

THE SOUTHERN
PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

VOLUME XXX.

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1879.

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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

VOL. XXX.—NO. 1.

JANUARY, MDCCCLXXIX.

ARTICLE I.

THE DIACONATE.*

The Committee appointed last year to report to the Synod, at its present meeting, on the subject of the Diaconate, respectfully present the following paper:

The Committee in taking up the subject referred to them have acted under the impression that the purpose of their appointment was not that they should attempt an exhaustive treatment of it, but should consider it in certain aspects in which either principles underlying the diaconal office may be developed, or theoretical differences be discussed, or the points indicated in which our practice is defective. Accordingly, we propose, after a brief statement of certain assumptions in reference to which there is universal agreement among us, to submit the results of our reflections under the following heads: first, The Relations of the Diaconate to the Presbyterate; secondly, The Scope of the Deacon's Functions; and thirdly, The Sphere of his Operations.

*This paper was presented as a report to the Synod at its recent sessions at Spartanburg, and appears in the REVIEW in accordance with a request of that body. It will be observed that the report was a partial one, discussing only the first head of the general scheme of topics which it proposes to cover. The Committee were directed to submit the remainder at the next sessions of the Synod.

In the first place, it is assumed that the office of the deacon was instituted by Christ, the King and Head of the Church, and therefore exists of divine right. This requires no discussion, since it is obvious that our standards, following the Scriptures, enounce the principle that an office which lacks a divine warrant is a mere human device, and should be excluded from the house of the Lord.

In the second place, it is assumed that the office of deacon is perpetual in the Church. "The ordinary and perpetual officers in the Church," says the Form of Government, "are bishops or pastors; the representatives of the people, usually styled ruling elders; and deacons." It is hardly necessary to state the distinction between the perpetuity of an office and its perpetual occupation by an officer. He may cease to be an officer by either deposition, or demission, or elevation to higher office, or removal by death, or transfer of membership. The officer may change, but the office remains permanent.

In the third place, it is assumed that the deacon is not a preacher. The designation of the end upon which his office terminates makes this clear. "The Scriptures," says the Form of Government, "clearly point out deacons as distinct officers in the Church, whose business it is to take care of the poor, and to distribute among them the collections which may be raised for their use. To them also may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the Church." The doctrine and practice of our Church are so firmly settled upon this point as to make it unnecessary that it should here be considered.

In the fourth place, the qualifications for the deacon's office are so distinctly specified in the Scriptures, that no difference of opinion can exist among us in regard to them. They are, therefore, taken for granted, with the simple remark, that they are partly spiritual and partly natural; but as the office takes its denomination from its end, and not from its qualifications, that of the deacon is said to be temporal in contradistinction from the others the ends of which are spiritual.

In the fifth place, we assume that the election of deacons is by the people. This has not been the practice of all the Reformed

Churches, but it is the law and practice of ours; and besides is settled by the precedent recorded in the sixth chapter of the Acts.

In the sixth place, we assume that the deacon ought to be ordained by the congregational presbytery, with prayer and the imposition of hands. This is not required by our present Constitution, but it may obviously be deduced from the scriptural account of the ordination of deacons; and the provision touching the matter in the Revised Book, sent down to the Presbyteries by the General Assembly, so clearly reflects the opinion of our Church, that discussion is now deemed unnecessary. Having premised these assumptions, we proceed to take up those aspects of the subject which particularly challenge our attention.

I. First, we will consider the Relations of the Diaconate to the Presbyterate. Under this head, we propose to speak, 1. Of the points of similarity and difference between the office of deacon and the other officers of the Church; 2. Of the theory that the higher office includes the lower; and 3. Of the relations of the deacon to the eldership in the practical working of our system.

FIRST. All the offices of the Church are reducible to their highest generic unity by the property of ministry. They are all ministers of Christ for the advancement of his glory, and ministers of the Church for the promotion of her welfare. Jesus himself said that he came not to be ministered unto, but to minister; and Paul declared that the Apostles preached not themselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord, and themselves the servants of the Church for Jesus' sake. What was true of the Apostles must be true of all lesser officers; and accordingly Peter exhorts presbyters to refrain from esteeming themselves lords over God's heritage. The appellation *deacon* is sufficient to show that the officer who bears that name is emphatically a servant of the Church. Accepting the usual distribution of functions as designating the chief end to which each kind of officers is to be devoted, we say that the preacher ministers by the word and doctrine, that the presbyter ministers by rule, and that the deacon ministers by distribution. Ministry, then, is the highest genus under which the offices of the Church may be collected. The whole essence

of the property of service enters into all the specific functions which church-officers are called to discharge. In this regard they are all alike.

But in order to ascertain the relations which the respective offices sustain to each other, it is necessary to point out the elements of difference between them, as well as that of similarity. We must go on to discover the proximate genus and the specific difference, in order to ascertain the peculiar properties and the limitations of the several offices. Now the ministry of the church divides itself into orders which furnish a lower generic unity. These orders are not three—the preacher, the presbyter, and the deacon, but two—the presbyter and the deacon. The order of the presbyterate is a proximate genus distributable into two species, which are distinguished from each other precisely by the possession or the non-possession of the property of preaching. One class of presbyters preach, and the other class of presbyters do not preach. The property of ruling is common, that of preaching peculiar and distinctive. The preacher and the ruling elder are not different as to order—they are generically the same officer. They differ only as to the performance or non-performance of a special function. We are not called upon here to vindicate this distribution, but content ourselves with the remark that the more closely it is examined the more distinctly will it be seen to be in accordance with the teachings of the Presbyterian Reformers. The doctrine of Calvin upon this point is very definitely expressed. We cite attention to his language in his comments upon the twenty-eighth verse of the twelfth chapter of First Corinthians. He says that Paul indicates a twofold order of presbyters—*duplicem ordinem presbyterorum*. He does not say two orders—*duæ ordines*, but a twofold order—*duplex ordo*; that is, clearly, one order with two distinct properties.

Now the deacon is not simply distinguished from the other officers by the possession of a specific property. He is generically different from them. He does not belong to the order of presbyters, with a specific function which peculiarly marks his office; he belongs to a different order, which has been generally designated by the title of distributors. He is not a presbyter who

distributes, as the preacher is a presbyter who preaches. He falls under an entirely different proximate genus; so that the difference between him and the other officers of the Church is generic and not merely specific, or, to speak perhaps with greater strictness, he is both generically and specifically different from them. In the case of the deacon the genus and the species are one and the same—the order and the function coincide. There is no division of the order diaconate into species, as in the case of the presbyterate. Let it be carefully observed, then, that the presbyterate and the diaconate are two distinct and separate orders, not indeed coördinate as to authority, but concurrent as to ministry. Whatever be the relations subsisting between them, it is evidently not that of generic identity. This is clear from the consideration of the object-matter about which each order of officers is concerned, and the ends which it contemplates. The one terminates mainly on persons, the other on ecclesiastical goods; the one is appointed for government, the other for distribution; the one is chiefly occupied with the care of souls, the other with the care of bodies.

SECONDLY. But here we are brought face to face with the next question which we proposed to discuss: Does the higher office include the lower? Does the presbyterate contain the diaconate? It is one which lies directly in the track of our exposition of the relation between the two orders, and which cannot therefore be logically evaded. What, then, is the doctrine concerning the inclusion of the lower office in the higher, as stated by those who have held it?

1. Sometimes it is thus expressed, as in the first revision of our Form of Government which was approved at Memphis, 1866, by the General Assembly: "He that is called to teach is called also to rule, and he that is called to rule is called also to distribute." If this language is to be strictly construed, it means that the obligation to distribute is as much bound upon the presbyter by a divine call as is that to rule upon the preacher.

2. Sometimes it is said to be a *virtual* inclusion of the lower office in the higher. This, for example, was the view expressed by the London ministers who were authors of the Divine Right of

Church Government. Their language is: "All the inferior offices are virtually comprehended in the superior, and may be discharged by them; elders may distribute as well as deacons, and beyond them, rule: pastors may distribute and rule as well as deacons and elders, and beyond both, preach, dispense sacraments, and ordain ministers: Apostles may do them all, and many things besides, extraordinary." Here the doctrine seems to be that the higher officers have the power possessed by the lower, so that in the absence of the lower they may actually discharge their functions. but in a regular condition of the church do not exercise that power.

3. But at other times, the ground is taken that there is an *actual* inclusion of the lower in the higher; so that the higher officers are not only empowered to perform the acts of the lower in an irregular and extraordinary state of the church, but in its regular condition may ordinarily discharge the functions of the lower. Thus, for instance, elders may cooperate with deacons in the joint administration of the business which properly belongs to the diaconal office. This is the view set forth in the Catechism of the Principles and Constitution of the Free Church of Scotland. To the question: "Does it not belong to the deacons alone to administer the secular affairs of the church?" the answer is: "The greater office always includes the less; the presbyter may, therefore, as a deacon, take part, when it is necessary, in conducting the 'outward business of the house of God.'" This is the theory in which the practice of holding what is known as the deacons' court is founded. The elders and deacons sit and vote together in relation to business which is properly diaconal. Such are the forms in which the doctrine is enounced, and it must be admitted that they are not coincident with each other; it becomes necessary, therefore, to settle the state of the question which we are discussing.

First, then, the question is not, whether the higher officers, when they are the only existing officers, may discharge the functions of the lower who are wanting. In that case, it is conceded that they not only may, but ought to, discharge those functions. Where no deacons can be obtained, the elders ought to perform

diaconal duties. But that, we conceive, is a different thing from saying that the elder is a deacon.

Secondly, the question is not, whether the ruling office includes the non-ruling and merely distributive, as an object upon which government terminates. In regard to that, there can be no dispute. The governmental administration of the affairs of the Church, as well temporal as spiritual, is lodged in the presbyterate. But in this sense, all ecclesiastical persons are included under the presbyterial office. The preacher who is the highest officer as well as the deacon who is the lowest are alike included under the jurisdiction of presbyterate.

Thirdly, the question *is*, whether in a regular condition of the church, in which its complement of offices is filled and in orderly operation, the higher office so includes the lower as to make it legitimate for the higher officer to discharge the functions of the lower. To state the question still more precisely, in relation to the matter immediately in hand, it is whether the presbyter is also a deacon, and whether, in a regular state of the church, he may therefore legitimately perform diaconal functions. And the question is, further, whether there may be a joint management by vote, or a joint execution, by presbyters and deacons, of business belonging to the deacon's office. This, then, is the precise question before us, and in undertaking to refute the doctrine that the higher office so includes the lower, we shall first consider the arguments in support of the affirmative, and then present those which occur to us in favor of the negative.

1. The first argument which we encounter is derived from alleged apostolic teaching and practice: the Apostle, the higher officer, included the presbyter and the deacon, the lower officers; therefore, reasoning from analogy—for there is no scriptural statement of the fact—the preacher, the higher officer, includes the presbyter and the deacon, the lower; and the presbyter, the higher, includes the deacon, the lower officer. There are here two questions: Do the Scriptures teach that the apostolic office included that of elder and deacon? and, if they do, is the analogical inference legitimate, that the preacher includes the elder and deacon, and the elder the deacon? In proof of the fact that

the Apostle included the elder, two passages are relied upon—1 Peter v. 1, in which the Apostle says: “The elders which are among you I exhort, who am also an elder”; and 2 John 1, in which the Apostle John styles himself an elder: “The elder unto the elect lady.” We submit that these passages are of too doubtful meaning to ground the doctrine of the inclusion of the lower office in the higher.

(1.) In the first place, they do not necessarily teach an inclusion of the lower in the higher office, but, for aught that appears to the contrary, only a divinely-ordained coëxistence of the two offices; and this view would seem to be supported by the fact that when the Apostles acted as Apostles, they did not act as elders, and, on the other hand, when they officiated as elders, they did not as Apostles. When they organised a church by the appointment and ordination of elders, they acted simply as Apostles; but the eldership having been constituted, whenever they sat with it in the exercise of joint rule, they acted not as Apostles but as elders. Thus, in the Synod of Jerusalem, they participated as presbyters with the body of the presbyters as, *quoad hoc*, their coördinates and peers in rule. The Apostle did not express himself as apostle mediately through the elder, but the Apostle who was at the same time also an elder expressed himself as elder. We see no reason to conclude that one office was included in the other, but merely that there was the concurrence of the generically distinct apostolic and presbyterial offices in the same person. At least the hypothesis of coexistence has as fair a support in the passages cited as that of inclusion; and as these are the only proof-texts adduced in behalf of the latter, we repeat it that they are too doubtful to furnish it an adequate ground.

(2.) In the second place, if it should be said that the Apostles were not only extraordinary teachers, but also extraordinary presbyters, and that as such they included the ordinary presbyters of the Church, we refer again to the fact that when they sat with the ordinary presbyters they did not sit as a superior order, with higher authority and rank than the other elders, but as coincident with them in order. They did not sit as prelates, but as the fellow-presbyters of their brethren.

(3.) But, in the third place, even if it could be proved from Scripture that the Apostle included the elder, the inference by analogy from that admission to the position that among the ordinary officers of the Church, the higher officer includes the lower would appear to be illegitimate. For, *first*, reasoning by analogy from the case of extraordinary and temporary officers to that of ordinary and perpetual, is, to say the least, too doubtful to ground a theory which takes on the aspect of a regulative dogma. *Secondly*, if the apostolic office as the higher included the presbyterial as the lower, this inclusion must be conceived either under the notion of the product of a genetic process of evolution, or of a result of logical classification. Let us suppose the former—that the elder's office was evolved, produced, out of the apostle's. Now pursuing the path of this analogical reasoning, it would follow that the elder's office as lower is evolved out of the preacher's as higher. But what is the fact? Every ordinary officer is, so to speak, produced, in the development of the steps looking to his induction into office, at the last, by ordination. No ordination, no officer. Now, in the ordinary and regular condition of the church, who ordains? The higher or the lower officer? The answer is, that it is not the preacher, the higher officer, who ordains the elder, the lower officer, but precisely the contrary—the elders ordain the preacher. The preacher is genetically evolved from the presbytery. But to press the analogy under consideration would be to establish the doctrine that the preacher ought to ordain the elder. The analogy therefore is deceitful. But if it be said that we conceive of the inclusion as the result of a logical reduction, then it must be held in the sense that the lower office is included under the higher as the species is included under the genus. If this be so, then as the whole essence of the genus is contained in the species and something more that is a peculiar property, the whole essence of the apostolate descends into the elder, and he is an apostle with an additional and distinctive function. That of course no one would hold. Further, the inference is drawn from the case of the apostle to that of the preacher. He includes the elder because he is the higher officer. But the genus, we have seen, is the presbyterate, and the preacher is a
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species; so that, logically speaking, the preacher is included in the elder and not the elder in the preacher. A species may be greater than the genus—man is greater than animal; so the preacher is greater than the elder, but, nevertheless, the genus includes the species, not the species the genus. Animal includes man, not the contrary. So, logically, the genus presbyterate includes the species preacher. The whole essence of the genus, presbyter, is in the preacher, and he is something more; but the contrary doctrine would lead to the position that the elder has the whole essence of the preacher as the generic officer, and something more that is distinctive, viz., the ruling function. Neither, therefore, upon one supposition or the other can the inference be drawn from the apostolic office that in the ordinary condition of the Church the higher office includes the lower. It would seem indeed that the lower and generic office, presbyter, includes the higher and specific office, preacher, and that all we can determine is, that in the defect of the lower officer, the higher officer may discharge his functions. There is no need to formulate a theory as to the inclusion of one office in another, but simply to hold that one officer may be called upon occasionally to perform the acts habitually pertaining to the other.

The truth would appear to be that it is useless to inquire whether the preacher includes the elder, or the elder the preacher, for the simple reason that the preacher is an elder, and therefore not only may perform, but is bound to perform, the duties of an elder. So far as he is an elder, there is no difference between him and the ruling elder. He does not include him; he *is* the ruling elder. There are other persons besides him who are also ruling elders though not preachers; but as to the office of rule, he and they are one. There is no dispute upon the question whether the person who preaches may also rule. Of course he may and ought, for the reason that he is an ordained ruler: but it cannot be proved that as preacher he ever performs the function of rule. He includes rule in his office, but not in his office as preacher. The distinction is patent.

The special question before us, however, is, whether the office of presbyter includes that of deacon; and we proceed to consider

the proof alleged from Scripture to show that the apostolic office included the diaconate, and the inference by analogy that the presbyter's office includes the deacon's. It is inferred from the narrative in the sixth chapter of Acts, that, previously to the election of the seven deacons mentioned, the Apostles themselves had distributed the alms of the Church to her poor members. It is certain that contributions were laid at the Apostles' feet, but there is no clear evidence that they discharged the distributive function. It is worthy of notice that the names of the seven appear to indicate that they were Hellenists, and it has been argued that, as it is not likely that there were no Hebrew distributors, such had previously existed as transferred from the synagogue upon their profession of the Christian faith. We venture no decisive judgment upon this point; but in the absence of anything more certain than a bare probability that the Apostles had acted as deacons—a probability somewhat countervailed, at least, by the considerations which have been mentioned—it must strike a candid mind as rash to found upon it a theory regulative of ecclesiastical practice. The words, "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables," may mean that the Apostles had not done so unreasonable a thing; they may mean, on the other hand, that, inasmuch as the opportunity existed for the appointment of others to attend to the poor, the Apostles availed themselves of it to relieve themselves of an unreasonable impediment to the full exercise of their proper ministry. Both suppositions have been advocated. The case is too doubtful to afford definite ground for a doctrine.

The other passages alleged are those in which the Apostles are represented as having acted as receivers and transmitters of alms contributed by the Gentile churches for the relief of the poor saints at Jerusalem. That, however, would not prove that they were deacons, or that they acted in the capacity of deacons. We send contributions by other hands than those of deacons to Baltimore, and to our brethren now suffering from the ravages of the pestilence. The Assembly's Executive Committees do not employ deacons to transmit money to distant missionary stations. If a minister going to one of those missionary points were made the

bearer of supplies, how would that prove him to be discharging the functions of a deacon any more than a trustworthy merchant charged with the same responsibility? No doubt the Apostles in their instructions, by letter or orally, urged the duty upon the Gentile churches of contributing to the wants of their needy brethren in Judæa, but in doing so they were performing a function proper to their own distinctive office as preachers, a function which every pastor now feels himself obligated to discharge in similar circumstances. Here again the scriptural evidence that the Apostles acted as deacons is too slender to afford a foundation for the generalised statement that the higher office includes the lower. And putting both these sources of proof from Scripture together, we cannot fail to observe that the induction is very incomplete which leads to so wide a generalisation, the data too meagre to ground so controlling a theory.

But even if it were admitted that the Apostles did under certain circumstances discharge the duties of deacons, that would by no means legitimate the inference that in a formed and regular condition of the Church preachers and elders may perform diaconal functions. The record in Acts would prove precisely the opposite. For, whatever were the facts before the election and appointment of the seven, after that took place it is certain that the Apostles did not act as deacons. They expressly affirmed that it would have been unreasonable for them to do so. Deacons being in existence, the performance of their duties by ministers of the word was pronounced to be incompatible with the due discharge of their proper functions. Should it be urged that such a consequence resulted simply from the want of time on the part of the Apostles to attend to the duties of the diaconate, and would not hold where there is time for such duties on the part of the higher officers of the Church, the answer is, that the supposition is purely gratuitous. There is no time, there never can be any time, from the very nature and pressure of his own official trusts, for any officer to leave his proper functions for the purpose of performing those of another, when that other may compass their discharge. This is certainly true of the minister of the word, and, we submit, must also be true of ruling elders, who, in addition to their

secular avocations, have the burden of government and episcopal oversight resting upon them. They have a plenty to do, if they attend to their peculiar duties. So much for the proof from apostolic teaching and practice.

2. The next argument in favor of the theory that the higher office includes the lower is derived from the doctrine and practice of the Reformed Churches.

(1.) It cannot be questioned that the standards and the practice of the Scotch Churches may be pleaded in support of the theory. The deacons' court of the Free Church is a well known instance of their practice, and the First and Second Books of Discipline, the Collections of Steuart of Pardovan, and the Catechism of the Free Church, definitely announce the doctrine. The virtual inclusion of the lower in the higher office is asserted in the "Divine Right of Church Government," written by certain London ministers. Our information may be at fault, and if so we will be glad to be corrected, but we have been unable to discover that there has been a common consent of the Reformed Churches touching this matter. We have not encountered any statement of the doctrine in their Confessions, and we have failed to find it in Calvin, or Turretin, or Voetius, whose great work on ecclesiastical polity is very full and minute, or in DeMoor, whose distinctions are particular, or even in George Gillespie; while Dr. David King, a Scotchman, in his able work on Presbyterian Church Government, expresses grave distrust of the tendencies of the practice upon this point of the Free Church. We have not found it in the Discipline of the French Churches; but Canon I., Chapter IV. is in these significant words: "Moneys belonging unto the poor shall not be dispensed by any other hands than those of the deacons, by and with the advice and consent of the Consistory." It is deserving of attention that in the French, Belgic, and Dutch Churches, exactly the opposite theory was, under certain circumstances, put into practice—that the deacon might discharge the functions of the presbyter. He shared the spiritual government of the church with the elders. Says Canon II., Chapter V., of the French Discipline: "Whereas our churches, by reason of the present distress, have hitherto most

happily employed deacons in their government, and that they have discharged at the same time the elder's office; such as for the future shall be so elected or continued, shall have with the pastors and elders the government of the church, and therefore shall commonly appear with them at the Consistory, and at Colloquies, and Synods, provided they be sent by their Consistory.' Here the office of the deacon was made inclusive of that of elder, the very reverse of the Scotch doctrine. These references are sufficient to show that there has not been common consent on the part of the Reformed Churches in regard to the matter under consideration. On the other hand, there have been wide differences among them, and the conclusion obviously is, that our Church must settle her doctrine and practice concerning it in accordance with her views of the teachings of Scripture, and of the analogy of Presbyterian church government.

(2.) But if it may be proved that the *consensus* of the Reformed Churches upon this point was more general than we have ascertained it to be, the argument derived from it would only have the force of a presumption—a venerable presumption, it is true, but still only a presumption. What is the force of that presumption? The answer to that question must depend upon the answer we give to another which precedes it—what is the true Church? That question must first be settled at the bar of conscience. But those who have settled it, must believe that the Church which they hold to be true is under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in its interpretations of the Word. And consequently to them the probability is a powerful one that doctrines sustained by the common consent of that Church for ages are true. Authority, numbers, and antiquity, may be and are pleaded in behalf of error; and therefore the celebrated maxim of Vincent, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, must be determined in its application by the sort of body in connexion with which it is pleaded. To us, what has been held always, everywhere, and by all, in the Reformed Church, comes commended by a presumptive value which no independence of judgment can despise. All this we cheerfully concede, but yet Protestants have always held that even the true Church, as visible, is fallible; and therefore its

common consent cannot be erected into an infallible standard of judgment. There is but one such standard—the supreme and perfect rule of faith and practice in the inspired Word of God. A true Church may depart from this standard; hence the possibility of a corrupt Church. Corruption presupposes purity; no corrupt church begins as corrupt. Like the human race in innocence, it starts right. It is therefore evermore necessary to compare the special doctrines and practices of even that Church which we believe to be in the main pure and uncorrupt with the infallible and unchanging standard of the divine Word. Sleepless vigilance is the price of purity. We can never be discharged from the law that evidence is the measure of assent to the intelligence of the adult, and that in matters spiritual and supernatural in the sphere of doctrine, government, and worship, that evidence is to be ultimately found in the Scriptures, and to be ultimately weighed by the individual judgment. Now, were it true that the particular principle under examination is sustained by the general consent of the Reformed Church, it could not be reflectively appropriated by us as an established one without testing it for ourselves by the supreme standard. Much more does it require investigation, if, as we have seen, there is proof of its being sustained only by a partial consent of the Church. We proceed, therefore, to indicate the considerations which lead us to question, if not reject, its validity, especially in its applicability to the relation between the office of presbyter and that of deacon.

We have seen that there is a defect of scriptural proof of the doctrine we are examining, that the passages relied on for its support are of too doubtful a character to ground it; the arguments in opposition to it will be in the shape of inferences—legitimate inferences we conceive—from the teachings of Scripture and from the principles of our standards which express them.

1. The first is derived from the admitted fact, which has already been set forth, that the elder and the deacon belong to different orders. They are generically different, and not merely specifically, as are the preacher and the ruling elder. Now, according to the first principle of classification, the essence which

is contained in the genus, as a whole of extension, must also be contained in the species, as a whole of intension. But the essence of the genus-presbyter is the property of rule, and it follows that if the deacon is included under the presbyter as generic, the property of rule descends to the deacon. It is evident, however, that the property of rule cannot be predicated of the deacon. He is not generically a ruler with the superadded property of distribution which specifically marks him. He is simply a distributor. This of itself is sufficient to show that he cannot be included in the elder. He belongs to a different order or proximate genus, the very essence of which is distribution and not rule. It cannot be urged in reply that one order may be included under another order, since one genus, as lower, may be included under another genus, as the next higher. For in that case the lower genus, so included, is relatively but a species, and the principle holds that it must contain, besides a specific property, the whole essence of the genus. But no reasoning can show that, in accordance with the Scriptures and our Constitution, the essential attribute of rule is possessed by the deacon. He cannot therefore be reduced under the order of the presbyterate. It may be said that the General Assembly of 1840 decided that an elder may be a deacon. The question was, "May a person at once be deacon and elder?" In answer, the ruling of the Assembly was as follows:

Resolved, That while it is important and desirable that the several offices in the Christian Church should be kept distinct, and be sustained by different individuals whenever a sufficient number of competent men can be found; yet, in the judgment of this Assembly, it is not inconsistent with the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, nor with the precedent furnished in filling the office of deacon at its first institution, that, where a necessity exists, the same individual should sustain both offices."

Now, it is evident that the Assembly did not deliver the judgment that the office of elder included that of deacon—the language of the ruling implies the opposite—but that the person who is elder may in extraordinary circumstances and under the stress of necessity, discharge the office of deacon. All that can be collected from the decision is, that it affirmed the possible coëxistence

of the two offices in the same person; not that the one office includes the other. The distinction is one we have already signalised, between a person embracing in himself two functions, and an office including another office. The preacher unites in his person two functions of preaching and ruling, but the function of preaching does not include that of ruling. But whatever may be the construction placed upon this deliverance of a single Assembly, it cannot legitimately contradict the plain principles which we have enounced.

It may also be suggested as a difficulty in this view that it would involve the consequence that a deacon when elevated to the eldership would cease to be a deacon. We admit that elevation to higher office is one of the causes of removal from the office previously held; as when, for example, a State Treasurer is made Senator or Governor, he ceases to be Treasurer; nor could he, in that case, in ordinary circumstances, act as Treasurer. Upon this point we cite the words of Owen, who inconsistently with his apparent approval of the doctrine that the higher officer may ordinarily perform the functions of the lower, but, we think, truly, says: "The difference between a deacon and a presbyter is not in degree, but in order. A deacon made a presbyter is not advanced unto a farther degree in his own order, but leaves it for another." But if he leave the diaconal order, to become a member of the presbyterial order, how can he continue to discharge vacated functions? Is he not *functus officio*, as deacon?

It may further be urged, that to admit the legitimate discharge of diaconal functions by the elder, by reason of necessity arising from extraordinary circumstances, is to give up the question. But that does not follow. It does not follow that because a ruling elder, in such circumstances, performs functions which are ordinarily assigned to the preaching elder, as our constitution provides in the case of churches having no preacher, his office includes that of the preaching elder. It does not follow that because, under similar circumstances, the deacon, as the Reformed Churches conceded, may perform those duties, his office includes that of the preacher or the ruling elder. "Necessity has no law." And to argue from a condition of things in which the

ordinary operation of law is suspended to one in which it exists, is certainly to reason inconclusively. The argument proves too much and is therefore invalid. An elder may, under extraordinary circumstances, do what is ordinarily done by a deacon, and yet the doctrine be true that his office, as such, does not include the office of deacon.

In connexion with this argument from the difference of orders, it may be added, that the doctrine under discussion proceeds upon a delusive analogy. As the preacher's office includes the elder's, so the elder's includes the deacon's. We have already exposed the confusion of the preacher, as person, with the office of preaching. But admitting that the preacher legitimately discharges the functions of ruling elder, the reason is plain: he is a ruling elder, and therefore ought to perform his own duties. He is ordained a ruler as well as preacher, as his ordination vows imply. But the ruling elder is not ordained as deacon, and accordingly he undertakes no engagements, makes no vow, at his ordination to perform the duties of deacon. The reason is, that he belongs to a different *ordo* from the deacon, and therefore has different obligations to meet. It is clear that there is no analogy between the two cases.

2. Our next argument is derived from the import of ordination. No one has a right to perform ecclesiastical functions unless he be ordained to their discharge. If, therefore, the elder may perform diaconal functions, it must be because he is ordained to the office of deacon. But this is contrary to the understanding by the Church of the import of ordination to the eldership, and contrary indeed to the terms of the ordaining act. Surely it does not follow that when one is formally inducted into one order he is formally placed in another. But unless the elder is thus assigned to the diaconal order, we fail to apprehend his right in an orderly state of the church to discharge its functions. But, further, if the ground be taken that the elder is ordained not only as elder, but as deacon, it would follow that as ordination is always to a definite work, and solemnly imposes an obligation to its performance, the elder is, *ex officio*, bound to do the work of a deacon. But that position will be held by none. Nor will it

do to say that there are others to whom that work is peculiarly assigned. If the work goes with the office, the fact that some deacons perform it cannot excuse other deacons from its discharge. They may have other work to do, but this cannot be neglected without a violation of their ordination engagements. They must do their whole work.

3. Our third argument is based upon the incompatibility of the duties of deacon and elder, in a settled condition of the church in which the offices are filled. It is not necessary to advance any other proof of this position than the declaration of the Apostles at the election of the seven deacons: "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God to serve tables." Attention to the temporal duties of the deacon is inconsistent with concentration of purpose upon, and devotion of energy to, the spiritual functions which are proper to the elder's office. He ought not to be diverted from his own proper work to do that which pertains to another office, and is of another kind than his. If the mingling of the two sorts of duty is pronounced unreasonable by inspired authority, one would be apt to suppose that a theory which justifies it is itself unreasonable.

4. Our fourth argument is a probable one drawn from the early existence of the office of archdeacon in the post-apostolic Church. We have the authority of Bingham for the statement that Jerome announced the view that the office was elective and that the deacons were the electors. In all probability the board of deacons in the early Church were accustomed to elect their chairman from their own number. This officer, it is altogether likely, came to be, like the moderator of the congregational presbytery, a permanent president. It would seem impossible to account for the existence of such an elective archdeacon as Jerome mentions, in any other way. This would be wholly inexplicable upon the theory that the minister of the word was, *ex officio*, moderator of the board of deacons, or that the elders sat with the deacons in the joint management of diaconal business.

5. Our fifth consideration is derived from a logical and yet impossible consequence flowing from the doctrine. It is presented by Dr. Arnold W. Miller in an able discussion of the

deacon question. If the higher office includes the lower, it follows that "the superior officer must possess all the qualifications required in the inferior." But such a consequence is both unscriptural and unreasonable. If you do not admit the consequence, then the head of the Church has imperfectly provided for its wants. He has called officers to a work for which they are not qualified. But such a view reacts to the destruction of the hypothesis that the greater office includes the less. If you admit the consequence, then it is not justified by the divinely given list of the elder's qualifications, which do not include those of the deacon. One may be qualified to rule and not to distribute; and therefore the offices themselves are distinct. And so the legitimate consequence of the theory being false, the theory itself must be defective.

6. The next objection to this doctrine springs from its legitimate tendency to effect the suppression of the deacon's office. If the higher office includes the lower, the lower to the extent of that inclusion becomes unnecessary. The elder being supposed to be the subject of diaconal power, and the executor of diaconal functions, the conclusion is easy, that the deacon as a distinct officer is superfluous. This is obvious from the law of parcimony which precludes the needless multiplication of causes for an effect—of agencies for an act. But this would be to impeach the wisdom and authority of Christ in appointing the deacon as a separate officer for the performance of peculiar and distinctive functions. The wisdom, nay, the necessity, of such an appointment, is briefly evinced by such considerations as the following. First, other than spiritual officers are able and suited to discharge temporal offices. A separate class of officers for those functions is required by the principle of a division of labor, assigning to it the duties which it is most competent and adapted to perform. Secondly, it is inexpedient, human wisdom being the judge, that they who minister in spiritual things should distribute the alms of the church. That would expose them to the danger of being continually deceived. Such is the weakness of human nature, that the recipients of spiritual instruction should not be liable to the motives arising from the hope of receiving material aid.

And here we refer not to the dispensation of private charity—though even in that case caution is necessary in mingling the two things—but to the regular operation of a system of offices. Thirdly, both functions—the spiritual and the temporal—cannot be adequately performed by the same officer. The practice, consequently, which tends in an ordinary and regular condition of the Church, to sink the deacon's office into the elder's, involves not only a disregard to the kingly authority of Christ, but an impeachment of his wisdom; and we may add, an obstruction to the operation of his mercy in relation to the temporal necessities of his saints. The natural tendency of the doctrine that the higher office includes the lower to render the deacon a supernumerary was manifested during a long period of the history of the Scottish Church. In very many of her congregations the office of deacon, as distinct from that of the elder, was obliterated. Some of her own writers assign this result to the influence of the theory in question, and we think with justice. We see the same tendency exhibiting itself in the American Church, in the exclusion of deacons from all the Executive Committees of the General Assemblies; for although they have diaconal functions to perform, this doctrine justifies their discharge by presbyters alone. But any theory which inherently tends to the suppression, or even the neglect, of an office established by the authority and grounded in the wisdom and mercy of Christ, is convicted by that fact of lodging a sophism in its bosom.

7. The last argument against the doctrine which we submit, is derived from the fact that it legitimates the bodies known as deacons' courts. If they are without warrant for their existence, the theory which justifies them must be regarded as erroneous. The force of this argument depends upon the proof of the illegitimacy of the deacons' court. That proof, therefore, it is incumbent upon us to furnish. What then is the deacons' court? For an answer to that question we must repair to the authorised documents of the Free Church of Scotland, since, so far as we know, that court had its origin in, or at least is indebted for its formal recognition to, that Church. In Appendix No. V. to its Catechism, entitled "Organisation of the Free Church of Scot-

land," we find this provision: "When the kirk-session meets *quoad temporalia*—that is to say, in reference to the secular business of the congregation—the deacons are entitled to be present as members of it, and have an equal voice with the elders in all the proceedings. On such occasions it is called the deacons' court." Here then we have a definition of the deacons' court. With an eye simply to the language of this statement, we would be entitled to infer that on these occasions it is the session, as session, which meets, and that the deacons are admitted to a participation in the sessional deliberations and decisions, because they bear reference to secular business. And then the judgment that such a body is illegitimate would be obvious and indisputable. For it would amalgamate two orders, generically different, into a mongrel unit—would admit those who have no right to rule to joint rule with presbyters who alone are entitled to rule. But we are not disposed to take advantage of mere phraseology. Let it be admitted that the deacons' court of the Free Church is not the same thing, even as to temporalities, with the extraordinary Consistory of the French, Belgic, and Dutch Churches, which mingled deacons with elders in joint rule; but that it meets not as the session, with an incorporation of deacons, but as a board of deacons, the elders not appearing as elders merely, but as elders who are also deacons. This construction is rendered possible by the very name of the body. It takes its denomination from the diaconal element as that which is prominent in its composition. But if it be conceded that this is the nature of the deacons' court as it would be explained by its advocates, it cannot, we conceive, be introduced into the working of the Presbyterian system without involving a departure from principles fundamental in that system. For, in the first place, it implies the sinking of some of the proper and distinctive functions of the eldership into those which are purely diaconal. It cannot be denied that the session, as session, is both empowered and obligated to act in reference to temporal matters, in so far as they stand related to the personal rights and duties of the members of the Church, and are made the subject of deliberation and action with regard to spiritual ends. For example, it is the province of

the session to fix the stipend of the minister of the word, to order collections for benevolent objects, and to determine the amount of money which may be needed for special purposes. Here they deal with temporalities, but temporalities as affecting personal rights and duties and contemplating spiritual ends. These are presbyterial and not diaconal functions, and to say that the elders discharge them as deacons is to say that they abandon the duties of the eldership to perform those of the diaconate, or, more strictly, that they destroy the functions of the eldership and substitute those of the diaconate in their place. This, we contend, is what the deacons' court actually does, and therefore charge it with being a body whose existence has no warrant. But, in the second place, if this be denied, and the ground is taken that in the cases specified the elders act as elders, the alternative is equally damaging. For, that is to admit that the deacons are allowed to share in acts of rule, which, as they terminate upon persons and spiritual ends, are absolutely competent to elders alone. The deacons are supposed, in this respect, to perform the ruling functions of the elders. And besides this consideration, to say that the elders, in the deacons' court, act as elders, is to give up the very theory in which that body is grounded, viz., that when the elders sit in it with the deacons they act as deacons and not as elders.

In addition to these views, it may be remarked, that the implicit tendencies of such an organisation are dangerous. Being a larger and more imposing body than the session, and wielding the whole power of the purse, it tends to overshadow that vitally essential body; and should this tendency be developed, it is not extravagant to augur that a new court would be introduced into the Church unknown to Presbyterianism, which would be paramount to the court of presbyters itself. Indeed, though we would not be captious, this seems to be indicated in the unhappy title affixed to the body. To call a deacon a member of a court is either a solecism, or, if the language means anything, it trains the deacon to regard himself as possessed of the power of jurisdiction, and entitled to express it as a constituent of a judicial tribunal.

If, now, it has been proved that deacons' courts are unpresbyterian institutions, the conclusion is fairly reached that the theory in which they find their justification is convicted of being erroneous. That theory is, that the office of elder includes the office of deacon.

In the prosecution of this argument against deacons' courts, it is not intended to imply that there ought not to be joint-meetings of sessions and boards of deacons. On the contrary, we believe them to be highly expedient. But then the ends sought ought to be conference, mutual information, and the reception of direction and advice by the deacons from the session, and not the decision of questions by a formal joint vote of the two bodies. Such a meeting might be designated elders' and deacons' joint meeting, or elders' and deacons' conference, or something equivalent to those titles.

Having endeavored to refute the doctrine that the office of elder so includes that of deacon, as to make it competent to the elder, in an ordinary and regular condition of the Church, to perform the duties of the deacon, and having attempted to establish the opposite doctrine, we proceed to indicate, without expanding, some of the prominent consequences which would logically flow and might be expected practically to result from the prevalence of the view for which we have contended in the working of our system. It would follow:

1. That in the general, the distinct functions and responsibilities of generically different offices would be disentangled from confusion and kept separate from each other. It is needless to argue at length that this would be a positive practical gain. What is every one's business is apt to be done well by no one.
2. That the session ought not to participate with the board of deacons in the joint formal discharge of proper diaconal functions. The deacons' court, as court, would be precluded.
3. That the minister of the word is not, *ex officio*, moderator of the board of deacons, but that board is entitled to elect their chairman from their own number.
4. That where the proper duties of deacon are to be discharged, the deacon ought to be assigned to their performance and not the

presbyter. This consequence is capable of special applications, some of which we signalise :

(1.) That, as the canon of the French Discipline already mentioned has it, "moneys belonging unto the poor shall not be dispensed by any other hands than those of the deacons, by and with the advice and consent of the session."

(2.) That, in connexion with executive committees of the courts, the deacon ought to have a place for the discharge of functions which are peculiarly and distinctively diaconal. Thus, for example, as the function of treasurer is purely diaconal, it ought to be assigned to a deacon. Where presbyterial functions are to be performed by committees, they ought to be composed of presbyters, as for instance, a committee of missions; but where, in connexion with these duties, those strictly diaconal come in, the deacon ought to come in with them. This would hold in regard to all the courts from the Session to the Assembly. Special temporary committees of finance, whose function expires with the meetings at which they are appointed, would come properly within the province of courts discharging financial business as affecting personal rights, interests, and duties.

(3.) The deacon ought to have a place in the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly, and in every board of directors appointed by a court, and which involves the execution of financial business.

5. That all agencies appointed for the raising of money for particular ends ought, so far as the collection of the money is concerned, to be executed by deacons. Let us illustrate by a special case which may serve as a specimen of the rest. Money is needed for the support of a theological seminary. An agent is appointed to induce the churches to contribute to this purpose. If he be a presbyter, or any non-diaconal person, his function consists in enlightening the Church in respect to the matter, and by instruction and exhortation inciting it to contribute. So was it with the Apostles when charged with an agency to raise money for the relief of the poor saints in Judæa. They stirred up the churches to contribute, but did not actually collect the alms. This is plain from the exhortation of Paul to the Corinthian church to collect

them before the agents came, that there might be no hurried collection after they came. And he boasted to the Macedonians that Achaia was a year ahead of the arrival of the agents in beginning to make collections for the specified end. It is clear that the actual collection was done by the deacons. The Apostle and his co-adjutors received and transmitted the alms simply because it was either impossible, or utterly inexpedient, to send deacons from every church to Jerusalem, as carriers of the supplies. We are satisfied that the employment of deacons for collection in every congregation would be a more penetrating, searching, particular, exhaustive method of raising money, than the personal collection of it by one individual. This, we think, is Christ's plan, and when the Church adopts and pursues it she will find her difficulties clearing away.

In the case of an effort to raise an endowment, while we believe that personal solicitation as well as public appeals may be committed to a single agent, for they are really of a didactic and hortatory nature, it would be better, and safer for the reputation of the agent, that the amounts contributed be placed in the hands of the deacons of the churches, and by them forwarded, either through the agent, or any other approved and trustworthy channel, to the Treasurer of the Board of Directors.

THIRDLY. We proceed to consider the Relations of the Board of Deacons to the Session in the practical working of our system. The duty of the diaconate may be conceived as having a threefold relation: first, to the temporary relief of the poor; secondly, to the temporal support of the benevolent enterprises of the Church; thirdly, to the temporal maintenance of the Church, and the care of all ecclesiastical goods. The third element of this distribution will not here be considered, as it properly falls for consideration under the second general head of this report, viz., the Scope of the Deacon's Functions, and ought to be reserved until the discussion of that topic. The relation of the board of deacons to the session will therefore be treated with reference to the first two aspects of the functions of the diaconate, viz., in regard to the care of the poor, and the support of the benevolent causes of the Church. The simplest method of dealing with the question

before us seems to us to be, in the first place, to compare the two bodies in respect to their ends, the nature of their power, and the objects about which that power is concerned; and in the second place, to take up the special questions, Have the deacons any autonomy? Are they in any sense possessed of independent authority? Have they any discretion in their own sphere? and if so, what is its extent?

1. Instituting a comparison then between the two bodies, we find—

(1.) That they differ in regard to their *ends*. Those of the session are spiritual; those of the board of deacons, temporal. This is generally conceded and need not be discussed. In this respect, therefore, the spheres of the two do not come together and blend with each other. Neither does that of the deacons intersect and share that of the session, nor that of the session overlap and engross that of the deacons.

(2.) They differ as to the nature of their *power*. The session is possessed of the *potestas jurisdictionis*, the power of joint rule as distinctively a court—the power to interpret and administer law, to dispense judgment in causes judicial, and to enforce discipline. Of this sort of power the deacons are entirely devoid. Their power is only that of a financial board. In this regard also it is manifest that the two bodies revolve in different orbits.

(3.) They differ further as to the *objects* about which their power is concerned, and upon which it terminates. It is agreed on all hands among us that the objects of sessional power are the Persons of the church members, and that with them diaconal power is in no degree concerned. On the other hand, it is customary to say that the objects upon which the power of the deacons terminates are Things—the moneys, the temporal substance of the Church. Here, it occurs to us, it is necessary to distinguish. The power of the session cannot be absolutely excluded from reference to things; it touches them relatively to persons. Whenever things are conceived as involving personal rights, interests, and duties, they fall within the purview of sessional power. It is for the session to determine whether in consistency with these personal rights and interests, or in obedience

to these personal obligations, contributions of things ought to be made to this or that purpose. Whether a cause shall be presented to the people, what amount of money is required for any end, what method shall be adopted to secure it, what destination the contributions of the people ordinarily shall take—these are questions relating indirectly but really to the things of the Church which the session alone has power to decide. With these questions the power of the deacons is not concerned. There is, then, an aspect of ecclesiastical things from which the application of diaconal power is debarred. Consequently the dictum that the power of the session is concerned only about persons and not things must be accepted under proper limitations. The whole practical system of our church operations evinces the justice of this opinion. But the session having decided these questions which have been designated as properly falling under its power, the things viewed as out of relation to personal rights, interests, and duties, pass under the power of the deacons. They collect them, receive them, keep them, distribute them. In fine, the power of the session in relation to things is exercised in determining the causes for which contributions are required, ordering the collections, fixing the mode of taking them, and, in cases in which offerings are made for the advancement of Christ's kingdom in the general, of specifying the particular direction in which they are to be distributed. What remains is in the hands of the deacons. Thenceforward the session ceases to touch the things; they are in the control of the deacons, whose acts in regard to them, however, although not in their performance interfered with by the session, are subject to the review of that court—involving its approval or censure. And to this end, it is the duty of the board of deacons to render a periodical report of their proceedings to the session. Such, briefly stated, is the relation of the deacons to the session in regard to the objects about which their power is respectively concerned.

2. The only remaining question which we shall discuss under this head—and one perhaps presenting the most difficulty—is. Have the deacons any independent power of control in the sphere of things? Or are they the mere agents and servants of the

session—its hands to execute its will? Have they any discretion, and if so, what is its extent? and what its limitations?

Here the question is not as to ultimate accountability. The principle of responsibility runs through and pervades our whole system. Every court in it is in a measure responsible for its acts; no one of them is independent of others, so far as ultimate accountability for its proceedings is concerned. And what is true of them must in a greater degree be true of a body which does not enter as an element into the correlated series of courts. The board of deacons must be responsible, and we think, responsible to the session. On this account, we cannot but regard the adjustment of the deacons' court in the Free Church system as seriously defective. It is made, for an obvious reason, responsible to the presbytery and not to the session; and so assumes the complexion of a congregational court coördinate with the session.

Nor is the question, whether the deacons, as persons, are responsible to the session. Of course they are. Every presbyter and preacher is personally responsible not only for his ordinary conduct but for his official acts. Every instance of neglect of the poor, or mal-administration of ecclesiastical things by the deacons, may be made a subject of complaint to the session, and of censure by it. Here the principle is plain. The personal duties of the deacons, and the personal rights of the members of the Church are alike involved, and, therefore, the case falls under the cognisance and jurisdiction of the spiritual court.

But the question is, whether in the legitimate exercise of their functions in their own sphere, there is any sense in which they are independent of immediate control by the session, and may employ their own judgment and discretion in deciding for themselves. In regard to the moneys contributed to the benevolent enterprises of the Church at large, we would answer this question in the negative. From the nature of the case, no discretion is required. They are, in this respect, the mere executors of the session's will. But in regard to their chief function—the care of the poor, the case, we think, is different. Here the fact comes out distinctly that they are officers of the Church, appointed by

Christ and clothed with some authority—an authority not as rulers of persons, but as to the administration of things. “The office of deacons,” says Owen, “is an office of service, which gives no power in the rule of the Church. But being an office, it gives authority with respect unto the special work of it, under a general notion of authority; that is, a right to attend to it in a peculiar manner, and to perform the things that belong thereunto.” “Owen’s meaning is,” remarks Dr. Boggs, in a valuable article on the Deacon’s Office, in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW for July, 1875, “that while in the Scriptures we find no carefully drawn definition of the precise limits of the deacon’s authority, yet the fact of an office being instituted by Christ carries with it a grant of power from him to transact the duties pertaining to it in such way as their own judgment may decide.” As officers in Christ’s house, then, they would appear to be something more than mere hands of the session. They are its subordinates, but not its slaves. They may without consulting the session determine upon investigation who are worthy to receive the church’s alms, and what amounts should be appropriated to them. Just here is one of the conditions upon which their peculiar qualifications may be put into exercise. For this sort of judgment they are distinctively suited in contradistinction from the other officers, and for that reason receive their special vocation. True, they must report even these decisions to the session; but that court passes upon them, not simply as the acts of the deacons, but as acts related to the rights of the beneficiaries considered as persons under its jurisdiction, and of the members of the Church who are entitled to know how their alms are disbursed. To state the case plainly: no wise session would contravene the judgment of the deacons as to these matters, since from the nature of the case that judgment must be better founded than their own. In short, in this sphere, the deacons are not independent, any more than in any other, of the superior authority of the session for their acts, but are independent of the session in the performance of the acts. Here they have a limited and relative independency; else they were mere machines, and the title officer as applied to them would be a misnomer.

There are two other respects in which, according to our judgment, the deacons pass out of the category of mere executive agents of the courts. In the first place, they would appear to sustain to them somewhat the relation which a committee of ways and means bears to a legislature. Not that we mean to imply that they are nothing more than committees appointed by the courts, for they are distinct officers appointed by Christ and elected by the people; but their function is analogous to that of such a committee. The session, for instance, having determined that a cause falling outside of the regular schedule of those for which the stated offerings of the people are given, should be proposed to them for their contributions, it devolves upon the deacons to devise the best and most effective method of compassing the end desired. Here especially their gifts and qualifications, as official ministers of finance, are evoked into exercise, and they cease to discharge the simple functions of treasurers and clerks. Here there is a draft made peculiarly upon their judgment and their time, and in performing this function they would, to a great extent, set the spiritual officers free from the entanglements and absorbing effects of secular questions. We submit that this view of the deacon's office merits more consideration than is given to it. In this respect it rises to an importance which redeems it from neglect.

In the second place, we would signalise what is so often overlooked—the recommendatory and advisory function of deacons. It is a function which is formally recognised in some Presbyterian standards—those of the Churches of Scotland, for example, but one which among us, at least, sinks into disuse. It would be exactly congruous to their office to suggest advice and make recommendations to the spiritual courts in reference to the care of the poor, and to questions concerning the raising and management of money. As for this they are supposed to be peculiarly qualified by their gifts and habits, so to this we think they are called. How greatly their discharge of such a function would abridge the time needlessly and perhaps improperly spent by the spiritual courts in the discussion of financial plans and methods, it is not difficult to estimate. And were our Church to recognise

this as one of the functions of the diaconate, and by her practical arrangements call it out into continual exercise, the solemn words of Dr. Thornwell would meet a fulfilment which now they so sadly lack: "Our spiritual courts would soon cease to be, what they are to an alarming extent at present, mere corporations for secular business."

ARTICLE II.

THE INFLUENCE OF THEORIES OF THE WILL ON
THEOLOGY.

The connexion between certain branches of philosophy and theology cannot but be close. So close is it, in fact, that the theology of many is virtually dictated by their philosophy. The intimacy of the connexion arises from three facts. First, all truths are inter-consistent. Hence, secondly, when propositions are embraced as truths, the very nature of the reason ensures that the mind shall strive towards an inter-adjustment of them. Thirdly, theology and philosophy have in part the same fields. Both claim as their subjects God and man; theology (in its restricted sense), and anthropology. When man's philosophy thus demands adjustment with revealed propositions, his pride of thought and rationalism are but too prone to suggest that Scripture shall be moulded to suit reason, instead of reason corrected to submit to Scripture. Thus, it is familiar to the student of Church history, how materialism has dictated atheism; the utilitarian ethics have vitiated the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice; the false ontology has introduced pantheism. But theories of the will and free agency have been more influential in Christian theology than any other part of philosophy. The effects have been extensive and subtle: if "the form of sound words" has not been rejected, in many cases new meanings have been injected into

them. Hence the belief that it is ever timely to illustrate the subject announced.

The method attempted will be to state, first, the three theories of volition which have been propounded, the Necessitarian, the Calvinistic, and the Arminian; and then, omitting the first, to compare the last two in their modifying power over doctrine. No attempt will be made to demonstrate the true philosophy of the will nor the doctrines of Calvinism cohering therewith, or to refute the opposing theory and its doctrinal results. The reader is presumed to be established already in both his philosophy and theology. Only the more important applications of the two philosophies can be touched in the limits of this article.

The prefatory remark should be made, that theories of the will cannot but have the most intimate relations with Christian doctrine. 1. Because they unavoidably involve the view held of moral responsibility. But God's chief relation to us is that of moral governor. Now we see an erroneous philosophy of the will exclude from the sphere of responsibility all man's concreated dispositions and desires, all those which are now connate in him, all those inwrought by an omnipotent Spirit, all the subjective consequences of a federal relation to Adam. We see it sundering the tie between disposition and volition, and placing the seat of self-determination in the separate faculty of choice, instead of the personality of the monad mind. It cannot but be, that when the view of our responsibility is modified in so many points, the doctrine touching sin, guilt, the law, expiation, shall be affected. 2. Because on the theory of the will turns our view of free agency; but free agency, as consciousness testifies, under all philosophies, determines our accountability, and makes man a subject of religion. Hence the question, What constitutes free agency? is almost synonymous with the question: How is man related to God in religion? But theology has been defined as "the science of man's relations to God." The very fact that all philosophies claim the reality of our free agency to be an immediate *dictum* of consciousness, will incline the rationalistic mind to bend its whole views of those relations, with the more confidence, to its preconceptions on that central point: he will either

make the Scripture bend, or break, before them. The law, providence, and redemption, must all cohere with the conditions of our free agency. 3. Because man's spirit was created in the image of God's, and so, the view held of our free agency and will cannot but be reflected back upon our apprehension of God's. When we remember, in the light of these remarks, that theology must be *a system*, that a close logical dependency and harmony must rule among all its propositions, we feel that the extent of our topic can scarcely be exaggerated.

I. Examining now the several theories of volition advanced, we see that the necessitarian scheme is the result of a sensualistic psychology, which, overlooking the subjective powers of the soul, accords to it only susceptibilities, and ascribes all mental modifications to objective impressions. Thus, 1. It fails to make the vital distinction between objective inducements to volition and subjective motives thereto. 2. It regards volition as an effect of desire, and desire in turn as an effect of some sense-impression. 3. Thus it really omits all true spontaneity, and views man's actions as under a necessity as fatal as though it were that of material forces. When the seductive object is presented from without, preponderant desire is, on this scheme, as truly the physical effect as pain is of a blow; and volition to grasp the object is the unavoidable effect of the preponderant desire. 4. Disposition, on this view, is not a rational trait of the spontaneity, any more than is the instinctive law of a brute's appetite. The only theology (unless atheism be called "a theology") consistent with this philosophy is that of the pantheist. As our debate is not with him, we dismiss this theory.

The Calvinistic theory, and that of contrary choice, will now be stated in contrast, so as to place them before the reader's mind in the sharpest discrimination.

Both agree that free agency is essential to responsibility, and that the necessity of external compulsion supersedes both. But—

The one places man's free agency in the self-determining power of the soul; the other places it in the self-determination of the will.

The one teaches that all deliberate, responsible volitions are

effects, viz., of the soul's own prevalent motives; the other that volitions *may* always arise *uncaused*.

The one teaches the efficient and certain control of (subjective) motives over all responsible volitions; the other teaches that volitions may always be contingent.

The one holds that this efficient certainty, which is "moral necessity," is entirely consistent with our freedom and responsibility; the other regards both "physical" and "moral necessity" as incompatible with them.

The one holds that man's freedom consists in his privilege of acting out his own preference, according to his own disposition; the other, that it consists in the power of the will to choose, without, or even in opposition to, the soul's own desire and disposition.

The one teaches that all responsible action is spontaneous, but that rational spontaneity has always its own regulative law, which is its own subjective disposition; the other claims that volition may always arise against the disposition.

The one teaches that the volition always follows the prevalent motives; the other that the will in choosing, always has, even though it does not exercise, a "power of contrary choice."

Both admit that there is a sense in which the involuntary is neither praise-nor-blameworthy. But here—

The Calvinist by the involuntary means only *the contra-voluntary*; that which the agent wills not to do, but is compelled against that will to do. And he holds that man may be responsible for states *not resulting from volition*, and in that sense involuntary, as for the concupiscence preceding evil choice. But the other party limits the voluntary to *acts of will* and their effects, thus excluding subjective dispositions and concupiscence from blame.

The one asserts that only physical inability excuses from duty, while inability of will, being itself spontaneous and criminal, consists with free agency and responsibility; the other demands both kinds, in order to ground responsibility.

It may be as well to say, that this statement of the principal points in the Theory of Contrary Choice is in consistent agree-

ment with the grand fundamental position of the theory, which is that *volitions may always be uncaused phenomena*. Some advocates of this theory would accept and attempt to defend it just as stated. Others—the Wesleyans especially—would object to some points. For instance, they would deny that the theory necessarily excludes the native dispositions of the soul from the sphere of responsibility. But it will appear before we finish, that even they practically exclude the native disposition in adhering to this theory.

The former theory of volition is that which coheres with the Reformed theology, as expounded in the Westminster standards. The latter finds its fullest theological expression in Pelagianism. To our readers the features of that old system are too familiar to need recital. Other schools of theology, as the Semi-Pelagian, the Franciscan, or Scotist, the Jesuit, the Arminian, and even the Wesleyan, while recoiling from many of the old positions under the stress of a greater reverence for Scripture, still retain the essential features of this philosophy. Did they retain all the theological consequences of Pelagius, they would be, while worse Christians, more consistent logicians from their wrong premises.

II. We come now to notice particular doctrines in theology which have been affected by false views of the Will.

1. And here we notice first, the influence of a false doctrine of the Will upon our views of several of the divine attributes; the divine law; and the impeccability of Christ.

A. *The Divine Attributes*. The Westminster Catechism says: “God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.” The definition is not intended to be exhaustive—this would be impossible from the nature of the case. It is, however, intended to be accurate as far as it goes. But the theory of contrary choice impugns several of the most glorious attributes here ascribed to God.

(a). *His Knowledge*. We do not know whether the Pelagians attempted to limit in any way the infinite knowledge of God. But the Socinians, arguing from exactly the same premises, have denied to God an absolutely certain, universal foreknowledge of

the acts of free agents. They admit that God has indeed, in a vastly higher degree, the same kind of wise foresight that belongs to a great statesman or a great leader among men. But they deny that even God can know, with absolute certainty, the future acts of free agents. And for those who admit their premises, their reasoning seems to be invincible. Say they, God can undoubtedly foresee all that can possibly be foreseen. But in the very nature of the case it is inconceivable that even the wisdom of God can enable him to foresee *as certain* an event which is *not certain*. But all the acts of free agents are contingent (here comes in that theory of the will which is common to them, Pelagians and Wesleyans); and hence they cannot be foreseen as certain. This logic is perfect. And the premises, viz., that all man's responsible acts are contingent, is one for which every advocate of "contrary choice" contends most earnestly. Hence, one of the first results of a wrong theory of the will is to rob God of one of his most glorious perfections.

(b). *His Justice*. Again, a false theory of the will impugns the justice of God. A sound theology teaches that by this attribute the will of God is invariably and immutably determined to visit every sin with punishment according to its desert. But can this be asserted, if we once admit, with those who hold to the indifferency of the will, the motives exert no efficient control over volitions? In other words, if we find that in the case of the human soul, its acts are not regulated by its native dispositions, what warrant have we, when reasoning of God, to assume that the perfections of the Divine Nature will infallibly control the Divine Will? Is not the Socinian position the only one we can properly assume? They do not deny that the attribute of justice belongs to God. But they affirm that, notwithstanding the fact of the possession of this attribute, it is competent for God either to punish sin or to pardon it. And in particular cases they place the decision as to pardoning or punishing not in an essential and necessary perfection of the Divine Nature (which will efficiently and certainly control the Divine Will), but in the *self-determination* of the Divine Will itself. Thus we see that a false doctrine of the will leaves us without any valid ground on

which to base the expectation that God will always govern the world in righteousness. It leaves us nothing but a Socinian God, who may do right or who may do wrong, according as an irresponsible faculty, which rejects alike the guidance of his infinite intelligence and of his immutable perfections, may dictate. Hence if it be true that the Divine Will is like the human will, and that the human will is not regulated and controlled by the essential dispositions of the soul, then God may at any time cease to be God.

(c). *His Holiness.* But let us notice yet another way in which an erroneous doctrine of the will must affect our view of the divine perfections. In what does God's holiness consist? Does it consist in acquired habits of rectitude, benevolence, and the like? Or is it not rather the effulgence arising from the harmony of all the other essential attributes which God has possessed from eternity, and itself as eternal as these attributes? Was there ever a time when God was *in puris naturalibus*? (we ask the question with all reverence) in order that by the *self-determined* choice of his will to holiness, he might henceforth claim the merit of virtue for his deeds? Or has he not rather from all eternity been immutably determined to holiness by the very spontaneity of his being? Is this present holiness the result of holy acts of a self-determined will; or are all the acts of the divine will inevitably determined towards holiness by the divine perfections which are back of and regulative of the divine will? If moral character is to be denied to those concreated dispositions which were regulative of Adam's will; if it can be maintained that Adam was without true holiness until this was acquired by acts of volition; if the certain efficient control over the will exerted by the new principles implanted by the Holy Ghost in the sinner's heart at conversion deprive the acts of the regenerate man of moral character and the man himself of free agency, what, under these circumstances, becomes of the holiness and freedom of God?

B. *The Divine Law.* Admit that volitions are uncaused; admit that in the case of a free agent the native dispositions exert no efficient control over his volitions, and we must seek the

ground of the moral distinctions found in the Decalogue in the mere will of the Creator. The Ten Commandments will become a mere expression of the will of God. Had that will, clothed as it is (on this false theory) with the power of self-determination, seen fit, it might have reversed every command of both Tables and made an exactly opposite code obligatory. But such an idea is at once rejected both by sound sense and a sound theology. A sound theology admits, indeed, that the Ten Commandments are an expression of the divine will, but at the same time it appears that they take their moral complexion from the divine perfections, which, as it teaches, are themselves immutable, and immutably control the divine will. Thus a sound theology finds the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, not in God's will, but in his very essence.

Already we begin to see the sad havoc which a false theory of the will—if consistently carried out—will make in our theology. It is subversive of all right ideas of the divine perfections. Does any one object? “Oh! but the advocates of the doctrine of contrary choice would be as far from pressing this theory to these results as the most zealous Calvinist.” Doubtless they would. But their theory may carry them when they would not carry their theory. It would be well for those who trifle with the foundations of truth, to remember that they may bring the temple down in ruin upon themselves.

C. *The Impeccability of Christ.* Let us notice the influence of a false theory of the will on those doctrines which concern the person and character of Christ. The Westminster Catechism teaches that “Christ the Son of God became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul, being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary and born of her, yet without sin.” The points to be noticed here are, (1) that Christ was very God; (2) that he was also very man; (3) that in his human as well as his divine nature, he was sinless; or to state it more strongly, Christ, even as to his humanity, was *impeccable*. None can deny the vital place which such truths as these occupy in theology. Yet a false theory of volition has attacked the first of these truths indirectly, and the last directly.

The bearing of a false theory of the will on the question of the real Deity of Jesus is best seen in the theology of the Socinians. Socinianism is but a development of Pelagianism. Pelagius began by belittling sin and extolling man's ability to save himself. Socinus ended by simply adapting the Saviour to the needs of the sinner. Pelagius taught that all that man—endowed as he was with the power of contrary choice—required in order to holiness, was the holy example of Christ. Socinus, entertaining the same views of human ability, acted according to the maxim of the Pagan poet—

*“Nec Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit;”*

and made Christ a holy man who led a holy life, yet who was nothing but a mere man. Here we see how the fully developed plant only gives us what was wrapped up in the fatal germ. And historically we find a false doctrine of the will resulting in a denial of the divinity of Christ.

But the connexion between a false theory of volition and a denial of the impeccability of Christ is still apparent. Remember the question here is concerning the man Christ Jesus, for all admit that as to his divine nature, Christ was impeccable. But on what valid ground can it be asserted of the man Christ, who, as other men, had a reasonable soul, that he was impeccable? that he possessed the *non posse peccare*? Evidently it was not because some higher power, by external means, restrained Christ from sinning. No, he was a free agent as truly as other men are. What then insured the fact that Christ would not and could not sin when urged by temptation? Or is it a fact that Christ could not sin? If not, he was not impeccable. Grant the principle, that holy dispositions, when nothing occurs to prevent their action, will invariably and infallibly secure holy volition; grant that God, without the violation of the creature's free agency, can sustain in constant exercise holy dispositions once implanted; and finally grant (according to a Calvinistic theology) that Christ's humanity was sustained just in this way; and we have a ready solution of the impeccability of the God-man. But on the assumption that our moral dispositions exert no efficient control

over our volitions, it is conceivable, nay certain, that, notwithstanding and even in spite of the support of the divine nature, Christ *might* have sinned. But the case is even worse than this, for those who hold a wrong doctrine of the will. On their principles, they are not only compelled to admit that Christ might have been peccable—they must go further and maintain that Christ *must have been* peccable. Else on their theory Christ could neither have been free, nor holy. He could not have been free, unless his will had possessed the power of “contrary choice,” which, according to their theory, is essential to pardon. But this power of contrary choice implies that his will might have determined itself to sin as well as to holiness—which makes Christ peccable. He could not have been holy, except in so far as his holiness was the result of deliberate acts of choice on the part of an indifferent will, which might have refused to make holiness its choice. For if Christ’s holiness was not voluntary, it could not have been meritorious. But according to their theory, a voluntary holiness is the holy character *acquired by right acts of will*. But while he was acquiring this holy character by right acts of will, it must have been possible for him to have yielded to temptation and chosen what was sinful. He would not have been free—which again makes Christ peccable. Thus we see that according to a false theory of the will the destiny of man and the glory of God hung for thirty-three years in terrible suspense. For during the entire course of Christ’s earthly existence it must have been absolutely uncertain whether or not Christ would sin. For to say that Christ was peccable is also to say that he was liable to sin.

2. Let us now consider the influence of a false theory of the will upon theology regarded as a science which treats of God’s counsels and dispensations toward his creatures. Here we must content ourselves with examining certain central doctrines which will give shape to all our views on these points. Of these we notice first—

D. *The Doctrine of the Divine Decrees.* What has been the bearing of a false theory of the will upon this doctrine? Our views of the *Divine Decrees* must all determine our views of *Predestination*, *Providence*, and *Election*.

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The true doctrine of the decrees is thus briefly and perspicuously stated in the Westminster Shorter Catechism: "The decrees of God are, his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." Which statement embraces the following points as to the decrees: "(1) Their unity; (2) Their eternity; (3) Their universality, embracing especially future acts of free agents; (4) Their efficiency; (5) Their absoluteness from conditions." Now examination will show that every one of these points as to God's decrees will be affected by a false theory of the will. This statement is found true simply as a matter of history. For historically we find that the unity and eternity of the decrees have been denied by the Socinians; while their universality, efficiency, and absoluteness from conditions have been denied by the Socinians, Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Wesleyans. Nor need this surprise us; for the rejection of the true doctrine of the decrees is logically necessitated by that false theory of the will which they all hold in common. Let us here restate one or two prominent features of the theory of contrary choice. The advocates of this theory insist that volitions are contingent; that moral necessity, which underlies the establishment of a causal tie between the soul's dispositions and its volitions, is inconsistent with man's freedom and responsibility; that the will remains *in equilibrio* after all the preliminary conditions of judgment in the understanding and emotion of the native dispositions are fulfilled; that the act of choice is self-determined by the will and not by these preliminary states of soul." Now if these cardinal propositions in the doctrine of contrary choice be true, then is the true doctrine of decrees overturned in every individual point. Let us first notice those points where all our opponents join in their denial.

They all agree that man's acts, to be free, must be contingent. The Calvinist can say, that, since dispositions and motives efficiently determine volitions, God, by knowing those perfectly, and by controlling providentially the objective circumstances surrounding the agent, can surely foreordain and effectuate these. But if there were no efficient, causal tie between them, then God

cannot. The decree as to free agents can be neither universal, efficient, nor unconditioned. He cannot determine that a given agent shall do thus, or that he will do thus; he can only say that he may do thus. It matters not that this result disparages the sovereignty and omnipotence of the Lord and introduces blind chance into the events his providence seeks to govern, logical consistency must lead all to it who deny the certain efficiency of the dispositions and motives. Since the more evangelical advocates of this false psychology, Arminians, hold the same premises, they are in danger of the same consequences.

Similar consistency constrains them to make all of God's decrees concerning human actions conditioned on the creature's foreseen free will. When we assert that it is derogatory to God to entertain any other than unconditioned purposes, we do not deny that his decrees are based upon his own wisdom and holiness. In this sense, we might say that they are based on all his perfections. Nor do we mean to deny that the events decreed are brought about through their appropriate conditions or means. But we mean that God's acts in holding his purposes are conditioned on nothing outside of himself. If the decree is eternal, sure, universal, and efficient, then it must be thus unconditioned; because there can be no creature's act subsequent to it, which does not in some sense proceed out of the prior decree; and the effect cannot determine its own cause. But now, if human volitions are uncaused and contingent, if, for instance, the sinner's acts of faith and repentance must be such in order to be free and responsible, obviously God's decree to save him through faith and repentance cannot be unconditioned. Waiving the hard question (already discussed) how God could certainly foresee these contingent acts, we must conclude that any purpose as to that man's salvation must be dependent and conditioned. And how deep will this cut? The dependent purpose cannot be more certain than the condition on which it depends. Since execution and purpose correspond, in God's providence, the execution must also be as contingent as the condition. Hence neither has God the power of keeping a justified believer nor a glorified saint in his blessed state beyond the uncertainty of this human will, always contingent in order to

be free; nor can we have a hope of such blessedness resting on any firmer foundation. Thus, this doctrine of self-determination unsettles the very foundations of our heaven! Again, Wesleyans are very loth to follow the Socinian to his consistent conclusions, that because volitions are contingent, even omniscience cannot foreknow them all; and that thus many of God's purposes originate in time, and that his providence is not almighty, and that his government is one of doubtful expedients. But if one does not wish to leap a precipice, he had best ask himself where he will stop, before he sets out on his race towards it. The laws of logic are as regular as those of gravitation. A dependent decree cannot be more absolute than the condition on which it depends, nor the foresight more certain than the condition foreseen. Hence, if Judas's act, for instance, in betraying his Lord, must be contingent in order to be free, then all the decree dependent on God's foresight of it must have been mutable just to the extent that Judas's "free will" was contingent. How, then, could God certainly determine what he would do for man's redemption through his Son's sacrifice accomplished through Judas's treason; until the effectuation of Judas's act had put it beyond contingency? And suppose Judas's will, in the exercise of its self-determination, should at last decline the treasonable volition—a supposition which must be always admissible, on their theory, before the act—then must not God effectuate his plan through some new patchwork of it?

E. Another central doctrine relating to God's counsels and dispensations toward his creatures is that of the

Federal Headship of Adam. Inseparably connected with this doctrine are the kindred and important doctrines of original righteousness, the fall, imputation, original sin, the nature of sin, human ability; and also the doctrines of Christ's federal Headship, vicarious satisfaction, and infinite righteousness. Let us see now how this doctrine has been affected by the theory of contrary choice.

Calvinists, without pretending to have sounded all the depths of the mystery involved in the doctrine of Adam's federal headship, assert that, as a mere matter of fact, it is taught in Scrip-

ture, is based upon God's sovereignty, and is consistent with God's righteousness. The following is a statement of the doctrine and what is implied in it, taken from our standards (Westminster Confession of Faith, Chap. VI., and Larger Catechism, Qu. 20-26). The reader will see, on reference, that the following points are there stated: (1) That God entered into a covenant with Adam not only for himself but for all his posterity descending from him by ordinary generation; (2) That Adam's conduct under this covenant was to determine not only his own state before God, but that of his posterity; (3) That had Adam kept the covenant, all his posterity would have been established in holiness, *i. e.*, they would have come into existence with wills immutably determined to holiness; (4) That in consequence of Adam's violation of this covenant, all his posterity are now born into the world with wills under bondage to sin, so that they are "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all that is evil, and that continually." Now, what is asserted and can be proven is, that upon the theory of "contrary choice," such a doctrine as that of Adam's federal headship would not only be unjust but utterly inconceivable.

This assertion is one which the bolder and more consistent advocates of the doctrine of contrary choice do not care to deny. It is true that a rejection of the doctrine of the Covenant of Works appears to be somewhat damaging to a scriptural theology; it appears to work confusion in the very language of Scripture; it appears to render inexplicable some of the most obvious facts of observation and experience, to say nothing of the fact that the rejection of this doctrine, by involving a rejection of the federal headship, vicarious satisfaction, and imputed righteousness of the Lord Jesus Christ, robs the sinner of hope and dooms him to despair. Still, notwithstanding all these damaging appearances, the Pelagians and Socinians have not hesitated to reject the doctrine of the federal headship of Adam. They do so avowedly on the ground that this doctrine is utterly at variance with their ideas of human free agency and responsibility taught in their doctrine of the will. And logically, their ground is valid. But here again the Wesleyans are unwilling to carry their doctrine of the

will so far. To reject what is involved in the doctrine of the covenant of works appears too much like a rejection of both reason and revelation. Rather than do this, they are willing to make some sacrifices in the matter of consistency. They prefer, therefore, in order to secure a theology not so entirely unscriptural as that of the Socinians and Pelagians, to sacrifice the head to the heart. This spirit may have something commendable in it, though it certainly seems that in so important a matter as theology it is desirable to have both head and heart united. Still, if necessity demands a sacrifice somewhere, it would possibly be best to make the head yield to the heart. They wish to retain the federal headship of Adam, albeit they wish to retain also the doctrine of contrary choice; whereas they cannot logically retain both. Let us see. The doctrine of Adam's headship implies that if Adam had kept covenant with God, then his posterity would have been born not only with the *posse non peccare*, but the higher blessedness of the *non posse peccare*. In other words, that they would have been born to an estate of secured blessedness and with wills immutably determined to holiness. This consequence of Adam's obedience they do not deny, but claim. But if the theory of contrary choice be true, such a state of things would not only be inexplicable but inconceivable. For what does this state of established holiness imply but the existence of an absolute moral certainty—a moral necessity that the creature would put forth none but holy volitions? Now such a moral necessity, no matter how brought about, is, upon the theory of contrary choice, essentially inconsistent with the creature's free agency. The position which the Wesleyan takes concerning regeneration asserts this incompatibility. When asked whether the grace there is invincible, he answers, no; and he argues that if it were, none of the evangelical acts following it would be free, responsible, or moral. It may be as well, now that this point is named, to take note how it both arises necessarily from the doctrine of contrary choice and how it makes havoc of the plan of redemption and of God's sovereignty. For, of course, if the most special forth-puttings of converting grace are vincible by the sinner's contingent will, Christ has no sovereignty as to his posses-

sion of a purchased people. But to return: we ask, if efficacious grace derived through the second Adam would infringe the soul's freedom, how comes it that efficacious principles of holiness derived from the first Adam, under a covenant of works successfully kept, would not have infringed that freedom?

Again, the doctrine of Adam's headship implies that if Adam failed to keep covenant with God (as he did fail to do), then his posterity would be born into the world with their wills in bondage to sin, so that they would be "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil." This statement the Wesleyan admits. Yet it is so palpably contradictory of his doctrine of the will, that he has recourse to his doctrine of "common sufficient grace." By this he holds that while in the fall man lost the self-determining power of his will, still by virtue of the covenant of grace it was restored to every man in Christ. So that every descendant of Adam comes into the world with his nature corrupted, it is true, but still with a will rehabilitated with the power of self-determination. And he holds that, except we admit his doctrine of common sufficient grace, we cannot justify God in making the covenant of works, nor can we establish man's free agency and responsibility. But this position is justly liable to the following criticisms: (1) That Mr. Wesley himself being judge, the *legitimate* result of the covenant of works (if the theory of contrary choice be true) would have been to leave fallen man destitute alike of freedom and responsibility; (2) That his only escape from this unfortunate conclusion is in the doctrine of common sufficient grace. But this doctrine is no where found in Scripture. (3) That in order to prevent injustice to Adam's posterity and an end of his moral government over them, God was bound to send Christ into the world to make an atonement. For this gift of common sufficient grace is bestowed only in consideration of Christ's work. Thus this doctrine of free will leads to the contradiction of all those Scriptures which represent Christ's whole mission as gracious, as an act of undeserved mercy prompted only by God's free compassion. According to this view, God, after once permitting man's fall into a bondage to sin, was bound to

provide this redemptive reparation. The work was not of grace, but of debt. The aid should be called the *common debt* of God to sinners, rather than "common grace."

F. The word "grace" suggests the last point (or cluster of points) to be discussed, the application of redemption in "effectual calling." The violence of the modifications made in this department of theology by the theory of contrary choice, is illustrated by the wild definitions which Pelagians and Socinians give of the idea of *grace*. With them, grace is our natural endowments of spirit, or it is moral suasion, or it is pardon on grounds of repentance. But the Apostle gives a very different and a perfectly distinct meaning: grace is the opposite of "debt;" it is that gift which is "not of works." Now the Westminster doctrine of regeneration involves these points: 1. That it is a work of pure grace; 2. That it finds the sinner in bondage to sin; 3. That his will is passive in the act, viz., is subject of it, and not agent or co-agent in it; 4. That the power is invincible (as already stated). This doctrine of "effectual calling" is a central one, around which cluster those of faith, repentance, justification, sanctification. There was a liberality, one may even say a gratuity, in the covenant of works. God promised Adam a reward out of all proportion to his obedience, and he waived, in promising it, the principle that he had a right to exact obedience of his creature, his property, without promising any recompense. Now then, the Apostle in the passages alluded to (Rom. iv. 5, xi. 6), is undoubtedly *contrasting the grace of the gospel with the covenant of works*. Hence his meaning must be, that *gospel grace is something contrasted even with the species of liberality exercised in that covenant*. But Arminians even, not to say Pelagians and Socinians, in order to retain their scheme of contrary choice, teach a grace which is virtually that of the covenant of paradise. The amount of it is, that God is so liberal as to place man under another probation, in which *he determines his own lot with the same species of self-determination* which Adam exercised in paradise, and is simply rewarded for the right or punished for the wrong use of the power of contrary choice about another "positive" command. Arminius denied that the law of

the covenant of works required faith or repentance, so that the gospel command to these is precisely as "positive" as the command to Adam not to eat the particular fruit. Does the Wesleyan teach that "common sufficient grace" is needed to restore to fallen man that power of "contrary choice"? But we have shown that, on his scheme, God was indebted to man to bestow it. Does the Socinian say that heaven is a reward out of proportion to man's evangelical obedience, and so, gracious? So was the adoption of life promised to Adam out of proportion to his temporal obedience. Does the Arminian say that our faith, without works, is imputed as our gospel righteousness? In his sense, *faith is a work*, and it is no more really out of proportion to eternal life than Adam's "work" was. No synergist can hold to a gracious application of redemption in the Apostle's sense. The synergist is a co-worker with God in that work: the Apostle describes a man that "worketh not." According to him, God sovereignly applies redemption to a sinner, dead, save as the application quickens him; according to the synergist, God lays before the sinner's self-determination this new proposal, and simply rewards his right choice of it.

As to the second and third points of the gospel doctrine of effectual calling, the doctrine of contrary choice must of course exact a denial of the sinner's inability. That scheme teaches that a "loss of all ability of will" would overthrow free agency as truly as the other kind of inability created by a destruction of the faculties requisite to serve God. It asserts that the man whose will is disabled unto all spiritual good by sin must be as irresponsible as the man who is deprived of the faculties of understanding and conscience by idiocy or mental disease. And they are consistent; for certainty of evil volition cannot consist with the power of contrary choice. Again: of course they must deny that man is passive in the quickening; for if he did not at least co-act in choosing the new gospel *habitus*, he would not be a moral agent in exercising it. The same result would follow were grace admitted to be invincible. If grace in effectual calling is invincible, and faith and repentance are the fruits of that grace, then they also would be non-moral and irresponsible, on the Arminian

principles ; hence they must be represented as preceding regeneration.

But these illustrations have been carried as far as space allows. Since the rationalistic influence of this theory of volition is so far-reaching, every reflecting mind is impressed with the importance of the correct philosophy here. Again, the reader sees a strong presumptive argument against the theory of contrary choice in this, that it dictates violent exegesis of such a multitude of Scripture declarations covering nearly every head of our theology. Arminians are wont to represent the Augustinian or Calvinistic construction of the Scriptures as rationalistic, in that we warp them to suit our foregone metaphysical theory of the certainty of the will. But every impartial reader of Scripture can testify that it is we who take the Bible declarations concerning sin, grace, redemption, and free agency, in their obvious sense, while it is our opponents who find the occasion, from the stress of their philosophy, to subject them to laborious tamperings. This is a true and fair summary view of the history of this debate: That when Pelagius had adopted the theory of contrary choice and had carried it out with thorough consistency through his scheme of redemption, he was found to have sophisticated every head of the Church's creed. Such was the deliberate, historical judgment of the Church of every subsequent age. But the Pelagian view of the powers of nature is flattering to man's pride and self-will, hence it was not surrendered. And this is the rational account of every subsequent movement of its advocates as to Christian doctrine, of semi-Pelagianism, of Arminianism, of Wesleyanism: *they are successive attempts, more and more refined and astute, to mix the oil and water: to make the obvious and inflexible declarations of the Scripture ply to the false theory; to find some more indirect bridge over the impassable gulf, which the sense of Christendom has always found existing between Pelagianism and Christianity.*

ARTICLE III.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

The foregoing analysis* of the facts of Adam's case, and the development of the inferences which legitimately flow from them, have, we submit, fairly conducted us to the following positions: first, that Adam was not in any sense necessarily determined, but determined himself, to the commission of his first sin; secondly, that the moral spontaneity of Adam, as started in the direction of holiness, did not determine his will to the formation of his first sinful volition, but that his will, traversing the path of his holy dispositions and tendencies so far as they were moral, was precisely the organ through which he determined himself in the commission of the first sin. In other words, we have seen that Adam sinned by a self-determination of the will. He had the power of contrary choice as an attribute characteristic of his will, and by an exercise of that power, which might have been avoided, willed to sin. Whatever difficulties emerge to speculation in the attempt to *think* the case, as one involving the self-determination of the will, we are under the necessity of *believing* the facts as revealed by Scripture, and of accepting the inferences which they enforce. The conclusion to which we are shut up is, that the sin of Adam was avoidable, and, therefore, cannot without a contradiction be affirmed to have been necessary, or unavoidably certain. His first sinful volition was efficiently produced by the causal power of his will. Here now we have the real test-case of a power in the human will to determine itself, that is, to form unnecessitated volitions—a case which is lifted out of the embarrassments environing the acts of a being already determined to sin by a fixed moral spontaneity. In Eden, and around the will of the first man, is the great theological and philosophical battle to be fought. Thither every train of speculation, not independent of God's revealed authority, inevitably tends; and there, we insist, is the ground upon which, after all, the issue as to the

*In an article in the October number of this REVIEW for 1878.

freedom of the will must be met. We do not reject nor overlook the argument from individual consciousness—that has its proper office; but consciousness has been, in the progress of the controversy, so diversely interpreted, inferences from its alleged deliverances have been so conflicting, that the demand becomes imperious for a more certain source of information. Kant, as we have seen, affirmed that we cannot, in the empirical sphere, escape the conclusions of Necessitarianism, and Sir W. Hamilton, that while the fact of liberty is to be believed, it is wholly inconceivable. Hamilton rested in an assumed deliverance of consciousness as to a fundamental belief in a self-determining power of the will. Kant, in order to ground responsibility, mounted to a transcendental existence, unconditioned by time and space, in quest of an original self-determination of each individual. The Sublapsarian Calvinist goes back to the will of Adam, and, as with the call of a trumpet, demands attention to its unnecessitated decision as fixing the moral complexion of every other human will.

Here, then, we encounter the great argument for Determinism—*instar omnium*—which if true of every human will is true of Adam's, if untrue of his is shorn of universal validity. We allude to the argument, against a self-determining power of the will, of a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is presented in two forms: First, If it be affirmed that the will is the self-determined cause of its acts, we have an absolute commencement, which is inconceivable. Secondly, The law of cause and effect requires for every specific determination of the will a preceding determination, and that another preceding it, and so on *ad infinitum*; but, as that is absurd, we are obliged to hold that every specific volition is efficiently caused by the sum of motives arising from the dispositions, tendencies, and desires of the soul; and as they in turn depend upon the views of the understanding, every such volition is ultimately caused by the last view which the understanding takes of any given case. This second branch of the argument reduces itself consequently in the last analysis to this: that every specific determination of the will is efficiently caused by a mental apprehension.

In regard to the first form of the argument—conceded to be reflectively valid by Sir W. Hamilton, himself a pronounced Libertarian*—we have to say, that there is a failure to signalise a distinction between the origination of existence, and the origination of phenomenal changes in existence. If the question were, whether the will by its determination originates itself as an existing thing, we would be obliged to confess that it would be a supreme absurdity to affirm that it does. That would imply that an effect produces itself—an absolute commencement with a witness. Or, if the question were, whether the will causes, that is, creates, any other substantive thing than itself, we would of course deny. Or, if it were, as Edwards in attempting to reduce the case to absurdity says, whether one act of choice produces another act of choice, we would also deny, since no phenomenal change can be conceived as, of itself, producing another phenomenal change. But if the question be—and we hold that to be the real state of the question—whether the will, as an existing power, causes its own acts, we fail to see that an absolute beginning is involved. In the power of the will we have a cause, of which volitions are legitimate effects. The chain of cause and effect is unbroken. We would have: volition caused by the power of the will, and that power caused by the creative will of God. There is no addition to the sum of substantive existence by a determination of the will. All that is accomplished is a phenomenal change in previous existence. We are happy to be sustained upon this point by the able and acute American critic of Hamilton's philosophy—the late lamented Dr. Samuel Tyler. After stating Hamilton's doctrine as to the origin of the causal judgment in our inability to construe in thought, as possible, an increase or diminution of the complement of existence, he remarks†:

“The question in nature is not, whether the present complement of existence had a previous existence—has just begun to be; but, how comes its new appearance? The obtrusive and essential element is the *new appearance*, the *change*. This is the fact which elicits the causal judg-

*Hamilton's Reid, pp. 602, 611, foot notes.

†*Progress of Philosophy*, p. 175, *et seq.*

ment. To the *change* is necessarily prefixed, by the understanding, a cause or potence. The cause is the correlative to the change, elicited in thought and posited in nature. The question as to the origin of the sum of existence does in no way intrude into consciousness, and is not involved in the causal judgment. Such a question may of course be raised; and then the theory of Sir William Hamilton is a true account of what would take place in the mind. And this is the question which, it seems to us, Sir William has presented as the problem of the causal judgment. His statement of the problem is this: 'When aware of a new appearance, we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to think, that what now appears to us under a new form had previously an existence under others—others conceivable by us or not. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought, as possible, that the complement of existence has been increased or diminished.'

