of the Supper than of baptism.

2. That God should have made saving grace *essentially* dependent on a "*positive*" form, or indeed on any act for which the soul is dependent on a fellow-creature, *in the case of those who are already spiritually docile, believing and penitent*, is incredibly contrary to the tone and spirit of both Testaments. Mr. Campbell endeavors to evade this by saying: "Why are not Pagan souls dependent on either preachers or Bibles for salvation? And in the latter case dependent, in a true sense, on the use of paper or parchment (of rags or skins) and coloring matter? What means more thoroughly external or formal?" The answers are two: These materials are simply *ministerial to a didactic use*. Is Mr. Campbell willing to make baptism such? 2. These souls are contumacious, unbelieving, and corrupt as to the truth; and God's providence merely ordains that their privation of these material means shall be the *occasion* of their condemnation already deserved. The soul who desires to embrace Christ and duty *never*, under either Testament, depends for redemption essentially upon *any* act where another *creature* must intervene between him and his God. He who cometh unto God through Christ shall in *no wise* be cast out. Again: a place in the favor of God always depends instrumentally on the spiritual state, and on nothing else. See, for example, 1 Sam. xv. 22; Ps. xxiv. 4; Matt. xii. 7; Ps. lxvi. 18. This leads—

3. To the irrefragable argument that the Scriptures everywhere says he that *believes* is justified. See Romans iv. 11; Jno. iii. 16; i. 12, iii. 36; v. 24; Rom. v. 1, *et passim*. Now if remission is given only in baptism, during any interval of time between the believing and the baptism the believing soul is still in an unjustified state. This is contrary to the Sacred Scriptures. Mr. Campbell makes an impotent endeavor to evade by distinguishing between title and possession, between an inheritance in prospect and in actual enjoyment. Thus saith he: The father of the prodigal says to his home staying son, "Son all that I have is thine." Yet that son had not a kid to make merry with his friends. Christ during his humiliation could say, "All that the

Father hath is mine," yet he was in the other sense so poor that "he had not where to lay his head." Does Mr. Campbell mean to say that true faith, before baptism, only secures a title in prospect, like that of the expectant heir? Why, that the elect sinner has, in God's apprehension, even before he repents! How can this idea square with the declaration, "he that believeth *hath*," "*is passed* from death unto life"? See also Rom. v. 1.

4. Many souls have obtained remission without baptism or *any* corresponding sacrament. As Abraham, Cornelius, Acts x. 4, 34, 35, 44; xi. 17; the dying thief, etc. Mr. Campbell endeavors vainly to escape the proof that Cornelius was a reconciled sinner before he was baptized, by pointing to ch. xi. 14: "Shall tell the words whereby thou and all thy house *shall be saved*." It is perfectly evident that the word saved here must mean, not the application, but the consummation of redemption, as in Matt x. 22.

5. The harshness and uncharitableness of this doctrine, if carried out consistently, must condemn it in every fair mind. It would at least throw the destiny of the sincere penitent who died after his regeneration and before baptism into great doubt. But what of the myriads of intelligent, consistent Pædobaptists who live and die without immersion? They present every mark and every fruit of true piety except immersion, and yet are damned? *Incredulus odi*. Mr. Campbell has great difficulty in meeting this charge, and vacillates much. Sometimes he seems to suggest that such unimmersed persons may be accepted on the ground of their misconception of their duty. Sometimes he is more exclusive; but he can never be made exactly to meet the issue.

6. A scriptural argument may be framed from the numerous passages which teach that every believer is born (*γεννηθεῖς*) of God, as 1 Jno. v. 1. But obviously the begotten of God are the children of God. See the clear implication of this in the same place, verse 2. But the children are *heirs*. How preposterous does it sound to represent the soul which is begotten of God, adopted, and co-heir with Christ, as still under condemnation for his sins? To avoid this, Mr. Campbell weakly attempts to reduce the new birth to a *change of state* (instead of change of

moral character) and to identify it with immersion. How unscriptural this is has been already shown. See in addition such passages as 1 Cor. iv. 15, Jas. i. 18.

In conclusion of this point, we may say of this doctrine as of all forms of sacramental grace, it is the prompting of that tendency to formalism and to a sensuous religion which exhibits itself in Popery and Paganism. To secure a grace pertaining to salvation by human manipulation, instead of embracing it by a sanctifying faith—this suits at once the pride and the obtuseness of the carnal mind. But it is “another gospel.” It is a conception utterly heterogeneous with the nature of the Bible system. It converts the work of God’s Spirit through the truth, into a system of religious jugglery.

The other striking peculiarities of Campbellism are the permission of lay-baptism and lay-administration of the Supper; the thorough independent church government, and the weekly repetition of the Supper. They insist much on these. But they are not the germinant points of the system, and we pass them over.

Our Church has committed itself definitely to a policy of non-recognition as to the Campbellite societies. Our grounds may be found stated in the Minutes of the General Assembly, 1871.

ROBERT L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE II.

CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF CAUSALITY.

Sir William Hamilton, in his Thirty-ninth Lecture, presents a tabular view of the different theories of philosophers in regard to the principles of Causality. These he discusses, with his usual learning and acuteness, under eight heads. The last is his own, which he seeks to substitute for the fifth in the series, that of the great body of modern thinkers. He thus introduces his peculiar views :

"I come now to the second category, and to the first of the four particular heads which it likewise contains—the opinion, namely, that the judgment that everything that begins to be must have a cause, is a simple primary datum, a positive revelation of intelligence. To this head must be referred the theories on causality of Descartes, Leibnitz, Reid, Stewart, Kant, Fichte, Cousin, and the majority of recent philosophers. . . .

"The eighth and last opinion is that which regards the judgment of causality as derived; and derives it, not from a *power*, but from an *impotence*, of mind; in a word, from the principle of the conditioned. . . .

"This theory, which has not hitherto been proposed, is recommended by its extreme simplicity. It postulates no new, no special, no positive principle. It only supposes that the mind is limited; and the law of limitation, the law of the conditioned, in one of its applications, constitutes the law of causality. The mind is necessitated to think certain forms; and, under these forms, thought is only possible in the interval between two contradictory extremes, both of which are absolutely inconceivable, but one of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, is necessarily true. . . . Thus, while obliged to think under the thought of time, it cannot conceive, on the one hand, the absolute commencement of time, and it cannot conceive, on the other, an infinite non-commencement of time; in like manner, on the one hand, it cannot conceive an absolute minimum of time, nor yet, on the other, can it conceive the infinite divisibility of time. Yet these form two pairs of contradictions, that is of counter propositions, which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, but of which, on the same authority, one necessarily must be true. This proves, 1st. That it is not competent to argue, that what cannot be comprehended as possible by us, is impossible in reality; and 2d. That the necessities of thought are not always positive powers of cognition, but often negative inabilities to know. . . .

"We have been hitherto speaking only of one inconceivable extreme

of the conditioned, in its application to the category of existence in the category of time—the extreme of absolute commencement; the other is equally incomprehensible, that is the extreme of infinite regress or non-commencement. With this latter we have, however, at present nothing to do. . . . It is the former alone—it is the inability we experience of annihilating in thought an existence in time past, in other words, our utter impotence of conceiving an absolute commencement, that constitutes and explains the whole phenomenon of causality. . . .

“Of no phenomenon, as observed, need we think *the* cause; but of every phenomenon, must we think *a* cause. The former we may learn through a process of induction and generalisation; the latter we must always and at once admit, constrained by the condition of Relativity. On this, not sunken rock, Dr. Brown and others have been shipwrecked.”

The purpose of the author in this discussion of Causality is fully developed near its close. It is to destroy the force of the necessitarian argument, and to vindicate his own view of the freedom of the will. He admits, throughout, that necessity is the *apparent* result of all logical processes. In fact, he represents the demonstration as perfect, so far as human knowledge is concerned. He speaks of “*the inevitable necessity of our nature, which compels us to refuse any commencement of existence to the phenomena which occur in or around us.*” And this necessity to impute all events to causes, he reiterates in a variety of forms. No philosopher of modern times has more explicitly taught that the testimony of nature and of consciousness is conclusively in favor of a determination of the will. But strange to say, he makes a gigantic effort, in this discussion, to prove this testimony fallacious. He declares that “we cannot conceive a free volition”; and yet he argues, against the necessitarian, “that something may, yea, must be true, of which the mind is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility.” And, in brief, he contends that volitions are uncaused, notwithstanding the fact that our *nature* leads us to the opposite conclusion. Necessity and freedom are to him two opposite contradictories, both of which, according to his logical system, cannot be true, while one must be. And, for reasons hereafter to be examined, he decides in favor of freedom.

We propose in this investigation to show, beyond dispute, that the great philosopher has here fallen into a fatal inconsistency, and that his argument not only fails “to save the phenomenon” of

causation, but directly impugns the validity of that principle. But before entering into an estimate of his logical method, we must indicate the bearing of his doctrine upon the question of undetermined volition. The following language evinces the spirit and motives that prompted the discussion: "The assertion of absolute necessity is virtually the negation of a moral universe, consequently of the Moral Governor of a moral universe; in a word, Atheism." "But this assertion is Fatalism," and "Fatalism and Atheism are convertible terms." It is obvious that, in his view, we are *compelled* to reject the conclusions of an inexorable logic which our nature *compels* us to adopt. But justice to so great a thinker requires us to add, that he was conscious of the posture of apparent inconsistency in which he was involved, and that the discussion of the origin of the causal judgment was designed to elucidate and justify his peculiar opinions. For, if he had succeeded in establishing his theory of Causality, the result of his reasoning would have been to reduce that principle to a relative notion, true to the human mind in consequence of its limitations, but not true in the sense of necessity and universality. Yet he has severely criticised Dr. Brown for eliminating necessity from causation.

His effort to accomplish the purpose we have indicated is directed to prove that the causal judgment does not arise from a positive principle in the mind, but from inability to conceive of non-causation; and he argues at length that our inability to conceive of a free volition is a *negative* necessity, which must give way before the imperative force of a *positive* principle in the moral nature, which affirms our responsibility. He justly assumes that two positive principles cannot contradict each other. But just here he fails to observe that, according to his own views, this contradiction may be only apparent. If "things may be true, the possibility of which we cannot construe to our own intelligence," then it may be true that necessity and moral freedom can be reconciled by higher orders of being. The contradiction may be but another illustration of the limited range of our faculties.

It is evident to readers who are familiar with the theological

controversy concerning the freedom of the will, that Sir William Hamilton has overlooked a distinction which is of the highest importance to the discussion. Freedom of the conative faculty is one thing, and freedom of our moral nature is another. Those who deny the former were misunderstood by him, as they have been by a multitude of others. They maintain that, whilst the soul, as a unit, is free from all compulsion in its choice, the volitions exercised by that unit, in action, are determined by certain states of the mind that precede them. The great question upon which so many religious interests depend, is, whether the distinct faculty of will is, or is not, absolutely independent of the subjective states. Those who take the affirmative locate "the power of contrary choice" in the will, as distinguished from the understanding and the affections. This distinction between a free moral nature and freedom of a single faculty, Sir William Hamilton ignores. Some writers who contend for a "power of contrary choice" in the will, maintain its independence in every responsible creature. Others limit it to unfallen beings. Our own position is that it cannot exist in *any* creature mentally constituted like man.

We admit that if Hamilton's doctrine of causation were correct, there might be plausible grounds for doubt. But adopting now, provisionally, the received opinion, that the law of causation is positively necessary and universal, we maintain that a free volition is, in the sense of the Semi-Pelagian, not only inconceivable, but absurd.

It is universally allowed that human conduct is greatly influenced by certain objects without, and certain conditions within. The influence of external objects is constantly experienced. But this source of impressions is never regarded as the cause of volitions. When these external inducements—these objective motives—are presented in opposition to one another, the force which they exercise upon the mind is constant in its value, acting upon one man very much as it acts upon another; and therefore we may say that these objects are the occasions and not the causes of the ensuing conduct. The law may forbid two men to steal, and the purse of gold may be equally desirable in the view of

both ; and yet their conduct—that is, their volitions—may be entirely different. The conscience of one may restrain him from the crime, and the cupidity of the other may lead him to commit it. If we inquire for the causes of this difference, we cannot find them in the equal objective motives. They must be sought, if sought at all, in the subjective states of the individuals. Hence the obvious distinction between objective and subjective *motives*. We know from experience that the mental states correspond with the external conduct. The principle of moral rectitude restrains the conscientious, and the influence of passion leads the vicious into crime. As far as we can see, the conduct will be in exact accordance with the relative strength of opposite principles. These permanent tendencies are, therefore, the only true causes of fugitive volitions, if volitions are caused at all. That they exert a powerful influence, has never been denied. But it is denied that this influence is determinative. Yet we have as much uniformity in the sequences as is observed in nature around us. In physics this uniformity is always held to warrant the assumption of a cause. But some writers endeavor to rescue the will from the operation of such a law ; maintaining that the will always possesses the power to act in opposition to the immediately preceding conditions of the mind. According to them, the conscientious man, in his normal state, might have committed the theft, and the vicious man might have resisted the temptation. But such a result would be so strange that all observers would begin at once to inquire for the cause of the anomaly, and the conclusion would universally be that the mental or moral states of the two men were temporarily reversed.

Sir William Hamilton has, in our humble judgment, committed two grave errors in his argument. One is, that our moral nature positively and directly affirms the freedom of the will. The other is that our intellectual nature does *not* affirm the law of causation. His position is, that the former is a *positive* necessity of belief and the latter only a *negative* necessity ; and as they constitute a pair of contradictories, the positive must prevail. We will examine the two propositions in the order in which they are stated.

1. Is it true that a positive principle in the mind affirms the independence of the will of all associated conditions? The argument is that we are conscious of moral responsibility, and this necessarily involves uncaused volitions. But there is a link wanting in the process of reasoning. If it could be proved that the will is the seat of responsibility, the logic would be sound. But our nature does not so testify. Consciousness declares plainly that *we* are responsible, and *we* are free agents in that sense; but it does not follow that the faculty of will is independent of the other powers. It is the soul, the indivisible personal unit, the conscious *ego*, that feels the weight of obligation, and asserts its freedom. The will, as a distinct attribute of the soul, cannot be properly said to be conscious of anything. It is impersonal. It is not chargeable, by itself, with error, cannot be separately tried, condemned, and punished. It is not, therefore, the seat of responsibility. Obligation obviously rests upon the *man* himself, as an individual whole—an indivisible personality; and the conscience and the will are different attributes belonging to that personality. Hamilton has here mistaken an inference for a direct declaration of consciousness. He has unconsciously employed a suppressed syllogism, the fallacy of which appears when it is fully developed. It is evidently this: The soul is free and responsible; it possesses various faculties, including the will; therefore each faculty is free. This amounts to little less than the startling conclusion that the different attributes of the conscious unit are so many moral agents, because that unit is a moral agent. But besides the fallacy of representing the attributes as component *parts* of such a *unit*, and arguing that what is true of the whole is true of its parts, the proposition contains another equally glaring. The notion of freedom is employed in two different senses. Moral freedom has reference to other individuals under whose influence the agent may come. A man is free when no other moral agent coerces him. But he is not free from himself. Neither are his own powers independent of him or of one another. They have no separate responsibility or freedom, but are, from the constitution of their nature, mutually dependent throughout. The will, therefore, cannot be free, in the same

sense that the man is free; and Hamilton's argument, when unfolded, is found to involve two fallacies, either of which would suffice to destroy its force. There is no positive *dictum* of nature that the will is independent of the conditions of the mind and the affections; and the same conclusion, reached by deductive reasoning, is equally unsound. The argument that a *positive* necessity in favor of freedom of the will, must override the *negative* necessity for causation, is, therefore, altogether untenable. But Hamilton himself is by no means so erroneous on this subject as some of his followers. His aim is to establish *personal* freedom rather than independence of the will. *Their* purpose is mainly to exempt the will from all dependence, to represent its volitions as uncaused phenomena, and to make it, instead of the more permanent principles of the soul, the seat of responsibility.

We have seen many desperate efforts made to reduce volition to the form of a fugitive occurrence independent of any of the native principles in the mind. The futility of all such attempts will appear whenever the law of Causality is recognised as necessary and universal. In the meantime we will present such considerations as may seem sufficient to throw discredit upon all these theories.

It is plain that no volition can take place until certain other exercises of the intelligence have occurred. In the mind of Adam there must first have been perception, apprehension, recollection, reverence, hope, and fear. These will not be denied by any one. Previous to any possible volition, we have then an abundance of antecedents. The question is, were they related to the subsequent volition, merely in a temporal succession, and not as its causes? It is held by the advocates of a "power of contrary choice in the will" that when the antecedent conditions—the subjective states—preponderate in favor of one course of conduct, it is still possible for the will to determine upon the opposite course. To put the doctrine in the mildest form, these antecedent conditions may guide, but cannot control, the decisions of the will. In opposition to these views we do not contend that it is *impossible* for the will to act contrary to the subjective states in a *popular sense* of the word. This would imply coercion. It

would amount to saying that the will may be forced to act "against its will." The very language would be absurd. But there is such a thing as *philosophical* impossibility; and in this sense, we maintain that no normal volition can take place that would place the man's will in antagonism to the predominant antecedents in his own mind. To be very brief, we cannot either conceive or believe that a responsible being, rightly apprehending a moral obligation, approving of it, and more disposed to fulfil than to violate it, should nevertheless commit the offence. Such an occurrence would be nothing less than a schism in a spiritual unit—a division of the indivisible soul into conflicting parts; and we have no hesitation in saying it would be impossible.

This doctrine of "a power of contrary choice in the will" is not only absurd, but altogether destructive of that very responsibility which it was invented to save. It makes the will independent of the immanent principles of the moral nature, and absolves them from all obligation. If a bad man without repentance, which involves a subjective change in the soul, may, at any moment, by an act of will, obey the law, and the next moment, by a similar act, disobey it, his responsibility must be limited to a moment; he cannot be rewarded to-day for the conduct of yesterday. All permanence of character and condition must be impossible. In material nature, if a new phenomenon without a cause were an admitted possibility, the return of chaos at any moment would be imminent. No less would be the ruin in the moral world, if the power of persistent principles to regulate the will were entirely abrogated.

Calvinistic theologians unanimously agree that certain permanent conditions of human nature, in its fallen state, do determine our volitions, without impairing responsibility. "It is impossible but that offences will come, but woe unto him through whom they come." "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?" It was possible, in a popular sense, for Judas to have refrained from the betrayal, for the Jews to have refrained from the arraignment, for Pilate to have refused to condemn and to crucify the Lord; but, in another sense, it was

impossible. It was necessary for Christ to die precisely as he did, that prophecy might be fulfilled.

It has been suggested by several eminent thinkers in our own country, that the case of our first parents was an exception never realised among their descendants. They suppose that the subjective state of Adam's mind, at the time of his transgression, was altogether favorable to obedience, but that the first criminal volition started from a pure and heavenly frame, like lightning from a clear sky, and that without a cause. The first obvious objection to this suggestion is, that it postulates a radically different mental constitution in Adam and in his descendants. But another is equally fatal, that it makes an independent will essential to responsibility in Adam, and yet holds his posterity responsible under opposite conditions. This is a strange theodicy. For such an account of the fall can have no object, unless it be designed to vindicate the justice of God. But if an undetermined will is necessary to constitute a just accountability in one man, how can it be just to condemn another whose will is governed by his subjective states ?

One of two propositions is clearly true : either the will of fallen man is undetermined, or an independent will is *not* essential to responsibility in any order of beings. Now the *certainty* of human actions is proof sufficient that our volitions are determined. No theist can deny that Omniscience apprehends our future acts in their succession. The idea that the divine knowledge is all present knowledge, is untrue, if it means that God has no *fore-knowledge* at all. It would amount to saying that a physical cause and its effect are, to the divine intelligence, contemporaneous. This would be fatal to any statement of Causality. It would make our notions of time and space mere illusions. If God views, or *can* view, events in succession, which it would be irreverent to deny, then his apprehension of the certainty of a future phenomenon in the material world, implies the necessity of its occurrence. If we deny physical causes, then God is the only efficient cause. But no writer of the present day holds any such doctrine. It follows that the certainty of such a phenomenon involves physical force, as the necessary antecedent. But

the divine foreknowledge of a *volition*, as certain, implies necessary antecedents in the mental succession. Otherwise such certainty would make every volition the immediate product of the divine will; and this would be fatalism. There is no escape. If the subjective states furnish no valid ground for foreknowledge, a volition that is foreknown as certain must be due to an immediate act of the divine will. Certainty, if predicable at all, must be twofold—*objective* in the thing foreknown, and *subjective* in the mind foreknowing. The objective certainty must logically precede the subjective. The subjective is false, unless there is an objective certainty to which it corresponds. But the latter involves necessity. When we affirm that a future event is certain, we thereby affirm that it *must* occur. And to affirm that it must be, is a contradiction of its opposite, that it may never be. A volition that may not be exercised, cannot, in the nature of the case, be foreseen as certain. But the alleged “power of contrary choice in the will” renders every volition *uncertain* until it transpires. Even Omniscience cannot invest an absolute contingency with an absolute certainty. Now all future volitions are thus certain to God, and are, therefore, determined. And even to human intelligence they may approximate certainty, without impairing the responsibility of the agent. If a strong probability does not diminish accountability, absolute certainty cannot destroy it.

One eminent American writer has resorted to a philological subterfuge to save Hamilton's conclusion from the consequence of his errors. He maintains that volitions are not *phenomenal*, because they are not impressed upon the senses. But this is virtually a *petitio principii*; their phenomenal character will not be disputed, provided it can be shown that they are effects; and it will not be required, if they are not effects. This is the great question to be settled first; and we think it has been fairly established by the ablest logicians in the world, that the will is regulated and its volitions determined by the subjective motives.

Holding as we do, in its integrity, the theological dogma of foreordination and the divine decree, that an uninterrupted chain of necessary antecedents and consequents intervenes between

every external or internal phenomenon and the will of God, we nevertheless insist that this is not the immediate object of the present discussion. Some of the links in the chain may be concealed, but the link that lies behind each volition is plainly visible. We not only hold with Hamilton that an uncaused volition is inconceivable, but further, that it would be *irrational*. There must be a felt apprehension of an object, in order that there may be a true volition. The will cannot act rationally when it yields to an inducement which appears to the understanding and affections *inferior* to its alternative. Such a power, instead of being the highest attribute of man, would reduce him below the level of the brute; for even the brute owes his superiority over the plant to the fact that his actions are performed under the influence of a rudimentary intelligence. But man, acting contrary to the dictates of both thought and feeling, would be an unclassifiable monster, governed by a blind force misnamed the will.

It is a grave error, no less inconsistent with philosophy than with religion, to locate the seat of responsibility in a single power of the mind. Not only the will, but every other faculty of the soul, is involved in error and in crime. How evil first originated in the human breast, we may never fully know. It is possible, however, to approximate a solution by means of a correct psychology. It is incredible as it is incomprehensible, that Adam partook of the forbidden fruit without a change in the current of his thoughts and feelings having prompted the act. Beyond question, there was a diminution of his reverence and his faith, and an increase of his curiosity and carnal appetite. His apprehension of truth was obscured, his feelings overmastered his judgment, and discontent took possession of his soul. In such a trial, as experience testifies, there is a period of fluctuation of purpose, terminating in action. But the process of change is by successive stages, and there must have been a first stage in Adam's apostasy. What it was is a matter of speculation. Satanic instigation was not resisted with sufficient firmness, and something was wanting in the mind that should have prompted that resistance. What was that want? Perhaps we would not be far wrong in calling it a want of *faith*. How this defect

originated we cannot possibly state in any but negative terms. It certainly did not originate in a volition. It was not caused, but only occasioned, by temptation; otherwise Adam would not have been responsible. Yet it had a proximate cause in his person, whether we can define it or not. For the same reasons exist for postulating a cause at this point that were indicated in reference to volitions. And here we plant our feet firmly upon Hamilton's own assertion, that "of no phenomenon need we think *the* cause; but of every phenomenon must we think *a* cause."

We are thus brought face to face with his argument from the positive *dictum* of the moral nature, that "we (personally) are the responsible authors of our actions." And we admit that, whilst the argument is unavailable against a *will* determined by the subjective motives, it would be available against a *nature* necessitated *ab extra* to fall into error—if the statement were true that "every scheme of necessity" leads to fatalism. But "some things may be true, the possibility of which cannot be construed to our intelligence"; and among these things, thus credible although inconceivable, we may reckon a necessity in the moral nature that is compatible with responsibility. The argument applies to physical necessity alone, and may not, without a gratuitous assumption, be applied to the sphere of morals.

2. We must now inquire into Sir William Hamilton's distinction between a *positive* necessity, affirming that moral states and actions are uncaused, and a *negative* necessity, affirming that every phenomenon *must* have a cause. If it can be shown that his argument is fatal to all causation, and that the latter necessity is as positive and irresistible as the former, we shall find ourselves on solid ground, in maintaining, with him, that one positive *dictum* of the mind cannot conflict with another, and that the inference, drawn from moral freedom in favor of non-causation in moral changes, is altogether untenable.

His course of reasoning must be very briefly stated. It is this: that all possible thought is confined to the three categories of existence, space, and time; and in each category, thought is only possible in the interval between two extremes—the *infinite* on

the one hand, and the *absolute* on the other. In these categories, the infinite is endless multiplication or division, the absolute is a complete limitation of either. But both extremes are equally inconceivable. For example, we cannot conceive of time beginning or ending; this would be the *absolute*. And we cannot conceive of time without beginning or end; this would be the *infinite*. These are two contradictories, one of which must, and both of which cannot, be true. Applying this law to the doctrine of Causality, he argues that an eternal causation and absolute non-causation are equally inconceivable; yet one must be true, and both cannot. We are therefore compelled to believe in one, although we can comprehend neither. The following extract contains his statement of the necessitarian argument, and his own counter-argument in clear contrast:

“They say that it is unconditionally given, as a special and positive law of intelligence, that every origination is only an apparent, not a real, commencement. Now to exempt certain phænomena from this law, for the sake of our moral consciousness, cannot validly be done. For, in the first place, this would be to admit that the mind is a complement of contradictory revelations. If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. “*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*” Absolute scepticism is hence the legitimate conclusion. But, in the second place, waiving this conclusion, what right have we, on this doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to our consciousness of moral liberty? what right have we, for the interest of the latter, to derogate from the universality of the former? We have none. If both are equally positive, we have no right to sacrifice to the other the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon.

“But the doctrine which I propose is not exposed to these difficulties. It does not suppose that the judgment of Causality is founded on a power of the mind to recognise as necessary in thought what is necessary in the universe of existence; it, on the contrary, founds this judgment merely on the impotence of the mind to conceive either of two contradictories. and as one or other of two contradictories must be true, though both cannot, it shows that there is no ground for inferring from the inability of the mind to conceive an alternative as possible, that such alternative is really impossible. At the same time, if the causal judgment be not an affirmation of mind, but merely an incapacity of thinking the contrary, it follows that such a negative judgment cannot stand in opposition to the positive consciousness—the affirmative deliverance that we are truly the authors—the responsible originators, of our actions, and not merely links in the adamant series of effects and causes.”

It will be seen that the author makes the infinite and the absolute, in causation, directly contradictory, and *equally* inconceivable. They thus constitute, in his view, two *negative* necessities, each counterpoising the other. Our first criticism of this statement is, that it must be erroneous in making the two necessities negative. For if this were true, the causal judgment must itself be negative. Each horn of the inevitable dilemma must repel the mind, and forbid any affirmation in the premises. If there is no law of the intelligence affirming causation, but merely an inability to conceive of non-causation, then the judgment of the mind must be a mere negation of the latter, without any assertion of the former. We could not say that every phenomenon *must* have a cause, but simply leaving the question undetermined, we would fall into endless scepticism on the subject. Hamilton nowhere in the discussion indicates any ground upon which a positive adoption of the law of causation may be reached. And, without intending it, he has furnished to more reckless writers the very weapon they needed to destroy the validity of the principle.

But, again, we insist that the equality of the two contradictories is gratuitously and erroneously assumed. Admitting, as not essential to the argument, that the infinite is inconceivable, it does not follow that causation is a negative principle. The moment we reject one alternative and accept the other, we invest the one with a positive and the other with a negative character. He allows that the causal judgment is necessary and universal; and this admission makes it positive. For unless we introduce a *third* principle, positive in its character, to decide between two equal contradictories, neither of them could ever be adopted. The conclusion is inevitable, that such an arbiter being wanting, causation and non-causation do not affect the mind with equal force.

The truth is, that the judgment of causality, so universal among men, and so imperative even with the most illiterate, is not founded upon a conscious comparison of the infinite with the absolute. None but disciplined minds can entertain such propositions. The common sense of mankind simply affirms the necessity of causation. Judgment is not suspended long enough to make comparisons; and if it were, the comparison would be

between proximate or finite causation and its opposite. And whenever such a proposition is stated, the universal, the inevitable decision is that there *must* be a cause. Therefore the proximate cause is positive, and non-causation is negative.

But, returning to a philosophical view of the question, we contend that, if the equality of two negative necessities were conceded, a third principle is clearly requisite to enable the mind to form a judgment. This is virtually admitted by the author, whenever he affirms that one of the contradictories *must* be true. Now, a negative necessity only declares that the opposite is *untrue*. It cannot affirm anything. Hence it is absolutely necessary to invoke the aid of another principle, to relieve the mind of a painful embarrassment. And this principle must be a positive one, if it is to effect a positive result. Hamilton's "Law of Parcimony," that more special principles than are needed cannot be admitted, does not apply to this case; for, obviously, some such principle is demanded by the phenomena.

But there is another objection to his theory, of two equal negative necessities, that confronts us all through the discussion. The question arises, Is there such a thing as a *negative* necessity? Is there not a contradiction in the terms? He describes it as "an inability," an "impotence," a "want of power to conceive"; but, nevertheless, he attributes to it the greatest efficiency in producing a judgment that is universal and irresistible. Surely there must be more than a negation involved, when such are the results. A negative necessity is no necessity at all. Impotence of mind may *prevent* us from forming a conception of an object; but that which *compels* us to accept its reality is a force as positive and energetic as any in nature.

In our view, the great error of the author lies in his assumption of *equality* between his pair of contradictories. Inequality could only result in a quandary. The law of causality, as necessary and universal, could never emerge from such a logical dilemma. Its testimony would be that neither causation nor non-causation can be true. And yet, no rational being can be found whose mind does not assent to the one and revolt at the other. The facts of experience and observation contradict the theory.

The infinite and the absolute are not seen by men at large confronting each other; but *a* cause or *no* cause are the alternatives everywhere recognised by common sense. Now, there is nothing in the affirmation, that every phenomenon must have a cause, that repels the assent of any rational being. Were there no motive to vindicate moral responsibility, no one would ever question the truth of the proposition. On the other hand, there is something so repugnant to natural reason in the proposition, that some phenomena may originate without a cause, that no human being can be unconscious of its repulsiveness. These facts show us plainly that the absolute, in this category, is the negative of a positive *dictum* of the understanding. The law of causality is thus established as a special principle, no matter what other principles may appear to conflict with it.

There is, moreover, a philosophical necessity for the recognition of this great truth, which we have no space to consider at length. Hamilton's argument is virtually an abandonment of causation as a necessary and universal law. If not valid in the matter of volition, it is not universal. If not valid in morals, what can make it imperative in physics? If one event may occur without an efficient antecedent, any other event may present itself spontaneously, and all confidence in the stability of the universe may be a baseless delusion. Now, we believe that all serious thinkers, including Hamilton himself, would agree in the statement, that any impugment of the law of causality is fatal to science and to philosophy. Remove this foundation, and all logical structures tumble into ruin.

It remains only to consider the bearing of these criticisms upon the question of moral freedom. This truth rests upon an immovable foundation—the moral consciousness of man. We have shown that the doctrine of Hamilton and others, that human action must be uncaused, is not a direct *dictum* of the understanding, but merely a *deduction* from the principle of accountability. If ever so valid, it could only be accepted as the result of a rational process. But a deduction cannot stand in conflict with a primary law of thought, such as the judgment of causality. But moral consciousness is no deduction, and we cannot avail

ourselves of the superior force of the causal judgment to counteract it. We here, at least, reverse the argument which Hamilton employs, and turn the guns upon his own position. In this conflict there is at least one escape for truth, and that is by the open door of his sound observation, that a "thing may be true, the possibility of which we cannot construe to our own intelligence." In other words, although moral freedom and causal necessity may *appear* inconsistent with each other, this inconsistency may be merely the result of our own impotence of mind. And this is the point at which such a confession is especially appropriate. The proper posture of a genuine philosophy is to accept facts, and, when they seem to be in conflict, to await the developments of the future. Moral responsibility is true by the testimony of consciousness, and the law of causality is also true by the same testimony. To proceed to undermine one of these truths for the sake of the other, is unworthy of a philosophical spirit.

Yet this is what our author has undertaken to do. A determination of the will appeared to him incompatible with accountability, and, in his zeal to vindicate the latter, he has sought, by means of a subtle and fallacious process of reasoning, to discredit the universal necessity of causation. The avowed purpose of his argument is "to save the phenomena of Causality," and yet exempt from its domain the entire sphere of voluntary action. This could only be achieved by reducing causation to a mere phenomenon—a seeming verity—the reality of which his theory denies. That he has signally failed in his effort, we think has been clearly demonstrated.

3. Discounting, for the present, the strange theory of some writers, that the will of Adam was undetermined, whilst necessity controls the volitions of his posterity, we find two great classes of thinkers arrayed against each other on this momentous question. In view of the great interests depending upon the issue, our aim is to make it evident to every reader that the efforts of Hamilton, and those of his followers who have pushed his theory to its legitimate results, have a direct tendency to engender a dangerous scepticism. The spirit of all such attempts is to force facts, apparently discordant, into agreement. And this can only be

effected by assailing some of the fundamental beliefs of the human mind. It is a conflict between reason, impatient under the restraints of nature, and faith, which enjoins a patient waiting for light from heaven. Rationalism is eager to unify truth, and therefore willing to sacrifice the most solid convictions in order that unity may be reached. It is this impatient spirit that makes war upon the doctrines of necessity, and certainty, and the foreknowledge of God, and ever and anon constructs a new *theodicy*—some fanciful scheme of compromise between the freedom of man and the sovereignty of God. Every such scheme begins, like Hamilton's, with a blow at the fundamental principle of causation. Now, in opposition to these dangerous suggestions, we have no counter-theory to offer, but the simple admonition to abstain from theorising. Whenever a restless mind affirms that Causality cannot be universal because it is fatal to moral responsibility, the first step in Rationalism is taken, and there is no stopping place short of downright unbelief.

We have endeavored to show that Hamilton has failed to account for the causal judgment by means of a negative principle. His Law of Parcimony does not serve his purpose, because a positive principle is involved in the acknowledged necessity we are under to adopt one of his inconceivable contradictories. This is an unavoidable *belief* of a truth which we cannot comprehend. He confesses that his theory is adopted "*provisoryly*," and that, if it should prove to be erroneous, we must fall back upon the commonly received doctrine of a majority of philosophers—that the causal judgment "is a simple primary *datum*, a positive revelation of intelligence." This return to the main body we would have a right to claim at his hands.

But even here he contends that two positive principles cannot be brought into conflict, (as we freely admit,) but argues that one of them must be rejected, because, if both be conceded, "the root of our nature is a lie." Our reply is that the two positive principles may be consistent, although their reconciliation may transcend our powers. This answer is strictly Hamiltonian, and ought to be conclusive against him. It does not follow that the testimony of our nature is untrue because we cannot arrange its

data in an unbroken chain. The conflict between two positive principles is not due to nature, but to the pride of reason, which seeks to force facts into a systematic union.

The sole question before us is, whether or not the judgment of causality is universally necessary. Is it true for the universe, or only true for man? The relativity of knowledge may indeed be admitted in one sense. We cannot think except under certain conditions. But this is not a question of comprehension, but of belief. The causal judgment is not only necessary, but it is a *judgment of necessity*. We are not only compelled to hold it ourselves, but to believe that other rational creatures do the same. If this were not so, we might believe that other orders of being view phenomena without a causal succession, and that our own conception of its necessity is a delusion. This would certainly fix upon nature the charge of mendacity. The most essential element of causation is its universal necessity. If this be abandoned, the law is utterly destroyed.

Let us imagine a world where second causes are untrue. Could a natural theology exist among its inhabitants? How could creatures who believe in the spontaneous existence of everything around them ever reach a rational belief of a First Cause? If such a world were possible, then its inhabitants might also think independently of time and space. Now as we are compelled to attribute these conditions to all other rational creatures, we are, in the same degree, compelled to include them all under the law of Causality. It is a condition of thought for the created universe. But if the principle is universally necessary, it is a plain contradiction to exempt any class of phenomena from its operation.

One of the "first fruits" of this argument of Hamilton's is to be discovered in the cautious, but questionable, discussion of Mansel of "The Limits of Religious Thought." Mansel rejects Hamilton's theory of the origin of Causality, and yet expresses himself thus in reference to necessity: "We cannot assume the simultaneity of the divine consciousness; for we know nothing of the infinite, either in itself or in its relation to time. Nor, on the other hand, could we deduce the necessity of human actions

from the fact of God's foreknowledge, even if the latter could be assumed as absolutely true; for we know not whether the conception of necessity itself implies a divine reality, or merely a *human* mode of representation." (Note XXVII., p. 193.) We have avoided any reference to *divine* consciousness so far, and only introduce it here to illustrate the use that it is so fashionable to make of the *impotence* of the human mind. It is plainly indicated by this author, that necessity may be a notion confined to this one race of beings, and which signifies nothing to God or to other creatures. Now Mr. Mansel seems to forget that God is the author of this representation, and that it is not reverent to refuse the benefit of a mode of knowledge which the Creator has imposed upon us. He seems to presume that a rationalistic divine may be entitled to take a *superhuman* view of necessity different from the mass of the race to which he belongs. A class of Gnostics might thus be organised in modern Christendom, as mischievous as that which sought to Platonise the ancient Church. It is a new method for making the plea of human ignorance a stepping-stone for human pride. Is necessity, even suggestively, a delusive *representation*? If the notion be not a consequence of the fall, it existed in Adam's mind as well as in ours, and was the gift of God. This again, would "make the root of our nature a lie," and charge deception upon the Creator. These are the efforts of desperation. The motive must be very powerful that leads great intellects to suggest such expedients "to vindicate the ways of God to man." There must be some misconception of necessity that causes their adoption. And this misconception is due, at least in part, to an oversight in reference to the operation of causes. Necessity is the same notion, in whatever sphere it operates; but the two spheres of matter and mind are so different that its operation must also be widely different. In the material world, this operation is through *force*; but in the moral world, it is difficult to characterise for want of an appropriate term. It certainly does not involve force, which is incompatible with spontaneity and volition. In the one case, inertia has to be overcome; in the other, the result is accomplished in and through a living, active soul. The difference lies in the *media* in which the causes act.

But further remarks upon this head cannot be indulged. In spite of every attempt at elucidation, an inscrutable mystery remains, which it is wiser to leave unsolved than to attempt its solution by sacrificing any truth which we already know. Among these we are obliged to recognise, as unquestionable, the Causal Judgment and Moral Freedom. They are two solid pillars of an arch that spans an unfathomable abyss, and whose keystone is too high for human thought to scan.

JAMES A. WADDELL.

ARTICLE III.

THE GOSPEL AND THE REIGN OF LAW.

The Duke of Argyle correctly limits Blackstone's definition of law when he gives as its primary signification: "The authoritative expression of human will enforced by power."* In like manner the laws of nature are the "expressions of a will enforcing itself by power." He then specifies and discusses five different senses in which the word is habitually used. These are to designate—

- 1st. An observed order of facts, but not connected with any known cause.
- 2d. That order involving the action of some force or forces, of which nothing more may be known.
- 3d. Individual forces, the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined or ascertained.
- 4th. Those combinations of force which have reference to the fulfilment of purpose.
- 5th. Abstract conceptions of the mind, deduced from phenomena, by which facts are reduced not merely to order, but to an order of thought.

It is impossible that the human mind should rest satisfied with

*Reign of Law, p. 64.

observing a mere succession of events. It is compelled to seek for causes, both efficient and final, and continues its search until it finds. Accordingly the third, and especially the fourth, senses in which the word "law" is used, are the most common and important. The fourth designates "not merely an observed order of facts—not merely the bare abstract idea of force, not merely individual forces according to ascertained measures of operation—but a number of forces in the condition of mutual adjustment, that is to say, as combined with each other and fitted to each other for the attainment of special ends."*

Every inquiry into nature's secrets reveals two facts: first, the universal prevalence of laws in the third sense; and, second, that not one but *several* are concerned in every one of nature's operations. These two facts, viz., the prevalence of individual forces, the measure of whose operation has been to some extent ascertained, and the combination of these by means of contrivances for the accomplishment of purpose, constitute what is meant by the "Reign of Law." Some objection may reasonably be urged against this phrase. It may lead to error or at least to some confusion of thought. It is not law that reigns, but God, the author and administrator of law, who reigns at once over and by means of law. But as the law everywhere prevails, as it is never set aside, violated with impunity, nor suspended, as events are brought about by means of and not at the expense of law, by a common figure of speech this rule is put for the Ruler.

There is an established order of facts in the physical universe known unto God from the beginning to the end. This order is produced by the action of laws, which, so far as we know, are never destroyed, contravened, or modified; but only continued by means of contrivances so as to be used, and, if need be, counteracted. The simplest illustration is that of a suspended weight. No matter when or how placed, the law of gravitation acts unchangeably. The suspension is secured by a contrivance of some sort, in which other forces are employed, not to destroy or modify the force of gravity, but to counteract it.

The devout believer in the Bible would not assert that nature's

*Reign of Law, p. 78.

laws might not be abrogated or changed by God, but only as a matter of fact, within the sphere of our knowledge, he does not change them. As man is compelled to accomplish his purposes by means of contrivances by which the inexorable demands of law are met and satisfied, so God secures the fulfilment of his plans. Men can ascend a river against both wind and tide; but be it observed, not in spite of, but by means of the forces which apparently make ascent impossible. So when God proposes to form a class of animals to swim in the sea or to fly through the air, he does not break or bend the natural forces which apparently oppose the accomplishment of his purpose. He utilises them.

It is important, in view of the ensuing discussion, to note that miracles do not form an exception to the general truths enunciated. It cannot be successfully maintained that a miracle is a *violation* of law, save only in the sense of an observed order of facts, which may or may not be known to be connected with ascertained causes. So far as we know, no natural force is suspended in its operation by a miracle, much less abrogated or destroyed. The miracle of creation, however accomplished, did not violate or suspend—it gave birth to physical laws. Concerning this initial act of God, it is safe to affirm, that, though a sovereign, it was not a lawless expression of omnipotence. Back of the creative acts and the forces then called into exercise were the regulative principles which constitute the character of God. These principles are not laws, strictly so called, for there is no power to enforce them on him who is guided by them. But they are rules of conduct as immutable as God himself. Concerning other miracles wrought for special ends in the sphere of grace, they may very properly be defined to be immediate and direct revelations of God in act. They are said to be immediate and direct, because the means employed to produce them are wholly unknown to us. When water and other substances are turned by ordinary natural processes into wine, we can examine and know some of the steps of the process, but not all. The contrivance to a limited extent only comes under our observation. When at Cana Jesus looked upon the water, and when

“The conscious water saw its God and blushed,”

we can trace none of the steps. But there is no reason to suppose that in this exercise of power any physical law was violated. The result in this case, as in all other miracles, was produced, we have reason to think, by some adjustment of forces wholly unknown to us, and it ought to be added, of forces beyond our reach and out of our power to employ. In a word, God, so far as we know, chooses to conform to the rule he compels men to go by. Man must adopt this principle of adjustment in order to utilise the forces of nature. God adopts it, and apparently without exception, as the rule of his own conduct. "Nothing gives us," says the author already quoted, "such an idea of the universality of law as this! Nor does anything give us such an idea of their pliability to use." How imperious they are, yet how submissive. How they reign, yet how they serve. (*Reign of Law*, page 125.)*

*These words clearly show that the view taken above of the expression, "Reign of Law," is the correct one. In the first chapter of his book the Duke of Argyle, in presenting this view of the miracle, frankly admits the difficulty of any exact definition or account of it. It involves the question of the boundary between the natural and the supernatural. He quotes an admission from Mr. Lecky, made in his book on "The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe" (Vol. I., Ch. II., p. 105, note), to show that this notion of a miracle is still strictly available for evidential purposes, and adds: "Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence . . . the only other purpose which is ever assigned to them (miracles) is an 'evidential purpose'—that is, a purpose that they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman knowledge and of the working of superhuman power. They were performed, in short, to assist faith, and not to confound reason" (page 16).

When we say that a miracle is an immediate revelation made by God of himself in act, as distinguished from a mediate revelation of himself made by means of the contrivances of nature, the terms "immediate" and "mediate" mark the boundaries of our partial knowledge or complete ignorance. One revelation is "mediate," because we know the means in part; the other is "immediate," because the means are wholly unknown, or if known, wholly beyond our power to employ them, and so we say, "This is the finger of God." In regard to these "immediate" revelations, or miracles, in our ignorance we cannot assert dogmatically that God does not use means, nor can we assert that he does. Reason, in the absence of a "thus saith the Lord," may infer with some degree of confidence from what it observes as to God's method of working, that in miracles

The same remarks might with equal justice be made of those laws which rule in the realm of mind. All the events in man's intellectual and emotional life are directed by laws which are as inexorable in their operation as the physical forces of nature. Yet, as we shall see, there is abundant scope for the exercise of a genuine spontaneity on man's part as there is on God's part, afforded by the application of the same principle, viz., the combination of these laws by means of contrivances for the accomplishment of their purposes.

The theologian, by an argument *à fortiori*, infers the same truth concerning the reign of law in the domain of morals. This conclusion is confirmed by the express declarations of God's word. Those rules of conduct devised by his wisdom, enforced by tremendous sanctions, are transcripts of his own immutable perfections. They can never be violated with impunity; they can never be ignored, suspended, or modified. In this domain it is emphatically true in the sense defined that law reigns. Here also it may be used to accomplish strange results. Imperious as it is, it can be made to serve.

It is proposed now to discuss the relations of the gospel of Jesus Christ to this "Reign of Law." The subject is trite enough, so far as the expiatory character of Christ's sacrifice is concerned. On this point there will be no elaboration of details. But a discussion of the gospel as a grand contrivance by which the inexorable demands of God's laws are met and satisfied for the accomplishment of God's purpose in man's salvation, should never be, and it is hoped will not be, in this article, either profitless or uninteresting.

When Paul wrote those wonderful words to the Corinthians, "We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness, but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God," the question of the survival of Christianity had not as

God does not violate or suspend the operation of law. He counteracts, according to this inference, the force of laws known to us by laws of which we know nothing, and which, if known to us, we could not use. He thus emphatically declares himself.

a matter of fact been decided. Heathenism was strong. Christianity, if conspicuous it all, was conspicuous only for its weakness. Apart from his inspiration, how, if at all, was it possible for the apostle to be assured that the religion of the cross would maintain its ground against and eventually destroy the heathen "*cultus*"? In other words, what were the features of the gospel which, as apprehended by him, clearly revealed to him that it was the power of God and the wisdom of God? These features may be reduced to three—

First. *As a revelation of God to man.*

Second. *As a solution of the problem of mercy.*

Third. *As an exhibition of divine love designed and adapted to affect man's heart and move his will.*

Of these, the second and third are implied in the first, but the articulate statement of them serves to give a convenient division to the present discussion. Viewed under either one or all three of these aspects, the gospel appears as the power of God and the wisdom of God, because in it and by it all the inexorable demands of God's laws are met and satisfied for the accomplishment of God's purpose to save sinners.

First. *The gospel is that revelation of God which man needs for his own development, but which elsewhere he has never fully received.*

The goal of man's efforts, so far as these terminate on himself, is his own exaltation. To make men better and bigger in all the essential elements of their character is the hope of philosophy and the design of religion. The will of God concerning man, so far as he has revealed it to us respecting his salvation, contemplates the same object. To make men God-like is the problem he has proposed to himself. It is evident that from man's standpoint the very first condition of a solution of such a problem is that man should have some knowledge of God; knowledge accurate and full, as far as it goes. Plainly it is impossible for the race to be better than its standard; for men to be higher and nobler than their own ideal of perfection. A man may be better than his creed, but he is never better than his God. Hence, if men are to become God-like, they must know him. To be like

God, they must know what God is like. It is in this view of the case that Paul perceived so clearly the futility of heathenism. "The world by wisdom know not God," and therefore, if for no other reason, had failed to become like him.

But at this point a difficulty emerges. How is God to reveal himself so that men can know him? Is it possible for God so to manifest himself that finite creatures can find in the revelation a perfect standard and pattern of conduct; a living example so striking and so powerful as to furnish an ideal, and move man's ambition to reach it? Confessedly, the revelations contained in the material universe, in ordinary providence, in men's natural consciences, have failed. Whatever value there was in Judaism (and, confessedly, it was great), grew out of the fact that it symbolised another and a more perfect revelation. It was, indeed, an adumbration of the Cross. Moreover, mere verbal announcements, whether of precept or of promise, were insufficient to satisfy the necessities of the case. At best the Mosaic economy was a pedagogue. With the oral and written law there was needed a living example—something to strike the imagination, to move the heart, to persuade the will. These results might be accomplished on a limited scale by a gorgeous ceremonial adapted to a peculiar and isolated people, subjected to extraordinary providences; but such means would be ill-advised when the time came for the chosen people to go forth for the conversion of the nations.

But how is this God-like example to be manifested? The difficulties growing out of God's laws appear insuperable. On the one hand is the law of God's being: his inexpressible glory, the one attribute which comprehends all, his infinitude. This apparently makes any personal manifestation of himself impossible. In the days of Anna and Simeon it was as true as in the days of Moses: "Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me and live." On the other hand are the equally inexorable laws of man's nature, making it imperative for him to see God in order to be like him. The Psalmist intimates as much when he says: "As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness." The Apostle John conveys the same truth when he says: "We know that when he

shall appear, we shall be like him; *for we shall see him as he is.*" Paul also asserts that though now we see through a glass darkly, then, in the perfect state, we shall see face to face, and know even as also we are known (1 Cor. xiii. 12).

The question now is: How can the inexorable requirements of these laws, apparently so opposed to each other in their operation and so opposed to the fulfilment of God's purpose touching man's exaltation, be met and satisfied? The law of man's growth demands that he must see God in order to be like him. The law of God's glory demands that no man shall see his face and live. Manifestly, a contrivance is needed. It is Christ crucified. "God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." He is Immanuel, God with us. Here, as in all God's adjustments, there are inscrutable elements. For example, in the sphere of physics, the *rationale* of the flight of birds is in some aspects a profound mystery. "The way of an eagle in the air," which was too wonderful for the wisdom of Solomon, eludes the research of the modern man of science after all his wonderful discoveries. Some years ago a carrier pigeon performed a feat, noticed at length in the *Scientific American* newspaper, which, upon known principles, was equivalent to one-third of a horse-power. That is, the bird, unless aided by some tremendous current of air or other unknown force, exerted power sufficient to lift eleven thousand pounds one foot in one minute.* The reason why men have not been able to construct flying machines is that they have not been able fully to discover how birds fly. The same is true of all the contrivances of nature—even of those with which we are most familiar. They begin or end in mystery. So there is mystery in the Incarnation. That wonderful event, nevertheless, is the contrivance, by means of which the apparently conflicting laws controlling the intercourse between God and man are met and satisfied. He that hath seen Christ, the Incarnate Word, hath seen the Father. All that man can know, all that he need to know of God, is

*We have not been able to refresh our memory as to the above figures; but for all the purposes of the illustration, they are sufficiently accurate.

clearly revealed in him. By him the God-like is exhibited on a plane adapted to man's capacity. The law which demands concealment, and the law which demands revelation, are both fulfilled. Here, as in so many other respects, "God is light" in his essence; in the unspeakable effulgence of his glory unseen and invisible. But light, though itself unseen and invisible, may be revealed by means of contrivances which reflect, refract, or polarise it. So God may be seen by means of a contrivance. The gospel presents the required adjustment. It is Jesus Christ in his person and work. He reveals God to man, by exhibiting God's idea of what a man must be like in order to be like God. He thus presents a standard by which men can measure themselves. He, therefore, fulfils the first condition of the problem of human advancement towards the God-like.

But the crucifixion is the complement of the Incarnation. The singularity of Immanuel's life culminated in the significance of his death. Men had lived and died for each other and for God before Calvary. But God living and dying for men was a new event in history. This was "the mystery which God ordained before the world unto our glory, which none of the princes of this world knew," now revealed in Christ crucified. In making this revelation of himself, God indicated in the clearest manner how man was to reach his ideal; he showed that the law of service is the law of greatness; that in order to be God-like, a man must be Christ-like; for "his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to sins should live unto righteousness." The man who attains unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ, becomes perfect even as God is perfect. The Incarnation culminating in the cross, therefore, signally displays the wisdom of God and the power of God. By it the demands of law are not ignored: they are met and satisfied.

Second. *The gospel solves the problem of mercy; completely answers the question of the ages: "How should man be just with God?"*

As God contemplates the sinner, he recognises, according to his own account of the matter, the laws seemingly as diverse as the centrifugal and centripetal forces of nature. By one he is

impelled to drive the sinner from him. The law of his holiness demands that he touch the sinner only to dash him from his presence into outer darkness. The gulf between Dives and God is not like that separating the peaks of the Alleghanies or Andes, to be bridged by the skill of the engineer. It is a moral gulf, dug by the repellent forces of a spiritual electricity, the laws of which cannot be disregarded. By another law of his being, God is impelled to draw the sinner to himself. The law of his love compels him to yearn over his fallen and wretched children, to take them back to his favor and bless them. The demands of this law are as inexorable as the other. God has, God must have, purposes of mercy towards his creatures. The obligation hinted at has, of course, no reference to any debt due sinners by God. It is an obligation owed to his own love. How are these purposes of mercy to be realised? Manifestly, there must be a contrivance, some adjustment of these apparently conflicting moral forces, by which the problem of mercy may be solved in accordance with law. This adjustment is seen in Christ crucified, who is the sum and substance of the gospel.

There is a story of a sailor, who once said to a minister of the gospel: "The mate and I have a quarrel, in which I do wrong. I see and acknowledge my fault; we shake hands over it, and there is an end of the difficulty. Now, why cannot God and I do the same?"

The answer in the light of the foregoing discussion is plain. The mate, regarded as the sailor's equal, may thus settle his quarrel; but regarded as the representative of the ship's government, the mate may not thus settle his quarrel, except on the supposition that he himself, in administering the government of the ship, has erred. Otherwise, there is a blow at good order and discipline, more or less violent, according to circumstances. We have seen that it is a fundamental principle of the "Reign of Law," that no law can be violated with impunity. If the offender escape, somebody else must suffer.

It is just here that the gospel is most violently attacked. Men go with the geologist into the bowels of the earth and rejoice to find that the rocks testify a reign of law. They mount the skies

with Newton and Laplace; they sweep the siderial heavens with their glasses, and acknowledge that suns and their systems are controlled by law. They follow the philosopher in his analysis of mind, of man's reason and conscience, of his emotions and judgments, and discover in all that law reigns. They then ascend to the throne where God sits in majesty, and wish to believe that he is an exception. They would persuade themselves that the Author of law is lawless; that in response to the desires of his love, he will subvert the first principles of his government.

Another class with equal perversity assert the reign of law, but deny in the sphere of morals and religion the possibility of an adjustment by which its inexorable requirements may be met and satisfied. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This law, it is said, is so imperious that by no contrivance can it be counteracted or made to serve God's purposes of mercy. He may indeed take that force which seeks to drive every material atom apart to wander alone through space, and adjust it to another, which would bring every atom together, a compact and symmetrical mass, about a common centre; he may contrive to unite these two opposing forces so as "to bind up the waters in his thick cloud, to stretch out the north over the empty space, to hang the earth upon nothing"; but he may not so adjust his moral laws as to be able to punish sin and save the sinner.

It is granted that if God's purposes of mercy are realised, he must contrive to preserve every law he has promulgated. Not a jot, not a tittle, can fail. This is no unworthy view of the Supreme. His laws, it has been admitted, are not laws over him in any strict primary sense. There is no power above him to enforce them. But they are, especially his moral laws, manifestations of himself, transcripts of his own character. He cannot deny himself. At the same time, immutable as they are, they are pliable to use. They reign, they also serve. They cannot be abrogated; they can be adjusted so as to produce strange results. What can be more hopelessly at variance, from a mere human standpoint, than the law which says, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," and the other law which says, "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson,

they shall be as wool"? Yet both of these may be met and satisfied. The adjustment is seen in Christ crucified. The law of substitution forms the basis of the scheme. "Slain in the guilty sinner's stead." The law of love expressed in sacrifice is the form which the adjustment takes. The result is, the law and the gospel are combined to secure the salvation of the guilty. Before the cross let the Jew demanding signs and the Greek seeking for wisdom alike bow in reverence, for it displays, as no where else is displayed, the power and wisdom as well as the love of a law-abiding God.

Third. *The gospel, presenting God in the aspect of a Redeemer, is an exhibition of divine love admirably adapted to affect man's heart and move his will to seek in God's way God's ideal of perfection.*

The gospel is not simply an ingenious scheme to make salvation possible. It is a practical religion which saves and sanctifies men. The efficient agent is, of course, the Holy Spirit himself. But he uses means. The present discussion regards the gospel as the wisely adapted means, which under the divine influence of the Spirit becomes efficacious to renew and sanctify the soul. "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth" (Jas. i. 18). Regeneration, no less than sanctification, in ordinary cases is by means of the truth as it is in Christ crucified. As a piece of steel brought into contact with loadstone becomes possessed of new properties and powers, so men subjected by the Holy Spirit to the influences of the cross become new creatures in Christ. The unconverted man is rightly called dead. He is dead to every holy thought of God. He is dead to every genuine and right religious impulse. He is spiritually dead. But let this dead man be brought by the Spirit of God into believing connexion with Christ crucified, let him be magnetised by contact with that mighty love, and he will become a new man. In spite of the allurements which from time to time draw him away, he will return again to his love and allegiance to Christ.

Here is an exhibition of divine power and also of divine wisdom. This mysterious and radical change, called the New Birth, is produced by the omnipotent power of God's Spirit, but it is

not a lawless, expression of force. God does not take a man, as is sometimes represented by those who either misunderstand or pervert the truth, and force him into heaven whether he want to go or not; nor does he thrust a man willing or unwilling down to hell. The picture sometimes drawn of God's decree, which represents it as a great fence around heaven over which men vainly strive to climb, because God by his arbitrary and superior power throws them back, is simply blasphemous. This is not the gospel; it is not Calvinism. God's election is a sovereign, but not a lawless expression of his will. Doubtless there are elements here which no human analysis can discover. A man must be either a fool or a charlatan who asserts that he can fathom with his little five-foot line the depths of God's sovereign grace. But one thing is known, for it has been clearly revealed in nature and in the Word: God never contravenes his own law. He will not, therefore, even in saving a man, set aside the laws which are constitutive of the man's nature. Now, it is a law of God touching man that he is free; free in the sense that he is called on to choose between good and evil, and is responsible for his choice. This is a law of his being constituting man what he is: a law that no creature can, and that God will not, violate.*

Now, then, *how* God does it no one may fully know, but the infinite resources of his power and wisdom enable him to make a man willing without destroying his spontaneity. A man is never so free, never does the law of his liberty more distinctly indicate itself, than when, under the influences of the Spirit of God, he is born again. What happens to the sinner of which he is not conscious, he knows not. But so far as they are conscious of the Spirit's influence, all Christians have in this regard essentially the same experience. John Wesley and John Calvin tell the same story. They choose to repent, to believe, to love. At every mo-

* It is not designed by these expressions concerning the will to set forth any philosophical theory on the subject, except as the common Calvinistic view is philosophical. In one sense, man being spiritually dead has no spiritual freedom. But he has not ceased to be a man. Hence he is still a responsible free agent, of whom choice between good and evil is rightly demanded, and who is justly held responsible for the choice he makes.

ment, as the eagle by the strokes of his wings rises towards the upper air, a mysterious force tends to draw him down to the surface of the earth. Were it not for that opposing force, he could not ascend an inch. The vital force within can do nothing except in connexion with the opposing force without. That opposing force is not destroyed, contravened, or (except in a modified sense) overcome. It is counteracted, and the counteraction depends on its utilisation. The force of gravity, so far as our knowledge extends, is a *sine qua non* to flight. So of the soul of man in its progress towards holiness. The vital force within him is God's Spirit. That Spirit *will* do nothing (his ability is not questioned) which destroys or contravenes, or (except in a modified sense) overcomes the other force, the opposing force of the man's own will. That force is counteracted, but in the counteraction it is utilised. The illustration may not be pressed in detail. No illustration can be. It is cited only to make the main thought clear and vivid. It is this: in regenerating a man, God does not violate the laws which make him a *man*. He uses those laws to secure the proposed result. To do this he resorts to a contrivance. It is Christ crucified. Says Dr. Thornwell in his sermon on the nature of salvation:

"Love is the talisman by which God subdues the sinner's heart and gains his supreme affection. Let him firmly believe and strongly realise that Jesus was the Lamb of God slain for the sins of the world, and that it was love, almighty love, which occasioned the awful sacrifice, and he will bow his soul in the depths of humility and give his heart to God. So the gospel accomplishes what the law could not do; it infuses into the sinner's mind a principle of holiness and living obedience; it gives him what nothing else could give him, a love of God, and, under the sacred influence of the Holy Ghost, fits him to enjoy the blessedness of heaven. Thus is Christ the Saviour of his people." Collected Writings, Vol. II., pp. 279-280.

Again it must be admitted that there is an inscrutable element in this. Why the gospel is a savor of life to some and a savor of death to others; why some who hear it accept it, while others with equal or better chance reject it, no one can tell, except that it pertains to the Spirit to give to each sovereignly as he will. We can only say with the Master: "Even so, Father, for so it

seems good in thy sight." But this much is known: the cross is admirably adapted to secure the salvation, and not the damnation, of men. "God sent his Son into the world not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved." Whatever the failure of the gospel through misuse, it is admirably adapted to move the heart of men and draw them back to God. Other religions have appealed to man's fear of punishment and hope of reward, even to his sentiment of gratitude. The religion of Jesus does all this in a superlative degree; and especially appeals to the sentiment of gratitude by presenting God as sacrificing himself in man's stead. If the gods of Olympus descended to help either the Greeks or the Trojans, the slightest hurt sent them in haste back to the delights of the Elysian fields, as when Venus and Mars were wounded by Diomedes. How striking the contrast. Jesus was borne as a lamb to the slaughter. He became obedient unto death, and that the death of the cross. It is this amazing exhibition of love, not as it appears to a poet's fancy, but as it is in all its solemn reality, which so powerfully affects the heart; an exhibition which becomes transcendently glorious when the relative positions of the Saviour and the saved are considered.

Herein, therefore, is the wisdom as well as the power of God manifested. Herein is the folly of all mere natural religions displayed. These latter have nothing in them remaining permanently to kindle the imagination, to touch the heart, to move the will. As Lord Macaulay has expressed it: "God, the uncreated, the incomprehensible, the invisible, attracted few worshippers. A philosopher might admire so noble a conception; but the crowd turned away in disgust from words which presented no image to their minds. It was before Deity embodied in human form, walking among men, partaking of their infirmities, leaning on their bosoms, weeping over their graves, slumbering in the manger, bleeding on the cross, that the prejudices of the synagogue, and the doubts of the academy, and the pride of the portico, and the fasces of the lictor, and the swords of thirty legions were humbled in the dust." (Essay on Milton.)

The strangest thing about it is that, though Jesus is no longer in bodily form on earth, he still exerts a most powerful influence

among men. For more than eighteen hundred years no human eye has seen him, no human hand has touched him, no human ear has heard him, but at this hour millions would die for him. It cannot be denied that other men, having lived in and then passed from the world, continue to exert a tremendous influence in it. Confucius, Mahomet, Cæsar, and Napoleon, to say nothing of the Masters of the Schools, those "dead but sceptred sovereigns who still rule our spirits from their urns," to-day can muster their adherents by the thousand. The strange thing about *Christ's kingdom* is not that he reigns, but that he reigns by love. The cross is the symbol of the whole life of Jesus. It is his life interpreted by the significance of his death which has changed the course of human history and given a new and powerful impulse to human progress.

There is a feature of this grand adjustment which in this connexion is worthy of special mention. It is the identification of Christ with his followers, even the least of them. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." How admirably adapted is this arrangement to perpetuate the influence of Christ! He is on earth in his life-giving Word; in his renewing and sanctifying Spirit. But more: he is on earth personally represented in and by every one of his believing people. Under every pagan civilisation, and especially those distinguished for progress in science and art, the individual was so slightly regarded that men were permitted to live and die like brutes. An intense selfishness pervaded all classes of society—a selfishness not mourned over as something wrong, but applauded as the true law of life. There were no public hospitals; there was no recognition of a man's right, *because he was a man*, to protection during life or to assistance during suffering. Christ crucified has changed all this—totally in theory, largely in practice. The means is the identification of himself with his followers. Nothing could more signally display the wisdom and power of the cross to touch the heart of humanity. How inspiring the thought—Jesus Christ, my Lord and my God, identifies himself with each and all of his disciples! A good deed done in his name for his sake to the meanest of his servants is a

good deed done to him! Armed with this truth, impelled by love for such a Master, the followers of the Nazarene have gone forth to conquer. For his sake they have braved the tempests of the ocean and the horrors of the desert. For his sake they have consented to be ground into powder rather than yield to temptation or bend to persecution. They have invaded every country which expanding commerce has placed within their reach. In the mines of Peru, in the wilds of Africa, on the Spice Islands, in the jungles of India, in cities desolated by plagues, on fields swept by the horrors of war, they have been found teaching the ignorant, warning the careless, animating the timid, pointing sinners to the cross, promising in their Master's name pardon and glory to all who would accept him as their Saviour.

The year 1878 was marked by a most singular occurrence, viz., a contribution from Chinese to relieve the wants of Americans. Strange and gratifying as this is, it must be noted that this donation comes from Chinese in America, and not from those in China. After all, it is not Confucius, but Jesus who prompts the good deed. It would be as strange to see Hindoo Brahmins and Mohammedan Mollabs in New York and London earnestly endeavoring to persuade Americans and Englishmen to embrace their respective religions, as to see native societies in Calcutta and Constantinople organised to furnish aid to wounded soldiers in Russia or fever patients in New Orleans. The impulse to do deeds like these is furnished only by Christ crucified, by his identification with his brethren. He has taught men that whenever and wherever any human want is found, there he is, saying, "Come, help me." How admirable is this device to attract men to the cross! Well may he say: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth will draw all (*men*) unto me."

If Paul knew that it would be so, we know that it has been so, and that it will continue to be so. Those scenes yet redolent of Jesus' presence; the memory of the patience with which he bore wrong, and the gentleness with which he rebuked it; of the love with which he forgave it, even when he had power to avenge it; the story of that earnest life and of that wonderful death must pass away before Christ crucified can cease to charm the true

heart of humanity. The gospel applied by the Spirit of God in no wise contravenes or interrupts the Reign of Law, yet it is able to make men wise unto salvation. The refined sentimentality of this utilitarian age, which can look, even as the cultivated ladies and gentlemen of ancient Rome could look, on frightful crimes without a shudder or a sigh, affects to be shocked at what it is pleased to call the "Blood Theology." But Christian lips will continue to sing and Christian hearts will continue to feel the plaintive words of the modern psalmist—

"Alas! and did my Saviour bleed,
 And did my sovereign die;
 Would he devote that sacred head
 For such a worm as I?
 Was it for crimes that I had done
 He groaned upon the tree?
 Amazing pity! grace unknown!
 And love beyond degree!

But drops of grief can ne'er repay
 The debt of love I owe.
 Here, Lord, I give myself away,
 'Tis all that I can do."

When Paul declared that Christ crucified was the power of God, and the wisdom of God, he knew and felt all this. The splendor of his genius illuminated every realm of thought he touched upon; the subtlety of his dialectic penetrated into the depth of the heathen philosophy; he had a right to all the prejudices of the Jew, and all the pride of the Greek; his devotion to duty put to shame the best disciples of Zeno; his love for men far outstripped the zeal of Epicurus; yet contemplating the life and death of his Master, he said, and said with truth: "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me and I unto the world."

It is because God has contrived thus to move men's hearts without destroying their freedom that the religion of Jesus survives. This is the secret of that inveteracy of belief in what, if false, is the most prodigious of all lies. This is the secret of

that wonderful recuperative power which enables Christianity to be reformed by its own internal resources. Again let it be observed that in signalling the wonderful *means* employed by the Spirit in his work respecting the Church, his own sovereign, omnipotent, and essential work of renewal and sanctification is not denied nor forgotten. But apart from this "new creation" which distinguishes Christianity from all other religions, the contrast between it and its rivals in the features now under discussion is strikingly conspicuous.

Mr. Edwin Arnold's recent poem entitled the "Light of Asia," was written doubtless with the design not only of making popular the teachings of the founder of Buddhism, but also of setting the life and example of Siddhartha Gautama in a favorable light when compared with the life and example of Jesus. In accordance with his own example, Gautama's all-embracing instructions to his followers were: self-denial issuing in self-conquest, and universal charity; self-conquest and universal love; a love so extensive as to embrace every sentient being; a love which recognised as a member of the common brotherhood of living beings the tiger and the serpent as well as man. The resemblance of all this, as well as of many subordinate features of this system, to Christianity, is very great. The questions are: Why, since the teaching of the Indian sage is so pure and so noble, why, since it has accomplished so much, did it accomplish no more? Why, since it deified human intellect, are its votaries among the most ignorant and degraded of men? Why, since it inculcated self-conquest and universal charity, are the countries where it has been received, by way of eminence called "the habitations of cruelty"? For more than two thousand years trial has been made of this system by nearly one-third of the human race. The result is Burmah, Thibet, Siam, China, Ceylon.

Less than two thousand years ago the northern barbarians, as they emerged from their primitive seats to devastate Western and Southern Europe with fire and sword, were met by the missionaries of the cross. They were the fiercest and most cruel people of which we have any account: Vikings from Scandinavian bays, Goths, Vandals, Huns. Compared with the rice-eating inhabi-

tants of the Malay peninsula and Burmah, they were fiends incarnate. They accepted the gospel. The result, after many a hard conflict, is England, France, Germany, America. This contrast is all the more striking when it is remembered that Buddhism has presented a steady deterioration in doctrine from the teaching, and in practice from the example, of its illustrious founder. Christianity has been marked by a series of reformations born of its own essential principles and issuing in a return to the purity of doctrine and practice which distinguished its early adherents. Amid all the formality and hypocrisy which to-day so largely obscures the Christian name and practice, there have never been so many faithful and devoted followers of Jesus, men and women accepting his teaching, animated by his spirit, striving to imitate his example, as in this year of our Lord 1880. The similarity between Buddhism and Christianity makes the difference between them all the more conspicuous. The former is not and does not pretend to be a revelation from God; it offers no solution to the problem of mercy; it is utterly lacking in the appeal which Jesus makes so successfully: "For my sake and the gospel's"; "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." In a word, Buddhism serves to illustrate the wisdom and power of man; the gospel displays the wisdom and the power of God. The harmony between Buddhism and all false religions, and the Reign of Law, is marred at many points. The harmony between the gospel and the Reign of Law is conspicuous at all points, and accounts for its survival in purity and power, in spite of all attacks from within and from without.

The age in which we live is distinguished for the number, variety, and ingenuity of its inventions; for the contrivances by means of which the various laws of nature are employed by the wisdom and power of man for the accomplishment of his purposes. It is also distinguished by the progress men have made in discovering nature's secrets; in ascertaining what are the laws by which God rules the world of matter. How magnificent are the conceptions of which men are now possessed touching the physical universe! The earth is no longer in man's view the centre of

the system. The sun himself is no longer that centre. He and his attendant planets form a department of a grander whole, whose revolution about a more central orb marks a day on the dial-plate which the angels of God look upon. From the minutest grain of sand on this speck of earth to Alcyone, the monarch of the skies, there appears a chain of contrivances signalising the power and wisdom of Him who, from a throne enshrouded in clouds and darkness, governs all. Beside this scheme of adjustments, by which the demands of law in physics are met and satisfied, there is another, none the less real in the sphere of mind: contrivances by which the subtle laws which excite emotion, which move the will, which control the formation of habit, are employed by God and man to form character and realise destiny. Between these two schemes, touching both, but more glorious than either, is a third, designed to meet and satisfy the inexorable demands of laws which seem to render the salvation of sinners at once necessary and impossible. It is the gospel with its central idea, viz., the Incarnation, culminating in the Cross, the wisdom of God and the power of God to every one that believeth.

E. C. GORDON.

ARTICLE IV.

REDEMPTION.

Having, in a former number of this REVIEW (October, 1878) discussed, to a limited extent, the nature and consequences of sin, we propose at present to offer a few thoughts upon that scheme of Redemption which has been graciously provided. From the standpoint occupied before, the darker shadings seemed to preponderate in the picture: but with our position changed, a silver lining encircles the cloud, while the cheerful light, partially obscured for a moment, shines out brightly.

If the wages of sin be death, the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. While the Scriptures, in language fearfully graphic and distinct, unfolds the end of sin, yet the very same message that warns of death likewise reveals the life. As man "stands shivering on the fearful brink," a heavenly voice points to Christ Jesus, who in the sinner's place endured all legal penalties and wrought out a perfect righteousness. Now, in consequence of this obedience and priestly offering, God the omnipotent and all-holy Lawgiver disannuls the curse and bestows upon the believer a heritage of bliss. The moment faith accepts the Second Adam in the stead of the first, the prospect changes throughout, and the shadowings of the foreground soften into lines where there is nothing but light.

But since the curse pronounced upon Adam and his seed was death in its deepest and broadest sense, it may be objected that a penalty so great cannot be expiated by the limited sufferings of any substitute whatever, however immaculate his nature, or however exalted his person. The debt must be paid, both in kind and in degree. But let it not be forgotten that it was by "the one offence" of Adam, and he a creature simply, that condemnation and wrath came upon all, even upon those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. And if the "one" disobedience of our progenitor brought death and sorrow on the race, and this when there existed no actual iniquity of the seed, can we wonder that the penalty which Christ endured, so wide

in its range and relations—albeit circumscribed in duration—should be accounted before God a sufficient sacrifice for the sins of his people? If the dignity and official position of Adam—the created and finite and fallible—warranted the sentence of judgment upon himself and his offspring, on the ground of “one offence,” why should it seem strange to any that eternal life is the gift of God through that broad and far-reaching satisfaction offered by a Redeemer, whom the Almighty Father has set at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named not only in this world but also in that which is to come; and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the Church, which is the body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all?

True, Jesus Christ being a divine and all-perfect person, his substitution in the room of guilty subjects must, of necessity, involve in that very substitution sufferings as different in kind and degree as the character of the Second Adam differs from the character of the first. But, nevertheless, if the “one offence” of Adam, differing as it did, consequentially, from the sins of all the seed, could provoke the law to the condemnation of all, how much rather shall the sufferings and righteousness of Christ be accepted in the just eye of God as an equivalent for the obedience of souls “once dead in trespasses and in sins;” and this, although Christ did not suffer precisely as the sinner himself suffers? This view is still further strengthened and enforced when there is added, as the cap-stone crowning all, the transcendent nature of the sufferer, who was not only perfect man but also perfect God. The great Lawgiver has treated directly with only two men in the history of our world. These were the First Adam and the Second. And the status of the seed in the one case and in the other corresponds legally with the status of the representative head.

The doctrine of representation is as old as time itself. Christ is the “Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.” From everlasting the Lord determined “to bruise him and to put him to grief.” In the councils of eternity, back of Adam’s

creation, and antecedent to death itself, there was established between the Father and the Son the Covenant of Life. Before the worlds were made, Jesus the Saviour contracted for his people. And it was upon the basis of this irreversible bond that the Messiah agreed to "pour out his soul unto death, to be numbered with the transgressors, to bear the sins of many, to make intercession for the transgressors;" and that the Father promised "to divide him a portion with the great and the spoil with the strong." It will be seen, therefore, that the Covenant of Redemption is from everlasting. And while all died in Adam, it is equally true that prior to this Christ Jesus the righteous undertook for the chosen.

It is enough, therefore, that the great High Priest of our profession bore in himself the identical penalty with which the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God were well pleased. And thus, if "by one man's offence death reigned by one, much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ."

Theory after theory has been propounded to harmonise to a mere human view the scriptural doctrine of federal representation. But, after centuries of toil, no advances have been made, for

1. If one teacher affirms that Christ repaired the loss sustained by us in Adam to such an extent that each descendant of the first man receives sufficient grace to make his probation as favorable for salvation as was the progenitor's in Eden, then this attempt thus to vindicate God is based upon a singular misconception of the gospel of his Son. Moreover, how could Christ repair any mischief done to us by Adam, unless it be conceded, in the first place, that Adam himself was the federal head of his race?

2. If it be contended that we were all personally present in Adam, and, therefore, God, in the infliction of punishment, simply punishes each man for the sins which he personally committed in Adam, then this explanation not only rejects the clear teachings of the Word, but confuses and belies the facts of human consciousness. For the Bible nowhere intimates any personal identity with Adam, and when the soul questions its own intelli-

gence, there is no ground, either in memory or any other faculty, mental or moral, for the belief of such a dogma.

3. Nor does it answer to say that I am not punished for the *guilt* of Adam, but only for that *depravity* which comes with me into the world. For, from whence did this depravity spring? Did it originate in any relations which I sustained to Adam? If so, is depravity itself either a curse or a sin? This responded to in the affirmative, then how do we vindicate the ways of the Almighty in saying that he declined to visit condemnation upon the seed because of Adam's guilt, but, some how or other, in consequence of Adam's *sin*, his children inherit depravity, and then, on account of this depravity, they are condemned from their birth! Such an apology as this may lengthen the chain, but leaves every real difficulty as unexplained as before. For since righteousness is never accounted until an obedience is provided, depravity cannot be charged where guilt has not preceded. And as righteousness or eternal life is the gift of God—but this gift only through Jesus Christ the Redeemer—so depravity is a punishment, but a punishment of (and through) *what*, if Adam's guilt be not imputed?

"In Adam's fall
We sinned all."

The truth of federal headship and imputation is a mystery, but this purpose and method of the Omniscient is clearly revealed. The creature does suffer in the cradle for sin which he did not actually commit. "Death reigned from Adam to Moses over them who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." Now death is the wages of sin. But, in the case of infants, of whose sin? Of Adam's? But if the infant suffers and dies on account of its connexion with Adam, then that connexion must consist either in personal relations of which the soul can never possess any consciousness, or in a depravity which came upon it prior to any imputation of guilt and antecedently to any knowledge of good or evil, or else the seed of Adam were not personally one with him, but the union of the two was federal and legal. And this last, as it seems to us, is unmistakably the doctrine of the Scriptures. For God did not treat with persons

at all, but with a person. At the period of the Covenant the descendants of Adam had no personal existence, and, consequently, were neither guilty nor the contrary. But Adam represented the race, and whatever should overtake him in that moment of trial, was to be accounted thenceforward to his seed. The father and his seed were legally one. This was God's plan; and we should accept it, not because the creed of any man approves or rejects it, because partial, erring, human reason disapproves; but here is a case where approval or disapproval must proceed simply and solely upon the testimony of inspiration. For if Holy Writ teaches the legal oneness of Adam and his posterity, then this scheme of necessity is just, for its author is that God who mistakes in nothing and can never do a wrong. The incompetency of our reason to perceive the justice of a plan demonstrates nothing that is not demonstrated daily in other matters of mystery, which are, nevertheless, believed.

The simple question is this, Can God hold me responsible for a sin which I did not actually commit? Can Adam's posterity be held to account for the sin of their first father? If answered in the negative, then how came sin and death upon all? If in the affirmative, the controversy ends. After this, modifications and adulterations only breed mischief in the end. These may push the mystery farther into the background, but not a real difficulty disappears; while in the final analysis, truth in its orderings and relations has been fearfully marred. Imputed depravity takes the place of imputed guilt, and the personal identity, which not only stultifies consciousness but finds no support in the Scriptures, is propounded as a substitute for that oneness under the law which the word of God so frequently and vividly unfolds. Christ undertook to satisfy legal demands in behalf of the elect before the chosen ones existed or bore personal relations of any kind to law. They, therefore, certainly could not have possessed personal identity with Christ. Two objections arise. In the first place, the redeemed had not, in any way, as yet existed in Adam; and, on the other hand, if they had, previous to the existence of Adam in the garden, personally existed in Christ, then the very establishment of this first relation with

a superior would have precluded in itself any thought of union with one who was an inferior.

In condemnation and in justification the constituents of the plan are substantially the same. Now in what conceivable sense can it be said that an imperfect creature is personally identical with an immaculate Redeemer? To speak truly, there is never any interblending of identity, but each party possesses his distinct personality from the beginning through to the end. The union that exists is simply that of oneness under the law. The same judgment that came upon Adam was imputed to the seed, and the righteousness of Christ is "made" the righteousness of his people. For, let it be recalled once more, that these two men, the First Adam and the Second, are the only persons with whom, either in the history of the fall or of redemption, the law has ever dealt directly. In the covenant of works Adam appeared for his offspring, and when he sinned the guilt was accounted to his posterity; as the act of an ambassador is regarded, not as the personal but legal act of every individual of the nation that he was chosen to represent. And so while Christ and his people are one, this oneness is not personal, but legal. To state the case with exactness, the personal identity of Christ and the believer is morally impossible, since such a union must imply the identity of innocence and guilt. The true doctrine is this, that Christ in his own person answered to law in the stead and behalf of his people, and that his sufferings and obedience are set down to their account. Each believer is treated and regarded as righteous solely on the ground of that righteousness which his great representative possessed. Adam and his seed, Christ and his people, respectively, are personally distinct, but legally one.