"This seems to us not a proper statement of the problem of causation. This problem does not require the *complement of existence* to be accounted for; but the *new form* to be accounted for; and a new form must not be confounded with an *entirely new existence*. Causation must be discriminated from creation; in the first, *change* only, in the last, the complement of existence, is involved. If we attempt to solve the problem of *creation*, the notion of an absolute beginning is involved; consequently, a negative impotence is experienced, as we cannot think an absolute beginning, and we would fall back on the notion of causation—would stop short at the causal judgment, unable to rise to a higher cognition, the cognition of creation.

"The causal judgment consists in the necessity we are under of prefixing in thought a cause to every change, of which we think. Now change implies previous existence; else it is not change. Of what does it imply the previous existence? Of that which is changed, and also of that by which the change is effected. Now change is effect. It is the result of an operation. Operation is cause (potence) realising itself in effect. . . . When we attempt to separate effect from cause, in our thought, contradiction emerges. It is realised to consciousness in every act of will, and in every act of positive thinking as both natural and rational. . . .

"It is doubtless true, that the negative impotence to think an absolute beginning necessarily connects, in thought, present with past existence; and as all change must take place in some existence, the change itself is connected in thought with something antecedent: and, therefore, the mind is necessitated by the negative impotence to predicate something antecedent to the change. But, then, as a mere negative impotence cannot yield an affirmative judgment, it cannot connect present with past existence, in the relation of cause and effect, but only in sum of existence which it is unable to think either increased or diminished. The causal

judgment is determined by a mental power elicited into action by an observed change, and justified thereby as an affirmation of a potence evinced in the changed existence; and it matters not whether the change be the result of many concurring causes, or of one; still the notion of potence cannot but be thought as involved in the phenomenon. When we see a tree shivered to atoms by a flash of lightning, it is difficult to be convinced that the causal judgment elicited by the phenomenon is merely the impotence to think an absolute beginning.

“We are conscious that we are the authors of our own actions; and this is to be conscious of causation in ourselves.”

If these views be correct, Adam's first sinful volition, as caused by a divinely imparted efficiency of his will, was not an instance of a supposed absolute commencement. It was an effect of the causal power inherent in his will; or, what is the same thing, of the causal power of will inherent in him.

In regard to this aspect of the argument we would further observe: First, that the difficulty alleged is not peculiar to the will, and therefore ought not to be urged in reference to it alone. The same difficulty might be adduced in relation to the production of any physical effect by a material cause. Unless we are prepared to adopt the hypothesis of Absolute Dependence in its most unqualified form, we must admit that there is a causal efficiency, derived, dependent, limited, indeed, but real, in natural forces to produce their appropriate effects. Why not such a causal efficiency in the human will? In the case of the effects produced by a natural force, is there any absolute beginning of existence? Are not these effects regarded simply as new appearances, as phenomenal changes in substantive existence? We see no difference in the two cases, so far as this difficulty is involved, unless it be supposed that the divine efficiency is more immediately exerted in the will than in physical force, and all real causality is denied to the human soul. It is sufficient to say in regard to such a supposition, that it is precisely the opposite of the ordinary judgment of men; and would, by denying the causality of the will, bar the possibility of an empirical development of the notion of cause as applied to physical changes. Whence do we derive the notion of cause, as elicited in experience, if not from the exertions of the will? And that it, the very instrument by which

the causal judgment is formally developed, should be stripped of causality, is something passing strange.

But if it be said that, although the acts of the will are not substantive beings, they are existences, real things susceptible of predication, and that the difficulty, in that view, is not relieved; we answer, that it does not appear how that distinction would vacate of force the argument just presented; for phenomenal changes in nature resulting from the operation of physical force are, in this sense, existences: and yet in affirming that they are caused, we do not dream of affirming that they have an absolute beginning. But we remark, secondly, that the difficulty, in this form, presses equally in relation to the acts of the understanding, held by the Determinist to be regulative of volition, as in relation to the acts of the will. The understanding being, in the general, the power by which the soul knows or forms cognitions, the cognitive acts are products of the cognitive power. If this is not granted, then whence come cognitions? What is their genesis? The law of cause and effect postulates a cause for them. What is that cause? If it be not the power of understanding, we crave to know what it is. Now, if volition is accounted for by referring it to intellectual apprehension as its ultimate cause, so as to avoid the inference of an absolute beginning, how is that inference to be avoided in relation to the first intellectual act? It would seem to be clear, that the alleged difficulty of an absolute commencement is not peculiar to the processes of the will, but holds equally, upon the hypothesis in hand, of those of the understanding. And so, all intellectual and voluntary activity are alike estopped by this inconceivable thing of an absolute beginning. Ere we can suppose ourselves to act causally at all, we must await the removal of this formidable contradiction! Now, if the Determinist replies, that all this is true, and that it only supports his doctrine, that cognitive acts are the unavoidable products of an immanent necessity in the intelligence which must be referred to the will of God, we confront him with the first sin of Adam, and urge upon him the irresistible consequence of his position, to wit, that Adam sinned by virtue of a necessity divinely implanted in his nature; which is tantamount to the position, that God was

the real efficient of the first sin. But if that cannot be true, the hypothesis which logically conducts to it is fallacious. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that the full force of the assumed difficulty of an absolute commencement directly recoils upon the half-way Determinist, who inconsistently maintains an originating causality in the understanding as the ultimate ground of voluntary action. To him the inconsistency is irretrievably damaging. We cannot forbear observing, in addition, that the refusal of causality to the will, and the assignment of it to the understanding, is a paradox, the statement of which is sufficient to refute it. As well might we say, there is no power of motion in the muscles; it resides in the brain.

It must be admitted, however, that the core of the difficulties attending this question has not yet been reached. That is found in the second aspect of the argument against a self-determining power in the will. Let it be conceded, it is urged, that there is a power resident in the will, adapting it to the formation of volitions; still, that power as a generic activity will not account for specific determinations. Each act, as being of a particular kind rather than another, can only be accounted for by the supposition of an intelligent reason, in which its peculiarity is grounded. Thus in thought we are never able to escape the necessity of referring specific acts of the will, as characterised thus and so, to the apprehensions of the intellect. Let us fix our conception of this difficulty, as presented by Leibnitz and relentlessly pressed by Edwards. On the hypothesis of a self-determination of the will, each act of choice must be determined by a preceding act of choice, and that by another antecedent to it, and so on *ad infinitum*; which is absurd. This absurdity is avoided on the part of Determinism, by denying the dependence of acts of choice, one upon another, and referring each to the causal efficiency of the *habitus* of the soul as ultimately directed to specific results by the last view of the understanding. The regression is, on the one hypothesis, to infinity; on the other, it is arrested, according to some Determinists, by the apprehensions of the understanding; according to others, by the causal efficiency of God. Such is the difficulty, stated, we think, with fairness. Now, if it be conceded

that an unnecessitated determination of the will is incapable of being thought, that fact would not destroy its possibility. It might still be believed, on the ground of a datum of consciousness, or the deliverances of supernatural revelation. And if an equal difficulty, to thought, can be proved to exist in the opposite hypothesis, the two would be *in equilibrio*, speculatively, and their respective claims would have to be adjudicated at the bar of consciousness and the Scriptures. This plan we propose to pursue. We shall endeavor to show, that the hypothesis of Determinism may be reduced to absurdity, at least equal to that which is alleged against its antagonist; and then, by throwing our fundamental beliefs and the testimony of the Scriptures into the opposite scale, kick the beam against it.

First, let us start with the assumption, which we have no disposition to dispute, that every effect must have a cause. Now, every act of the understanding, according to the Determinist, is an effect; for every thing that comes to pass, he contends, is an effect. And as an act of the understanding is something which occurs—which begins to be—it must be assigned to that category. But if every act of the understanding is an effect, it must have a cause. Now, either that cause must lie in the understanding or without it. Without it, it cannot be; for the Determinist makes the acts of the understanding ultimate causes of volition. The only cause, therefore, for an act of the understanding must be within the understanding—namely, a previous act of the understanding itself; and as that is an effect, it is likewise grounded in another preceding it, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is just as absurd to suppose the acts of a finite understanding to be projected backward infinitely, and of an understanding acting in time to reach to eternity, as to make a similar supposition in regard to a finite will acting in time. The Determinist cannot meet this argument from an infinite regression of intellectual acts, by affirming the existence of a first act which originates the series; for, on his own principles, that first act, as an effect, must be accounted for by the assignment of a cause for it, and so we would have an act preceding the alleged first act, and his own contradiction as to the will emerges. If he says that there must

be a limit to the series of intellectual acts, and that the first act is not determined by a previous act, but by something extraneous to the subjectivity of the man—by the circumstances, for example, in which he is placed, and the objects to which his understanding is related—he gives up his position, that although the will does not determine itself, the man determines himself. If, inconsistently, he admits that the man does not determine himself, but is determined to the first act of the understanding by something outward to himself, he strikes the track of external effects and causes. Either that series must recede *ad infinitum*, or it must stop with the efficiency of God. If the former, his own *reductio ad absurdum* ensues. If the latter, we confront him again with the first sin of Adam, and, Scripture and intuition being our authority, we pronounce the result still more absurd.

If it should be objected to this reasoning, that intellectual activity is a property of a substance rather than the effect of a cause, the reply is obvious, that a distinction is to be taken between the power of thinking, which is a property of the soul, and the act of thinking, which is a product or effect of that power. The relations are different. But such an objection would be incompetent to the Determinist, whose theory is that the intellectual apprehensions are causes and not mere properties; and as they must be admitted to be second causes, they are also effects. Otherwise, the immediate efficiency of God is exerted in the production of every human act, and, consequently, of every sinful act.

Secondly, upon the hypothesis of Determinism, there can be no such thing as responsibility for intellectual opinions. Its very core is in its affirmation, that every specific act of the will is ultimately determined by some view of the understanding. It is not our intention to deny that in many cases that may be so; what we have to do with is the assertion that it is so in every case. Now, the only way in which, so far as we know, it has ever been attempted to prove that men are responsible for their intellectual views, is by showing, that in some sense the will is able to control the operations of the understanding, either by determining it to reflective, as distinguished from spontaneous, processes; or,

by directing its attention to certain kinds of evidence; or, by controlling its relations to external circumstances which influence it; or, by holding this or that class of objects in connexion with the springs of action in the appetites and emotions, which in turn affect the mental states. But if the understanding always controls the acts of the will, never the contrary, it is clear that that method of proof is destroyed. Then, either the man is responsible for his intellectual views on some other ground or he is wholly irresponsible for them. The only other ground, possible to the Determinist, is the self-determining power of the man over his intellectual acts by his intellectual acts. But it is absurd to say that the man determines one involuntary mental act by another equally involuntary. They may possibly be determined one by another, but he does not determine them. The only remaining supposition is, that he is wholly irresponsible for his mental acts; and it may be left to common sense to say whether that position does not lead to practical consequences not only absurd, so far as our relation to God and to truth are concerned, but dangerous to the well-being of society. And this is all the more remarkable, because the Determinist makes the views of the understanding determine the acts of the will. If, therefore, we are not responsible for intellectual acts, we are not for volitions. And so, all the actions of men would be exempted from the law of responsibility. The truth is, that the very seat of obedience to law is the will; but if the will is always determined by the views of the understanding, and there is no responsibility for them, there is no responsibility for disobedience and no room for punishment. Now let the application be made to Adam's first sin. If his will was determined by the views of his understanding, and he was not responsible for them, he could not be justly said to have been responsible for his disobedience to God, and therefore could not have been punishable. To that result Determinism logically leads; and if so, no reduction to absurdity could be stronger, since it would hold in the moral, and not simply in the speculative, sphere.

If it be said, that this reasoning begs the very question in dispute, namely, whether the will is not always controlled by the

directive power of the understanding; and that it is overlooked that the very reason why the will determines the intellect in its reflective processes, or directs the understanding to this or that sort of evidence, or places the man in this or that relation to circumstances, or puts the springs of action in connexion with this or that class of objects, is precisely some previous view of the understanding itself without which the action of the will in the premises would be irrational and arbitrary; we answer: In the first place, we concede the fact that there must be some intelligent reason for the specific determinations of the will in the premises, but the very pinch of the question is, Does the reason absolutely control the acts of the will, as a natural law the operation of a natural force, or has the will power to concur or not to concur with the reason? And we anticipate our final conclusion by the remark, that in the beginning of certain voluntary acts the understanding illuminates, without absolutely governing, the will—shows the path to be pursued, but does not compel the will to take that path. There must be some light to see by, but the light is neither the power nor the determination to walk. In the second place, if this be not admitted, it follows with indisputable certainty, as the states and acts of the understanding must conform to the laws of evidence, or implicitly follow those of its spontaneity, that if they control the will and are in no degree swayed by it, men are not responsible for their intellectual processes and opinions. This last position cannot be true, and therefore it cannot be true that in every case the understanding dominates the will. Granted that we cannot escape in thought the antecedence of some intellectual action to every volition, it is equally true that we cannot escape the moral conviction that we are responsible for our opinions. Now we may legitimately doubt whether the views of the understanding control the will in all its acts—it is not perfectly clear what the precise *quantum* of their influence is upon the will. But we cannot legitimately doubt the responsibility of men for their opinions—it is perfectly clear that the conspirator against lawful government lawfully administered, that the criminal whose crime has been proved by unimpeachable testimony, that the hearer of the gospel who rejects it when truly

preached, cannot plead immunity from judgment on the ground of irresponsibility for their opinions and beliefs. We are, therefore, bound to square the doubtful position by the undoubted. It is the latter which is entitled to stamp the type of our theory.

Thirdly, the theory of Determinism furnishes an incomplete account of the origination of motives, and of the mode in which they operate upon the will. It is conceded that no elective act of the will ever takes place without some motive to its occurrence. We reject that view of contingency, as sometimes applied to the acts of the will, which ascribes to them no cause for their existence, and no motives to their production. In this respect, therefore, there is no controversy between us and the Determinist. But there is a twofold aspect of his theory of motives, in which we regard it as inadequate and unphilosophical. In the first place, he assigns to motives an invariable dependence, in their origination, upon the perceptions of the understanding. The rise of the emotions and desires, as inducements to voluntary action, is regulated by the intellectual processes. Says Edwards:*

“Whatever is a motive in this sense [of a complex whole operating as inducement] must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or to act anything any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind’s view: for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind’s view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.”

We have no wish to misstate any element of the theory under consideration; and we think it will be acknowledged that these words of Edwards justify the account, attributed to it, of the determining influence of the understanding upon the origin of motives. Not that we mean to imply that Edwards taught that no feelings, tendencies, or desires could spontaneously arise without the originating influence of the understanding; but that they could not operate *as motives* upon the will without such an influence of the understanding. Now we appeal to consciousness and Scripture to bear us out in the assertion, that there is a class of

* *Inquiry*, etc., Pt. i., § 2.

motives which cannot be assigned to this category. Those appetencies which are termed blind impulses must be excepted from it. They receive that denomination, partly because they do not depend for their emergence as springs of action upon any operation of intelligence. Hunger does not originate in, nor is it regulated by, any perception or thought or view of the understanding as to the necessity or desirableness of food. It springs blindly, unintelligently, from the very make of the bodily organism. So is it with curiosity, which, although intellectual in its nature, does not depend for its excitation upon any particular view of the intellect. It is an original spring of action. These examples of a class are sufficient to expose the incompleteness of the Determinist's analysis of the origin of motives. But these impulses are among the most frequent and powerful inducements which solicit the will to action. They are imperious wants which clamor for gratification; they admit of no rest until they are supplied.

In the second place, the Determinist makes the understanding always and absolutely regulative of the application of motives, when they have arisen, to the activity of the will. It is an inevitable mediator between inducements and the will; more than this, it first appropriates the inducements, gives them the character of motives, assimilates them to its own processes, and then presents its views as the controlling motive—the real, efficient cause of volition. “The will,” according to the great canon of Edwards, “always is as the greatest apparent good,” and nothing can appear as good or agreeable except as submitted by the understanding. It is its office to stamp the agreeable complexion of every object to which the tendency of the will is directed. It is alike, therefore, the master of the motives and of the will. If this claim for absolute supremacy and unexceptional control in favor of the understanding can be invalidated, it is obvious that the theory of the Determinist would break down at its most critical point. His position would be fatally breached, if any exception could be indicated to the operation of this law.

We appeal to consciousness to sustain the statement that, in the first instance, the blind impulses regulate the views of the

understanding, and subordinate it as an adjuvant in the attainment of their appropriate objects. Hunger excites the imagination of food, and drives the judgment to adopt the means of its procurement. The very dreams of the hungry man are ruled by the craving for food; they are haunted by visions of it. He sits at royal banquets and feasts on delicious viands. So with the appetite of sex, and so with curiosity. They impress themselves upon the imagination, mould it into conformity with themselves, and stimulate the mental processes to action in order that the means of their gratification may be furnished. True, the imagination thus excited reacts upon them and inflames them to a higher pitch of energy. But that is because of its vicarious power of representing the objects with which the impulses are naturally correlated. It is as if those objects were themselves presented. And if it be a fact that it is not the presence of the real objects which creates or regulates the impulses, for the hungry man, for example, continues to be hungry in the absence of food, the power to create or regulate them cannot be assigned to the imagination as their mere vicar. Now, it is further clear, that the tendency in the impulse, which awoke into activity independently of the representations of the intelligence, terminates as directly upon the will as upon the imagination. There is no need of the mediating office of the understanding to transmit the influence of the inducement to the will. It may heighten the impression, but does not communicate it. The impulsion is communicated immediately to the will, and its conative element is directly incited to exercise. The hungry man, for instance, thus stimulated by the direct influence of the impulse upon the will, forms the volition to seek food; and, if the desired object is at hand, forms the volition to eat. Here then, we maintain, is a volition which no necessity compels us to refer to the view of the understanding as its efficient cause; and we have in it a negative instance which checks a thousand affirmatives in the prosecution of the induction leading to the law, that the acts of the will are invariably determined by the views of the understanding. Let consciousness be consulted, and it will testify that while the influence of the impulse may simultaneously terminate upon the imagination and

the will, we do not depend upon the information of the understanding for an inducement to act, but are moved by the impulse communicated immediately to the will. That is inducement enough.

It would be vain to say that the very nature of these blind impulses is to impel, without directing, and that consequently the understanding must come in to designate the special mode of their gratification, and so to cause a specific volition to adopt that mode. That may be so, but we have already discovered volitions which do not depend upon this office of the intelligence, and therefore cases infringing the invariability of the law we are considering. And further, in regard to the specific directions of the understanding in these cases, it is the will which puts that power upon exerting itself to furnish them, and the will is moved by the impulses to that determination. To say that the understanding directed the will to direct the understanding to direct the will specifically, looks very much like burlesquing the whole matter; but that is what the Determinist must say in accordance with his theory.

The conclusion to which we are conducted by this special line of argument is, that it is not a universal and invariable law that the understanding originates, absorbs, and regulates all motives acting upon the will, but that, on the contrary, the blind impulses start and control the intellectual processes, and at the same time terminate independently of them and immediately upon the *nisus* of the will.

In accordance with the central idea of this discussion—that the question of a self-determining power of the will is really the question of an original self-determining power in the will of our first progenitors, the exercise of which was destined to fix the moral attitude of all their posterity—it is necessary to subject this doctrine of a regulative control by the understanding of all motives operating upon the will to induce specific action, to a comparison with that first test-case. Now, it would seem to be manifest, that the understanding of our first parents, normally right as it was in their estate of innocence, could not have *originated* the motives to the first sinful act. It could not have been the precise seat of responsibility for the “first disobedience”—

the organ and motor of the great revolt. The supposition is impossible. Did it then take up the inducements to the sin originated by other elements in their subjective condition, represent them to the will as motives, and causally enforce them upon it in order to the commission of the sin? The moral spontaneity of their affections and wills and consciences was as normally right as that of their understandings. The motives to the sin, therefore, could not have originated there, any more than in the spontaneity of the intellect. Where, then, was the source of those motives? We have seen that in all probability it was, as Butler has profoundly suggested, in the blind impulses implanted in their constitution by the hand of their divine Maker. Possessed of no intrinsic moral character, they might be correlated either with lawful or forbidden objects, by virtue of the inherent adaptability of their nature. These impulses received their direction to a forbidden object, not by the spontaneous or elective action of the powers of our first parents, but by the insidious art of an external tempter. Here is the scriptural account of the way in which they were induced to a specific determination of the will—to an abusive employment of the *libertas specificationis*. It was not their understanding which, in the first place, imparted the specific direction; it was that of the devil, immediately in Eve's case, mediately through Eve in Adam's case. He touched the spring of action in the blind impulses, perhaps the only vulnerable point at which they were accessible to temptation. If it be said that the devil must have operated upon the understanding in order to reach the will, it may be answered: In the first place, the first apprehension which mediated the access of the temptation, the first channel through which it came, was one of sense—the visual apprehension of the fruit, and the suggestion of good to accrue from eating it was consequent. The sensation conditioned perception and judgment; and so the appeal to the intellect was not the initial step in the process. The great master of temptation, with consummate adroitness, put his finger upon the divinely constituted adaptation between the make of the body and the external object.* It must not be overlooked, that the

* It deserves to be noticed, that such was precisely his policy in his first approach to the Second Adam in the wilderness.

sin had a progressive development culminating in the eating of the forbidden fruit; and that the moment at which it began was exactly that at which, at least in Eve's case, the will moved by the blind impulse consented to that motion—tolerated the suggestion to look wishfully at the interdicted tree. It was this sinful consent of the will in the first instance which made it possible for the imagination to be inflamed, and the intellectual apprehensions to be impressed, and thus for the soul to be projected forwards, under a combination of inducements, to the consummation of the transgression. It would seem, therefore, to be clear that the views of the understanding could not have been the efficient cause of the beginning of the sin. In the second place, in the progress of the temptation, it must be observed, that the argument of the tempter addressed to the intelligence was not employed until he had appealed to the blind impulse of curiosity. Here, again, the will must have consented to the indulgence of this innocent impulse thus directed towards a forbidden object, before the intellectual incentives presented by Satan could have had their designed effect. In other words, in the second stage of the temptation of Eve, the impact of the blind impulse of curiosity upon the will was felt, before the intellectual considerations suggested by the tempter operated as motives upon it. We have not space, nor is it necessary, to consider particularly the case of Adam. Allowance being made for the circumstantial differences between it and that of Eve, we believe that the conclusions reached would be substantially the same, with the exception that his sin was more aggravated than hers. The considerations submitted we regard as sufficient to prove that, in the case of our first parents, the views of the understanding were not motives which causally controlled the action of their will in the production of the first sin. And if so, this leading element in the theory of Determinism is overthrown, in relation to the only case of self-determination in the religious sphere about which it is worth while to discuss—the case of our first parents in the garden of Eden.

Fourthly, The hypothesis of Determinism, however specious its argumentation, is opposed to consciousness, Scripture, and

the general usage of language as expressive of the convictions of the race, in regard to the seat of efficient causality in the human soul. It is, we know, an old question, whether the soul has any efficient causal power; whether the will of God be not the sole efficient cause in the universe. We will not now discuss that question at length, but content ourselves with one brief but conclusive argument. If the will of God is the only real efficient cause of all things, it is the efficient cause of moral acts, and if so, of sinful acts. It was, therefore, the efficient cause of the first sinful act of the first man, and by consequence of all the sinful acts of all men which spring from it as their ultimate source. But we have already shown that such a position leads to inconceivable absurdity and contradiction. We therefore assume that God, in creating man, endowed him with a causal efficiency as to acts somewhat analogous to his own—not a power creative of existence, but a derived, dependent, and limited power, productive of phenomenal changes in the mode of man's being. Now, this causal efficiency in man has its seat precisely in the will, and expresses itself in the determinations of that faculty. In the first place, we must distinguish, what Determinism confounds, efficient and final causes. The Determinist makes motives the efficient causes of voluntary acts. But what are motives but ends of action as conceived by the mind? They are, therefore, final and not efficient causes. Granted, that the understanding furnishes some of the motives to action, it *proposes* the ends to be secured—it gives the final cause. But it is the will itself, as the doer of the action, which *purposes* its performance—it gives the efficient cause. The understanding proposes; the will purposes and disposes. The power to direct lies in the motives as final causes; but the power to do lies in the will. It is clear that neither the understanding, nor the emotions, nor the blind impulses, could do what the will does. The distinction would seem to be perfectly obvious between that which incites to doing and that which does. Motives, therefore, are the final, the will is the efficient, cause of voluntary acts.

But, in the second place, the old difficulty will here be urged that the specific acts of the will are determined by the motives:

otherwise they are unaccountable. We have admitted that where a moral spontaneity has been established by an original free self-decision, that is so. The fixed self-expression is the result of that self-determination. But in the instances of natural and merely moral and non-spiritual acts, that principle does not operate. Nor did it operate, in the case of our first parents, in the spiritual sphere. The Determinist confounds the *directing* power of motives with a *determining* power. They direct, but do not determine the will. It determines itself in accordance with directions furnished to it. On the principle that most effects are produced by a concurrence of causes, we admit that final causes concur with the efficient cause in the production of voluntary acts. Without the final, the efficient would not produce; but it is the efficient, not the final, which produces. Without the final cause of justification—the glory of his grace, God would not justify the sinner; but surely it is not the final cause which justifies. It is grace itself which is the efficient cause of the result. And we might just as well argue that, because it is inconceivable that God would specifically determine to justify a sinner without the direction of his wisdom as to the end contemplated, therefore it is his wisdom and not his grace which justifies, as to say that because the specific determination of the human will cannot be formed without the directing power of the understanding, therefore it is the understanding and not the will which voluntarily determines. So, Adam's will would not have formed the sinful volition, without motives inducing the act; but it would be unphilosophical and unscriptural to say that the motives, and not his will, efficiently produced the act. This is another of the defects of determinism, that it paradoxically transfers the seat of efficient causality in the human soul from the will to the understanding. It is like mistaking a man's eyes which indicate the point toward which he walks, for his power to walk to that point. Without his eyes he would not walk to that point, but surely it is not his eyes which walk.

Further, the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective processes of the understanding deserve especial notice in the consideration of this question. With the spontaneous, it is con-

ceded that the will has nothing to do; but it is directly concerned in the reflective. The very point of difference between the two is, that the one class of intellections is involuntary, the other voluntary. This the Determinist must admit, or announce his arbitrary resolution to stick to paradox. But, if it be admitted, we have the understanding determining the will to volition, and the will determining the understanding to reflection, or, since the Determinist must hold that some of the acts by which the understanding determines the will are reflective, the case may be put more sharply: reflection determines volition; volition determines reflection. This circle cannot be endured; we must break it and get a starting point somewhere. Where shall it be? Is it reflection? Is it volition? If reflection, the case will be: reflection determines the volition which determines reflection, and the circle is as vicious as ever. If volition, the Determinist admits that there are some cases in which the will determines the understanding, not the understanding the will; and his invariable law, that the views of the understanding are efficient of volition, breaks down. Let it be observed that this is an *argumentum ad hominem*. It is not our purpose inconsistently to depart from the position for which we have contended—that at the root of every faculty there are laws by which its own processes are regulated. The understanding discharges its appropriate functions in obedience to the fundamental laws of thought and belief, and the will in conformity to the law of efficient causality, lying at the basis of all free, voluntary determinations. As we have maintained that the understanding does not causally effect the decisions of the will, so we here concede that the will does not produce the acts of the understanding. It is the understanding which reflects, not the will, even when it is determined to reflection by the will. All that we do urge is, that the intellect does not efficiently cause the free determinations of the will. The nature of effects, strictly speaking, must correspond with the nature of the efficient causes by which they are produced—intellectual effects with an intellectual cause, emotional with emotional, and voluntary with voluntary. The Determinist departs from this principle in demanding for the free determinations of the

will an invariable connection with the acts of the understanding as their efficient cause. He makes the root of intellection produce volition as its fruit.

The following remarks of Müller are worthy of consideration :*

“That the will is this, inseparably one with all other elements of the personal life, just as its inmost determining centre, the very use of language confirms. Even consciousness and reason it ventures to denominate as something which the Ego has ; while it directly identifies the will with the Ego. No one will say : my will has determined this or that, just as he says : my reason, my consciousness has taught me that. The will is very man himself, just as Augustine says : *Voluntas est in omnibus ; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt*. By a just estimate of this relation, the old instances of the common Determinism, that the will in each one of its decisions is determined by certain representations, as motives, that these therefore produce the resolve and bring about the act by the will as their instrument, will scarcely be able any more to place us in embarrassment. That would imply a strange psychology, which regarded the conceptions, mental representations, as the only strictly active and efficient agencies in the soul, and on the contrary gave to the will a merely receptive, or, to speak more correctly, passive position. That is in reality to deny the will, which is indeed nothing if it has not real causality. . . . Are, then, determinate mental representations, as such, motives, impulses, for our will ? The question is not, whether they ought to be, but whether they factually are so. No, answers experience, but they first of all become so, by our placing our *interest* in their contents, and then making it the object of our desire. . . . The motives are always only the self-mediation, not the producing cause of the free volition ; they belong to that inner body which the will out of pre-existent stuff forms for itself, in order to reveal itself therein. The will attracts and encircles itself with the representations and feelings which correspond with its germinating tendency, not as by a definite resolve, but as if with the power of magic, operating unobservedly, and thus constitute them the permanent determinings and determinate tone of the inner life, by which it is actuated, or by which its volition is mediated in the individual act. As therefore the conditions of, and changes occurring in, the soul become known in the expression and movement of the body, so does one recognise in the nature of the motives, by which man determines himself, the fundamental constitution or character of his will, present at the time, and which he cannot have derived elsewhere than from himself. His will is entirely in them, the motives are very moments of his will ; but thereby it is not in the smallest degree deprived

**Christian Doct. Sin*, Vol. ii., p. 54 f.

of its freedom. Also the individual act of the will is never dependent upon the motives, strictly taken, but may very well be so upon the tendency immanent in the will itself."

Let us now review the state of the question in hand. The alleged unanswerable argument of the Determinist is his *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory which affirms the possibility of an unnecessitated determination of the will by showing that it involves a regression of such determinations to infinity. This cannot be thought. We have endeavored to show that there are, on the hypothesis of Determinism, difficulties equally insoluble, absurdities equally great. We claim that this has been accomplished; and the effect is, to neutralise, at least, the force of the famous reduction from a *regressus ad infinitum* of unnecessitated volitions. That celebrated argument is checked; and we are at liberty to appeal to other sources of proof. This would be the state of the question, upon the admission of a perfect equipoise.

But we submit that the equipoise is not perfect, that the force of each *reductio ad absurdum* is not the same. There is not a simple neutralisation of each other. This may be the case in respect to the arguments considered only as metaphysical. But in favor of that in the *moral* sphere we have the testimony of our fundamental intuitions and of the Scriptures, which, taken together and thrown, like Brennus's sword, into the scale, kick the beam; while for that in the metaphysical sphere, there is no equal additional consideration. The equilibrium is thus destroyed. But even if it be granted, that no more has been achieved than to complete the neutralisation within the limits of the subjective states and processes of the soul, still, as soon as those limits are overpassed, and the connection is palpably established with the train of causes leading to the causal efficiency of God in relation to sin, the equipoise is destroyed, and the argument from that point is overwhelmingly opposed to the hypothesis of Determinism. Let us gather up these additional considerations with reference to the first sin of the race and by rapidly throwing them together evince their transcendent power. God was not the efficient producer of Adam's first sin; that sin was not a mere negation of rectitude, a privative effect of a deficient

cause, but a positive and gigantic disorder; Adam was the efficient producer of the sin; his moral spontaneity was all right, and therefore it could not, as a motive or as a complex of motives, have necessitated the commission of the sin; therefore, the first sin was the effect of an unnecessitated and avoidable determination of Adam's will.

This conclusion having been fairly established, it follows that the invariableness of the great law of Determinism is disproved—namely, that, in the moral sphere, volitions are always and necessarily as the moral spontaneity; that the decisions of the will are necessarily or unavoidably determined by the sum of motives in the soul. The first sinful volition of the first man furnishes that “negative instance,” which Lord Bacon says, is, “in establishing any true axiom, the most powerful.” It overthrows the induction proceeding upon a host of affirmatives. The determination of the will in the first sin was not necessary, not unavoidably certain. It negatives the universal conclusion of the Determinist. And this is true of the sin which fixed the destiny of the race, apart from the supernatural interposition of grace. We see clearly, what the Determinist fails to show, that the fixed expression of a sinful spontaneity was not original—it is penal.

The question finally demands our attention—and it is a critical one—what is the relation of God's foreknowledge to the first sin of Adam? The ground has been taken by some Calvinistic theologians that inasmuch as only that, the futuration of which is certain, can be foreknown, and nothing can be certain in the future unless it be efficaciously decreed, the divine foreknowledge of Adam's sin as a fact certain to take place must have been grounded in a decree that it should take place. They seem, in addition to a strange oversight of the distinction between efficient and permissive decrees, to have been led to adopt this view from a failure to observe another obvious distinction—namely, that between the sin of one already a sinner and the first sin of one previously innocent. They put these two sorts of sin, differently conditioned as they are, in the same category, and make them the subjects of common predication. For example, they deal with Adam's first sin and the crime of our Saviour's crucifixion upon

the same principles. Because the Scripture appears to affirm that the divine foreknowledge of the crucifixion was grounded in the divine decree that it should take place, they infer that the same must hold good of Adam's first sin. Principal Cunningham,* ascribes to the compilers of the Westminster Standards and the Reformers the belief, in which he himself evidently concurs, "that God's providence, executing his decrees, was concerned in the fall of Adam, in the same sense, and to the same extent, to which it is concerned in the sinful actions which men perform now." Let us soberly inquire whether this principle is capable of equal application to the first sin of Adam and the crime of the crucifixion. It is argued, as by President Edwards, that God, in decreeing the death of Christ, also decreed the means by which it was to be accomplished. But as those means involved the sin of the agents of his crucifixion, that sin was decreed in the sense that it could not but have been committed. Its commission was necessitated by the decree; and so, it was an object of the divine foreknowledge. Now assuming that this view is correct, in so far as the foreordination of the sin efficaciously is concerned, is there no difference between such a case and that of Adam's first sin? Because it is right and just in God judicially to shut up malicious sinners to the performance of an act which is but the climax of their iniquity, the consummation of their desperate wickedness, does it follow that he would appear to be equally just in shutting up an innocent being to the commission of a sin which would initiate an endless series of crimes and be the key-note of an eternal doom? It cannot be true that the relation of God's providence to the two cases is precisely the same, nor that Dr. Cunningham has correctly represented the catholic doctrine of the Reformers and Westminster divines upon this point. But if there be a difference between the cases, then the alleged ground of foreknowledge in that of the crucifixion is not proved to be the ground of foreknowledge in that of Adam's first sin. In the one, it is assumed that the certainty of the event as necessitated by the divine decree was the ground of its being foreknown. In the other, there was no such necessitation, as we

**Historical Theology*, Vol. I., p. 579.

have shown in the previous argument, and consequently no such ground of foreknowledge. God most assuredly knew the certainty of Adam's first sin, but he did not know its certainty because by his decree he had necessitated its occurrence. No sublapsarian, at least, can hold that to have been the reason of his knowing it. He must admit that, as there was a possibility of Adam's standing, he was not necessitated to sin by the divine decree. So far as God's positive agency was concerned, he might have obeyed, been justified, and have secured eternal life for himself and all his seed; otherwise the covenant of works was a mockery. To the sublapsarian, therefore, there must have been some other ground of God's foreknowledge of the sin of Adam than the causal necessitation of decree.

But admitting that the sin of the crucifixion was rendered necessary by an efficacious decree, it would not follow that God's knowledge of its certainty was grounded in—depended upon—the relation between it and the decree. The concurrence of the foreknowledge and the necessary result of the decree may be conceded, without the admission that the divine foreknowledge of the certainty of an event cannot exist without the effectuation of that certainty by a decree. The acts of no creature can pass into the category of history, without having been necessarily objects of the divine knowledge from the very nature of that knowledge as infinite.

And here we must call attention to a distinction which is too often overlooked, but which it is necessary to signalise; namely, that between the foreknowledge of the existence of an active being as grounded in the divine decree to produce it, and the foreknowledge of the acts of that being. It must be confessed that God could not have foreknown the existence of Adam as an actual being unless he had decreed to create him, and the certainty that he would exist, as depending upon the execution of that decree. Otherwise Adam must have remained an object of knowledge only as in the category of the possible. But God having decreed to create him and therefore having foreknown his existence, the question is, how he foreknew the sin of Adam. Now we have proved, if argument can prove anything, that God neither decreed

to produce his sin nor efficaciously to procure its commission. But he must have foreknown it, else his knowledge was limited and imperfect. *That* it could not have been, nor can be, for it is infinite. The foreknowledge of the sin of Adam was not grounded in a decree which necessitated its commission. The explanation seems very simple, and the wonder is that it is so often lost sight of. It is certain that Adam's sin has taken place. It has passed into history. We know it as an historical fact. But all historical facts must be known by the divine mind from eternity by virtue of the very nature of his knowledge, however they may be produced. He must equally know those produced by the agency of other beings than himself with those which are the products of his own causal efficiency. Adam having been known as to be produced by a creative act, and to be produced as an active being endowed with power to will, all the acts which he would put forth must have been also objects of divine knowledge. For that knowledge, being commensurate with God's existence, reaches from eternity to eternity. He knows the succession of events, but there is no succession in his knowledge. It is all as much present to him as an object now gazed upon is to us. Having determined to create Adam, he knew how he would act, not from a sagacious calculation based upon the relation of cause and effect, but by intuition. If God had determined to prevent the sin of Adam, it could never have occurred. In that case God would have known his purpose causally to hinder the commission of the sin, and the necessary effect of that purpose—its non-occurrence. But he did not please so to determine. Consequently, what he knew was Adam's free causality, and the acts proceeding from it. He made Adam an active being, and such a being, while in a state of activity, must produce some acts. But if so, God must know those acts before they actually occur and become historical, or his knowledge would be imperfect. What has occurred, what occurs now under our observation, is no more certain to us, than what will occur is certain to God. But Adam's sin has occurred, and it is obvious that God must have known it from eternity by virtue of the infinite perfection of his knowledge. In the case of the *acts* of beings whose *existence* was determined by his effica-

cious decree, there is no need of any effectuating causality; to ground the certainty of his knowledge. He knows, not because those acts are made certain by any necessitating influence, but because from the very nature of the case, he must know them, if they are to be, no matter how produced. If a future event can never be known to be certain unless there is the previous knowledge of a cause which will necessitate its occurrence, then the knowledge of the certainty of the event is not immediate and intuitive, but mediate and inferential. But God's knowledge is immediate and intuitive; and it follows that its relation to a future event, no matter what its cause, is not mediated through, nor inferred from, the operation of the cause. The event as an element of history is as directly known to him as is any occurrence upon which we actually gaze. He knows the operation of causes, and he knows their effects, but he does not know the effects because they can only be produced by the causes. He knows both alike in the same intuitive act. If any proof were needed for this view, it is found in the consideration that God's knowledge must be commensurate with his being. If not, then a portion of his being would be characterised by knowledge and a portion not; that is, God would be partly ignorant—which is contradictory and absurd. But his being is eternal and immense. All events occur within his immensity and eternity. He is present in his undivided existence at every point of space and at every instant of duration. Wherever and whenever he is, he knows. All facts, therefore, whether past, present, or future, in the order of their actual occurrence, are matters of present knowledge to him. He knows the succession and order of actual events as they are developed, but his knowledge of them is not developed. As intuitive, perfect, infinite, it is characterised by no succession, no development. It is not dependent upon premises, whether they be causes which ground existence, or reasons which ground conclusions. He knows the relations of cause and effect, but does not depend upon them in order to know; he knows how to reason, but is not indebted to reasoning for knowledge.

If these views be correct, it follows that God knew Adam's sin

from eternity, as he knew it at the time of its actual occurrence, and as he knows it now, that it has become an element in human history—by intuition.

Two sorts of error have been maintained by the parties to the controversy concerning the relation of knowledge to the certainty of events. The first is, that as certainty is a quality predicable of events as related to causes, there can be no knowledge of an event the certainty of which is not guaranteed by a necessitating cause. The other is, that certainty is never a quality of events, but only of knowledge. It must be admitted, on the one hand, that there may be certainty of knowledge in regard to an event where the event is not made certain by necessity—that there may be intuitive knowledge without reference to cause; and on the other, that there may be certainty in an event owing to the necessary operation of cause, apart from the knowledge of the event—that the certainty of existence is not the same thing as the certainty of knowledge. Allowing, on the one side, that certainty may characterise events, we deny that God knows them to be certain by a process of inference; and admitting, on the other side, that certainty may characterise knowledge, we deny that God knows an actual event without its being certain. In brief, all actual events are certain, and God certainly knows them as certain, not by sagacious calculation, but by an infinite, all-embracing, all-perfect intuition.

It is proper to remark, that in speaking of God's knowledge as intuitive, it has not been intended to deny that the term *fore-knowledge* may be legitimately employed under certain relations. There is a period of duration during which every event which comes to pass had no actual existence. Considered in relation to its actual occurrence, God's knowledge of it must to human thought be conceived as foreknowledge; and so the Scriptures employ the term. But considered as to its intrinsic nature as an energy of the divine being, knowledge is neither before nor after events; it is neither prescience nor memory. It is, to speak reverently, as presentative as ours is, when an external object is in immediate relation to our faculty of perception.

It may be said, that, as there is an actual succession in the

acts of God's power, the same may be true of his acts of knowledge. To this it is obvious to reply, that, as power is creative and productive, it is necessary, unless all things which it effects are simultaneously brought into being, that there should be succession. But no such necessity obtains in the case of knowledge. It is not creative and productive, but simply apprehensive. God knows in the unity of intuition the successive acts of his power. Accordingly, the Scriptures say: "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." And in like manner, known unto him from the beginning are all the works of man. He does not produce all things at once, but he knows all things at once.

A farther distinction, in order to a complete discussion of the subject, ought to be noted between the contingency of Adam's sin, as related to his knowledge, and the certainty of it as related to God's. To Adam it was contingent, while he was innocent, whether he would sin or not. He had the power to do either. He may, or he may not, have sinned. And, of course, his knowledge as conditioned upon the exertion of his will, was contingent and uncertain. But such was not the case with his divine Maker. His knowledge of Adam's course was not conditioned upon the acts of Adam's will, and was, therefore, not contingent and uncertain. What was contingent to Adam was certain to God.

From these considerations it appears, that the Divine prescience of an event as certain is not grounded in the perception of the necessary relation between an efficient cause and its effect, so far as acts are concerned. The argument, therefore, founded on that assumption in favor of the position, that, as God foreknew the sin of Adam, he must have necessitated it, is seen to be destitute of proof.

The doctrine for which we have contended in regard to the foreknowledge of God, may be supposed by some to be out of harmony with the teaching of Calvinistic theologians. The contrary, however, may without difficulty be evinced. It is admitted that it is consistently denied by the supralapsarian Calvinists; and also that some sublapsarians have, with utter inconsistency,

maintained that God could not foreknow any sin which he did not efficiently decree. But we have shown* that the *consensus* of the Reformed Church, as expressed in its formularies, is clearly in favor of the view which we have advocated concerning the relation of God's decree to the first sin; and by necessary inference we conclude that it could not have grounded the foreknowledge of that sin in a decretive and causal relation which it denied. We refer, further, to a few names, which will be confessed to be of great weight, in regard to the question what the doctrine of Calvinism is upon the point in hand.

Augustine made the contents of God's foreknowledge wider than those of his efficient decree. He taught that "predestination could not be without foreknowledge, but that foreknowledge could be without predestination;" that "by predestination God foreknew those things which he himself would do; but he is able to know those things which he himself does not do."† Here, of course, he means not permissive, but efficient decree.

Calvin, we have seen, drew the distinction between efficient and permissive decrees, and between the relation of efficient decree to the sin of Adam and to the sins of sinners. He thus clearly states the view for which we have contended in regard to the nature of God's foreknowledge: ‡

"When we attribute prescience to God, we mean that all things always were, and ever continue, under his eye; that to his knowledge there is no past or future, but all things are present, and indeed so present, that it is not merely the idea of them that is before him (as those objects are which we retain in our memory), but that he truly sees and contemplates them as actually under his immediate inspection.

* SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, October, 1878.

† Prædestinatio est, quæ sine præscientia non potest esse; potest autem esse sine prædestinatione præscientia. Prædestinatione quippe Deus ea præscivit quæ fuerat ipse facturus: unde dictum est, Fecit quæ futura sunt. Præscire autem potens est etiam quæ ipse non facit, sicut quæcumque peccata. *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum*, Cap. X., §§ 19, 20.

Præscientia quippe Dei eos quos sanaturus est, peccatores prænoscit, non facit. Nam si eas animas liberat a peccato quas innocentes et mundas implicuit ipse peccato; vulnus sanat quod intulit nobis, non quod invenit in nobis. *De Anima et ejus Origine*, Cap. VIII., § 7.

‡ *Institutes*, B. iii., C. xxi., § 5.

This prescience extends to the whole circuit of the world and to all creatures."

John Owen also distinguished between efficacious and permissive decrees; but he was entangled by the attempt to distinguish between sin as an entity and as a quality, and with Turretin illogically represented permissive decrees as making their objects certain; that is, that God decreed that some things may be and shall be at one and the same time. Like the same great author, also, he failed to mark a palpable distinction between making and proving a thing certain. Foreknowledge, from the nature of the case, never makes, it only proves, an event infallibly certain. It exercises no causal efficiency. Nevertheless, Owen furnishes the following just description of the divine foreknowledge, from which our conclusion logically flows:*

"God knows all things as they are, and in that order wherein they stand. Things that are past, as to the order of the creatures which he has appointed to them, and the works of providence which outwardly are of him, he knows as past; not by remembrance, as we do, but by the same act of knowledge wherewith he knew them from all eternity, even before they were. Their existence in time and being, cast by the successive motion of things into the number of the things that are past, denotes an alteration in them, but not at all in the knowledge of God. So it is, also, in respect of things future. God knows them in that *esse intelligibile* which they have, as they may be known and understood. . . . He sees and knows them as they are, when they have respect upon them of being future; when they lose this respect, by their actual existence, he knows them still as before. They are altered; his knowledge, his understanding, is infinite and changeth not. 'In God there is simple intuition, by which compound things are viewed simply, variable things, invariably, and successive things, simultaneously.'"

The philosophic John Howe is very express as to the matter before us. We give a brief extract from an able discussion by him of the question, How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause: †

"It must be acknowledged that to whom anything is uncertain, it is a contradiction that *to him* it should be certainly known; but that

* *Works*, Goold's Ed., Vol. xii., p. 127.

† *Living Temple*, Pt. i., C. vi., § 8.

such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with. . . . But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God (and of them *such* as we may be also sure he never intended to effect), we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. . . . Though he [Strangius] truly says that the Scotists' way of expressing how future contingents are present to God—that is, according to their objective and intentional being only—affords us no account *why* God knows them (for which cause he rejects it, and follows that of the Thomists, who will have them to be present according to their real and actual existence); I should yet prefer the deficiency of the former way before the contradictiousness and repugnancy of the latter; and conceive those words in the *Divine Dialogues* [More's] as good an explication of the manner of his knowledge as the case can admit (which, yet, is but the Scotists' sense), 'That the whole evolution of times and ages is so collectedly and presentifickly represented to God at once, as if all things and actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very instant and so always really present and existent before him.' Which is no wonder, the animadversion and intellectual comprehension of God being absolutely infinite, according to the truth of his idea."

In regard to relation of the divine foreknowledge to the fall of Adam, he thus speaks:*

"God's prescience of the event (besides that no man knows what it is yet), whatever it is, it is wholly immanent in himself, as also his decrees; therefore could have no influence into the event, or be any cause of it; all depended, as hath been shown, on man's own will; and, therefore, if God did foresee that man would fall, yet he knew also, that *if he would, he might stand.*"

The conclusion at which we arrive from this special discussion is, that God's foreknowledge of Adam's first sin was not grounded in a decree which necessitated its occurrence, or rendered it unavoidably certain, and if so, the proof professedly derived from the opposite view in favor of the theory of Determinism as to the freedom of the will fails to be established.

We here finish our examination of the fundamental positions of Edwards and his school as to the will, viewed in relation to the estate of man in innocence and to the fall. The theory of Determinism has been laid upon the anvil of Adam's first sin, and struck by the hammers of Scripture, consciousness, and the

* *Works*, Tegg's Ed., Vol. i., p. 472.

fundamental beliefs of the race. Whether it has endured the blows the candid thinker must judge. In our humble judgment, it has failed to stand the test. We have endeavored to show that, theologically, it cannot, in its radical principle, be adjusted to the Calvinistic system; and that, philosophically, as well as theologically, it fails to answer the grand inquiry, How man's present moral condition came to be so determined. Considered in relation to man's natural fallen estate, it accounts for self-expression, but not for self-determination, and in relation to his fall from his estate of innocence, it accounts neither for self-expression nor self-determination. We have not written on the question as one involving the mere history of opinions, but as a living, pressing, supreme, tremendous issue. The agony and sweat of the soul have demanded a reply to the great query: Did God determine the present wretched moral condition of man? or did man determine it for himself by a free, unnecessitated, avoidable decision of his will? We inquired at the oracle of Determinism, and its response deepened our gloom. We inquired at the Oracles of God, and they thundered forth the answer: Man, by his first sinful volition, himself unnecessarily determined his mournful captivity to the law of sin and death. Great New Englander! Mighty master of metaphysical argumentation! First, spell-bound by his genius, which wielded over us the wand of a wizard, we bowed in allegiance to his sceptre, then doubted its legitimacy, and then declined subjection to its sway. We close with one of his own utterances, by which he appears to us indirectly but surely to refute himself:*

"This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is good is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice?"

Here, then, is the great law of his philosophy as to the will:

* *Original Sin*, Pt. ii., C. i., § 1.

no volition has any moral value except as it is determined by a preceding moral principle or disposition—a moral spontaneity; and of course it is applicable to bad as well as good acts of choice. Let us then read the foregoing utterance in relation to bad acts of choice: This is the general notion, not that principles derive their badness from actions, but that actions derive their badness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is bad is no further sinful than it proceeds from a bad principle, or sinful disposition of mind, which supposes that, therefore, it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any sinful disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a bad disposition of heart, *what signifies that choice?* Now, Edwards was maintaining against Taylor that Adam was created in righteousness, “with holy principles and dispositions.” *Whence, then, the sinful principle or disposition which determined the first sinful act of choice?* And if there was none, *what signified that choice?* We answer: there was no preceding sinful disposition which determined it; but, alas, that unnecessitated and avoidable act of choice, originated and determined by Adam’s will, had a significance which is marked upon the everlasting ages.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

ARTICLE IV.

A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF HEBREW.

It is a well established principle of the Presbyterian Church, that her ministry should be educated. This doctrine she holds in unison with most of the Reformed Churches. The well known arguments, behind which they have entrenched themselves on this point, need not be here enumerated. It may be stated, however, that the doctrine, if we may so term it, is one that is gaining ground. Even those evangelical Churches which have hitherto

deemed it of no vital importance, are beginning to turn their attention to the matter, and to view it in a more favorable light. In consequence of her views upon this subject, consistently sustaining theory by practice, the Presbyterian Church has ever been among the foremost in providing for the education of her candidates. She strictly binds them to a course of study in college and seminary that requires at least six years for its successful prosecution. The Church has laid down as many requirements, and been as strict in enforcing them, as we could expect. We would not have her go any farther in this direction than she has already gone. The field to be cultivated is sufficiently broad. The standard which the student is theoretically required to attain is sufficiently high ; we would not have it raised. The remarks about to be made are not, therefore, to be understood as applying to the curriculum of our seminaries. As long as the Church is responsible for the candidate's education, she discharges her duty. But when the student finally quits the walls of the seminary, the point arrives at which the Church ceases to be responsible for the direction of his studies, and the responsibility is transferred to himself. It is to this class that we wish more particularly to address the remarks about to be made. We suppose the young licentiate to ask the question : "Shall I prosecute my Hebrew studies after leaving the seminary, or shall I suffer them to drop ?"

It will hardly be denied that very few of our young ministers do prosecute their Hebrew studies after entering upon the active work of the ministry. They breathe a sigh of relief, and exclaim : "We are done with Hebrew." The Hebrew Bible is laid aside, and soon becomes

—"to dumb forgetfulness a prey."

The dust of months and years accumulates upon it. The undisturbed worm is the sole visitant to its pages. It holds its unmoled way through leaf and back. You need not ask the owner whether he uses it. Open it. The musty smell tells its own tale, and that tale is a tale of neglect.

It was formerly a custom, almost religiously observed in some of our colleges, that a copy of the Calculus in use should be

solemnly buried on the day of graduation. The whole class would appear as chief mourners. In solemn array they would bear the book to the designated spot, and there bury it out of sight, in token that they had forever buried from sight and thought its odious equations. This is just what very many of our ministers practically do to-day with their Hebrew Bibles.

When we come to inquire into the causes of this state of things, we find that there are several which concur to bring it about. At the very outset of his theological course, the student finds the opinion prevailing that the Hebrew language is a bore and its study a drudgery—a thing to be endured, as the galley slave must endure the toiling at the oar, but a thing no more to be enjoyed than the galley slave enjoys his irksome task. The force of public opinion, strong everywhere, is especially strong in institutions of learning. The student immediately falls under its influence. A few enthusiastic minds may see beauty in the simplicity and dignity of one of the oldest languages, and earnestly seek to master it; but they are generally laughed at for their pains. The majority will give their strength to other matters, and give to Hebrew only the grudging attention that a school-boy, eager for his bat and ball, gives to his Xenophon or his Cæsar. Should they be solicited to pay more attention to this study, the question *cui bono* is asked; no one appears to answer, and the matter is adjudicated against the friendless language.

When the student comes to leave the seminary, feeling that he is just freed from a troublesome task, as far as this study is concerned, he finds nothing in the opinions or the habits of the ministry to combat, but everything to encourage, his willing neglect. He is told that whatever else he may fear, he need entertain no fears as to the result of his examinations in Hebrew. This is in most cases true, and for the very best of reasons. In many Presbyteries not a man can be found who is capable of conducting a Hebrew examination, worthy the name of an examination. A few questions are asked, remarkable for nothing except their elementary character. But a few moments suffice to show that though the candidate's attainments are slim, the attainments of the examiner are yet more hopelessly slim. The whole thing

degenerates into a farce. The impression left upon the minds of Presbytery, candidate, and spectators alike, is, that this is a mere routine or red tape matter, and may safely be dismissed from the minds of all until another candidate appears upon the scene, when the farce shall be repeated. Not only, then, is it a fact that the ministry neglect this study, but, considering the circumstances, it is a fact which was to have been expected. It is none the less, however, in the opinion of the writer of this plea, a thing to be deplored.

We proceed now to answer some objections, and to urge some reasons why the study of Hebrew should not be neglected. We trust that if our arguments do not prove convincing, they may at least be thought worthy of attention. The chief objection urged to the continuance of the study is based upon the assumption of the inutility of such a course—not an absolute, but a comparative inutility. There are so many things, it is said, that will give a better return for the labor spent upon them. Why should we spend our strength for naught? The minister has at best but little time for study; should he not spend that time in cultivating more fruitful fields? By way of answer, it may be remarked that this objection has been made against all the higher branches of study—against logic and psychology and moral science. It is based upon the wide-spread but erroneous doctrine that we should confine our attention to what are called practical studies. Were this doctrine logically carried out, it would prove fatal to culture and progress. Learning itself would commit a *felo de se*. Link by link the chains of thought would be shortened, until there would be none long enough to draw water from the deep wells of truth. We must plough deep if we would obtain a vigorous growth of ideas.

Again, let it be remembered that if this argument is to be pressed, it should cut far deeper, and lay a prohibition upon the study of the language in the seminary. Are we prepared for this which ought legitimately to follow? Let us see, now, what may be said in favor of our plea. At the outset we may state that we have the judgment of the Church. What is the design of that part of the Constitution which enjoins the study of He-

brew? for it is the law of the Church that every candidate under her fostering care shall study it—why? Is it merely as a means? The faithful study of this language, as the faithful study of any language, is valuable as giving to the mind exercise, and thereby strengthening all its powers. This was no doubt one reason; but it is not the only one. Was not the knowledge of this language, in the opinion of our fathers, at least, an *end* to be desired? Nay, was not this the chiefest reason for its study? The other is merely incidental. A man may obtain the finest kind of exercise hoeing in his garden; but his purpose is not to get exercise, but to raise vegetables. The company in which the study is found shows this. The student is supposed to have completed his special course of training before he reaches the seminary. Here the studies are to be eminently practical—such as shall have a direct tendency to fit him for his work. Theology, Church History and Government, Biblical Interpretation and New Testament Greek, and Archæology, are all studied, because they are directly to fit the student for the coming labors of his calling. They are, each, part of his furnishing and his armament. It was therefore evidently the intention of the framers of our Constitution to place Hebrew in the same category. We have, then, the authority of the Church. Shall that be almost a dead letter, and be carelessly contemned every year by those who, in other respects, exalt it as a wonderful compendium of wisdom?

But there are special arguments. A student, whenever it is practicable, ought to drink at the fountain head. Suppose that he may acquire the same knowledge in two ways. He desires, for instance, to discover the exact shade of meaning of a passage in the Old Testament. To obtain this knowledge, he may consult a commentary, or he may pursue an original investigation. The latter course, when practicable, will be worth far more to him than the former. Benefit is derived from the exercise of the faculties of the mind. He obtains the gratifying reward of industry. The mind is grateful for being trusted, and not merely made the porter of other men's thought. A sense of responsibility is thrown upon the judgment, which tends to strengthen it

and make it more careful and trustworthy. That which passes through the alembic of one's own mind is in a better condition to be used by that mind. Original investigation gives a tone of decidedness to our convictions and teachings.

Again, the majority of our ministers find that, even when most actively engaged in pastoral work, they are all the better for earnestly pursuing some branch of study; and the question arises, What that study shall be? The minister will of course give attention to general science, but here he must confine himself to the results obtained by other explorers. The pastor cannot possibly plunge into the fathomless depths of investigation that geology or chemistry open up. For original study, then, the languages afford him the best opportunity. And here Hebrew has an advantage over all others, because, if he studies the Hebrew in its purity, he must study the Bible. Greek, besides the New Testament, gives him the lofty thought and consummate method of Aristotle, the wonderful history of Thucydides, the wisdom of Socrates, and the almost inspired common sense of Plato, and, above all, the living and life-giving eloquence of the ideal orator, Demosthenes. But Hebrew takes him to the very fountain head of history and bids him marvel at the majestic simplicity of Genesis, Joshua, and Judges, opens to him the more than Socratic wisdom of Proverbs, and waits till he grasps the lofty images of Prophecy, or kindles his enthusiasm at the fire that burns in the book of Job. If Latin leads him to the purity and eloquence of Tully, Hebrew takes him to the sublime utterances of Isaiah; and the Commentaries of Cæsar are far excelled by the hand that guides us through the rapid conquest of Canaan.

Or look at it from another point of view. The man who cultivates eloquence, who seeks by every legitimate means to arouse men to action, who would express himself in "thoughts that breathe and words that burn," must cultivate the imagination, must store his mind with striking analogies, must be inspired with something of the spirit of poetry. The Hebrew, like all Oriental languages, is picturesque and poetical. A striking analogy is often found in a single word, and there is the sugges-

tion of a poem in a line. It may be said that we have all these advantages in the English Bible. True, we have many of them, and yet who does not know that much of the vividness, the picturesqueness, and the force of a language is necessarily lost in the process of translation. It is well known that no poem especially can bear translation without losing something of that delicate aroma that lingered around it in its native garden and its native air. When you translate it, you strip it of that grace which was born with it, amid the throes of genius, and you adjust to it garments which often fail to fit. And this lack of fitness must be increased when the language vestments belong to different families, widely separated ages, and diverse civilisations. Analogies and similes are frequently, it is true, transferred, but by common use in our every-day language their origin is forgotten and their beauty unappreciated. But when we find them in a new and unfamiliar language, they come upon us with all the stimulating vividness of a new discovery. We cannot therefore derive the full benefit here suggested, unless we go to the old language itself.

Again, consider that the Hebrew Bible is one of the very best and simplest commentaries on the English. To discover the original meaning of a word is often like throwing open the window of a darkened room. As the light streams in forms hitherto dim and shadowy stand forth with the clear and distinct outlines of well-known objects. We might give many examples of this, but two will suffice for illustration. The word translated *sanctify*, means, originally, to separate. A sanctified person or thing, therefore, was one *separated* from all others of the same class, and *set apart* to the service of God. See how much this adds to the clearness of the concept of which this word is the sign. The Old Testament word for *faith* comes from a root meaning to make steady, thus bringing out the idea of that practical reliance which is of the very essence of saving faith, and denoting that steadying effect which it exercises, not only over the intellect and the heart, but over the whole life.

Once more : the study of this noble language cannot fail to act in some measure as an antidote to the weak and watery style which the literature of the day is too well fitted to beget and

nourish. The infant sometimes draws death from the same breast from which it draws life. We must, to a large extent, seek our literary *pabulum* amid the publications of the day, and too often the tainted leaven infuses corruption into the fermenting style of the young.

The age tends to superficiality; young men come forth with great pretensions and great expectations. Their encyclopedic attainments are calculated to startle. And yet too often this is illusory. There is the breadth, but not the depth. There is the glitter, but not the gold. They lack that sweep of pinion and that vigor of stroke that lifts the eagle toward the sun. It avails not to have much and varied knowledge in the multiplied branches of human investigation, unless there be also depth and justness of thought and keenness of vision. Truth lies beneath the surface. We must dig for her diamonds, we must dive for her pearls. Anything that antagonises the mushroom learning of the day must be beneficial. Let us lay the foundations broader and deeper with lexicon and grammar. We need to commune not only with Augustine and Calvin, with Turretin and Hodge and Dabney, but also with Gesenius and Fuerst, with Davidson and Deutsch. Our Southern Church is already widely known for her orthodoxy and for her unswerving fidelity to the incomparable symbols of the Presbyterian faith. Let her be equally widely known for her scholarship and her ability and determination to stand on that high plane of learning on which Melancthon and Calvin placed the Church of the Reformation. Let her do this—not for the pride of learning, or the exulting joy of superiority, but for the glory of her King; that she may bring to his altar a richer sacrifice, and offer there with vows of consecration not only the strength and service of her body, but the power and service of her mind; that she may bear her continued testimony to the value of an educated ministry; that she may have young men upon whose shoulders the mantles of ascending scholars may fall, to cover a double portion of their spirits; and lastly, that she may cover her front with that broad and burnished shield of learning that shall turn aside from her vitals the poisoned darts of superficiality and ignorance.

F. W. LEWIS.

ARTICLE V.

PLANS OF CHURCH FINANCE.

At its meeting in Columbia, in October, 1877, the Synod of South Carolina appointed John B. Adger and John L. Girardeau, *Ministers*, and Thomas Thomson, *Ruling Elder*, a Committee to report to its "next meeting a plan for improving the contributions of our churches." In October, 1878, the Committee reported to Synod in session at Spartanburg church. It pleased that venerable body to express its approbation of the report and its desire to have the same spread before the churches. The manner of publication it was left with the Committee to determine. The following paper will set before the reader with sufficient exactness the views which were presented to the Synod.

At this late day, after so much has been written and said, it would seem that it ought to be admitted by all that giving to the Lord of our substance is a mode of worship divinely appointed and acceptable; also that it is not only a duty but a fruit of grace and a means of grace and also an evidence of grace, and likewise one of the sweetest privileges Christians can enjoy. Further, it would seem that all should admit that this mode of worship is to be at regular times, and by every individual, and in proportion to each one's ability. Moreover, all would allow, one might well suppose, that it is to be perfectly voluntary, and not offered grudgingly nor of necessity. And in addition to all these things, all Presbyterians may be expected to agree that, in the conduct of this worship, it is orderly and proper to use, as being divinely ordained to this business, the services of the diaconate.

It has appeared safer to say what it would seem ought to be allowed by all, rather than venture to affirm what is admitted by all. In fact, it is to be feared that there are numbers in every Presbyterian church who do not intelligently and heartily accept the idea that God can be and must be worshipped with substance, and who, therefore, are not prepared to accept all the consequences of this view as they have been now set forth. An intelligent and considerate observer can hardly fail to be impressed with the

belief that this doctrine of Scripture needs to be more fully and frequently expounded and inculcated in every one of our churches. Should the present examination result in deepening this conviction in the reader's mind, it will not have been made in vain, even though there should be a complete failure to establish any other of the positions which may be assumed.

But whilst the points named already seem to be perfectly indisputable, there are some others bearing on the subject, which are not so plain. One of these is the question whether our worship by giving is necessarily to be always in secret. Our Lord does indeed say that we must not let our left hand know what our right doeth. But so also, and in the same place, he said, we must shut our door when we pray. He was speaking there of private prayer and private charity, and not of public worship and public offerings in the great congregation. Indeed, elsewhere he himself says, "Let your light so shine, that others seeing your good works may glorify your Father who is in heaven." Manifestly, therefore, while ostentation is to be avoided, we are not required so to arrange our services of this kind as that absolute and perfect secrecy shall be secured in reference to the gifts of each person. In so far as it may be necessary for any good reason to have it known to the deacons what each person contributes, there is no sin in giving them this knowledge.

Another question is whether the current expenses of a church, as the salary of minister or sexton, the cost of fuel, lights, repairs, etc., ought to be excluded from any connexion with its benevolent givings, and never be provided for on the same plan. This is the position taken by the Rev. George Harris, of Providence, Rhode Island, in a tract of his, widely and acceptably published. But it is not clear that it is absolutely necessary to make two distinct kinds of church givings—those of benevolence and those for church debts. The items named are indeed of debt by the church; for the minister's salary, for example, is not due to him by individuals. It was the church, as such, which called and promised him a support, and to the church he very properly looks for the fulfilment of this promise. Yet the church appeals to individuals to enable it to discharge this obligation, somewhat in

the same way that the Assembly appeals to every individual member for offerings to enable its Executive Committees to discharge the Assembly's obligations. It is not clear, therefore, that the current expenses of a church must not be provided for in the same way precisely as funds for benevolent work.

At the same time there may be churches so situated, in one respect or another, as to make it convenient for them to separate their current expenses from their benevolent givings, and evidently they must be allowed to arrange the matter as may suit them best. Indeed, it is very certain that some of our churches receive no little help in the support of their ministers from persons outside of the church, who for various reasons are willing to contribute to that object and yet are not ready to give money for missions or other like church objects. And surely none should feel disposed to throw the least obstacle in the way of these outside supporters. It is infinitely preferable by every warrantable means to attract them to the church, and interest them in its support.

There is a third question: Must the public worship of God with our substance necessarily be offered on every Lord's day in every church?

In answer, many are disposed to insist that this is the only right plan. The apostle, say they, gives this to us in 1 Cor. xvi. 2, as the divine plan, and therefore it is of course universally binding. Yet it is not quite clear to all that the inspired writer did intend to lay down there a rule for all churches without regard to any difference in their circumstances. Paul says to the Corinthians, "As I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye;" but he does not say that he gives this inspired order to all churches. Had he been laying down a universal rule he would hardly have added, "And when I come, whomsoever ye shall approve by your letters, them will I send to bring your liberality to Jerusalem. And if it be meet that I go also, they shall go with me." Surely in these last words, the apostle is referring to the particular case before him; but if this portion of his directions be specific and not universal, it can hardly be insisted that the other portion conveys unquestionably a universal

and inviolable rule. And indeed, it may well be asked, Is it analogous to the free spirit of the gospel that a rule of this kind should be imposed as binding on all churches, whatever their circumstances? Were this indeed a binding rule, then whenever any church should neglect to obey it, there would be sin; and no matter what might be its liberality in other modes, it would be necessary that that church should be visited in some form or other with the discipline of the Presbytery.

Now, on the other hand, some hold that the apostles' labors naturally were at first given to cities and towns where money is apt to be in somewhat plentiful abundance and use. There, even the day-laborer as well as the richer man may be expected generally to have money in hand, at least at the close of every week. Wherever this is the case, the wisdom and efficiency of the apostle's rule are beyond question. But had it been the fact, and been known as a fact to the apostle, concerning the rural populations of that day—the country churches of other regions than Greece and Galatia—that they had no money in current circulation and no conveniently merchantable products of their labor suitable to offer for church use, can we believe that Paul would have laid on them, in such circumstances, the binding rule that they must on every Lord's day absolutely settle their accounts with God's good providence, and liberally give of what was not in their hand?

And yet the zeal of many for this as a universal divine rule, leads them to insist that somehow or other it must be enforced. One excellent minister of our Church writes thus: "Ever since I entered the ministry I have believed that all the revenues of the kingdom ought to come in from week to week by the free gifts of God's people. I have preached it and prayed it and practised it. It is God's plan, and with faith and prayer it must succeed. It is said (he continues,) that in some communities men only get money once a year. Very good. As soon as they get it let them lay by God's part, and put a portion in each of the fifty-two envelopes, and it will be there when the Lord's day comes." But one might well ask, if thus portioned out and placed inside of fifty-two envelopes to be given in every Lord's

day at church, is it *quite* certain that it would stay there? Might not some of these envelopes be stolen, burnt, or otherwise lost? Would it not be safer and every way better to give to the Lord his portion at once? Is it not really the Lord's as soon as laid by for the Lord, and may it not, therefore, be well placed at once in the Lord's treasury? Or, will it be said that it is more acceptable to God, given in weekly portions through the coming year, than paid over all at once as soon as obtained? Is there, indeed, any weight or value in the good brother's idea that all the revenues of the kingdom must come in from week to week? Is that really the divine plan and the only acceptable plan?

Let us now take up for consideration some of the plans in present use, and compare them one with the other.

1. There is a plan pursued in many congregations for raising the pastor's salary, which we may call

THE SUBSCRIPTION PLAN.

It usually has in view no other object than the one named. When a call is about to be made for a minister, a paper is circulated, and every subscriber promises such a share of the salary as he is willing to pay. This plan certainly has some merits. But one very great objection to it is that it frequently is understood as a mere personal promise of the individual and for the time. The minister called is (erroneously in all ordinary cases) considered as having examined the names and amounts on that paper, and as forming his own conclusions as to the *goodness*, in a financial sense, of each of the subscriptions; and if he sees fit to accept the call fortified by these individual subscriptions he does it at his own risk. In the course of time, some die, some remove, and some see fit to withdraw from the engagement with or without notice given, and some again just neglect or decline to pay what they promised. But it is an individual affair; the church does not hold itself responsible for the amount stipulated in the call or for any definite amount whatever. When individuals draw out, it is the preacher's loss, and the church has nothing to say or to do in the premises. Thus comes about an irregular and insufficient support of the minister, and a consequent diversion of time, thought, and effort on the minister's

part from his proper work of winning souls. And thus comes about that most fatal trouble in a church—the *getting behind in settling with its minister*. Who likes to pay for dead horses? For his back services past and gone, who likes to be called upon to make up deficiencies in the pastor's salary? The church that gets into debt to its minister is in a bad way, even though it is for a small amount and has been only for a short time; if the debt is large and old, the church may be said, in a sense, to be on the road to ruin. There is only one way to save it—a very bad way, but in the noble disinterestedness of our ministry a somewhat common way—and that is for the generous man of God to forgive the debt, if his family does have to suffer.

2. There is

THE PEW RENT PLAN.

This also is a plan for raising the minister's salary. But as it contemplates no other object, let us pass it by.

3. There is the plan of

WEEKLY COLLECTIONS BY THE BAG.

Many congregations in cities and towns have adopted this plan, using the bag or hat or basket passed around. In a great many cases it has worked well. We personally know of some where it has proved itself in the highest degree efficacious. Sometimes it has proved a failure, because of a prejudice with individuals against a bag thrusting itself before them at church for money. Yet we know of one case in a Southern city, and that immediately after the war in the midst of great suffering and distress, where this plan was successfully employed, a forenoon collection being raised in this way for benevolent or foreign objects, and then an afternoon collection for current or home expenses; and both collections were ample. Let it be observed that the forenoon collection, which might well be expected to be the larger one, was given to benevolence, the afternoon collection to home objects, which illustrated the spirit of the scriptural injunction for every man to look not upon his own things, but to regard primarily the interests of others. It should be stated that in this case there never was employed any urgency of appeals or any pressing

application for money ; only the preacher frequently and earnestly held forth to the view of the congregation the greatness of Christ's sacrifice made for us. Here lies the potent influence which alone can draw forth the Church's liberality. In the case of this church of poor suffering Confederate people, as in that of the Macedonians mentioned by Paul, "in a great trial of affliction, the abundance of their joy and their deep poverty abounded unto the riches of their liberality." It was "the joy of the Lord" which constituted their "strength," making them richly liberal even in deep poverty. It was their being made "to know the grace of Christ. that, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor, that we through his poverty might be rich"—it was this which wrought in them, although in distress and want, an abounding charity to others. It was an earnest ministry, at once enlightening their understanding and stirring their affections, which made them forget their own troubles in caring for others yet more needy and distressed. It was also the power of the litanies, and the influence of frequent collections, and the effect of letting all have the opportunity at all times to worship the Lord with offerings of substance, small perhaps, but numerous and oft recurring, and so swelling into a great and ample volume. Great is the power of grace, but great also the advantage of good plans over bad ones. This is a good plan in many places. It gives every one an opportunity to offer. It passes no one by. It comes again and again to each person in God's house and accepts from every one, great and small, his willing tribute to the King. But still, in rural congregations generally this plan can hardly be expected to be efficient, because there, very commonly, the people have not much money in hand all the year round. They cannot all give weekly in proportion as the Lord prospers, because their returns are for the most part annual. The plan of weekly collections in the bag may bring in some little gifts from some of them, but to get at such congregations successfully some other plans must be substituted for, or at least conjoined with, this plan. For it is a demoralising thing in any congregation to see many persons decline to give—a very demoralising thing it is for this blessed ordinance of worshipping God with offerings of money to be visibly

(though perhaps it may be excusably) dishonored in pew after pew as the deacons go round! Yes, a dreadful thing it is for our children to grow up habituated every Lord's day to the sight of what certainly must look like the Church's trampling on her Lord's ordinance!

4. There is

THE PLAN OF LADIES' ASSOCIATIONS.

This has been very successful in raising funds for Foreign Missions. There are not over one hundred and ninety of these in all our nineteen hundred churches—not more than one in every ten of our churches. Yet they have given one-fifth of our whole Foreign Missionary contributions for the past two years. This is a remarkable showing. It was not reasonable to calculate that these few women associated together thus would give one-tenth of all our whole Church gives, but lo, they give one-fifth of the whole sum. And yet perhaps in no case does the Ladies' Missionary Association in a church combine the strength of even all its female members! What is the secret of the power of these Associations? Multiply their number tenfold, and put one in every church of our whole connexion, and the Foreign Missionary fund of the body would be by them alone doubled immediately. And how would this result come about? What is the process by which they multiply Missionary funds? There is no mystery about it. Systematic giving of a small sum by a number of persons is the whole secret. It is just the power of the littles. The ladies promise each of them a certain sum—and it is usually a small one—every month. There needs no machinery—only a Treasurer to receive and forward the offerings. A missionary lecture by the pastor is given at the monthly meeting, and thus the members learn to know what is doing by the Church through missionaries, and also to pray for the spread of the gospel amongst the heathen.

Now what should hinder the uniting of all the members of any church and of all our churches, in this kind of systematic giving for Missions and learning about Missions and praying in concert for their success? There is no charm of course in the union of one sex by itself in this blessed work. Why should we need a

Ladies' Missionary Association? Why not all the church members, old and young, male and female, be associated *as such* in this giving of money systematically for Missions? And if for Missions, why not for every one of the Church's objects? And this done, whether the gifts were large or small, the treasury would be full. And this done, all would be accomplished which our hearts desire, and the Sacramental Host would march to assured and speedy victory.

5. Some have endeavored to get a contribution from every church member for one or more church objects by using in various ways a *written pledge*.

In some churches in New England a card is left at every house for each and every member of the family, and the receiver, if willing, puts down so much pledged by him as a daily contribution, from one cent up to any higher figure, and the cards are all sent back to the proper person. Then collectors are appointed to go and gather the promised amounts every month. We Presbyterians should do all this through our divinely appointed Diaconate. This plan has proved very effective. In country churches who work on this plan, it is arranged that those who are farmers may pay in any sort of produce at the market price, some merchant being selected as receiver, who sells the produce on the church's account. This is one way of employing the written pledge.

Here is another: in a little church in South Carolina Presbytery a paper is circulated by the deacon amongst the members, which has a column for every one of our Assembly's schemes, and for other objects of the individual church, and every person is requested to set down in each column such contribution, however small, as he or she feels able to pledge. The result is very much larger contributions than that little church ever before made. The secret of this success is just the power of the littles—the mighty influence of systematic and universal giving.

There is yet another form of written pledge suggested in *The Missionary* for October. It is headed

*Deacons' List of Contributions to Benevolent Objects for the year
1879, in the Presbyterian Church.*

	\$	cents.
Sustentation, to be paid in January,		
Publication, to be paid in March,		
Foreign Missions, to be paid in May,		
Invalid Fund, to be paid in July,		
Evangelistic Fund, to be paid in September,		
Education Fund, to be paid in November,		
Theol. Institute, Tuskalooosa, to be paid in Dec'r.		

It is suggested that about the first of December* a full statement be made to the church in regard to these matters and the plans of our Assembly; that two copies of the Deacons' List be furnished to every member of the church, old and young, male and female, both to be filled up, one to be retained and the other given back to the deacons; that at the appointed time each collection be taken up, the members bringing or else sending in their offerings, name attached; that the deacons keep precise accounts and inform the congregation statedly through the Session of the results attained.

Now it will be observed that here are three forms of using the written pledge, but none of these contemplate weekly collections. The New England plan of cards and collectors looks to monthly gatherings; and the little South Carolina church plan looks to gathering the gifts pledged, at no stated times, which is certainly a great defect in that plan; and the plan proposed in our *Missionary* for October looks for payments to be made once in every two months.

6. But we come at length to speak of one form of using the written pledge which distinctly contemplates weekly offerings and those on the Lord's day, and as a formal act of divine worship. It is known as *the envelope plan*. The Rev. George Harris, before mentioned, claims that this plan was introduced

*There is no reason why this plan should not be introduced at any period of the year.

by the Union church of Providence, Rhode Island, which is certainly, we think, a mistake. He says that church adopted it in 1873, while we are confident that we met the envelope system in some form before that time in Mr. Spurgeon's Tabernacle, London. Possibly some of the many Americans who saw it there used, brought back the idea to this country, or it may have been known before in the United States. Mr. Harris says, "The merit of this plan lies in the annual pledge of a weekly offering." As he sets forth the plan, cards are left before the beginning of a new year* in every pew, stating the objects had in view, and a column of figures, from one cent up, representing a weekly offering, and each person is requested to cross out the figure which represents the sum he pledges to give every week. These cards are to be dropped the next Sunday into the boxes at the church, and then fifty-two small envelopes are sent to each person pledging, and every envelope has printed on it the date of each successive Sunday in the year. The envelopes are numbered each several pack with its own particular number, (say *sixty* or *twenty-three* or some other figure,) and as they come in a check is made against their corresponding figure in the Treasurer's books, who keeps his accounts with numbers and not names, and so there is no parade made of donors' givings. Into one of these envelopes every Sunday the amount pledged is to be enclosed, and it is dropped into the box as the person enters the church. If he has been absent one or more Sundays, his little pack of envelopes remind him of it—he sees that some have not been used and he encloses the money and drops them in.

In some churches the envelopes are not dropped into a box, but gathered during the service, either whilst the congregation sings, or else keeps profound and thoughtful and reverential silence. And after the collection is made, the minister in a short offertory prayer beseeches the Head to accept and acknowledge these gifts with his blessing. In other churches, the practice is for this prayer to precede the collection, and then it becomes a prayer of special consecration of the offerings about to be made.

*The New Year having now already begun, there is no difficulty in entering on this plan at any subsequent period.

In such cases the minister prays that the people may give thoughtfully and intelligently, and that the Lord's blessing may follow what they thus set apart to his service. No mere formal petition is suitable, of course, but a glowing, heartfelt, touching prayer, in which every pious heart would join, and which would instruct and impress every observer and every hearer. The interests involved are unspeakably great—they are connected with the extension of the kingdom; and the gifts are especially sacred in many cases, devised by generous, loving hearts, procured by toil and self-denial; and surely, as has been well said, very, very tender should be the spirit of the occasion when the offering is made. But, it is to be feared that money very often is thoughtlessly, nay, perhaps unwillingly, cast into the Lord's treasury, no higher promptings moving the giver (as it has been well said) than when he tosses a nickel to an organ grinder in the street. A consecrating prayer by the minister before the collection would surely add not a little to the solemnity and devout seriousness of our worship with substance.

The financial success of the envelope system has, in many cases, been very decided. In one church it raised the collections in one year from \$479 to \$1,686, and the year after to \$2,397; in another church in one year from \$3,540 to \$5,064; in another from \$3,600 to \$7,674. These churches are all in Providence, Rhode Island. In one of them the number of givers was increased by the envelope system from sixty-two, which was the largest number called on by collectors, to one hundred and eighty-seven and then to two hundred and ten; in another of these churches from ninety-five to two hundred and eighty-three.

And then there are other advantages of this system :

1. It is entirely free of all personal solicitation, which is perhaps an unmixed evil, for it is fatal to a genuine benevolence to give only on persuasion. In fact, there are some who go so far as to say that it is a shame to send any person, young or old, male or female, upon any begging errand.

2. It removes elements of uncertainty: on a rainy Sunday one-half the people will not come out, but the envelopes will bring their offerings on the next clear day.

3. It secures the small gifts which readily swell into a large volume. For nine persons in ten, who live in cities or towns, it is easier to give twenty-five cents per week than to give thirteen dollars once a year—easier to give one dollar a week than fifty-two dollars at the end of the year. If fifty-eight persons in a city congregation give five cents a week, the amount in one year will be \$150.80, but if a deacon sets out to collect such an amount for any church object whatever, he is very apt to feel and say, "I do not know where I can find givers enough to contribute it." If fifty persons give ten cents a week, the sum total will be \$260—just think of it—*two hundred and sixty-five dollars in ten cent pieces!* If thirty-three persons give each twenty-five cents a week together they pile up annually \$429.00. And these several amounts, contributed in small gifts ranging from five cents to twenty-five cents, will count up annually \$839.80. Great is the power of the littles! Nine-tenths of this amount, moreover, is clear gain, for very little of the sum accumulated by these small gifts would have been gathered into occasional collections. A capital mistake in our collections commonly is, that we get from the few but not from the many. The Roman Catholics build their grand cathedrals with gifts of laboring men and servant girls. Their exactions may sometimes prove oppressive, but the principle on which they proceed is the correct one for all church-givings—we want the gifts of the many, of all the multitude, whether large or little, the gifts of the whole body in one, and we want these gifts at regular and short intervals.

4. It invites every one to give as God hath prospered him, that is, according to his or her own ability, whether great or small. It invites each to make no account of what others do or leave undone. It invites each to deal in this matter personally and in a private way directly with the Lord. It invites each to pay conscientious worship to him of a kind which he has directly appointed.

5. It trains the children to give systematically and on principle. One reason why the members of our churches generally give so little is, that they *do not know how* to give more, and that because they were never trained to give. In no one affair of

human life is the effect of training more manifest than in this matter of giving. One Christian or one church will with great delight give largely and enjoy it as an unspeakably sweet privilege; another gives as if it were the drawing of teeth; and the difference between the two is simply a matter of training. Dr. Smyth of Charleston, thirty-five years ago had a Juvenile Missionary Society in the Second church of that city, and the children brought in a really large amount of money in the course of years for Foreign Missions. But the main point gained was his education of these children in the love of Missions by the lectures with which he constantly enlivened and enlightened their meetings, as well as by their individual efforts. He trained those children to be zealous for Foreign Missions, and therefore for every good work. Those juvenile friends of Missions are now the members of the office-bearers of that congregation, and they know all about giving and therefore it comes easy to them. Their old minister sleeps in his grave there, but his living, active influence survives.

One of the pastors of the South Carolina Presbytery tells of a church member saying in his presence, "Why, I gave ten cents for Foreign Missions three times last year!" How much education in giving, think you, had that person enjoyed? But another minister of the same Presbytery hearing this statement, remarked that there are hundreds of our church members who could not boast of giving even that much! Astounding comment on a statement which no well-trained Christian could regard otherwise than as both surprising and ridiculous, "Why, I gave ten cents for Foreign Missions three times last year!" But what will the reader think when we tell him that still another minister of the same Presbytery spoke on the same occasion of an intelligent and generally zealous ruling elder, who said to him, "If all the money expended by the Church on missionary work in heathen lands had been employed in building railroads amongst them, more good would have been accomplished"—which signified, of course, that the Lord Jesus (may he graciously forgive the unworthy sentiment) should not have said, "Go, preach and teach the gospel," but, "Go, build railroads"!

The simple truth is, that we must train the next generation to be better givers, and, in every other respect, better church members. We need a better article of members, deacons, elders, ministers; and the way to get them is by rightly training them from the beginning.

It should be stated, in explaining the envelope system, that it is distinctly expressed on the cards employed that should the person pledging discover at any time during the year that his offerings are too large for his means, he is to be at perfect liberty to make the necessary reduction, only notifying the Treasurer of the change.

It should also be stated, that where contributors make no specific apportionment of their offerings, it will be for the Session to divide out the same according to its best judgment.

It should yet further be said, that our Committee of Publication at Richmond will, at low prices, furnish any church with envelopes and other papers explanatory of their use.

Once more, it is to be very especially observed, that all agree in recommending the greatest thoroughness of explanation to the congregation wherever this system is proposed to be introduced. The Rev. Dr. Lane, of our church at Athens, Georgia, before entering on the use of this plan in his church, preached several sermons on giving as a required act of worship. "I do not think (he says) that the plan can successfully be put in operation without first thoroughly discussing the whole subject." Another high authority says: "The thoroughness with which the matter is presented at first will have influence for years; and no time, consideration, or labor should be spared in its inauguration. After a proper presentation of it from the pulpit, let the officers of the church prepare a careful and ample estimate of the amount necessary to meet all the working expenses of the church, including the Sunday-school, and then convene the congregation and lay it before them, that they may act intelligently in providing for these expenses, as well as in contributing for the benevolent objects of the church." This distinction between the working expenses and the benevolent objects of the church is a necessary and proper one. There is no benevolence in providing ourselves with a house

of worship and a minister and sexton, and with fuel and lights, nor in carrying on a good Sunday-school for our children; the benevolent work of the church relates to those outside of the church, and perhaps far off at the ends of the earth.

There is one aspect, however, in which objection might be urged against this envelope plan, namely, that it seems at first sight to be calculated only for members of the church, leaving all the non-communicants aside, making no application for help to them, and using no efforts to interest them in the benevolent work of the church. But it does not appear, on more thorough consideration, that this neglect of the outsiders is any necessary part of the system. We do not see why application for offerings to the Lord may not properly and suitably be made to all such persons as are diligent in attending upon the "common ordinances;" that is, those ordinances which people come together to enjoy *in common*. Let them signify, as the members of the church do, what they are willing to pledge of their substance to the Lord by the use of the envelopes. It may be that, through grace from on high, the giving of their substance may help them to give themselves to the Lord. Let us in every proper way attract them to the church.

Thus has been presented to the reader a somewhat full exhibition of the envelope system which is now accepted in very many churches of cities and towns, as beyond all comparison the best plan for their church collections. One eminent minister of our Church says: "It is the plan of plans for raising church revenues." Another commends it as "bringing every believer face to face once every week with the Lord, to settle the question, How much do I owe him?" Already one has been quoted who says that he "has long been satisfied that all the revenues of the kingdom ought to come in from week to week by the free gifts of God's people," and that "this is God's plan, and with faith and prayer must succeed." And yet, let the impressive words of the Rev. George Harris of Rhode Island be recalled to mind, who truly says, as already quoted: "The merit of this system resides, however, in the annual pledge of a weekly offering." It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that with all its acknowledged

efficiency, this plan does not literally nor fully comply with the apostle's injunction to the Galatians and Corinthians. The laying by as God hath prospered each one, the apostle said to those churches, must be done *on every Lord's day*—that is, strictly from week to week, with their varying circumstances, all along through the whole year. He did not enjoin the pledge at the year's beginning, of a fixed amount for each successive week, as the admirable and very efficient envelope plan proposes and requires. The question is therefore raised here again, Is there any weight or value in the idea that all the revenues of the kingdom must come in from week to week? Is that really the divine plan to the exclusion of all other plans, and are our offerings acceptable to God upon no other system?

7. There remains one other plan to be considered. It does not literally comply with the apostle's directions to the Galatians and Corinthians. It contemplates the formal offering of substance to the Lord in worship chiefly once in the year. It is a plan suited especially to rural congregations. It proposes that every such congregation associate itself under its own deacons in some sort of voluntary agreement to raise different kinds of produce for the church's objects—each man signing a written agreement to cultivate for the service of the church, ten acres, or five, or three, or two, or one acre, or a half acre, or a quarter acre, in cotton or rice or corn or wheat or barley or oats, as might suit him best; and each woman dedicating, in the same formal and solemn way, all she can make by manufacturing a carpet or a quilt, or by the care of so many turkeys or geese or ducks or hens; and each child promising what can be produced by a beehive, or a bed of potatoes in the garden, or a patch of pindars, or an apple tree, or a peach tree, or the care and feeding of a pig or lamb or kid. On a given day the results might all be gathered at some central house in the congregation, or some store in the neighboring village, or wherever it could be most conveniently gotten to a market; or, all these articles being turned by each person into money, the proceeds might be brought thus together, and then the elders and deacons divide it out between

their own church's objects and the Assembly's seven schemes. Who can doubt that in some such way as this, larger results would be attained in our country churches, than their subscriptions and collections do ever now reach? And might not other advantages accrue to these churches besides this development of their financial strength? More zeal and more devotion to the church's interests; a closer union of the whole body in hearty sympathy and mutual good will; a great deal of pleasure in the very cares and labors required; a great deliverance from the burden which the collection of money for the church's use now constitutes and imposes; an agreeable escape from many disastrous failures and break downs in our church financial undertakings; a valuable training of ourselves and our children in working directly for the Lord in our daily avocations; a pious sense of our dependence upon him for all success, since without his rain and dew and sunshine no crops and no produce are possible—might not all these advantages flow to our rural congregations from some such plan as this, in addition to the large increase of their benevolent contributions?

The ground on which this plan is proposed for the adoption of rural congregations, is that for the most part they get their money once a year, when their fall crops are sold. If they are to give as God has prospered them, they must give out of these annual receipts. The money which in small amounts they do frequently receive all through the year is not an adequate sum from which the Lord's share can be apportioned. But the farmer and planter can daily and weekly worship the Lord with their substance and their strength, as they cultivate his crop on their consecrated ground; and their "God's acres" may thus minister all the season through to their increase in faith, and their growth in zeal and love.

It has indeed been suggested by an Oconee farmer, who is a ruling elder, that there are two seasons in the year when the agricultural class of church members may be successfully called on to give money: in the fall, when cotton is sold, the farmer has the most money; but in the spring, also, he generally has some wheat or corn or other produce left, which he can sell.

And so this farming elder urges that, as we have two meetings of Presbytery in the year, we may make demands before the spring meeting for the farmers' offerings for Sustentation and Publication, which are the appointed objects for January and March; and then, before the fall meeting of Presbytery, (or at least before the Synod's meeting, when Presbytery can always have an adjourned meeting,) we can call on him for his offerings on behalf of Foreign Missions and the Invalid Fund, the Evangelistic Fund, Education, and the Tuskalooosa Institute.

8. In conclusion, reference may be made to what a young brother in the ministry in the North Carolina Synod writes as to a plan by which he was enabled to wake up the benevolence of one of his churches there, so that their gifts were increased from fifty dollars to four hundred and fifty dollars in a comparatively short period. He went to the tax records, and ascertained what every one paid to the State. Then he found out, by patient inquiry, what each one paid for his own gratification with tobacco and cigars. And then he persuaded every one, in a private conversation, to compare with these expenditures for the State and for luxury, what he was doing for Christ and the Church.

J. B. A.

There may properly be appended to this article the resolutions which embodied the action of the Synod after consideration of the subject thus presented to it.

Resolved, by the Synod of South Carolina—

"1. That it be urged on every minister to instruct his people, and every evangelist the feeble congregations to which he ministers, in the Scripture doctrine of the worship of God with substance. On this subject, it is necessary in every one of our churches to give line upon line, precept upon precept. And our Sessions and evangelists are called upon to give opportunity in the best possible manner, whatever that may be, to all our churches, for offering to our adorable Head the worship under consideration.

"2. That for our churches in cities and towns this Synod recommends the envelope or some similar plan of weekly collections in order that the unquestionable advantages of frequent, systematic, proportionate, and universal offerings may be gained under the guidance of Apostolic

wisdom in all those churches where that method can be successfully employed.

"3. That for rural congregations which cannot depend on the envelope or any other system of weekly collections, we recommend the combined use of several plans. The Synod would favor the trial in such churches of the plan of agricultural and such like undertakings as detailed in the report just presented. But where persons have a repugnance to such plans, it is recommended to our country churches to have them invited to employ the written pledge of money. The deacons can make a list of all the Assembly's objects, adding to them, if thought advisable, those objects which concern immediately the local church, and persons may be asked to give a written promise to contribute a certain sum at stated periods. The written pledge, in some one or other of the forms suggested in the report, is very important to be secured in order to give efficiency to collections in such churches as cannot follow out Paul's directions to the Galatians and Corinthians. The tribute to our King must be taken from every one of his liege subjects in proportion to the prosperity vouchsafed by Him.

"4. Regarding associations of ladies and others in efforts to raise money for the work of Foreign Missions, in which they have certainly been very efficient, it may be said that they simply constitute an attempt to unite the churches where they have been established, in systematic giving by each and every member for that object, and then going on in the same track to interest and unite them in collecting money for every other church object. But where such associations exist, or may be formed, measures should always be taken to have them come under the acknowledged rule of the church, by their submitting regular reports of their doings and securing the approbation of the same by the Sessions; because the Synod is properly and rightfully jealous of every plan which does not contemplate direct and immediate action by the church *as such*, and under direct and acknowledged responsibility to the ruling eldership *as such*. Let us call on our churches, in their church capacity to contribute their offerings at stated times in those ways which seem most practicable, instructing them about Foreign Missions and all the other interests of the Church, and appealing always to that great motive—the love which we owe to Him who bought us with His blood."

ARTICLE VI.
PRESBYTERIANISM.

“ And as they ministered unto the Lord and fasted the Holy Ghost said: Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had prayed and fasted, they laid their hands on them and sent them away.” This passage is a record of fact throwing light incidentally upon the great transition period when the Church was passing from one regime to another. The period of that transition ran over a space of ninety years, including the whole of the New Testament record, a period in which the Church of God made its escapement from an elaborate system of symbols, some of them specially oriental and archaic, and therefore having a special adaptation to earlier ages and modes of thought; some of them typical, and therefore carrying in them their own limitation of time; some of them of apt and universal significance, and therefore, though Jewish, of universal application.

We say it without unkindness to any who may differ from us, that the Presbyterian Church most truly represents this transition period, has brought away whatever was integral to the Church of God under the old dispensation and left behind whatever deserved desuetude; that her genealogy of Church government, of ordinances, and of doctrine, runs back to the original constitution of the Church, and that she most thoroughly antagonizes the attempt now too prevalent in some quarters to underrate the Old Testament writings.

1. The Old Testament Church government was essentially Presbyterian. It was a government by elders. The position of Moses was that of a medium or agent to inaugurate and set in motion. He was not an element of the organic system, just as the Apostolate was not an organic element in the New Testament revival of Church government. The priesthood was chiefly typical of Christ, and therefore fell when he came. The ceremonial, being adumbratory mainly, had its bounds set to it beyond which it could not pass. But the interior and permanent government

of the Church was by elders in body. We read everywhere of elders of the people, elders in the gate, elders of the city, elders of the congregation; in fact, of elders of Egypt, and elders of the tribes before the organisation. He was a most natural and necessary man, the first formulated idea of organised society, entering into the Senate of all nations, the Sheik of the Arabs, and the Patrician of the Romans, the original Alderman or Elderman of the English. He was a natural growth, and had come down from original patriarchal times before the Flood. When the Church was organised fully, he was not *created*, but *appropriated*: lifted into a higher position and endorsed; just as circumcision and anointing, long known and practised, were lifted into the position of Church ordinances. At the Mosaic organisation these officers were utilised, were distributed into higher and lower courts, and a bench of seventy of them erected into a Senate, the highest tribunal of the Church. Then arose the famous General Assembly of the Jews, which never died out until fifteen hundred years after, when the first General Assembly of the apostles and elders met in Jerusalem, A. D. 46. When the New Testament record opens, it opens upon the Jewish Church in full running order. The "Great Synagogue" of rulers was sitting. We read of rulers of the synagogue, elders of the synagogue in every city. When Paul came to Antioch in Pisidia, the elders of the synagogue there gave him permission to preach. When Jesus was taken in Nazareth to the brow of the hill, it was by the orders of the rulers of the synagogue. Now when the Apostles are spoken of as ordaining elders in every church, without saying what the business of that officer was, the conclusion is irresistible that they were, with silent consent, just giving to them the same old functionary with whom they were familiar—just setting apart to the well known eldership new incumbents of that office, in the place of those who were found hostile to the gospel, as they usually were. When one of these rulers was converted, as in the case of Sosthenes, the chief ruler or moderator of the bench of rulers at Ephesus, he probably exercised his office in the new church without re-ordination. For the whole record seems to speak of the Church order of the time not as a new thing

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but an institute *resuscitated*. Converted Jews went to work in the old tracks of Church activity. Hence little specific instruction is given about Church offices. It would have been a false history. It would have implied that the office was not known to the people. Of the office of elder little is said, because that office was not changed; of his moral and spiritual qualifications much is said, because the old officers had lost their spirituality. It is for this reason that Church government, in its organic elements, is only incidentally taught in the New Testament, since the model of Church government had been long before given and had been long in use. Now it was this work of putting new life into an old frame, of breathing on the same dry bones of the valley, that yet had all the articulations and fitnesses for motion when again strung with sinews and muscles, that gives to the work of the apostolic missionaries so little of the appearance of formality. And if this work was essentially a resuscitation of all that was valuable or abiding in the Church order of the old Church, and if the bench of the ordinary or particular synagogue ran up into the great synagogue, the ruling power of the Church lay in the ruling elders. Ruling was the trunk from which preaching and teaching grew as branches. There was no place for a higher order or rank of officers, as *bishop* is by some understood to imply. Nor is there any reason for this opinion, because the terms *bishop* and *elder* are used in the New Testament interchangeably. In the church of Philippi a plurality of bishops is expressly mentioned. That could not have been one diocese, much less a plurality of them. When you have shown that the ruling elder is the generic church officer of the Apostolic Church, you have shown that Presbyterianism is the true succession from the old to the new dispensation.

2. What has been said of Church government as a descent from the Jewish economy is equally true of the ordinances of the Church. Baptism and the Lord's Supper are lineal descendants of the old Church; the paschal lamb being dropped for obvious reasons, and the bread and wine of the Jewish supper retained for equally obvious reasons; the circumcision and personal ablutions of the earlier economy being dropped as having their meaning

better expressed in the one Church ordinance in which they all culminated, the baptism of sprinkling. Our Baptist friends, in all their arguments upon this latter ordinance, proceed on the assumption that Christianity is an entirely new movement; that as the apostolic record is in a new language, and in speaking of the subject of baptism employs a new term, they are warranted in breaking the connexion between the old and the new economy. They depend upon the surroundings of the transition period for their interpretation of the ordinance. It is here that their great mistake is made. For the New Testament treats the subject incidentally in running narrative, without a word of explanation, precisely as it speaks of elders. It would have been a false history to have *explained* baptism—it being simply one, and the simplest and most sacred one, of the purifying ordinances of the old Church. Now the fundamental doctrine of this ordinance and the doctrine of which the Presbyterian Church is the true conservator is: that the Church of God, the kingdom of heaven, is a *succession* from generation to generation, and that its charter, “I will be a God unto thee and thy seed after thee,” secures this succession. In fact, the charter with its privileges was meant for the children of believers as their natural successors. Were there no heirs to the estate, the covenant would have no perpetuating quality, and each generation of adults would require for the continued existence of the Church a new charter. Considered as an estate, there could be no natural descent of its franchises except by the operation of express law. God meant this succession to be *natural*. To this end he adapted the great religion to earthly law, that the channel of its transmission might be natural rather than extra-natural. For the natural transmission is from parent to child: the extra-natural by adult conversions, which sometimes proves a stumbling-stone to the Church. The addition of men to the Church by adult conversions is only a secondary and provisional arrangement, for which, as Malachi tells us, “God reserved the residue of the spirit.” But the primary law is through the institute of the family, in which God made them one (*i. e.*, the man and his wife,) that, as Malachi tells us again, “he might seek a godly seed.” Now if we recognise this

normal and natural law of perpetuation of the kingdom of heaven throughout the generations of men, we shall understand that the child inherits the franchises guaranteed to his parents. He may forfeit them by misconduct, yet by birth he comes into covenant possession. He is a part and continuation of the parent in all interests, personal, governmental, and religious. Our definition of the Church therefore is: that it consists of believing parents and their children. The Church is in reality not an aggregation of individuals, but of families. And the whole history of the introduction of Christianity into countries shows it to be naturally an association of families. In the New Testament record this doctrine of succession is quietly assumed, and the blessings of the kingdom assured to parents and their children with scarcely any reference to the mode by which that assurance is sealed. Whatever be the mode, children of believers are by birth entitled to it. The family is the integer, and if all the children are adults, yet if they are under parental representation they are baptized. But the whole New Testament narrative, with all the special cases of baptism in it, just quietly assumes that the *mode* was an element of the Jewish ritual, one of its purifications, understood by everybody in Judea, and therefore no explanation is anywhere attempted. It would have been an indirection unworthy of the noble indifference of the sacred narrative. That mode, there can be no doubt, was the final and most prevalent sanctuary mode, *baptism by sprinkling*, the mode to which the whole terminology of the Bible on related subjects conforms. Now it is the doctrine of succession, as most perfectly held by the Presbyterian Church, that controls the subject of baptism. As the constitution of the Church comes to be more and more understood, the lines will close around immersion more and more. It will be understood that fanciful arguments drawn from little versatile prepositions "into," "out of," etc., still more versatile in Greek than in English, are frail things on which to build an ordinance of the Church of God. It will be understood that the majestic indifference of the New Testament narrative as to modes, and that at a juncture when the Church of God was making its escape from a system of modes, rebukes the absolutism which cannot be satisfied with anything short of mode.

3. And as we have traced the genealogy of Church government and the genealogy of the ordinances to the original institution of the Mosaic Church, so might we trace every one of the doctrines of the faith to the same source as being less articulately and didactically stated, it is true, but not less really and substantially contained in the record. The doctrine of predestination, for example, of which the Presbyterian Church has been the chief exponent through all the ages of its history, runs like a strong cordon throughout the Old Testament writings, binding together its parts and binding indissolubly the Old and New Testaments together. The words of Jacob, "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah. nor a lawgiver from his feet, till Shiloh come," was a veritable predestination that came duly to its maturity. The captivity and thralldom of the children of Israel in Egypt four hundred and thirty years; their deliverance, their march into Canaan; the desolating sweep with which they brought the doomed inhabitants to lick the dust; their actual possession of the land of milk and honey—was, every step of it, a stern predestination. The man who burnt the bones of the priests of Jeroboam fulfilled a predestination uttered three hundred and fifty years before by a nameless prophet. Both his deed and his name were predestinations. Every promise, and every prophecy, every type, every adumbration, and every historical prefigurement. involved predestination. Everything in the Old Testament that looked to futurity in the New was a predestination. It has been the special honor of the Presbyterian Church to hold up this great but mysterious truth before the world, and to combat legions in defence of it.

4. But not only has the Presbyterian Church conserved whatever was substantive of the Church and doctrine of God through the great transition from dispensation to dispensation, but it has also the honor of a veritable historical succession from the apostles down to our own time. The Church of Rome has long claimed such a succession unbroken. The Church of England has long claimed it. But Thomas Macaulay, the great historian and a member of the Church of England, has demonstrated that such a succession cannot be made out. Many of the learned

divines of that Church have fairly abandoned the claim. We know where the Methodist Church as an organisation originated. The Baptists also have claimed a succession. But the late Dr. Williams, Professor of Church History in Greenville, S. C., says: "There can be no doubt in the world that in our so-called histories of the Baptists, sects are claimed as Baptists, which if now reproduced, would not be acknowledged as such; as Novatians, Paulicians, Donatists." "Those Baptists," says he, "who urge our claims on the ground of a historical succession, are doing us harm with all intelligent and well read people." Drs. Northrop and Buckland, also of the Baptist Seminaries at Rochester and Chicago, unite in saying that a Baptist succession is a sheer historical picture.

We have not insisted upon it, being content to find the lineaments of our organisation on the pages of the Bible. Yet the Presbyterian Church has such a succession. One presentation of the argument is found in a little book by Dr. T. V. Moore on the Culdee Church. The theory is this: the Celts, the original inhabitants of Northern and Western Europe, called by the Greeks Keltai, by the Romans Galli, settled a section of Asia Minor, which was styled after them Galatia. To this people Paul preached and wrote an epistle. Converts from among these Asiatic Celts carried the gospel in their trading expeditions, and in the movements of the Roman armies across the continent of Europe. One line of them through the Roman armies, which were invading Britain from A. D. 43 to 80, carried Christianity to England, from which sprang the Culdee Church. From these a succession can be traced to the present time. Very briefly the main facts are these: Tertullian, A. D. 200, says, that "the inaccessible parts of Britain are subject to Christ." The *inaccessible parts of Britain* mean Scotland. *Subject to Christ* means that Christianity was prevalent and had been introduced a good many years earlier, while the Apostles were yet preaching, and before the invasion of Britain under Claudius A. D. 43. Baronius says that Christianity was carried to Britain A. D. 35, three years after the death of Christ. Greek names, Alexander and Andrew, were found in Scotland before the invasion. The

conquest of Britain began A. D. 43, continued to A. D. 80. But Scotland was never subdued by the Romans. During that campaign of forty years it would have been scarcely possible that Christians among the Roman armies should not disseminate the story of the cross, and even the Epistles, during the lives of the Apostles. Here is Christianity in Scotland, and perhaps Ireland, while the Apostles were yet preaching. But where is Presbyterianism? Here: Milman says: "The early Scotch and Irish missionaries held an uninterrupted succession of their tradition from the Apostles." Mr. Jones says: "The gospel from its first planting by the Apostles was never extinguished from Britain." Stillingfleet says: "If we may believe the antiquaries, the Church of Scotland was governed by their *Culdei*, as they called their presbyters or elders, without any bishop over them." He uses the word *bishop* in the sense of prelate. This was Presbyterianism. Joannes Major says: "The Scotch were instructed in the faith without any bishop, by priest and monks." He speaks from a Romish standpoint, *priest*, the only name that a Roman Catholic knew for minister and *monk*, for a churchman. Thus he gives us the preaching and the ruling elder. Here was Presbyterianism. Dr. d'Aubigné says: "Their candidates were ordained to the ministry by the laying on of hands of the elders after the apostolic manner." Archbishop Ussher says: "St. Patrick founded three hundred and sixty-five churches, ordained three hundred and sixty-five bishops, and three thousand elders. Here was one bishop to about ten elders. This was Presbyterianism. Now when you remember that a theological seminary was established on the Island of Iona about A. D. 560, which sent out its missionaries for a century or more over England, Norway, and other countries, long before the Romish Church was shaped into Popery, and by what strategy the Romish Church finally gained the ascendancy; that when it was established in Scotland, it was the forcible act of the government and not the choice of the people; that when it was established it had to be done by an importation of rulers from France; how from the earliest time that people have been characterised by their desperate struggles against a foreign religion, and how, when

the choice was given them, they flew to their beloved Presbyterianism again, there seems to be no doubt that through the Scotch Church, Presbyterianism is traced by an uninterrupted succession up to New Testament days, the same that has been imported to these shores and constitutes the American Presbyterian Church. As a denomination, we have never insisted on a historical succession. Amid the fluctuations of human society many a people may drift wide of Bible doctrine and recover Christianity again and be as good Christians as if they had a lineal genealogy. The Jews had a perfect genealogy from Abraham, a line that took in Christ. Yet that Church became so corrupt that God said to the pious, "Come out of her, my people." It is the glory of the Protestant Church that she heard that voice and came out. Yet it is one of the honors of the Presbyterian Church that she has not been under the necessity of seceding from the Great Apostasy. She stood, by a desperate and forlorn struggle, in the valleys of Piedmont and of Scotland, successfully against the absorption. If there is any Church that can claim a succession through all time, through the chasm of fifteen hundred years from Luther to Paul, and over the other dismal chasm, from John the Baptist, our Great Sprinkler, to Moses, fifteen hundred years more, it is the Presbyterian Church. It has fought all the great battles of time, and is still holding its way. It has occupied, we may proudly and thankfully say, the forefront of the war of time, for the great fundamental doctrines of the faith. It has held them against statesmen and kings, against philosophers and fanatics, against the sword that persecuted unto death. Its names are escutcheoned with the many of whom the world was not worthy. Its record, its sublime succession, is on high. And yet it has never been a Church of dogmatic bigotry. It has never given its sympathy to absolutism. It shakes hands with all Christians, and counts their institutions valid, if not scriptural. It has always accounted substantive doctrine and principle more valuable than ritual, and has, therefore, always been patient of the fanaticism that wastes itself on modes. It has none of the *esprit de corps* of the zealot, because it has an evangelical sympathy too wide to be confined within the limits of a denomination. It is generous

to a fault. It gives without stint its material to make other communions, but never compasses sea and land to make one proselyte. It blocks out the truth from the quarry, and throws with generous hand the pabulum of thought to every people. Popular manipulators appropriate and adapt it to their uses. Still she abides by her quarry work, her grand mission to feed the world with truth, rejoicing and continuing to rejoice that "nevertheless every way Christ is preached." This is noble. But has not the time come, when we must train our children and ourselves to a more cohesive loyalty to the Presbyterian Church? Has not the time about come when we should more perfectly popularise the two great fundamentals of Presbyterianism, the *elder* and the *family*, and take the field as well as abide by the foundry? Nay, the Presbyterian Church in this country owes it to Christ and to herself more perfectly to unfurl her banners, and instead of a popular literature, to hold up to the world the sturdy religion of Knox and of Murray, of Calvin and Coligny, of Augustine and Paul. Let us honor the faith which it is our honor to possess.

D. E. FRIERSON.

ARTICLE VII.

THE REVISED BOOK OF CHURCH ORDER.

The Committee of Publication have, in accordance with instructions of the Assembly of 1878, issued the last revision of the Book of Church Order now submitted to the final vote of the Presbyteries. It may be neither inappropriate nor untimely to make this the occasion for submitting some remarks in historical review of this great work, and noting some of the more important amendments of our "constitutional rules" contained in it.

It is now over twenty-one years since, under appointment of the Assembly at Lexington, Kentucky, a Committee, composed of ecclesiastics so conspicuous as Thornwell, Robert Breckinridge, McGill, Hodge, Swift, and Judges Sharswood, Leavitt, and

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Allen, began the second general revision of our rules of Discipline. There had been a previous general revision near forty years before, from 1816 to 1821 ; but by reason of the growth and development of the Presbyterian Church in that forty years, it had become a prevalent conviction among the leading ecclesiastics of the Church, that the Church needed, in the language of Dr. Thornwell, "a more articulate and more pronounced exposition of our Church Order and Government, as these have been elucidated in the discussions and controversies of the last thirty years."

After a most laborious consideration of the subject, under the lead of Dr. Thornwell, this Committee submitted as the result of their labors to the Assembly of 1859, a "Revised Book of Discipline"—the basis of that now before our Presbyteries. It was pronounced even then, by those who examined it, a work of singular merit and worthy the genius of Dr. Thornwell ; though it was also vigorously assailed, and called forth the two Essays of Dr. Thornwell, in defence of his work in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, to be found in his "Works, Vol. IV.," pp. 300-375. These we would specially commend to the perusal of those who may yet be in doubt in regard to the changes in the Book of Discipline. After some able discussion, the subject was recommitted, and in 1860 additional members were added to the Committee, with instructions to suggest modifications of the Form of Government also.

Then followed the war and the division of the Committee. In the Northern Assembly of 1863, a report was submitted, and that Assembly adopted seven of the twelve chapters of the Book of Discipline. But just at that time a movement was initiated looking to the reunion of the Old and New School Churches, which was consummated in 1868. This movement, naturally enough, suspended the work of revision, since it was to be feared that the adoption of a new Form of Government and Book of Discipline at that time by one of the parties might rear a barrier to the contemplated union. After the reunion, the united Church was so engrossed with the rearrangement of its executive agencies and adapting itself to the new order of things, as to be unable

to prosecute the work of revision suspended in 1863; and besides, the New School portion of the body had not been a party to the revision, nor had it yet become interested in it. It was therefore not until the Assembly of 1878, at Pittsburgh, that the work of revision was resumed by giving it in charge to a Committee embracing in its numbers the very best ecclesiastical ability and experience in the Church. The names of McGill and Hatfield, their Permanent and Stated Clerks almost from time immemorial; Moore, the compiler of the New Digest; West and Patton, both conspicuous for the ability with which they had conducted celebrated cases; R. W. Patterson and Judges Strong, Allison, Breckinridge, Moore, and Nixon, furnish a sufficient guarantee that the work of revision will be ably done.

The Southern Assembly, in 1861, as soon as organized, evinced its sense of the importance of the work of revision which had been begun in 1857 and reported in 1859, by adding other members to the Committee with Dr. Thornwell, with instructions to continue the revision of the Book of Government and Discipline and the Directory for Worship. This Committee was unable to meet, owing to the troubles and confusion of the war, before the death of Dr. Thornwell. But taking up the work where he had left it, they reported to the Assembly of 1866, at Memphis, a Revised Book of Church Government and Discipline, which was carefully examined by the Assembly and sent down for approval by the Presbyteries. Just at that time, however, was opened the question of the union of the Synods of Kentucky and Missouri with the Southern Assembly, and, in prospect of the immediate accession of those Synods, leading members of the Committee of revision publicly advised that the Presbyteries should not take final action on the subject until the Presbyteries in Kentucky and Missouri might have a voice in the modifications to be made. In view of this state of the case, very few of the Presbyteries voted to approve of the Book. But on the admission of these Synods, delegates from the Synod of Kentucky feeling that it was due to the other Synods who had suspended the work of revision on their account, that the proposal to resume the work should come from themselves, it was therefore overtured the Assembly of 1869,

that the Revised Book be taken up then and there; and after being amended by a Committee of the Assembly, in the light of the amendments sent up by the Presbyteries, be sent down to the Presbyteries, "that the Presbyteries express their assent to such portions thereof as may meet their approval, and send up also to the next Assembly objections to any portions they disapprove of, with a request that the portions disapproved of be revised by that Assembly and sent down to the Presbyteries, with a view to final action by the Assembly of 1871. At the Assembly of 1870, the report of the Committee on the responses of the Presbyteries was, that "of forty-seven Presbyteries reporting, twenty-seven favored further revision and the early adoption of the Book; and on the other hand, twelve sent amendments, with an expression of general approval of the Book; seven express a wish that, in view of the unsettled condition of the present period, the Book may not now be pressed upon the Church." The movement made in the direction of union with the North, by the appointment of commissioners by the Philadelphia Assembly of 1870, to confer with the Louisville Assembly, led to a general concurrence, in the judgment of the seven Presbyteries, that the unsettled state of things rendered it unwise to press revision further at that time. The Assembly therefore referred all the amendments proposed by the various Presbyteries to the original Committee on revision, to be incorporated into the New Book, if approved by a majority. The unsettled state of things continuing, this Committee did not make report till the Assembly of 1872, and then only on the Rules of Discipline, which were sent down to the Presbyteries. It was reported to the Assembly of 1873, that "out of the forty-seven Presbyteries reporting, thirty approve of the work of revision and of the Revised Book of Discipline. But of this number, ten, on the ground of expediency or for other reasons, decline to adopt. Of the remainder, fifteen decline to adopt, while three decline to vote either to adopt or not." On account of the continued unsettled state of things, the Assembly suspended again the work of revision. In the Assembly at Savannah, 1876, seeing that the question of our relation with the North, with its excitements, had been practi-

cally settled and the Church almost a unit on the main issue, the earliest opportunity was taken to resume a work felt by many to be so much needed; and, with apparently no division of sentiment, that Assembly sent down the Book of Church Order as last revised, for the approval or disapproval of the Presbyteries. The responses of the Presbyteries indicating that there were certain points about which there was more especially difference of opinion, the Assembly of 1877 adopted the method of sending down to the Presbyteries, that portion both of the Form of Government and the Rules of Discipline about which there seemed to be little difference of opinion, and for a separate vote, some eight propositions, two of them alternative propositions, to be voted upon separately by the Presbyteries.

The report of the responses of the Presbyteries to the Assembly of 1878 at Knoxville, shows a very considerable advance toward unity of sentiment. The votes of the Presbyteries on seven of the debatable propositions show a very remarkable degree of unanimity. Out of sixty-four Presbyteries, fifty-two affirm the proposition "of cases without process;" forty-four affirm the revised definition of an offence; forty-three affirm the proposition that communicants only shall be electors for pastor; thirty-nine affirm the proposition to transfer unconverted communicants to the roll of non-communicants; thirty-nine affirm the proposition for inserting the examination rule into the constitution; thirty-five affirm the proposition for ecclesiastical commissions; and twenty-eight against seventeen of the Presbyteries that voted at all affirm the proposition for the involuntary demission of the ministry, which was also sent with the Assembly's propositions by the Committee; while no less than forty-seven affirm the proposition for the voluntary demission. The vote on adopting "the Book as a whole," as it stood incomplete, was but twenty-nine; but very obviously this came from the misunderstanding of the overture sent down to the Presbyteries, some being unwilling to adopt the Book as a whole before they knew whether the separate propositions would be adopted and made part of the Book. The chairman of the Committee claimed, and no doubt justly, that while but twenty-nine Presbyteries voted

to adopt the Book as it stood incomplete, the number in favor of a revised Book was really forty-two. The very large majorities affirming the separate propositions, about which there has been most controversy, indicate a remarkable agreement where there seemed at first to be much division of sentiment. It may therefore be fairly inferred that, on a vote to approve the Book, with these separate propositions embodied in it, there will be a much nearer agreement than on votes taken heretofore. The fact, too, that the twenty-nine Presbyteries who have voted to approve the Book even in its incomplete state, and most of the separate propositions, also comprise about one-half of the ministers of the Church, and about five-sevenths of the 5,428 ruling elders, and the further fact that two-thirds of the Presbyteries voted in favor of going on with the work of revision, would seem to indicate a growing desire in the Church that the Revised Book be accepted as the "constitutional rules" of the Church, in place of the present Book.

In view of the very cumbrous and inconvenient method in which a general revision of our constitutional rules must be carried on, it is somewhat surprising that the work should have reached its present stage with comparatively so little division and agitation. The provision of the famous "Barrier Act" of the Kirk of Scotland in 1696, embodied in our Constitution, providing for the submission of any changes of the constitutional rules by the Assembly to the Presbyteries for their sanction, and then the enacting of them by the Assembly, contemplated originally only the submission of but one, or, at most, a few propositions to the Presbyteries. In that case the process is very simple. But when it comes to the submission of so many propositions in a general revision to be approved or rejected, each one of them by sixty-four Presbyteries, it is a different matter. That so general an agreement has been reached is of itself proof sufficient that the Church is essentially at one on the subject. Indeed, it is well known that the chief part of the discussions and divisions have arisen on incidental questions of expediency and outside issues not involving the real merits of the propositions of the New Book. On a test vote in the Knoxville Assembly, on a square

issue presented by the minority of the Committee in charge of the reports from the Presbyteries, whether the revision shall be indefinitely postponed, the majority against indefinite postponement was not far from 4 to 1; and on the vote to send down the Book as completed to the Presbyteries, the vote was nearly 5 to 1. Both these votes—96 to 28 in the one case, and 95 to 20 in the other—indicate a full house on the occasion, and show that these are fairly representative expressions of the opinions of the Church.

The correctness of this growing sentiment in favor of a revision of our Government and Discipline in our Church, as evinced by these votes in the Knoxville Assembly, has recently received a strong confirmation in the resumption of the work of revision by the Northern Assembly after a suspension of fifteen years. And it is no less gratifying than surprising to find the leaders of thought in the Northern Church commending without stint our Revised Book of Order on its recent issue by the Committee of Publication. Even the *Presbyterian Banner* of Pittsburgh, hitherto so prone to ask concerning every thing Southern, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" in a masterly article on this subject, after an elaborate history of Revision from 1857 to 1863, and of the work in the Southern Church from 1861 to 1878, speaks in the following generous and intelligent terms of the Book now before our Presbyteries:

"The Southern Book is a more extensive work than the Revised Book of 1863. It includes the 'Form of Government' as well as the 'Book of Discipline,' and its revisions are not limited merely to verbal corrections or occasional new insertions, but make a re-cast and re-arrangement of the whole structure of both these departments. Radical improvements are made throughout. The doctrine of Ecclesiastical and other Commissions is developed, electors of Church Officers sharply defined, difference between Ecclesiastical and other Offences stated, Judicial and Non-Judicial Process distinguished, Common Fame is abolished as an accuser, and the Committee of Prosecution erected into an Original party with the right of appeal. Every indictment is to begin, 'In the name of the Presbyterian Church of the United States,' and conclude with the words, 'against the peace, unity, and purity of the Church, and the honor and majesty of the Lord Jesus Christ as the King and Head thereof.' Provision is made for the demission of the ministry, and

special discipline for ministers who have turned aside to secular callings. It is no copy of the Revised Book of 1863, but a new Book, and rejects some of the most important features of this Book. It is Presbyterianism of the highest and purest kind, and the logical relations of all the parts of the Book, the clear statement of principles and duties, and the emphasis given to the Covenant of God, and to Doctrine and Discipline as an institute of God, removes it the farthest from the modern liberalism that would let everything drift as it pleases, or fly at loose ends in the wind. There are some things in it we would prefer to see otherwise; but on the whole, it is far in advance, as a 'Book of Church Order,' of anything that has appeared in this country."

In the *Interior* of Chicago, of November 21st, we find an editorial, evidently from the pen of Dr. Halsey, inspired, we doubt not, by the recollection of his noble and manly fight, shoulder to shoulder with Dr. Patton, against Swing and his adherents in the Chicago Presbytery and in the Synod of Illinois, which speaks of our Revised Book in such terms as the following:

"So far as we have examined it, we can have no hesitation in saying that it is a great improvement on the partially accepted Book of 1863, even as that was a great improvement on the old Discipline. It sacrifices no single essential principle either of polity or discipline contained in the old Book, while what it adds or restates, renders the old far more intelligible and perfect. If the two stood before us to-day, for the first time, to be judged on their own merits, we could not for a moment hesitate to accept the new as a vast improvement in fulness, in clearness of statement, and in logical arrangement. On reading its lucid definitions, its ampler statement of essential points, and its better proportioned chapters, one cannot help wishing that the Presbyterian fathers of 1788, 1789, while they were on the work of revision and amendment, had given us a work like this, in place of our excessively curt, and sometimes not unobscure, little treatises.

"The Book of Church Order is in two parts of equal length, the first containing the Form of Government in seven chapters, the second the Rules of Discipline in fifteen chapters. Many of the difficult, perplexing questions which perpetually arise in our Church courts, and lead to endless debates, would be at once settled and ended under the sharply defined and unmistakable statements of this new book. This is especially the case with the admirable chapters on Church Officers and Church Courts, and with those on Offences, on Jurisdiction, on Original Parties, on Election of Church Officers, on Judicial and non-Judicial Process, on Appeals, and on Complaints. With scarcely an exception, the book as a whole meets our cordial approbation. As to its general tone, through-

out, we can heartily respond to what the *Presbyterian Banner* says: 'It is Presbyterianism of the highest and purest kind, in the logical relations of the book, the clear statement of principles and duties, and the emphasis given to the Covenant of God, and to Doctrine and Discipline as an institute of God.'

"As in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms, everything is clear, logical, and exhaustive—adequately proportioned as to parts, and well nigh perfect as a whole. No intelligent reader can fail to see that the compilers of this new Book of Church Order, have reached something of the same precision of statement, and perfectness of systemisation. They have given to the ecclesiastical standards precisely that clear-cut finish of definition and that unmistakable intention as to the import of the law, which have so distinguished our doctrinal standards. It would unquestionably be a great gain, and a great relief from doubtful disputations, if our own Church had a book like this; and the strong probability is that the Southern Presbyteries will approve it. The Southern Church is proverbial for its conservatism and strong attachment to the past; but it can hardly set aside a work so excellent in itself as this, and at the same time so conservative of all the grand essential elements of Presbyterianism and so true to the old Westminster Standards."

This is very strong, and, evidently, very intelligent testimony; and the more confirmatory in that it comes from outside parties who cannot be suspected of having become partisans from participating in the discussions of revision during the last twelve years. It comes also from men representing the ecclesiastical conservatism of the Northern Church.

That our revision is a wise one—wise in practical wisdom—is affirmed also, so far as we know, by the ecclesiastical men of the Northern Church who have had most experience in the application of the present "constitutional rules" to concrete cases in maintaining the Presbyterian doctrine and order. Rev. Drs. West and Skinner in the midst of their great struggle for Presbyterian order in the case of McCune, frequently expressed the wish that they had our Revised Discipline instead of the present Book; for with that they would have been able to restrain their opponents from the raising of side issues, and entangling the case in technicalities and special pleadings. Since their triumph in the Pittsburgh Assembly, they have repeated their opinion. Says Dr. West of our Revised Book, in a letter to a friend:

"Abating one or two unimportant particulars, I am highly delighted

with it. It is superior in every way to any Presbyterian Manual of Discipline I have ever seen, and, if adopted by your Church, will unquestionably relieve Church courts of many of the perplexities and improper disputes that so constantly arise in cases of judicial and executive administration. That it will operate efficiently, if adopted and faithfully carried out, to promote the peace, piety, and unity of the Church, no competent ecclesiastic who has studied it can doubt for a moment. I have pondered it carefully and frequently, and find that it provides most wisely for the most troublesome exigencies that, unforeseen, yet too often arise from the very inception to the consummation of our various processes. It is a great advance upon the Revised Book reported for the Old School Church years ago by the lamented Dr. Thornwell; and I could wish no greater blessing, in this line, for the Northern Presbyterian Church, than its unanimous adoption of the Southern Book as its own, and the constant and faithful practice of its provisions by all our courts. Every intelligent and sagacious presbyter must admit it is the result of long experience, wisdom, and care."

This we take to be a very remarkable testimony from confessedly one of the very ablest ecclesiastics of his Church; and one, as is well known, whose prejudices have had no leaning in favor of anything Southern in its origin. It is the manly and magnanimous testimony of an impartial critic entitled by his eminent celebrity to express an opinion.

Dr. Thomas H. Skinner, become justly famous as the leader and defender of Presbyterianism in the McCune case, fully endorses Dr. West's opinion, saying:

"I heartily endorse Dr. West's letter. I have not seen the more perfect copy of your Book of Discipline. The one I had was such a marked improvement on the old Book that I could not but commend it. I am sure that it will greatly serve the interests of religion and order, and facilitate the action of the courts of the Church. The defects of our present Book are glaring, and it is wide open not only to the captious obstructions of accused persons and their friends, but also to honest objections which delay justice in our judicatories. I have learned the lesson by a painful experience in Presbytery, in Synod, and in the Assembly."

We have other similar testimony from the Northern Church,*

*The testimony of Dr. Francis L. Patton, another member of the Northern Committee on Revision, in favor of the New Book of Discipline, might also have been cited here. "The New Book is certainly a great improvement on the old, and will make process far simpler and

borne by such as are best qualified to express an opinion, but it is needless to multiply witnesses. We fully recognise the fact that this is not an issue to be settled by authority. But it certainly is legitimate to show for the benefit of those who have hesitated about our revision as too radical and revolutionary, that disinterested conservative judges and those best qualified to give an opinion fully concur with us in sentiment, both as to the character and extent of the changes needed.

The plea has indeed been urged with some plausibility, that instead of a "New Book" we need simply amendments inserted into the old. That plea will not be pressed by any who have actually attempted, as we have, to insert the amendments necessary into the old book. They will find this to be one of the cases in which he that "putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment," finds that "the rent is made worse." For not only does the want of logical arrangement of the present book render any neat patch-work impossible, but the insertion of one important amendment involves change in so many other places as would make the book a mere confused medley of propositions throughout.

From what has been said, it will be seen that the steady increase of opinion in our own Church in favor of the importance and the necessity of a revision of our Constitutional Rules; the existence of the same opinion in the Northern Church which has recently found expression in the action of the Pittsburgh Assembly resuming the work of revision suspended in 1863; and the

much less liable to mistake. The points in my mind are (1) The clear definition respecting original parties, who they are. (2) The detailed method of prescribing the order to be followed (3) Making all prosecutions run in the name of the Church. (4) The use of a more discriminating phraseology throughout." In connexion with some criticism expressing his preference for the old Scotch terminology over that in our Book borrowed from the civil courts, and suggesting some minor defects, Prof. Patton says: "I think the true view should be that the court is never a party: that it is the *cause*, not the court which goes up to the higher courts, that the parties are the original accusers and accused at every stage where an appeal is taken."

Dr. Patton's remarkable experience in the *Swing* case entitles him to ~~ave~~ and to express an opinion on the provisions of a Book of Discipline.

testimony above recited of these disinterested judges from the outside best qualified to pronounce an opinion to the singular excellence of the revision which we have made, all goes to create a very strong presumption in favor of the Revised Book anterior to any critical examination of the changes made in it in the way of improvement.

The ordinary limits of such an article as this forbid any examination in detail of the provisions of the Book now before the Presbyteries. All that will here be attempted is some general considerations going to show the benefits that may be expected from its adoption as the constitutional rules of the Southern Presbyterian Church.

It is not claimed that the Revised Form of Government has introduced any new principle of Church Order not already asserted in the standards of the Church. But it is very obvious that it has brought the formulas of Government and Discipline into more perfect conformity with the utterances of our doctrinal standards on the subject of the Church, its government and discipline. While it retains every important proposition of the present Book, it supplies omissions with statements from the recognised standards of Presbyterianism and the interpretations of the General Assembly, and by a logical rearrangement of the statements, adapts the Book to use in the practical administration of the Church. It must have struck every one who has paid any attention to the subject, that, aside from many omissions to speak where it is proper, there is a striking contrast between the loose and full statement of the doctrine of the Church, so far as any statement is made, in our present Government and Discipline, and the strong, explicit, clear cut statements of the doctrine of the Church and its government, as made in our doctrinal standards. And there is a very interesting historical reason for this contrast. The fathers who originally framed our Form of Government and Discipline accepted what had come to be considered the Church Government and Discipline of the Westminster Assembly. Whereas, it was not really the Presbyterian order of the Westminster Assembly at all, but the order which, in spite of that Assembly, the Erastian Parliament had forced upon the

Presbyterianism of Britain. It is a noteworthy fact, that while the Parliament accepted the statements of the Westminster Assembly in the Confession of Faith, as to the doctrine of the Church and its government, made during the earlier sessions of the Assembly, it would not accept the same principles several years later, when embodied in a Form of Government and Discipline. This conflict between the Parliament and the Assembly forms one of the most remarkable episodes in its history. Finding themselves in a lean minority in the Assembly, the Erastians and Independents adopted the policy of acting against the Presbyterian Assembly through their agents in Parliament, when the conclusions of the Assembly were laid before that body for ratification. By the time the Assembly had reached the subject of Church Government, the Scotch had ceased to be so essential to the protection of England against its King, and therefore the influence of Presbyterians was on the wane. Hence, when the Assembly sent up to Parliament its scheme of Government, involving the *jure divino* right of Church Government, the record is: "Mr. Glynn and Mr. Whitaker (in Parliament) spoke largely against the *jus divinum* of any particular form of government; and when the question was put to the vote, the decision was against the proposition of the Assembly; and instead of determining that the government of the Church was of divine authority, by Congregational, Classical, and Synodical Assemblies, their resolution was, *that it is lawful* and agreeable to the word of God that the Church be governed by Congregational, Classical, and Synodical Assemblies. The loss of this important question in Parliament greatly affected the minds of the Scottish Commissioners and the Presbyterians in the Assembly."*

A still more exciting struggle on the question of *Jus Divinum* between the Assembly and the Parliament occurred on the occasion of the Assembly's sending up its Rules of Discipline, providing that the elderships (Sessions) should have power to exclude the profane from the Lord's Table. The Parliament refused such power to the elders, and undertook to declare what sins

* Hist. of Westm. Assembly, pp. 113-122, Pres. Board of Publication.

should exclude from the Lord's Table, and after enumerating several sins, enacted that commissioners appointed by the civil government should decide in cases of sins not enumerated; thus excluding the elders altogether. Thereupon, as we learn from the recently discovered "Minutes of the Westminster Assembly," at the session of March 20, 1645, Mr. Marshall, referring to this Act of Parliament as lying heavy upon the conscience of himself and brethren, moved that a committee be appointed to prepare a petition to Parliament, which was done. In this petition, after pointing out that this appointment of commissioners to fence the Lord's Table is contrary to Christ's appointment, they proceed to say: "Wherefore, your petitioners, in discharge of their fidelity to God, to His Church, and to your Honors, do humbly pray that the several elderships may be sufficiently enabled to keep back all such as are notoriously scandalous from the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, of which we must, as formerly we have done, say it expressly belongeth unto them by *divine right* and by the will and appointment of Jesus Christ," etc.

The Parliament affected great indignation at this petition, and after grave deliberation, entered upon their journals "a narrative of the matter of fact concerning the *breach of the privilege of Parliament* by the petition of the Assembly of Divines," in which they set forth how the Assembly was called to treat of such matters as should be proposed to them, and no other; that by Act of Parliament, Oct., 1643, they are authorised to treat among themselves upon such a Discipline and Government as may be most agreeable to God's word; that the Parliament having received their advice on this subject, saying that Jesus Christ hath placed in his ministers and elders of his Church the power of keeping away scandalous persons from the Lord's Table—notwithstanding both houses did ordain that commissioners appointed by law should exercise this power; that the Assembly doth, under the name of a petition, oppose their judgment as an Assembly in relation to a law passed both houses unto the judgment of Parliament; that it appears to their consciences to be so contrary to that way of government which Christ hath appointed in his Church, etc., the House hath resolved and declared

that this petition thus presented by the Assembly is a breach of the privilege of Parliament.

Thereupon Mr. Samuel Browne, Mr. Fiennes, Sir John Evelyn, Sir John Wentworth, Mr. Rouse, and others—twelve in all—are appointed a committee “to communicate in a fair manner unto the Assembly of Divines the vote of this House upon the breach of privilege in their petition; and are to enlarge themselves upon the several heads of this narrative.”*

Accordingly at the session of the Assembly, April 30, 1646, the Committee appeared in the Assembly, Sir John Evelyn opened a long speech, by informing the Assembly that, in the petition, the House “did find things that did strike at the foundation and roots of the privileges of Parliament”; and descanted upon the condescension of Parliament in thus sending a committee to confer with such offenders.

Mr. Fiennes told them that “in Parliament resides the power of making laws, and, once passed, all are subject to them. Whosoever shall infuse anything to the contrary in the mind of those that should obey them, are guilty of a grave offence,” and inflicted upon them a terrible rebuke, reminding them all the while of the grace of Parliament in condescending to reason with them.

Mr. Browne made an elaborate historical discourse to prove that Parliament is the supreme judicature, spiritual and ecclesiastical.

Sir Benjamin Rudyard declared “this *jus divinum* is of a formidable and tremendous nature. ‘Decency and order’ are variable, and therefore, cannot be *jure divino*. The civil magistrate is a Church officer in every Christian commonwealth.”†

After thus—if one may use an expressive slang term in this case—“*bulldozing*” the Assembly, the Committee left the famous Nine Questions as to the *jure divino* of Elderships, Elders, Classical and other Assemblies, to be answered by order of the House of Commons, and requiring each member to *subscribe his name to his vote on each proposition*,‡ obviously for the purpose of intimidating them.

*Minutes of the Assembly of Divines, pp. 456–458.

†Minutes of West. Ass. pp. 448, 458.

‡Minutes West. Ass., pp. 225, 226.

Now, the point of this summary of a long story is, that in the matter of Church Government the theory of the Westminster Assembly was suppressed, and the system which was forced upon the Church was in large measure permeated by the Erastian poison of the Parliament, and this was strengthened by the leaven of Erastianism in the scheme establishing the Church of Scotland. That the ideas of our fathers who framed our Form of Government were derived from the Presbyterian usages that grew up under the Acts of Parliament, rather than from the original theory of the Westminster Assembly that framed our Confession of Faith. And hence the contrast between the bold, clear propositions concerning the Church and its *jure divino* order, and the statements of our Form of Government.

Any thoughtful student will see at a glance that the Revised Book contains more nearly the original theory of the Church and its government held by the Assembly that framed our Confession than any system of Church order constituted since the Westminster Assembly. So far, therefore, as the argument from venerable antiquity and the fathers of Presbyterianism goes, it is, doubtless, with the Revised Book, rather than with the old Book.

But, returning to the Book itself and the more important improvements in it: in place of the introductory chapter which is in the nature of an apology, all well enough for a Church of one hundred and seventy-seven ministers and four hundred churches, contributing for religious purposes, outside of current expenses, less than one thousand dollars, but surely unnecessary for a Church "whose sound has gone forth into all the earth." No important truth is set forth in this chapter that is not better exhibited elsewhere in our standards. It probably should be recited in a historical preface to the Revised Book as an interesting historic document. But surely its place is better supplied with the statement "of the doctrine of Church Government," in Chapter I., and that grand old preface from the original Westminster Form of Government in Chapter II. of the Revised Book, which ought never to have been omitted. The conservatism that clings so affectionately to ancient symbols cannot well object to the restoration of this venerable preface with the summary of

propositions concerning Christ's kingly relations to the Church, voted at the 76th Session, October 20th, 1643.

On the other hand, the Revised supplies here a very important omission of the old Book, in the statement that the doctrine of *jure divino* government by no means excludes the evangelical denominations from a place in the true Church of Christ. That "this visible unity of the Church of Christ, though obscured, is not destroyed by its division into different denominations," etc.—a statement not only important but very *timely* in the present age of the Church. It protects, on the one hand, the principle of *jure divino* against the unreasonable charge of "High Churchism," and on the other, silences the clamor of Papists and Campbellites about the "sects" of evangelical Protestantism.

Important omissions are supplied in Chapter II. in the statements concerning "the Nature and Extent of Church Power"; "Of the Particular Church"; and in the specific direction for "the organisation of a particular Church." The value of all the additions in this Chapter will hardly be questioned. While there is no new principle introduced, yet the principle on which the provisions of the present Book rest are distinctly set forth. Indeed, this is one of the great advantages of the Revised Book, that it so clearly brings out the doctrinal principle involved in the provisions for the administration and government of the Church. The shortest and surest method of getting at the meaning and purpose of a law is to get clearly before the mind the principle upon which the law rests. It is a distinguishing mark of the Revised Book that it gives prominence to the principle in every case.

Without noting several minor improvements, we may point to the clear and definite statement in Chapter IV. of the duties and functions of Church officers, in which all must admit the deficiency of the present Book is glaring, while the Revision is every way admirable. Thus, for instance, how marked the contrast between the Revised and the present Book in setting forth the official functions of ruling elders and deacons. Who can distinctly define the duties of either under the vague incidental allusion to the subject in the present Book? Where is the ruling elder who can

find out from this Book what his place is in the Church, and what the functions of his office? One would suppose that a comparison on this single point would constrain every such elder in the Church to accept the Revised Book gladly, unless he should find something elsewhere in the Book which opposed insuperable objections to it. With the provisions of this paragraph in our Book formulating so distinctly the duties of the office which is the distinguishing feature of our system, if the eldership can be brought up to it as the measure of their duty, the Church will be practically revolutionised within five years. With the blessing of God upon the labors of such ruling elders, the Presbyterian Church will stand forth "clear as the sun, fair as the moon, and terrible as an army with banners." The lamentable failure of our churches in so many instances to reach the masses of the people is largely due to the fact that the eldership at present is so truly representative of Chapter V. of our present Book, which asserts simply the propriety of an eldership, without any definition of the functions of the office beyond their joint power of jurisdiction as members of the Session. It makes no suggestion of their duties as set in the Church, to have oversight of the flock, to watch over the people, to admonish them of their duties, to guard them against errors, to visit the sick, comfort the mourning, cherish the children—keeping the pastor fully advised of the state of the congregation, upholding his hands, and pointing out to him where his special attention is needed. We are persuaded that if the attention of the ruling elders can be fixed upon this Section 3 of Chapter IV., their voice will be nearly unanimous for the Revised Book.

The Chapter, "Of Church Courts," embracing about one-third of the Revised Book of Government, is essentially the same with Chapters VIII. to XI. of the present Form of Government, except that several important omissions are supplied from what has become accepted usage or declared by the General Assembly to be the meaning, by implication, of the present Book. The chief improvement in this chapter is its setting forth distinctly the "jurisdiction of church courts," for the instruction of office-bearers in regard to the principles which underlie the action of these tribunals. The question so much controverted, heretofore,

as to a quorum of Presbytery, is settled by requiring the presence of at least one ruling elder in Presbytery and three in the Synod to constitute a quorum. Provision is made also for a formal subscription to the formula assented to at ordination; for receiving ministers of other denominations and churches of other denominations into our connexion—none of which will probably be challenged as unwise or improper.

The Section, "Of Ecclesiastical Commissions," especially that part of it relating to commissions of the Synod and General Assembly to try appeals, we confess is less satisfactory to us than any other portion of the Revised Book. That such commission shall be authorised only in case of "appeal"—not in cases of "complaint"—and then "only by consent of parties"—seems so to restrict the power of acting by commission as to render the provision, practically, almost inoperative. Yet, when it is considered that for half a century there has been so decided a difference of judgment on the subject of commissions among the ablest ecclesiastical leaders of the Church, this limited provision for commissions is probably all that can be expected at present. If it shall be found, on fair trial, that the scheme works well and saves much time and trouble, at no sacrifice of truth and justice, the limiting clause will probably be stricken out. Besides, the adoption of the Revised Discipline would relieve the courts of so many of the difficulties attending judicial trials as to render the commission less needful. It will be the part of wisdom for those who, like ourselves, find some things in the Revised Book that we would rather have otherwise, to accept cheerfully what we can get, rather than what we want, in view of the vast advantages of the improvements of the Book in other and vastly more important matters.

As to Chapter VI., "Of Church Order"—its two sections concerning "the doctrine of vocation" and "the doctrine of ordination," though they contain additions to the present Book in the way of supplying omissions, yet they are really but an explanatory preface to what follows concerning the election and ordination of Church officers. This brief definition of terms and exhibit of the principles underlying vocation and ordination, for

the benefit of both the office-bearers and the people who have occasion to take part in the solemn proceedings afterwards described, is manifestly a most valuable provision, and in full accord with the spirit of our system. Of the improvement in Section 3, defining explicitly the qualifications of the electors in the choice of pastor, and confining the right of suffrage to communicants, it is needless to speak, since the voice of two-thirds of the Presbyteries has already decreed in favor of the revised provision.

The remaining four Sections of this Chapter, covering the same ground as Chapters XIII. to XVII. inclusive, of the present Book, are substantially the same as the present Book, and are therefore passed over without notice.

Since these are the more important changes proposed in the Form of Government, it will be perceived that they are not in their character revolutionary, introducing any new principles, but simply supply from sources already recognised as law the defects and omissions of the present Form of Government. Nay, in all the criticisms of twenty years no one has, at least to our knowledge, seriously challenged these amendments as wrong, unwise, or contrary to the spirit of our standards. The chief arguments against the Revised Form of Government have been directed, not against its intrinsic provisions, but chiefly against the expediency of adopting so thorough a revision in times of excitement.

Of the revision of the Book of Discipline there is space here for only a brief comment on a few of the proposed amendments. This portion of the revision is chiefly the work of Dr. Thornwell, but his work has been much improved by the varied criticisms of the Presbyteries since 1859. The claim set up for the Revision by Dr. Thornwell in 1859 is still valid in every particular :

“It has pruned away redundancies and supplied many important omissions; removed incongruities and contradictions to the general tenor of our system; extended privileges which experience has shown to be important; cleared up ambiguities, and reduced our discipline to a logical completeness which it did not possess before; it has simplified the process of appellate jurisdiction and cleared away a highway for our upper courts where all before was rocks and thorns.”

A careful comparison of the Revised with the present Discip-

line will show that this is no extravagant claim in any of its several particulars. The chief improvements in the Revised Book relate to the definition of an offence, how offences shall come before the courts, how the prosecution of offences shall be carried on through the series of courts, or dealt with in certain cases without process.

Of the revised definition of an offence it is unnecessary to say anything further, since the Presbyteries, by a vote of more than two-thirds, have accepted the Revision in this particular. Of the manner in which offences shall come before the courts and be prosecuted—in regard to which the present Book is singularly obscure, ambiguous, and erroneous in principle—the Revised Book, as it seems to us, is singularly felicitous in clearing up the difficulties which environ the provisions of the present Book, by two brief paragraphs (Chap. V. 3, 4) declaring the original and only parties in a case of process are the Church, the accuser, whose honor and purity are to be maintained, and the accused; and the prosecutor, whether voluntary or involuntary, is always the representative of the Church, and has all its rights in the case.”

It will be perceived that this simple, clear-cut statement at once sweeps away all the disputes about “common fame,” and all questions about who are the original parties, those chronic troubles in almost every case of judicial process. It sets forth so clearly the principle that underlies judicial process that none can well fail to comprehend it. And, more important still, it rids the Church of the error of throwing the protection of the Christian commonwealth upon individuals, and thereby making the trial of offences a personal conflict between the prosecutor and the accused and his friends. It is no doubt largely on account of this glaring error in our present Book that discipline in the Church is becoming almost obsolete. Nor is it to be wondered at, that church sessions should hesitate about encouraging persons to prosecute offences, in view of the fact that the prosecution is likely to engender personal feuds in the Church, the end of which no one can foresee. And, indeed, how shall it be expected that a person in the Church will volunteer to assume the position

of prosecutor and thereby subject himself to the odium of affecting to be more scrupulous of conscience and more concerned for the name of the Church than his brethren who seem to consent to let the offence pass without notice, rather than become involved in a personal quarrel?

Another great improvement in the Revised Book relates to the method of appeals. Under our present Book we have the strange incongruity of carrying up the lower court as a party with the case itself to the higher court, to be judged for having given a certain decision. As Dr. Thornwell very aptly puts it, "The appellant appears not only to represent the merits of the case to which he was an original party, but to expose the demerits of the court that refused him justice. He is at once a suitor and a prosecutor. Both issues are tried at the same time and so blended that they constitute but one apparent case. . . . To try at the same time the question of individual right and the question of the integrity of a judge, is an outrage upon common sense, and yet this is what the Old Book does." Surely it is but right reason and common sense that the purpose of an appeal should be simply to transfer the case—the identical case on which the lower court decided, and that the higher court should have before it precisely what the lower court had—the same issue, the same testimony, the same circumstances. It is owing to this singular incongruity that we have in almost every case which comes to the higher courts, the never-failing dispute to begin with, as to who are the parties before the court, and the confusion and entanglements of side issues that renders it impossible to have an *intelligent* final decision.

The provision of the Revised Book for "Cases without process"—that is, not requiring the formalities of a judicial process—has already been endorsed by the Presbyteries by the extraordinary vote of fifty-two out of sixty-three Presbyteries, and therefore needs no discussion here. It is worthy of note, however, that this chapter "Of cases without process" contains the propositions so much controverted in former times, that a communicant confessing an unregenerate heart, but otherwise having been guilty of no offence, may, at the discretion of the Session,

be transferred to the list of non-communicants; also, that a minister who may conclude that he was mistaken, and that God has not called him to the ministry, may be divested of his office without censure. The large vote for these propositions is one of great significance, as showing how the diverse views of the Church have gradually come together, and that therefore the adoption of the Revised Book will leave no great questions of controversy to be agitated among us.

Of the minor improvements in the Book of Discipline it is not important to speak here. These are for the most part only the necessary result in carrying out the important changes already noticed. It is, however, no unimportant change that has been effected by the re-arrangement of the whole, both in the Form of Government and in the Book of Discipline. In the constitutional rules, both of government and discipline, the chief aim should obviously be a book of definitions, forms, and rules, and these in the most compressed form consistent with clearness. Our Book of Government and Discipline should be so arranged as to adapt it to the purposes of a text-book for students in our Theological Seminaries, so that the professor may connect his instructions in the doctrine and order of the Church directly with the propositions of the Book which is to become their manual in all their future professional life. Beyond doubt, the generally admitted deficiency of our younger ministry in knowledge of the law which they are called upon to administer comes from the ill-adaptedness of our present Book as a text-book of instruction, It will hardly be disputed either that the present Book of Government and Discipline is sadly deficient in this respect, or on the other hand, that the Revised Book is eminent in the excellence of its logical arrangement, and its direct and clear expression of what it means. In short, as Dr. Halsey expresses it, "They have given to the ecclesiastical standards precisely *that clear-cut finish of definition and that unmistakable intention as to the import of the law which have so distinguished our doctrinal standards.*"

We contemplate this Book of Church Order now, in its completeness, with singular pleasure. That such a work has been

accomplished by the Church of our love, the Southern Presbyterian Church—leading the Presbyterian Churches of the world in exhibiting our glorious scriptural system in its simplicity and beauty, without any trace of the collar which usurping civil governments put upon the neck of Presbyterianism in the days of our martyr fathers—we confess stir our pride somewhat. As we read the admirable judgments of the most capable judges of the Northern Church—men entitled to have and to express an opinion, and who cannot be suspected of partiality—confirming our own judgment, that we have at last worked out a formula of Presbyterian Church order “far in advance of anything that has appeared in this country,” we feel a glow of high satisfaction. We feel disposed to say, all honor to the men that have labored and toiled in the accomplishment of a task so honorable to our Church. From the immortal Thornwell, who “being dead yet speaketh” in the work he projected, on through the list of the living men who have so laboriously built it up—Adger and E. T. Baird, and Palmer and Armstrong, who have figured more conspicuously in it, with scores of equally earnest though less conspicuous fellow-laborers in the great enterprise—these men have our gratitude and our homage.

There may still be things in the book to which many will have objection. But these points should be yielded now. Our earnest hope is that the Presbyteries will accept this Revision with the same unanimity with which they have approved some of the separate propositions of the Book. A good degree of unanimity will secure the more ready application of its important provisions, without jar or friction, to the administrative and disciplinary work of the Church. While there may still be differences of opinion in regard to matters of detail, let us thank God that we have been able to accomplish so much and go forward with one heart and “one step” to the work of spreading our pure Presbyterian Church order and pure gospel doctrine. It needs no gift of prophecy to foresee that within ten years or less it will become a matter of wonder that the Presbyterian Church endured these deficiencies in her constitutional rules so long. And following our lead, other Presbyterian bodies will make a similar revision.

STUART ROBINSON.

ARTICLE VIII.

ETHICS OF THE FATHERS.*

A Tractate of the Mishna, with the Commentary of Maimonides thereon. Translated and annotated by ALEXANDER MEYROWITZ, M. A., Ph. D., Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages and Ancient History in the University of Missouri.

PREFACE.

The following work is a translation of the best and most instructive part of the Jewish literature called Mishna. The Mishna is the text of the Talmud. The word Mishna means *repetition*; and, according to the Jewish belief, it is the only true commentary on the Pentateuch, imparted by God himself to Moses after imparting to him the text. This commentary Moses

* The Reverend Dr. S. S. Laws, President of the State University of Missouri, has done us and the readers of the REVIEW a favor in procuring us this article from the learned translator, Dr. Meyrowitz, now a devout Protestant Christian, but a Jew by blood, who is master of both biblical and rabbinical Hebrew. He has doubtless given us a most accurate version of this specimen of the Talmud. Archæologists tell us that this compilation of Jewish traditions, the Talmud, consists of two parts: the Mishna, or text, and the Gemara, or commentary thereon. But the portion of the Mishna given here has no Gemara of the earlier Rabbis. Dr. Meyrowitz gives us, instead, the exposition of Maimonides, a learned Jew, who lived six centuries after the Talmud was compiled. Our author also adds some explanations of his own, which are placed as notes in the margin, enclosed in brackets, thus, [], and also signed Tr. (translator).

The strange literature of the Talmud formerly received much attention from some learned Christians, such as Lighfoot. But their works are rare, costly, and voluminous, and inaccessible to most Presbyterians. We therefore present our readers this specimen; in which rabbinical ideas are as exactly reproduced as an English dress will permit; that we may have some actual knowledge of the modes of Jewish thought, and may be able to appreciate our Saviour's verdict on the "traditions of the elders." The triviality and error of many of their rules are no measure of the value of this knowledge to us, and of the article which presents it. The reader will not fail to notice the progress of error in uninspired tradition. Maimonides is worse than the Mishna.

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is said to have delivered to Joshua, and Joshua to the Elders, and the Elders to the prophets, as the reader will find in the first section of the following article. The Mishna was at first oral, but the compilation of it was made by Rabbi Jehuda, the holy, about one hundred years before Christ; whilst the commentary on it, which passed under the name of Gemara, *i. e.*, completion or complement, was not finished till the end of the fifth century. The Mishna is certainly the oldest part of uninspired Jewish literature; its language is purer than that of the Gemara, and it is, in a literary point of view, next to the later prophets. Let it here be remarked, that the simple study of the Old Testament, the Mishna, and the Gemara, is considered by the Jews the most pleasing act in God's sight. The Talmud says: "Whosoever is occupied with the study of the Law"—and under the word Law they understand all the three above-mentioned compositions—"is released from observing any other of God's commandments." Yet, in their perverse pride, they say (Baba Meziä, fol. 33, col. 1): "Whosoever studies the written word of God possesses virtue, but receives no reward; whosoever studies the Mishna possesses virtue and receives reward; but there is nothing higher than the study of the Gemara."*

By keeping these Talmudistical notions in mind, many a passage which occurs in the Mishna will be better understood. The commentary on this Tract of the Mishna, here translated, is composed by Rabbi Moses, son of Maimon, generally called Maimonides. He was born at Cordova in Spain A. D. 1131. The early part of his education was under his father, the later under Rabbi Joseph, son of Mages, and also under the learned Arabian, Iben Thophail and Averroes. Maimonides was perfect master of the Hebrew, Chaldee, Arabic, Turkish, and Greek languages; was a very great admirer of Aristotle; and made himself familiar with all the branches of philosophy and mathematics written in those languages. He was also well informed in Jewish divinity and jurisprudence. His extraordinary accomplishments excited the envy and ill-will of some of his own nation

* How true the words of Christ: "Thus ye have made the commandment of God of none effect by your traditions" (Mark vii. 13).

in Cordova; hence, before he was yet of the age of thirty, he left Cordova for Egypt. His great medical skill caused him to be appointed chief physician to Saladin, Sultan of Egypt; and he died in Egypt A. D. 1205. When the Jews speak of him now, they use the proverbial saying, "From Moses to Moses, there arose none like Moses,"—*i. e.*, from Moses, son of Amram, to Moses, son of Maimon. The first of his productions, in order of time, was his commentary on the Mishna. It was originally written, like most of his works, in Arabic, and translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Jehuda Aben Tiben. Our Tract, like many others, has no Gemara. Let, now, the indulgent reader, if he can, imagine the difficulty of translating a translation of an Oriental work into our Occidental English. It is quite an impossibility to render Maimonides's commentary literally into English. The Hebrew phraseology is so ornamental, that the English idiom cannot bear it, and its literal rendering would be quite unintelligible to the English reader. The translator was, therefore, sometimes, forced either to omit or to add, so as to give faithfully the full meaning of the commentator. In some places of this Mishna, where its sense seemed to have been quite plain to the commentator, but rather obscure to the English reader, I have given my own explanations, marked Tr. (*i. e.*, translator).

Should this translation find favor with the *literati* of my adopted country, and add but the least to the great knowledge of its *savans*, I shall feel myself greatly gratified, as an instrument in the hand of the Lord, who wills, for the sake of his righteousness, to magnify the law and make it honorable (Isaiah xlii. 21).

ALEXANDER MEYROWITZ.

Columbia, Mo., April, 1878.

ETHICS OF THE FATHERS.

PART I. MISHNA.

Mishna 1. Moses received the Law on Mount Sinai, and delivered it to Joshua, Joshua to the Elders, the Elders to the prophets, the prophets to the Great Assembly.* They said three sayings: Be slow in passing judgment (*a*); make many disciples; and make a hedge to the law (*b*).

(*a.*) Be slow in judgment, lest you find out, after having passed sentence, something you did not know before.

(*b*) You shall hedge around the law of God with other laws, so that it will be impossible to transgress it lightly.

Mishna 2. Simeon the Just was one of the last of the Great Assembly. He used to say: Upon three things does the world depend, viz.: upon learning (*a*); upon sacrifice (*b*); and upon benevolence.

Commentary.—(*a*) Learning, *i. e.*, a thorough study of the law of Moses, so as to know what is right and what is wrong.

(*b*) Sacrifices make man's peace with God. But now, when there is no temple, the reading of the ordinances of sacrifices is acceptable in its place, as it is written (Hosea xiv. 3). [And let us repay the bullocks with (the prayers of) our lips.—TR.]

Mishna 3. Antigonus of Socho received (the oral tradition) from Simeon the Just. He said: Be not like servants who serve their lord in order to receive favor פָּרָס (*a*), but like servants who expect no favor; and let the fear of God be before you (*b*).

Commentary.—(*a*) The word פָּרָס, which is here used, is properly the Chaldee word for the Hebrew מִנְחָה, a present, and is quite distinct from שָׂכָר, reward. Rabbi Antigonus means to say: Man can never expect reward, as he never can do more than what he is obliged to do; but in this case only can there be reward. All that God will ever give to those who fear him, will

* According to the Talmud, the כְּנֶסֶת הַגְּדוֹלָה *Congregatio magna*, was established by Ezra, in which were Daniel, Nehemiah, etc., and consisted of seventy persons, in imitation of the seventy elders under Moses.—TR.

be but favor, and those who serve him should not even do it for this favor's sake. Two of this Rabbi's disciples, Zadok and Boëthos, when they heard this saying, went away from his school in great displeasure; for they supposed the Rabbi taught, there is nothing to be expected in the future life. The followers of Zadok are called Zaducess in the Talmud, and Karaites at present; and those of Boëthos are called Boëthussim. Both sects deny the traditions of the Rabbis, and accept the books of the Old Testament only literally.

(b) The fear of God is commanded (Deut. vi. 13). The Lord thy God thou shalt fear. Serve thy God out of love, or out of fear.

Mishna 4. Jose, son of Joezer, of Zereda, and Jose, son of Jochanan, of Jerusalem, learned from them. Jose, son of Joezer, says: Let thy house be a meeting-house for wise men (a), and be covered with the dust of their feet; and drink their words like a thirsty man.

Commentary.—(a) When one rabbi asks the other, Where shall we meet? let the answer be, At thy house.

Mishna 5. Jose, son of Jochanan, of Jerusalem, says: Let thy house be wide open (a), and let the poor be of thy household (b). Do not talk too much with thy wife. If that is the rule to be observed with one's own wife, how much more is it applicable to his neighbor's wife? (c) Hence said the wise men: Whenever a man talks much with a woman, he brings evil upon himself, is hindered in his study, and ultimately gets his inheritance in hell.

Commentary.—(a) "Wide open," that they may have easy access, and every hungry and thirsty traveller may find relief in thy house.

(b) Instead of having many servants, let the poor and needy serve thee, and find themselves at home in thy house.

(c) Talk with woman tends only to inflame man's passion. It keeps him back from study, while he spends his time in foolish chat; and ultimately hell becomes his portion.

Mishna 6. Joshua, son of Perachia, and Nitai, the Arbelite, received the tradition from them. Joshua says: Make to thyself a teacher (a), and acquire a fellow-student (b), and judge every one for the best (c).

Commentary.—(a) Even if thou thinkest thou hast no need of a teacher, it is nevertheless better to have one; that thou mayest be sure thou goest the right way in what thou studieth.

(b) A companion thou must acquire; for it is written (Eccl. iv. 9): "Two are better than one; because they will have a good reward for their toil."

(c) When thou seest any one whom thou dost not know, doing or saying something which can be taken either for good or for bad, judge it for good, and do not suspect him because thou dost not know him. But if thou dost know him to be a wicked man, and seest him doing or saying something which may be considered as good, judge for the worst, for of such a one it is written (Proverbs xxvi. 25): "Though he make his sound ever so graciously, believe him not." Only as to an unknown person, judge always that he does for the best.

Mishna 7. Nitai, the Arbelite, says: Avoid an evil neighbor (a); do not join thyself to a wicked man (b); and do not despair of punishment (c).

Commentary.—(a) If you join yourself to an evil neighbor, you will be sure to learn his evil habits; for, bad company corrupts good manners.

(b) For in doing so, you will forego the blessings of the good man, who does not walk in the way of the ungodly.

(c) When you see the wicked prosper, do not suppose that God will hold him guiltless; even if he goes out of this world unpunished, he is sure to get his punishment in the world to come.

Mishna 8. Jehuda, son of Tabai, and Simeon, son of Sotach, received the traditions from them. Jehuda, son of Tabai, says: Be not (if thou art a judge) like a pleading attorney (a). And when the litigants are before thee, consider them both as guilty; but when they depart, accepting the verdict, consider them both as worthy of good.

Commentary.—(a) The judge must not speak for one party in his favor, or put words in his mouth, thus acting the part of an attorney; but his decision is to be clear and positive, according to what he hears from the litigants.

Mishna 9. Simeon, son of Shotach, says: Examine diligently

the witness, and take care of what you speak; that the witness may not learn from your words to tell a lie. Shmaya and Abtalion received from them. Shmaya says: Love to work, and hate to rule, and do not seek friendship with (the heathen) government.

Mishna 10. Abtalion says: Wise men, take care of what you say! (a) lest you may be exiled, and come to a place where there is bad water (b), and your disciples who come after you will drink of it, and thus God's name will be profaned.

Commentary.—(a) The disciples of Antigonus, Zadok and Boëthes, because they misunderstood the saying of their Rabbi, separated themselves from the traditional doctrines, and became heretics; let, therefore, every teacher take care that his teaching may not be misunderstood.

(b) Bad water is a figurative expression for heresy.

Mishna 11. Hillel and Shamai received from them. Hillel says: Be of the followers of Aaron (a), loving peace and pursuing peace, loving men and bringing them to God's law. He used to say: He that blasphemes God's name, let his name perish; he that does not add (to his learning), let (his life) be diminished; he that does not learn at all is worthy of death; and he that makes use of the crown (b), let him depart from life.

Commentary.—(a) Tradition tells, that Aaron, when he observed a man of bad character, used to visit him and converse with him, so that the man, supposing that Aaron did not know of his wickedness, became ashamed of his life and became better. This tradition is based on the words of the prophet (Mal. ii. 6): "In peace and in equity he walked with me, and many did he turn away from iniquity."

(b) "Crown" is used for the law of God; the meaning is: He that tries to gain honor and wealth by the law, is not worthy to live.

Mishna 12. He (Hillel) used to say: If I am not for myself, who is for me? (a) And when I am for myself, what am I? (b) And if not now, when? (c)

Commentary.—(a) If I do not stir up myself to learn something, and to do what is best, who should stir me up? Man must

exert his own energy, if he is to become a good and a useful member of society.

(b) But if I possess in myself the energies of directing myself in the right way, what am I? Am I a perfect being, so that my energies are adequate to lead me in the good way?

(c) And if not now, *i. e.*, while I am young and capable of receiving any impression, when? Surely not when I grow old, and the bad habits have become rooted into my nature. The wisest of men said (Proverbs xxii. 6): "Train up the lad in accordance with his course; even when he groweth old he will not depart from it."

Mishna 13. Shamaï says: Make your study the chief matter (a); say little and do much (b); and receive everybody with friendliness.

Commentary.—(a) Your study must be the root of all your actions; and private business must be done when you find time after study.

(b) Say little, *i. e.*, like Abraham, when the three visited him; he said: "I will fetch a morsel of bread" (Gen. xviii. 5). But when he came to do, Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetched a calf, tender and good. The ungodly say much, but do little, like Ephron, who offered to Abraham much, and at last did not relax even one penny.

Mishna 14. Rabbi Gamaliel says: Get thee a rabbi, and avoid doubt (a). And do not pay tithe by conjecture.

Commentary.—(a) The getting of the rabbi is not for instruction, but for decision, that you may lean on him in giving judgment; for it is always better to have some one's aid in deciding a matter. So in the case of paying tithe, it should not be done by conjecture.

Mishna 15. Simeon, his son, says: All my days have I spent among wise men, and have not found anything better for a man than silence (a). The learning is not the chief matter, but the acting; and any one who speaks much cannot avoid sin.

Commentary.—(a) Solomon said (Proverbs x. 19): "In a multitude of words transgression cannot be avoided." And the sign of a wise man is silence, but much talking is the sign of a

fool. It is told of a wise man who talked very little, that when he was asked for the reason of his constant silence, he answered: "Talk may be divided into four parts: (1) Talk useless to one's self, but completely injurious to others; (2) Partly good and partly injurious, *e. g.*, praising one's neighbor, which will provoke his enemies; (3) Indifferent talk, *e. g.*, about buildings and the weather; (4) Scientific, and the most necessary household talk. We see, therefore, that only the fourth part of usual talk is useful. I can, therefore, talk only the fourth part of others."

Mishna 16. Rabbi Simeon, the son of Gamaliel, says: The world exists by three things, viz.: Justice, Truth, and Peace (*a*). As it is written (Zech. viii. 16): "Truth, judgment, and peace judge ye in your gates."

Commentary.—(*a*) No community can exist without these three governing powers. Truth is necessary in family life, justice in life's intercourse, and peace for the security at large.

PART II. MISHNA.

Mishna 1. The Rabbi says: Which is the best way (of life) that a man is to choose? That one which is most beautiful for himself, and is most beautiful in the sight of others. Be diligent in observing the smallest commandment, as in the greatest, for thou dost not know their reward (*a*). Reckon the loss which thou sufferest by observing the commandment, against its reward; and the gain of committing a sin, against the punishment for it. Consider, also, three things, and thou wilt not be enticed to sin, viz.: above thee is (1) an eye that sees, (2) an ear that hears, and (3) all thy doings are recorded in a book (*b*).

Commentary.—(*a*) The law of God has specified certain punishments for certain transgressions; which are: for the greatest sins, (1) stoning, (2) burning, (3) decapitation by sword, (4) strangling, (5) unnatural death, (6) excommunication, (7) stripes, forty save one. By these degrees of punishments, we know how to estimate the greatness of the sins; but no gradations of rewards have been specified for fulfilling God's commandments; therefore, if thou art engaged in observing one commandment, do not leave it off to do another.

(*b*) The language of Scripture uses the anthropomorphic figure of recording in a book, for anything known to God. As in Malachi iii. 16, "And there was written a book of remembrance before him."

Mishna 2. Rabbi Gamaliel, son of Rabbi Jehuda the Nassi, says: Study is good when connected with business; for the exertion in both makes man to avoid sin. And study which is not accompanied by some work is at the end useless, and causes sin (*a*). And all who work for the community should work for God's sake. For the virtue of their forefathers helps them, and their righteousness is of eternal value. God will greatly reward you, as if you had done his work (*b*).

Commentary.—(*a*) Study, with the Rabbis, had no temporal advantage. No teacher was allowed to receive payment; and those who studied had to support themselves. Hence, if a student had no wealth, he was obliged to live on the wealth of others, which is robbery.

(*b*) The time which you spend in working for the community you will not be able to employ in doing something else for which you might expect good reward; therefore, he says: God will reward you, for this time, as if you had done some other thing, for which you could expect a great reward.

Mishna 3. He (Gamaliel) used to say: Direct thy will according to his (God's) will, that he may direct the will of others according to thy will. Give up thy will because of his will, that he may make others give up their will because of thy will. Hillel says: Do not separate thyself from the community. Put no faith in thyself until thy last day. Do not judge thy neighbor until thou be in the same situation. Do not say anything which is unintelligible, though it be understood at last (*a*). And do not say, When I shall have time I will learn; perhaps thou wilt have no time.

Commentary.—(*a*) When you teach, do not use language which is unintelligible, and requires much explanation to make it intelligible at last.

Mishna 5. He used to say: No ignoramus can fear sin, nor can the unlearned be pious, nor the bashful learned, nor the

irascible teachers. And not every one, who engages greatly in business, becomes wise. And where there is a want of (good) men, try diligently to be a man.

Mishna 6. He saw also a soul swimming upon the water, and said: Because thou madest another to swim, they made thee to swim. But at last those who made thee to swim, will also swim (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) In the original there is a paronomasia. The meaning is, that with the measure one measures it is measured unto him. The Rabbi, seeing a man who was probably drowned by some one, concluded that this one must have previously drowned somebody, but predicted that those who drowned him should also get their reward.

Mishna 7. He used to say: He that accumulates flesh (on his body) accumulates worms; he that accumulates possessions accumulates cares; he who multiplies wives multiplies sorcery;* he who multiplies handmaids multiplies whoredom; he who multiplies men-servants multiplies robbery; he who increases learning in the law prolongs his life; he who increases classes (of students) increases wisdom; he who takes many counsels increases in understanding; he that gives much alms increases peace. Has one acquired a good name? he acquired it for himself; and has he made the law of God his own? he has acquired the life to come. He used to say: If thou hast learned much, be not proud of it; as for this hast thou been created.

Mishna 8. Rabbi Jochanan, son of Zakai, had five disciples: they were, Rabbi Eliezer, son of Hircanos; Rabbi Joshua, son of Chananya; Rabbi Jose the priest; Rabbi Simeon, son of Nathaniel; and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch. He told their good qualities. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Hircanos, is like a plastered pit, which does not lose even a drop; † Rabbi Simeon, son of Nathaniel, fears to sin (*a*); Rabbi Joshua, blessed be his mother! (*b*) Rabbi Jose is pious (*c*); Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, is like a fountain continually increasing (*d*).

* The Talmudical idea is, that sorcery is mostly practised by women. And in Tractate Sanhedrin, page 67, it is said: "Sorcery is mostly to be found with women."—TR.

† He retained whatever he learned, without forgetting one word.—TR.

Commentary.—(a) He occupied himself always with doing good, for fear of doing something wrong and sinful.

(b) He was of so lovely a character, that every one praised and blessed the mother of such a child.*

(c) His learning went over into actions; he practised what he learned.

(d) Rabbi Eliezer was of such great wisdom, that there was nothing too difficult for him, and his wisdom continually increasing.

Mishna 9. He used to say: If all the wise men of Israel were in one scale of the balance, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Hircanos, in the opposite one, he would outweigh all of them. Abba Saul said in his name: If all the wise men of Israel, together with Rabbi Eliezer, son of Hircanos, were in one scale, and Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, was in the other scale, he would weigh more than all of them. He (Rabbi Jochanan) said to them: Go and consider, which is the best that man should choose? Rabbi Eliezer said, A good eye (a); Rabbi Joshua said, A good companion (b); Rabbi Simeon said, To behold the future (c); Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, said, A good heart; Rabbi Jose said, A good neighbor (d). Then said their Rabbi: I consider the words of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, the best, for yours are included in his.† Then he said to them: Go and consider, which is the bad way which man must avoid? Rabbi Eliezer said, An evil eye; Rabbi Joshua said, An evil companion; Rabbi Jose said, An evil neighbor; Rabbi Simeon said, To borrow and not pay, for to borrow of men is like borrowing of God, as it is written (Psalm xxxvii. 21), "The wicked borroweth and repayeth not;" Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, said, A bad heart. Then said their Rabbi: I consider the words of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Aroch, the best, for your words are contained in his.

Commentary.—(a) A good eye means, contentment with what one possesses.

* See Luke ii. 34, where the same expression is used of Christ.—Tr.

† A good heart is the thing most necessary for going in the right way: for it is written (Prov. iv. 23), "Above all that is to be guarded, keep thy heart: for out of it are the issues of life." And, therefore, their Rabbi judged that all they found to be good, is included in the words of his fifth disciple.—Tr.

(b) A good companion is to be chosen; because one can learn of him what is best.

(c) To behold the future, *i. e.*, to foresee the consequence of his actions, is certainly the best means of going in the right way.

(d) A good neighbor is more constant than a good companion.

Mishna 10. They (the last mentioned five disciples) said each three things. Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of thy companion be as dear to thee as thine own. Do not be easily provoked to anger (a), and repent one day before thy death (b). And warm thyself at the flame of the wise men (c), but take care that thou dost not burn thyself by their coals; for their bite is the biting of the fox,* their sting the sting of the scorpion, their hissing the hissing of a serpent, and all their words are like fiery coals.

Commentary.—(a) Anger is considered to be equal to idolatry. Tractate Sabbath, 105.

(b) But does any one know when he will die? Therefore, one ought to repent every day of his life, as though the next day were to be his last.

(c) Warm thyself by the flame, *i. e.*, do not mix with them freely, but approach them only by their permission; else thou mayest offend them and suffer by it, just as one who warms himself by the fire does not approach too close to the fire. Their honor is to be kept sacred.

Mishna 11. Rabbi Joshua said: An evil eye (a), evil nature,† and misanthropy (b), shorten a man's life.