But only let it appear that the attitude of Adam, while on probation, was not personal but representative, and the precise legal status of the seed can be determined by that of the federal head. For, had the first man obeyed perfectly in Eden, then the finished righteousness of this father would have redounded forever to the benefit of his children. And thus when he fell, condemnation came upon the "all" in the same degree and of the very same nature that it came upon the "one." Morally and

legally, but not personally, Adam's offspring were in existence when the federal head disobeyed, and the curse descended on Adam. In Adam's trial in the garden was determined all that his posterity were ever to be under law in respect to either blessing or cursing. Hence, if in consequence of Adam's sin penal evil of any kind, whether it is guilt, or depravity, or aught else, be visited upon his seed, then the principle, as concerns the justice of God, is identically the same. For every judicial mind must quickly perceive that the replacement of a greater injustice by a smaller will assuredly leave the vindication of heaven's Judge mournfully incomplete. Whenever any scheme or doctrine resorts to such a plea, the proof is positive and plain that it rests not on the truth.

The presence of sin in every human heart is a stupendous but unquestionable fact! But how did it get there? If man's consciousness contradicts the idea of personal identity in Adam, and if on this point too there be no warrant from Holy Writ, the question returns once again, how comes it that all men are sinners, that all men suffer—that death hath passed upon all? Punishment implies guilt, and if every one enters life depraved, is this not itself proof positive that sin had an existence previous to birth? Punishment is based upon guilt, and guilt again is the outgrowth of sin. Infants are both condemned and punished. If, therefore, we are born under condemnation, it must be because we have antecedently sinned. For where there is no law there can be no transgression, and sin is not imputed where there is no law. When, where, and how, then, did condemnation come upon the entire race? Does not the apostle answer in words clear as the sunlight? "By one man's offence death reigned by one." "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation."

And it is just here that the theories of "governmental display" and "moral influence" break down totally. For if Adam did not represent his posterity, then the infliction of penal evils of any kind upon the seed is an act of sheer and frightful injustice. And if Christ Jesus did not, upon the cross, bear the iniquities of his people, then the Almighty Father, by "his determinate

counsel and foreknowledge" delivered "the innocent blood" over to "the snare of the fowler." And any "governmental display" based upon such cruelty and wrong and "moral influence" that perverts so wofully the right, is not alone contradictory in terms, but manifestly absurd in itself. For before an example can be honestly made, the government which punishes must find a fit subject. We know, however, "that the law was not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly, and for sinners." The integrity of government, embracing moral influence withal, would depart, if it allowed, much less inflicted with its own hand, punishment upon the guiltless. If, therefore, it be admitted that Jesus, in his own nature, was "holy and harmless and undefiled," the only possible vindication of the divine government, in the sufferings of such a person, is to be found in the fact that he voluntarily undertook for the sinner and our sins were imputed unto him. God having laid on Christ the iniquities of us all, he treated and regarded the representative of the transgressor just as he would have treated and regarded the real culprit himself. For in every government of right, justice must first be enthroned before mercy is allowed to enter.

In Adam, then, all died. The infant, although incapable of actual sin, is overtaken by the same curse that was visited upon Adam. And this because of those federal relations which he sustains to the first father. Adam acted not alone for self; but as the representative of the race, his acts in the garden were set down to our account. And thus the disobedience of the head constitutes the ground of that condemnation which passed upon the seed. There are none that do good. Not an individual of the entire family of man possesses righteousness with which to satisfy law. We can live only through Christ. That which he did and suffered must be accounted to us. I live because Christ lives, just as the soul is spiritually dead from birth because Adam died. There is no actual sin in the one case, and there can be no personal righteousness in the other. Had Adam stood in the garden, all accruing benefits would have descended legally to his seed. For so ran the covenant. But even such equality before law of Adam and his posterity entitled the latter simply to a

righteousness of which a mere creature was the author. For Adam could have imparted to his seed such life only as he possessed in himself. This much and no more. For the stream cannot rise above the fountain. But under the covenant of grace; the believer draws his life and receives his righteousness from Christ. For if under the headship of the first Adam, the generations were entitled to all the life and righteousness existent in the head, shall not the regenerate, under the headship of the Second Adam, be made sharers in the very righteousness and life of him through whom they are made alive? And, furthermore, is it not evident, that as the second Adam is exalted in nature and excellence and glory far above the first, so they that are born again from the dead in him take rank correspondent to their Redeemer and Head? Recall the words of the Saviour's intercession: "I pray that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they all may be one in us; and the glory which thou gavest me I have given them that they may be one as we are one, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." Christ the head, we the members; Christ the vine, we the branches; Christ the bridegroom, we the bride. We are "members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. We are made the righteousness of God in him. We are chosen in him before the foundation of the world. We receive of his fulness and grace for grace. We are complete in him which is the head of all principality and power. We are circumcised in Christ and buried with him in baptism. We are quickened together with Christ and made to sit together in heavenly places with him. We are dead, but our lives are hid with Christ in God. Christ is our life. We do not live, but Christ lives in us. We are baptized into Christ, and sleep in Christ when we die. Christ's death is our death, and his resurrection from the dead involves the certainty of our resurrection. We are made partakers of his righteousness, of his sufferings, of his spirit. We are joint heirs with him and destined to sit with him on the throne of his glory. Amazing thought, the believer's life is so hidden in the life of Christ that the redeemed, however lowly, partakes of every advantage

which falls to the Redeemer himself, either in this world or the next.

In Adam, mankind lost an earthly Paradise; lost original righteousness; lost communion with God; "are under his wrath and curse, and so made liable to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and to the pains of hell forever." Yet in the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, heaven takes the place of earth, the worth of the Infinite transcends, unspeakably, the merit of the finite, while by reason of the glory that excelleth, the wages of sin are not only made of none effect to the faithful, but in the stead of the blight and ruin of Eden is substituted that gift of God which is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. As the strength of the branch is supplied from the vine, as nerve power in the brain imparts vigor to the limbs, as the members of the body subsist, not separately, but in vital and necessary union each with the other, so Christ and his people are legally one, and spiritually inseparable. Hence the "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" which is the heritage of the saint. For as the act of the first man brought on his seed the very same death that was inflicted on himself, so that eternal life which God gives to the saved is the identical life which exists in his Son. For as Adam dragged to the lowest depth of which his iniquity was capable the seed that should follow, so the soul made alive in Christ is exalted to behold that glory which the Omnipotent gave to his fellow and equal before the foundation of the world. What wonderful words are these: "I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me."

It matters not that previous to adoption the creature was without worth and unknown. The maid who at her betrothal is portionless and obscure, from the moment when wedded to a prince, becomes henceforth, in law, the equal of her husband. Broad domains, fair and well furnished palaces, rank, the retinue of servants, every guest and attendant—all stand related to her as they do to her lord. Disjointed and divergent interests belong to the past, and hereafter, in society and in the household, the

bride lives in the life and the lineage of the groom. For in the hour of marriage these twain were made one flesh. And after this manner the chosen of God in Christ die to the law, die to sin, and its curse, while the life, dignity, and righteousness of Jesus are set down to their account. Evermore the Church, the Lamb's wife, is adorned with a diadem whose lustre is the same that glows in the crown of her glorious Head. And in all the ages yet to come, the Bride, leaning on the arm of her royal husband, shall walk unchallenged through the heavenly courts. Therefore, that federal arrangement which, in the fall of Adam, portended only death and everlasting woe, brings to light in Christ a life and joy which fill eternity with praise.

And yet, the human heart, in its lost estate, cleaves to legalism. Mankind in all ages, and of every race, have come to God with a price in their hands. An atonement that provides salvation is a doctrine which fallen nature does not love. But "this is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son"; "he that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son hath not life." It is not by what we can do, but by that which Christ has so fully done, that the soul is saved.

Let it be understood, that by a righteous person is not meant one who is pious and exemplary. For the law demands invariable and unshaken conformity, and the very holiest man falls short of this standard, "which is as high as heaven and as deep as hell." The "righteous" is one who, in his relations to law, as a rule of salvation, cannot be convicted of a single moral blemish. Now, it is clear that no fallen man, however exalted his piety, possesses, or can possess, such a righteousness as this. And yet the law is inflexible in its claims. Do and live, or disobey and die. The only conceivable method, therefore, by which a child of Adam can be pronounced legally just is through the perfect and acceptable righteousness of another. This provided, no sooner does faith receive it than the eye of the law turns from anything wrought in the sinner, or done by him, and fixes its gaze wholly upon that Redeemer who has been accepted as a substitute. Henceforth, justice deals directly, not with the principal, but with the surety; and although the regenerate still

“finds a law in his members that when he would do good evil is present,” yet this does not change his legal status. For having been once justified “from all things,” upon the ground of a perfect righteousness acceptably furnished by another, the law can never reverse this decision, because of those “motions of sin which work in the members.” For in the moment of justification, and ever afterward, Christ himself confronts the law in the soul’s stead; and so long as his strength and righteousness avail, there can be no condemnation to him that believeth. For,—

“Nothing, either great or small,
Nothing, sinner, no;
Jesus did it, did it all,
Long, long ago.

When he from his lofty throne,
Stoop’d to do and die,
Everything was fully done—
Hearken to his cry:

It is FINISHED! Yes, indeed—
Finished every jot;
Sinner, this is all you need—
Tell me, is it not?

Weary, working, plodding one,
Wherefore toil you so?
Cease your doing—all was done
Long, long ago.

Till to JESUS’ work you cling,
By a simple faith,
‘Doing’ is a deadly thing,
‘Doing’ ends in death.

Cast your deadly doing down,
Down at JESUS’ feet;
Stand IN HIM, in him alone,
Gloriously complete.”

Salvation is of God through Christ. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life. But it may be asked, Is not *faith* itself a work? We answer, No. For faith is the acknowledgment of sin, a confession of dependence, a distinct renunciation of self. The spirit, bankrupt in strength, trusts to the arm of another that

is able to save. In exhaustion and weakness, work is out of the question. Hence, in his extremity, Bartimeus cried, "Lord, that I might receive my sight." The man at the pool of Bethesda admitted disease, and pleaded inability, and only at the word of the Master rose up and walked. The man with the withered hand had no healing power in himself, but stretched forth the dead member at the command solely of a life-giving Saviour. Wherever the deaf ears were unstopped, the blind eyes opened, the lepers recovered, the dead raised up, the virtue went forth alone from the omnipotent Redeemer. The impotent had no capacity for work, they could only penitently petition and humbly believe. They could just pleadingly say, "If THOU wilt, thou canst MAKE us clean."

As with the body, so with the soul. Salvation is never purchased, but ever given. Yea, all hope of doing must be utterly cast down, and the wells of self-confidence emptied to the dregs, before the fountains of grace can open freely and flow. For the soul can find life only where it exists, and that is in the "gift of God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Everywhere else there is death. For the law abhors the faulty doing of a heart like mine, and seeks to slay, until the Saviour hides me beneath the shadow of his wing. Justice is satisfied at last, and lays aside its fiery vengeance as it beholds a righteous Redeemer, through whose life the sinner lives. From this moment, and forever, there is no condemnation.

The human mind, however, is prone to contemplate God the Father as stern and implacable—the administrator of wrath rather than the fountain of love. And the believer even, at times, is terrified as he ponders that justice and judgment which are the habitations of Jehovah's throne. But it is to this very God the Father that we are indebted for that redemption which bringeth life to the dead. For while Jesus is our Saviour, let it adoringly be remembered, that the Father, "by determinate counsel and foreknowledge," freely delivered up his Son, in order that souls dead in trespasses and sins should be saved. It was to declare God's love for the world that the only begotten, which is in the bosom of the Father, appeared. "Christian faith properly com-

mences with persuasion of the Father's love, in his essential, paternal character; and from the beginning to the end of its course, contemplates Christ as being his gift, so that the more it sees of Christ's preciousness, the more does it discover the love of the Father who gave him." The Father gave, the Son executes, the Spirit applies. And to this mysterious, holy, loving **THREE**, the ransomed owe their life. "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear, but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit also beareth witness with our spirits that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ, if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together." It is, therefore, the believer's joy and honor to live in holy and blessed communication with the Father, through the Son, by means of "that Spirit that helpeth our infirmities, making intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered."

Yes, eternal life is a gift! For by grace are we saved, through faith, and that not of ourselves. Not of works, lest any man should boast. For "we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." It is only when Redemption is applied that the dead in trespasses and sins are quickened; that the "children of disobedience and wrath, who in time past walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air—who had their conversation in the lust of the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh, and of the mind—have by the great love of God, and through the depths of his mercy, been raised up together, and made to sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus: that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness toward us through Christ Jesus.

Aye, we are quickened together with Christ. And not merely quickened *as* he was, but, in virtue of the union—covenanted and vital—between Christ and his people, his death was their death, his life is their life, and in his exaltation these all are exalted likewise. "Our old man was crucified with him, that the body

of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now, if we be dead with Christ, we believe we shall also live with him. I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

And thus it is that we are no longer "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenant of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world; but now, in Christ Jesus, we who some time were afar off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us; having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace; and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby; and came and preached peace to you which were afar off, and to them that were nigh. For through him we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father. Now, therefore, we are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God; and are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone; in whom all the building fitly framed together groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord: in whom we also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit."

Such, then, is the scheme of Redemption that meets and offsets the story of the fall. The first man forfeited an earthly Eden, lost the favor of God, and brought the dread judgments of heaven on himself and his seed. But the Second Man satisfied law, abrogated death, and through the covenant of grace, bestowed on his people, not a justifying righteousness simply, but an inheritance in glory that surpasses the Paradise of earth by as much as an infinite Redeemer, God manifest in the flesh, transcends in excellency and power every creature of his hands. This is enough. If "the wages of sin be death, THE GIFT OF GOD IS ETERNAL LIFE THROUGH JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD"!

J. S. GRASTY.

ARTICLE V.

ASCETICISM.

The word is derived from the Greek *ἀσκεῖν*, to exercise, strengthen, and was applied by the Greeks to denote the kind of exercise by which the athletes in the national games were fitted for the various contests of agility or strength. Hence Hesychius gives *γυμνάζεται* as the equivalent of *ἀσκεῖ*. So also Suidas has *ἐγκρατεία* as the synonym of *ἀσκησις* (see Suidas's Thesaurus, *sub verb.*). Hence Christians were called by the Greek fathers *ἀθληταί*. The idea was derived from the Scriptures: "Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain. And every man that striveth for the mastery (*ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος*) is temperate (*ἐγκρατεύεται*) in all things" (1 Cor. ix. 24, 25). So Paul: "I exercise myself (*ἀσκῶ*) to have a conscience void of offence toward God and man" (Acts xxiv. 16). It is the idea which lies at the foundation of a Christian profession, the idea of a self-denying discipline, without which the world, the flesh, and the devil, cannot be overcome. In this sense of the word, all Christians from the first considered themselves *ascetics*. The warning of their Master was ever ringing in their ears: "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it." The promise is ever "to him that *overcometh*," whether it be addressed to a member of the church of Smyrna, in which grace seemed to triumph over all evil, or to a member of the church of Laodicea, in which evil seemed to triumph over grace. Conflict was the law of the Christian's life, and he soared, like the eagle, by the very resistance opposed to the stroke of his pinion.

In the course of time, however, the denomination of ascetics came to be restricted to a certain class of Christians, superior to the mass of their brethren by the rigor with which they renounced the world and its pleasures. Christians of this class did not at first withdraw themselves entirely from society. Like the Naza-

rites among the Jews, they moved familiarly among their people, though specially consecrated to God. No higher standard of consecration was proposed for them either by themselves or by others, than for their brethren. The moral law, as interpreted in the gospel, was the perfect standard for all. The difference between the ascetics and the rest consisted in the degrees of labor and of self-denial with which they aimed to realise the common ideal, or to reach conformity to the common standard.

But it was one manifestation of the power of the reaction of heathenism in the Christian Church, that the aristocratic idea again obtruded itself upon a religion which was designed to be popular in its character and to constitute a universal priesthood of believers. The truths of Christianity were not abstract ideas which only trained and disciplined intellects could apprehend, but facts and explanations of facts revealed upon the testimony of God. The facts could be apprehended by the plainest understanding, by any understanding capable of receiving a testimony. The explanations of the facts could be received by the most enlightened only by the teaching of the Holy Ghost; and with that teaching, they could be received by the most unenlightened. The duties of Christianity were binding upon all, according to their several relations. But a distinction began to be made between *πίστις* and *γνώσις*, with reference to the truths; and between *præcepta* and *consilia*, with reference to the practical life. The Gnostics, who made the most of these distinctions, divided mankind into three classes: the "spiritual," the "psychical," and the "hylic," or "somatical"—the men of the spirit, the men of the soul, and the men of the body or flesh. The *gnosis* and the *counsels* belonged to the men of the spirit; the *pistis* and the *precepts* to the class next below, the men of the soul. We may note here, in passing, the close connexion between the understanding and the active powers. A difference in the mode of knowing or apprehending carried with it a difference in the rule of duty; *pistis* and *precept*, *gnosis* and *counsel*.

This distinction between precepts and counsels may have originated in a misapprehension of certain passages of Scripture; as, for example, the famous passage which Origen, in opposition

to his whole theory of interpretation, interpreted literally (Matt. xix. 12), and the other passage in the same chapter (verse 21) which the Papacy quotes in support of its doctrine of supererogatory works. See also 1 Cor. vii. 6, 25, 40; Luke xvii. 10; Luke xiv. 26 *et seq.* But, as Whately admonishes us in regard to Papal errors generally, we must guard against the mistake of supposing that those errors originated even in a false interpretation of Scripture. They were, for the most part, the inventions of men, instigated by the father of lies; and some color of support was sought for them in Scripture. It is a palpable abuse of these passages and of the moral law. Such statements proceed upon the supposition of a difference between duty *in abstracto* and duty *in concreto*—a difference the poles apart from the distinction between *precepts* and *counsels*. Duty is determined by relations and conditions. The moral law requires perfect love both to God and man; but as to the mode in which that love is to be manifested, that must be determined by relations and providential conditions. In its essence, as the law of love, the Decalogue is binding upon all the subjects of God's moral government, whether angels or men; but it determines some duties for men which are no duties for angels, and some duties for some men which are no duties for other men. There can be, however, no *adiaphora* in morals. A man cannot be more than *wholly* consecrated to God; but whether a married or single state is necessary to this whole consecration must be determined by the condition of individuals. It is as much the duty of a few to remain single as it is the duty of the many to be married.

Upon this distinction, as has already been hinted, of precepts and counsels, the scientific construction of the doctrine of "*opera supererogativa*" has in part proceeded; as also the monastic vows of "chastity, poverty, and obedience," which are named as the chief of the twelve counsels of Christ (*præcipua et substantialia perfectionis consilia*). If a man can do more than his duty, then the superfluous or supererogatory merit may be set down to the account of somebody else. This doctrine is defended by some modern Romanists of great reputation.*

*See article entitled "Consilia Evangelica," in Hertzog's Encyclopædia.

Another error of the ancient asceticism was the confounding of the opposition of the flesh and the spirit, as it is found in Paul's Epistles, with the opposition of matter and spirit as propounded in the Oriental and Greek philosophy. The Scriptures give no countenance at all to this dualism of the philosophers, so far as it involves the doctrine of the essential depravity of matter. They pronounce the material as well as the spiritual works of God *good*, and the bodies as well as the souls of believers are called the temples of the Holy Ghost. The resurrection of the body, as well as its original creation—to say nothing of the incarnation of the Son of God—are directly in the teeth of this antagonistic dualism. The Gnostics holding the dualism, consistently denied the incarnation and the resurrection. But while the Church manfully fought and conquered Gnosticism, and bruised its head, yet it was itself wounded in the heel, and seduced into the error of the inherent depravity of matter. There was, indeed, no formal, much less any dogmatic, substitution of the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter for the ethical conflict of the spirit and the flesh; but there can be no reasonable doubt that the former species of dualism was practically received and acted upon to no inconsiderable extent. The body as such was practically treated as “a body of sin” in a sense very different from that of the Apostle. When he speaks of “the body of sin,” he means the *whole* “old man,” manifesting its nature and power through the body and its organs as its servitors; in like manner as when he speaks of the consecration of the whole person under the dominion of the “new man,” he speaks of it as the presenting of the body a living sacrifice to God. Pride, envy, malice, hypocrisy, are qualities of this body of sin, albeit they are undoubtedly sins of the spirit. “Flesh” with him is the whole man infected with sin; spirit with him is the whole man endowed with the Holy Ghost, and under the dominion of the Holy Ghost. “To crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts” is not to crucify the material body, but to crucify “the old man which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts.” The body is not to be abused and destroyed, but to be kept under and brought into subjection (1 Cor. ix. 27), and thereby made a nimbler servitor of the heroic

spirit. This was the asceticism of the Greek athlete, with which Paul compares his own. We are to glorify God in our bodies, which are his, his temples.

† The error upon which we have been commenting was a fatal one. If sin is a thing of the body, holiness is also a thing of the body. The ultimate result is a religion such as is seen in Rome: a religion of bodily exercise which professes to war against the flesh, with its "touch not, taste not, handle not," while, as the Apostle warns us (Colossians), it is only a dishonorable "satisfying of the flesh." Such a religion is pleasing to the sinner, flattering to his pride and indolence, allowing him to rejoice in the reputation of humility, while he is "vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind." He finds it much easier to abstain from flesh on Friday than from malice, envy, and all uncharitableness, on that or any other day of the week. It is an easier religion than Christ's, and will always be popular, so long as men desire to be religious without forsaking their sins. They will continue to strain out gnats and swallow camels, until they learn that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, nor abstinence from both, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

Asceticism, further, had in it, beside the metaphysical theory of dualism, another speculative element; an element which lay, in fact, at the foundation of the theory of dualism. Dualism cannot satisfy the speculative intellect which, from its very nature, seeks after unity; and this unity more rational thinkers have generally supposed, both in ancient and in modern times, they have found in *being*, either metaphysically or logically considered, *i. e.*, either as an existing monad which physically embraces all possible existence (the *Ens Realissimum*), or as the logical absolute and infinite, the "*Ultima Thule*" of the reason (the *Genus Generalissimum*), which may be predicated of everything, but which itself has no predicates; which is, therefore, logically considered, at once everything and nothing—God=0—pure being, or pure intelligence.* The irresistible tendency in pure speculation to this result, to Pantheism, either in its idealistic or in its

* See Thornwell's Coll. Writings, Vol. I., pp. 535, 536; Müller's Christian Doctrine of Sin, Introduction.

materialistic phase, is painfully evident in the doctrine of causation as expounded by Sir William Hamilton, and in his application of it to the idea of motion. Being, which can neither be increased nor diminished, but only developed, modified, etc.—this is the last and highest result. Truly he has given us a mournful illustration and proof of “the impotence of the reason.” Asceticism is a characteristic of the two most wide-spread religions of Eastern Asia, Brahmanism and Buddhism; and both these religions are Pantheistic and mystic. According to some authorities, Brahmanism is a materialistic, Buddhism an idealistic, Pantheism. Others think* that they are both idealistic, Buddhism being a reformed or purified Brahmanism: both making the Supreme Unity to be Intelligence, and the supreme perfection of man to consist in absorption into this Intelligence, or identification with it; both making release from the bonds of matter the chief part of the process of purification, with this difference, that Buddhism is popular and universal, Brahmanism is aristocratic, and by its *caste* makes it impossible for the lower sort of men ever to be made perfect. But in both, *contemplation*, the gazing upon the absolute until the soul becomes identified with it, is the organon of improvement. The senses are to be denied and the material world is to be shut out in order to give the soul a chance for perfection. Mosheim ascribes the asceticism of Egypt in a great measure to the prevalence of a similar philosophy. Without doubt, this was the prevailing philosophy in the monasteries of the Middle Ages. The reign of Realism is one evidence of this, and the influence of the Neo-Platonic writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius is another. The speculations of Philo Judæus and Ammonius Saccas differ very little from those of the mediæval mystics;† and both resemble, in a very remarkable degree, the speculations of the Brahmins and the Buddhists. They all savor strongly of Pantheism, and therefore of self-worship, of self absorbed or transformed into God. One inevitable result of such views is intolerable pride and arrogance, qualities in which it is

* Maurice's Religions of the World—the Boyle Lecture for 1846.

† Mosheim: De Rebus Christ. ante Const., Cent. II., Sec. 35.

difficult to determine whether bonzes and fakirs have surpassed Christian monks and hermits.

The only Greek philosophers whose followers have exhibited a tendency to asceticism are Pythagoras and Plato, whose systems partook largely of oriental elements. But these systems were never, for any great length of time, popular among the Greeks proper. They were so utterly foreign from the temper, the social and political life, of that mercurial and versatile people, that Pythagoras was compelled to seek a home in Magna Græcia, and Platonism found full scope only in semi-oriental Egypt. Diogenes and the Cynics were not ascetics, in the proper sense; and Diogenes "pitched his tub," not in the wilderness, but in the Agora, amidst "the busy hum of men." Indeed, it may be affirmed of Plato himself that he was too much of a Greek, with all his dreamy oriental imagination, to be controlled by his theoretic dualism. While in his *Timæus* he shows a predilection for the cosmogonical speculations of Asia, and a tendency to recede to the position of Thales and Xenophanes, from which thinking he had been recalled by his master Socrates, yet in his *Republic*, his idealism is, as it were, confined to earth. "Even his religion," says Milman,* "though of much sublimer cast than the popular superstition, was yet considered chiefly in its practical operation on the welfare of the State."

"In Rome," says the same author, "the general tendency of the national mind was still more essentially public and practical." "Under the Republic, philosophy was a recreation in the intervals of business. Under the Empire, they took refuge in philosophy from the degradation and inactivity of servitude, still hoping to be summoned again from a retirement without dignity to public life. The philosophic Seneca, who talks with the mortified piety of an anchorite, lived and died the votary and the victim of court intrigue. The Thræseas stood aloof, not in ecstatic meditation on the primal Author of Being, but on the departed liberties of Rome; their soul aspired no higher than to unite itself with the ancient genius of the Republic."

* *Hist. of Christianity*, B. 2, C. 5, p. 39, Vol. 2 of Murray's Lond. Ed., 1867.

Another error of asceticism was the overlooking of the social nature of man, and its final cause in his constitution. The ascetic was right on the side of individualism, in regarding his own improvement and perfection as one of the ends of his creation, and, next to the glory of God, his highest end; but he overlooked the fact that society is the sphere, and the only sphere, in which his perfection can be attained. It is a striking fact that asceticism should have been so rapidly developed after the "Catholic doctrine" of the external unity of the Church was established. It looks like a counterpoise of the doctrine which makes the Church everything and the individual nothing, that there should be a doctrine which makes the individual of so great consequence as to justify him in leaving the corporation altogether and insulating himself for his own salvation. It is hard to say which of these extremes is the most pernicious. The Scriptures, in this as in other things, respect and preserve all that is truly natural and original in man. They make salvation a personal concern of every man, and yet make the Church the instrument of teaching him salvation, and of training him, by the exercise of his graces for the good of his brethren. But the voice of outraged nature will be heard sooner or later; and these very people who retired to the deserts for the purpose of avoiding society, not only formed associations among themselves, but associations which ultimately became so potent as completely to swallow up the individuality of their members. The monastic vow of "obedience" (that is, obedience to the head of the association) practically absolved him who took it, not only from all obligation to obey any other man than the head of the society, but even from the obligation to obey the Head of the Church itself. The great wheel of the Church was often embarrassed, in its motions, by these smaller wheels within it. It must be borne in mind, however, that what has just been said is true of asceticism, not in its earliest stages, but only in its later, the stage of monasteries, congregations, and orders.

The circumstances which have been thus far mentioned would not be sufficient to account for such a gross perversion of Christianity as we have seen asceticism to be. They are circumstances

which attended and promoted the thing, rather than circumstances which gave rise to it. The root of the evil is to be found in man's dependence upon his own righteousness and strength for salvation, rather than upon the righteousness of Christ and the grace of the Holy Ghost. This is the evil against which the whole gospel scheme is a protest. Now when men are ignorant of God's righteousness and go about to establish their own righteousness, they almost universally adopt some system of bodily exercise by which to justify and sanctify themselves. If they take the moral law for their rule, in all its comprehensive spirituality, they will speedily discover that it can only reveal and condemn transgression; that they cannot love God and their neighbor as they ought; and failing in this love, that they are condemned. They must invent a law for themselves which they are *able* to keep; and, from the nature of the case, it will be a law of the flesh and not of the spirit. When asceticism passed into monasticism, religion was no longer "a worshipping God in the spirit, trusting in Jesus, and having no confidence in the flesh," but the reverse of all this. We do not, of course, intend to deny that there was any true faith among the monks, but are only describing the genius and tendency of the system. This tendency was discovered and rebuked by some clear-sighted men among the monks themselves, like Jovinian, who spoke from experience, as well as by others, like the Gallic Presbyter Vigilantius, who were not blinded by the prejudices of the *esprit de corps*. But Jovinian and Vigilantius spoke only to be overwhelmed by the invectives of Jerome, and to be stigmatised as semi-heretics by the Church. It is honorable to Augustine, who was the greatest and soundest theologian of his time, that, in spite of his own admiration of monkery, he ventured to say a word in behalf of these witnesses, and to rebuke the scurrilous vehemence of the monk of Bethlehem.

We may pause here, for a moment, to note the Papal idea of religion. The monks and nuns are, in that apostasy, known by the name of "the religious"; they are the people who *do* the religion of the body to which they belong; and what kind of religion it is, enough has been said to show.

That monasticism has signally failed to do for its deluded victims what they hoped, history makes painfully evident. The monasteries have been the nurseries of the very worst sins, both of the flesh and of the spirit. Insulted nature has been terribly revenged.* Pride, cruelty, envy, bigotry, fornication, sodomy, and all manner of abominations, have reigned within them. The fact of the terrible impurity of monasteries and nunneries may be abundantly established by the testimony of Papal writers and even of Papal councils. Upon this point we have no need of resorting to "Protestant slanders," in the way of proof. The sarcasm of Gibbon ("Decline and Fall," c. 37) is not without truth when he says: "The ascetics were inspired with a savage enthusiasm which represents man as a criminal and God as a tyrant, and embraces a life of misery as the price of eternal happiness." How could the divine honor be vindicated but by giving up these institutions, in some measure at least, to work out their own principles, "to eat of the fruit of their own way and to be filled with their own devices"?

As to the misery endured by conscientious monks, let us hear the testimony of Jerome, concerning himself, Jerome whose zeal in recruiting for nunneries led to his banishment from Rome: "Oh how often in the desert, in that vast solitude, which, parched by the sultry sun, affords a dwelling to the monks, did I fancy myself in the midst of the luxuries of Rome! I sat alone, for I was full of bitterness. My misshapen limbs were rough with sackcloth; and my skin was so squalid that I might have been taken for a negro. Tears and groans were my occupation every day and all day; if sleep surprised me unawares, my naked

*No other result could be rationally expected. The monastic vows of "chastity" (*i. e.*, celibacy) and "poverty" were intended for the extirpation of instincts and appetites implanted in the nature of man when God created him. The vows were a war against nature, and were therefore not only ineffectual, but, like all other attempts against nature, pernicious—"naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret." In reference to celibacy, Bungener well says: "Can it be admitted that, in the creation, with a Creator infinitely powerful and wise, the abnormal can be essentially purer than the normal? Was the barren fig-tree then purer than if it had been covered with fruit?" (Hist. du Conc. de Trente, 2, 233.)

bones, which scarcely held together, clashed on the earth. I will say nothing of my food or beverage; even the rich have nothing but cold water; any warm drink is a luxury. Yet even I, who from fear of hell had condemned myself to this dungeon, the companion only of scorpions and wild beasts, was in the midst of girls dancing. My face was pale with fasting, but the mind in my cold body burned with desires; the fires of lust boiled up in the body which was already dead. Destitute of all succor, I cast myself at the feet of Jesus, washed them with my tears, and subdued the rebellious flesh by a whole week's fasting."* "The hermit," says Milman, "may fly from his fellow-men, but not from himself, . . . the very effort to suppress certain feelings has a natural tendency to awaken and strengthen them. The horror of carnal indulgence would not permit the sensual desires to die away into apathy. Men are apt to find what they seek in their own hearts, and by anxiously searching for the guilt of lurking lust, or desire of worldly wealth or enjoyment, the conscience, as it were, struck forcibly upon the cord which it wished to deaden, and made it vibrate with a kind of morbid, but more than ordinary energy. Nothing was so licentious or so terrible as not to find its way to the cell of the recluse. Beautiful women danced around him; wild beasts of every shape, and monstrous with no shape at all, howled and yelled and shrieked about him, while he knelt in prayer or snatched his broken slumbers."

The misery of a monastic life is in strong contrast with the gospel, the glad tidings of salvation. Next to the glorifying of God, and in some sort identical with it in the experience of a believer, stands in the gospel the seeking of our own happiness. The gospel "does not interfere with any rational pleasure, and bids nobody quit the enjoyment of any one thing that his reason can prove to him ought to be enjoyed." It is true that it makes the disciplines of self-denial and the cross the indispensable requisites to being disciples of Christ; but this, so far from interfering with man's happiness, promotes it. Paradoxical as it may seem, the highest pleasure is often found in

*Quoted in Milman's *History of Christianity*, Vol. III., p. 204.

abstaining from pleasure. Happiness is the reflex of energy, the glow of the soul from the exercise of its proper energies in the proper degree. The gospel is called "the glorious gospel of the blessed (or happy) God," to indicate, perhaps, that the happiness of God himself is not to be contemplated by us apart from the infinite energy exhibited in the person and work of the Saviour. The culminating act of God in this salvation is presented to us in the light of an act of self-denial. "He that spared not his own Son," etc. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son," etc. There is a development of energy in self-denial, in a *proper* self-denial, and therefore, such a self-denial promotes happiness, which is a very different thing from pleasure. Pleasure is the result of "the suitable application of a suitable object to a rightly disposed faculty or organ." It is an excitement produced from without, in which the man is rather passive than active. Happiness is a "home-bred delight." This was the theory of Aristotle, a wiser man, though a heathen, than many nominally Christian philosophers.*

The limitation has been stated of "a proper self-denial," by which is meant a self-denial required by Christ who gives the law for this Christian contest. No man is crowned except he strive lawfully, that is according to the rules and regulations of the contest. There is happiness in the cross, but it must be Christ's cross, of his imposing, not of our own. "Pilgrimages, going barefoot, hair-shirts, and whips," says South, "are not gospel artillery," but the artillery of will-worship and superstition.

"With the Romanists," says the same forcible and witty preacher, † "a man cannot be penitent unless he also turns vagabond and foots it to Jerusalem, or wanders over this or that part of the world, to visit the shrine of this or that pretended saint, though, perhaps, in his life ten times more ridiculous than themselves; thus, that which was Cain's curse is become their religion. He that thinks to expiate a sin by going barefoot only makes one folly the atonement for another. Paul indeed was scourged and

*See Sir Wm. Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, Lect. II. Discussions, p. 39. Thornwell's *Discourses on Truth—Writings*, II. pp. 462 *et seq.*

†South's *Sermons*, Sermon I.

beaten by the Jews, but we never read that he beat or scourged himself; and if they think that his 'keeping under his body' imports so much, they must first prove that the body cannot be kept under by a virtuous mind, and that the mind cannot be made virtuous but by a scourge, and, consequently, that thongs and whip-cord are means of grace and necessary to salvation. The truth is, that if men's religion lies no deeper than their skin, it is possible that they may scourge themselves into very great improvements. But they will find that 'bodily exercise' touches not the soul; and that neither pride, nor lust, nor covetousness, nor any other vice, was ever mortified by corporal discipline. It is not the back, but the heart, that must bleed for sin; and, consequently, in this whole course they are like men out of their way: let them lash on never so fast, they are not at all nearer to their journey's end; and howsoever they deceive themselves and others, they may as well expect to bring a cart as a soul to heaven by such means."

But has monkery been overruled for no good? If it has not, then truly it is an exception to the general rule. It is hardly conceivable that an institution which has existed for so many ages in the bosom of the Church has been wholly and exclusively pernicious.

(a). In the first place, the retirement of so many from the world, their renunciation of its wealth, its honors, its pleasures, in the earnest pursuit of salvation, served to keep alive the sense of the reality of religion and of its supreme importance, in a time of general declension, when worldliness overflowed the Church like a deluge. This was specially true after the time of Constantine, when the "woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under feet, and with a crown of twelve stars upon her head" (Rev. xii. 1), became the "woman sitting upon a scarlet-colored beast" (Rev. xvii. 1-6). The ascetics showed, at least, a real earnestness in that in which all nominal Christians professed to be in earnest, and so subserved, in some measure, the purpose of the Nazarite under the Levitical Law. Even before Constantine this was true. It is difficult for us who have been accustomed from our infancy to a society, even to a world, moulded, more or

less, by the *moral*, in contradistinction from the *spiritual*, power of Christianity, to conceive of the condition of society in the Roman Empire. The first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans contains a short but graphic summary of the atrocious and shameless pollutions which defiled it. The First Epistle to the Corinthians shows to what extent these pollutions continued to infest those who had become Christians. The Apostle says that they who would keep no company at all with fornicators, covetous men, extortioners, idolaters, must needs go out of the world (1 Cor. v. 10). The marriage relation, which is the source of all social relations, had become utterly polluted, if not virtually abolished; and thus the great tree of society had become poisoned at the root, and brought forth bitter and deadly fruits. The religion of the Empire was interwoven with the whole texture of social and civic life; and as that religion was itself horrible corruption, the very atmosphere was like the smoke from the bottomless pit. Earnest Christians felt that they must retire from the world, or die. This was a grievous error in those who were called to shine as lights in the world, who professed to be the followers of him who lived in the world for the world's good; but an error not unnatural, and therefore an error which ought to save those who committed it from any harsh judgment by us. They seemed to themselves to be obeying such injunctions as that of 2 Cor. vi. 14 *et seq.*

(b). Asceticism was overruled for the spread of the gospel. The gospel was at first, and for a great length of time, preached in the cities and towns of the empire as prominent centres from which the truth might radiate; and these centres had become Christian long before the country, the villages, and hamlets, had renounced idolatry. This is witnessed by the very word Pagan (*paganus*, villager), which came to be equivalent with *heathen*. There were many regions which would never, so far as appears, have been penetrated, or at least would not have been penetrated for ages, by the gospel, if the anchorites had not taken up their abode in them. "When Eremitism gave place to Cœnobitism; when the hermitage grew up into a convent, the establishment of these fraternities in the wildest solitudes gathered around them

a Christian community, or spread, as it were, a gradually increasing belt of Christian worship, which was maintained by the spiritual services of the monks. These communities commenced, in the more remote and less populous districts of the Roman world, that ameliorating change which, in later times, they carried on beyond the frontiers. As afterwards they introduced civilisation and Christianity among the barbarous tribes of North Germany or Poland, so now they continued in all parts a quiet but successful aggression upon the lurking Paganism.”*

(c) These monasteries became refuges, ultimately, from the degrading ignorance, as well as from the violence and pollutions of the world. After the overthrow of the Western Empire by the northern nations, society was for ages in a state of chaos, a boiling abyss of darkness and confusion, in which reigned the genius of the bottomless pit, a genius opposed to all polite learning as well as to all religion which could make any pretension to truth or holiness. The feeble remnant of learning fled to the dens and caves of the mountain and the wilderness. It was feeble indeed. The great master-pieces of Greece and Rome were not studied; the sacred records of salvation were, for the most part, sealed records even to the monks themselves. Nevertheless the monasteries were God's repositories of these treasures, where they were preserved with a traditional veneration until the time should arrive when they were to come forth for the illumination, the training, the salvation of the human race. These repositories have not yet been exhausted, and, ever and anon, some new treasure is exhumed, some new manuscript of the Bible, or some lost tractate of a master spirit of Greece or Rome, who instructed or entranced the men of his own generation by his skill in reasoning or his charms of diction.

It cannot be denied, however, that monasticism is inherently hostile to sound learning. Some abatement must be made in the praise which has just been accorded to the monasteries as the preservers of books. “It is forgotten,” says Bungener,† “that what the monks have *saved* of the writings of the ancients is not

*Milman's History of Christianity, *ut supra*, pp. 194, 195.

†Hist. du Conc. de Trente, 5, 25.

the hundredth part of what they have suffered to be *lost*." And no doubt what they suffered to be lost was much of it lost for a reason: they desired to get rid of troublesome witnesses for the truth. If monasticism was unfriendly to religion, it must have been unfriendly to learning. Sound learning and true religion naturally go together; for God has created no schism in the human soul. A man shut up in his cell all his life cannot be expected to have any enlarged and liberal views of man or of the world. As little can he feel the genial influence upon his intellect of the domestic and social affections, or the sobering effect of domestic and social sorrows. A hard heart can scarcely be joined with a sound head; and that monasticism hardens the heart, who that has read its melancholy history can doubt? How could it be otherwise? A man whose only business and calling is to maintain an unrelenting war against nature in himself is not likely to be touched with a sympathy with nature in others. Again we say, God has created no schism in the human soul.

The great thinkers of Greece and Rome, who "still rule our spirits from their urns," were no recluses. They moved about continually among men, and gathered thoughts and illustrations from the street and the market-place. The soundest ethics of the monastic schools of the Middle Age were derived from Aristotle. The thinking of that imperial mind was healthy in a marvellous degree, because the social and public life of his time and country were totally opposed to anything like monastic seclusion. The greater teachers of mankind, before whose influence even the influence of Aristotle dwindles into insignificance—Jesus and his apostles—were anything but monks. The freedom of Jesus' intercourse with the world exposed him to the charge of being "a gluttonous man and a wine bibber"; and his apostles mingled as freely with society as other men. It is their hearty *humanity* which, in part, gave popularity to their writings at the era of the Reformation. It was a glorious transition from the dreary platitudes, the endless hair-splitting, the barren jargon of the schools, to the fresh, lively, racy, human sentences of Paul or Peter.

While, therefore, it must be conceded that monkery has been, in a very important sense, the friend of learning, it must also be

affirmed that, in a sense still more important, it has been the enemy of sound knowledge. There are many flagrant instances in ecclesiastical history of the pernicious influence of monks on the faith of the Church. One may be mentioned. The error which goes under the name of "anthropomorphism" was one which monkery had a direct tendency to foster. This may, at first view, seem paradoxical, as the monks are people who have retired from the world in the interest of spirituality, for the very purpose of contemplating, undisturbed by the importunities of sense, the nature and perfections of the Deity. As the dread of the corrupting influence of nature was one powerful inducement to this retirement, it might be expected that whatever error they might fall into concerning God, they could certainly keep clear of *materialising* his nature. Yet this is the very thing they did. It was among the monks of the Scetian desert in Egypt that anthropomorphism assumed its grossest and most obstinate form. "They seemed," says Milman, "disposed to compensate themselves for the loss of human society by degrading the Deity, whom they professed to be their sole companion, to the likeness of man. . . Imagination could not maintain its flight, and they could not summon reason, which they had surrendered with the rest of their dangerous freedom, to supply its place." The same process took place in regard to other spiritual beings, angels and devils; they had to become incarnate in order to be proper companions or antagonists of the solitary anchorite. Luther's devil in the Wartburg was one that he could throw his inkstand at. A solitary must be a visionary. The mind of a monk must be "*mens pasta chimæris*," a mind on fancies fed. It is sad to see what havoc such a life has made on the fairest human intellects. Open any of the volumes of the scholastic monks, those, for instance, of the Seraphic Doctor, Bonaventura, or of the Angelic Doctor, Aquinas, and see what wretched fooleries are mingled with profound thought and sincere devotion; or take a more flagrant instance (more flagrant because belonging to a period long subsequent to the Reformation), that of the Port Royalists in France, numbering among them the names of Pascal and Arnauld, and see how the loftiest intellect can grovel in the dust, and how

Pascal himself illustrates his own favorite antithesis of "the glory and the misery of man"! It is a noteworthy feature of the history of the Jesuits, that while it has been a capital point of their policy to inveigle into their order the ablest men of the world, and while they have made the boast (a boast which has been strangely allowed by some eminent men among the Protestants to have been well-founded) of being the best educators of youth, yet that order has never produced a thinker of the first rank, a Bacon, or Des Cartes, or Leibnitz, or Kepler.

(d). Lastly, the monks have done good service, without intending it, in exposing to the derision of the world the pretensions of the Papacy to unity and infallibility. The different monastic orders, as every tyro in Church History knows, have been as wide apart from one another in matters of faith as if they belonged to different communions—wider apart, by a great deal, than the various branches of the Reformed Church have been from each other. Innocent III., one of the ablest and shrewdest of the Popes, he who established the dogma of Transubstantiation and Auricular Confession, he who hated *Magna Charta* as well as John Lackland, he who let slip the blood-hounds upon the unoffending Albigenses, and, in general, was the highest type of Papal arrogance and tyranny, was opposed, with a true instinct, to the multiplication of the monastic orders, which he called (here also with a true instinct or true insight) "religions."* The Dominican and Franciscan orders were as much different "religions" as the Presbyterian and the Methodist, to say the least. The Pope's apprehensions were fully justified by the result. Was there ever a more bitter controversy in the Protestant world than that in the bosom of the Papacy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists? The truth is, the pretension to unity on the part of that system—if anything more be meant than unity of government—is of all the impudent pretensions ever made one of the most baseless and shameless.

The monks have been equally successful in demonstrating the hollowness of the pretension to Infallibility. In the famous war

*Acta Concil., Lateran IV., Canon 13. "De novis religionibus prohibitis." Labbe and Cossart's Conc., XIII., p. 950.

between the Jesuits and the Dominicans, in the sixteenth century, about "grace," a vital point of religion and theology—the Pope refused to decide between the combatants—a very crafty stroke of policy in a mere worldly kingdom; but what shall we say of it as coming from one who professed to know the divine will, and to be commissioned to declare it? We owe a debt of thanks to the mighty *esprit de corps* of some of the monastic orders which proved itself stronger sometimes than the spirit of the general body to which they belonged; and in virtue of which they became a breakwater against the despotism of the central power and a check mutually upon each other.

ARTICLE VI.

GALILEO GALILEI.

One of the darkest chapters in history is certainly that period of the mediæval age, when religious intolerance had come to be so intense that aberration from any dogmas of the Roman Church was persecuted with fire and sword. Then did the officers of the Holy Inquisition attempt with torture and fagot to force the noblest men of liberal views back into gloom of a thick darkness.

History relates innumerable examples when free research was suppressed or crippled in the name of religion, when individuals and whole schools were persecuted to the utmost for scientific opinion. Only a single link in this long chain of scientific martyrdoms is the prosecution of Galileo, and this prosecution is far surpassed by many other cases in the pathos and the romance of the conflict, in the power and the magnitude of the actors, and in the striking cruelty of the end.

The hero of this tragedy was not one of those magnanimous reformatory characters, who sacrifice themselves in the service of a historic idea, who continue their course with unwavering firmness, throwing all obstacles aside, or being themselves shattered in the collision. Notwithstanding his scientific greatness, from

the beginning he manifests overmuch consideration for the power which stands in the way of his researches; and when he perceives at last the impossibility of escaping a conflict, he does not throw overboard his too great respect for his opponents. but intimidated, endeavors to hide behind ambiguous expressions, and can finally not avoid (subterfuges availing him no longer) denying his own convictions in an unbecoming and humiliating manner.

On the other hand, we find on the part of his persecutors all the malignancy, but not the overwhelming force, the impetuous passion, of the religious fanatic. Precisely the most influential among them produce on our minds as we look at them the impression of a slight unsteadiness of principle; they seem to have lost to a certain degree faith in their own course, the only thing which might induce us to pardon the intolerance of the fanatic. Anticipating danger and disgrace, they appear to be endeavoring to avoid the conflict, if they could only see how to reconcile their situation with their interest. Irresolution here, irresolution there, and accordingly failure! On the part of Galileo, undecided martyrdom; on the part of the Church, undecided victory! Ill treatment, rough handling, but no personal infliction of cruelty, no annihilation of the enemy! A protest against scientific convictions, but without cutting off the possibility of maintaining it, should it be necessary; and soon enough such a course had to be taken.

But, nevertheless, his fate is of great and peculiar interest to us. Although the conflict of which it was the result lacks the immediate tragic power exercised upon us in other cases of contest between historical rivals, the conflicting elements in Galileo's conduct and that of his foes possess a high interest for the analytical psychologist, as well as for the historian, who would investigate those motives which made a bold and consistent advance equally impossible for the supporters of the new as of the old system. The principles, at least, are clearly distinguished, whether the contesting parties are or are not precisely defined and perfectly decided. On one side we see a man of science who never entertained the idea of revolting against his Church, who never dreamed of denying its authority; on the other side a Pope, who

is no fanatic, not even sincere in his religious conviction, who cared no doubt very little whether the earth moved round the sun or the sun round the earth.

We cannot suppose that either one sought the conflict—the conflict came of itself. Once aroused, there was no other chance to get rid of it than by the subjugation of one or the other side—a subjugation which was enforced first upon the man of science by the brutal power of the inquisition, but after the lapse of only a few decades upon the Church by the progress of civilisation.

We see plainly that two diametrically opposite opinions are maintained. There is a sharp and distinctly defined contrariety, and this impresses a certain type upon the trial of Galileo, gives it an importance far surpassing its personal and even its immediate historical interest. Here is a trial which manifests in a classical way the eternal contest between scientific investigation and priestly authority, between independent meditation and sacerdotal control, which contest began with the first scientific thought, and can only end with faith in authority itself. But this trial comes off on the same ground on which our intellectual life moves to-day; we feel ourselves far more interested in it than in the sentence against Socrates, or in the indictment of Anaxagoras. The contesting powers are the same who wage the war to-day, although the direct object of the war may have changed; and the question who shall carry off the palm of victory is not so undecided as it was, when Galileo was compelled to forswear before the judges of the Holy Inquisition what to-day no Pope and no inquisition would doubt.

The prosecution of Galileo has lately been made the subject of investigation by learned historians. As late as 1850, Monsignor Marini, custodian of the Vatican documents, published as a pamphlet, *Galileo e l'Inquisizione Romana, Memorie Storico-critiche*. Monsieur Henri de l'Espinois, a French author, published in 1867 as an essay, *Galileo, son Procès, sa Condamnation d'après les Documents Inédits*. Monsieur Berti also had access to the official records of the *santo officio*, and has given his views to the world. Then Dr. Wohlwill, a German, investigated the celebrated prosecution of Galilei; but he seems to have never seen

the documents himself, and only knew them from the transcripts of the above-named authors. Finally Herr von Gebler, an Austrian, inspected the documents of the *santo officio* in Rome, and followed Galilei with admirable devotion to all the points in Italy where this great scientist had lived, taught, and suffered. His researches are laid down in a very interesting book: *Galileo Galilei und die Römische Curia, nach authentischen Quellen. Von Karl von Gebler, Stuttgart, 1876.* About a year ago the death of Herr von Gebler was announced. He died a very able and highly promising man of not quite twenty-five years of age.

Galileo's life occurred at a period when the liberal progressive movement which had taken possession of the noblest spirits in Italy in the first part of the sixteenth century, had already given way to a decided reaction. The 18th February, 1564, gave him birth, the same day which deprived Florence of her greatest artist, Michael Angelo. The Inquisition and the Jesuits had eradicated everything which resembled ecclesiastic reform, and the Council of Trent had crowned the work, carefully guarding the Roman Catholic world against all temptations of heresy, inaugurating, however, many improvements compared with the former centuries, although they did not involve actual reforms. The Papacy and its hierarchy began to settle down comfortably again, and while the worst abuses were abolished, those antagonists were never lost sight of who menaced the power of the Pope.

The struggle for the subjugation of the apostate churches was carried on at the frontiers both with force and intrigue, and in the interior the fagots of Giordano Bruno and Banini demonstrated what awaited any one who might be bold enough to bring his own opinion into opposition with the dogmas of the Church, his own will into variance with the dictations of the hierarchy. Many fell victims to the inquisition; still greater and more injurious to the intellectual life of the nations was the number of those who fell victims to the educational system of the Jesuits. This order endeavored, with increasing success in all Roman Catholic countries, to mould thought and energy into a shape suitable to the hierarchy of Rome. Especially the leading members of society were influenced in order to press the very reform

element into the service of the anti-reformation, to compel both the people and the governments to yield to servitude. Hence they arrived soon enough at the point where no theology nor even philosophy could be taught if it deviated from the mediæval authorities, or failed of the sacerdotal approbation; at the point where all scientific and historic investigation were zealously scrutinised. Nevertheless, the Church could not afford to neglect true science, or at least a pretended science, because, on the one hand, its indispensableness was too evident; and on the other hand, because the dignitaries of the Church took too much interest themselves in scientific researches. Therefore, while the Church did not approve of free investigations, a fully decided opposition, according to the adopted principles of the Church, was impossible. On the part of the men of science, however, no one felt at liberty to act independently of the Church.

This state of affairs must be taken into consideration if we endeavor to understand the relations between Galileo and the Church in his time. Although his scientific conception of the universe was in open opposition to the dogmas of the Church, strength was developed reluctantly on both sides. He was already a man of reputation when he received the professorship at Pisa, where he established the laws of gravity, by which invaluable service was rendered to science. When professor at Padua, in 1597, he was perfectly convinced of the theory of Copernicus, as he confesses in a letter to the German astronomer Kepler; but this theory was at that time rejected and ridiculed not only by theologians, but also by men of science, who believed in the authority of Aristotle and Ptolemy not less fully than theologians in the Bible. Galileo had not enough bravery to stand the ridicule of the masses. It does not appear that danger could have been apprehended at that period from the ecclesiastic authorities, considering that the work of Copernicus was favorably received by Pope Paul III., and had now been for fifty years in circulation. Galileo, however, seems to have been of timid character, and, therefore, over-sensitive to the prejudices of the time.

All his precautions, however, could not save him from the final conflict. In the year 1605, he observed the sudden

appearance and disappearance of a fixed star, and roused the dissatisfaction of the followers of Aristotle by disputing the absolute invariability of the skies, and the absolute contrast between the celestial and the terrestrial world, which was just as much an axiom to the Aristotelian philosophy as to the dogma of the Church. When the optician, Jan Lippershey, of Middelburg, invented the telescope, he heard of it, constructed one and materially improved it, and made a series of observations of high importance. He analysed the galaxy, the surface of the moon, observed a multitude of new stars, and discovered the satellites of Jupiter in 1610. In the same year he observed the ring of Saturn, which appeared, with the imperfect telescope, in the shape of two appended stars. Furthermore, there occurs this year, so rich in new discoveries, the observation of the variable shape of Venus, and of the spots on the surface of the sun, from which discovery our astronomer was led to deduce the rotation of this celestial body.

It is not surprising that these new discoveries, so rapidly following each other, roused the envy and the passionate opposition of those whose reputation was at stake, when doubts arose against what had been so long considered an indisputable fact. And this was exactly the moment when Galileo left the service of the Republic of Venice, which probably would not have refused to guard him against the persecution of the Church. He followed a call of his former pupil, the Grand Duke Cosmos II., of Tuscany. In the fall of 1610 he left Padua and accepted the situation of first professor of mathematics at Pisa, and of first philosopher to the grand duke at Florence. But this splendid position proved to be a dangerous one for him, because the Jesuits had much influence in Florence, even during the life of Cosmos, and this influence increased after his death. The enemies of the great astronomer did not, however, succeed at once in setting the ecclesiastic courts against him, and only at a distance the clouds darkened more and more.

When Galileo went to Rome, at the expense of his prince, hoping to remove the prejudices against himself at the religious centre, he was received with the greatest respect and with dis-

tinguished honors. The learned colleges, who were consulted by the celebrated Cardinal Bellarmine as to his astronomical discoveries, unanimously pronounced in his favor. But at the same time the Holy Office watched him carefully, and the Peripatetic school of philosophy did not refrain from asserting the irreconcilability of his doctrine with the Bible and the teachings of the Church. But yet in 1613, when Galileo, in a pamphlet against the Jesuit Scheiner concerning the sun-spots, openly declared himself in favor of the system of Copernicus, cardinals and high papal dignitaries not only took no offence, but some of them expressly testified their harmony with his doctrine.

The first impulse to an inquest by the authorities was given by Galileo himself in a letter to his pupil and friend, Father Castelli, of which the fanatic dowager Grand Duchess had heard. In order to defend Galileo, Castelli published another letter of Galileo, explaining his views; but his enemies found poison in it, and the Dominican Caccini preached a furious sermon against Galileo, and another Dominican, Lorini, sent Galileo's letter, accompanied by a formal letter of denunciation, to the Holy Office. This time the danger was once more averted; the sermon of Caccini was totally silenced, and Lorini intermixed so many evident falsehoods in his denunciations, that the inquisitors dropped the inquest, and Galileo's friends in high position did not receive any knowledge of it. Our philosopher, however, did not think he could keep silent, and published a pamphlet, demonstrating that he had not the slightest intention of attacking the authority of the Church, but that it would be in the interest of the Church itself not to *veto* undeniable facts and logical conclusions following from them. He declared his readiness to accept the decision of his superiors in affairs of religion, in regard to the system of Copernicus, but it was evident that he adhered nevertheless to this system. He also aggravated his position by construing certain words in the Bible in a way different from the current construction of the Church, saying the Pope had the undoubted power to approve or condemn the laws of nature, but no man could cause them to be true or untrue.

Galileo did not conceal from himself the fact, that his enemies

had not acquiesced in his answer; and in order to counteract their intrigues, he proceeded to Rome again of his own accord—not summoned, as has been stated. He succeeded only partially. The authority of the Church was at stake, the scientific truth was not taken into consideration at all. The suspicions of the ecclesiastical authorities were increased by every new step he took in advancing and establishing the scientific truth, and on February 24th, 1616, the Papal theologians published the following deliverance: “The doctrine of the sun being the centre and immovable is not only a foolish and absurd one, it is also formal heresy, and stands in direct opposition to many sentences in the Holy Scriptures. The doctrine of the earth being not the centre of the universe, and moving round the sun as well, as revolving round its axis, is, in a scientific sense, just as absurd, and is at least an error of faith.”

In consequence thereof, Cardinal Bellarmine was ordered to admonish Galileo that he should give up his convictions. In case he should refuse to do so, he must be notified that he was ordered on pain of imprisonment not to teach nor to defend his doctrine, nor to make it the subject of public discussion. At the same time the work of Copernicus, which had so long a free circulation, was prohibited.

Thus the Holy See had taken position in the great astronomical contest of the century: the motion of the earth round the sun was declared a formal heresy, and a Roman Catholic Christian could neither believe nor defend it. Perhaps some of the adherents of the new doctrine might have yet been able by artifice and subterfuge to circumvent the letter of this demand, but this could only last as long as the Church would ignore such a course. Galileo himself remained in Rome unmolested for several months, but his scientific life was poisoned, and any attempt to throw off those shackles would have brought him serious difficulties.

When we see how submissively he acknowledges the higher judgment of his clerical superiors in a pamphlet on *Ebb and Flood*, published by him immediately after his return from Rome, stating they had demonstrated to him how erroneous the doctrine of Copernicus was; when we see how he treated his convictions like

a dream from which he was awakened by the voice of the heavens, we are not so much surprised by his abjuration afterwards; but we hardly know whether we are more disgusted by this unworthy renunciation from the mouth of so eminent a philosopher, or by the iron despotism by which he was forced to abjure.

In 1624 he arrived again in Rome, was again received with the highest distinction, even by the new Pope Urban VIII., who in a letter to the Grand Duke of Tuscany could not praise his piety high enough. If Galileo hoped, however, to see the decrees of the year 1616 revoked, he was greatly mistaken. He evidently supposed, since he was not permitted to maintain the system of Copernicus as a truth, no one would interfere if he would offer it to the world in the shape of a hypothesis, as long as he would leave the last decision to the authorities of the Church; and since, from all he could learn, the sentiment in high places continued to be favorable to him, he ventured at last to break the imposed silence by publishing his celebrated "Dialogues on the two most important Astronomical Systems." In this work he treated explicitly both systems, and brought all the achievements of his long and careful investigations to bear upon the question, thus producing a work of overwhelming power.

Galileo had done everything in his power to attain his object without violating the inhibition of the Church, and covering his retreat before the clerical authorities. He had written his book in the form of a dialogue, in which both parties developed and maintained their respective ideas, without giving a final decision. He asserted in the most particular and positive way that nothing could have caused his drawing up of the dialogue but the intention to refute the reproach that the Holy See had given its former decision without understanding the question properly. He readily admitted that his opinion might only be a vain idle supposition. He declared, with a resignation which could not possibly be honest, that the final decision was not to be expected from mathematics, nor from natural philosophy, but only from one eminently high intellect, meaning of course the Pope. He submitted without remonstrance to all and every change and addition the clerical censors proposed. But the whole arrangement and the whole

tenor of the book could only make the impression that it was a most effective plea for the system of Copernicus, and this effect was so much more dangerous, since the book was written in a style so bright and clear that every intelligent man must have been convinced by it of the correctness of the new system. Can we be surprised that the enemies of our astronomer eagerly seized the opportunity to accuse him of flagrant violation of the prohibition of 1616?

All kinds of difficulties and obstacles had been thrown in his way when he sought permission to have the Dialogue printed; and after having submitted patiently to every condition, he was yet reproached with having violated these conditions. The effect of the publication was overpowering, but not less intense was the consternation and irritation on the other side; and the Jesuits, who induced the prosecution, went to work with the greatest energy, and showed their hand clearly in the manner in which the prosecution was carried on. Not satisfied with the accusation against the intrinsic contents of the Dialogues, the vain, and against all personal insults irreconcilable, Pope was made to believe, that by one of the characters in the Dialogues, Simplicius, to whom the disadvantageous task was given to defend the old system unsuccessfully—that by this character the Pope himself was meant. But still worse was it, that in order to support the new accusation against Galileo, the records of the proceedings of 1616 were falsified; to wit, there is a paper among the records stating that after Cardinal Bellarmine had admonished Galileo, as mentioned above, the Commissioner-General of the Inquisition had ordered him in the name of the Pope not to defend nor to teach the new doctrine in any way, verbally or in writing, and that Galileo had promised to obey this order.

In the new proceedings of 1633 upon this paper new accusations were founded, stating that Galileo had violated a formal promise given to the authorities, and had concealed the former prohibition in order fraudulently to obtain from them permission for publication.

This suspicious paper is defective even in its external appearance, bears no signature, nor any other sign of official character,

and was never produced to the defendant. Furthermore, it is in positive conflict with the other evidently genuine records of the Holy Office and with the declaration of Bellarmin, who expressly stated that Galileo was prohibited to teach the new theory but not to discourse upon it as an astronomical hypothesis. It is further impossible that the paper should never have been mentioned by so many persons who were connected with the proceedings. These and other reasons too numerous to mention here, first induced Dr. Emil Wohlwill, as far back as 1870, to pronounce the document to be falsified, and Herr von Gebler subsequently confirmed this opinion.

Six months after the publication of the Dialogues, the Pope appointed a commission to investigate the work; and the above mentioned paper, only now discovered, formed the principal document for the indictment. Galileo was summoned before the Holy Office in Rome by the Inquisitor at Florence, notwithstanding the eager intercession of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and his ambassador. Sick and broken down, Galileo, now sixty-nine years old, endeavored in vain to have the trial postponed, or to have it take place at Florence. The efforts of his sovereign made as little impression as his own supplications, and to avoid force he set out for Rome on the 20th of January, 1633.

In Rome he was treated with clemency unknown to a prisoner of the Inquisition. He was only twice, altogether for seventeen days, imprisoned in the Palace of the Holy Office in rather comfortable quarters. The rest of his time he spent in the house of the Florentine ambassador, and the common belief that torture was applied to him is to be reduced to the fact that he was ordered to tell the truth under pain of torture. The final result, however, of his trial was hereby not influenced.

Galileo intended at first to defend his opinion with scientific reasoning; but the Florentine ambassador, who during the whole period showed him the most untiring and friendly attentions, advised him most decidedly to drop this idea, and he was so perfectly exhausted that he gave up every thought of resistance, and based his whole defence only on the endeavor to impress his judges favorably by his humility, and to persuade them that

he never intended to publish the new theory otherwise than as a mere hypothesis. He went even so far as to profess, that, though he had formerly considered the system of Copernicus as admissible as that of Ptolemy, without deciding for one or the other, now that since the wisdom of the clerical authorities had decidedly pronounced which was true, he was perfectly sure and certain and had no more doubts. Also in his Dialogues, he confessed further that he had only striven to demonstrate the incorrectness of the new system; but that now, however, he had found out how imperfectly he had succeeded in doing so, and proposed, in a continuation of the Dialogues, to pursue this end, and to demonstrate in the most impressive terms how fallible the new theory was.

These untruths were too palpable to do him any good. On the 22d of June, 1633, the sentence was published to him in the church *Santa Maria sopra Minerva*, in the same church which was adorned with the celebrated Christ of his countryman, Michael Angelo, in presence of a great many dignitaries. The sentence read as follows: Galileo had made himself worthy of being suspected of heresy by his defence of the theory of Copernicus, but the other fines would be remitted, provided he would sincerely forswear and abjure his other errors. Not only was his book prohibited; he was also condemned to be imprisoned at the discretion of the Holy Office, and had once a week for three years to recite the seven penitential psalms.

The sentence was immediately followed by the execution. Directly after the publication Galileo had not only to confess on his knees that he had broken an interdiction which had never been made known to him, but had also to abjure and to condemn the erroneous doctrine of the motion of the earth, and to promise he would denounce every one to the Inquisition who might be tainted with the same error and heresy.

After this moral suicide the imprisonment was moderated. He was first confined in the Villa of the Grand Duke of Tuscany at *Trinita dei Monti* near Rome; then in the Palace of his friend the Archbishop Piccolomini at Siena; and after the latter part of 1633, in the Villa of Arcetri near Florence. Here this untiring

spirit of undestroyable elasticity enriched science with his last great works, but nevertheless he was a prisoner of the Inquisition, and his petition to get permission for his removal to Florence, in order to have medical advice nearer at hand, was refused to the sick old man in the harshest manner. All intercessions for his final pardon were in vain, and not before February, 1638, when he was perfectly blind and in miserable health—he suffered with double hernia—was he permitted to move to his house in Florence, but with the warning that he was to be imprisoned for life and excommunicated should he take a walk in the city or speak to anybody about the double movement of the earth. Towards the end of the year he returned to Arcetri, and lived there three years more. He died January the 8th, 1642, the same year in which Newton was born.

But even when dead he was not liberated from the clutches that had taken hold of him when alive. Only privately could he be buried; no monument marked his grave; not before 1737 could his last wish, to rest in the church of Santa Croce in Florence, be fulfilled; not until then could a monument be erected in his honor near that of Michael Angelo and Machiavelli.

When the remains of Galileo thus were at rest, the victory of the system for which he had struggled and suffered was established beyond doubt. The ecclesiastical authority itself, which had condemned it in the person of the Florentine man of science one hundred years before, abandoned all resistance after having acknowledged its absolute uselessness, although the conclusion to revoke the decree of the 24th of February or the 5th of March, 1616, was not arrived at before 1757, and the works of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, were not taken off the Index of Prohibited Books before 1835.

It must have been sickening for the Pope and the whole Church to change opinions in a matter to which they had attributed so much importance. The effort has been made to make only the theologians of the Holy See responsible for the maintenance of a system which had to be abandoned afterwards. But this had been done under the auspices and authority of two sovereign Popes, Paul V. and Urban VIII. It is plain, further, the

Church upheld its opinion until it found it could do so no longer. Galileo, however, was of the opinion that the system of Copernicus could easily be brought into accordance with the Scriptures, and believed he could be a good Christian if he only could find a compromise. But a compromise was impossible, not only because the dignitaries of the Church had declared against it, but also because the Church had at all times defended its right of construing the Scriptures as one of its most inalienable privileges. The endeavor of the man of science to explain everything in the universe from natural causes is just the contrary to that arbitrary caprice by which the religious imagination sometimes takes even the most incredible things to be actually existing, for the reason that for divine omnipotence nothing is impossible. To us it sounds incredibly weak when Pope Urban VIII., discussing the theory of Galileo on Ebb and Flood with Cardinal Barberini, exclaimed: "God is omnipotent; he can produce the same effect by many other means." It must have cost Galileo a good deal of self-denial to treat this childish whim in his Dialogues with the highest respect and greatest serenity as an admirable and "really celestial argument [these were his words] offered by an eminent and learned personage." Undoubtedly the part played by Galileo in this drama is disappointing. There is not a particle of what we expect from a martyr: nothing of the enthusiasm which forgets itself in the struggle; nothing of the scorn that challenges fate and does not shrink an inch before the power of the enemy. At the very beginning of the trial he abandons all thought of maintaining his convictions; he delivers himself into the hands of a power against which he utterly fails. His only weapon is humility, his only endeavor not to irritate the judges; in silent resignation he submits to everything, even to the most unworthy treatment. Even his celebrated words, *E pur si muove*, "and still it moves," he never uttered; the anecdote is invented, and not even well invented. History shows us the unfortunate philosopher after the disgraceful abjuration too much reduced and broken to leave him firmness enough for this pathetic protest, so ill applied after the renunciation.

But before we condemn the unfortunate old man, let us see what induced him to this action.

The disposition for scientific investigation was undoubtedly stronger in him than moral courage; his bright intellect was not accompanied by an equally strong character. He can in this respect be compared with his equally celebrated English contemporary, Lord Bacon of Verulam. In the same manner that he was ruined by his relation to a despotic and corrupt government, Galileo was ruined by his relation to the Roman Catholic Church. And likewise, as Bacon was not so much corrupted through external powers, but because he could never arrive at the full development of his spiritual liberty, Galileo did not fall because he was not a good, but because he was too good, a Roman Catholic; or to speak more plainly, because the relations of a man of science to the Roman Church did not become *clarified* in him. If he could have clearly seen from the beginning that his scientific convictions would force him into conflict with his Church, he would have seen three roads clearly before him—three roads, of which either would at least have been a straight one: 1. He could have contented himself with the announcement of discoveries without carrying out the consequences for the system of Copernicus; 2. He could have turned his back upon a Church which had no room for his scientific convictions— but then he must also leave his country forever; 3. He could have taken up the gauntlet— but herewith he had to expect the worst, if he did not remain in Padua, where he might have been protected by the Republic of Venice. He was constantly under the delusion that the authorities of the Church might be won to the truth at last, and in this delusion he made constantly new efforts to gain vindication for his opinions, while he feared the conflict with the Church so much, and endeavored assiduously to avoid it by subterfuges and unworthy tricks. When all this no longer sufficed, and there was placed before him the alternative of unconditional surrender or martyrdom, he succumbed. But he fell for one reason only: because the Church, now victorious, had not permitted his character to develop independently, had broken the elasticity of his spirit from childhood.

THEO. SCHUMANN.

ARTICLE VII.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1880.

We have no hesitation in saying that the Assembly of 1880 has deserved well of the Church. In the excellent qualities of patience, good temper, and conservatism, it was surpassed by none of its predecessors whose sessions we have had opportunity to witness. The choleric brother seems to have staid at home, where his virtues doubtless shine more to edification than in our Church parliaments. There was no choking down debate, no application of "gag-law," and every one who had the right to speak was heard, in some instances at a considerable cost of time and comfort. Much of the good work done by the Assembly was due largely to the efficiency of the Standing Committees. The Moderator was for the most part fortunate in his lists, and the Assembly very wise in giving ample time for them to prepare their reports thoroughly. For several days the house receded from its regular business at 2 p. m., that the committees might have the afternoons and evenings for work. The seeming inaction of the earlier sessions began after a while to excite the fears of some. Allusions were occasionally made, half playful, half earnest, to the charms of Charlestonian hospitality and the soothing effects of our excellent dinners. But to the experienced, this delay augured well for the harmony of the body and the ultimate dispatch of business. The Moderator filled his place ably and gracefully; and if embarrassed by any consciousness of the want of complete familiarity with the Assembly's methods of procedure, as he modestly intimated upon taking his seat, his uniform courtesy and tact answered very well instead of experience.

WORK OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES.

Each of these committees reports some improvement on the last year's showing. The country is slowly rising from the prostration which culminated in the "panic" of 1873, and Church finances feel the bouyant movement of the returning tide. Whether much more than this can be claimed, may perhaps be

doubted. We are inclined to the opinion that our present system has about attained its development, and will henceforth only grow as the Church expands. This surmise seems to be sustained by a reference to older Churches having substantially the same modes of work.

The Executive Committee of Education at Memphis reports a gain over last year's income of \$954.69. And when due allowance is made for the marked reduction in the running expenses, by scaling down the Secretary's salary from \$1,500 to \$600, it is gratifying to observe that a similar success for the current year will yield nearly \$2,000 additional net dividends for our candidates, who sorely need it. The Secretary was enabled to state on the floor that funds are now in hand to liquidate the last remnant of the burdensome debt bequeathed to the present Committee by its predecessor at Richmond. Ninety-five names of candidates from forty Presbyteries were placed on the Committee's list; but of these eighty-seven only received aid, and one of them proving unworthy was stricken off.

This item naturally suggests one of the chief obstacles to our satisfactory solution of the problem of Beneficiary Education—the sinful carelessness of Presbyteries in taking up youths as candidates into whose antecedents no proper scrutiny is made. For this there is no remedy outside of the Presbytery. The Executive Committee has no discretion, but must in all cases receive candidates when officially recommended. Our Book seems to require this control to be vested absolutely in the Presbytery. And this is pleaded very forcibly as an argument for requiring Presbyteries to raise, except in extraordinary cases, the funds for their own candidates. The argument is that in general men will be more careful in drawing on their domestic treasury than upon one a thousand miles off. Human nature seems to move along some such line as this. An illustration in point was repeated to us within the past few days by an original witness: Young Mr. — appeared before the Presbytery of — to be received as a candidate and placed on the beneficiary fund. He was wearing the well known dress of a certain school, the principal of which, a Presbyterian, was present, though not a

member of the court. It was taken for granted that all was just as it should be. The usual questions were propounded as to his motives, etc., and the young man was received, sixty dollars being voted to him. The facts were that the youth was no longer a pupil in — school; he was notoriously lazy, extravagant, and addicted to lying! Of the money he received, five dollars was promptly paid over in advance to the barber who was to shave the prospective whiskers and apply pomade to the ambrosial locks of our candidate. And after he had, like a certain gay youth of Scripture, "spent all," he dropped out of ranks, and is probably doing service now as the "Beau Brummel" of his rustic neighborhood!

The proposal made by four Presbyteries to have this Committee placed in Nashville created some discussion which verged closely upon personal feeling. The decisive rejection of the proposal was based, we think, upon two solid reasons: (1) The zeal, fidelity, and economy of the present Committee, the objection that Memphis is liable to epidemics not having been shown to work any real injury to Education; (2) the belief which created a good deal of comment outside of the house that too much of the advocacy employed was moved by personal considerations.

The Report on Foreign Missions exhibits two favorable features: (1) an increase over last year of \$2,251.23; and (2) better still, a larger number of hopeful conversions than ever before presented. Of the \$48,485.98 of receipts, the large proportion of \$10,031.36 was given by "Ladies' Associations." We may be in error—we shall certainly seem ungracious in the exception—but candor requires us to say that we do not approve of this plan of raising funds. We know the guards which our beloved and venerable Secretary has sought to interpose. But to our poor mind the logical outcome of it all is just the "Women's Boards," and the "L. C. T. U.," etc., which figure so largely in higher latitudes. Better wait on the clearly revealed methods, we think. Better abide by "the pattern showed in the mount" than set schemes in motion whose remote consequences we cannot control. Let the Lord's work be done in the Lord's well-known way. We are responsible only so far as this. Of the disturbances and un-

happy divisions in the Campinas Mission little is known outside of the Committee. This is right. Judicial inquiry instituted in Presbytery is the only way to take up such matters; we cannot say whether or not this is necessary. From all that we can learn, Mr. Morton's withdrawal, whether right or wrong, and his establishing a school only thirty miles distant from Campinas Institute, has inflicted great injury on the Mission. The Committee at Baltimore are wise and good men. We can only unite with them in the prayer that God will overrule it all for good.

The fourteenth annual Report on Home Missions presents, in a clear and lucid shape, many items that deserve careful consideration by our presbyters. Progress is announced in each of the several departments of the work. A total gain of \$6,274.58 is reported over last year. About eighty-five per cent. of our ministers who devote their whole time to the work are reported as receiving a maintenance termed "adequate," when measured by local standards. The "Invalid Fund" does not receive that response from the churches that one would naturally expect for a cause which so tenderly and peculiarly appeals to the Christian heart. Appropriations have been painfully inadequate, and yet a deficiency of nearly \$2,000 existed on March 31st.

The debate on the motion to remove Home Missions to St. Louis excited the interest of the body. As is well known to many, when the Committee on Foreign Missions was sent to Baltimore in 1875 by the St. Louis Assembly, that on Home Missions was expressly retained in Columbia, S. C. But near to the end of the sessions of that Assembly, it was declared to be necessary on account of certain financial complications in the Treasurer's office, that Home Missions should be sent also. Many members had gone home, the body was thoroughly weary with heat and work. But, chiefly through the personal influence of Dr. Robinson, (as we remember it,) a reconsideration was had, and Home Missions was sent to Baltimore by a mere majority in a very small vote. It was done avowedly as a temporary measure, and to satisfy the mind of the Treasurer. When this suddenly discovered emergency should be past, the Home Missions should be sent to St. Louis or some other point. We favored the

removal at Charleston because we deprecate the concentration of so much power and patronage in the north-eastern corner of our territory. Our brethren there are as worthy of our love and confidence as any in the world, but they are *only* men—men of like passions with us. The effects of centralisation are not confined to conscious efforts after power. We had other reasons, too, which need not now be named. The removal was resisted, (1) On the ground of letting “well enough alone”; (2) Removal involving increased expense; (3) Dr. McIlwaine’s assistance being necessary to the senior Secretary. The Assembly seemed very evenly divided. Our opinion is that the motion would have prevailed but for an impression made by casual remarks interposed by Dr. Wilson, that he was opposed to the removal. This was probably not intended, but we know that votes were decided by that belief.

Dr. Hazen’s Report on Publication gave us great pleasure. The great “floating” debt has been reduced to \$10,870, with assets available to bring it down to \$9,000. The excellent Secretary has the thanks of all the Church for his energy and skill in their service. The condition of our affairs was enough to appal a stout heart. He has taken us out of the vain effort to compete against the immense business capital invested by the publishing houses of the country. We can now avail ourselves of the world’s market in purchasing for our missionary operations. The recommendation of the Church will generally secure the publication of any book. We are getting some returns on our costly investments in the shape of “royalties.” Our Sunday-school Lessons, are, we believe, giving deserved satisfaction. One thing only we regretted to see pressed by the Committee—the repeal of the order of a former Assembly that the “Publishing House,” which ought never to have been bought, and still has a separate debt of more than \$30,000 hanging over it, we believe, be sold with all the despatch that the interests of the Church will allow. The Committee at Richmond and its Secretary know what a burden that indebtedness is to many in the Church. They will not receive all the contributions they need until this matter is settled. We hope the delay will not be protracted.

RETRENCHMENT AND REFORM.

The Committee of Nine appointed at the last Assembly to make a full report on this subject have shown commendable diligence, and we were glad that the result of their labors is ordered to be furnished in the Appendix of the Assembly's Minutes. The matter has exercised the thoughts of many for years. Opportunity is now offered to examine and compare opposing views, that all may be thoroughly informed who are willing to take the slight trouble.

The Committee presented majority and minority reports, the former signed, with one slight exception, by seven, and the latter by two members of the Committee, Dr. Lane naming several points in which he was not prepared to agree with Mr. Martin. The majority report advocates the present mode of conducting our work by five Executive Committees. They give as their reasons, (1) The concurrent Presbyterian practice in this country based upon a century of successful experience; (2) The demands of each branch of our work indicating a separate agency for each; (3) Our secretaries, not merely financial agents, but "watchmen on the walls" to care for and advocate this or that branch of work; (4) Salaries not extravagant, being about the same paid by Southern bodies and from \$500 to \$1,000 less than those allowed in the North. These are confessedly weighty considerations, and express the mind of a majority in the Church.

The minority report, drafted by Mr. Martin, may be expressed in six points, which we insert from a newspaper report:

"1. Appoint one treasurer, a deacon (not minister), a bonded officer, a thorough business man, to hold *all* the contributions of our churches.

"2. Abolish all paid secretaries, and commit the general control of each department to its Executive Committee.

"3. Diminish the machinery by remanding the educating of candidates to the Presbyteries, requiring each Presbytery to manage its own funds, and calling on them to send a percentage or surplus to a central committee.

"4. Manage Home Missions in a similar manner. In the Foreign Mission department, unite the *Missionary* and *Earnest Worker*. In Publication, engage editors instead of paying a secretary.

"5. Abolish the Tuscaloosa Institute, and let colored candidates be trained by their own pastors.

"6. Make the Assembly meetings triennial instead of annual."

This programme is too extensive and the proposed changes too radical for our conservative Presbyterian Church. But our brother has no doubt been moved by loyal devotion to the Church and to her Lord. On the floor of Assemblies he has proved himself an accomplished presbyter, in debate as keen as he is courteous. Personalities have not been permitted to mar his arguments. He asks nothing for himself but to labor as a self-denying missionary in the mountains of North Carolina.

We agree with Dr. Lane in wishing to retain the Tuscaloosa Institute. It has not as yet accomplished what the Church designed. But our circumstances are exceptional. Our relations to the negroes and the problem of their future destiny suggests special efforts on their behalf. Fifteen hundred dollars is not an extravagant sum to spend in training, even partially, thirteen colored men to labor in the great field that lies around our very doors. And if only five of them happen to be Presbyterians, we may indulge the hope that all are the Lord's. The whole question of our relations to this people calls for prayerful consideration, if not for humiliation. Obstacles are doubtless in our way—the greater facilities allowed by other creeds and forms of worship to ignorant, excitable, half-civilised people, as well as influences of a social and political nature. But we cannot afford to allow strangers, if not enemies, to gain the gratitude and confidence of our former bondmen. Strangers do not comprehend them. They do not really feel for them as we ought to feel and do feel for them. Let us be found ready and waiting to enter the door when it pleases the Lord to open it. The time may be at hand. The Presbyterianism of Paul is suited to all branches of our fallen race. Human devices may conform to passing phases and fancies. God's plan is for all men and for all time.