Commentary.—(a) An evil eye means a greedy eye and discontent.

(b) Misanthropy induces man to avoid his fellow-man, and live in desert places, which kills him before his time.

*The bite of the fox was supposed to be incurable.—Tr.

† Evil nature; the original has *יֵצֶר הָרָע*, which is generally understood to represent an evil spirit, which accompanies every man and seduces him to every bad action. The orthodox Jews believe two spirits accompany every man—a good one on his right, and an evil one on his left: the good genius solicits him to and rejoices in his doing good; the evil genius seduces him to and rejoices in his doing evil.—Tr.

Mishna 12. Rabbi Jose said: Let the money of thy companion be dear unto thee as thine own; and make thyself fit for the study of the law; for it is not thine as an inheritance. And whatever thou doest, be it done for God's sake.

Mishna 13. Rabbi Simeon said: Take care to read Sh'ma, שְׁמַע, and prayer.* And when thou dost pray, do not perform it as an obligation, but as a supplication for mercy before God; for it is written (Joel ii. 13): "Gracious and merciful is he, long-suffering and of great kindness, and he bethinketh himself of the evil." And do not consider thyself too wicked (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) When a man considers himself wicked, no sin is then of any importance in his eyes.

Mishna 14. Rabbi Eliezer says: Be diligent in learning the law. And know what thou shouldst answer to an Epicurean (*a*). Know also before whom thou workest, for faithful is thy master to pay thee the wages of thy work.

Commentary.—(*a*) The word "Epicurean" is used by the Rabbis for heretic, *i. e.*, any one who denies anything of the written or traditional law. The believing Jew is here commended to be able to give an account of his faith to any unbeliever.

Mishna 15. Rabbi Tarphon says: The day is short, the work is great, † the workers are lazy, the reward is great, and the master urges.

Mishna 16. He used to say: Thou art not bound to finish the work (of obedience to God), neither is it allowed thee to pre-empt it wholly. Hast thou learned much, thou wilt receive much reward. And thy master is faithful to repay thee the wages of thy work. But know, that the reward of the righteous is in the world to come.

* Every Jew is obliged to read twice a day, morning and evening, the portion of Scriptures written (Deut. vi. 4-10) which begins with the word שְׁמַע. The prayer consists of eighteen blessings; and no Jew must taste anything or go to work in the morning before the reading of Sh'ma and performing the prayer of the eighteen blessings.—TR.

† The Latin poet says: "*Ars longa, Vita brevis.*"—TR.

PART III. MISHNA.

Mishna 1. Akabia, son of Mahallallel, says: Contemplate three things, and thou wilt not be induced to sin: (1) Whence dost thou come? (2) Whither dost thou go? and (3) Before whom wilt thou give an account? Whence comest thou? From a fetid drop. Whither goest thou? To a place of worms and rottenness. And before whom art thou to give an account? Before the King of kings, the Holy One; blessed be his name!

Mishna 2. Rabbi Chanina, leader of the priests, said: Pray for the peace of government; for were it not for the fear of it, each man would have swallowed the other alive. Rabbi Chanina, son of Tradion, said: When two are sitting together and do not speak about the law of God, it is the seat of scorners, of which it is written (Psalm i. 1), "And sitteth not in the seat of the scorners." But where two sit together, and converse about the law of God, there is the presence of the Shechina,* as it is written (Malachi iii. 16): "Then conversed they that feared the Lord one with another; and the Lord listened and heard it, and there was a record written in a book of remembrance before him for those who fear the Lord, and for those who respect his name." Here I learn of two sitting together; but how do I know that when *one* is occupied with the study of God's law, God rewards him? For it is written (Lament. iii. 28): "That he sitteth in solitude and is silent, because He has laid it upon him." (a)

Commentary.—(a) The relevancy of this verse depends, not on the usual sense given to it, but on quite a different one, which the Rabbi understood, and read thus: "When he sits alone and murmurs (שִׁבְחָהּ in the law), it is as if God had laid upon him (the whole law)."

Mishna 3. Rabbi Simeon says: When three are eating together and do not converse about the law, they are as if they had eaten of the sacrifices to idols; and of them it is said

* The Rabbis never use the name of God as given in Scriptures, but use either שְׁבִיכָהּ, שְׁבִיכָהּ, or הַשֵּׁם; and wherever the reader finds in this translation the word God, it is either added by the translator for the better understanding, or a translation of one of the above given words.—TR.

(Isaiah xxviii. 8): "For all tables are full of vomit of filthiness." But when three are sitting together at the table, and converse of the law, they are as if they had eaten at God's table (*i. e.*, the altar), as it is written (Ezekiel xli. 22): "And he spoke unto me, This is the table that is before God."*

Mishna 4. Rabbi Chanina, son of Chakinai, says: Whosoever is awake at night, or travels singly on a road, and thinks of nonsense, has forfeited his life. Rabbi Nechemia, son of Canna, says: Whosoever accepts the yoke of the law, providence takes off from him the yoke of government (*a*) and the yoke of business; but he that removes from himself the yoke of the law, upon him is placed the yoke of government and business.

Commentary.—(*a*) The yoke of the law means diligent study, and the removal of the yoke means denying that the law is from God, and therefore neglecting it. In Tractate Erubin, page 54, column 1, it is said: There is no such free man as he who studies the law, for it is written (Exod. xxxii 16): "Engraved קְרָרְתָּ upon the table." Do not read קְרָרְתָּ, engraved, but קְרָרְתָּ: freedom, *i. e.*, the study of the tables brings freedom.

Mishna 5. Rabbi Chalafta, from the village Chanania, says: Where ten sit and study the law, the Shechina is among them, for it is written (Psalm lxxxii. 1): "God stands in the congregation." (*a*) Whence do I know, when even five? For it is written (Amos ix. 6): "And has founded his bundle (*b*) upon the earth." Whence even two? For it is written (Malachi iii. 16): "Then conversed they that feared the Lord one with another." Whence even one? For it is written (Exod. xx. 21): "In every place where I shall permit my name to be mentioned, I will come to thee and bless thee."

Commentary.—(*a*) A congregation is no less than ten, and ten make a congregation.

(*b*) A bundle is as much as one can hold with five fingers.

Mishna 6. Rabbi Eliezer Bartotho says: Give Him of His, for thou thyself and thine are His. And thus says David

* The Talmud explains it more fully in another place; it says: "The verse begins with the Altar and finishes with the Table; that teaches us, that our table is a substitute for the altar."—Tx.

(1 Chron. xxix. 14): "For from thee is everything, and out of thine own have we given unto thee." Rabbi Simeon says: When one studies* while he is travelling, and interrupts himself and says, How beautiful is this tree! or landscape! the Scripture considers him to have forfeited his life. Rabbi Dostoë, son of Janay, said, in the name of Rabbi Meir: Any one who forgets a part of what he has learned, has forfeited his life, for it is written (Deut. iv. 9): "Only take heed to thyself, and guard thy soul diligently, that thou do not forget the thing which thine eyes have seen." Wouldst thou say that this is the case, even when what he has learned is too difficult to be remembered? Therefore it is written (*ibid.*): "And that they depart not from thine heart all the days of thy life." That means to say, that he willingly forgets them. Rabbi Chanina, son of Dossa, says: When a man first fears sin and then learns wisdom,† his wisdom will avail him; but he who learns wisdom before he has learned to fear sin, will not be profited of his wisdom.

Mishna 7. He used to say: When one's works are more than his learning, his learning has stability; but when his learning surpasses his good works, his learning has no stability. He said also: Whomsoever people like, him does God like; and with whomsoever people are displeased, with that one God is also displeased. Rabbi Dossa, son of Hircanos, says: Sleeping late in the morning, drinking wine at noon, chatting with children, and sitting in the company of ignorant people, shorten a man's life.

Mishna 8. Rabbi Eliezer the Modai says: He that profanes the holy sacrifices, despises the feasts, makes white his friend's face publicly (*a*), makes naught the covenant of our father Abraham (*b*), and gives a false explanation of God's law (*c*), though he has learned much and performed good works, he has no part in the world to come.

* No other study than that of the law is considered a study.—Tr.

† The meaning is, when one's character is firmly fixed, then the wisdom he acquires by learning will help him to direct his actions; but if one believes that learning will give him a good character, he may be greatly mistaken.—Tr.

Commentary.—(a) To make one's face white means, to put him to shame.

(b) Covenant of Abraham is circumcision. So, when one does not circumcise the child which he is commanded to circumcise.

(c) A wrong explanation means, doing contrary to what the law commands. But this is only the case when one, who did these things, died without repentance; in which case, though the pains of death blot out many other sins, it cannot blot out the above three mentioned sins; but if he exercised repentance, no sin can remain, as repentance blots out any and every sin.

Mishna 9. Rabbi Ishmael says: Be humble before a head (a); deport thyself easily before a black-haired head (b); and meet every one with a friendly face (c).

Commentary.—(a) A head means, any person more honorable than thyself. One who, when in company, will be its head.

(b) A black-haired means a young man whose hair is yet black. Do not urge thy company on him.

(c) Yet even one below thee receive in a friendly way.

Mishna 10. Rabbi Akiba says: Laughter and light mindedness induce a man to shameful doings. The Masorah* is a hedge for the law. Tithes are a hedge for riches. Vows are a hedge for self-control (a). The hedge for wisdom is silence.†

Commentary.—(a) Vows, when they are made and performed, will by experience teach the man to refrain from making them.

Mishna 11. He used to say: Beloved is man, for he was created in the image (of God.) He is peculiarly beloved, because he was declared to have been created in (God's) image, as it is written (Genesis ix. 6): "For in the image of God made he man." Israel is beloved, for he is called the child of God.

* Masorah is either to be understood Tradition, and then its meaning would be, the commandments of the law of Moses are so hedged around by traditional laws, that no law can be broken before all its surrounding laws are violated; or, by Masorah is to be understood that the traditional reading of the text of the holy written Scriptures is its hedge, so that the text cannot be corrupted, and its true meaning is thus preserved.—Tr.

† Silence certainly withholds a man from folly. Solomon said (Proverbs xvii. 28): "Even a fool, when he keepeth silence, is counted wise."—Tr.

They are peculiarly beloved, because they have been told that they are called the children of God (*a*), as it is written (Deut. xiv. 1): "Ye are children of the Lord your God." Israel is beloved, because God gave him a delightful vessel (*i. e.*, the law). They are peculiarly beloved, because it was told them that there was given them such a delightful vessel, as it is written (Prov. iv. 2): "For good information do I give you, my teaching must ye not forget."

Commentary.—(*a*) The telling one of a favor is here supposed to increase the favor, as an unknown favor may not be regarded.

Mishna 12. Everything is seen (by God), and freedom is granted (to man). The world is well judged, and all according to the multitude (*a*) of the works done.

Commentary.—(*a*) Here the Rabbi solves the great problem of fore-knowledge and free-will. He says: "Everything is seen in the present tense. Man lives in time; with him all is either past or future, for time is transient; but God lives in eternity, where there is neither past nor future, but all is present. So, God sees everything as it is done, and his seeing does not necessitate the action, but freedom is granted to every man to do as he wills." "According to the multitude," *i. e.*, God rewards man for each action separately; *e. g.*: one gives to one poor man one hundred florins, God rewards him as for one action; another gives one hundred florins to one hundred poor men, and God rewards him for one hundred actions. The reward is not according to the greatness of the act, but according to the number.

Mishna 13. He used to say: All is given, but on a pledge; and a net is spread out upon all who live. The store is open, the master of the store lends out with care (*a*), the ledger is open, and the hand writes down. Whosoever will borrow, let him come and borrow. But the executors (*b*) come daily to exact payment, whether the debtor will or not, or have anything on which they can rely. The judgment is a true judgment, and all is prepared for the entertainment (*c*).

Commentary.—(*a*) With care, *i. e.*, though some may suppose their debts are forgotten; for the wicked may long prosper, yet the act is recorded, and care is taken of it.

(b) The executors, *i. e.*, death and other bodily pains, from which no mortal is exempted.

(c) "The entertainment," the life to come is represented in this figure.

Mishna 14. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Azaria, says: If there is no study, there can be no good behavior; and if there is no good behavior, there can be no study. If there is no fear of the law, there can be no wisdom; and if there be no wisdom, there can be no fear of the law. If there is no understanding, there is no knowledge; and if there is no knowledge, there is no understanding (a). If there is no flour (bread), there is no learning; and if there is no learning, there is no flour.

Commentary.—(a) The Rabbi makes each of the two objects dependent on the other. Under knowledge he implies the possession of various sciences, which depend on the capacity of the human mind to grasp them, which he calls understanding.

Mishna 15. He used to say: He whose wisdom surpasses his good actions is like a tree whose branches are many, but whose roots are very few; the wind comes, uproots, and overthrows it. Of him it is written (Jerem. xvii. 6): "And he shall be like a lonely tree in the desert, which feels not when good comes, but abides in the parched place, in the wilderness, in a salty land which cannot be inhabited." But any one whose good works surpass his wisdom, is like a tree whose branches are few, but his roots are many; so that, though all the winds may blow at him, they will not move him from his place. Of such a one it is written (Jerem. xvii. 8): "And he shall be like a tree that is planted by the waters, and by a stream spreads out its roots, which feels not when the heat comes, but its leaf remains green, and in a year of drought it is undisturbed by care, and ceases not from yielding fruit."

Mishna 16. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Chismo, says: The law concerning the birds which a woman has to offer after the birth of a child,* and the laws concerning her purification, are the bodies

* It may be curious to the English reader that this entire clause is expressed by one Hebrew word, קִיּוּרָה.—Tr.

of the laws (*i. e.*, most important). But astronomy and geometry* are like the dessert of a banquet.†

PART IV. MISHNA.

Mishna 1. Ben Zoma says: Who is wise? He that learns from everybody, as it is written (Psalm cxix. 99), "I became wise from all my teachers." Who is a hero? He that can conquer his own lusts, as it is written (Prov. xvi. 32), "One that is slow to anger is better than a hero, and he that rules his spirit than the conqueror of a city." Who is rich? He who is content with his portion, as it is written (Psalm cxxviii. 2), "When thou eatest the labor of thy hands, thou wilt be happy and it shall be well with thee." Thou wilt be happy in this world, and it will be well with thee in the world to come. Who is honored? He that honors others; as it is written (1 Sam. ii. 30), "For those that honor me I will honor, and those that despise me shall be lightly esteemed."

Mishna 2. The son of Azai says: Run to do a small commandment, as to do a great one (*a*); and flee from sin. For one good action follows another, and one sin brings with it another. The reward of one good deed is another good deed, and the reward of one sin is another sin.

Commentary.—(*a*) The Rabbis say: That when Moses appointed the three cities of refuge this side of the Jordan, he knew that they could be of no use until the other three cities of refuge on the other side were established, for it is written (Num. xxxv. 13), "Six cities shall be unto you." Nevertheless, Moses said, "Though I can fulfil but half of the commandment, I will not neglect it."

Mishna 3. He used to say: Despise not any man, and contemn no thing, for every man has his time, and everything its place.

* The Talmud seems to have no word to express geometry, and uses the Greek *Γεωμετρία* with the Hebrew plural, גֵּוֹמֵטְרִיאוֹת. So, for the word dessert, it uses שֵׁרְפָרְאוֹת, *i. e.*, ἡ περιφορά; and many other Greek words will be found.—TR.

† The whole Mishna means, that the lest important scriptural law is more important than the greatest scientific laws.—TR.

Mishna 4. Rabbi Levitas from Jabne says: Be very, very meek! (a) For all that a man can hope for is to be consumed by worms.

Commentary.—(a) Meekness is the best quality that man can possess. In Tractate Meggilah, page 31, we find: Rabbi Jochanan said: Wherever thou findest described the greatness of God, there thou findest described his meekness. This is written in the law, repeated in the prophets, and also in the Hagiography. In the law (Deut. x. 17, 18): “For the Lord your God is the God of gods, and the Lord of lords. . . . Who executes judgment for the fatherless and widow.” In the prophets (Isaiah lvii. 15): “Thus says the Lord, the high and lofty One, . . . I dwell with the humble.” In the Hagiography (Psalm lxviii. 5, 6): Extol Him who rides upon the heaven, . . . “a father of the fatherless, and a judge of the widows.” The greatest encomium that was given to Moses was: “The man Moses was very meek” (Numbers xii. 3).

Mishna 5. Rabbi Jochanan, son of Beroka, says: Any one who profanes God’s name in secret is punished publicly, be the profanation [committed] willingly or unwillingly (a).

Commentary.—(a) That is to say, if it was done willingly, the punishment in accordance with it will be visited upon the perpetrator publicly; and when it was done unawares, the punishment in accordance with it will happen publicly.

Mishna 6. Rabbi Ishmael says: He that learns for the sake of learning, is helped (from above) to learn and to teach. But he who learns for the sake of doing (what he learns), is helped to learn and to teach, to observe and to do. Rabbi Zadok says: Do not make (thy learning) a crown, in order to become great by it, nor a mattock, to dig with.* And thus said Hillel: “He

* Maimonides gives here a large homily against those who try to live at the expense of others, whilst engaged in study. To understand his rebuke, it must be stated that it was already the custom of many Jews in the eleventh century to emigrate to Jerusalem for the purpose of studying the Talmud there, and to depend for their subsistence on the alms sent them from Jewish congregations in various quarters of the globe. Maimonides, in his integrity, despised such an idle life; and he quotes many instances of the great Rabbis who showed their aversion to such dealings.

that makes use of the crown should die." Hence thou canst learn, that whosoever makes any gain by the word of God has already taken the reward which he might have expected in the world to come.

Mishna 7. Rabbi Josi says: Whosoever honors the law, he himself is honored by men; but whosoever profanes the law, he himself is profaned by men (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) The honor of the law consists in observing it, and honoring the learned and their writings.

Mishna 8. Rabbi Ishmael says: He that withdraws himself from being a judge avoids hatred, robbery, and false swearing; but he who gives decision with a proud heart is a fool, a wicked man, and possesses a proud spirit.*

Mishna 9. He used to say: Do not give a verdict when thou art the only judge; for to judge singly is only permitted to the only One (*i. e.*, God). And do not say, Take my opinion; for they are allowed, and not thou (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) When thou art sitting with other judges, who differ from thee, thou canst not force upon them thy opinions, for they, being the majority, are allowed to sustain their opinions, but thou art not allowed to coerce them.

Mishna 10. Rabbi Jonathan says: Whosoever occupies himself with the law when he is poor, will occupy himself with it, even when he becomes rich. But whosoever neglects the law when he is rich, will neglect it when poor (*a*).

The first is the great Rabbi Hillel, who lived in abject poverty, and had to support himself by cutting wood whilst he attended the teaching of Shemaia and Abtalion. Secondly, Rabbi Chanina, of whom a voice from heaven said: "The whole world is sustained for the sake of Chanina my son, and Chanina himself lives on a measure of St. John's bread (Carob) from one Friday to another." In a year of famine Rabbi Jehuda the holy opened his granary to the poor and said: "Let any one who is learned partake of it." The learned Rabbi Jonathan came for some help, whereupon he was asked: "Hast thou learned anything?" He answered, "No." "But," asked Rabbi Jehudah, "wherefore shall I help thee?" Rabbi Jonathan answered: "Feed me, as God feeds the dog or the raven." So great was their aversion to receive any favor as learners.—Tr.

* According to the Jewish jurisprudence, he who deprives one of the litigants even of one penny to the profit of the other, by giving a wrong judgment, though unwillingly, is a robber and a perjurer.—Tr.

Commentary.—(a) If poverty and the trouble of gaining his livelihood will not prevent a man from studying the law, a comfortable life will certainly not do it. But if the comforts of riches will prevent one from study, much more the cares of poverty.

Mishna 11. Rabbi Meir says: Do less business, and take time for studying the law, and be humble before every man (a). Wilt thou neglect the study of the law? So wilt thou find many things which will make thee neglect it. But if thou art diligent in its study, there is great reward to be given to thee.

Commentary.—(a) “Before every man.” Not only before one who is greater than thou art, but even before thine equal, or one less than thyself.

Mishna 12. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Jacob, says: He that fulfils one commandment acquires an advocate, and he that commits a sin acquires an accuser.* Repentance and good works are like a shield against punishment (a).

Commentary.—(a) Repentance and good works—i. e., either repentance after committing sin, or good works at the beginning, will save a man from hell. Every good action will speak for man’s acquittal, and every bad action will ask his condemnation.

Mishna 13. Rabbi Jochanan, the shoemaker, says: Every assembly which assembles for God’s sake will have stability. But if it is not for God’s sake, it will have no stability. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Shamua, says: Let the honor of thy pupil be dear unto thee as thine own, and the honor of thy companion as the reverence for thy teacher; and the reverence for thy teacher as the fear of God. Rabbi Juda says: Take care of thyself when thou art learned, for the error of the learned is presumption.† Rabbi Simeon says: There are three crowns—the crown of the law, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of royalty. But the crown of a good name overtops them all (a).

Commentary.—(a) God crowned Israel with three crowns. To

* The original has for the word advocate פְּרַקְלִיט, Παράκλητος, and for the word accuser, קַטְיִגְרָר, Κατηγορος. The first corresponds to the Hebrew מְלִיץ; the latter to the Hebrew שֹׁטֵן.—Tr.

† A wrong act committed by a learned man, though done in ignorance, people will suppose to be done in presumption.—Tr.

Aaron he gave the crown of priesthood, to David the crown of royalty. The crown of the law is left for any one who will take it up; but in the law the other two crowns are contained, as it is written (Prov. viii. 15): "Through me (learning) do princes rule and nobles decree justice." The crown of a good name gotten by learning surpasses them all.

Mishna 15. Rabbi Neharöi says: Go thou to the place of learning, but do not think that the learning will come to thee, or that thy friends will bring it to thee. And do not rely on thy knowledge.

Mishna 16. Rabbi Janai says: We possess neither the peace of the ungodly nor the sufferings of the righteous. Rabbi Mathya, son of Charash, says: Greet everybody first. And be rather the tail of a lion than the head of a fox (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) That is, be rather a pupil of some great Rabbi than a teacher to some one less than thyself. For in the first case thou wilt always learn more, while in the latter thou wilt forget.

Mishna 17. Rabbi Jacob says: This world is like the entry hall to the world to come.* Prepare thyself in the entrance hall, that thou mayest be allowed to enter the dining room.

Mishna 18. He used to say: One hour spent in repentance and good works in this world is better than all the life to come (*a*); and one hour of a cool spirit in the world to come is better than all the life in this world.

Commentary.—(*a*) The world to come is only the consequence of this world; he that has prepared here can enjoy there. "For there is no work nor experience nor knowledge nor wisdom in the world whither thou goest" (Eccles. ix. 10). Therefore, one can gain in one hour in this world what it is impossible for him to gain in the whole life of the world to come.

Mishna 19. Rabbi Simeon, son of Eliezer, says: Do not try to reconcile thy friend whilst he is angry; do not comfort him whilst his dead lies before him; do not question him whilst he is

* The original has here for entry-hall, פְּרִזְרוֹר, *prösodos*, and for the word dining-room, טְרִיִּקְלִין, *triklinon*, *triclinium*.—TR.

making his vow ; and do not try to see him whilst in the middle of affliction.

Mishna 20. Samuel, the little one, says : At the fall of thy enemy do not rejoice ; and at his stumbling let not thy heart be glad ; “lest the Lord see it, and it be displeasing in his eyes, and he turn away from him his wrath” (Proverbs xxiv. 17, 18).

Mishna 21. Elisha, son of Abuya, says : He that teaches the young is like one who writes with ink upon new paper ; but he who teaches the old is as one who writes with ink upon old paper, from which writing has been erased.

Mishna 22. Rabbi Josi, son of Juda, from the Babylonian village, says : He who learns from the young is like one who eats unripe grapes, and drinks out of his wine-press. But he who learns from the old is like one who eats ripe grapes and drinks old wine. The Rabbi says : Do not regard the flask, but its contents. There is a new flask full of old wine, and there is an old flask wherein there is not even new wine.

Mishna 23. Rabbi Eliezer, the Capor (?), says : Envy, lust, and vain glory shorten a man's life.*

Mishna 24. He used to say : Those who are born must die, and those who are dead will revive, and all living will be judged. To know, make known and take knowledge (*a*), that He is the mighty, the One who forms, the Creator, and the future Judge. Blessed be he ! before whom there is no perversion of judgment, no forgetfulness, no respect of persons, no bribery ; for all is his. And know, that all will be by reckoning. Let thy imagination not persuade thee that the grave is a place of refuge. † Thou art formed without thy consent, unknowingly thou art born, without thy will thou livest, against thy will thou diest, and constrained (*b*) wilt thou have to give reckoning and account before the King of kings, the Holy One, whose name be blessed.

* There is nothing which makes a man's life more miserable than envy, because all that makes others happy conspires to make him most miserable. He is the enemy of all mankind. Lust weakens man's natural constitution. Vain-glory is an object of continual pursuit, which yet is never attained.—Tr.

† Both the punishment and the reward of an action is given, according to the Talmud, in this world.—Tr.

Commentary.—(a) To know, make known, and take knowledge, refers to the three divisions of mankind: those not yet born, those who are born, and those who will rise after death; of the first he is the *former*, of the second the *judge*, and of the third he *will be* the judge. “No respect of persons,” *i. e.*, if any one has done ever so many good actions, and committed but one sin, that sin will be punished. On the contrary, the wicked who perform only one good action will be rewarded for it.

(b) Here the Rabbi would say, that all natural accidents happen to man without man’s will, but that the doing of good or bad lies in man’s own will: and, therefore, though unwilling, man must nevertheless give an account of all his doings while in the body.

PART V. MISHNA.

Mishna 1. With ten sayings (a) did God create the universe; and does this teach us? Could he not create it with one saying? Yes, but he speaks thus to show, with emphasis, that he will punish the wicked who destroy a world which was created with ten sayings, and reward the righteous who establish a world which was created with ten sayings.

Commentary.—(a) Nine times are repeated the words, “and he said.” רַיָּאָמֵר, in the six days of creation, and the word בְּרֵאשִׁית makes ten.

Mishna 2. Ten generations passed from Adam until Noah, to teach thee how long-suffering God is; in that all these generations were continually provoking him to anger, until he brought upon them the deluge. There were ten generations from Noah to Abraham, to show thee how long-suffering God is; for all these generations continually provoked him, till Abraham came and received the reward which they might have had.

Mishna 3. With ten trials (a) was Abraham tried, and remained steadfast; to show how great our father Abraham’s love to God was.

Commentary.—(a) The first trial was, leaving his country; 2d, the famine in Canaan; 3d, Pharaoh’s taking Sarah; 4th, Abraham’s war with the four kings; 5th, taking Hagar as his wife while despairing of a son from Sarah; 6th, circumcision in

old age; 7th, the taking away of Sarah by Abimelech, king of Gherar; 8th, the driving away of Hagar; 9th, the sending away of Ishmael; 10th, the offering up of Isaac on Mount Moriah.

Mishna 4. Ten miracles were done to our fathers in Egypt (*a*), and ten at the Red Sea (*b*). Ten times did our fathers tempt God in the wilderness (*c*); as it is written (Numbers xiv. 22), "And they tempted me these ten times, and did not hearken to my voice."

Commentary.—(*a*) The ten miracles in Egypt were the ten plagues, from which the Israelites were exempted.

(*b*) The ten miracles at the Red Sea were: 1st, the dividing of the waters; 2d, that the water formed itself into a roof; 3d, that the ground became hard for easy walking; 4th, that the road on which the Egyptians walked was sticky clay; 5th, that the water was divided into twelve separate roads for the twelve tribes; 6th, that the water became hard like stone; 7th, that the water was in separate layers like bricks; 8th, that hardened water was transparent; 9th, that the hardened water yielded sweet drinking water; and, 10th, that as soon as the sweet water was used, what was left hardened.*

(*c*) The ten temptations were: 1st, at the Red Sea; 2d, at Marah, asking for water; 3d, before the giving of the manna; 4th, seeking the manna on the Sabbath; 6th, at Rephidim; 7th, making the golden calf; 8th, at Taverah; 9th, at Kibroth ha Taara, asking flesh; 10th, in sending the twelve spies.

Mishna 5. Ten miracles were done to our fathers in the holy temple, viz.: (1) No woman miscarried from the smell of the holy flesh (sacrifice); (2) The holy flesh never became corrupt; (3) No fly ever appeared in the slaughter-house; (4) No high priest ever became self-polluted on the day of atonement; (5) The rain never extinguished the fire on the altar (*a*); (6) The wind never blew away the pillar of smoke (*b*); (7) There was never found anything wrong in the sheaf, the two loaves, † and the shew-bread; (8) The

* Every item of this statement is sustained by an ingenious sentence from the Scriptures.—Tr.

† The sheaf was that which was brought on the second day of Easter, and lifted up before the Lord (Leviticus xxiii. 10–15). The two loaves are those which were to be offered on Pentecost.—Tr.

worshippers in the temple stood in very limited space, but when they fell down to worship they had space enough;* (9) No serpent or scorpion ever did any harm in Jerusalem; (10) No Israelite ever said, "There is no place for me to lodge in Jerusalem."

Commentary.—(a) The altar stood in the fore-court, where there was no covering, and yet the fire burnt continually.

(b) The pillar of smoke, which was caused by the burning of sacrifices, was never disturbed by the wind.

Mishna 6. Ten things were created on the evening before Sabbath, in the twilight (a): (1) the mouth of the earth; (2) the mouth of the well; (3) the mouth of the ass; (4) the rainbow; (5) the manna; (6) the staff; (7) the Shamir; (8) the written; (9) the writing; and (10) the tables. Some say, also, the demons and the grave of Moses, and the oak of our father Abraham. Others say, even the tongs by which the first tongs was made.

Commentary.—(a) All things mentioned here, though they appeared to occur at different times, were nevertheless caused by the same God, and it was fixed and appointed at the time of creation when they should take place. (1) The mouth of the earth to swallow Korah; (2) the mouth of the well, *i. e.*, the opening of the rock to give water; (3) the mouth of the ass, of Balaam; † (6) the staff, *i. e.*, the rod of Moses; ‡ (7) the Shamir, *i. e.*, a kind of animal which splits any hard substance over which it is thrown. Solomon in building the temple was not allowed to cut the stones by iron, and employed this Shamir to split the stones; (8) the written, *i. e.*, the written tables; (9) the writing on the tables; (10) the tables of stone, which were, according to tradition, large precious diamonds.

Mishna 7. There are seven properties in a wise man, and seven in an idiot. A wise man will not talk before any one who

* Literally, stood swimming, and worshipped commodiously.—Tr.

† Maimonides in his *Ductor perplexorum* regards this and the visit of the three angels to Abraham as a dream.—Tr.

‡ The Jewish tradition is, that Adam took it with him from Paradise, gave it to Shem, Shem to Abraham, Abraham to Jacob—or Shem to Jacob—Jacob who brought it to Egypt, Jethro stole it and planted it in his garden, where Moses found it and performed by it his miracles.—Tr.

is his superior in wisdom and age; he will not interrupt another's speech; he will not be hasty in answering any question; he will ask properly, and answer to the point; he takes up any matter in proper order; he will confess his ignorance, and give in to the truth. The contrary in each of these cases is true of the idiot.

Mishna 8. Seven kinds of punishments come upon the world for seven kinds of sins. When some give tithe and some not, then comes a famine of drought; so that some are filled and some do hunger. Do they not give tithe at all? there comes a famine of war and of drought. When they do not give the first cake of the dough to the priest, a universal famine comes (*a*).

Commentary.—(*a*) The difference between these three kinds of famine is, that the famine of drought is only partial, some fields get rain and some do not; the war famine is by reason of the people's not having time to sow their fields; the universal famine is by reason of no rain at all.

Mishna 9. Pestilence comes upon the world because the four punishments of death are not executed by the law courts, and because the fruits of the Sabbath year are eaten. The sword (war) comes upon the world because justice is delayed and perverted.

Mishna 10. Wild beasts destroy the world, because people swear falsely and profane God's name. The punishment of exile is visited upon the world, because of idolatry, fornication, murder, and the neglect of releasing the field (in the Sabbath year). At four times does the pestilence increase: in the fourth year, in the seventh year, and at the end of the seventh year, and at the end of every feast in the year. In the fourth year, because of the neglect of giving the poor tithe in the third year; in the seventh year, because of the neglect to give the poor tithe in the sixth year; at the end of the seventh year, because of the fruits of the Sabbath year;* and after every feast, because the poor were robbed of the gifts due to them at every feast.

* The private consumption of the fruits of the seventh year, which were common property. It will be easily perceived that the purport of Mishna 8, 9, and 10 is to teach the well-established doctrine of the Talmud: that the world exists only for the sake of Israel; and that all calamities of the world come also in consequence solely of Israel's sins.—Tr.

Mishna 11. Men possess four kinds of characters (literally *measures*). Mine is mine, and thine is thine; that is middling. Some say, it is the character of the Sodomites. Mine is thine and thine is mine, that is common. Mine is thine and thine thine own, that is piety. Mine is mine and thine is mine, that is the character of the wicked.

Mishna 12. Men possess four kinds of natures (literally *measure*). One is quick to become angry, and easy to be reconciled; his reward counterbalances his loss. Another is difficult to become angry, and difficult to be reconciled; his loss counterbalances his reward. A third is difficult to become angry, and easy to be reconciled; that is piety. A fourth is quick to become angry, but difficult to be reconciled; that is wicked.

Mishna 13. There are to be found four properties (literally *measures*) in students. Quick to comprehend and quick to forget; his gain is equal to his loss. Difficult to comprehend and difficult to forget; his loss equals his gain. Quick of comprehension and slow in forgetting; that is a good portion. Slow in comprehension and quick in forgetting; that is an evil portion.

Mishna 14. There are four properties (literally *measures*) in men giving alms. (1) One gives himself willingly, but does not like that others shall give; his eye is evil as to the property of others. (2) Another likes that others shall give, but does not like to give himself; he has an evil eye as to his own. (3) A third gives, and likes that others shall also give; he is pious. (4) Neither does he give, nor does he like others to give; that is wicked.*

Mishna 15. There are four qualities (literally *measures*) in those who go to study. He goes, but does not study; he has the reward of his going. He studies, but does not go; he has the reward of his study. He goes and studies; that is the pious one. He does not go nor study; that is a wicked one.

Mishna 16. There are four qualities (literally *measures*) in those who attend the teaching of the wise. A sponge, a funnel, a filter, and a sieve. The quality of a sponge is his who sucks

*Cases 1 and 3 are cases of alms-giving, but 2 and 4 only pertain to it. Similar discrepancy will be observed in the next Mishna.—Tr.

up everything; of a funnel, who receives what he hears in one ear and dismisses it through the other ear; of a filter, who ejects the best and retains the worst; of a sieve, which lets go the fine flour and retains the coarse flour.*

Mishna 17. Whenever love depends on something that will cease, as soon as the thing ceases this love ceases; but when it does not depend on a transient matter, it never ceases (*a*). What kind of love is it that depends on a things that cease? The love of Amon and Tamar (2 Samuel xiii. 1-15). And what kind of love does not depend on passing things? The love of David and Jonathan (2 Samuel xviii. 1).

Commentary.—(*a*) The thought of the Mishna is, that all material objects must ultimately cease, and if man's affections are set on such objects they must cease, but the spiritual is of eternal duration.

Mishna 18. Every dispute which is for God's sake will endure; but every dispute which is not for God's sake will not endure. What kind of dispute is for God's sake? That of Hillel and Shamai.† And what kind of dispute is not for God's sake?

*The word חֲסִיס is understood by lexicographers, like Gesenius, to mean *fine* flour. Maimonides, however, means that it denotes the *coarse* flour, else the idea of the Mishna would be altogether wrong. The Mishna gives preference to the sieve, and it agrees with the doctrine of our present science, that coarse flour is more nourishing than fine.—Tr.

†Hillel and Shamai were two presidents of two great schools. Rabbi Hillel is said to have been of a very patient and mild temper, and was very popular, because he always favored making things as easy as possible; while Rabbi Shamai was of a contrary temper. In regard to what is allowed or not allowed, what is to be considered clean or unclean, these two schools always differed. The dispute went to such a height, that once, when both parties were together in one room, and the disciples of Shamai outnumbered those of Hillel, they stuck a sword into the ground and threatened to kill any one who should leave the room; and thus having gained the majority, fixed eighteen laws. The most curious part, perhaps, of this scene is, that when a certain Rabbi met Elias, who, according to Talmudical tradition, was a frequent visitor of the Rabbinical schools, and asked him: Which of these two schools is in the right? Elias answered him, The words of the one as well as the other (which perfectly contradict each other) are the words of the living God.—Tr.

That of Korah and his assembly. He who makes others virtuous will not sin; but whosoever makes others to sin will not be permitted to repent. Moses was virtuous and led others to virtue; the virtue of those others is ascribed to him, as it is written (Deut. xxxiii. 21), "He executed the justice of the Lord, and his judgments with Israel." Jeroboam sinned and made many others to sin; the sins of those others are ascribed to him, as it is written (1 Kings xiv. 16), "Who did sin and who induced Israel to sin."

Mishna 19. Whosoever possesses the following three properties is one of the disciples of our father Abraham; and whosoever possesses three other properties is a disciple of the wicked Balaam. He who has a good eye (*a*), a humble spirit, and a magnanimous soul, is a disciple of our father Abraham. But whosoever has a bad eye, a proud spirit, and a pusillanimous soul, is a disciple of the wicked Balaam. What is the difference between the disciples of our father Abraham and the disciples of the wicked Balaam? The disciples of our father Abraham enjoy this life and inherit the world to come, as it is written (Proverbs viii. 21), "That I may cause those that love me to inherit a lasting possession; and their treasures I will fill." But the disciples of the wicked Balaam inherit Gehenna, and descend to the pit of destruction, as it is written (Psalm lv. 24), "But thou, O God, thou wilt bring them down into the pit of destruction: let the men of blood and deceit not live out half of their days: but I will trust in thee."

Commentary.—(*a*) A good eye means one who is not greedy, but content with what he has. As for instance, Abraham refused to receive anything out of the hands of the king of Sodom. An evil eye is one which has never enough, as Balaam who said, "If Balak gave me his house full of gold and silver."

Mishna 20. Jehudah son of Thoma says: Be fierce as a leopard, light as an eagle, swift as a roe, and strong as a lion, to do the will of thy Father who is in heaven. He used to say: The impudent belong to hell, and the bashful belong to Paradise.* Let thy will be. O Lord our God, that thy city be quickly built in our days, and let our portion be in thy law.

*The Rabbi supposes that the Israelites are mostly bashful, whilst the heathen are generally bold and impudent.—TR.

Mishna 21. He used to say: At the age of five years one is to learn the holy writ; at the age of ten the Mishna; at the age of thirteen one is obliged to keep God's commandments;* at the age of fifteen one is to study the Gemara; at the age of eighteen one must marry;† at the age of twenty one must pursue (business); at the age of thirty he possesses strength; at the age of forty understanding; at the age of fifty he can counsel; at the age of sixty he is an old man; at seventy he is a hoary man; at eighty he must possess vigor (to arrive to that age); at ninety he can only meditate; at a hundred years he is like one dead, and no more regarded in this world. The son of Bagbag says: Turn, and turn again in it (*i. e.*, in the law), for you find all in it; contemplate it, and become old, and finish thy existence over it, but do not remove thyself from it, for there is nothing better than the law. The son of Hehe says: As the pains, so the reward.

*According to the Jewish jurisprudence, a child before the age of thirteen is not commanded to keep God's commandments. Women, slaves, and little ones, says the Talmud, are released from obeying the law. It is, therefore, the usage that when a male child becomes thirteen years old, he is called up to read a portion of the law in the synagogue publicly, and the father says then, "Blessed art thou, Lord! who hast relieved me from this punishment."—Tr.

†Early marriage is a bounden duty with the Israelites. The Talmud says: Till man arrives at the age of twenty God waits for him to marry; after that time God curses him for diminishing the people of Israel.—Tr.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology, taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia.
By R. L. DABNEY, D. D., LL.D. Second Edition. St. Louis, 1878. 903 pp., large octavo.

Dr. Dabney, in the publication of this book, has done the science of Theology a service at once most valuable and most seasonable. A one-sided development of Calvinism, too exclusively forensic, has had the public ear and held the public sway in the Calvinistic world for more than a third of a century. Whilst this development was taking form and scientifically arranging its results, there were more than occasional murmurs from old-time theologians against the new thoughts that had been thrust into the old statements on vital points. Now that the structure is complete, and stands forth in the full dimensions and proportions to which its "idea" has all along tended, it is time to enter a formal protest against the authority it assumes. Dr. Dabney has had the eminent privilege and honor to rearticulate the ancient Calvinism in the forms of modern scientific thought; and well has he done the work. He deserves the most careful study, and, if worth can win its due, will receive it from theologians of all schools.

The ethical Reason instinctively assumes that there must be some nearer approach between "the subjective and the objective," the *real* and the forensic, than the so-called Princeton-school can admit. It is this felt need which makes the now most popular and current Calvinism seem defective and artificial, and has driven some of its ablest defenders to seek a remedy in the untenable dogma of a substantive generic humanity. The reader of this neo-Calvinism is quite conscious that he is in the hands of a system whose spirit, point of view, and practical results, are strangely different from those of Calvin's Institutes. Especially is this the fact in reference to the two great all-controlling subjects, the Fall in Adam and the Restoration in Christ. In reading the "Course of

Theology" under review, one feels that he is led back to the old pastures—food for the soul—in which the needs of the moral instincts are not sacrificed to the demands of a factitious symmetry determined by the constructive imagination. We consider that this return to the postulate "that God's judgments are according to the truth," and not merely according to a "concept," is the all-conditioning characteristic of these lectures, and stamps them with a personality and significance altogether their own. If now Dr. Dabney would prepare and publish a practical work, like "Hodge's Way of Life," they would be tests clearly revealing to the intelligent untheological layman the *animus* of each system. Of this much we are sure: Dabney's book would have much more need of the sinfulness of human nature and the work of the Holy Spirit than, strange to say, there is room for in "The Way of Life." The "Sensualistic Philosophy," the "Syllabus and Notes," and the future "Guide to Life," would form a complete series.

The form of the book is determined to a great extent by the wants of the class-room. Hence, each lecture is prefaced with a syllabus to guide the student in his reading. In this prescription, however, Dr. Dabney evidently intends to plan a full course of study for the post-graduate in after-life. In the immense claim that is made upon every professional man for keeping up with his science, he has imperative need of a qualified "professor" to point out what is worth the time and labor of reading; and Dr. Dabney has done this with unexceptionable wisdom for the theologian. The curriculum is not too much for average diligence to accomplish, and yet, at the same time, gives a complete view of theological science. No better guide for study or for a library is known to the writer, who, as he often looked back with pain upon his own weary and useless reading, has equally often tried to save his younger brethren from the same mistake.

The lectures themselves are gems. We know nothing in the realm of theological literature with which they can be compared for luminous excellence except the sixteen published lectures of Dr. Thornwell. Indeed, excepting the peculiar charm of that brilliant man's style, they are equal to these in all substantial

merits, and superior to them in patient, sober thought. In reading Thornwell, one feels that the author is in danger of being led astray and leading the hearer astray by his own powers of generalisation. On the contrary, in reading Dabney, he feels himself under the guide of a safe and cautious leader, who examines with inexorable analysis the contents of his statements. The wisdom, moderation, conservatism, balance, and symmetry of these lectures, as well as their extensive learning, are above all praise. The march of their logic is a most salutary and delightful exercise. Evidently they are not intended to exhaust their subjects, but to teach the way in which the reader may safely explore all the territory for himself. Thus, in less than nine hundred pages we have more and better theology than is often found in as many thousands. We find in the book no fruitful tendency to absurd deductions and generalisations offensive to that rational and moral nature of man to which alone a revelation can be given or a theology be intelligible or possible. The *educating* power of these lectures is wonderful. The ex-pupils of Dr. Dabney are accustomed to give expression to a most enthusiastic admiration of their former teacher. In the light of these didactics and polemics, this enthusiasm is altogether comprehensible. If there are pleasure and benefit in having one's own mind aroused, stimulated, and guided to its most vigorous action, then surely that pleasure and profit await the reader of the "Course of Theology taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia." We have no hesitation in saying that it is the best book with which we are acquainted, to put into the hands of students, ministers, and intelligent laymen.

The plan of the work is substantially that of our standards; and, if the author had followed their order more exactly, he would perhaps have done quite as well, if not better. It is scarcely an advantage to put the discussion of the moral law immediately after the lectures on original sin. It does not appear that the plan of the Westminster standards is capable of improvement. This order assigns the law its most logical place in a system of Christian theology—its place as the rule of Christian living. To be sure, the pedagogic office of the law is logi-

eally in place as a preparation for the reception of grace; and, without doubt, this view was the one that determined its place *before* "the covenant of grace" in "the Syllabus and Notes." Perhaps, to be perfectly true to the facts of experience, it ought to be in both places, and may therefore properly appear in either.

It is manifest that Dr. Dabney intends his "Sensualistic Philosophy" to be the companion and fore-runner of his Theology. These two books are a most noble pair of brothers. They have the same characteristic traits of great learning, ability, fairness, logic, and thorough research. It is right, too, that the philosophy should be introductory to the theology. Our standards begin at the beginning, and therefore set out from the fundamental fact of man's conscious existence. Hence, a just and adequate knowledge of one's self with his laws of thought is a necessary prerequisite of all theology; and especially so, as the belief in God's existence is dependent on a belief in the laws under which the human mind exists. Dr. Dabney has indeed done well in incorporating parts of his philosophy, as they were needed, in his course of theology; but the whole of his psychology and metaphysics is a necessary preparation for a just appreciation of the man and of his work for the defence of divine truth.

The reviewer is aware that he is speaking almost too much as a judge, and discarding the good example of Dr. Dabney, in giving, at every step, the ground of the faith that is in him. The impossibility of exhibiting, in this short notice, the proofs and examples of the excellent traits and individual character which distinguish this new theological work, is his only excuse. At some future time he hopes to deal with it in more detail, "objectively and relatively considered," whilst he now declares only the effect of its presence upon his own mind and heart.

Before finishing, however, the writer wishes to put on record his dissent in two particulars. The points to be criticised, however, are independent of its general drift, and do not depreciate its value as a whole. They can be excised and leave a complete and unique volume behind. First, on pages 95, 96, Dr. Dabney argues that a logical judgment—the conclusion of a just syllogism—is truly and properly *intuitive*. We deem this a

grave error in psychology. True, there is no practical use made of this generalisation in the progress of the lectures; but, as all error tends to practical vice, and unforeseen consequences may flow from any error in the analysis of our mental powers, we enter our dissent. The author here seems to be misled by his own trope, and to halt in his usual accuracy. Is it to be explained by the fact that he had no use for the generalisation after he had made it? If useless, is it correct?

He says: "Whether the object of bodily sight be immediate or reflective, an object or its *spectrum*, it is equally true that the eye only sees by looking—looking immediately. So the mind only sees by looking; and all its looking is intuition; if not immediate, it is not its own; it is naught." We reply that the eye is not the only organ of sense-perception, nor intuition our only faculty of spiritual cognition; that the eye by looking can see *only a visible* object, and intuition only an immediate truth. The percipient *does not* SEE a valid deduction, but only its validity. Certainly all knowledge, *once attained*, is immediate, is the mind's own; or is nothing; but the truths known are as disparate as the energies by which they are known. It is an oversight to transfer the popular use of "to see"="to know" into the realm of mental science; and, unless Dr. Dabney is willing to affirm that the mind *knows only* by seeing, and that all knowledge is intuitive or naught, his labor has been lost. If the eye be the analogue of the intuitive faculty, then the legs are the analogue of the discursive faculty, whereby we pass (*discurrere*) from thought to thought. Their actions are as different as vision and locomotion; their products, as color and place. Consciousness reports *Discourse* as specifically different from *Intuition*, whether we consider them as faculties, functions, or products. If any perspicuity could be gained by extending the definition of intuition,—the faculty of knowing *without* any discursive process,—we would not object. We thoroughly agree, for instance, with Dr. Dabney in accepting the substantial oneness of Induction and Deduction. In both these there is the same consciousness of *passing* from one notion to another; but the unity of Intuition with either is of a different kind. This unity consists:

(*a*) in the subjective fact, that they are faculties and exercises of one and the self-same *ego*; and (*b*) in the objective fact, that Intuition guides Discourse, as vision directs locomotion, and Discourse bears Intuition to new fields of vision, as locomotion transports the eye to new places in space; and (*c*) in the singular relative fact, that Intuition endorses the trustworthiness of Deduction, just as we are compelled to think of *place* as *colored*; and (*d*) in the absolute fact, that the results of both are *knowledge*. This extended statement is here made, because we are convinced that it is nothing less than a movement towards intellectual chaos to substantially identify *intuēri* with *discurrere*; as if we might say that, in some sense, we intuit a deduction or infer an intuition. The writer is not more sure that to him the knowledge that Lord Beaconsfield is the leader of the British government, is *not an intuition* than any "good and necessary inference" he has ever drawn. We do heartily wish that the word *see* were banished from psychology. It is misleading to the last degree, by the furtive ease with which it glides from its specific to a general sense, and then scatters itself into numberless specific meanings, remotely analogical, until at last we discover that a blind man may go to see his friends, *i. e.*, see them, by hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling them.

The second point marked for criticism, is Dr. Dabney's great argument from "traits of naturalness," against the conclusions of current sceptical geologists. If the position is valid, he can of course *silence* them, whenever he chooses to say, "Thus far and no farther." But then he also *shuts* the eye of Reason, which refuses to consider creation as merely an object of God's omnipotence unlimited by His moral attributes; and *stops* the logical faculty, which always struggles to move along in the presence of Reason. Indeed, on this point, Dr. Dabney reminds one of Sir Wm. Hamilton with his "law of Parcimony," a sword that he always kept ready, holding it *in terrorem* over his opponents, but never could prevent it from hurting himself.

In Lecture XXIII., Dr. Dabney argues (*a*) that the six days of creation are days of twenty-four hours,—a point of exegesis on which we may join issue in the future; (*b*) that "the first of

each species must have received from the supernatural, creative hand, *every trait* of naturalness; else it could not have fulfilled the end for which it was made,—to be the parent of a species." This allegation does not appear to be either an intuition, or a valid induction or deduction, or established by "parole-witness." In repeating the proposition, the author undoubtedly enunciates a valid induction, when he says: "The parent of a natural species, while supernatural in origin, must have been thoroughly natural in *all essential traits*." The italicized words call attention to the difference in the statements; yet the whole force of the argument proceeds on the assumption that *all the natural traits of the individual* are identical with *all the essential traits of the species*. Now, the *natural* traits of the individual are precisely those that Nature communicates; that is to say, the essential traits of the species, *plus the marks of propagation*. The traits of the original parent are the same *minus the marks of propagation*. By an irresistible impulse of human nature, it is authoritatively affirmed, that wherever the signatures of embryonic or foetal life are found, the record is "parole-testimony" to the truth, and overrides all other hypotheses. Now, what are the marks of *growth*, is a physiological question; but, whatever they are, they were not impressed by the act of creation. It is unscientific, nay, impossible, to believe that the method by which a creature comes into being does not, from the necessity of the case, make its own record. If it had "every trait of naturalness," its origin was natural: if not, then not. For instance: believing that Adam was *created*, we believe that he was also destitute of the marks which foetal life invariably necessitates. This "estate of creation" neither helps nor hinders his propagation of children after his own kind, who will bear on their bodies and souls the marks of their derived origin. The parent trees of every species were created without the marks of growth, whilst their descendants have necessarily recorded in their own structure the history of their progress from germ to maturity. Of these signatures of a natural origin, the writer is acquainted with only two or three, but feels impelled to conjecture that they will be revealed in vastly greater number, as science improves

her instruments and observations. Perhaps the time may come when even "a bone of Adam" would reveal in a language of its own that it did not *grow*, but was *made*. Creation is unlike propagation: their effects must be unlike to an equal degree. We object to this postulate, however, chiefly because of its tendency towards what Dr. Dabney happily names "the eternity of naturalism," and the dreadful abyss beyond. The *a priori* conception of Nature, which underlies the proposition that the original parents of every species were created with all the traits of naturalness found in the offspring, *is that of a cycle*; so that, at whatever point the Creator introduces Nature, she will necessarily appear as if she had passed through the previous stages. There is certainly a wonderful fascination in this transcendental construction, but what is its logical tendency? To the Christian, who believes the revealed word, it is at best utterly barren of results, if indeed devoid of positive evils. To the sceptic, it only confirms doubts as to the reality of a creation in time *ex nihilo*. If the supposed anterior ideal stage had such an energy as to project the traits of a natural origin into the realities of its immediate successor, it must have been a *cause*; and, if a cause, must it not be assumed to be *real*? Can an *ideal* cause be one at all? Thus we have at once a *regressus* into a past eternity, and with it the eternity of Nature. Indeed, the most charming and acute metaphysician we have ever read yields exactly to this, the *legitimate*, result of such a conception of Nature's cycle. In his "Introduction to Metaphysic," on page 214, C. M. Ingleby, M. A., LL.D., of Trinity College, Cambridge, says: "Let us then understand by the term *nature*, the world limited by time and space and the law of causality. Of this world it is infallibly true that there is not, nor can be, any origination *in its own order*. Every event, whether state or act, is the product of a co-existing or antecedent event, and is, in its turn, the co-efficient of others: so that in this series there is *no first cause or last effect*. We believe this complex was created; and we deny that the assumption of its eternity, backwards and forwards, is repugnant to this belief. But if it was created in time, it was created with all the evidences of its præexistence inscribed on its surface." . . .

“If we conceive God to start the cycle, we must conceive Him as starting it at some point in the cycle. . . . And since there is no necessity in the case determining us to a blind belief that so it was, the case supposed is *incredible*.” Here, then, we have *an eternal creature without a first or a final cause!* How different from Dr. Dabney’s doctrine on Creation! And yet we deem it the only logical result from the assumed *datum*. “The cycle of Nature” is “limited by time, space, and causation,”—is a work of creation;—but there is not one moment of time or point of space in the whole cycle where causation can be supposed to begin rather than any other! The doctrine and the thing are bewilderingly circular.

We could wish that Sir Wm. Hamilton’s “law of parcimony” and Dr. Ingleby’s “Cosmothetic Idealism” were buried in the same grave with this doctrine of “Nature’s Cycle.” And yet, for our philosophy, we are indebted chiefly to Hamilton; and for most important corrections thereof, to Dr. Ingleby; even as for our theology we are mainly indebted to Dr. Chas. Hodge; and for most valuable corrections thereof to Dr. Dabney.

J. A. L.

Discussions in Church Polity. By CHARLES HODGE, D. D. Selected and arranged by the Rev. W. DURANT, with a preface by A. A. HODGE, D. D. New York: Chas. Scribner’s Sons. Pp. 532.

These “discussions” have been selected from the *Princeton Review*, sometimes in the form of whole articles, sometimes in the form of excerpts more or less full, from articles contributed by the industrious pen of Dr. Hodge. Many of these contributions were in the form of a review of the proceedings of the General Assembly. Annual articles of this sort were written by Dr. Hodge for thirty years, beginning with 1835. They consisted of “brief narratives of the proceedings of that court, and of discussions of the doctrinal and ecclesiastical principles involved.” “They therefore contain an exposition of the author’s views of the fundamental principles underlying the constitution of the Church and its administration.” Another class of articles in

the *Review* were substantially identical with lectures delivered to his classes in the Seminary from 1845 to 1857 on the subject of Ecclesiology as one branch of Dogmatic Theology. The book is well printed; has a full table of contents, and a copious index. We are sorry to say that the foolish custom has been followed in this instance of leaving out the date of publication on the title page.

The contents of the volume may be distributed under two general heads: 1. The Church and its doctrine as a department of Theology. 2. The principles and features belonging to the Presbyterian Church, in contrast with other denominations, specially the forms of Independency and Papacy. Under neither of these heads can the discussions be considered as satisfactory by those who have been trained in the school of Dr. Mason or of Dr. Thornwell.

1. As to the first, Dr. Hodge gives such prominence in his "Idea of the Church" to "the true Church" (the "*vera ecclesia*" of the Reformers) as to lose sight of the Church visible almost entirely, and to seem to deny the doctrine of the Westminster Confession of Faith in Chap. XXV., Sec. 2. His notion seems to be that of the Donatists, Anabaptists, and Novatians, that the Church consists only of holy people; and he uses expressions, in some passages, which seem to imply that the members of the true Church may be discerned by men to be such; in other words, that the invisible Church is visible. In other passages, indeed, he makes concessions which are inconsistent with these views; but we think that the impression which would be left on the minds of his readers, upon the whole, is what we have just described. The author was led, no doubt, to take this extreme view, by keeping the Papal and Prelatical view too much in his eye. His doctrine is unquestionably less objectionable than that of the Papists, whose definition of the Church practically denies the invisible Church; but both the doctrines are extremes. The truth in this as in so many other cases, lies in the middle.

Again, we cannot help considering his derivation of the outward form of the Church from its inward life or nature as very unhappy, or at least as very unhappily expressed. His idea

seems to be that the form of the Church is the result of its life in much the same sense as the cocoon of the silk-worm is the result of its life. Hence there is room for diverse forms and polities of the Church, all of which may be equally legitimate and normal. Within whatever range of aberrations from the type the life may still preserve its essential nature, within the same range may the outward forms vary legitimately. If this be his view, he must deny the *jus divinum* of the Presbyterian polity, in any exclusive sense. It has the same divine right, and no other, with the other forms. We are not sure that Dr. Hodge would not have been willing to take the position of Melancthon, at a memorable crisis in the history of the Reformation, and to acknowledge the Pope as, in a certain sense, a legitimate officer of the Church.

Now we admit that there is a correspondence between the life and the form, and that without such a correspondence, the life cannot be fully manifested and developed. The soul of a man in the body of an ox would have a very sorry chance of development. We admit, further, that when any serious change occurs in the character of the life, it tends to work a change in the outward form, and, without hindrances, will in time work such a change; as the forms of the Roman Republic gave way at last to the forms of the Empire, and as the forms of the Church gave way at last to the hierarchy, after the time of Constantine. But we hold that, as in the beginning God created the body of the man as well as the soul which was to animate it and did not leave the soul to make a body for itself, so he created a body for the Church in entire correspondence with the nature of its life. No other differences in outward form are legitimate, than those which are analogous to the varieties which we find in the human form. Dr. Hodge himself uses this illustration, but it makes rather against than for his position. It would hardly be contended that a creature whose body was different, in its organic frame-work, from the human body, was a man.

2. As to the second head under which the contents of this volume have been distributed, our remarks must be briefer than they were upon the first. The author states "the fundamental principles of our Presbyterian system" thus: (a) "The parity of

the clergy" (by "clergy" he means the ministers of the word—our standards never use the word). (b) "The right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the Church." (c) "The unity of the Church."

In reference to the *first* of these principles, it is very obvious that while it *is* a fundamental principle, it is not a distinctive one. It merely gives us the genus to which Presbyterianism belongs; and the same may be said of the *third*, "the unity of the Church." We must have the *differentia* in order to get a specific idea of Presbyterianism. Dr. Hodge finds it in "the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the Church." This process of defining is very much like that of undertaking to define a *man* by saying that he is an animal, and then that he is a biped; and when it is objected that there are other animals and other bipeds, to add, in order to give the species, that he is a *feathered* biped. That is, in defining Presbyterianism, our author has stated as the specific difference something which does not belong to Presbyterianism at all, and, if it did, would belong to it in common with Congregationalism. His idea was that the ruling elder is only the deputy or proxy of the people, appearing in the church-courts simply because it is impossible or exceedingly inconvenient for the people to appear there. It differs from the Congregational theory only as a representative democracy differs from a simple or pure democracy. The "clergy" are present as a sort of prelates, not representing the people, but keeping them straight, and, in their turn, kept in check by the people. A portentous mixture this of Congregationalism and Prelacy! Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Cunningham have shown, after Ames and the old writers, that it is *not* Presbyterianism—this right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the Church. It may be true, it may be just, it may be scriptural, but it is not Presbyterianism; and we venture to predict the ruin of that form of church polity, when this view of its theory shall have been generally received and acted on as the true one.

Such being the theory of the Church in general, and of Presbyterianism in particular, held by our author, we need not be

surprised at certain conclusions which he reached in regard to the nature of the Church's mission, and in regard to the rights of ruling elders. We will mention a few of them as specimens.

(1). A body which is authorised to make a form and polity for itself cannot be expected to make the Bible the rule of faith and practice in the sense of the sixth section of the first chapter of the Westminster Confession. Its discretionary power must needs be very large, so large, indeed, as to be limited only by the prohibitions of the Bible. We confess ourselves unable to see any difference in principle between the position of our author upon this point and the position of the anti-Puritan party in the Church of England in the reign of Elizabeth.

(2). If the ruling elder be what Princeton said he is, then doubtless he has no right to lay on hands in the ordination of a minister; and it is difficult to see what right is left to him, except that of informing the "clergy" what the wishes of the people are.

But we are engaged in an ungracious task, and hasten to conclude. We have a great veneration for the memory of Dr. Hodge as a noble champion of that truth which lies nearest to the salvation of a sinner. His name deserves to be held in everlasting remembrance in the Presbyterian Church as a theologian. And we sincerely regret that we cannot respect him as highly as an Ecclesiologist. But, *non possumus omnia*. T. E. P.

Some Elements of Religion: Lent Lectures, 1879. By H. P. LIDDON, D. D., Canon of St. Paul's. Second Edition. Rivingtons: London, Oxford, and Cambridge. 1873.

Since his famous Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of our Lord, the name of Canon Liddon is known wherever English is read and the Redeemer honored. At home he is equally celebrated as the London preacher who in the estimation of many most admirably combines weight of matter with impressiveness of delivery. It was therefore with strong expectations of what Plato calls a banquet of reason that we betook ourselves to the perusal of this neat volume: nor were those expectations wholly disappointed. These Lectures were delivered in St. James's church,

Piccadilly, during the Lent services of 1870. This accounts for the fact that they are in form, and to a certain extent also in substance, of a popular rather than a scientific character. They are moreover published in the midst of pressing cares without material revision, under the judgment that they had already proved useful in the shape first given them, and that

"Un sou, quand il est assuré,
Vaut mieux que cinq en espérance."

There are six Lectures, one for each of the six Sundays in Lent. The *first* is on the Idea of Religion; the *second* on God, considered as the Object of Religion; the *third* on the Subject of Religion—the Soul; the *fourth* on the Obstacle to Religion—Sin; the *fifth* on Prayer, regarded as the Characteristic Action of Religion; and the *sixth* on the Mediator, contemplated as the Guarantee of Religious Life. The foot-notes are as interesting and valuable as the text. These may be said to be select rather than numerous, and to be discerning and apposite rather than remote in their reference to the matter in hand. They are rich in apt quotation and pondered learning, and bring the scattered rays of many cross-lights to bear upon the subject that in the given case happens to be under treatment. In the first Lecture the author emphasizes the significant fact that religion to-day more than ever before is a matter of general scrutiny. This is all the more remarkable as religion, though never before so universally safeguarded as an idea, was perhaps never before more widely opposed and denounced as a reality. Where are we to look for the explanation of this fact? Is it that this period in which we live is one of transition? "Is it that as of old, barbarian invaders, who will without scruple devastate the precincts and sack the interior of the temple, are pausing involuntarily, spell-bound, almost terrified, upon the threshold of the sacred shrine?" Is it due to the æsthetic feeling? Is the present notice that is taken of religion, even by a godless world, at bottom owing to social, to political, to selfish, or instinctive causes? Allowing as he does some force to these and other secondary influences, Canon Liddon finds a deeper reason for the phenomenon in the wider conviction that religion is an indispensable part

of man's moral and mental outfit. Two causes have deepened this conviction in modern times: *first*, the *subjective* spirit of the age, following the leading of the German idealists, and especially of Schleiermacher, which has been carried, indeed, so far by Feuerbach as to have conceived of all existing religions as but the creations of human thought; and *second*, a profounder study of history. These causes special to the time we live in, do, however, only reinforce the reasons for the sway of religious reflection which are always operative. One of these is the certainty that every one of us must die. From this the Lecturer presently comes up to the question, "What is religion?" This he answers by showing that it is not a *mere* form (though the highest and purest) of feeling. This was the view of Schleiermacher, and he might have added of Morell. Neither is religion a *mere* form of knowledge. This too is evinced and illustrated. This (or something near it) was the view of the Gnostics and of such recent thinkers as Hegel. Nor is it enough to say that the essential thing in religion is morality. This was the view of Kant. The true answer is then given. It is that religious life is more than feeling, more than knowledge, more than obedience to a moral code, and yet it involves all these. "Religion is feeling; it is mental illumination; it is especially moral effort; because it is that which implies, and comprehends, and combines them all. It is the sacred bond, freely accepted, generously, enthusiastically, persistently welcomed, whereby the soul engages to make a continuous expenditure of its highest powers in attaching itself to the personal source and object of its being."

Dr. Liddon refers to the notion of Cicero that religion is that anxious habit of mind which cons over and over again what relates to the divine. He himself evidently inclines more to the notion of Lactantius, who connects religion with the idea of an obligation by which man is bound to God. This, as he points out, is in substantial harmony with the phraseology of Scripture. Religion is a covenant and at the same time a communion. But what are the characteristics of a true religion? It must be mysterious. It must be definite. There are weighty arguments and fine remarks under this head. The definiteness of the New Tes-

tament is strikingly signalized. It must be positive. The unfruitfulness of religious negations is well brought out, while it is cheerfully admitted that even a true religion has important negative aspects. It must furthermore be absolute. Would any sane man die for what was only "relatively true," in the sense of the sceptic? Yet religion is not absolute in the sense of Theodore Parker, and precisely because Christianity is not relative in the sense of a partial, merely preparatory system, but a universal and perfect one.

This is a crude statement of the main drift of the first Lecture. It takes no note of the amplification of the points of the delicate *nuances*, of the rich dress in which the thought is clothed. An interesting testimony to the importance of religion is given from the lips of Sir Robert Peel. Dr. Tholuck is reported as saying to Dr. Pusey that the higher criticism having done away with Christianity was just then earnestly insisting upon the necessity of taking regular exercise.

We cannot analyse the remaining Lectures minutely. The soul's thirst, our author proceeds to show, cannot be satisfied by heathenism, or by materialism. The human mind recoils from Atheism. The thought of God is latent in the breast of man. The cosmological and teleological arguments are carefully stated. The Lecturer then goes on to point out how God is banished from the world by Deism, and buried in the world by Pantheism, and how Pantheism relapses back into Materialism. This part of the book is especially able and impressive. A noble passage, that has been often cited, is quoted both in English and Latin from the Confessions of Augustine. It is the one in which that father tells us why nature was to him so beautiful, by telling us how nature had led him up to God. God is more than the highest intelligence; being an inference also of the practical reason. There is a discussion of conscience, which is proved to be not a product of education. God is a postulate of conscience; and the identity of the God of conscience and the God of nature is certified by miracle. It is conclusively demonstrated that the dignity of God is not compromised by miracles which attest his morality. *Man* is next considered; the sense of personalty; the spiritual

nature of the soul; the estimate that the Lord puts on the outward and inward elements of human nature. The theory of the soul's preëxistence is fully presented and refuted. The rival theories of Traducianism and Creationism are exhibited with unusual clearness, and we know not where to find a better account of the matter in English from the view-point of a creationist. The destiny of the soul, immortality, the resurrection, are discussed in a manner worthy of the theme. There is considerable space devoted to a philosophic examination of the subject of suicide. Our business is to save our souls. There is therefore an awfulness no less than a blessedness in life. Then our author treats of sin. He follows the traces of its recognition in Judaism and heathendom, in the melancholy of Werther, and in the Pessimism of Schopenhauer, as well as in the threnody of Paul over creation's anguish, who, however, alone sees light on the distant horizon. The awful problem is then dealt with of the origin of moral evil, of which the reverend Lecturer says: "Our path lies between the temptation to extenuate the idea of evil, and the temptation to tamper with the idea of God." The falsity and worthlessness of Spinoza's theory is made evident. The theory of Dualism is then admirably discussed, and is rejected. Sin is tracked to its lair in evil desire and the selfishness that originates in a corrupt heart. It is further shown that sin contradicts eternal law, lifts itself in opposition against the self-existent nature of the infinite lawgiver, and abuses the generosity of a boundless and divine benefactor. There is a valuable analysis in the notes of the Hebrew words for sin. Paul and Augustine are shown to be in harmony in what they say about the reasons for the permission of sin. It is religion's task to grapple with sin. The "philosophies" vainly ignore or belittle it. Jesus teaches what sin is and what it leads to, and is himself the only atonement for it, the only victor over it. There is a thorough discussion of prayer, as the characteristic action of religion. Serious prayer, it is argued, so far from being "sentimental," is a form of hard work. This view is perhaps pushed a little too far, and might seem to squint towards monachism. There is little if anything, however, to except to in the author's language.

Prayer implies and teaches that "God is really alive." Prayer is far more than mere petition, yet in the lower sense is shown to be reconcilable with the principles of enlightened reason and the mandates of natural law. The author leans towards the possibility of a miraculous intervention. This is virtually the position of Mozley. This is a grand chapter. The most attractive of all the Lectures is the last.

H. C. A.

A Blow at the Root of Modern Infidelity and Scepticism; or, Huxleyism Analysed and Criticised. By THOMAS MORROW, J. B. Lippincott & Co.: Philadelphia. 1878. Pp. 60.

Mr. Morrow is engaged in a most important work. This pamphlet, he informs us, is the condensation "of a more elaborate and more extensive work,"* and is designed to give a summary view of the alleged discoveries of men of science, such as Darwin, Tyndall, and others of less note, but especially of Prof. Huxley, whose name he introduces, as represented by "Huxleyism" in the title of the pamphlet, because he embraces nearly all the "suppositions and theories of scientific scepticism." Mr. Morrow proposes to show, in his larger work, now ready for the press, in fuller discussion, what he here summarily sets forth, "that the arguments of the Professor (Huxley) and others in favor of Evolution are utter failures;" that "all the suppositions, hypotheses and theories of scientists, biologists, and geologists, in opposition to the Bible, have their ultimate and *only* foundation in the *supposed* chronological records of geological strata;" that "by their own statements, the existence of such chronological records in geological strata is a fivefold impossibility," and that "Prof. Huxley himself admits, and repeats with emphasis, that there is not the slightest proof of the age of strata."

These are bold and confident words. We do not profess to enter into that minute and careful examination of this little work, by which we might give a positive endorsement of Mr. Morrow's views. Yet we have no doubt of the entire honesty and fair dealing

*Morrow's Thesaurus: Containing a collection of Facts on Geology, Darwinism, the Bible, and Modern Scepticism, with Appendices A, B, C, D.

with which he makes his quotations from Prof. Huxley and other scientific writers; and we can see no reason to doubt the correctness of his inferences, as he states them. We have been especially impressed with his "recapitulation" on page 59, in which he sustains his "five impossibilities" in the way of forming a chronological record of geological strata, by the statements of scientific men themselves, especially of Prof. Huxley.

It has not been our custom to criticise "pamphlets," but in view of the intrinsic importance of the subject, we bring this production to the attention of our readers with the hope that they will procure a copy of it, and so be led to patronise his enterprise in publishing the larger work. But this is not all. While not proposing any close examination of Mr. Morrow's views or of those whose "theories" and "suppositions" he combats so earnestly, we embrace the occasion to offer some suggestions touching the great importance of proper discussions of the sceptical views which have been set forth by some men, eminent in scientific attainments, whose views must exert great influence on minds capable of appreciating the conclusions presented, even if incompetent to form intelligent apprehensions on the facts, real or supposititious, on which those views are alleged to rest.

Scepticism and infidelity are by no means the legitimate offspring of true science. Of two things we have an abiding conviction: (1) That the teachings "of the things that are made" respecting God's "eternal power and Godhead" and all involved in that comprehensive phrase, must, rightly read and understood, confirm and sustain the teachings of that book which has been given to lead us to the knowledge of "what we are to believe concerning God and what duty he requires of us;" (2) And that, after the Bible has passed successfully through such crucial tests as those to which for eighteen centuries it has been subjected, both the credibility of its history, on which so much of its other teachings rest, and the divine authority, including the strict inspiration of God, of the entire volume, are and must remain indefeasible.

Still we are not insensible to the force of the considerations by

which Mr. Morrow informs us he has been induced to undertake the elaborate and extensive discussions, of which we have before us this condensed presentation.

To some thinking minds in our day, the Christian faith has appeared to be threatened with an "eclipse." True, it is not supposed that such will be final. Nay more, the calculations on which such an eclipse are apprehended are probably not well founded. Still, to drop our figure, there is much in the course of thought extensively prevalent, to justify fears lest the "faith of some be overthrown." The credibility of the Pentateuch and the historical books of the Old Testament has been openly and persistently impeached, and the wonderful narrative of the Creation, Fall, Flood, and Dispersion declared to be myths or legends of no more authenticity than the fabulous accounts of the origin of the world set forth in Oriental tales; or the founding and rise of the Roman Empire, as given in the *Æneid* of Virgil, and the traditions of the birth and lives of Romulus and Remus. Before the stern canons of what has been called "Historical Criticism," the myths and legends of the earliest profane writings melted, and now the Biblical historical criticism has been brought to bear on the venerable records, which from our childhood we have been accustomed to receive as not only credible and authentic, but written by "holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The result of the processes of criticism to which the Old Testament Scriptures have been subjected, if accepted, must be to sap the foundations of the revealed principles of faith and practice, and leave us to the surmises and hypotheses of the "advanced thought of the nineteenth century." There is great danger that the uncontradicted and unanswered systems of teaching advanced by the abettors of modern scepticism, have already exercised a pernicious influence on the minds of many. For these teachings are no longer confined to strictly scientific works, nor to the essays and other papers read in associations of scientific men, and published under the auspices of such associations. They have been to a great extent incorporated in commentaries on the Bible, set forth as well-established principles in articles in quarterly reviews, monthly magazines, and weekly

or daily newspapers. In all such periodicals we encounter discussions by sceptical writers respecting the Mosaic or other historical writings of the Old Testament. They find place in popular school-books in Christian schools. Mere hypotheses or illogical corollaries from alleged discoveries in geology and kindred topics, are postulated as authentic declarations of science; and the institutions, as well as historical statements of the Old Testament, are summarily dismissed as the productions of a barbarous age, the interpolations of conceited Jews, or the dreams of visionary enthusiasts; all of which, we are told, might be tolerated centuries ago by uncultivated men, but to the "advanced thought," are idle tales and immature fancies. The names of German and English Biblical critics are heralded to readers among English-speaking people as the discoverers and teachers of "more excellent ways" in unfolding to us the history and the interpretation of the Bible. Bishop Colenso, a "Right Reverend Father in God," of the Anglican Church, Davidson, author of an Introduction to the Old Testament, and Bleek, a German writer on the same topic, have classified, condensed, and combined with their own views those of such men as DeWette, Kälisch, Von Bohlen, Knobel, Graff, Riehm, Koster, Nöldeke and others. Under the guise of defenders and expounders of the volume, of whose religious system they are professed and liberally remunerated teachers in Christian communions, and occupants of professorial chairs in nominally Christian institutions, these men have presented to the world the teachings of scepticism, consisting in part of their own deductions from the theories of physical science, and in part of their speculations in historical criticism. They arraign not only the credibility of the historians, but of the history, the wisdom not only of the lawgiver Moses, but of Moses' God; and essay to be infallible judges, both of the best method of making the world and peopling its continents, and of governing the whole physical and moral universe.

Meanwhile there has arisen an unexpected difficulty in the way of pressing the principles of "Historical Criticism" (confidently asserted to be so successful in the attacks on the Old Testament), with any measure of success in attacking the New. The stale

old argument, that the Jews were semi-barbarians, and the age of the writers of the Old Testament one of darkness, fails as to the New Testament, both respecting the people for whom its authors wrote and their age. It would be a bold attempt to make such allegations respecting the advanced civilisation, both material and intellectual, of the Christian era. The histories and didactic teachings of the writers of the New Testament were addressed to men, both Jews and Greeks, who fully understood what was written, and whose appreciation of such situation, whether in rejecting or accepting its ideas, is a matter of well authenticated history, both by those who favored and those who rejected.

But "dripping water wears away rock." If we allow semi-infidel views respecting the Bible, whether taught *first hand* by men of eminence in physical science or Biblical criticism, or *second hand* by text-books and teachers in our literary institutions, to be continued unchecked, we may look forward to a coming generation prepared to sneer at the faith of their fathers and abjure the obligations of the divine word. For we must remember that these sceptical views, as Universalism, and other forms of error, find ready reception in the carnal mind, which is enmity to God and his law, by nature. Natural men need no conversion to unbelief.

And yet it is encouraging to believe, that though *absolutely* more prevalent than formerly, sceptical views are *relatively* less prevalent. In our age, the knowledge and reception of the Bible is more extensive than in the early part of this century. Still, though less prevalent relatively, the facilities for publishing everything and increased means of reaching the popular mind, render the advocates of sceptical views more loud and peremptory, as well as more articulate. Hence the great need, under every aspect, for endeavoring to bring intelligent expositions of truth face to face with destructive error.

B. M. S.

A Popular Commentary on the New Testament. By English and American scholars of various denominations, with illustrations and maps. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL.D. In four volumes. Vol. I., large 8vo., pp. 508, containing Introduction and Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Chas. Scribner's Sons: New York.

The editor states that the object of this new exposition of the New Testament is to provide a commentary suitable for intelligent laymen. Hence it does not compete with the voluminous and learned commentary in twenty-one volumes, edited in Germany by Lange, and in this country by Schaff. The names of the contributors to the whole of the four intended volumes are given to the public. They are confined to Great Britain and the Northeastern States of the United States, and are chosen from among Presbyterians, evangelical Episcopalians, and Congregationalists. Among the names whose aid is promised, are many which are already known to students, such as those of Dean Howson and Dr. Oswald Dykes; and also of some who are only beginning to be known to American readers. This first volume is the joint work of Dr. Schaff himself and Prof. Matt. B. Riddle of Hartford, Conn.

First, as to the material part of the book: the paper and print are excellent, neat, and substantial, and the binding the usual flimsy muslin. The illustrations consist of eleven engravings (or maps) representing to us important cities or scenes in Palestine, each of which is of the full size of a page; and of a number of smaller cuts representing natural or architectural objects in Bible lands. It is our opinion that these illustrations may be accepted by the reader with confidence, because they are either copied from photographs carefully taken on the spot, or have been criticised by careful eye-witnesses from Syria. The maps are corrected by Dr. Arnold Guyot of Princeton. The general impression on the eye is that the volume is too much of a picture-book for its serious purpose. This impression is confirmed by our observing that many cuts are introduced, which, even to the ordinary reader of Sabbath-school publications, have no novelty or new merit whatever, and which seem to be put in merely to fill space. It is

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palliated by the real interest and utility of a part of the pictorial illustrations.

Secondly, as to the contents of the work: their plan is to give a brief, compact, and plain exposition of the text, presenting the results of criticism rather than the criticism itself. The extent of the comments may be conceived from the fact that they do not usually cover more than twice as much space as the text. The work opens with a brief, and in the main, judicious, introduction to the New Testament as a whole, to the Gospels as histories of Christ's life and works, and to each of the four specially. The text of the Gospels, which is printed in large and beautiful type, is accompanied with marginal references, with suggestions of emendations in the received text of the Greek, and with a multitude of corrections in the English version. The concern of the learned editor with the "revision movement" which is now in progress, suggests the probability that in these proposed changes of translation, which as yet, in this exposition, are kept in the place of notes at the foot of the page, are foreshadowings of the work of revision to be disclosed to the public in future, as a part of the English Scriptures. Should this surmise prove correct, the prediction and warning uttered by the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW as to the revision movement, will be proved timely: that the Revisers will attempt to change too many things. In the newly suggested translations of this exposition, we find a number valuable as expressing the force of the Greek more exactly, the most of them correct and scholarly, and many of them unnecessary. That is to say: in many cases it is proposed to change our version, when the only difference is a more exact expression of the force of a Greek word or idiom in some minute respect, where the present version does not contain the slightest shade of error, and no addition of clearness is gained. We submit, for instance, then when, Matt. iv. 18, the words of our version for *θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας*, "sea of Galilee," are changed into "lake" of Galilee; and *Σίμωνα τὸν λεγόμενον Πέτρον*, "Simon called Peter," into Simon "who is called," etc., there is no atom of gain in correctness or expressiveness, justifying the change of our venerable translation. The Notes also seem objectionable to

us, in proposing too many excisions and emendations of the *Textus Receptus*. The remark recurs too often: "According to the best authorities this word (or clause) should be omitted;" or, "should be read thus." The exposition professes to be written for lay readers. There is reason to fear lest these frequent indications of mistrust as to the text shall produce some of the sceptical results which came from the too slashing criticism of Griesbach. Not having become converts to all the canons of criticism enunciated by those who are claimed as "best authorities," we have not yet felt any conscientious obligation to surrender so much of the received text. Hence we naturally deprecate so much cutting and pruning.

The exposition seems usually orthodox, just, and sober. The liberties which used to be taken by Neologian expositors find no countenance in the reverent comments of our authors. As the work is designed, in a certain sense, for a catholic use, the doctrinal peculiarities of neither of the denominations represented are sharply deduced. On the whole, we can recommend the work, as beautiful for typography, replete with useful information, and valuable to all who have not the time and means for extended and critical study of the New Testament. R. L. D.

The Christian. By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D. D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1878. Pp. 146, 12mo.

This little work discusses the Christian's Name, Profession, Life, Doctrine, Character, Simplicity, Way, Temptations, Views of Sin, Faith, Hope, and Trust. It speaks of his Enemies, his Shepherd, and his Advocate, his Joy and his Sorrow, his hatred of Error and his glorious Riches. It presents to us some musings of an old Christian, a letter to an aged Christian, and an account of the death of an old Disciple, also some account of Two Great and Good Men—the Rev. Dr. Thomas Smyth of Charleston and the Rev. Dr. Thomas DeWitt of New York.

Our readers are familiar with the writings of the author. This book has all their usual characteristics. It is adapted to be useful to many, both in the Church and out of it. We had no sooner read it than the determination was formed to send our

copy to an aged man in our neighborhood, who may or may not be worthy to bear the name given to this volume, but who cannot fail, with God's blessing, to be profited by its perusal. A large class of readers, old and young, will be interested in this account of "the Christian," and all interested must be profited.

The last topic discussed is *Posthumous Usefulness*. Abel's case is referred to, of whom the Scripture used four thousand years after his time: "He being dead yet speaketh." The venerable author expresses the hope of his own usefulness in this world after death as well as of glory, honor, and immortality in the world to come. It is a natural and an honorable wish, which in his case is not likely to be disappointed. He says the virtue and the value of a good song or saying or book ever depended on the truth taught by the spirit breathed into it, and so it may long survive the man who made it. We agree with him that "such things invest life with the deepest solemnity," and "should encourage us to zeal in the Master's service." J. B. A.

An Examination of the Alleged Discrepancies of the Bible.

By JOHN W. HALEY, M. A. With an Introduction by ALVAH HOVEY, D. D., Professor in the Newton Theological Institution. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1875. Pp. 473, 12mo.

This author did not propose a discussion of all the difficult questions which arise in studying the Bible, but only an examination of so-called "discrepancies" in the statements or narratives of the sacred volume. Of these he has treated nearly *nine hundred*, and in a clear and forcible style, vigorously, directly, and without unnecessary circumlocution. We may not be able always to accept the solution given by Mr. Haley, but he appears to be a sober and careful writer, and to have mastered the literature of his subject in various languages. But he says that he knows of "no work, ancient or modern, which covers the whole ground, treating the subject comprehensively yet concisely, and which is at the same time adapted to general circulation." And to supply this lack is the aim of this book. He claims little originality or literary merit, and designs his book not so much

for scholars and critics as the common people. And he begs the reader to bear in mind that the Bible is neither dependent upon nor affected by the success or the failure of his endeavors.

The plan of the book is to present in Part I. the *Origin* of the Discrepancies, the *Design* of the Discrepancies, and the *Results* of the Discrepancies, each of these being discussed very fully and ably in a separate chapter; and then in Part II. we have three other chapters presenting *Doctrinal* Discrepancies, *Ethical* Discrepancies, and *Historical* Discrepancies. These are followed by a Bibliographical Appendix, an Index of Scripture Citations, and a full General Index, all of which add of course very much to the value of the work.

We quote the last few sentences of this modest author:

“When we consider the long interval of time—from eighteen to thirty-three centuries—which has elapsed since the several Books of Scripture were written; and that during all but four centuries of this time they have been circulated and transmitted *in manuscript*; and the additional fact that our knowledge of antiquity is exceedingly limited and imperfect—many minute and sometimes important circumstances pertaining to every event having passed irrecoverably from the memory of mankind—where these disadvantages which attend the investigation of the subject, are taken into account, it surely cannot be too much to believe, that, if in any instance the explanation adduced should seem inadequate, a knowledge of *all* the circumstances of the case would supply the missing link and solve the supposed discrepancy to the complete satisfaction of every reasonable mind.”

J. B. A.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

There is certainly not more than the ordinary degree of interest attaching to the last quarter's instalment of new books. From the days of Sir William Jones to the present time, increasing attention has been paid to the subjects of ethnography and comparative grammar and theology. During this entire period the Parsees¹ have continued to attract a special notice. We have here a new claimant to the eminence in the hard science of values.² It is a mistake to suppose that the Chinese can boast no literature.³ By way of example, we saw a cultivated Japanese this summer reading an extended Chinese poem of the ninth century before Christ. After the elaborate article in the Quarterly, little need be said at present about [in] "glorious John."⁴ That paper hardly does full justice to two other names^{5 6} which appear in close succession after his at the bottom of this page. As to the remaining name, it is sufficient to remember that he has restored the lost Paradise. What would John Wilson have said to the new American primer?⁷ Books of reference are always useful.

¹Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees. By Martin Haug, Ph.D. Edited by E. W. West, Ph.D. Vol. XI. in the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library." Second edition. 8vo., xvi., 427 pp., cloth, \$4.50. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

²The Political Economy of Great Britain, the United States, and France, in the Use of Money: A New Science of Production and Exchange. By J. B. Howe. 8vo., ix., 592 pp., \$3.50. *Ibid.*

³The Dhammapada. Translated from the Chinese by the Rev. Samuel Beat, B. A. Vol. xii. of the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library." 8vo., viii., 176 pp., \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Dryden's Poetical Works. 2 vols. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$3.50. Riverside edition. *Ibid.*

⁵Prior's Poetical Works. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$1.75. Riverside edition. *Ibid.*

⁶Poetical Works of Milton and Marvell. Complete in two volumes. With Memoirs and Portraits. Crown 8vo., gilt top, \$3.50. Riverside edition. *Ibid.*

⁷A Primer of American Literature. By Charles F. Richardson. 18mo., 117 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

but seldom require pictures.¹ Who wants to study Russian?² If any, the opportunity has arrived. We should sooner think of studying Basque or Coptic.³

Masson in his biography of John Milton has taught us how much the author of "the Paradise" owed to the author of the Faery Queen.⁴ The question now agitated is, To what extent was the courtly Elizabethan a benefactor also to the Bedford Tinker? Sir Walter Scott was a passionate admirer of Edmund Spenser. Of his great poem, it may be said that it is "linked sweetness long drawn out." Those who prefer (as we do, unhesitatingly) the breezy charm of bluff old Chaucer may now (under good guidance, too) begin with him and only end with the Portuguese Sonnets.⁵ We are half inclined to forgive the sweet Quaker poet the false but pretty nonsense about Barbara Freitchie out of consideration of the Vaudois Teacher.⁶ A new volume from such a writer is always to be welcomed—until, as may chance, it must be condemned. Like Dryden, Southey was as successful in prose as in verse.⁷ Unlike Dryden, he was far more so. Southey's verse and Dryden's prose are now read by few. Yet there is a

¹The Dickens Dictionary. By Gilbert A. Pierce and William A. Wheeler. With many illustrations. Uniform with "Illustrated Library Edition of Dickens." Price reduced to \$2. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

²How to Learn Russian: A Manual for Students of Russian. Based on the Ollendorffian System of Teaching Languages, and adapted for self-instruction. By Henry Riola, Teacher of the Russian Language. With a Preface by W. R. S. Ralston. 12mo., 567 pp., \$3. *Ibid.*

³Key to the Exercises of the Manual for Students of Russian. By Henry Riola. 12mo., 125 pp., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁴Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser. Riverside Edition. 3 vols. Crown 8vo., cloth, gilt, \$5.25. *Ibid.*

⁵The Family Library of British Poetry, from Chaucer to the Present Time (1350-1878). Edited by James T. Fields and Edwin P. Whipple. With heliotype portraits of Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Goldsmith, Burns, Wordsworth, Scott, Byron, Tennyson, and Mrs. Browning. Royal 8vo., xxx., 1,998 pp., \$6.50. *Ibid.*

⁶The Vision of Echard, and other Poems. By John G. Whittier. 16mo., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁷Poetical Works of Robert Southey. "Riverside Edition of the British Poets." 5 vols. Crown 8vo., \$8.75. *Ibid.*

species of ponderous merit in the cantos which sing "How happily the days of Thalaba went by."

Calvin wisely forebore to comment on the last book in the New Testament. Much light has since been shed upon its transcendent symbols by Hengstenberg, Auberlen, Fairbairn, Waldegrave, and Ramsey. We may, not improbably, find ourselves once more on this account indebted to a German pastor.¹ Luthardt's² fame as an exegete is settled; but there are grave drawbacks. Lampe and Godet are esteemed the best books on the Fourth Gospel. Much of what is finest in modern literature takes its rise in the *chansons* of the Troubadours;³ and their romantic story never grows wearisome to the student of history and language. Others besides fishermen are enthusiasts in their love for one who is at once the prince among angling scribblers and a delightful old-fashioned fireside companion.⁴ The Oxford Lecturer's⁵ is a high name in a difficult and profitable field of thought. Mr. Howell⁶ is a rising man in the same department. What may be the reason-of-being of another history of the Peninsular War⁷ after Napier's grave but splendid and seemingly exhaustive treatment of that subject passes our wit. "Insatiate archer, will not one suffice"? This, however, is the day of duodecimos!

¹The Doctrine of the Apocalypse, and its Relation to the Doctrine of the Gospel and Epistles of John. By Pastor Hermann Gebhardt. Translated from the German by the Rev. John Jefferson. Svo., cloth, \$3. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²St. John's Gospel Described and Explained according to its Peculiar Character. Vol. iii. By C. E. Luthardt. Svo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

³The Troubadours: A History of Provençal Life and Literature in the Middle Ages. By Francis Hueffer. Svo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁴The Complete Angler. By Isaak Walton and Charles Cotton. A new illustrated edition, with Notes, by George Christopher Davies. 12mo., 470 pp. "The Chandos Library Edition," cloth, gilt, \$1; "The Chandos Classics Edition," paper, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁵Chapters on Political Economy: Being the Substance of Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford. By Bonamy Price. 12mo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁶The Conflicts of Capital and Labor, Historically and Economically Considered. By George Howell. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁷The War in the Peninsula. By H. R. Clinton. "Chandos Library." With maps and plans. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

All continental travellers will hail with joy the appearance of Bædeker's London.¹ There is nothing to compare to these guides, considered as a series. Galignani is the book for Paris. Hare's books on Italy and London are of inestimable richness, but are far above the level of mere travelling guides, and are not portable. The eulogium of Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France has seemed to us to be extravagant; but "*L'Esprit des Loix*" is one of the works that marks an epoch.² The treatment of the subject is one of startling novelty. The characteristic features of the several forms of government are given with a delusive air of precision and accuracy. There is much that is superficial and fanciful in the book, and much that has endured the test of ages. We are more partial to the manner of Hallam or DeTocqueville. Agnosticism had better be insulated than conducted.³ The island meant in this case is an imaginary one and *not* England. The author is a clever writer. The Latinity of Desiderius "Erasmíus" is probably the best since that of Cicero, and his lambent satire has never been successfully imitated.⁴ The other one (Francis William), we are glad to see, has taken to literary subjects. The physic of the late Henry Rogers was too much for his "spiritual" constitution. His brother, the Oxford priest, is one of the great masters of English and of Romish dialectics and exegesis.⁵ Is not Mr. Brassey the

¹London and its Environs: Including Excursions to the Isle of Wight. Handbook for Travellers. By K. Bædeker. 16mo., cloth, \$2.50. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²The Spirit of Laws. By M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. With D'Alembert's Analysis of the Work. Translated from the French by Thomas Nugent, LL.D. A new edition, revised, with additional Notes, and a new Memoir from the latest French editions. By J. V. Prichard. 2 vols., \$2.80. *Ibid.*

³The New Paul and Virginia; or, Positivism on an Island. By W. H. Mallock. Uniform in type and binding with "The New Republic." \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴Colloquies of Erasmus. Translated by N. Bailey. Edited, with Notes, by the Rev. E. Johnson, M. A. 2 vols. 8vo., cloth, \$7. *Ibid.*

⁵An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. By John Henry Newman. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

member who navigates so many vessels?¹ The Bampton Lectures on Miracles² are masterly, but concede much.

Whatever may be thought of the prime minister's eye-brow and curl, there is no doubt of his genius or of the figure he will make in English history.³ Right or wrong in his treatment of Peel, he has realised the early dream of Tancred and Coningsby, and raised England from a second-rate to a first-rate power. Yet the ides are not over. John Leech is probably the cleverest caricaturist that ever lived, and but for John Tenniel Punch would hardly have survived him. The historian of the Crimean War had already made his fame by a literary *tour de force*, which atoned for his silence in the House of Commons.⁴ By a happy coincidence, John Morley, the editor of the *Fortnightly Review*, is whitening the sepulchres of Rousseau⁵ and Voltaire⁶ at the very time that Dennis Kearney and Robert Ingersoll are rattling the dishonored bones of Tom Paine. Morley is a learned but heavy critic, a refined scholar, and a bitter opponent of Christianity. We know nothing of this volume,⁷ but just such a handy-book on England as a whole has been in request among tourists. Murray twaddles; and demands a shelf for his district-guide. A friend once remarked to us of Kane's book, "There is but one idea in it!" "What is that?" we asked. "Ice!" was the reply. This is another book on the same thrilling, but also chilling topic.⁸

¹Lectures on the Labor Question. By Thomas Brassey, M. P. Third edition. London, 1878. 8vo., cloth, \$3. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²Eight Lectures on the Miracles. By J. B. Mozley. (Bampton Lectures.) 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

³Benjamin Disraeli, in upwards of One Hundred Cartoons, from the Collection of "Mr. Punch." Drawn by John Leech and John Tenniel. 4to., paper, \$1.25; cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴Eothen. By W. A. Kinglake. New edition. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁵Rousseau. Vol. I. of the "New Uniform Edition of John Morley's Works." Complete in one volume, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁶Voltaire. Vol. II. of the "New Uniform Edition of John Morley's Works." Complete in one volume, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁷Handbook for England and Wales. Alphabetically arranged for the use of Travellers. With an outline map. 12mo., cloth, \$4. *Ibid.*

⁸The Great Frozen Sea: A Personal Narrative of the Voyage of the "Alert" during the Arctic Expedition of 1875-6. By Captain Albert Hastings Markham. With numerous illustrations. 8vo., cloth, \$9. *Ibid.*

There is more glow, if not more glitter, about the royal coffers we come next to open.¹ The great Surrey pastor writes as well as he preaches; and take him for all in all, where shall we find his equal as an expounder of the Scriptures for the multitude?

“Verdant Green” and “Tom Brown at Oxford” give us capital glimpses of certain aspects of Oxford life. Bristed’s autobiographic sketches and criticisms still left something to be done of the kind now attempted by Mr. Stedman.² The popularity of the Jewish historian,³ though not everywhere as great as it was in Edinburgh in the boyish days of Robert Chambers, is as steady as it is wide-spread. The Tübingen critics mention him with the awe reserved by believers for inspired authors. Yet we should not for that or any other reason undervalue the services of this honest and able writer, who is often our chief and sometimes our only dependence. We once perused an essay on “Ham and Eggs,” lamenting the apparently indissoluble nature of the tie that uniformly connects them in the same dish. It is with somewhat of the same feeling of regret, not unmingled with apprehension, that we approach the uncut leaves of Mr. Urwick’s lexicon.⁴ The grammar is easily distanced by the dictionary in the arena of dogmatic disputation. Notwithstanding, this may be and is likely to be (as from a second edition in Germany) a work of some mark. A good idea.⁵ Mr. Morley⁶ is judged to have come off better with his narrative than with his critical estimate of the

¹The Treasury of David. Vol. V. By C. H. Spurgeon. 8vo., cloth, \$4. Scribner & Welford. New York.

²Oxford: Its Social and Intellectual Life. With Remarks and Hints on Expenses and Examinations, the Selection of Books, etc. By Algernon M. M. Stedman. 12mo., cloth, \$3.75. *Ibid.*

³Josephus’s Complete Works. By William Muston. New edition. 12mo., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament, Greek. Translated from the German of the second edition. With additional matter and corrections by the author. By William Urwick. 4to., cloth, \$10. *Ibid.*

⁵Selected Essays, Chiefly from Contributions to the *Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews*. By A. Hayward, Q. C. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. *Ibid.*

⁶Diderot and the Encyclopædists. Vol. III. of the “Uniform Edition of Morley’s Biographies.” By John Morley. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

Encyclopædists. A question of such momentous importance as the one supposed to have been set at rest by Diderot, D'Holbach, and their *confrères*, could not be fairly dealt with by so prejudiced a court as that of the *Fortnightly*. Nobody has pretended to more knowledge about Russia than Mr. Eugene Schuyler,¹ who here puts Count Tolstoy into English form. The rage for this class of works has, however, subsided for a while; though there are symptoms of its early revival. On the whole, let us hope that the peace of Europe, if *not* of Asia, has been secured. The effect of music² on the human soul is one of the things that materialism fails to account for. Such a theme³ by such a writer will make many mouths water. "*O si sic omnes.*" But the Archbishop³ is not a man to follow blindfold. Neither, for the matter of that, was John Calvin. Professor Perry's book⁴ was as lively as it was sound, but apparently written in some haste. The chapter on currency, for instance, had not been perfectly analysed. It is a work of rare merit. Dunlop and Long and Mommsen, and now Crutwell.⁵ The theme is inexhaustible. May the day be distant when the portcullis of Merton shall give way under the pressure of the men who know not Tully.

Whatever Dr. Shedd⁶ writes for the press is sure to be valuable and interesting. The robust literature of theology and history is

¹The Cossacks. Translated by Eugene Schuyler from the Russian of Count Tolstoy. Small 12mo., 310 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

²A Concise History of Music, from the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Present Time. By H. G. B. Hunt, B. Mus. For the use of students. 12mo., 200 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³Lectures on Mediæval Church History. By R. C. Trench, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. 8vo., 454 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴Elements of Political Economy. By Professor A. L. Perry. New edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo., 621 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁵A History of Roman Literature: From the Earliest Period to the Death of Marcus Aurelius. By Charles Thomas Crutwell, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. With chronological tables, etc. Crown 8vo., 520 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁶Literary Essays. By the Rev. Wm. G. T. Shedd, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York. With a new portrait of Dr. Shedd, engraved on steel by Mr. Ritchie. 8vo., 377 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

not the only literature with which the learned professor is richly acquainted. The time should have come for a new synthesis, by one who is not only a competent scholar but a competent artist, of so much of the early Roman story as has resisted the acid of sober criticism.¹ We boldly avow the opinion, that nothing has been written in the vernacular since Junius that has so keen an edge as these papers on the career of Disraeli.² They are currently attributed to the editor of the *Daily News*. They are certainly the work of a consummate master of language, of allusion, of the subtlest as well as the broadest irony, as well as an expert in the cunning fence of political debate and in the treatment of political affairs. This little volume of recollections³ has the finest aroma for the lovers of Charles Lamb and of refined literary gossip. The gentle authors were held in deserved estimation by some of the most famous wits and poets of the past generation. "The Speaker's Commentary"⁴ has already been noticed in these pages. It is in some important respects the most satisfactory commentary we yet have on the Old Testament. It strikes the golden mean betwixt books of a popular and devotional nature, and works of a severely critical character. It presents in an intelligible form the results of the recent antiquarian research. It nevertheless has serious defects and blemishes. It often lacks the vigor of the older and more practical school of exegetes, whilst it is not critical enough to meet the demands of the more thoughtful student. It is somewhat

¹Early Rome: From the Foundation of the City to its Destruction by the Gauls. By W. Ihne, Ph.D., Professor at the University of Heidelberg. With map. 16mo., 238 pp., cloth, \$1. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

²Political Adventures of Lord Beaconsfield. 192 pp., paper, forty cents. *Ibid.*

³Recollections of Writers. By Charles and Mary Cowden Clarke. With letters of Charles Lamb, Leigh Hunt, Douglas Jerrold, and Charles Dickens. 12mo., 355 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴The Bible Commentary: The Speaker's Commentary, Explanatory and Critical, with a Revision of the Translation. By Bishops and Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M. A., Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, and Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen. *Ibid.*

tainted, too, with what may be justly described as Semi-Rationalism. These Letters¹ of the German Chancellor are vastly diverting, and have modified, and yet in some things confirmed, the view we had of him before we read them—or rather read some of them. The Prince comes out emphatically and impetuously on the side of religion. A stern sense of duty to God, he tells us, is all that keeps him at the helm of State. It appears he is as good a cook as a diplomatist. The glimpses of autobiography and of contemporary history are of special interest and sometimes of great value. The Yale President² discusses of American education as few others can do. We warm to him just now (and forgive his chapter on "System" in "The Human Intellect"), because of the remorseless castigation he has just administered to Mr. Tyndall for his late address on man regarded as a machine. The great reply to Farrar³ is that of Dr. McElhinny of the Alexandria Seminary. A good subject.⁴ All questions are reopened now-a-days.⁵ The question about Agnosticism⁶ is a question only with the sceptic. Theism is no longer in question, except among infidels, but "in proof!" The evidence is unassailable.

If the "Young Folk's History of Germany,"⁷ by Charlotte Yonge, has the charm of the Child's History of England by Charles Dickens, it is a good book. "England's Worthies,"⁸ "forgotten"

¹Prince Bismarck's Letters to his Wife, his Sister, and Others, from 1844 to 1870. Translated from the German by Fitzh. Moxse. 12mo., 269 pp., cloth, \$1. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

²The American Colleges and the American Public, with After-Thoughts on College and School Education. A new, revised, and enlarged edition. By President Noah Porter, D. D. 12mo., 408 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³"What is the Eternal Hope of Canon Farrar?" Being a Review and Reply to his Book. Cloth, 75 cents. Pott, Young & Co., New York.

⁴Sketches of Church History. By the Rev. J. C. Robertson. 12mo., 130 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵What is Natural Theology? By the Rev. Alfred Barry. 12mo., 327 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶Theism or Agnosticism. By Rev. B. Maitland. 12mo., 239 pp., cloth, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁷Young Folk's History of Germany. By Charlotte M. Yonge. Map and eighty-one illustrations. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

⁸Men of Mark; or, Heroes of English History. By William Marshall, D. D. 12mo., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

and unforgotten, stand high on the scroll of *Viri Illustrissimi*; and deserve better at the hands of Massachusetts than to be rapt from the repose of antique vellum and stately folio to the poor apotheosis of flimsy cloth and twelve times folded rags. We have lately said our say of the author¹ of the "Holy War" and "The Jerusalem Sinner Saved." With possibly one exception, he was the strongest imaginative genius of the century. Over and above all this, he was one of the soundest of exegetical and practical theologians, and the most popular of theologians, whether sound or unsound. Then, too, he has given to the world one of the noblest models in existence of English style. We ought to be sincerely grateful to the venerable scholar and ex-president for the guidance he here offers to the untitled and the immature.² America owes a debt to the old "Grecian" and interpreter of the classics and the Bible that cannot be otherwise than "*forcibly re-adjusted.*" At last the rarely gifted Virginian³ has obtained the recognition of both hemispheres. His present biographer tells the sad story calmly and well, though not without a dash of pardonable bitterness. There has been no more original poet in our time. His fault is in pushing the mysterious too far in the direction of obscurity and horror. Yet, in his verse, his "every idea will to melody run." The recent prevalence of yellow fever in unaccustomed places makes Dr. Logan's book⁴ a timely one.

The greatest of modern historians in the ancient acceptation of the term.⁵ The author of "The Decline and Fall" followed the French in his idiom and his irreligion. The amplitude, the honesty, and the worth of his citations have never been contested.

¹The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan. With illustrations by Stothard, and vignette title engraved by Marsh. New edition. \$1.25. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

²Helpful Thoughts for Young Men. By Ex-President Woolsey, of Yale College. New edition. 12mo., cloth, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

³The Life of Edgar A. Poe. By William F. Gill. Fourth edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo., 347 pp., cloth, \$1.75. W. & J. Widdleton, New York.

⁴Physics of the Infectious Diseases. By C. A. Logan, A. M., M. D. 12mo., 212 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Jansen, McClurg & Co., Chicago.

⁵Gibbon. By J. C. Morison. "English Men of Letters." 12mo., cloth, 75 cents. Harper & Bros., New York.

The accomplished editor of the *Spectator* has rewritten for us the life of Scott.¹ The work is thought to be well done, and contains many suggestive remarks and novel judgments. The student's *vade mecum* in extra-biblical Church history—we mean the well known work of Philip Smith²—is chiefly defective because of the enormous multitude of the facts to be epitomised. The man who suggested the steamboat lived a life that was worthy of record.³ The best works that have been put forth of late years on the Atonement are those of Professor A. A. Hodge and Hugh Martin. We know nothing of this treatise by Dr. Samson⁴ except what is told us on the title page. We are free to own that we do not admire *the style* of the title. The two wizards^{5 6} are here placed side by side. Andersen has more poetic genius, Grimm more homely variety and better plots. Of the two, Andersen loses far the most by translation even into kindred tongues.

The two gentlemen who have undertaken the biography of the statesman and orator of Georgia⁷ are singularly qualified, one should say, to do so, on the score of their talents, their acquirements, and their experience. Since it has been found out that Democritus and Lucretius have forestalled the egotistic science of the nineteenth century, they have been more run after than

¹Sir Walter Scott. By R. H. Hutton. 12mo., cloth, 75 cents. Harper & Bros., New York.

²Student's Ecclesiastical History. By Philip Smith. 12mo., cloth. \$2.75. *Ibid.*

³The Life of John Fitch, the Inventor of the Steamboat. By Thompson Westcott. With illustrations. New edition. 12mo., cloth, \$1.25. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

⁴The Atonement: Viewed as Assumed Divine Responsibility; Traced as the Fact Attested in Divine Revelation; Shown to be the Truth Harmonising Christian Theories; and Recognised as the Grace Realised in Human Experience. By G. W. Samson, D. D. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵Hans Andersen's Fairy Tales. A new translation by Mrs. H. B. Paull. Especially adapted and arranged for young people. With original illustrations. 672 pp., cloth, black and gold, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶Grimm's Fairy Tales. A new translation by Mrs. H. B. Paull. Especially adapted, etc. Uniform with "Andersen's Fairy Tales. 16mo., nearly 600 pp., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁷Life of Alexander H. Stephens. By Richard Malcolm Johnston and William Hand Browne. 8vo., cloth extra, \$3. *Ibid.*

ever.¹ "The Southern Household Companion"² gives a comprehensive and captivating account of itself. The "People's Edition" of the Waverley series³ is one of the cheapest forms in which these delightful and indispensable volumes can be had. The editor of the *Portfolio*⁴ (an art journal) is a marvel of versatility. Nothing will content him but he must enter the lists with M. Taine. With a sudden transition, *presto* we change to the quaint and memorable pages of the titled and pious English doctor.⁵ For some odd reason we always associate in our mind with the "Religio Medici" of Browne the "Utopia" of Thomas More. They are in reality as unlike as the "Utopia" and the "New Atlantis" are like one another.

No one writes more pointed papers than the active pastor of Brooklyn.⁶ They are always as terse and racy as they are evangelical. The eighth volume of this series⁷ crowns the historical labors of the pictorial chronicler and brave defender of the Reformation. This is already the approved narrative of the labors of Calvin and his coadjutors. The old paths of catechetical prolongation are by M. T. S.,⁸ abridged and beautified, and thus converted into "primrose paths" of easy household chat. The character

¹Lucretius. By W. H. Mallock. Vol. VIII. of the supplemental series of "Ancient Classics for English Readers." Edited by the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M. A. 12mo., cloth, \$1. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

²The Southern Household Companion: Containing valuable information on all subjects connected with Domestic and Rural Affairs, Gardening, Cookery, Beverages, Dairy, Medical, Veterinary, and Miscellaneous. By Mrs. Mary L. Edgeworth. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

³Waverley Novels. "People's Edition." New edition illustrated. 12 vols., crown 8vo., fine cloth, in neat box, \$12. *Ibid.*

⁴Modern Frenchmen. By P. G. Hamerton. Square 12mo., cloth, \$2. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

⁵Religio Medici and Miscellaneous Writings of Sir Thomas Browne. 16mo., cloth, \$1.25. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

⁶Pointed Papers on the Christian Life. By the Rev. T. L. Cuyler. 12mo., 360 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

⁷D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin. Vol. VIII., completing the work. With full Index to set. 12mo., \$2; the set, eight volumes, \$16. *Ibid.*

⁸Home Lessons on the Old Paths; or, Conversations on the Assembly's Shorter Catechism. By M. T. S. 16mo., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

and the writings of John¹ are as pure and unfathomable as the unsullied and luminous blue sky. Robert Hall used to read two chapters in Matthew Henry² every day. Macduff³ is felicitous and full of unction. "Outlines of Theology"⁴ occupies a place by itself and a place of high merit. The Bath clergyman⁵ is in general a safe interpreter of Scripture, and a writer of tact and fervor.

The miraculous and parabolic elements in the Old Testament afford abundant scope to gifted sermonisers.⁶ The honored names of Dr. Browne and Bishop Ellicott seem to guarantee the soundness of this little book on inspiration.⁷ The father of political economy⁸ once more advances to the front, and takes up a question of which it may be said, "*Nodus vindice dignus.*" The last book on our list⁹ is evidently a compilation, but the subject is one of unusual interest. We notice the omission in the title page of Taney and Binney. H. C. A.

¹John, Whom Jesus Loved. By Dr. Culross. 12mo., \$1.25. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

²Henry's Commentary on the Bible. 5 vols. 4to., cloth, \$15. *Ibid.*

³Brighter than the Sun. By the Rev. Dr. Macduff. New edition. \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴Hodge's Outlines of Theology. New edition, rewritten and enlarged. *Ibid.*

⁵Help Heavenward. By Octavius Winslow, D. D. 18mo., 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁶Outlines of Sermons on the Miracles and Parables of the Old Testament. Original and selected. By a London Clergyman. 12mo., cloth, \$2. T. Whitaker, New York.

⁷The Inspiration of Holy Scripture. By the Rt. Rev. E. Harold Browne, D. D., and C. J. Ellicott, D. D. Square 18mo., cloth, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁸The Wealth of Nations. By Adam Smith. 12mo., 780 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁹Short Studies of Great Lawyers: Containing a Brief Biography and Critical Estimate of the Character and Career of the Leading English and American Lawyers and Judges, including Coke, Mansfield, Kenyon, Thurlow, Loughsborough, Ellenborough, Erskine, Eldon, Romilly, Abinger, Brougham, Parsons, Kent, Marshall, Pinckney, Wirt, Riker, Story, Webster, Walworth, and Choate. By Irving Browne. 12mo., 386 pp., \$2. Weed, Parsons & Co., Albany, N. Y.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXX.—NO. 2.

APRIL, MDCCCLXXIX.

ARTICLE I.

MEDIÆVAL AND MODERN MYSTICS.

1. *Ullman's Reformers before the Reformation.* Translated by Rev. ROBERT MENZIES. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
2. *The History and Life of the Rev. Dr. John Tauler,* with twenty-five of his Sermons. Translated by SUSANNA WINKWORTH; Preface by Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY; Introduction by Rev. ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D. D., Washburn Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Union Theological Seminary (New York). New York: Wiley & Halsted.
3. *Madame Guyon and Fenelon.* By THOS. C. UPHAM, Professor in Bowdoin College. Harper & Bros., New York.

WHAT MYSTICISM IS.

Difficult indeed would be the task of defining the undefinable. Mysticism is not like the sun, the moon, the planets, all which give the telescopic observer a sharp-edged disk; not even like the fixed stars which present glittering points, or at least approximations thereto; but like the zodiacal light stretching back from the sun just after nightfall in long vagueness of splendor; or the nebula in Andromeda shining yonder from age to age, an undefined luminosity. Like the nebula, it is, however, a reality; it has a central aggregation from which on all sides it passes away gradually into utter faintness.

We take this nucleus to be an aspiration after an intuition; a longing for immediate communion with the Greatest and the Best. Ullman says of John Wessel that he "has also a mystical element. . . . He strives, like the mystics, to break through the limits of the finite, to blend himself in love and longing with God, and, as the principal means of union with him, employs contemplation and prayer." Dr. Hitchcock characterises the mystics as "inordinately bent on hiding their lives in God." Kingsley says they are "all inclined to claim some illumination, intuition, or direct vision of eternal truth, eternal good, eternal beauty, even of that eternal Father in whom all live and move and have their being."

PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF MYSTICISM.

A phenomenon which has appeared and re-appeared so often in the Church, must find something within man to which it appeals. We might almost say a man is a born mystic, or else he never becomes one; *nascitur, non fit*. To be more exact, there are some persons, who, like George Fox, spontaneously develop into mystics; others, like the excellent Penn, easily absorb the infection; then after every conceivable degree of liability to contract the disease, we arrive at mental constitutions so robust as to repel its most powerful attacks.

So far as the intellect is concerned, we apprehend the differences between men in this respect to be closely allied to the different proportions in which the intuitive and the discursive faculties are comprehended in each individual. Every man has both of these faculties, and it must be owned that the discursive is ultimately for the intuitive, and not the intuitive for the discursive. But there may be a just balance of these powers; or the discursive may so predominate as to make the man a mere mathematician, or metaphysician, or dialectician; or the intuitive may be so overshadowing as to produce a dreamer, a theosophist, a mystic.

The common way of expressing this difference in men is to say that the one is a Platonist, the other an Aristotelian. There is a modicum of truth in this statement; only a modicum, for Plato

was a powerful dialectician. He could hardly have been so long under the influence of that cogent and subtle reasoner, Socrates, without cultivating his own discursive faculty to the last degree of which it was susceptible.* On the other hand, Aristotle insists in his *Organum* upon the absolute prior need of first truths, if we would reason at all. Yet we cannot but suspect that the intuitive was paramount in Plato's mental constitution and the discursive in Aristotle's, and that this will explain Dr. Shedd's result (*History of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. I., p. 60): "In this way, Platonism, under the treatment of the New-Platonics, degenerated into an imaginative theosophy; and Aristotelianism, in the handling of the later schoolmen, became mere hair-splitting." The trouble in both cases arose, he says, "from an exaggeration of one particular element in each, and its sole employment in philosophising upon Christianity to the neglect of the remaining elements of the system." This, however, could scarcely have happened as it did, unless Plato and Aristotle had differed in their own leanings.

Another phraseology discriminates the Pauline from the Johannean type. Forceful, but inexact concretion of thought, doing injustice to Paul, who was a man of rare intellectual balance. Yet, again, the discursive minds of the Church turn to Paul's writings, and the mystically inclined find refreshment in those of the beloved disciple. The born dialectician will hardly become a mystic. No, their ranks must be recruited from men of imagination, from contemplatists, and from dreamers.

Leaving the intellect now, and seeking for the roots of mysticism in the domain of the sensibilities, we find in all men more or less, in some men a very ardent, longing for repose. The coveted boon may be a rest from the accusations of a guilty conscience and a sense of the just indignation of God. Our Luthers and Bunyans are types of this class, which, however, is not very productive of mystics.

*"The poetical essays of his [Plato's] youth were discontinued after he became more intimately acquainted with Socrates. . . . A young man, endowed with a luxuriant fancy, he received the logical discipline to which Socrates subjected him as a kindness worthy of all gratitude." Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I., p. 101.

A second class seek for rest from intellectual toil. They are disinclined to research, to laborious comparison of scripture with scripture, to wearisome deduction of one truth from another. It is so much easier to say, "God has revealed this or that truth to me," either as an exposition of scripture or as a strictly new revelation. We speak now not as before of the intellectual ability to reason, but of the slothful aversion to ratiocination; of the desire to grasp the wealth of knowledge without paying the divinely appointed price of labor.

A third class long for rest from the struggle against sin. They would by one *coup de main* of the will, one so-called act of consecration, terminate the battle. They would by one eagle wing-flap soar above the smoke, dust, and din of the Church militant.

A fourth, and it is our last class, are the invalid corps of the Church; the worn, the disappointed, the sick, the aged, the recluses of constraint or of choice. The trumpet no longer summons them to battle. Pæans of victory do not, as once, burst from their lips. Their daily monody is

"I long, oh! I long to be there!"

The gentle mystics come largely from this class. Let us be very tender to them, even as the Shepherd of Israel bears them in his arms.

From this pathology it will appear that objective mysticism is an exaggeration, a want of balance, resulting psychologically from a one-sidedness of original constitution or of development, and admitting of a boundless variety of degree and modification—as a ship may go directly with the wind and thus keep its decks level; or may sail across the wind at various angles and careen accordingly; or may be struck at right angles to its length by a sudden and violent squall throwing it on its beam-ends, and, if it be ill ballasted, causing it to founder in mid ocean.

THREE CLASSES OF MYSTICS.

Dr. Shedd subdivides into these three classes: 1. Mystic Scholastics. 2. Heretical Mystics. 3. Latitudinarian Mystics. "The Mystic Scholastics were those who held the hereditary or-

thodoxy of the Church, and sought to reach the meaning of the old symbols and doctrines by a contemplative and practical method; yet not to the entire exclusion of the speculative and scientific. Such men were Bernard († 1153), Hugh St. Victor († 1141), Richard St. Victor († 1173), William of Champeaux († 1113), Bonaventura († 1274)." *Hist. Chr. Doct., I., 79.*

Christ announced himself as the Truth and the Life. We may fail to render unto the Truth the things which belong unto the Truth; or, on the other hand, to render unto the Life the things that belong to the Life. The former of these is the error of the mystic; the latter, at least a prominent error of many of the scholastics. A man might be both a scholastic and a mystic in one sense of the terms, *i. e.*, by rendering their dues to both the Truth and the Life. But this was an unusual phenomenon. Pronounced mysticism and pronounced scholasticism seem to us to have been natural enemies.

Milman says (*Book XIV., Ch. 3*):

"It is an error to suppose mysticism as the perpetual antagonist of scholasticism; the mystics were often severe logicians: the scholastics had all the passion of mystics. Nor were the scholastics always Aristotelians and nominalists, or the mystics realists and Platonists. The logic was often that of Aristotle, the philosophy that of Plato."

Yet in the same connexion he tells us that

"From the hard and arid system of Peter the Lombard the profound devotion of the Middle Ages took refuge in mysticism. . . . Hugo and Richard de St. Victor (the Abbey of St. Victor at Paris) were the great mystics of this period. The mysticism of Hugo de St. Victor withdrew the contemplator altogether from the outward to the inner world—from God in the works of nature to God in his workings on the soul of man. This contemplation of God, the consummate perfection of man, is immediate, not mediate. Through the angels and the celestial hierarchy of the Areopagite, it aspires to one God, not in his theophany, but in his inmost essence. All ideas and forms of things are latent in the human soul, as in God; only they are manifested to the soul by its own activity, its meditative power. . . . Thus the silent, solemn cloister was as it were constantly balancing the noisy and pugnacious school. The system of the St. Victors is the contemplative philosophy of deep-thinking minds in their profound seclusion, not of intellectual gladiators." (*Latin Chris., Vol. VIII., p. 240-1.*)

If by a scholastic we mean merely a man who spent his life in

reading and writing theology, it is manifest that a scholastic might readily be a mystic. But if we mean by the term one who discussed theology in a scientific way, using a logical method, answering all objectors, thrusting and parrying, we cannot well see how such a man could have been a St. Victor. St. Augustine with his vast territory of intellect may have been a combination of the consummate logician and the profound mystic; but St. Augustines are rare phenomena. Jonathan Edwards, in more recent times, furnishes an instance of subtle ratiocination and ecstatic fervor.

Taking the terms, then, in their very best sense, we deem the scholastic mystics the highest style of theologians. Their pathway lies along the lofty summit of a ridge from which there is a too easy descent on either side. Such men never give in to the heresy that the pursuit of truth is better than its possession. They are not guilty of the solecism of pursuing the pursuit of truth. Truth and holiness; truth in order to holiness; holiness by means of the truth; truth sought in order that it may be gained, and when gained, may sanctify: this, in brief, is the purpose and the method of a true theology. This would have preserved the scholastics from their enormous waste of subtlety and logical power on trivial questions. Supplemented by just views of the right methods of acquiring knowledge, it would have spared the Church the evils of mysticism.*

*We have followed Dr. Shedd's classification, although it does not suit our purposes as well as it did his. In giving a history of Christian doctrine one would naturally make orthodoxy the standard, and differentiate heresies and heterodoxies from it by the amount of their divergence from the truth—as though they were so many variations of the needle from the true meridian. Neither is it easy to make a more satisfactory classification on any plan other than Dr. Shedd's. We suggest the following: Our emotional and intellectual natures are so closely related, and the impossibility of experiencing an emotion without a preceding intellection is so utter, that the mystics themselves have been unable to invert or wholly ignore the mental process. Then we may select as the principle of the division, the source of the intellection. When it is derived from the Scripture by a claimed but imaginary illumination of the Holy Spirit, the result may be a sense of measureless repose or of jubilant delight. When the mystic deems himself the recipient of a new revelation, it is a

THE HERETICAL MYSTICS.

It would have been better at once to call these the Pantheistic mystics. Pantheism seems at first sight the most absurd of all imaginable theories of the universe. It emerges, however, in the speculations of the ancient Hindus and Greeks; it has largely influenced the thinkers of Germany; practical, commercial New England has not escaped the malaria. Dr. Emmons unwittingly maintained it; and the Church has had to cry out

“Quo tantum mihi dexter abis?”

even to the astute and most evangelical Jonathan Edwards.

JOHN ERIGENA SCOTUS († 880).

This remarkable man was educated in one of the famous Irish schools, and found a patron in Charles the Bald, King of France. He read not only the Latin, but also the Greek Fathers, and thus fell under the influence of the New-Platonists. The works of the pseudo Dionysius which had appeared first about A. D. 532 were sent by the Greek Emperor to the Emperor Louis the Pious in A. D. 824. They were translated into Latin by the Abbot Hilduin, and again at the instance of Charles the Bald by Scotus. If such a thing be possible, Scotus was both a theist and a pantheist. He prays devoutly to God and to Christ; yet at other times utters pure pantheism. Speaking of God, he says: “Himself alone is truly *per se*, and everything which is truly said to be in those things which are, is himself alone. . . . He is the end of all things, which seek him that they may rest in him eternally and unchangeably.” God, truly speaking (according to Scotus), neither creates nor is created. The creature

case of enthusiasm, properly so called. When the mind evolves from its own depths a consciousness of essential union with the Absolute of which it is only a transient individualisation; when it derives nothing from the Scriptures except some wretched perversions of the mystical and living union of Christ with the Father and with the Church, the phenomenon is Pantheism. Hence using a subordinate principle in subdividing the first into two classes, we have, 1. The Mysticism of Quietism; 2. That of Ecstasy; 3. Of Enthusiasm; 4. Of Pantheism. More than one of these, however, might be found in a single mystic. The Quietist might be an Enthusiast, or even a Pantheist.

subsists in God. In the creature God is created in a wonderful and ineffable manner. The Invisible manifests himself as visible, the Incomprehensible as comprehensible, the Infinite as finite. With other pantheists, he denied the real objective existence of sin. God was all in all, and even the semblance of evil should finally be driven from the universe of creation which was the manifestation form of God.

It is interesting, though not wonderful, that whenever and wherever pantheism appears, the original principle is developed into the same forms. Even the phraseology and the poetical similitudes are strikingly alike. Shedd justly remarks that pantheism may be reached by two routes, the cold dialectic, or "the rejection of all logical methods, and the substitution of mere feelings and intuitions for clear discriminations and conceptions." (P. 80.) The speculative reason finds it hard to explain the nexus of the Infinite with the finite, and the immanence of second causes, while yet "all things consist" in God. This, apart from any professed belief of the Scriptures. But there are passages in the inspired documents of our religion which can be and have been wrested from their proper meaning, as for instance Matt. x. 20: "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." This was twisted into a pantheistic sense by Scotus. So also of course the saying of Paul: "In Him we live, move, and have our being."

This loose kind of exposition was in all likelihood fostered by Origen, with whose writings Scotus seems to have been acquainted. Of the second route by which pantheism has been reached, we shall have an example presently; but with regard to this first we may well echo the thought of Neander, that dialecticism and mysticism form "a strange mixture."

MASTER ECKHART.

Eckhart was at one time a Professor in the Dominican Convent of St. Jacques in Paris. This was about the end of the thirteenth century; for in 1304 he was appointed Provincial of the Dominican Order in Saxony. He was esteemed "the most learned man of his day in the Aristotelian philosophy." In him we find again

inconsistencies such as must always arise when a man tries to be a Christian in religion and a pantheist in philosophy. Eckhart longed for peace.

“Dost thou ask me what was the purpose of the Creator when he made the creatures? I answer, Repose. Dost thou ask again what all creatures seek in their spontaneous aspiration? I answer again, Repose. Dost thou ask a third time what the soul seeks in all her motions? I answer, Repose. . . . That word I AM none truly speak but God alone. . . . He has the substance of all things in himself. . . . All things are in God, and all things are God. . . . Simple people conceive that we are to see God as if he stood on that side and we on this. It is not so: God and I are one in the act of my perceiving him.”

These quotations sufficiently exhibit his views.

Prof. Schmidt says:

“Regarding Neo-Platonism as by no means incompatible with Christianity, his philosophical views resemble, in their general tendency, those of Dionysius Areopagiticæ, combining with them the mystical elements contained in the writings of St. Augustine. . . . With Plato himself he is not unacquainted, but cites him several times, calling ‘the Great Parson’ (*Der Grosse Pfaffe*). Scotus Erigena, the translator of the Platonising Dionysius, though not named in his writings, must be regarded as furnishing the starting point for his theories. Of the other mystics of the Middle Ages, he only names St. Bernard. But he has not rested within the systems advanced by any of the philosophies he studied; he made all the ideas that he may have derived from them his own, and gave them a further development, so that his position is that of a thoroughly original thinker.”

Eckhart is interesting also on account of his influence upon John Tauler, who belongs to Dr. Shedd’s third class.

LATITUDINARIAN MYSTICS.

These, says Dr. Shedd, “agreed with the Mystic Scholastics in holding the Church orthodoxy in honor, but from the neglect of scientific investigation lost sight of some parts of the catholic system. The piacular work of Christ, and the doctrine of justification in particular, were misconceived and sometimes overlooked. The best representatives of this class are Von Cölln († 1329), Tauler († 1361), Suso († 1365), Gerson († 1429), Thomas á Kempis († 1471), and the author of the work which goes under the title of ‘Theologia Germanica.’”

JOHN OF RUYSBROEK († 1384).

Ruysbroek's proper place is here, and not, where Dr. Shedd puts him, among the pantheistical mystics. He was born in Belgium, not far from Brussels, about 1293; was educated in part in that city, and in due time was appointed vicar of the church of St. Gudule. He zealously discharged the duties of a secular priest up to his sixtieth year, and then retired into the Augustinian Monastery of Groenendael, two miles from Brussels, in a vast beech forest which extends to Waterloo. Ullman gives 1381 as the date of his death, instead of 1384, as above, from Shedd. A life-long trait of Ruysbroek was a love for solitude and contemplation. In his later days he would plunge into the depths of the forest to meditate and to write on his waxen tablet. He was visited by multitudes of people, among others by Gerhard Groot and John Tauler; but he retained his humility and modesty to the last. Among his writings are the Commentaries on the Tabernacle of the Covenant, The Mirror of Eternal Salvation, and treatises On the Adornment of the Spiritual Nuptials, On the Progress of Religious (*i. e.*, monks), On the Seven Degrees of Love, On the Four Temptations, On True Contemplation. In the absurd legends of his time, he is said to have been haunted by the devil in the form of a hideous monster; but also to have been visited by Christ, who on one occasion, in the presence of the Virgin Mary appearing as the Regina Cœli, and of all the saints, said to him, Thou art my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased. We take these stories of course to have been posthumous. Ruysbroek believed in the Trinity of persons in the one divine essence, and repeatedly taught that God never became the creature and the creature never became God. He held to the true objective reality of sin, and the obligation of the law even over the most advanced earthly saints.

He lays down three great steps toward unity with God, viz., the active, the inward, and the contemplative life. The active life consists in abstinence, penitence, good morals, holy actions, denying ourselves, and taking up the cross, even as Christ did for us. The inward life is one of love, of dissatisfaction with our attainments in spirituality, of longing, of aspiration. Nothing

but God pleases us. "This oneness with a perpetual hunger and intense desire, consumes the object of its love, and constantly gives birth to a new fervor, in which the spirit offers her highest sacrifice." (Quoted by Ullman from Engelhardt's Monograph.) The contemplative life consists in going out of ourselves and becoming one spirit with God. He abides in us and we in him. Our contemplation of him is not unreasonable, but it transcends reason in its mode, and also in its object, which is the absolute. There is a lower stage of this, wherein God flashes like lightning into the heart that has been opened to him, and floods it with an ineffable joy. But in the highest stage there is no mental action, only a pure rest in God, the soul no longer conscious of its own existence, forgetting itself, forgetting all things in the calm repose of celestial love.

Some of Ruysbroek's expressions bordered so nearly on pantheism that even Gerson, himself a mystic, directly charged him with that heresy. His theory of the spirit of man's existing eternally in God, being an image of God, as the image of a natural object is reflected from a mirror, approaches closely to pantheism, particularly because he uses the same figure to express the Son's relation to the Father in the Godhead. "The spirit becomes the very truth which it apprehends: God is apprehended by God. We become one with the same light with which we see, and which is both the medium and the object of our vision."

No theist *ought* to use such phrases, for their most natural interpretation is pantheistic. But Ruysbroek avows over and again that God and the creature never can become the same.

No fitter place may occur for the remark that the rhapsodies of many mystics often fail to cohere with their everyday, sober declarations. They revel in ambiguous, overwrought, easily misunderstood, and self-contradictory expressions. John of Schoenhoeften, an admirer of Ruysbroek, and a canon of Groenendael, it seems defended the great mystic so successfully that Gerson substantially withdrew his accusation.

We must not omit to state that for all his mysticism, Ruysbroek was an energetic reformer of morals, and chastised the sloth, the dancing, the gluttony, and the debauchery of convent

and nunnery with an unsparing hand. He does not exempt prelates and Popes if they are worldly-minded and covetous. A pure, good, humble, and holy man, this priest and monk of the Netherlands.

GERHARD GROOT (1340-84).

Among those who personally knew, admired, loved, and were profoundly affected by Ruysbroek, was Gerhard Groot. Born in 1340 in Deventer, educated there first, and afterwards at the University of Paris, and again at Cologne, where he became a Professor; next receiving high preferments at home, rich, talented, fashionable, he stands one day looking at some public game. An unnamed person regards him with interest and says to him, "Why do you stand here intent on vanities? You must become another man!"

Moreover, an old friend of the former years at Paris, Henry Aeger, now prior of a Carthusian monastery, subsequently admonishes him of the vanity of earthly things, of death, of eternity, of the chief good. From that hour Groot is a transformed man. One trait of the mystics is a peculiar impressibility, as we shall note again. They have all the ordinary traits of mankind, but some almost obliterated, others exaggerated greatly.

Gerhard fears to take orders as a priest, but he becomes an eloquent preacher, being first licensed by the Bishop of Utrecht, as the day of Lay Evangelism had hardly dawned then. His ease, his copiousness, his eloquence, above all, his heartfelt love for souls, made him a power wherever he preached.

Owing, it is said, to his attacks on the vices of the clergy, complaint was lodged against him with the bishop, who withdrew the license he had given him to preach in his diocese. Gerhard then became a teacher in his native city of Deventer. He employed clerks to copy the Scriptures and the ancient fathers. One of his intimate friends, Florentius, then vicar at Deventer, said to him, on a day, "Dear Master, what harm would it do were I and these clerks who are here copying, to put our weekly earnings into a common fund and live together?"

"Live together?—the mendicant monks would never permit it; they would do their worst to prevent us."

“But what,” said Florentius, “is to prevent our making the trial? Perhaps God would give us success.”

“Well, then,” said Gerhard, “in God’s name commence. I will be your advocate and faithfully defend you against all who rise up against you.”

Thus arose the society of the Brethren of the Common Lot. It spread far and wide and became a powerful instrument for good. The Brethren were not monks, took no monastic vow, could quit the Brotherhood if they desired, did not segregate themselves from the world, except that they lived in Brother Houses; yet they maintained a community of goods, lived according to rule, and “for God’s sake” yielded an unconditional obedience to their superiors.

Gerhard having some knowledge of medicine, hastened to the help of a friend who had been struck with the plague. He contracted the disease himself, and died in Deventer August 20, 1384, aged forty-four. He was cheerful, affable, modest, prudent, and sagacious; had a vein of humor; dressed in grey, with great plainness; was an exceeding lover of books; and left behind him a few old articles of furniture, his library, a fur mantle, and a hair cloth shirt; “an example to the devout,” says good Thomas à Kempis, who wrote his life, “and a holy memorial to posterity.”

His “Rules of Life” and “Moral Sayings” are mildly flavored with mysticism. He exhorts to turn away the heart even with violence from the creatures, that we may conquer ourselves and point our minds continually to God; to be humble, chiefly within, in the heart; never to show yourself off as very pious or very learned; and never to study, write, journey, or labor to extend your fame, to obtain promotion or gratitude, or to leave a memorial behind you among men. His spiritual kinship to à Kempis is thus very apparent. He evidently was a link between à Kempis and Ruysbroek.

JOHN TAULER (1290–1361).

Another man who was somewhat influenced by Ruysbroek was the celebrated John Tauler; born at Strasburg, of independent worldly estate, becoming a Dominican monk probably in the year

1308, a student of theology in the Dominican College of St. Jacques in Paris, and a famous preacher in Strasburg. In the troublous times resulting from the conflicts between the Pope and the Emperor, Tauler did the work of an evangelist at Cologne, Basle, and the regions along the Rhine.

He was an earnest, useful preacher of the gospel in Strasburg in the prime of his powers, when he attracted the attention of a layman who was destined to affect him profoundly. We have the singular advantage here of an autobiographical account of the matter, which was confided in manuscript by Tauler himself to the layman. The existence of this manuscript has been known to a few learned persons for some time, but it has been brought into publicity quite lately by Prof. Schmidt. A large folio volume also has been discovered in the archives of Strasburg. It formerly belonged to the Convent of the Knights of St. John, and its existence was a secret intrusted to only a few, as it contained some private papers. Among other things it contains a manuscript called *The Book of the Five Men*, which gives an account of the layman and his four friends; so that, as the translator of *Tauler's Life*, etc., remarks, we know more of these worthies now, after the lapse of five hundred years, than was known to their contemporaries. Ullman quotes from the autobiographical sketch, but it is extremely gratifying to have the sketch itself in our own hands. Isaac Taylor says that more Church History is to be learned from a single original tractate than by a far larger amount at second hand. The quaint style, the illuminated initials, the antique head and tail pieces, and the marginal notes, transport us into the past.

“In the year of our Lord 1340 it came to pass,” so the account begins, “that a master in Holy Scripture preached oftentimes in a certain city.” A layman was warned three times in his sleep to go and hear him. He went and heard him five times; sought him personally; made confession to him and received the Lord's Body from him. He next, that is twelve weeks after his arrival in Strasburg, said to the Master: “I beg you for God's sake to preach us a sermon, showing us how a man may attain to the highest and utmost point it is given to us to reach in this present

time." Tauler complied with the request, and took for a text John i. 47: "Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile." The sermon, as given by Tauler, is short, but is divided into no less than twenty-four heads or articles, as he denominates them. It inculcates submission to God's will, a single eye to God's glory, humility, and the imitation of Christ. The layman heard it, returned to his lodgings, and from memory wrote out the whole discourse with surprising exactitude. He told Tauler that it was a "good lesson," but moreover charged him with not living up to his own preaching. "Your vessel is unclean and much lees are cleaving to it. . . . You are indeed able to understand the letter, but have not yet tasted the sweetness of the Holy Ghost; and withal you are yet a Pharisee."

Tauler replied that he had never before been spoken to in this way. "The man said, Where is your preaching now? . . . You are in truth guilty of all that I have said. . . ." He went on, however, to explain that he did not mean by "Pharisee" a hypocrite, but one who loved and sought himself in all things, and not the glory of God. He then, at Tauler's request, gave a short history of God's dealings with him. "The first thing that helped me was, that God found in me a sincere and utterly self-surrendering humility." He practised austerities until he was brought to death's door. He sank into a sleep, and seemed to hear a voice upbraiding him for following his own or "the devil's counsel. When I heard speak of the devil, I awoke in a great fright, rose, up, and walked out into a wood nigh to the town." He consulted a well known old hermit, who advised him to give up his austere practices and yield himself entirely to God. One morning at 3 o'clock he was saying his matins, when "an ardent longing came over me, so that I said, O eternal and merciful God, that it were thy will to give me to discover something that should be above all our sensual reason." He was sorely affrighted at the thought of having offered such a petition when so unworthy. He confessed his sinfulness, and then punished his body for his sin. "With that I threw off my garments and scourged myself till the blood ran down my shoulders. . . . And in that same hour I was deprived of all my natural reason; but the time seemed

all too short to me. And when I was left to myself again, I saw a supernatural mighty wonder and sign, insomuch that I could have cried with St. Peter, 'Lord, it is good for me to be here.' Now know, dear sir, that in that self-same short hour I received more truth and more illumination in my understanding than all the teachers could ever teach me, from now till the Judgment Day by word of mouth, and with all their natural learning and science."

Time would fail to recount the whole history. Suffice it to say that the layman took the learned and eloquent Dr. Tauler under his instruction; urged him to follow Christ's example, to spend much time in meditation and contemplation, and to abstain for some time from preaching. Tauler suffered greatly for two years and fell into poverty; lay sick in his cell and meditated on our Lord's sufferings; heard a wondrous voice and was straightway healed in body and mind; sent for the layman, who rejoiced much that the master had been enlightened of the Holy Ghost, and counselled him to preach again. He agreed to do so, and on the appointed day a large audience assembled to hear him; but when he attempted to speak from the pulpit, "his eyes overflowed with tears of tenderness, and this lasted so long that the people grew angry. At last a man spoke out of the crowd, 'Sir, how long are we to stand here? It is getting late: if you do not mean to preach, let us go home.'" In the end he found himself so overcome with weeping that he was compelled to dismiss the congregation. "This tale was spread abroad and resounded through the whole city, so that he became a public laughing stock, despised by all; and the people said, 'Now we all see that he is a downright fool.'"

But he did preach again, and his words produced an impression not unlike what was witnessed in our own land in the Revival of 1800. A man hearing him speak of the joy the Bride (the Church) has with the Bridegroom (Christ), cried out with a loud voice, "It is true!" and fell down as if he were dead. It is certain that from this time onward he preached with new unction, and with the greatest acceptance.

Tauler was evidently a man of very tender feelings, and quite

impressible from without. He was fond of spiritualising upon a text, which is always attended with more or less danger. As we are not making history, but writing it, we have given a picture of the times as they were. There was much in these men that the Church of the present day would look very askance upon, and justly so. Yet Tauler truly loved, devoutly worshipped, and most faithfully and courageously served the divine Redeemer. With a leaning towards mysticism, and with the idea of following Christ in his poverty and humiliation as well as his holiness, he yet was violently hostile to the pantheism of the Beghards of his time. Witness an extract from one of his sermons: "From these two errors proceedeth the third, which is the worst of all; the persons who are entangled therein call themselves beholders of God, and they may be known through the carnal peace which they have through their emptiness. They think that they are free from sin, and are united to God without any means whatsoever, and that they have got above all subjection to the Church, and above the commandments of God, and above all works of virtue." He proceeds to speak of their desire to be free, and obedient to none, neither the Pope, nor the bishop, nor the pastor. The fourth error he characterises as that of those who think themselves "empty of all works, and tools of God, by whom God works whatsoever he will, and they merely suffer him without working themselves. . . . Inwardly they are passive, and live without care for anything. . . . In this they are false that they hold everything whereunto they are inwardly impelled, whether good or bad, to proceed from the Holy Spirit." These notions of the pantheistical Beghards may be compared with some things heard at the present time.

While Tauler was a monk, he did not carry his monachism to as great an extreme as some. In his sermons we find much of self-renunciation, even the Hopkinsian sentiment of being willing to be damned for the glory of God, as in the remark with which he ends his story of the young maiden who "resigned herself humbly to the will of God, content to bear an eternity of pain in hell, if God in his righteousness saw fit to condemn her thereunto." (Sermon for the second Sunday in Lent, p. 314.)

But there appears little of the swallowing up of the soul in an ecstasy of immediate communion with the Infinite Spirit. In his sermon for the fourth Sunday after Trinity this passage occurs: "It flows back into its source without channel or means, and loses itself altogether; will, knowledge, love, perception, are all swallowed up and lost in God, and become one with him." This, however, should be taken in connexion with what follows, where he says that the gush and outflowing of this love gives a man a yearning desire for the salvation of sinners. Tauler's favorite authors would seem, from his quotations to have been Augustine and Bernard; and on the whole he was—if a mystic at all—one of the mildest and best.

In the year 1361, after a painful illness of twenty weeks, in which he was cared for by his aged sister, who was a nun, he felt that death was approaching, and sent for the Layman, who lived a considerable distance away. The Layman was glad to find him still alive, and said, "Dear Master, how fares it with thee?" Then said the Master, "Dear son, I believe the time is near when God is minded to take me from this world; therefore, dear son, it is a great comfort to me that thou shouldst be here at my departure." He then gave him some papers on which he had preserved the account of their interviews twenty years before, and asked him to make a little book of them, but by all means conceal both their names, substituting the Master and the Man. For eleven days longer Tauler lived, and had much discourse with the Layman; then, on the 16th of June, 1361, he yielded up his spirit to God.

THE LAYMAN.

After great research, Prof. Schmidt has succeeded in identifying the Layman with Nicholas of Basle, a man of considerable wealth, fair education, and good abilities, but not very notable save for an intense consecration to Christ. He became the head of a society of *Gottesfreunde* or Friends of God, which was not a sect, but an association of devout men in the fourteenth century. Did space permit we would give some details of his life. It is enough to say that in extreme old age he received the crown of martyrdom at the hands of the Inquisition in the diocese of

Poitiers. Johann Niederus writes that he publicly avowed to the inquisitors that Christ was in him actually (actu) and he in Christ. This would appear to have been taken in a pantheistic sense by his stupid judges. Nieder winds up the recital by saying, "secularium potestati juste traditus est, qui cum incinerarunt," *i. e.*, burnt him to ashes!

THOMAS A KEMPIS (1380-1471).

It is remarkable that so much obscurity has rested upon the authorship of "The Imitation of Christ." Dr. Ullman and his English translator, Rev. Robert Menzies, have thrown all needful light upon both authorship and author.

Thomas Hammerken (in Latin *Malleolus*, a diminutive of Hammer), was a native of Kempen or Kampen, a small town not far from Cologne, and in the valley of the Rhine. His father was a mechanic, and a good workman, his mother of humble family, but very pious. As the Brethren of the Common Lot established schools everywhere and aided the indigent, Thomas was sent at the age of thirteen to the famous academy at Deventer. He was filled with admiration at the sight of the piety of the Brethren, and in due time entered the order. His time was occupied in devotion, in reading, and in copying the Scriptures. The superintendent of a monastery at Windesheim in connexion with the Society of the Common Lot, was Florentius, a very kindly, venerable man, whose influence on Thomas was great and happy. Thomas afterwards wrote a grateful, loving Life of Florentius. This excellent man advised him to enter the order of the Canons of St. Augustine, instituted by Gerhard Groot. They had lately erected two colleges, and to one of these, the Convent of St. Agnes, near the town of Zwolle, young Thomas went. Here he passed his long life, industriously copying the Bible, and some of St. Bernard's works, and writing various devotional books, of which his "Imitation of Christ" is considered the best. He was for a while steward, but the duties were found to take too much time from his hours of meditation and authorship, and he resumed his former position of sub-prior. Thomas was one of those who long for tranquillity; he avoided great and honorable men; he

loved solitude and meditation; he usually wore a placid exterior, but would warm into eloquence in speaking of heavenly things. It is to be regretted that he used the scourge upon himself while singing the hymn *Stetit Jesus*. In person he was rather small, but shapely, and had eyes of piercing brightness, that never needed the aid of spectacles. His pen was not idle; he wrote large biographies of Gerhard and Florentius, and smaller ones of several less noted Brethren of the Common Lot; Sermons to Novices and Discourses to Conventual Brethren; the Soliloquy of the Soul, the Garden of Roses, the Valley of Lilies, or a tract on the Three Tabernacles, and some minor pieces, part of which are poetical.

After a laborious life, passed largely in his cell, he died at the age of ninety-one. His bones were exhumed in 1672 and reinterred in Zwolle.

Thomas à Kempis is usually classed among the mystics. Most of his works are inaccessible to the American student, but so far as we can judge from his *Imitation of Christ*, and from Ullman's copious citations from his other writings, he was far more of an ascetic than a mystic. While he did not, like Florentius and Gerhard, injure himself by fastings and vigils, or indeed by his weekly scourgings, yet he always advocates the strictest obedience to conventual superiors, the most total self-abnegation, and the uttermost humility. Give up the world was his maxim; for truth, freedom, peace, and blessedness are to be sought in God alone. He only can quiet the longing of the heart, and give it perfect tranquillity. *Quicquid Deus non est, nihil est*. Whatever is not God is nothing. That man will long remain little and grovelling himself who esteems anything great save the one infinite and eternal good. His whole rule was condensed into the aphorism, "Part with all, and thou wilt find all." Forsake thyself, and thou shalt find God. Die to thyself, and thou shalt live to God. Whosoever loves himself will never find God.

All this is monachism, though in its longing for peace and tranquillity it touches upon mysticism. A monk could well be a mystic too, and was certainly in danger of becoming one, if he were not so when he entered the cloister.

Bodily penances have a double outlook: they may be intended as the punishment of sin, in order to justification; or as the subjugation of the flesh, in order to sanctification. In the latter of these, as we conceive, they partake of a mystical character. The mystic seeks for holiness in an unscriptural manner. Thomas seems not to have laid special weight on these personal chastisements as means of grace. For instance, he says that Florentius too rigorously chastised himself with fasting and vigils. But according to the Gnostic dualism, which entered so largely into mysticism, the greater the chastisement the higher the attained degree of holiness. Otherwise, he insists on resisting sensuality, and therefore guarding all the avenues of temptation. An excess of this is ascetic rather than mystic.

Again, his directions to the monks favor our view. He prescribes solitude, silence, fasting, prayer, copying the Scriptures and other good books, submission to the superior, self-examination, recollection of God, eternity, heaven and hell, and unremitted bodily or mental occupation from the earliest to the latest hour of the day. In addition, attendance on public worship, a zealous observance of sacred rites and seasons, the faithful adoration of Mary and the saints, and a frequent partaking of the Holy Supper. "Rise early, watch, pray, labor, read, write, be silent, sigh, and bravely endure all adversity." In his "*Vita boni Monachi*," which is in rhyme, these lines occur—

"Sustine vim patiens.
Tace, ut sis sapiens.
Mores rege, aures tege.
Saepe ora, saepe lege.
Omni die, omni hora,
Te resigna sine mora."

In all which there is hardly an allusion to any rapt intuition of Deity. In fact, he dissuades from metaphysical and transcendental inquiries into the nature of God, but advises to know God as he is in us.

If prolonged contemplation on the divine word and works be mysticism, then all the higher attainments in religion should be called mystical. The piety of the present day needs just this contemplative cast. Not less action, but more meditation;

spiritual mountain-tops of prayer amid the calm of nightly seclusion. We need to be more with God, that from this holy communion we may go forth to faith's battles and victories.

We must not omit one feature in Thomas: he did not expect to become holy by any one act, or in a single hour. "Not by a sudden conversion," says he of the Apostles. "nor in one day only, did they rise to so great perfection." "Little by little a man advances, and that by daily exercises." The conflict is a life long one. "A man should extirpate a vice every year." *Quamdiu in hoc mundo sum, mundus non sum.* So that he cannot be claimed very strongly by the mystics of our day.

Yet after all, there is a tinge of mysticism in Thomas, as when he speaks of our being at length wholly dissolved and swallowed up in the divine love, and of God's being one and all. His attention is withdrawn too much from Christ's work for us, and our appropriation thereof by faith; to the Spirit's work in us, and to our responsive love to God. Sanctification rather than justification; love rather than faith. This is a mystical leaning, and we shall find Madame Guyon following closely in his footsteps.

HENRY SUSO († 1365).

This poetical mystic was a Swabian by birth, and of the family of the Bergers or de Berg. He took his mother's name of Suess or Seuss, Latinised into Suso. From his mother he derived an ardor in religious matters; from his father a chivalrous turn. He entered the Dominican Convent at Constance as a pupil at the age of thirteen. In his eighteenth year he was strongly drawn to a spiritual life. Eternal wisdom appeared to his impassioned mind as a beautiful female. "She floated high above him in the vaulted choir, she shone like the morning star, and seemed as the sun sporting in the dawn. Her crown was eternity, her robe was bliss. . . . She accosted him affectionately, and gently said, Give me thy heart, my child! He knelt at her feet and thanked her from his inmost heart, and in deep humility. Such was his vision, and none greater could he have received."

Suso went to the University of Cologne, studied the scholastic theology and philosophy, and became specially acquainted with

Aristotle. He also fell under the influence of Eckhart, and from some rapt expressions would appear to have adopted his pantheistic views. For instance: "Thus man is exalted to spiritual perfection, is made free by the son and is the son. Above time and space, and in close and loving vision, he has vanished into God." Again he makes God say, "I will embrace them so closely and lovingly that they and I, I and they, and all of us together, shall continue a single unit forever and ever." Once more: "The dying of the spirit consists in this, that in its transition into the Godhead, it perceives no distinction in the proper essence." No one who is not a pantheist should express himself in this way. It will have, we suppose, to be charged to mystico-poetic license. Elsewhere he avows distinctly that in all this there is no transmutation of the human into the divine; everything continues to be what it is in its natural being; the spirit is a real existence created out of nothing.

Suso was an exceedingly attractive man, very sympathetic, very kind to the afflicted, who regularly sought his counsel; a truly good man and an eloquent preacher. From his eighteenth to his fortieth year he was extremely rigorous in his penances; so much so indeed that he was forced to desist or die. Ullman claims him as a Reformer before the Reformation, partly because he "instituted fellowships among godly people, which inevitably led to *their disconnecting themselves from the Church* and the control which she exercised in all spiritual affairs"—the italics are our own—partly because he resolutely attacked the sins of the clergy and the laity.

MADAME GUYON (1648-1717).

This remarkable woman, whose life no one can read without being aroused to the desire of greater holiness, was born at Montargis in France, about fifty miles south of Paris. Her maiden name was Jeanne Marie Bouvier de la Mothe. She was talented, beautiful, charming in conversation, an heiress, and married early in life to M. Jacques Guyon, a gentleman of rank and great wealth. She was educated as well as women of her rank usually were, chiefly in a convent of the Benedictines, but

for some months also in a Dominican convent. Her favorite religious authors seem to have been A Kempis, Molinos, and Francis de Sales. The influence of A Kempis is very marked, although she did not adopt the ascetic rigor at all, and, in fact, considered outward penances comparatively unimportant. Of Francis de Sales it will be sufficient to state that he was a Bishop of Geneva, and died in 1622. He strongly urged the renunciation of human will.

At the age of twenty-two she was seized with small-pox, which disfigured her for life—the more so, as from a false notion of duty she refused to employ the means offered to diminish the marks of the disease. At twenty-eight she was left a widow, and after settling her husband's estate, and placing her children at school, she began, in 1681, her travels and more extended spiritual labors in France, Switzerland, and Italy. She at length returned to Paris, fell under the displeasure of Bossuet, but seems to have affected powerfully the religious opinions and career of Fenelon. She was imprisoned twice by order of Louis XIV., the last time in the Bastille and for four years. In 1703 she was banished to Blois, a city on the Loire, one hundred miles southwest from Paris, where she died in great peace in June, 1717.

Madame Guyon's mind was of a susceptible and imaginative type; not of the exact and the systematic. The salient features of her system were the annihilation of self, the losing of our will in that of God, uncomplaining resignation, absorbing love to God, and Christian perfection.

As to her impressibility—she consulted at her father's house a devout Franciscan monk, who after remaining silent for some time in inward prayer and meditation, said, "Your efforts have been unsuccessful, madame, because you have sought without what you can only find within. Accustom yourself to seek God in your heart, and you will not fail to find him." She says these words were to her like the stroke of a dart, which pierced her heart asunder. "I felt at this instant deeply wounded with the love of God—a wound so delightful that I desired it never might be healed."

She often speaks of her soul being "absorbed in God," but

never seems to have thought of pantheism. So to lose our will in God's as to be wholly passive in his hands, and to move only as we are moved upon by him, was a favorite thought with her. If it verged upon a denial of second causes and contained a germ of pantheism, she does not appear to have been aware of it. She advocated a high communion with God in which both intellect and desire were in abeyance. This she denominated the "Prayer of Silence," in which the soul no longer desired aught, because it possessed all things in God. We imagine that perception or intuition was allowed to remain in action, that is, in a calm appropriation of God, but that the ratiocinative faculty was to be wholly inert.

In the office of love in religious experience, she closely follows A Kempis. In her external activity, she is like Tauler, combining her spiritual elevations with honest toil in the vineyard. We need not therefore speak particularly of these points, but will confine our attention to her views of Christian Perfection, the more so as they are making a stir in our own day. But to give these views from her own writings would be a difficult task. Prof. Upham says (Vol. II., p. 371-2): "It is often necessary to compare one passage with another, and sometimes to modify the expressions in order to reach the true meaning."

Fortunately we have the subject of the inner life, or as it would be styled to-day, the Higher Life, treated by Fenelon, the Archbishop of Cambrai, but most widely known in America as the author of *Telemaque*. Fenelon became acquainted with Madame Guyon's character and writings during his mission in Poitou, 1685-8. He then met her for the first time at the country residence of the Duchess of Charost, not far from Versailles. They had several conversations with each other and exchanged a number of letters. Under date of August 11, 1689, he draws out in a number of particulars the way to the inward life. The first step after conversion is to bring our natural appetites and propensities under subjection. The second, to cease to rest on the pleasures of inward sensibility. The struggle here is more severe and prolonged than in the first step. Third, an entire crucifixion to any reliance upon our own virtues; to become dead

not to the practice of the virtues, but to a secret satisfaction in them, as if they were self-originated. Fourth, a death to our aversions, a kissing of the divine hand that smites us. Fifth, the New Life, not merely the *beginning* of a new life, but a new life in the higher sense of the terms. God smites all that joy and prosperity which the creature has in anything out of himself, that the soul may be brought into perfect union and communion with God. The soul has this new life by ceasing from its own action, that is to say, from all action except that which is in coöperation with God, and letting God live and act in it. Sixth, this life becomes a truly transformed life. The soul now acts or suffers, acts or is inactive, just as God would have it to be. It does this without the trouble of first overcoming contrary dispositions. All selfishness and all tendency thereto is taken away. But this transformed soul does not cease to advance in holiness; its life is love, all love, but the capacity of its love continually increases.

In this statement we have given almost *verbatim* Fenelon's understanding of Mme. Guyon's views. He adopted them with a few unimportant explanations. Upham says that at this time Fenelon had not much acquaintance with A Kempis, Tauler, Ruysbroek, and other mystical writers, but learned these lessons in the inward life from Mme. Guyon. Possibly so.

Meanwhile Bossuet, the Bishop of Meaux, spent some eight months in carefully reading up the whole subject, and finally produced his very able work, "Instructions sur les Etats d'Oraison" (Instructions on the States of Prayer). He regarded Mme. Guyon's views as heretical on two points mainly, the needlessness of the austerities and mortifications of the Church, and the possibility or even actuality of attaining on earth to a life without sin. Having prepared his MS. thus laboriously, Bossuet submitted it to a number of distinguished men for their approbation; among others to Fenelon, who declined to approve and was dragged into the controversy. "The Maxims of the Saints" published by Fenelon in January, 1697, professed to be drawn from previous devout minds of the Church. The synopsis of this work, given in the second volume of Prof. Upham's "Mme. Guyon and Fenelon" (pp. 209-253), contains probably as guarded

and strong a defence of Perfectionism as can be found in any language. It defines three stages of love to God. 1st. The mercenary or selfish, originating in an exclusive and sole regard to our own happiness. This is described in the language of St. Francis de Sales as "sacrilegious and impious." 2d. Mixed love, involving a regard to our own happiness, and also a regard to God's glory as its chief element. It is loving God as he ought to be loved, and ourselves no more than we ought. 3d. Pure love. In this our own happiness becomes so small and so recedes from our view as to be practically annihilated. Our own happiness and all that regards ourselves is entirely lost sight of in a simple and fixed look to God's will and God's glory.

We are to advance to this high state step by step. Love is not the only virtue, but it is the fountain of all others, as temperance, chastity, truth, justice. The perfect in love desire their own salvation chiefly because it is God's pleasure that they shall be saved, and because he is glorified thereby. If it should be his pleasure to separate them forever from the enjoyments of his presence, their language is, "Not my will, but thine be done."

Fenelon accepts the Arminian view of universal grace. "To every one under the new dispensation, the covenant founded in the blood of the Cross, God gives grace."

We love ourselves and our neighbor in and for God. Self-love is innocent when kept in due bounds. When it goes beyond these bounds it becomes selfishness, which was the sin of the first angel. The perfect in love, forgetting the nothingness of the creature in the infinitude of the Creator, love God for his own glory alone.

In the prayer of silence we have God. What else can we have? What else can we ask for? In this state the soul is so occupied with God as to be hardly conscious of its own existence. It does not stop to think and reason; it looks and loves. In the contemplative state we find ourselves incapable of profitably employing our minds in meditative and discursive acts. All our time cannot be spent in this contemplative state, but much may and ought to be. Having God, the soul has everything and rests there. Dionysius the Areopagite is quoted in favor of the view

that in the exalted state of contemplation, the holy soul is occupied with the pure or spiritual Divinity; with God, and not with any sensible image or conception of him. Fenelon adds that the soul is not satisfied with the attributes of God, but seeks and unites itself with the God of the attributes. Persons arrived at the state of divine union are made one with Christ in God; they no longer seem to put forth distinct inward acts, but their state appears to be characterised by a deep and divine repose. Hence St. Francis of Assisi and others have said that souls in this state are no longer able to perform distinct acts. The highest state is not characterised by excitements, raptures, ecstasies, but by peace. Holy souls are allowed a familiarity with God, not deficient, however, in reverence, like that of a child with a parent, like that of a bride with a bridegroom.

The perfect in love do not sin deliberately and knowingly, but can still say, "Forgive us our trespasses;" for their former state of sin can never be forgotten. . . . There are sins, properly so called, and there are mere venial transgressions which are termed faults (such as imperfections of manner, errors of judgment, an unintentional wrong word, and the like). . . . When devout writers speak of an essential and substantial union with God, they mean not a literal union of essence or substance, but only a firm, established union.

This a very brief *résumé* of the Maxims of the Saints. It will be observed that the precise nature of the impeccability sought is not very fully defined. A few extracts from other parts of the Memoir will make it plainer.

The new creature may love God without selfishness and with entire purity, yea. with all the heart. The voice has gone forth : Put away all sin; Be like Christ; BE YE HOLY. Beginners in the Christian life, Mme. Guyon conceived it to be her mission to lead into what might perhaps be called a perfect conversion. "My soul, as it seems to me, is united to God in such a manner, that my own will is entirely lost in the divine will. . . . The creature is nothing (I speak now of myself); God is ALL." "So easy, so natural, so prompt, are the decisions of the sanctified soul on all moral and religious subjects, that it seems to reach its

conclusions intuitively. And if such a person is asked for the reason of the opinion which he gives, it is not always easy for him to analyse his mental operations and to give it. At the same time, he retains great confidence in the opinion itself, as being the true voice of God in the soul, although it may not be an audible one." The love of the sanctified one may become stronger, but not purer; its increased exercise will be the result exclusively of its increased capacity; it will not render him more acceptable to God, who requires from us according to what we have, and not according to what we have not. . . . My state has become simple and without any variations. It is a profound annihilation. I find nothing in myself to which I can give a name." The holy are free from the mixed life of faith and doubt, of love and aversion. Is it our destiny to be always sinning and always repenting? Is there really no hope of deliverance from transgression till we find it in the grave? No; amid all the temptations of this world we may live wholly to God, and in some true sense an entire surrender, not excluding, however, a constant sense of demerit and of dependence upon God, and the constant need of the application of Christ's blood, is in reality not less practicable than it is obligatory. We are to receive Christ as a Saviour, moment by moment, from sin. Here on earth, at least, we must rest, so far as rest is given us, with our armor on.

From the above it will be seen that perfect sanctification was, and again was not, claimed by the older advocates of the Higher Life. If we have been able to frame an intelligible statement from their inconsistent ones, it would be that the principle of sin was not wholly eradicated from their natures, but its manifestation, or natural fruit, was kept down so far that they did not knowingly or willingly commit actual transgressions.

Let us see now how this state of holiness is to be reached. Not exactly at a leap; not by springing across a line that separates two states. Yet the trouble with most Christians is that while they *desire*, they do not *will* to be holy; the will is wanting, therefore the man is wanting. They are not willing to die the *second death*, so as to be truly sanctified. They do not make an act of consecration, and thus place themselves so that God can

consistently and effectually operate upon them by his Holy Spirit, and complete the great work. Fenelon urges the thought that no one should lightly conceive himself to have attained the "fixed" or "transformed" estate. "Strive after it; but do not too readily or easily believe that you have attained to it."

There is at least a touch of sobriety in this, as compared with the recent extravaganza of seizing upon the Higher Life by one vigorous clutch, and of indubitably and at once believing that you have it.

We have stated Mme. Guyon's views partly in her own language, partly in that of Fenelon, and partly in that of Upham. Our object in adhering so closely to their words, and introducing so few of our own, is that the readers of this article may be able to compare the phraseology of earlier mystics with those of our own day. Verily there is nothing new under the sun.

Before passing on, let us make a few remarks on Mme. Guyon and her system.

1. The fundamental error is that all sin consists in selfishness. This heresy in morals is always detrimental to religious experience.

2. While the conception of justice is not entirely wanting in this system, it is obscured. We become just—so they say—by loving. Hence little or no place is left for justice pure and simple.

3. While admiring beyond expression the zeal and almost superhuman resignation of Mme. Guyon, we cannot regard with any satisfaction her extreme consciousness of spiritual elevation. Read the following quotations.

"The fervency of my love allowed me no intermission. . . . The taste of God was so great, so pure, unblended and uninterrupted, that it drew and absorbed the powers of the soul into a profound recollection, a state of confiding and affectionate rest in God. . . . This immersion in God absorbed all things. . . . A lady of rank . . . said that she observed in me something extraordinary and uncommon. My impression is that my spiritual taste reacted upon my physical nature, and that the inward attraction of my soul appeared on my very countenance. . . . A gentleman of fashion one day said to my husband's aunt, 'I saw the lady your niece, and it is very visible that she lives in the presence of God.' . . . She was surprised at my expressing things to her so much above what is considered the ordinary range of woman's capacity.

. . . It was God who gave me the gift of perception and utterance for her sake. . . . That heart (her own) where I had formerly detected in their secret places so many evil motives, was now, so far as I was enabled to perceive, made pure. I did all sorts of good, as it were by a new and imperative law, written in my heart, naturally, easily, without premeditation, as it was without selfishness.

. . . I no longer felt myself obliged to say, 'When I would do good, evil is present with me.' . . . How could such a soul (as her own) have other than a deep peace. . . . One characteristic of this higher degree of experience was a sense of inward purity. My mind had such a oneness with God, such a unity with the divine nature, that nothing seemed to have power to soil it and to diminish its purity. . . . The dark and impure mud does not defile the sunbeams that shine upon it. . . . The person who is truly pure, may see sinful acts, may hear impure and sinful conversation, or may otherwise be brought providentially and in the discharge of duty into connection with impurities, without contracting any stain from them. . . . I did not practise the virtues *as virtues*. That is to say, I did not . . . endeavor to practise them as a person generally does in the beginnings of a Christian life. . . . The *effort*, if I had made one, would have been to do otherwise." And so on.

4. Some psychological errors might be expected in an untrained thinker; such as exalting the will, exclusive of the affections, into a controller of the whole man. The will in this sense is itself controlled by the affections and desires.

5. Her imaginative and poetical temperament did not fit her to be an expositor of the prose parts of Scripture. Neither did her ignorance of Greek and Hebrew.

6. The duty of loving the God of the attributes rather than the attributes of God is either a truism or an absurdity. Love always terminates upon an entity as its object, but never on an entity abstracted from its qualities or attributes.

7. All of which goes to show that real godliness can live and be fruitful in the midst of some very unpropitious surroundings. Yet we must say that imitators are in peril of copying the worst parts of a model.

GEORGE FOX. (1624-1691.)

This famous founder of the Society of Friends or Quakers was born in Leicestershire, England; was the son of a pious weaver;

was apprenticed to a grazier; had a natural turn for mysticism; gave up laboring for a support at the age of nineteen, as he conceived that he was called of God to devote himself exclusively to a religious life; commenced preaching in 1648; visited America in 1671 and remained here two years; twice visited the continent of Europe: was persecuted; was discharged from custody by Oliver Cromwell, who seems to have had somewhat of a liking to him; and at last ended his days in 1691. From this brief *résumé*, it is seen that he appeared in a stormy period of English history, his life extending from the last year of James I., through the reign of Charles I., the Commonwealth, the reigns of Charles II., James II., and to the third year of William and Mary. It was also the era of the large proprietary settlements in America. Wm. Penn introduced his views into Pennsylvania; and as the Quakers organised themselves without disregarding family ties into societies, and have recognised all the local societies as constituting a general Society, they have not frittered away like the Beghards, Beguins, Lollards, Friends of God, Brethren of the Common Lot, and other loosely constructed sodalities of the Middle Ages. Beside a powerful political friend in Wm. Penn, Quakerism found a learned expositor and apologist in Robert Barclay (1648-1690), a native of Gordonstown, Scotland, educated at a Scotch college in Paris, where he became a Roman Catholic, but after his return home followed his father into Quakerism. His celebrated "Apology for the True Christian Divinity, being an Explanation and Vindication of the Principles and Doctrines of the People called Quakers," is said on the title-page of my copy to have been "Written in Latin and English by Robert Barclay and since translated into High Dutch, Low Dutch, French, and Spanish, for the information of Strangers." A rather sonorous title.

Barclay lays down in the beginning Fifteen Propositions, which he, then takes up seriatim and maintains, citing and responding to objections, and quoting Church Fathers from Polycarp down, Bellarmine and the Council of Trent, Luther, Calvin, Carlstadt, and Osiander, besides various other Councils and several Confessions. From these Propositions we select what is to our purpose.

“The testimony of the Spirit is that alone by which the true knowledge of God hath been, is, and can be only revealed. . . . These divine inward revelations which we make absolutely necessary for the building up of true faith neither do nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or right and sound reason. Yet from hence it will not follow that these divine revelations are to be subjected to the examination either of the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or of the natural reason of man, as to a more noble or certain rule or touchstone.”

Hence, he holds that every man is or at least may be as truly inspired as the apostles and the prophets.

Of the Scriptures he says, “Nevertheless because they are only a declaration of the fountain, and not the fountain itself, therefore they are not to be esteemed the principal ground of all truth and knowledge, nor yet the adequate primary rule of faith and manners. Nevertheless as that which giveth a true and faithful testimony of the first foundation, they are and may be esteemed a secondary rule, subordinate to the Spirit, from which they have all their excellency and certainty.” He holds also a “saving and spiritual light wherewith every man is enlightened.”

Under the 10th proposition as expounded p. 287, we find—

“There may be members therefore of this catholic Church both among heathens, Turks, Jews, and all the several sects of Christians, men and women of integrity and simplicity of heart, who though blinded in some things in their understanding and perhaps burdened with the superstitions and formality of the several sects in which they are ingrossed, yet being upright in their hearts before the Lord, chiefly aiming and laboring to be delivered from iniquity, and loving to follow righteousness, are by the secret touches of this holy light in their souls enlivened and quickened, thereby secretly united to God, and therethrough become true members of this catholic Church.”

By the catholic or universal Church he means the invisible Church, including the Church triumphant. So that our old friend Haroun Al Raschid may have been a spiritual Christian, or at least a living member of Christ's body, without knowing it.

“By this gift or light of God . . . every true minister of the gospel is ordained, prepared, and supplied in the work of the ministry. . . . Moreover, those who have this authority, may and ought to preach the gospel, though without human commission or literature.” The sacraments of Baptism and the

Lord's Supper are to be taken only in a spiritual sense, there being no need of the outward ordinances, which are, accordingly, not in use among the Friends.

Touching a learned ministry he says: "As for letter learning, we judge it not so much necessary to the well-being of one, though accidentally sometimes in some respects it may concur, but more frequently it is hurtful than helpful, as appeared in the example of Taulerus, who being a learned man, and who could make an eloquent preaching, needed nevertheless to be instructed in the way of the Lord by a poor laick." He commends the knowledge of languages and schools, but "the Spirit is the truest interpreter of the Scriptures, whether from the original languages or without them. . . . A poor shoemaker that could not read, refuted a professor of divinity's false assertions of Scripture. . . . If ye would make a man a fool to purpose, that is not very wise, do but teach him logic and philosophy." "Natural logic" however was "useful. . . . Ethics is not so necessary to Christians. . . . Physics and the metaphysics make no preachers of the truth. The school divinity is a monster," and ruined Origen and Arius. Satan invented it. "The devil may be as good and able a minister as the best of them; for he has better skill in languages, and more logic, philosophy, and school divinity than any of them, and knows the truth in the notion better than they all, and can talk more eloquently than all those preachers." Ordination is solely by the Spirit. "When they assemble together to wait upon God, and to worship and adore him, then such as the Spirit sets apart for the ministry, by its divine power and influence opening their mouths, and giving them to exhort, reprove, and instruct with virtue and power—these are thus ordained of God, and admitted into the ministry, and their brethren cannot but hear them, receive them, and also honor them for their work's sake. . . . It is left to the free gift of God to choose any whom he seeth meet thereunto, whether rich or poor, servant or master, young or old, yea, male or female. . . . The distinction of clergy and laity is not to be found in the Scripture. . . . When God moved by his Spirit in a woman, we judge it no ways unlaw-

ful for her to preach in the assemblies of God's people." Ministers may receive free gifts, but not salaries, for that makes them hirelings. Tithes are specially abominable. "I know myself a poor widow, that for the tithes of her geese, which amounted not to five shillings, was about four years kept in prison, thirty miles from her house."

The 8th Proposition of the Apology is one "Concerning Perfection."

"In whom this pure and holy birth is fully brought forth, the body of death and sin comes to be crucified and removed, and their hearts united and subjected to the truth; so as not to obey any suggestions or temptations of the evil one, but to be free from actual sinning and transgressing of the law of God, and in that respect perfect; yet doth this perfection still admit of a growth; and there remaineth always in some part a possibility of sinning, when the mind doth not most diligently and watchfully attend unto the Lord."

Barclay published this Apology when he was twenty-seven years of age. His youth and the times in which he lived may be pleaded in extenuation of some harsh expressions. Moreover the Quakers in England (and in America too) in the seventeenth century were horribly maltreated.

The benevolence, the quaint simplicity of manners, the style of dress, not invented by them but only retained from the time of Fox and Penn, the straightforwardness, and the unaffected piety of the Friends are too well known to require either proof or delineation. But it is not a little surprising to see so many of their minor doctrinal crotchets adopted by religionists far removed from the Quakers in other respects, and apparently in no wise acquainted with the writings of honest Robert Barclay.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. It would be Utopian to hope to purge out Mysticism absolutely and forever from the Church. Sobriety in doctrine and practice is a great desideratum, but we must not become disheartened if it be not attained as fully as we could wish. The Church still lives, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her. Of all the millions of the human race, only a few would be pronounced by life insurance examiners physically sound from

head to foot; yet meagre Calvins somehow live on as well as stalwart Luthers, and accomplish much for God and his truth. The gracious Head of the Church works in and by Prelatists and Independents as well as more scriptural Presbyterians; yea, mightily in and by evangelical Arminians, as well as true-blue Calvinists. We would that they were all of them not only almost but altogether Presbyterian in church order, and Augustinian in faith.*

So with the Mystics: in spite of all the miserable errors recited in the foregoing pages, how much worth, spirituality, and tender yearning for souls have we found in them! Of course we exclude Neo-Platonists like Plotinus, and Pantheists like Spinoza, as enemies of Christ. But Tauler may well put our sluggishness to shame, and the one-sided, ascetic, Romish A Kempis may soothe and cheer, when we note the gradual approach of death.