Upon some other matters connected with these reports on Retrenchment and Reform we venture a few suggestions:

1. *First*, as regards the century of Presbyterian *experience*. Are our brethren so sure after all that this demonstrates the gen-

eral success of our present plan? We confess that our observation, not very extensive it is true, does not accord with their views. Our information shows that debt and frequently serious contentions mark the history of this system. The delegate of the Reformed (Dutch) Church, to whose operations special attention is called by way of precedent in the majority report, told us at Charleston that his Church is now in debt to the amount of some \$110,000. This certainly is not very encouraging. Readers of their organ (the *Christian Intelligencer*) have long ago discovered that they have not been sailing over untroubled seas.

2. *Secondly*, the majority suggest that our present system is fundamentally the same as the old system of Boards. This certainly is not a correct statement. Dr. Thornwell's great objection to the Boards in his speech at Rochester was that they were coördinate bodies unlawfully appointed by the Church to do the work God had appointed her to do. The Board was an *organism* and not an *organ*. It was a complete body to which the General Assembly had intrusted a department of the work committed to itself. It was a complete whole; all the parts of a separate, self-acting organisation belonged to it. It had head, body, limbs, hands, tongue. It had a President for its head with a body of perhaps one hundred members scattered over the land, who could never come together to attend to their duty. It had an Executive Committee for its hands. And at Rochester they were proposing, by appointing a "travelling" Secretary, to give it feet to travel over all the Church. Now wherein (said Dr. Thornwell) does this body, so organised and equipped, differ from a church court. It was no mere *organ*. It was as completely a moral person, with rights and powers to all intents and purposes, thorough and definite, as any court in the Presbyterian Church. It stood up alongside of the General Assembly itself, as fully organised, as completely officered, and even more perpetual in its existence, so far as regarded its component members. Who gave you the power (said Dr. Thornwell) to make such coördinate courts? Who authorised you to appoint *vicars* of the Assembly to act *in the Assembly's place*? The opposite to all this for which Dr. Thornwell contended, was the direct action of the Church

and its General Assembly. He wanted the Assembly to act immediately through its own Executive Committees. The Board he held was a missionary society beyond the Church, outside of the Church, a distinct organism, and the Executive Committee under that plan was not the hand of the Assembly, but the hand of this outside society, and reported to it. He wanted an Executive Committee which should be the hand of the Assembly and directly responsible to the Assembly.

Now the Assembly at Rochester, the last where Northern and Southern commissioners met, rejected Dr. Thornwell's views by an overwhelming vote. But in this debate, as in so many others, the real victors were the overwhelmed minority. For after the separation of the South, when the union of elements which now constitute the Northern body took place, the organic changes urged by Dr. Thornwell were substantially adopted in the constitution of their new Boards. They still use the name *Boards*; but if we are not altogether mistaken, their Boards are the same as our Executive Committees, consisting of twelve or fifteen members, attending themselves directly to the business committed to them and reporting directly to the Assembly and not to any intermediate body. They constitute the *hand* for which he argued at Rochester instead of the separate coördinate body. And so he carried his point.

And yet it may be said that the Executive Committee instead of the cumbersome and unpresbyterian Board, which would have satisfied Dr. Thornwell at Rochester, was not his ideal of Church action. He was no extremist—no Utopian dreamer, but eminently practical and moderate in his views and characteristically submissive to his brethren. He found the Church in 1860 still, in general, wedded to Congregational methods in reference to Missions and other like undertakings. He regarded what the Nashville Assembly did in reference to Church Extension (where he got a Committee appointed instead of a Board) as “one step towards the simpler and directer organisation” which he advocated; and so at Rochester he would have been thankful to have secured the great organic changes in the Boards for which he spoke. In like manner it may be said that the Executive Com-

mittees which he assisted in organising at our first General Assembly in Augusta in 1861 were not *his ideal* of Church action. Let the reader examine those great discussions on *Church operations* in the fourth volume of his Collected Writings and see how Thornwell's mind turned to the *Diaconate* as the financial office appointed in the Word. Let the reader look especially at pages 155 and 199-202, where he maintains the position that our Book does not limit the Diaconate to a single congregation, and that the Scriptures authorise a bench of deacons acting for each of our courts as its financial agent.

It is our conviction, in common with many other brethren, that some of Thornwell's objections to the old Boards hold in some measure against the Executive Committees as constituted in our Church. One of the chiefest of his objections, urged both by him and by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, was the tendency of the system to "cast all power into a few central hands," and that the Boards are "so located and filled that in truth the Presbyterian Church is managed through these contrivances by about two or three dozen persons in all its great practical operations. There are in effect residing in Philadelphia about one dozen persons, ministers and laymen, who are the *real* Board of Missions, Board of Publication, and Board of Education, and who have the official power to be largely all the rest if they please." So far Dr. Breckinridge. And Dr. Thornwell said: "The fact is unquestionable that the various officers of our Boards are invested with a control over their brethren and a power in the Church just as real and just as dangerous as the authority of a prelate." Now these things cannot all be said in all their extent of *our* committees, and yet it can be said that these committees are in danger of becoming the predominating, ruling power in the Church. Take the one point of the location of these committees. There is widespread and growing dissatisfaction with it in some respects. Who does not see that the objections urged at St. Louis to the mere temporary arrangement by which our two most important committees were placed in one Presbytery in our extreme northeast, which committees handle and dispense not less than \$80,000 of our Church's annual collections, which is far the larger portion

of them all, and which committees wield so great a share of her influence and power, yes, and which committees nominally two are really just one—who does not see, we ask, that every year the opposition to this condition of things increases, as this temporary arrangement is threatening, as the years roll on successively, to become our permanent policy? Again Dr. Thornwell's objection that the old Boards tended necessarily to devitalise our Presbyteries by performing for them their appropriate functions, applies to at least one of our Executive Committees—that of Education. To raise funds for the support of candidates whom *they know*, to inspect the conduct of those young candidates, and to let their personal worth operate to secure amongst each Presbytery's churches the raising of the funds necessary for their support, to control and direct the individual ministry even in this incipient and formative stage—this is one great end for which, according to the doctrine of Thornwell, our Presbyteries exist. To transfer this duty and this power to a committee of the General Assembly both centralises power and devitalises the Presbyteries where the power ought to lodge. Because power disused is slowly but surely transformed into impotency. And then again Dr. Thornwell urged that the old Boards subverted Presbyterianism by the transfer to them of powers, whether temporal or spiritual, which, according to our system, belong to our church courts and church officers. We have just referred to the transfer to an Assembly's Executive Committee of power properly belonging to the Presbyteries. But the pecuniary affairs of our Church are taken out of the hands of deacons to whom they belong, and our ordained ministers and elders, to whom they do not belong, are made to take charge of them. Dr. Thornwell spoke what certainly does apply to our Assembly and its Executive Committees in some respects when he said: "By intrusting all pecuniary matters into the hands of men ordained under solemn sanctions for the purpose, our spiritual courts would soon cease to be what they are to an alarming extent at present—mere corporations for secular business. If all our Boards were converted into mere benches of deacons, commissioned only to disburse funds under the direction of the spiritual courts, there would be no serious ground

of objection to them; but in their present form they are lords and masters of the whole Church. They are virtually the head of the Church; their will is law, their authority irresistible, and they combine what God has separated—the *purse* and the *keys*."

But we cannot close this long *excursus* into which, by their substantial identification of our present system with that of the old Boards, the Majority Report on Retrenchment has led us, without repeating that any such statement is and must be incorrect. Our committees may not be, are not in all their operations and influence, just what we want. But they are not the old vicious system of coördinate bodies standing up alongside of a General Assembly with somewhat equal powers and more permanent life. Dr. Thornwell himself fully admits—as how could he deny?—the legitimacy of an Executive Committee of the Assembly to do the Assembly's proper work. No, our Committees are not the old Boards—they have no ecclesiastical power conferred on them by our Constitution. If they employ any, it is an unconstitutional assumption. Our Sustentation Committee is simply a central agency to divide out funds according to rules given. It can undertake no work within the bounds of any Presbytery. It can undertake to make no appropriations concerning any Presbytery's territory except upon the application of that Presbytery. And it can commission no minister to go and preach within the bounds of any Presbytery. In all these and other similar particulars, our Committees are shorn of the powers given to the old Boards. And yet we must also repeat that our Committees themselves, simple as they are compared with the old Boards and directly as they act for the Assembly, do yet wield an enormous influence and are in danger of becoming predominant in our Church. We shall never forget how strongly this was impressed on the mind of one of the wisest men in our whole communion, a ruling elder who sat for the first time in the General Assembly at St. Louis, a well-instructed, thorough, sound Presbyterian, and a man of wide and large reading and observation. He returned to his Presbytery absolutely shocked and alarmed at the extent to which the power in our Church is centralised and the manner

in which from a few of the Assembly's own institutes comes the influence that rules the Assembly.

DEMISSION OF THE ELDERSHIP AND DIACONATE.

The discussion on this topic was quite animated and instructive. The matter was introduced by an overture from the Presbytery of Florida asking: "Can the office of ruling elder and deacon, as well as that of minister, be demitted?" The three citations from our Book given by the Committee on Bills and Overtures as bearing on this point are the following, which for convenience and brevity we give entire:

Rules of Discipline. Chap. 12, Sec. 3, page 77. *Of cases without process.*—"A minister of the gospel, against whom there are no charges, if fully satisfied in his own conscience that God has not called him to the ministry, or if he has satisfactory evidence of his inability to serve the Church with acceptance, may report these facts at a stated meeting. At the next stated meeting, if after full deliberation the Presbytery shall concur with him in judgment, it may divest him of his office without censure, and shall assign him membership in some particular church."

Form of Government, Chap. 6, Sec. 4, Par. 3, on pages 35 and 36: "The offices of ruling elder and deacon are perpetual; nor can they be laid aside at pleasure; nor can any person be degraded from either office but by deposition after regular trial. Yet a ruling elder or deacon may, though chargeable with neither heresy nor immorality, become unacceptable in his official character to a majority of the church which he serves. In such a case, it is competent for the session, upon application either from the officer or from the church, to dissolve the relation. But no such application from either party shall be granted without affording to the other party full opportunity for stating objections."

Rules of Discipline, Chap. 8, Sec. 10, page 65. *Process against a minister.*—"Whenever a minister of the gospel shall habitually fail to be engaged in the regular discharge of his official functions, it shall be the duty of the Presbytery, at a stated meeting, to inquire into the cause of such dereliction, and, if necessary, to institute judicial proceedings against him for breach of his covenant engagement. If it shall appear that his neglect proceeds only from his want of acceptance to the church, Presbytery may, upon the same principle upon which it withdraws license from a probationer for want of evidence of the divine call, divest him of his office without censure, even against his will, a majority of two-thirds being necessary for this purpose. In such a case, the clerk shall, under the order of the Presbytery, forthwith deliver to the individual concerned a written notice that at the next stated meeting the question of his being so dealt

with is to be considered. This notice shall distinctly state the grounds for this proceeding. The party thus notified shall be heard in his own defence; and if the decision pass against him, he may appeal, as if he had been tried by the usual forms. This principle may apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to ruling elders and deacons."

It will be seen at a glance that *one case* of divesting a minister of office is expressly applied to the elder and deacon. Now, the question was, Have we authority to go beyond this one specified case, using analogy as our guide in applying the rules of "cases without process" to elders and deacons? The temptation to do so is confessedly tantalising. The omission in the revision is palpable. The minority were for using analogy, and making the application. But the majority held, and we think wisely, with the Committee, that the only sure rule is "good and necessary inference" when we undertake to construe law. "If," as Dr. Girardeau argued, "there is an omission, we must amend the law; not attempt to cure it by interpretation." The argument from analogy is not to be pressed so far." The "strict construction" of the Committee prevailed, therefore, as expressed in the following recommendations:

"The Committee report: First. The word 'demit' does not occur in our standards, and its use produces confusion. A minister of the gospel cannot demit his office; he can be divested of his office only by act of Presbytery. Second. The rules for divesting a minister of his office without censure do not in all cases apply to the ruling elders and deacons. For instance, the provisions of the Rules of Discipline, Chapter 12, Section 3, has application only to a minister of the gospel, and the provisions of the Form of Government, Chapter 6, Sections 3, 4, 6, and Rules of Discipline, Chapter 8, Sections 6 and 10, while applying to the elders and deacons, are expressly restricted to the case where the officer is unacceptable to the church."

The way now clearly lies open to an amendment of this defect in our existing law.

UNITARIANISM—DIVISION AMONG PRESBYTERIANS IN CHARLESTON.

Two matters involving local issues of a perplexing and annoying kind incidentally came before the Charleston Assembly. One of these came up in the report of the Committee on Devotional

Exercises, making an appointment in the Unitarian church for one of the Assembly's members on Sabbath. Before the paper was acted upon, Dr. Woodrow called attention to the appointment, saying: "If the action proposed is to '*approve*' that report, I shall be compelled to give my reasons for voting against it. But if we are only to receive it as information, I shall not feel inclined to go any further." Mr. Penick, of Orange, was not satisfied to let this course be taken. He would strike out the recommendation of the Committee. He cited the example of Dr. Thornwell, who, under embarrassing circumstances, declined to worship with Unitarians, on the ground that he and they did not worship the same God. There was force in Mr. Penick's position. The Committee was the Assembly's servant, and recommended its appointments as a part of the regular business. But the Assembly was evidently embarrassed by social considerations, and perhaps Dr. Woodrow's plan reached the end aimed at. The brother filled the appointment, but none was made, we believe, for the succeeding Sabbath.

The other local question was brought up in a letter from Rev. Dr. Dana, of the Central Presbyterian church, Charleston, rehearsing the circumstances which led to the withdrawal of himself and others from the Presbytery of Charleston and to the formation of an independent body, known as the "Charleston Union Presbytery." The action complained of by Dr. Dana was, it seems, the exception taken by the Presbytery of Charleston about ten years ago to several of its members continuing indefinitely to supply the pulpits of churches not connected with the Presbytery. Dr. Dana did not say what further steps the Presbytery had taken, if any, to terminate these relations. As a matter of fact, we believe none were undertaken; we doubt whether any were devised. Dr. Dana and his friends seem to have withdrawn when the Synod sustained the Presbytery in its expression of discontent that such relations should be perpetual. The object of the memorial was to ascertain whether the Assembly held that a Presbytery has the right to dissolve "pastoral relations" between its ministers and congregations without the consent or against the consent of either or of both parties. To this, of

course, there was but one reply, and the Assembly in courteous terms made it. The right, they said, is given in the Constitution, but is to be exercised with great caution. From such judicial action the way would be open, of course, for appeal or complaint to the Synod and thence to the Assembly. But, obviously, the question arises, Are such relations to churches beyond our bounds the "*pastoral relations*" contemplated in our Book? In our opinion, they are not. They are not instituted by Presbytery at all, nor can it enter into such congregations as umpire or judge. The *man* only is under Presbyterial oversight. The question, then, is, Whether, in objecting to such relations *ad libitum*, a Presbytery would be violating those rights which are guaranteed to a minister in our Constitution? It not easy to see how the affirmative can be proved, and in case of failure by complainant, the discretionary power of the Court must be allowed. We learn through the press that Dr. Dana was pleased with the tone of the Assembly's answer, and sees in its reference to the Constitution ample reason for preferring an independent position.

ARE WOMEN TO PREACH?

This question came up in an overture from the Synod of Texas, and the Assembly on recommendation of the Committee of Bills and Overtures made this reply: "Inasmuch as the public preaching of the gospel is a branch of the ministerial office, to the authorisation of which ordination or licensure is essential; and inasmuch as inspired Scripture, as interpreted by our standards, nowhere in the case of women sanctions such a solemnity, but on the contrary does clearly prohibit it, this Assembly does therefore declare the assumption of this sacred office by women to be opposed to the advancement of true piety and to the promotion of the peace of the Church, and this to such an extent as to make the introduction of women into our pulpits for the purpose of publicly expounding God's word an irregularity not to be tolerated."

After a very lively discussion, which made it evident that the Assembly was of one mind as to the right of a woman to preach publicly and officially, and with a change of *seems* for *does* in the middle of the answer, the Committee's report was adopted.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.

The Report on the Tuscaloosa Institute has been sufficiently commented on. The Report from Union Seminary presents features of prosperity in the main. The failure of Virginia to provide for the payment of accrued interest on bonds amounting to \$116,995 causes embarrassment which we must believe to be temporary. The public conscience in that noble commonwealth will not tolerate the sacrifice of public faith. The report of fifty-one students for the scholastic year suggests the statement here that we had in both Seminaries this year seventy-six students. From such copies of the Minutes as are at hand we compile this defective table: In 1875 both Seminaries report 115; in 1876, 99; in 1878, 90; in 1879, 84; in 1880, 76. From this imperfect statement it will be seen how timely the resolution of the Assembly is calling upon the people to lay this matter to heart and pray the Lord of the harvest to send forth more laborers.

The Columbia Seminary appears once more as a cause for anxiety to the Assembly. Let us hope that this is the last occasion when the complicated details of such an institution will be proposed to a popular body, which from the nature of the case must be peculiarly unsuited to deal with them. Sir Wm. Hamilton's theory of the government of such institutions has been fully vindicated in our painful experience. Of all our church courts a General Assembly, meeting but once a year for a few days and under a heavy pressure all the time, is the very least adapted to such work. We trust that the Synods will promptly resume their guardianship over the Seminary.

The following is the report of the Board of Directors of Columbia Theological Seminary:

"The past year has been one of anxiety, perplexity, and distress. Our financial embarrassments have been great, and the Angel of Death has entered the ranks of our students and also of the Board. One of the senior class, Mr. John F. Mayne, died in the Seminary last February, the first instance of death there for nineteen years; and the oldest member of the Board, the Rev. John Douglas, has gone from grace to glory. The vacancy caused by his death has been filled in the *interim* by the election of Rev. W. E. Boggs, D. D., of the Synod of Georgia.

"The number of students in attendance during the year has been twenty-

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six, which is less by three than last year. It is still more discouraging to state that while one year ago the number in the middle and junior classes was twenty-three, now it is only eleven. The students have manifested diligence and proficiency in their studies, and there has been a deeper state of religious feeling and a greater interest in the subject of Foreign Missions among them than for some years past.

"The financial condition has been gloomy. It was found necessary last September (*before* the failure of James Adger & Company) to decrease the salaries of the professors from \$2,500 to \$2,000. The Board first attempted to meet the financial embarrassment by requesting one of the professors, instead of imparting instruction in the Seminary during the past year, to visit churches and individuals in order to solicit funds. But he declined to do so.

"We then made special appeals to the three Synods of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. They responded liberally, thus enabling us to close the year almost free from increase of debt. But the Synod of South Carolina, from which the greater part of all the help came, coupled their liberal effort with the statement that 'it is the sense of this Synod that, inasmuch as the Seminary at Columbia is the property of the General Assembly, and therefore under its control, the burden of sustaining the same properly devolves upon the *whole* Church; and that while this Synod is willing *in the present emergency* to exert itself to meet the wants of the institution as heretofore for the current year, it cannot see its way clear to undertake, in connexion with the Synods of Georgia and Alabama alone, to bear this burden in the future so long as the Seminary retains its present relations to the General Assembly.'

"The financial condition of the Seminary is not as good as it was last spring, but better than it was last fall. The improvement since last fall results partly from gifts to the Endowment Fund, amounting to about \$3,500, partly from the payments on their indebtedness by James Adger & Company, amounting to \$7,560, and partly by the appreciation of the securities held by the Seminary. These things, however, have not greatly increased the income of the Endowment, owing to a reduction of interest on some of the investments.

"The Board expected to try to continue the exercises of the Seminary during the year 1880-81, though it would have been a hard struggle, requiring a contribution from the churches for the current expenses of \$3,700, for the expected income from the Endowment would be only \$5,100, while the expenses were estimated at \$8,800.

"The unexpected resignation of Rev. Dr. Girardeau, as Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology, completely changed our plans. He having insisted upon the acceptance of his resignation after the Board had earnestly urged upon him to withdraw it, we were compelled to reluctantly accept it, to take effect October 1, 1880.

“This left the Seminary in a dismantled condition, for two of its important chairs are vacant, viz., that of ‘Didactic and Polemic Theology,’ and that of ‘Ecclesiastical History and Church Polity.’ These vacancies in the faculty, the decreasing numbers, the insufficient income of the institution, the unpaid indebtedness, the solemnly expressed unwillingness of the large and liberal Synod of South Carolina to give during the coming year as during the past, and other things, made the temporary closing of the Seminary a painful necessity.

“To attempt to carry on the institution in the face of these difficulties would be wrong, and could only result in disaster. Hence with reluctance and in sorrow the Board were compelled to close the Seminary until a professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology could be secured. The election of such professor requires time, so that it may be done only after earnest prayer and careful consideration; for to place in that important chair one unsuited to its duties would be worse than keeping the institution closed. Besides, if a proper man is elected, it is very doubtful about his coming; for how can we hope that such a man will come to a Seminary burdened with so many difficulties, when we cannot offer a sufficient salary, nor even be sure of the prompt payment of the small one which we would offer?

“During the period of suspension, the Rev. Geo. Howe, D. D., who has for nearly fifty years been a professor here, will have charge of the ‘buildings, grounds, and library,’ with a salary of \$1,500 per annum. During this period the salary of Rev. James Woodrow, D. D., who has been a professor here for over twenty years, and who has been performing the duties of two chairs for the past few years without any extra compensation, will be discontinued. The Rev. W. S. Plumer, D. D., who has been a professor here for over thirteen years, who has long since passed his ‘three-score years and ten’ and who is nearing his ‘four-score years,’ was made a professor *emeritus* with a salary of \$1,000 per annum.

“There has been a large and valuable addition to the library by the bequest of the late Rev. John Douglas, who gave to the Seminary his own library, containing 1,372 volumes, and a large number of pamphlets. The whole library now numbers 20,295 volumes, and steps have been taken to put it in the most available condition by binding the pamphlets, by rebinding the worn-out volumes, and by having a catalogue of subjects as well as authors.”

This Report was referred to the Committee on Theological Seminaries.

After several days of earnest consideration and full conference with Dr. Plumer and other brethren, the Committee on Theological Seminaries presented its report on the Columbia Seminary, through the Chairman, Dr. J. L. Kirkpatrick, recommending,—

"1. That the Report of the Directors be approved and their action confirmed.

"2. In view of the urgent importance of reopening the Seminary at an early day, we recommend that the General Assembly instruct the Board of Directors to proceed with no more delay than can be avoided to the election of Professors to the vacant chairs, or to such of them as are indispensable to a complete course of theological instruction, and that the Board proceed also with all prudent expedition to set in operation the most efficient means they can employ for raising funds for the current expenses of the Seminary, and for its permanent endowment.

"3. Recognising the unqualified right of the Board of Directors, under the constitution of the Seminary, to elect all its professors, their action being subject only to the veto of the Assembly, your Committee yet recommend to the General Assembly an expression of its earnest desire that the Rev. Dr. J. L. Girardeau should, if possible, be induced to resume his charge of the chair of Didactic and Polemic Theology, for which he has evinced, by years of actual trial, his eminent qualifications, as it respects alike his learning, the soundness of his doctrines, and his aptness to teach. It is confidently believed that his continuance in the Seminary would not only be highly gratifying to his friends and the Church at large, but also contribute greatly to the success of the efforts that may be made for its enlarged usefulness.

"4. In the Report of the Board of Directors, we find the following extract from the Minutes of the Synod of South Carolina, viz.: 'That it is the sense of this Synod that, inasmuch as the Seminary at Columbia is the property of the General Assembly, and therefore under its control, the burden of sustaining the same properly devolves on the whole Church, and that while this Synod is willing *in the present emergency* to exert itself to meet the wants of the institution as heretofore, for the current year, it cannot see the way clear to undertake in connexion with the Synods of Georgia and Alabama alone to bear this burden in the future, so long as the Seminary retains its present relations to the General Assembly.' We construe this declaration as implying a wish on the part of the Synod of South Carolina that the Seminary should be restored to its former relations to the three Synods named. At a meeting of the Alumni, called by a published notice, and held in this city on Tuesday last, as we have been officially informed, a resolution was adopted, with but one dissenting voice out of about thirty concurring, advising the re-transfer of the institution to the above Synods. We recommend that the General Assembly inform those Synods of its readiness to restore the Seminary to their ownership and control whenever they, the Synods above-named, shall indicate their desire to receive it.

"5. The persons named below are nominated to the General Assembly as Directors for three years from this time, viz.: Rev. Messrs.

J. B. Mack, D. D., W. E. Boggs, D. D., Col. J. J. Gresham, and H. Muller, Esq."

Rev. L. B. Johnson made a minority report:

"I desire to enter a dissent to the action of the majority of the Committee on Theological Seminaries in approving the action of the Board of Trustees of Columbia Seminary, by which Rev. W. S. Plumer was retired and made an *emeritus* professor.

"I cannot see that the Board had a constitutional right thus to *translate* Dr. Plumer *without his consent* from an active to an honorary connexion with the Seminary, holding, as I do, that this action of theirs comes properly under Article 5 of the Constitution of the Seminary, and not under Article 11, as is held by the Board."

A letter from Dr. Plumer was read, asking that, as he was elected by the Assembly, and is under the jurisdiction of the Assembly, he be allowed a hearing in this matter.

The report came up for consideration on Saturday, the 29th of May, when Mr. Johnson moved that Dr. Plumer be allowed to address the Assembly. Mr. Clisby moved to amend by inserting a clause giving permission to Dr. Boggs to reply in behalf of the Board. Adopted. On motion, the addresses were limited to one hour each, but upon Dr. Plumer declaring the time insufficient, this limitation was removed, and he proceeded to address the Assembly. We copy from the columns of *The Christian Observer* an outline of his speech:

"DR. PLUMER—I come before you with some disadvantages. Every kind of influence has been used outside to injure me. It has been said that I came into this State to oppose the theology of Dr. Thornwell. By no means; I have been in full accord with him. I deny that I made a promise (as has been asserted) at the Knoxville Assembly, to resign in twelve months. I deny the statement that I was *compelled* to resign my position as professor of *Didactic* Theology at the St. Louis Assembly. But I requested a transfer to the chair of *Pastoral* Theology of my own motion. I refused to make the change in the form of pressure. (At this point he had a letter from Dr. Lefevre read, saying that the change would not have been recommended to the Assembly but for his own urgency. Also from Rev. J. L. Wilson, D. D., also written at the St. Louis Assembly to the same effect. Also one from Rev. W. E. Boggs, D. D., which Dr. Plumer asked Dr. Boggs himself to come forward and read. Also letters from Dr.

Brown, Dr. Bullock, Dr. McIlwaine, and Dr. Hoge, saying that Dr. Plumer has pursued such a disinterested and generous course, and has so endeared himself, that he will never be disturbed in his chair.) Dr. Plumer said that the inference from these letters was that the controversy was ended. I was reading the other day how a curse came from God upon Israel, because Saul had broken faith even with the Gibeonites. That is a warning to us.

“The resolution of the Board, making Dr. Plumer an *emeritus* professor, was then read, at Dr. Plumer’s request, and he continued: That resolution is without the slightest authority from either the old or the new constitution. They cannot set me aside without any accusation of unfaithfulness, but merely of age and infirmities. There is an express clause in the constitution protecting me as a professor elected by the Assembly from being transferred to another chair without my consent. I secured the insertion of that clause in the new constitution, and Dr. Woodrow wrote it.

“They have removed me without notice to me, without any expression of commendation. At my election at the Memphis Assembly, I had no notice of my nomination, no intimation of it, and my election was made unanimous. After entering my office, my old church at Pottsville, Pa., wanted to call me back to their pulpit, but the Directors, with a resolution of great confidence (here read by the clerk), objected to my returning to Pottsville. My salary was fixed at \$3,000 a year and a house. In sixteen months there was a deficiency of \$1,000 to me. My colleagues and I agreed to remit it, and I proposed a reduction to \$2,500. A year or two ago I received a letter, asking me to agree to a reduction of all the salaries except Dr. Girardeau’s. I agreed, but the others did not. Afterwards all agreed to a general reduction of salary.

“But I am told that I am retired ‘because of age.’ Why, Gladstone is only six months younger than I, and Von Moltke nine years older. I am satisfied that when a man of active habits ceases from active duties, he is apt to become imbecile, and I do not want to become imbecile. He referred to letters from Dr. Alexander and Dr. Miller, of Princeton, to himself, published in the memoirs of these men, as to the duty of an old man about retiring, and the danger therefrom.

“But they retire me ‘because of infirmities.’ Infirmities do not disqualify a man from work, and my infirmities have not prevented my travelling 12,500 miles on the work of the Seminary (and at my own charges), and preaching ninety-seven times during the last year. I have met every appointment except five in the

Seminary. I have attended the conferences and corrected the manuscripts of the students, and have written twenty-nine religious tracts during this year.

“I have not asked to be made *emeritus*, and there is no power on earth, not even this Assembly itself, that can do so without my consent.

“In the afternoon he continued: I have endeavored to show that hoary hairs ought to be respected when they are crowned with righteousness and good works. (He called on the clerk to read a eulogistic remark about him from the *North American Review*.) Remarks have been made on the streets that Dr. Plumer is an incubus on the Seminary. I have piles of letters from former students, letters from every student of the Seminary, written when this action of the Directors became known, expressing their conviction that they had learned much from me. I have raised more money and saved more money for that Seminary than I have ever received. My books have lately been translated into the Chinese and the modern Greek, and for the Brazilian work. Brethren, I am making a fool of myself, but you have compelled me; I am *not* a burden to the Seminary. Here is the paper expressing the thanks of the Directors to Dr. Plumer for his assistance to the Seminary.

“Now, here is Dr. Girardeau. What do I think of him? He is a man, a gentleman, a Christian gentleman. And the Directors the other day accepted his resignation in twenty-four hours in the face of the rule that a professor must give six months' notice of an intention to resign.

“Next, there is Dr. Howe. He has been appointed, like Rizpah, to watch over the dead body of the Seminary. And I have a letter here saying that Dr. Howe must soon be laid on the shelf. But when you say to that old man, ‘Go up, thou bald head,’ something worse than bears will catch you.

“As to Dr. Woodrow, he is thrown over the fence—but I cannot speak for him.

“There is no need to close the Seminary. Not because of funds, for the funds of the Seminary are now \$20,000 better than they were twelve months ago. For want of students? There is a dearth, but it affects Union Seminary also. If we have but four students in the junior class, Union has but eight. The difficulty lies in your refusal to give aid to students for the ministry before they are ready to enter college.

“It has been said that we live like cat and dog at Columbia Seminary. Why, there has not been a jarring word among the professors of the Seminary since it was reorganised.

“And there is strength in the Church. There are now in the Southern Church more churches than there were in the whole United States in 1826; more members and only five less ministers than in that year, in all the land.

“And if you suspend the Seminary, you kill it. In *Græca Minora* there is a chapter on *Scholastikos*. It means a fool, a learned fool. And when his father wrote to know how he was getting along at school, he answered, ‘Very well. I am now selling my books and living on the money.’ And that is what you are now doing at the Seminary.

“Again, there is no power in the Directors, or anybody else, to close that Seminary. By the constitution the trust is a sacred one to keep the Seminary *open*. Were these funds given to found a Seminary that should be kept closed for a term of years? Were they given to pay an *emeritus* professor who was willing to work? It is cruel!

“Suspend the Seminary, and it is dead. I once saw a man suspended for seventeen minutes; afterwards they galvanised him and made his muscles jerk and jump, but he did not come to life again.

“To close that institution is a fraud. The catalogue calls for bequests. Will you take the money given to train young men for the ministry, and hoard it up idly and uselessly? Close the institution, and in twelve months you will be shingled all over with suits to recover the endowment. One of these would have been begun already but for moral and personal considerations. Close it, and you are only in the beginning of troubles.

“An old sailor on the *Bellerophon* was asked how Napoleon looked. He answered, ‘He looks as if he had twelve campaigns in him yet.’ I have served you thirteen campaigns and a half in this Seminary, and now I am turned off without one word of thanks, with the expression, ‘by reason of age and infirmities.’ I do not ask you for money: I ask you to give me back my honor, my life. God bless you all; God bless the Seminary; I pray for you every day.”

Dr. Boggs replied, setting forth the views of the Board and the law under which they acted. He began by stating the kind relations between himself and Dr. Plumer’s family, whose pastor he had been for some years. His reverence for Dr. Plumer’s age and distinguished services to the Church made it trying for him to advocate measures to which Dr. Plumer objects. He then explained briefly the occasion of the letter which Dr. Plumer had

asked him to read. An impression, he said, had been made on the minds of certain eminent brethren, friends of the Seminary, that Dr. Plumer's gifts did not suit the chair of Didactic Theology. They felt that he was injuring the Seminary and wished him to resign it. Brethren now present, he was sure, recalled the intense excitement which pervaded the St. Louis Assembly in 1875 as to this very matter, and what relief was felt when Dr. Plumer announced his purpose to vacate that chair to assume that of Pastoral Theology. Dr. Boggs happened to be present at an interview between Drs. Palmer and Hoge, in which the latter promised to be a mediator, so that a peaceable solution might be attained. Dr. Plumer agreed to concede the point, and there was great joy in the Assembly. The peace of the Church and the honor of religion had been saved. The next day Dr. Plumer approached the speaker and requested him to write the letter to his daughter. "I was happy," said Dr. Boggs, "at our merciful escape from bitter contention. I believed it, that in spite of powerful opposition Dr. Plumer would probably have been able to retain the chair for a while longer, if he had so decided, and I was grateful to him for saving us as he did. I wrote the letter in all sincerity, and am not ashamed of it."

The speaker then alluded to the impression on the minds of some members of the Assembly, that the action of the Board really grew out of past differences; that the whole thing was a programme agreed upon beforehand for the express purpose of getting rid of Dr. Plumer. He took this occasion to affirm solemnly in the presence of the Assembly and of God that there is no ground for this suspicion. There was no plot, no secret understanding of any kind, no letters passing from one to another. All came to the meeting, supposing that the exercises for another year would be continued as a matter of course. All were surprised and perplexed by the sudden resignation of Dr. Girardeau, and our subsequent action in closing the Seminary grew out of the condition in which we were left thereby. The words, "because of old age and infirmities," in that part of our action which pertains to Dr. Plumer, were inserted as an amendment, and the attention of the Board was pointedly called to their sig-

nificance, so that no honorable man could have voted for the resolution unless he really had believed them to be true.

“The question of law has been raised” as to the acceptance of Dr. Girardeau’s resignation without requiring him to wait six months. In Section III., Article 9, the constitution does say, “Any Professor intending to resign his office shall give six months’ notice of his intention to the Board.” The rule falls under the head, “Professors and Faculty,” being plainly intended for their government and for the protection of the Board and Seminary against sudden withdrawals. Dr. Girardeau cited this rule and complied with it. He was willing, if the Board required, to remain and teach for the few weeks in September and October, which would make out his six months. But we did not think it best for him to do so, thus disappointing the students by losing him ere they had well entered upon the term. The Board did not consider that it is bound by the six months’ rule, but only the Professors. It was not classed among rules pertaining to the Board, which are found in Section II. And as Dr. Girardeau, seeing the embarrassment sure to result from insisting on six months of delay, proposed that we dispense with it, we did so under the general powers conceded to us in Section II., Article 13, which says: “The Board shall further make all rules and regulations, and generally do whatever they deem for the welfare of the Seminary,” etc. In so doing, Dr. Boggs said he was reminded that they followed the course of the Assembly of 1874, which accepted without any delay the resignations of Drs. Adger and Wilson.

“The next item is the closing of the Seminary until a suitable man can be found for the chair and the money to maintain him. The same wide law above cited, authorising the Board ‘to do generally whatever they deem for the welfare of the Seminary,’ seems to cover this act completely. We could hope for no students with the chair of Didactic Theology vacant. We were not prepared to name the man. We could not expect him to come for such salary as we could promise. We could not say even, We will certainly pay you the \$2,000. The Board was cooler, more dispassionate, than Dr. Plumer in deciding what to do.”

“The next step is scaling down Dr. Howe’s salary to \$1,500 and discontinuing Dr. Woodrow’s during the suspension. This action falls under Sec. 2, Art. V., of the Constitution—‘All Professors of the Seminary shall be elected by the Board and their salaries fixed by the same . . . provided also that none of the powers given to the Board in this article shall be exercised so as to affect any one who is at the time of the adoption of this Constitution a Professor of the Seminary, except with such Professor’s full consent.’ Well, sir, we acted under this law in taking away \$500 from Dr. Howe’s salary and all of Dr. Woodrow’s, but we have their consent to the act. They are here to object, if I misrepresent them. We had important work for Dr. Howe. He had for years been our librarian. We wished him to superintend certain repairs necessary in order to preserve from total decay volumes of great value. We also needed a thorough catalogue of the Library made out by the authors’ names as well as by subjects treated of. No one is so well qualified as he to do this work. Besides, we must have some one to take charge of our grounds and buildings. These duties we laid on Dr. Howe and gave him \$500 more. The pay is small for the work. Dr. Plumer considers the \$1,000 given him to be a small annuity. I wish from my heart it were twice or three times as large. But the Seminary is poor and in debt. We give him a fifth of our entire income.

“The next thing is the retirement of Dr. Plumer from active duty *because of age and infirmities*. Dr. Plumer thinks, and the minority report of Mr. Johnston agrees with him, that this action falls under the same Rule, and that inasmuch as he does not consent, the action is therefore null and void as to him. I call attention to the fact that a Professor’s consent is only necessary in two contingencies—(1) change in his salary; (2) his translation from one chair to another. If Dr. Plumer’s retirement does not fall under one or the other of these heads, his case is not covered by the proviso, his consent is not necessary. I think Brother Johnston fails to understand the terms *Professor Emeritus*. If it were a chair in the Seminary, he would be right, and our act be incomplete without Dr. Plumer’s consent. But *Professor*

Emeritus is not a chair. It is an honorary title only, and an honorable one too. We did not translate from one chair to another, but removed altogether. We considered ourselves as acting under Art. XI., and not Art. V. The matter was definitely mentioned in the conference of the Board. The exact bearing of Articles V. and XI. was noted. We considered ourselves to be acting under Art. XI.—“The Board of Directors shall have power to remove from his office any Professor who shall be found unfaithful in his trust, or incompetent to the discharge of his duties.” The last clause gave us authority to retire Dr. Plumer. We acted under it. The fact is delicately stated in our Minutes, but with sufficient plainness. Every member of this house understands the language, I imagine—*‘made Professor Emeritus because of age and infirmities’* is just *‘removed because of inefficiency’* mildly put. We had abundant evidence in the examinations of his classes. We really judged them to show his incompetency. Dr. Plumer differs with us in this judgment. We thought the evidence sufficient to justify the conclusion. The older members of the Board had been growing into that conviction for years. He may have the best qualifications as a preacher or a writer of tracts, but we had to decide on his ability to instruct students in theology. I am grieved that Dr. Plumer feels touched in his honor. I have passed sleepless hours in sympathy with him. But we are not to be governed by our sympathies, but by the sacred duty of training preachers of the everlasting gospel. We have acted in kindness. You must decide between us.

“So much for the law of the case. Now as to its expediency and prudence, I can only refer you to the facts recited in the report of the Board. These statements of fact come as their testimony, and their action is their united judgment. Here they are: the chair of Theology vacant; only eleven undergraduates left in the Seminary, and some of them not expected to return; a debt of \$3,000 unpaid; a deficiency of nearly \$4,000, and the chief source of supplying this deficiency (the Synod of South Carolina) expressing unwillingness to continue unless changes be made over which we have no power. Think of all this, and say what else could the Board have done? We do not consider, as Dr. Plumer

does, that we are violating trusts and exposing the endowments. We thought, and now think, that we are protecting the endowments. To incur debt is to make them liable in law. We have been sustained in every point save one by your Committee, with Dr. Kirkpatrick at their head, experienced as he is in educational matters. As to one point, one of your Committee only differs with us in judgment. If you agree with your Committee and with us, you will sustain; but if you are clear that we are wrong, say so."

Mr. Collins—I move the adoption of the majority report and the approval of the report of the Board of Directors.

Rev. L. B. Johnston made a brief explanation.

Mr. W. S. Primrose offered the following amendment:

"That in view of the action of the Board of Directors, reported to this General Assembly, in making the Rev. W. S. Plumer, D. D., a Professor *Emeritus*, the General Assembly takes this opportunity of expressing to this venerable and respected brother their cordial and hearty appreciation of his past services in relation to his connexion with Columbia Theological Seminary, and hereby convey to him their respect, veneration, and kind Christian sentiments of regard, with the prayer that God's richest blessings may abide with him now and always."

It was carried, and the report as amended was adopted.

On Monday, Rev. Mr. Bryson entered his dissent to the action of the Assembly declaring Dr. Plumer incapacitated by age and infirmity to give adequate instruction in his chair, when the same action closes the Seminary for an indefinite period. Rev. Mr. Briggs and Rev. Mr. Milner united in the dissent.

Rev. L. B. Johnston asked that the minority report be entered upon the Minutes as his protest against this action. These dissents were entered without answer.

COMMITTEE ON THE DIACONATE.

Dr. Girardeau stated that the Committee was not ready to report, and asked that it might be continued, which was granted.

THE REVISED DIRECTORY OF WORSHIP.

Dr. Adger reported that the Committee, not being able to meet all together, had nevertheless accomplished their work to a

considerable extent by correspondence. Dr. Armstrong and himself had elaborated together a complete Revision, and he had sent a copy of the same to every member of the Committee and obtained their views in detail. Then Dr. Armstrong, with Dr. Palmer, Dr. Woodrow, and himself, met in Charleston during the early days of the Assembly and had carefully revised the Revision. It was now ready to be submitted to the Assembly, but he suggested that it might be difficult for a single hasty reading of it to put the Assembly adequately into possession of its contents, and that it might be well for the body to accept the report and order the Revision published at the Assembly's expense, one copy to be sent to each minister and two to the Stated Clerk of each Presbytery, with a view to the thorough examination and criticism of the work in all our Presbyteries, the results of such criticism to be reported to the next Assembly.

The report was made the special order for ten o'clock the next day.

On that occasion, after debate, the following substitute for the Committee's suggestion was adopted, on motion of Mr. Collins of Ebenezer Presbytery:

Resolved, That the report of the Committee on the Revision of the Directory of Worship be accepted and recommitted to the same Committee, with permission to have a sufficient number of copies printed at the expense of the General Assembly, and a copy of the same be forwarded to each minister of this Church and two copies to each Session; also two copies to each Stated Clerk of Presbyteries, with a request that the same be critically examined by each Presbytery, and the result of such examination and criticism be forwarded to the Chairman of said Committee on Revision for their use in making a report to the next General Assembly."

ASSEMBLY REPORTER.

The Rev. Mr. Wolfe resigned his office. On motion of Dr. Woodrow, the Rev. W. P. Jacobs of Enoree Presbytery was appointed to fill the office, at a salary of one hundred dollars and his travelling expenses. It is no extravagance to say that this office is of like importance with that of the Stated and Permanent Clerks of the Assembly, and we hope Mr. Jacobs will accept and may live long to discharge its high duties. If it is necessary to

have so many commissioners assemble at such great expense, it is surely desirable to put into trustworthy records what was said to their Assembly.

COMMITTEE ON THE EVANGELIST'S OFFICE.

This Committee, consisting of Drs. J. A. Lefevre, J. L. Wilson, Thomas E. Peck, and Jno. B. Adger reported, through Dr. Adger, that they had made progress in the work committed to them, but asked for further time, and that Drs. Palmer, Woodrow, and Stuart Robinson be added to their number, Dr. Palmer to be chairman of the Committee in the room of Dr. Lefevre, whose health is feeble. The report was accepted and the request granted.

APPEAL OF REV. J. EVANS WHITE.

This was an appeal against the Synod of South Carolina for dismissing an appeal which Mr. White brought before it against Bethel Presbytery as *out of order*. As the case came before the Assembly, Mr. White assigned only one ground for his appeal to them, namely, that Synod had assigned no specific reason for not entertaining his appeal. The Assembly at Charleston by their vote of 71 to 2 not to sustain Mr. White's appeal, seemed to think that Synod gave a sufficiently specific reason for not entertaining his appeal when they declared it was *out of order*.

The Assembly was regularly constituted as a court for judicial business by the usual warning from the Moderator which the Book requires. Mr. White was then heard at length. He said the only question was a very simple one: Has an appellant a right to be heard? He asked for a hearing before the courts of the Church—only that and nothing more. All he wanted was for the Assembly to order the Synod to reverse its action and hear his case upon its merits.

Dr. Mack, one of the Committee appointed by the Synod to defend it before the Assembly's bar, explained that Mr. White had appealed to the Synod against Bethel Presbytery, not from any judgment it had rendered or from any cause it had decided

(as must always form the ground of appeal according to our Book), but because at a certain meeting it had just *done nothing*. A *pro re nata* meeting was called by two ministers and two elders to reopen Mr. White's case, which had been decided at a previous meeting *when he made no appeal*. At this *pro re nata* meeting neither of the parties calling the meeting appeared. No motion to reopen the case was made. Nothing was done. Then Mr. White gave notice that he would appeal to Synod. This was the appeal which Synod decided to be *out of order*.

Dr. Adger (the other member of Synod's Committee) said the Presbyterian Church had always held to the strict construction of law. The appellant in this case has forfeited all his rights under the law by not making his appeal at the right time and in the right way. He was sure the Assembly would not go out of its way to reopen this old difficulty which has harassed the Church for years. Every attempt to restore Mr. White by extra-constitutional methods must do evil. You have no right to require the Synod of South Carolina to take up this case again. There is just one thing for Mr. White to do, and that is by proper steps on his part to settle this matter for himself with his Presbytery.

Mr. White was heard again in reply to the Committee, and then the Assembly voted not to sustain his appeal.

A MORE EXPLICIT DELIVERANCE ON DANCING.

On the overture from the Presbytery of Athens, asking the Assembly to make a more full and explicit deliverance on the subject of dancing and worldly amusements, the Committee on Bills and Overtures made the following report:

This Assembly declines attempting any such deliverance—

1st. Because the deliverances of former Assemblies on this subject are as full and specific as the nature of the case allows.

2d. Because the evils referred to are to be met, not by resort to deliverances of the Assembly, but rather by care on the part of the courts of original jurisdiction.

The report of the Committee was adopted.

CONCLUSION.

We have thus noticed in review the chief matters of interest in the proceedings of the Assembly at Charleston, excepting one, which was, indeed, of especial importance. We have chosen to say nothing on that subject, knowing it was the purpose of one of the Editors of this journal to present a full report and review of that able discussion. And so we make an end.

ARTICLE VIII.

DELIVERANCES OF CHURCH COURTS.

We have been at pains to secure for permanent record abstracts of the chief speeches in our last Assembly touching its *in thesi* deliverances, from the speakers themselves. The feeble health of one of these preventing him from complying with our request for a long period, has necessarily delayed the appearance of this number of our work.

The question came up on an overture from the Synod of South Carolina as follows:

The Synod of South Carolina hereby overtures the General Assembly, respectfully praying that it will consider and repeal, or at least seriously modify, so much of the deliverance of the last Assembly, at Louisville, in relation to Worldly Amusements, as declares that all deliverances of the General Assembly, and by necessary implication, of the other courts of the Church, which are not made by them in a strictly judicial capacity, but are deliverances *in thesi*, can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory. (See Printed Minutes, 1879, p. 24.) The Synod admits—

1. That the General Assembly cannot add to the Constitution or make any constitutional rule.

2. That it has no power to commence process against individuals.

3. That in the exercise of the constitutional power of review and control, it can reach *directly* only the court next below, and the other courts only *mediately* through it.

4. That it is precluded from deliverances *in thesi* which may prejudice a judicial case likely to come before it.

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5. That *some* deliverances of the Assembly and of the other courts of the Church are only advisory, recommendatory, and monitory.

The repeal or modification of so much of the said deliverance as has been herein specified is asked on the following grounds :

1. Because it makes judicial decisions, as contradistinguished from didactic decisions, something different from and more than didactic : which is the same thing as to make them different from and more than declarative decisions, and so the constitution is contradicted, which represents *all* church power as simply ministerial and declarative. There is, it is conceded, a difference between judicial and deliberative decisions growing out of the different circumstances which condition them ; but to make a distinction between judicial and didactic decisions is to assign to the judicial something more than a declarative enforcement upon the conscience of the law of God. Either it is held that didactic and judicial decisions are the same, or it is held that they are different. If it be held that they are the same, the reduction in this deliverance is utterly illogical, and ought to be corrected. If it be held that they are different, we affirm the unconstitutionality of the discrimination.

2. Because it reduces the General Assembly and the other courts of our Church, so far as they are deliberative bodies, to the *status* of Congregational Associations, possessed only of advisory power, is contrary to the genius of the Presbyterian system and the historic doctrine of our Church as to the binding force of such deliberative decisions as are expository of constitutional law ; and tends to degrade the authority and lessen the influence of the Assembly.

3. Because said deliverance takes away the key of doctrine from the General Assembly and the other courts of the Church, and retains in their hands the key of discipline alone.

4. Because it contravenes the great principle laid down in the Confession of Faith, consecrated by the blood of our martyred ancestors, and until now well-nigh universally recognised among us : that good and necessary consequences from the doctrines and precepts of the Divine Word, or from the Constitution of our Church, are of equal authority with the Word and the Constitution ; and when declared by a Church court in any capacity, whether judicial or deliberative, must bind the conscience and can no more be regarded as simply advisory and monitory than are the Word itself and our Constitution. They have legal authority because they *are* law.

5. Because it opposes the doctrine of our standards, long practically acted on in our Church, that the church courts are appointed by Christ to be authoritative expounders of his law contained in the Scriptures, and, as we believe, reflected in our Constitution. It is admitted that they have no original power to make law, but they can declare it, and it cannot, consistently with our standards, be held that the only office of expo-

sition by which the courts ministerially declare Christ's law is discharged by them when sitting in a strictly judicial capacity. But if the courts act by Christ's appointment when they, in their deliberative capacity, solemnly declare his law, they are entitled, in the discharge of that function, not only to be respected as advisers, but to be obeyed as authoritative expounders of law. Their deliberative decisions, so far as they furnish the right construction of the law, exert a legal force upon the conscience.

6. Because it makes it necessary, in order that an authoritative decision upon any point, either of doctrine or of morals, may be obtained from the General Assembly, or any other court, that judicial process in the courts of first resort be instituted, involving the case whose resolution is desired; and so a tendency to general litigation would be engendered in our churches. For it is not to be supposed that, having been accustomed to Presbyterian usages, they would be satisfied with mere Congregationalist advice. The action will in all probability issue in breeding contentions and multiplying judicial cases.

7. Because it is inconsistent with the following express provisions of our Constitution: "It belongeth to synods and councils ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience; to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of his Church * * * which decrees and determinations, [together with those which are judicial and just mentioned] if consonant with the word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission, not only for their agreement with the word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereto by his word." (Confession of Faith, Chapter 31, Section 2.) "They (church courts) * * * may frame symbols of faith, bear testimony against error in doctrine and immorality in practice, within or without the pale of the Church, and decide cases of conscience." "They have power to establish rules for the government, discipline, worship, and extension of the Church." "They possess the right of requiring obedience to the laws of Christ." (Form of Government, Chapter 5, Section 2, Article 2.) "The General Assembly shall have power * * * to bear testimony against error in doctrine and immorality in practice, injuriously affecting the Church; to decide in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline." (Form of Government, Chapter 5, Section 6, Article 5.)

To this overture the majority of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, through Dr. J. R. Wilson, Chairman, reported the following answer:

This Assembly interprets the language complained of in the overture as by no means declaring that all deliverances *in thesi*, uttered by a General Assembly, are to be considered as merely "didactic, advisory, and

monitory;" but only as assuming that, when any *in these* deliverance bears upon the law of offences and the administration of discipline, it is not to be regarded as furnishing a sufficient ground for judicial process by the court of original jurisdiction, a part of which original jurisdiction is the power of interpreting for itself the law of offences as laid down in the Constitution of the Church.

2. This Assembly therefore declines to repeal or modify the deliverance of the last General Assembly, referred to, as thus interpreted.

The minority of the Committee, through Rev. L. H. Blanton, D. D., reported the following answer:

In reply to the overture of the Synod of South Carolina requesting this General Assembly, either to repeal or seriously modify that part of the deliverance given by the last General Assembly to the Presbytery of Atlanta, which asserts that no deliverance *in these* can be accepted as law by judicial process, but that all such deliverances can be considered only as didactic, advisory, and monitory—

We recommend that this request be declined, believing that that answer in this respect is a correct interpretation of the Constitution.

The adoption of the majority report was moved by the Rev. Mr. Penick, as he said, in order to bring the matter fairly before the Assembly. The Rev. Mr. Neel believed that the minority report brought the subject more clearly and simply to view, and he moved, therefore, to substitute that for the majority report. Accordingly the question was upon the adoption of the minority report.

Dr. Girardeau opened this grand debate with a very grand speech, occupying over two hours, which was heard with fixed attention throughout. The abstract here given presents, of course, a mere outline of it. The reader must have been a hearer to have any adequate idea of its eloquence and force. It is not often such logic set on fire is heard in any Church Assembly.

ABSTRACT OF DR. GIRARDEAU'S FIRST SPEECH.

Preliminary Remarks:

1. While the majority report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures on the overture from the Synod of South Carolina admits that all *in these* deliverances of church courts are not merely advisory, and so, to some extent, concedes the position of the Synod, it recommends, equally with the minority report, that the

prayer of the Synod for a repeal or modification of the last Assembly's deliverance be declined by the Assembly. I am obliged, therefore, as representing the Synod, to oppose both reports.

2. No disrespect can be conceived as intended, on the part of the Synod, towards the last Assembly. The language of the overture is respectful; and a distinction must be taken between the conscious intention and ends of the Assembly, and the logical results which may be thought to flow from its action. No animadversion is passed upon the former; the latter constitute a legitimate object of criticism.

3. The intimation, that it is unfortunate that the Synod excepts to the action of the last Assembly, inasmuch as this Assembly was appointed to meet within its bounds, is met by the consideration that the circumstance of place is accidental and unimportant, and that the Synod had to act promptly or not at all.

4. A presumption lies against the repeal or modification by this Assembly of the action of its immediate predecessor. This is met by a reference to precedents. The reversal by the Assembly of 1875 of the action of that of 1874, touching the Pan-Presbyterian Confederation, is an instance in point.

5. The question now before this Assembly is one of great importance, as involving some of the fundamental principles of Presbyterian polity.

Admissions guarding against misconceptions:

1. No church court, strictly speaking, can make laws—can legislate by virtue of original or derived authority. The legislative power is in the Head of the Church, and his law is furnished to her in his word. All her power is exhausted in declaring that law. To this there is one exception. In the diatactic sphere, the Church has discretionary power to make laws, in the form of canons and regulations, in regard to “some circumstances concerning the worship of God and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed.” But just here, where the Church has a certain legislative power,

her laws do not bind the conscience; they only impose a necessity upon practice. The conscience is only bound when Christ's law in the word is declared.

2. No court can usurp the jurisdiction of the courts below. The Constitution defines the original jurisdiction of each court, which cannot be invaded by the courts above.

3. Some *in thesi* deliverances of church courts are merely advisory. In claiming that some of them are possessed of legal authority, I do not contend that all are. While some are advisory, some are authoritative.

Construction of the Deliverance of the last Assembly :

That part of the deliverance, the repeal or modification of which is asked, is as follows: "That none of these deliverances were made by the Assembly in a strictly judicial capacity, but were all deliverances *in thesi*, and therefore can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory."

The construction which I place upon this language is: That no *in thesi* deliverances are possessed of legal authority and capable of enforcing judicial process.

1. The illative "*therefore*" sustains this construction.

(1.) Those who at first maintained that the language is to be limited to the specific deliverances of the Assemblies of 1865, 1869, and 1877, which had been previously mentioned, have been led by the force of the word "*therefore*" to relinquish that construction.

(2.) The reasoning of the deliverance reduced to exact form is as follows:

All *in thesi* deliverances are destitute of legal authority;

These deliverances (of 1865, 1869, and 1877) are *in thesi* deliverances;

Therefore, they are destitute of legal authority.

It is clear that the validity of the conclusion depends upon that of the major proposition: all *in thesi* deliverances, etc. That is to say, these specific deliverances of the New Orleans Assembly of 1865, 1869, and 1877 are destitute of legal authority, because they are in the class *in thesi* deliverances, all of which are destitute of legal authority.

2. The enunciation, "can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory," is analytic, not synthetic. The terms, "*advisory and monitory*," are simply explanatory of the term "*didactic*." They make no substantive addition to the idea expressed by didactic. The term *didactic* cannot here be taken to mean something more than solemnly advisory, for then it would mean authoritative, and the language of the deliverance would be self-contradictory. It is plain that the language means this: these specific deliverances, because they can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory, cannot be considered as legally authoritative. All *in these* deliverances are devoid of legal authority, for the reason that they are not judicial decisions, but are only didactic, advisory, and monitory. Judicial decisions are authoritative; *in these* deliverances are not.

3. The express admissions of those who defend the Assembly's deliverance justify the interpretation of it which I have given. The issue is plain. The question which has now for months been debated is, Whether any *in these* deliverances of church courts are legally authoritative.

Precise State of the Question:

It is, first, Are some *in these* deliverances of church courts possessed of legal authority? and, secondly, Do some *in these* deliverances of superior courts impose an obligation upon the courts of first resort to institute judicial process?

-I propose, in regard to the first aspect of the question, to maintain the proposition, that some *in these* deliverances of church courts are possessed of legal authority.

Arguments in Support of this Proposition:

I. When the *in these* deliverances of a church court are identical with the statements of God's word as interpreted in our standards, the respective enunciations are not two and different, but are one and the same, and are therefore susceptible of common predication. What is affirmed or denied of the one may be equally affirmed or denied of the other.

1. The statements of God's word are possessed of legal au-

thority. A distinction must here be taken as to what is law and what is advice in the divine word. There are instances of inspired advice, but they are few, and do not affect the general proposition, that the statements of God's word are legally authoritative, and therefore bind the conscience. There is the law of doctrine and the law of duty. The gospel is possessed of legal authority to us, as binding faith and practice alike. In this wide sense, the whole Scripture, evangelical as well as strictly legal, embodying the gospel as a remedial scheme, as well as the moral law, is expressly said to be the law of the Lord (Ps. 1 and 19).

2. Our standards of doctrine, duty, government, and worship, forming our constitution, are assumed by us to coincide with God's word, and so far as that coincidence obtains, although they be human compositions, are held by us to be possessed of legal authority. They are law, because they deliver the law of the Lord.

3. The *in thesi* deliverances of church courts may be exactly coincident with the statements of God's word, as interpreted in our standards:

(1.) When the express words of Scripture or of the standards are used. This is too plain to require proof.

(2.) When "good and necessary consequences" from God's word as interpreted in our standards are stated in the deliverances of the church courts. A necessary inference from a proposition makes no substantive addition to it. It is part and parcel of the original enunciation. It only explicitly evolves from it what was implicitly contained in it.

Here, then, are instances in which the *in thesi* deliverances of church courts may be one and the same with the statements of God's word as interpreted in our constitution. Now,

4. It is impossible to separate between *such* deliverances of church courts on the one hand, and their contents, viz., the statements of God's word as interpreted in our Constitution, on the other, so as to say that the contents of the deliverances are possessed of legal authority, but the deliverances themselves are not. The only way in which the disjunction may be conceived to be attempted, is by separating the language and the matter of the deliverances. But the language symbolises the matter, and can

have no intelligible existence apart from it; and the matter cannot be apprehended except through the language. They cannot be disjoined. Especially is this the case when the language of the deliverance is the very language of the divine word as given in our standards. If, then, in the cases specified, the deliverance of the court cannot be disjoined from the contents of the deliverance, they are one and the same, and what is predicable of one is predicable of the other. Are the contents possessed of legal authority? So is the deliverance.

The conclusion which follows from these premises is, that some *in these* deliverances of church courts are possessed of legal authority. The argument briefly stated is: whatsoever is one and the same with God's word as interpreted in our standards is possessed of legal authority; some *in these* deliverances of church courts are one and the same, etc.; therefore, some *in these* deliverances of church courts are possessed of legal authority.

5. This is the old, uniform, catholic doctrine of the whole Presbyterian Church. [Here the testimony of Calvin, Gillespie, and Cunningham was cited. This from Gillespie is very striking: "If the doctrine or exhortation of a pastor, well-grounded upon the Scriptures, be the word of God, then much more is the decree of a Synod, well-grounded upon the Scriptures, the decree of the Holy Ghost."]

Those whom I represent take no "new departure" from the old, accepted doctrine of Presbyterianism. We adhere to it and contend for it. In the past, the other great pole of the same great truth was that which attracted chief attention, namely, that when church-deliverances are not consonant to the word of God, but impose the doctrines and commandments of men upon the consciences of Christ's people, they are destitute of legal authority and are to be resisted even unto death. The circumstances of the times demanded the maintenance of that great truth. The tyranny of Rome, and the oppressive human legislation of Prelatical churches, drove the Reformers and Puritans to its assertion. But we are called upon by the circumstances of our own time, also to contend as strenuously for the other great truth, the twin of the first, that when church-courts exactly utter

the will of Christ their deliverances are legally authoritative. We are to do both things. But if the question were raised, which of these two great complementary truths now deserves the more attention and enforcement, the answer must be: the laxity of practice and discipline growingly prevalent in the Church, and the radical and law-contemning temper of society at large, require the special inculcation of the necessity of obedience to the scriptural deliverances of the courts which Christ appointed ministerially to represent his government in the Church.

Objections to the foregoing argument :

1. From the analogy of civil courts.

(1.) The *in thesi* deliverances of a church-court are mere *obiter dicta*, and therefore possess no authoritativeness. Answer: *Obiter dicta* are the opinions of a judge, uttered in passing, which are not essential to the decision. It is impossible to regard the solemn acts of a deliberative body, arrived at upon discussion, as mere *obiter dicta*.

(2.) The only authoritative function of a court is to apply law in judicial cases. Answer: First, our church-courts are partly deliberative and partly judicial. The analogy, therefore, fails. Secondly, even in civil courts judges discharge a declaratory function in stating the law before it is applied judicially to a concrete case involving actual process. Thirdly, the nature, spheres and ends of civil and ecclesiastical courts are so different that no real analogy exists between them. The former are natural and secular, the latter supernatural and spiritual. Appeals to an analogy so deceptive ought to be abandoned.

2. The doctrine that *in thesi* deliverances of church-courts are possessed of legal authority makes the courts infallible. It is the Romish theory of the infallibility of the Church, and grievous tyranny over the conscience must be the result. Answer:

(1.) I maintain only that some, not all, *in thesi* deliverances of our church-courts are legally authoritative. The courts are fallible and may err in their deliverances. But they may, under the guidance of the Spirit, deliver the law of Christ. In that case only are their deliverances authoritative.

(2.) A distinction must be taken between the infallibility of the *persons*, and that of the *deliverances*, of the courts. The persons who compose the courts are fallible. The difference is between inspired and uninspired teachers. The ordinary preacher may err in attempting to declare God's word. The Apostle could not. In the latter case the inspiration was both in the teacher and in the thing taught. In the case of the uninspired teacher, the inspiration may be in the thing taught, and is in it when he truly delivers the inspired word, but it is not in himself. - He is not personally inspired and therefore is not personally infallible. He may teach exactly what is in the inspired word, and then the thing he utters is infallible ; but he, as a person, remains fallible, and on other occasions may teach that which is contrary to the inspired word, and then the thing he teaches is erroneous and unauthoritative. So is it with the courts in the exercise of their dogmatic power. This is the Protestant doctrine in contradistinction from that of Rome. She vests infallibility in the Church itself ; this doctrine, in the inspired word alone. She arrogates to the Church the power to create substantive additions to the Scriptures by virtue of the permanent gift of inspiration ; this doctrine restricts the Church, in her teaching function, to the utterance of the words of Scripture and of logical and therefore necessary inferences from them. I deny infallibility to the Church, but affirm it of those deliverances of the Church which exactly coincide with the divine word. To deny the infallibility and therefore the authoritativeness of *such* deliverances is to deny the infallibility and authoritativeness of God's word itself.

(3.) If all *in these* deliverances of church-courts are unauthoritative because the courts are fallible, it would follow that, for the same reason, all judicial decisions are unauthoritative—so far as they affect the conscience.

3. The doctrine that *in these* deliverances of church-courts may be possessed of legal authority makes man's deliverances bind the conscience, which is intolerable tyranny. Answer :

(1.) I only maintain that these deliverances bind the conscience when they coincide with the statements of God's word as interpreted in our standards. In that case they are not man's deliv-

erances, but God's. The instrument of utterance alone is human—the utterance is divine. To impose the doctrines and commandments of men upon the conscience—that is tyranny. To impose the doctrines and commandments of God upon the conscience—that is not tyranny; that is the requirement of obedience to “the perfect law of liberty,” and in that obedience the highest freedom of the soul consists.

(2.) Conscience is not a supreme judge in relation to the government which Christ has established in his Church and administers through it. As to man and man's laws, it is supreme; as to God and God's laws, it is not.

(3.) The Holy Ghost speaking in the Scripture is the supreme Judge. When therefore a church-deliverance is consonant to Scripture, the Holy Ghost as supreme judge speaks through it to the conscience (Conf. of Faith, C. I., Sec. X).

(4.) The authority of the Scriptures is paramount to that of conscience. Conscience as affected by sin, is an erring rule; the Scriptures, an unerring. The decisions of conscience, as God's primal revelation of duty to man, must be judged and corrected by the word as the latest expression of his will. The subjection of the conscience to the Scriptures is its subjection to God. When therefore a church-deliverance is consonant to the Scriptures, the conscience must be bound by it, or be disobedient to God.

(5.) Granted, that church courts are fallible: so also is the individual judgment. Here then are two fallible and fluctuating elements. But there must be an infallible and unfluctuating element, or stable rule is impossible. That element is the word of God. Now a church-deliverance either expresses that infallible element or not. If it does not, the conscience cannot be bound, for God's authority is not uttered. If it does, the conscience is bound, because God's authority is imposed upon it. And it is bound, in that case, whether the individual judges be is or is not bound. No man can be discharged from the duty of submitting to God's will, because of his private convictions.

(6.) The Church does not and cannot bind the conscience, but the deliverance of the Church may. It does, when it communi-

cates God's will. The conscience is not related to the Church, nor to the will of the Church, as Church, but to God and to God's will. He alone is the Lord of the conscience. The conscience is bound not because the Church speaks, but because God speaks in the Church's deliverance, when that deliverance exactly represents his word. Then, and then only, *Vox ecclesiæ, vox Dei.*

4. It is denied that any decisions, *in thesi* or judicial, terminate on the conscience or exert any binding influence upon it. They terminate, it is said, on the external, ecclesiastical sphere, and affect only church relations. Their force is exhausted in the forum by the visible Church; the forum of conscience is untouched. Answer:

(1.) This theory is intelligible. It is more clear and consistent than that which makes all ecclesiastical decisions affect the conscience, and yet affirms that judicial decisions alone are authoritative. But if it is more self-consistent, it is more radical. A theory which places conscience beyond the influence of all decisions of church-courts is revolutionary.

(2.) This is the real issue underlying this whole discussion, and must be looked squarely in the face. Of course, if outward ecclesiastical relations alone are affected by the decisions of the courts, only judicial decisions are legally authoritative, for they only affect ecclesiastical relations so as to produce definite results. But if the decisions of the church courts terminate also on the conscience, it cannot be true that judicial decisions alone have the binding force of law.

(3.) This theory is disproved by the very nature of all church-power as spiritual. The exercise of it is in the spiritual sphere primarily and chiefly, and consequently conscience must be the principal object on which it terminates.

(4.) It is also disproved by the end sought in the infliction of censures. That end includes the spiritual good of the offender, and if so, the conscience must be operated upon in order to its attainment.

(5.) It is also inconsistent with itself, as is seen by considering the judicial censure of admonition. Only relations are affected by judicial decisions, it is said; hence they are authoritative.

But here is a judicial decision which terminates on no relation, and yet it must be admitted to be authoritative. Admonition severs no relation. If it be urged, that it affects relations prospectively, by way of warning, I reply, that the warning is addressed to the conscience and may prove so effective upon the conscience as to lead the offender to repentance, and so his church-relations may remain permanently unaffected. The hypothesis is wrecked upon the censure of admonition.

(6.) Our standards assign to church-courts the power to "decide cases of conscience." Here are decisions which are expressly said to terminate on the conscience; and it is noteworthy that they are *in theai* decisions. If it be said, that these decisions teach the conscience, but do not enforce law upon it, that supposition is overthrown by the word "*decide*." The law is declared. Further, the teaching of God's law binds the conscience.

(7.) Against this theory I plead the testimony of Scripture as to the power of the Church to bind and loose—to retain sins and to remit them, when she decides in precise accordance with the divine word. This language would have no meaning, if conscience be not chiefly the sphere in which church-censures operate. How the retention and remission of sins affect relations only is inconceivable.

5. Each individual is entitled to judge whether the deliverances of the courts declare the law of God; consequently, these deliverances cannot bind the conscience: the individual conscience is supreme. Answer:

(1.) The argument is: the individual must be the judge; therefore he cannot be bound. But suppose the individual judges that the court truly declares God's law. He is then certainly bound. Now this concurrence is not only possible, but probable. Surely, in the majority of cases our church-courts would truly declare God's law; and surely, in the majority of cases the individual servants of Christ would judge that the courts truly declare that law. Moreover, the presumption is a powerful one that in the majority of cases this coincidence will occur, arising from the fact that the consentient judgments of all the members of a court are more likely to be right than the judgment of an individual.

When the concurrence takes place between the deliverance of a court and the individual judgment, the conscience of the individual must be bound. Here then we have instances—plenty of them—which negative the affirmation that as the individual must judge whether the courts declare God's law, the deliverances of the courts cannot possess legal authority over the conscience.

(2.) There is an analogy between this case and the relation of the individual to the preaching of the gospel. The individual must judge whether the truth is declared; but when he judges that the preacher delivers the truth, his conscience is certainly bound.

So in the case of denominational differences. The individual must judge which of the conflicting sects holds the truth; but the truth must be somewhere, and when he perceives it as held by some one denomination, his conscience is bound by it, and his duty is to attach himself to that body of Christians.

Although, therefore, each individual is entitled to judge whether the deliverances of church-courts are consonant to the word of God or not, still it is true that when a deliverance truly decides that word, he ought to be bound by it, and when his judgment is that such is the fact, he is bound by it.

II. The second argument is derived from the fact that our Constitution itself is a digest of *in thesi* decisions, and is liable to be amended by *in thesi* decisions.

It will require no discussion to prove that every part of our Constitution was formed by bodies acting in a deliberative capacity and voting upon the propositions of which it consists, apart from judicial cases. Every decision was reached *in thesi*. If, then, no *in thesi* decision is possessed of legal authority, it follows that our Constitution itself is destitute of legal authority; that is, that our fundamental law is not law, but only solemn advice! And then where would be the authority to institute judicial process, and to pronounce those judicial decisions which, we are told, constitute the principal acts of church-courts which possess legal authority?

III. The third argument is grounded in the principle that all church-power is declarative or didactic.

Church-power is defined in our standards to be spiritual, ministerial, and declarative. By this it is not meant that the power is partly spiritual, partly ministerial, and partly declarative. It is wholly spiritual, wholly ministerial, and wholly declarative. There is therefore no difference as to authority between judicial and *in thesi* decisions. They both derive the sole authority which they can possess from the fact that Christ's authority is declared by them. Otherwise they are founded upon human authority, and are therefore null and void. It is true that judicial decisions are specifically distinguished from *in thesi* deliverances, in that they are pronounced upon particular cases, and, for the most part, terminate on external relations; but they determine these cases and relations only as declarative of the law and authority of Christ. Generically, therefore, both classes of decisions are the same. They are both authoritative when they truly represent Christ's authority. Neither is authoritative, when his authority is not declared, his will not taught. An unjust, because unscriptural and unconstitutional, judicial decision may indeed sever an ecclesiastical relation in the merely external sphere, but it is an exercise of only human authority, and is therefore illegitimate and tyrannical. It is, to all spiritual purposes, void.

The deliverance of the last Assembly is chargeable with two defects: first, it virtually strips judicial decisions of their authoritative element, viz., the didactic or declarative, and at the same time pronounces them authoritative; secondly, it attributes to *in thesi* deliverances the authoritative element, viz., the didactic or declarative, and pronounces them unauthoritative!

IV. The fourth argument against the last Assembly's deliverance is that it would reduce our church-courts, so far as they are deliberative and endowed with dogmatic power, to the *status* of Congregationalist Associations.

1. All *in thesi* deliverances, says the last Assembly, are only advisory. But the dogmatic function is exercised in framing *in thesi* deliverances; therefore our courts, when discharging the

dogmatic function, are only advisory bodies. What is that, so far as it goes, but Congregationalism?

2. Rule enters generically into church-power, and pervades every department of business assigned to a church-court. The dogmatic function, therefore, is a ruling function. A court performs it as a body of rulers, not as a convention of preachers. The element, rule, must consequently enter into *in thesi* deliverances; and the conclusion is that they cannot be merely advisory. The opposite view is un-Presbyterian and Congregationalist.

3. But the courts may and do advise, it will be said. Yes; God advises sometimes. All rulers advise sometimes. But to advise sometimes, at discretion, and to be able to do nothing but advise, except when enforcing judgment, are very different things.

V. The fifth argument is, that the last Assembly's deliverance denies to our church-courts the function of Authoritative Interpretation of law.

1. This is contrary to the doctrine of our standards, which affirms that the courts "are appointed thereunto."

2. It is contrary to the precedents of the Presbyterian Church. The *in thesi* deliverance of this very Assembly in answer to the overture of the Synod of Texas, touching women-preaching, is a case exactly in point.

3. It is contrary to the catholic doctrine of standard Presbyterian writers.

VI. The sixth argument is that the deliverance complained of would tend to multiply judicial cases and engender litigation.

1. Because Presbyterians will not be satisfied with advice as a resolution of difficult and contested questions. It would settle nothing.

2. Because the only method of securing authoritative decisions from the superior courts, would be the presentation of actual judicial cases.

VII. The seventh argument is, that the deliverance in question is inconsistent with the express law of our standards.

1. "It belongeth to Synods and Councils, ministerially, to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience." (Conf.

of Faith, 6, xxxi., § ii.) These determinations are discriminated from diatactic and judicial determinations, which are immediately afterwards formally mentioned. They are therefore *in these* determinations in the dogmatic sphere. Now of *all* these determinations, dogmatic, diatactic, and judicial, it is declared: "which decrees and determinations, if consonant to the word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission." (*Ibidem.*) The authoritativeness of *in these* determinations, when consonant to the word of God, is placed on the same foot with that of diatactic and judicial, when similarly conditioned. They cannot therefore "be considered as only advisory and monitory." The inference is plain as to the last Assembly's deliverance.

2. The same line of argument holds good in regard to the words of our Form of Government, C. v., Sec. ii., Art. ii., in which the jurisdiction of our church-courts is treated as the same with that of Synods and Councils as defined in the Confession of Faith.

Concerning the decision of the Synod of Jerusalem, I have to say:

(1) If we give up our appeal to it, we abandon the main scriptural support for our system of authoritative courts, and play into the hands of the Congregationalists.

(2) The body of Presbyterian writers have denied the inspiration of the Synod's decision; the body of Congregationalists have affirmed it. The fact is significant.

(3) If the *in these* decision of the Synod was inspired, that would make nothing against the authoritativeness of the *in these* deliverances of our church-courts, when consonant to the word of God; for if they truly declare the inspired word, it is all one as if the inspired apostles themselves gave the deliverance. Where is the difference? We have, said Chrysostom, we have Paul and Peter and James and John in their writings.

3. Our Form of Government (Chap. v., Sec. vi., Art. v.) assigns to the General Assembly power "to decide in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline." This function is discriminated from the judicial. The inference is that the decisions mentioned are all made *in these*, and, consequently, such

in thesi decisions cannot be merely advisory. They are authoritative, from the nature of the case.

This concludes the discussion of the first aspect of the main question, namely, Are some *in thesi* deliverances of our church-courts possessed of legal authority? I have thus endeavored to prove the affirmative.

The second aspect of the main question is, Do some *in thesi* deliverances of superior courts impose an obligation upon the courts having original jurisdiction to institute judicial process?

In regard to this I lay down the proposition: When, and only when, the *in thesi* deliverances of superior courts, touching offences, are consonant to the law of God as interpreted in our standards, they impose an obligation upon courts having original jurisdiction to institute judicial process, in relation to cases which may come under that law.

Arguments in Support of this Proposition.

I. The preceding argument, if valid, necessitates this conclusion. If some *in thesi* deliverances are authoritative declarations of law, some of them may be authoritative declarations of law touching offences. That being granted, it follows that they ought to be enforced; else they are mere advice, which is contrary to the supposition. If it be said that they may be authoritative declarations of law, and yet exert no binding force, I reply: A contradiction emerges. Nothing but what is law can exert a binding force; and what is law must bind. No distinction can obtain between what is legally authoritative and what is binding.

II. Church-courts, following the word of God as interpreted in our standards, have power to discharge the imperative function of law, as well in its prospective and categorical form, as in its retrospective and penal form. Like conscience they have their categorical as well as their penal imperative—they can say: Thou shalt not, as well as, Thou art condemned. And when like it, their deliverances reflect God's law, they are as authoritative in forbidding offences, as in censuring offenders. In either case, their sole authority lies in their consonance to God's law.

If it be said: The Constitution sufficiently discharges the

categorical imperative function, and therefore authoritative *in these* deliverances of church-courts, performing the same office, are superfluous and unnecessary, I answer :

1. It is universally admitted that the courts may declare law. This declarative function cannot be limited to the disciplinary application of the law ; it includes the prohibitory.

2. As well might it be said : The gospel with sufficient clearness sets forth the terms of salvation ; therefore the preaching function is superfluous and unnecessary ; it is enough that the Scriptures be read.

The following are some of the occasions for the discharge of this function by church-courts :

(1.) Ignorance of the law on the part of church-members or of church-sessions.

(2.) Negligence in enforcing the law on the part of courts of first resort.

(3.) Division of opinion in lower courts—especially Sessions, perhaps causing inability to act.

(4.) Want of uniformity in the practice of neighboring Sessions, it may be in the Church at large.

(5.) Requests from the lower courts to the higher, authoritatively to interpret the law—a thing of ordinary occurrence.

(6.) The superior wisdom and knowledge of the higher courts, especially of the supreme court, make the discharge of this function proper, and sometimes necessary.

Guards against Misconstruction of this Position.

1. The original jurisdiction of the General Assembly is limited to cases of offence occurring in the presence of the court ; and they are cases without process.

2. There is a palpable distinction between the upper courts requiring the lower to institute process, as contingent upon the commission of offences specified, and their requiring the lower to institute process against certain individuals as actual offenders.

There is some analogy between this general requirement for which I contend, and that made by a civil court upon a grand jury. The Judge does not say, Gentlemen of the Jury, you must

find a true bill against this or that individual; but, Gentlemen of the Jury, I have declared to you the law; if, in your judgment, this or that individual is guilty of an offence against it, it will be your duty to find a true bill against him.

3. The infamous *Ipsa Facto* deliverance of 1866 finds no justification in the view here maintained. That involved a usurpation by a General Assembly of the original jurisdiction of Presbyteries. This view warrants nothing so monstrous.

III. Sessions are entitled to the authoritative support of the higher courts, especially of the General Assembly as the supreme court, in their confessedly difficult attempts to declare and apply the law in our Constitution in relation to offences. This can only be extended through *in thesi* deliverances.

IV. Uniformity of opinion and action in regard to offences can only be effectually secured by authoritative *in thesi* deliverances of the superior courts, especially of the General Assembly as sustaining a broad and catholic relation to the interests of the whole Church.

V. The deliverance of the last Assembly, denying the authoritativeness of any *in thesi* deliverances of the church-courts, and consequently their competency to exert an enforcing influence upon the prosecution of offences by courts of first resort, is out of harmony with the current of Precedents in the Old School Presbyterian Church of this land.

I refer to the action of the General Assembly of 1810, in the celebrated case of the Rev. William C. Davis. (See Baird's Digest, Book vii., Part ix., Sec. 85.) After by *in thesi* decisions condemning the doctrinal errors of Mr. Davis's book, "The Gospel Plan," the Assembly thus concludes: "And the Assembly do judge, and do hereby declare, that the preaching or publishing of them ought to subject the person or persons so doing to be dealt with by their respective Presbyteries, according to the discipline of the Church, relative to the propagation of errors."

The same position is maintained in the case of Craighead (*Ibid.*, Book vii., Part x., Sec. 92, Head 6, Par. (c); also, Book viii., Part iii., C. i., Sec. 42, Par. (g).)

The same doctrine was held by our own Church until the As-

sembly of 1879. The action of that Assembly is exceptional, and ought to be modified.

On the day following, Dr. Woodrow replied to Dr. Girardeau's argument in a speech perhaps of equal length, and was heard with the same profound attention that was accorded to his colleague. It is not too much to say that the weight and clearness of his reasoning carried conviction, for the time being at least, to the most of his hearers. His is not the impassioned eloquence of the first speaker, but he addresses the understanding, which may, perhaps, be more suitable to the deliberative council. Dr. Woodrow's speech was very effective, and, had the vote been taken immediately, would perhaps have carried the house. The abstract now presented will give no adequate idea of what he said, the state of his health having prevented his preparing it for over two months.

ABSTRACT OF DR. WOODROW'S SPEECH.

After referring to the fact that I was the only person present who had voted for the paper adopted by the last Assembly, I expressed my great pleasure in listening to Dr. Girardeau, and stated that I agreed with him in very much that he had said, as, for example, respecting the importance of the question, the meaning of the deliverance of 1879, the supremacy of God over the conscience, the power of the Church (though not of the General Assembly by itself) to give to its utterances the force of law, and the administrative power of our church courts. I regretted my inability to agree with him throughout; but was glad that the views he held had been presented by one so able, and who had, as he had told us, so carefully and intensely and continuously studied the subject during the greater part of the past year. We may, therefore, assume that all has been said that could properly be said in support of the peculiar views which he holds.

The overture of the Synod of South Carolina asks us to "repeal or seriously modify" the essential part of the last Assembly's deliverance. Believing that the last Assembly was right, I must advocate the adoption of the minority report.