2. Some of the most extravagant features of Mysticism are out of keeping with the spirit of the age. The author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm* has adverted to the boldness and brilliancy of the speculations of the first few centuries after Christ. The cause alleged by him is that Greek was then a spoken language, and the healthful toil of linguistic labor was not needed by the expositor; hence restless Thought ventured into the unreal domain of Speculation, and Gnosticism, Manicheism, and Arianism dazzled and confounded the world. We deem this a cause, possibly, but, compressing all the external causes into one phrase, would say that those glittering heresies were due to the spirit of the age. The same formula will sufficiently express the ground of our conviction that the Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus Erigena, and Master Eckhart will never again deeply affect, much less dominate, the philosophy of the Church.

3. Some of the elements or frequent concomitants of mysticism are to be feared in our own day; as

* "Altogether Augustinian in faith" will of course be understood as referring to the general system of doctrine styled Augustinian. As to adopting all the opinions of that great man and profound thinker, no Westminsterian could for a moment think of doing so, after the most cursory perusal of the Confessions of St. Augustine or of Wigger's Augustinism and Pelagianism.

(a) Unchurchliness; the disorganising spirit; fostered by Plymouthism; not a necessary element of mysticism, for Bernard, if he may be called a mystic, and A Kempis, were, after the Romish style, strictly churchly. Still mysticism, as Ullman has well shown, is in its own nature introversive and egoistic. The mystic who at all goes to the length of his principles, is occupied with his own mental states; he does not greatly feel the need of external forms and sacraments, but soars into his immediate communion with Deity without the felt coöperation or even the joint presence of a fellow-worshipper. He does not in spirit mingle his adorations with those of the Church militant and the Church triumphant; his voice does not rise together with the voices of the hundred and forty and four thousand. No, the true mystic longs to be alone with God. This solitariness of ecstasy tells upon his practical life. A brotherhood or society is enough for him. He does not consciously need a church. But if he be in outward union with a church, he gives his best affections to a sodality within the Church,—or the Churches.

(b) As closely connected with this, we have reason to apprehend antagonism to an ordained ministry; resistance to all authority in the Church; an undervaluing, if not a blatant decrying of human learning in the clergy; perhaps an intrusting of the administration of the sacraments to the laity.

(c) A wild spiritualising of Scripture; a deriving of strange lessons from the historical parts of the Old Testament, and from colors, buttons, shovels, or what not accessories of the tabernacle in the wilderness; opening thus a flood-gate to extravaganzas in doctrine and worship.

(d) Enthusiasm, *i. e.*, a belief that God makes revelations to us, or at least lets us into the meaning of isolated passages of Scripture, so that we need not disturb ourselves or our interpretations by the fact that studious and learned and also truly pious men dissent strongly from those interpretations. So that, indeed, we can look down from the height of superior spiritual illumination, and smile at arguments that we cannot answer, saying, "We are not logicians, or scholars, but God has *revealed* thus and so to us." Neither shall we be moved by ascertaining that the dif-

ferent parts of our creed will in no wise cohere. If this enthusiasm should turn acrid and become fanaticism, the student of church history will not be surprised.

(e) In our day the old doctrine of Christian Perfection, newly dubbed the Higher Life, threatens the Northern Methodist Church, to a less degree the Southern Methodist, and to some extent the Presbyterian bodies. We fear that it is of a more violent type than it has hitherto assumed since the time of the Stylites; that it is fuller of spiritual pride and irreverence. Why should not those who approach so near to the Unseen One indulge in a little familiarity? Meanwhile a truly reverential soul, prostrate before the throne, but hearing man speak thus, may inwardly ask, "Is this the house of God, and the gate of heaven?"

4. How shall we guard against mysticism? We must begin with the education of our ministry; and here we have not so much to suggest anything new as to commend the wisdom of the fathers.

Let our theological students be well drilled in Greek and Hebrew for sundry weighty reasons. They can form independent opinions as to the real meaning of a passage by examining the originals. This alone will preserve them from numberless false interpretations. Winer has said that many blunders in theology are in truth and at bottom blunders in grammar. This study of language requires and promotes a healthful use of our faculties, and habituates the mind to sobriety.

But of course mere grammar and lexicon work is not all. The mind that utilises the grammar and the word is itself more than the grammatical word. Calvin does not seem to have been at the head of the grammarians, but he stands amazingly near the head of the interpreters. Why? Because he discovered so acutely and held with such tenacity the logical thread of his text.

Then theology, systematic theology, must be stated, proved, and defended. Above all, Westminster theology.* The man

* For instance, the Higher Life vagary of the present day can never live in the atmosphere of sound Presbyterian theology; except perhaps a short sickly life. It is an excrescence which Arminianism or Semi-Pelagianism may foster, but genuine Calvinism rejects and destroys. A

who has ever really understood and embraced this system will never become a mystic—unless he was born one; and the born mystic not once in a myriad of times ever can be made an Old School Westminsterian in theology.

In the department of Church History, the rise, progress, plausibility, error, and evil of mysticism will present a very interesting and a most profitable theme. It is well to teach our young ministry that this or that apparently new experiment is no novelty at all, but has been tried and demonstrated to be a failure by the slow but unerring instructor—Time.

Then as to the pulpit, let us have logical preaching both expository and doctrinal. Be the scabbard gilt, and the handle jewelled, if need be, but oh, let the blade be steel! Dr. Nathan Rice said in his later days that congregations would listen longer to logic, *i. e.*, argumentative preaching, than to anything else. A church trained to think, to compare scripture with scripture, and to connect doctrine with doctrine, will not be easily blown about. The intellectual habits of the preacher, too, will be reproduced in the people.

We say nothing against eloquence, *μη γένοιτο*; but let it fit the definition given by Lyman Beecher, "Logic set on fire!" such as some time fell from the lips of Thornwell.

Last of all be it said, in the pastoral treatment of the mystic, use gentleness. For mysticism, though absurd and hurtful, is an aspiration heavenward, to be guided and purified rather than sternly repressed. It is an infirmity of noble spirits, a weakness of warm and often of generous hearts. Oh for its warmth, its generosity, its aspiration, without its extravagance and its spiritual pride! *

L. G. BARBOUR.

deep Augustinian sense of the spirituality of the law, of the hidden evil of the heart lying below the reach of consciousness, and of the sinfulness of emotions as well as desires and purposes, will leave no room for that self-complacency which is so odious to God and man.

* Our limits forbid a discussion of Swedenborgianism, which alone would require a monograph.

ARTICLE II.

NON-SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

No man by searching, can find out God. If this statement were not found in Holy Writ, the fact would still be apparent, as an axiomatic principle. The whole is greater than any one of its parts; and even upon the theory of the ancient philosophy which made God the soul of the universe, no fragment of this vast frame of nature could be equal to the central force that vitalised the whole.

But if there is really a God, who is Creator, Governor, Giver, and Judge, then the relations sustained by creatures, subjects, recipients, and criminals, make it necessary that men should know something about God. Indeed the Scriptures assert that God reveals himself to the unreached heathen, making his eternal power and godhead known to them by all the outward works of his hands, "so that they are without excuse," when they fail to render thankful adoration to the Giver of good. And so much of a true knowledge of God is involved in this revelation, that Paul affirms "that which may be known of God, is manifest to them, for God hath shewed it unto them." And this, without any other revelation than the orderly courses of nature. While it is true, therefore, that man, being only a part of this grand system of nature, cannot equal the Creator of Nature in wisdom and knowledge, and cannot know the Almighty unto perfection; it is also true that man is so constituted as to know his eternal power and godhead by the evidence of his senses, by instinctive perception, and by the clear deductions of logic.

The argument of the apostle does not end here. He distinctly announces (Romans i. 19-32.) that the hideous catalogue of evils that have cursed the race are the legitimate consequences of the loss of this natural knowledge of God. And he concludes by charging all the members of the race with the same guilty ignorance. "Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art."

Added to this natural obligation, there is the distinct announce-

ment of the ever-incumbent duty to search the Scriptures for higher attainments in the same knowledge of God. And the culmination of human history is summed up in the short sentence: "then shall we know even as we are known." When man attains perfection, it will be a perfection in the knowledge of God, and the Scriptures clearly enjoin the steadfast cultivation of this knowledge from day to day. The sinner is specially rebuked because he does not retain "God in all his thoughts," that is, in the totality of his thoughts. As a matter of invitation, of exhortation, and of definite command, the cultivation or acquisition of this knowledge of God is spread all over the Scriptures.

These statements will probably meet with no opposition from Christian thinkers. As statements of general truth, they would probably pass in the most orthodox assemblages. The example of Enoch, whose character was so sublimated by his constant intercourse with God, is frequently quoted to enforce the general duty. All the exhortations to frequent prayer, meditation, praise, and study of the Divine word proceed upon this basis. Man, who was created in the image of God, is bound by every consideration to press on toward the mark for the prize of perfection in knowledge. There are insurmountable limits to this knowledge, of course, but these limitations are the natural barriers that separate the finite from the infinite. All that Gabriel may know of God, and probably far more, is lawfully within the scope of human attainment. Because God did not make Gabriel in his own image and likeness. Yet it is patent that Gabriel knows more of God to-day than the most holy and wise of the incarnate sons of men. His experience is far wider than that of Enoch, because he has lived longer; but it is probable that Enoch has far outstripped the seraph, because Enoch was endowed with far nobler attributes. And the common experience of the two Intelligences, through the long centuries since Enoch "was not," has probably resulted in higher attainments in knowledge to the glorified man than angelic powers could compass.

The question is here suggested, How shall man know God? If you are saved, you *must* know two things: you must know that God is; you must know that God is the rewarder of them

that diligently seek him. And so far from being the limitations of possible human knowledge, these two truths are at the threshold. "He that cometh to God" must come thus far furnished. There is far more to learn. If you are endowed with the ordinary wisdom of your race, you will know yourself a sinner, and you will need to know how God can be just and yet justify you. If you say, you know this by faith, that you are justified by faith, this is very true. But faith is not a blind reliance upon dogmatic formulæ. You must be able to give a reason for the faith that is in you. If God had not said so, it would still be true, because you are made in the image of God, and you are compelled by the very constitution of your nature to know in whom you have believed.

First, then, shall you reach the knowledge of God by the evidence of your senses? There are teachers in the world who have earned a wide reputation for wisdom, who do not hesitate to affirm that man can know nothing except by sense perception. And as men do not see God, or hear his voice, or touch him with their hands, there is no God. This is the sum of their philosophy. If you say Peter and James and John did see him and talk with him, and that these witnesses laid special stress upon "that which our eyes have seen, our ears heard, and our hands handled," the reply will be that the followers of Mahomet can present precisely similar arguments. If you say Moses talked with God face to face, the answer will be, that events occurring three or four thousand years ago cannot be authenticated now, and that the proof of the existence of such a man as Moses is by no means satisfactory, or at least conclusive. And after all, the world has no better evidence than the mere word of Moses, who might have been either a deceiver or himself deceived. There will ever be, lying back of all the accepted declarations of Holy Writ, the demand for something analogous to inherent probability.

Such evidence of the existence and goodness of God as may be presented to sense perception, is not underrated in this statement. It would apparently accord with the highest philosophy to ascribe the multitudinous adaptations in Nature to the wisdom and beneficence of Nature's God. There is a large degree of unmixed

effrontery in the scholastic arguments of Evolutionism, for example. It is fashionable to give a patient hearing and to return a courteous reply to such vagaries, but it still remains true that the vast majority of educated thinkers in the world have a profound contempt for such schools and a profound pity for such scholars. Because man, made in the image of God, is endowed with a substratum of hard sense, which enforces the cognition of a Designer when confronted with the tokens of design. And as the organs of sense were constructed by God, they do continually discover the Worker in His works. It is possible to befool the thinker, to confuse his mind by the use of scholastic technicalities, and to make the ready answer to atheistic theories very difficult; but the underlying conviction abides in every human heart that somehow, God is true, though every man be a liar. And deep down in the consciousness of all men, there is the cognition of a possible God, wherever the wide sweep of the ocean tempest or the appalling force of the thunderbolt in the land storm attest his presence and power. These tokens appeal to the sense perception, and they tell of God.

But, secondly, does man obtain a knowledge of God by instinctive apprehension? It is no part of the present purpose to attempt the analysis of metaphysical science. It is no part of this purpose to intrude into those misty solitudes where the few guide-posts are inscribed with directions that were incomprehensible to the men who erected them. Here, again, the honest thinker and searcher after truth is easily bewildered and easily silenced. Among those who profess to have threaded these labyrinths there are here and there trustworthy witnesses whose testimony would be valuable if it could be made intelligible. But having dwelt in Ashdod, they speak with the Ashdodian accent, and the enormous majority of their instructors in that unhappy region have written their theses upon brazen tablets. The common sense of the world refuses brass. And the common sense of the world has already pronounced its verdict upon Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Darwin, and a host of others like them, whose only capital was composed of technical fluency and unlimited effrontery and pretension.

This second question does not invade the charmed circle, however. You are asked only to examine your own mental exercises, and to determine whether intuitive perception discovers God. It is not easy to discriminate between this exercise of the mind and the deductions of logic. But there is less difficulty in making this distinction when it is remembered that intuition is that act of the mind which cognises prerequisites *sine qua non*. Intuition does not come by experience, and cannot be strengthened or disturbed by logical disputation. That which is known intuitively is so known, because it needs must be. Does the knowledge of God come under this category?

The quotation from the tenth Psalm already given, "God is not in all his thoughts," has been variously paraphrased.* In a late revision, published by Eyre and Spottiswoode of London, the phrase is rendered: "All the thoughts of the wicked are—No God!" As if the Psalmist should say: "The sum of wicked thinking is atheism." The same sentiment occurs three times in the Psalms: "The fool hath said in his heart, No God." (Psalm xiv. and Psalm liii.) In all these places the implication seems plain, that the "fool" or the "wicked" has reached this conclusion by the violent contradiction of his instinctive apprehension; or, as Thornwell states the case: "Man cannot think rightly without thinking—God!" Herein is no reference to logical thinking, but to the instinctive apprehension, which cognises God, as the natural eye cognises light. The infant of days

* Is there not in this expression of the Psalmist a very common Hebrew idiom which is to be met with even in the New Testament? "Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?"—that is, of *any* tree? The wicked suggestion is: "Has God been so hard on you as to forbid the use of any tree?" The woman's answer fits this view: "We may eat of the trees generally, and only one is forbidden." But the mischief was done when she for one moment entertained a question of the Creator's goodness. And the adversary then boldly presses his advantage: "Ye shall not die, for God doth know," etc. So Paul: "Without all contradiction"—that is, without *any* contradiction. So here the Psalmist: "God is not in all his thoughts"—that is, in *any* of his thoughts. This would still be an assertion of the practical atheism of all wickedness.—EDITORS SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

sees the light and rejoices in it. When he reaches the full maturity of his powers under rare cultivation, he will not see the light, but certain vibrations or undulations in the ether that may be measured by mechanical appliances, and described in technical phraseology. Because—scholastically—no matter is cognisable by the senses. The senses cognise the *phenomena* of matter, but the substance eludes human scrutiny.

And here is suggested the point of the present argument. The cognition of God by the normal power of the human organism is of the nature of inevitable necessity, if God exists, and if God made man. The Being who was able to make *you* with your marvellous mental endowments could not hide himself from you. The first thing Adam saw, when he opened his eye-lids just formed, was—God! And it was a personal God who touched him in every nerve of his organism, mental, moral, and physical. And he will see him again and hear him again when the normal organism in its exquisite perfectness is restored to him and his redeemed progeny. He has never seen God since he saw the glitter of the flaming sword at the eastern gate of Eden.

But there is some remnant of the normal power which is revived by the touch of grace, and brought back to its pristine vigor by the long processes of grace; so that the saved sinner may say: "Though after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God!" It was not to be the creation of a new faculty. It was only the restoration of lost power. "Open thou mine eyes, and I shall behold!" And it does not militate against this argument to affirm the necessity for Divine power to effect the restoration. Only the Power that created these now shattered faculties can repair the damages of sin. And the illustration of the cognition of light by the eye of infancy is applicable here. Because the simplicity of childhood is the very analogy employed in Scripture; as the unmixed faith of the infant in parental love is the type of the highest exercise of faith in a covenant-keeping God, who is also a father.

The peculiarity of original sin is to manifest itself more and more as the native powers of its victims mature. It does not show itself in the infant of days, when the *native* disposition of

the child is unfolding. For example: a child may manifest an inherited independence of character, which is restive under restraint. He derides all assumptions of authority, excepting the recognised authority of the parent, which is something more than the dread of penalty. There is some psychological faculty by which the child learns obedience, before the law of obedience can be formulated; and the same occult power detects the lack of authority in fellow-subjects. Now the resistance to unlawful authority is not sinful in the child. If you have watched the development of mental powers you will have seen numberless examples of this sort, and if you have learned how much of royalty there is in this prompt rebellion, you will be able to discriminate between the normal intuition, which is *right*, and the prompt display of evil temper under the provocation, which is *wrong*. And you may also learn to allot a due proportion of your condemnation to the provocation. No amount of culture will render the direct power of the Holy Ghost unnecessary in regeneration. But there are no statistics that shew a contradiction to the affirmation of Holy Writ: "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." And you have this sure foundation to start upon: the earliest mental exercises of the child may include the instinctive cognition of God, and a large part of your labors will be expended in clearing away or in preventing the accumulation of rubbish that obscures the normal faculty.

One other question remains: Can man know God by his logical powers?

It is precisely upon this wide plateau that all the battles between atheism and theism have been fought. "The argument from design" is the precise thing that evoked Evolution on one hand, and materialistic systems like that of Mr. Tyndall on the other. And this portion of the argument, though touching the borders of temporal scholasticism, does not invade the domain of theological scholasticism. It is therefore an open ground for discussion, even by non-scholastic thinkers.

It is probable that all resolute, systematic thinking upon any allowed topic of human interest, breeds in the mind of the thinker

more or less restiveness and impatience under the restraints of scholastic formulæ. And it is not improbable that the reason for this growing restiveness may be found in the detection of weak links in the chain of accepted formulæ. Take for example a case of this sort. The common faith of Christendom, twenty-five years ago, accepted the Mosaic cosmogony, as set forth in formal shape in the Westminster Catechism: "The work of creation is that wherein God did in the beginning, by the word of his power, make of nothing, the world and all things therein for Himself, within the space of six days, and all very good." (Larger Catechism, Question 15.) Now there are four statements in this sentence, that all science known or knowable can never contradict or disprove. First, God made. Second, God made by his powerful word. Third, God made—absolutely—not reformed—but created. Fourth, God made all for himself. No system of philosophy can be constructed that subverts any one of these four points, except atheistical philosophy. No philosophy that has the necessary existence of God for its primal postulate, can escape these four conclusions. And atheistical philosophy is a misnomer. It is always literally true that the "fool says, No God." The wise man may say he does not *know* there is a God, but he can never say he knows there is no God. If Christian scholars would only investigate the doctrines of infidel scholars, they would infallibly detect the cold-blooded effrontery that supports all their systems. And if they would not allow their politeness to obscure their common sense, they would coolly kick these miserable vagaries out in the cold, with the exposure of the one weak link in the chain of causation.

But when you reach the fifth statement—"within the space of six days"—you are confronted with something more formidable than infidel philosophy. You find the indubitable evidence that huge mammals existed on the pre-Adamite earth, and that in the coal formations of pre-Adamic eras there are the ring marks, indicating years of growth. Therefore you are compelled to say that God made the mammals that never brought forth and gave suck to their young; and that he builded these vast storehouses of fuel with sham time-marks engraved upon them; or, that the

literal, civil day of the Westminster Catechism is a faulty translation of the statement given by Moses. How readily then do you accept the statement in Hebrews i. 2: "His Son, by whom he constituted the æons," that is the "time-worlds," before he entered into his rest after the culminating creation—man! And if you venture into the domain of scholastic theology you will find that Moses uses the exact word, "day" (Hebrew, *yom*), in Genesis ii. 4, as including the entire *week* of creation. So the time-honored students of the Westminster Assembly can safely afford to accept the amendment: "all in the space of six ages, and all very good." Now, supposing all Hebraists to admit the accuracy of this rendering—behold how great a stumbling-block melts away, and how God's revelation in his Word and his other revelation in his Work, are found to be in exact accordance, each with the other. And the mind of the non-scholastic thinker returns to its rest, because the defective link in the chain is taken away.

So, recurring to the question, "Can man know God logically?" the foregoing illustration comes prominently forward. Because the logical faculty would never disclose a God, infinite in truth, who made sham mammals. But, beginning with the inevitable cognition of the distinction between *ego* and *non-ego*, the logical faculty cannot escape the cognition of God. And if you have the courage to throw off the shackles of scholastic formulæ, you may see that God is revealed to you by a succession of syllogisms, if you have the patience to construct them. Give nihilism and pantheism both to the moles and bats—they are both essentially silly—and try the mental processes by which a God of some sort must be disclosed.

It is not an easy task to construct an original argument upon this theme; because the present age is distinguished from all preceding times by its vast flood of formal disputation from all quarters, and upon all phases of this topic. That which the learned few knew in past generations has been largely diluted and given to the world in copious streams. All the religious periodicals, of all evangelical sects, have more or less of this fragmentary scholarship scattered over their pages. You will

be met by the most unlettered unbelievers, with quotations from some famous atheistical formula; or you will receive from some humble gospel hearer, a clear statement of Christian doctrine in syllogistic form, which cannot be found in the books of a past generation. The age is far wiser than past ages. The lecturer who presumes upon the possible ignorance of his audience to-day always makes a mistake.

But, beginning with the apprehension of one's identity, you see the sun blazing in the heavens day after day, and all the planetary systems pursuing their courses with unerring regularity. The common school books tell of the laws that control all these movements, and your first conviction is, that these things exist around you, outside of you, independently of you in every sense, while you still have so enormous an interest in them that your own existence is involved in these orderly recurrences. The solar system to which the earth belongs hangs upon the central sun. And if, so to speak, some accident should happen to the sun, to relax or weaken his hold upon his system (including your own dwelling place—the earth), you feel that the banded universe may be dislocated in a moment by a thousand chances. If you are learned in chemical lore, for example, you will know how small a change in the elements would make the atmosphere of the earth inflammable. If you are learned in geological science, you will know there *was* a time when the surface of this planet could not sustain organic life, and that the present cosmical arrangement of this surface came from chaotic disarray. The story is written all over the globe, in the thick strata that support field and forest and city.

In the presence of all these overwhelming realities, what is your estimate of your identity? Because you are concerned only with *ego* and *non-ego*, and *ego* stands on one side—and all the universe on the other.

Well—the answer comes from all philosophy in all ages—the individual man is a mere speck of dust, a mere mote floating in a chance sunbeam. He may have lived a thousand years, but he is nothing; or he may be hurried into instant annihilation, and is he is nothing. Because the individual is swallowed up and lost in

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the millions that people the earth, and yet all these millions by combining their powers, could not make the sun rise one second early or one second late. And the earth itself is a mere speck in space, and for aught that man can know, it might be rent asunder by internal convulsions and scattered into a thousand fragments, like the asteroids that revolve between Mars and Jupiter, and still produce no perceptible effect upon the cosmos. This is the sum of all possible philosophy. *Ego* is a very small thing.

Now what is the precise thought in the mind of every man who thinks at all? What is the bottom conviction that controls all his powers? Is it this conclusion? Verily no!

Because each man feels, acts, lives his entire life upon the theory that *ego* is everything and all else nothing! And when the man is enlightened by divine light and made a partaker in the divine inheritance, it is still true that his own personal salvation is the first, chiefest, overmastering interest. If you investigate man in his noblest relations, as husband and father, where the most unselfish manifestations of character appear, you will still discover that self gives emphasis to his purest affections. It is because the woman to whom he devotes his life is *his* wife, and the children for whom he spends all his energies are *his* children, that this special display of unselfish beneficence is common. The patriot who dies for the country does so because it is *his* country, and not a strange land. Everywhere *ego* dominates the earth, and the most disinterested exhibition of charity reveals upon analysis the same foundation. Because God hath made of one blood all nations to dwell upon the earth, man gives kindly aid and succor to his brother man. It is the controlling law of human existence. In a certain sense, all the hopes, desires, and purposes that make the activities of life, have their origin in each segregated heart of each actor, and all terminate upon self.

If the most splendid illustrations of unmixed benevolence that ever beautified humanity be examined, the same inevitable tendency appears. There once lived a man of wonderful native gifts, of high cultivation, and of most spotless Christian reputation. His history, as recorded by himself, in sober sentences thus sums up the events of his life: "I have fought the good

fight. I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for ME a crown of righteousness." He was "more abundant" in all ministerial labors because, to use his own words, "WO is ME if I preach not the gospel."

Now this selfhood is the common heritage of the race. Each man is so certainly separated in his *egoism* that all the powers of men and devils combined cannot invade the citadel of his soul. It is coexistent with the most sublime thinkable form of unselfish philosophy. It is far different from the "selfishness" that animates the miser, who, failing to apprehend the *ego*, has allowed his affections to fasten upon so mean a god as gold. It is widely removed from the emotions of the cruel man, whose faculties are so blunted and brutalised that he cannot adequately measure cruelties under which he suffers himself, and therefore cannot estimate the effect of cruelties upon others. In his normal condition, and with his sensitive organism perfect, man recoils with horror from the bare sight of suffering. To venture once more into the dominions of theology, the formal statement accords with this patent fact. Suffering is the penalty of sin, and sin is abnormal. God made man upright, and, so to speak, did not provide him with attributes for the enjoyment of sin or its fruits. When he tastes the "pleasures of sin," it is "for a season" only, and the poison is always hidden under the transient sweet. So, when man violates the least commandment, and covets unlawfully, and when he violates the greatest commandment, and proceeds to the overt act of harm, he dethrones the *ego*. To do this is to attempt the dethronement of God, because man is made in the image of God.

This intense selfhood has been perfectly visible to philosophy throughout the ages. And the systems of the old heathen would have been more symmetrical if these ancient instructors had not mistaken the caricature for the original, and thus expended their powers in the analysis of selfishness instead of selfhood. The study of human character in all ages has been hampered by the fatal fact that humanity was in ruins; and the race has furnished no perfect specimen in its original symmetry excepting

the One Man, who being also in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God. The life of this Man, upon the earth, began long after the ancient systems of philosophy had been formulated. And none of these made provision for the exercise of the normal powers in a future state of existence, because none of them recognised the remnants of the lost faculties in fallen humanity. The Jews had sacred books and sacred traditions, but all the rest of the world was lying in ignorance. When, therefore, Jesus of Nazareth appeared among men, to take his place in the annals of the race, he did not appear for the purpose of exhibiting these native excellences, but for the purpose of establishing a system of philosophy against which the gates of hell could not prevail. His human life was *ipso facto* exemplary; yet no doctrine is more clearly announced in evangelical standards than that of the inability of *any* mere man since the fall to keep the law of God perfectly. And Jesus kept this law perfectly. This is another most fundamental doctrine of all creeds that contain his revered name. But this is anticipating. The present point relates to the knowledge of God, independently of revelation, and therefore independently of any doctrine founded upon revelation.

The old philosophers were confronted by the selfhood of the individual. A uniform law requires a certain supply of oxygen to the human lungs as the invariable condition of life. Without it, the physical organism dies. Another law, just as inflexible, requires the mental organism to demand the "How" of all phenomena. As man cannot breathe without air, so man cannot think without reason. The most ignorant of the children of Adam has, by the necessity of his constitution, a theory of some sort to account for all the phenomena he cognises. And this inflexible necessity has peopled the air with such agencies as chance and luck whenever the sequences of cause and effect are hidden. Without the revelation of a God of providence no other conclusion was possible. Therefore the primal maxim of old assumed definite shape: "All things come from chance."

But the sages could not rest under this conclusion when an

invariable law came into view. Chance could not make universal selfhood. Look for a moment at the result of a life of thinking, in the case of Epicurus.

It was no small advance upon the previous philosophy for this man to begin with the assertion that "nothing could come from the non-existent." It was a marvellous advance from this point to affirm that "nothing which exists can pass into non-existence." And so he constructs the universe from "atoms and space" which were eternal. Thus far his physics. One would expect from such a thinker something better in his ethical system than blank egoism. Yet this is the sum and substance of his philosophy. "The highest good is happiness," individual happiness of course, "and happiness and pleasure, synonymous terms, are the natural objects for which man must seek. Virtue is commendable only because it is the only possible, and the perfectly sure way to happiness." (Ueberweg, Vol. I., p. 208, 209.) It is not easy to find a more utterly selfish conclusion in any known system of morals.

From these brief suggestions, the drift of the argument upon this head may be seen. The eternal domination of self, visible upon every page of human history, would seem to suggest to the thinker this conclusion. All men belong to the same race. Among the earliest diversities there is an ever-present identity, and this universal selfhood is one of the characteristics that proclaim the brotherhood. And if all the sons of men are in fact the progeny of a common ancestor, (which would be the infallible deduction of reason if the thinker did not hate God,) then this ancestor must have transmitted this self-love, just as he transmitted any other distinguishing attributes.

The second thought would seem to follow: that this universal instinct must be essentially right. Because all the orderly courses of nature are beneficent, and the Lord of nature could not be the one exception to the uniform rule. It has been seen that man did not make nature, or enact the laws that govern nature. He is at best only a part of one grand system, though he be at the head of it. And the Force that made nature stamped this selfhood indelibly upon the character of the dominating intelligence.

It is of the nature of a uniform law, a beneficent law, a righteous law.

Therefore, if the Force that made Adam set this peculiar mark upon him, it must have been a necessary reflexion of his own attribute. All that God does, he does for his own glory. As all things came from him, all things tend to him. "*For whom are all things; by whom are all things.*" And the creature made in his image must needs, in his place and degree, shew forth something analogous to the selfhood of God. *Because* he was made in the image of God.

But there is one more source of light still outside of scholastic theology. God has given a revelation to man, and this revelation has the universal injunction, "Search the Scriptures," inscribed all over it. Not one solitary sentence in the sacred volume is withheld from the scrutiny of the humblest and most ignorant reader. And the poorest saint is bound, as he values his soul, to see to it that all doctrine that may be proclaimed upon the authority of God is clearly revealed in this Word. So far as this discussion has gone, it has proceeded upon the theory that there is such a thing as natural theology, which, however, culminates in the cognition of *possible* Deity. But now the august word of revelation comes into view and supplants all other sources of knowledge. There is henceforth only one question: "What hath God spoken?"

There have been various answers to this query, sometimes so contradictory that sectarianism is far more prominently manifest in the Church than vital godliness. But while this is true, it is also true that the points of divergence in evangelical creeds are minor points. All creeds teach that God is infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. But all sects do not teach identical doctrines, as founded upon these attributes. There is not a Christian in the world who would deny that God is infinitely, eternally, and unchangeably wise, just, and good; while there are multitudes of divergent opinions in the Church as to God's methods of manifesting those attributes. And the schools of theology are established for the very purpose of giving formal shape

and logical unity to the doctrines that distinguish the sects of Christendom.

Concerning this revelation, the first thought presented is, that coming from a wise and infallible God, it must needs be at agreement in every part of it. The Larger Catechism of the Westminster Assembly, in answer to Question 4, gives "the consent of all the parts" as the evidence of the divine authorship of the Scriptures. And it is not a thinkable proposition that the God of truth could contradict himself in his own revelation. Yet ignorant persons in the Church have a vague idea that the Epistles to the Romans and the Ephesians are specially Calvinistic epistles, while others, such as the Epistle of James, specially favor Arminian doctrine. Such a conclusion is nowhere stated, of course, but any reader can easily satisfy himself of the existence of such an illogical delusion by questioning the members of different sects. The inestimable advantage of schools of didactic theology, nay, the imperative necessity for them, if the integrity of the Church is to be preserved, is therefore apparent. It is of the last importance that the authorised teachers, called of God into the gospel ministry, should be thoroughly equipped for their work; and no amount of native genius, no extent of desultory investigation, no degree of piety in the preacher, can substitute the *training* of the seminary. The authorised preacher must, first of all, be called of God. But he must be endorsed by God's representatives as well, who have also been called of God, and invested by God's Church with the authority to give this needed endorsement. God's government is not a commune. It is an absolute monarchy. And while the King could call ignorant fishermen and publicans, qualify, and send them forth into the world with his messages of grace, it is still true that every word of these messages was spoken by a holy man as he was moved by the Holy Ghost. All the authority of the New Testament rests precisely upon the same basis as the "sure word of prophecy" contained in the older revelation. Nothing short of the "inspiration of God" can give authority to revelation. Men do not read the Epistles of Peter as merely human utterances, or the Epistles of Paul with mere admiration of the logical force of his

statements. It is the Word of God, whether spoken by Peter or Paul, and the chief business of later preachers of the word is to expound the divine word that came through these channels.

It has been said in recent times, that irregular and unordained preachers stood substantially upon the same ground as that occupied by Peter and Paul. As God called Peter and Paul, so he called these modern evangelists, filled their hearts with grace, with a longing desire to save souls, and endowed them with distinguishing gifts for the work. It would not seem unreasonable to ask for a more thorough authentication. Let these modern apostles raise the dead, and then submit to martyrdom, for example. These were the "signs of an apostle" in the olden time, and the Scriptures do not tell of any change in the signs. And when you find a travelling self-called evangelist who can furnish the certificate given in 2 Corinthians xi. 23-28, it will not be amiss to give a patient hearing to his message. But these excellent brethren generally content themselves with the concluding clause of the certificate, and only assume "the care of all the churches."

Enough has been said to show that this paper, treating of non-scholastic theology, does not make an assault upon scholastic theology. The present purpose is served, if it can be shown that the saving knowledge of God is within reach of the unlearned; and that problems which cannot be solved by the unaided reason may be solved by faith in the Revelation which God has given to men. The things which man must believe concerning God are sometimes marvellous things, but they are never monstrous things. And the credence which God requires is never the blind acquiescence of the Papist worshipper, but rather the intelligent apprehension of the thinker, who searches reverently for the exact shade of thought in the message.

The present age is deistical, and the belief in and acknowledgment of a possible personal God, is the sum of religious sentiment in many. It has become fashionable to sneer at revelation, or at least to express grave doubts as to the authenticity of the Sacred Scriptures. Very often the doubter is only the victim of conceit, and adopts the doubt in order to show his independence of mind

and his strength of character. "So many learned men deny revelation that there must be a weak spot somewhere."

Now what are the things most surely revealed in this word of God? The first thing is the authenticity of the revelation, and the last words of it contain an awful warning against the slightest addition to the canon or the subtraction of the most minor precept from it. The attention of the reader is challenged at once to this unique position. In the face of all the unbelieving philosophy in the world this Book asserts its own preëminence, as if the audible voice of God called upon his universe to hear and heed. It is not credible that a book of such dignity, such logical force and coherence, such uniform excellence of doctrine and precept, should contain so silly a prohibition, if it were merely a human composition! Whatever men may *say*, the strong probability remains that no sane man ever reads those terrific words without feeling a thrill of apprehension lest in some unguarded moment he should incur the dismal penalty. There is a dynamical principle hidden under the very form of words.

But there is more than this. The Book itself contains the announcement that the Divine Spirit gives efficiency to the revealed word. God opens the eyes to see, the ears to hear, the heart to receive the truth. And the most curious part of this divine system is the fact that no previous training, no long apprenticeship, no probationary exercises, no self-culture, are required. The analogy is stated to be that of the dead man, hearing a voice and leaping into life; and though not fully equipped for his warfare, still an armed warrior, and more than a match for the hosts of hell. It is at the reception of this word that he begins his apprenticeship, his training, his probation, his cultivation. And the assurance that he shall grow in grace and knowledge, in the study of this revelation, is written all over it, with the promise of the certain culmination, in the fulness of stature at last.

If it be said that the non-scholastic student of Scripture is in danger of error, because of the tendency to wander from the record, and to explore the wide fields of merely speculative philosophy, the answer is, the Word itself is his safeguard. The

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more he explores this field, the less temptation will he find to go beyond its limits. And the notorious fact is, that erratic excursions to the misty fields of doubt are rarely made by the non-scholastic reader. The cases in which he has ventured into those localities are the cases in which he has followed some acknowledged authority, and where he essayed to show the philosophical errors which encumbered the unorthodox theory of the acknowledged teacher. And the grand argument in support of a non-scholastic theology is the fact that the very citadel of Popery is builded upon the assumption that the priest is the only authorised interpreter of Scripture. God's revelation has nothing to fear from all the scrutiny of all the world. And the private intelligent Christian has as free access to this word as the most learned professor. The glory of Protestant Christianity is its open Bible, where the truth is so clearly revealed that the wayfaring man need not err. And if this wayfaring man does not happen to be a fool, he may not only learn something for his own comfort and guidance, but may even point out to others some wayside flowers and fruits that have escaped the attention of his more highly instructed and more highly favored brethren. The Bereans probably announced what resulted from the search for which they were commended, if anything practical came from their search of the Scriptures. At all events, their example has been presented to the Church since apostolic times as worthy of imitation.

There are multitudes of questions, however, which are constantly discussed in the Church and out of it, that have more of a philosophical than a theological character. Such questions will be debated while the world stands, and the fact that they have a theological side will not exclude non-scholastic debaters from the consideration of the topics. You cannot say to the world, and certainly not to the membership of the Church *in* the world, that these topics occupy a forbidden ground. The area occupied by didactic theology is clearly enough defined. But the area occupied by apologetic theology has larger boundaries, and there are hundreds of points where the domain overlaps the domain of pure logic. The Temple is holier than Porch

and Academy, but Paul took the chief pillars of the Temple and set them up in the midst of Mars Hill, where the disciples of Porch and Academy had a sure foothold.

Nothing can be more contemptible to the Christian thinker than Broad-Churchism, in so far as this system overrides or overshadows the time-honored symbols of Christian faith. But you pray to the King in Zion to lengthen her cords. May it not be true that these cords are shrunken by the application of that form of sacerdotalism, which denied the right of private judgment and forbade the discussion of doctrine outside the cloister? It is one thing to preach the gospel under the assumed call of God and the assumed authority of Christ, *without* the endorsement of Christ's visible Church. It is quite another thing to discuss the numberless questions perpetually cropping out in the world—all having an ethical aspect and all relating to the glory of God and the good of man—with reverent humility as towards God, with honest jealousy of the honor of Christ, and with a sincere desire to discover the truth as revealed in God's Word. The men whom Malachi tells of as "speaking one to another" were probably not all priests or all scholars.

ARTICLE III.

THE GRACE OF ADOPTION.

Paul, in speaking of that system of saving truth, that wisdom of God in a mystery, hidden from the world, which he in the gospel preached, says to the Corinthians (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10): "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him; but God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit." In all nature there is nothing like the exceeding riches of his grace which is bestowed upon sinners; and the thought of such amazing exaltation and blessedness it never entered the mind of man to conceive. The knowledge of them comes only by special revela-

tion of the Spirit. Concerning this same wondrous grace to sinners of mankind, the Apostle, on another occasion, is led to exclaim (Romans xi. 33): "Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!" In magnifying and praising the riches of this marvellous grace as experienced by sinners, the same Apostle, on still another occasion, breaks forth in this glowing strain (Ephesians i. 3-14): "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace; wherein he hath abounded toward us in all wisdom and prudence; having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself; that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth; even in him: in whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will: that we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ. In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation; in whom also after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that holy Spirit of promise; which is the earnest of our inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possession, unto the praise of his glory." And, once more, in application of this divine grace to the Galatian Christians, who were "so soon removed from him that called them into the grace of Christ, unto another gospel" (so-called), who were *so foolish* as to turn away from the true benefits and privileges of the gospel of God's grace, and resort again to the lower system of legalism; in order to remind them of their true and high vocation in Christ,

and to call them back to the full acceptance and enjoyment of his grace, the Apostle writes (Galatians iv. 4-7): "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father. *Wherefore*"—he adds, making a direct application of this precious truth to the heart of every individual believer among them—"Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son."

It is, then, the *Grace of Adoption* which God confers upon believers under the gospel scheme. To the contemplation and study of this rich and abundant grace of God toward sinners, in the Christian economy, the mind of the believer may well be turned. It is a topic full of comfort to the Christian heart, and one which opens up a grand field for religious thought and inquiry. Yet, strange to say, it is one which has been little discussed, and is very imperfectly understood and appreciated. The remark was made from the pulpit by an eminent preacher a few years ago, that no published treatise on theology contains a full and distinct treatment of this subject. Calvin, in his famous *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, seems to have overlooked it almost altogether, and the name does not appear even in Dr. Hodge's voluminous work on *Systematic Theology*. The *Westminster Confession* does indeed devote to it a separate chapter, but disposes of the whole subject in a single section. With the purpose of directing the attention of others to this doctrine, which is one of great practical importance and value in the Christian life, and in the hope of leading to its fuller discussion by abler pens, we venture to present to the readers of the *REVIEW* some thoughts upon this subject.

I. The highest and most blessed relationship to which the sinner is admitted under the scheme of grace is *Adoption*.

This is peculiarly a personal relationship of the redeemed sinner with God *the Father*. Not that it does not imply a personal relationship also with the Son and the Spirit. This is very clearly involved. But the relationship distinctly expressed

by the word *Adoption*, while, of course, it covers a great deal under it, is that which exists between the sinner, redeemed by divine grace, and the Father, the first person of the sacred Trinity. The term, therefore, sets forth peculiarly the office of God the Father toward us under the economy of saving grace. Now, the Father's official position in this scheme is the first and highest. Jesus himself taught (John xiv. 24-28) that the Father sent him, and is greater, in official position, than he; and (John xiv. 26, xv. 26) that the Spirit is sent by the Father and himself; and so is officially inferior to both of them. Since, then, the Father's official position in the scheme of grace is the first and the highest, it follows that the personal relationship with him, expressed by the term *Adoption*, is—if we may distinguish betwixt them—the most exalted and blessed under the covenant of redemption. That is to say, this *relationship with the Father*—in all that it comprehends under it—is the highest and fullest expression of divine grace to the sinner included under the gospel economy.

(1). Our relationship with Jesus Christ *the Son*, in the economy of redemption, is indeed most blessed and most essentially important. His is peculiarly a *law* work. His special office is to represent us under the moral government of God before the law. Accordingly he appears as our Substitute, who dies in our stead under the penalty of the law, which we by our transgression had provoked, and so atones for our guilt. As Paul declares (Gal. iii. 13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." He also, as our federal Head, obeys the law in our behalf, and so brings in a righteousness for us, on the ground of which we are justified. And as our representative before the law, whose perfect obedience, both active and passive, in our stead, has been accepted and approved of God for us, he ever appears before the throne of God in heaven and intercedes in our behalf there. The end, therefore, which is accomplished singularly by Christ the Son's work in the plan of salvation is, as Paul expresses it (Romans iii. 26), "That God might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

Now, under God's absolutely perfect and inviolable moral

government, which lies at the foundation of, and necessarily conditions, all his dealings with us sinners, it is a most essential and a most blessed thing for us that we have such a representative to appear for us before the law, who so fully and gloriously meets all its demands with regard to us, who thus completely lifts us above its condemning power, who turns its curses into blessings, its threats into approvals, and its frowns into smiles, upon our souls; and so fulfils the first essential requisite in the matter of our eternal salvation. We cannot, therefore, too greatly magnify, too highly estimate, nor too loudly praise, God for his grace, as expressed to us in our relationship with the Son, *who loved us and gave himself for us*. In the contemplation of this grace alone, we are fully warranted in joining in the glowing doxology of John in Patmos (Revelation i. 5, 6): "Unto Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father: to him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen."

(2.) Our relationship with the Holy Spirit, under the scheme of redemption, is also a most gracious and blessed one. His special work therein is peculiarly a *personal* one with regard to us; his office is to apply to us individually and personally the salvation wrought out for us under the law by the Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. If the work of redemption had stopped with the Son's peculiar work, though that is most glorious and complete in itself, the sinner would be left still personally dead in sin. Such, for example, as we know, was the case of every one of us up to the time of our conversion to God. Though Christ had completed his redeeming law-work for us eighteen hundred years ago, and had thus been, long before our birth into the world, accepted of God in our behalf as included in the election of grace; yet we were born guilty and dead sinners, and continued in this state up to the time that, in infinite grace, we were quickened into spiritual life by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. But because the Son has worked out complete redemption for us under the righteous government of God, and appears for us as our accepted Redeemer in heaven, the Holy Spirit is sent forth to apply salvation personally to us whom Christ in covenant has

before redeemed. And his work is to restore us personally to spiritual life. By divine power and grace he *regenerates* us, which is the beginning of this saving work; *sanctifies* us, which is its continuation; and finally *glorifies* us—raises us from the dead in incorruption and immortality, in the full likeness of our blessed Lord—which is its completion.

And this he does by actually entering our sinful hearts in his own person, and dwelling in us and operating in us, acting directly upon and infusing new life into all our natural faculties; breaking down, mortifying, and rooting out the old sinful nature that still remains in us and hinders the action of the new; and finally, causing the life of God, of which he is the active principle and efficient energy, to permeate and control fully our whole man. And so are fulfilled the words of Scripture (2 Cor. vi. 16): “Ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people;” and (Phil. i. 6), “He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it (margin, *will finish it*) until the day of Jesus Christ.”

It is, therefore, a most necessary and a most gracious work which the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Godhead, performs for us in the scheme of redemption. And no words can adequately set forth the honor and blessedness of the relationship which thus exists, by divine grace, betwixt him and ourselves. To be, in our poor sinful selves, the temples of the living God; to have the divine and blessed Spirit himself come and take up his habitation in these polluted hearts of ours, and thereby enter into the most intimate, tender, and constant fellowship with us; and, at the same time, make us partakers of the divine nature, by his gracious power cleanse, purify, and elevate our hearts so that they may become fit dwelling-places for the Holy God: surely it would be difficult for us to conceive of any relationship that is higher and more blessed. Indeed, this is itself one of those things which God has prepared for them that love him, which it certainly would never have entered into the heart of man to conceive. This blessed work of the Spirit, and the relationship which it implies, are altogether worthy to evoke the sublime invocation of the

Apostle concerning the Ephesian Christians (Eph. iii. 14-19): "I bow my knees unto the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God." And realising this priceless blessing by the Spirit, we may well unite with Paul in the grand doxology which he adds in celebration of the Spirit's grace: "Now unto Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, *according to the power that worketh in us*, unto Him be glory in the Church by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end. Amen."

(3.) But, important, exalted, and blessed and glorious as are our relationships with the Spirit and the Son under the wondrous scheme of redemption, it is not until we take in also our peculiar relationship with God the Father, which is expressed by the term *Adoption*, that we arrive at a just conception of the *exceeding riches* of divine grace to sinners, and that we acquire a true idea of the spiritual exaltation and blessedness which is *ours* by that unspeakable grace. We must see ourselves to be not merely redeemed legally by the Son, who has fully met all the requirements of the law in our behalf, and restored to spiritual life and purity by the Spirit dwelling and ruling in our hearts; but, further, as vitally united to Christ by the Spirit, and personally identified with him, even as the wife is with her husband; we must see ourselves to be so borne by the Son, personally with himself, into his own most blessed relation of Sonship with the Father; and ourselves so recognised personally, and owned and actually admitted and established in his family by the Father as *his children*, before we can know all. It is only as we thus see ourselves to be really *the sons of God* by a spiritual adoption, personally received and treated as the brethren of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit dwelling in us, as the "Spirit of Adop-

tion," crying from our hearts, "Abba, Father;" and ourselves, personally the objects of the Father's paternal love and compassion and care, admitted to full and free fellowship with Him, and entitled, as "joint heirs with Christ," to eternal heirship under him,—*only then* is it that we perceive what the grace of God to us-ward is, and what is the full height of privilege and blessing which he has made ours. We are the *sons of God, and nothing less*. "Thou art no more a *servant*, but a *son*."

These thoughts have been suggested by a careful study of that exquisite portrayal of the scheme of grace contained in the fifteenth chapter of Luke's Gospel, where our Saviour most clearly and beautifully sets forth the distinctive work of the three persons of the Trinity in the plan of redemption, by a group of inimitable parables. The first, that of "The Lost Sheep," exhibits specially in this aspect the law-work of the Son, who, as a good Shepherd going out after his strayed sheep and seeking it till he finds it, rescues the sinner from guilt and destruction, and brings him back on his own person to the fold of God, the trophy of his redeeming grace. And thus is the salvation of sinners made possible.

The second parable, that of "The Lost Piece of Money," sets forth specially the work of the Spirit, who, like a woman hunting for a lost coin, through the Church—usually represented in Scripture under the figure of a female—searches out amidst the dust and filth of sin, the lost and dead sinner whom Christ died to save, and plucking him out of his state of sin and death, restores him to spiritual life and sets him a jewel in the Saviour's diadem of glory.

In the third, the parable of the "The Prodigal Son," is portrayed in distinction from the others, the Father's special office in the gracious scheme. And he is represented as receiving and welcoming back the lost sinner, who, redeemed by the Son and reclaimed by the Spirit, returns in penitence to him; appointing him a place—not that of a *servant*, but—in his own house and at his own table: and, reaching the culminating point of the whole wondrous exhibition of divine grace to sinners, as expressly

proclaiming him to be his son, who was dead and is alive again ; who was lost and is found.

And a more recent study of the eighth chapter of Romans has revealed to us the fact that the Apostle Paul employs the very same method and follows the very same order in setting forth the grounds of assurance to believers under the gospel scheme. "His theme here," says Dr. Hodge, "is the security of believers. The salvation of those who have renounced the law, and accepted the gracious offers of the gospel, is shown to be absolutely certain. The whole chapter is a series of arguments most beautifully arranged in support of this one point. . . . The proposition is contained in the first verse. There is no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus ; they shall never be condemned or perish." And this is proved, 1 (verses 2-4). By the fact that *they are delivered from the condemning power of the law*, through the law-work of the Son, by which the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in them that believe. 2 (verses 5-11). By the fact that *they are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit*. That is, they are not in a state of nature, having the carnal mind, which is death, but have been renewed by the Spirit, who now dwells in them, and carries forward their salvation, and will certainly complete it by quickening their mortal bodies, even as he raised up Christ from the dead. And 3 (verses 12-17). By the fact that being led by the Spirit of God, *they are the sons of God* ; of which blessed privilege they are assured by having received the Spirit of adoption, whereby they cry, "Abba, Father ;" and by the witness of the Spirit with their spirits that they are the children of God. Thus we see that Paul, in setting forth the grounds of Christian comfort and hope, begins with the law-work of Christ the Son, as the *foundation* ; rises up through the Spirit's work, in the *application*, and reaches the highest, crowning expression of divine grace in the Father's work of *adoption*. This is that most exalted relation, to which believing sinners are raised under the gospel economy, in which, despite "the sufferings of the present time" they are assured that all things work together for their good ; and that God being for them, it matters not who may be against

them, for nothing can separate them from his love which is in Christ Jesus their Lord.

II. The full comfort and joy of the Christian religion, to which we are entitled by the grace of God, are realised only as we breathe truly the spirit of adoption.

The truth as revealed to us in God's word is the proper measure of Christian experience; and our experience may and ought to accord with that truth so revealed to us. Now adoption being, as we have seen, the highest and fullest expression of divine grace to us, our personal experience of religion ought to correspond with that, and we realise the full measure of inward comfort and joy only as it does so. In other words, we attain to the true and full measure of inward blessing only as we realise in our experience what the Spirit, through Paul, says to each one of us in the Scripture, "Thou art no more a *servant*, but a *son*."

In order that we may the better understand this truth, let us see what, according to Scripture and experience, are those spiritual comforts and joys which accrue to us respectively—if we may venture to draw a line of distinction betwixt them—from our several relationships with the Son, the Spirit, and the Father, in the scheme of grace.

(1.) The comforts and joys arising specially from the work of the Son,—which no doubt come first in the order of our Christian experience—are those which appertain immediately to our *law* relations. They are such, resulting directly from our justification in God's sight for Christ's sake, as the Apostle (Romans v. 1) comprehends under the expression "peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ;" which is, as more fully drawn out, a sense of relief from guilt, of acceptance with God, and assurance of his eternal favor. This is certainly a very important and essential element of religious experience, and it is plain that there could be no genuine Christian comfort and joy without it. It is indeed fundamental to all Christian joy. And so precious is it that we may well say, Happy, thrice happy is that humble believer who, in the personal experience and full sense of the truth, can say with Paul, "There is therefore now no condemnation . . . for the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

(2.) The comforts and joys of religion which pertain peculiarly to the Spirit's work, are those pleasures which arise specially from the experience of *new life*, and the divine presence with us through the personal indwelling of the Spirit of grace in our hearts. Such, for instance, as new views of the truth, new energies, new activities, new tastes, new hopes; what Paul expresses when he says (2 Cor. v. 17): "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away, behold, all things are become new." To which may be added the assurance of divine sympathy and help in all the infirmities and trials of life, through the Spirit's presence with us, as declared by Jesus when he said, "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter that he may abide with you forever," and by Paul when he writes, "The Spirit also helpeth our infirmities." With such experiences of divine grace, following up and confirming and making effectual in our lives the glorious work of Christ for us, we may justly consider that our cup of spiritual comfort and joy is full to overflowing, and be ready to exclaim, It is enough.

It may indeed be enough for our poor feeble human thought to comprehend, and more than enough for our weak faltering faith to believe. But we have not seen all; we have not felt all; we have not taken hold of the yet larger, richer, cup of inward blessing which divine grace has filled for us, until we are carried a step further—conducted, as it were, into another chamber of love—and experience

(3.) The blessedness of *Adoption*, in our personal relationship specially with the Father. It is only here that all the comforts and joys of salvation as realised in Christian experience, reach their full scope and exercise. To illustrate: take the case of the Prodigal Son, which, in the spiritual meaning of the parable, clearly and beautifully portrays to us the whole matter. And suppose now that he had received ample assurance of his father's forgiveness of his sins, which he so freely confessed, and of his father's entire reconciliation toward him, thus relieving completely all his fears and troubles upon this score. Now this, regarding him as the sinner saved by grace, is what Christ the Son's redeeming work, apprehended in itself, would do for him.

Then add to this his personal restoration to spiritual life; a new nature given him, new feelings, new desires, new aspirations; the power of that old sinful nature that led him wickedly to wander away from home and conducted him down to such depths of moral infamy and wretchedness, broken, and new spiritual life infused into his whole being. This is what the Spirit's work alone would do for him. But suppose that the work of grace stopped here, left him just at that point, what would be his state? What would be his position? and what would be, consequently, his experience? Certainly very much improved; infinitely superior to what it had been. But his relation with God would be that only that of a *servant*. Not that of a *slave*, but of a *servant*, as distinguished from a *son*.* And of course his experience would be accordingly. We really have no such thing under the scheme of grace; and exactly such a case never has existed in the history of man. But we can imagine something of what that experience would be. We can see the Prodigal in that case, putting on a new and different countenance, exercising new activities, led by new tastes, prompted by new motives, and choosing a new occupation, and, in a word, living a new and better life. But still, he remains in a state of strange isolation and self-dependence, and must actually look to his own efforts, his own *work*, under God, for the supply of his wants and his maintenance. In other words, exalted and blessed as his experience now is, compared with what it formerly was, it is yet but that of a *servant*.

And how incomparably inferior this is to what the Prodigal actually experienced, when, by the grace of God, through the work of the Son and of the Spirit he was lifted up out of his moral wretchedness and degradation, from the midst of the filthy swine-herds, and borne directly back to his father, who, perceiving him while he was yet a great way off, instantly recognised him as his son, felt his compassion move for him, ran out to meet him, welcomed him home with a parental kiss and fond embrace and at once adopted him into his family as *his own son*, that

* For a clear presentation of the distinction between a *servant* and a *son* under the moral government of God, see Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 258, 259.

was dead and is now alive again, and that was lost and is found! The Prodigal, out of an overwhelming sense of his sinfulness and unworthiness, may be ready to ask that he be given—and that as a special grace—only a hired servant's place. But no: this is not the place provided for him, this is not the place that divine grace assigns him, and this is not the place that his father will permit him to occupy. "Thou art no more a servant, but a son," is the purport of the father's reply. A *son*, and nothing less than a *son*, he must be; with the family badge upon his hand, a seat at his father's table, a full admittance to all the privileges and benefits of his father's home, and a full interest in and title to his father's rich estate. "If children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ."

The sweet and precious comfort and the "joy unspeakable and full of glory" flowing from all this, is ours by the grace of God. In adopting us as his sons, God *the Father* steps out and enters into a personal relation with us too; and comprehending in it the work of his only begotten Son, whom, in infinite love, he gave to redeem us; and the work of his Spirit, whom he sent forth to apply salvation to us; he crowns it all by his own inestimable and superabounding grace in becoming *our Father*. And this most exalted and blessed relationship into which we are thus introduced, throws its benign light back upon, and determines the character of, all the other relationships and the experience of the Christian life. In its light, Christ stands to us not simply as our legal representative and sponsor, but our own dear Elder Brother, "in whom it hath pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell," and who is to us "the chiefest among ten thousand," and "altogether lovely." And the Holy Spirit becomes, not merely the *principle* of life within us, operating unseen and unrecognised in our hearts, but himself "the Spirit of adoption," ever breathing forth from our breasts the filial cry of "Abba, Father;" and himself, too, the seal of our adoption and the earnest of our inheritance, bearing his personal witness with our spirits that we are the children of God. Other Christians, too, no matter what their earthly position or relationships be, become bound to us by the sacred and tender ties of brotherhood, we and

they being all the children of one common *family*. Life's work with us also becomes, not so much *duties*, which belong more to the relation of a servant, but *privileges*, which we exercise and enjoy as expressions of our own love, and in response to our Father's wondrous love. And the life which we live upon this elevated plane of Adoption, where we are lifted above all servile fear and anxious care, and where the ineffable love of God pours down its full flood of heavenly light upon us, is a veritable *walking in love*: its very atmosphere is love, its every motive love, and all its works are done in love. "God is love, and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him."

Such is the privilege, and such ought to be the experience, of every sinner who accepts the Lord's gracious promise: "I will receive you, and will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty." T. H. LAW.

ARTICLE IV.

THE FOUR APOCALYPTIC BEASTS; OR, THE CHERUBIC SYMBOL.

Nothing in the Sacred Scriptures is more remarkable than their profound and beautiful symbolism. Throughout the entire period of revelation, great moral and spiritual truths are most impressively set forth by the use of natural and material things; and whatever natural and material thing is used to convey moral and spiritual truths is appropriately termed a *symbol*. It is greatly to be regretted that a subject so fruitful and instructive as that of scriptural symbolism has not received more careful study at the hands of biblical students.

Many of these symbols are found in every period of revelation, and much of our knowledge of divine truth must depend upon their proper interpretation.

The revelations to Daniel in the Old, and the revelations to John in the New Testament, are almost entirely made through

the medium of symbolical representations; and until we have the key to these symbols, large portions of the word of God must remain sealed.

The beasts, the living creatures, the candlesticks, the stars, the elders, the trumpets, the vials, the horns, are the impressive objects used by the Holy Ghost to represent the great spiritual truths of the heavenly kingdom. Some of the symbols of Scripture are found in many portions of the word; many of them, certainly, are found in every dispensation of the covenant of redemption.

Everywhere bread and water are used as symbols of gospel grace. Ho, every one that thirsteth: if any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink; I am the Bread of Life. Everywhere animal sacrifices are typical of the sacrifice of Christ Jesus, the spotless Lamb of God. Christ, our Passover, sacrificed for us.

The central object to whom all the prophets gave witness, and testimony to whom is the spirit of the entire Scriptures, is the Lord Jesus Christ. He is the Bread of God, the Lamb, the Vine, the Corner-stone, the true Manna, the Lion of the tribe of Judah. Nearly all of the symbols of Scripture are connected directly with the Lord Jesus Christ, the God-man Mediator, and with his redemptive work.

After the vision of the seven golden candlesticks and the seven stars, and the interpretation thereof, contained in the first three chapters of the Revelation, John beheld a door opened in heaven, and heard a voice saying, Come up hither, and I will shew thee things which must be hereafter.

The chief figure of the vision was seated upon the heavenly throne, and to look upon was like a jasper and a sardine stone; the emerald rainbow was round about the throne, and the golden crowned elders, clothed in white, sat upon the four and twenty seats; He who sat upon the throne was the Lord Jesus, who created all things, and for whose pleasure they are and were created. In the midst of the throne and round about the throne were four *living creatures*; for the Greek word ζῶα is here most incorrectly and improperly translated "*beasts*;" and the first

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living creature was like a lion, and the second like a calf, and the third a man, and the fourth a flying eagle.

The *position* of this living creature is most significant: it is immediately connected with the mediatorial throne upon which the Lord Jesus Christ, as Lamb of God, is seated. And this gives one clue to the interpretation of the symbol; viz., whatever may be the solution of the figure, it must be found in connexion with the redemptive work of the Son of Man, the Seed of the Woman, the King upon the throne.

If, upon examination of the word of God, it shall be found that in every instance where this symbol occurs, it is always found in connexion with the Lord Jesus, then we are certain that no explanation which disconnects the symbol from the work of Christ can be true. Omitting at this time any argument to identify the living creature of John with the Cherubim of Ezekiel—for this identity will appear as we proceed—the first mention of this symbol is found in Gen. iii. 24: God placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the Tree of Life.

The Tree of Life in Eden, of which man was commanded to eat, was the symbol of the divine food which God prepared and gave to sustain that life which he breathed into man. It was thus a symbol of blessedness—of man's truest, highest, and most exalted blessedness. The cherubim are in immediate proximity to this Tree of Life; the Messianic Promise of the seed of the Woman—the Son of God incarnate—has been made; the altar of sacrifice, stained with the blood of those animals whose skins now covered the shame of our first parents, stands in view, and the fourfold composite form of creaturehood is thus connected with the Tree of Life, the altar of sacrifice, the blood of Atonement, the promise of a Saviour who should be the Seed of the Woman. Any careful examination of this portion of Scripture must connect the cherubic symbol with the redemptive work of the promised Saviour, the Seed of the Woman. That Tree of Life is to be protected by the flaming sword, until it reappears in paradise regained—when the redeemed shall eat of it, as it bears its twelve manner of fruits, yielding her fruit every month, and

whose leaves shall be for the healing of the nations. And in sight of that Tree of Life, restored to paradise by the blood of the Lamb, is the fourfold form of *creaturehood*, the four living creatures of the Revelation of Jesus Christ to his servant John on Patmos.

From the fall in Eden to the exode from Egypt, a period of about twenty-five hundred years, there is no record in the Scriptures of any appearance of this symbol.

But when the tabernacle of testimony was erected in the wilderness, and when the Lord Jesus Christ took up his abode in that Tabernacle in the midst of his redeemed people, the Cherubim or the living creatures reappear in immediate connexion with the Mercy Cover, the Blood, and the Shekinah presence of God.

Among the divine directions for building the tabernacle is this: "And thou shalt make two Cherubims of gold, of beaten work shalt thou make them, in the two ends of the mercy cover; and the Cherubims shall stretch forth their wings on high, covering the mercy cover with their wings, and their faces shall look one to another, toward the mercy cover shall the faces of the Cherubim be. And there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy cover from between the two Cherubim which are upon the ark of the testimony."

Here the Cherubim are in immediate connexion with the Ark of the Covenant, the blood-sprinkled mercy cover, the Shekinah presence of God; and all of this within the Most Holy place. From Moses to Solomon, a period of about five hundred years, the Cherubim held this position in the tabernacle of testimony; and from Solomon to Nebuchadnezzar, a period of over four hundred years, this symbol occupied the same relative position in the temple.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, which is an inspired exposition of the symbolism of the Levitical dispensation as related to the priestly work of Jesus the Son of God, calls attention to all of these symbols, and makes special mention of the Cherubim by name, saying that they were within the most holy place.

Ezekiel the prophet of God to the children of Israel, exile of the captivity, on the banks of the river Chebar, two hundred

miles above lordly Babylon, saw through the opened heavens visions of God, and lo, the *Cherubic Symbol* in wondrous four-fold form appeared.

Again, when he sat in his house with the elders of Judah before him, the hand of the Lord was upon him, and he saw this same majestic symbol, the appearance of the likeness of the glory of God; this time, however, not on the river Chebar, but in the holy city Jerusalem, and preparing to depart from the house of the Lord; and the prophet knew that this was the Cherubim, for he expressly says: "I knew that they were the Cherubim." Whatever of hope, mercy, or comfort was connected with the Cherubic Symbol goes with the covenanted people of God from Jerusalem to their captive home in Babylon; and doubtless the heart of the prophet of God was cheered and strengthened by this imposing vision of the glory of God.

Nearly seven hundred years after this, John, from another exile at Patmos, saw in the midst of the heavenly throne and in the midst of the elders a slain Lamb with seven horns and seven eyes, and there in the midst of the throne and elders were the four living creatures, the Cherubim that Ezekiel saw on the banks of the Chebar. Thus it is established, that, during the entire period of revelation, under every dispensation of the Covenant of Redemption, the Cherubim, or the living creatures, are never found except in immediate connexion with the redemptive work of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Another most significant and important fact, as related to the exposition of this Symbol is found in the song which the four living creatures sing before the throne: with the elders, they fall before the throne, saying to the Lamb, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof, for thou wast slain and hast *redeemed us* to God by thy blood; and then the angels take up the song of thanksgiving to the worthy Lamb; and then every creature which was in heaven and on the earth and under the earth ascribed blessing and honor and glory and power to Him that sitteth upon the throne and to the Lamb forever.

Whatever interpretation may be given to the *Cherubim*, this much is certain, they themselves say that they have been re-

deemed by the Lamb. The symbol may have other significations; *but it must signify Redemption*: "Thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood."

In the Eden, then, that was lost, the Cherubim are found near the altar of sacrifice and the Promised Seed; in the wilderness and in the promised land, they are seen over the mercy cover, and near the atoning blood; in time of the captivity, they go with the redeemed people, and are seen in vision with all the symbols of salvation on the banks of the river Chebar; and in the paradise regained, the new heavens and the new earth, they are in immediate connexion with the slain Lamb, and they sing, "Thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood."

We are thus prepared from this induction of Scripture facts to take another step, and say that the Cherubim represent the redeemed creation and symbolise the deliverance of the creature—all creaturehood, *κτίσις*—to the favor and enjoyment of God; not merely redeemed man, but the redeemed *creature*—the creature that now waiteth in pain the hour of joyful deliverance from the bondage of corruption. The symbol represents complete creaturehood, the totality of animal life, delivered by the second Adam, the Son of Man, the Head of the creation, from the curse and death which entered into and passed upon the whole creation by the sin of him who was the first Head, and who was the *figure*—the *τύπος*—of Him who was to come.

As the symbol becomes fully developed and clearly defined, there are plainly seen four faces—the *man*, the *lion*, the *calf*, the *eagle*—the representative types of the animal world; man the representative of moral intelligence, the lion of wild animals, the calf of domestic animals, the eagle of all fowls that fly, and fish that swim; for in the Mosaic account of creation, the eagle was the product of the water: "God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth."

The *Cherubim* of the Old and the *four living creatures* of the New Testament represent the totality of creaturehood; and the song they sing before the slain Lamb—"Thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood"—leads to the conclusion that they sym-

bolise the redemption and restoration of the creation to the favor and fellowship of God.

But here the objection will at once be raised: this teaches the immortality of the brute creation; and "do you mean to assert that Christ died in any sense to save the world of irrational animals?" We reply: the *immortality* of the brute creation is *not* taught in the sense of any resurrection or restoration of the generations of dead animals to life; nor does Christ die in any sense to take away their *personal guilt*, for they can have no guilt in any moral sense; but it is asserted that Christ's death does remove the curse not only from man, but also from the entire creation, upon which that curse passed from the sinning head, the first Adam.

The work of Christ has a far wider scope than man's redemption; that work overflows the channel of manhood, and reaches to the farthest limits of creation, and blesses the whole boundless universe; for in the dispensation of the fulness of times he will gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him. He is the first-born of every creature; for by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, whether visible or invisible, whether thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him and for him.

When we look carefully at the creation, we find man with a material body, linking him to the material world around him; he had also animal life, linking him to the animal world; and a God-given and God-like life, linking him to his Maker and his God. When the second Adam came, of whom the first was a figure—*τύπος*—he too had a material body, animal life, and a human soul, and all these united indissolubly to his *eternal Godhead*.

It is evident, therefore, that the inorganic creation and all the forms of animate existence are bound up in the destiny of Him who is creation's Lord and Head; and if that Head shall suffer, all the members must suffer with Him. Hence, when he sinned against God, by eating of the forbidden tree, the curse and the death falling upon him, the offending head, passed over upon all the manifold forms of the creation: "Cursed is the ground for

thy sake; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return;" and thus the curse and the woe passed upon all forms of life, even from the head to the very earth upon which Adam walks; and with this statement all the facts of human history and the teachings of God's word agree; and the imagination of the poet expresses a sad and solemn fact, when he says:

"Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat,
Sighing through all her works, gave signs of woe
That all was lost."

Christ, the second Adam, comes not merely to save man, but to retrieve the ruin of the fall, to restore the lost creation. He is the Lord from heaven, and is indeed a quickening Spirit, who shall roll away the curse from the *κτίσις*—the created thing—and make all things new. "In him creation and the Creator meet in reality and not in semblance." "On the very apex of the finished pyramid of being, he sits Son of Man and Son of God, the adorable monarch of all."

Christ as Son of Man, in whom the headship over creation is to be regained, must reach forth his healing hand and touch and restore and renew every form and part of that sin-cursed creation, which now groaneth and travaileth in pain, waiting for the redemption and resurrection of the bodies of the sons of God, when the Lord himself shall appear in glory, and make all things new.

Πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις—*every creature*—is waiting in earnest expectation the hour when the children of God shall be openly manifested to the universe as such; at which time the creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into that glorious liberty which the children of God shall enjoy at the appearing of Him who is creation's Lord and Head and Restorer.

The heavens and earth which now are, by the word and power of God are kept in store unto the day when the Lord will come, when they shall be dissolved, and be purified with fire; when the earth, its works, and elements shall be burned up, but not annihilated; and when the *new heavens and earth* shall appear in immortal beauty and glory, according to the promise, in which the four and twenty elders and the four *living creatures* shall

dwell eternally with the slain but ever-living *Lamb*. Behold, I make all things *new*.

“Come, for creation groans,
 Impatient of thy stay;
 Worn out with these long years of ill,
 These ages of delay.

“Come, and make all things new,
 Build up this ruined earth;
 Restore our faded paradise—
 Creation's second birth.

“Come, and begin thy reign
 Of everlasting peace;
 Come, take the kingdom to thyself,
Great King of Righteousness.”

The typical symbol of the restored creation—the *Cherubim of Eden*, of the *Tabernacle*, of the *Temple*, of the river *Chebar*, reappear as the *four living creatures* in the *new heavens and earth*, and join in the anthem of praise to Him who hath redeemed them to God by his own precious blood.

God has assured us in his word that he will not leave the present material and animate creation, which before sin entered he himself pronounced very good, under the blight of sin, the bondage of corruption, and the power of the devil; that blight shall be removed, that bondage shall be broken, that power shall be destroyed by Him who is the Restorer, the Resurrection, and the Risen Lord.

No spot in all this wide universe has ever been hallowed as has this earth upon which we live—hallowed by the human birth and life, the toils and tears, the sufferings and sacrifice, the burial and resurrection, of the Son of God. Honored thus above all other worlds, God will not leave it under its present burden and bondage of corruption, but will still more highly honor and glorify it at the appearing of the Son of Man, when Christ and his redeemed people as kings and priests unto God shall reign upon the earth.

The composite Cherubic form, the man, the ox, the calf, the eagle, represents then the *κτίσις*—the creature—every creature; and symbolises the redeemed creation, and its restoration to the favor and fellowship of God.

The four living creatures, or the Cherubim, is also *the symbol of God's dwelling place in the midst of this redeemed creation.*

The wise king of Israel, Solomon, asked, "Will God indeed dwell on the earth?" and the Cherubim is the symbolic answer: Yes, God will indeed dwell on the earth, with him that is of an humble and contrite heart, in the midst of his blood-bought people, in the midst of his redeemed creation. In very deed, God has dwelt on the earth; he now dwells on the earth; he will dwell on the *new earth*, in the midst of the four and twenty elders and the *four living creatures.*

For nearly a thousand years, in the Tabernacle and in the Temple, within the most holy place, God had his dwelling, over the mercy cover, between the outstretched wings of the Cherubim; here was the manifested presence of God, the Shekinah glory; and from this, as his dwelling place, Jehovah met and communed with the high priest of his people. Ezekiel saw the same God in the same place, between the Cherubim, on the banks of the river Chebar; and John, in his exile at Patmos, saw through the opened heavens the Lamb of God, the Lord Jesus, in the midst of the throne and the four and twenty elders and the *four living creatures.* The second point of the symbol, then, is plain—it is God's dwelling in the midst of his redeemed creation.

As the Infinite Spirit, the Fountain of Light and Life, the Author of all existence, God is equally present in every part of his boundless universe; so that if we ascend up to heaven, he is there; if we make our bed in hell, he is there; if we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall his hand lead us and his right hand hold us; the darkness and the light are both alike to him.

But while he is thus omnipresent, he manifests his gracious and loving presence in a special and preëminent sense in the midst of his redeemed creation: as his dwelling place was in the midst of Israel of old, so now it is and will be in the midst of his redeemed ones, to whom he will reveal the infinite fulness of his glory as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ our Lord; and God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of

God in the face of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ, God dwells in mortal flesh; and the High and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy, saith, I dwell also with him that is of a contrite and humble spirit. From the Cherubim of Eden to the Cherubim of the Paradise restored in the Revelation, this symbol sets before us, for perpetual memorial, the precious truth, that God dwells in the midst of his redeemed ones here, and will dwell in his redeemed creation throughout the endless ages; it is not merely a redeemed creation, but this as the dwelling place of the Infinite God—God and man dwelling together in holy fellowship in the new heavens and the new earth. Here we reach a point beyond which the imagination of man in its wildest flights cannot possibly reach; at which the deepest and most intense longings of the human soul rest in peaceful and profound satisfaction. Here all heathen mythologies, all pagan sacrifices, all philosophical inquiries, all poetic musings, all prophetic dreams, all Christian desires terminate—to dwell with God and he with us forever and forevermore. The life of the Infinite and the finite coming together in one dwelling-place in the restored creation.

How fearful and dreary the unbelief of atheism—to dwell in a Fatherless, Godless universe; to see no Father's face, to hear no Father's voice, to feel no Father's hand; to be left thus forever, with nothing higher than the human amid the infinities of time and space. How sublime and thrilling the faith of the Christian—to see God, to know God, to be with and like to God, to dwell with him, and to have poured into the human soul the fulness of the blessedness of the Godhead.

God created this earth as the *dwelling-place* of man, where he would meet with him and reveal to his creature and servant all the plenitude of his holiness, goodness, and love; nor shall man's sin, and the consequent curse upon the creation, prevent the joyful and blessed consummation.

A second Adam, the Lord from heaven, of whom the first Adam was a *figure*, shall come down to earth, and dwell in human form with men, and die, and rise again, and ascend on high, and sit on the throne; and from thence will come back to earth, and make all things new, and shine himself in this renewed creation

as his eternal home. He dwelleth in the midst of the four living creatures; and his redeemed ones shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more, neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat, for the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.

This, we believe, is the *second* truth set forth in this symbol, viz., God's dwelling in the midst of the redeemed creation.

To say that the Cherubim is a symbol of redeemed men is insufficient—it is more than *man*, it is the total of *creaturehood*. Nor is this all, for the Cherubim is always connected with God; in no instance are the living creatures found apart from God; the interpretation of the symbol must therefore make full account of this fact; and what more apparent than that this inseparable connexion teaches the inseparable connexion between *God* and his *new creation*? The *symbol* cannot be, properly interpreted, separated from its connexions. This intimate and invariable connexion of the Cherubim with God is an essential element in the exposition. To say that the living creatures symbolise the redeemed creation is to stop short of the full truth; we must add that the symbol teaches that this redeemed creation is God's eternal-dwelling place.

A *third* truth is taught, and this, we believe, exhausts the symbol, viz.: the Cherubim is a *symbol of the glory of God shrined in and shining out from his dwelling-place in the restored creation.*

Ezekiel says expressly concerning the Cherubim: "*This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of God.*"

And a careful induction of Scripture will show that the glory of God is always connected with the symbol, and the symbol is never separated from that glory. The glory of God is so intimately and inseparably connected with this symbol, that no interpretation can be correct that fails to notice the glory: this is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of God. The redeemed creation, as the dwelling-place of God, is the most glorious manifestation of God to the universe.

The chief end of all things, of creation, providence, and re-

demption, is to show forth the glory of God: of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory forever.

Beautiful and glorious beyond description was this world, with its teeming forms of life, as it came into being, fresh from its Maker's hand; very good unto its glorious end, as manifesting the wisdom, power, and goodness of God, its new light flashing over it, its new life pulsating wildly through it, clothed with verdure, and filled with all lovely forms of sentient and animal life.

God created the earth and man upon it; and here he dwelt with man in holy and blessed fellowship. Here he manifested to man, his creature and his son, the fulness of his goodness, holiness, and love. The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. This earth hung upon nothing, with its attendant moon revolving round the sun; the sun and moon and stars hung in the heavens for days and weeks and months and years, and for signs and seasons; the ocean bound in his bed by rock-ribbed shores and sandy beach; the expanse dividing the waters above from those beneath; the earth teeming with all forms of life, trees and fruits and flowers; countless races of animals springing into being at the almighty word; and man, the last and highest in the very image of God himself, the head and lord of all, the link between the Creator and his creation. From this creation, his dwelling-place with man, the glory of God streamed forth to and upon the universe.

But the glory of God, as it dwells in and shines forth from the new creation shall as far exceed this as the light of the noonday sun exceeds the light of the twinkling far-off star. By just so much as the second Adam surpasses the first in the dignity of his person and the divinity of his being, shall the new creation, the new heavens and earth, the Spiritual Temple of living souls, surpass the first creation in splendid magnificence and glory.

In that day of the Lord, to which all days are looking forward and hasting; when the sons of God shall be manifested; when the creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption; when the New Jerusalem shall come down out of heaven; when the Lamb shall dwell in the midst of his blood-bought people, leading them in the green pastures and beside the still waters,

wiping all tears from all faces; when there shall be no night, and no death and no parting forever: then from that new creation shall the glory of God pour forth in richer and more copious streams, filling and flooding the universe with light and beauty and blessedness. That the glory of God shrined in and issuing from his dwelling place in the redeemed creation is an essential element in the Cherubic symbol is evident from the fact, that the Spirit-taught and Spirit-rapt prophet at Chebar and apostle at Patmos gather up all the precious and costly and beautiful things of earth to give us some idea of the transcendent splendor of that glory.

There are wheels and eyes, clouds and infolding fire, jasper and sardine stones, and crystal sea, and arching rainbow, and crowns of gold, and tree of life, and light above the brightness of the sun, and redeemed creaturehood and glorified humanity and shrined in the midst of all is the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. Angels, principalities, and powers in the heavenly realm gaze with wonder and admiration upon the redeemed creation; and with adoring love and delight upon Him who is Redeemer and Lord and Head of all and over all, God blessed forever more; throughout the limitless bounds of the universe there is no such manifestation of the life and loveliness of God.

The four living creatures sing the new song: "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, and hast made us unto our God kings and priests; and we shall reign on earth."

The angels, the number of whom was ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands, say with loud voice, "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches and wisdom and strength and honor and glory and blessing."

And then every creature in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, say: "Blessing and honor and glory and power be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever. And the four living creatures say Amen."

The results reached may be thus briefly summed up: (a) The identity of the Cherubic symbol in all the periods of revelation, from the Cherubim of Eden to the four living creatures of the

Apocalypse; (b) The Cherubim represents not man only, but the creation; and symbolises the redemption not of man only, but of the creation; (c) This redeemed creation as the dwelling-place of the risen and glorified Son of Man; (d) The glory of God as shrined in and flowing out from this redeemed creation.

Or, stated in another form: The Cherubim is a symbol—1st. Of the redeemed creation; 2d. Of this redeemed creation as God's dwelling-place; 3d. Of this dwelling-place as the seat of God's greatest glory.

Or, stated in one sentence: It is Christ, from his dwelling-place in his new and redeemed creation, manifesting to the universe the glory of God.

In this impressive symbol, God has revealed to believers, in every dispensation of the covenant of grace, the truth, that for man, the earth, and creature there was redemption; that God himself would dwell with his redeemed; and that here his glory would be most signally manifested; and these three truths are necessary to the full exposition of the symbol.

A. W. PITZER.



ARTICLE V.

THE DANCING QUESTION.

Modern society, while condemning sternly many things which the ancients tolerated or even applauded, countenances some things which they utterly rejected. It is very pleasant and natural for us quietly to assume that ours is the advanced and civilised age. But when men reason thus, "A given usage cannot be improper because Christian opinion and society allow it among us," they reason in a circle. If the propriety of the usage is in question, then there are two hypotheses to be examined, of which one is, "Ours is a pure state, and therefore what we tolerate must be pure;" but the other is, "This tolerated usage being impure, it proves our state corrupt." Now the decision between the two

hypotheses cannot be made by a self-sufficient assumption. Oriental, Greek, and Papal Christianity justifies many things which we think excessive corruptions, by just such an assumption; it is no more valid in our case than in theirs. Indeed, the very tendency to such self-sufficiency is, according to the Bible, one of the strongest symptoms of corruption. The matter must be settled by a fair appeal to Bible-morals. These remarks are made because many relaxed Christians now virtually settle the dancing question by this short and easy sophism. They see numerous persons who claim Christian character tolerate or advocate dancing. They assume that all these are a very proper kind of Christians. Thus they "jump to the conclusion" that in spite of the opinions of the "old fogies" dancing must be a very proper thing. Now, in opposition, no charge is here made as to the character of our fashionable Christianity, but this obvious thesis is asserted, that should the dancing usages of fashionable Christian society be found in fact corrupt, then their easy tolerance among us is a sign, not of their innocence, but of a fearful and unsuspected corruption of our state.

Circumstances now give this matter a peculiar importance. The discussion involves not only the wrong or right of dancing, but many other vital questions, such as the extent of Church power, the nature of the Church's didactic function, Christian liberty, with its "metes and bounds," the obligation of Christian charity to avoid causeless offence, and the social morality proper for God's people. These all-important questions need exposition and reassertion from time to time. It is evident that such a need now exists.

It is expressly admitted in the outset that there are acts which are sinful, and yet are not such offences as are properly reached by church discipline. (*Book of Discipline*, Ch. I., §5.) Hence the proof that dancing is sinful would not suffice to demonstrate that it is disciplinable, and each proposition requires a separate discussion.

On the question whether dancing is an innocent recreation for Christians, it must be remarked that the act must be considered in the concrete, with its usual circumstances, adjuncts, and con-

sequences. Practically, these determine the question of moral propriety. No one affirms that there is sin *per se* merely in the rhythmical motion of human members to music. Just as some killing is the sin of murder and some is not, some beating is the sin of assault and battery and some is not, so the attendant circumstances give the moral character to this form of motion. It is proposed first to state the judgment of past ages. The classic heathens of antiquity ever regarded dancing for amusement, even of a male *solus*, or of males with males, as contemptible in a free-born adult, and inconsistent with manly dignity and self-respect. In a religious ceremonial, the *afflatus* of the divinity was supposed to authorise this extravagance of motion and make it excusable at least, if not compatible with a freeman's dignity. The dancing of females with males for social amusement would have been regarded as an act so inconsistent with decency that an instance can scarcely be heard of in reputable society. Greek and Roman gentlemen, whose amusements in their *symposia* and *cœnæ* (with no lady present) were certainly far from strict, found much interest in the evolutions and pantomimes of professional dancers, male and female. But the actors were usually slaves, and the profession was regarded as worse than menial. Such is a fair digest of the testimony of antiquity. The earliest witness cited is that of Herodotus, the "Father of History." In Book VI., 139, he relates that Kleisthenes, the chief magistrate of Sicyon, having a marriageable daughter, collected many of the chief men of Greece as her suitors. Among these the favored suitor was Hippocleides, son of Tisandros, from Athens. At a male entertainment, after the drinking had proceeded far, this young man, calling on the *auletes* to play for him, danced first some Laconian and then some Attic figures. Herodotus proceeds: "Kleisthenes, while he was dancing these, though loathing the thought of having Hippocleides as his son-in-law, by reason of his dancing and indecency, still constrained himself, not wishing to break out on him. But when he saw him gesturing with his legs he was no longer able to hold in, but said: "Well, son of Tisandros, thou hast danced away thy bride." The daughter was given to another.

The eminent and accurate Greek scholar, Becker, in his *Chari-cles*, says (p. 103): "Though the art of dancing was so highly prized, though it served to give *éclat* to the festivals and shows, and though the guests of the *symposia* delighted to see the feats of a skilful *artist*; still, in private life it was little practised, and there seems to have arisen almost a prejudice against it. . . . it seems to have been considered incompatible with the dignity of a man. . . . Indeed, it was usually looked upon as a preliminary symptom of intoxication."

As to the opinion of the Romans, Dr. Wm. Smith (*Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, p. 852), concludes thus: "Dancing, however, was not performed by any Roman citizens except in connexion with religion; and it is only *in reference to such dancing* that we are to understand the statements that the ancient Romans did not consider dancing disgraceful, and that not only freemen, but the sons of senators and noble matrons practised it. In the later times of the republic we know that it was considered highly disgraceful for a freeman to dance; Cicero reproaches Cato for calling Muræna a 'dancer.'" Dr. Smith then quotes a part of the famous passage in the *Oratio pro Muræna*, c. 6: "Saltatorem appellat L. Murænam Cato. Maledictum est, si vere objicitur, vehementis accusatoris; sin falso, maledici conviciatoris . . . Non debes . . . temere consulem populi Romani saltatorem vocare; sed conspicere quibus præterea vitiis affectum esse necesse sit eum, cui vere istud objici possit. Nemo fere saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit, neque in solitudine, neque in convivio moderato," etc. "Tu mihi arripis *id, quod necesse est omnium vitiorum esse extremum.*" The *Oratio in Pisonem*, c. 10, 22, may be compared. Forcellini and Facciolati, in their *Latin Thesaurus*, define thus: *Saltator: mollis artifex et probrosus.* To one who knows antiquity this statement will appear perfectly moderate and reasonable: that had the daughter, not only of a rigid Cato, but of a flexible Cicero or Julius, done precisely the thing which is currently done by Christian females at modern dancing parties, Roman opinion would have such a sense of the disgrace that on the following morning the father would have consulted the leading parents of his "Gens," and, with their

full moral support, would have exerted his autocratic domestic authority to consign the disgrace of his house to an imprisonment, which she would have not a little reason to submit to thankfully, as the alternative of a capital penalty. Roman opinion was not an infallible ethical standard? No. But it gives us the estimate of one civilised age. And if Roman morals were in many points deplorably relaxed, and yet judged this amusement thus, there is yet room for the question, whether a sounder standard of morals might not condemn it even more clearly.

But let us now look at the verdict of Christian antiquity. Chrysostom (court preacher at Byzantium), expounding the history of Herodias's daughter in Matthew, says: "Where dancing is, there is the devil. For God did not give us our feet for this end, that we might demean ourselves indecently; but that we might walk decently, not prance like a parcel of camels; but that we may exult with the angels. If even the body is disgraced, which perpetrates this indecency, much more the soul. . . . Dancing is the devil's invention."

The councils of the early Church frequently condemned the practice. The fifty-third Canon of the Synod of Laodicea enacts, "Christians when coming to weddings must not caper or dance; but dine or sup decently as becomes Christian people." The same Synod forbids clergymen when attending marriages even to witness dancing exhibitions. The Synod of Agatho says (A. D. 450): "Dancings to songs or music of an amatory or loose character are absolutely inhibited to all Christians." So enacts the council of Illerda, A. D. 515. The eighth universal council of the Church (*in Trullo*) (A. D. 692) enacts: "We also forbid and expel all public dances of women, as producing much injury and ruin."

We now hasten to modern Christian judgment and legislation. Presbyterianism has uttered no uncertain sound. Calvin insisted on the discipline of dancing in Geneva. The Westminster Assembly Larger Catechism, Question 139, declares "lascivious dancing and stage-plays" breaches of the Seventh Commandment. The Scotch Assembly of 1649, "finding the scandal and abuse that arises through *promiscuous dancing*, do therefore *inhibit and discharge the same*, and do refer *the censure thereof* to the several

presbyteries," etc. So the Scotch Assembly of 1701, "do revive the acts of the General Assembly of 1648, discharging promiscuous dancing," etc. If recent use has allowed these acts to fall into such desuetude as to justify the assertion that Scotch Presbyterianism does not now discipline for dancing, the comment made on the neglect, by its manifest influence on the morals of the Scotch peasantry, is the best demonstration of error.

Let us now hear the testimony of American Presbyterianism. The Assembly of 1818 pronounced dancing in "its highest extremes" as admitted by all to be of "fatal consequences." (Round dances were then unknown in America.) The Assembly "apprehends danger from its incipient stages;" and requires church members to "heed on this subject the admonitions of those whom you have chosen to watch for your souls." The Assembly of 1827 virtually repeats this action. In 1789 the Synod of North Carolina, in reply to an overture, requires that persons guilty of dancing, horse-racing, etc., must be "dealt with by their spiritual rulers." This action, being allowed tacitly by the Assemblies which reviewed the Synod's proceedings, becomes of authority as expounding the law.

The existence, and consequently the action on this subject of our Southern Assembly, are recent, and should be familiar to us. Hence only the main points are recalled. In 1865, our Assembly decided, 1st. That while no church court "has a right to make any new rules of church membership, different from those contained in the constitution," all courts, including church sessions, have the undoubted right "to make deliverances *affirming their sense of what is* 'an offence' in the meaning of the Book of Discipline, Ch. I., §3." 2d. That our church courts have hitherto "probably been too tolerant of dancing," etc. 3d. That "it is the duty of every judicatory to enforce the teachings of our standards on this and other fashionable amusements." Those teachings "repeatedly" uttered by the supreme judicatory and now reaffirmed at large, are that dancing is "in direct opposition to the Scriptures and our standards," is indisputably a "worldly conformity," and is liable to "excesses." What species of "enforcement" this Assembly enjoins the church courts to employ

is thus explained at the end of the enactment: "Instruction from the pulpit," prudent "admonition"; but when all other means fail, then such methods of discipline *as shall separate from the church those who love the world and whose practices conform thereto.*"

In 1869, the Assembly "heartily responds" to a similar question by "*earnestly and solemnly enjoining upon all sessions and presbyteries under its care the absolute necessity of enforcing discipline . . . against offences; under the word offences including . . . theatrical exhibitions and performances and promiscuous dancings.*"

In 1877, the Presbytery of Atlanta asked the Assembly to interpret the law of the Church, as set forth in 1865 and 1869, as to these points: whether it forbade dancing, or only "promiscuous dancing." And if the latter, to what accident of the dance the word "promiscuous" referred. The answer of the Assembly is in these words:

1. "The Assembly has uniformly discouraged and condemned the modern dance, in all its forms, as tending to evil, whether practised in public balls or in private parlors.

2. "Some forms of this amusement are more mischievous than others—the round dance than the square, the public ball than the private parlor; but all are evil and should be discountenanced.

3. "The extent of the mischief done depends largely upon circumstances. The church session is therefore the only court competent to judge what remedy to apply; but the Assembly, being persuaded that in most cases it is the result of thoughtlessness or ignorance, recommends great patience in dealing with those who offend in this way."

When this is viewed in connexion with the previous enactments (which are not repealed here but virtually reaffirmed), its meaning is obvious: that while all dancing is against the law of the Church, yet, as some forms are more mischievous than others, and attendant circumstances largely qualify the mischiefs, church sessions should use great patience in dealing with offenders. But the law of the Church clothes the sessions with discretion as to "what remedy" should be applied, mere remonstrance or judicial discipline. That the Assembly, notwithstanding its tenderness towards offenders, clothes the sessions with the power of

judicial discipline and designs its exercise in all the worse cases, is manifest. Why else do they authorise sessions to "judge what remedy to apply," and speak of their "dealing" with offenders? Again, the body clothed by the Assembly with the discretionary power is not the didactic agency, the pastor, nor even the individual elder, but *the judicial body, the session*. The Assembly indisputably authorises judicial action in all such cases as are "mischievous" and cannot be curbed by didactic means, and that at the discretion of sessions.

The views and law of the great Wesleyan body may be gathered, first, from Wesley's own words. In his Works, Vol. VII., p. 224, he says of square dances (round dances were then unknown in England): "It seems God himself has already decided the question concerning dancing. If dancing be not evil in itself, yet it leads young women to numberless evils." So in Vol. II., p. 271, Sermon on "The More Excellent Way." "So (evil tendencies) undoubtedly have all public dancings. And the same tendency they must have, unless the same caution obtained among Christians which was observed among the ancient heathens. With them men and women never danced together, but always in separate rooms. This was always observed in ancient Greece and for several ages at Rome, where a woman dancing in company with men would have been at once set down as a ——." Wesley's classical attainments authorised him to speak of the ancient usage and opinion. So Adam Clarke: "Let them plead for it who will; I know it to be evil and that only." Let the enactment of the "Methodist Church South" be taken as a specimen of Methodist law on this subject. The General Conference of 1874 added to their Book of Discipline, as an appendix, the Pastoral Letter of the Bishops. This, speaking of worldly amusements, says:

"Their multiplied and insidious forms are a source of perpetual temptation and damage, and are denounced by the word of God and by that part of our general rules which forbids 'the taking of such diversions as cannot be used in the name of Jesus.' This denunciation is explicit and comprehensive. 'The name of the Lord Jesus' in this connection is a decisive test; and we are content to leave the issue to its sovereign arbitrament. Amongst those indulgences which cannot stand this solemn

rest is the modern dance, both in its private and public exhibitions, as utterly opposed to the genius of Christianity as taught by us. When persisted in, *it is a justifiable ground of judicial action by the church authorities.*"

The Protestant Episcopal Church has been sometimes unjustly called a "Dancing Church." But the tenor of its verdict against dancing may be seen in the following:

Bishop Hopkins, speaking only of square dances, "No ingenuity can make it consistent with the covenant of baptism." Bishop Meade: "Social dancing *is not among the neutral things* which, within certain limits, we may do at pleasure, and it is not even among the things lawful but not expedient; but it is *in itself wrong*, improper, and of bad effect." This Bishop Meade spoke of "social dancing": what would he have said of round dances? The latter, Bishop Cox pronounces "enormities," and "lascivious." Bishop Johns calls round dances "lascivious" and a "demoralising dissipation." "This scandal is not to be tolerated in the Church of Christ." "If all such efforts (as remonstrances and instructions) prove unavailing, . . . and it becomes necessary to resort to the exercise of decided discipline, it must be done."

It may be said that these opinions, though the views of bishops, are not Episcopal law. Let us then to the law. The general canons of the "General Convention," enjoining discipline for irregular living, in the hands of the minister, subject to an appeal to the bishop, remits the providing of detailed rules to the different diocesan conventions. (*Digest of Canons, 1878.*) The canons of the Virginia Diocese may be taken as a fair specimen. Canon nineteenth, after authorising the minister of the parish to repel from the Lord's table any professed Christian "conducting himself in a manner unworthy of a Christian," adds: "And gaming, attendance on horse-racing or theatrical amusements, witnessing immodest and licentious exhibitions of shows, attending public balls, etc., . . . are offences for which discipline should be exercised."

But Bishop Whittle of Virginia, wishing for still more stringent and imperative legislation against round dancing, speaks of it thus: "I adopt his" (Bishop Johns') "language as my own." Round dancing is a "dreadful evil." "Judging the tree by its fruit,

our wisest and best people, ministers and laymen, have become alarmed lest its effect shall not only be to injure pure and undefiled religion in the Church, *but even to sap the very foundations of all social virtue and morality.* I will not discuss its character and consequences. For while St. Paul wrote to the Church in Ephesus that it was a shame even to speak of those things which were done by some *in secret*, I should feel ashamed even to speak, as the truth would require, of this thing which is done *openly before all.*"

The Council of 1878, in response to the bishop's request, unanimously resolved that it is the "solemn duty of every communicant to abstain from round dancing; and that every minister be requested to use every effort to arrest the practice of round dancing *by admonition AND DISCIPLINE.*" Legislation, rendering this absolute by an additional "canon," is now on foot and referred to the next Council.

The Papal body has not had the character of being at all a strict guardian of morals. But even American popery cannot away with the abuse. The Pastoral Letter of the Roman Catholic archbishops and bishops in Council in Baltimore in 1866 speaks thus: They consider it "their duty to warn their people, . . . especially against the fashionable dances, which, as at present carried on, *are revolting to every feeling of delicacy and propriety, and are fraught with the greatest danger to morals.*"

The same Council adopted the following Canon C. *Choreæ dictæ* "round dances" in *scholis nec tolerandæ nec docendæ.*

Cum PP. Conc. Balt. Plenarii II. in Literis Pastoralibus ad Populum, omnino improbarint choreas, quæ vulgo nomine 'Waltzes' et 'round dances' veniunt: statuimus illas non esse docendas et ne tolerandas quidem, in Collegiis, Academiis, et Scholis hujus Diocœseos, etiamsi recreationis tantum causa inter personas ejusdem sexus habeantur.

And the archbishop, with a nerve which shames the timidity of many a Protestant, ordered the parochial clergy to withhold absolution from all such as refused to forsake these amusements.

It may be rejoined, that all the witnesses cited are human, and therefore none of them is Lord of the Christian's conscience.

Let this be granted. But what shall be the presumptive estimate of the humility, modesty, and docility of that temper, which sets itself up arrogantly against this *concursum* of all religions, all ages, all civilisations, to decide, in its ignorance and inexperience, in favor of what the wise and good of the ancient and modern world have condemned? In the face of this array, the charge that the condemnation of dancing is only puritanical or self-righteous is simply silly. Whether this opinion of the virtuous of all ages be sound or not, it is clear that the self-sufficiency and arrogance of mind which rejects it under the plea of asserting its Christian liberty, is the farthest possible from that righteous and reverent, God-fearing, and humble temper which should animate the champion of the holy rights of conscience, especially when constrained to contend against God's own Church.

But it is by no means conceded that this condemnation of public dancing is without scriptural warrant, and sustained only by ecclesiastical opinion. Few practices, which have become current since Bible days, are so fully and expressly condemned by the Bible as is this. No competent archæologist will risk his credit by denying the following facts: that modern dancing, *i. e.*, the dancing of free males and females together for amusement, was unknown in the decent society of the Jews (as of the ancient heathen); that the only dancing mentioned with allowance in the Bible was religious, choral movements, in which the sexes always danced alone, and that the dancing of females for amusement in a male presence, like that of Herodias' daughter, was uniformly recognised as too notoriously indecent to need any new condemnation. Hence all attempted use of the Bible cases as precedents for modern dancing are simply preposterous. And that the canon of Scripture should close without any additional prohibition, in express words, of our modern dancing, is exactly according to that plan by which God has legislated for his Church in all other points of modern sin. Why is it that no church session, if called to discipline a man for the trespass of wantonly cutting a telegraph wire, or the crime of displacing a railroad bar in front of a passenger train, would expect to find a prohibition in express words against these forms of sin? Every child knows the answer:

Because telegraphs and railroads had not then been invented, and God's uniform plan is not to place on the page of the Bible, in Bible times, precepts which must be wholly unintelligible to the generation to which the Bible was given. But his plan was, so to prohibit sins which were current in those generations, as to furnish all honest minds parallels and precedents which would safely guide them in classing the sins of later invention. The position here assumed is, that *the Bible has condemned the modern dance* as expressly as the plan of its revelation made possible for it. For—

1. The Bible enjoins on Christians sobriety: the dance is an act of pronounced levity. The Bible morality is not ascetic, but it is distinctly sedate. It summons us to regard ourselves and our fellow-men as invested with the dignity of immortality; as engaged in a momentous struggle for our own salvation and for the rescue of a perishing generation of fellow-men; as bought for God with divine blood; as at strife with spiritual adversaries of mighty power; as waging this warfare in the presence of a world of men, of angels, and of God. The Bible commends cheerfulness, but forbids frivolity and levity. It allows recreations, but it limits them to such bounds as refit the powers for the serious duties of life, or such as are compatible with the solemn warfare we wage. Let any obedient mind from this point of view compare the numerous places where this *σωφροσύνη* is positively enjoined.* To appreciate the meaning which the Spirit meant to put into this precept, we must consider the meaning which the usage of the age attached to the quality. According to that usage, all such levities as the dancing of a virtuous free-born man for amusement, were outrages on that *αἰδώς*, that sense of dignity and decency of person, the absence of which was a shame and disgrace.

2. The Bible enjoins on Christians strict economy. They are stewards of their riches for God. They must use their superfluity to do good, in the spirit of that Redeemer, "who, though he was rich, for our sakes became poor."† But the modern dance is a wasteful and expensive amusement, wasteful of time,

*1 Tim. ii. 9, 15; iii. 2; 2 Tim. i. 7; Titus ii. 12; 1 Peter iv. 7.

†Luke xi. 41; xii. 33; 2 Cor. viii. 7; ix. 6; 1 Tim. vi. 17. 18.

of money, of dress, of equipage and furniture, and most mischievously hindering industrial pursuits. Is it said that modern Christian society indulges in many other expensive amusements besides the ball? This is deplorably true; but the answer is that "two wrongs do not make a right." All of those expensive amusements are unscriptural and unchristian; God calls for the retrenchment of all. But it would be a sorry method to pursue that important result by sanctioning one of the most obtrusive and fruitful sources of this sinful waste. He who looks around and comprehends the vast destitutions appealing to Christian charity, he who sees our young missionaries detained from the open doors God has set before them among the perishing heathen, he who hears the imploring but vain appeals of our Committees for aid, and then sees God's money, in the hands of his stewards, lavished on the mischievous prodigalities of balls and other fashionable pomps, can appreciate somewhat the greatness of this element of sin. It is as expressly anti-scriptural as the word of God can make it.

3. It has been already remarked that a practice must be viewed in the concrete and with its usual adjuncts in order to make a just moral appraisal of it. The modern dance is antiscritural again, because it dictates usually a mode of dress in females which the Word condemns. Paul* expressly requires Christian females to "adorn themselves in modest apparel" (*ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ*). How much this meant, this raiment seemly and decent for woman, must be learned from a proper understanding of the meaning which virtuous opinion in Paul's day attached to the words. The unlearned Bible reader may see what this was from 1 Cor. xi. 4-10. We there see that, according to that standard which is enjoined on the Christian female, she who appeared in public unveiled—not to say with parts of her person exposed which delicacy should have most jealousy guarded—disparaged the honor of her sex by an unnatural transgression.

4. The Scriptures expressly forbid the modern dance, in that they enjoin the strictest purity in the intercourse of the sexes.† Here we approach very delicate ground. But as our citations

*1 Tim. ii. 9; 1 Peter iii. 3-5. †1 Tim. v. 2.

showed, it is one which the Church and its pastors have always and everywhere felt constrained by duty to assume in resisting the sin. Its defenders not seldom resent this objection to their practice as an indelicate and libellous assault. They endeavor to cry shame upon the construction which experience places on their indulgences. But one thing is clear: if the candid and plain description of the adjuncts of the modern dance would demand words whose utterance would be an outrage to the decencies of debate, then this is the strongest possible proof that *the doing* is still more an outrage upon the decencies of Christian morals. We have seen above a Christian, as pure as he is brave, confess that the personal modesty he cherished as a man disqualified him for expressing in words the adjuncts of the fashionable dances. He could have selected no words which implied so severe and just a censure of them. The Christian physician is sometimes obliged to uncover a fatal ulcer in order to excise it. But he may do it with a hand as chaste as that which lays his benediction on an infant's brow. So the spiritual surgeon may be under obligation to probe, and in probing expose, the moral impurity which his sanctity would fain hide. But the duty may be performed with sanctity. It may be modestly claimed that if any place is suitable for such exposure, it is especially the page of a professional journal which is designed for the teachers and rulers of the Church, and not for the popular assemblage of families.

The attempt has been often made to break the force of the precedents cited from sacred and secular antiquity, by saying that the usages of those days were dictated by that jealous seclusion of women which Christianity has banished as a remnant of barbarism. And we are reminded that, as there is a legitimate union of the sexes, there may be a legitimate scope in social intercourse for the disclosure of the emotions which approximate them to each other. Such is the intimated plea. Now it is conceded that Christianity has elevated woman, in freeing her from that ancient state in which she was, while unmarried, half a slave and half a prisoner. It is conceded that the intercourse of the sexes in domestic society refines both, as long as it is retained within

scriptural bounds; and that it is necessary to found Christian marriage in the mutual knowledge, respect, and friendship of the parties. It is admitted that God, in his laws, always assigns somewhere a legitimate scope to those affections which, in his creative handiwork, he made constitutive of our nature. But since man's fall he teaches us that every one of these affections must be restrained. Now it is the clear teaching of Scripture that the special emotions which approximate the sexes can have no innocent or lawful existence, except between those who desire to be united by them in that sacred union which makes of the twain one flesh. That union is the institution ordained by God in paradise as the means of "seeking a godly seed," consecrated to the high and holy purpose of surrounding young immortals with the safeguards which will fit them for heaven. It is the selected type of the eternal union of Christ to his ransomed Church. Hence its affections must remain unique, and must be sacredly directed towards or confined to the enclosure of the consecrated type. Anything else than this is pollution. From this scriptural position it follows, that in the common social intercourse of the unmarried everything is to be retrenched which has a regular tendency to develop, promiscuously, sentiments which can have lawfully but one single direction. Clear as this deduction is, we are not left to deduction, but have the sure word of Scripture. The rule enjoined on Timothy, 1 Epistle v. 2, is: "Treat the younger women as sisters, with all purity." Now, first, while it is conceded that a breach of propriety by a young minister would carry heavier aggravations of guilt, it is false and absurd to allow to the young layman a different rule of morals. The rule then is, that young Christian males and females are, in their general social intercourse, *to exclude all the peculiar sentiments of the sexes, just as completely as they are excluded between virtuous brothers and sisters.* The apostle teaches us the stimulation of those sentiments towards the common female acquaintance is, while less criminal, as distinctly unlawful. See also for confirmation, Prov. v. 17-18, 1 Tim. ii. 9; 1 Pet. iii. 2-5; Matt. v. 28.

Does any one exclaim that our Christian society is exceeding

far below this standard in many other things besides dancing: in modes of dress, in manners and intercourse? And that therefore we cannot justly condemn dancing while we allow the other departures? If the statement is true, then it proves, not that we are to legitimate dancing, but that we are to reform all the other licenses along with it. Our Saviour's word concerning such reform of a prominent abuse is clear: "This ought ye to have done, and not to leave the others undone." Again, should the averment be true, then the state of facts proves, not that the standard laid down above from the Scriptures is unreasonable, but perhaps it may prove that we are, indeed, far gone from that high Christian state on which it is so pleasant to plume ourselves, and that we may be, in God's eyes, in a deplorable state of decadence and corruption. What way is there for safely settling this question except a comparison of our ways with God's word?

The impulses of human acts are usually complex. To the less objectionable dances of a former generation, young people may have been prompted in part by the mere animal love of motion which leads the lamb to skip and the school-boy to leap. Some found another impulse in the love of music. Many were impelled by the tyranny of fashion, by the fear of being taunted as "wall flowers," or of being reproached as Puritans. Many moved under a love of excitement which they did not stop to analyse. In some at least, less innocent emotions prompted the exercise. In the modern dances it is simple folly to deny the presence of a stronger tendency towards the evil elements of attraction. Now, the complexity of the impulse could not but deceive, especially the inconsiderate and inexperienced dancer, as to the nature of his own emotions. He felt, but did not analyse. This admission may on the one hand greatly palliate the error of the inconsiderate dancer, and may give us the pleasing ability to exculpate him personally from conscious corruption. But on the other hand, *it only places the practice in a more objectionable light by so much as it shows it deceitful and treacherous as a stimulus of evil.* From this point of view, one easily sees how futile it is to quote the declarations of a few inexperienced dancers as to their innocency of evil sensations, in proof of the lawfulness of the amusement.

Over against this partial testimony must be placed a fearful array. It is notorious that the introduction of the waltz, less objectionable than the more recent round dances, excited in England and America the general condemnation of the world and the universal reprehension of the Church. To those who are old enough to remember the verdict of the healthier sentiment, it is self-evident that any change in that verdict since is due to the sophisticating of the general conscience by the tolerance in society of the evil. Those whose experience is more recent may see a fair picture of the earlier and healthier disapprobation in Byron's poem, "The Waltz." It is replete with his keenest and bitterest satire. The amusement is by innuendo charged with the worst possible tendencies. He intimates that nothing but the deplorable relaxation in the fashionable world, resulting from the example of the fourth George when Prince Regent, and the force of his personal example, could have made it possible to domesticate the abominable innovation in British society. In his view the waltzer had tarnished all the purity and delicacy which make woman attractive :

"At once love's most enduring thought resign,
To press the hand so pressed by none but thine :
To gaze upon that eye which never met
Another's ardent look without regret.
Approach the lip which all, without restraint,
Come near enough—if not to touch—to taint!
If such thou lovest, love her then no more."

Byron, it is well known, was far from a saint. If even his gross mind was thus impressed by the new amusement, what is the judgment which Christian purity must pass upon it? And if we may receive these verses of Goethe as an expression of German sentiment, the waltz was no more justified in the land of its origin than here :

"What? The girl of my heart by another embraced?
What? The balm of her lips shall another man taste?
What? Touched in the whirl by another man's knee?
What? Panting recline on another than me?
Sir, she is yours: from the plum you have brushed the soft blue:
From the rose you have shaken its tremulous dew—
What you touched you may take; pretty waltzer, adieu!"

He must be verdant indeed, who can defend the round dance from the charge of impurity, after he is made aware of the feelings avowed by its unblushing male votaries. Let the participants of the other sex be as innocent as a vestal of the infection, that innocency does not remove the loathing which the delicate mind should feel for the unconscious association. Nor, in view of the fact that God forbids our making ourselves unnecessarily the occasions of sin to others, does it remove the guilt. Again, it is well known that men who join in these dances with females for whom they care nothing, usually express the greatest repugnance to seeing their own sisters imitate their example. Why is this? Because these men know the true nature of the amusement. The argument is trite but just, that the real secret source of the excitement is disclosed by the fact that round dances of men with men, and women with women, possess no attraction. In view of these stubborn facts, and the fearful testimony of the police of our large cities as to the sources whence the denizens of the house of her whose "feet go down to death and whose steps take hold on hell" are recruited; the denial of evil tendency in this practice can appear as only the blindness of prejudice and folly. Should any reputable father detect a man, who had no other rights than those of a stranger or at most of a common acquaintance, in such relations to the person of his daughter in the parlor as attend the round dance, he would unquestionably regard it as an outrage upon the honor of his house, which, if Christian forbearance did not hold his hand, would be washed out in blood.

But now we ask, first, how does publicity modify an indecent act except by aggravating it? Second, can such an act, intrinsically immoral, be changed in its character by the attachment of any frivolous adjunct? Would a judge at law, for instance, in a commonwealth which made duelling by its laws a crime, dream of justifying the duellist because the perpetration of his murder was accompanied with a graceful Pyrrhic dance? With what scorn would the righteous magistrate dismiss so impudent a plea! Why then shall the Christian moralist modify his reprobation of that which, when done without accessories, would be condemned by all as unchaste; because, forsooth, tyrannical fashion has at-

tached to it her frivolous adjuncts of music and rhythmical motion? The demand is an insolence.

It is therefore without a shadow of ground that a lack of express law for applying the corrective of discipline is asserted either of the Bible or of our Constitution. Let any church session bring charges, not against the music and motion, but against *the postures* of the round dance, and they would find express authority in the Larger Catechism, Question 138, 139. The impropriety which would be admitted by all, if perpetrated without those adjuncts, cannot be excused by them. Hence if the court should, in tenderness to the offender, refrain from stating its charge in terms fully equal to the grossness of the real act, and speak of it as "round dancing," it is hard to see how a culprit otherwise clearly condemned by our law, can acquire any rights of justification from this undeserved forbearance.

5. The Scripture has virtually included the modern dance in an express prohibition in three places, Rom. xiii. 13, Gal. v. 21, 1 Peter iv. 3, where it sternly inhibits the κῶμοι of the heathen. In the first text it is rendered "rioting," and in the other two "revellings." These words now fail to convey to the English reader the real nature of the sin. "Rioting" suggests some such violent insurrection against law as is put down by reading the riot act, or by an armed police; while "revelling" suggests lavish and intemperate amounts of eating. The κῶμος of the Greeks was wholly another matter: the *comissatio* of the Latins. This was a general frolic or jollification, following the δείπνον or *cæna*, usually pursued within the house of the host. Its spirit and nature may be inferred from the "walking honestly," εὐσχημόνως, of Rom. xiii. 13, with which the κῶμος is contrasted. Εὐσχημοσύνη was that sedate dignity and seemliness which the gospel requires of the Lord's freedmen, the same dignity, exalted and spiritualised, which the Greek ethics exacted of the free-born citizen. The κῶμος was condemned, partly because it was in contrast with this dignity. Cicero, in the place cited, describes the *comissatio* as an excess considerably short of dancing, and a milder preliminary usually preceding, before dissolute people got to the dancing pitch. His defence of *Muræna* against the infamous charge of

being a dancer is that Cato could not catch him in any of these previous excesses, which alone could lead a freeman down to the final shame of dancing for social amusement. "Tu mihi arripis id, quod neesse est omnium vitiorum esse postremum: relinquis illa, quibus remotis hoc vitium omnino esse non potest. Nullum turpe convivium, non amor, non *comissatio*, non libido, non sump-tus ostenditur." Now if Paul and Peter sternly inhibit the *κῶμος* or *comissatio*, *a priori* they inhibited the dancing which contemporary opinion regarded as still more unworthy. No female was usually present in these jollities. But their presence and participation, had it occurred, would unquestionably have made the condemnation of the apostles just so much the sterner, because it would have outraged their moral sense in another point. But add to the ancient *comissatio* the presence of women participating as agents in the frolic, and we have precisely the modern ball, as it appears in its full fledged dissipation. The conclusion of the whole is, that in forbidding *κῶμοι*, the Scriptures did still more forbid the modern dance.

None will be so hardy as to deny that the light of experience may properly be invoked in interpreting the preceptive principles of Scripture and applying them to existing practices. For instance, it is agreed that the Sixth Commandment forbids suicide as truly as the murder of a fellow-man; and that therefore practices destructive of mental and bodily health are criminal. (Larger Catechism, Question 136.) But now the modern drug "chloral" is introduced, and it is found to be a fascinating sedative and nervine. May we then indulge in it causelessly—when not really necessary as an anæsthetic—for our gratification? *It is said*, that when habitually used it fatally impairs the brain-tissue, tending to induce mental imbecility and premature death. *If this be true*, its causeless, habitual use is clearly a sin under the Sixth Commandment. What is to settle the question? Now, every one will say in this case, *the light of experience must settle it*: and the experience must be chiefly that of medical observation. Now, should some caviller in this case object: "No; for that would be to clothe the doctors with power over my conscience, which is a species of popery;" it would cost no person of common

sense any trouble to explode the cavil by saying: *God's word has decided the principle* of the duty of abstinence; the doctors are merely referred to as to a question of fact. And if what they state is a fact, then the rash fool who persists in saying, against the light of a sufficient experience, "I don't believe that any amount of chloral will hurt me—these doctors shall not make my conscience for me," must even bear the penalty of his own sinful obstinacy. This parallel receives an easy application. There is no question but experience proves the tendencies of modern dancing to be, not in every case, but in ordinary cases, unhealthy for body and soul. Medical experience has lately been cited, from the over-pampered and luxurious society of one of our cities, to testify that it was not unhealthy. Of such subjects this may be relatively true, that is, even so ill-judged an exercise as that of the ball-room may be found not as bad for the health as the pampered indolence in which such people would otherwise exist. But this admission does not at all detract from the truth that the practice is of unhealthy tendency. Other and more trustworthy medical authority testifies that modern dancing is most deleterious. Unseasonable hours, an atmosphere over-heated and vitiated, the glare of lights, the imprudent and unseasonable raiment, the unhealthy food, the excessive social excitement prompting over-exertion, all indisputably concur to make it anything but a safe recreation. An old physician, looking on a gay dance, said: "This will be worth — dollars to me." The prediction was exactly verified, with the addition of the death of two young people from pneumonia. It is a vain attempt, in the presence of experiences like these, for thoughtlessness to dismiss the warning of prudence.

Experience proves the tendency of the modern dance to be yet more unhealthy for the soul. Is one and another "dancing Christian" obtruded as an instance of lively religious zeal? The answer is: "One swallow does not make a summer." These facts are well known: that it is not usually the spiritual-minded people who are the dancing members; that a dancing minister would shock even the most worldly sentiment; that at the approach of a revival dancing always ceases; that the world claims the amusement as its own. What is the meaning of these facts? The

familiar association with the ungodly on their own ground, the levity, the intoxicating excitement, the bustle and glare, cannot but quench the holy and silent motions of God's Spirit and exhale the dew of his graces.

It has been conceded that all evil acts are not properly disciplinable by the visible Church. Advantage is taken of this admission to argue that dancing should be disapproved, reasoned against, and admonished, but not disciplined. One plea for this untenable position is, that it is admitted that there are forms of dancing which are innocent, and since the different kinds shade off into each other by nice gradations, and since the Bible has not drawn a line between the tolerated and the disciplinable forms of the practice, all the Church can rightfully do is to remonstrate and instruct. The answer is, that by the same logic one might prove that no breach of any commandment is disciplinable. The lesser and greater breaches of all of them shade off into each other. Who doubts that a plain breach of the Third Commandment by cursing or swearing should be disciplined? But there are expletives and exclamations heedlessly uttered by truly good people, which are against the spirit of that Commandment in that they depart from our Saviour's law: "Let your yea be yea, and your nay nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." Breaches of the Ninth Commandment are certainly disciplinable. But a Christian youth might, in a thoughtless moment, utter a quiz. Now to make these faults grounds of judicial censure, without other provocation, might be neither wise nor just. Shall we argue thence that the rod of discipline cannot reach lying and profanity? No one claims this. Then the existence of such gradations in dancing cannot prove that the grosser forms of the practice may not be disciplined.

The reader has a right to ask this objector, who says he wholly disapproves dancing but does not deem it disciplinable, how he found out that it is to be disapproved. May not a church session ascertain its evil in the same valid way in which he has? He stickles much for the principle that none but God can make an act a sin. How then did the objector convince himself so clearly that dancing is to be disapproved? Has he committed the error

which he is so jealous of in the church court, that of judging his fellow-creature's conduct by some merely human standard?

When men plead that there are other sinful amusements than this, and that a pharisaic professor may not dance, and yet may commit much greater sin by tattling, censoriousness, covetousness, the answer is too plain to need restatement. The conscientious Christian should forsake dancing and also these other forms of evil. If it be charged that church courts are partial, even though dancing be conceded to be evil, in directing their discipline so exclusively against this, while much greater sins go unwhipped of justice, then all that can be inferred is, not that the court erred in exerting its authority in the one case, but that it erred in failing to exert it in the many other cases. It needs to go, not backward, but forward; not to begin conniving at this one form of evil, but to cease conniving at all the other forms.

But there is a truth usually overlooked which justifies special watchfulness and jealousy touching these worldly and sinful conformities. It is that they practically lie so near the dividing line between the penitent and the ungodly. When two rival kingdoms touch each other geographically, the boundary line is but a mark. A portion of the territory of the one, although as really foreign soil to the other as though it were in the centre of its own realm, must be within a single inch of the line, and so within an inch of the other's ground. However sharply the boundary may be defined and established, this remains true. One result is that the king of either side takes much more pains to defend his frontier than his interior: his fortresses are built and his guards paraded almost exclusively along the outer edge, next his foreign and hostile neighbor's territory. By the same reason, it is unavoidable and right that in Christ's kingdom the frontier ground which borders upon the territory of Satan's kingdom, the sinful world, should be more jealously guarded. Practically, that is the region where the citizens of the spiritual kingdom suffer incursions and are exposed to danger. The officers of that kingdom would be derelict to their duty if they did not bestow special watch at these points. Thoughtless people suppose that the noise made by presbyters of the Church against cards and dancing is

prompted by nothing but their puritanical prejudice; that being determined from censoriousness and pride to be "righteous over-much," they pitch on these practices as their "pet horrors." But that this is entirely short-sighted appears from the simple view just given. Since the rival kingdoms are both together in this one world, this nearness of the conterminous domains must always exist, it matters not what may be the practices prevalent. It must be so in all ages and states of manners. Were the world to agree so utterly to desert cards and dancing that its votaries and worldly Christians should both forget them, the general truth would recur. The contest would inevitably revive about other questionable worldly practices, and the same jealousy and watch would become obligatory upon the guardians of the Church.

Another truth follows from this view: that however sharply the boundary line may be drawn between the hostile kingdoms, practically, the belt of land next the frontier must be "debatable land" as to its perils. Hence the man who desires to pay a righteous regard to his own safety will avoid occupying the space very near the boundary, even though he may believe that it belongs to his own king. His actual peril is about as great as though he were over the line. Let us suppose that a western cattle farmer should insist that he knew exactly where the line between the territories of the United States and Mexico ran, even to an inch; that he was legally entitled to "preëempt" any United States lands; and that therefore he should claim his rights and place his farm-house within an inch of the Mexican line. All this might be very true; and yet when the lawless Comanches harried his home, he would become convinced that he had been very foolish and criminal. The analogy is just. The Christian who is successfully assaulted by Satan is the one who causelessly ventures near his boundary line. Usually men do not backslide by suddenly falling into some large and clearly acknowledged crime. *Nemo repente turpissimus*. To change the figure—Satan does not attempt to rend a soul away from Christ by inserting the blunt of his wedge between them first. The thin edge is insinuated. It is *because it is thin*, because the crevice first made by its introduction is very narrow, that it is adapted to do its

deadly work. Because this is generally true, Christians are morally bound to guard themselves most against the smaller sins lying next the debateable zone; and those who watch for souls are bound to be most wakeful and strict in the same points.

This conclusive argument would hold thoroughly upon the ground asserted by the palliators of dancing, that it is a slight sin. But that ground is by no means admitted, as to all forms of the practice. We believe that round dancing, at least, is a sin of a very grave character, and a flagrant breach of morals, such as cannot but rapidly debauch the conscience and choke the spiritual life.

The reasonable inquirer will now be ready to concede that if some forms of dancing have been proved sinful by the former part of this discussion, then such dancings are clearly disciplinable offences. They have every mark by which disciplinable sins are discriminated from the undisciplinable. They are public sins. Their commission is overt. The acts may be clearly defined. They are, notoriously, attended by scandal. They have regular tendencies to other sins. Above all, if the testimony of pastors and elders may be believed, the milder measures of instruction and remonstrance fail to restrain the irregularity of many. In such a state of the case, when the purity and authority of the Church are wantonly provoked and defied by the continuance of *a practice confessedly needless* and non-obligatory, in spite of her solemn and tender entreaties, the claim, that the offenders may not be touched with the rod of discipline, savors more of sinful audacity than of righteous zeal for freedom of conscience. Our Assemblies, in 1869 and 1877, have distinctly declared that some forms of dancing are not only reprehensible, but disciplinable. We have seen that the authorities of all the other denominations, even those farthest from Puritanism, treat the practice as disciplinable.

It has been argued that a Session may not discipline any form of dancing, no matter how gross, because the records of our Church courts contain *no precedents* of such cases. Is it demonstrated that they do not? When the statute law exists, as in the decisions of 1869 and 1877, no precedents are necessary. The demand for a precedent is absurd. The first precedent could

only arise by the legitimate exercise, by some church court, of the power to discipline in some first case. But this preposterous argument would require a precedent before the first precedent to justify the use of the power! Let us suppose that when railroads were first constructed, our Assemblies had seen a stolidity and perversity of conscience among the people, such as required a declarative enactment to this effect, viz., that the displacement of a rail for the purpose of throwing a passenger train off the track is a breach of the Sixth Commandment, and must be disciplined as such. According to this notable argument, this most clear and righteous rule must remain a dead letter until after a precedent had arisen, which, on the terms of the argument, could never arise. Should it then prove the case, that the declarative enactments of Assemblies have made gross forms of dancing disciplinable? that such forms do prevail, and yet no precedent of their discipline exists? the only reasonable inference is, that our church courts have been too long derelict to solemn duty; and that they should reform their delinquency at once.

It has been supposed that the rights of conscience are involved in this discipline. Some have taken the ground that nothing can be justly disciplined, except what is expressly condemned by God; others, assuming a less extravagant ground, say, that the interpretative powers of church courts can never inhibit any practice, under any circumstances, which cannot be proved by Scripture to be forever and under all circumstances *malum per se*. And it is further claimed, that whenever an individual judges that his own church courts have in any thing exceeded these restrictions, it is his right and duty to assert his freedom of conscience by doing the thing inhibited. To separate the error mingled with the truth here, let this series of statements be considered, which all Presbyterians will accept without cavil:

“God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrine and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word, or beside it in matters of faith or worship.”

“All church power . . . is only ministerial and declarative; . . . and all decisions should be founded upon the revealed will of God.” Gov., Ch. 1, §§ I. and VII.

“The whole counsel of God concerning . . . man’s salvation, faith and

life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or *by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture.*" Con. of Faith, Ch. I., § VI.

"Every Christian Church is entitled to declare the terms of admission to its own communion," etc. "In the exercise of this right they may, notwithstanding, err, in making the terms of communion too lax or too narrow; yet even *in this case they do not infringe upon the liberty or the rights of others, but ONLY MAKE AN IMPROPER USE OF THEIR OWN.*"

If the erroneous term of communion forbids a positive permanent duty, or commands an act which is sin *per se*, then the conscientious dissentient has no discretion: he must resist it at once and utterly. But if the act in question is only "beside" and not "against Scripture," then his course is to be modified by circumstances.

The adult member seeking admission to a Christian Church is responsible for informing himself as to that understanding of scriptural terms of communion on which its previous members have expressly agreed among themselves as their known constitution; and he is justly presumed, when he voluntarily applies for membership, therein to have approved those terms, and to covenant with his brethren to keep them. He is therefore bound, as for himself, by his own act to keep all those rules, unless he afterwards discovers any of them to be unscriptural in such sense that he may not righteously comply with them. But in this case also, his voluntary covenant binds him to vindicate his conscience, not by remaining in the communion and disobeying its agreed rules, but by peacefully withdrawing to some other church, whose terms he believes scriptural. Should he wish to exercise his right of seeking, inside the church of his first choice, the amendment of the rule which he once covenanted to observe, but now finds to be unscriptural, common honesty requires him to promote that amendment, not by the breach of the rule while it yet subsists, which is factious and of bad faith, but by moving and arguing for the change in the ways provided by the church constitution. If the dissentient is an officer in the church, such factious conduct is a still more indecent breach of faith.

Each man must be his own judge, in the fear of God, on every question, whether a church rule is scriptural or not; and on that question the courts of the Church must not come between his

conscience and God by assuming to decide for him that the rule is scriptural.

But neither has this dissentient a right to come between the consciences of the majority and God, when they decide that the rule he regards as unscriptural is scriptural, and that it shall therefore remain the rule of their communion. He has his inalienable right of withdrawal; but he has no more right to dictate his judgment to them, against their conscientious judgment, than they have to punish his conscientious dissent with fine or imprisonment. In this case, even if it be conceded for illustration's sake, that he is right and the majority wrong, "they have not infringed upon" his rights, "but only made an improper use of their own."

In such case, where the majority make a term of communion, though not sinful yet too strict, and insist on its observance by those who voluntarily join them, they do not commit the sin of popery, neither do they make a papal assault on liberty of conscience. This appears from two differences: they do not claim any right to coerce acquiescence in what they judge according to the mind of God, by civil pains and penalties; neither do they declare submission to and communion with them essential to salvation. The nature of their error is only this: that they blunder in their interpretation of God's will on the point involved in their rule, and impair causelessly the comfort or edification of their brethren who judge with and adhere to them.

Actions which the Scripture does not make *sins per se*, neither by expressly setting them down as such, nor by good and necessary consequence, may, by reason of circumstances, be not for edification. Then the law of love should prompt every Christian to forego those actions for his weak brethren's sake. But of the duty of foregoing these acts, or of the call uttered by the law of love, each one must judge, in the fear of God, in his own Christian liberty. For, were the church court to usurp that decision, and enforce their view of it by church discipline, as a universal obligatory rule on their members, they would thus indirectly attain that power of making a thing to be sin which God did not make sin; which Christ has inhibited to all human authorities.

But once more: the maxim, that "circumstances alter cases," has an ethical application. That is, actions which, under certain circumstances, were morally neutral, may, by a change of circumstances, become truly sins. Seth's marriage to his own sister must have been allowable. In the days of Moses the changed conditions of the human race made such a marriage the sin of incest. Under the Mosaic manners, a "bill of divorcement" to a newly espoused wife was in a certain case allowable; in our Saviour's and our times, it would be the sin of adultery. If this is so, then for a Christian to claim his liberty of conscience to continue that act, now become actually sinful, would be license and not spiritual liberty.

May a Church then, after the completion of the canon of Scripture, assume to declare that circumstances have now made some act sinful in itself which Christ or his Apostles had left allowable? No; this would be a violation of spiritual liberty, and a claim of an uninspired and fallible body to change his infallible legislation. That a Church may justly prohibit a practice as evil by reason of newly arising circumstances, it must be able to prove from Scripture (either by express declaration or good and necessary consequence) that God regards the practice thus circumstanced as evil. An instance in point may be imagined. Our Assemblies, while scripturally condemning drunkenness, have scripturally refused to make temperate drinking an offence. Hence, no Presbytery may enforce total abstinence on its ministers, by the plea that their temperate drinking *may become* a temptation to excess to others. But here is a town, in which is a drinking-hell that is proved to be a regular occasion of drunkenness to many. A Presbyterian minister residing in that town habitually exercises his right of temperate drinking in public in that drinking-hell; and it is duly proved that this his example does occasion the fall of unwary persons into the sin of drunkenness, and the name of Christ into scandal. Can the Presbytery restrain that minister by its ecclesiastical authority? Every man's common sense answers at once that it can. By what rule? Not by enacting that temperate drinking, which Christ had left allowable, has now become sin; but by enforcing Christ's own rule,

that Christians must not "let their good be evil spoken of." The Presbytery would leave him his Christian liberty of temperate drinking under other circumstances, but it would teach him to distinguish between this right and the sin of causelessly misleading souls. See Con. of Faith, Chap. XX., § 4.

But the Scripture furnishes us with a better instance. About the fifty-second year of Christ, Jewish Christians felt themselves scandalised by several things which were seen among some Gentile converts to Christ. One was, that they entered the Church without circumcision; another, that they ate articles of food which had before been offered to idols; another was, that they ate flesh with the blood, as things strangled; and another, that some continued to practise unchastities which pagan morals had long justified. The apostles and elders met to settle the dispute. See Acts xv., xvi. 4; Rom. xiv. 2, 17; 1 Cor. viii. 8, x. 25; Titus i. 15. They decided, with the authority of the Holy Ghost (Acts xv. 28), that circumcision was not incumbent on the Gentile believers; that all forms of fornication must be jealously avoided; and that two practices, in themselves indifferent (see Rom. xiv. 14; 1 Cor. viii. 4, x. 25)—eating things which had been before offered to false gods, and eating the flesh with the blood—must be temporarily forbidden and forborne. The propriety of this latter part of the rule is grounded on these circumstances (see Acts xv. 21): that Gentiles were almost everywhere united in Christian communion with believing Jews; that these Jewish Christians were still observing the Mosaic ritual and synagogue worship of the seventh day, just as they had for ages; that during the transition stage from the Old to the New Dispensation this was legitimate for Jewish believers (see Acts xxi. 20-24); that according to the Mosaic point of view, blood was sacredly set apart from all common uses to the sacrificial, and whoever "ate of a sacrifice (1 Cor. x. 18) was partaker of the altar;" whence the indulgence of Gentile brethren in these must unavoidably scandalise Hebrew Christians, and break the peace of the Church. For this reason it was necessary to enforce the two prohibitions temporarily, so long as the transition stage lasted.

It has been attempted to argue, that these two points were not

enjoined by apostolic and presbyterial authority, but only recommended. The plea is, that Paul, notwithstanding the decision, circumcised Timothy; and that in the Epistles he gave the Gentile converts full liberty to eat if they saw fit. Of the latter, we shall enquire anon. To the former, it is a sufficient reply to distinguish between enforcing circumcision on Gentiles and permitting the circumcision of one who was half a Jew by blood, and who had been reared as an orthodox member of the old dispensation in all else than circumcision. When Pharisaic men *demand* the circumcision of Titus, a Gentile—the very thing forbidden by the Synod at Jerusalem—Paul had scrupulously anticipated the Synod's subsequent decree, and refused the exaction. But to grant circumcision to Timothy, from prudential reasons, was not a transgression of the Synod's decree. They had only forbidden the exacting of it of Gentiles. The attentive reader of the history will hardly doubt but that these other points of duty were positively enjoined. The Apostle James says (Acts xv. 19): "My sentence is" (*ἐγὼ κρίνω*); 28: "It seemed good (*έδοξεν*) to the Holy Ghost and to us *to lay upon you*" this "*burden.*" The burden is "*these necessary things.*" Acts xvi. 4: Paul himself "delivered them" (the Gentiles) "*the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the Apostles and elders*" (*τὰ δόγματα τὰ κεκριμένα*). Acts xxi. 25, the Apostles remind Paul (after the Epistles to the Romans and First Corinthians had been written, in A. D. 60): "As touching the Gentiles which believe, *we have written and concluded,*" etc. (*ήμεῖς ἐπεστείλαμεν κρίναντες*, etc.) How could more authoritative terms be used? It is incredible that Paul should have set himself to infringe a rule which was thus legislated by the Apostles, in his presence, with his concurrence, and to meet a state of facts reported by himself as brought about chiefly by his own labors. Hence the exegesis of the Epistles must be erroneous which represents him as authorising his converts to disregard a *δόγμα κεκρίμενον*, a "necessary" obligation "*laid on them*" by God's Holy Spirit, with his own concurrence.

From the historical point of view, the true exposition of those passages is very obvious. It is not necessary to detain the reader with citations and verbal criticisms; he can compare the three

passages (Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii. and x.) for himself. He will see that the Apostle, in thorough consistency with the Synod of Jerusalem and with himself, asserts all along these points: That the Jewish law of meats being positive and ritual, any food was, *per se*, indifferent; that idols, being nonentities, no real effect could be wrought on the flesh which had been on their altars, so that to the believer who understood this fact, it was, *per se*, as any other meat; that yet, if a man indulged his appetite, while himself doubtful of the lawfulness of his indulgence, it would be sin to him; not because the meat was defiled, but because his act was a tampering with possible sin according to his own judgment; that if the man's own mind were clear, and no scandal arose, such eating would be lawful. But if such eating were attended with scandal, then it became unlawful; not because the food was defiled, or the act sin, *per se*, but because self-indulgence in a needless gratification was preferred to a brother's safety and salvation. On this last point Paul dwells. It is evidently the turning point of the duty of abstinence. It is evidently on this point that he justifies the Synod of Jerusalem (whose "dogma" he had himself given to the churches "to keep"), in forbidding, under certain circumstances, what they admitted to be indifferent. Rom. xiv. 20. "But *it is evil* to that man who eateth with offence" (*κακόν*). 1 Cor. viii. 12. "But when ye sin so against the brethren and wound their weak conscience, *ye sin against Christ*." X. 32. "Give none offence." It is the *πρόσκομμα* attending the act, otherwise indifferent, which makes it sinful. It should be observed that the "offence" arose in this way: the "weak brother" who witnessed the eating, not comprehending the eater's more enlightened view, really regarded him as in the act doing homage to an idol. Had the "weak brother" understood that the eater only considered himself as doing the allowable act of satisfying hunger, the former could not have seen in it a just occasion of offence. When that result is experimentally ascertained, the precept is as positively, "Eat not," as any other Christian precept. But this scandal is precisely the ground assigned by the Apostle James for his vote in the Synod.

We thus have an unquestionable instance of a church court which, under the teachings of the Holy Spirit, declared that the moral character of a concrete act, the form of which might be, *per se*, indifferent, may be changed, at least for a time, by circumstances. It may be said: The canon was not then closed; and they had the infallible guidance of inspiration in thus declaring. The just reply is, that a supreme church court still has the infallible guidance of the Bible principle ("It is evil to that man who doeth the indifferent act with offence") to direct it in parallel declarations; and unless that principle clearly sustains it, it should not venture on them.

But, supposing a well-informed believer had persisted in eating, and had declared that he did so regarding an idol "as nothing," and had urged the question: "Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?" Would Paul have disciplined him for this act alone? We suppose not; the man would have been left to his own conscience, with the warning: "Now walkest thou not charitably." He is clearly sinning; but there are clear sins which yet are not proper subjects for human discipline. Should that man prosecute his selfish act under circumstances which proved demonstrably that he was not defending his conscience, but acting selfishly and mischievously of deliberate purpose, then he would come under discipline, not merely for eating, but for wantonly doing mischief.

The establishment of these views is not really necessary to prove round dances unlawful and disciplinable in Christ's Church. For they are never *per se* indifferent, but essentially contrary to the permanent precepts of Scripture, as has been shown. But it was judged best to settle these points of exposition, because the misconception of them has tempted some to push the claim of Christian liberty much farther than Scripture allows.

To one who places himself in the point of view of the Westminster Assembly, and of the American General Assembly which adopted our constitution, there is no doubt whatever, but that they would have included the modern round dances under the forbidden term "lascivious dances." But "the meaning of the law is the law." In their day, the society which these holy men

considered worldly and unchristian had not gone farther than minuets, reels, and quadrilles. When the round dances were at last introduced, in our generation, the estimate of a worldly opinion even, was, that they were lascivious. If the decent part of the world now wavers in that judgment, it is only because the abuse "unwhipped of justice," and weakly connived at by Christian tribunals, has already had such disastrous power to debauch public opinion. The claim that these dances shall be acquitted of prurient tendency on the testimony of some females that they do indulge without any such consciousness, is preposterous. For, in the first place, we have shown that when the impulse is so complex, consciousness will probably fail, amidst the haste and excitement, to detect the prurient element. And second, such ambiguous testimony is fatally counterpoised by the candid declaration of the coarser sex, avowing the prurient excitement as the prime attraction to them. There is no offence against decency, save the most extreme, which might not be cleared of blame by so absurd a plea, because it is supposable that a rash and reckless person might still aver, without conscious falsehood, that in his own case his mind was preoccupied in the perpetration of it, by the fun, or the novelty, or some accessory excitement. No; Church courts are both entitled and bound to judge practices by their overt forms, and by the tendencies which experience shows usually inhering in them. Tried in this way, round dancing certainly falls under the ban, both of the principles of Scripture and the express words of our constitution, by which we have all voluntarily covenanted to walk.

Seeing that the practice of our Sessions is still timid, we are persuaded that it would be well for our next Assembly to speak out still more explicitly, and *order categorically the discipline* of all church members who are found contumacious in round dancing as practised between men and women, or who dance in public and promiscuous balls, after any fashion of the mixture of the sexes. The latter prohibition should rest on the facts that, as the world now goes, round dances do prevail at all public balls; and also, that the free access to them of persons disreputable, profane, intemperate, or utterly frivolous, renders them *sinful places for*

Christians; unless, like their Saviour, they go thither to carry the warnings of the gospel. And this declarative legislation the Assembly should rest squarely on the words of our Catechism, and the principles of the Bible. As to the milder forms of domestic and social dancing, we would have the presbyters of the Church rely, for the present at least, on dissuasions and instructions.

No man is fit to be a presbyter in Christ's Church who is capable of being intimidated from the performance of covenanted judicial duties by the strength and rampancy of an abuse. No presbyter should need to be reminded that, as a question of mere policy, it is far wiser to have a small church expurgated of worldly corruptions, and clad in the beauty of holiness, than a large one weakened and crippled by dead members. But there is, we fear, reason that we should all have "searchings of heart" for our moral cowardice, in the presence of the worldly conformities which now so deface our Zion.

It is justly remarked, that a merely repressive policy, where no innocent substitute for vicious amusements is offered, may more probably repel than reform the youth of our Church. There is a trait of human nature which the wise pastor should study. We usually speak of man as "a social being." The mass of human beings scarcely deserve so elevated a description, and should rather be termed gregarious. The gregarious instinct in them is potent. They shun solitude, and earnestly crave the *presence* of their kind; but not *conversæ* with their kind. For, in fact, ordinary people have not intellectual resources enough to furnish anything that deserves the name of conversation, except for a small fraction of the hours they crave to spend together. To be compelled to keep up intelligible conversation the whole time would be to them more irksome than the solitude from which they flee. Here is the true source—so far as the impulse is not vicious—of all the non-intellectual amusements. People need something which does not tax their ill-furnished minds, *which they may do together*, so as to provide for the instinct of gregariousness. This solution is verified in the case of the old housewives, who spend a long summer's day in each other's presence, with little social communion save the community of their occupation

of knitting. It was verified around the planter's fireside, in former days, when children and servants pleasantly spent the long winter evening in the common task of "picking cotton." It is verified in the long *sederunts* of whist-playing old ladies and gentlemen. The communion in the mild excitement of their game gives play to the gregarious appetency, without taxing their vacant minds for any other contribution to the mutual intercourse. The same solution accounts for a large part of the interest in the more decent dances of our fathers. Often have we seen young fellows, at social gatherings, with minds too unfurnished for sustained converse, detained in the parlors in part by good manners, and in part by the unsatisfied gregarious instinct, yet insufferably "bored." But at last the music enters, and they are immediately revived. Here now is something which they can *do in common*; a social occupation which brings them into a gregarious union, to which their heels are competent, if their heads were not.

The problem for the wise parent then should be, not overlooking this trait, to find social occupations which may satisfy it, and yet may be innocent; and instead of aggravating the incapacity, and leading downwards like the dance, to deeper mental vacuity and positively vicious sentiments, may instruct while they please and unite. Might not a holy ingenuity find a sufficient variety of such gregarious occupations? One suggestion is that of parlor vocal music, both social and sacred. Another is the time-honored usage of reading aloud. Let the selections vary from "grave to gay," while never coarse or demoralising; and let "them who are strong bear the infirmities of the weak," by yielding their attention in turn to the simple matter which may interest without fatiguing even the juvenile and the vacant mind. Thus the temptation to less safe amusements may be obviated, and the social hours of the young be made enjoyable, without being made dangerous.

R. L. DABNEY.

VOL. XXX., No. 2—16.

ARTICLE VI.

THE QUESTION OF DANCING FROM ANOTHER
POINT OF VIEW.

This is and ever has been a free journal. From its beginning, some thirty years since, there has never been amongst even its editors a complete agreement of opinion on all subjects. And so its correspondents and contributors have frequently differed in the sentiments expressed by them. Indeed, our Church is by no means at one upon a variety of questions which, though not fundamental, are yet frequently of great practical importance. Hence the necessity and the value of free discussion. This journal claims that during its whole course it has furnished opportunity to thoughtful men for setting forth without reserve their varying opinions.

In this very number we are furnishing an illustration of the catholic spirit of this REVIEW. One of our most learned theologians, who is at the same time of our editorial corps, utters freely and forcibly his opinions on an important practical question which is dividing our Church at the present moment. He may well be reckoned to have made the strongest, fullest, and most impressive exhibition possible of that side of the question which he has espoused. If he has not established the doctrine which he advocates, it may be taken for granted that it cannot be established. Having no such claims as his to the attention or respect of the Church for what we have to offer, nevertheless we shall essay to dispute some of his positions, being much impressed with the opinion that there is danger both to the purity, the liberty, and the peace of our ecclesiastical household from some of the views which he has advanced.

There are two positions maintained: the one that dancing is sinful, the other that it is an offence to be formally disciplined. On the first point, as well as on the second, the argument is full, positive, and elaborate; and the ground taken makes every form of this amusement to be morally wrong. There is a distinction drawn between some forms and other forms of it, so that the sin-

fulness is greater in some cases than in others; but it will not be denied that the first position maintained is condemnatory in general of all dancing as sinful.

Now we are not and never have been patrons of your "dancing disciples." We are not and never have been friends, admirers, or apologists of the amusement of dancing in any of its forms. But this is not because we are able to accept the first position taken, which makes all dancing sinful. We are on record as expressing very strong disapprobation of all forms of dancing between the sexes, and we still hold the same opinions on that subject. But the proposition, that dancing, considered generally, is sinful, followed as it is and must be by the other proposition, viz., that it must be formally disciplined, presents the subject in a very different light. Our ground is, that this is just one of those many things which are to be condemned and dissuaded from, but not made matters of technical discipline. But it is attempted to shew (page 323) that one has no right to disapprove unless one is so clearly convinced that God's word is against that which is disapproved, as to be prepared to demand its discipline by the Church. Now, we admit that the word is our rule in morals as in faith. But the distinction is clear and warrantable between disapprobation or condemnation, and formal church discipline based on judicial proceedings. An individual Christian may speak or write against what is in his opinion dangerous, and a pastor may from the pulpit reason and exhort, and a Session may warn or remonstrate, respecting whatever in the general aspects of the word seems to be improper or injurious. But when that court comes to acts of technical discipline, the warrant of the word is reasonably and rightfully required to be much more explicit. This distinction is made in chapter first of our present Book of Discipline, and is expressly admitted on page 303 of the argument we criticise. And it has been acknowledged necessary and just by all authorities on ecclesiastical discipline.

The distinction is also clear and warrantable between those actions themselves that are to be disapproved on general grounds of Scripture as many persons believe, and other actions whose condemnation is either express in Scripture or else necessarily de-

ducible therefrom. We call these latter sinful. The former are only questionable, and different minds will and may view them differently. There is card-playing, and theatre-going, and novel-reading, and tobacco-chewing or smoking, and all use, even the most moderate, of any kind of stimulating drink, and dinner parties, and big suppers, and fashionable dress and equipage, and the wearing of a gold watch, diamond ring, or other jewelry—yes, and we may go further and say life insurance, and the marriage of first cousins; and proceeding another step, the use of instrumental music in public worship in God's house, and of church fairs with their many bad accompaniments; and going a little further, the use of stated supplies for a long period instead of settled pastors; and still further, the establishment of theological seminaries; and still one step more, the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance itself—all these, and a score or two more of other like things, are questionable with many, and they have been and are occasions of earnest differences of opinion amongst honest, conscientious, intelligent Christians, who have nevertheless all alike adopted the word as their only rule. And some of these things have seemed to many to be fully as objectionable as any form of dancing. Novel reading, for example, as practised amongst us, is probably in every aspect quite as great an evil as dancing. It has lately been said on high authority that "no one systematically reads the average novelette of the day and keeps either integrity or virtue; and that there are a million of men and women in the United States to-day reading themselves into hell." And then the use of tobacco: who can calculate the evils of that practice to health and to morals both? These evils are so manifest, and they press so heavily on the consciences of many, that some Churches in these States have been ready to make either chewing or smoking a disciplinable offence. For ourselves, we have a thousand times wished that we had a scourge of small cords put into our hands with authority to go and cleanse our ministry, and our membership too, from all this abominable filth. But where are we to find Scripture for making the use of either tobacco or novels a disciplinable offence?

Now, the whole argument to prove that dancing is sinful ap-

pears to us to be a signal failure, while, nevertheless, it is a very successful demonstration that dancing, like the other matters just named, is questionable, and may fairly be held in disapprobation by a conscientious Bible believer.

What is the line of argument to prove dancing to be sinful? The *first* point made is, that classical antiquity eschewed it. Surely the heathen Greeks and Romans are hardly to be held up as authority with us Christians as to what our church courts shall condemn as sinful. Surely all things were not wicked which they held to be such. The *second* proof is drawn from the condemnation of Christian antiquity; where again it is just the opinions of men that are quoted. Then, *thirdly*, we are told of modern Christian judgment and legislation, where Calvin, and the Westminster Assembly, and the Scotch Kirk, and the American Assemblies (including our own), and John Wesley, and Adam Clarke, and the General Conference of the Methodist Church, and a number of Episcopal bishops of the highest character, and various Diocesan Conventions of the Episcopal Church, and certain Papal bodies and bishops in America are quoted.

Now let it be observed, that in Calvin's day, at Geneva, there were enormous excesses practised under the guise of popular amusements. Bungener, in his "Life of Calvin," says:

"It must not be forgotten what, at that period, certain things were, which the refinement of manners has more or less modified. Every custom, and therefore, much more, every kind of disorder, retained the impress of preceding centuries; hence the passions easily degenerated into a brutish and uncouth cynicism. Drunkenness and revelling are now among the very lowest of the inferior classes just what they were then to many of the higher ranks. There were scarcely any innocent pleasures. The dances, for instance—do those who reproach Calvin for having so strictly forbidden them, know what they were? They may learn it from these same registers, which shew us that the said dances were forbidden long before Calvin's time; they may learn it also from the registers of our courts of justice; for they not seldom degenerated into outrages on decency which no respectable government will ever tolerate." (P. 110.)

So, too, Guizot, in his "Saint Louis and Calvin" (p. 274), quotes from the "Pièces Justificatives by Gaberel" (p. 249) as follows: "A memoir still exists which gives a detailed account of

these extraordinary amusements, and from this terrible record it appears that the dances then performed in private houses would not be tolerated at the present day in the height of the most disorderly carnival." This memorial, addressed to the king of Navarre by Dancau, is in the library of Geneva.

And let it also be understood, that no man has expressed himself more scripturally, kindly, moderately, and wisely than Calvin on the subject of disciplining offenders by the Church. He knew, like his great teacher Augustin, how to point out "the inconsiderate zeal for righteousness of even good men," and how to condemn their "excessive moroseness" and their too "rigorous severity." He could quote from Augustin how "the pious and placid should mercifully correct what they can in the Church, but bear patiently what they cannot correct, in love lamenting and mourning until God either reform and correct, or at the harvest root up the tares and scatter the chaff." He could say in his own words: "Let all the godly study to provide themselves with these weapons, lest, while they deem themselves strenuous and ardent defenders of righteousness, they revolt from the kingdom of heaven, which is the only kingdom of righteousness." Yes, Calvin strongly sympathised with Augustin when he said that "if the contagion of sin has seized the multitude, mercy must accompany living discipline." And so when Augustin, speaking of "drunkenness, which is so severely condemned in Scripture, but was prevalent in Africa with impunity," called for a council to provide a remedy, Calvin heartily approves his declaring, nevertheless, "In my opinion such things are not removed by rough, harsh, and imperious measures, but more by teaching than commanding, more by admonishing than threatening. For it is thus we are to act with the multitude of offenders. Severity is to be exercised against only the sins of the few."

Calvin, therefore, is not to be pleaded as insisting on disciplining the dances at Geneva without explanation as to the character of the amusement then and there. And the Reformer must be understood as objecting with Augustin to any use whatever of formal discipline with a whole demoralised church or community. Formal discipline is not to be used where the public sentiment

does not sustain it as wise and good; and this, of course, cannot be where any abuse is generally practised. In cases of that sort, preaching is the remedy, according to Augustin and to Calvin; not commanding and not threatening, but teaching and admonishing must be relied on. It is only where an offence is the sin of the few that they recommend formal discipline. And we may add, that even then it should not be resorted to hastily. It is a dangerous remedy in unskilful hands. One single case of it mismanaged may split a flourishing church into fragments.

Then, as to the Westminster Assembly, let it be observed that it qualifies the dancing it pronounces sinful with the term "lascivious."

And then the testimony of our Southern Church does not seem to us quite so strong as represented. In 1865, for example, the Assembly denied distinctly the right of any church court to make new rules of membership different from those contained in the Constitution, but allowed that each has power to declare or affirm *its sense* of what is an offence; signifying, of course, that *an appeal might always be taken* from its judgment on that point. And that Assembly said that the "lascivious dances" named in the Larger Catechism are not, in its belief, those usual in our best society; also, that it would not say that all these worldly amusements are, in their own nature, sinful. Yet it is correctly stated that that Assembly did call on Sessions to "separate from the church those who love the world and conformity thereto rather than the law of Christ." The same was done by the Assembly of 1869; but that body qualified the dances to be disciplined by the term "promiscuous." Then in 1877 the Presbytery of Atlanta asked the Assembly to explain whether *all* dancing, or only *promiscuous* dancing, is forbidden. And that Assembly answers that all forms of the dance, whether round or square, and whether in public balls or private parlors, tend to evil, are evil, and should be discountenanced. It was very clear as to the teaching and admonishing, but less so as to the commanding and threatening. For that Assembly very wisely said that the extent of the evil depends on circumstances, and that Sessions are the only courts competent to judge what remedy to apply; and it also

recommended great patience on the part of Sessions with offenders in the matter of dancing.

This language is interpreted to mean that the Assembly "clothes the Session with the power of judicial discipline." We submit, that if the Session did not possess the power of judicial discipline before, it could not be clothed with it by any Assembly. No Assembly can clothe a Session with any power which it does not get from the Constitution of our Church. This representation of the matter is repeated again and again. The Assembly, it is said, "authorises the Sessions to judge what remedy to apply." We know that the New Orleans Assembly expressed the opinion that only the court most immediately connected with the people can judge how best to deal with such occurrences amongst them; but we submit, that that was not by any means the same as to say that Sessions must use formal discipline. The Sessions who only can know all the circumstances of each case can alone determine wisely what the remedy should be; but whatever remedy they do employ, they must exercise great patience in dealing with those who offend in this way. That is really what the New Orleans Assembly said. But we submit, that even if it had expressed the positive judgment ascribed to it, our Sessions should have now no more authority in the matter than they had before the Assembly met at New Orleans. It is from the Book, and not from the Assembly, they get all their authority. Moreover, it is to our mind quite clear that the Assembly at New Orleans was not thinking at all of any such undertaking as "clothing the Sessions," nor yet of bestowing on them, the grant of any new "authority." On the contrary, what it was aiming at was just to free itself from any supposed power or obligation to deal with such cases, seeing that, as has been well said in the article we are considering, the act in question must be considered in the concrete with its circumstances and adjuncts. The Assembly said that the church Session is the only court competent to judge what remedy to apply; in other words, the supreme judicatory cannot determine any such cases except as they may come up from the courts below in one or other of the four constitutional

ways. This, now, really is the last deliverance made by our Southern General Assembly.

But as touching Calvin's opinion and that of the Westminster and the Southern Assemblies and all the other Assemblies, and all the Bishops and Dioceses, all the Conventions and Conferences named—what of them all, singly or collectively? What do they avail in the question before us? Excellently good they certainly are, and deserving of much respect as evincing that, according to the best judgment of the most pious and the wise men, dancing is to be discountenanced as an improper and a dangerous thing. Let them be quoted again and again to frown down this amusement. Let them be used to organise a public sentiment which shall banish it from refined society. There must be something evil in dancing (as said Dr. Thornwell) when the Church in all ages has set her face against it. But (as he said again) the Church has no opinions—she has a faith. That is to say, the Church may not act on opinions held by whom they may be, in or out of her bosom; she can act only on what is indisputably revealed. Our Confession says well the whole counsel of God is either expressly set down in Scripture or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing is at any time to be added. It is thus we get every doctrine—either it is expressed in the word, or it is necessarily deducible from the word. And so our rules of discipline must be based on principles that are distinctly revealed. If the good and the wise who have been quoted, can shew that dancing is either expressly or by necessary consequence deductively prohibited in the word, let them make that plain, and there will be an end of the matter. But it is just wasting words to tell us what men have thought or believed on a subject like this, when the question regards formal discipline by the Church. Suppose the lawfulness of instrumental music in public worship were under earnest discussion, as we ourselves think it ought to be all through our Church, could those who, like ourselves, believe that not being commanded it is forbidden, claim to apply that principle so decisively as to make the use of an organ an offence to be formally disciplined, and that against the honest and earnest, though, we think, unfounded. plea

by good men that the organ is a necessity to good congregational singing? Suppose the marriage of cousins was to be earnestly protested against, on the ground that the Scripture forbids marrying any who are "near of kin." Could it be fairly maintained that the application of that prohibition in this way is clearly necessary, so as to make this kind of marriage sinful? A great deal is said, and we think can be justly said, against such marriages; logic and eloquence and zeal might fortify themselves with the testimonies of the highest medical authorities and assail this practice and seek to bring it under the formal ban of the Church; but is the deduction a clear and necessary one, such as would justify the claim that the Scriptures condemn this kind of marriage? Why, even the marriage of the wife's sister, which seems to us to be far more clearly condemned in the word, could not, we seriously apprehend, be successfully maintained to be so unquestionably forbidden in the Scriptures as to be a proper matter of discipline. That practice is getting to be common in our Church, and the subject is one that ought to be discussed amongst us by way of preventing the further spread of it, supposing that such marriages are incestuous; but is it not manifest that the formal discipline of such marriages in the present state of public opinion is a somewhat questionable remedy for any church Session to apply? Suppose, again, that a church Session should be unanimous in the opinion that life assurance is based on a wicked distrust of providence, and in fact is a species of the sin of gambling. Would it be safe or right for them to undertake to discipline a church member for making that sort of provision for his widow and orphans? And so we might ask whether the most earnest advocate of total abstinence from drink, though he can portray in melting terms the grief of broken-hearted wives and the distress of worse than fatherless children, and though he can describe justly and movingly the dishonor to religion from drunkenness in the very Church, and though he can demonstrate that no man becomes a drunkard in a day, and that the temperate use of liquor is the road to intemperance—yet, we might ask, can this pleader for *teetotalism* expect to prevail with the Church to make all use of stimulus a sin and a disciplinable offence? Let

him tell us of the tremendous array of testimony which can be produced to declare the dreadfulness of intemperance; let him also set forth the incontrovertible opinion held by hundreds and thousands of good and wise men, that if there were no moderate drinkers there could be no drunkards; let him produce (as has been done in this question of dancing) "a *concursus* of all religions, all ages, all civilisations," against drunkenness and all the causes (especially the chief cause) of it; and let him seek by all this powerful array to make some little, insignificant, obscure Presbyterian church Session declare that moderate drinking is a sin: and he will fail, and he ought to fail, because the Church must not essay to be wiser than her Lord, or better than the Bible. Let the State adopt the Maine law, which forbids all selling of liquor except by the apothecary on the physician's prescription; we would hold up both hands for it; it would be a mighty bulwark against intemperance, and in fact might be the very cure of it; and not only so, but it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of the law-making power of the State. But the Church cannot make laws. This is the insuperable obstacle in the way of that exercise of discipline which is urged. We are not the Lord's councillors, but his servants. He makes the laws; Church rulers can only administer them. And therefore, all that is said about the "self-sufficiency and arrogance which, in its ignorance and inexperience sets itself up against what the wise and the good of the ancient and modern world" have said about dancing, or any thing else; all this falls to the ground. The plea of Christian liberty is to be asserted over and over again whenever churches or church courts essay to invade that liberty in the least degree. The Apostle says we must stand fast and be not brought under any human yoke. And so, whatever "the opinion of the virtuous of all ages" about dancing, and whether that "opinion be sound or not," the question before us simply is, whether, if the Church undertake the formal discipline of any practice not indisputably forbidden in the Scriptures, basing her action solely on the opinions of the virtuous of all ages, it does not become the duty of the humblest member in all "humility,

modesty, and docility" to protest, in the interest of the liberty and the purity and the peace of the Church.

But it is contended, touching the first point of the argument we are reviewing, that the Scriptures do condemn public dancing both "fully and expressly"—as much so, at least, "as the plan of its revelation made possible for it." The proof offered is: (1) that the Bible enjoins sobriety, and the dance is an act of pronounced levity; (2) that the Bible enjoins strict economy, but the modern dance is a wasteful and expensive amusement; (3) that the Bible requires modesty of female dress, but the dance usually an opposite mode; (4) that the Scriptures expressly forbid the modern dance, in that they enjoin the strictest purity in the intercourse of the sexes. There is a fifth statement of proof, but let us look for a moment at the argument as thus far presented.

The first remark we have to offer is, that we have under these four heads a statement of the writer's views touching the bearing of certain Scriptures on the dance. There are very many who agree with him. In many of the positions he takes, we agree with him ourselves. But there are many, very many, perhaps, not in his circle or sphere of life or ours, but certainly many in other spheres, who differ with him entirely as to the justness of his application of the Scriptures quoted. A great deal, of course, depends on our training. Many things seem to country people extravagant which city folks consider moderate. Persons of the middle class, educated at home and brought up with simple tastes, cannot take the same views which obtain in the highest ranks of life. There must be allowed a considerable latitude for these necessary differences of taste and habits and feeling. The Church must not undertake sumptuary regulations. She cannot construct her rules of discipline to suit any one class, whether the highest or the lowest or the middling. They must be such as will easily and naturally apply to the different situations in which her members are found. Her rules of discipline, it is true, must not be made of gum-elastic; but, on the other hand, they must not be iron-works which cannot bend without breaking.

The second observation we make is, that the acknowledgments quoted from many advocates of the round dance are such as we

have ourselves heard denied by honest and fair witnesses. Here, again, much depends on training and character, and both those testimonies we have received and those quoted on the other side may be equally true. But this much is certain: there are men of such vicious disposition and such immoral training and character that every circumstance is to them a temptation and an inducement. For such men, not the dance merely, but every other form and mode of social life excites evil inclinations. Moreover, if because of the abuse of it by some very badly disposed persons, we are to discipline dancing, it will be necessary, for the same reason, to make an offence out of all the amusements which young people can ever have, however innocently, together. There is no possible coming together of the sexes in social intercourse which will not be liable to the objection of tempting bad men to evil.

The third remark which occurs to us is, that the Scripture injunction to *sobriety*, as here interpreted and understood, would apply full as well to the playfulness of our youth; and that what is said about the requirement of *economy* would call for the discipline of rich church members who ride in fine carriages and dwell in brown stone fronts.

A fourth suggestion is, that our Creator has made the sexes to incline towards one another, and it is right that they should. And every attempt that is made to bar against these constitutional tendencies must not only fail, but react and work evil. A good deal of what has been said upon this whole topic appears to us preposterous; for example, the idea that young men and young women in society are required by the Apostle Paul to regard each other with only such feelings as belong properly to brothers and sisters. We cannot make Shakers of our young people, and must not try to do it.

Once more: the weakness of all this argument from Scripture, so far, is, that the deduction is not of good and necessary consequence. The application made is not such as will bear calm and fair examination, or as will commend itself to the impartial judgment of intelligent observers of human life and manners. Discipline would break down under any attempt of this sort to make out its justification.

But let us recur to an expression quoted already as to the Bible's condemning dancing "as expressly as the plan of its revelation made possible for it." With deference, we suggest that this language is objectionable—it seems to signify (what we know was not designed) that the word is not as complete and perfect a rule as might be desired. It would seem to have been forgotten for the moment that not only what is expressly written, but what is necessarily deducible therefrom, is revealed—the latter full as completely as the former. And some will be in danger of receiving the idea from what is said that from the very nature of the case, however sinful dancing may be, the revelation made long before it was invented could not possibly prohibit it in a perfectly clear and distinct way by anticipation, which position, of course, is not tenable any more than it is honorable to the word. Nor does it appear to us that there is as felicitous a statement as our author usually makes when he sets forth what is the plan adopted by the Author of the Bible, as follows: "This plan was so to prohibit sins which were current in those generations, as to furnish all honest minds parallels and precedents which would safely guide them in classing the sins of later invention." It is not "parallels and precedents" so much as *principles* which the Author of revelation has given us for the guidance of our minds and our ways. Accordingly, it seems to us that no Session called on to discipline a man for wantonly cutting a telegraph wire or displacing a railroad bar in front of a passenger train, would any more go to the Bible for a parallel or a precedent than for an express prohibition of these particular forms of sin. Our standards would make the former of these offences, in several different forms of expression, a clear and indisputable violation of the Eighth Commandment, which requires justice between man and man; and they would make the second also, clearly and indisputably, a violation of the Sixth Commandment. There were no telegraph wires or railroads when the Decalogue was given, but the Sixth and the Eighth Commandments have unquestionably anticipated the sins mentioned, and no session could pretend that there is any lack of clear Scripture condemnation of these sins. So of all sins: the Bible condemns

all possible offences against God or man, and whatever it does not condemn, either expressly or deductively by good consequence, is no offence, and must not be made by man to be an offence. And the difficulty which Sessions find as to dancing, and which the Westminster Assembly also found, was that it cannot be made out to be indisputably certain that all dancing can be held to be in violation of the Seventh Commandment; so that the Assembly of Divines were obliged to insert that qualifying term, "lascivious."

But, fifth, it is said that Scripture virtually includes the modern dance in an express prohibition in three places, viz., Rom. xiii. 13, Gal. v. 21, and 1 Peter iv. 3. The first passage condemns rioting, and the other two revellings. And it is added that the Sixth Commandment prohibits suicide, but dancing destroys both mental and bodily health, which makes it doubly suicidal. This completes the argument from Scripture to prove dancing sinful.

We have only to remark, with deference, that this appears to us to be a thorough *break down* in the appeal to the word. That portion of the argument which relates to suicide is just a mere general inference not to be relied on for a moment as a basis of judicial discipline. But what of the three texts? Clearly they forbid rioting and revelling. And these offences may accompany dancing; but is it safe to affirm that they always do accompany it? Can we reason from rioting and revelling, which are clearly forbidden, to all dancing—to even all round dancing? On page 326 we read: "We believe that round dancing at least is a sin of a very grave character and a flagrant breach of morals;" and again, on page 334, that round dances are always "unlawful and disciplinable in Christ's Church; for they are never *per se* indifferent, but essentially contrary to the permanent precepts of Scripture, as has been shown." Now, if any texts of Scripture have been adduced to show that round dancing is essentially sinful, it can only be these three; and to affirm that these do so teach is to affirm that "round dancing" and "rioting and revelling" are synonymous terms. Surely this will be acknowledged by all to be going too far.

So much for the first position maintained—viz., that dancing

is sinful. Let us pass to the other: that it is an offence to be formally disciplined. Of course, however, this cannot stand if there has really been, as we suppose, a failure to make good the first position. If this be so, then all falls to the ground which is said about some forms of dancing having "every mark by which disciplinable sins are discriminated from the undisciplinable; they are public sins; their commission is overt; the acts may be clearly defined; they are notoriously attended by scandal; they have regular tendencies to other sins" (page 326). Indeed, how could it possibly be true that some forms of dancing are as here described, and yet some other forms of the same amusement be innocent? Admit that it is the circumstances which make the criminality, and then you may discriminate between dancing and dancing. But if certain forms of dancing are, as is declared, "never *per se* indifferent, but essentially contrary to the permanent precepts of Scripture" (page 334), then it passes our comprehension how there can be any innocent forms of the same act. There may be innocent forms of killing, but not of murder, nor of stealing, nor of lying, nor of adultery, nor of any other act which is essentially sinful.

We are, therefore, not a little surprised to meet at the outset of the second part of this discussion the admission distinctly made (page 323), that "there are forms of dancing which are innocent." So far as observed, this has not been admitted till now. All along we have understood it to be held that the modern dance—that is, the dancing of the sexes together in any form—is always sinful, though more or less so, according to circumstances.

The first point made under this second head of the discussion, is, that there is no reason to deny that dancing is a disciplinable offence from the fact that there are gradations in dancing—some kinds being admitted to be innocent, and the sinful kinds shading off nicely from the other; and the further fact, that the Bible has not drawn the line between the tolerated and the disciplinable forms of the practice; because the lesser and the greater breaches of all the commandments shade off into each other, and because such a plea for not disciplining certain dances would prove that no breach of any commandment is disciplinable.

Now, the first remark we have to offer is, that we do not know of any greater breaches of any of the commandments which do so shade off into lesser breaches as that these latter become innocent. There are some sins greater than others, but no breaches of any commandment are innocent.

And our second observation is, that the gradation plea is one we would not think of making. A far more obvious as well as stronger plea is, that the Bible does not, so far as proved, make any form of dancing sinful; and therefore the Church can only warn and cannot discipline. If rioting and revelling, or any other sinful thing, be mixed up with any dance, that may of course be disciplined. But the simple dancing, whether round or square, we have not had demonstrated to be condemned either expressly or by good and necessary consequence in the Bible. It is not, therefore, in itself a disciplinable offence. And yet, in every age, the Church has looked upon it as a questionable and dangerous thing, and therefore has remonstrated and exhorted against it, and to these warnings and remonstrances all right-minded church members should pay great respect. What is so well urged about its being a dividing line, in the apprehension of many, between the penitent and the ungodly, deserves the highest consideration. For our own part, we cordially accept the statement that it is frontier ground between the kingdom of Christ and that of Satan. There is, and as has been well said, there always must be, a belt of territory between rival kingdoms, and so between the Church and the world, which is "the debateable land." And this is always, as is well said, a region full of perils, and the man or the woman who desires to pay proper regard to his or her own safety will not dwell very near this dangerous boundary, even though it may be honestly believed that it belongs to the King. The actual peril of this contested territory is well nigh as great as of the enemy's acknowledged soil. And the Christian who is successfully assaulted by Satan will usually be, as is well urged, the very one who causelessly ventures near his boundary line. It is true, as is insisted on, that usually men do not backslide by suddenly falling into some monstrous crime. Satan does not attempt to rend a soul from Christ by inserting

first the blunt edge of his wedge between them, but its thin edge, and that because it is thin. And for this reason Christians ought to guard themselves most against the smaller sins lying next to the debateable zone; and for this reason, those who watch for souls are bound to be most wakeful and strict at the same points.

All this is exactly to our mind, only the strict watchfulness of pastors and Sessions must not take the form of technical discipline, but that of parental, loving, affectionate oversight and care. We do not believe that the testimony of pastors and elders, who are thus tenderly watchful, will be found to be, as is said on page 326, that "the milder measures of instruction and remonstrance fail to restrain" our youthful church members. Certainly we have had contrary testimony. At New Orleans, two pastors, one of Richmond, Virginia, the other of St. Louis, each having in charge a large church in a rich and gay community, told us they never had any difficulty on this subject. They found the power and influence of a loving pastorate amply sufficient in every case, and they held formal discipline for dancing to be incongruous and needless.

The next point which we deem it necessary to take up is, whether rights of conscience can be involved in this question. It appears to be considered quite doubtful. There is a statement made of the grounds on which such an idea may be entertained, but we do not consider the statement altogether adequate. Some, it is stated, hold that nothing can be justly disciplined except what is expressly condemned by God; others, only what are *mala per se*; and yet others, that whenever a church court exceeds these two restrictions, the individual who so thinks about its action is not only at liberty to assert, but bound to assert, his freedom of conscience by doing just what such court forbids. Now, as to the first of these points, surely nobody would say that the express prohibition is necessary where the thing is forbidden deductively. And as to the second, surely nobody would say that a church court may not judicially discipline where an act, not *malum per se*, becomes unquestionably sinful through the circumstances of its commission. Then as to the third point, clearly it involves a very nice and difficult question, and nobody

could be so foolish as to lay down the imperative rule stated. Wisdom is profitable to direct. It may be one's duty under such circumstances quietly to submit. It may be his duty to refuse submission to the court of first resort in the way of appealing to a higher court until a decision is reached in the highest court. And should the decision be then adverse to his conscientious convictions of what Scripture and our Constitution maintain, as might be the case, perhaps he would be bound (see Confession, Chap. XX., § 2) to hold his membership or his ministerial position and agitate—of course, however, in a constitutional and Christian way—for the reform of what he may justly consider corruption and abuse; for “all synods or councils since the Apostles' times, whether general or particular, may err, and may have erred,” and “to obey” their commandments is sometimes “to betray true liberty of conscience.”

Now we do not think it can be justly maintained that any professed believer who entered our communion when we became a separate Presbyterian Church, whether member or office-bearer, found any such rule as made dancing a disciplinable offence. There was no such term of communion amongst us then, and there is no such term of communion now. The Assembly of 1865 called on Sessions to discipline such as “love the world and conformity thereto rather than the law of Christ.” The Assembly of 1869 enjoined the discipline of “promiscuous dancings.” Those who were anxious for the formal discipline of the dance pressed the Assembly in 1877 to interpret this word “promiscuous,” and say if all dancing is forbidden by our Church. And the answer probably surprised them, for the Assembly very wisely discountenanced all forms of dancing, but referred the whole business of formal discipline to the only body which can constitutionally exercise it, and recommended that body to be very patient with offenders.

It is therefore, we conceive, rather premature to urge that our Church has a rule binding Sessions to discipline all dancing, and that whoever is not able to approve that method of dealing with it must either go out of the Church or else quietly submit; as though our Church policy were settled in favor of formally dis-

ciplining the dance. If we are to have a new constitutional rule, the Presbyteries must first agree to adopt it. And it might be well for those who favor the formal discipline of dancing not to be too sure that the majority, when such a question shall come to be proposed, will certainly be found on their side. Who are to wear the name of "dissentients," it will be time enough to decide when the question really comes up for decision and is decided.