In the paper objected to, it is said that certain deliverances mentioned are not to be "accepted and enforced as law by judicial process," because they "were all deliverances *in thesi*, and therefore can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory." The Assembly here asserts that the specified deliverances have not the force of law, because they belong to a class which has no such force. What is true of the class, is true of each and every member of it.

The question before us is not, Could an *in thesi* deliverance, under any circumstances and by any body of church rulers, ever be framed so that it would have the force of law? but, Can our General Assembly, or other single court, existing under our constitution and having its powers prescribed and limited by that constitution, give to its *in thesi* deliverances the force of law? Were the Church without a constitution, its presbyters, assembled in mass or by their representatives, could immediately and without limitation exercise all the power intrusted to it by its Divine Head; its *in thesi* deliverances would constitute its confession of faith, its rules of government and discipline—its standards. But when a constitution has been agreed upon, this is all changed; then no power can be exercised except in accordance with the compact called the constitution. True, the confession of faith may be changed; the form of government may be modified; new definitions of an "offence" may be given—all of which shall have the force of law; but only in the manner prescribed in the constitution, or in accordance with the fundamental principles already stated. In civil affairs, the point is well illustrated by the difference between a constitutional convention and the legislature or General Assembly. The latter body, although it represents exactly the same people who were represented in the former, yet cannot exercise the same power; all that it may do must be in accordance with the authority and within the limits prescribed in the constitution framed by the convention. So it is in the Church. If we neglect this distinction, we shall certainly go astray.

It is important to show still further to what the question before us does not relate.

1. It does not relate to the source and character of church

power in general. We all agree that it is bestowed by the Head of the Church, and that it is exclusively ministerial and declarative.

2. It is not a question as to the power of the Church to bind the conscience. As towards God, there is no such thing as freedom of conscience; on the other hand, God alone can bind the conscience. Because God is Lord of the conscience, his infallible word binds it. It does this by whomsoever uttered: by church, minister, church court, or child. And any utterance of a church court, if consonant to that word, is to be "received with reverence and submission, not only for its agreement with the word," but "also for the power whereby it is made, as being an ordinance of God." But who shall decide whether or not an utterance is "consonant to the word"? The judgment of each man for himself; and, if the private judgment is that the utterance is not consonant to the word, the conscience is not bound. We exercise this judgment at our peril, and are responsible to God for our mistakes; but such exercise cannot be escaped or evaded, or the right to it denied. Dr. Girardeau has properly acted in accordance with this doctrine: he does not regard the deliverance of the last Assembly as consonant to the word, and therefore he refuses to allow his conscience to be bound by it. But the question before us relates to the enforcement of law by judicial process—to discipline. The primary and immediate object of discipline is to determine the relations of its subject to the visible Church. These are absolutely fixed thereby, without reference to the conscientious convictions of the supposed offender. So far as the disciplinary utterance coincides with the word of God, implicitly or explicitly, it binds the conscience; but of this coincidence each must judge for himself. But when judicial sentence—say, of excommunication—is pronounced upon a supposed offender, that decision binds absolutely as to relations to the church; the person stands excommunicated, whether really guilty of the alleged offence or not, and whether the alleged offence is an offence in God's sight or not. All admit that synods and councils—church courts—may err; the law as contained in our standards may be wrong, and church courts may err in administering it; hence it is possible in any given case that the judicial sentence is wrong;

does it, when wrong, bind the conscience of the person sentenced? Clearly not; but who is to judge? Each man for himself, as he shall answer to God. But yet the sentence binds—fixes—his relations to the Church. This is wholly independent of his private judgment and his conscientious convictions. The court is not to stop to inquire as to his views, but must judge for itself, according to the law and the evidence; and its decision, right or wrong, *binds*—not the supposed offender's conscience, but his relations to the church. Further, it may be added, that when the members of a court are sitting as judges, it is no part of their duty to consider whether the law is right or wrong, but simply to learn what the law is, and to apply it in the case before them. They have already, when being invested with office, solemnly expressed their approval of the standards containing the law; and if they think the law in any respect not exactly what it should be, it is their right and their duty to seek to have it changed in a constitutional manner; but so long as they are sitting as judges, it is the law as it is, and not as they think it should be, that they are bound to administer.

It is never enough for us to learn merely what the church, councils, ministers, have said—all these together cannot bind my conscience; it is free from them all; it sits in judgment upon all their decisions; it recognises as its supreme Lord God alone.

3. In the next place, the present discussion does not involve a consideration of the *contents* of *in these* deliverances. The question is, Can the General Assembly, under our Constitution, give the force of law to any utterance by making it an *in these* deliverance? We have been told that if the utterance is consonant to the word of God, then it has the force of law when made as a deliverance; and that in such a case we cannot distinguish between the contents and the authority of the court making the utterance. But nothing is easier. For example, let a child utter one of the Ten Commandments; all admit that the commandment binds; now, does it bind because the child uttered it, or because it is God's word? What is the source of the binding power? So, if the Assembly utters the commandment, the source of its

binding power is not the Assembly, but the Lord who spoke from Sinai.

4. Further, the question is not as to the power of judicial decisions. If it were, a modification, or at least an explanation, of the last Assembly's words might reasonably be asked for; because these are at least ambiguous, if not erroneous. If the Assembly meant to say that the deliverances of a church court, when sitting in a judicial capacity, have legal authority outside of the case under trial, it was in error. True, the decision does determine the case in hand; but it has not the binding force of law in other cases. Ordinarily, the judicial deliverance is entitled to more weight than a deliverance *in thesi*, for the reason that in a judicial case all the principles involved are most carefully discussed in successive courts from the lowest to the highest, and by those who are stimulated by personal interests to the utmost zeal in bringing forward all the considerations that ought to affect it; while, in many cases at least, deliverances *in thesi* are adopted by our Assembly without a moment's consideration, except from the committee reporting them. But neither the judicial decision, as a precedent, nor the *in thesi* deliverance, has the force of law. A church court may seek for additional light by the study of both; but it can never escape the responsibility of at last interpreting the law for itself in the case it is trying. But this question is not before us.

The only question we are now called on to decide is, Is the major premise in the following syllogism true?

No deliverance *in thesi* can be accepted and enforced as law by judicial process;

The deliverances of 1865, 1869, and 1877 are deliverances *in thesi*;

Therefore they cannot be so accepted and enforced.

The General Assembly of 1879, as we understand it, affirms; the Synod of South Carolina denies; which is right?

As this question is brought before us by the request contained in the overture from the Synod of South Carolina, that we "repeal, or

at least seriously modify," this part of the last Assembly's deliverance, it would seem to be our proper course to examine carefully and in detail the reasons urged by the Synod why its request shall be granted. If the Assembly erred, it went fearfully astray, if we are to believe the Synod. That body tells us that the Assembly's deliverance is either "utterly illogical" or "unconstitutional"; that it "is contrary to the genius of the Presbyterian system, and the historic doctrine of our Church"; that it "tends to degrade the authority and lessen the influence of the Assembly"; that it "takes away the key of doctrine from our church courts"; that "it contravenes a great principle laid down in the Confession of Faith"; that it "opposes the doctrine of our standards"; that "it is inconsistent with express provisions of our constitution." Surely, if the venerable Synod of South Carolina is right in this terrible indictment, this Assembly ought to hasten to exercise all its power in obliterating from its records that which deserves to be thus denounced.

The first reason given by the Synod why the request for repeal should be granted is as follows:

1. Because it makes judicial decisions, as contradistinguished from didactic decisions, something different from and more than didactic; which is the same thing as to make them different from and more than declarative decisions, and so the Constitution is contradicted, which represents *all* church power as simply ministerial and declarative. There is, it is conceded, a difference between judicial and deliberative decisions growing out of the different circumstances which condition them; but to make a distinction between judicial and didactic decisions is to assign to the judicial something more than a declarative enforcement upon the conscience of the law of God. Either it is held that didactic and judicial decisions are the same, or it is held that they are different. If it be held that they are the same, the reduction in this deliverance is utterly illegal, and ought to be corrected. If it be held that they are different, we affirm the unconstitutionality of the discrimination.

Here we have the position maintained, that since the utterances of church courts are the same in one respect, they cannot be different in other respects; that since they are all generically the same, they cannot be specifically different. The Assembly ascribes didactic or teaching power and also disciplinary power to church courts; it claims for them that they hold the key of doctrine and

also the key of discipline; it discriminates between these different things; and the Synod of South Carolina "affirms the unconstitutionality of the discrimination"! All the rightful utterances of our church courts are "ministerial and declarative," and so all belong to the same genus; but a judicial utterance is one primarily intended to apply Christ's truth to the determination of the relation of a person or class to his visible Church, while a didactic utterance is one primarily intended to teach Christ's truth—hence the two species. Under the genus, "ministerial and declarative," are the two species, "judicial" and "didactic." They agree in being ministerial declarations of Christ's will; they differ in the end immediately aimed at. The didactic utterance may, indeed, incidentally aid in reaching a right judicial decision, but that is not its aim as didactic; the judicial decision may incidentally teach, but teaching is not its immediate aim. Therefore the Assembly was right when it distinguished between the different things, didactic and judicial utterances; and the Synod of South Carolina has no ground for the charge that it was either "utterly illogical" or "unconstitutional." It is as if the Synod had gravely condemned one for pointing out the specific differences between the palmetto and the apple. Are they not both trees? If, then, it be held that they are different, the Synod should be ready to "affirm the unconstitutionality of the discrimination." Thus far, the "utterly illogical" character and the "unconstitutionality" are to be found, not in the last Assembly's deliverance, but in the Synod of South Carolina's overture.

But the Synod is not only illogical; it also directly contradicts itself. As we have seen, in the first ground, it charges the Assembly with violating the constitution in discriminating between the power of teaching and the power of discipline; in claiming for church courts both the key of doctrine and the key of discipline, and saying that these keys are two and not one. Now see what the Synod says in its third ground:

3. Because said deliverance takes away the key of doctrine from the General Assembly and the other courts of the Church, and retains in their hands the key of discipline alone.

Poor Assembly—the Synod had just denounced it for retaining

both keys; now it denounces it as having thrown away one and retaining only the other!

The second ground is:

2. Because it reduces the General Assembly and the other courts of our Church, so far as they are deliberative bodies, to the *status* of Congregational Associations, possessed only of advisory power, is contrary to the genius of the Presbyterian system and the historic doctrine of our Church as to the binding force of such deliberative decisions as are expository of constitutional law; and tends to degrade the authority and lessen the influence of the Assembly.

If it is true that the Assembly has, in accordance with our Constitution, pointed out certain characteristics which belong equally to our church courts and to Congregational Associations, what harm has it done? No one will deny that our General Assembly and a Congregational Association have many characteristics in common: they both consist in part of ministers, both consult and deliberate respecting the good of their churches, both give advice, both bear testimony against evils, etc. It cannot be very wrong to recognise the advisory power of our courts when this is so expressly provided for in our standards, as, for example, in the section on "References." Shall we, to show how different we are from Congregationalists, to make our courts unlike Congregational Associations, wrest, distort, trample on our Constitution, and claim legal authority not there granted?

The charges in the rest of this ground are too vague to need an extended reply. We have as our guide as to the question before us something definite—our Constitution. We act in accordance with the "genius of Presbyterianism" when we learn the exact meaning of our fundamental law and act accordingly; authority is degraded and influence is lessened, not by faithfully observing the prescribed limits of the law to which we have professed allegiance, but by grasping at and exercising unlawful power, which is tyranny to which the Presbyterian freeman will never and ought never to submit.

The fourth ground is:

4. Because it contravenes the great principle laid down in the Confession of Faith, consecrated by the blood of our martyred ancestors, and until now well-nigh universally recognised among us: that good and necessary

consequences from the doctrines and precepts of the Divine Word, or from the Constitution of our Church, are of equal authority with the Word and the Constitution; and when declared by a Church court in any capacity, whether judicial or deliberative, must bind the conscience, and can no more be regarded as simply advisory and monitory than are the Word itself and our Constitution. They have legal authority because they *are* law.

We are not told here who denies the doctrine of "good and necessary consequences." Certainly it was not denied or doubted by any member of the last Assembly; just as certainly as it is not denied or doubted by any one here present. Further, God's truth always binds the conscience, by whomsoever it may be declared; but it is as God's truth that it binds, not as a declaration made by this or that body. As the Synod truthfully intimates, whatever is implicitly in law, as well as what is explicitly there, is *law*. But what is implicitly in a law is for the court trying a case to decide, and not for the General Assembly in a supposed case.

The fifth ground presented by the Synod is:

5. Because it opposes the doctrine of our standards, long practically acted on in our Church, that the church courts are appointed by Christ to be authoritative expounders of his law contained in the Scriptures, and, as we believe, reflected in our Constitution. It is admitted that they have no original power to make law, but they can declare it, and it cannot, consistently with our standards, be held that the only office of exposition by which the courts ministerially declare Christ's law is discharged by them when sitting in a strictly judicial capacity. But if the courts act by Christ's appointment when they, in their deliberative capacity, solemnly declare his law, they are entitled, in the discharge of that function, not only to be respected as advisers, but to be obeyed as authoritative expounders of law. Their deliberative decisions, so far as they furnish the right construction of the law, exert a legal force upon the conscience.

The points here presented have been in the main covered by what has already been said. The courts have authority as far as it is given them by the Constitution; but if they step beyond the limits there set, their acts are utterly powerless, and instead of being respected and obeyed, they are to be resisted as usurpers of that which does not belong to them. True, whenever their utterances "furnish the right construction of the law," they bind

the conscience; not because they are their utterances, but because they furnish the right construction. But then, we must ask again, Who shall decide whether or not they do furnish the right construction?

The sixth ground is:

6. Because it makes it necessary, in order that an authoritative decision upon any point, either of doctrine or of morals, may be obtained from the General Assembly, or any other court, that judicial process in the courts of first resort be instituted, involving the case whose resolution is desired; and so a tendency to general litigation would be engendered in our churches. For it is not to be supposed that, having been accustomed to Presbyterian usages, they would be satisfied with mere Congregationalist advice. The action will in all probability issue in breeding contentions and multiplying judicial cases.

If the argument here has any force, then in all cases where the Constitution is not exactly as we think it should be, we may proceed at once to change it to suit our views, without regard to the lawful mode of effecting changes. But in this discussion we have nothing to do with what we may suppose will be the effect of adhering to the law; all that we have to do is to find out what is the law, and then faithfully to obey it. The Synod seems to imagine that all advice must be "Congregationalist," and tells us our churches will not be "satisfied with mere Congregationalist advice." I earnestly hope they will not; but that they will always listen with the utmost respect to good Presbyterian advice, when it is given them in the methods accurately set forth in our Constitution.

The last reason assigned by the Synod why we should repeal is as follows:

7. Because it is inconsistent with the following express provisions of our Constitution: "It belongeth to synods and councils ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience; to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of his Church * * * which decrees and determinations, [together with those which are judicial and just mentioned] if consonant with the word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission, not only for their agreement with the word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereto by his word." (Confession of Faith, Chapter 31, Section 2.) "They

[church courts] * * * may frame symbols of faith, bear testimony against error in doctrine and immorality in practice, within or without the pale of the Church, and decide cases of conscience." "They have power to establish rules for the government, discipline, worship, and extension of the Church." "They possess the right of requiring obedience to the laws of Christ." (Form of Government, Chapter 5, Section 2, Article 2.) "The General Assembly shall have power * * * to bear testimony against error in doctrine and immorality in practice, injuriously affecting the Church; to decide in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline." (Form of Government, Chapter 5, Section 6, Article 5.)

The argument here urged by the Synod is as follows:

Synods and Councils may frame symbols of faith, etc.;

The General Assembly is a Synod or Council;

Therefore the General Assembly may frame symbols of faith, etc.

The fallacy here is manifest: the middle term, that with which the extremes are compared, is equivocal or ambiguous. That term, Synod or Council, is used in two senses; in one case, it means the body of church rulers in general, unrestricted by constitutional limitations; in the other case, it means a body of church rulers restricted by such limitations. As our Form says, speaking of our church courts (Synods or Councils): "The jurisdiction of these courts is limited by the express provisions of the Constitution." Hence we have here a clear case of the "ambiguous middle"; and the Synod of South Carolina seeks to control our action by presenting us with a palpable "fallacy of equivocation," to use the technical language of logic. If the Synod's reasoning were correct, then a church session, which is a Synod or Council, has the right to "frame symbols of faith," "establish rules for the government, discipline, worship, and extension of the Church." So would the Presbytery, the Synod, the General Assembly, all of which are "Synods and Councils," "church courts." Then since the General Assembly has such power, why did our Church spend twenty years in revising our Book of Church Order, sending revision after revision to the Presbyteries for their action, if all the while it had the power itself to make such changes as it thought needful? And why does not this Assembly at once make such changes as it desires

in the Directory for Worship, now under revision, instead of expecting the next or some future Assembly to send it to the Presbyteries? Why all this circumlocution, this begging help from others in doing for you what you have the power, and therefore the duty, of doing yourselves? But this Assembly will not suffer itself to be misled by the Synod of South Carolina's surprising reasoning. The only part of this seventh ground that affects the question before us is the quotation from the Form of Government constituting the last sentence: "The General Assembly shall have power . . . to bear testimony against error [that is, it may teach, advise, and warn against it]. . . . to decide controversies [that is, judicial cases] respecting doctrine and discipline." And this is exactly the distinction made by the last Assembly, which the Synod assails.

It has thus been shown that the overture of the Synod of South Carolina is wrong in many of its statements, it is self-contradictory, it is utterly illogical; it presents no good reason why this Assembly should grant its request by "repealing or seriously modifying" the deliverance of the last.

The Synod seems to imagine that *in these* deliverances are degraded by being recognised as having only teaching power. But teaching is the highest function of the Church. Its great commission bids it "Go, TEACH." In the Church, discipline is wholly subordinate to doctrine. And, therefore, to pronounce *in these* deliverances "didactic," is to assign them the very highest place in the Church of Christ.

But now let us look at the positive reasons in favor of the answer given by the last Assembly, that no deliverance *in these* can be accepted and enforced as law by judicial process.

The only "proper object of judicial process" is "an offence"; hence the real question is, How can we find out what constitutes an offence? Our Book of Discipline, recently adopted after careful scrutiny of every word, answers: "Nothing ought to be considered by any court as an offence, or admitted as a matter of accusation, which cannot be proved to be such from Scripture, as interpreted in these standards." Not, "as interpreted by the

General Assembly or other court," but "as interpreted in these standards." What could be plainer? This single passage ought to settle the whole question. Is it not amazing, with this passage before us, that this discussion could have arisen as to the "legal authority" of *in these* deliverances?

But suppose there is doubt as to the meaning of the standards, what are we to do then? Shall we not ask the opinion of the highest court? and when it has given an interpretation, does that not bind us as the true meaning of the law? Our Book of Church Order answers these questions. In the Rules of Discipline, Chapter XIII., Section II., we have full instructions how to proceed in such cases. Lower courts may obtain interpretations from the higher, though it is held that generally "every court should fulfil its duty by exercising its judgment." When the higher court, in answer to an application from the lower, gives its interpretation and opinion, this answer is over and over again in the Rules of Discipline called "advice," "mere advice"; it cannot be enforced as law; it has no other than didactic power, and its accordance with the truth is to be determined by the court actually trying the case. If, on a reference, the higher court desires to do more, it can do so only by hearing and judging the case itself; it cannot direct the lower court what decision it must give, how it must interpret the law.

Now, when the Constitution thus carefully limits the power of a higher court, pronouncing its opinions and interpretations to be "mere advice" in all cases except those which it actually tries, is it credible that the same higher court could give the force of law to its interpretation by merely throwing it into an abstract form?—that it cannot, indeed, give its interpretation the force of law in the single case referred to it, but it can do so by issuing its opinion as an *in these* deliverance, which will then decide ten thousand cases, the single one which it is forbidden to decide included?

The jealous care with which the Constitution limits the higher courts in this respect is still further seen in its provisions as to "general review and control." The higher court may censure, may teach, advise, and warn; but however reprehensible the

course of the lower court, "in cases of process"—the only kind we are now concerned about—"in cases of process, no judgment of an inferior court shall be reversed, unless it be regularly brought up by appeal or complaint." Thus it is here expressly provided, as also in case of references, that binding legal effect can be given to no opinion of a court, except when that court itself hears and issues the cause.

These express limitations and express provisions of course cut off all other methods of legally affecting the judgment that has been given or is to be given by a court. The Constitution shows that the interpretations given of God's word in our standards are to be enforced as law by judicial process, and that nothing else can be; that interpretations may be obtained from the General Assembly, but that when obtained they are "mere advice"; and that no judgment of any court can be changed except by a higher court which actually tries the special case in accordance with the rules provided in the standards.

Thus by another route we have reached the conclusion, that the request of the Synod of South Carolina ought not to be granted, for the reason that the deliverance of the last Assembly was in exact accordance with the teachings of our Constitution.

We might go on to show the practical danger attending the Synod of South Carolina's doctrine. Give each church court the right to clothe its interpretations with the force of law, and all liberty is gone. As the sons of God, as those whom he has made free, it is our duty most jealously to guard our freedom, and to resist to the utmost every attempt to bring us under the yoke of bondage. Faithfully obey them that have the rule over you, so far as God has given them authority to rule; but beyond those limits, conscientiously disobey those who are usurping in God's name power which he has not bestowed.

It may be observed that I have not quoted the opinions of Calvin or other great men of the past. I claim to be second to no one in profound reverence for these distinguished men, or in gratitude to God for having given them to his Church. But the question we are discussing, as to the powers of our church courts

under our Constitution, cannot be determined by their opinions. And I cannot forget that, if I must accept the opinions of these Reformers and leaders, I must believe that Copernicus was a fool, as Luther pronounced him to be; that it is right to play nine-pins on Sunday, as Calvin is said to have done—or if that is an erroneous statement, that it is proper to punish violation of ecclesiastical laws by imprisonment, which Calvin certainly did; and that the civil magistrate “hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented and reformed,” etc.; and that those who “publish opinions or maintain such practices as are contrary to the light of nature or to the known principles of Christianity, . . . may lawfully be called to account and proceeded against by the censures of the Church, *and by the power* of the civil magistrate”—all of which Gillespie and Cunningham taught and maintained. As the question relates solely to the power of our church courts under the Constitution, I have sought to answer it solely by an appeal to the “word of God as interpreted in these standards.”

This debate began on the sixth day of the sessions, and the foregoing speech of Dr. Woodrow was delivered on the seventh day, in the morning.

In the evening session of that day Dr. H. M. Smith, of New Orleans, made a very able speech, of which an abstract follows here.

ABSTRACT OF DR. H. M. SMITH'S SPEECH.

1. There is one aspect of this question very important to Presbyteries, Sessions, and to all who are concerned in the administration of law. We ought to know the precise authoritative value of the spontaneous deliverances of the Assembly.

The deliverance of 1869, on *Worldly Amusements*, seems to have been intended to be law; that of 1879 explicitly denies that it can be enforced as law. If there be here a collision, the

usage of deliberative bodies which gives precedence to the latest decision would decide that difficulty. But the discussion of this question has started another much more weighty, *namely*, On what footing does this whole class of decisions stand? This is a pressing question. From year to year overtures asking similar decisions are sent up in large numbers from every part of the Church. This right to overture cannot be denied nor limited. And thus we are accumulating a great number of decisions, on topics of the most valued character, *in thesi* as they are called, which in certain circumstances might come to have a most important bearing on public and private interests. We ask, What is the relative authority of such decisions, as compared with the authority of our Constitution?

It is contended by some that the Assembly has the power to make enactments which are of equal authority with the requirements of the Constitution, and which can be enforced by judicial process. We cannot admit such a principle. If it were admitted, the first effect would be that we should witness in these annual deliverances a body of law growing up outside of the Constitution and independent of it, neutralising it, and making it obsolete. For such law, no patient plodding nor careful scrutiny is needed. They could be made at any time, for any purpose, and in any terms, and for the benefit of any interest that could secure a majority of votes. In such a case, the Constitution would in course of time become superfluous. It would be effectually suspended by the more convenient and more flexible system of Assembly law.

2. Again, if the deliverances of the Assembly are to be clothed with such authority, its relations to the Constitution will be radically changed. Practically, it would put the Assembly above the Constitution. The power that creates law is higher than the law. Give the Assembly the power to make law of equal authority with the Constitution, and in the first instance you give it equal authority with that instrument. But inasmuch as the Constitution, when adopted, ceases to promulgate law, and the Assembly is continually promulgating law, its operation will be more extensive, and may be in directions never contem-

plated by the written law. It is no longer amenable to the Constitution. It cannot be restrained when the only other authority is no higher than its own. In short, it would be practically an irresponsible body.

The Papacy shows us the final outcome of such a theory of Church Government. See *Decretals*, P. 1., Dis. 40: "If a Pope, neglecting his own salvation and that of his brethren, is found to be remiss in his duties, indifferent, moreover, to good—which is more hurtful to himself and to all—notwithstanding he is leading numberless crowds of people with himself into the supreme bondage of hell, there to be punished with him forever by many stripes, yet let no mortal presume to rebuke him for his faults in this particular, since he who is to judge all can be judged by none, unless he is found astray from the faith; therefore, let the whole community of the faithful the more earnestly pray for his continual safety, inasmuch as they observe that after God, then salvation hangs suspended on the soundness of his person."

His jurisdiction is unlimited, because he only has the right to define it. The written Constitution is of less authority than the living voice which stands in the place of it. It follows, that the Church is at his mercy. God is the only refuge against his arbitrary power.

It may at first sight seem gratuitous to speak of this culmination of Papal absolutism in connexion with any form of Presbyterian tendency. But greed of power has not always been a stranger to Presbyterianism. We need look no further than the *Digest of the Northern Assembly* for an illustration. We need not go to the trouble of analysing the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Walnut Street church of Louisville, Ky., which is spread upon their *Digest*. (See *Moore's Digest*, p. 251.) The principle which forms the basis of papal absolutism—the power of the Pope to define the limits of his jurisdiction—is distinctly stated and avowed, as follows: "A spiritual court is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction. Its decision of that question is binding on the secular courts."

If it had said, "the secular arm," instead of "the secular courts," it would have used the exact phraseology of Romish law.

According to this decree, neither the secular courts nor the ecclesiastical are bound to ask whether such decision is sanctioned by the Constitution. The Assembly being "*the exclusive judge*," the Constitution is practically ignored. If the Assembly accepts this construction of its authority, what can hinder from the assertion of despotic authority when the occasion serves? Theoretically, nothing! And practically, as we all know, nothing has hindered it. Their enactments were published to the world, proclaiming, in 1861, new terms of membership; in 1865, new terms of communion for Southern Presbyterians; in 1866, their *ipso facto* acts of disfranchisement, and also their enactments for evicting Southern congregations from our houses of worship. All these things are contrary to the Constitution; but if the decisions of the Assembly are of equal authority, they may claim that they exercised only a legitimate right. Upon their theory, their claim is consistent. They do not admit that they had no authority to perpetrate those enormities. And they profess to feel injured when we suggest that such things should be repudiated.

But we who condemn such things cannot approve the principle which justifies them. We cannot place the Assembly—by vesting it with such authority—above the Constitution, without vesting it with the elements of irresponsible power and depriving ourselves of the safeguards of religious liberty.

3. It is claimed that the power of the Assembly to make law, which can be enforced by judicial process, is sustained by the assumption of arbitrary power on the part of the Council of Jerusalem. It is claimed that the Council—Acts xv.—bound the conscience of Christians to duties which, apart from the decision, would not have been of moral obligation, *viz.*, to abstain from eating blood, meat offered to idols, etc., and in this matter assumed the highest kind of authority. We must dissent from both parts of this proposition. In the first place, the injunction did *not* concern questions of things indifferent as to moral character. The practices condemned were the notorious badges of

heathenism throughout the world. Was it inventing a new "burden" to specify that practices which amounted to a profession of faith in idolatry, were inconsistent with the faith and fidelity of a believer in Christ? On the contrary, it was a duty so imperative that no conscience could fail to recognise it.

We look in vain for the tokens of an assumption of power by that Council. It was composed of Jews, men who had breathed from infancy the atmosphere of the Holy Land; men imbued with the traditions of the fathers; separated from the Gentiles by religious rites, a purer faith, and the cruelty of heathen domination; who saw the Messiah through the Old Testament dispensation and the Temple worship; who had never considered the Gentiles except as ceremonially and spiritually unclean; men who worshipped God in Christ according to the Temple ritual as long as the temple stood—it is these men who announce to the Gentiles the decision which puts them on a footing of perfect equality with Jewish believers in the Church of God. They practically say, "For ages our ritual has been the badge of the people of God. It will always be incumbent on us. He has called us under it. He has called you without it. We *do not* lay it on you. Publicly, and by a consistent life, profess your faith in Christ, and as equals in the kingdom of God, come and share with us the faith of Abraham, and the redemption of Christ Jesus!"

Where in the history of the world do we see a body of men rise so high above prejudices, tradition, national character, and religious habits of thought? It is a most signal token of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the plenitude of his power. It is perhaps the sublimest instance of self-abnegation the world has ever seen.*

*NOTE.—At the close of the debate Dr. Girardeau said: "The Council of Jerusalem is quoted by Dr. Smith. But all the *consensus* of theologians is against him. Our Church polity is based so largely on this Council, that if you remove its authority, you undermine our Presbyterian polity." See published report.

As there was no opportunity to correct this impression at the time, we beg to offer a few citations:

Calvin. Inst., B. 4, C. 10, § 2.: "The first thing in order and the

We also feel justified in exercising caution lest we give too much weight to the opinions of those Scotch divines who are quoted on this subject. Men's opinions of Church government are liable to be colored by their political opinions and surroundings. The influence of the feudal system had not disappeared in the days of Gillespie and Rutherford. All power flowed from the crown or the courts which represented it. In most cases the

chief thing in importance is, that the Gentiles were to retain their liberty, which was not to be disturbed; and that they were not to be annoyed with the observances of the law. . . . The reservation which immediately follows, is not a new law enacted by the Apostles, but a divine and eternal command of God against the violation of charity, which does not detract one iota from that liberty. It only reminds the Gentiles how they are to accommodate themselves to their brothers, and not to abuse their liberty for an occasion of offence."

Neander. *Planting and Training*, p. 79, note: "This Assembly required no reason why they should impose *so much*, but only why they should impose *no more* on the Gentile Christians."

Baumgarten. *History of Apostolic Church*, Vol. 2, p. 52: "An astonishment was felt to find among these injunctions which refer to what are usually designated 'indifferent matters,' a purely ethical one. But it is not with indifferent matters that this passage is concerned, but with what are essentially moral obligations, though indeed they here appear individualised."

It is well known that Dr. Thornwell did not base his theory of Presbyterian polity on that Council. In considering our polity he seems altogether to ignore it. He says, Vol. 4, p. 140: "The polity of the Church is nowhere minutely described, but it is treated as a thing well known. . . . The form was no novelty. It was an old, familiar thing in a new relation. That old thing was the synagogue, and there the elder was a ruler. And there were elders there who did nothing but rule."

And p. 137: "There is but one Church, a set of congregations bound together by the *nexus* of one parliament. Each congregation has every element of the universal Church, and the universal Church has no attribute which may not be found in each congregation."

According to Thornwell, the principle on which our Church polity is based, is quite independent of that Council, and would have been perfect had that Council never existed.

So also taught Dr. B. M. Palmer to his classes in the Seminary at Columbia. We might mention other eminent names, but these are enough to show the kind of the authority which supports the view we undertook to advocate.

privileges of the people were concessions from feudal lords. And in many instances the privileges of the Church depended on the patronage of the crown. It would be unreasonable to suppose that their ideas of government in the Church should be altogether free from the influence of such facts and precedents.

On the other hand, our point of view is entirely different. Among us the lower courts do not derive power from the higher: the reverse is the case. There is no concession of privilege, with us, from the courts to the people. The Constitution is a covenant between the churches themselves. It is at the same time a bond of union and a charter of rights. The Assembly is a meeting of representatives. Its powers are delegated and defined. It meets under the shelter the Constitution gives and the restraints it imposes. Before it meets the standard is already set up, by which its proceedings are to be tested and judged.

Our point of view being so widely different, is therefore a consideration which deprives of much of its force the opinion of Scotch authorities on a question like this.

4. We have but to look at the limitations under which the Assembly acts, to see that it was not originally intended to exercise such power as is now claimed for it. It is premised, that "synods and councils are liable to err," to act without due knowledge or reflection, to mistake or exceed their powers. Should we accept as final their decisions, in that view of the matter, we should simply stultify ourselves by clothing with infallibility the decisions of confessedly fallible courts. Our Church seeks to protect itself from such consequences in various ways:

First. By limiting the powers of the members. Each of us is delegated for a specific purpose. It is laid down in our commission. And of our diligence therein, we are to give account at our return. Each takes his seat with defined and limited powers, and no one has a right to augment them. What each may not participate in as an individual, the body cannot effect as a whole. Each and every member being bound by his commission, it is plainly intended that the whole body shall be bound in the same way, and to the same extent.

Second. By the right of review in the Presbyteries. The com-

missioner is required to report his fidelity to these instructions to his Presbytery, which approves or otherwise as it sees fit. He comes back not as the bearer of concessions or messenger of law, but to report discharge of a trust. And so, in this investigation of the course of each member, the entire proceedings of the Assembly are subjected to consideration. It is implied that if the Presbyteries, or a majority of them, should repudiate the action of their commissioners, it would be shorn of its authority.

Third. By the right of repeal, lodged in succeeding Assemblies. According to our usages, every Assembly is represented on the floor of its successor, thus providing for complete uniformity of action. The presiding officer of one Assembly is the chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures in the next. All the new overtures pass through his hands, and are subjected to his criticism. But, though the previous Assembly has always this influence upon the deliberations of its successor, yet, whenever it appears expedient or necessary, no Assembly hesitates to repeal former decisions. Hence the stability of any particular action is not absolute, but conditional.

The terms of the commission of members, the revisory power of Presbyteries, the power of repeal in the Assembly succeeding, plainly show that it was not intended to put the enactments of the Assembly on the same footing with the Constitution.

II. We have pointed out that the theory we object to is subversive of the Constitution. It can be also shown that it would soon leave us without a system of coherent law.

1. Here is the Constitution, expressing the thorough and settled convictions of the whole Church, reached by calm and protracted investigation. You are asked to adopt as equally potential, the enactments of ever changing bodies of men, who, without previous consultation or even acquaintance, meet under constantly changing influences, amid the press of other duties, with no chance for elaborate study or minute investigation. Year after year they reflect the movement of public opinion, and the changing habits of thought of their changing experience. It can only be in a general sense that their enactments will always harmonise with the Constitution. And certainly they cannot be ex-

pected to harmonise always with each other. Make these enactments final, and imagine the hopelessness of the attempt to digest them along with the Constitution into a harmonious system of law! And if it could be done, the action of the very next Assembly might throw all into confusion, if the law-making power continues to enact new law from its own ever varying point of view, and with a criterion of opinion always liable to change.

Consider, for example, the scope of the injunctions, recommendations, and decisions, in the case of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. In 1761 it was counted unlawful, and persons in this relation were suspended from special communion. In 1782 they were declared capable of Christian privileges, their marriage notwithstanding. In 1783 it is recommended that such marriages be discountenanced but not annulled, and offending parties be received into communion. In 1821 it is resolved that such marriages are unfriendly to domestic purity, but not so plainly prohibited by Scripture as necessarily to infer exclusion from Christian privileges. In 1842 Rev. A. McQueen was on this account suspended from the ministry. In 1845 he was restored.

Acting upon its judgment in all these cases, the Court arrives at different conclusions, basing its action on different principles, believed at the time to be sufficient. And so long as the Constitution is supreme, there is a corrective for such inconsistencies. But if you make each of these conflicting enactments of equal authority with the Constitution itself, such a theory as a coherent system of law becomes impossible. Successive deliverances neutralise the Constitution and each other. And the moral power of our legislation perishes in the conflict and in the confusion.

2. Should the theory be adopted, how could you carry such law into effect? No Session could act on it with any assurance of safety. Suppose the attempt be made, and a case of discipline comes before the next Assembly on appeal. The question at once arises, What was the exact mind of the body enacting the law? It is not certain that every subsequent Assembly would accept the responsibility of deciding that question; hence in the

first instance, the case is liable to be thrown out, since the law cannot be verified. Again, the Session would be liable to encounter an Assembly of a different mind from that one which made the law; in that contingency both the case and the law are likely to be thrown out. Furthermore, the Book prescribes a regular mode of proceeding for all cases of discipline, which contemplates only constitutional law, and the Assembly is at once debarred from approving proceedings which have not constitutional sanction.

Such risks as these would go far towards making such legislation inoperative, because it would be felt that the obstacles in the way of its execution render it impracticable.

3. It is thought by some that there is a want in our system which this theory would supply. We venture to say, on the contrary, that it is entirely unnecessary. It secures no advantage, it remedies no defect, it supplies no want in our process for securing the ends of discipline, or for protecting the purity of the Church. Anything it may profess to do can be more promptly and better done by constitutional methods. True, every possible form of offence is not described in our Book. But the principles, plainly set down, and fully established, by which the moral quality of conduct in all circumstances is to be estimated—these principles are there. And the methods of proceeding according to these requirements are also defined. No wrong-doer, acquainted with our Discipline, would seek a Presbyterian church, with a faithful Session, as a place of safety. Wherever immorality shows itself, and under whatever form, it at once becomes a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Sessions, in the application of our principles of law, must act with piety and prudence, as a matter of course. But under the divine guidance and blessing, the faithful application of those principles, according to the methods of our Discipline, will be found adequate to any case that may possibly arise,

III. Our third argument is, that the exercise of such power in the way proposed is contrary to the recognised polity of our Church.

1. This question is not a new one, and the mind of the Church

has been so distinctly stated, that it might justly be regarded as *res adjudicata*. In 1822, nearly sixty years ago, the Assembly declared in reference to *in thesi* deliverances :

“It does not appear that the Constitution ever designed that the General Assembly should take up abstract cases and decide on them, especially when the object appears to be to bring those decisions to bear upon particular individuals not before the Assembly.”

Such has been the tenor of Presbyterian sentiment on this question since that time. See New School Minutes, 1856. Old and New School Minutes, 1870, declare that “it is inexpedient to consider cases *in thesi*.”

The theory, therefore, proposes an innovation on our usages, and is condemned by our Record.

2. The Synod of South Carolina admits that the Assembly may make not only judicial deliverances, but such also as “are only advisory, recommendatory, and monitory.” This we also admit and maintain. But we also maintain, that these two capacities, the judicial and the monitory, mark the whole scope of its authority in matters of discipline.

In its judicial capacity it sits as a court of trial in concrete cases. In its monitory capacity, it sits as a court of inquest, reviewing the condition of the Church at large. From its eminent point of view, and with high moral authority, it warns or exhorts as events may demand. But this is only a step preliminary to investigation. It is not a basis for judicial proceeding. It needs to be supplemented by action on the part of the lower courts before a basis for judicial proceeding can be found. It calls for inquiry and verification of the facts, and of the moral character of the facts before a true cause of judicial action can be acknowledged.

A “monitory” deliverance is in the nature of the case conditional. It does not contemplate judicial action, except on the supposition that the facts of the case, when investigated, will of themselves justify it. It cannot be considered as law, since its only purpose is to stimulate the fidelity of those who are intrusted with the administration of law.

So long as the Constitution is supreme, the rights and responsibilities of the lower courts will be secured, and the moral power of the highest court will operate as a healthful and beneficent influence, which will be felt throughout the whole of their jurisdiction. Thus the whole organisation will continue symmetrical and strong. The attempt to centralise power in the highest court, would be an attempt to build up one part at the expense of the rest, and thus destroy the strength and symmetry of the whole. Our Presbyterian system is not to be considered as if it were a chain which is useless if the chief link is broken; nor as an arch which falls if the key-stone is removed; nor as an organism, dependent for circulation of life on a great central heart, where each member is doomed to perish whenever connexion with that central heart is interrupted. But it is rather like the immortal bodies of which Milton speaks—which,

“Vital in every part,
Cannot, but by annihilation, die.”

Suppose our Assembly to be shattered; let some vast calamity sweep out of existence every Presbytery and Synod, and let but a single church survive the wreck; yet from that solitary germ the whole grand structure would arise again, Phoenix-like, in all its pristine strength and beauty. It is not our policy, then, to centralise power, but to distribute it. It is not our policy to accumulate life or responsibility in any great central organ at the expense of all the other members. Our true policy is to respect the jurisdiction of the lower courts, to refuse to trench upon it or share it, and thus awaken a most constant and resolute fidelity throughout the whole scope of their responsibility. This is our true policy; let the Assembly refuse to exercise any powers which the Constitution has reserved or imposed upon the lower courts, and thus by awakening life and energy in every part of our system, build up and vitalise the whole.

On the ninth day of the sessions, Dr. Girardeau replied to both the preceding speakers, and we here present the readers his abstracts of these replies. It is to be wished that it could have been possible to avoid the repetition involved in his statements of the arguments employed by his opponents. But the distance

which separated them from one another, and from the present writer, who undertook to edit this debate, put that out of our power. The reader may find an advantage in having exactly what the reply contemplated set right alongside of it.

ABSTRACT OF SECOND SPEECH OF J. L. G., IN REPLY.

[To prevent repetition and secure brevity, the main points of the arguments replied to will be stated without the speaker's name, and the replies will be indicated by the prefixed word, *Answer*. Dr. Woodrow's speech consisted of three parts: 1. Introductory arguments; 2. Strictures upon the reasons accompanying the overture of the Synod of South Carolina; 3. A discussion of the powers of the General Assembly. The salient points of the argument which seemed particularly to require answers are given from notes taken during the delivery of the speech.*]

I. 1. A formative condition of a church must be distinguished from one that is regular. In the latter, the Constitution is already formed and the functions of the courts are definitely prescribed. There is, therefore, no need of authoritative *in thesi* deliverances. The assertion of their authoritativeness tends to overthrow the Constitution. *Answer*:

(1.) A Constitution already formed may be amended and recast by church courts. These amendments are *in thesi* determinations in the form of good and necessary consequences from the word of God, which is the radical Constitution of the Church. But if inferences may be made *in thesi* directly from the word, they may be made from the word as interpreted in our Constitution.

(2.) The word of God as interpreted in our standards, that is, our Constitution, may be authoritatively interpreted by courts of Christ's appointment, when the interpretative deliverances are consonant to that Constitution. Necessary inferences from the Constitution neither supersede nor overthrow it. They are but an explicit evolution of its implicit contents.

* As I am unable to recognise the notes taken by Dr. Girardeau as accurate in every respect, I feel obliged to refer the reader to the abstract previously given as showing exactly the views which I maintained.—J. W.

(3.) The explicative power of church courts must be admitted in the formation of judicial decisions which are confessed to be authoritative. If so, the principle is given up, and there is no reason why the same power may not be exercised in the production of authoritative *in these* decisions; provided they involve good and necessary consequences from the Constitution.

2. Conscience must be excluded from the operation of the authoritative decisions of the courts. Whether the law in the Constitution be right or wrong, it must be enforced on relations, and the judicial decisions by which alone it can be enforced are authoritative because they are final. *Answer:*

(1.) Conscience cannot be excluded from the operation of church law, without a violation of the nature of that law and of the nature of church power and the ends for which it is exercised. The law which the Church administers is confessedly the law of God, and of course that is related to the conscience, and operates primarily and chiefly upon it. Otherwise it is mere human law and unwarrantably exercised. The nature and ends of church power are spiritual, and demand a spiritual sphere of operation. What is that but the conscience?

(2.) A wrong law in the Constitution is one which is not a good and necessary consequence from the word of God. If so, it ought not to be enforced. It ought to be resisted until expunged. No church court can be under obligation to enforce, in the name of Christ and under the sanctions of eternity, a wrong law. If enforced, it may sever an ecclesiastical relation, but it does it without authority from the King of the Church. A decision, without Christ's authority, cannot, except by a solecism, be termed authoritative. The fact that it may be final in its effect upon external relations, proves nothing as to the authority in which it is grounded.

3. It is conceded that the word of God binds the conscience—no man has liberty of conscience to disobey it. But the *contents* of deliverances are not in question. The first speaker took the ground that the contents of a deliverance cannot be disjoined from its human *source*—what is predicable of one is predicable of the other. If the contents of a deliverance are derived from the word

of God as interpreted in our standards, they are authoritative. So, therefore, must be the court which utters it. *Answer:*

This is a great misapprehension. The ground was taken, not that the contents of a deliverance could not be disjoined from the human source of the deliverance—that would be absurd; but that the contents of a deliverance cannot be disjoined from the deliverance itself. Now the question under discussion is, not whether church courts are in themselves authoritative, but whether some *in thesi* deliverances of church courts are authoritative. And the argument was, that as a disjunction cannot be effected between the contents of a deliverance and the deliverance itself, then when the contents are derived from the word of God as interpreted in our standards, and they are confessedly authoritative, the deliverance itself is authoritative. That was the argument, and it is repeated, with a challenge to any to effect the disjunction between a deliverance and its contents.

4. Judicial decisions are authoritative and binding because they are reached after mature deliberation. *Answer:*

The same reason might be pleaded for the authoritativeness of an *in thesi* deliverance. For example, the *in thesi* decision which will conclude this discussion will have been attained after mature and protracted deliberation. But the true view is, that the authoritativeness of a deliverance is derived solely from its conformity to our standards.

II. 1. The Synod's paper charges the deliverance of the last Assembly with being illogical. If now the paper itself is proved to be illogical, the charge will be sufficiently refuted. *Answer:*

(1.) I regret that my brother did not professedly examine the arguments presented in my first speech, rather than those of the Synod's paper. The latter were somewhat hastily stated; the former were carefully prepared.

(2.) The legitimacy, however, of his method of procedure is cheerfully admitted, and I will proceed to answer his strictures upon the Synod's paper.

2. The Synod's paper is illogical because it maintains, in effect, that a genus can have no species—that where there is generic unity there must be specific. Declarative utterances are the

genus; and as the species are didactic deliverances and judicial decisions, and both are affirmed to be declarative utterances, the specific difference between them is denied. It is as if because you have the genus *trees*, you should deny the specific difference between an apple tree and a palmetto tree. *Answer:*

This is an erroneous view of the Synod's argument, which, for brevity's sake, is elliptically put. The Synod makes the genus to be declarative or didactic decisions (for the two terms mean the same), and the species contained under them to be *in thesi* decisions and judicial decisions (which is the distinction of the last Assembly); and its argument is: that as the whole essence of the genus must descend into each of the species, the generic element, *declarative* or *didactic*, must enter into the judicial decision as well as into the *in thesi* decision. They are both declarative or didactic decisions, inasmuch as both profess to declare or teach the will of Christ. The specific difference between the two classes of decision is not denied. The judicial decision is differentiated by the possession of the specific property of declaring law in relation to a concrete personal case. The *in thesi* decision is differentiated by the absence of that specific property. But the generic attribute enters into both species,—the *in thesi* decision is didactic; the judicial decision is didactic. Now, argues the Synod, if, on the one hand, the two kinds of decision are admitted to be generically the same, the last Assembly's reduction is illogical, for this reason: that, in contra-distinguishing judicial decisions from didactic decisions, it contra-distinguishes the species from the genus at the same time, and so violates the logical canon, that the whole essence of the genus must be contained in each of the species.

The generic unity and the specific difference between preaching elders and ruling elders will furnish a familiar illustration. The generic attribute is ruling, which is contained in both species—preaching elder and ruling elder. Both rule. The specific property of the preaching elder is preaching; the specific property of the ruling elder is the absence of preaching. But to discriminate between the two classes of elders, by saying that one rules and the other does not rule, would be illogical. So to dis-

tinguish, as the last Assembly does, between the two classes of decision—*in thesi* and judicial—by saying that one class is didactic and the other is not didactic, is equally illogical. The *in thesi* decision teaches the will of Christ without relation to a particular personal case; the judicial decision teaches the will of Christ in relation to such a case. Both are didactic or both are unwarrantable.

On the other hand, argues the Synod, if the last Assembly held that there is a generic difference between *in thesi* and judicial decisions, that position is unconstitutional. The only difference between them is specific.

3. The Synod's paper is also self-contradictory. It first, as has been shown, denies the difference between didactic and judicial decisions; and then affirms the difference between them. This it does in the third reason assigned for the repeal or modification of the last Assembly's deliverance, viz., "Because said deliverance takes away the key of doctrine from the General Assembly and the other courts of the Church, and retains in their hands the key of discipline alone." Here is the self-contradiction of the Synod's paper: Didactic and judicial decisions are the same; didactic and judicial decisions are different.

(1.) Had my brother criticised the technical accuracy of the Synod's language in its third reason above cited, the legitimacy of the criticism would now be conceded. The usual distinction which obtains in standard Presbyterian writings, between the key of doctrine and the key of discipline, is overlooked in the Synod's statement. That distinction is, that the key of doctrine is lodged in the hands of the ministers of the word, and is employed by them in the exercise of their several power of order; but the key of discipline is in the hands of presbyters sitting in courts, and is used by them in the exercise of the joint power of jurisdiction. The Synod's language departs from this usage. There is a distinction between the dogmatic and the diacritic (or judicial) power of courts, but both are included under the symbolic terms, *key of discipline*. Having made this concession in regard to a defect in the Synod's language which my brother did not criticise, I remark:

(2.) That the Synod's paper is not really chargeable with self-contradictoriness. When it affirms that it is unconstitutional to make a difference between didactic decisions and judicial decisions, it means that it is unconstitutional to make a generic difference between them. They both teach the will of Christ—the one without, and the other through, a special judicial case. When it affirms that the last Assembly takes away from church courts the key of doctrine and leaves them only the key of discipline, it means, that the Assembly denies to courts the power of dogmatic discipline as specifically distinguishable from the power of judicial discipline. There is therefore no more self-contradiction in the two statements of the Synod's paper, than there is in the affirmation in regard to any two things, that they are generically the same, but specifically different.

The Synod's allegation in its third reason is substantially correct. It is that the last Assembly takes away from churches the *authoritative* element of their dogmatic power, and reduces that power to one of mere advice. For the Assembly discriminates *in these* deliverances from judicial decisions, which are authoritative, by the fact that they are only didactic, advisory, and monitorial—that is, that they are not authoritative. But if the dogmatic power of the courts as distinguished from the judicial be unauthoritative, all that remains of the dogmatic is simply advisory, and it follows that its chief feature—the authoritative—is taken away. And to talk of authoritative advice, or authoritative opinion, is alike unpresbyterian and unmeaning. That which is authoritative binds.

4. The second reason of the Synod's paper unwarrantably charges the last Assembly's deliverance with reducing our church courts to the *status* of Congregational Associations; for there are many things common between our courts and those Associations, and our Book provides that our courts may give advice. *Answer:*

This is not a valid reply to the reasoning of the Synod's paper. For, (1.) That paper expressly admits that some deliverances of our courts are merely advisory and recommendatory. (2.) It charges the last Assembly's deliverance with denying authoritativeness to all *in these* deliverances like those which were in ques-

tion—that is, to all such deliverances made by them when sitting in a deliberative, and not in a strictly judicial, capacity; and to that extent, no more, with Congregationalising our courts. The argument of the Synod is, that if, as deliberative bodies, our courts are restricted to giving advice, they are, as deliberative bodies, no more than Congregational Associations. If the whole dogmatic power of our courts is exhausted in making unauthoritative deliverances, the inference is irresistible that, so far as the dogmatic function is concerned, they are mere Congregational Associations. That argument of the Synod stands unanswered.

[The acts of our courts in the *diatactic* sphere were not in question. Their authoritativeness was not disputed. What was said as to the courts, as deliberative bodies, was affirmed of them irrespectively of their diatactic functions.]

5. I deny the doctrine that our church courts are possessed of the power authoritatively to expound the word of God as interpreted in our standards. “Let us have no more of it.” *Answer:*

This denial of the power of our church courts to give authoritative interpretations of the word of God as represented in our standards is radical; it is in conflict with the whole history of Presbyterianism. Our digests of decisions not only embody judicial decisions, but *in thesi* deliverances, as professedly authoritative expositions of fundamental law. And so far as any of these decisions are true interpretations of that law, we have always held that they are really authoritative, and appeal to them as valid precedents.

6. “I admit that the deliverances of our courts are authoritative so far as their construction of the word of God as interpreted in our standards is right.”

[Comment on this admission was interrupted by an objection to a remark made in connexion with it. It is too important to be omitted here, and must speak for itself.]

7. The individual conscience is the supreme judge; consequently no *in thesi* deliverances of church courts can be possessed of legal authority. *Answer:*

(1.) The individual conscience cannot be supreme in relation to the word of God; and since some deliverances of church courts

are consonant to that word, either explicitly or by necessary inference, the individual conscience cannot be supreme in relation to such deliverances.

(2.) The individual conscience of every member of a court is as much a supreme judge as is the individual conscience of him upon whom the deliverance of a court terminates; for every member of the court is as much bound by duty in the formation of a deliverance, as is the person upon whom it terminates in its interpretation. We have then as many supreme judges as there are members of the court and persons upon whom a deliverance terminates. Where, then, is ultimate supremacy? It must be in those deliverances which are faithful representations of God's word, in which ultimate supremacy resides. The supreme judge is not the individual conscience, but the Holy Ghost speaking through the supreme rule.

(3.) But granted, that the individual conscience is supreme judge as to the question whether a deliverance be consonant to the word of God or not, then, when the individual conscience is convinced that a deliverance *is* consonant to the word of God, it is bound by its own supremacy to obey the deliverance as authoritative. The fact, therefore, that the individual conscience is a supreme judge of the consonance of a deliverance with the word of God, serves, in those cases in which the conscience is convinced of that agreement, to refute the doctrine of the last Assembly that no *in these* deliverances can be authoritative.

8. According to the doctrine of the first speaker, it would follow, that "when a statute is needed, the General Assembly should make the statute." *Answer:*

(1.) In discussing this question, the power of church courts, not alone of the General Assembly, has been considered by me.

(2.) I have expressly maintained that church courts have no power to make law, in the sense of originating it. I could not, therefore, hold that the General Assembly may make statutes.

(3.) But if it be meant that, because I have contended for the power of church courts to make authoritative deliverances declaring the law, or expounding it in the form of good and necessary consequences, the logical result is that I have ascribed to

the courts the power to make statutes, I reply: First, that my brother is liable to the same charge, inasmuch as he has admitted that so far as a deliverance is a right construction of the law, it must have binding force. Secondly, I have, no more than he, contended that a deliverance which rightly construes the law derives any binding force from the human authority which makes it. The legal force is derived alone from God's authority, which speaks through the deliverance. Thirdly, no court can make statutory law, but it may declare it or interpret it by way of necessary inference. When a deliverance truly declares the law, it is a transcript—a *fac simile* of the law; when it truly interprets it, it explicitly evolves from the original law by logical inference what is implicitly contained in it. In either of these cases no statute is made, that is to say, originated. The old existing statute is set forth in its application to special questions of individual duty or of ecclesiastical practice. Where is the making of statutes here?

(4.) My brother says that the constitutional way to make statutes, when they are needed, is for the Assembly to invoke the action of the Presbyteries, which are the only bodies that can make organic law. I reply: First, I admit that Presbyteries are the bodies which frame organic law—construct a Constitution; but I deny that they make statutes in the sense of originating them. Even they have not that power. What is our Constitution but a systematised declaration, and evolution into good and necessary consequences, of the fundamental law of the Church in the word of God? But although the Presbyteries do not make the law, but simply declare and evolve it, the law as thus declared and evolved in the shape of the Constitution is admitted on all hands to be ultimately binding. Now, if a Presbytery, or Synod, or Assembly, or even a Session, declare and evolve the law contained in the Constitution, in the shape of deliverances, why may not these deliverances be for the same reason binding? The *principle* underlying both cases is the same, although the methods of procedure are in some respects different. Where is the essential difference between true inferences made by a number of courts, and true inferences made by one court?

Secondly, if all the overtures upon important questions, involving the interpretation of the Constitution as to doctrine, government, discipline, and practice, were sent down by the General Assembly to the Presbyteries for action contemplating the incorporation of the answers into the Constitution, what a prodigious and unwieldy body of fundamental law would be the result! The Church has never acted simply on that theory, but while she sometimes requires the concurrent action of Presbyteries, she most frequently, as in the instance of this General Assembly, makes deliverances which are issued as authoritative interpretations of the existing Constitution. And if those deliverances are precisely accordant with the Constitution, it is impossible to regard them, when uttering law, as mere solemn advice.

(5.) My brother asks, Why should not the Church be satisfied with Presbyterian advice, which is always good and weighty when it is in accordance with the Constitution? I reply by asking, Why should not the Church be satisfied with Congregationalist advice, which is always good and weighty when it is in accordance with the word of God? We are Presbyterians and not Congregationalists, and ask, at least sometimes, for authoritative interpretations of law, not for opinions nor counsels however wise or affectionate they may be. Our ecclesiastical bodies when sitting deliberatively are courts composed of rulers, not conventions of Christian gentlemen.

9. The Synod argues that because Synods and Councils may frame symbols of faith, the General Assembly may do the same. But the powers of the Assembly are limited by the express terms of the Constitution, and therefore it cannot frame symbols of faith, articles of government, rules of discipline, etc. *Answer:*

(1.) It is a mistake to confine the argument to the powers of the General Assembly specifically. It is concerned about the powers of church courts, and only peculiarly about the Assembly when it is contemplated as the supreme court in a correlated series of courts. The argument of the Synod is, that because Synods and Councils may frame symbols of faith, etc., therefore, not the General Assembly specifically, but, generally, church courts may frame symbols of faith, etc.

Now, further, if the Assembly cannot frame symbols of faith, etc., because its powers are limited by the Constitution, neither, for the same reason, can even Presbyteries discharge that function. For, according to the Constitution, the Assembly must first act before the Presbyteries can. The truth is, that the powers of all the courts check and limit each other, so that in so important a matter as framing or revising a Constitution there must be, to some extent, concurrent action. This the Constitution provides for, and so what is true of Synods and Councils, although not true, under our system, of any one court, is true, under that system, of the courts. The Synod's argument, then, is not: Synods and Councils have power to frame symbols of faith, etc.; therefore the General Assembly has power to do the same. It is: Synods and Councils have power to frame symbols of faith, etc.; therefore church courts have power to do the same. And if that argument be not valid, how did *we* get our symbols of faith, etc.? How would *we* ever revise and amend our Constitution? We have no Synods and Councils but our church courts. The Church of Scotland adopted the Westminster standards by her courts. The American Presbyterian Church did the same thing, and amended those standards. Where was the unchanging work of an initial Council, such as my brother's argument demands, when he says that "what a Synod or Council did at first may not be done again"? But if our courts have these powers when not sitting in a judicial capacity, but deliberating upon propositions and forming *in thesi* decisions, the statement of the last Assembly needs to be changed. To say that courts discharge an advisory function in framing a constitution could be matched only by saying that they perform a judicial function in framing a constitution.

(2.) My brother charges the argument of the Synod, in its seventh reason, with the logical fallacy of equivocation, in employing an ambiguous middle. It uses the terms, *Synods and Councils*, in a double sense. In reply, I would show by a simple statement of the Synod's argument that the charge is not well founded. The argument formally stated is: Synods and Coun-

cils are possessed of the power to determine controversies, decide cases of conscience, etc. ;

Our church courts are Synods and Councils ;

Therefore, our church courts are possessed of this power.

Now, the middle term here is *Synods and Councils*. Is this an ambiguous middle? Why, it is the very purpose of the minor premise to prove that our courts are Synods and Councils. If, therefore, there be any defect in the argument, it is in that premise, and my brother's attack is really on the validity of that premise. But if our courts are not Synods and Councils, we have no Synods and Councils, and according to our system *could* legitimately have none. If the minor premise stand, the Synod's argument is conclusive ; and the deliverance of the last Assembly is proved to be out of harmony with our Constitution.

III. The power of the General Assembly.

1. The didactic power of the Church is preëminent ; the didactic function is the most glorious she can discharge. *Answer :*

Yes. I contend strenuously for the truth of this statement, but this position makes my brother's argument inconsistent with itself. He defends the deliverance of the last Assembly, which, according to his own admission, in making all *in these* deliverances of church courts "only didactic, advisory, and monitory," strips them of legal authority—a quality which is assigned by that deliverance to judicial decisions. But the didactic function is the chief and most glorious. It follows that the less is superior to the greater—moral influence more potent than legal, advice paramount to law !

2. The definitions of offences are exhaustively given in our standards. Church courts cannot add to them by their deliverances. The law of offences is not the standards and interpretations by the courts superadded to the standards—it is the standards alone.

(1.) This is a misconception which is fundamental, and regulates of the argumentation of the side which my brother represents. A true interpretation, proceeding by good and necessary consequences, is not something superadded to the law in the

standards. The case does not stand thus : the law in the standards *plus* a new and separate element, viz., the interpretation of the court. But the interpretation, if it involve only necessary inferences from the law as stated in the standards, is only an unfolding—a clear development of the matter of the law. It is the law itself evolved and applied. There are not two standards—there is really but one. The interpretative office of the courts is grounded in the possibility, and sometimes in the necessity, of expounding the general principles of the word as interpreted in our standards in their application to concrete cases of experience. What is true of the preacher in wielding the key of doctrine in his several capacity is true of courts in employing the key of discipline—wide as well as narrow—in the exercise of their joint power. If you restrict courts to the mere letter of the Constitution, limit also the minister of the word to the bare reading of the Scriptures.

(2.) Were the meaning and scope of the law in the standards always transparently obvious, there would be no need of an interpretative function. But they are not always clear in relation to certain kinds of offence. I have known Sessions to declare the law in reference to offences, and they have acted legitimately. Why should not the other courts, why should not the collective wisdom of the Church in a General Assembly, discharge the same office? Once admit the constitutionality of the declarative and interpretative function as authoritative—and how can it be denied?—and you concede the authoritativeness of deliverances which are simply logical inferences from the law, and are therefore the law itself. If an interpretation is but a logical deduction from the law, it is the law, and it is clear as day that it has the binding force of law.

3. The only valid way in which any matter can be carried up to the higher courts for authoritative settlement is that which involves judicial process. Matters carried up in any other way can only elicit advice, the end of which is to enlighten the courts or the individuals asking deliverances, so that their own duty may be made clear. *Answer :*

(1.) This is not the *law* of our Church. The Constitution ex-

pressly provides for the authoritative settlement by the higher courts of other matters than those which are carried up in the way of judicial process. Our courts are empowered not only to decide judicial cases, but those also which are not judicial, coming before them by overture and other non-judicial methods. They are authorised to "determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience," "to decide cases of conscience," and the General Assembly, particularly, "to decide in all controversies respecting doctrine" as well as "discipline." Either this language must be understood to apply solely to judicial cases, or advice must be understood to be determination, decree, decision. The first supposition cannot be justified by the terms of the Constitution; the latter cannot be supported by the accepted meaning of the terms.

(2.) If this view be adopted, our Church would be deprived of a privilege explicitly guaranteed in her Constitution—that of referring non-judicial matters to the courts for authoritative decision. A positive right would be destroyed; and one or both of these two consequences may be expected to follow: either the folly of asking a resolution of grave difficulties by mere advice will drive Presbyterians to abstain from such a course, and the deliberative function of the courts, apart from the diatactic sphere, be reduced almost to zero; or judicial cases will be multiplied as the only means of securing authoritative decisions. If these results should not follow, it would be because Presbyterians would acquiesce in the conversion of their courts, as deliberative bodies not acting in the diatactic sphere, into the advisory Associations of Independent churches.

4. An appeal on this question ought not to be taken to historic authority or to the opinions of the great men of the past. Calvin, Gillespie, Cunningham, and others were distinguished leaders, but they are only to be imitated so far as they followed Christ. So far as they failed to do this, they should have no weight with us. All of them sanctioned certain doctrines, and Calvin certain practices, which we cannot approve. Human authority cannot be followed. Our standard is the word of God alone, and we must judge for ourselves. *Answer:*

(1.) It is urged that Calvin maintained the doctrine that the

Church has power to inflict civil pains and penalties. He is misunderstood upon this point. He expressly denied that power to the Church, as may be proved from his Institutes. If he advocated the infliction of civil penalties, it was in relation to offences regarded as civil.

(2.) It is true that the great men of our Church in the past ought not to be followed so far as they departed from the word. That statement is just and universally admitted by us. But the other and complementary statement, which was omitted, is equally true and just—that they ought to be followed so far as they agreed with the word.

(3.) I have pleaded the *consensus* of the Presbyterian Church in favor of the view I maintain. I do not hold the doctrine of Dr. Charles Hodge, that the common consent of the true Church is an absolutely determining element in settling controversy. The only ultimate rule is the word of God. But I agree with Dr. Thornwell, that the common consent of the true Church to a doctrine furnishes in its favor a venerable and powerful presumption—a presumption which the individual who holds the opposite doctrine cannot lightly set aside, but is bound to rebut. Now the force of that presumptive evidence is in favor of the view for which I contend. That has not been disproved. The case, then, stands thus: my brother urges the result of private judgment, *minus* the *consensus* of the Presbyterian Church; I urge the result of private judgment, *plus* that *consensus*. The presumption is clearly against his view, and deserved to be rebutted. But that has not been done.

5. There is danger of our Church following the evil example of some other Churches in assuming the power of minute legislation in regard to practices which the word of God does not treat as offences, and thus exercising a tyranny over the conscience and practice of Christ's people which ought to be defiantly resisted. *Answer:*

I have admitted this danger. I admit it now. It is one against which it is always necessary to guard. Had the last Assembly said nothing more than that the specific deliverances of the New Orleans Assembly of 1877 ought not to be inter-

puted as enforcing *judicial prosecution* against every form of dancing, I would not, although I think every form of dancing ought to be discountenanced in church members, have endeavored to secure a change of its deliverance. In this matter, as in all matters, the deliverances of our courts ought to be strictly limited by the requirements of our Constitution. But the case would have been different, had the New Orleans Assembly pronounced some forms of dancing—what is called the round-dance, for example—disciplinable offences. In that case I would have objected, had the last Assembly declared that such a deliverance could not legitimate judicial prosecution. I believe that it would. While we should carefully avoid an illegitimate declaration of the law touching offences in application to practices which cannot be proved to be offences by the Scriptures, as interpreted in our standards, we should, on the other hand, as sedulously guard against a failure to declare that law in application to practices which are, like the round-dance, beyond doubt condemnable by our Constitution. It is better to take hold of some undoubted offence, than to strike loosely at a class of actions embracing some practices which it might be difficult, if not impracticable, to prove to be offences.

But admitting, as I do, the danger adverted to, I repeat it, there is a greater. It is that which springs from laxity of discipline on the part of church authorities, and license of practice on the part of church members. A disregard of authority and a contempt of law are more and more putting our discipline to the strain. Worldliness is rapidly increasing in the Church. How shall it be checked? If a church member, who has been warned by a faithful Session that he will be disciplined for persistence in an offence, can find refuge in a neighboring Presbyterian church which pronounces him guilty of no offence, discipline is practically at an end. We need harmony of views and of practice among all our churches, and that can only be attained by the firm and decided declaration of our law as to offences, by our church-courts, especially by the General Assembly. That remedy our condition demands. If that be neglected, our discipline will sink more and more into a dying state.

REPLY TO DR. H. M. SMITH'S SPEECH.

1. The doctrine of the overturists tends to the establishment of a system precisely akin to that of the Papacy. *Answer :*

This charge could only be proved by showing that that doctrine involves the assertion of the infallibility of our church courts. That cannot be shown. There has been nothing approaching an assertion of that sort. On the contrary, exactly the opposite view has been explicitly affirmed. The distinction has been signalled between the infallibility of God's word, and the fallibility of the persons composing the courts which profess to deliver it. The word is infallible, and therefore when a court utters the word, the utterance is infallible. But the persons who compose the court are fallible, and therefore they are liable to utter that which is contrary to the word. Did a court always deliver the word, it would be infallible; but a court does not always deliver the word, but sometimes the contrary. That fact is at once the result and the proof of its fallibility. I have contended that no authority resides in the courts themselves, independent of the word, and that only those decisions are authoritative which involve necessary inferences from the word. What analogy, then, is there between this doctrine and that which claims for the Church of Rome an inherent infallibility conferred by direct inspiration? What tendency can there be in a doctrine which maintains the infallibility and supremacy of the word alone, to establish the infallibility and supremacy of the Church? This charge proceeds upon the supposition that I have assigned authoritativeness to *all* the deliverances of our courts. That supposition is groundless, and therefore the charge itself is wholly irrelevant.

2. The doctrine of the overturists attributes to the General Assembly an independent authority to make law. *Answer :*

(1.) This involves the great mistake of supposing that the question is in regard to the authoritativeness of the Assembly's deliverances alone. The question is, in regard to the authoritativeness of the deliverances of our church courts. The ground maintained is, that a deliverance of any church court which is consonant to the word of God as interpreted in our standards, is authoritative, because of God's authority which it represents. A deliverance of the General Assembly could not be paramount to

such a deliverance made by a lower court, because, if so, it would be paramount to God's word.

(2.) It is incorrect to say that the overturists ascribe an independent authority to the General Assembly. They expressly maintain that the Assembly, and the other courts as well, have no authority independent of the word as interpreted in the standards.

(3.) It is equally erroneous to say that they assign to the General Assembly the authority to make law. They carefully denied this position, except as to the diatactic sphere; and contended that the laws made in that sphere have relation only to circumstances common to human actions and societies, and possess no authority over the conscience. They only affect the practice of the Church, for the attainment of order. In making deliverances which, as consonant to the word, are authoritative, the courts do not make laws; they only deduce good and necessary consequences from laws already made by God himself. The deduction of inferences from existing laws is surely not making laws.

3. According to the doctrine of the overturists, the General Assembly has the power to build up a vast code of law coördinate with, and independent of, the Constitution; and the consequence would be that the Constitution would gradually be more and more hidden behind this mass of deliverances. *Answer:*

(1.) It must be borne in mind, that the overturists contend only for the authoritativeness of deliverances which involve good and necessary consequences from the Constitution.

(2.) This charge, therefore, commits the logical blunder of representing necessary inferences from propositions as coördinate with, and independent of, the propositions from which they are derived. The fact is, that they are the propositions themselves, developed and expanded. And how the original enunciations can be hidden behind necessary inferences which illuminate their meaning, it would be very hard to show. It is out of the question that deliverances, which are simply necessary consequences from the Constitution, can form a code of law coördinate with and independent of that from which they are deduced, and the meaning of which it is their legitimate office to evolve.

(3.) This charge could only hold good of deliverances which are not consonant to the Constitution, and the authoritativeness of such deliverances the overturists persistently deny. It therefore falls to the ground.

4. The doctrine of the overturists, if accepted, would render the General Assembly irresponsible and its acts irreformable.

Answer :

(1.) Again the mistake is here made of restricting the question to the deliverances of the General Assembly—*an ignoratio elenchi*.

(2.) Such deliverances as those, for the authoritativeness of which the overturists contend, viz., such as are strictly consonant to the word of God as interpreted in our standards, do not need to be reformed—they are, from the nature of the case, irreformable. Would my brother demand a power to reform the word of God? It is only deliverances which are contrary to the word as interpreted in our Constitution which are reformatory, and require to be reformed; and the authoritativeness of such deliverances is not only not maintained, but expressly denied. Of course they ought to be reformed. If the question were—and it is not—as to the responsibility of the Assembly for such erroneous deliverances and the mode in which they may be reformed, as my brother is very able, I need only employ his own method of answering it. First, there is a limitation upon the power of the Assembly involved in the responsibility of the commissioners who compose it to their Presbyteries. In this way the power of the Presbyteries operates as a check to that of the Assembly. Secondly, another limitation exists in the power of one Assembly to reverse or modify the acts of a preceding Assembly—a power invoked by the overturists in the present instance. To these I add, thirdly, the limitation involved in the inalienable rights of revolution and secession. All these considerations destroy the hypothesis of the irresponsibility of the General Assembly, and the irreformability of its erroneous acts; and they are as firmly supported by the overturists as by my brother himself.

5. Some of the decisions of the General Assembly are wrong; therefore its deliverances cannot have the force of law. *Answer :*

The formal statement of this argument will furnish its refutation: some of the decisions of the Assembly are wrong and con-

sequently devoid of legal authority; therefore all of the decisions of the Assembly are wrong and consequently unauthoritative. From some to all is a *non sequitur*. Some of the decisions of conscience are wrong and unauthoritative. It does not therefore follow that all are. If the argument be: some of the decisions of the Assembly are wrong; therefore, the Assembly itself is destitute of authority, I answer: that is disproved which was never attempted to be proved. My brother is welcome to the credit of so conclusive an argument. Certainly, I will not dispute it.

6. The decisions of General Assemblies are variant and contradictory; consequently, they cannot have the force of law.

Answer:

(1.) Let us divide again. If the conclusion be: therefore, Assemblies have no inherent legal authority in themselves; that is admitted.

(2.) But if the argument be: the decisions of Assemblies are variant and contradictory; therefore no decisions are authoritative, I deny the conclusion. For, first, those decisions which are thus characterised are those only which are contrary to the word of God as interpreted in our standards. Such decisions may contradict those which are consonant to the Word and the Constitution, or may contradict each other. What follows? Let them be rejected, as unauthoritative. But, secondly, those decisions which are consonant to the Word and the Constitution cannot contradict each other, else God's word would contradict itself. The inference is clearly illegitimate from the unauthoritativeness of wrong decisions which contradict those which are right and each other, to the unauthoritativeness of right decisions which are consistent with each other. But it is only for the authoritativeness of the latter that the overturists contend. The argument is therefore invalid.

7. The deliverance of the Synod of Jerusalem was altogether peculiar and exceptional; therefore it cannot be pleaded as a precedent to establish the authoritative force of the deliverances of our church courts. *Answer:*

It is sufficient to say that this extraordinary opinion is out of harmony with the uniform doctrine of Presbyterian writers, and assails the scriptural foundations of the Presbyterian polity.

Being impressed with the idea that the real difference between the two sides was not great, it occurred to the present writer, while listening to Dr. Girardeau's second speech, to make an effort at drawing up a paper which should not compromise either party and yet constitute a common ground where both might stand together. The brief statement thus hurriedly composed was shewn to Dr. Girardeau as soon as he left the platform. The usual recess of twenty minutes occurred at this time, and we examined it together. He seemed to be favorably impressed with it on the first reading, but asked for a second and then a third reading, but though evidently more and more favorable to it each time that he read it, he would not decide positively to accept it until it should be seen by Dr. Woodrow. *His* acceptance of it was immediate and unhesitating. Returning to Dr. Girardeau with the paper, he expressed his readiness to adopt it. In consequence of this agreement, Dr. Woodrow considered it unnecessary to make any reply to his colleague, and after a few introductory remarks said that if the minority report could be withdrawn, he would offer a substitute which he had reason to believe would reconcile all differences. This being done, he read the following paper and moved its adoption :

"The Assembly met in Charleston, in virtue of its power to give authoritative interpretations of the Word, declares—

"1. Nothing is law to be enforced by judicial prosecution but that which is contained in the Word as interpreted in our standards.

"2. The judicial decisions of our courts differ from their *in thesi* deliverances in that the former *determine*, and, when proceeding from our highest court, *conclude* a particular case. But both these kinds of decisions are alike interpretations of the Word by a church court, and both not only deserve high consideration, but both must be submitted to, unless contrary to the Constitution and the Word; of which there is a right of private judgment belonging to every church court, and also every individual church member."

It was immediately seconded by Dr. Girardeau and adopted by the Assembly. Some surprise was evidently mingled with the general relief experienced in the body, and a few members seemed disposed to hesitate about accepting the paper. It was called by one prominent member of the Assembly a "compromise paper." Dr. Woodrow answered immediately, "It is not a compromise

paper." The rejoinder was, "It is a very singular thing if it is not. It is offered by the speaker from one pole, and seconded by the speaker from the other pole." "But," cried out Dr. Girardeau, "both having the same axis."

The writer may be permitted to say that he considers the paper no *compromise* at all. It is evident that the opposition of Dr. Girardeau to the Louisville deliverance arose chiefly out of its discriminating so widely and so absolutely between the judicial and the *in thesi* deliverance. This appears throughout all that he said. It is equally evident that if the *in thesi* deliverance is not "law to be enforced by judicial process," that language is too strong to be applied unqualifiedly to the other kind of decision. And so Dr. Girardeau might well be content with the denial by the Charleston Assembly that the *in thesi* deliverance is law to be enforced by discipline, seeing that that high court equally denies this of the judicial decision as well. On the other hand, Dr. Woodrow plainly intimated in his speech that he considered it unfortunate that the Louisville Assembly had so highly exalted the judicial deliverance, and certainly what he desired chiefly to secure was the declaration that nothing is law but the Word, as interpreted in our standards. When we come to look at the remainder of the Charleston paper, we meet what precisely suited both sides, namely, that both kinds of deliverances are interpretations of the Word by church courts which have authority from God to interpret his Word and to enforce it by discipline, so that both kinds deserve high consideration and both must be submitted to, provided they accord with the Word; and that, as to this accordance, every church session and every church member has inherently and indefeasibly the right of private judgment.

At Charleston, on the first passage of this paper, some of Dr. Woodrow's supporters said he had given up everything. It was not very long before some of Dr. Girardeau's sympathisers wrote to him that he had sacrificed his side to Dr. Woodrow. Calm reflection will perhaps convince all that neither side was sacrificed, and that both parties gained all they cared about. The Charleston deliverance secures both order and liberty.

JNO. B. ADGER.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

It is unnecessary to repeat the remark that the four incomparable lives of Christ are to be found in the New Testament. The uninspired biographies of our Lord do not put themselves in competition with the accounts given with absolute adequacy by the Evangelists, and are not without their own proper place. Of these purely human narratives the very able work of Geikie¹ is rapidly pushing aside, with English readers, the seductive but provoking book of Canon Farrar. The late Episcopal Bishop of Maryland was regarded during his life-time, at least by outsiders, as an exceedingly High-Churchman; but these discourses² show him to have taken moderate ground on certain of the mooted questions that ordinarily divide the High-Church from the Low-Church parties. Having despatched the consideration of the smaller Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles, Dr. Cowles here³ "enlarges his brief" and essays the treatment of those of greater extent and compass. Scotland is becoming even more distinguished of late than England for its contributions towards the true understanding and appreciation of the ancient classics. The most finished and splendid of the Greek tragedians⁴ is brought out *comme il faut*, by a University man whose business it is to teach the Caledonians the language of historic Attica and the kindred dialects.

We are glad that the flimsy, unsavory, and we would fain think libellous, gossip of Madame de Rémusat⁵ is so soon offset

¹The Life and Words of Christ. By Cunningham Geikie, D. D. New edition. 8vo, 1,258 pp., cloth, \$1.50. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

²Fifteen Sermons. By William Rollinson Whittingham, Fourth Bishop of Maryland. 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

³The Longer Epistles of Paul, viz., Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians. By the Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. 12mo, cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴Sophocles. By Lewis Campbell, LL.D., Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews. Being No. 4 of "Classical Writers," edited by John Richard Green. 16mo, cloth, 60c.

⁵Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat. With an Index. Complete in one volume. 12mo. 740 pp., Cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

by the celebrated Memoir of Madame Junot,¹ also done into English; which before could only be obtained in octavo. The historical scope is wider in the older work, and the personal view more favorable and perhaps less prejudiced. The character of Bonaparte remains as inexhaustible a study as that of Hamlet. We are opposed to all quaintnesses in book-titles, but there is something otherwise winsome in the way our Mediterranean traveller² puts himself before his readers. *The Riviera!* what an almost matchless field does it afford, from Genoa to Nice and Cannes and Toulon, not to say Marseilles, to the descriptive artist! And then we have Corsica, Algiers, and Spain thrown in, without mulcting us for more volumes. Pioneer literature³ is apt to be very tolerable reading in an idle hour by the wayside or elsewhere.

We have lately adverted in these pages to the recognised biography of Dickens by Forster. It was eminently desirable that another writer should give us a more succinct narrative⁴ and one less imbued with egotism. We feel like buying Professor Lupton's book⁵ on theoretic farming. A popular work on this subject from a man of competent talents, and a specialist in this department, has hitherto been much needed. The Constitution⁶ of

¹Memoirs of Napoleon, his Court and Family. By the Duchesse d'Abrantes (Madame Junot). New Edition. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$3. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

²A Search for Winter Sunbeams in the *Riviera*, Corsica, Algiers, and Spain. By Samuel S. Cox. With illustrations. New, cheaper edition. 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

³Recollections and Opinions of an Old Pioneer. By Peter H. Burnett, the First Governor of the State of California. 12mo, 468, pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴A Short Life of Charles Dickens. With Selections from his Letters. By Charles H. Jones. "Handy Volume Series." Paper, 35c.; cloth, 60c. *Ibid.*

⁵The Elementary Principles of Scientific Agriculture. By N. T. Lupton, LL.D., Professor of Chemistry in Vanderbilt University. 12mo, cloth, 45c. *Ibid.*

⁶The Constitution of the United States, with Brief Comments; and Incidental Comments on the Constitutions of England and France. Edited by J. T. Champlin, D. D. 16mo, 205 pages, cloth, \$1. John Allyn, Boston.

these associated commonwealths may be studied to-day with the same sort of interest exactly with which one ponders the Constitution of Rome or of Carthage. Mr. Mallock is one of the most charming and suggestive writers of our time. In the present discussion¹ he shows conclusively that the logical outcome of Agnosticism is Pessimism. His remarks towards the end on the Roman Catholic Church are the most whimsical and disappointing in the volume. The volume as a whole is (as Lord Cockburn wrote of the "Noctes") "bright with genius," and displays an unusual breadth of discursive reading in contemporaneous literature, but is vague, *ennuyé*, and unsatisfying. Mr. Hildreth's important history² of the United States became at once a formidable rival to Mr. Bancroft's. We are glad to see it going to a new edition. The history of Holland's Grand Pensionary, by Mr. James Geddes,³ is pronounced worthy of companionship with the kindred publications which have built up the reputation of Motley. Professor Davis, of the University of Virginia, makes a creditable appearance before a wide constituency of educated readers in his analysis of the laws of human thinking.⁴

As the names Johnston and Jackson are particularly famous in the civic and military annals of America, so is the name Thompson connected inseparably with the geography and antiquities of the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. After "The Land and the Book," when the author had spent, if we mistake not, twenty-five or thirty years in Palestine and Syria, we had "In the Holy Land," by Dr. Andrew Thompson of Glasgow,

¹Is Life Worth Living? By W. H. Mallock. "Fitch's Popular Library." 12mo, 180 pp., paper, 35c. Geo. W. Fitch, Rochester, N. Y.

²The History of the United States. First Series.—From the First Settlement of the Country to the Adoption of the Federal Constitution. Second Series.—From the Adoption of the Federal Constitution to the End of the Sixteenth Congress. By Richard Hildreth. New edition. 6 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$12. Harper & Brothers, New York.

³The History of the Administration of John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland. By James Geddes. Vol. I.—1623–1654. With Portrait. 8vo, cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴The Theory of Thought. A Treatise on Deductive Logic. By Noah K. Davis, University of Virginia. 8vo, cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

who had merely taken a six months' tour over the country. Now we have Dr. William Thomson's ripened experience of nearly a half century in "Southern Palestine and Jerusalem."¹ The authority of this judicious writer is hardly second to that of Robinson. It was meet that we should have these well selected masterpieces² of the best English writers bound up in a single crown octavo volume. We have several times commended Mr. Rolfe's³ appositeness and fine discernment as an interpreter of him who has been styled somewhat extravagantly "the high priest of nature."

There is no denying the learning and capacity of the late Professor Murray of the Johns Hopkins University. It was Professor Murray's father, it will be remembered, who wrote "Kirwan's Letters." This work on the Psalms⁴ is one of much value, though not untinctured with the rationalising virus now so prevalent in Germany and Scotland. Everything that Professor Fisher writes is sober, solid, meritorious, and, so far as his apologetical articles are concerned, in general orthodox. When he ventures out upon the *mare magnum* of theology proper, it is natural to find traces of the New Haven school with its well-known distinctive peculiarities. Professor Fisher's contributions to our historical knowledge⁵ are especially unexceptionable and valuable. Dr. Macdonald's "St. John"⁶ is a good book. Even if it were not a good

¹Southern Palestine and Jerusalem. By Wm. M. Thomson, D. D., Forty-five Years a Missionary in Syria and Palestine. 140 illustrations and maps. Square 8vo, cloth, \$7.50. (Subscription.) *Ibid.*

²Masterpieces of English Literature. Being Typical Selections of British and American Authorship, from Shakespeare to the Present Time: together with Definitions, Notes, Analyses, and Glossary, as an aid to Systematic Literary Study. For Use in High and Normal Schools, Academies, Seminaries, etc. By Wm. Swinton. With Portraits. Crown 8vo, cloth. *Ibid.*

³Henry IV. Shakespeare. Edited by W. J. Rolfe. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, 60c. a volume.

⁴The Origin and Growth of the Psalms. By Professor T. C. Murray. 12mo, 336 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁵Discussions in History and Theology. By Prof. George P. Fisher, D. D. 8vo, 570 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁶The Life and Writings of St. John. By the Rev. James M. Macdonald, VOL. XXXI., No. 3—30.

book, Dean Howson's introduction would entitle it to a ready sale. The Rev. Mr. Scribner¹ is a pleasing and tender devotional writer.

Mrs. Terhune in her "Loiterings"² has presented us with one of her most serviceable and enjoyable literary offerings. If she is a trifle too rancorous in her strictures upon John Bull, she can fairly plead the *lex talionis* after Martin "Chuzzlewit" and "American Notes." Mr. Stone invites us to a banquet of not wholly unaccustomed dainties.³ We may safely go to Professor Dawson of Canada for thorough information as to all the recent "finds" among the fossils.⁴ The account of the great astronomer of Italy—whose primitive telescope is still to be seen in Florence—that is spread before us by Mr. Carlos⁵ is likely to prove a useful substitute for much of the cheap and worthless, if not pernicious, matter that is issuing daily from the press. The high name of Mr. Sayce gives some importance to his elaborate treatise on linguistics.⁶ We are no admirer of books made up of "The Beauties" of famous writers. No one of our day, however, could stand the test of selected quotations better than George Eliot,⁷ and her eminence both in letters and philosophy is not to be gainsaid. It may be worth noting that Mr. Mallock regards

D. D. Edited, with an Introduction by Dean Howson. With maps and illustrations. New edition. 8vo, 472 pp., cloth, reduced to \$3. *Ibid.*

¹The Saviour's Converts. By the Rev. William Scribner. 12mo, 188 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

²Loiterings in Pleasant Places. By Marion Harland. 12mo, 443 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

³Cradle Land of Arts and Creeds; or Nothing New under the Sun. By C. J. Stone. 8vo, \$5. Scribner & Welford, New York.

⁴Fossil Men and their Modern Representatives. By J. W. Dawson. Illustrated. 12mo, cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁵The Siderial Messenger of Galileo Galilei. Containing the Original Account of Galileo's Astronomical Discoveries. A Translation, with Introduction and Notes, by Edward Stafford Carlos. Illustrated 16mo, \$2.60. *Ibid.*

⁶Introduction to the Science of Language. By the Rev. Archibald Henry Sayce. 2 vols., large post 8vo, cloth, \$10. *Ibid.*

⁷Wise, Witty, and Tender Sayings in Prose and Verse. Selected from the Works of George Eliot. By Alexander Main. 12mo, cloth gilt, \$2.60. *Ibid.*

George Eliot as the principal mouth-piece of the current Agnostic materialism. Our literary palate is titillated by fillips from a new book of ballads.¹

After long acquaintance with the work, we do not fear to say that so far as our information goes "Lippincott's Gazetteer"² is one of the most valuable and convenient books of reference in the world. Mr. Duff has hardly done Camoens³ into better English than that of Mr. William Julius Mickle; but the style may be regarded as more in consonance with the fashion of writing that is just now in vogue. Mrs. Mills's merry title⁴ might almost tempt a truculent critic not to carp at her *cuisine*. Stimulating reflections on the aim and methods of Providence may be either clever or dull, either sound or erroneous. Mr. Butts has, we fancy, set down many things that he thought worth saying in a less humdrum way than he might have done had it not been his effort to be novel.⁵

The love feast between Dr. Bellows and Mr. Henry Ward Beecher, at the Channing anniversary, must have been an edifying spectacle. This,⁶ as we take it, is Dr. Bellows formal address on that occasion. Though a hard judgment must be passed on Dr. Bellows's Socinianism, we may concede that he is an admira-

¹A Ballad Book. By C. K. Sharpe. With colored frontispiece. 12mo. half Roxburgh, \$6. *Ibid.*

²Lippincott's Gazetteer of the World. A Complete Pronouncing Gazetteer, or Geographical Dictionary of the World. Containing notices of over one hundred and twenty-five thousand places, with recent and authentic information respecting the Countries, Islands, Rivers, Mountains, Cities, Towns, etc., in every portion of the Globe. New edition, thoroughly revised, re-written, and enlarged. Imperial 8vo, library sheep, \$10; half turkey, \$12; half russia, \$10. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

³The Lusiad. By Camoens. Translated by Robert French Duff. With portraits. Royal 8vo, cloth, \$6. *Ibid.*

⁴Mother Hubbard's Cupboard. A Cook Book. By Mrs. W. T. Mills. 8vo, 84 pp., boards, 50c. American News Company.

⁵Suggestive Thoughts on the Purpose and Process of All Things. 12mo. 81 pp., cloth, 75c. Asa K. Butts, New York.

⁶William Ellery Channing. By Henry W. Bellows. 8vo, 39 pp., paper, cloth, \$1. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

ble writer of pure English. The influence of William Ellery Channing, always pale and cold in comparison with that of Chalmers, or even that of Coleridge or of Carlyle, is growing less and less marked as the years glide by. Blanqui's *History of Political Economy in Europe*¹ would be wholesome reading during vacation for some of our Washington legislators. Its value is increased by Mr. Wells's sound and moderate introduction. It is now actually questioned not only whether the Maid of Lorraine² was burnt as a witch in the market-place of Rouen on the 31st of May, five centuries ago and more, but whether she was ever burnt at all. New interest is given to the romantic figure of *La Pucelle* by Le Page's picture of her in this year's *Salon* as a coarse hard-featured rustic lass; but on her face "the light that never was on sea or land." Bickersteth's fine but monotonous and too sensuous poem³ bids fair to live as long as any of the claimants to a similar celebrity. Many of these agitating essays⁴ well deserve a discriminating perusal.

Professor Plumptre is, it need not be said, one of the most accomplished scholars of the English Church, and his contributions to Smith's and the other Bible Dictionaries and Cyclopædies have greatly enlarged the circle of his admiring, though not always assenting, readers. He is referred to, if we are not at fault, as holding the Broad Church views as to future punishment which have been avowed by Canon Farrar. Dr. Plumptre's *Commentary on the Acts* is one of the finest extant, and has given us a taste of what he can do in that line. The endorsement of his "Luke"⁵ by Bishop Ellicott is, with possibly one exception,

¹*History of Political Economy in Europe.* By Jerome Adolphe Blanqui. Translated by Emily G. Howard. With Introduction by David A. Wells. 8vo, 590 pp., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

²*Joan of Arc.* By Janet Tuckey. Sq. 16mo, 224 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³*Yesterday, To-day, and Forever.* A Poem. By E. H. Bickersteth. New edition. 16mo, 460 pp., cloth, 50c. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

⁴*Theological Unrest: Discussions in Science and Religion.* Essays by James Anthony Froude, Professor G. P. Tait, of the University of Edinburgh, and the Rev. E. A. Washburn, D. D. No. 11 of the "Atlas Series of Essays." 8vo, 64 pp., paper, 25c. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York.

⁵*The Gospel according to St. Luke.* With Commentary by E. H.

the highest he could receive in England. Mr. Winchell is thought to have written an able but dangerous book¹ to prove that God had created other men before Adam. We accept with gratitude Mr Carpenter's heart-testimony² to the truth of the religion of Jesus. We strongly recommend the noble argument by the illustrious and devoted missionary, Alexander Duff.³ That great Christian scholar, the late Dr. Tayler Lewis, discourses knowingly of Bible Psalmody.⁴

We see that Mr. Buckle on his list of the few original books has justly put down the story of Cervantes as one of the three great modern novels. The tinge of immorality that discolours the original belongs more to the age than the man. To the translations by Smollett, Jarvis, and others, one more is now added⁵ and passed through the marvellously cheap process of the American Book Exchange. There is another edition, too, of Milman's Gibbon;⁶ a book that wears better than any coeval writing, unless it be that of Edmund Burke. Macaulay's superb history⁷ is daily losing reputation for anything like impartial accuracy, but (if that be possible) it is gaining reputation as an English classic.

Plumptre, D. D., Prebendary of St. Paul's, Vicar of Bickley, Professor of Divinity, King's College, London. Edited by C. J. Ellicott, D. D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Fep. 8vo., 440 pp., cloth extra, \$1.25. Cassell, Petter, Galpin & Co., New York.

¹Preadamites; or, A Demonstration of the Existence of Men before Adam. By Alexander Winchell. 8vo, 528 pp., cloth, \$3.50. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

²The Witness of the Heart to Christ. By the Rev. W. Boyd Carpenter. 12mo, 174 pp., cloth, 75c. A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.

³Missions—The Chief End of the Christian Church. By the Rev. Alexander Duff, D. D. With steel engraving. 16mo, 262 pp., cloth, \$1. United Presbyterian Board of Publication, Pittsburgh.

⁴Bible Psalmody. By Tayler Lewis, D. D., and others. 18mo, 64 pp., cloth, 30c. *Ibid.*

⁵The Adventures of Don Quixote de la Mancha. By Miguel de Cervantes. Illustrated. 16mo, 610 pp., cloth, 50c. American Book Exchange, New York.

⁶Milman's Gibbon's Rome. 5 vols. 16mo, 3,450 pp., cloth, \$2.50; half russia, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁷Macaulay's History of England. 3 vols. 16mo, 2,135 pp., cloth, \$1.50; half russia, \$3. *Ibid.*

Meanwhile Charles Knight's unpretending, more symmetrical, more comprehensive chronicle,¹ is found to supply very adequately a popular want that was not exactly met by the abler and more philosophic and occasionally picturesque volumes of Green. All aids towards the cultivation of fruits² or of flowers are to be received with thankful pleasure. The lovers of that gay and golden-tinted minstrel, the canary, will doubtless in some instances be gratified by the instruction that is now furnished how to mate and breed them.³

¹Knight's History of England. By Charles Knight. Illustrated. 4 vols., 12mo, 2,483 pp., cloth, \$3; half russia, \$5. *Ibid.*

²The Fruit Grower's Friend. By R. H. Haines. 8vo, 34 pp., paper, 30c. Baker & Godwin, New York.

³The Canary: Mating and Breeding. 16mo, 64 pp., boards, 25c. Singer Gravel Paper Co., New York (American News Company, Agents).

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ARTICLE I.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

The question which we considered in our last article in this REVIEW (April, 1880), was, whether our position that the first sin was not necessitated by an efficacious decree of God is uncalvinistic and untrue. We showed that the Supralapsarians themselves maintain the distinction between efficacious and permissive decree in relation to the first sin, and hold that God did not effect that sin, considered as sin, but permitted it. We next showed that Calvin was a Sublapsarian, so far as the order of the divine decrees and the object of predestination are concerned. But the question occurred, whether he held the view that God necessitated the first sin by an efficacious decree, and, more particularly, whether he decreed to effect, and therefore actually effected, the first sin, regarded as an act or an historical event, while he permitted man to infuse the evil quality into the act, or, to fail in producing the good quality which ought to have existed. That was the particular question under discussion when we were compelled to bring the article to a close, and we now proceed with its consideration. Having remarked that we proposed to adduce and examine the most prominent passages in the writings of the Reformer which seem to place him on the affirmative of

this question, we began with those which appear to teach that God decreed to create man for destruction, and from which the inference has been drawn that Calvin held the necessitation of the first sin by divine decree. Having evinced the improbability of such a construction of that class of passages, we next take up those from which the inference might with some plausibility be deduced, that, in Calvin's view, the causal efficiency of God was implicated in the production of the first sin, considered as an act or event.

Before quoting Calvin's language, however, we deem it necessary to observe that we have nowhere in his writings discovered the distinction between an act, as act, which God effects, and the quality or want of quality of the act for which man is accountable, which is fundamental to the doctrine of Supralapsarians and the advocates of the privative character of sin. The distinction which he makes, and which he often uses, is a different one. Let us explain. An act may be regarded in a twofold aspect—as to its matter and its form. The matter, or what is the same thing, the material cause, of an act, is the act itself; the form, or the formal cause, of an act, is that which distinguishes it from all other acts whose matter is the same, viz., the subjective inducements leading to, and the end contemplated by, the act—in a word, its motive or intention. Now the Supralapsarian and the maintainer of the privative character of sin hold that the matter of sin is given by God, but the form by man. Calvin's distinction, on the other hand is, that the matter is given by man, but that the form is partly given by man and partly by God. We shall have occasion to note this difference between the doctrine which we are considering and that of Calvin as we proceed. At present we call attention to it for the purpose of showing that no passages, so far as we know, can be adduced from the Reformer's writings in which the supralapsarian distinction between sin as act and as quality is formally affirmed; in which he maintains that God is the author of sin, considered as an act, but man, of the sinful quality attached to the act.

The passage, in which he seems most clearly to obliterate the distinction between the divine effectuation and permission of sin,

is the well-known one in the Institutes. We give those parts of it which are strongest:

"From other passages in which God is said to draw or bend Satan to himself, and all the reprobate to his will, a more difficult question arises. For the carnal mind can scarcely comprehend how, when acting by their means, he contracts no taint from their impurity, nay, how, in a common operation, he is exempt from all guilt, and can justly condemn his own ministers. Hence a distinction has been invented between doing and permitting (*agere et permittere*), because to many it seemed altogether inexplicable how Satan and all the wicked are so under the hand and authority of God, that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and employs their iniquities to execute his judgments. . . . It seems absurd that man should be blinded by the will and command of God, and yet be forthwith punished for his blindness. Hence recourse is had to the evasion that this is done only by the permission, and not also by the will (*voluntate*), of God. He himself, however, openly declaring that he does this, repudiates this evasion. That men do nothing save at the secret instigation (*nutu*) of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on anything but what he has previously decreed with himself and brings to pass by his secret direction, is proved by numberless clear passages of Scripture."

Having mentioned some of these passages, all of which have reference to the works of the wicked, he adds:

"Those who have a tolerable acquaintance with the Scriptures see, that with a view to brevity I am only producing a few out of many passages, from which it is perfectly clear that it is the merest trifling to substitute a bare permission (*nudam permissionem*) for the providence of God, as if he sat in a watch-tower waiting for fortuitous events, his judgments meanwhile depending on the will of man."*

Upon this passage and others of a similar character we would offer the following remarks: 1. The title of the chapter in which the passage cited occurs, and the whole drift of the discussion, show that Calvin is treating of the relation of God's agency to the sins of the wicked. Now we have before alleged proof that Calvin did not treat the relation of God's will to the sins of the wicked as entirely the same as its relation to the first sin. He made a distinction between the sins of those already sinners and the first sin of a being previously innocent, and a corresponding distinction in God's decrees—distinctions as obvious to common

**Inst.*, B. I., C. xviii., §1, *Calv. Soc. Trans.*

sense as they are demanded by justice. Now unless it can be shown that this representation of Calvin's views is incorrect, and that he treated the two cases as the same, involving the same relation to the decree and providence of God, the passage before us proves nothing as to the effectuating agency of God in the production of the first sin. It must, of course, be granted that there are points of similarity between the cases, points in which the relation of divine decree and providence to them is the same. God bounds and governs the sins of the wicked; he orders, disposes, and directs them, so that they accomplish his holy purposes and promote the glory of his name. In like manner he bounded and governed, ordered, disposed, and directed the first sin. Both sorts of sin are objects of his fore-ordaining will and his controlling providence. Concerning this there is no dispute as to Calvin's doctrine or the faith of the Reformed Church. But the question now at issue is, whether Calvin taught that the divine efficiency is exerted in the same way in relation to the sins of the wicked and the first sin of Adam. The school whose views we are canvassing hold that God produces sin considered as an act, but man the evil quality inhering in the act; that is to say, God produces the sin materially considered, and man the sin formally considered. The matter is God's, the form man's. The divine causality is thus made to appear as the immediate efficient of the matter of sin. Calvin's doctrine, as we have indicated, is different from this. He assigns the matter of sin to man, and so makes him the immediate efficient of sin, materially considered. Let us hear him upon this point :

"They will have it that crimes ought not to be punished in their authors, because they are not committed without the dispensation of God. I concede more—that thieves and murderers and other evil-doers are instruments of divine providence, being employed by the Lord himself to execute the judgments which he has resolved to inflict. But I deny that this forms any excuse for their misdeeds. For how? Will they implicate God in the same iniquity with themselves, or will they cloak their depravity by his righteousness? They cannot exculpate themselves, for their own conscience condemns them: they cannot charge God, since they perceive the whole wickedness in themselves, and nothing in him save the legitimate use of their wickedness. . . . While the matter (*materia*) and guilt of wickedness belongs to the wicked man, why should it

be thought that God contracts any wickedness in using it at pleasure as his instrument?"*

"Though their perdition depends on the predestination of God, the cause and matter of it is in themselves."†

"For though, by the eternal providence of God, man was formed for the calamity under which he lies, he took the matter of it from himself, not from God, since the only cause of his destruction was his degenerating from the purity of his creation into a state of vice and impurity."‡

In his treatise entitled *Instructio adversus Libertinos* Calvin professedly discusses the question of the nature of God's agency in the sins of the wicked. The maxim of the fanatical sect against whom he wrote was: *Deus efficit omnia*; and they abused it to the perpetration of every species of wickedness under the sanction of the divine name. The question of God's efficiency in relation to sin was therefore fairly before the Reformer's mind. He expounds the various modes of operation employed by God in his administration of the affairs of the world. When he comes to the question of the mode in which he governs the wicked, and uses them as his instruments in the accomplishment of his purposes, he says:

"There is a great difference between the work of God and the work of a wicked man when he uses him as his instrument. For the wicked man is incited to the perpetration of his crime by his own avarice, or ambition, or envy, or cruelty, without contemplating any other end. Therefore from that root, that is, the affection of the mind and the end which it regards, the work takes its quality, and is deservedly judged as evil. But God has altogether another end in view, namely, that he may exercise his righteousness in preserving the good; may exhibit his grace and goodness towards believers; but may also chastise the ill-deserving. See then in what manner we must distinguish between God and men, so that in one aspect of the same work we may contemplate righteousness, goodness, and judgment, and in another the wickedness of the devil and unbelievers. . . . For all things take their quality from the purpose and will of the author."||

When, then, the question of the relation of the divine efficiency to the sins of the wicked was that which he was professedly discussing, he did not draw a distinction between sin as an act and as a quality, and affirm with the Supralapsarians and the advo-

**Inst.*, B. I., C. xvii., § 5. †*Ibid.*, B. III., C. xxiii., § 8. ‡*Ibid.*, § 9.

|| *Opp.*, Amstel., 1667, p. 385.

cates of the privative character of sin, that God is the producer of sin, as act, and man, of sin, as quality. And this is all the more noteworthy because the writings of Augustin, who maintained that distinction, were familiar to Calvin, and the authority of that illustrious father was very frequently invoked by him. The distinction which he makes is one between the formal qualities of a wicked work which receive their denomination from the ends contemplated—man seeking his own gratification in performing it, and God the glory of his name and the good of his people, in ordaining, governing, ordering, directing, and using it. The work of God—*opus Dei*—of which Calvin treats, is the acts of God concerning the sinful acts of men rather than the production of those sinful acts. But if he did not maintain the supralapsarian distinction in regard to the sins of the wicked, much more is it probable that he did not hold it in reference to the first sin of Adam.

In that part of his treatise on Eternal Predestination in which he discusses the subject of Providence, he makes a distinction between the proximate and remote cause of sin—*causa propinqua* and *causa remota*. The agency of the sinner is the proximate, that of God the remote, cause. It cannot, we conceive, be gathered from this discrimination that he intended to represent God as the efficient, though remote, cause of sin. It is true that he was accustomed to designate sinners as instruments of the execution of God's will, and a cursory reader might infer from this language that he held the sinner to be the instrument in the production of sin, while God is the real producer. But Calvin's language implies a distinction between an instrument in the accomplishment of an end, and an instrument in the performance of an act. God uses the sinner for the former purpose. He employs both the sinner and his acts for the execution of his plans. It is not that the human actor is efficiently used in the production of the human act, but the actor and the act are used for the attainment of the divine end. We do not mean to say that Calvin denied the exercise of an efficacious influence by God upon the wicked, determining them to the commission of particular acts of sin. He certainly affirmed, continually and emphati-

cally, the exertion of such an influence. And this leads us to inquire, What, precisely, was his doctrine upon this point of the relation of the divine efficiency to the sins of the wicked?

He taught, first, that man by the exercise of his free will sinned against God, and so fixed upon himself a moral necessity of sinning; secondly, that the judicial curse of God, induced by this wilful transgression, punitively inflicts upon him this necessity of sinning; thirdly, that God judicially withdraws the Spirit of his grace from the incorrigibly wicked; fourthly, that the current of sinful inclination, running thus by a moral and judicial necessity towards sin in general, is efficaciously determined by the will of God in certain specific directions. This is done in two ways: in the first place, God righteously shuts up the sinner, by the arrangements of his providence, to the commission of special acts of wickedness to which he is inwardly impelled by his own corrupt nature, so that those acts become necessary. In the second place, God, by an internal influence upon the mind, bends—*flexit* is Calvin's word—the will of the sinner towards the perpetration of particular forms of iniquity, so that the general inclination to sin, for which he is responsible as his own product, is by the divine power determined in special directions. As these are the acts of God, as an efficient cause, they are the necessary results of his efficacious decree. Under this explanation fall the sins of Pharaoh in refusing to let Israel go, of Satan and the human instruments of his malice in persecuting Job, of Shimei in cursing David, of the lying spirits and the false prophets in extending ruinous counsel to Ahab, and of Judas in betraying, and the Jews and Romans in crucifying, Christ.

This efficacious influence upon those who are already sinners is not the same as the efficient causation of sin. The wickedness of the sinner is not produced by God; it is only determined by him in certain specific directions, for the accomplishment of definite ends which were eternally foreordained. The case is different in regard to the first sin. An efficacious determination, by a divine influence, of the will of Adam to the commission of that sin, would have involved the divine production of the sin. In one case, God finds man a sinner and shuts him up to special

manifestations of an existing principle of wickedness; in the other, he finds man innocent, and shuts him up to the performance of an act which originates the existence of wickedness.

It deserves, further, to be considered as lending confirmation to the view we have given of Calvin's doctrine, that he carefully distinguished between this efficacious influence of God upon the wicked, which operates upon wickedness as an existing thing, having its root in the free causality of the sinner, and the efficacious grace of God, which generates the principle of spiritual life and implants holy dispositions in the heart of the regenerate. In the latter case, we have the efficiency of God immediately producing holiness and working in the saint to will and to do holy acts; but in the former, such an efficiency producing sin and working in the sinner to will and to do sinful acts is not asserted by Calvin. In a word, God is not the principle and cause of sin as he is the principle and cause of holiness. Evil is to be attributed to God not as a created corruption, but as a judicial infliction. The evil of punishment is God's; the evil of wickedness, as the cause of punishment, is man's. Calvin's position is, that the operation of the divine power upon the sins of the wicked is not creative, but judicial; and that God uses his righteous judgments upon their perpetrators, together with the results which flow from their infliction, for the accomplishment of his wise and holy ends in the general administration of his providence.

We are now prepared to estimate the true force of Calvin's language when, as in the passage cited, he rejects the distinction between "doing and permitting." He justly scouts the notion of a bare permission, an idle permission—*otiosa permissio*—a mere inoperative sufferance of sin, as not to be ascribed to God, who exercises an efficacious influence in relation to the sins of men. At the same time, the "doing" which he attributes to God, in contradistinction from such a permission, although efficacious, is not the effecting—the causal—production of sin itself.

That this was the Reformer's doctrine concerning the relation of the divine efficiency to the sins of the wicked, we would fain believe, is so patent to every careful reader of his works, that we shall make no labored appeals to them in order to establish the

fact. If this be conceded, it will be obvious that, up to this point, we have not been out of harmony with his teachings as to the relation of God's decree to sin. It has been thought necessary to furnish this exposition, for the purpose of vindicating our claim, that his views in regard to the relation of God's efficient causality to the sins of the wicked should not be made a gauge of his position as to its relation to the first sin, and thus of disentangling the main question of one of its chief embarrassments.

We come now to the real question in dispute: What did Calvin teach as to the relation of the divine efficiency to the first sin? Did he so efficaciously decree its commission as to render it unavoidable and necessary? Having efficaciously decreed the occurrence of the sin, did he efficiently cause its commission? We have seen that Calvin did not affirm the causal efficiency of God in the production of even the sins of the wicked, although they are the result of a moral and judicial necessity. It appears to us entirely unnecessary, therefore, to discuss the question, whether he held an efficient production by God of the first sin of a being previously innocent and under neither an intrinsic nor a judicial necessity of sinning, which he denied in regard to the sins of the wicked. It is out of the question that he could consistently have maintained that view, as it is a fact susceptible of proof from his writings that he did not. But the Supralapsarian contends that while man was responsible for the evil quality attached to the first sin, or the absence of the good quality which ought to have existed, God was the producer of the sin, considered simply as an act. We have seen, also, that Calvin did not adopt that distinction. There is, therefore, no necessity to raise the question whether he held that God decreed efficaciously to produce the first sin as an act, and, in pursuance of that decree, providentially effected the act. But he did maintain an efficacious operation of God in relation to specific sins of the wicked which necessitates the commission of those sins. May he not have maintained a necessitation, for the same reason, of the first sin? The question, then, which may fairly claim attention is, whether he held that God, in any way, to use the terms of Twisse, decreed *efficaciter*

procurare—efficaciously to procure—the occurrence of the first sin, and so necessitated its commission.

First, he held that God decreed to permit the first sin. This we have in previous articles proved by quotations from his writings, and, if it were necessary, could adduce much more evidence of the same sort. But why endeavor to show that he maintained a view which even the Supralapsarians universally admit? Surely he did not go further than they—he did not out-Herod Herod.

Secondly, he held that God did not decree barely, idly, inoperatively, to permit the first sin. It was not to be a thing of mere sufferance or toleration. God was not “sitting in a watch-tower” waiting for the act of man, and suspending his decisions upon its problematical occurrence. The decree was not one of naked otiose permission.

Thirdly, he held that God willed the occurrence of the first sin. He says, as we have already seen, that it took place in accordance with the will of God, because he had the power to prevent it, and did not. He must, therefore, have willed the occurrence of the sin in preference to its non-occurrence.

Now, what was the force of this will? Did it necessitate the commission of the sin, in the sense of efficaciously procuring it? Calvin’s own words must furnish us the light we require upon these questions. We have already cited the passage in his Commentary in Genesis. The core of it we have just given above. In that passage he reasons thus: God permitted the sin. But he foreknew that it would occur, unless he prevented it. He did not will to prevent it, although he might. He therefore willed the occurrence of the sin; not positively, by his efficaciously bringing it to pass, through an influence exerted upon the will of Adam; but negatively, by withholding determining grace from him, which would have secured his standing by preventing the sin. Now, we submit, that this was indeed God’s willing the occurrence, rather than the non-occurrence of the sin, but it was not his willing efficaciously to procure its commission. It is perfectly clear that, according to this statement, what God decreed was non-action, not efficacious action, on his part. He did not decree to effect, or efficaciously bring to pass, the sin, but simply

not to prevent it. We cannot see how such a decree could be construed into a determination to make the sin necessary and unavoidable, except upon one supposition, to wit, that God did not furnish Adam with sufficient grace to enable him to stand; we say not determining grace, for that would have made the sin impossible, but sufficient grace, so that although the sin was possible, it might have been avoided. Now, Calvin holds that Adam was endowed with this sufficient grace. How, then, could God's not having communicated determining grace have efficaciously necessitated the sin? Determining grace *would* have prevented it, and that God did not give; but sufficient grace *could* have prevented it, and that God did give. It amounts to this: God decreed to make Adam's sin possible; consequently, he did not decree to make it certain, for possible and certain, as to causal power, though not to knowledge, are inconsistent terms. But having made the sin possible, and knowing that although Adam might not sin if he pleased, he would in fact please to sin, if the sin were not made impossible by determining grace, God did not decree to make it impossible. The decree, however, not to make it impossible is not the same as a decree to make it necessary. There are three conceivable suppositions: either God decreed to make the sin impossible, or he decreed to make it possible, or he decreed to make it necessary. Calvin's doctrine is that he decreed to make it possible. If so, it was not his doctrine that he decreed to make it necessary. Let us hear other testimonies from Calvin. He quotes, with approval, the following passage from Augustin:

"Nothing comes to pass, except the Almighty wills it to come to pass, either by permitting it to come to pass, or by doing it himself. It cannot be doubted, that God does well when he permits to come to pass, whatsoever evil comes to pass. For he does not permit this except by a righteous decision. Although, therefore, evil things, so far as they are evil, are not good things, nevertheless it is a good thing that there should not only be good things, but evil things as well. For, except this were a good thing, that there should be evil things, in no way could they be permitted by an omnipotent being who is good; to whom, without doubt, it is as easy to do what he wills, as it is easy not to permit what he does not will to exist."*

* *Consensus Genevensis*, Niemeier, p. 230.

"In ordaining the fall of man, God had the best and most righteous end in view, from which the name of sin is most remote. Albeit I say that he so ordained it, yet I will not concede that he was its proper author. That I may not be tedious, what Augustin teaches I perceive to have been entirely fulfilled, that in a wonderful and ineffable manner that was not done apart from his will, which at the same time was done against his will, because it could not have come to pass had he not permitted it. Nor, assuredly, did he unwillingly permit it, but willingly. The principle which he there assumes cannot be gainsayed."*

"Man was placed in such a condition, when he was first created, that by falling of his own accord, he himself became the cause to himself of his own destruction; yet, nevertheless, it was, in the admirable counsel of God, so ordained, that by this voluntary ruin there should be matter of humility to the whole human race. Nor, indeed, if it so seemed fit to God, does it follow that man did not precipitate himself into the fall, seeing that in himself he was endowed with a right nature and was formed in the image of God."†

"God foresaw the fall of Adam: he had the power to prevent it: he did not will to prevent it. Why did he not so will? No other reason can be given, except that his will tended in a different way. . . Those whom he elects God supports with invincible fortitude in order to their perseverance. Why did he not furnish Adam with the same, if he willed that he should stand in safety?"‡

From these passages we collect the following positions as held by Calvin: First, that there are some things which God decreed to permit to be done, and some things which he decreed to do himself. Here is a clear distinction between permissive and efficacious decree. The first sin falls into the category of things which God permitted to be done, and not into that of things which he does himself. Secondly, that God was not the author of the first sin. Consequently, he could not have produced it. Man was the author, the efficient cause of the sin, and therefore subjected himself to just punishment for its commission. Thirdly, God's permission of the sin is not to be opposed to his will ordaining its occurrence. But how was God's will concerned in its occurrence? In this way: he did not will, as he might have done, to prevent its occurrence, by giving determining grace to Adam, such as he gives to his elect. But Adam was endowed

* *Ibid.*, p. 268. † *Ibid.*, p. 251.

‡ *De Occul. Dei Providentia, Opp.*, Amstel., 1667, p. 636.

with sufficient strength to stand. While, therefore, God, foreseeing the abuse by Adam of his natural endowments, did not efficaciously decree to prevent it, he must, in that sense, have willed the sin to occur, rather than not to occur; but he did not efficaciously decree to effect the sin himself, or efficiently to procure its commission, and therefore did not himself actually effect it, or efficiently procure its commission. Fourthly, it must be added, that Calvin taught that the will of God in regard to the sin was not passive and inoperative, but was an active will, in the sense that it limited and governed, ordered, directed, and used it for the promotion of his own most wise and holy purposes. What God permits to be done, as well as what he does himself, is subject to the control of his ordaining will.

So far, notwithstanding certain expressions which to the Sublapsarian seem to be exaggerated, Calvin's doctrine as to the relation of the divine efficiency to sin is consistent with itself, and, when fairly interpreted, sustains our position in regard to that subject. But we desire to be just in expounding his whole doctrine, and we are free to say that we have met a few passages which it is not so easy to adjust to the bulk of his teachings, or to the view we have maintained. They seem to teach a necessitation of the first sin by the will of God.

"Nor, indeed, is there any probability in the thing itself, viz., that man brought death upon himself merely by the permission and not by the ordination of God; as if God had not determined what he wished the condition of the chief of his creatures to be. I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustin that the will of God is necessity, and that everything is necessary which he has willed; just as those things will certainly happen, which he has foreseen (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. VI., Cap. 15)."*

"At first blush that saying of Augustin seems harsh (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. VI., Cap. 15), that the will of God is the necessity of things; also what he adds (Cap. 18) for the sake of explanation: that God so framed inferior causes, that from them that, of which they are causes, might take place, but should not be necessary; yet he has concealed profounder and remote causes in himself which render necessary what, so far as inferior causes are concerned, is only possible."†

There is another passage, upon which we cannot just now lay

* *Inst.*, B. III., C. XXIIL. § 8.

† *Cons. Gener.*, Niemeyer, p. 305.

our hands, in which Calvin says, in effect, that what is unnecessary, intrinsically considered, that is, so far as man's internal nature is concerned, is extrinsically necessary, that is, so far as God's will is involved.

We are not perfectly sure of Calvin's meaning in these passages. We could understand them, and perceive their consistency with his views as we have already collected them, if he meant the necessity of infallibility or logical consequence, or if he meant the necessitation of specific acts of sin in the case of the wicked by the efficacious will of God. But we must admit that, in these passages, he seems to maintain that the decree of God in some way rendered the first sin necessary and unavoidable. If this be his meaning, we must confess that, in this particular respect, our doctrine is inconsistent with his, and that at this point we must part with our venerable guide; and we proceed modestly to assign our reasons for the divergence. There are only two conceivable suppositions in this case: either, first, that God efficaciously procured or brought to pass the commission of the first sin; or, secondly, that God himself effected that sin.

Let us consider the first supposition: that God efficaciously procured the commission of the first sin. In the first place, if this were Calvin's meaning, he is, in this matter, inconsistent with himself. What was his carefully enunciated doctrine as to the nature of God's decree in relation to the first sin? It was, that God decreed not to prevent the sin, although he might have prevented it, and that, in that sense, he willed it to be, rather than not to be. Now, to say that he did not prevent it, when he might have prevented it, is the same thing as to say that he permitted it, when he had the power not to permit it. He did not unwillingly permit it; he willingly permitted it. But to hold that God willingly permitted the sin, and efficaciously caused its commission, is to hold inconsistent positions. We are at liberty to make our choice between the incongruous alternatives. We prefer the doctrine cautiously and often stated, that God decreed to permit the first sin, when he could have prevented it, to that which is less formally and frequently intimated, namely, that

God necessitated it by an efficacious determination. We appeal from Calvin, as Supralapsarian, to Calvin, as Sublapsarian.

In the second place, let it be remembered that Calvin's elaborately established doctrine was, that so far as man's nature at creation was concerned, so far as his ability to stand and freedom of will to elect holiness were involved, the first sin was unnecessary and avoidable. This even the Supralapsarians concede. But in the passages last adduced he seems also to teach that, notwithstanding these intrinsic considerations derived from man's nature and furniture, God's decree, by an efficacy exerted in the extrinsic sphere, made the sin necessary and unavoidable. Now, either this efficacious influence was confined to the sphere external to man's subjectivity, or it was not. The first of these suppositions appears evidently to be that which Calvin makes. Let us consider the mode in which, of necessity, it must have operated. The external means through which its force would have been exerted were the temptation of the devil, the presentation of the forbidden fruit, and the correlation of the bodily senses with that fruit. But, according to Calvin's express admission, the internal forces of man's nature were adequate to resist the influence exercised by these external forces. He could have endured temptation, and have been blessed in enduring it. It is, therefore, upon his principles, impossible to conceive how an influence proceeding *ab extra* could have efficaciously procured the commission of the sin. The will of man which was indued with strength to stand must have been affected by an efficacious influence immediately exerted upon it in order to impart efficacy to the external forces operating upon it. But if the supposed efficacious influence were confined to the external sphere, then, *ex hypothesi*, no efficacious influence was exercised in the internal sphere of man's subjectivity. The distinction between the intrinsic avoidableness of the sin and its extrinsic unavoidableness is both inconceivable and impossible. It involves a contradiction.

If the other alternative be assumed, namely, that the efficacious influence which necessitated the sin was not confined to the external sphere, but, beginning from without, crossed the boundary line of man's subjectivity and operated directly upon his

nature, it would follow that God gave man grace to stand, and himself by an irresistible force overcame that grace; which amounts to this, that God rendered man both able and unable to stand, which is a flat contradiction. If it be said, that God at first made man able to stand, and then by an efficacious influence exerted upon his nature overcame and destroyed that original ability, the questions at once arise, 'Wherefore was the original ability bestowed, if it was at once to be removed? Where was the use, what the office, of such ability? It never was called into exercise. At the first moment of conflict with temptation, when it might have strengthened Adam to resist it and to maintain his integrity, it ceased to exist because extinguished by an efficacious influence from God, which determined the will to the commission of the sin. Further, the gifts and calling of God are without repentance. If he gave Adam ability to stand, he would not have taken back that gift without a sufficient reason for its withdrawal. That reason could only have been found in the sin of Adam. But, according to the supposition we are considering, the gift of ability was resumed before the first sin was committed, inasmuch as it held that he was unable to stand, for the very reason that God efficaciously determined him to fall. The first sin was grounded in a disability inflicted by God, and therefore could not possibly have grounded the disability itself. It is but trifling with the perfections of God—with his immutability at least—to say that he first communicated to Adam ability to stand, and then efficaciously neutralised that ability before Adam's first sin was committed.

We cannot, in view of these considerations, adopt either of the alternatives mentioned: that an efficacious influence procuring the commission of the first sin operated purely in the sphere of external circumstances, or, that it passed out of the external sphere into the subjective nature of man, and determined it to the production of sin. And as these are the only conceivable modes in which such an efficacious influence could be exerted, we are obliged to refuse our assent to the position that God's decree necessitated the first sin by efficaciously procuring its commission.

We have remarked that the view, apparently maintained by Calvin, that God by his decree necessitated the first sin involves two suppositions: either that God efficaciously procured the commission of the sin; or, that he himself effected it. We have shown that the first of these suppositions cannot be substantiated; the second remains to be discussed.

In the two testimonies cited from the Institutes and the treatise on Eternal Predestination, it will be noticed that Calvin, in affirming that the will of God is necessity, and that as he willed the occurrence of the first sin it was necessary, appeals for confirmation of that view to the same passage of Augustin. Now it is well known that the eminent father whose authority he invoked held that as God is the efficient cause of all things, he must have been the efficient cause of sin, since sin is a thing. But in order to free the divine causality from the taint of moral evil, he adopted a distinction between sin as an act and sin as a quality of the act. The act he affirmed to be a simple entity and therefore a good thing. Consequently God without contracting any taint, immediately effected sin, considered as an act. It follows that the act was necessary. But inasmuch as a sinful quality is a thing which, upon his principles, would have to be referred to God's efficiency for its production, he went further, and, to relieve his theory of this difficulty, took the ground that sin, considered qualitatively, is a mere privation. It is nothing positive; it is a defect of a positively good quality which ought to exist and does not. God's efficiency is, therefore, not implicated in its occurrence. On the other hand, Augustin, as we have seen, held—and Calvin concurred with him—that there are some things which God does himself and some things which he permits to be done by others. Into the category of things which he permits to be done by others sin falls. If sin be not what he here intended to specify, what is there more than it which God permits to be done by others and does not do himself? Sin then, is a thing which God does not do himself, but permits to be done by others. Now either sin both as act and quality was a thing which God permitted to be done by others and did not do himself, or it was not. If it was, sin as an act was not done by God himself, and his other position is contradicted,

viz., that sin, as an act, is done by God himself. If it was not, then his meaning is that sin as a quality was permitted to be done by others. If so, as a thing which is done is an effect which must have been produced by some efficient cause, sin as a quality was an effect produced by an efficient cause and an efficient cause other than God himself; and that is contradictory to his position that God is the only efficient cause of all things that are done; and also to his view that sin is a mere privation, and therefore not a thing done by an efficient cause. Moreover, if it be said that sin is not a thing which was done, but merely the privation of a thing which ought to have been done, it would follow that sin is nothing, and therefore had no cause. The only method of avoiding this conclusion is by holding that sin is the effect of a deficient cause; and that extraordinary hypothesis we shall subject, as we go on, to a careful examination.

In the course of this discussion it has been remarked that we have nowhere in his writings encountered the distinction, as formally made by Calvin, between sin considered simply as an act and sin considered as a quality. But let it be supposed that he acted under the influence of that distinction as made by Augustine and with which he must have been acquainted, in consequence of his familiarity with the works of that great man. Under that supposition, the meaning of Calvin, when he says that although the first sin was not rendered necessary by any reasons intrinsic to the nature of man, it was necessitated by the fore-ordaining will of God, was that God decreed to effect the sin, simply as an act, and hence the occurrence of the sin was necessary; while it was in the power of man, so far as his natural endowments were concerned, to avoid producing the evil quality of the sin. We repeat it, that we are slow to believe that this was Calvin's view; but if it was, it is, in our judgment, out of harmony with his perspicuously stated doctrine concerning the nature of the divine decree in relation to the first sin, and concerning the ability of man to have avoided the commission of that sin, which sprung from the rich and ample endowments that were concreated with his being. We are satisfied that our views are in harmony with the general strain and tenor of his teachings, and that this has been proved by an ap-

peal to his writings. We are not bound to follow him in utterances which are exceptional and incapable of logical adjustment to his system; and the special tenet in which he appears to follow Augustine we regard as belonging to that category. This tenet is precisely that of the Supralapsarians; and we embrace the opportunity to discuss it, which is thus afforded us by the legitimate demands of our argument.

Let it then be noticed, that it is universally admitted by the supralapsarian theologians, that God is not the efficient producer of sin, as sin. So far as an act or event is evil, it is attributable to the creature; only so far as it is good, is it efficiently caused by the Creator. It is their doctrine that God effects the act or event, as simply act or event, and that he permits the evil quality, or the defect of a good quality, which characterises the act or event. But inasmuch as the efficacious decree which necessitates the act or event, necessitates likewise its qualities as inseparable concomitants, the permission of the latter supposes their necessitation. The act or event cannot occur without these accidents, and therefore the accidents, although in themselves only permitted, are necessitated by virtue of their necessary connexion with the entity in which they inhere. It is in this way that they consider permission as equivalent to necessitation. There is no other way, to our minds, in which the paradox can be explained, that, although God only permitted the sin of the first man and of the angels, as sin, he at the same time made its commission necessary and unavoidable. He did not necessitate it, in itself considered, but simply as an accident of a necessary act or event. In what other mode can the extraordinary proposition be understood: God did not efficaciously decree to produce the first sin, as sin, he only decreed to permit it; but the sin became a necessity in consequence of his decree to permit it—the sin must have occurred because permitted. The hypothesis is intended to show how God can be the efficient cause of all things, and yet not be directly and causally implicated in the production of evil.

Having endeavored to elucidate, as fairly as we could, the meaning of those who maintain this position, we proceed to evince its untenableness; and inasmuch as ecclesiastical history proves

that Calvinists have been divided upon this question, we shall no longer appeal to authority, but discuss the matter upon its merits.

1. This hypothesis is contradictory of the fundamental principle which it was invented to support, namely, that God is the efficient cause of all things—beings, acts, and events. Either the sinful quality of Adam's act in eating the forbidden fruit—that which gave the act its denomination as sinful—was something or it was nothing. If it was something, it must, as an effect, have had an efficient cause. Either that efficient cause was God or Adam. If God was the efficient cause, the position is abandoned—that God does not effect, but only permits, sin, as sin. If Adam was the efficient cause, the principle is contradicted that God is the only efficient cause of all things. If, on the other hand, it be said that the sinful quality of Adam's act in eating the forbidden fruit was nothing, it would follow that there was no sin in that act, that the act was a good one, although God had said, *Thou shalt not eat of it*; that all other sins which took their origin from this are nothing; and that for nothing the judgments of God rest upon the race, the scheme of redemption was wrought out in the blood of Christ, and some men are everlastingly damned. No, it cannot have been nothing. It must have been something; and then the principle which makes God the efficient cause of all things necessitates the position, that he was the efficient cause of the sinful quality of Adam's act in eating the forbidden fruit. But the advocates of the hypothesis under consideration deny that God is the efficient cause of that sinful quality, and contend that he only permitted it. The hypothesis, consequently, contradicts their fundamental principle, and is, therefore, nothing worth.

If it be urged, that the sin of Adam's act was not a positive quality, but simply the defect of a good quality which ought to have existed, we reply: Either this defect of a good quality was something or nothing. If it was nothing, as of nothing nothing can be positively predicated, and from nothing nothing, by creature power, can be produced, it cannot be affirmed of this defect that it was damnable, and it would follow that the miseries of mankind which had their source in nothing are themselves nothing.

It will not do to say that this first defect of a good quality was nothing, and that, therefore, all sin is a chimera. No Supralapsarian would take ground so impious and absurd. If the defect of a good quality in Adam's act was something, then again we submit that, according to the principle that God is the efficient cause of all things, he was the efficient cause of this thing, and so the position of the advocates of the hypothesis in hand is contradicted, namely, that God did not efficiently produce, but only permitted, sin, as sin. But if the position, that God only permitted the defect, be still asserted, then there is something of which God was not the efficient cause, and the principle is given up, that God is the efficient cause of all things. Either horn of the dilemma is fatal to the Supralapsarian.

2. The necessitation of the act by which Adam committed the first sin would have been the necessitation of the sin, as sin. The distinction between effectuation and permission, as to that sin, is destitute of force. There is a distinction between the matter and the form of an act, and in the light of that distinction certain acts may be pronounced materially right and formally wrong, or materially wrong and formally right. Should one strike a man a fatal blow, intending only to stun him so as to save him from drowning, the act would be materially wrong, but formally right. Should one give alms to a beggar in order to elicit applause from bystanders, the act would be materially right but formally wrong. It would appear that resort is had to this distinction in the affirmation, that the act of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit may have been right, as an act, but that the quality of it was sinful. The wrong motive gave the act a sinful denomination—it may, in other words, have been materially right, but formally wrong. This distinction can only hold good where the matter itself of an act is not forbidden; but not where the act, materially considered, is prohibited. Now, this was the case with the eating of the forbidden fruit—the act itself, as to the matter of it, was prohibited: Thou shalt not eat of it. It is impossible, therefore, to say of Adam's act in eating of it, that it was materially right and formally wrong. The truth is, it was both materially and formally wrong. It was emphatically a wicked deed, in all re-

spects sinful. Unless, therefore, this distinction is not exhaustive, and there may be a further distinction in the matter itself of the act, it will follow that if God produced the act, as act, he produced that which was materially sinful, as a violation of the divine command. Throw out of account the sinful quality—motive, intention, whatever it may have been—and confine the agency of God to the mere matter of the act, and as that was wrong, the conclusion must be that God did a wrong thing. But that is contradictory to the position maintained by the supporters of the hypothesis under consideration, viz., that God effects no sin, as sin.

If it be contended that God's efficient agency must be separated from Adam's agency in the production of the act, as act, so that while Adam did what was materially wrong in performing the act, God did no wrong, we answer: (1.) According to the hypothesis, the divine agency is the only efficient agency, Adam's simply instrumental. The act, therefore, must be supposed to have been performed by God mediately through the agency of Adam. If so, it is impossible to separate the two kinds of agency from each other in the production of the act. The only conceivable difference is that the divine was efficient and the human instrumental; and that only serves to show that the real actor was God. It is, therefore, impossible to prove that the divine and the human agency were so distinct in the production of the act, that they are susceptible of different predication, to wit, that Adam's was sinful and God's was holy. Thus again are we shut up to the supposition that God produced the sinful act, as sinful, which is contradictory to the hypothesis. (2.) This is made still more apparent when we contemplate the nature of the act. What kind of act was it? A corporeal one—the eating of the forbidden fruit. As God cannot be conceived as performing the bodily act of eating, and yet, according to the hypothesis, he was the only efficient cause of the act, it is necessary to suppose that he produced the act through the bodily organs of Adam which alone were adapted to its performance. Now, attempt the disjunction of God's agency from Adam's, and what remains to thought as that which was peculiarly accomplished by the divine agency?

Nothing. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that the corporeal act of Adam in eating the fruit was efficiently produced by God, and that what is predicable of Adam's act, materially considered, is predicable of God's. That is to say, we must affirm that God produced the sinful act, as sinful, which is the contradiction to the hypothesis already noticed.

3. No mind, unbiassed by a desire to sustain a hypothesis, would conceive it possible to attribute to God the efficient production of Adam's corporeal act in eating the forbidden fruit. It is not only inconceivable, but, we think, incredible. The doctrine, under proper limitations, of a divine *concursum* with the bodily acts of creatures is not only conceivable but rational, and it is delivered to us by the Scriptures. But that is vastly different from the tenet that God by his efficient causality performs corporeal acts. And unless that tenet can be established, the position of the hypothesis in hand, that God was the efficient producer of Adam's physical act in eating the forbidden fruit, must be regarded as alike unphilosophical and unscriptural.

4. Let us return to the distinction made by the advocates of the hypothesis we are combating, between the effectuation of an act, as act, and the permission of the sinful quality, positive or privative, attached to the act. This distinction must involve one of two suppositions: either, that the permitted quality may or may not exist; or, that it must necessarily exist. If the first of these suppositions be made, namely, that the sinful quality which is permitted may or may not exist, the supposition is further possible that it may not exist. Let us then suppose, that while Adam's act in eating the forbidden fruit was effected by God and was therefore rendered absolutely necessary, the sinful quality of the act may not have been infused. The act was necessitated, the quality of the act may have been absent. We would then have the absurdity of the supposed existence of the act without a quality which was essential and inseparable. Adam must have done the act, but may not have been guilty. And yet it must be admitted that the act itself was a violation of the divine command—an absurdity upon an absurdity. If the second supposition be made, namely, that the permission of the sinful quality

necessitated its existence in consequence of its connexion with the necessitated act, what is that but God's efficacious procurement of the existence of the sinful quality? and how that differs, except in words, from the efficient production of that quality, it passes our ability to see. For if one is shut up by irresistible power to the infusion of a sinful quality into an act, he is the mere instrument of that power, and to talk, under those circumstances, of his being permitted to infuse the sinful quality, is to employ language abusively. To speak of one's being permitted to do a thing, which yet he is compelled to do, is to use terms contradictorily. Adam was permitted to attach a sinful quality to his act of eating the forbidden fruit, that is, he may or may not have done so; but at the same time he was necessitated to attach the sinful quality to the act—he could not avoid doing so; this surely is a contradiction.

The force of these objections to the hypothesis we are considering must, in the main, have been perceived by the able men who have supported it, and the question is an interesting one, How, in the last analysis, did they attempt to resist it? The answer is to be found in the hypothesis, essential to their scheme, of the privative character of sin. They held that a good quality is something positive, an entity which as a real effect demands an efficient cause for its production. God is that efficient cause. But a sinful quality is a mere privation of the good quality which ought to exist but does not. It is nothing positive, no entity which as a real effect requires an efficient cause for its production; it is a *defect* of good which demands for its existence nothing more than a *deficient* cause. The defect of a positive cause corresponds with the defect of a positive result. Man was the deficient cause of this privation. This is the view that lies at the root of their scheme.

A full consideration of this radical postulate of the Supralapsarians we do not now propose to undertake. It has already been partly discussed in the first article of this series on the Freedom of the Will.* There also we referred to the masterly treatises of Dr. Julius Müller, in his *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, and of Dr.

*SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, October, 1878.

Thornwell, in his Lecture on the State and Nature of Sin, in the first volume of his Collected Writings, as rendering superfluous on our part a discussion which would, of necessity, largely consist of a re-statement of their arguments. The same reason operates upon us now; and as Dr. Thornwell's Writings are, no doubt, in the hands of most of the readers of this REVIEW, we would refer to them as presenting what is, in our judgment, a conclusive refutation of the hypothesis that sin is a mere privation of good. What, however, we now purpose doing is to subject to a particular examination the special hypothesis of a deficient cause—*causa deficiens*—for the existence of sin, under the conviction that if that assumption can be exploded, the supralapsarian doctrine in regard to the genesis of the first sin will be deprived of its chief foundation stone. We shall not fight a man of straw. The supposition to be considered is supported, as furnishing the ultimate philosophical justification of their doctrine, by Twisse, by Edwards, and, we take it, by our reviewer himself.

What, then, is a deficient cause? It cannot be a partially efficient cause which produces a partial effect. For if some effect were produced by it, the result could not be termed a mere privation. Something would positively exist as the effect of its action. But that is contrary to the supposition. A deficient cause, in the sense in which it is here employed, is the precise opposite of an efficient cause. An efficient cause is one which produces some effect; a deficient cause is one which produces no effect. It is simply the absence of an efficient cause, which might have existed. In the case of Adam, and that is the case with which we are dealing, if holy dispositions had acted as an instrumental cause, the grace of God would through them have produced, as the efficient cause, obedience to the divine command. But as these causes failed to act, there was no obedience—there was simply the privation of obedience. No good cause was in operation, and consequently no good effect was produced. If there had been in operation an evil efficient cause, a positively evil effect would have been produced; but then what would become of the doctrine that the only efficient cause of all things is the

divine causality? For, in that case, the evil cause and the divine efficiency would have been one and the same. And then, also, the position would have to be abandoned, that God did not produce sin, as sin. It is sufficiently evident that, according to the hypothesis under consideration, the deficient cause of sin was one which was neither active nor existent—it was no cause. And then the question at once occurs, whether the language—sin is the result of a deficient cause—has any intelligible meaning, whether it be not a solecism to speak of any kind of effect where there was no cause to which it could be assigned. For, the great canon, that there can be no effect without a cause, must be understood to mean not only that every effect which actually exists must have had a cause—some effect, some cause, but that no effect can exist without a cause—no cause, no effect. But, if what is termed sin had no cause for its existence, it would follow that sin itself had no existence—no cause for sin, no sin. The cause of sin is nothing; therefore sin is nothing. The argument is as conclusive as it is short; and the absurdity of the conclusion is enough to destroy the supposition of a deficient cause for sin.

This reasoning, cogent as it is of itself, receives confirmation from the fact to which we have already adverted, that the first sin involved not only a want of conformity to the divine law, but positive disobedience of its requirement. It will not do to say that the act of eating the forbidden fruit, as an act, possessed no moral character. It was the act of eating which was specifically forbidden. Adam ate, and therefore was guilty of a positive, overt, palpable infraction of the divine command. No doubt the act of eating, in general, is indifferent. But this act of eating cannot be reduced to that category—it was this particular act of eating which God prohibited. To talk of such a sin having been, as a mere privation of good, the result of a deficient cause, is to speak unintelligibly. Here was positive disobedience, not simple privation of obedience. The positive effect demanded a positively existent and active cause. According to our hypothesis, this disobedience had no cause!

These difficulties, formidable as they are, are not all which

block the path of this extraordinary hypothesis—they thicken as we press our inquiries. What was that efficient cause, the absence of which was the deficient cause in which the first sin originated? It is admitted by the Supralapsarians themselves, that God furnished Adam at his creation with good dispositions, that he implanted in his nature, when he formed it, no positive principle of evil. How, then, did it come to pass, that when there was no acting cause, springing from his concreated dispositions, which could produce sin as its effect, the positive cause, existing in his good dispositions, did not keep him from sinning and induce obedience? How was it that this positive cause, which tended to the production of holiness, lapsed into a deficient cause in which sin had its source? This good cause could not have been counteracted by an evil cause, efficiently impelling the nature of Adam in the direction of sin, for the existence of such an efficient cause is denied. How is the gigantic difficulty to be met? The Supralapsarian boldly answers, that the grace of God was necessary to preserve Adam from sinning, and God withheld that grace. Grace was an efficient cause adequate to the production of obedience, but the fact that God withheld it left nothing in Adam's nature but a deficient cause from which sin necessarily resulted. Adam, argues Edwards, was constitutionally too weak to keep from sinning, and God was not pleased to impart to him the needed strength. Grace alone, argues Twisse, could have kept him from sinning, and God withheld that grace. Their language is different, their meaning the same. Their deficient cause of sin was simply the result of the withholding by God of his grace, which would have been an efficient cause adequate to prevent it. And yet they call this the divine permission of sin! Adam was permitted to do what he could not help doing! You may sin, you must sin—these are represented as the same thing!

Look at this matter in another light. According to this hypothesis, sin, proceeding from a deficient cause, was no real thing: it was merely the privation of the good quality which ought to have existed, the want of the obedience which ought to have been rendered. God, therefore, who is the efficient cause of real entities, of positively good things, was not the producer of sin—

he only permitted it. But the advocates of this hypothesis are obliged to acknowledge, that the privation of the good quality which ought to have existed, the absence of the good conduct which ought to have been maintained, involved guilt in Adam. He was on that account obnoxious to punishment. For the privation of good God condemned him. It seems, then, that the sin of Adam was something, which was adequate to ground the damnation of himself and his posterity. This is the express doctrine of the Supralapsarians—they indignantly reject any other supposition, viz., that God did not decree nakedly to damn man, but to damn him *for his sin*. Sin, they contend, was conceived in the divine mind as the ground or precedent condition of condemnation. It seems, then, that this privation of good involved Adam and his descendants in guilt, and exposed them to “the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, and the pains of hell forever.” Now, how did he contract this fearful guilt? He failed, replies the Supralapsarian, to produce the good quality and the obedience which were due from him. But why did he fail? Because, rejoins the Supralapsarian, God permitted him to fail. Well, it is implied in this that Adam may have stood in integrity and not failed. No, again responds the Supralapsarian, he was under the necessity of failing, because God withheld from him the grace which was requisite to prevent his failing. Now, we ask, was Adam responsible for the failure? Was he really guilty in failing? Did he, in thus necessarily failing in consequence of God’s withholding the strength which alone could have enabled him to stand in integrity, expose himself and his whole posterity to merited punishment? To answer these questions affirmatively, is to violate our conceptions of the divine perfections and our fundamental intuitions of truth, justice, and benevolence. Adam was no producing cause of sin, he was simply a deficient cause of the absence of holiness; and this deficient cause was the result of God’s efficient causality! The Supralapsarians refute themselves. They link the divine efficiency to the production of the first sin, as the privation of the good which ought to have existed. And then they represent man as damnable for not doing what the divine efficiency prevented!

Still, further, if sin had its origin in a deficient cause, and was, therefore, no positive thing, but only the privation of good, one would naturally conclude that the following consequence would logically result: that when the sin, thus originating, becomes in turn a proximate cause—as proximate cause it is universally admitted to be—it would only be a deficient cause. Springing from an ultimate deficient cause, it must itself be a proximate deficient cause; for the effect, although becoming in its turn a cause, must correspond in its nature with the cause from which it arose. Now, as a deficient cause, according to the Supralapsarians, can only issue in privative results, it follows that sin, as such a cause, can only lead to such results. The consequence of sin, therefore, could only be the privation of happiness, not the positive infliction of misery. A deficient cause itself, it can only originate privative results. We submit, that this is a logical conclusion from the fundamental position of the Supralapsarians; but if so, what becomes of their doctrine, that sin is the procuring cause of the miseries of this life, the wrath of God and the eternal pains of the world to come? Not only is the favor of God forfeited, but his displeasure incurred; not only heaven lost, but hell endured.

These consequences cannot be legitimately deduced from the ordinary doctrine, that sin, as a want of conformity to the divine law, as well as a transgression of it, is attended with punitive results of a positive nature; for that doctrine is that a want of conformity to God's law is itself a positive evil produced by an evil efficient cause, and therefore challenges the infliction of positive punishment. We are dealing with a very different doctrine, one which characterises sin as a mere privation of good, and assigns it to a deficient cause as its source.

But let us not do injustice to the Supralapsarians. They expressly maintain that sin was the *meritorious* cause of damnation; that while God is its efficient cause, in the sense that he inflicts it, man by his sin deserved it. This is their doctrine. But we cannot conceive, in consistency with the intuitions of justice and benevolence, that sin, *in the first instance*, could have merited punishment unless it was avoidable. Twisse and Perkins, as we have shown by citations from their writings in the article pre-

ceding the present, saw this difficulty, and maintained that the first sin was avoidable; and Twisse went so far as to say that it was avoidable, whether regarded from the point of view of man's freedom of will or from that of God's decree. On the other hand, they strenuously contended that God efficaciously decreed the first sin, and that, in pursuance of that decree, he effected that sin, considered as an act; and therefore that the sin was necessary, though as evil it was unnecessarily done by man. The sin was avoidable, but it was a necessity. It might have been avoided, but it must have been committed. What contradiction could be more pronounced? Nor will it meet the difficulty to say, that the terms are used in different senses determined by different relations. Let us see. If it be said, that the sin was avoidable contemplated in relation to the intrinsic power of man's free will, but necessary viewed in relation to God's efficient decree, and so no contradiction is involved, we answer: the Supralapsarians deprive themselves of this explanation, for they hold that God efficaciously decreed to withhold from Adam the grace, which they confess was necessary to empower his will to refrain from choosing sin. The terms are not used in different senses, and the contradiction stands in all its force. Adam, by virtue of the ability conferred by grace, may have avoided the commission of the first sin; but God, by withholding the grace which conferred ability, made it necessary that he should commit it; the sin was avoidable and unavoidable at the same time and in the same sense.

Still another view of this matter deserves to be pressed. The Supralapsarians, and the advocates of the hypothesis of the privative character of sin, fully admit that the good quality, the defect of which constituted the essence of the first sin, as sin, *ought* to have existed. Now this plainly asserts that it was Adam's duty to produce the requisite good quality. But obligation is, in the first instance, conditioned by ability. It would have been unjust that Adam should be required to produce a quality which he had not, as innocent, the power to produce; and consequently unjust that he should be punished for the failure to produce what, as he came from the hand of God, he had no power to produce. We have

already emphasised the important distinction between an original and a penal inability. In case an ability to discharge duty at first exists, and has been wilfully destroyed by an avoidable and therefore inexcusable act of sin by the moral agent, the inability which results as a penal consequence cannot exempt the sinner from the pressure of the original obligation. He freely and unnecessarily disabled himself, and justly bears the retributive results of not performing the duties which at first he had ability to discharge and of committing the sins which at first he had the ability to avoid. This truth, in connexion with the doctrine of the federal headship of Adam and the just imputation of his guilt to his seed, constitutes the Calvinistic answer to the cardinal position of the Arminian, that ability is the measure of obligation. The Arminian makes the tremendous mistake of putting the descendants of Adam in the place of Adam—the guilty in the place of the innocent. His principle is true, in its application to the first man in innocence. We maintain that, in the first instance, ability conditions obligation. Our conviction of the indispensableness of this principle in the case of Adam, in his integrity, cannot be affected by the unscriptural doctrine of its applicability to the case of sinners. We must insist on the truth that Adam was able to stand, though liable to fall. He ought, inasmuch as he was able, to have produced the good quality the defect of which, it is urged by the advocates of the privative character of sin, constituted the essence of his apostasy from God. But the supralapsarian supporters of this hypothesis hold that his ability was not a constitutional and concreated endowment. It depended for its existence upon the positive communications of grace. Now God, they say, withheld the grace which created ability. Adam therefore was destitute of ability by a divine determination. No grace, no ability; and God deprived him of grace. Where then was his ability? and how ought he to have done what confessedly he had no ability to do? Had he, by his conscious act, disabled himself, we can see how he would have become culpable for not doing what he ought to have done. But, according to this view God disabled him. How then was he to blame? Under such a supposition, it is idle to talk of moral obligation—to say that

Adam ought to have produced the good quality, which he could not have produced, nay, which God prevented him from producing. And it is worse than idle to attach to such an unavoidable failure the condemnation alike of himself and of his whole posterity. This hypothesis is a speculation of theologians, not the doctrine of Calvinism as held by the Reformed Church. This line of argument, too, renders it still more obvious that the supralapsarian position makes God the real efficient of the first sin, as sin; and so, while it extends their doctrine that God is the sole efficient cause of all things in all its logical development, contradicts the tenet by which the sweep of that principle is limited and the divine holiness is sought to be saved, viz., that God is not the efficient cause of sin, considered as sin.

We have thus subjected to examination the hypothesis—supported by the splendid names of Twisse and Edwards—of the origination of sin, as sin, in a deficient cause. If the arguments employed are valid, the hypothesis has been convicted of insufficiency; and if so, the main prop has been swept away of the celebrated doctrine of the privative character of sin.

There remains yet another view, the consideration of which is necessary to anything like thoroughness in this discussion. Some of the Supralapsarians take the ground that sin is a real evil, a positive quality; and that while God efficiently caused the first sin, as an act, Adam produced the quality of the act, as sin. In regard to this position we remark, in the first place, that a positive quality is an effect which demands for its existence a positively producing—that is, an efficient—cause. It is, therefore, admitted that the creature may be an efficient cause, which is contradictory to the principle, vital to the supralapsarian hypothesis, that God is the sole efficient cause of all things. In the second place, if the evil quality of the first sin was produced by Adam—and that is the supposition under consideration—it follows that it must have been produced by his voluntary act. That he could have produced the sinful quality without any act is out of the question. In that case there could have been no production. But, upon the principles maintained by those whom we are opposing, at least by the reviewer himself, an act has no moral sig-

nificance except it be grounded in and represents a quality (or disposition) lying back of it, and preceding it in the order of thought or production. Now this preceding evil quality which stamps the significance of the act in question must, according to the hypothesis we are considering, have been produced by a still preceding act; and so we would have a regression of act producing quality and quality originating act. Either this regression must be *ad infinitum*, or it must come to an end; which is the same thing as to say that the series must have a beginning. To suppose that the regression proceeds *ad infinitum* is to suppose an infinite series of relative commencements, which is contradictory to the fundamental assumptions of a Christian theism. If it be granted that the regression of act and quality comes to an end, it must be admitted that the terminal point is either an act or a quality. If an act, the vital principle of the advocates of the hypothesis under review is abandoned, namely, that an act derives its moral significance and value from a quality preceding it, in which it originates and which it expresses. If a quality be the terminal point of the regression, the position against which we are immediately contending is given up, namely, that man, not God, produces sinful qualities—that is, that sinful qualities originate in the acts of man. The Supralapsarian, who holds this view, is tossed upon the horns of these dilemmas. The position that man produced the evil quality inhering in the first sin is, as far as it goes, an element of the sublapsarian scheme. Its interjection into that of supralapsarianism is like putting a piece of new cloth into an old garment—the rent is made worse. Consistency would suggest that those Supralapsarians who hold it should either relinquish it, and stand up squarely for the sole efficiency of God in the production of sin, or adopt the sublapsarian doctrine as a whole.

Reserving to ourselves a fuller consideration of it, we now take occasion to advert briefly to the objection, that in denying that God is the efficient cause of sin, we deny that he is the first cause of all things. God is the first cause of all things in the sense that he efficiently causes their being, and their power to act. This is true of the whole creation—inanimate, animal, and intel-

ligent. He is the first cause of all human things, in the sense that he is the efficient cause of man's being and of his power to act. Now we have distinguished between the existence of man and his principle of activity on the one hand, and his sinful acts on the other. The former we refer to God's efficient causality, the latter to man's. Considered as to his being and his power to produce sinful acts, man is related to God as a first cause, and in this regard he is, as to his sinful acts, a second cause. His being and power owe their existence to God's efficiency, and depend upon it for preservation and continuance. But considered as to the actual production of sin, man is a first cause, inasmuch as he efficiently causes—originates—the sinful acts. He is relatively and subordinately a first cause—a second cause, as to his existence and power to sin; a first cause, as to the production of sin itself. General propositions, or propositions couched in general terms, must be accepted under necessary limitations. The general proposition, that God is the first cause of all things, is no exception to this rule. To say that he is the first cause, in the sense of efficient cause, of all things, including human acts, is to say that he is the efficient cause of man's first sin, as sin, which is denied by the Supralapsarians and Determinists themselves. Man, therefore, must be regarded as the efficient—the relatively and subordinately first—cause of sin. To take any other ground is to say that sin is nothing, seeing that it is to be assigned to no producing cause whatsoever; and to affirm that sin had its origin in a deficient cause is, as we have shown, substantially to affirm that sin is nothing. In that conclusion no theist can rest. Our doctrine, therefore, does not involve the denial of the proposition, taken under proper limitations, that God is the first cause of all things. The limitations which we have put upon its universality are demanded alike by a regard for logic and a reverence for God. He is the first, because efficient, cause of every cause—*causa causarum*—but not the first, because efficient, cause of every act of every cause.

We have thus considered the doctrine of the Supralapsarians and the maintainers of the privative character of sin, that the first sin is distinguishable into act and quality; that God effected the

act as good, while man infused the quality as evil; and that although God only permitted the evil quality, it became necessary in consequence of its inseparable connexion with the act, which was the necessary result of efficacious decree. Let us now collect the results which have been attained by separate lines of argument, and exhibit them in a recapitulatory statement. In the first place, we have shown that the distinction, as to the first sin, between act as good and quality as sinful, is one which cannot be vindicated; and that the hypothesis, based upon that distinction, that God effected the sin as act, but that man was culpable for the infusion of the evil quality, or the privation of the good quality which ought to have existed, falls to the ground. In the second place, we have shown that the hypothesis of the origination of the first sin in a deficient cause, which was invented to rid God of the imputation of having efficiently caused it, is incapable of proof; but that if it be admitted as a supposition, it does not relieve the difficulty of the ultimate causation of the sin by the divine efficiency. In the third place, we have shown that the distinction between the decree to permit the first sin and a decree to effect it is, regarded from the supralapsarian point of view, merely nominal, having no foundation in reality, and that the doctrine, founded upon it, when brought to the last analysis, is that God decreed to effect, and so providentially effected, the first sin. In the fourth place, we have shown that the supralapsarian hypothesis concerning the genesis of the first sin being thus logically reduced from a nominal one of mixed divine effectuation and permission to a real one of simple divine effectuation, it is impossible to hold the divine effectuation of the first sin without contradicting the Scripture account of the nature of the first sinful act as itself a violation of law, and admitting, what the Supralapsarians deny, that God effected the sin, considered as sin.

The conclusion from all this is, that the effectuation of the first sin by God cannot, upon the principles of the Supralapsarians themselves, be proved, but on the contrary is positively disproved; and that the dependent consequence must along with it be abandoned, that the first sin was necessitated by efficacious decree. And so, the position, for which we have contended, is estab-

lished—that the first sin was unnecessitated and avoidable, and in this way a competent account is furnished of the guilt and punishment of man, and of the origin of that moral necessity which now determines him in the direction of sin.

We had hoped to finish this discussion in the present number of the REVIEW; but it has grown upon us as we proceeded, and we must, with the leave of Providence, occupy another article with answers to special objections which have been offered to our views, especially the objection that, if the first sin had not been made certain by an efficacious decree, it could not have been foreknown.

ARTICLE II.

THE LAW OF MARRIAGE.

1. *The Hebrew Wife; or the Law of Marriage Examined in Relation to the Lawfulness of Polygamy, and to the Extent of the Law of Incest.* By S. E. DWIGHT. New York: Leavitt, Lord & Co.; Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1836. 1 Vol., 12mo., pp. 189.
2. *Inquiry into the Christian Law, as to the Relationships which Bar Marriage.* By WILLIAM LINDSAY, D. D., Professor of Sacred Languages and Biblical Criticism to the United Presbyterian Church. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1871. 1 Vol., 12mo., pp. 226.
3. *The British Law of Marriage.* *New York World*, 9th July, 1880.

In ranking marriage among the sacraments of God's house, the Roman Catholic hierarchy is not so far astray as they are who regard marriage as a merely civil contract. And it must be acknowledged that all Papal countries contrast favorably with the United States in the regard outwardly paid to the sacredness of the institution, and in the absence of divorce laws, like those that disgrace American statute-books. For while the Romish observance of the true sacraments is semi-idolatrous, the customs of the

apostate Church are always more reverent and less offensive to Christian people in the administration of baptism and the eucharist, than the customs of some sects of the Protestant faith. The educated Presbyterian as really rejects and protests against the sign of the cross, the addition of salt to the water, and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, as against the more outspoken heresies of Papal rituals. And the man who recognises the essential sacredness of the marriage relation, more promptly condemns the loose theories of American jurisprudence (as affecting the marriage compact) than he condemns the profaneness of the Papal dogma which elevates the marriage rite into the dignity of a sacrament. Independently of the *profaneness*, as manifested in adding to the sacraments, which God has limited to two, the error of Popery is, so far as concerns marriage, far more in the interest of social order and social purity than the flippant legislation which makes the marriage tie a rope of sand; and this legislation is confined to Protestant and democratic America. The superior morality of Papal practices in this regard will again appear later in the discussion.

Concerning the essential sacredness of the marriage relation, notice, first, the estimate God puts upon it. It was instituted in Eden, and it is the only human relation that was known to man before the fall. In the lower creation, there were analogies, such as the pairing of birds and beasts; but no argument has ever been constructed to show that these examples of "mating" were upon the same plane as the marriage tie. It would be ridiculous to affix any moral quality, or any sentimental quality, to the mating of sparrows or elephants. Yet in all the nations that people the earth, both sentiment and morality are ever chief factors in human mating, even among the rudest tribes. Thus the finger of God is constantly manifested, because the unwritten law, which God stamped upon human nature at creation, has been operative in all climes and among all classes, compelling men to acknowledge and obey an obligation growing out of the marriage relation, even where codes and penalties are unknown. So universal a force could not regulate human thought and conduct through traditional influences or through example. It is a tacit force, but none

the less potent. It is God's voice, and is powerful, though it be "a still small voice."

But God has added an audible voice. In the institution of the relation, as recorded in Genesis, God surrounds it with solemn formality. "And God said, It is not good that the man should be alone." Although God had said, "It is good," at each step in the majestic march of creation, from the first command, "Let there be light," down to the formation of the highest orders of animal life; yet now, reaching the last step, perhaps the last *possible* step, before God entered into his rest, it seems from the record that the Creator paused to scrutinise his own handiwork. It seems that God put the powers of this last *creation* to the test. He brought all living organisms before the man "to see what he would call them," and confirmed the decisions of the man, as he affixed the names that should stand throughout the ages. Everything about the narrative forbids the conclusion that this long process of nomination was merely arbitrary. On the contrary, the idea of superlative wisdom and judgment is all over the record; as if to say, God would *not* have confirmed any portion of the nomination that might have been foolish, frivolous, or faulty. The highest possible created wisdom was engaged in the work of giving names to the lower creation. And the account is apparently given for the purpose of showing that "it was not good" for the man to reign as solitary viceroy; and of showing, further, that God could not go backward and *create* the needed help-meet: she must needs proceed from the man, and thus, by one of the most sacred and one of the most mysterious of divine paradoxes, manifest at once her essential equality, and her inevitable subordination.

The account of the formation (not the creation) of Eve is parenthetical—as the story goes on to say that the man concluded his task of naming by giving her his own name. All the poets of the ages have exhausted all vocabularies to find names for the heroines of their songs and stories, calling them after birds and flowers and fruits. Even the Song of Songs abounds with titles—the Rose, the Lily, the Dove; but the royal name-giver called her Woman—the grand old Saxon name corresponding very

accurately with the Hebrew title, and indicating most prominently her wifeness. Her motherhood was indicated in her *personal* name, Eve, suggesting a relation of undoubted sacredness, and hedged about by stringent legislation; but inferior to the first name, Woman, given in Paradise, under official forms. And this name, according to the English version, seems to give the basis for the uniform law of marriage: "*therefore* shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh"—that is: Woman, as signifying wifeness, outranks Eve, as signifying motherhood. Materially, a man is more really "one flesh" with his mother than with any or all other beings. He is made of her substance. But God ordains that this material relationship, which no force in nature can abrogate or change, shall yield precedence to another relationship, wherein material identity has no place. Because the material identity of Adam and Eve, and of the married progeny of the first pair, is the unavoidable accident of their condition as the primal pair. Later on, in the inspired history of the race, God, by his word and providence, forbade this union within certain lines of propinquity.

Thus brought to the legislative side of the topic, notice, first, that God gives the marriage relation a very prominent place in the Decalogue.

It is hardly necessary to say that the arrangement of the commandments in their order, from the first to the tenth, was not an accidental arrangement. If there were no marks of logical sequence, still, man would be bound to conclude that God had a sequence in his mind when he spake "all these words." Thus: the first table deals with God's claims upon men; the second deals with man's claims upon men. And in both tables the gradation of turpitude, in violating the specifications of the complete law, is very clearly shown. It is far more flagrant to have other gods than to profane the Sabbath; it is far more flagrant to kill than to covet. And while the breach of the least of these commands is fatal, still some sins are more heinous in the sight of God and man than others. Noting, therefore, the *order* of the law of the second table, look for a moment at the divine estimate of the marriage tie, in this light.

The last commandment deals with the thought of sin—"Thou shalt not covet." In the gradation above-mentioned, the act comes first, then the word, and finally the thought. And as expounded by the Divine Teacher, this covert thought or desire is singled out (Matthew v. 28) with express reference to the relation under discussion. The general law announces, first: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house"—or household—that is: thou shalt not desire any of thy neighbor's possessions; and then the specifications are added, beginning with "thy neighbor's wife." There are two or three remarkable texts in the New Testament that bear upon this point. The first to notice is that already mentioned in Matthew v. 28, wherein the Lord Christ asserts that the violation of this tenth command, *in this particular only*, is a virtual violation of the seventh. It is true that he previously asserted a similar connexion between the sixth command and the angry thought or word; but the anger of man does not partake of the nature of covetousness. And here, in this twenty-eighth verse, the Lord narrows it down to a mere look, coupled with the unholy thought. Why should he not have said: "If any man look upon the gold of his neighbor, and desire it, he hath already stolen it in his heart"? The other texts will perhaps explain. In Romans vii. 7, Paul says, "I had not known lust (*ἐπιθυμίαν*), except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." Here, again, the Apostle singles out the first prohibition of the tenth commandment, and treats its violation as if, by some hideous necessity, this breach stained the whole Decalogue, as no other offence could do. One might lie and not steal, or one might steal and not murder; yet when Paul says, "I had not known *sin* but by the law," he selects this solitary, secret, unholy coveting as the very obliteration of the entire code. The whole chapter (Romans vii.) is perhaps constructed with reference to the law of marriage, to which he refers at the beginning; and if so, how startling is the passionate wail with which he concludes: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this filthy, corrupting corpse?"

The other text, which is more obscure in the English version, is in 1st Thessalonians iv. 6-8, where Paul, exhorting to sancti-

fication, and insisting specially upon the law of chastity, says: "Let no man go beyond and defraud his brother in this matter!" And he enforces his exhortation by the remarkable warning that the Lord Jesus is the special Avenger of this special wrong; that God the Father, having surrounded the relation with special sanctions, is he whom the violator despises; and that God the Holy Ghost, in his great work of sanctification, specifically guards the saint in the observance of this law of purity. This is all clearly implied in the sentence contained in the first eight verses of this chapter; and there is probably no other case in the Bible where the Holy Trinity is thus introduced, as in battle array against specific sin.

In addition to this distinguishing prohibition in the tenth commandment, God gives one special command—the seventh—which deals with the marriage relation alone. And throughout both Testaments, apostasy and idolatry are constantly rebuked as *quasi* violations of the seventh commandment, thus making all four specifications of the first table take a new significance in God's sight, from some actual connexion with the seventh. A human codifier would have selected the fifth, "the commandment with promise," wherein God demands honor to be rendered to the father, as the best illustration to be drawn from human relationship to show forth the honor due to God, the great Father. But, in fact, this fifth command rather enforces the present argument, because the reverence bespoken for father and mother is really reverence bespoken for the marriage relation, under which the subject of this specification was brought into the world. It is no fanciful interpretation of the moral law, therefore, to say, that God has made the law of marriage to run through all its precepts by direct enactment, or by certain implication.

Enough has, perhaps, been said in reference to positive legislation in the divine word upon this relation, excepting the law of prohibitions, as contained in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. This law will be examined later; and in the meantime it is profitable to notice God's estimate of the marriage tie in its moral aspects. Because, while the material unity of the pair in Eden is undoubtedly a parable and a prophecy of the substantial unity

of Christ and his Church, or rather of the positive union of Christ and the saint, still, this union is moral, mental, spiritual. It is not merely or mainly sentimental, as unbelievers assert; but there is a certain vital oneness, like the life of the branch and the life of the vine. And there is of necessity in this unity something analogous to the marriage bond, because God would not otherwise have selected this human relation as the one type and parable of the relation subsisting betwixt Christ and his Bride—the Church.

It is in this view of the topic that idolatry and adultery are constantly put together in the prophetic Scriptures. If there were not some accordant moral elements in these two highly divergent relations, a large portion of the book of Isaiah, for example, would be utterly meaningless. You cannot be satisfied with the shallow theory, that God selected this earthly relation as the best, on the whole, to typify at once the lordship and the love of Christ over and for his Church; and the reciprocal obedience, fidelity, and love of the Church to and for Christ. If you have thought to purpose, you will readily answer that God rather made the earthly relation just what it is, because of the unchangeable perfection of his own attributes. The Creator of all beings, and the Legislator for all relations, could not be driven to the selection of a defective or inappropriate type. It is far safer to conclude that marriage is thus exalted in the word, purpose, and providence of God, because of the Headship and Husbandhood of Jehovah Jesus. Any other course of thinking puts the effect for the cause, and contradicts the foundation postulates of a Calvinistic creed, logically considered.

The argument would be incomplete without a suggestion of the indispensable need of the element of sacredness in the marriage tie for the maintenance of social order. Social life, for which man was created, demands something more than a mere civil contract, and when God instituted the relation, he made no provision for divorcement. "It was not so at the beginning" (Matthew xix. 8). Moses added the legal provision, but, as the Lord expounds it, it was abnormal. God made the twain to be one flesh, and the hardness of heart consequent upon the fall brought in the Mosaic

law of divorce. Therefore, when the gospel and the new birth and the sanctifying grace of the Holy Ghost restore the race to its original moral status, there is also the restoration of the original marriage law, which abhors divorcement. And so the the marriage ceremony among all sects always contains the authoritative words of Christ: "What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." All history teaches the same lesson, to wit, that wherever communities have drifted away from the most decided cognition of this essential sacredness in the marriage union, such communities have drifted nearer and nearer to the level of the brutes that perish. The Goth, whose swarming armies obliterated the Roman Empire, was far nobler than the corrupt sensualist he conquered, whose highest idea of marriage was based upon the character of the deified lust he worshipped; while the Northern Barbarian, amid all his rudeness and ignorance, had this one distinguishing trait: he placed woman in her true sphere, as the wife to be honored and cherished. His sword leaped from its scabbard in her defence as promptly as when his own life was endangered; and he guarded her purity as sedulously as he guarded his own sacred honor. Doubtless the great race that dominates the earth to-day, owes much to this distinguishing characteristic in the "sea robbers" who invaded England, and who have left to their descendants such names for inheritance as husband, wife, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, and household.

If a small part of the foregoing be true, it is evident that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. The law as laid down in 1 Timothy, in the third chapter, is the natural law, and was not enacted merely for the government of elders and deacons. The restriction to "one wife" was only the indispensable element of the "blamelessness" of those who held official station in God's house. And unless you enact a specific law of morality for each sex, the prohibition of a plurality of wives is included in the prohibition of a plurality of husbands. A man is no more truly married to two women at the same time, than a woman is married to two men—an idea that is abhorrent to humanity. It is true that the Bible contains many histories of the multiplication of

wives, by the acknowledged saints of God—such as Jacob and David; but there is not one word of approval of these wicked unions. In the case of Jacob, there was a deliberate fraud practised upon him by his heathen father-in-law, and there seems to be a show of excuse for him in his later marriage with the wife of his choice. But the Word is silent as to the morality of the case, and nothing is left to the reverent thinker except the clear utterance of the normal law: “These *twain* shall be one flesh.” It is not at all likely that any *trio* were ever one flesh in the eye of God.

Therefore, and in the absence of any positive suggestion in the Word, men have sometimes reached a conclusion that is rather sentimental than moral, to wit, that there is no such thing possible as a second marriage—or, more accurately, as *two* marriages. So far as this theory has found expression, in poetry and romance, there have been cases where the first marriage was not the true union of heart and sympathy that was secured in the second. Some such idea is suggested in the question of the Sadducees—“Whose wife shall she be at the resurrection?” This is the more evident, because—other things being equal—she would certainly be the wife of the first. But there is no law of sentiment; and as the New Testament Scriptures do plainly authorise the marriage of widows, it would be impossible to erect any sentimental theory into the dignity of positive enactment on the other side. But the restriction to one wife is intimated in the natural law under which the primal pair were pronounced one. And if Adam had maintained his integrity and won immortality for himself and his race, it is tolerably certain that God would not have “built” a second Eve for him, even if she had perished alone in her sin. This is not a thinkable proposition, however, and is only suggested for the sake of the argument. So far as the “sentiment” above referred to is concerned, this much may be asserted. There are widows and widowers in the world who recoil with horror from the thought of placing another upon the throne that was occupied by the departed. And the reason for this repugnance must rest upon the conviction that the separation wrought by death is only temporary. And, finally, there is the

very remarkable sentence in 1 Corinthians vii. 40, wherein Paul, with wonderful caution, and with free admission of the contrary *law*, says: "She is happier if she so abide, *after my judgment*: and I think also that I have the Spirit of God." If this man had been fanatical, or merely "sentimental" upon any subject, it is not probable that the marriage relation, of which he had no personal experience, would have been that subject. And it is *very* remarkable that he should apparently refer to "the Spirit of God" for endorsement in uttering this warning.

Before examining the law of limitations, one other remark is necessary. After the marriage of one man with one woman, the degree of responsibility resting upon the latter is modified by the authority of the husband. But before such union, the responsibility of the two sexes is precisely the same, under the law of God. There is no letting down of the requirement, because the woman is the "weaker vessel," and there is no hint throughout the Scriptures that the soul of the virgin woman has a lower rank in heaven on account of sex, even supposing sex can be predicated of souls. Therefore, the law of marriage, when it gives specifications that only affect *man*, necessarily includes, by implication, the same specifications as addressed to woman. The command, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," certainly includes the command, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's husband." If this is denied, then the whole of Paul's argument in the seventh chapter of Romans is inapplicable to such of God's dear children as happen to be women! A short step beyond this absurdity leads to the denial of souls to women. They can be neither sinners nor saints. And all the exhortations of the New Testament addressed to women are utterly meaningless and idle. If they have individual souls at all, every jot and tittle of the law that affects man—that is, mankind—applies with precisely equal potency to both sexes. This point cannot be too strongly stated. Every sentence in the present argument proceeds upon this basis.

Respecting the law of limitations, there are two preliminary observations needed. The first and most obvious is the fact that no bar in the direction of consanguinity could apply to the immediate progeny of Adam and Eve. There were no other men

and women upon the earth, if the race proceeded from one original pair. And—parenthetically—the blood relationship subsisting betwixt Cain and Abel and their sisters was really not so *near* a relationship as that subsisting betwixt Adam and Eve. Eve was not only bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh by marriage, but was, literally, a portion of his vital organism. And the subsequent marriage of their sons with their daughters was the first possible step towards the divergence which God afterwards made the subject of positive legislation. In the third generation, the sons of Cain might lawfully marry the daughters of Abel, as this relationship (that of first cousins) is nowhere prohibited in the word of God, even by the most remote implication. On the contrary, the only instance in which the Lord gave a formal command in *individual* cases, was when he commanded the daughters of Zelophehad to marry their kinsmen. This brings to view the second observation.

The command to the surviving brother to marry the widow of his deceased brother, was a special legislative enactment that was based precisely upon the plea of the daughters of Zelophehad, to wit, that the legitimate inheritance of the holy seed to the allotted portions of the holy land would otherwise pass out of the families and tribes to whom God had apportioned them. The first-born of the progeny of such marriages was treated as though begotten by the deceased husband, and inherited (under this special enactment) that deceased husband's property. These two exceptions to the law of limitations are the only exceptions to the accurate list of prohibitions found in the Bible. And in the case of the daughters of Zelophehad, there is not the most remote hint that they married *within* the limits of consanguinity, even if "fathers' brothers' sons" is a correct translation. Their case serves to illustrate the second exception above noted, as the connexion betwixt the holy seed and the holy land is thus indicated.

The law of prohibitions is contained in the 18th chapter of Leviticus, and is complete and exhaustive. No argument constructed on a lower hypothesis could stand. If God really announced a law intended to regulate any relation among men, it is not credible that he would overlook or omit any phase of such

relation. The command, "Honor thy father and thy mother," is complete and exhaustive, and no mortal of Adam's race can escape or outgrow its sway. And the command, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," is complete and exhaustive, and if women have a moral nature, includes the command, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's husband." The warning of the Lord Christ in Matthew v. 27-32, respecting the sinful desire, and the sinful divorcement, must have precisely equal application to both sexes, if women have moral and accountable natures at all. So the list of prohibitions in Leviticus xviii., although addressed to men only, must include women in analogous relations. If this list forbids a son to marry his mother, it includes the command to a mother not to marry her son. Nor is this all. It forbids the marriage of father and daughter (which is nowhere expressly forbidden in Scripture) because their relationship is precisely analogous to that subsisting betwixt mother and son.

This law was not local, ceremonial, or typical, but universal and permanent as the commands of the Decalogue. It is as applicable as they are to all the kindred and tribes of the earth. It is as binding now as it was when given to Israel. If the 18th chapter of Leviticus be not our Christian law of incest, then we have none, and the most dreadful abominations in marriage are allowable under the gospel. Here as elsewhere, the distinction is as manifest and as necessary between the typical that was to be abolished and the moral that should stand forever. The command to the Levitical priesthood to marry only within their own tribe was, first, a tribal ordinance given for specified reasons; and secondly, a typical law enlarged and augmented in the gospel by the admonition, "Be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers." The marriage law as it came from Eden was paramount, however, and the gospel expressly forbids divorcement on account of the unbelief of either partner. But the gospel does enjoin the saints to keep within the limits of the priesthood, for they are all kings and priests. And the fact that this law in Leviticus xviii. is a law of universal application is manifest, because no other revelation touching prescribed relationship is found in the Bible. Moreover, the very unions forbidden in this chapter God charges

upon the Canaanites, and declares that "their land vomited them out" *because* of these specific pollutions. Dr. Lindsay states the case as follows:

"The conclusion, then, we think, stands impregnable, that the prohibitions embodied in Leviticus xviii. must be viewed as including not merely those cases which are specifically described, but others also, where the relationship is exactly the same. Deny this, and you are under the necessity of admitting some of the most shocking marriages which it is possible to imagine. It has been argued against the extension of the Mosaic prohibitions to any cases but those specified, that the omissions which strike us as anomalous are to be accounted for on the ground of the different positions occupied by the two sexes in ancient times. Things were permitted to the one which were not permitted to the other; and, in short, throughout the marriage law of Moses, the feelings of the male sex only were consulted, and not those of the female at all. Now, even supposing that this theory fully accounted for all the omissions observable in Leviticus, which it by no means does, we should still be warranted to conclude, that under the New Dispensation, where male and female are all one in Christ, the distinction in favor of the stronger sex had ceased, and that consequently any cases, omitted on account of ancient disregard of female feeling, ought now to be supplied in conformity with the more equal and elevated spirit of the gospel. It could hardly be maintained that a marriage law was right in our day which professed to be grounded upon a disregard of female feeling. But this theory does not even meet the exigencies of the case as it is exhibited in the code of the Jewish legislator. Will any man maintain that, while a son was forbidden by Moses to marry his mother, a daughter was left at liberty, on account of the difference of sex, to be married to her father? But, unless it was so, the theory is not worth a straw. If it was so, then certainly the theory is a sound one; but let those who employ it in defence of marriage with a wife's sister, have the candor to acknowledge that it equally sanctions marriage between a father and his own daughter. On the other hand, if father and daughter were not allowed, any more than mother and son, to be united in marriage, then it is undeniable that there were cases omitted from the Mosaic code which were as really contemplated by that law as others that are expressly described, and of course the proposed explanation of omissions falls to the ground. But there is another consideration equally fatal to the theory under review: the omitted cases, supposed to be left out on the ground of disregard of female feeling, are not always similarly related to the different sexes, and this single circumstance overturns the whole hypothesis. Marriage between a mother and a son is expressly forbidden, but nothing is said about a father and a daughter. With regard, however, to the grandparents and

the grandchildren, whilst there is also one of the two possible combinations left out, it is not the corresponding one, but the reverse. The grandfather and the granddaughter are expressly forbidden to intermarry, but not a word is uttered against the union of the grandmother and the grandson. Now, why should mother and son in the one case, and grandfather and granddaughter in the other, be the parties that are specified, whilst it is father and daughter that are omitted in the former case, and grandmother and grandson that are omitted in the latter? If any greater consideration be shown for either sex in the one section of the law, the very same preference is manifested for the other sex in the other. The only escape out of this labyrinth of perplexity and confusion is the adoption of the principle that a prohibition with regard to one relationship must be held as applying to another when it is exactly the same in point of nearness. Admit this principle, and it is at once perceived to be a matter of indifference which of two similar cases be expressly specified, for the settlement of either determines the other. But deny this principle, and then it is impossible to explain why, in the case of parents and children, mother and son should be mentioned and father and daughter omitted; whilst in the case of grandparents and grandchildren, the position of the cases is just reversed, grandfather and granddaughter being laid under restriction, but grandmother and grandson left to do as they please. In addition to these considerations, it is no small argument in favor of the idea that the analogous cases must be considered as included under those actually specified, that this view recommends itself to the common sense of mankind. A law constructed upon the principle of forbidding marriage between certain relatives and tolerating it between others where the propinquity was quite the same, would not command respect, nor carry along with it the moral convictions of society. This is apparent from the unhesitating manner in which all persons, when their attention is first turned to this subject, reason from the case of a wife's sister to that of a brother's wife, and *vice versa*, as also from the case of aunt and nephew to that of uncle and niece. What surprise and bewilderment are exhibited when the idea is first suggested, that in one of each of these pairs of cases marriage may be right, whilst in the other it is wrong. Every person who has conversed with others to any extent upon the present aspect of the marriage-law controversy must have observed that the feeling instantly springs up in every mind, that wife's sister and brother's wife must of course be placed upon the same footing; and that whatever it be right or wrong for aunt and nephew to do, the same must also be right or wrong in the case of uncle and niece. The moral sense of mankind instinctively hurries on to the conclusion that perfectly analogous relationships should have the same place assigned to them in a marriage law; and by deviating from this principle in any civil code you might enact, you would do violence to the moral perceptions of

society and weaken the sense of obligation with regard to those connexions which you did prohibit. Legalise marriage with a wife's sister, and you will not be able to secure respect for the enactment which forbids it with a brother's wife. Legalise marriage between an uncle and a niece and you will not be able to avoid abrogating the law which interdicts the union of aunt and nephew.

"The opposition given by many to the idea that the prohibitions of the Mosaic law are to be viewed as embracing the relationships which are quite analogous to those actually specified is so great that it seems as if they imagined the principle proposed was to widen the circle of prohibited relationships, and to bring remoter connexions under the sweep of the law, than any mentioned by the Jewish legislator. But that is not what is meant by the inclusion of cases for which we contend. What we mean is, not that the law may be extended to remoter relationships than any Moses has mentioned, but that when any given relationship is put under ban by Moses, we must view the prohibition as extending to another relationship where the nearness of kin is precisely the same. When Moses, for example, forbids nephew and aunt to marry, it is not meant that we are at liberty to go a step further, and to interdict the union of cousins; but it is contended that as uncle and niece, and nephew and aunt, are relationships of the same propinquity, they should both be viewed as coming under the same law. And not only does this principle, as we have seen, recommend itself to the common sense of mankind, but it is also forced upon us by the monstrous conclusions which we are compelled to draw if we set it aside." Pp. 76-81.

It is difficult to conceive of a clearer statement than this. And no argument can be constructed that will answer it, except one that is based upon a theory which differentiates the sexes in the scope of moral obligation. If a woman can be a sinner and a saint, then a law which forbids marriage betwixt mother and son on the ground of kinship, must certainly forbid the union of father and daughter on the same ground. And, therefore, a law which prohibits the union of brother and brother's wife does certainly prohibit the union of sister and sister's husband upon the ground of propinquity. The Levirate law (commanding the marriage of brother and brother's widow), by all the terms of the enactment, separates the case from all other cases where such relationship subsists, and by the very *force* of the enactment confirms and endorses and *emphasises* the universal law *forbidding* such marriage. It is the solitary exception proving the universality of the rule. And the reason for this solitary exception is

explicitly given in the text of the law itself. No man in this day has ever sought to marry his wife's sister because his deceased wife left no issue. And no man in this day has ever sought to marry his brother's widow for the sake of progeny that might bear his deceased brother's name and inherit his deceased brother's property. It would be an absurdity in law as well as a disgrace in morals.

The controversy that has arisen in the Church and also in the State, touching the limitations of propinquity, affinity, or consanguinity, has always been fought on the line of Leviticus xviii. 16-18. No other explicit law (except the Levirate law, which was special and strictly local) can be found in the Scriptures to deal with this question in explicit terms. It is true that Paul in the fifth chapter of 1 Corinthians, deals with another relationship with summary efficiency; but it is the marriage of a widower with his dead wife's sister that has provoked all the discussion. The argument of Mr. Dwight proceeds upon the theory that the words "a wife to her sister," in the 18th verse of Leviticus xviii., are really "one wife to another," and is therefore only the prohibition of bigamy. In proof of this he asserts that the Hebrew words—which really mean "a woman to her sister" (*isha el acothah*)—are idiomatically employed throughout the Bible to signify "one to another"; and that these exact words are used in Exodus xxvi. 3-6 to designate the coupling of the loops and curtains of the tabernacle—all these being in the feminine gender. ("The Hebrew Wife," pp. 109, 110.) He quotes no less than thirty-four examples from the Old Testament Scriptures; and it may be added that the words are translated "one wife to another" in the margins of English Bibles in this famous passage of Leviticus xviii. 18.

It is rather remarkable that Dr. Lindsay takes the opposite view. He says the textual rendering is correct and that the law of the 18th verse is added to the list as a special warning to the children of Israel against the sin of Jacob in having Leah and Rachel. He enforces this view by the very conservative and satisfactory postulate, that the law prohibiting marriage betwixt a man and his wife's sister is expressly laid down in verse 16,

where the brother is forbidden marriage with a brother's widow. Mr. Dwight's doctrine can be better shown by a quotation of the seven points he claims to have established in his argument:

"1st. Polygamy was expressly prohibited by God in the original law of marriage on account of its immoral tendency; has been shown to have been unlawful to the patriarchs and under the Levitical code; and is declared by Christ to be adultery.

"2d. The law of incest in *expressly* forbidding marriage between a *brother's wife* and a *husband's brother* just as certainly forbid it between a *sister's husband* and a *wife's sister*, as in *expressly* forbidding marriage between a *nephew* and an *aunt*, or between a *mother* and a *son*, it forbade it between an *uncle* and a *nièce* or between a *father* and a *daughter*. If we deny this, we must also deny that equals are equal.

"3d. The law of incest in *expressly* forbidding marriage between a man and his collaterals of the *second* degree by affinity, declares the propinquity between them to be so great as to render marriage between them unlawful; and yet this interpretation makes it declare the propinquity between a man and his *wife's sister* a collateral of the *first* degree, and of course *one degree nearer* than they, not to be so great as to render marriage between them unlawful; in other words, that the less is greater than the greater.

"4th. If we deny the unlawfulness of this marriage, we are also compelled to admit that under the Levitical law of incest a man had a right to marry *his own daughter* and *his own grandmother*; and that these marriages are now right.

"5th. The reason expressly assigned in the law, why a *brother's wife* may not marry a *husband's brother after the husband's death* is that, on account of the propinquity, such marriage is "an abomination," and yet the reason assigned in this interpretation, why a *sister's husband* may not marry a *wife's sister during the life-time of the wife*, that is, why he may not have *two sisters* for wives at once, when the propinquity is *identically the same*, is that it will vex the sister whom he married first! We cannot charge such trifling on a law of God.

"6th. A minute and careful examination of every passage in the Scriptures, in which the controverted phrase, *a man to his brother*, or *a woman to her sister*, occurs, has shown that the words *brother* and *sister* in this phrase have no reference to *relationship by blood*; and that the phrase itself denotes uniformly *one to another*, and in the given passage *one woman to another*, or *one wife to another*.

"7th. The position assumed in the interpretation *that it will not vex a wife to have her husband take another wife, who is not her sister*, has been shown to be not only ridiculously foolish, but certainly and palpably false." (Pp. 125 to 127.)

The temptation to quote more largely from this author is resisted because space is limited. Enough is given to shew that he regards the marriage in question with horror. And it is well worthy of note that both Dwight and Lindsay (each taking a different rendering of Leviticus xviii. 18) still reach the same conclusion because both proceed upon the original law of marriage as announced by God in Eden.

The editorial from the *New York World*, dealing with this topic, shows, first, the platform upon which British "free-thinkers" stand; and, second, the supposed popular side of the controversy in America. It is very remarkable that the law of God and the "sentimental" idea of marriage are equally conspicuous by their absence from the discussion:

"The Prince of Wales and the Dukes of Edinburgh and Connaught went together to the House of Peers on the evening of June 25 in order to vote for Lord Houghton's bill legalising marriage with a deceased wife's sister. When the bill was called up for its second reading, the Prince of Wales presented from the Convention of the Royal and Parliamentary Burghs of Scotland a petition, numerously signed, in favor of it. His action was followed by Lord Houghton, who presented in favor of the bill a huge petition signed by 42,500 women of Leeds. After this Lord Houghton, as the promoter of the bill, proceeded to argue for it at great length in the presence of nearly all the spiritual peers—every one of whom, with the exception of the Bishop of Ripon, voted adversely to the bill. Lord Beaconsfield voted but did not speak against the measure. The Duke of Argyll also voted against it, and this conjunction of the Tory ex-Premier with the Liberal father-in-law of the Queen's daughter is understood to have represented the sentiments of Her Majesty on the subject. Lord Houghton spoke at length with characteristic spirit and earnestness, dwelling particularly on the attitude of the bishops as to his bill. He said with much significance of tone that he gave the first rank to the ecclesiastical question, because it constituted the real difficulty which had to be encountered in dealing with this subject. While no one would regret more than he the absence of the right reverend bench from the deliberations of the House, there could be no doubt that this measure would instantaneously become law but for these right reverend prelates. It should be remembered that if they had the power to reject the bill, they incurred the responsibility as well. Already the people of England were beginning to understand that it was the Church of England, as represented in the House of Lords, that came in between those who were interested in the passing of the bill and what many of them thought was

a portion of their public rights in regard to this question. In rude ages there was a desire to increase the power of the Church by imposing certain restrictions with regard to marriage. Those rights of restriction, possessed at the early period of the Church, were confirmed by the State, but by the side of such rights there was that of dispensation. When the question of marriage fell out of the hands of the Church into the hands of the State, there was a necessary change in the order of events. The consequence was that now, while right reverend prelates asserted their authority over this question, the enormous Nonconformist bodies of England claimed that those prelates had no right to impose their views upon them. Right reverend prelates might continue their ecclesiastical legislation as they chose, but they should not impose upon Nonconformists, and upon their civil and religious liberty, an unjust restraint, and he called upon them to assert by what right they imposed that restraint.' When the bill came to a division the majority against it was only 11 in a vote of 191 with 54 pairs absent, and the number of bishops who voted against it was exactly 11, the Archbishop of York making a twelfth and the Archbishop of Canterbury being absent. If only six of the prelates had voted with the Bishop of Ripon, there would have been a majority of one for the bill. The Bishop of Ripon, the Rev. Robert Bickersteth, D. D., is the son of the Rev. John Bickersteth—names well and favorably known to churchmen. He was a surgeon before he took orders, and is a man of most liberal views. Lord Houghton's defeat is regarded as a victory, since he succeeded in practically proving the responsibility for the defeat of the bill upon the prelates. His point that when the ecclesiastical law was paramount forbidding a widower to marry his sister-in-law the prohibition was coupled with the power of dispensation, was felt to be a telling point. History chronicles many such dispensations. Now that the Church acts through the State, the prohibition is practically absolute, so that the prelates, by insisting upon the old theory of the ecclesiastical law, restrain the civil and religious liberty of their fellow-subjects more effectually than their predecessors did ages ago. Now that the Episcopal bench has been definitely identified as the real obstacle to the repeal of this special feature in the marriage law of England, there can be no doubt that the advocates of disestablishment will take the measure up as a party cry, notwithstanding the fact that the extremely unecclesiastical, not to say unbelieving, Duke of Somerset united with the bishops against it. The discussion developed a good deal of brilliant nonsense. Lord Coleridge characterised the bill as a measure for the abolition of sisters-in-law, and added that if it was passed, its provisions would designate every man's sister-in-law as the proper Parliamentary successor of the wife. Earl Beauchamp deprecated it as tending to abolish the tender title of aunt and creating a presumptive stepmother in almost every household, to substitute jealousy for affection and suspicion

for confidence. Lord Beauchamp was shocked also at the 'Americanism' of the measure, and gracefully observed that if he were asked to compare the social and domestic life of England with America, he would greatly prefer that of England. In Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Connecticut, during 1877 no less than 1,531 divorces were granted. The Bishop of Lincoln, who is the patron of eighty livings, declared his solemn conviction, according to the persuasion of universal Christendom, that this bill was contrary to the divine law as contained in God's word, but he failed to cite any passages of Holy Writ which sustained this sweeping assertion when he was politely invited so to do by Earl Granville. The veteran Secretary for Foreign Affairs made the most effective speech after Lord Houghton's in favor of the bill. He said in the course of it:

"As to this bill destroying the sanctity of our present family relations, I think there is a little delusion on that point. The noble and learned Lord talks of the enormous advantage of a man making all the relations of his wife his own relations. I may be very fond of my wife's relations, but I do not feel that they are all my relations. In the same way the noble and learned Lord contends, as an argument against my noble friend behind me, that we are bound to wish to marry our wives' sisters. For my part I most solemnly declare that I have not the slightest wish to marry any one of them. But is that a reason for me to debar those who have excellent reasons for desiring a marriage of that sort? Is it so perfectly clear that the sister-in-law can enter into a man's household and take care of his children with complete indifference to all circumstances merely because the law happens to prevent her marriage with the widower? I have known recently a case where a lady, moving in Your Lordship's society—an excellent woman—speaking from her own personal experience of painful trials to which she had been exposed, deprecated in the strongest manner intercourse between a young widower and young sisters-in-law. This I must say most positively in regard to any daughter of mine or young sister of mine, that, while I should not object—if the legal prohibition were taken away—to their marrying the man who was the good honest husband of their sister, and thus becoming the mother of her children to whom all their affections were peculiarly drawn, I should object in the strongest manner to any such young person entering into the household of a young widower merely for the sake of looking after the children, without any question of marriage. Notwithstanding the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, it is quite clear that this question does not affect the poor. A rich man with a family has ample means of providing governesses and making other arrangements for taking care of his children; but in the case of the poor laboring man who loses his wife, the only person he can take to attend to his children

is his sister-in-law. In certain parts of the country such cases are very frequent.'

"In the Commons it is understood the bill commands a decisive majority." *N. Y. World*, July 9, 1880.

The assertion that the popular branch of the British Legislature is in favor of the repeal of the Marriage Law is simply gratuitous. There is not the slightest indication furnished by the House of Commons that a bill to legalise the marriage of a man with his wife's sister could reach a second reading. There are not many Bradlaughs in the British Parliament, and excepting interested parties, there are very few educated men of note in England who approve of such incestuous unions. The appeal made to the example of other Governments is extremely unfair, inasmuch as such marriages in European States are almost always prohibited under the general law, but permitted "by dispensation." And this brings to view the potent argument from the Roman Catholic rule. The Papal hierarchy does just two things: it asserts, first, that the law of the Church, which is the law of God, forbids the marriage of a man and his wife's sister; and second, it asserts its authority to set aside the law of God at will, by dispensation!

Reasoning from revelation and following the plain deductions of logic, the case may be thus stated:

Monogamy is God's ordained law. It is lawful for one man to marry one woman. It is the *natural* law of the race, and if man had not fallen and brought death into the world, no question touching dual marriages or second marriages could have arisen.

The Levirate law, commanding the marriage of a man and his sister-in-law, that is, the widow of his brother, was *abnormal*, and all the terms of the law itself reveal its special and local application. And it is specially emphatic in that no woman is anywhere commanded to marry her sister's widower under any circumstances.

The law of incest is universally conceded to be contained in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. And all the prohibitions therein contained are acknowledged to be of binding force to-day (not upon the Jews only or mainly, but upon the people of God

of all tribes), excepting *only* the *inferred* prohibition of marriage between a man and his wife's sister. The prohibition of the sixteenth verse touches a woman and her husband's brother. The seventeenth verse forbids the union of a man with his daughter-in-law, *upon the ground of kinship*, and the eighteenth verse forbids bigamous union with sisters, where natural kinship does not bar such union. Because a man, who is lineally descended from Shem, with no admixture of Aryan blood, may marry a woman descended from Japheth, with no admixture of Semitic blood; and there is certainly no *natural* blood relationship to bar his union with his wife's sister. The same rule applies to the prohibition of a man's marriage with his son's widow, or his brother's widow.

The table in Leviticus xviii. cannot be literally exhaustive, because a man is not therein forbidden to marry his *own* daughter, while he is forbidden to marry his daughter-in-law. It is therefore certain that the table is exemplary, and the whole law is summed up in the opening prohibition in the sixth verse, where "nearness of kin" covers the whole ground; this "nearness" exemplified in the sixteenth verse, where a man is forbidden to marry his brother's wife—not *naturally* akin to him.

The Hebrew phrase that is employed throughout this eighteenth chapter is not that commonly used to express violations of the seventh commandment, or *ever* used to express the lawful marriage relation. It is never used except to denote a polluting intercourse; and its accurate meaning, according to accomplished Hebraists, is identical with that of the English word "incest." This word has an idiomatic meaning to English-speaking people, although its Latin root (*incastus*) signifies merely unchastity. Yet the Hebrew phrase, while capable, perhaps, of a modified sense, is no more used to signify "marriage" than the English word "incest" is. Therefore the sixth verse of Leviticus xviii. is literally, "Thou shalt not commit incest." And this verse is the key to the whole law that follows, with the exemplary specifications. In the eighteenth verse, which has become famous in this controversy, *both* phrases are used, and a very literal translation would be, "Thou shalt not marry thy wife's sister, to com-

mit incest." And it is this very significant fact that leads Dr. Lindsay to adhere so strenuously to the textual rendering.

No argument that is builded upon God's revealed law would prove convincing if these considerations fail. And on the other side, there is positively nothing presented excepting the motives of economy or convenience. It is said, for example, a man naturally seeks the aid of his deceased wife's sister, to bring up her half-orphaned children. And if you allow the bereaved man to marry his sister-in-law, you avert all danger of scandal. And, again: the aunt of those bereaved children is the fittest of all women to take a mother's place, if she have the ordinary love for her departed sister! It is quite curious to note how these conveniences vary with varying circumstances. The poor man who buries his wife cannot afford to employ a non-related woman to guard his infant children, and therefore must have his sister-in-law. The rich man can employ as many nurses and governesses as he likes, but the more he employs, the more does he multiply scandals!

But the man who is furnished with logical perceptions need not be swayed by these paltry considerations. The doctrine of the Confession of Faith, Chap. XXIV., Sec. 4, reads: "The man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own; nor the woman of her husband's kindred nearer in blood than of her own." And this doctrine must accord with the instinctive apprehension of the man who apprehends the scope of God's law of marriage. No man can *comprehend* it. It is like the union of soul and body—that is, of the spiritual and material organisms—which must ever baffle the scrutiny of science. Man was made in the image of God, and whether the idea of form is involved or not, the idea of spiritual likeness is certainly included. And that peculiar department of the mental organism, which deals with "sentiment," is certainly the most inscrutable of all. Perhaps the *degree* of damage wrought by the fall may vary, and, perhaps, some men are more brutalised by the fall than others. Or, to state the case more accurately, some men may, by distinguishing grace, retain more decided marks of the shattered image than others. This God-

likeness was not *utterly* destroyed, because all men have still a native perception of the distinctions between right and wrong. And while faith is the product of the new creation in Christ Jesus, still the saint believes with the same mental organism that he had as a sinner. The new creation does not destroy manly instincts, or destroy the powers of logic, or contradict the sure deductions of the natural reason. And, especially, the new life-principle in Christ does not invade the domain of the sentimental, or obliterate the postulates which have been secretly stored away in the sacred chambers of the soul. For—notice—the purest sentiment of the imagination has been tested in the severest crucible of inexorable logic; and while the man who loves his wife with the extremest devotion will not discuss the emotion with you, because it is a hidden, *sacred* emotion, he will still be profoundly conscious that the oneness of himself and his wife is as real a unity as his own separate individuality. And the infallible logic of both mind and heart makes the wife's sister *his* sister as really as his own natural *twin* sister could be; so that such a man could as well marry the last as the first. God was not merely rhetorical when he said:

“No more twain—but one!”

The doctrine of the Confession of Faith, which is the organic law of the Presbyterian Church, is decided upon this question. It especially forbids marriage betwixt a man and any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than his own personal kindred. That is, he may marry his own sister as soon as his wife's sister. And in this statement there is included the general doctrine, that affinity within defined limitations is identical with consanguinity. He may marry his wife's cousin, because he may marry his own cousin. The proof-texts cited by the Confession are not those already quoted in this argument, but are from Leviticus xx. 19, 20, 21; which passage not only repeats the prohibition of Leviticus xviii. 16, but makes the prohibition more emphatic. In the last scripture (Leviticus xx. 21), there are *two* expressions—“Thou shalt not *take* thy brother's wife” (employing the word that is almost universally used to designate lawful marriage); and then giving the reason: “because it is incest”—the

Hebrew word having this exact significance. So thus much may be safely affirmed: the Confession, which is the organic law of the Church, bases this enactment upon the express law of God, which says such a marriage is "an unclean thing."

Now, it is quite conceivable that the sister of a deceased wife may have been an utter stranger to the widower. She may have been born in another hemisphere, and even her existence may not have been known to the brother-in-law. There could be no *sentiment* in the case. There could be no consanguinity. But when the widower meets her—after twenty years of widowerhood, if you choose—and learns her relationship to his dead wife, he can no more marry her than he could marry his own sister. And perhaps the man would instinctively recognise this impossibility, if the twenty years of separation had not obliterated the beloved image of his dead wife from his heart and memory. So the law of the Confession, the law of God, and the prompt intuition of man, all accord, and all grow out of the same root, to wit, the assertion of God—"no more twain, but one." There is a time in the life of all the children of God, when they are in the gall of bitterness, without God and without hope in the world. And there comes a time to each one of them, when he passes from a condition of alienation to a condition of sonship. At one hour he is an heir of wrath; at the next hour he is an heir of God. If he had died yesterday, he would have died under the curse, and would have begun a life of endless despair. If he die to-day, his body will "sleep" in assured hope of a glorious resurrection. So far as human scrutiny can discover, it is the same man in both conditions. All the elements of body and mind are the same, yet God can discover a divergence as wide as the distance between heaven and hell. And this difference is due to the fact of his union with Christ, and to nothing else. All those distinguishing graces, such as faith, repentance, hope, and charity, are the products—not the producers—of this union. He that is in Christ, and only he, is the new creation. Nor is this wide difference due to a mere decree of God. Paul's argument in Romans viii. shows the orderly march of God's purpose, culminating in the "glorified" condition of the saint, through regular stages, all

gracious, yet suggesting continually a wise reason for each separate step; and also suggesting the idea that each step, as well as the completed purpose, was in the nature of the case. God did not "call" first, and then "predestinate." He did not justify, and then call. And, specially, he did all in order that "Christ might be the first-born among many brethren." So he ordains that the Church shall be gathered in to be the Bride of the one Bridegroom.

The analogy in human marriages is perfect. There is a time when the predestined husband is no more to the bride than any other man on the face of the earth. But there comes a time when all the other men in the world are as nothing in comparison with him. And while the true husband may never allow the yoke to become oppressive, there is never a time when the authority and domination which God ordained is wanting. The marriage is a true unity, because the habits of thought in the dominating force become the habits of thought in the wife. And the twain grow into physical likeness, past all controversy. Any observer who has given attention to the phenomenon, will recall instances of such resemblance, where there was no touch of consanguinity. You will detect the same tone of voice in both, and the same expression of countenance. And if any ethical topic should be presented to them separately, you would get the same response from both. A brother and sister may live in the same house together, with daily familiar intercourse through forty years; yet these will not present the same degree of resemblance, albeit allied by blood, as you can readily discover betwixt husband and wife. It is no fanciful or sentimental oneness, but an actual unity, and also a unity that is the *natural* consequence of the relation. You cannot tell why twin children will inherit both physical and mental traits which differentiate them: while one resembles the father and the other the mother in these special traits, and still retain the twin resemblance to each other, yet there is no such identity in their twinship as there is in the union of their parents. The twins will be twain throughout eternity. Perhaps the parents will be twain nevermore! It is not likely that Adam and Eve bear the same relation to each other in heaven

that they separately bear to all the rest of God's redeemed children in the same blissful household of faith.

The conclusion seems inevitable, that if God has revealed a law of marriage at all, he has also fixed the limits of affinity as well as the limits of consanguinity, within which marriage is forbidden. In the list of incestuous unions given in Leviticus xviii. there are many more cases of affinity than of blood relationship. The law of the Confession of Faith is unmistakable. It forbids marriage with a dead wife's sister, upon the announced ground that the relationship is identical with that subsisting betwixt a man and his own sister. If God's law is loose and unsatisfactory, if it contradicts the normal instincts of pure humanity, and prohibits that which good men know to be good and commendable, it is time to throw off the shackles, and to take native common sense for a law. When these incestuous marriages were common, it is said, "Every man did that which was right in his own eyes." Better go back to this good time than profess to obey the law of God, while legalising that which he pronounces "confusion and uncleanness." And the explicit law of the Church had better be amended by formal authority, if these unions are commendable or even harmless. So long as you allow open violations of this law, you are merely *advising* your brethren to hold your *opinions* upon an indifferent subject. And the attempt to erect a law of that sort into the dignity of an enactment which you say is founded upon God's word, is unbecoming in Calvinists, not to say in Christians.

We must not close this article without expressing our very high estimate of both the volumes named in our rubric. The one is British, and inaccessible to readers generally; the other is out of print. Both deserve republication. This is no dead but a living question, and of the profoundest interest and importance. It cannot much longer fail to attract the notice and attention of American believers in the revealed morality and religion. We hope some enterprising publisher in this country will give these and similar books, which are rife in Great Britain, the opportunity of enlightening our people in respect to this subject.

ARTICLE III.

"THE MIDDLE ADVENT."

The writer is indebted to Dr. Stier for the title which heads this article. The term "middle" has reference to the second of the three events spoken of by the Lord in two chapters of the Gospel according to Matthew—the 23th and the 25th; and its appropriateness will appear as we proceed. A few preliminary remarks will set forth its meaning more clearly.

1st. Two, and only two, *personal* and *visible* advents of the Lord are spoken of in Scripture. These are sometimes put in close connexion, as in Heb. ix. 28, "So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation." The first evidently was when he took upon himself our nature, in order that he might be made an offering for sin. The second, it is equally evident, will be at the general resurrection and judgment of the last day. This second personal and visible coming is generally spoken of in the Scriptures in immediate connexion with these two events.

2nd. In addition to these personal advents, two other events are mentioned in the Bible, which are so wonderful in themselves, and so important in their results, that they are expressly designated the "coming of the Son of man." The first was the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, the overthrow of the Jewish commonwealth, and the dispersion of that people thirty-seven years after these words were spoken. The second is that "coming of the Lord," or "day of the Lord," so often spoken of by Christ and his apostles, for which the Church is to be in a state of constant preparation; ever ready, waiting, and watching for her Lord.

3d. These two advents and the second personal and visible coming of Christ are the three events spoken of in these two chapters. They may all be styled, in the language of Zeller as given by Stier: "The coming of the Lord" (1) to judge Judaism; (2) to judge degenerate antichristian Christendom; (3) to judge

all nations—the final judgment of the world. All which together are the *coming again of Christ*; and in respect of their similarity and diversity are most exactly recorded from the lips of our Lord by St. Matthew: (a) chap. xxiv. 1–28; (b) chap. xxiv. 29 on to xxv. 30; (c) chap. xxv. 31–46."

4th. The "middle advent" will not be a *personal* coming of Christ. This we may infer from the following facts: (1) Only two personal comings are spoken of in the Scriptures, and this cannot be identified with either of them. (2) It is strictly analogous to "the coming of Christ" when Jerusalem was destroyed and the inhabitants thereof dispersed; and that we know was not a personal coming. (3) The *sign* of the Son of man is to appear in heaven; not the Son of man himself, but his sign. But it may be asked, May not the sign be a warning and premonition of his coming in person, as was the star of Bethlehem when the Saviour was born into the world? No, for we are expressly told that this coming is to be without warning; he is to come suddenly, as a thief in the night. (4) There is nothing in the representations of this event as given in the word of God that absolutely requires it to be understood as a personal coming. The latter clause of the 30th verse of chapter xxiv. might appear to do so in the statement, "Then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." May it not be, however, that they shall see him, not in person, but in his sign, which shall appear in the manifestations of his power and glory, in the terrible judgments he shall send upon them? He was thus seen in the destruction of Jerusalem, seen by both Jews and Romans according to the records of their own historians; seen so plainly that Titus refused the honor of a crown of victory upon the taking of the city, saying that the honor was due not to himself but to the gods; and Josephus, the Jewish historian, testifies that the terrible and unprecedented calamities that befell his countrymen were direct judgments sent upon them by a justly offended God.

With these preliminary remarks, let us now consider the passage itself, and see if it will bear us out in the views thus expressed.

In the first place, notice the question of the disciples. It is evident that three events were present in their thoughts, and expressed in their words, "When shall these things be?" What things? Why, the destruction of the temple and the desolation of their city, which the Master had just foretold. "And what shall be the sign of thy coming?" Had the Lord said anything to suggest to their minds the idea that he would come again? He had. That very day, when foretelling the judgments that were coming upon Jerusalem, he had said of its children: "Ye shall not see me henceforth till ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord." He was coming again then; this they clearly understood from his words. But there is still a third event included in their question: "and of the end of the world." It is evident, therefore, that these three events, the destruction of Jerusalem, the reappearing of their Lord, and the end of the world, were present in their minds. It is further evident that they regarded these three events as standing in some way in close connexion with one another.

Let us, *in the next place*, notice the occasion upon which this question was asked, and the circumstances that drew it forth. Thus we may get further light upon the subject.

Just two days before that feast of the passover at which time he was to be betrayed into the hands of his enemies, the Lord was sitting upon the mount of Olives, overlooking Jerusalem, and with the beautiful temple Herod had built full in view. It was at the close of an eventful and wearisome day. The opposition of his enemies was becoming more decided. They had sought that day to entrap him in his words, and to lead him to commit himself. He had denounced their wickedness in no measured terms. He had not only pronounced woes upon them, but had foretold the utter ruin of their city. Once before, under very different circumstances, when approaching the city surrounded by a rejoicing multitude, he had wept over it, foretelling the fearful calamities that should befall it, and now he once more repeated the same ominous words. That evening, as they passed out of the temple, the disciples remembered his language and called his attention to the magnificence of the temple buildings and the ma-

terial of which they were constructed—huge stones, forty-five yards in length and of proportionate breadth and thickness. "Master, see what manner of stones, and what buildings are here." These words, prompted, it would seem, by a spirit of incredulity, only serve to draw from him a reply in which he declares still more plainly the entire destruction of their temple: "Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down." These words sank deep into the hearts of the disciples, and filled their souls with sadness. They were contrary to all their long cherished views of their Messiah's kingdom. Their fondest hopes clustered around their temple. It was the pride of their nation; and under their Messiah's reign they doubted not that it would become the great object of attraction to all the nations of the world. That it should be thrown down, and so completely demolished that not one stone should be left upon another, seemed to them incredible. In their perplexity they embrace the first opportunity for private conversation; and with anxious hearts propound the question: "Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the world?"

The Lord makes no attempt to correct their erroneous views as to the *time* of these three events, which they doubtless believed would be concurrent. He enters into no explanations of that kind. It would have been useless for him to have done so. With their crude and mistaken views as to the nature of his kingdom, they could not have comprehended his meaning. He proceeds like a wise and skilful teacher to answer their question fully and satisfactorily upon all points concerning which they needed to be enlightened; while at the same time he instructs the Church during all ages of the world as to those things which most deeply concern her welfare. Without entering into any unnecessary explanations as to the time or connexion of these three events, he proceeds in the most direct manner to answer fully and plainly the threefold question of his disciples.

This, then, we understand to be the key to this passage. The Lord's words have reference to three events; all of which were at that time in the future; one of which has since been fulfilled,

and is now a matter of history; the second of which may possibly now be "near, even at the doors;" but whether near or distant will, in God's own time, be fully accomplished. To this our attention will now be more particularly directed.

Before considering this, however, we will refer to the first; and briefly notice the Lord's predictions concerning it, and their wonderful fulfilment. Certain signs and premonitions were first mentioned, by means of which the disciples would recognise its approach. These were the appearance of false Christs, wars and tumults, famines and pestilences, the falling away of many of the disciples, and yet the continued spread of the gospel till it reached all the nations of the world as then known; and finally the sign spoken of by Daniel the prophet, the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place. When this appeared, the disciples were to make their escape in haste from Jerusalem; were to flee without a moment's delay to a place of safety. Then fearful calamities and indescribable miseries were to come upon the Jewish nation. The destruction of their capital and the temple was to be complete. The people were to be dispersed and scattered abroad, and Jerusalem was to be trodden down of the Gentiles until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled. These predictions were uttered about forty years before their fulfilment. It was a time of profound peace; not a speck of war was visible; not a sign of impending calamities could be seen. Josephus, who was an eye-witness to the things he relates, describes accurately the accomplishment of these predictions. So do the Roman historians of that period. These are unintentional witnesses to the exact fulfilment of the Lord's words. The signs and premonitions all appeared—the false prophets and false Messiahs; the signs in the heavens; the wars and tumults; the famines and pestilences. The disciples recognised the warning sign and escaped to Pella, and not one of them perished amid the fearful calamities that befell their countrymen. In the impressive words of the Lord, then was "tribulation such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no, nor ever shall be." Vast multitudes from the adjacent country, upon the approach of the Roman armies, fled into the city for protection. The

sword devoured without, while starvation and pestilence raged within the walls of the city. A mob of half-famished men, maddened by hunger, banded themselves together, and like wolves ranged through the city in search of food. They were attracted to a house by the scent of cooked flesh. Here they supposed were hidden stores secreted for the use of the family. They forced an entrance and demanded food. Resistance was useless. The mother brought from its hiding place the half-eaten body of her own suckling child, of which she had just partaken. Such were the extremities to which the people were driven. Eleven hundred thousand of the Jews are estimated to have perished during this siege. Titus gave positive orders to the army to spare the temple. Contrary to his commands, and despite all efforts to save it, it was destroyed, totally destroyed. Literally, not one stone was left upon another; and the ploughshare was driven through the soil where it had stood in hope of finding treasures. Thus were fulfilled the Lord's predictions. From that time to the present, Jerusalem has been trodden down of the Gentiles, which is another and striking illustration of the truthfulness of the Lord's words. Julian, the Roman Emperor known as "the Apostate," in his bitter hatred towards Christ and his religion, resolved that this part at least of the Lord's prophecy should not be accomplished. He accordingly gave orders that the temple should be rebuilt, and the Jews restored to their own country. But all the power and wealth of the Roman Empire were not sufficient to overthrow the words of the despised Galilean. The temple was never rebuilt, although the attempt was made. The workmen reported that huge balls of fire burst forth from the ground, and so scorched and terrified them that they were compelled to desist. To this day Jerusalem is trodden of the Gentiles. Nowhere is the Jew more down-trodden and oppressed; nowhere is he less at home than in his own country, the home of his forefathers; nowhere is he more cruelly treated than in the city of David. Such will continue to be the case until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled. These words, which are found in Luke xxi. 24, but which are not recorded by Matthew, we regard as the connecting link between the first and

second of the events here foretold. It refers to the continued dispersion of the Jews, their continued existence without a country or a nationality until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled; or, as Paul expresses it (Rom. xi. 25), until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in.

This brings us then to the consideration of the second of the three events, the "middle advent" of the Lord.

Like the first, its approach will be indicated by certain signs and precursors. These tokens, as the Lord describes them, are: "The sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken." Matt. xxiv. 29. "And there shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars; and upon the earth distress of nations, with perplexity; the sea and the waves roaring; men's hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth." Luke xxi. 25 and 26. The description of the same as given in the Apocalypse is: "And there were voices, and thunders, and lightnings; and there was a great earthquake, such as was not since men were upon the earth, so mighty an earthquake and so great."

Such are the descriptions given. Now, what meaning shall be put upon these words? Are they to be understood literally or figuratively? Let the word of God be its own interpreter. To select just one instance out of several, we turn to Isa. xiii. 10, 13, and we find the identical language in part used: "The stars of heaven, and the constellations thereof, shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine. I will shake the heavens, and the earth shall remove out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and in the day of his fierce anger." This was a prediction of the judgments God would send upon Babylon. That prediction has been fulfilled. It is only necessary, therefore, to inquire what that fulfilment was, in order that we may understand the Lord's meaning in the passages we are now considering. In regard to Babylon, we know that the language was figurative. It referred to no literal blotting out of the sun, or of the moon, or of the stars. It had reference to a

mighty political revolution; the overthrow of its civil government; the subjugation of the people; and the inauguration of a new dynasty. Thus, then, are we to understand the Saviour's words. His language is figurative, not literal. The earthquake, the shaking of the heavens, the darkening of the lights thereof, indicate civil and political commotions, mighty revolutions, "distress of nations." These things are to be looked for. The so-called Christian nations of the earth are to be mightily shaken; shaken in all their interests; shaken from the lowest strata of society to the highest; shaken as they have never before been shaken since they existed as nations; for the description of the earthquake is, that it was a great earthquake and mighty, such as was not since men were upon the earth. The object of this shaking, we are told in Heb. xii. 27, is "the removing of those things that are shaken; that those things which cannot be shaken may remain." What those things which cannot be shaken are, the apostle tells us in the next verse. They are the kingdom of the Lord; that "kingdom which cannot be moved." It is for its advancement that the nations of the earth are to be shaken.

The advent itself is next foretold in these words: "And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven; and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." He is to be seen in the *sign*; so we understand these words to mean. What that sign is to be, the Lord has not told us, and it is useless for us to conjecture. Many and very different have been the speculations about it, but they are as useless as they are various. It is sufficient for us to know that whoever are living at that time will see it and recognise it. There will be no uncertainty about it. To those ready and waiting and looking for their Lord, it will be the most joyful and the most glorious of all the sights they have ever beheld. To all others it will be just the reverse: the most fearful and ominous of all signs they have ever seen. Just as the early disciples recognised the sign that was to warn them of the Lord's coming to judge Judaism, so will all Christian nations see and know his sign when he comes to enter into judgment with them.

This brings us to the consideration of the next point, which is the *object* of this coming. As previously stated, it is to judge the Christian Church. This we learn from the general tenor of the passage, but more especially from the three parables with which it closes. The term "Christian Church" is here used in its widest sense. It includes all who bear the name Christian. It embraces all those nations among whom Christ's spiritual kingdom exists; all people who live under the light of the gospel, and who have the means of enjoying its blessings. To these people and nations a very solemn and sacred trust has been committed. That trust is the spiritual kingdom of the Lord; that for which he died; the dearest object on earth to his heart. Its interests are intrusted to their keeping. God took it from the Jewish nation because of their unfaithfulness. Have the Gentile nations been more faithful? We fear not. We fear that in the day when God enters into judgment with them, they will be found just as recreant to their trust as were that people who crucified the Lord of glory. This is a grievous charge; but when we come to consider the representation that Christ gives of the Christian Church as he shall find it at his coming, we will be compelled to admit its truthfulness, and to acknowledge with shame that the Christian Church is just as faithless to this trust as was the Jewish. The same grounds for condemnation that formerly existed in reference to the one, will be found likewise to exist in reference to the other. This point will be referred to again when we come to consider the parables with which the Lord closes this part of his discourse.

Three especial results will attend or follow this event.

(1) God's ancient covenant people will be gathered back into Christ's spiritual kingdom, and there united with the truly pious of the Christian Church. This result is clearly foretold in God's word. Turn to Rom. xi., and read the 15th and 25-29th verses. The 15th verse speaks not only of "the casting away of them," but likewise of "the receiving of them." It tells us further that this receiving of them will be a glorious day to the Church; it will be as "life from the dead;" a spiritual resurrection. The other verses referred to tell us with equal plainness that the

blindness that has happened to Israel is only for a time, only until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in ; that then a Deliverer shall come out of Sion, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob ; that God's covenant with them is not annulled ; that they are still beloved for the Father's sake ; that the gifts and calling of God are without change ; that he has never turned from his purposes of love and mercy to that people. But, say some, may not the reference here be to spiritual Israel, and not to the Jewish people ? No ; for if so, the Apostle's argument loses all force and all appropriateness. He is here speaking of the rejection of the Jews, and the calling of the Gentiles. It was the Jewish race that was cut off, not spiritual Israel, and the same who were cut off are again to be restored.

But it is further predicted that they are not only to be brought into the Christian Church, they are also to be restored to their nationality and to their own country. See Isa. xi. 11 and 12. There it is clearly foretold that God shall the *second time* gather his people Israel from all nations and from the four corners of the earth. Two restorations, then, are spoken of. The first was after the seventy years captivity in Babylon ; the second will be when the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. God's ancient covenant people shall then be brought back to their own land, and a name and a place shall once more be given them among the nations of the earth. The dry bones that Isaiah saw in his vision, scattered through the valley, and separate one from another, shall again be gathered together, a great army of living men.

(2) Another result shall be the destruction of Antichrist. This result is alluded to in the three parables with which this passage closes ; but it is more clearly foretold elsewhere. What is Anti-Christ ? Let Paul answer. This he does in 2 Thess. ii. 3, where he describes it as "that man of sin, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped ; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God." It is something, then, in the "temple of God," that is in the Church itself, that opposeth and exalteth itself above God.

The evil thus described finds its full development in that fearful system of superstition, error, and idolatry, the Church of Rome. It is this that sitteth in the temple of God, claiming to be that temple, the Church of God; and yet exalteth itself above God, usurping his authority, and claiming his prerogatives; putting aside his word, and substituting for his truth its own vain and blasphemous doctrines. This is Antichrist in its full and perfect manifestation; but the spirit out of which it grew, and of which the Papal Church is the development, is by no means confined to Rome. It is found in a greater or less degree in every branch of the Christian Church. It is seen in its pride and worldliness; in its love for earthly power and glory; in its contempt for pure, spiritual religion, and its admiration for that which is material and sensuous; in its love for outward show and ceremony; in its holding to the form of godliness, while denying the power thereof. All this must perish, and along with the Papal system will be destroyed by the brightness of the Lord's coming.

(3) A third result will be the coming of Christ's kingdom in power and great glory. The Lord says to his disciples: "When ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand." And again he says to them: "Then look up and lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh."

In other portions of Scripture this result is predicted in language strong and emphatic. The eleventh chapter of Isaiah gives a beautiful and glowing description of Christ's kingdom as it shall then be, and concludes with the declaration, "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea." In Rev. xi. 15, it is declared, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever."

Then shall be answered that petition that Christ put into our lips when he taught us to say: "Thy kingdom come." That petition the Church has been using for two thousand years. How little have we thought of the full meaning of these words, and of their glorious accomplishment! That petition of our Lord is

not offered in vain. His kingdom will come in a manner that has never yet been witnessed upon earth.

The *time* of the Lord's advent is not revealed to us. We are only told in general terms that as the budding of the fig-tree indicates the approach of summer, "so when we see these things coming to pass, we may know that the event is near, even at the doors." Its approach will be indicated by the fulfilment of the Lord's predictions. But of the precise time we are not informed. On the contrary, we are told in language clear and emphatic: "Of that day and hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels which are in heaven; neither the Son, but the Father." What a rebuke are these words to all the vain and useless speculations as to the exact time of the Lord's coming! How idle for men to attempt to fix a date which God in his wisdom and sovereignty has purposely concealed from our sight! How can we hope to determine that concerning which the Lord uses the strong language, that it is not known even to the Son, but to the Father only?

But though the time is unknown to us, we have the strongest assurance given us of the *certainty* of this event. This assurance is given not only in the strong affirmation: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away;" but, in addition to that, he gives us a visible proof, a constant witness to the truthfulness of his words. This evidence is before our eyes, a standing miracle, a living witness to the certainty of the Lord's coming. This evidence is given in the continued preservation of the Jewish people; and is found in the 34th verse of the 24th chapter of Matthew. This meaning is not brought out in our version; but if we adopt the translation of many eminent scholars, and read it: "This race," or people, "shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled," we have the full force and meaning of our Lord's words. He is here speaking of the certainty of the fulfilment of his words, and he mentions this as an evidence of that fact, that Israel shall not pass away; that they shall not be lost or obliterated like other nations; that though dispersed and scattered abroad to the four corners of the globe, yet they shall be wonderfully preserved and perpetuated as a

nation. They shall not lose their identity, nor be absorbed by the nations among whom they dwell. This we call a standing miracle. It is contrary to the history of all other nations which have thus been scattered abroad. It is contrary to all natural principles with which we are acquainted. It justifies the answer given to Frederick the Great, when he asked that some convincing evidence of the truth of Christianity might be given in one word. The answer was, "The Jews." This wonderful preservation of this remarkable people cannot be accounted for nor explained away by the ingenuity of man. This fact we are all acquainted with. It confronts us every day of our lives. In every land and nation, to whatever country we may go, in almost every city and village we meet the Jew; and wherever we meet him, he is the same. There is a wonderful propriety and significance in the use of the word *γενεά* by our Lord. In one sense it is the same "generation." In his religion the Jew is the same now that he was then. That generation has perpetuated itself. Through eighteen centuries it has continued the same. There is no progress, no advancement, no enlightenment. With the rest of the world in motion, the Jew has remained stationary. He is now just where he was when the Lord used these words, and said, "This generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled."

We are further informed that this advent of the Lord will take place *suddenly*. It will be when men are not expecting it and are unprepared for it. It will be as the flood came in the days of Noah, when men were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage; living in fancied security and anticipating no evil. To use the Lord's expressive figure, it will be as the coming of a thief in the night, secretly and without warning. It will be when men are engaged in the ordinary duties and avocations of life; when they are in the field and at the mill, seeking the things of this life with no thought for the future, and, in the case of many, with no preparation for the life to come.

Not only will the world be unprepared for this event, but so will the Church be likewise. This part of the discourse closes with three parables, which we may regard as descriptive of the condition of the Church as the Lord shall find it at his coming.

Each of these parables divides the Church into two distinct classes. The first is the parable of the faithful and unfaithful servants. The first class are true to the trust committed to their keeping. They are faithful to the interests of their Lord, and in seeking the welfare of his household, and are ready at any time to give an account of their stewardship. The other class have lost sight of the Master's coming. They have begun to lord it over his heritage; to usurp an authority that is not theirs; and to live in open profligacy and wickedness. The latter is the picture of a corrupt and apostate Church, a Church living in usurpation of his authority and in open defiance of his law. Do we recognise the picture? Is it not a faithful delineation of a large part of the so-called Christian Church?

The second parable is that of the virgins, five of whom were wise and five were foolish. This divides the servants described in the first parable as "faithful" into two other classes. Notice, in one sense they are all faithful. They are all virgins. They are not corrupted by idolatry, which in the sight of God is as the sin of fornication. But still they are not alike. A part are wise, and a part are foolish. Their folly is found in their state of unreadiness. Once they thought themselves ready and were patiently awaiting their Lord's coming. But he tarried longer than they expected, and now their lamps have gone out, and their oil is exhausted. This is a representation of the best part of the Christian Church, that part which remains pure and uncorrupted and undefiled. Even it is divided into two classes, a part of which are wise, and a part are foolish. The wise are in a state of readiness. They are in the full exercise of all their Christian graces. They shine with a pure and steady light. They are living witnesses for Christ. They bear unceasing testimony in their lives to the power and presence of the Holy Spirit. The foolish are in a state of unreadiness. Their love has grown cold. Their faith is weak. Their hopes are faint. They manifest no vigor, no activity, no earnestness in their spiritual life. Of how many in all our churches is this a true and faithful representation! What a lack of earnestness, what a decay of Christian graces, what a want of zeal, what cold-

ness and lifelessness do we exhibit ! How little are we doing for the Lord's cause ! How many opportunities of improving our own spiritual condition, and of benefiting and blessing others are neglected, and slip unimproved through our hands ! Oh there is reason to fear that the lights of many Christians have gone out, and that the oil of grace in their hearts has been exhausted.

The third parable is that of the talents committed to the servants. Here another division is made. Two of the servants were industrious, improved their talents, and rightly used the trust committed to their keeping. These represent that class in Christian lands who recognise and acknowledge the Lord's right to them and to their services ; who say with sincerity of heart, We are not our own, we are bought with a price ; who inquire daily, "Lord, what wouldst thou have me to do." These are they who recognise themselves as the Lord's servants ; and acknowledge that life and time and talent and influence and property and all that they possess are to be used in the service of God and for his glory.

But there was another servant who was slothful, and hid his Lord's money. Thus is represented that large class in every Christian land, who, living under the light of the gospel, and in the enjoyment of its privileges, have never seriously devoted themselves to the Lord's service. We are here taught that they are without excuse for so doing. They may dig in the earth and hide their talent ; they may assert that because they have never professed the name of Christ, and have never acknowledged themselves to be his servants, therefore he has no claim upon them, and that they are under no obligation to serve him. They are mistaken. They cannot thus escape responsibility. The Lord is their Master whether they acknowledge him as such or not. He has committed a sacred trust to their keeping, and will hold them to a strict account for its use and improvement. It is useless to cry out against this service. It is useless to denounce the Lord as a hard master. This does not help the matter. Responsibilities are not thrown off by a failure on our part to recognise them. We cannot change the fact that we are the Lord's, and that he has a right to our services. We cannot avoid re-

sponsibility by failing to acknowledge his claims. We cannot escape the strict and impartial account to which we will be held for the use we have made of the talents committed to our keeping.

With these three parables the Lord concludes his words concerning his "middle advent." Of the third, his final advent, his coming to judge the quick and the dead, it is not our purpose to speak. This is referred to in the concluding words of the 25th chapter from the 31st verse to the end. It is the middle advent for which the Church is now looking and waiting, and which, for aught we know, may be near, even at the doors. It is this for which the Church is to be ready, knowing not at what time her Lord may come. It is this event that is to inaugurate the kingdom of Christ in our world with such power and glory as has never yet been witnessed. It is this event for which we are to pray as John prayed: "Even so, come, Lord Jesus, come quickly."

H. F. HOYT.

ARTICLE IV.

RE-EXAMINATION OF DR. GIRARDEAU'S VIEWS
OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

In two numbers of this REVIEW, during the past year, our esteemed brother, Rev. Dr. Girardeau, published certain views in reference to the fall of Adam, which the present writer ventured to criticise in these pages. In the January and April numbers of this year (1880), Dr. Girardeau responded, in an excellent spirit of moderation, but with a sensitive anxiety to vindicate his orthodoxy before the Church. He intimates, moreover, that his articles may be continued. It does not become an obscure individual to occupy much space in controverting the opinions of one so eminent for his character and talents, and so deservedly enjoying the confidence of his brethren. A brief rejoinder will suffice to justify our position as a fraternal critic, and to place clearly before the reader the issues between us.

In the first place, Dr. Girardeau has endeavored to adopt the strategy of Scipio, by carrying the war into Africa. He sets the writer down as a Supralapsarian, and appears disposed to avail himself of a common prejudice against this class of theologians. Unfortunately for his success, the evidence for this classification can be derived from no other source than the single article in which his opinions were examined, and which was not designed to expose the views of the writer, but his own. It is a matter of indifference to the Church whether *we* are Supralapsarian or not. But it does not follow from the fact that we differ from him on the points in question, that we *are* Supralapsarian. A large number of our most distinguished theologians differ from him in unmistakable terms, and are, nevertheless, pronounced Sublapsarians.

There are two principal points of issue between us, and they will be considered separately. First, as to the agreement of Dr. Girardeau with Calvin and our standards. And, here, let full justice be done this distinguished brother. He declares, in his last article, that he does not limit a permissive decree of the fall to "a bare permission." Our inference from his argument was to the effect that, in this very point, he had departed from the language of Calvin and the Confession of Faith. It is now clear that, so far from rejecting this doctrine, he is in accord with it, in his theological views. He believes that the decree of God, permitting the fall, was *more* than a mere permission. That he is here in exact agreement with Calvin, is evident from the words of the latter, distinctly and repeatedly used in the Institutes. For example: "For the first man fell *because* the Lord had *determined* it was so expedient." (Bk. III., ch. xxiii., sec. viii.) Again: "Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm that God not only *foresaw* the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also *arranged* all by the *determination* of his own will" (Sec. 7). Again: "Here they recur to the distinction between *will* and *permission*, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruc-

tion by the *mere permission*, and without any *appointment* of God, as though God had not *determined* what he would *choose* to be the condition of the principal of his creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, to confess plainly, with Augustin, that the will of God is the *necessity* of things, and that what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass; as those things are really about to happen which he has foreseen" (Sec. 8).

No reader of this chapter of the Institutes can fail to see that Calvin utterly rejects the idea of a *bare permission* of the fall; but, on the contrary, teaches throughout, that it was the result of *volition, choice, purpose*, on the part of the Almighty. It is pleasant to know that Dr. Girardeau substantially adopts the same view. The standards of our Church are equally explicit on this point: "The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a *bare permission*, but such as has joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own glory" (Conf. of Faith, Ch. V., Sec. 4); "God's decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will, whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, *unchangably foreordained* whatsoever comes to pass in time, especially concerning angels and men" (Q. 12); "God *executeth* his decrees in the *works* of creation and providence; according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his *own will*" (Q. 14, L. C.)

It is taken for granted that Dr. Girardeau also adopts this language from the Confession and Catechism, and when he avows his belief that the decree of God concerning the fall was more than a bare permission, he means to admit that it was, in a complete sense, *unchangably foreordained*. Under these circumstances, it would be highly unjust to question his orthodoxy on the subject. So much for his statement of his belief. We have no wish, whatever, to impeach his theological standing. Let us rather deal with the consistency of his logic, the coherence of his argumentation. This it was that arrested our attention at first,

and excited our painful apprehension. We thought, and still think, after all he has written, that he has put a dangerous argument in the mouth of the Arminian, to assail the faith which he himself reveres.

We still maintain that Dr. Girardeau's *course of reasoning* on the point now under consideration, involves a retreat to a *bare permission* in God's decree concerning the fall. *He* thinks differently; but we are not dealing with his consciousness. That may be ever so right, and his processes ever so wrong. The question is, Does he attribute to God anything *more* than a determination to let Adam yield to the tempter? We appeal to his own language. His argument is directed to this very end, to show the volition of the divine mind as merely concerned in securing the free exercise of the will of man. All efficiency in the will of God is expressly excluded. Yet, some sort of efficiency is obviously implied, or, rather, clearly expressed in the citations we have made from Calvin and the standards. "The most wise and powerful bounding," that is joined with the permissive decree, cannot be a limitation of the permission. This would make it *less* than a bare permission, instead of *more*. It is obviously a limitation of the power of the creature. This, at least, is the interpretation of Calvin. He leaves not a shadow of doubt upon the subject. He declares that "God arranged all (pertaining to the fall) by the *determination* of his *own* will." "It is not probable that man procured his own destruction by the *mere* permission, and without any *appointment* of God." "The will of God is the *necessity* of things, and what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass." Nor is there any obscurity in the language of the Confession. It declares that "the *power* of God extendeth to the first fall, and that, *not* by a bare permission." Foreordination is predetermination. The fall was *predetermined*, and we are surely warranted in repeating that, in a theological sense, Calvin and our standards sustain Determinism as rigorously as Edwards himself.

There are but three possible gradations involved in the question. 1. A bare permission. 2. A divine efficiency consistent with free-agency. 3. A divine efficiency incompatible with free-agency. We challenge the reader to conceive of anything inter-

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mediate between the first and second. Dr. Girardeau repudiates a bare permission—a "*nuda permissio*" (April Number, p. 331). Where, then, can he stand? With us, he rejects the third position. If he recoils from the second, we see no possible place for the sole of his foot. But it is evident, from his repeated language, that he *does* refuse to admit any efficiency in the permissive decree. Here is his own statement: "We maintained that God neither decreed efficiently to produce the sin of Adam, nor efficaciously to procure its commission, nor to render it unavoidable by a concreated necessity of nature; but that he decreed to permit it; so that, while he did not determine to prevent it, he, *in that sense*, willed its occurrence rather than its non-occurrence; yet so, moreover, that it was committed by a free, that is, by an unnecessitated and avoidable, decision of man's will."

It will be observed that the only sense in which he admits that God *willed* the fall of Adam, is, that he determined not to prevent it. In other words, he represents God as a *passive* spectator of a transaction independently occurring before him. Now we challenge the reader to discover in his statement anything but a bare permission. It plainly represents the Deity as foreseeing the event certainly occurring in the future, and simply determining not to prevent it. And, of course, such a determination would have been vain, seeing the occurrence was so certain as to baffle any attempt to reverse it. How could even omnipotence prevent an act already foreseen as certainly transpiring? But our chief inquiry is whether Dr. Girardeau agrees with Calvin and our standards. Does Calvin teach anything of the kind? Surely not, unless he has been guilty of the grossest contradictions in language. He says, with Augustine, "The will of God is the *necessity* of things, and what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass." Now if God willed the fall, it occurred *necessarily*. Did Calvin hold that God willed the fall only in Dr. Girardeau's sense of not willing to prevent it? It is impossible so to interpret him. He declares that "God had determined what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures." A determined choice is not a negative thing. It implies a contemplation of two alternatives, both possible to the eternal

mind, and the sovereign selection of one. Calvin everywhere uses language on the subject that is irreconcilable with a merely passive state of the divine mind. He speaks of *will, choice, purpose, appointment, determination*, over and over again, in connexion with the fall. If he does not mean that the fall was due, in some true sense, to the active will of God, his words are full of Jesuitical deceit.

The pivotal point here, is the *order* of the operations of the divine mind. According to Calvin, the decree preceded the foreknowledge. Hear him: "I say, with Augustine, that the Lord created those who, he certainly foreknew, would fall into destruction, and that this was actually so *because* he willed it" (Institutes, Bk. III., Ch. xxiii., Sec. 5). Here, undoubtedly, the foreknowledge of the event is represented as logically *following* an act of the divine will. And more than this, the foreknowledge is based upon the decree, not as an inference from it, but as necessarily consequent. How is it possible for the most liberal critic in the world to reconcile Dr. Girardeau's statement with Calvin? In direct opposition to Calvin, he bases the decree upon a foreknowledge of the event. His own words are before the reader. According to him, the decree was "to permit it." What is meant by "*it*?" Why the fall, an event already before the mind as a *certain* occurrence. Thus the decree of God concerning the fall is reduced to a mere resolve, that what is certainly to be may be. Is Dr. Girardeau in accord with Calvin or not?

Let it be noticed that Calvin and Augustine affirm that the event occurred, and was foreknown as certain, "*because* the Lord willed it." If the question were asked why Adam fell, we have their answer in these words. And the former expresses himself thus: "If God simply *foresaw* the fates of men, and did not also *dispose* and *fix* them, by his determination, there would be room to agitate the question, whether his providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But since he foresees future events, *only in consequence of his decree that they shall happen*, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree" (Sec. 6). Who can doubt, after reading this passage, that Calvin makes

the decree logically precede the foreknowledge? And who can fail to discover that, between him and Augustine, on one side, and Dr. Girardeau, on the other, there is a difference of statement on this great doctrine of the decrees, as vast as the diameter of the spheres? The former do *not* teach, like the latter, that the fall was "fixed" and made certain by the self-determination of *Adam's* will.

Our esteemed brother is right in imputing to us a denial of *his* distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees. We maintain that the permissive decree of our Confession, being *more* than a *bare* permission, involves an efficacious determination of the will of God. We, however, took especial pains to say, that a distinction might be made between the decrees of God, as they affect brute matter, or rational accountable beings. We understand the permissive decree of the Confession to pertain to the latter class. And we press our point with Dr. Girardeau. If there is no efficiency in it, it is nothing more than permissive; and this is in the teeth of Calvin, Augustine, and the Confession. The brother owes it to himself to define his position, categorically, between a bare permission and an efficacious decree.

But what right has *he* to insist that an efficacious decree in relation to Adam would make God the author of sin? This is the gist of his dissent from Calvin's doctrine presented in our brief citations. Of all writers with whom we are familiar, he (Dr. Girardeau) is the most emphatic in his opinion concerning the decree of God in the affairs of *fallen* man. He not only holds that this decree efficaciously disposes of their eternal interests, but goes so far as to introduce *external force* into the execution of it. And yet he can see no objection to his doctrine, on the ground that it makes God the author of sin. He teaches that an efficacious decree, in Adam's case, would have destroyed his free agency; and yet a *forcible* execution of such a decree, in the case of his posterity, is perfectly consistent with free agency. We cite his own words: "We are even prepared to go further than some advocates of Determinism, and to assert that, besides the inherent inability of the sinner, without regenerating grace, to perform spiritual acts, there is an *external force*, that is, an ex-

ternally originated force, operating upon him, which disables him spiritually." (Apr. No., p. 5.)

Whether he is correct or not, in this opinion, we cannot stop to consider. The language is intensely strong. He has nothing of Dr. Taylor or Mr. Barnes in his composition. But we press our point nevertheless. If free agency is unimpaired, even by the exercise of external force upon the sinner, disabling him from obedience, why should it be insisted that Adam's free agency would have been destroyed by an efficacious decree of God concerning the fall? What principle is involved that creates so vast a difference? Dr. Girardeau says the sinner's case is judicial. He is punished with inability and constraint for crime. But if the destruction of free agency is essentially unjust, how can it be consistently employed as an instrument of justice? His objection in reference to Adam is, that equity forbids that an innocent creature shall be subjected to death by an efficacious decree. But does not the same principle forbid a sovereign to restrain a *guilty* subject from doing right, and to punish him for doing what he is forcibly impelled to do? Our complaint is, that our author, in opposition to rationalism, accepts the latter doctrine on scriptural grounds; but objects to a mysteriously efficacious decree in Adam's case, on grounds outside of Scripture and purely rationalistic. For the scriptural narrative does not contain a syllable on the subject.

His argument is, that it makes God the author of sin. To be valid, it must be founded in some great law of thought—some fundamental principle of truth. But if this were granted, the rationalist might promptly retort, that such a principle must be comprehensive and universal, and cannot be set aside by our interpretation of Scripture. No interpretation can be accepted that contravenes the primary dictates of the reason. We insist that there is no such dictum of the reason, that an efficacious decree of God makes him the author of sin. If there were, it would be equally tenable that the *creation* of a holy being, knowing he would perish, would also involve the Creator in the responsibility. Can Dr. Girardeau rationally defend the character of God from such an imputation, on *his* premises? Does he not

make God the author of the sin of Judas, and, instead of denying it, actually vindicate the fact, by teaching that God was *just* in the matter? The whole difficulty arises, in our judgment, from applying a human standard to the acts of a Being, who, from the nature of the case, is incomprehensible and irresponsible. Calvin warns us against this very error. We must add a little more of his testimony:

"They" (his opponents) "say it is nowhere declared, in express terms, that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as though the same God, whom the Scripture represents as doing whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures without any *determinate end*. They maintain that he was possessed of *free choice*, that he might be the author of his own fate, but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert. *If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God's omnipotence*, by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing besides? But, whether they wish it or dread it, predestination exhibits itself in Adam's posterity. For the loss of salvation by the whole race, through the guilt of our parent, was an event that did not happen by nature. *What prevents their acknowledging concerning one man, what they reluctantly grant concerning the whole species?*" Bk. III., Ch. VII., Sec. VII.)

Does this leave any doubt of Calvin's views? Does he not denounce Dr. Girardeau's scheme as "a weak one" in advance? What prevents *him* from acknowledging concerning one man what he distinctly grants concerning the whole species? This question of Calvin shows, beyond a doubt, that *he* did that which he censures his opponents for not doing. He includes Adam in the species, and represents him as subject to the same predestination. And yet our brother, in all candor, we know, insists that he and Calvin are at one on this point. Again:

"I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations . . . in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. . . . It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, *and that he did foreknow it, because it was appointed by his own decree.*" (Sec. VII.)

Does not our author deny, in most positive terms, the doctrine of Calvin which this passage so clearly expresses? A brief cita-

tion, from a long discussion, will suffice to prove that he and Calvin are at direct issue :

“And here we must call attention to a distinction which is too often overlooked, but which it is necessary to signalise : namely, that between the foreknowledge of an *active* being, as grounded in the divine decree to produce it, and the foreknowledge of the *acts* of that being. It must be acknowledged that God could not have foreknown the existence of Adam, as an actual being, unless he had decreed to create him, and the certainty that he would exist as depending upon the execution of that decree. Otherwise Adam must have remained an object of knowledge only as in the category of the possible. But God having decreed to create him, and therefore having foreknown his existence, the question is how he foreknew the sin of Adam. Now we have proved, if argument can prove anything, that God neither decreed to produce his sin, nor efficaciously to procure its commission. But he must have foreknown it, else his knowledge is limited and imperfect. *That* it could not have been, nor can be, for it is infinite. The foreknowledge of the sin of Adam *was not grounded in a decree which necessitated its commission*” (Jan., 1879, pp. 75, 76).

We have taken the liberty to italicise some of his expressions. Let the reader remember that by “necessitated” Dr. Girardeau means rendered certain, and insists that the fall was not made certain by a decree. The main point for which the passage is quoted is to show that he is in irreconcilable antagonism with Calvin. He says God did not foreknow the fall because he decreed it. Calvin says he did. Is this agreement, or disagreement?

But we add a few subordinate remarks on the logic of this passage. He admits that a portion of God’s foreknowledge is grounded in an efficacious decree. We see no necessity for the distinction. If he would certainly foresee an undetermined act of Adam’s will, he could equally foresee an act of his own without a decree. But we give his language above as an example of faulty reasoning. He says God could not have foreknown the existence of Adam if he had not decreed it. What, then, becomes of his laborious argument to show that *all* God’s foreknowledge is independent of his decree? He says (p. 75): “But, admitting that the crucifixion was rendered necessary by an efficacious decree, it would not follow that God’s knowledge of its certainty was grounded in—depended upon—the relation between it and the decree.” Here he insists that the sin of the crucifixion, con-

fessedly predestined, was not foreknown because it was decreed ; and his objection is based upon the intuitive character of all the divine knowledge; and yet he admits that foreknowledge of creation was dependent upon a decree. All God's knowledge, then, is not independent. But the predestined *acts* of sinful men are objects of independent foreknowledge. Why may not the foreknown acts of Adam have been also predestined? We respectfully suggest that this is not sound logic. "He knows the operation of causes, and he knows their effects, but he does not know the effects because they can only be produced by the causes." But the creation of Adam was an effect. Therefore, God's certain foreknowledge of it may have been independent of the predestined cause. And yet he makes it depend upon God's own decree. Now, if God's decree gave certainty to the crucifixion, how could his foreknowledge of it be any more independent than his foreknowledge of the existence of Adam?

Dr. Girardeau does not notice the reasoning from the freedom of God. Surely that argument was valid. The decree of God was, by his own admission, efficacious over his own creative act. Our author's logic is, that an efficacious decree ensuring the fall would have been destructive of the freedom of Adam. A free will cannot have its choice in time determined by a decree in eternity. But if this reasoning were correct, it would destroy the freedom of the divine act at the time of its occurrence. We contend that the Creator enjoyed as much freedom of choice when he performed that act as when he decreed it, and fully as much as Adam did when he fell. Yet it is undeniable that the eternal decree made the creation of man a certainty. God's own acts are unchangeably determined, and are yet the most perfect examples of freedom.

But the brother maintains that the free action of Adam, being that of another will, must have been exempt from predestination. We answer that if Adam's will had been, like God's, unchangeable, he would have been no less free. This would have ensured his safety without impairing the liberty of choice. We reject the doctrine, that confirmation in holiness puts an end to moral free-

dom. It amounts to a denial of such freedom to God, to elect angels, and to glorified saints.

What was CALVIN'S view of the freedom of Adam's will in his state of innocence? On this subject, Dr. Girardeau has crowded his articles with quotations which it is impossible for us, in a moderate space, to notice. It brings us, however, to a consideration of the *second* issue between us—the psychological aspect of the question.

Dr. Girardeau complains of our intimation, that he has broached a new kind of psychology. We simply meant that, according to him, the mental laws that prevail in fallen men, in spiritual matters, are inapplicable to the primitive state of man. We understand him to hold that the will of fallen man is *bound* by his depraved affections and his darkened mind, whilst that of unfallen man was *not* bound by his existing affections and mental states. If so, we argued that the will, in the two cases, was differently related to the other faculties, and a system of mental and moral philosophy adapted to our present state could not be suited to the former condition of man. Moreover, he has introduced an element of *force*, to show that the will of wicked men is doubly bound. He distinctly admits *necessity* in the nature of man, governing his voluntary actions in his present state; that is, he admits Determinism in all its efficiency. Now, a constitution of mind in which the will was free from such necessity, must have been radically changed by the fall, to bring about a necessitated condition of the will. This is what we termed a novelty in psychology—an altered relation of the will to the subjective motives. The one involves free agency; the other seems to us, with its element of external force, altogether destructive of it.

But what was Calvin's opinion? He treats it, as we have done, as a distinct question from predestination. No matter whether the will is self-determined, or determined by the subjective motives, predestination is a fixed fact in his system, "extending even to the first fall." In treating of that event, he recognises a concreated condition in Adam, that rendered him inferior to what he might have been, if God had seen fit to create him differently. This inferiority consisted in what he calls a

mutable will; and he attributes the fall (under God) to this peculiarity. We give his own words:

"In this integrity man was endued with free will, by which, *if he had chosen*, he might have obtained eternal life. For here it would be unreasonable to introduce the question concerning the secret predestination of God, because we are not discussing what might possibly have happened, or not, but what was the real nature of man. Adam, therefore, could have stood, *if he would*, since he fell merely by his own will; but because his will was flexible to either side, and he was not endued with constancy to persevere, therefore he so easily fell. . . . If any object that he was placed in a dangerous situation, on account of the imbecility of this faculty, I reply that the station in which he was placed was sufficient to deprive him of all excuse. . . . But why he (God) did not sustain him with the power of perseverance, remains concealed in his mind, but it is our duty to restrain our investigations within the limit of sobriety. He had the power, indeed, *if he chose to exert it*; but he had not the *will* to use that power; for the consequence of this will would have been perseverance." (Bk. I., C. XV., Sec. VII.)

Let the reader first notice, that Calvin declares that this inquiry is not affected by predestination, or predestination by it—a truth which he maintains in all its integrity. He sets that truth aside, as belonging to one sphere, the divine, and confines himself to another sphere, the limited, the human, the contingent. And whatever may have been his psychological notions, in an age when that science was so immature, it is obvious that he attributes the fall, within the sphere of second causes, to something wanting in the nature of man. We protest that it is not fair to infer from the varying phraseology of Calvin, that he held doctrines in philosophy inconsistent with his theological views. He says in this paragraph that Adam's nature would have been more excellent if he had been created with a will confirmed in holiness. The gift of constancy was denied him for secret reasons in the mind of the Almighty. Dr. Girardeau insists that the fall was not necessitated by Adam's nature. This is true in one sense, but not in another. No principle implanted in his nature was, according to Calvin, a cause of his fall; but a principle *not* implanted was, by its absence, a cause of the result. What can a mutable will mean, but one that would certainly change in the course of time with changing circumstances? If Adam's will

had continued steadfast under a long succession of changes and temptations, this fact would have indicated the presence of that very constancy which was wanting in his nature. Let the reader also observe that Calvin introduces an *if*, which can have no place in the divine sphere. Adam could, indeed, have stood, *if* he would, in the language of contingency; but he says expressly that Adam had not the *will* to do so. It seems to us indisputable that he uses the term *will* to include the desires and affections of the soul, and that he means to impute the fall to the changes that took place in its moral dispositions.

We have quoted from Calvin to the verge of weariness, to prove that he attributed the fall to the efficacious will of God, as its first cause. We add one more passage. Explaining what Augustine means by *permission*, he says: "He certainly does not suppose God to remain an idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an intervention of actual *volition*, if I may be allowed the expression, which otherwise could never be considered as a *cause*." He also asserts that Augustine "excludes any contingency dependent on the human will." Now, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Calvin, adopting Augustine's views, attributes the event, permissively decreed, to an actual volition of God, as the primary cause, and to the will of man as a second cause; and that he makes the first cause independent of the second: in other words, he held a *determinist* view of the transaction. The same is unquestionably asserted in our standards. "Unchangeably foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," is an all-comprehending expression, that admits of no distinction between *existences* and *acts*. "The contingency of second causes is established," but they are true second causes still, and are due to the first.

But, at least, it must be conceded that the language of Calvin represents the fall as predetermined by the will of God, either through second causes in a succession, or directly, as the result of the divine volition. Dr. Girardeau must take his choice. Calvin was either a determinist of the type of Edwards, or a determinist of a still higher order. We believe that he, as well as the Confession, recognised second causes as the *media* through which

God *executes* his decrees. And if he *executes* his decrees, how can we understand him as barely permitting them?

What, then, are the second causes to which these authorities refer? Dr. Girardeau admits the universal validity of the law of causality. Volitions, then, are not exceptions, and were not so even in Adam. What, then, are the causes of specific volitions? What makes one *right* and another *wrong*? Surely not the will itself. This is the doctrine of the author. Adam's will was the cause of his sin—a doctrine that makes God its original author as inexorably as any other theory. For God's power was the cause of the will, and if the will of Adam was the cause of his sin, God must have been its author by Dr. Girardeau's own logic. But the term *will* is only a convenient name for a *power to will*. A power to act is not a cause of acting. When a man walks, we assign no cause for the act by saying he is able to walk. All men, in such cases, point to a motive as the cause. If the law of causation is granted, a *bad* volition must have a *bad* cause, and a *good* volition a *good* cause. The will cannot be good and bad at the same time. There must be successive changes in the causes to account for the changes of the result. But this is nothing but what we affirm of the soul itself—the indivisible unit of personality. It is this that passes from one state to another. Our brother, in the ardor of his pursuit, speaks of the will as if it were locally or anatomically distinct from the soul. He knows that it is a function of the *ego*, not an essence or an organ, and that the changes upon which specific volitions depend, are really changes of the soul. When, therefore, he admits a valid causation in volition, is it philosophical to contend that the will is its cause? Ought he not, in accurate language, to consent to our proposition, that the causes are to be found in the soul? The *ego* is the true seat of these causes. And as volitions are specific, the causes must be specific. When, in Adam's case, a wrong volition occurred, it was clearly due to a different cause from that which might have led to the opposite alternative. And this points directly to a change in the spiritual state of the soul itself—in other words, to an inevitable determinism. But this our author cannot tolerate. We complain that he *virtually* denies that

volitions are effects. His position is distinctly taken. He denies that the certainty of Adam's first sinful volition was due to God's decree, as its first cause, and that it was due to the state of the soul, as its second cause. God, in apprehending that certainty, perceived it as occurring without either kind of cause. He expresses himself thus: "*This causal efficiency in man has its seat precisely in the will.*" This locates it in a mere power of the soul, rather than the soul itself. "*Motives, therefore, are the final, the will is the efficient cause of voluntary acts.*" Here, the local seat, or, as he elsewhere denominates the will, the "organ" of volition, is represented as the efficient cause of its own exercises. His representation is, that the will is a sort of existing object, endowed with contrary choice, as the eye is the organ of vision. Of course, we do not understand him as speaking literally. But we do object to the suggestion, even the most remote, that a power of the soul may be the only efficient cause of its appropriate action. We insist that the will has no such existence, but is merely one of the soul's endowments. How can an object that has no substantive existence, but is, itself, an endowment of a substance, be gifted with a power distinct from itself? Only in the imagination. It is the soul that exercises volition, and it must be the soul that, according to his own theory soberly stated, is the only efficient cause of these specific acts. But this amounts to saying that an existing substance is the only efficient cause of the acts that spring from it. We recur, then, to the point, Can the soul be the only efficient cause of specific volitions? Causes answer the question, *Why?* Why, then, does a right volition manifest itself? Our author's reply should be, *The soul.* Why does a wrong volition occur? He should still answer, *The soul.* Is this logical, or not? He is too sagacious and profound to be directly guilty of such reasoning; and yet he has been unconsciously betrayed into it by his very ardor. It is evident that if the will or the soul was the cause of Adam's first sin, and God the cause of the soul, he was the cause of the cause, and, according to him, the author of the sin.

If we reason at all, we are compelled to seek specific causes in the changed condition of the soul—in other words, in the active

states of the subject. This is Determinism, and we see no escape from it. Dr. Girardeau positively denies that states of the soul are efficient second causes. The will, and the will alone, is the efficient cause. And thus the question, Why? gets no significant reply. When we ask why Adam chose to disobey, the only consistent answer is, *He willed it*. But this is another form for, *He chose it*. The answer thus becomes this, "He chose it, because he chose it." Choice is the sole function of the restricted will, or rather the will is simply the power of choice. The only answer possible is in its nature absurd. Dr. Girardeau admits the existence of motives in Adam's case, but they were *final*, not efficient causes. Are we not right, therefore, in maintaining that, *virtually*, he denies all efficient specific causation in the fall?

It seems to us that the difficulty that leads so decided a Calvinist to this strange position, is owing to his rejection of all distinction in the nature of efficient causes and necessities. Calvin himself makes such a distinction. He says: "What God decrees must *necessarily* come to pass, but not by an *absolute or natural necessity*." He illustrates it thus: there was no absolute or natural necessity that the bones of Christ should not be broken; yet, owing to the decree of God, the breaking of them was impossible. The Roman soldier had the natural ability to do it, but the decree prevented its exercise.

Whatever form we may give it, there is surely a difference between a predestined volition and a predestined physical occurrence. A physical effect implies entire passivity in the subject, but a volition implies a concurrent activity. The necessity that secures certainty in the one case must be different from that of the other. Let Dr. Girardeau come down to Calvin's position, that this involves an inscrutable mystery which human reason cannot solve. We have two facts: the certainty of the fall from eternity, the effect of God's decree, and the voluntary character of the transaction, implying a second cause in the soul of man. Shall we endeavor to reconcile these facts, rationally, by denying causal efficiency in both? Is it not wiser to let them stand in apparent conflict till the light of eternity shall remove the difficulty? These efforts are at the expense of both reason and

Scripture. To eliminate causal efficiency from the decree is to destroy the decree; and to eliminate it from the states of the soul is to destroy second causes.

This theory of a power of contrary choice in the will, is fatal to the law of causality. No necessity analogous to that of physical nature is supposed to govern voluntary acts. But we insist that the certainty of such events is the necessary consequence of a divine decree, and that the voluntary nature necessarily, yet freely, concurs with that decree. We have no right to limit the power of God by denying that he is able to constitute a creature whose free nature shall certainly work out a career which his own sovereign will has ordained. There is a difficulty in it which we have no ambition to explain. In reference to the efficient second cause, we differ from Dr. Girardeau *toto cælo*, when he locates it in the will alone. There is a secondary and subordinate causation in the person, but not in the single faculty of the will. This power in the personal unit—the *ego*—implies independence of every other person but God. There can be no independence of him. He cannot delegate his sovereignty to a creature. But in relation to other creatures, Adam was the author of his own destiny. Neither Satan nor Eve was the cause of his defection. But this by no means implies that his will was independent of himself, or of his associated faculties. The doctrine of a power of contrary choice in the will makes our faculty independent of all the rest. But a faculty is not the *residence* of power. It *is* power. It is unphilosophical to locate power anywhere but in the substance or unity of the soul. If the will were the seat of this alleged power, to the exclusion of other faculties, it might dispose of a man's destiny in spite of the dictates of thought and feeling. This we have shown to be a fatal *schism* in the indivisible soul. According to our author, the will of Adam had the power to concur or not with these dictates. He calls motives "final causes," and says: "*Without the final, the efficient would not produce; but it is the efficient, not the final, that produces.*" The reader knows that by the efficient he means the will. His language, therefore, signifies that without motives the will would not exercise volition; but it is the will, not the motive, that

causes the volition. We have shown that this is no cause at all. He here admits that no case of volition occurs without the presence of motives. The question is, *Can* volition occur without an adequate cause? And as the will is no cause, must not something else be the cause? If so, what other cause shall we assign but the motives themselves? Now, he claims for the will a power to do what it never actually does—that is, act against all motive. He says of Adam: “He had the power of *contrary choice*, as an attribute characteristic of his will, and by an exercise of that power, which might have been avoided, willed to sin.” Again: “His will, traversing the path of his holy dispositions and tendencies, so far as they were moved, was precisely the *organ* through which he determined himself in the commission of this first sin.” Here he recognises no sinful dispositions and tendencies as present, but represents the will of Adam as acting in opposition to the holy state of his mind and heart. The external motives which were present had produced no change in his spiritual frame. There were no internal or subjective motives inciting him to disobedience. His will acted in opposition to his holy dispositions, and overcame them. Where, then, was the cause? We cannot say a volition was the cause of the volition. But no other cause than will is even suggested.

Is Dr. Girardeau sure that there were no *unholy* dispositions at the moment in Adam's spiritual nature? If there were, the case is not one of a choice contrary to them. We argue that, unless the volition “traversed his holy dispositions,” *without a cause*, there were unholy thoughts and tendencies, present in the mind at the time, that were not traversed by it. This conclusion is unavoidable; and unless it can be shown that the influence of the latter was weaker than that of the former, it follows that the sinful volition was produced, if caused at all, by the sinful dispositions and tendencies. The dilemma is obvious. There is no escape. Either the subjective motives were the cause, or there was none.

If the holy dispositions were at the time stronger than the unholy, as some might suggest, the case is not changed. The will, without adequate cause, submitted to the minor influence,

and its volition was efficiently produced by nothing. The only conceivable efficient is a preponderating influence in the motives.

The question would not be a serious one, whether the missing link were in the will or in the soul, but for its theological consequences, which we have no space to discuss. If the highest reason teaches us that the first sin had its origin in the will, the argument from analogy must be applicable to the present state of man. The same reason will insist that all sin now has the same origin, and it follows, rationally, that we are not responsible for our sinful frames of mind, until they assume an overt form as volitions and actions.

Dr. Girardeau triumphantly appeals to Adam's case, as a demonstration of his theory on its face. But this is a presumption, and what he assumes is not susceptible of proof. The presumption is altogether against him, unless his appeal to *consciousness* is well taken. This appeal is peculiarly unfortunate. Sir Wm. Hamilton, with all his aversion to Dr. Girardeau's Calvinistic views, gives the matter up. He says a free volition is inconceivable. Dr. Girardeau, on the contrary, holds that, in non-spiritual actions, the will is always undetermined, even in fallen man, and that each of us is conscious of the fact. Hamilton appeals to our moral consciousness of *responsibility*, to show that our spiritual volitions must be free. But our author denies this, and insists that the will of man, now, is bound by his depraved nature. Yet he teaches that, in non-spiritual acts, men are conscious of this power of contrary choice in the will. Now we contend that this cannot be so. We insist that our conscious freedom extends to *all* our actions. A man is no more conscious of freedom in eating than in blasphemy. We are conscious, all the time, of acting in accordance with an apparent preponderance of motive, and the appeal to experience is directly against the theory under review. Dr. Girardeau admits that a choice contrary to apparent inducements is very unusual. But was an exception ever known among men? Did any one, except from a blind impulse, and irrationally, ever do freely what his head and heart opposed? Did any one ever, in the main, desire to do what his prevalent disposition at the time urged him not to do?

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If the power exists, it exists under various conditions. Suppose, then, that all the dictates of reason, and all the urgency of the disposition, combine to induce the adoption of one alternative, and yet, without motive, the man adopts the other. Under the theory, the case is possible. But we ask the reader, if that man would act as rationally as a dog in similar circumstances? It would be the act of a madman. The premises must be wrong that lead to such conclusions.

But the bare statement of the theory condemns it. It violates the law of causality almost in terms. That law requires an antecedent phenomenon for every occurrence. Now the first sinful volition of Adam, and every non-spiritual volition of our own, must be a phenomenon in time. Prof. Bowen, indeed, denies the phenomenal character of volitions, on the ground that they are not apparent to the senses. But this is a play upon words. A volition is as truly an historical event as an eclipse. If so, it must have some causative phenomenon preceding it. This must in turn, stand related to some antecedent phenomenon as its effect. Dr. Girardeau cannot controvert this, because, in attributing volition to the will as its cause, he recognises the distinction of the terms. But there is no *self* in will, and no *determination* except volition. A self-determination of the will, is simply a volition. Now here is the phenomenon of volition. Where is the antecedent phenomenon? There is none discoverable under the theory, and those writers are more consistent who confess that volitions are uncaused phenomena.

This difficulty was observed by our author, and he attempts to overcome it by teaching us that there are "regulative principles at the *root* of the will." But this axe, laid at the root of the tree, effectually cuts it down. For the regulative principles are not *in* the will, but *at* it. And regulative principles *exterior* of the will, if determinative of its volitions, land us in that very determinism against which we are warned.

If, however, we abandon these exterior regulative principles, and assign some such property to the will itself, we give that power a substantive existence. Otherwise no property can attach to it. The will has no *root*, and all that regulates it must be

found among the laws of our spiritual nature impressed upon the spiritual essence. They pertain to the substance of the soul, and cannot be distributed where there are no dimensions.

Where, then, is the causative antecedent of volition, under this theory? We have sought it in vain. Two opposite effects cannot proceed from the same antecedent. There must be changes in the subjective states of the soul, to account for changes of volition; and Adam's will did *not* traverse the path of perfectly holy dispositions and tendencies. Changes in these dispositions took place first, or else his choice was absolutely without a cause.

Our author interprets the "contingency of second causes," which the Confession declares is "established" by foreordination, as equivalent to *uncertainty*. He says "a contingent event is one which *may*, or *may not*, be produced by its appropriate cause." Now we positively deny, with Augustine and Calvin, any contingency in God's decrees dependent upon the will of man. The language of the standards clearly implies that the contingency is limited to "second causes," and does not extend to the "first cause." The operation of a second cause may be, to human apprehension, uncertain; but surely not to Omniscience. The permissive decree was not adopted with an *if* in it. This would make it depend upon the second cause, and thus reverse the order of causation. The decree did not establish the *uncertainty* of the fall to the divine intelligence. It is admitted that the event was not uncertain to God. The uncertainty, therefore, pertained to creatures alone. We understand the Confession to mean that some second causes are made to act by a natural or physical necessity, others freely, as the soul in volition, whose liberty is thus established. But all this is in the sphere of creation. It has no reference to the Creator. We cannot comprehend how anything can be contingent to *him*. The very definition of a second cause is that it is an effect of an antecedent phenomenon. The essential idea of a first cause, is, that it is independent of everything else. The will of God was not the *necessity*, or first cause, of all things, if its exercise depended upon the will of Adam. We admit the freedom of Adam in the fall, as unnecessary by any other created object, but we utterly reject the

notion that it was his will that played the sovereign part, whilst that of Deity was subordinate.

As we have shown, the phenomenon of Adam's volition was the effect of an antecedent phenomenon in the soul, and the latter also an effect. Every specific difference in the effect, was due to a specific difference in the cause. If this is denied, causation is denied. Yet it *is* denied, on the ground that it makes God the author of sin—the old Arminian argument. But specific causation is a dictum of our nature from which there is no appeal; and the objection is rationalistic in its tendency, because it rejects facts for the reason that they appear irreconcilable. How second causes may be free, and yet the effects of a first cause, may be ever so incomprehensible; but we have no right to sacrifice the law of causality in our efforts to reach a solution.

But what about Calvin's doctrine of the freedom of Adam's will? After what has been said, we might content ourselves with his consistency. Dr. Girardeau considers his numerous quotations conclusive against us. But it can be shown that he is mistaken. First, however, in reference to the language of our Confession, it may be stated that the cautionary clauses, concerning liberty and contingency, were introduced to forestall a rational inference from the principal doctrine there stated—the doctrine of foreordination. There was danger that the naked proposition might, without qualification, be abused to the extent of fatalism. We fear our brother has done that which it was the intention of the framers to prevent—only in an opposite direction. He has used the qualifying clause to overthrow the principal clause. We argue against him, that although “no violence is done to the will of the creatures, and the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away, but rather established,” yet God has, “from eternity, freely and *unchangeably* ordained whatsoever comes to pass.” If the fall came to pass, it was *unchangeably* ordained from eternity. Its certainty was in the decree. Nor can this phraseology, without torture, be reduced to a bare permission, which this authority explicitly condemns. The qualifying clause must, therefore, be interpreted so as not to invalidate free and unchangeable ordination.

We may assume, as historically true, that the terms here used were employed in the sense adopted by Calvin and his contemporaries. In what sense, therefore, did Calvin use *will*, *liberty*, *contingency*, and *second causes*? We confidently affirm, on the authority of our quotations, that, in his vocabulary, these terms could not mean anything inconsistent with his doctrine of the efficiency of the divine decrees. The *will*, for example, included far more than the simple faculty that produces action. As a matter of course, he could not use it with the precision of a modern metaphysician. But we have his own analysis of the mental faculties:

“Without perplexing ourselves with unnecessary questions, it should be sufficient for us to know that the understanding is, as it were, the governor and guide of the soul; that the will always respects its authority *in its desires*. . . . The primitive condition of man was ennobled with these eminent faculties; he possessed reason, understanding, prudence, and judgment. . . . To these was added choice to direct the appetites, and regulate all the organic motions; so that the will should be entirely conformed to the government of reason.” Bk. I., Ch. xv., Secs. 7, 8.

Here “desires” are classed with the will. Understanding and will are the two leaders under whose banners all the framers are marshalled, and each is a comprehensive term.

But the use of the other terms clearly determines the meaning he attaches to will. By “liberty” he undoubtedly means freedom from all control by creatures—not exemption from the determinative will of God. This has been demonstrated already. By “contingency” he means uncertainty in the human sphere of knowledge, and not in the divine. By “second causes” he means phenomena depending upon one another in succession. These facts appear from a careful observation of passages which have been cited. Now, in the light afforded by them, we cannot mistake his use of the word *will*. It is, according to him and the Confession, that power whose acts are second causes, the freedom of which is established. In other words, they are free in one sense and necessitated in another. A concurrent, but subordinate, activity in the will, distinguishes its volitions from all physical effects. Nevertheless, they are inscrutably connected with

the will of God, which is called the first cause, by a succession of free second causes.

We are not anxious to prove that Calvin was a determinist after the type of Edwards. Our aim has rather been to show that philosophical determinism does not add any intensity to his scope of God's decrees, as our brother would have us believe. Being resolved to confine ourselves within moderate limits, and leave to our opponent all the advantage of extensive discussion, we will be very brief in our remaining remarks. No writer can connect the fall with the express purpose of God in stronger language than that used in the Institutes. That connexion with the first cause must either be mediate, through second causes, or immediate, without them. The former is the scheme of Edwards. The latter, making the first sinful volition the effect of no second cause, refers it at once to the volition of God. This moves the determinism back, and merges it in simple predestination. The avowed aim of Edwards was to introduce free spiritual activity between the decree and the result, which would exclude force, and yet account for its certain fulfilment.

But who can assert that Calvin did not hold views similar to those of Edwards? Allowing for difference of language and method, their opinions seem to us almost the same. When Calvin speaks of the sin of Adam being unnecessitated and avoidable, he evidently speaks from a human stand-point; and surely we may admit that Adam might have stood, *if he would*, which is his most common expression. Edwards would have used the same. It is probable that the same condition is generally to be understood, when unexpressed. But it must be remembered, as we have shown, that he explains *necessity* and *ability* as consistent with freedom on the part of man and sovereignty on the part of God. According to him, there is a necessity that is different from that of physical nature, and there is an ability which is subject to the sovereign will of the Almighty. If we would understand him, it is necessary to bear these explanations in mind throughout his works. But whatever may be our opinion of his philosophical views of volition, one thing remains unquestionable: *If he was not a determinist, after the method of Edwards, he was*

a necessitarian, who made the first sinful volition of Adam depend immediately upon the will of God.

Before closing, let us add a few remarks upon a matter which has been too briefly considered. We refer to Dr. Girardeau's doctrine of *certainty*. It will be remembered that he denies the *objective* certainty of the fall from eternity, although he admits that it was *subjectively* certain in the foreknowledge of God. He insists that Adam possessed the power in his will, down to the moment of its exercise, of determining the event either way. We understand, then, that he believes that, if God's foreknowledge were *mediate*, he could not have foreknown the result. But if he foresaw the event as certain, there must have been some cause giving validity to the fact. We contend that assurance of futurity must have an objective certainty to correspond with it. If the fall was absolutely uncertain before its occurrence, the only object of foreknowledge was that of its uncertainty. God intuitively foresees the future just as it comes to pass. But the fall came to pass, *ex hypothesi*, as an event up to that moment uncertain. He could not foreknow it as a certainty, if it was determined by him as uncertain. Nothing appears to us more absurd than to represent the Almighty as positively foreseeing that which he himself has made in its nature uncertain.

According to our author, and directly contrary to Calvin, God had simply determined or decreed that the fall should be a possible event, but uncertain, unappointed, unfixed, unnecessitated, and absolutely avoidable. Yet he did not *know* it in this character at all. Is it credible?

His argument is founded upon the admitted intuition and immediate nature of God's knowledge. He infers that it is always a knowledge of the present—the past and future, as such, being excluded. But shall we imagine that he has no perception of space and time? We insist that these conditions of thought are better known to him than to us. His knowledge is comprehensive of all relations. It is a present knowledge, but not a mere knowledge of the present. He *does foreknow* the event before it occurs. If so, he foreknew the fall, not as then taking place, but as destined to occur. How, then, could he foreknow it as uncertain or contingent?

Dr. Girardeau answers the question himself. "What was contingent to Adam was certain to God."

Dr. Girardeau seems to us to have utterly invalidated the foreknowledge of God, however little he intended to do so. He says: "Considered in relation to its actual occurrence (the event), God's knowledge of it must, *to human thought*, be conceived as foreknowledge; and so the Scriptures employ the term. But considered as to its intrinsic nature, as an energy of the divine being, knowledge is neither before nor after events; it is neither prescience nor memory." We have no space to discuss so vast a subject, but simply observe that he makes this term of Scriptures a mere *adaptation* to our faculties. If so, we see no room for predestination, or decrees, or causation in the universe. An eternal *now* blots out all succession, and all phenomena are really simultaneous. The doctrine points us to the gulf of Nihilism.

Our own statement would be, that there are two distinct spheres, equally real. In the divine sphere uncertainty cannot be predicated. Contingency pertains to second causes. Deity knows no *ifs*. When he foreordained the fall, by a permissive decree, he did not simply determine to permit it, *if* about to occur; for such language must imply contingency in his decree. But it is contrary to our standards to impute contingency to any but second causes.

We readily concede that a permissive decree does not admit of the exercise of any force analogous to those of the material world. The expression was, no doubt, adopted for the very purpose of excluding such a supposition. But it must be apparent that it was not intended to imply the absence of a specific purpose on the part of the Almighty. It destroys the decree altogether, to make it conditional upon a foreseen certainty. It puts into the mouth of Deity a resolve to permit what he knows will occur, and thus renders a decree absolutely useless and irrational.

Our task is done, without any expectation of resuming it. Our aim has been to expose fallacy, not to detect heresy. We take leave of the subject with great respect and regard for the eminent minister whose writings have been examined.

JAMES A. WADDELL.

ARTICLE V.

FROUDE'S BUNYAN.

Bunyan. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE. Morley's Series of English Men of Letters. Harper & Brothers.

It is difficult to understand upon what principle Mr. Froude has become the biographer of Bunyan. If he solicited the work, he has exposed himself to the suspicion of an unworthy purpose, which we would be loth to attribute to him. If the Editor is responsible for his selection as biographer, then Mr. Morley has made a mistake not very creditable to him as a literary man, in assigning the task to the author of *Short Studies on Great Subjects*. From the very nature of the case, readers assume, without further inquiry, that a biographer is the friend of the person whose biography he undertakes to write, and that he will be inclined to exhibit in the strongest light what is excellent, and palliate, as far as possible, the errors which he must admit. Hardly would a Christian undertake to write the life of Mahomet, or a Calvinist edit the works of Swedenborg, unless with the avowed purpose of antagonism and refutation.

When an author takes for his subject the life and career of some historical character, it is ordinarily because he admires his deeds and is in sympathy with his principles of action. This is well illustrated by Mr. Froude, in the recent *Sketch of the Life of Julius Cæsar*. In the first Roman Emperor, Mr. Froude finds a man after his own heart. He does not attempt to disguise an unbounded admiration of his lofty ambition to make himself master of the tottering Republic, the comprehensive intellect that perceived clearly the actual opportunity before him, and the best means of seizing it, his dauntless audacity in moving forward to his object, the power with which he beat down every opponent, his merciless humiliation of the Senate and the aristocracy, and the magnificent selfishness with which he concentrated in his own hand all the existing force of arms, laws, and religion. He gazes with astonishment not unmingled with awe, at the majestic success of his hero, when prostration, wreck, and

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ruin seemed the destiny of all things else, and the inheritance of the times. Under such influences, he naturally underrates, if he does not purposely depreciate, Cæsar's great contemporaries, inferior in importance only to him—Pompey, Anthony, Cicero, Cato, Brutus, and others. So, too, he either positively denies or mitigates charges against Cæsar's character which have been accepted as true ever since the time of Suetonius. His ambition he resolves into a patriotic desire to save his country by appropriating it to himself. His open demagoguism he justifies as war against the corrupt aristocracy; his insensibility to the slaughter of a million of men, in order that his triumph might be secured, he regards as allowable in a great commander; his atheism he treats as the candor of advanced philosophy; and his sensuality he partly denies and partly pooh-poohs.

Now this may not be the best sort of biography, but it at least possesses the cardinal qualification which we may expect in every biographer—full sympathy with his subject. Even in excess this may be subjectively honest. But suppose that a writer professing to be an admirer of Gen. Washington, giving him due credit for his military achievements and for his successful civil administration in the inaugurating, under circumstances of much difficulty, a form of government novel and to be operated by untried machinery, should allow that the veneration felt for him by the whole people was unbounded, and has continued for almost a century unabated, and that he fully deserved it all, but should nevertheless assert that he was a mistaken enthusiast for liberty, was, as a rebel against a lawful government, morally wrong, and that though he was a wise and virtuous civil ruler, his influence as such has been hurtful to the best interests of mankind, inasmuch as it has given a false temporary prestige to a government founded on unsound principles, and destined to fail, and by its failure to fasten more firmly than ever the bonds of despotism on the necks of humanity—the incongruity between the biographer and his subject would be too shocking to be endured.

Now, had such a biography been written by one at heart an enemy of republican institutions, with the real though unavowed

purpose of thus advocating any other form of government, this would hardly be regarded by any fair-minded man as anything less than literary dishonesty. For the enemies of republican government might justly quote the book as substantially the forced concession of a republican, and the true friends and admirers of Washington would indignantly assail the work not only as untrue, but as unfair.

Or, to vary a little the illustration, should Mr. Morley undertake a series of the lives of eminent Americans, it would be an inexcusable blunder to request Jefferson Davis to write the life of President Lincoln, or Mr. Blaine that of Gen. Hampton.

We have thus indicated what to our mind is a fatal objection, *in limine*, to this biography of Bunyan by Mr. Froude. To show that we have not exaggerated its gravity, we quote the following just, and considering who writes them, remarkable, expressions of Mr. Froude himself, in the very book before us. He says (page 89): "No object can be pictured truly, except by a mind which has sympathy with it. . . . Every character, if justice is to be done to it, must be painted at its best as it appears to itself; and a man impressed deeply with religious convictions, is generally incapable of the sympathy which would give him an insight into what he disapproves and dislikes."

Certainly, the conditions being reversed, this is not less true of a man without deep religious convictions who undertakes the biography of Bunyan.

Let us now present some of the evidences of the utter want of sympathy on the part of Mr. Froude with the essential elements of the character of Bunyan, and the injustice necessarily thence resulting to the memory of the author of *Pilgrim's Progress*.

Bunyan's history and his religious character—and his character is much more important than his history—has been given to the world by a number of competent admirers. But no portrait of him can compare in fidelity, vividness, and interest, with that which, all unconsciously, he has himself drawn in his own artless, genuine, inimitable style, in his Autobiography, under the title, "*Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*." We quote here from one of the most truly appreciative of the notices of

Bunyan that have fallen into our hands. We quote the more freely, inasmuch as the article in question was published nearly fifty years ago, and therefore it is to be presumed that the extracts given will be new to most of the readers of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW :

"Bunyan, more than others, was a mind from the people. He worked his way out of the ignorance and vice by which he was surrounded, against much opposition and with scarcely the slightest aid from any of his fellow-creatures. His genius possessed a faith dictated by his piety, and one that no other being in the world ever possessed before him. The light that first broke through his darkness was from heaven. It found him, even that being who wrote the *Pilgrim's Progress*, coarse, profane, boisterous, and almost brutal. It shone before him, and with a single eye he followed it till his native city of Destruction could no longer be seen in the distance, till his moral deformities fell from him, and his garments became purity and light. The Spirit of God was his teacher; the very discipline of his intellect was a spiritual discipline. The conflicts that his soul sustained with the powers of darkness, were the very sources of his intellectual strength. . . . Never was the inward life of any being depicted with more vehement and burning language [than Bunyan's in his *Autobiography*.] It is an intensely vivid description of the workings of a mind of the keenest sensibility and most fervid imagination, convinced of guilt and fully awake to all the dread realities of eternity. . . . Bunyan's features of character were naturally strong and good, so far as unperverted. Yet if he had not been turned toward heaven, he was likely to make a man of great wickedness. Had he been pursuing his humble occupation when Matthew, Peter, and John were upon earth, his was a character of such native elements that he might perhaps have been chosen as one of their associates in the work of the primitive gospel ministry. Our Saviour committed his gospel to unlettered, but not to ignorant, men; and Bunyan, though illiterate, was not ignorant. No man is so who believes with his heart in him who was the Light of the world, beholds spiritual realities, and acts with reference to them."*

The last two lines of the above quotation may be taken as a brief summary of Bunyan's religious character. He beheld with distinct vision spiritualities, and acted with constant reference to them. It may be added that this realising knowledge of spiritual things was gained solely from the Scriptures. His theology was not a systematic creed, accepted from any Church or any teacher; but the form of belief revealed in Scripture and verified in his

* *North American Review*, April, 1833.

personal experience. And yet it is, essentially, just what has been formulated into their Confessions of Faith by all the evangelical Churches since the Reformation: that man is fallen, and exposed to the just indignation of God, because of sin, and in peril of his soul forever; that salvation has been provided and is freely offered through the atonement of a divine Saviour; that believers are justified by faith, and their sins forgiven; that the Holy Spirit regenerates, enlightens, sanctifies, guides, and comforts; that God's providence is over us and near to us; that believers are, after death, completely blessed; that the finally impenitent are everlastingly punished; that the Scriptures are the revealed word of God; that prayer is effectual in all the aspects of spiritual life. These and their associated doctrines are the great truths that form the staple of his Autobiography, and the same upon which rolls his immortal Allegory.

All this is familiar to every one who knows anything about Bunyan and the most popular religious book in the English language, which, together with his other writings, has, as Mr. Froude affirms, affected the spiritual opinions of the English race in every part of the world, more powerfully than any book or books except the Bible. We have introduced it only to signalise the incongruous relation between Mr. Froude and the subject of his life—a relation insufficiently expressed by the weak, negative phrase, “want of sympathy.”

Mr. Froude we believe does not call himself a Christian, and certainly we have no disposition to stigmatise him as an unbeliever. This much, however, his book allows us to say about himself: he not only does not believe, but distinctly rejects, denies, and with undissembled sneer, flouts at the cardinal doctrines of Bunyan's faith and the affirmed facts of his experience. This shall be exhibited presently, in some special particulars; but for a brief, general view of the attitude which he assumes towards Bunyan's Christianity, let the following paragraph be taken. He thus states imperfectly, and therefore unfairly, Bunyan's creed:

“Bunyan had come to realise what was meant by salvation in Christ, according to the received creed of the contemporary Protestant world.

The intensity of his emotions arose only from the completeness with which he believed it. Man had sinned, and by sin was made a servant of the devil. His redemption was a personal act of the Saviour's toward each individual sinner. In the Atonement, Christ had before him each separate person whom he designed to save, blotting out his offences however heinous they might be, and recording in place of them his own perfect obedience. Each reconciled sinner, in return, regarded Christ's sufferings as undergone immediately for himself, and gratitude for that great deliverance, enabled and obliged him to devote his strength and soul thenceforward to God's service. In the seventeenth century, all earnest English Protestants held this belief. In the nineteenth century, most of us repeat the phrases of this belief and pretend to hold it. We think we hold it. We are growing more cautious, perhaps, with our definitions. We suspect that there may be mysteries in God's nature and methods which we cannot fully explain. The outlines of 'the scheme of salvation' are growing indistinct and we see it through a gathering mist." (Page 49.)

Such is a statement of Bunyan's religious faith, given in a tone indicating that the writer considers it a superstition, or at best an ignorant error. It is added, irrelevantly, so far as Bunyan is concerned, and recklessly, as a matter of fact, that only a small portion at present, of those who call themselves Christians, sincerely receive it; the major part only "pretend to hold it." Then follows what may be taken as an uncalled-for setting forth, in a way as positive as the subject allows, of Mr. Froude's own vague theology:

"Yet the essence of it will remain true, whether we recognise it or not. While man remains man, he will do things which he ought not to do. He will leave undone things which he ought to do. To will may be present with him, but how to perform what he wills, he will never fully know; and he will still hate 'the body of death' which he feels clinging to him. He will try to do better: when he falls, he will struggle to his feet again. He will climb and climb on the hill-side, though he never reaches the top, and knows that he never can reach it. His life will be a failure, which he will not dare to offer as a fit account of himself, or as worthy a serious regard. Yet he will still hope that he will not be wholly cast away, when, after his sleep in death, he wakes again."

Now we do not feel at liberty to call Mr. Froude an infidel, a rationalist, or an agnostic; but we do feel warranted in maintaining that a creed which does not recognise Christ is not *Christian*. Nor will we argue the question: Which is to be preferred—

the theology of "all earnest Protestants of the seventeenth century," or this platform of Mr. Froude's, in the nineteenth century? Much less are we disposed to find fault with any writer for expressing in a proper place and manner any views he may conscientiously hold. But we must be allowed to give utterance to an unbounded astonishment, that Mr. Morley, or Mr. Froude himself, should ever have thought that holding such opinions, he had any call to write the life of Bunyan, who was nothing if not a Christian, and who owes all that he accomplished, and all the fame he enjoyed during his life, and that has crowned his memory for two hundred years, solely to the precise fact, that he was a Christian holding the same form of faith with "all the earnest Protestants of the seventeenth century."

Mr. Froude may have honestly undertaken and finished this work unconscious of the incongruity of his relation to it—so obtuse sometimes, as to itself, may be an intellect otherwise of remarkable perspicacity. But if, entertaining hostility to the faith of Bunyan, he has purposely assumed the mask of his biographer, in order to assail it the more effectually, a charge more serious than that of literary dishonesty would lie against him.

The general statement of his religious *status*, presented by Mr. Froude in the quotation given above, is so often repeated by him with variations in different passages of his work—in fact so pervades it—that to exhibit it to the continuous view of the reader seems to be a leading object of the biographer. This is especially noticeable in the tedious, and to those acquainted with Bunyan, superfluous account given of *The Holy War*, mainly as one would judge, to reach the following incisive criticism directed against the Allegory, not so much as a work of art, as containing an unanswerable objection to the Christian system: "Here lies the real weakness of *The Holy War*. It may be looked at, either as the war in the soul of each sinner that is saved, or as the war for the deliverance of humanity. Under the first aspect, it leaves out of sight the large majority of mankind who are not supposed to be saved, and out of whom, therefore, Diabolus is not driven at all. Under the other aspect the struggle is still

unfinished: the last act of the drama has still to be played, and we know not what the conclusion is to be." And he quotes, with apparent relish, "the old dilemma which neither intellect nor imagination has ever dealt with successfully—*Deus aut non vult tollere mala, aut nequit. Si non vult, non est bonus; si nequit, non est omnipotens.*"

In introducing the *Pilgrim's Progress*, which as a work of artless art he admires, he thus enters his *caveat* against the acceptance of its spiritual significance: "In the midst of changing circumstances, the central question remains the same, What am I? What is this world in which I appear and disappear like a bubble? Who made me? And what am I to do? Some answer or other the mind of man demands and insists on receiving. Theologian or poet offers, at long intervals, explanations which are accepted as credible for a time. They wear out, and another follows, and then another. Bunyan's answer has served average English men and women for two hundred years; but no human being with Bunyan's intellect and Bunyan's sincerity can again use similar language." Why say, "Bunyan's answer"? Why not say plainly what is meant—*Christianity can no longer be accepted by men of average intelligence!* that it is worn out and is waning, to give place to some other form of religion! Not even Mr. Froude himself has ever questioned that Bunyan's religion is Christianity, as revealed in the Scriptures. But the Bible is not accepted by Mr. Froude as a revelation. He speaks of it as a book which theologians "call the word of God," and which, in the time of Bunyan, "was regarded by the best instructed men in England as an authentic communication from God."

"Prayer," he says, "in the eye of reason, is an impertinence." "The wrath of God" he declares to be "an expression out of place when we are brought into the presence of metaphysical law. Wrath corresponds to free will misused. It is senseless and extravagant when pronounced against actions which men cannot help, when the faulty action is the necessary consequence of their nature, and the penalty the necessary consequence of their action." And in another passage: "It might have been

thought that since man was born so weak, that it was impossible for him to do what the law required, consideration would be had for his infirmity; that it was even dangerous to attribute to the Almighty a character so arbitrary as that he would exact an account from his creatures which the creature's necessary inadequacy rendered him incapable of meeting."

Speaking of Bunyan's struggle to know what faith was, and his temptation presumptuously to test whether he had it, after quoting his words—"thus was I tossed between the devil and my own ignorance, and so perplexed, sometimes, that I knew not what to do"—Mr. Froude says: "Common sense will callth is disease, and will think impatiently that the young tinker would have done better to attend to his business."

Conviction of sin, the foundation fact of Bunyan's religious life, and the staple of *Pilgrim's Progress*, which is but the allegory of the religious experience of its author, Mr. Froude treats as a fanaticism, or at best, a superstitious phase of thought which prevailed among serious men in England in the seventeenth century. He gives his own vague rationalistic explanation of the state of mind so denominated, and his contemptuous feeling for this and like supernaturalisms, is manifest in the coarse sneer: "Election, conversion, day of grace, coming to Christ, have been pawed and fingered by unctuous hands for now two hundred years. The bloom is gone from the flower."

It is not creditable to a writer utterly to misunderstand the subject he is writing about; to gratuitously insult the religious sensibilities of his readers, is an offence which does not originate from ignorance.

We have exemplified amply, but by no means exhaustively, what it is the main object of this article to set forth—the entire unsuitableness of Mr. Froude for the work he has undertaken. He has himself supplied us with a concise summary of what we have said. Speaking of a certain class of persons, he says: "Any passionate agitation about the state of their souls, they consider unreal and affected. Such men may be amiable in private life, good neighbors and useful citizens, but be their talents what they may, they could not write a *Pilgrim's Progress*, or

ever reach the Delectable Mountains, or even be conscious that such mountains exist." It is obvious to add: nor could they fairly write the life of Bunyan.

The same deficiency that distinguishes Mr. Froude as a biographer, impairs his critical estimate of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. The writer, from whom we have already quoted, furnishes us with an illustration so beautiful that we cannot refrain from giving his words:

"A reader who has never felt that he is a stranger and pilgrim in a world of temptations and snares, can see but half the beauty of such poetry as fills this work, because it cannot make its appeal to his own experience; for him there is nothing within that tells, more certainly than any process of judgment or criticism, the truth and sweetness of the picture; there is no reflexion of its images, nor interpretation of its meaning in its own soul. The Christian—the actual *Pilgrim*—reads it with another eye. It comes to his heart. It is like a painting meant to be seen by fire-light; the common reader sees it by day. To the Christian it is a glorious transparency, and the light that shines through it and gives its incidents such life, its colors such depth, and the whole scene such a surpassing splendor, is light from Eternity, the meaning of Heaven."*

As an exemplification of the unavoidable limitation of Mr. Froude's critical faculty, when applied to writings of a spiritual nature, we may observe that he has failed to notice the concluding sentence (really the concluding one, though a superfluous paragraph in the nature of a postscript is added) of Bunyan's vision, which for simplicity, naturalness, comprehensive completeness, and immediate effect upon the mind and heart of the reader, has no parallel in the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, or *Æneid*. Possibly in a reversed aspect, some of its coloring is seen in Milton's last lines:

"They, hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way."

How, then, could he fail to notice the conclusion of Bunyan's vision? He has called attention to the picturesqueness and vividness of the opening words: "As I walked through the wilderness of this world, I lighted on a certain place where there was a den, and I laid me down in that place to sleep, and as I slept I

* *North American Review*, April, 1833.

dreamed a dream, and, behold, I saw a man, a man clothed in rags, standing with his face from his own home, with a book in his hand and a great burden upon his back."

How could Mr. Froude miss the beauty of this conclusion? "Now, just as the gates were opened to let in the men, I looked in after them, and behold the city shone like the sun; the streets also were paved with gold, and in them walked many men with crowns on their heads, palms in their hands, and golden harps to sing praises withal. There were also of them that had wings, and they answered one another without intermission, 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord!' And after that, they shut up the gates; *which, when I had seen, I wished myself among them!*"

And this Mr. Froude has missed simply because he never had any spiritual discernment of the meaning of these symbols. He had never comprehended what manner of men true Christians are, and had never wished to be "among them," either here or hereafter. He had written the life of Bunyan without understanding the man, and had commented upon his immortal volume without being able to take in its one sole purport.

The dogmatism of Mr. Froude's manner is as irritating to his readers who differ from him, as the perpetual obtrusion of his peculiar religious views is painful to the Christian. The lofty air of superiority constantly assumed by him toward Bunyan, though unjustifiable and in very bad taste, may be passed by. He speaks of him in one place as "a poor uneducated village lad bravely struggling in the theological spider's web." Certainly, Bunyan was not highly cultured, and Mr. Froude is, and has written several books more or less important, with a success variously estimated. Bunyan, too, wrote many books upon subjects confessedly the most momentous that can engage the mind of man; among them, notably, the *Pilgrim's Progress*, which, by the consent of all, Mr. Froude included, takes its undisputed place among the noblest productions of human genius, and has exercised an influence which cannot be claimed for the writings of men with whom Mr. Froude would not, of course, compare himself.

But how shall we tolerate a writer who speaks thus absolutely

about the three great systems of Christianity (the threefold division is Mr. Froude's own), the Catholic, the Protestant, and the Church of England?

"Catholic Theology, as a system, is a development of Platonism. The Platonists had discovered that the seat of moral evil was material substance. . . . Catholic Theology accepted the position and formulated an escape from it. The flesh of man was incurably vitiated, and if he was to be saved, a new body must be prepared for him. This Christ had done. . . . The natural body was not at once destroyed, but a new element was introduced into it, by the power of which, assisted by penance and mortification and the spiritual food of the Eucharist, the grosser qualities were gradually subdued and the corporal system was changed"—with more of the like sort.

"Luther spoke, and over half the Western World, the Catholic Church collapsed, and a new theory of Christianity had to be constructed out of it."

Then, after giving his view of the Protestant Theology, with astonishing comments of his own, he proceeds:

"This was the Puritan belief in England in the seventeenth century. The reason starts at it, but all religion is paradoxical to reason. . . . This belief or the affectation of this belief, continues to be professed, but without a realisation of its tremendous meaning. . . . The form of words is repeated by multitudes who do not care to think what they are saying."

Of the Church of England he speaks contemptuously:

"The Church of England is a compromise between the old Theology and the new. The Bishops have the Apostolical Succession, but many of them disbelieve that they derive any virtue from it. The clergyman is either a priest who can absolve men from sins, or he is a minister as in other Protestant communions. The sacraments are either means of grace, or mere outward signs. A Christian is either saved by baptism, or saved by faith, as he pleases to believe. In either case he may be a preacher of the Church of England. . . . To a man of fervid temperament, suddenly convinced of sin, incapable of being satisfied with ambiguous answers to questions which mean life or death to him, the Church of England has little to say."

But enough. We have not attempted any refutation of the errors of Mr. Froude. What need? Though uttered in the supercilious tone of modern sceptical scientism, the objections against our faith are essentially the same that have been again and again brought forward, and again and again replied to. But what Christian heart would not be filled with something deeper than sadness, if Mr. Froude's estimate of Bunyan and his Book could

by possibility be true? If rudely disillusionised, we must henceforth regard as a deluded enthusiast him who for nearly two centuries the universal Church has prized as the best interpreter between the word of God and the human heart in its spiritual experiences! And if so, we must henceforth treat the Book which has furnished us with food, next to the heavenly manna, the sweetest, as not only in form a dream, but in fact a baseless vision! And yet, what is a man, however admired, and what is a book, however precious, in comparison with our Faith? If Bunyan was deluded, we have no Christ! If *Pilgrim's Progress* is no more than Mr. Froude represents it, we have no Bible!

All this, thank God, being impossible, how shall we restrain our indignation in reading a work which, under the specious guise of a biography, disseminates errors so pernicious?

The one great event in Bunyan's life, outwardly uneventful, was his imprisonment in Bedford gaol, originally because of his religion, and continued for twelve years because he refused to bind himself not to preach the truth that he believed. The magnitude of this event Mr. Froude curtails, because he is unable to appreciate the heroic principle which dignifies it into martyrdom.

In conclusion, we would observe, that we are not ignorant that Mr. Froude in some earlier writings (collected into a volume under the title, *Short Studies on Great Subjects*) has set forth like views upon religion. He does not, however, there exhibit his antagonism to evangelical theology either so completely or so arrogantly. The general tone, nevertheless, is the same; and we are sorry to add, that instances are to be found of similar misrepresentation so astonishing that we are compelled to attribute them either to ignorance or disingenuousness. To present but one instance—having related the almost fatal austerities practised by Luther under an overwhelming sense of his own wretchedness and sinfulness, he gives us the following paragraph as the only account of the means by which he obtained relief:

“Staupitz the prior listened to his accusations of himself in confession. ‘My good fellow,’ he said, ‘don't be so uneasy. You have committed no sin of the least consequence. You have not killed anybody, or committed adultery, or things of that sort. If you sin to some purpose, it is right that you should think about it; but don't make mountains out of trifles!’”

If the statements of the most eminent authors be received, these were not the effectual words of comfort used by the good confessor, nor was Luther the man to accept them as sufficient.

Again is it possible that Mr. Froude does not perceive the utter insufficiency, not to say manifest perversion, of the following account given by him of the doctrine of Justification by Faith as propounded by Luther and accepted by his contemporaries. The sneer at modern Theology we may allow to pass—it is part of Mr. Froude's manner, to which, by this time, we have become accustomed. He says :

“The peculiar doctrine which has passed into Europe under Luther's name is known as Justification by Faith. Banded about as a watchword of party, it has by this time hardened into a formula and has become barren as the soil of a trodden footpath. As originally proclaimed by Luther, it contained the deepest of moral truths . . . a perpetual struggle; forever to be falling, yet to rise again, and stumble forward with eyes turned to heaven; this was the best which would ever come of man. It was accepted in its imperfection by the infinite grace of God, who pities mortal weakness, and accepts the intention for the deed; who, when there is a sincere desire to serve him, overlooks the shortcomings of infirmity.

. . . It was this doctrine—it was this truth, rather (the word doctrine reminds one of quack medicine) which, quickening in Luther's mind, gave Europe its new life.”

Justification by Faith is, indeed, a life-giving truth and doctrine; but it never would have been such, were it what Mr. Froude understands, or at least describes it as being.

J. T. L. PRESTON.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PARABLE OF THE TARES IN THE FIELD.

The interpretation of the parable of the tares in the field, and the closely allied one of the draw-net, has been the subject of more controversy in the Church than any other of our Lord's parables. "It was a special battle ground," says Drummond, "in the controversy which raged between the Donatists and Augustine"; and Trench writes, respecting the words—"the field is the world"—"words few and slight, and seemingly of little import, a great battle has been fought over them; greater perhaps than over any single phrase in the Scriptures, if we except the consecrating words at the Holy Eucharist;" and adds, "these disputes, though seemingly gone by, yet are not in fact out of date, since in one shape or another they continually reappear in the progress of the Church's development, and in every heart of man"; and all this will appear the more strange when we call to mind the fact that this is one of the few parables of which our Lord himself has given us an explicit exposition.

The great difficulty in the interpretation of this parable arises out of the seeming prohibition of church discipline contained in the words, "The servants said unto him, Wilt thou that we go and gather them" (the tares after their true character had become evident by their fruit) "up? But he said, Nay, lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest; and in the time of harvest"—which our Lord afterwards defines by "the end of the world"—"I will say to the reapers (the angels, verse 41) gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn"; and the corresponding declaration in the parable of the draw-net. How are such declarations as these to be made to harmonise with the authority given to the Church of "binding and loosing" (see Matt. xviii. 15-18), and "trying the spirits whether they are of God" (see 1 John iv. 1), and the duty enjoined upon the Church of exercising this

authority? It is around this point that the difficulties of interpretation gather.

That the reader may see more distinctly the nature of these difficulties, we will ask his attention to the different ways in which different writers have attempted to remove them.

"The Romish expositors, and those who in earlier times wrote in the interest of Rome, in the words, '*lest ye root up the wheat with them,*' find a loop-hole whereby they may escape the prohibition itself. Thus, Aquinas says, the prohibition is only binding, when there exists this danger of plucking up the wheat together with the tares; and Maldonatus, that in each particular case the householder is to judge whether there be such danger or no. The Pope, he adds, is now the representative of the householder, and to him the question is to be put, '*Wilt thou that we go and gather up the tares?*' And he concludes his exposition with an exhortation to all Catholic princes, that they imitate the zeal of these servants, and rather, like them, have need to have their eagerness restrained than to require to be urged on to the task of rooting out heresies and heretics." (*Trench on the Parables*, pp. 84, 85.)

This exposition every Protestant will at once reject, if on no other ground, on this, that it places the crown which belongs to Christ alone, upon the head of the Pope; and authorises him to do through the agency of a "bloody Mary" or an ignorant bigot such as Philip of Spain, a work which Christ will intrust to none but the "holy angels."

In his exposition of this parable, Drummond writes:

"The householder in possession of the good field in which he has sowed good seed has his farm servants. When these are first introduced they are merely asking a question—they are not actually engaged in farm work, and so they are only called *servants*. At the close of the parable, however, they are engaged in field work; and so they are called '*the reapers*.' They are obviously the same parties as are spoken of at first, but are now named '*the reapers*' from the employment in which they appear at last engaged. And as our Lord says '*the reapers are the angels,*' we cannot come with propriety to any other conclusion than that these '*servants of the householder*' are *angels* too. This double reference, indeed, to these beings in the parable, is in exact accordance with what Scripture says regarding them. They are, on the one hand, '*ministers* (or *servants*) of God who do his pleasure'—that is their general designation. They are likewise '*a flame of fire*'—that is their particular designation when they are specially sent forth by him to execute his wrath. The '*servants of the householder*' were made the '*reapers*.' The angelic ministers are made '*a flame of fire*.'

“It is no matter of surprise, when such an interpretation of the ‘servants’ in the parable is given, that it should be followed up by certain views of other parts very cognate to it. Thus, it has been said, that the field is the visible Church; and that the coming of *the servants* to the householder is the surprise and anxiety which ministers of that Church feel when they behold such noxious things as they are compelled to do, growing up within the outward fold, as show plainly that they came from the evil one. Moreover, it is added, that when the servants ask, ‘*Will thou, then, that we go and gather them up?*’ this is the language of those who have authority to exercise discipline in the Church of Christ, and who, if left to themselves, would with unsparing and probably indiscriminate zeal, seek to cast out, or, in other words, excommunicate from the fold all that offends.

“It is hardly possible to conceive anything more alien to the whole bearing of the parable than these matters. ‘*The field*’ is not the visible Church. Our Lord expressly says it is ‘*the world*’; and yet, with this clear and emphatic statement, so entirely irreconcilable with the view just referred to, many fanciful theories have been propounded as deducible from this parable about the extent and limitation of church-discipline, and so forth. This parable, indeed, was a special battle-ground in the early history of the Church, and is frequently introduced in the controversy which raged between the Donatists and Augustine, who opposed them on the orthodox side. That controversy was very similar to some modern ones—whether it is or is not the duty of the members of the visible Church to exclude every one from their communion who does not bring forth the fruits of righteousness? The Donatists said it was; Augustine said it was not. The latter adduced this parable in support of his views. The former evaded the force of it by affirming what is in itself true, that the field is ‘*the world*,’ not the Church. But the truth is, the parable does not help either side. It does, indeed, indirectly prove the Donatists to have been in error, because it sets forth the state of the Christian Church during the whole of this dispensation as mingled wheat and tares; but it says not a word about the discipline, more or less, which may or ought to be used in order to purify the visible Church from corrupt membership, or whether all such discipline should, indeed, be let alone. It is the attempt to make the ‘servants’ in the parable ministers of the Church on earth which has introduced such confusion into the explanation, and brought in matters entirely irrelevant to the figure employed.” (*Drummond on the Parables*, pp. 374–376.)

On the two points which Drummond makes, viz., (1) That *the field* is the world and not the Church, and (2) That *the servants* in the first part of the parable are the same with *the reapers* in the latter part, *i. e.*, *the angels*, we remark—

Drummond himself cannot carry out consistently the idea that "*the field is the world, not the Church,*" *i. e.*, the world as contradistinguished from the Church—for in the very same paragraph in which he writes, "The field is not the visible Church . . . it is the world," he writes, the parable "does, indeed, prove the Donatists to have been in error, because it sets forth the state of Christ's Church during the whole of this dispensation as mingled wheat and tares." How, we ask, can a field of mingled wheat and tares, which represents the world and not the visible Church, set forth the condition of Christ's Church during the whole of this dispensation, or during any other period of time? And again, if the field is the world as contradistinguished from the Church, what shall we say of the draw-net? Does that represent the world also? If so, then the only truth taught in these two parables is that the world shall continue to embrace the evil along with the good through this present dispensation—a truth, indeed, but not the truth intended to be set forth in these parables.

On his second point, that *the servants* and *the reapers* are the same, *viz.*, *the angels*, we remark, if this interpretation be admitted, then the great lesson of the parable is, that God's permission of the existence of the evil mingled with the good in this world, is something so strange that it provokes surprise, if not dissatisfaction among the angels; as implied in their proposal to go and gather up the tares: and it involves the inconsistency, that they who at one time cannot be trusted "to gather up the tares lest they root up the wheat with them," are the very ones who are afterwards sent forth to do this very thing.

As an example of the exposition of this parable adopted by the older Protestant commentators, we give that of Pool:

"The design that Christ had in this parable was to show them, that though he laid a good foundation of a Church in the world, calling some home to himself, and making them partakers of his effectual grace, laying the foundation of his gospel Church in such as took his yoke upon them; yet in process of time, while those that should succeed him in the ministry slept (not being as diligent and watchful as they ought to be), the devil (who is full of envy and malice to men's souls, and is continually going about seeking whom he may devour) would sow erroneous opinions, and find a party, even in the bosom of the Church, who would

hearken to him, and through their lusts comply with his temptations, both to errors in doctrine and errors in practice; and it was his will that there should be in his visible Church a mixture of good and bad, such bad ones especially as men could not purge out without a danger of putting out such as were true and sincere; but there would be a time in the end of the world, when he would come with his fan, and thoroughly purge his floor, and take to heaven all true and sincere souls, but turn all hypocrites into hell." In his exposition "our Saviour saith nothing to that part of the parable where the tares are said to be sown *while men slept*; that was plain and intelligible enough. The devil hath a power to seduce, persuade, and allure, none to force. If particular persons kept their watch, as they might, the devil could not by his temptation force them. If magistrates and ministers kept their watches according to God's prescription, there could not be so much open wickedness in the world as there is. Neither does our Saviour give us any particular explication of that part of the parable, verses 28, 29, where the servants say to the master, '*Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? And he said unto them, Nay, lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them.*' The Saviour by this teaches us, that every passage in a parable is not to be fitted by something in the explication. It was not the point that he designed in this parable to instruct them in, how far church officers might or ought to act in purging the Church; but only, 1. That in the visible Church they must expect a mixture, till the day of judgment. 2. That in that day he would make a perfect separation. So as those that would from this passage in the parable conclude, that all erroneous and loose persons ought to be tolerated in the Church till the day of judgment, forget the common rule in divinity, that parabolic divinity is not argumentative." (*Pool's Annotations, in loc.*)

Here. Pool, admitting that the field of mingled wheat and tares of this parable, like the draw-net of the other, represents the visible Church, seeks to get rid of this apparent prohibition of church discipline: (1) By understanding the fact that our Lord in his exposition of the parable takes no special notice of verses 28, 29, "The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them," to imply that these verses are not to be regarded as a significant part of the parable; that they form "a passage in the parable which is not to be fitted by something in the explication." And yet, with a strange inconsistency, he makes the words, "But while men slept," confessedly treated by our Lord in the same way, signifi-

cant; and on the strength of this significance, traces the state of things in the Church, represented by the growing together of the tares and the wheat, to unfaithfulness on the part of the officers of the Church—forgetting that under the perfect ministry of our Lord himself this state of things existed: there was a Judas among the twelve apostles. And (2) by making the words, “Nay, lest while ye gather up the tares ye root up also the wheat with them,” simply a limitation upon the extent of discipline; and not, as they evidently are, a reason given for prohibiting altogether the separation which the servants had proposed to make—for letting “both grow together until the harvest.”

Of recent Protestant expositions of this parable, that of Trench is the most carefully prepared we have seen. On the words, “*But while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares.*” he writes:

“Many suppose that these words indicate negligence and lack of watchfulness on the part of rulers in the Church, whereby ungodly men creep in unawares, introducing errors in doctrine and in practice. But seeing that it is thus indefinitely put, and the servants who should have watched, if any should have done so, are first designated at a later stage of the history, and then without anything to mark a past omission on their part, it would seem that the men who slept are not such as should have done otherwise, but the phrase is equivalent to *at night*, and means nothing further (Job xxiii. 15). This enemy seized his opportunity, when all eyes were closed in sleep, and wrought the secret mischief upon which he was intent, and having wrought it undetected, withdrew.”

On verses 28, 29, he writes:

“No doubt in the further question, ‘*Will thou then that we go and gather them up?*’ the temptation to use outward power for the suppression of error, a temptation which the Church itself has sometimes found it difficult to resist, finds its voice and utterance. But they were unfit to be trusted here. Their zeal was but an Elias zeal at the best (Luke ix. 54). They who thus speak have often no better than a Jehu’s zeal for the Lord. And therefore he said ‘Nay.’ By this prohibition are doubtless forbidden all such measures for the excision of heretics and other offenders as shall leave them no possibility for after repentance or amendment; indeed the prohibition is so clear, so express, so plain, that whenever we meet in Church history with something that looks like the carrying into execution this proposal of the servants, we may suspect, as Bengel says, that it is not wheat making war on tares, but tares seeking to root

out wheat. The reason of the prohibition is given: '*Lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them.*' This might be, either by rooting up what were now tares, but hereafter should become wheat—children of the wicked one, who, by faith and repentance, should become children of the kingdom; or it might happen through the mistake of the servants, who, with the best intentions, should fail to distinguish between these and those, leaving the tares and uprooting the wheat. It is only the Lord himself, the Searcher of hearts, who with absolute certainty 'knoweth them that are his.'"

And in another place Trench adds:

"There are some, in fear lest arguments should be drawn from this parable to the prejudice of attempts to revive stricter discipline in the Church, have sought to escape the cogency of the arguments drawn from it, observing that in our Lord's explanation no notice is taken of the proposal made by the servants (verse 28), nor yet of the householder's reply to this proposal (verse 29). They argue, therefore, that this parable is not instructive of what the conduct of the servants of a heavenly Lord ought to be, but merely prophetic of what generally will be the case in the Church—that this offer of the servants is merely brought in to afford an opportunity for the master's reply, and that the latter is the only significant portion. But it is clear that when Christ asserts that it is his purpose to make a complete and solemn separation at the end, he implicitly forbids, not the exercise, in the meantime, of a godly discipline, not, where that has become necessary, absolute exclusion from church-fellowship—but any attempt to anticipate the final irrevocable separation, of which he has reserved the execution to himself. That shall not take place till the end of the present dispensation; not till the time of the harvest will the householder command—and then he will give the command not to the servants, but to the reapers—that the tares be gathered out from among the wheat. Not till the end of the world will the Son of Man send forth his servants—nor even then his earthly ministering servants, but '*his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and all which do iniquity*'—in the words of Zephaniah (i. 3), '*the stumbling-blocks of the wicked.*'" (*Trench on the Parables*, pp. 78, 79, 84, 87, 88.)

With this exposition of Trench most of our best modern commentators, such as Alford, Stier, and Brown, substantially agree; and, if we mistake not, it comes much nearer to the truth than the older expositions do, especially on two points, viz.:

1. In interpreting the expression, "while men slept," as simply equivalent to "in the night time." On this expression Alford writes: "Not *the men* belonging to the owner of the field, but

men generally; and the expression is used only to designate *in the night time*, not to charge the servants with any want of watchfulness." (Alford's New Testament, *in loc.*) And Stier: "What is decisive as regards the true meaning of our Lord is this, that it is by no means said: *the servants* slept—these rather show themselves as watching and guarding with all laudable zeal. As indeed in that period of the Church to which the parable chiefly points, the *apostles* certainly did not sleep, but watched and were zealous for the purity of the Church. . . . By this feature of the parable nothing else is expressed than *by night* (as Job xxxiii. 15) in darkness and secrecy. This is the way of the evil one in all that he does." (Stier's Words of Jesus, Vol. II., p. 233.)

2. In understanding the prohibition contained in the household-er's reply to the question, "Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up?" as "a prohibition forbidding all such measures for the excision of heretics and other offenders, as shall leave them no possibility for after repentance or amendment; as a prohibition of any attempt to anticipate the final, irrevocable separation, of which he has reserved the execution to himself." But in what way this is the teaching of the parable he does not attempt to show; and so, does nothing towards removing the grand difficulty in the way of interpreting the parable.

If we mistake not, the difficulties in the exposition of this parable arise mainly from not adhering strictly to the scriptural idea of the visible Church, as distinct from the communion of the Church; and of excommunication, the severest "censure" which the Church is authorised to inflict as a part of "godly discipline."

THE VISIBLE CHURCH, as defined in our Larger Catechism, is "a society made up of all such as in all ages and places of the world do profess the true religion, and of their children" (Ans. 62). From the beginning, the visible Church, like the State, has been made up of families. Such was unquestionably its constitution in our Lord's day, organised as it was under the covenant with Abraham; and into this Church our Lord and his apostles were introduced by circumcision when eight days old. And this constitution of the Church is to continue to the end of the present dispensation. This, we believe, is the true scriptural idea of the

visible Church, and the only idea of it which finds countenance in the word of God.

As the children of believing parents, as well as others, are "conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity," the visible Church must embrace in its numbers many who, for a time at the least, are unbelievers, are destitute of that personal faith in Christ which is characteristic of the true children of God. They may be of the number of the elect, to be afterwards "effectually called" by the Spirit, but for the time being they do not differ in personal character from other unbelievers.

Besides the visible Church, and within it, our standards acknowledge the existence of a body we are accustomed to speak of as the communion of the Church, consisting of those alone who make credible profession of a personal faith in Christ.

"The Church of God, as a visible external institute, is made up of two classes of members. This results from the very nature of its organisation through families. One class consists of true believers, or those who profess to be such; the other of their children who are to be trained for God, and for that purpose are blessed with pre-eminent advantages. They are to be retained as pupils until they are converted. If they should continue impenitent, the Church does not revoke their privileges, but bears with them as patiently as their Master. They are beloved for the father's sake. This host of baptized children is, however, the source from which her strength is continually recruited. The Church contains a sanctuary and an outer court, and the sanctuary is continually filled from the outer court." (*Thornewell's Works, Vol. IV., p. 333.*)

In the administration of a "godly discipline," the highest "censure" which may be inflicted upon an offender is *excommunication*, which is defined in our Book of Discipline, Ch. IV., §4, as "the excision of an offender from the communion of the Church." Having in mind the Romish distinction between the *excommunicatio major*, or *anathema*, which cast the offender out of the Church, and devoted him to destruction; and the *excommunicatio minor*, which simply excluded from the communion of the Church, and this for the purpose and with the hope of the reclamation of the offender, the Presbyterian Church, in common with most Protestant Churches, disclaims the right to anathematise, or inflict the *excommunicatio major*.

On this subject Calvin writes :

“Excommunication differs from anathema in this, that the latter, completely excluding pardon, dooms and devotes the individual to eternal destruction ; whereas, the former rebukes and animadverts upon his manners ; and although it also punishes, it is to bring him to salvation by forewarning him of his future doom. If it succeeds, reconciliation and restoration to communion are ready to be given. Moreover, anathema is rarely, if ever, to be used. Hence, though ecclesiastical discipline does not allow us to be on familiar and intimate terms with excommunicated persons, still we ought to strive, by all possible means, to bring them to a better mind, and to recover them to the fellowship and unity of the Church ; as the Apostle also says, ‘Yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother’ (2 Thess. iii. 15). If this humanity be not observed, in private as well as public, the danger is that our discipline shall degenerate into destruction.” (*Calvin's Institutes, Book IV., Ch. XII., §10.*)

Dr. Thornwell writes :

“The difference between suspension and excommunication is a difference in degree and not in kind. Excommunication is more solemn in form, and more permanent and stringent in operation. But in the Protestant Church it never amounts to anathema ; it never dissolves the *vinculum* by which the person is, through baptism, related to the Church and the covenant of grace. It never consigns him to hopeless and eternal perdition. The only case in which the Church would be at liberty to denounce such a censure would be one in which the party had notoriously sinned the sin unto death. That is the only crime which cuts off from the hope of mercy and the possibility of repentance, and is consequently the only crime of which the Church, in the exercise of her declarative power, is competent to say that by it the man is excluded from all the benefits symbolised in baptism, and has become an alien and an outcast. But as God has furnished us with no means of knowing when this sin has been committed, he has virtually debarred us from this species of excommunication. The highest censure left us is that of permanent exclusion from the sacraments.” (*Thornwell's Works, Vol. IV., p. 343.*)

With this distinction between the visible Church and the communion of that Church in mind, and with the scriptural idea of excommunication—that it is, as the word imports, an exclusion from the communion of the Church, and not from the Church itself, let us turn to the study of the parable.

I. It is generally conceded that by the field of mingled wheat and tares of this parable, as by the draw-net of the other, we are

to understand the visible Church, as it ever has and ever will exist in the world. It is true that in his exposition our Lord says, "*The field is the world.*" This on the one hand. But on the other, in this same exposition he says, "The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of *his kingdom* all things that offend, and them which do iniquity" (verse 41); thus giving to the field the name of "his kingdom."

Besides this, in the opening sentence of the parable, his words are, "*The kingdom of heaven* is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in his field, but while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way" (verses 24, 25). And in the corresponding parable, "*The kingdom of heaven* is like unto a net that was cast into the sea, and gathered of every kind" (verse 47). The expressions, "the kingdom of God" and "the kingdom of heaven," so often used by our Lord, are used to mean: (1.) The reign of Christ in the world; as in his charge to his disciples, "Preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matt. x. 7); (2.) The reign of Christ in the individual soul, as in the parables of the "hid treasure" and "the pearl" (verses 44-46); (3.) The true invisible Church in the world, as in the parables of "the mustard seed" and "the leaven" (verses 31-33); and (4.) The visible Church in the world, as is conceded on all hands to be the case in the parable of the draw-net; but never are they used to mean the world, as contradistinguished from the Church—there would be an obvious impropriety in so using them; nor are they ever used to mean the communion of the Church, as distinct from the Church. Hence we conclude that the parable concerns the visible Church, as it exists in the world. In this visible Church, where God has given a birth-right membership to those "conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity," it must be the case that unbelievers will always be mingled with believers; since some of those thus introduced, as experience teaches, never become true Christians; and others, who eventually become very pillars in the temple of God, for a season, like Paul, labor to destroy the very doctrine which they afterwards preach.

II. "*The tares are the children of the wicked one; the enemy that sowed them is the devil*" (verses 38, 39). How this can be

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said of such as Simon Magus (see Acts viii. 5-24) is plain enough. Though he had been baptized by Philip, on a profession of personal faith in Christ (verse 13), and so received into the visible Church, he had been all the time "in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity." It was doubtless under a delusion, of which Satan was the author, he had sought a place in the Church; Satan's object in this being, not his personal destruction alone, but to bring reproach upon the Church by the subsequent ungodly deeds of Simon—deeds sure to be done, sooner or later, by one whose "heart was not right in the sight of God."

But how can such language be used concerning the children of believing parents, who, by divine appointment occupy a place in the Church? To this we reply: (1.) As to the title given them—"children of the wicked one"—it is a title given in Scripture to all who are not Christians. "In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother" (1 John iii. 10). And our Lord applies it to the wicked Jews, while expressly acknowledging them to be "Abraham's seed," *i. e.*, members of the visible Church: "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do" (John viii. 37, 44).

(2.) In explanation of our Lord's words, "the enemy which sowed them is the devil," we ask the reader to remark: that the visible Church, in the wide sense of the term in which it corresponds to "the kingdom of heaven," has existed in the world from the creation of man: under the covenant of works, as it is called, before the fall; and under the covenant of grace ever after. This first covenant, or covenant of works, was "made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity" (*Larger Catechism, Ans. 22*). And so, the Church under that covenant had the same constitution it has had ever since, in so far as the membership of children is concerned. Had Adam never sinned, all his posterity would have been born in that same image of God in which he was created, and so the Church would have contained none but "the children of the kingdom." The householder sowed good seed, and good seed only, in his field. Through the temptation of the devil, Adam sinned; and as a consequence, all his

descendants are "begotten in his own likeness"—his likeness as a fallen sinful creature. The original constitution of the Church, as made up of parents and their children, remains unchanged. And so it comes, that while it is true that children "conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity" are in the Church by divine appointment, it is at the same time true, that they, as sinners, are in the Church through the agency of Satan; and they may properly be represented as "tares" sowed at night, by God's great enemy, the devil.

This language will appear the more appropriate, if we remark what Alford directs attention to, viz., that this parable refers "to the whole history of the world from beginning to end—the coming of sin into the world by the malice of the devil, the mixed state of mankind, notwithstanding the development of God's purposes by the dispensation of grace, and the final separation of the good and evil at the end. The very declaration, 'the harvest is the end of the world,' suggests the original sowing as the beginning of it. Yet this sowing is not in the fact, as in the parable, one only, but repeated again and again. In the parable the Lord gathers, as it were, the whole human family into *one life-time*, as they will be gathered into one harvest, and sets that forth as simultaneous, which has been scattered over ages of time." (*Alford's New Testament, in loc.*)

III. "The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest." What the servants here propose to do—dropping the figure of the parable—is to make a final, irrevocable separation between the righteous and the wicked; such, in substance, as the angels shall make at the end of the world; such as the Church of Rome claims authority to make when she denounces the anathema against an offender, and delivers him over to the civil power to be put to death.

In this parable which our Lord spake, and afterwards expounded for the especial instruction of his disciples, he expressly denies such authority to his Church. And he does this for the reason that, incapable as mere men are of judging infallibly of

the human heart, and ignorant as they must be of God's purposes of mercy toward such as at any particular time are found in the ranks of unbelievers—his purposes of mercy, for example, toward a blood-stained Saul of Tarsus—in attempting “to gather up the tares, they should root up the wheat also with them. Let both grow together until the harvest,” says he. And then, when all God's purposes of mercy to individuals shall have been accomplished, and when, in the searching light of that day all shall appear in their true character, “the Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity.”

As thus interpreted, the parable contains no prohibition of the “binding and loosing,” and of the “trying the spirits whether they are of God,” enjoined in other scriptures. A “godly discipline,” in the judicial sense of that expression, concerns the communion and not the Church as such; whilst the parable concerns the visible Church, and not the communion as such.

The important practical lessons taught in the parable are :

1. That the condition of things in the visible Church on earth, till the “end of the world,” shall be such as is fitly represented by a field of mingled wheat and tares: it shall always contain “the children of the wicked one” along with “the children of the kingdom.” And this necessarily results from the fact that throughout all this time it is to be made up of families, children “conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity” entering along with their believing parents. God, for wise reasons, gave it such a constitution in the beginning, and he never has, and never will, change its constitution in this particular so long as it is a Church in the world. “It would argue little love or holy earnestness in the Christian, if he had not a longing desire to see the Church of his Saviour a glorious Church without spot or wrinkle. But he must learn that the desire, righteous and holy as it is in itself, yet is not to find its fulfilment in this present evil time; that, on the contrary, the suffering from false brethren is one of the pressures upon him, which is meant to wring out from him a more earnest prayer that the kingdom of God may appear” (Trench).

2. “A godly church discipline,” such as the Scriptures author-

ise and enjoin, does not include authority to denounce the anathema against an offender. The Church may and ought to keep back and exclude from her communion all who make no credible profession of personal faith in Christ, or whose life is inconsistent with such a profession, even though they may have been born within her pale. But she may never cast them beyond the reach of her care, her efforts, and her prayers. The authority Christ has given her is "for edification and not for destruction" (2 Cor. x. 8). Her excommunication is, just what the term indicates, an exclusion from her communion, and not from the Church itself. Even in the days of miraculous judgments, and under the administration of Apostles, it reached no further than "to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. v. 5). The darkest blood-stains on the pages of the Church's history are the result of her disregard of this limitation on her authority "to bind and loose"—thirty-two thousand persons are said, on good authority, to have suffered death, in various ways, under the direct sentence of the Inquisition—so terrible has been the result of fallible man's assuming to do the work which Christ has assigned to the angels; to do now the work which Christ has appointed to be done at "the end of the world."

GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG.

ARTICLE VII.

ONE PHASE OF THE PRAYER QUESTION.

The general question is, Shall sinful, needy, helpless man pray?

1. No, said the ancient atheist; for it is absurd to pray to Nothing. We cannot adore nothing. If man is a praying animal, so much the worse for man.

No, echoes the modern atheist, we cannot adore Protoplasm. And the modern atheist is as self-consistent as the ancient. For how preposterous any worship on his part would be, appears from the substitution of his divinity for Jehovah in the noble lyrics of the Psalmist. While atheists may perhaps advocate a vague devotional frame of mind as a good sort of thing, they cannot bring themselves to say: "O come, let us worship and bow down; let us kneel before Protoplasm our Maker; for Protoplasm is our God; it is It that hath made us, and not we ourselves. Let the floods clap their hands, let the hills be glad together before Protoplasm."

2. Pantheists may dream of communion with The All, but of all dreams theirs is the idlest. The All cannot hear our cries; cannot pity, cannot help, though peradventure it may crush and destroy.

3. Deists, who believe in the being of a personal, extramundane God, but reject the Bible, differ among themselves. Some hold to the duty of prayer, and perhaps, to a limited extent, indulge in its practice; but others on various grounds object to it, theoretically as well as practically. They say that God is too wise to make any mistakes in the government of the world, and it is an act of presumption on our part to attempt to instruct him or take the reins of government out of his hands; he is immutable, and we cannot hope, and should not desire, to change his methods or thwart his plans. This we understand to be the argument of unbelief, if such paltry stuff deserves to be called an argument.

Others again, and notably Mr. Tyndall, who in his strong moments may be, at least by courtesy, classed among theists, distinguish between the objects of prayer. They admit, or rather

they will not deny, that God may answer prayer in the domain of mind, if, indeed, there be such a domain, but not in the charmed realm of matter.

4. As a matter of course, Christians, accepting the Bible as the inspired and infallible word of God, pray for blessings temporal as well as spiritual: for health, for prolonged life, for rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness. They hold that God is our Father, and will withhold no good from them that fear him; that he knoweth what we have need of before we ask him, and therefore we should not din his ears with vain repetitions, as the heathen do; that he awakens within us desires for the spiritual blessings which he intends to bestow; that he knows far better what is good for us than the wisest of us can possibly know; that prayer should be made for things agreeable to his will, and with submission to his superior wisdom, but also in reliance upon his infinite love. Hence there is in prayer no impeachment of the divine wisdom or goodness, but the highest recognition of them both; and in regard to the immutability of God's character and purposes, while there may be metaphysical difficulties in connexion with the subject, yet they bear no more upon the duty of prayer than upon the duty of effort in any other line. If his unchangeableness forbids us to pray, it forbids us to labor too.

5. Is there no concession, then, that we can make to the prayerless scientism of the day? No exhibition of candor, to conciliate its favorable regards? May we not show ourselves free from the shackles of dogmatism, and superior to the low prejudices of party?

Let us choose our ground carefully. There is that great *dictum*, that the laws of nature are uniform. The empiricists and intuitionists, John Stuart Mill and his opponents, may differ as to the origin of the conviction universally entertained on this point, and even as to the universality of the conviction itself. But it is generally considered a safe thing to believe and to say that the laws of the material world are uniform; perhaps even to pronounce this apothegm to be the grand major premiss of all induction. Anyhow, the *dictum* is safe, and perfectly "*en règle*." May we not so use it as to silence the clamors of the students of

Matter, and yet, by holding firmly to the truth of miracles, defend Christianity?

6. Some years ago the writer was a member of a debating club, composed chiefly of professional gentlemen. At one of the meetings, a member, who was a Presbyterian minister, set forth the theory that at the foundation of the world the Almighty had so arranged all the laws of matter as to answer the prayers of his people without any new adjustment or ordering of those laws, or of matter under those laws. The Christian prays for some result in the physical world. The desired result comes to pass, but it was foreseen that he would ask for it, and the train was set in motion away back on the verge of eternity, so as to accomplish at the right moment the ends wished for. A college president dissented from this view. An ex-professor of theology exclaimed with great warmth, "The doctrine is not found in the Reformed theology"—meaning, of course, the Reformed as distinguished from the Lutheran theology. The writer of this article remarked, "It is a fearful doctrine." This is the phase of the prayer question which we propose to discuss, and we begin with a word as to the conduct of the argument.

Ninety or ninety-five of every hundred readers of this REVIEW are believers in Christianity, and nearly all of these are members of evangelical churches. It is for them above all that this article is written. We weary of the war with unbelief. A while back and it was Hume and Condillac; then Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and my Lord Bolingbroke, and Mr. Chubb, and Mr. Morgan; then, passing over into France, it was Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and the Encyclopedists generally; then back again into Britain and on into America, it was Tom Paine, and now in England it is Huxley and Tyndall, Tyndall and Huxley, Protoplasm and Joshua, Prayer Tests and Lay Sermons, until we sigh for relief, and can almost adapt the words which Jean Paul puts into the mouth of the man who attempted to travel to the outside of the world-systems, and cry out, "Let me lie down in the grave and hide me from this persecution, for end I see there is none." As the elder Hodge has said, it is very trying to see men calmly endeavor to destroy all our hopes of heaven, and to

prove our adorable Redeemer to be an impostor. But we have not to do at present with them. We write now for God's own people, who already believe that he hears the cry of the young raven, much more that of his own suffering children.

In expounding the infinitesimal *calculus*, one does not need to go back to the simplest elements of arithmetic. So in writing for believers, it is not necessary to discuss the settled question as to whether God answers prayer for physical blessings. But it may be useful to the household of faith to consider whether the foregoing theory is true, or in any way necessary for the confirmation of our faith. Is the Church prepared to receive it as the explication of any part of the doctrine of prayer?

That the theory is no novelty in theological speculation will be shown in the next section. Indeed, genuine novelties are by no means so common as some people suppose. Errors long buried revive again, and old battles often have to be fought over again, and with very much the same old weapons.

7. Dr. James Buchanan, the able successor of Dr. Chalmers in the Divinity Chair, New College, Edinburgh, furnishes enough for our present purpose in his work on "Modern Atheism." He mentions four hypothetical solutions of the difficulties urged against Prayer:

1st. "That there is the same relation between prayer and the answer to prayer as between cause and effect in any other sequence of nature. . . . To this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer, when he says that the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces a new sequence to the notice of the mind, that it may add another law of nature to those which have formerly been observed."

"The second hypothetical solution is that of those who hold that while God, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the known or discoverable sequences of the natural world, yet his interference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take place at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the limits of our experience and observation. . . ."

"The third hypothetical solution is that of those who hold that a divine answer to prayer may be conveyed through *the ministry of angels*. . . ."

"The fourth hypothetical solution is that of those who hold that God has so arranged his providence from the beginning as to provide for particular events as well as for general results, and especially to provide an answer to the prayers of his intelligent creatures."

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He then quotes from three distinguished men who seem to have adopted this last solution. First from Euler, the great mathematician, a most voluminous author, and in his specialty standing in the rank next to Archimedes, Newton, Leibnitz, and La Place.

"I begin," says Euler in one of his letters to a German Princess, "with considering an objection which almost all the philosophical systems have started against prayer. Religion prescribes this as our duty, with an assurance that God will hear and answer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the precepts which he hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand, instructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the course of nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers can effect no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God should be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers. This objection has the greater weight, that religion itself teaches the doctrine of God's having established the course of all events, and that nothing can come to pass but what God foresaw from all eternity. Is it credible, say the objectors, that God should think of altering this settled course in compliance with any prayers which men might address to him? But I remark, first, that when God established the course of the universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pass in it, he paid attention to all the circumstances which should accompany each event, and particularly to the dispositions, desires, and prayers of every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was disposed in perfect harmony with all these circumstances. When, therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events. It is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a miracle."

This extract from Euler is long, but it presents the case so fully that its admission is justifiable. It also brings out the strength of the argument in favor of the theory, and disarms prejudice by the evident good intention with which it is pervaded.

The second authority is Dr. Wollaston, who says:

"It is not impossible that such laws of nature, and such a series of causes and effects, may be originally designed, that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but even *particular cases*, at least many of them, may also be provided for without innovations or alterations in the course of nature. . . . Thus the prayers which good men offer to the all-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects already forecasted in the course of nature."

The third authority, Dr. Robert Gordon, delivers nothing bearing particularly upon the question.

The fourth, Bishop Warburton, says :

“We should blush to be thought so uninstructed in the nature of prayer as to fancy that it can work any temporary change in the dispositions of the Deity, who is ‘the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.’ Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God, in the chain of causes and effects, which not only sustains each system, but connects them all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived that the temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert evil by means of that ‘pre-established harmony’ which he hath willed to exist between moral actions and natural events.”

Dr. Buchanan, however, winds up the chapter by saying :

“On the whole, we feel ourselves warranted and even constrained to conclude, that the theory of ‘government by natural law’ is defective, in so far as it excludes the superintendence and control of God over all the events of human life, and that neither the existence of second causes nor the operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence in the care of Providence and the efficiency of prayer.”

So that he does not appear to have been convinced by the reasonings of Euler and the rest ; as we assuredly are not.

These extracts, however, will serve to place before the reader the objectionable tenet in the language of its promulgators themselves ; exhibited in the exact shade of meaning, and sustained by the arguments of its defenders.

8. Perhaps no fitter place will be reached in the discussion for a word as to the ill effect of too engrossing a study of the exact sciences. This is suggested by the mention of the illustrious Euler. We have long regarded Sir. Wm. Hamilton’s diatribe against the study of mathematics very much as Dr. McCosh seems to regard it—*i. e.*, as, after all, an absurd performance. It was a brilliant partisan harangue, not a weighty judicial opinion. At the same time, it must be allowed that a narrow range of thought will make narrow thinkers. The mind needs a variety of food ; and a one-sided training will develop one-sided men, whether that training be metaphysical, mathematical, linguistic, or what is now-a-days termed scientific. Astronomers see a great deal of the reign of law. The plane of the ecliptic remains parallel to

itself age after age. If there are any minute deviations, they merely furnish a new problem to the student. If the moon is not precisely where it should be by the tables, the tables are incorrect—that is all; and some patient Hansen must hunt about for an overlooked source of disturbance.* It is never supposed that the Maker of the heavens has interfered with his workmanship. It is easy to see that a mind habituated to such views would come to think after a while that God never touches the complicated but perfect mechanism of the heavens and the earth at any point or for any purpose whatever. We need hardly say how narrow this view is, but we can see how eminent men may take a very contracted survey of God's works. They sink a deep but slender shaft, from whose lowest point they can behold little of the wealth of the glory of the sky.

It may be thought that Euler was a man of different stamp; and in some sense he was. The son of a Swiss clergyman, who wished him to enter the pulpit, he for a time studied theology and the oriental tongues. Blessed with a memory like that of Magliabecchi, Mezzofanti, or Addison Alexander, he forgot nothing that he had learned in botany, chemistry, history, and medicine. Strangers were astonished at his information and erudition. His adopting the hurtful error under consideration, however, shows how far a fine mind may be warped on other subjects by a too predominating attention to mathematics and physics. We do not forget his standing up manfully for revealed religion in the evil days of Voltaire and Frederick of Prussia, or his toiling away at science during the last seventeen years of his life in blindness. Only, therefore, with infinite regret, be it stated, that

* The moon is so accessible to observation, and so important to navigators, that it has been studied from a very early period. Five chief perturbations have been eliminated, viz.: Evection, suspected by Hipparchus; Variation, thought by some to have been known to Abul Wefa in the ninth century; Parallaxic Inequality, Annual Equation, and Secular Acceleration. To these Hansen has added two inequalities due to the attraction of Venus. The maximum error in its calculated place is now only ten seconds. So that in the whole range of science there is hardly an illustration more pertinent. Bradley's discovery of the Aberration of Light, however, as a single instance, is unsurpassable.

his was one of a few high names sustaining a mischievous theory. A few names can be adduced in favor of almost any vagary. Everybody knows that Bishop Warburton taught that the ancient Jews had no knowledge of a future state. It requires the *consensus* of both learned and sound men to give any authority to an opinion.

9. As to the hypothesis itself, it may be remarked, *in the first place*, that it is *only* an hypothesis—*i. e.*, a suggested explanation of certain facts; one, indeed, of several hypothetical solutions. The Scriptures bid us pray. The scientist says, It will accomplish nothing if you do, for nature is unalterable. By way of an Irenicum, it is replied, Perhaps God foreseeing what physical blessings his believing children would ask for, prearranged the machinery so as to bring out what is wanted just *when* and *as* it is wanted. This, we repeat, is only an hypothesis; and it is very noticeable that there is not one word of it in all the revelation which God hath given us. There is positively not one intimation looking toward such a thing, however needful some may deem it to the confirmation of the faith of the Church. Neither do the Scriptures contain any utterances, from which, by just and sound inference, any such hypothesis can be deduced. This silence of Scripture is certainly ominous; for though God's word is not a text-book in astronomy or geology, in physics or zoology, it does insist everywhere on the duty of prayer; and it would have been infinitely easy for some one of the inspired writers to say that God has thus cunningly devised this mighty frame of nature—if any of them had only believed it. Aye! there's the rub. What a help might not such a deliverance have been to weak-kneed Christians! Whether it would have promoted the discharge of the high and solemn duty of prayer, will be considered in due time. But in regard to the writers of the sixty-six books of Holy Scripture, we do not for one moment imagine that the hypothesis ever entered one of their heads. That is, of course, as a verity. If it did, what a felicitous use might not the intellectual Paul have made of it before those very distinguished Stoics and Epicureans on Mars' Hill! It seems that the *élite* of Athens could not abide the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Some

held what would now be called Fatalism; others, that God had assigned its laws to nature and then left nature to itself. This would have been a most opportune opening for the ever conciliatory Apostle of the Gentiles. "Why, *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*," he might have said, "you greatly misunderstand me. I agree with both of you. I am going to reconcile Zeno and Epicurus. Just see how neatly I can do it by my hypothesis."

Again, as this hypothesis cannot be proven and is not countenanced by Scripture, so also it cannot be proven from science. A general uniformity of the laws of nature, as accepted more or less fully and intelligently by all men, is the poles apart from the Epicurean notion that God exercises no control over his works. But more of this in another section.

10. *In the second place*, it may be remarked, that this hypothesis is closely akin to Leibnitz's obsolete theory of a "preëstablished harmony." This appears to have occurred to Bishop Warburton, as is shown by the occurrence of the phrase in the above given extract.

Leibnitz came, as all thinkers sooner or later come, to the unbridged chasm between Matter and Mind. He set out from his curious, original, and, in some respects, highly erroneous theory of Monads. God is the highest Monad. A material point is the lowest. A *material point*, mark you: not a mathematical point, which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness, but position only; whereas, a material point has all three dimensions in an infinitesimal degree, and hence may, after a fashion, be said to be unextended. The whole range of monads may be represented by a continuous line, one of whose ends rests upon the earth, while the other is lost in the infinite sky. A line representing an equation that has no discontinuous values. So closely allied are his mathematical and his metaphysical conceptions. An unbroken gradation of beings from the infinitesimal, and hence unseen atom, of which a boundless number constitute a grain of sand, stretching up through the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, the spiritual kingdoms, until it ends in the last term of the series which is the unseen God—such was the conception of the universe elaborated by this brilliant and daring genius. This scheme,

it will be observed, well nigh obliterates the essential distinction between Mind and Matter. In fact, it is a species of Monism, although Leibnitz would have been far from willing to be considered a Monist in the ordinary sense of the term. It favors the "*unisubstancisme*" of Spinoza and his disciples, yet Leibnitz was an earnest believer in a personal God.*

One would suppose from this brief exposition that Leibnitz would have no difficulty with the interaction of mind and matter. But so far from it, he denies such interaction wholly. A simple illustration from mechanics will convey our idea of his doctrine. An ivory ball rolling upon a marble slab may so impinge upon another ball that the latter shall go off obliquely at any angle less than a right angle to the original direction of the first ball. But this is due to the spherical shape of both balls. Reduce them to material points, and the only motion the first can communicate to the second is in the prolongation of the straight line along which the first was moving when it struck the second. Now, Leibnitz sometimes defines a monad dynamically—*i. e.*, as if it were a force. The result of a force must conserve the direction of the force as well as the amount. "*Lex de conservanda quantitate directionis.*" Hence a spiritual force cannot generate a mechanical effect. The soul cannot originate motion in any one of the infinitely numerous monads which constitute its body. (He defines the body as "*Une masse composée par une infinité d'autres monades qui constituent le corps propre de cette monade centrale.*") Much less, of course, can it originate motion in the infinitude of monads of which the body is the aggregation. To account, then, for the phenomena of bodily injuries awakening painful sensations, and mental conations being immediately followed by the desired bodily movements, Leibnitz had recourse to his theory of

* Leibnitz thought that he had overthrown Spinozism by his doctrine of Monads: "Je ne sais comment vous pouvez en tirer quelque Spinosisme ; au contraire c'est justement par ces monades que le Spinosisme est détruit. Car il y a autant de substances véritables, et pour ainsi dire de miroirs vivans de l'univers toujours subsistans ou d'univers concentrés, qu'il y a de monades, au lieu que, selon Spinoza, il n'y a qu'une seule substance." (From his Second Letter to Mr. Bourguet, quoted by Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos., Vol. II.)

a preëstablished harmony between all the monads. God in the beginning impressed such laws upon both mind and matter, that, when the one willed, the other should move, and move not only when, but as, the mind willed. In other words, if Leibnitz could not bridge over the chasm, he tunnelled under it, and based the opposite and corresponding granite cliffs of the cañon upon the eternal rock underlying them both. This is the preëstablished harmony, the *harmonia præstabilita* of Leibnitz: "*Cette admirable harmonie préétablie de l'âme et du corps et même de toutes les monades ou substances simples.*" Nothing less than divine omnipotence, he held, could accomplish such a work.

Any one can perceive at a glance the remarkable agreement between this theory of Leibnitz and the hypothetical solution under consideration. In both there is a synchronism or a near sequence between the desires of men and the occurrence of phenomena in physical nature. In both, the occurrence of these phenomena is due to physical laws without any contemporaneous divine interposition. In both there was in the mind of God an antecedent regard to the wants or wishes of his rational creatures. In one minor point they differ, viz., in the hypothetical solution there is in prayer no conation of the human will, and no synchronous conation of the divine will; in the theory there is always a human conation that effectuates nothing. Which of the two stands on the more absurd ground, our readers may decide. The theory is obsolete. It fell with the wild, gigantesque doctrine of Monads, and is as irremediably dead as the scarcely wilder or more gigantesque doctrines of the ancient Gnosis. Men will as soon believe in Æons and Demuirges again as in the preëstablished harmony; or in the hypothetical solution either. Especially will the Church never adopt that solution as a part of her doctrine or a corroboration of her faith.

11. This conducts, *in the third place*, to a prime reason why the Church never will accept the hypothesis. The intuitive conviction of a causal connexion between our mental conations and the immediately following movements of our bodies, can never be overthrown by artful ratiocinations. Men cannot be made to disbelieve that they do themselves move their limbs. What! do

we not move our fingers in writing these successive lines? Leibnitz himself no more really and practically believed such nonsense than Hume and Berkeley did the non-existence of an external world. Hume owned that, once out of doors, he felt and acted as other men do. And as long as men ask and receive, seek and *find*, knock and see the gate opened to them, so long will they hold to some kind of a causal *nexus* between the correlated phenomena.

It is very easy to quibble about this word *cause*. The word has been taken in different senses. There are Aristotle's famous four causes of the statue of Hercules in the temple. There is again the scholastic distinction of the "*causa causans*," and the "*causa sine qua non*," expressed in un-Ciceronian mediæval language, but sharply discriminating between a producing (causing) cause and an indispensable condition. And once more John Stuart Mill synthesizes, and throwing causes proper and indispensable conditions into one category, gives the name of *cause* to the whole. Time forbids our dwelling on this, and it is unnecessary to do so. We all know that what we ask another to do for us we confessedly do not do ourselves. It is enough if we honestly retain the phrase, "*efficacy of prayer*," and candidly maintain that prayer *obtains* the desired blessing. Our Saviour teaches us to pray in order that we may *obtain*. If prayer does not *obtain* anything, the word of God misleads and deludes us. Can the Church adopt such a theory? God forbid.

We cordially accept the *dictum* that our instinctive beliefs are a *quasi* revelation from God. To suppose them to be deceptive is to make the blessed God himself a deceiver, nay more, the primary and arch deceiver. Hence all right-minded persons refuse to believe that the Maker of the earth placed fossils in every geologic period and stratum down to the primitive rocks, just to induce us to think them the remains of organised substances when they were not. Going from his works to his word, can any one imagine that we are taught to ask in order to receive, when the receiving is, in truth, a mere sequence, and in no proper sense a result? Does our Maker thus delude us? And does not every tyro in philosophy see that this substitution of mere antecedence

and sequence for cause and effect is really of a piece with Hume's and Dr. Brown's denial of causation? And that it is applying their baneful philosophical heresy to spiritual things?

We go farther, and maintain that the instinct which leads even disbelievers in revelation and in prayer to cry to God in time of imminent peril, is a wise and true and God-given instinct. It is wiser than man's folly and truer than Satan's lie.

12. Notice particularly that no man ever asks God to *have* done something for him. No man in his senses, and thinking of what he is saying, will be guilty of such a solecism. We do not pray that anything be done in the past! We ask God to act *now*, or in some *future* time. If any choose to quibble about the Infinite One's having no relation to time, we need not introduce Kant or Hamilton or Mansel. It is sufficient that we ask God to act in the material world now or hereafter, as we ask him now or hereafter to regenerate an impenitent friend.*

Against the absurd tenet of Leibnitz men are guarded by the experience of everyday life. There is no bias in the common mind toward his theory. But the natural man does not love to pray, and is but too ready to catch at anything that weakens the sense of obligation to that duty. Let him begin by not praying for health and harvests, and he will end in not praying at all. To induce him not to pray for physical blessings, all that is needful is to teach him that the material universe is a vast machine constructed indeed by the Almighty long ago, but never touched now by so much as his finger. Whoever thinks of praying that the hands of a clock shall not at the due time point to twelve? If a son were to be executed at twelve, and the mother had reason to believe that a pardon was on the way; if five minutes' time was thus a matter of life and death, and she knew that the clock was too fast; she would beseech the keeper of the clock to set back the hands. If he would not or could not do this, she might in a frenzy shriek out her anguish, but she would not address a prayer to the unfeeling brass and iron up yonder in the tower. Once

* A curious apparent exception, proving the rule, occurs in the Greek, *ἡ θύρα κερκεῖσθω*. Let the gate have been shut; *i. e.*, let it be shut and remain so.

convince men that the world is only a vast chronometer, whose wheels were cast and whose spring and balance were fabricated, however ingeniously, thousands of years ago, and they will cease to pray that the hands may or may not point to any designated hour. So that men will either cease to pray for physical blessings, or they will pray inconsistently and illogically, and hence half-heartedly; or else they will arise and cast false philosophy to the winds.

Before passing to the next head of argument, it may be as well to state that Leibnitz himself used the illustration of two clocks running exactly together. He inquires how their keeping precisely the same time is to be accounted for, and suggests three possible answers. 1st. There is a connexion between the works of the two, so that one determines the rate of the other. Thus most people suppose that the soul controls the body. 2d. That some person is employed to keep them together by constant interference with one or the other. This he conceived to coincide with the pantheistic Occasionalism of Malebranche, and therefore by all means to be rejected. 3d. That both clocks were so perfectly constructed by the maker that they ran exactly together without any subsequent attention. This last explanation Leibnitz deemed most worthy of God. "The absolute artist could only create perfect works, which do need a constantly renewed rectification." (Ueberweg II., 110.) It will be remembered that Leibnitz applied this to the soul and the body of every man, to account for the raising of our hands, etc., when we will. The general principle is plausibly stated, but, as we shall attempt to show, is essentially a narrow and altogether inadequate view.

13. *In the fourth place*, it is an ill-founded objection to the common Church doctrine, that it involves the continued and continual working of miracles. By miracles we are to understand some suspension or contravention of the laws of nature. This is given not as a satisfactory definition of the word, but as its meaning when used in this connexion by objectors. In this way we take it that Euler employed the term in the extract already given. The objection loses sight of the obvious and most important distinction between contravention and intervention. Man can inter-

vene, but cannot contravene. God can do both. They who accept the Bible as his word, believe that he has contravened the laws of nature in many cases; that no facts of history have been better authenticated than these self same contraventions; and the reasons for them were not only sufficient but cogent. Protestant Christendom, however, apprehends that the great occasion for miraculous displays has passed away; that their perpetual recurrence is needless and might be even hurtful during the ordinary progress of affairs; but that at the close of the present system of things, if not before, a power and a wisdom greater than appertain to men or angels, will again make extraordinary exhibitions on the earth. Meanwhile, why may not God in some way intervene in the realm of nature? Every Christian holds that he perpetually intervenes in the spiritual domain. He quickens dead souls; he sanctifies the impure and imperfect; and these works are not denominated miracles. Yet they certainly are interventions. The spiritual world, then, is not in such a state as to render the intervention of God unnecessary. Quite the reverse. And if he can intervene in the higher realm without any contravention of its laws or any derangement of its delicate adjustments, why not in the lower kingdom of matter also?

And if man is permitted to intervene and produce effects that never would have been produced without his agency, why may not God do the same by his own hand, or, as some profound thinkers have suggested, by the ministry of angels? Of all men our scientists ought to have least to say against interventions. For while geology, geography, astronomy, anatomy, and in part botany and physiology, are only sciences of what has been and is, chemistry finds its chief utility in the production of new compounds. It analyses, it recombines, it seeks for not only the unknown, but the hitherto unrealised. This is the glory and the charm of chemistry, and, we may add, of physics too, in which, however, the procedure lies mostly in the visible collocation of matter.

But we must not confine our attention to the laboratory. We emphasise the great and broad truth, that *human life is maintained by a series of interventions*. Our crops, our houses, our

food and raiment, in a word, everything needed for the support of life, is obtained by intervention in consistence with and by the aid of LAW. This is precisely the theatre in which the Allwise God has placed man, surrounding him by laws which he cannot contravene, but may understand and obey; and by forces which he could not originate and cannot annihilate, but may direct and utilise. By what sort of stupidity, then, shall the sceptic say that in all this vast scene of infinitely varied intervention, the Author of all shall never intervene? He whose knowledge of all the laws of his wondrous mechanism is immeasurably superior to any that man now has or ever will have? Which leads at once to the thought, that unless God had made man a far greater being than he actually is, or else the system of laws and forces, by which he is environed, very much simpler and less admirable than it is, there must needs be a region obscure or even wholly unknown to man, but clear as noonday to the eye of the All-seeing One. Why shall not he who is not only almighty and allwise, but also of great compassion and tender mercy, succor our helplessness by timely aid, and enrich our poverty by gracious supplies from this part of his vast dominion? This is a matter well worth pondering, and one that seems to have escaped the attention of sceptical scientism.

Another fruitful theme for the meditation of the devout Christian is the way in which the Son of God acted while on earth. Nearly all who read this article believe that Jesus of Nazareth was God manifest in the flesh. From the Gospels we learn that on occasion he wrought in the domain of nature beside and above what are denominated nature's laws. He produced wine without the aid of vegetable life, bread and fishes without the assistance of either vegetable or animal life; and very probably exerted a creative power in both miracles. He also originated anew animal life in the dead bodies of Jairus's daughter, of the son of the widow of Nain, and notably of Lazarus, thus transcending human power and wisdom, and creating ORGANIC LIFE to subdue the rebellious inorganic forces, as fabled Neptune did the winds of Æolus. But during thirty years of his life, and in fact through for the greater part of his ministry of three or four years, he subjected

himself to the physical laws which he had by his own power established in the beginning, and accomplished most of his mediatorial work by intervention instead of miracle. His sacrificial death was not miraculous. Miracle proved that the Intervener was divine. Miracle convinced; intervention saved. What we contend for is that the same gracious Being still intervenes for us in answer to the cry of his own.

14. *In the fifth place*, it is an ill-founded objection that we may not be able to state just how or where the Ruler of all touches the mechanism. Your watch comes home from the jeweller's, repaired, and in running order and keeping good time. To your untrained eye the works look much as they did before. Perhaps you can detect no change in them at all; yet a change there must have been.

On a morning, in the year of grace, 1807, Fulton, surrounded by a few friends, on his pioneer boat steamed out from the pier at New York City into the middle of Hudson River. Ten thousand spectators lined the bank, ready to jeer at him in case of failure. And failure seriously threatened him, for when he endeavored to make his little craft head up stream, it refused to do so. What was the matter? What was to be done? His friends on board could not conceal their chagrin. In great anxiety Fulton went down to examine the engine, and found something or other out of position. He set it right, and the gallant little boat wheeled into line, and started on its triumphant way to Albany. Yet it is not likely that any living man can tell what Fulton did to the machinery. But how absurd to discredit the history of the case on that account. "Dr. Chalmers . . . suggests that in the vast scale of natural sequences, which constitute one connected chain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be given 'either at a higher or lower place in the progression,' and that if it be supposed to be 'given far enough back,' it might originate a new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since it occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation." (Modern Atheism, pp. 294-5.) Dr. Buchanan, while endorsing the conclusiveness of this answer, amends it by saying "there is no necessity and no

reason for supposing that the responsive touch *can only* be given at a point to which our knowledge does not extend." Numberless illustrations could be given like the one from Fulton's account. The following incident occurred to the writer. We were on the cars one moonlit night long ago, returning to Princeton Theological Seminary, when a peculiar oscillatory motion of our car aroused general attention, and created some alarm. Presently a passenger arose and walked forward to the front door to see what was the matter. "Ah, yes," said he, "we have become disconnected from the rest of the train. They will find it out pretty soon, and come back for us." We looked and saw the train already some distance ahead of us, and getting farther away every moment. But in a few minutes here it came back, the connexion was reëstablished, and our journey was resumed. Two points emerge here. 1st. The engineer violated no law of mechanics in returning to us. The mode of the formation and the expansive power of steam were not interfered with in the least. If any law of nature involved in the case had been suspended, he could not have brought back the train. He worked not against, but by and through known laws and forces. 2d. Probably no man or woman in that rear car knew just what the engineer did; yet no one doubted for an instant that he did something, and indeed the very thing needed. This belief was rational, and disbelief would have been irrational.

15. *In the sixth place*, it is ill-founded to say that the Church doctrine argues imperfection in God's workmanship. How this idea arises may readily be seen from the illustrations just given. If Fulton's machinery had been perfect and perfectly adjusted, it would not have needed any readjustment out in the middle of North River. If the car coupling had been better devised, or more carefully looked after, the engineer would not have needed to reverse his engine. Such things are due to the ignorance of man and the imperfection of all his works. But, as we have already quoted from Leibnitz, "the Absolute Artist could only create perfect works," etc. We aim to give the full strength of the objection, and reply, 1st. This is an odd affirmation for a theist to make. Are there no burning deserts in which wearied travel-

lers, parched with raging thirst, lie down in despair and die? No wastes in temperate zones, producing only the thorn and the cactus? No immense uninhabitable Siberian plains? No howling wildernesses the world over? No imperfections, at least to our eyes, in the vegetable or the animal world? Yet has not the Absolute Artist created them all? But it may be rejoined that on a wide survey of the whole system of things, many, if not all of these so-called imperfections, would prove to be no imperfections. There is weight in this; for surely a man ill acquainted with any subject, and judging hastily concerning it, is liable to blunder exceedingly. For example, it may appear to be an imperfection in iron that it rusts so easily, while the precious metals are nearly free from this defect. But if iron were not oxidisable, it might be worse for us in the long run. It could not constitute a part of our soils; and where would be the red corpuscles of blood?

We do not give in to the atheistic notion that the Almighty can never create an imperfect work. In one sense gradation implies imperfection in all but the uppermost rank. Then if one kind of wood is stronger, more elastic, or more beautiful than another, the other is imperfect, forsooth, and cannot have been created by an omniscient and omnipotent God! The human eye, say recent writers, is not quite achromatic, and it analyses polarised light.* So be it. Pray how were these imperfections discovered except by the eyes of observers? Then at least the eye is sufficiently good to discover its own imperfections. But further, if the human eye did not polarise light, the caviller might allege that it is very inferior to the eye of the eagle; if it were made equal to the eagle's eye, still it might not be sufficiently acute to discern stars of the seventh and lower magnitudes, not

* Fraunhofer discovered that a wire placed at the focus of the object glass of a telescope and visible by red light, was not visible by violet light, even after correcting the distance between the lenses by an amount equal to the difference in refrangibility of the colors. The further alteration needed is due to a chromatic aberration of the eye. It is a curious fact that the unavoidable spherical aberration is corrected in the eye by the iris acting as a diaphragm, *i. e.*, the very expedient resorted to by opticians. But the iris is infinitely superior to any diaphragm of man's invention.

to mention nearly all the nebulæ. There is no stopping place. The Infinite could create nothing less than itself.

2d. The mechanical notion of perfection in God's works is altogether too narrow. This narrowness of survey characterises the lucubrations of the scientism of our day. To leave out God from the universe, and all the higher departments of human nature from the world, is not the way to arrive at any adequate understanding of the world or the universe. The laws and forces of matter are not for themselves; they are for man. There are higher needs in a physical universe than a perfection of mechanism. The grand and complex system of matter has a higher purpose, a nobler outlook. Where the material arrangements approach nearest to perfection, in the tropical regions where winter never comes, where the bread-fruit and the banana grow almost without man's labor or even supervision, just there man languishes in indolence. Where human intervention is most dispensed with, or, on the other hand, in the frozen zones where it accomplishes least, where it is thwarted and well-nigh paralysed, there man is least advanced. Man is most developed in an arena not of actualities, but of capabilities. The instructed Christian carries this thought farther, even up into the spiritual realm, and adores the wisdom that has left a field for divine intervention, in order to educate man in the sublime graces of faith, hope, and charity. The great God would have us trust in him. He would have us feel as should the children of the Lord God Almighty. Of the inexpressible sweetness of this feeling sceptics know nothing. In their madness they may sneer at it. We can only respond,

"Fools never raise their thoughts so high;
Like brutes they live; like brutes they die."

This confiding love to a person cannot be cultivated by practising a delusion upon us, and by teaching us to ask him to do now what he is not going to do now. The poor, ignorant Christian, still adhering to his primitive belief that God *hears* and *does*, might find prayer a refreshment. Its reflex influence might be most happy on him. But alas for the enlightened ones, who have discovered the imperfection of all such schemes

as admit of intervention! Can they continue to enact a farce? Impossible.

16. *In the seventh place*, the hypothetical solution is not Augustinianism, but a caricature thereof. Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world (*ἀπ' αἰῶνος*). The thoughtful Arminian is bound to go with us to this extent, that God's mind is fully made up as to everything that *He* himself is to do throughout eternity. When the fulness of the times comes, then he acts most freely in executing his holy, wise, and unchangeable purpose; unchangeable, because holy and wise. But this is not the mechanical outworking of machinery, according to a popular misconception of the Augustinian doctrine. It is the acting of a free, intelligent person; who must have purposes because he is a person, and if he did not act in pursuance of his purposes, could not act at all. It will not strengthen or extend Augustinianism to incorporate into it the foreign and indeed antagonistic element of the hypothetical solution. Nor will it conciliate and satisfy unbelief. One demand submitted to, the shout of triumph from the infidel camp will hardly have died away before another demand is made. Let truth, candor, and absolute justice be maintained; but yield an inch!—Never. L. G. BARBOUR.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Psalms. By T. C. MURRAY, Associate Professor of the Shemitic Languages at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 12mo, pp. 319. \$1.50.

It is a misfortune that the Hebrew Scriptures have received so little attention as a literature at the hands of English and American scholars. We are, therefore, the more ready to welcome the contribution which Mr. Murray has made to the literary treatment of a part of that venerable collection of writings which need not shrink from a comparison in the best qualities of literature with the productions of the most highly cultivated peoples of the past or present.

In the Preface to his Commentary on the Psalms, Dr. Addison Alexander expressed the hope that he might be able to produce a complete Introduction to the Psalms, in which he would have traversed the ground covered by Mr. Murray, and, in addition, would have given the principles of their exegesis. Unfortunately, this hope was not fulfilled. In the various Introductions to the Scriptures accessible to English readers and in the Commentaries on the Psalms, especially that of Delitzsch, the topics handled by Mr. Murray are more or less fully treated; but these Lectures will be found a fresh and attractive discussion of the origin, growth, and characteristics of our Psalm collection.

Mr. Murray, a son of the Rev. Dr. Nicholas Murray, so well known as a controversialist, in his Letters to Archbishop Hughes under the name of "Kirwan," was Professor of Shemitic Languages at the Johns Hopkins University, and took high rank in the body of eminent scholars gathered in this new institution of the higher learning. After graduating at Williams College and Princeton Seminary, he spent several years in Germany furnishing himself with a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew and the cognate languages, especially Arabic, under the guidance of such instructors as Ewald and Lagarde. His brief career as a Professor was closed

by his death in March, 1879, when only twenty-nine years of age, to the grief of friends, who had become attached to him because of his simplicity, purity, piety, and warmth of affection, and to the regret of the scholars of America, who had already prophesied for him eminence and success in his chosen field of study. These Lectures, which were concluded just a week before his death, form the only published memorial of his studies, except some articles furnished Johnson's Cyclopædia. He left in manuscript and well advanced towards completion a work on Hebrew Synonyms, now deposited in the Library of the Johns Hopkins University, and two papers on the Early History of the Shemitic People and on Case-forms in Shemitic. This book is indebted to the Rev. Dr. Toy for a general supervision in its publication and for a few explanatory notes. It should be said that these Lectures were not intended for specialists, but were delivered to a general audience, not supposed to be acquainted with the Hebrew.

In the first two Lectures Mr. Murray leads up to his proper subject by an outline of the early history of the Shemitic people, and of the history and characteristics of the Hebrew language and literature, and the collection of the Scriptures in their present shape. He then enters upon the criticism of the Psalms, treating the history of the collection as a whole and the five books which constitute it, and discussing individual Psalms in more or less detail. We shall sum up his conclusions in his own words :

“What we call the Psalter is a collection of the various books of religious song, which grew up around and were compiled for the sake of the worship of the Second Temple between the return under Joshua and Alexander's conquest of Palestine, say during the two centuries between 537 and 337 B. C. The First Book was compiled for the opening worship of the restored Temple by some priest connected with the early return, who draws his material exclusively from the service-book of the Solomonic Temple, ‘The Sacred Songs of David.’ The Second and Third Books were prepared by Nehemiah, about a century later, and were part of his reform in the service. He not only borrows from the service-books of the older Temple, but also has gathered many other poems, whose beauty of form or religious expression commended them to him as of value for sacred song. The Fourth Book was compiled by some scholar in connexion with the Temple, about fifty years later, to meet a want for liturgic

chorals which none of the other books supplied. Finally, toward the middle of the fourth century, the Temple board who had been charged with gathering, editing, and regulating the Sacred Books used in the service, came to take in hand the religious song of the Temple. They took the four books which were already in constant use, added to them a supplemental collection of new songs, cast the whole into a single book, giving to it as a prologue Psalm i., and as a doxology Psalm cl., and introduced it by their authority into the service of the Temple, where, with unessential variations, it ever after remained."

Allusion is made in the preceding extract to the "Sacred Songs of David." Mr. Murray interprets דָּוִדִּים as indicating not the authorship of David, but as an editorial mark to notify us that the Psalm was drawn from a former collection which he calls the "Davidic Book." Considerable space is given to the discussion of this Davidic Book, in the course of which David's characteristics as a poet and the number of Psalms to be referred to him are set forth with fulness. Here again Mr. Murray furnishes us a summary of statement :

"We saw that the older book received the title Davidic, from the usage, so common in the Orient, of naming a collection from the one who inaugurates it, or whose contributions form its oldest or most considerable part; that though the Davidic authorship of each and all of these hymns has been sharply disputed, it may be shown on grounds as reasonably assuring as we can have for any ancient literature, that David wrote many, perhaps most, of the poems that have been preserved to us from the service-book which bore his name. On the other hand, we saw that a number of poems in the Davidic Book so clearly belong to a time subsequent to David, that it cannot have lain before our Psalter-collectors in the form into which it was cast by him; that they probably used it in the revised and enlarged shape given it at the reorganisation of the Temple service in the reign of Hezekiah, and to this last view we showed there could be no objection, as we possess at least the Proverbs in the shape in which they were edited by a literary commission which was appointed by the same king."

It is readily seen that Mr. Murray does not regard the Inscriptions as part of the inspired record, but as having an editorial origin and editorial authority. The reasons for this view are given in a Lecture preceding the one from which the above quotation is made.

The most striking features in these Lectures is the acuteness

of insight and delicacy of taste displayed by the author in his literary criticisms. Perhaps his remarks on Psalm xlii., which belongs to the Korahite Songs, and of which Psalm xliii. is but the concluding part, will best illustrate those qualities :

“The singer is in exile or captivity among heathen enemies to whom his religion is a source of mocking. The situation is in the outlying spurs of Anti-Lebanon. He hears the Jordan gush seething from its fountain heads at Baneas and dash roaring down its rocky defile, cataract calling to cataract, on its way toward Merom. He sees the sunny dome of Hermon rising before him, but deems it of less beauty than the little hill of Zion, where rises the city and Temple of his affection. He is one of the Temple singers, who recalls with fondest recollection the time when among his brethren he had led with music and song the festal procession into the holy place. When the Psalm was written we cannot say, but it must have been long after the establishment of the Temple and its worship. If we accept any hypothesis at all, that of Vaihinger is the more probable, that its author was one of the Levites banished by the usurper Athaliah. Whoever wrote the Psalm, it marks the highest attainment of the lyric art among the Shemitic people—some say among any people. The balance of the rhythm, the exquisite poise of the sentences, the minute and dainty touch in the setting of the words, give to the song an almost indescribable beauty. There lies hid under the general name, ‘Sons of Korah,’ an artist whose name should be inscribed on the roll of the world’s literature as chief among the masters of pure form.”

In addition to the topics already mentioned, Mr. Murray touches at more or less length on the Anonymous and Vindictive Psalms, the Epic and Dramatic Poetry of the Hebrews, the Songs of Degrees, Shemitic Song and Music, the Musical Inscriptions of the Psalms, the Music of the Second Temple, and other matters of like interest.

It was our wish to criticise in detail some of the views of Mr. Murray, but we forbear. We must, of course, dissent from his theory of Inspiration, which, if not announced clearly, can at least be gathered from the coloring it imparts to his judgments on several questions. He was a firm believer in supernatural inspiration, but allowed such play to the human element as, in our opinion, would logically overthrow this belief. His defective views have, at least, not led him to that radicalism which attempts to identify itself with the only true scholarship. The general conservatism of the book is seen in the position taken on David’s

authorship of the Psalms, indicated in the extract made from the discussion on the Davidic Book, and more particularly in the attitude assumed towards what are perhaps the two uppermost questions with Biblical students, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and the Maccabean authorship of the Psalms. In regard to the first question Mr. Murray makes this deliverance:

“The fairest summing up of the outcome of the whole discussion is probably this: that the Mosaic literature in its main lines, its documents, its genealogies, and its laws, is the product of the great mind who laid the foundation of the Jewish state; that it first passed from documentary to literary shape, after the rise of the Jewish kingdom had given the order and leisure necessary to literature, and finally was edited after the exile by those who collected the canon, with annotations on many points of interest to their time, which in the original were obscure.”

As regards the second question, Mr. Murray states and refutes the extreme theory of Justus Olshausen, who maintains that, excepting perhaps a half-dozen, all the poems of our present Psalm book are the production of the times of the Maccabees. We shall quote our author's arguments, which would seem conclusive, and which will further serve to show what sort of thing confessedly learned men put forth under the name of “Criticism”:

“If they are Maccabean in origin, how is it that this same collection is found in the translation of the Septuagint, contemporaneous at the latest with the Maccabean period, and made by Greek scholars who, if not hostile, were at least indifferent to the Maccabean struggle, and would have taken as the old Temple melodies no collection of Maccabean hymns, and whose inscriptions of the Psalms, in the titles, to the early prophets, show that they were not consciously translating any contemporaneous songs?”

“How is it that, not fifty years after this Maccabean struggle, when its memories were still fresh in men's minds, this collection is constantly spoken of as by David and the men of the older time, without any trace of reference to the persecution whose scars had not yet been healed?”

“Lastly, if we accept as the date of Chronicles the pontificate of the High Priest Jochanan, toward the close of the Persian period, B. C. 405-359, where it is most generally referred, we shall have convincing proof against the Maccabean origin of our book, for in 1 Chronicles xvi. 36 we find a cento made up of fragments from Psalms xvi., cv., cvi., with certain liturgical notes which could not very well have been borrowed until the collection had assumed its present shape.

“In a word, could we believe the Psalm Book to be a collection of Mac-

cabean poems, we should have to resign all confidence in history which was not coincident with our own personal experience."

Psalms lxxiv. and lxxix., Mr. Murray thinks, may be from this period, but leaves this an open question, in which conclusion he keeps company with Calvin.

It is a consideration of some value that a competent critic, who cannot be accused of being influenced by the necessities of theological exposition, of which such complaint is made, decides on purely literary grounds that the radical theories on these two points of controversy are untenable. It is certainly refreshing to follow Mr. Murray after coming in contact with Mr. Michael Heilprin in his "Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews," two volumes of which have issued from the press of the Appletons, and who, if it be possible, out-Kuenen's Kuenen. Without holding ourselves responsible for the correctness of Mr. Murray's views, we can commend his Lectures to all who love the songs of the sweet singers of Israel; and we have no doubt that he now unites with those divine poets, whom he loved so well on earth, in the nobler songs of the Church above. C. R. H.

Faith and Character. By MARVIN R. VINCENT, D. D., Pastor of "The Church of the Covenant," New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 743 and 745, Broadway. 1880. 12mo, pp. 376.

A book of sermons numbering twenty in all. "The two thoughts of FAITH and CHARACTER underlie the whole book. Each sermon deals either with the relations and bearings of character, or with the principle of faith in the unseen as its only permanent basis." These sermons are a fine specimen of the combination of doctrinal and practical theology. The style is simple and clear, the arguments forcibly presented, the doctrines sound, the practical applications naturally deduced, and oftentimes pressed home with vigor. There is no sensationalism about the book, no maudlin sentiment, but every page exhibits the earnest minister intent on doing good—lasting good by faithfully preaching Christ and him crucified. There is no stiff or artificial arrangement of the thoughts presented, everything seems to flow easily and naturally. They are

not pulpit essays upon theological topics, but practical sermons upon Bible doctrines. It would be an appropriate addition to the Congregational Library. The man of business pressed with his secular cares, the invalid, the afflicted and bereaved, they who have much of this world's goods and they who have little or none, may each find something in this volume to sustain, to comfort, and to profit.

In his Preface the author says :

"If it shall do aught, within the Church itself, to prick that dangerous conceit, that emotional raptures, or activity in Church work, or regular ecclesiastical standing, can be substitutes for solid goodness and for consistency of conduct; if it shall go to strengthen the emphasis upon the fact that religion is a development of character, and is not summed up in the single experience which inaugurates that development; . . . if, above all, it shall help any man to a larger and clearer view of the divine Saviour, and shall enable him to discover a new meaning in manhood and a new dignity and sweetness in duty through their relation to Jesus Christ, it will not have been written in vain."

The twenty sermons are classified under two general heads—*Faith, Character*; seven sermons under the former, and thirteen under the latter. Those on Faith are again subdivided into— I. Faith in the Unseen. II. Intercourse with the Unseen. III. Christ the Interpreter of the Unseen. Those on Character are subdivided into— I. Its Integrity. II. Its Development. III. Its Risks. IV. Its Independence. V. Its Attitude toward Men. VI. Its Active Side. VII. Its Eternity.

By way of illustrating the author's style and method, let us take an extract or two. In the third sermon—"What think ye of Christ"—

"Now when I say that Christ occupies to-day precisely the same position with reference to current thought, I do not merely state an opinion that the subject is as important now as then; I state a fact, let it be accounted for as it may, that a man who thinks at all can hardly be in contact with nineteenth century civilisation and not be compelled to think of Christ. All attempts to banish him into the region of remote history are vain. The age has gotten past other men. Plato, Socrates, Cæsar, Alexander, Homer, and Virgil—all confessedly great men, are yet instinctively felt to belong to the past. But the age does not get past Christ. He is as distinctly, yea, more distinctly, a fact of the nineteenth century

than of the first. In a hundred different ways he appears in the philosophy, the politics, the social science, the statesmanship, the language, the ordinary customs of the present. He is historical, but he is more than historical. He is a memory, but he is also a power, and a growing power; and the position of modern society in reference to Christ is very well represented by Pilate's dilemma when the Saviour was brought before him. He could not but respect him; he wanted to avoid the responsibility of dealing with him. He sent him to Herod, and Herod sent him back, and he had to dispose of him in some way, and Pilate never had a harder question to settle than that which he propounded to Jews, 'What shall I do then with Jesus of Nazareth, who is called Christ?' Christ is in the way of the nineteenth century. He cannot be waved out of the way, nor argued out of the way, nor driven out of the way, nor ignored. He must be confronted and dealt with, no matter how many Pilates desire to wash their hands of him. He was a troublesome fact in his own time, but the trouble has taken on a thousand new forms since that. His own time dealt with him at last, and thought it had gotten him safely out of the way; but the resurrection disappointed its hopes, and Christ, being raised from the dead, has been proving to every succeeding age that he dieth no more. An age that is annoyed by his presence, and stirred into opposition by his power, is yet forced to hear with chagrin, the words so dear to his disciples. 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'

Take another extract, from the sermon on "Meat or Drudgery," John iv. 34:

"The tendency of religious thought for some years back has been to expect work. This has grown in part out of the enormous needs which have forced themselves on the attention of Christians, and partly out of a reaction from a morbid, self-contemplative, brooding, and speculative type of piety. In many ways this reaction was healthful. It stimulated the Church to enterprise and liberality, made her more aggressive, and more familiar with the world's needs. On the other hand, it tended and ran to a dangerous extreme. In the vigor and variety of action, the true motive power of Christian action fell into the shade. In their zeal to *do*, men forgot that out of their *hearts* were the issues of life, and neglected to keep their hearts with all diligence. They began to substitute work for prayer, and sometimes to cajole conscience with the poetic prettiness that to labor is to pray! And it came to pass thus that many a man concealed real spiritual poverty, prayerlessness, uneasiness of conscience, want of peace with God, under stirring activity in Christian enterprise. Under cover of this terrible fallacy, legitimate impulses to duty were being weakened while so-called duty was being done. Men were building reputations for Christian activity upon foundations which were rotting beneath them. They were conducting Sunday-schools, and organising

societies, and promoting conventions, saying Lord, and Lord, and doing many wonderful works, when they knew not the secret of the Lord. You are seeing some of the fruits of that fallacy now. The tests of these awful days are probing deeper than men's activities. They are cutting down into the secret places of character. It is coming to light how much so-called religious energy was the result of natural enthusiasm and love of action, of the instinct of organising and leading, and how much of true love and faith and solid godly principle."

Once more, we extract from Sermon XIX., "The Multiplied Oil," 2 Kings iv. 1-7—

"'What shall I do for thee?' But his next words must have seemed strange to her: 'What hast thou in the house?' She had told him she was destitute. She had come to him for aid, and yet he turned back to her own house, and asked what there was there.

"The opening of that house door is the opening of a familiar truth of God's administration; namely, that God in working for men, uses them and their possessions as far as they will go. Often a man goes to God for help in abject need, feeling that he has absolutely nothing wherewith to help himself, and is surprised at being told to go back and look over his own resources. . . . Just so God calls our attention to some little thing which we had not thought worth mentioning among our possessions and says, 'Use that.' The widow had not thought of paying her debt with the oil she had in the house. It was not a jar of oil, as we are accustomed to think, but only a little flask, used for anointing. Probably there was not half a pint in all, yet the prophet seizes upon this. 'What hast thou in the house? Only a little flask of oil? That is the very thing. That shall pay thy debt, and save thee thy children.' A flask of oil was not worth counting in liquidation of the widow's debt; but a flask of oil and God were good for any amount. And one of our errors is that, while we, perhaps, see the truth up to this point, we do not see it as a universal truth. We confine it to the occasional miracles of history; whereas these miracles are only illustrations of the law of God's economy in all time: *that power, consecrated to God, multiplies according to God's rule and not according to man's.* That law is in force just as much now as in the days of Elisha or of Christ. When there is something to be done, something for you to do, God says to you, 'What have you to do it with?' And you are very likely to say, Nothing, absolutely nothing. A very little money, a very small share of personal influence, a little gift of tongue or of pen, or possibly only the power to pray; but these are nothing. I have nothing fit to do this work. God rebukes you. He tells you plainly you look at the matter in the wrong way. He says to you, 'Do you call yourself my child; and do you think you are living under the narrow, niggardly economy of men? Am I restricted to what men

call great means to bring to pass great results? Cannot I, who made you and the world out of nothing, do this work with your little gift, as well as with something greater? Bring forth your little money. Utter your little word. Write your little line. Breathe your prayer, and see what your Father in heaven can do?"

J. L. M.

Home Worship: A Series of Topical Prayers for use in the Family Circle. By the late JAMES W. WEIR, of Harrisburg, Pa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1,334 Chestnut Street. 12mo., pp. 318.

This is a profitable book for the family and the closet. The spirit of true devotion manifests itself in every page. It is not intended to be used as a "Prayer Book," but to "guide and help the reader by suggesting trains of thought and forms of expression." Used in this way, it cannot be otherwise than useful to all who engage in prayer—private, social, and public. The author was for many years, and until his death in 1878, "an officer in the Harrisburg (Pa.) National Bank, a ruling elder in the Market Square Presbyterian church, and the Superintendent of its Sunday-school." He seems to have enjoyed in a remarkable degree the gift of prayer, and to have diligently cultivated it. "For many years it was a habit with him, in the intervals of pressing public business, and after the wearying cares of the day were over, to refresh his own soul and to cultivate the power of expression in prayer by committing his prayers to writing. Prayer was a study to him." Mr. Weir was evidently familiar not only with the words of Scripture, but also with the words of the Shorter Catechism; and these productions of his pen exhibit how appropriately the very language of our Catechism may be interwoven with our petitions. If we would learn to pray as he did, we must cultivate the gift as he did; not by becoming the slaves of any set form, or the devotees of any book, but by careful meditation, by studying the word of God, by committing to memory the standards of our Church, by relying on the Spirit who helpeth our infirmities, by writing our own prayers (not having others to write them for us), by praying—in the closet, in the family, in the Sabbath-school, in the sanctuary—everywhere.

The table of contents furnishes a pretty full and suggestive

list of topics, some of which are subjoined—*e. g.*, “The Lord’s Prayer;” “Attributes of God,” “Christian Graces;” “Offices of Christ;” “Creation, Providence, and Redemption;” “Justification, Adoption, and Sanctification;” “Life, Death, and Eternity.” “Monthly Concert,” of which there are five; “Faith, Hope, and Charity;” “Talents;” “The World, the Flesh, and the Devil;” “Knowledge, Holiness, and Zeal;” “Trinity;” “Deprecations.”

J. L. M.

A Selection of Spiritual Songs, with Music, for Use in Social Meetings. Selected and arranged by REV. CHARLES S. ROBINSON, D. D. Scribner & Co., New York. Fine cloth, red edges, 8vo., 75 cents.

Dr. Robinson, under the patronage of the enterprising and prominent publishing house of Scribner & Co., has been a prolific compiler of hymn and tune books. There are no less than *seven* distinct volumes of this character to which his name is attached. And he certainly has eminent qualifications for this work, as is best proved by the unprecedented popularity and widespread use of his various collections. The special object of these numerous collections is, of course, different; and hence the number of them. One is designed to be a full and comprehensive collection of hymns and tunes for the regular worship of the great congregation upon the Sabbath; another is designed more especially for the choir, another for the Sabbath-school, and others to meet peculiar wants.

The volume before us is designed to be a manual specially adapted for use in prayer-meetings. And the object is certainly a worthy one. Lively, spirited singing is essential to the interest and success of such meetings. To secure this, it is of the utmost importance that a suitable hymn book should be used; and it is a great advantage to have appropriate tunes set to the hymns, with the music printed beside them. The felt necessity of all this has led to the extensive use in social meetings of the “Gospel Hymns,” issued under the auspices of Moody and Sankey. But however excellent and appropriate these may be for the special purpose for which they were intended, it can hardly be claimed

that there is sufficient compass in the range of subjects, or sufficient dignity of expression in many of the hymns and tunes to render these books suitable for ordinary use in our congregational prayer-meetings. The tendency of their constant use, we are persuaded, would be to lower the tone of our worship and make it too entirely sentimental.

But Dr. Robinson's book, as far as we have been able to judge from a somewhat cursory examination, admirably meets the wants of the case. It contains (with the Supplement, selected by Dr. Stuart Robinson, of Louisville) six hundred hymns, and three hundred and thirty distinct tunes. Thus the range of subjects, as well as of music, is amply large. And every hymn has an appropriate tune set to it and printed in full beside it, in the book.

In glancing through it, the following good points struck us :
1. The hymns appear to be choice. They consist largely of the standard hymns which are sung in most of our evangelical churches, with a sufficient sprinkling of the more modern hymns and songs which are of real merit. But we have observed nothing that is frivolous or ephemeral in character. 2. The tunes are good ; for the most part such as have proved their excellence by their popularity. In turning over page after page, we have been pleased and gratified at finding so many of the sweet tunes, old and new, which nearly everybody loves. 3. The tunes set to the several hymns seem to be remarkably appropriate to them. This we regard a very important matter, not only for the value of the book, but also for the practical use of the hymns. We often wish that every hymn we love had its own proper tune, to which it should always be sung. 4. The hymns are short. They range usually from two to five stanzas, none more than five. This, too, is important, especially in social meetings. Scarcely anything kills out the spirit of singing more quickly than long hymns. It is not often the case that more than four stanzas should be sung under any circumstances. Lastly, the book is printed on fine paper in large clear type, with an ample index, is neatly and substantially bound in cloth, and sold at a low price. To any of our congregations that can afford a separate book for their prayer-meetings, we would recommend the trial of this. T. H. L.

A True Republic. By ALBERT STICKNEY. New York: Harper & Bros. 12mo, pp. 271.

We wish everybody would read this book. To say that we endorse every sentiment and approve every doctrine would be too much. Still we do approve it in the main, and for one would be heartily willing to see these United States enter upon the experiment of amending the Constitution according to the suggestions of this author. There is every evidence of careful study and matured thought. The titles of Chapters II., III., and IV. are extremely felicitous in condensing in a single phrase the doctrine of each chapter—thus bringing it out into bold relief; *e. g.*: “Hereditary Monarchy—The Tyranny of Kings;” “Constitutional Royalty—Unfinished Revolution;” “False Republicanism—The Tyranny of Party.” Those who frequently express their admiration for the English Government as far superior to Republican, would do well to ponder carefully the exposure of the English system as it is presented in the Third Chapter and in the Appendix.

In his “Note,” which serves instead of a Preface, the author says, amongst other good things :

“The immense growth of party which we have had in this country is something new in history. I do not think its evils have been duly weighed; nor do I think its causes have been carefully studied. It has been too readily assumed that political parties are desirable things in the State. We speak of the abuses of party government. Is it certain that party government now has its uses?”

“Party and party rule, as they now exist with us, are, as I believe, great evils—evils which naturally and certainly result from certain features in our political system.

“In private life we find in every profession and employment many men who do their work as well as they know how. We have at times such men in public life; but, as a rule, our public men do their work, not as well as they know how, but only as well as the interests of party will allow them. Many of those men have good intentions, but they are bound in the chains of party. Party controls the selection of our public servants; it controls their actions.”

Again, in the “Introductory” Chapter :

“We had at first in our public service the best men in the country, and we had from them their best work. The men we now have in the public

service are not our best men ; nor do we have from them the best work that even they can give us. . . . But it has already been said that our system of government is such as necessarily and certainly to keep out of the public service our best men, and is such as to make it certain that the men in our public service will not give us their best work. The main inquiry here made, then, will be what changes, if any, we need in our political system, in order to secure in each department of our public service—
1. Our best men ; 2. Their best work.”

Of course it is not attempted in this brief notice and by these few extracts to do justice to Mr. Stickney's book ; to be appreciated the book must be read. In conclusion we copy a brief outline of his system as presented in the first part of the Eleventh Chapter :

“Let us now see what are the conclusions to which we have been led.

“The chief points which have been here maintained are these : 1. Public officers must have only one kind of work. There must be no confusion of legislative and executive administration. 2. Each officer must be held 'responsible'—for doing well the work of his own office. No man then must hold office for life, or for any term of years or days, but only for so long as he does well the work of his office. 3. Each executive officer must be made responsible to his immediate superior in office. Every head of an executive office or department must, then, have the power of appointing and removing all his subordinates in that office or department. 4. There must be one Chief Executive at the head of the executive administration, who must be held responsible for all that executive administration. 5. That chief executive must be responsible directly to the supreme assembly. 6. That chief executive must be chosen by the votes of the whole people through the machinery of an electoral college. 7. There must be some one power in the State which is supreme over all citizens and officers. 8. This supreme power must be an assembly, of a reasonable number of men, chosen by the people. 9. This assembly shall have the power—*a.* To make all necessary laws. *b.* To raise and disburse the people's revenues. *c.* To create and abolish all officers (except that of chief executive) and regulate their duties. *d.* To remove all officers. *e.* To appoint no officers. 10. Aside from this framework of executive officers, and from this supervising council, is the judiciary—the body of men who dispense justice. As they have to pass on the acts of both executive officers and of this supervising body, let them, too, be elected by the people. Let them, too, be removable by the legislature, as there is no permanent body of men with whom that power of removal can be so well left. That is substantially as it is now arranged.

“This is the statement of all the positions, which it has been attempted

to establish in this argument, by an examination of the results of actual experiments in government mechanics.”

This system is then compared with the “present English system.” He then enumerates the changes which would be made in our “present national system” :

“1. We abolish the term system. 2. We give to Congress—*a.* All the legislative power. *b.* None of the appointing power. *c.* The removing power, by a two-thirds vote, for any cause in their discretion. 3. We give the chief executive and his heads of departments—*a.* None of the legislative power. *b.* Full appointing and removing power as to executive officers. 4. We have the electoral college meet in one place, and make it the judge of the qualifications and elections of its own members, as the Houses of Congress now are. 5. In case of a vacancy in the office of President from any cause, we have the senior head of department act as President until a successor is chosen.”

It will be noticed, that in refusing all legislative power to the chief executive, he is thereby deprived of the veto-power.

“And the question is, whether we will continue an experiment [the Constitution] which we know has failed, or will try a new experiment which we think may succeed.”

J. L. M.

VOL. XXXI., NO. 4—22.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We do not mean to confine ourselves this quarter to the issues which have already found their way to the counters of the book-sellers, but to refer as well to those which are announced by the publishers as immediately forthcoming. The most interesting account we have met with of the origin of the English and American *Jury* is in Green's Short History of the English People. This is but one phase of the more general subject handled in the little treatise of Mr. Abbot.¹ The Irish songs and tales of the merry author of "Molly Bawn" and "Barney O'Reirdon" entitle him to at least a passing consideration.² The question about the Banks³ and their relation to the Government of the country, involves the whole congeries of questions about politics and economics. The epistolary literature of four hundred years⁴ affords an ample and fascinating theme to one who is apparently worthy to walk in the footsteps of the late Professor Holcombe of the University of Virginia, who has given himself a wider range than that which circumscribed the effort of his accomplished predecessor. The splendid success of Mr. Green in his "Short" history has tempted him to compete with the more voluminous historians on their own ground.⁵ So Benvenuto Cellini not content with his unrivalled fame amongst the goldsmiths of Florence and his unmatched skill in chiselling marvellous figures in gems and in the precious metals, executed his

¹Judge and Jury. A Popular Explanation of Leading Topics of the Law of the Land. By Benjamin Vaughn Abbot. 12mo, cloth, \$2. Harper & Brothers, New York.

²Samuel Lover. By Andrew James Symington. 16mo, cloth. *Ibid.*

³The National Banks. By H. W. Richardson. 32mo, paper, 25c.; cloth, 40c. *Ibid.*

⁴Four Centuries of English Letters. Selections from the Correspondence of One Hundred and Fifty Writers from the Period of the Paston Letters to the Present Day. Edited and arranged by W. Baptiste Scoones. 12mo, cloth. *Ibid.*

⁵History of the English People. By John Richard Green. Vol. IV.—The Revolution, 1683–1760. Modern England, 1760–1815. With three maps. 8vo, cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

great bronze statue of Perseus slaying the sea-monster that now stands in front of one of the old Florentine palaces. In this walk he had a number of competitors; in the other he was unique and alone. Yet as the large work of Cellini is as noble as the small is exquisite, so may the same thing be said of the twofold work of Green. There is a sort of affectation now with some people of saying much about "the Christ";¹ but aside from that, we do not care for invented stories about Jesus, when we have inspired biographies about our Lord. We know nothing as to the special claims of this particular venture. As to the "Plymouth Brethren,"² as they are styled, there is much said *pro* and *con*. They have a very engaging way with them, but are sadly in error; and many, of other names, are badly tarred with their stick. The averment in each particular case that such and such a person is "one of them," calls for good and solid substantiation. We hail with gratitude every new exertion in defence of the blessed Sabbath of our ancestors and of the Christian Scriptures.³ Even in the South the pressure of the sea against the dikes is becoming day by day more and more alarming. The great work on "Sales," etc., is that of Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, formerly of Louisiana, but now the acknowledged leader of the English bar: but Mr. Benjamin's work is necessarily of a somewhat insular character. Mr. Landreth's "Brief Analysis"⁴ is perhaps better suited to this climate, and is apparently less of a professional law-book. Having had occasion not long ago to say a word about the author of "The Robbers," it is hardly desirable that we should say another word.⁵⁶⁷⁸

¹Ben Hor: A Tale of the Christ. By General Lew Wallace. 16mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

²The Doctrines of the Plymouth Brethren. By the Rev. Henry Wallace. Presbyterian Board of Publication, Philadelphia.

³The Sabbath Vindicated. By the Rev. R. Armstrong. *Ibid.*

⁴A Brief Analysis of Sale. By Lucius S. Landreth. Rees, Welsh & Co., Philadelphia.

⁵Schiller's Complete Works in English. With 56 full-page illustrations. 2 vols., 8vo, 1,282 pp., cloth, \$4.50. Iz. Kohler, Philadelphia.

⁶Schiller's Complete Works in German. 8vo, cloth. *Ibid.*

⁷Schiller's Complete Poems in English. Illustrated. Cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁸Schiller's Complete Poems. German and English on opposite pages. Illustrated. \$2. *Ibid.*

We have found much instruction and solace in perusing certain chapters of Canon Vaughan's exceedingly valuable book about the religious mystics.¹ There is, by the bye, a curious flexibility in regard to the use of the terms "mysticism" and "rationalism." No one is prepared to challenge the undeniable learning and vivid imagination of Renan; the only things he lacks are trustworthy judgment, orthodox opinions, and spiritual faith. The farther off such men keep from *the citadel* of Christianity (as *here*²) the less are their assaults to be regretted. The somewhat flagging interest in the sage (and god) of Buddhism³ has been generously reawakened by the superb poem of Edwin Arnold. Buddhism⁴ is perhaps the nearest approach that heathenism has made to the ethics of Christianity; but the interval between the two systems is like the interval between light and darkness. In its earlier form Buddhism seems to have been Pantheistic. Subsequently it assumed the shape of a very subtle kind of atheism. The esoteric doctrines are many of them inviting; but the exoteric have engendered the most debasing superstitions.

The extraordinary attention now paid to art and to biography is rewarded by several entirely distinct sets of lives of the great painters. Those of the Harpers are, we judge, not inferior to any other series. The great advantage in having these "artist biographies"^{5,6} is that you then have a complete pictorial representation of all the most famous of the "old masters," besides other

¹Hours with the Mystics. By C. J. Vaughan. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$7.50. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²The Hibbert Lectures, 1880. On the Influence, etc., of Rome, on Christianity. By Ernest Renan. 8vo, cloth, \$4.20. *Ibid.*

³The Life and Legend of Guadama, the Bud[d]ha of the Burmese. With Annotations, the Ways to Neibbun, and Notice on [*sic*] the Phonygies, or Burmese Monks. By the Right Rev. P. Bigandet, Bishop of Ramatha. Third edition. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$8.40. *Ibid.*

⁴Chinese Buddhism. A volume of Sketches, Historical, Descriptive, and Critical. By Joseph Edkins. Vol. XVII. of Philosophical Library. Crown 8vo, 443 pp., \$4.50. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston.

⁵Landseer. By Frederick G. Stephens. (Illustrated Biographies of the Great Artists.) \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶Reynolds. By F. S. Pulling, M. A. (Illustrated Biographies of the Great Artists.) \$1.25. *Ibid.*

celebrated pictures. Macaulay's *poetry*¹ is as much *underrated* by the overweening admirers of Tennyson, as Macaulay's *prose* is *overrated* by a generation that has forgotten Bolingbroke, Southey, and Burke. The English poet who has said the most memorable things after Shakespeare is possibly Milton; possibly Pope; but possibly, too, Wordsworth. The poetry of Wordsworth,² like the written and spoken prose of Goldsmith (as estimated by Dr. Johnson), is due to an astounding coalition between "an angel" and "poor poll." What is good in the lake poet is, however, better than almost anything to be found elsewhere. The title³ adopted by Mr. Johnson for his satirical critique of contemporary politics in Europe reminds one of that given to "The Comedy of Convocation." We question if the book be so lively and clever.

This work of President Edwards on the *Economy*⁴ of Grace is not to be confounded with his well known History of Redemption. It is hardly too much to say no one has ever equalled that "prodigy of metaphysical acumen" (as Robert Hall calls him) in the union of immense dialectical power with profound knowledge of the human heart. John Owen was far more learned, and had more practical sagacity, and Augustine possessed a higher order of genius; but it is probable neither Augustine nor Owen was a match for Jonathan Edwards in the peculiar conjunction of attributes just referred to. The jovial companions whose exploits are chronicled by Mr. Stockton⁵ had a capital time together, and their journeyings were the occasion of this amusing volume.

¹Lays of Ancient Rome. With Ivry and the Armada. By Lord Macaulay. New edition. With forty beautiful illustrations by J. R. Meguelin, Post 8vo, cloth, extra gilt. *Ibid.*

²Wordsworth's Poetical Works. The "Arundel Poet's" edition. With portrait and illustrations. 8vo, \$4.20. *Ibid.*

³The Political Comedy of Europe. By David Johnson. Small post 8vo, cloth, \$2.40.

⁴Observations Concerning the Scripture *Economy* of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption. By Jonathan Edwards. With Introduction and Appendix by Prof. Egbert C. Smyth. 12mo, cloth, \$1. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁵A Jolly Fellowship. By Frank R. Stockton. 32mo, cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

Everything about the land of "the Nihilists" is caught up now by a wide class of readers. An American army officer would appear to be the right man to write¹ about the army of the great Slav empire. Professor Bowen has risen into deserved prominence amongst transcontinental thinkers, by reason of his "Logic" and his "History of Modern Philosophy." A book of literary and personal reminiscences² from such a pen is, we need not say, highly acceptable. The empire founded by Philip and signalised and spread by Alexander is traced to its beginnings³ by Mr. Curteis.

We are presented with five separate works of which the authors are apparently learned Israelites. The first is a discussion of first principles.⁴ The second is a practical help to the study of the Scriptures,⁵ and seems to make an appeal to the rationalising tendencies of the age. The third takes a broad view of the Jewish and the cognate races.⁶ The fourth touches a secret spring and lets us into the arcana of the Hebrew modes of logic.⁷ The fifth is an account of the regular teachers in the American synagogue.⁸ We receive all these treatises with pleasure, and have no sympathy with the persecuting spirit which would denounce or cast contempt on all the modern descendants of Jacob.

Hans Christian Andersen's "Märchen"¹² are inimitable in

¹Army Life in Russia. By Lieut. F. V. Green, U. S. A. 12mo, cloth. \$1.50. *Ibid.*

²Gleanings from a Literary Life. By Professor Francis Bowen. 8vo, cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

³Rise of the Macedonian Empire. By A. M. Curteis. 16mo, cloth. \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴Essay on Religion, from a Historical and Philosophical Standpoint. By Morris M. Cohn. Paper, 50c.

⁵A Guide for Rational Inquiries into the Biblical Writings. By the Rev. Isidor Kalisch. Cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶The Semitic Nation. By Dr. D. Chwolson, Ord. Prof. at the Imperial University of St. Petersburg. Translated by Eph M. Epstein, M. D. Paper, 50c. *Ibid.*

⁷The Rabbinical Dialectics. By Dr. Aaron Hahn. Cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁸The American Jewish Pulpit. Cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

¹²"Das Buch der Märchen." By Andersen, Bethstein, Grimm, etc. 4to, 384 pp., cloth, \$3. M. & R. Burgheim, Cincinnati.

their native German. The stories by Grimm and others are generally superior in plot and suffer less by translation. We opine that *Der Hinkende Bote*¹ is after all no lame news-carrier. The Platt deutsch² is nearer to English than any other of the Teutonic dialects, and can boast at least one great writer. Then we have a nosegay of American verse. Dr. Holmes gave us a solemn and beautiful poem³ on the occasion of the celebration of his seventieth birthday. His theology is very indifferent; but his literature is of the best, his pathos and humor are often exquisite, and his wit and intellectual keenness hard to beat. Mr. Aldrich⁴ is at times very felicitous in a sort of rich, sensuous style, with faint reminiscences now of Keats, now of Herrick. Mr. Fields⁵ (if this be not some relative and namesake) has hitherto been known as a publisher, a letter-writer, a magazine editor, and a gossiping autobiographical essayist. Mr. Stedman⁶ has the ability (if he do not lack the will) to write justly of Poe.

The most graceful writer of English since Oliver Goldsmith that we can now call to mind is the author of the *Sketch Book* and of *Bracebridge Hall*.⁷ His chief strength does not appear in his "Columbus" or "Mahomet," much less in his "Washington," but in some of his tales and his more transitory essays. This is said to be an excellent edition. People who think of Holland as being gross, or dull, would have their eyes opened by going there. Holland⁸ is the synonym for all that is opulent and luxu-

¹*Der Hinkende Bote in America*, for 1881. 4to, 128 pp., paper, 25c. *Ibid.*

²*Plattdeutscher Volks Kalenner* (for Low Germans) for 1881. 8vo, 128 pp., paper, 25c. *Ibid.*

³*The Iron Gate and other Poems*. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. 16mo, cloth. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

⁴*Thirty-six Lyrics and Twelve Sonnets*. By T. B. Aldrich. 16mo, vellum. *Ibid.*

⁵*Ballads and other Verses*. By James T. Fields. 16mo. *Ibid.*

⁶*Edgar A. Poe. An Essay*. By E. C. Stedman. 16mo, vellum. *Ibid.*

⁷*Irving's Complete Works*. By Washington Irving. Spuyten Duyvil edition. 12 vols., 12mo, 900 pp. each, cloth, \$20. G. P. Putnam & Sons, New York.

⁸*Holland and its People*. By Edmundo de Amicis. Illustrated. 8vo, *Ibid.*

rious, as well as neat and commodious, in the present advanced state of material civilisation; for all the refinement, the comfort, the splendor, the taste, of substantial worth as well as of aristocratic elegance. *La voici!* A Japanese classic, or at all events a Japanese book,¹ done into the language of the British islands and the American mainland! Our old friend, "good Haroun Alraschid,"² like *Cœur de Lion*, poses better in romance than in veracious history; but we never tire of his passionate generosity; and Saladin and the Saracens is a subject worthy of Sir Walter Scott and John Lockhart. All that is much worth knowing about the first experiences³ of the human race is in the Bible. Frothingham knew something of Parker,⁴ and transcends the Transcendentalists;⁵ but knows no more of "the cradle" than of the cross "of the Christ."⁶

What will come next? Who would ever have thought to see Clarke's Commentary⁷ illustrated by *Gustave Doré*? Among the older class of English exegetes, the two Methodists, Whitby and Clarke, are unusually full in their quotations from the fathers, the classics, and the rabbins. Adam Clarke was not only a man of extensive learning, but of considerable independence and force of mind. Doré, it need not be said, is a man of original as well as eccentric and audacious genius, and has had great prac-

¹The Loyal Ronins. Translated from the Japanese by Edw. Greycy and Shinishiro Saiter. 8vo. *Ibid.*

²Haroun Alraschid and Saracen Civilisation. By Prof. E. H. Palmer. New Plutarch Series. Cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³The Creation and the Early Development of Mankind. By Professor J. H. Chapin. 12mo. *Ibid.*

⁴The Life of Theodore Parker. By the Rev. O. B. Frothingham. New edition. 8vo, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁵A History of Transcendentalism in New England. By the Rev. O. B. Frothingham. New edition. 8vo, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁶The Cradle of the Christ. By the Rev. O. B. Frothingham. New edition. 8vo, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁷Clarke's Commentary on the New Testament. With Marginal Readings and Parallel Texts. With a Commentary and Critical Notes. By Dr. Adam Clarke. New and enlarged edition. Finely illustrated with designs by Gustave Doré and other artists. Super royal 8vo, 1,002 pp., sheep, \$3. J. Fagan & Son, Philadelphia.

tice in illustrating sacred subjects. For ourselves we prefer to have our Bibles unadorned in this way. Side by side we find the two great historians who had their birth in Great Britain. They were both enemies of Christianity, but both reasonably fair as to their facts: neither of them has been accused of making a dishonest use of his authorities. Of the two, Hume¹ is the author of the best *general* history of England—certainly the best before Green's. Gibbon² is the author of the best history of the later Roman Empire, and is (in our judgment) the greatest of modern historical writers, not excepting Mommsen or Curtius. Mr. J. G. Wood is a reverent believer in the Bible and a thorough expert in his chosen³ department. Lovers of the dairy will be glad to know how to have one.⁴

These are two extreme views in relation to Dr. Tanner's fast.⁵ One is that he is an impostor, and has deceived his vigilant and, we presume, honest observers. The other is that he is the apostle of a new and important school of hygiene. We hold to neither of these views. We take it for granted that Dr. Tanner really fasted forty days, and regard the achievement as a very remarkable one. For the very reason just mentioned, we do not suppose that Dr. Tanner's famous exploit has shed much light on dietetics or physiology; although it has afforded new evidence of the power of the human *will*, especially when sustained by pride of opinion and a sense of injured reputation. The greatest master of uninspired eloquence of all time, if we may judge by the extent and permanence of the impress he has left behind him,

¹History of England. By David Hume. 5 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

²Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. By Edward Gibbon. 5 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

³Natural History. By J. G. Wood. Fully illustrated. 12mo, cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Keeping One Cow. Being the experience of a number of practical writers, in a clear and condensed form, upon the management of a single Milch Cow. Illustrated. 12mo, extra cloth, \$1. Orange Judd & Co., New York.

⁵Forty Days without Food. Dr. Tanner's Great Fast. By one of his Watchers. 12mo, 14 pp., paper, 10c. American News Company, New York.

was the renowned antagonist of the Macedonian intrigues in Greece.¹ The transient effect of other and even recent speeches may perhaps have been not inferior to that of the Philippics and the Oration on the Crown. "Christian Sociology" is a profoundly interesting subject, and has just been dealt with at the hands (not wholly incompetent, we imagine) of Dr. Stuckenberger.² Books made up of similes, historical parallels, anecdotes, and what not, are apt to contain some wheat and much cockle. It was said of Robert Hall that his imagery was indigenous. Those who import their imagery (and illustrations) are likely to be aided by this storehouse of materials.³ The best way is to find one's own parallels *inter legendum*. Undoubtedly the present Prime Minister of England (though hardly all that Mr. Justin McCarthy makes him out to be, in his "History of Our Own Times,") is one of the most commanding figures of the age; and shows largest as an orator, financier, and author. The miscellaneous products of his versatile and wonderfully active brain⁴ must always present attractions to a great body of his admirers and critics. This new and valuable work on the rising empire⁵ of that enlightened potentate Dom Pedro is to be received with the warmest satisfaction. The sketches of French *littérateurs* that are offered us by Mr. Mauris,⁶ are of the most entertaining nature. Victor Hugo

¹The Philippics of Demosthenes. By Frank B. Tarbell, Ph. D. 12mo, 100 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Ginn & Heath, Boston.

²Christian Sociology. By J. H. W. Stuckenberger, D. D. 12mo, 1,380 pp., cloth, \$1.50. I. K. Funk & Co., New York.

³Things Old and New. A Storehouse of Illustrations. By John Spencer. To which is added, A Treasury of Similes, by Robert Cawdry. 4to, 1,112 pp., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁴Gleanings of Past Years, 1843-'79. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P. 7 vols., 16mo, each \$1. Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁵Brazil: The Amazons and the Coast. By Herbert H. Smith. Illustrated from Sketches by J. Wells Champney and others. 1 vol., 8vo, extra cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁶French Men of Letters. Personal and Anecdotal Sketches of Victor Hugo; Alfred de Musset; Théophile Gautier; Henri Merger; Sainte-Beuve; Gérard de Nerval; Alexander Dumas, Fils; Emile Augier; Octave Feuillet; Victorien Sardou; Alphonse Daudet; and Emile Zola. By Maurice Mauris. Appleton's "New Handy-Volume Series." Paper, 35c.; cloth, 60c. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

is far enough from being a saint or an angel: but a transition from Victor Hugo to Emile Zola is the transition from Hyperion to a satyr. We object to the word "anecdotal," and object to it chiefly as appearing on a title-page. Those of us who remember the picturesque flowing brown beard and the liquid pathetic eyes of the Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth, particularly those of us who have heard (or even read) his persuasive language and really faultless English, would esteem ourselves somewhat the richer for his recollections of the time of banishment.¹

Mr. Heilprin is said to have written in a sober and reverential spirit, and with admirable knowledge and beauty, of the historic portions of the old Hebrew poetry.² Trench on "Miracles"³ is perfectly well known to our readers. We maintain that the theory of "Miracles" upheld by the lamented author is at fault in not allowing the Christian miracles to stand solely upon their own merits, and in subordinating them too much to the evidence deducible from a consideration of "the doctrines" which they support. We yield to no one in admiration of the learning and genius, as well as the devout spirit, displayed throughout the volume, and of the unequalled felicity of many of the expositions. Sir Theodore Martin, who now comes before us with the last volume of his royal biography,⁴ is the same who upwards of twenty years ago was associated with Aytoun in the "Ballads of Bon-Gaultier," the same who translated Horace and who wrote his life for the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. This is Sir Theodore's crowning work, and it reflects lustre at once upon the late Prince-Consort,

¹Memories of My Exile. By Louis Kossuth. Translated from the original Hungarian by Ferencz Jausz. One volume, crown 8vo, cloth. Price, \$2. *Ibid.*

²The Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews. Volumes I. and II. Translated and Critically Examined by Michael Heilprin. Crown 8vo, cloth. Price \$2 a volume. *Ibid.*

³Notes on the Miracles of our Lord. By Richard Chevenix Trench, D. D. New edition. 12mo. Price reduced to \$1.25. Uniform in style and price with new cheap edition of "Notes on the Parables of our Lord." *Ibid.*

⁴The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort. By Sir Theodore Martin. Fifth and concluding volume. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth. Price, \$2. Volumes I., II., III., and IV., at same price a volume.

the reigning Queen, and the very accomplished man of letters who is after all hardly more than its editor.

Professor Bastian's treatise on "the Brain"¹ is much glorified in the English journals as the only adequate discussion of the subject. Professor Bastian, like Dr. Maudsley, is one of the men that have to be watched, and who are not to be followed blindly. The best history of philosophy we ever examined is that of Schwegeler.² The astuteness and subtlety of not a few of the comments are undeniable and surprising. The first volume contains a noble conspectus of ancient classic thought. The critique of Spinoza is the most lucid, the most penetrating, the most incisive, the most damaging, since that of Bayle. The method of the work is rigidly uniform, and could not well be improved. The masterly and profound discussion of the Jena Professor³ has received the high and (so far as we know) unqualified endorsement of President Noah Porter of Yale College. Mr. Spencer is thought to have done nothing better than these essays on education.⁴ This we are not prepared to dispute. The writings of Herbert Spencer make up a wonderful mass of specialised knowledge; together with a series of logical paralogsms that take one's breath away, and a variety of monstrous absurdities, profane vagaries, doubtful or untenable propositions, hasty inductions, and glittering generalities; besides much that is new and valuable.

¹The Brain as an Organ of Mind. By H. Charlton Bastian, Professor of Anatomy and Clinical Medicine in the University College, London; author of "Paralysis from Brain Disease." With numerous illustrations. One volume, 12mo, 708 pages, cloth. Price, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

²A History of Philosophy in Epitome. By Albert Schwegeler. Translated from the first edition of the original German by Julius H. Seelye. Revised from the ninth German edition, containing Important Additions and Modifications, with an Appendix, containing the History in its more Prominent Lines of Development since the time of Hegel. By Benjamin T. Smith. 12mo, 469 pages, cloth. Price, \$2. *Ibid.*

³The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought, Critically and Historically Considered. By Rudolph Eucken, Ph. D., Professor in Jena. With an Introduction by Noah Porter, President of Yale College. 1 vol., 12mo, 304 pages, cloth. Price, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. By Herbert Spencer. A new cheap edition of Herbert Spencer's famous Essays on Education. 1 vol., 12mo, paper cover. Price, 50c.

Mr. Cooley's *Cyclopædia*¹ has been long before the people, and is praised in quarters from which we do not commonly look for deception. It has been revised and partly rewritten by a Professor Tuson. We are willing to believe that it is full of useful information. The book claims, we see, to be not only "a cyclopædia of receipts," but "a supplement to the pharmacopœia." According to our notion, when a man is pretty well, he had better "throw physic to the dogs"; and when a man is very ill, he (or his friends for him) had better lose no time in sending for a doctor. In other states of the system, intermediate between normal health and grave indisposition, and indeed in any state of the system, mineral springs, mountain haunts, wintering places, seaside resorts, and the like, also have their uses; often their inestimable uses. The continent of Europe, like our own country, has many justly famed places of this description,² to which vast multitudes annually repair for amendment or recreation.

¹Cooley's *Cyclopædia of Practical Receipts and Collateral Information in the Arts, Manufactures, Professions, and Trades, including Medicine, Pharmacy, and Domestic Economy*. Designed as a Comprehensive Supplement to the *Pharmacopœia*, and General Book of Reference for the Manufacturer, Tradesman, Amateur, and Heads of Families. Sixth edition. Revised and partly rewritten by Richard V. Tuson, Professor of Chemistry and Toxicology in the Royal Veterinary College. Complete in two vols., 8vo, 1,796 pages. With Illustrations. Price, \$9. *Ibid.*

²*Watering-Places and Mineral Springs of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland*. With Notes on Climatic Resorts and Consumption, Sanitariums, Peat, Mud, and Sand Baths, Whey and Grape Cures, etc. A Popular Medical Guide. By Edward Gutman, M. D. With maps and illustrations. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth. Price, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

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