It is said that where a majority make a term of communion though not sinful yet too strict, and insist on the observance of it by the body, it cannot be alleged that there is any Popery in their proceeding so long as they do not coerce by civil pains, nor declare submission necessary to salvation. But it seems to us, with deference, that, notwithstanding what is said, there may be a grain of Popery in such a proceeding, inasmuch as "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word, or *beside* it in matters of faith or worship; so that to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commandments out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience, and reason also." The great Assembly which wrote these words, and the many and various other Presbyterian Assemblies which have adopted them (our own included), have all considered that apart from enforcement by civil pains and from limiting salvation to obedience, it is a Popish thing to make any rule that is *beside God's word*, that is, *additional to God's word*. The whole counsel of God is either expressly set down in Scripture or deducible by necessary consequence, and we may neither take away from nor add to it. And if there be added any rule, whether to be enforced by civil or by spiritual and eternal threats, our devotion to true liberty of conscience may require us to resist and not obey, lest we become betrayers of that most precious inheritance. And here we must remember what was said above in connexion with another point about "the thin edge." If there is a thin edge of sinful compliance with worldly enticements which Satan uses to separate the disciple

from his Lord, so there is also a thin edge of human inventions in religion and in morals which the devil often introduces to corrupt the faith and the worship and to destroy the liberty, purity, and peace of the Church. The apostle bids us "stand fast and not be entangled." We do not know whereunto would grow our yielding that anything may be "considered by any judicatory a (disciplinable) offence or admitted as matter of accusation, which cannot be *proved to be such from Scripture* or from the regulations and practice of the Church *founded on Scripture*." There are, as we said in the outset, a score or two of questionable things, as many view them, which the Church may discountenance but cannot lawfully discipline, because it is not clear from Scripture to the general apprehension that they are sinful. And if we begin by allowing Sessions to discipline dancing, *as dancing*, if the thin edge is once introduced in this way, our Church liberty may be speedily destroyed, and with it will go our Church unity and also our Church purity. Because it is Popish, let what will be said to the contrary, to make any rule *beside* the Word. The Church is, as Calvin well said, closely "*astricted to the Word*."

In all free governments the ruler may not take the life nor abridge the liberty, nor even despoil the property of the subject or citizen, except in certain cases plainly provided; and the provisions which are made to protect the private individual from the unlawful exercise of governmental authority over him are very numerous, very ingenious, and of the utmost value to liberty. And so in that free Christian commonwealth which the Church of Jesus Christ constitutes, the liberty of the private Christian and of the individual office-bearer is carefully guarded. Presbyterians have always been great on liberty, and representative government finds its chief model and bulwarks in the provisions of its heaven-descended constitution. The question, then, of the formal discipline of dancing, or of any other merely questionable thing, goes down to the very foundations of our system, for that requires that every Christian be left free from doctrines and commandments of men that are beside the word. And therefore we are very strongly of opinion that whatever cannot be clearly and indisputably proved from Scripture to be forbidden by the Master,

his Church can well afford to have passed by without formal discipline. Our standards, deducing clearly from the word, say that "all provocations to uncleanness" and "all immodest apparel" and "all light behavior" are violations of the Seventh Commandment, and on the same ground they condemn as sinful all "lascivious dances." If we cannot make out to the general conviction that any particular form of amusement comes up to this description, we are necessarily estopped from formally disciplining it. What do we want to condemn in any worldly amusement except what is certainly sinful? And what can any church court touch that the word does not unquestionably condemn?

The discussion of the law of love and of the unquestionable fact that actions may under certain circumstances become truly sins is both interesting and instructive, including as it does an elaborate exposition of the proceedings of the first Presbyterian General Assembly described in the fifteenth chapter of Acts. As to the law of love, it is well said, that its obligations never can upset Christian liberty—each freeman in Christ must judge in the fear of God when he should forego any right of his for the sake of his weak brethren; and that no church court can require of him this surrender on pain of discipline, because that would be to give them power to make things sinful which God has not made so. Then as to neutral acts becoming sinful by circumstances, which undoubtedly they may in certain cases, it is also well said on the other hand, that for a Christian to claim the right to do such acts, which have thus become sinful, would be license not liberty. And so it is likewise well said that no church court can assume to declare that circumstances now make some act sinful which Christ or his apostles had left allowable. Everything which Christ and his apostles, in other words which the word, leaves allowable, may be done without guilt. Let it be here repeated by us that the perfect word of God anticipates to condemn every conceivable sin. There never can arise any new sins which that word will not be found to have prohibited. And so it is here (page 330) correctly stated: "that a Church may justly prohibit a practice as evil by reason of newly arising cir-

cumstances, it must be able to prove from Scripture (either by express declaration or good and necessary consequence) that God regards the practice thus circumstanced as evil." Hence it is added, "our Assemblies, while scripturally condemning drunkenness, have scripturally refused to make temperate drinking an offence." All this appears to us exactly true and just, and moreover quite confirmatory of our position in this argument. But the illustration here given we are not prepared to adopt. That a Presbyterian minister should ever go habitually to drink in a drinking-hell and in that way encourage drunkenness is a very un-supposable case. Some strangely powerful and sustaining reason for such a course would be necessary or it could not be taken, and this reason must needs be such as would justify the act before Presbytery. We can as easily suppose such a reason as we can suppose such an act. If the act were done without some such reason, of course it would be censurable as an evil act. But what is the thing Presbytery would censure? Not his drinking, but his setting a scandalous example by his drinking publicly. And he would be told to use his liberty of *drinking in secret*, which possibly would constitute a greater scandal in the eyes of many than what it was designed to remedy. On the whole, we are forced to say that the illustration is both very un-supposable, and also avails little if such a case could be supposed. Let us pass to what is very properly said to be "a better instance"—that which occasioned the first General Assembly at Jerusalem. We find nothing to object to, but much to admire, in the explanation of the decrees here given. It is confirmed by Calvin's exposition of the same. The great Genevan aims to prevent Romish or other councils from claiming the right from this example of the apostles and elders to make new moral laws. He meets the question: if lawful for that Assembly to do this, why not lawful for their successors as often as occasion requires? Calvin shows that the Jerusalem Council decreed nothing new whatever. For if Peter declares that God is tempted if a yoke is laid on the necks of disciples, he could not afterwards agree to the imposition of such a yoke. So then, Calvin continues: "The first thing in order and the chief thing in importance is that the

Gentiles were to retain their liberty, which was not to be disturbed; and that they were not to be annoyed by the observances of the law. And the reservation which follows touching idols and blood is not a new law enacted by the apostles, but a divine and eternal command of God against the violation of charity, which does not detract one iota from liberty." Only (he says) the Gentiles were not to abuse their liberty—in other words, they were to use "an innoxious liberty, giving no offence to the brethren." "In removing grounds of offence, the apostles would simply enforce the divine law which prohibits offence, as if they had said: The Lord hath commanded you not to hurt a weak brother; but meats offered to idols, things strangled and blood ye cannot eat without offending weak brethren; we therefore require you by the command of the Lord not to eat with offence."

We have therefore here, as is properly said, an unquestionable instance of a church court, under the plain and sure guidance of the Spirit, declaring that the moral character of a concrete act had become under circumstances and for a time at least, sinful; while yet *per se* it was indifferent.

Now how does this bear on the question we are discussing? All that has been proved is that circumstances may make a thing sinful which is *per se* indifferent. And if the thing becomes sinful, then it is a proper subject of discipline *if circumstances render it suitable and wise so to deal with it*. Liberty is a great and precious right, but charity is a great and holy duty, and liberty must not violate charity. The law of love is to be obeyed. Regard for the opinions and prejudices of others must influence our conduct *unless a greater duty override this one*. It is a grievous thing to wound the weak brother. He who does it assumes a heavy responsibility. Yet sometimes this very thing has to be done. Charity, sweet and heavenly as it is, must not be allowed to invade or overthrow liberty. When the weak brother gets so strong that he demands the sacrifice of my freedom, the time has come for me to resist him and to refuse his demand.

Now it is very difficult sometimes to decide between the conflicting claims of charity and liberty. It is given up in the article we are reviewing that Paul would not have disciplined a well-

informed believer who persisted in eating idol's meat and claimed that his liberty was not to be judged by another man's conscience. Only in case he was not defending his own liberty, but acting selfishly and mischievously of deliberate purpose, only for wantonly doing mischief, and not merely for eating, it is said could such a man be disciplined. This is distinctly admitted. So far so good. Let us go just one step farther, and say if it be not perfectly clear and certain that such a believer was deliberately and wantonly set on doing injury to his weak brother, it were evidently better not to attempt the formal discipline of him, but merely to reason with and exhort and persuade him.

The conclusion reached by this elaborate discussion of "The Dancing Question" is that our Assembly at Louisville ought categorically to order the formal discipline by our Sessions of all round dances and public and promiscuous balls. We should very much prefer that the Sessions should be left according to the New Orleans deliverance to apply the law of God in their own wisdom and faithfulness. Let Assemblies, Synods, and Presbyteries declare and expound the teachings of the word on this subject, as occasion shall require; but let our Sessions determine what remedy is suitable in each particular case as it arises, and let pastors also be left to deal tenderly and prudently but earnestly with this matter. You cannot trust the Sessions because too timid? Far better trust them to act as may be right and wise in each separate case than impose on them the sweeping order proposed, which they would not, could not, ought not to carry out, because it transcends the word. Let the Louisville Assembly deliver itself zealously but scripturally on this subject, and then let our pastors preach and teach the people. We want no preaching of a crusade against dancing. Vastly more should we confide in the preaching of Christ and the powers of the world to come, in the setting forth of our duty to the Head of his Church. The remedy of Augustin and of Calvin is the one we wish to see tried—"not rough, harsh, imperious measures, more teaching than commanding, more admonishing than threatening." But if there must be special action taken against special evils, let us at least keep our action within constitutional bounds. We may not

discipline but we may teach. Only three of our Assemblies have yet spoken. Let them utter their voice, if needful, *from year to year*, and let Synods and Presbyteries take up the testimony, and let all these bodies speak. It may be fairly said that there has been no speaking adequately yet. Let all church courts, if it be necessary, thunder against the evil in question, and let the pulpit thunder also. We have done nothing yet. The power of teaching is immense. Whatever it cannot overthrow, no human power can. Let this remedy be tried. Let there be at least a fair beginning made of trying it before we rush to our highest judicatory and weakly beg it to do what it has no authority to do. We insist upon it, the remedy is by doctrine and not by discipline; and as yet we never have indoctrinated adequately on this subject. The remedy is teaching, exhorting, persuading, by the church courts as they are clearly empowered to make deliverances of true doctrine, and by the ministers who specially are called to teach. This is the remedy for the evil, and this remedy faithfully and prudently employed we cannot doubt will be found sufficient; if not, then there is no remedy. Sure we are that what is urged to be done by the Assembly would be no remedy.

We trust we shall never see our Assembly by any such categorical order as has been proposed undertaking to deal with individual churches and persons, nor in any manner otherwise than in one of the four ways that are provided. We trust we shall never see our Assembly giving forth *in these* deliverances, nor sumptuary regulations, nor sweeping requirements touching concrete cases. Each case must needs be left to be decided by the Session concerned; for the circumstances of each case make the case. This was what the last Assembly said, which spoke of this matter; and what it said was true and wise and scriptural, and moreover was *Presbyterian*. Our system requires the formal discipline of churches and individuals to remain with courts of first resort. In extreme cases, dancing may come to rioting and revelling. In such cases our parochial presbyteries may be safely trusted to proceed to formal discipline. JOHN B. ADGER.

ARTICLE VII.

THOUGHTS ON FOREIGN MISSIONS.

It is not the design of this article to offer any formal argument in defence or in support of this sublime enterprise, but rather to bring forward some of those more familiar considerations which ought to stimulate the people of God to a heartier and more earnest prosecution of it. The time for argument is gone by. The man who professes to be a disciple of Jesus Christ, but denies his obligation to do what he can to promote this cause, needs to vindicate the sincerity and consistency of his Christian character. If it be true, as is generally acknowledged, that we who dwell in Christian lands are indebted to the presence and influence of Christianity for all the civil, social, and religious blessings with which we are surrounded; if it be true, as is acknowledged by all evangelical denominations, that there is no possibility of salvation for the heathen without some knowledge of the gospel of Jesus Christ; if it be true, that it is the special work of the Church to spread the knowledge of salvation among all mankind; if it be true, that the Bible, and the Bible alone, sheds any light upon the world to come, then it is a matter of momentous importance that the knowledge of the gospel should be communicated as speedily as possible to all the nations of the earth.

Among those considerations which we wish to impress upon the minds of our readers, we would mention,

1st. That if the Lord Jesus Christ has made known his will more clearly in relation to any one matter than another, it is that his gospel should be made known to all the nations of the earth. We touch at once the main-spring of Christian activity. The man who feels no desire to do the will of Christ can have no well-founded hope of interest in his atoning blood. Christ himself has emphatically said, "Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you." Not only has the Saviour made known his will in commanding that his gospel should be preached to every creature on the face of the earth, but the very circumstances under which it was uttered give great emphasis to the command itself.

He had completed the work of redemption, so far as that work was to be completed here upon earth. He had by his sufferings made atonement for sin; by a life of obedience he had wrought out a perfect righteousness in behalf of all his own chosen people; he had come forth from the grave, not only for the justification of his people, but thereby furnished the assurance of their resurrection also; he was just about to ascend to heaven to take his seat on the mediatorial throne; he had just made the grand and sublime announcement that all power in heaven and in earth had been committed to his hands. It was in connexion with these impressive surroundings and this grand announcement, that he gives the command to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. He saw distinctly all that was involved in the execution of this command: how much self-denial would have to be practised, how much hardship would have to be endured, how much danger would have to be encountered, how much persecution would have to be borne. In view of all this, he fortifies the minds of his disciples with the precious assurance that he would be with them to the end of the world; and with this assurance, they went everywhere proclaiming the unsearchable riches of Christ; realising at every step his personal presence and protection.

But not only is the will of the Saviour made manifest in appointing this work in the first instance, but it is equally manifest in the favor he is bestowing upon it in these latter days. And without going into any extended details, we would simply ask, Where has the gospel been preached in modern times, even among the most degraded portions of the human race, that there have not been tokens of the Saviour's presence and blessing? How is it that there are scores of immortal beings in almost every kindred and nation on the face of the earth, who are to-day lifting up anthems of praise to him who died to redeem them? Can any one fail to see the hand of the Redeemer in all this? Can any one doubt whether this enterprise lies near to his heart?

And what is the spontaneous feeling of every regenerate heart, especially when that heart feels the freshness of atoning blood applied to it? Is it not, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?"

And what is the answer that comes down from heaven, if not in articulate voice, yet in the indications of providence which sometimes speak even louder than the audible voice? Is it not, "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature"? If, from some providential hindrance, any one cannot go himself, then, to the extent of his ability, let him help those that can go. How any church, or individual member of the church, can stand aloof from this great work that is so dear to the heart of the Redeemer, and yet profess to be a friend and follower of him, is a problem that we cannot undertake to solve.

2d. The work assigned the Church by her Divine Head is to make known the salvation of Jesus. The field he has given her to cultivate is the world. If this is not the special work of the Church, then the Scriptures may be searched in vain to find out what that work is. The apostles and primitive Christians made no mistake in relation to this matter. They felt that a special work had been given them to do; that the world was truly and literally the field that was to be cultivated. They commenced their labors in Jerusalem, which was not only the most natural course, but was in strict accordance with the command of the Saviour himself; but in a comparatively short time the glad news of salvation were made known, not only in Judea and Samaria, but to the distant ends of the earth. They never thought of using the miserable pretext "that there is work enough at home," for lingering indefinitely on the confines of their own native homes. The same unmodified obligation rests upon the Church at the present day.

The Church is not responsible for the conversion of men, either here or in the heathen world, this being preëminently the work of the Holy Ghost. But she is responsible, at least to the extent of her ability, for the universal dissemination of the gospel among all mankind. And this responsibility is greatly heightened by the fact, that, so far as we know, the Holy Ghost never regenerates the heart of an adult man except through the medium or instrumentality of that truth which it is the special business of the Church to disseminate. In the order of God's grace, therefore, the sowing of the gospel seed, which is the work of the Church,

must precede the converting power of the Holy Ghost. It is unreasonable, therefore, for us to expect or to pray for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon any portion of the human race among whom the knowledge of salvation has not been previously diffused. In this view of the matter, the duty of the Church becomes solemn and momentous to the last degree. The position assigned her in carrying the work of redemption into effect is momentous in the extreme, and is especially so in connexion with the urgent duty of carrying the knowledge of salvation to those portions of the race who are destitute of it. Not only is the honor of the Redeemer involved, but the spiritual welfare of the Church and the salvation of millions of perishing men are all dependent upon the faithful performance of this duty by the Church. Indeed, we do not see how any Church can have spiritual life while it neglects this duty. There have been times in the history of the Church when the heathen world was inaccessible to her, and of course it was not expected that she could do much for their salvation. But now the case is different, and inactivity is incompatible with the life and spirit of the Church. The spirit of missions, which is the spirit of Christ, is emphatically the life of the Church. Without this, no matter how large her communion, how compact her organisation, how abundant her pecuniary resources, or how sound her religious creed, it will be utterly impossible for her either to maintain her own spirituality or to fulfil the object for which she was instituted. Duty to a perishing world, the maintenance of her own spiritual life, as well as duty to Him who redeemed that life, make it necessary for her to be unreservedly devoted to the business of spreading the knowledge of salvation among all mankind. Her activity in the performance of this duty will always be the true gauge of her spirituality, and without which she cannot long be regarded as a living Church.

3d. Another consideration of great moment, and one that ought to be deeply impressed upon the heart of the Church, is, that so far as we are informed by the word of God, there is no possibility of salvation for the heathen without some knowledge of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Of course no reference is made

here to the millions who die in infancy in heathen lands, and who, never having committed actual transgression, may be saved through the atoning merits of redeeming blood.

In relation to this general matter, there has recently sprung up (and we are sorry to say to some extent in the evangelical Church) a wide-spread scepticism, which is undoubtedly closely allied to that general disbelief in future retribution which has become so rife of late. Now without citing the almost innumerable passages of Scripture, both from the Old and New Testament, which declare that all the nations that forget God shall be destroyed; without stopping to show that the denial of the punishment of the heathen is a virtual abrogation of all God's denunciations of sin; without dwelling upon the solemn declaration of the Saviour himself that those who refused to hear the gospel would be damned; without commenting upon the statement so frequently and so emphatically made in the New Testament Scriptures, that the gospel was just as necessary to the Gentile as to the Jew, we come directly to the well-known creed of all evangelical denominations, that there is no salvation for man (that is, adult man) without faith in the merits of a crucified Redeemer. And here the apostle, as if he were writing with special reference to this modern scepticism, settles the question beyond all reasonable controversy: "How shall they (the Gentiles) call on Him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?"

But the question presents itself and is pressed with no ordinary pertinacity, how shall the heathen be condemned for rejecting the gospel when that gospel has never been presented to them, or for turning away from Jesus Christ when they never heard of that blessed name? The answer is, that they will not be condemned on either of these grounds. The same apostle makes this point just as clear as the other: "The Gentiles which have not the law, are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written on their hearts." The law of God, of course not in all its fulness, is indelibly written upon the human heart. This is not more in accord with the teachings of God's word than

it is with the experience and the observations of all those who have had the opportunity to study the matter under favorable circumstances. There exist in every heathen mind, it is confidently believed, some conceptions of a supreme governor of the universe, some perceptions of the distinction between right and wrong, and some ideas, though indistinctly developed, of future accountability. There are those, and among them some for whom we have great respect, who doubt the correctness of this statement. But this doubt, we apprehend, arises from one of two things, or from the two combined. 1st. The heathen (the great majority of them at least) are not in the habit of formulating their religious creed in any very intelligible phraseology. Indeed, they cannot always tell what they do believe, and their creed has to be inferred from their actions rather than their words. 2d. In many cases those who seek this knowledge are not sufficiently acquainted either with the language or the character of the people to ascertain precisely what they do believe. All nature reminds the heathen that there is one great first cause of all things. The laws and usages by which all their social intercourse is regulated are based on the conviction that there is an essential difference between right and wrong, good and evil. Then the custom, which is amazingly prevalent in all heathen communities, of burying persons of notoriously bad character apart from those that have been orderly in their deportment, shows not only a belief in a future state of existence, but also in a state of future retribution. Without the existence of such convictions it would be almost impossible for a missionary to bring the gospel to bear upon the hearts of the heathen at all; as the matter stands, it is not necessary for him to attempt to prove the existence of a personal God. This is already admitted. His work will consist in giving right views of God's moral character. So it is unnecessary for him to attempt to show that lying, theft, adultery, murder, and sins of like nature, are all wrong. The heathen not only knows this, but these crimes against society are often severely punished. It looks like an absurdity to the heathen to try to convince him that he has a soul that is to exist hereafter. He carries food almost every day to the grave of his parents. When

reminded of future accountability, he plainly shows that a painful apprehension has been confirmed, rather than a new idea suggested.

But how far operative is this law of God written upon their hearts? Here is just the point where its weakness and insufficiency manifest themselves. Whilst the law itself is universal, and cannot be altogether obliterated, it exercises very little power over the moral character of men. On this point there is no diversity of views among missionaries. The first man in all the heathen world is yet to be found who is living according to this law written upon his heart, or is even trying to do so. There is diversity of moral character among the heathen as there is among ourselves. But the best and purest among them not only fall infinitely below the gospel standard of purity, but far below that standard of moral rectitude that might be inferred from their inherent knowledge of right and wrong, and by which they are to be judged and condemned in the great day of accounts. There is no more possibility of their being saved by this natural law than there is of our being saved by the law as revealed in the word of God. We and they therefore stand substantially on the same platform. Neither can be saved except through faith in the merits of a crucified Redeemer. If the gospel is necessary for our salvation, it is not less so to theirs.

But we are told that it is a great mystery that the millions of the heathen should have been left for so many centuries in utter ignorance of the gospel, when that gospel was so essential to their salvation. It is readily admitted that there is a mystery in this too profound to be fathomed by the human mind. But is this the only mystery in God's providence or grace that cannot be fathomed? Who can tell why the coming and incarnation of the Son of God was delayed four thousand years after the promise was first made? Who can tell why the Redeemer, when he took his seat upon the mediatorial throne, did not at once take to himself his great power and subdue all the nations of the earth to his dominion? More than all this, is there really any more mystery in the fact that the heathen should be lost, than that hundreds

and thousands of men should be permitted to perish here in the full blaze of gospel light?

4th. The success of the gospel among the benighted nations of the earth during the present century furnishes a powerful motive for the more earnest prosecution of the work. This is not offered as an argument for the undertaking or the prosecution of the work, for obedience to the command of the Saviour makes it the duty of his people to preach the gospel everywhere, whether men hear or forbear. But when God is pleased out of regard to the weakness of his people's faith, or in fulfilment of his own designs of mercy, to make the gospel effectual to the salvation of multitudes of ignorant and perishing men, a most powerful motive is superadded for a more vigorous prosecution of the work. The cause, thus made to bear the seal of the Saviour's approval, ought to be brought very near to the heart of every believer.

But in what does the success referred to consist? In an article like the present this inquiry can be answered only in the briefest manner. It is not necessary to go back to apostolic times for proofs of the power of the Holy Ghost to reclaim the worst and most degraded of the human race. The times in which we live are furnishing even stronger illustrations of that power. Before adducing the actual facts connected with the success of modern missions, it is necessary to premise that the condition and circumstances of the world at the two periods referred to are essentially different. Most of those communities in which early Christianity had its most vigorous growth had been previously permeated by the teachings of the Old Testament Scriptures, and were in consequence measurably prepared to embrace the gospel as soon as it was proclaimed. Again, the Gentile world, in the days of the apostles, occupied a much higher place in the scale of civilisation than the present inhabitants of the pagan world. Not only did they occupy this higher place, but human ingenuity had exhausted all of its resources in the effort to acquire more certain knowledge about a future world. The minds of men, therefore, were in a favorable attitude for the reception of the truth. The pagan nations of the present day have sunk so deep in the mire of sin and superstition that nothing short of an extraordinary divine

power can reach and save them. More than this. The early propagators of the gospel were endowed with the gift of language and the power of working miracles. What the primitive disciple possessed by intuition or inspiration, the modern missionary can acquire only by laborious study.

In view of this state of things, it must be seen at once that a most important work of preparation had to be perfected in modern times before any great ingathering of souls into the fold of Christ could be realised. The minds of the nations had to be aroused from the slumber of centuries, their systems of superstition and false religion overthrown; and the truth had to be disseminated, which involves not only the preaching of the gospel in languages that have been acquired at the expense of great labor, but also the translation and the circulation of God's word into all such languages. No adequate views of the actual success of modern missions can be formed without taking into the account the nature and magnitude of this work of preparation.

Let us now look at some of the actual facts connected with the progress of modern missions. And first, as to the extent to which the work has already been carried. There are those still living who can remember the time when all the Protestant missionary stations in the heathen world could be numbered on the fingers of the two hands. But what is the state of the case at the present time? What considerable tribe of Indians are there on the North American continent of the present day that have not representatives of the Christian Church among them, endeavoring to guide them in the paths of Christian knowledge? What considerable group of islands are there, either in the Northern or Southern Pacific, upon which the light of the gospel is not already beginning to shine! Note the fact too, as we pass along, that the inhabitants of at least three hundred of these islands have already been brought so much under the influence of Christianity that all traces of idolatry have disappeared from among them. Look at the great continent of Africa, that which a few years ago seemed to be the darkest and most hopeless of all portions of our habitable globe. Travel now along its western coast, over its southern territory, along its eastern shores, penetrate the regions

around the newly discovered lakes, ascend the Niger from its outlet in the Gulf of Benin to its source near the Great Desert, and everywhere you will find representatives of the Christian Church, kindling up lights, feeble and flickering now, but destined in the mercy of God to blaze up and illuminate the whole continent. Go to Eastern Europe, especially to that portion that was known until recently as Turkey in Europe; to Greece and the Grecian Islands; to all parts of Asia Minor, including Armenia and Nestoria; to Palestine, to Syria, to Persia, to the Valley of the Euphrates, to all portions of the great empire of India; to Burmah, to Siam, to China and Japan; and what one of these great sections of the earth has not representatives of the Christian Church laboring among its people at the present day? Not only are missionaries to be found in all these regions, but the most important, and what may be called strategical points, have been seized and will be made tributary to the universal spread of the gospel among these various races. Now connect with this wide spread work the further fact that there are at the present time as many as twenty-five hundred foreign missionaries and more than twenty thousand native laborers scattered over these vast regions and proclaiming far and wide the glad tidings of salvation, and we shall have some idea of the extent to which the work has already been carried.

But we must look further at what has been achieved, through the blessing of God, by these missionary brethren.

One of the most serious obstacles that lay in the way of the evangelisation of the heathen world was the number of languages and dialects that had to be acquired, and many of them to be reduced to writing for the first time, before the knowledge of the gospel could be communicated to the people. It is a work of great labor to acquire one of these languages, but especially so if it is to be reduced to system for the first time. A still greater and more laborious work is to translate the word of God into one of these newly written languages. But what has been accomplished in this direction? As many as two hundred and thirty languages have not only been made tributary to the public preaching of the gospel, but into most of them the word of God,

in part or in whole, as well as hundreds of other religious books, have been translated, printed, and circulated, and are read to-day by millions of the human race. It is estimated that there are now as many as one hundred and thirty-five million copies of the Scriptures in whole or part, in possession of the human family—about one copy for every ten human beings on the face of the earth—and more in all than was ever possessed by the world from the days of Moses to the present time.

But the achievements of the missionary work are by no means limited to this work of preparation. Far more has been accomplished in connexion with the conversion of men—the great end for which the work was instituted—than could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances of the case. Without the exercise of the power of miracles, the gift of tongues, or any of the extraordinary advantages which attended the labors of Apostles and primitive Christians, the number of conversions that have taken place in the heathen world during the last half century is probably a good deal larger than what took place during the whole of the first century of the Christian era. Rieger, whom Lange endorses as good authority, estimates the number of conversions during the first century at five hundred thousand. This includes the converts in Palestine as well as those in all other parts of the world. The estimated number of converts in all parts of the unevangelised world at the present day—taking no account of those in Christian lands—is probably not less than six hundred thousand, the great majority of whom have actually been gathered into the fold of Christ in the last twenty-five years. It should be borne in mind at the same time, that these converts have not been gathered mainly out of one or two nations, but from all the kindreds and tongues and peoples and nations on the face of the earth—thus showing that the glorious Redeemer is now marshalling in all parts of the earth that mighty host, too great to be numbered, that is to surround his mediatorial throne in heaven. It has become true, too, as has frequently been remarked, that the sun, in performing his daily circuit around the earth, rises now upon no people among whom there are not some to send up ascriptions of praise to Him who sits upon the throne,

and who redeemed them from their sins. What a grand view is this that is now spreading itself out before the Christian Church! What a privilege, what an honor it is, to live in times like these! How strange it is that any portion of the Church should be asleep in such an emergency! How strange it is that the whole Church does not rise up with one mind and one heart and devote all her strength and all her resources to the one great object of saving a lost world!

5th. Another consideration of great moment is, that there are greater facilities and advantages at present for spreading the knowledge of the gospel among mankind than ever existed before. This is equally true whether regard be had to the condition and resources of the Church, or to the altered condition of the great mass of the heathen world. The number of ministers, as well as the means of training men for the ministry, has been multiplied beyond anything that has ever before been known in the history of the Church. At the same time, wealth has been poured into the lap of the Church without stint; so that there are means and agents in the bosom of the Church at the present day, if they were properly consecrated, to carry the gospel, in a comparatively short time, to every portion of the habitable earth. The heathen world, too, in some respects, is in a more favorable condition for the reception of the gospel. They have been aroused to unusual activity by being brought in contact with modern commerce—have felt the throb of a superior civilised life. They realise, as they never did before, the essential difference between a life of barbarism and one of enlightened civilisation.

But not only is the mind of the heathen stirred, but the increased facilities of travel and transportation bring the products of the civilised world to their doors, and, what is far more important, they bring the heralds of salvation also to guide them into the paths of truth. India, Burmah, China, Japan, and the Polynesian Islands, can now be reached in greater comfort and safety, and in fewer weeks than it formerly required months to perform the same voyage. And not only can these far-off countries be reached in a comparatively short period, but they can be traversed with more ease, speed, and safety than could have been

imagined fifty years ago. A missionary can travel and see more of India in one day now than he could formerly have done in a whole month. Similar advantages will soon be enjoyed in China, Japan, and other parts of the world. Recent discoveries show that there are at least twenty thousand miles of navigable inland waters in the heart of Africa, and intended in the goodness of God, no doubt, to furnish facilities of access to the millions of that benighted land.

Now, what is the design of that providence which has brought all these unevangelised nations face to face with the Christian world? The man of commerce sees in this nothing but the results of the commercial activity of the age. The man of science claims it all as the necessary results of the scientific discoveries of the day. But the thoughtful Christian recognises the hand of the Redeemer behind and above all these movements, directing them so as to bring about the complete fulfilment of his own precious promise, that "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea."

But whilst there is cause to rejoice in this promising state of things, there is also occasion for most serious anxiety. And it is this: if the bringing of these uncultured races in contact with the civilised world does not result in promoting their spiritual welfare, it will certainly result in their ruin, both temporal and spiritual. This has not always been the consequence of the mingling of barbarous and civilised races. But there is something in our modern civilisation—even what is called Christian civilisation—or in the deeper degradation of modern heathen nations, or in both combined, which prevents the two from being brought into close contact without serious detriment to the best interests of the weaker and more ignorant party. Nothing but the interpenetrating power of Christianity can counterwork this result. We shall not turn aside to analyse the causes which lead to these disastrous consequences, but look at a few of the facts themselves; and we have not to go far for such facts. Where, for example, are all those numerous tribes of Indians which once overspread New England and occupied all the country lying between the eastern slopes of the Allegheny Mountains and

the Atlantic Ocean? The only answer that can be given is, that, with the exception of a little handful of Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks, now residing in the Indian Territory, and who were brought under the influence of religion before the tide of white population reached them, they have been swept from the face of the earth. Their names, except so far as they have been perpetuated by our geographical nomenclature, are not even known to the present generation. And those smaller tribes to the Northwest, who are now struggling so manfully, but unwisely, perhaps, to perpetuate their own nationality, where will they soon be? Their names will scarcely be known two generations hence.

It is the boast of Great Britain that she put an end to the foreign slave-trade on the western coast of Africa. And when it is remembered how much it cost her to suppress that nefarious trade, she deserves all the honor she claims. Legitimate trade, as it is called, has taken the place of the slave-trade, and it may with propriety be asked, what has been gained by the exchange? Peace has been restored to her borders, it is true, but intemperance, brought about by the use of New England and Old England rum, is likely to do that country more harm than the foreign slave-trade ever did. This is the express testimony of an American missionary who lived on that coast nearly twenty-five years, who had the amplest opportunities for forming a correct judgment on the subject, and whose veracity is heartily endorsed by the writer of this article. Again, it is well known that the British government was the chief agent in forcing open the empire of China to the light and influences of Christian civilisation. But at the same time she forced upon that people the opium trade. And what have been the consequences? In the judgment of missionaries and others equally well qualified to form a correct opinion on the subject, there are now at least seven million of Chinese who have become the victims to the use of this poisonous drug, which is virtually acknowledging that that number will be destroyed. In no part of the unevangelised world has the gospel performed greater achievements than among the Polynesian Islands in the Southern Pacific. But now this work is threatened

with entire overthrow by the introduction of what is called the "transportation of labor," *i. e.*, by carrying laborers from these islands to different parts of Australia to cultivate cotton and sugar plantations. . Bishop Paterson, who labored among the people of those islands for many years, affirms that the prosecution of this system is doing as much harm to the Melanesian Islands as the foreign slave-trade ever did on the west coast of Africa. Further, those who are at all acquainted with the progress of British colonisation on the island of New Zealand, are perfectly aware that the native population of that great island is rapidly disappearing before the march of European civilisation. What has become of the aboriginal population of the Cape of Good Hope? And what is to be the fate of those brave Zulus who recently dealt such heavy blows in the face of this onward progress of European colonisation?

Now we raise no question about the natural rights of civilised men to force themselves upon territory that is but partially occupied by weaker and savage races. But we simply look at the facts of the case, and ask what is the duty of the Church of Christ in view of these conflicts which must necessarily take place. The influence of Christianity alone can forestall the direst calamities that must always ensue from contact between races of such diverse condition and circumstances. The weaker races must always go down, unless they are sustained and fortified by the principles of a living Christianity. The Christian Church ought, therefore, to be alive to her great mission, and do what she can to save these untutored races both from temporal and eternal ruin.

JOHN LEIGHTON WILSON.

VOL. XXX., NO. 2—21.

ARTICLE VIII.

CAPITAL AND LABOR.

Time is a teacher. Time brings its revenges. The Southern statesman may find many of these in the confessions to which Northern men are brought, in their recent journals, by the "logic of events." They are now learning in the school of experience truths tendered to them a generation ago from this quarter, and disdainfully scouted then. For instance, Fitzhugh's "Sociology for the South," a book which they scarcely noticed enough to disparage, forewarned them of a defect in the popular application of their favorite science of political economy. He told them that if men were only machines, if money was the only end of social existence, if the moral side of political economy was properly discarded, then the principles of Adam Smith were doubtless correct. The surest way to get most dollars was to leave labor, like calico and pig iron, to adjust itself to the rigid laws of supply and demand. But if political science was to remember that a laborer was something else than an animal machine, then there must be a modification in that symmetrical theory of theirs of "free trade" in labor. Dabney's "Defence of Virginia and the South" forewarned them that on their hiring system the strife between labor and capital must be perpetual and remediless. "Where labor is free, competition reduces its price to whatever grade the course of trade may fix; for labor is then a mere commodity in the market, unprotected, and subject to all the laws of demand and supply. The owner of land or capital pays for the labor he needs, in the shape of wages, just the price fixed by the relation of demand and supply; and if that price implies the severest privation for the laborer or his family, it is no concern of his. Should they perish by the inadequacy of the remuneration, it is no concern of his—he has but to hire others from the anxious and competing multitude." The law of increase in population, illustrated by Malthus, at which the philosophers of hiring societies had only railed, while equally unable to refute it or to provide a remedy for its evils, was pointed to as un-

avoidably diminishing the remuneration of labor in an endless series, and thus ensuring the progressive misery and discontent of the laborers.

All this was folly in their eyes in 1850 and 1865. But it is edifying to see how rapidly they are now learning these truths under Dame Experience, the price of whose tuition and the quality of whose pupils are both so accurately stated in the old proverb. President Chadbourne, for instance, of Williams College, Massachusetts, in the *International Review*, September, 1878, writes on the "Cry of Labor: What Answer?" He makes some confessions. He has found out that the facts are as these despised "rebels" had taught. He avouches them both in terms of remarkable similarity. He admits that the problem of the relation of labor to capital has, thus far, found no solution from hiring society; and that it is now looming up as a frightful, urgent, and absolutely unmitigated peril among them. He confesses that whatever Northern labor presented of prosperity or comfort was not due to its right organisation, but to the accident of possessing a wide and fresh virgin soil to ravage; and that as soon as it was tested by any strain, it disclosed itself a failure. Their publicists have no practicable remedy. Almsgiving, while a Christian duty, is no adequate solution, because it leaves the fatal causes in full action. Popular education, so boastfully relied on as the American safeguard, has demonstrated its worthlessness for this end. "It brings the conditions of fever to the patient, but has thus far, to the masses, offered no prevention and no cure." Such is the gloomy result of "free-soil" wisdom and material civilisation!

What, then, is the remedy which President Chadbourne advises? He maps out the main lines of a new organisation of labor, which the North will be constrained to adopt, in its essential features; while he admits many details must be left to the teachings of experience. Here it is:

Having distinguished the community into the two main divisions, capitalists and laborers, he claims that "society," by which he means civil government, must lay its regulative hands on both, and fix the relations between them. As for capitalists, whether individual or corporate, they are no longer to be per-

mitted to avail themselves freely of the law of supply and demand in the labor-market, and get labor for the least remuneration that market allows. They are not to be allowed to run such a career of competition against each other, as so reduces the cost of their productions that remuneration of labor becomes inadequate to its comfort and respectability. That is, every capitalist that employs labor is to be compelled by government to give the *employés* enough, in wages, homes, and perquisites, to enable them, 1st, to live in human decency; 2d, to rear families intelligently and respectably; and, 3d, to lay up savings "for a rainy day."

But then, labor may not wisely employ these, its legal emoluments, in the designed way. So our writer proposes that "society" shall see after that point also. He next distributes laborers under the two classes of those who have work, and those who are too ignorant, lazy, or unlucky to get work. The former class is to be so regulated by law that they shall be compelled to apply their adequate wages to the three legal ends. They are not to be permitted to misuse them, and thus disable themselves from the attainment of comfort, present and prospective, and brew trouble, pauper or socialistic, for "society." As for the unemployed class, "the strong arm of the law . . . must see that they have some employment, and that they work. *They are wards of society.* It comes to this at last, when such persons reach the prison and almshouse, and the earlier the wardship is recognised the better."

Is it objected that all this indicates very extensive intrusions into individual liberty? His answer is: "We have listened to this cry long enough. *Whatever is essential to the preservation of society can never be against individual rights, but must be for them.*" We cannot forbear Dominie Sampson's exclamation: "Prodigious!" Is Saul verily among the prophets? Time is a potent teacher indeed! President Chadbourne, after so long a time, finds himself confidently asserting the very premise (and conclusion even) by which we have been refuting the Abolitionists for forty years! Well, he has been a slow pupil; but "better late than never." "We have listened to this cry long enough," viz., that the right to personal liberty is inalienable, being natural;

no supposed right of individuals is valid against any measure which is essential to the preservation of society. Just so; and the personal restraint of the Africans being a measure essential to the preservation of our "society," that measure was "not against their individual rights." But, on the contrary, the Africans being a part of our society to be thus essentially preserved, that measure "must have been *for* them." That is to say, Africans among us *had a right to the protection of bondage*. Excellent; only our writer, unfortunately for the South, "listened to the cry" some forty years too long; until he and his people had time to destroy Southern "society" in the pursuit of what he now finds out was a "cry," *i. e.*, a sophism, a mischievous heresy. He adds: "We must not, from our *fine ideas about freedom*" [consoling irony for us, ruthlessly destroyed by precisely those "ideas"] "wait for them (laborers) to come to the prison or almshouse before we care for them by controlling them. . . . In a word, *let society, through organised forms of law, become his guardian before he is sentenced as a criminal.*" How quickly is the North unlearning its "fifteenth amendment," so lately boasted as the axiom of political justice: that in this free land no person shall be subjected to personal servitude except for crime. Here the proposal is, to subject a whole class, not for crime, but for lack of employment, which may be no fault of theirs; nay, for a mere prospective liability to give trouble at a future day. Verily, the Massachusetts Rehoboam maketh his little finger thicker than the Southern ruler's loins.

Let us see what is unavoidably involved in this plan of organising labor. It unavoidably implies, first, that "society," that is the civil government, shall dictate to employers, of all classes, the rates of wages paid by them for labor, and also the rates at which they shall sell the commodities produced. The former will be both impossible and wrong without the last; for if capitalists are allowed to compete against each other in low prices, they cannot pay the high wages. Second, the government must dictate to the laborers how they shall spend their money after they earn it, how much for current subsistence, how much for education, how much for the savings bank. To do this with any effect, govern-

ment must, of course, go deep; it must be virtual treasurer and housekeeper for the laboring families. Then, to the unemployed class, government is to be "guardian," and is so to control it as to cause it effectively to work, and to use the wages of its work wisely. This must obviously imply, first, the government's power to choose an employment for the individual laborer. The government says to him, "Work." The poor fellow has no answer but the question, "Work at what?" The government must give the practical reply, *i. e.*, choose his work. Then, second, the government must, of course, be armed with a coercive power to ensure obedience; for the unemployed man is presumably so, according to our author, because he does not wish to work. Shall the coercion be imprisonment? No; for if he is locked up he cannot work. Shall it be *the rod*? Third, the plan must, of course, include the government's control over his person and locomotion. For when the law says to this laborer in western Massachusetts, unemployed because lazy, "Work," he will almost surely take himself off to Boston, or some whither. But tramping is not working. So, "society" must treat him in a way amazingly like "slave-catching"! Fourth, if the "unfortunate" cannot be trusted with himself, *à fortiori*, he cannot be trusted with his family; for thus he would inevitably disappoint this precautionary system, by multiplying himself into a whole household of "society's wards." Hence government must govern his family for him. Let the reader now gather up these features of the "guardianship," and ask himself what it looks like; what it used to be called in South Carolina! But this is the present Northern political philosophy for white men!

One more point remains to be viewed: the executive agency through which all this "control" is to be exerted. President Chadbourne says it must be "through organised forms of law." These, of course, imply organs; that is, officials. Government office-holders, then, are to be invested with all this power over capitalists' wealth, prices, wages, and business enterprises; and over the laboring classes' liberty of motion, toil, wages, families, and expenditures. Certain questions here become relevant. Must not some chief office-holder have the appointing power for

all these office-holders, who are to be the "guardians" of labor? How enormously will this swell his prerogatives? Will he be magistrate or Czar? Again: will these laborers, so benevolently "controlled" for their own good, vote or not? If not, what limit have they to this subjugation, or check on their "guardians'" use of them, their earnings, and their families? If they vote, what chance will *other voters* have against the will or ambition of the "guardians" advancing to the ballot-boxes with such cohorts of "wards"? Again, have Americans, especially, encouragement to expect of government officials such philanthropy, integrity, intelligence, or disinterestedness, as will qualify them for these large trusts over the interests of the rich and the persons of the poor? Is there any danger of their "manipulating" the questions of prices, products, wages, in the interest of parties or persons? What is the experience of business men about Washington, Albany, and Boston on that point? Will they be just and faithful, as well as humane, to the "wards" over whom they are to have so much power? Will none of the wages find their way into their pockets instead of the "wards'" savings banks? Will they be in circumstances to feel any of that family tie which so naturally grows up in domestic dependence and intimacies between superior and inferior? And above all, will they have any of that keen, wakeful prompting of self-interest to care faithfully for their "wards," lest their own pockets suffer by their sickness or destruction, which that "barbarous" old system of the South produced? Or will they, being mere officials, know that either the happiness or misery, life or death, of the hirelings intrusted to their oversight will have no effect whatever on their own emoluments, save as the death-rate may diminish their own labors and make their snug places more of sinecures?

These are questions which "give us pause." The illustrative reply which they receive from an experiment of Northern wisdom of recent date, strikes us as rather unfavorable. Americans have an unsavory remembrance of the "Freedmen's Bureau." When the Africans were found precisely in that category of "unemployed" for which President Chadbourne is now legislating, and from the same causes of ignorance, laziness, and ill luck, we re-

member how that Congress fell very much upon this plan—it organised the “Freedman’s Bureau.” It selected the “Christian statesman and soldier,” Gen. O. O. Howard, who turned out not to be just the Howard of Burke’s splendid panegyric, and made the freedmen say to him, after the fashion of the Danites to Micah’s Levite: “Be thou unto us a father and a priest.” But we have a dim reminiscence that the experiment was not a success, and that the Danites, instead of plundering Lachish were plundered themselves; that the “nation” became excessively weary both of “wards” and “guardians”; that the former only became more lazy, dependent, and helpless as the latter became richer; and that the howl of disgust and indignation which consigned them to “the tomb of all the Capulets” was louder in the North than the South.

Yes; all such organisations of labor are but forms of political slavery, having every bad feature ever erroneously imputed to domestic slavery, without a single one of its redeeming features. It would fix on rich and poor every outrage and oppression of despotism and communism at once. President Chadbourne may be assured that there is no remedy in that direction. He assures us that some remedy is essential, because the evil is in full tide of progress, it has found as yet no solution at all, and it threatens society with certain calamity. He is doubtless correct in this: he speaks what he does know, and testifies that which he has seen.

But the remedy? He has given an accurate diagnosis; but his “physic is worse than the disease.” What is to be done? It does not become guilty rebels to obtrude a prescription—we only echo the question, What? One quack remedy has killed the Southern patient, a result exceedingly comforting to the Northern “Sick Man” in the hands of the same doctor. QUIS?

ARTICLE IX.

LIFE OF HORACE MANN.

This volume was published in 1865. It is not, therefore, in order to call attention to something new, that it is made the subject of the following article. But an examination of it is not inappropriate at any time, because the character and career of Horace Mann illustrates so conspicuously the tendencies and results of false philosophy.

The biography is very interesting. It was written by one who of course was absolutely familiar with her subject, and whose intellectual character and culture fitted her, not only to sympathise with all her husband's opinions and feelings, but also to cooperate with him vigorously in his work. We may indeed feel called upon to be on our guard when contemplating a portrait drawn by a hand so fond and so skilful. In fact, she says that she is herself aware of the danger of idealising his character, and of seeing virtues where others see faults. The memoir, however, consists very largely of the letters and other writings of her husband. This puts authentic materials into our hand as far as they go; but does not secure us against the error of estimate which may be occasioned by adroit omission. As we read of his relinquishment of his post of Secretary of Public Education in Massachusetts for a seat in Congress, and afterwards of his removal to Antioch, Ohio, where he ended his life in the midst of the ruins of disappointed expectations, we are conscious of a suspicion that there are some clews of the narrative which we do not hold in our hand. In this we may be mistaken; and if we are not, who can find fault with the tear-blinded eyes of love if they cannot see everything? For the purpose of this article, a very brief recapitulation of the events of the life of Mr. Mann is all that is necessary.

He was born in 1796, in Franklin, Massachusetts, of parents represented as of much moral worth and very strongly religious convictions carried out strictly into daily life. The poverty of his parents compelled him to unremitting toil, which, while it de-

prived him of any but the most meagre opportunities of elementary education, gave him habits of industry and a power of continuous labor which enabled him to prepare in six months to enter the Sophomore Class of Brown University, where he graduated with the first honor of his class. In 1823 he was admitted to the bar, and until 1837 practised law with sufficient success, but from anything that appears in his biography, without any of that enthusiasm which characterised his movements everywhere else he appears. He served several years as member of the House and the Senate of Massachusetts respectively, and devoted his efforts mainly to humanitarian objects, as the founding of a State Lunatic Hospital, and to temperance legislation. In July, 1837, he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Board of Education, or as the more familiar title now is, Superintendent of Public Instruction in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This work, the most laborious and conspicuous, and probably the most successful, of his life, he continued till 1848, when he took in Congress the seat vacated by the death of John Quincy Adams. He remained in Congress for two terms. In 1852 he was nominated for Governor by the Free Soil party in Massachusetts, but was defeated. In the same year he was offered the Presidency of Antioch College in Ohio, which he accepted, and there he continued to labor until his death in 1859.

If this outline brings before the mind of the reader a man of intellectual ability, varied attainments, vigorous activity, pure personal character, and elevated aims, of incessant industry with great endurance, the portrait will not be untrue, so far; but it would be incomplete, as will appear from a more minute inspection. Horace Mann was superficial and bigoted in religion, fanatical and inefficient as a legislator, and visionary in his schemes for education. All this resulted from his inability to take a comprehensive view of things in their mutual relations and comparative importance, and from want of self-knowledge, and thence an overestimate of his own powers.

Things of second-rate importance and men of second-rate ability he assigned to the first rank, and considered as impossible whatever he could not do, and as necessarily untrue whatever he could not comprehend.

To establish and illustrate this statement, we will present, as brought to view in this volume, his religion, his political career, and his educational labors.

His parents were Calvinists in creed, and seemed to have maintained fully the domestic strictness of New England. The celebrated Dr. Emmons was the minister of his native town, and certainly the Calvinistic tenets were not softened as they were uttered from the pulpit. Mr. Mann, in an autobiographical passage, says:

“At ten years of age I became familiar with the whole creed, and knew all the arts of theological fence by which objections to it were wont to be parried. It might be that I accepted the doctrines too literally, or did not temper them with the proper qualifications; but in the way in which they came to my youthful mind, a certain number of souls were to be forever lost, and nothing—not powers, principalities, nor man, nor angel, nor Christ, nor the Holy Spirit—nay, not God himself, could save them; for he had sworn before time was, to get eternal glory out of their eternal torment. . . . The judgment had been made up and entered upon the eternal record millions of years before we, who were judged by it, had been born: and there sat the Omnipotent upon His throne, with eyes and heart of stone, to guard it; and had all the beings in all the universe gathered themselves before him to implore but the erasure of a single name from the list of the doomed, their prayers would have been in vain. . . . The consequences upon my mind and happiness were disastrous in the extreme. . . . I remained in this condition of mind till I was twelve years of age. I remember the day, the hour, the place, the circumstances, as well as though the event had happened but yesterday, when, in an agony of despair, I broke the spell that had bound me. From that day I began to construct the theory of Christian ethics and doctrine respecting virtue and vice, rewards and penalties, time and eternity, God and his providence, which, with such modifications as advancing age and a wider vision must impart, I still retain, and out of which my life has flowed.”

The particulars of this experience are given in the following reminiscence of a friend, as coming from Mr. Mann himself. It was at the funeral (conducted by Dr. Emmons) of a young brother who had been drowned.

“A crisis took place in his experience similar to that described in Mrs. H. B. Stowe's story of ‘The Minister's Wooing,’ when Mrs. Marien hears of her son James's death without knowing whether he was converted or not. His whole being rose up against the idea of such a cruel

Creator, and declared *hatred* to him. He would hate Infinite Malignity personified, if he must suffer eternally, in consequence . . . and deliberately, with all the tremendous force of his will, he chose to suffer with the lost, rather than make one with the selfish immortals who found happiness in witnessing torture."

He is quoted by his editor as saying: "If I believed in total depravity, I must of course believe in everlasting punishment; but I consider both unworthy of God." Yet, with an inconsistency of which we have no explanation, he says of himself in after life: "I have come round again to a belief in the eternity of rewards and punishments, as a fact necessarily resulting from the constitution of our nature!"

We are inclined to suppose that Mr. Mann has unconsciously transferred the matured creed and sentiments of after life to the period of childhood. He would be a very precocious boy of twelve who could formulate so precisely his objections to what he called Calvinism, and a very wicked one, in will at least, who could deliberately declare *hatred* to God, as "personified Malignity"! But whether to be accredited to his childhood or to his manhood, it determined his religious life; and his own account of it clearly illustrates the fatal narrow-mindedness and the excessive self-estimate which so deteriorate his character as to cause undoubted great possibilities to end in almost a failure.

The difficulty which pressed him was the old difficulty of reconciling God's sovereignty with man's free will. It is not peculiar to Calvinism, nor even to revealed religion, but inheres in every system of theism which assumes that God is infinite in his power, wisdom, and goodness, and that man is responsible for his moral acts. And, again, however true and important the doctrine of the eternity of future punishment, the belief of it is not made a necessary condition of salvation; while yet the creed which disowns it comes not up to the declaration of our Saviour in Matthew xxv. 46 and John iii. 36, and utterly fails to account for his humiliation and exceeding sufferings in Gethsamane and on Calvary, and is so far defective and harmful.

Yet to the mind of Mr. Mann, the solution in general of this inexplicable problem, and the unhesitating denial of a dogma connected with it, and held by the great majority of professing

Christians, seemed to be fundamental in doctrinal religion. His child's view of the question he makes the initial of the system which he undertook to "construct" concerning the momentous topics of Christian ethics and doctrine, virtue and vice, time and eternity, God and his providence. It does not seem to have occurred to him that he was, to any degree, relieved from the obligation to become an original *constructor* by the fact that a revelation had been already vouchsafed by God to man; or by the further consideration, that during many years, men of transcendent intellects, had given the profoundest thought to the subject. The audacity of his self-reliance and its logical worthlessness, are strikingly illustrated by the fact that, as we have seen, in after life he abandoned the basis of his system without changing the system itself. What was the precise religious system he "constructed," or what formulated creed he held, if any, is not easily gathered from his writings. Either he was reticent upon the subject or his biographer has seen fit to eliminate what might remove doubt upon the question. One element of his system is obtrusively obvious—antagonism to those he called *Orthodox*. This epithet, as used by him, is so indefinite that we are at a loss to know how far inclusive it is. We have seen that his own personal religion began in passionate hatred of the Calvinism, as he apprehended it, of Dr. Emmons; but it afterwards presented a much more extended front of antagonism. Whoever were his *Orthodox*, they were the objects of his lively animosity and perpetual invective. He says of one class of them: "That they are born orthodox; and if they had had wit enough, they would have invented orthodoxy, if Calvin had not. I never saw one of this class of men whom I could trust so long as a man could hold his breath."

To a suggestion that in a certain town, in order to avoid any charge of sectarianism (he was then at the head of the public schools), he might go to each of the several churches, Congregationalist, Baptist, and Methodist, he replied jestingly in form, but *ex animo*, that sooner than hear three orthodox sermons in one day, "I had rather be burned in —, at least a little!" Writing of the West, he says: "The Great West has been con-

quered, religiously speaking, from Black Hawk to John Calvin. So far as the religious dogmas are concerned, I would rather it would be Black Hawk's again."

As we have seen, the corner-stone of the religion he undertook to *construct* was the characteristic tenet of the Universalists; but he arrayed himself with the Unitarians, and often appealed to them for support in his educational schemes. In one of his letters he says: "Think of the great State (Ohio) with more than two million of inhabitants and only one Unitarian Society! The Christians are, however, the best medium through which to introduce a more liberal Christianity." This latter sentence demands attention. By "the Christians" Mr. Mann does not mean to include all commonly so called; but he designates a particular denomination of believers who have assumed the generic term as their peculiar name. This Church, though small and not influential, owned and controlled Antioch College when Mr. Mann became President. The differential tenets of the *Christian* denomination it is not necessary here to signalise. It is sufficient to say that it differed as really, though not as widely, from Unitarianism as it did from Orthodoxy, as generally understood. But to this Church he a Universalist, Unitarian, and rejector of revelation, united himself as a member. It is fair to give his own qualifying account of the transaction. "Last Sunday Mrs. M——, R——, and I joined the Christian Church. We thought our influence for good over the students would be increased. We had no ceremony of baptism: we subscribed no creed. We assented to taking the Bible for 'the man of our counsel,' as it was expressed, with the liberty of interpretation for ourselves; and we acknowledged Christian character to be the only true test of fellowship. This is all."

This generality may have satisfied Mr. Mann's view of candor; but it is certain that the society which received him entertained, if not at the time of his admission, very shortly afterwards, views not so latitudinarian. Mr. Mann's theology became a matter of suspicion to the "*Christian*" denomination, and he declined to allow himself to be held to account for his views "respecting the agency of the Holy Spirit in the conversion of men, respecting the

Atonement, the Resurrection, etc." This led Theodore Parker to charge him with having concealed from the leading members of the "Christian" sect his differences of opinion from them. We have a much better opinion of the integrity of Mr. Mann than of that of Theodore Parker, and much more respect for his memory. We will not therefore affirm that there was intentional deception in his act of joining the "Christian" Church. But in a wider view there was a duplicity, of which he furnishes himself the proof, apparently unconscious of any moral obliquity.

He avers, in the paragraph quoted above, that his motive in joining the "Christian" Church was that thereby he hoped to exercise more influence over the students. Whether this was a legitimate motive for the act we will not inquire. But what was his object in taking control of Antioch College? Publicly he says, and his biographer states the same thing, that it was to inaugurate a system of *non-sectarian, undenominational* education; and further asserts that the Unitarians of New York contributed twenty-five thousand dollars to the College then under the control of the "Christian" denomination, upon the explicit pledge that its sectarian character should be abandoned. But what does Mr. Mann cover up under the negative term *non-sectarian*? Writing to the Rev. Daniel Austin (Unitarian) he says:

"I wish you knew more of our Institution here and of our plans. In all this Great West, ours is the only Institution of a first-class character which is not directly or indirectly under the influence of the Old School Theology; and though the mass of the people here are more liberal-minded and free-thoughted—more open and receptive, and less *cast-irony* than the corresponding class in the East, yet the ministers are more narrow and bigoted. Our College, therefore, is really like breaking a hole in the Chinese Wall. It lets in the light of religious civilisation where it never shone before. Think of this great State, with more than two millions of inhabitants, and only one Unitarian Society! The *Christians*, however, are the best medium through which to introduce a more liberal Christianity."

Liberal Christianity in the mouth of a Unitarian means *Unitarianism*. Thus Mr. Mann was solemnly connecting himself with the "Christian" denomination when distinctly to himself his great object was, through this readiest medium, to introduce Unitarians

to the overthrow of all other denominations, that of the "Christians" included!

Was he the person to proclaim that "no Orthodox minister was to be trusted longer than a man can hold his breath?" The biographer seeks to avoid the charge of Theodore Parker by asserting that when he wrote his criminative letter, "he was so enfeebled in mind by illness as to be scarcely responsible." It is within the competency of an only moderate intellect and of a conscience only tolerably enlightened to pass judgment upon such Jesuitry. A system of religion constructed even by a child ten years old could hardly be so crude as not to condemn such paltering with sincerity. Certainly the Calvinism of his parents, from which Mr. Mann revolted, would not have tolerated it. Certainly it would have been more in harmony with the Black Hawk theology which he grieved to see superseded by Calvinism!

Want of space forbids a more extended notice of Mr. Mann's religious system and career. But, for the purpose in hand, enough has been said. Surely the man who adopted Unitarianism, which, to say no more against it, is confessedly negative, sapless, and utterly uninfluential upon the history of mankind; who rejected the Bible because he could not fathom it, and took up a child-constructed religion in place of the Christianity revealed by God, which overthrew the Paganism and conquered the philosophy of Greece and Rome, that dispersed the millennial darkness of the Middle Ages, that planted Europe with power, that is at this hour the acknowledged source of civilisation, liberty, learning, morality, and religion throughout Christendom, and is diffusing the same blessings to the ends of the earth—surely the man who did this, was narrow-minded, of short vision, and incapable of comprehending the meaning and the relative importance of the facts in the midst of which he was living and acting!

Yet something more must be said briefly about his philosophy, if, indeed, we can separate his philosophy from his religion; for he manifestly inclined, after discarding the religion of revelation, to substitute the religion of man, or philosophy so called, in its stead. And as he rejected revelation because he could not fathom its depths, he would be sure to take up with a philosophy which

did not soar above his reach. Such a philosophy he found in *Phrenology*! And he embraced it with an ardor which, as the world now regards that pseudo-science, seems contemptible. He says of Mr. Combe's work, "The Constitution of Man": "Its doctrine I believe will work the same change in metaphysical science that Lord Bacon wrought in natural." And again, in writing to the author himself: "There can be but one discovery of the circulation of the blood, or of the solar system, or of the identity of electricity and lightning; and so there can be but one author of 'The Constitution of Man.' We or others may apply its principles to facts and to near combination of facts, but the great discoverer must stand unequalled by himself or by others. Your applications of the subject to criminal legislation, jurisprudence, etc., will in time, I have no doubt, work revolutions in those departments." In another place he says: "Mr. Combe is, on the whole, the completest philosopher I have ever known. He comprehends how he was made and why he was made, and he acts as the laws of his nature indicate." Nor does Mr. Mann hesitate to utilise his supreme philosophy; of merely speculative philosophy he has no notion. Thus we find him giving a very dogmatic estimate of Gen. Harrison, based mainly upon the following inventory of his phrenological developments: "He has no predominant self-esteem or love of approbation. These organs are small. Combativeness is also small. Alimentiveness and acquisitiveness are almost wanting. The moral region is tolerably developed; but this absence of the great mischief-working propensities gives it fair play. This is the key to his character and history."

We are not surprised, therefore, to hear him express great admiration for a *sermon* based on Phrenology, nor to find that he is ready to believe in animal magnetism, and suggesting that the battery (electric) in a man's brain might overcome the natural gravitation of a table. Indeed, Mr. Mann seemed to have a natural susceptibility for all contagious fanaticism, and was not by any means discriminating in his fervor. His denunciation of the use of tobacco is as fierce as of intemperance, and for himself he classed coffee and tea among the *delenda*. Holy City, Holy

Sepulchre, Holy Cross, were in his eyes equally worthy of a crusade. His ability to discriminate between what is first and second rate is manifested by a list of some of the men whom he held as heroes—Channing, Combe, Sumner, Kossuth, Pierce, Fay, Neal Dow, and some others of like uncelebrity.

Mr. Mann's longest and most faithful public service was in connexion with the Public Schools of Massachusetts. It would seem from his biographer's statement, (and we have not felt called on to examine any other documents for the purpose of either confirmation or correction,) that Mr. Mann is entitled to the credit of having infused new vigor into a system of public instruction that was in a lethargic condition at the time, and to have greatly extended the comprehension of its existing narrow limits. He aroused public sentiment in favor of Public Schools, secured for them legislative aid and oversight, established Normal Schools, held conventions and institutes of teachers, and by his speeches and writing so advanced the whole matter of popular instruction that he may fairly be called the father of the modern Common School System in Massachusetts. Let all this be so: we have no occasion to dispute any part of it. We only wish to point out in Mr. Mann in connexion with this, his most successful work, the same want of apprehending the just relations of things, the same tendency to regard as first rate what is secondary, the same overweening confidence in himself, and the same intolerance towards all who differed with him, especially the *Orthodox*.

It is natural and not inexcusable that men should have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of any pursuit to which they have devoted themselves with ardor. Unless we are mistaken, this tendency is notably conspicuous in the advocates of the free or public school system of education. They hold, in varying degrees, that the education of the intellect is the greatest need of man, and the greatest blessing, as bringing in its train all other blessings; and further, that all other systems of education are of little worth compared with that of organised, consolidated State education. The first of these exaggerations has its foundation in an inability to make a just comparison between things of first and things of secondary importance; and the second, in self-conceit

engendered by a certain measure of acknowledged success. Mr. Mann was just the person to appropriate in excess these two errors. He who could substitute "The Constitution of Man" for the Bible, and Combe's Philosophy for religion, would have no difficulty in believing that society might safely intrust its interests to universal education, with but little help from Law, and less from Divine Providence. Thus we hear him say: "The common school is the greatest discovery made by man; we repeat it: *the common school is the greatest discovery ever made by man.* Let the common school be expanded to its capabilities, let it be worked with the efficiency of which it is susceptible, and nine-tenths of the crimes in the penal code would become obsolete; the long catalogue of human ills would be abridged; men would walk more safely by day; every pillow would be more inviolable by night; property, life, and character would be held by a stronger tenure; all rational hopes, respecting the future, would be brightened." His biographer, writing under the inspiration of such sentiments, thinks that by the impulses of education, the colored race "bids fair to be the *superiors* and *instructors* of the white men of the South"!

In a letter to a *reverend* friend, Mr. Mann says: "I certainly agree with you, that schools will be found to be the way that God has chosen for the reformation of the world." The success of normal schools in Massachusetts, he predicts, "will be *an era in the welfare of mankind.*"

It would be easy, but it is needless, to multiply evidences of Mr. Mann's inordinate estimate of the importance of Common Schools, and his apparent unconsciousness of the existence of any other system of education worthy the name. His estimate of himself appears in his impatience of opposition, and his intolerance towards those whose views were contrary to his own, "the Orthodox" especially. Speaking of some article in *The New York Observer*, he says: "As for St. James's definition, 'Pure religion and undefiled is to visit the widows and fatherless in their affliction,' and that other definition, 'Do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God,' the Orthodox have quite outgrown these obsolete no-

tions, and have got a religion which can at once gratify their self-esteem and their destructiveness."

It is further noticeable that his educational methods were novelties, and what we are inclined to call radical, banishing from schools all corporal punishment, eliminating emulation as an incentive to study; the coeducation of the sexes and the mingling the two races in schools; and, what he calls non-sectarian education, but what, as we have seen, was in reality an education on the basis of Unitarianism, with some variations introduced by himself. In instruction he aimed at uniting "the drill of West Point with the conscience of the Normal Schools of Massachusetts." Whether the drill was to improve the conscience, or the conscience the drill, is not stated.

Mr. Mann served two terms in Congress, taking the place of John Quincy Adams, who had been stricken by paralysis while in his seat in the House. The Congressional career of Mr. Mann extended over somewhat more than four years, covering the exciting period of the election of Gen. Harrison and the culmination of the Slavery question. His character as an extreme abolitionist was the sole ground of his election to Congress; and during all his four years there, he devoted himself almost exclusively, and with all the ardor of his nature, to the anti-slavery contest. Following the fatal tendency of his mind, he believed that this question ought to dominate all others, actual or possible. He says: "I will never yield to the claim to carry Slavery into the Territories, come what will. I should prefer dissolution (of the Union) even, terrible as it would be, to Slavery extension." He would not support Gen. Taylor, "because he had been nominated by the combined force of Slavery and War." He would not attend the Congressional funeral of Mr. Calhoun. The passage of the bill to make operative the requirement of the Constitution touching the rendition of fugitives from service, he styled "an infernal day's work." He adopts, of course, the "higher law" morality, and writes to Theodore Parker to furnish him with "heathen and pagan authorities in favor of it." He avows that the importance of education (that "greatest discovery ever made by man") subsides in his view before abolition. Of the

South and Southwest he says: "Christianity is nineteen hundred years distant from them." Perhaps a *sub-audition* against his *Orthodoxy* is discernible here. Mr. Mann was not only bigoted in his opinions, but acrimonious and vindictive in his animosities. Not to refer to his comments upon men of lesser note, he says: "Cass as a Democrat, and Clay as a Whig, had offered to immolate Freedom to win the South. Webster must do more than either, or abandon hope. He consented to treachery; and to make his reward sure, proposed to do more villainies than were asked of him."

With an unfortunate overestimate of his own powers, Mr. Mann seems to have felt called on to be the leader of the abolition attacks upon the great Massachusetts senator. He did this most prominently by a letter addressed to his constituents. In one place he expresses his regret that he had not had the opportunity to do so in a speech. His letter, which it would seem was vituperative as well as antagonistic, arrayed against him, according to his own account, all the supporters of Mr. Webster, constituting pretty much all the intelligence and influence of the State. He represents the whole Webster party as combining to defeat his nomination for a second term in Congress; "and in order to bring the *odium theologicum* to crush me [we quote to show here his own anti-orthodox *odium*] an evangelical was taken as my opponent." If so, he had reason to be proud of a signal victory; for he offered himself as an un-nominated independent candidate, and stumping the State, a thing at that time unusual in Massachusetts, he was re-elected by a handsome majority. This success in no wise, so far as we see, mitigated his animosity against Mr. Webster, which he allowed himself to express in such terms as "apostate," "Lucifer," "fallen star," "fit only to mingle with mules and apes." "as corrupt a politician as ever lived," "intellect without morality." "Webster has debauched the country, not only on the subject of Slavery, but as to all decency and truth."

This exceeds the usual virulence of politicians, or even of the old-time abolitionists. What acerbated the feelings of Mr. Mann, we learn from a side-light casually let in. In a letter to Mr. Combe he says, "When I returned to Washington, Webster *cut*

me. In a letter written to some citizens, he put in the most arrogant *sneer* that his talent could devise." In replying to a friend who seems to have regarded his utterances as unjustifiably severe, he says in bitterness, or, to use a still harder term, vindictiveness: "My references to Webster, compared with his contemptuous and supercilious manner to me, were as honey to vitriol." Mr. Mann had misconceived the relative importance of things, when he proposed himself as a match for Mr. Webster; and to be treated as insignificant, was to his self-esteem a sting harder to endure than would have been a crushing political buffet.

In 1852, the Free Soil party nominated him for Governor; he failed to be elected; and having been invited to the presidency of Antioch College, he abandoned his political career and returned to his educational work. Why he left Massachusetts does not appear. What were his purposes and real motives in undertaking this scheme we have already seen. It was to introduce in the West education of a high grade, conducted on principles called by him unsectarian, but which were in fact advanced Unitarianism; and this, as we have also seen, through a college belonging to a sect distinctly different.

This he was not able at that time to accomplish; but, says his biographer, "It may be done now. The ground has been broken for the Unitarians. Let them hang out their banner. It is not yet too late to enlist the enthusiasm of many who personally knew the spirit in which Mr. Mann worked upon the *underpinnings*."

We have already expressed our view on this matter; but we cannot withhold our admiration for the industry, courage, and self-denial with which he wrought. All his labors were sacrifices, but he never yielded to weariness any more than he was discouraged by difficulties, or daunted by opposition. But he had, as was usual with him, underestimated the obstacles in his way, and overestimated his own ability. Religious antagonisms, dissensions in the Faculty, the crudeness of his material, untried schemes (as the coeducation of the sexes and of the different races), and above all, insufficiency of funds, involved him in a struggle in which he was steadily growing weaker. He saw this, and others

saw it. Others yielded, but he would not yield. The more inextricable became his embarrassments, the severer were his efforts. He stood at his forlorn post, despairing but undismayed, until, after six years, death relieved him.

Nothing more commends itself to all men than true courage. Even when ill-directed and ill-inspired, it separates itself from the object and the motive, and for itself attracts admiration. Horace Mann was brave. From his initial struggle with poverty, through his course as a lawyer, temperance advocate, abolitionist, State legislator, Congressman, and President of Antioch College, he never flinched nor blenched. His courage did not fail him in the trial of death, if that solemn scene has been truthfully reproduced by his biographer. After a period of extraordinary labor and excitement, he came in an exhausted condition to preside over the Commencement exercises of his College. The festivities of the day lasted twelve hours, ending with a crowded levée at the house of the President. A fearful reaction in his system ensued. Burning fever raged for weeks, depriving him of sleep; but only for three days was he a prisoner in his apartment. When he was informed that he had not more than three hours to live, he replied: “‘I do not feel it to be so, but if it is so, I have something to say. Send for B——’” (a student who had given much anxiety). “To this young friend and others of the students he spoke earnestly for two hours, pouring forth his great soul in inspired words.” Of this address his biographer has given no record. He again and again uttered the words, “*Man, Duty, God;*” words of great import, and comprehending all that is of supreme final importance. But the value of them to every mortal closing his career, depends upon their adjustment in proper relations. And this adjustment is not the work of man, nor discoverable by the reason of man, but is given in the ministry and mystery of reconciliation received by faith, “to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.” Mr. Mann’s only recorded mention of the name of Christ is, that he said to his children: “When you wish to know what to do, ask yourselves what Christ would have done in the same circumstances.” How much faith

in the Redeemer this implied, we cannot know. Let us hope, enough to save. But this much, without any breach of the tenderest charity, we may say: that we do not find here, nay, we mourn the absence of that light and warmth which has so often been shed around the dying bed of many an humble-hearted believer, who, as a little child, has received the kingdom of heaven.

It is to our purpose to remark, and thus in closing this article to signalise its intended moral: that the death of Mr. Mann was in accord with his life. We have seen how in his early youth he turned away from the Light of the world, and ventured with deliberate hardihood to be his own guide. Never, from that moment, was he able to perceive the highest truth. With elevated purposes, great abilities, unusual opportunities, and often apparently on the verge of success, his disappointments were renewed, one after another his plans were frustrated, until a life of incompleteness was terminated by an unirradiated death.

J. T. L. PRESTON.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin.
By the Rev. J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. Translated by
William L. R. Cates. Vol. VIII. Hungary, Poland, Bohemia,
Netherlands, Geneva, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. New York:
Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1879. Pp. 464,
12mo.

This is the eighth and concluding volume of this great work. There was a previous History of the Reformation by D'Aubigné, which he entitled as *of the Sixteenth Century*, and which extended through five volumes. The work now finished he called by the name of *The History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin*, and it runs through eight volumes. The whole History covers thirteen volumes, ten of which the author himself published, and three are posthumous. His labors as their author commenced, it seems, in 1817, "immediately after his ordination to the ministry," and continued almost uninterruptedly down to 1872. He conceived the idea of becoming a historian of the Reformation when visiting Germany in the first named year for the purpose of perfecting his theological studies. That year was the tercentenary of the Reformation begun by Luther, and Germany was in a ferment and the Reformer's name on every tongue. The young Genevese sketched, Nov. 23, 1817, the plan of his work, and devoted his life to its accomplishment, dying when he had nearly finished his eightieth year. Two more years, the editor tells us, he required to finish his great undertaking, but they were denied him.

The consequence is that we have an incomplete history of the Reformation, and the parts omitted are precisely those which we should have most earnestly desired not to have been left unwritten. We cannot agree with the editor that "everything that is essential to the history of the Reformation is narrated in these thirteen volumes." The most important part of the History of the Reformation in the time of Calvin is the part which Calvin acted, and

that we have not here in full. The history breaks off long before that Reformer's death. Nor is there any account given of the struggle betwixt Calvin and Servetus. It is much to be regretted that D'Aubigné was not led to devote his attention to a complete presentation of the great Genevese in every part of his history, from the beginning of it to its very end—for it is he who constitutes beyond all comparison the most interesting actor in the whole drama; and it is especially to be regretted that the author did not give us at least one long and complete chapter to clear up the proceedings held in the case of Servetus.

The volume before us presents a curious and awkward blunder on its title page. There we read that it relates to Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, Netherlands, Geneva, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. But there is nothing about these countries in this volume. Denmark, Sweden, Norway are treated in Book XII., and Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, Netherlands, in Book XIII. But this volume contains Books XIV., XV., and XVI., the first treating of Spain, the second of England, and the third of Germany.

Of course the most interesting to us is Book XV. about England. It consists of eleven chapters. A considerable portion of these is taken up with the terrible, and we must add the most sorrowful, history of Henry the Eighth and his four last wives. Jane Seymour, mother of Edward VI., dies; Anne of Cleves is divorced, as was Henry's first wife; Catharine Howard was beheaded, as was his second wife; and Catharine Parr barely escapes the same fate and survives the King. Of the six queens two were Roman Catholics and four Protestants, and doubtless political and sectarian intrigues have had much to do with the pictures history has drawn of them all. D'Aubigné condemns Henry "as a man for his treatment of his wives, especially of Anne Boleyn." We certainly will not defend him absolutely, but it is our opinion that there is some excuse for Henry in all these affairs. He had great faults as a man and a monarch, but it was his lot to stand between very embittered opponents, and we have no idea that justice is done him by writers in general. It was also his lot to occupy a throne respecting the succession to which it was of the utmost importance to England and to Europe that

there should be no doubt. It is the noble task of enlightened, patient, industrious, candid, modern history to investigate the records of the past, sometimes intensifying our hatred and contempt for base and wicked conduct, but sometimes also redeeming in whole or in part a reputation which has been unduly blackened.

J. B. A.

The Reign of God Not the Reign of Law. By the Rev. THOMAS SCOTT BACON, Rector of the Episcopal church, Oakland, Md. Turnbull Bros., Baltimore. 1878. Pp. 400, 12mo.

The title of this work discloses its origin in a protest against the Duke of Argyle's "Reign of Law." The problem of this was to show how prayer could be answered and miracles wrought, consistently with that universal and immutable prevalence of natural law asserted by modern science. Mr. Bacon's dissatisfaction with the Duke's solution may be summed up in this word: that no such reign of natural law should be admitted by the believer, but we should squarely deny that term of the theorem, and assert instead the mediæval Scholastic or Thomist and modern Cartesian theory of the universe. This is the only reign of law which Mr. Bacon thinks the Bible admits, and the only kind he will hear of. He does not believe that there are, properly speaking, any such things as "second causes," except rational creature-wills; the rest are only effects. God is the only, "the incessant, the immediate agent" of all changes in the physical universe. There is literally no force and no power except his will; and this will, while dictating law to created wills, is so far from having any regulative law that he is unwilling even to say that it is regulated by God's own rational and moral perfections. His statement is, that the divine will is not regulated by wisdom or love, but *is love*. And he is convinced that none of us can save the doctrines of supernatural creation, miracles, special providence, or prayer, on any other ground.

The well-informed reader will see at a glance that the author, while in the main on the right side, is a logical extremist. He is vigorous, extensively read in some departments, dogmatic, perspicuous, and in true and pious earnest. As against the ration-

alistic theory of a providence, which is merely the original construction and general superintendence of Nature as an automatic machine, self-regulating under the dominion of invariable physical laws, he gives us a capital, and in some respects an original demonstration. In a sense, his protest is timely, for there is a strain in this noted book, the "Reign of Law," which demands vigorous correction. It is that suggested by the title. It seems to concede to the sceptical physicist that *law reigns*, whereas all intelligent Christians hold that it *does not reign*; being itself, as it is physical, unintelligent and dependent. It is God that reigns in and through physical laws, just so far as he pleases to uphold their regularity. The capital error of the Duke of Argyle is that he seems to concede the universality and immutability of physical law as an initial postulate. Whereas it is the very point to which he should have held the assailant, to prove that postulate which human knowledge never can prove. Many old truths are tersely and powerfully stated by Mr. Bacon, and some are set in a new and advantageous light. Thus: such a doctrine of "reign of law" must be sustained on a theological rather than a physical demonstration (Chap. III.), because physics are properly only the science of the phenomenal. But such a law, if demonstrated, must be shown to be the exclusive and radical solution of the phenomena. But, to any except atheists, the hypothesis that God's will is that solution must always be tenable and probable, unless the place can be shown in his word where he disclaims it. So, page 207, he gratifies the friends of truth by a powerful statement of the real rationalism (or virtual infidelity) of that claim so often made by physicists, that the meaning of Scripture must await its exegesis from scientific results. "It needs but a little reflection to see, that if a 'word of God' is to be construed, without regard to its apparent meaning, by something outside of itself, the real authority is in this 'supreme court' of construction, whatever it may be." Page 198 he exposes the arrogance and folly of the current, often tacit, assumption: that "of the two related factors (of human knowledge) there, Holy Scripture is the variable, science the constant." He shows that this assumption is a virtual rejection of all revelation. Chapter X. gives us a

telling *argumentum ad hominem* against the unbelieving advocate of the automatic theory of natural law. It fancies that it has excluded God's providence and interposition. But here are millions of creature-wills tampering with the machine, in little, teasing, disturbing ways. Mankind are forever making intrusions into the workings of nature, small individually, but inevitable in ultimate effect. The more complicated, nicely adjusted, and automatic the great machine, the more certainly these perpetual little meddlings must break it down, just as the great Strasburg Clock must be ruined by the wilful child who should insist on dribbling little pebbles between its accurately polished wheels; and all the more certainly ruined by reason of its complication and accuracy.

The list of our exceptions against the ultraisms of our author may begin as conveniently at this tenth chapter as elsewhere. Man's thorough free agency is obviously the premise of the ingenious argument just stated. Not content with asserting free agency, the author must needs also assert for man "free will," and then misrepresent and attempt to vilify "Calvinism," which he imputes, with very little justice we suspect, to the Duke of Argyle. He thinks it fosters a "rigid and unspiritual temper of mind," etc. The only "rigid" things history has really found fostered by true Calvinism are "rigid" logic, a quality by which the author would be greatly profited, and "rigid" principles of duty, which we sincerely trust he possesses. Did he understand either the logic or history of Calvinism, he would know that its main characteristic has been to foster just that devout, gracious, and spiritual type of piety which he professes to admire; and that of this, Augustine whom he claims, Calvin, whom he only remembers, of course, as the burner of Servetus, and the noblest names in the Anglican Church, from her first reformers down to Scott and Ryle, were eminent types. Mr. Bacon has himself subscribed the Thirty-nine Articles. We do not intend to permit any such attack on Calvinism from that quarter to pass, without testifying to its flagrant inconsistency, from the well known fact that this Episcopalian symbol is precisely as Calvinistic (even in the sense of being guided by the individual views

of John Calvin) as any of the other symbols of the Reformed Churches. And with all well-informed readers the attempt to deny this would only illustrate the impugner's ignorance of history the more.

Had Mr. Bacon's knowledge whereof he affirmed been greater, he would have been aware that his special theory of God's relation to creatures in providence is *precisely the Thomist*; and that all the adequate thinkers on both sides of the debate, whether Dominican, Augustinian, Scotist, Molinist, Genevan, or Arminian, saw that this Thomist theory, true or false, can be made to fit only with the most rigid and extreme form of what is now called Calvinism. One simple view should be enough to evince this: The Thomist view makes God the only real agent, in the true, efficient sense, in the universe. If that agent is immutable in will and infinite in knowledge, then inevitably his decree necessitates everything that happens in the universe. If Mr. Bacon were consistent, he would "outherod Herod" among the Predestinarians he dislikes.

No correct mind will demur to his definition of "law" as, strictly, a rule imposed by a superior will on a subject will, and thus implying personality and intelligence in both its related parts. But our author objects also to using the phrase "law of nature" even in the secondary sense, whose justice he admits as expressing only *the regular method of a power* in nature. We find that in this sense we need that or some equivalent term to express a general fact. The power exhibited in nature (or as Mr. Bacon would have us say, in created things), *manifestly has a regular method*. All may safely admit this. But what is the power whose "law" or regular method we observe? Mr. Bacon answers, with Thomas Aquinas, Des Cartes, Malebranche, Dugald Stewart, nothing but God's direct, immediate power. He "does everything in 'nature' as immediately as when he said, 'Let there be light.'" P. 102. And this he thinks to be the unmistakable teaching of "thousands" of scriptures, while God's creating or governing any real "second causes" at all (except creature-wills) is taught in not a single one. When we examine his texts, we find that they teach what every consistent Christian

believes—a universal special providence; God's "upholding and governing all his creatures and all their actions." But we find none which teach that there are no such things in God's creation and government as veritable second causes, truly possessed, from him, and under him, of power in their subordinate place. We find the opposite. Gen. i. 11: God "made the fruit-tree yielding fruit *after his kind*." Mr. Bacon thinks there is no generic cause whatever in the trees: only successive acts of immediate divine will. In God's "covenant of the day and the night" (Jer. xxxiii. 20), which cannot be broken, he sees no astronomical law at all. He does not think that in Jer. v. 22, when God "placed the sand for the bound of the sea by a perpetual decree," there is any real restraining force in the sea-beach itself to contain the waves, but that the beach is only a sort of deceiving screen to hide God's hand. In Daniel iii. 27, we are told that the fire had "no power" on the bodies of Shadrach, etc., by reason of a miraculous hindrance, although it slew the guards who cast them in. This would look, to a plain mind, as though God had given to fire a natural power to burn. But Mr. Bacon thinks not; the only power is God's, "as immediate as when he said, Let there be light." So in the "mighty wind," the "mighty waves of the sea," the "rushing of mighty waters," the "power of the sword," he sees none of that natural power which to the plain reader of the Bible is so obvious; he sees only "God's immediate will," over which these physical objects are but delusive masks.

This suggests the objection from reason against the Thomist doctrine: that it contradicts the testimony of our senses and common sense. These tell us that second causes are not *simulacra* of causation, but are endued (by and under God) with real power. Should we thrust a hand into the fire, it would be impossible for us to avoid the conviction that the fire hurt us; we should never learn that the fire was a delusion and it was God alone who really hurt us. Again, we perceive in all material things certain essential attributes, and these our reason judges to be potentially powers, not shams. If our perception of essential attributes is not trustworthy, then we can still less know the *esse* of material things, for the knowledge of the *essentia* is in order to that of the

esse. Thus this Thomist doctrine is not far off from idealism. Yea, it leads to it by a still more direct road. If the real efficiency in all second causes is only from God, why should Mr. Bacon except this class of second causes which seems to operate on our organs in sense-perception? Consistently he cannot. Then, when a horse in the highway seems to impress my sense of sight, it is not really the horse, but the Almighty, who immediately effects this impression. Then I have no evidence whatever, from this impression, that the horse exists. I know only the *ego* and God! The objective world has become wholly unreal! The remaining step is most natural. Ought not the seeming subjective modifications in consciousness also to be referred to that same sole efficient? Why not? Why should the *ego* be more stubborn about yielding up its reality than the objective, when one is as valid to common sense as the other? Thus we have nothing left but *pantheism*. The step from Des Cartes to Spinoza is much easier and more natural than Mr. Bacon admits. Indeed, to go back to his own doctrine, if God is the only real agent and second causes are the mere phenomenal modes of his one, immediate agency, then it is most reasonable to say also that the $\Pi\alpha\nu\text{-}\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ is the only real being, and all seeming beings are but phenomenal modes of his existence.

If the author will study these deductions, he will see that the Duke of Argyle had reason, when he assumed that second causes are real, subordinate causes; that God has been pleased to deposit in them potentialities which are, under proper conditions, real; and through which he conducts his special providence, which is his ordinary and general providence. For we agree with Mr. Bacon that all providence is special. That it is not necessary to impeach this philosophy of common sense and Scripture in order to uphold God's special providence, sovereignty, and answers to prayer, may be made plain to Mr. Bacon thus: he admits that free agency ("free will" he calls it) is real; that the human soul is not a mere puppet; and yet he believes that God's providence over men is as real and efficient as over material masses. Why then should he deny that material causes may be real second causes also, and yet equally manipulated by this sovereign providence?

In his fourth chapter, he makes an assault on natural theology, which seems unessential to his main thesis, as well as extreme. He thinks that men are not *convinced* of the existence of God, but *told* of it; that the latter is the way they become theists. Told by whom? Adam and Moses, by God himself; we later mortals, by our parents and pastors. Now, unless this human testimony is authoritative and certain, it does not ground in us the truth that there is a God. Is this a squinting towards the prelatie theory of the Church and faith? Is it "holy mother Church" which is the source of my credence? Many parents and pastors also tell children many false things about fairies, ghosts, goblins, transubstantiation, purgatory. What is the difference between the child's conviction of these and of a God? The simple appeal of natural theology to reason and conscience, sustaining the testimony to the latter. Mr. Bacon admits that the Creator has fashioned human souls for the prompt recognition of his being. True. But when he sends only a fallible, human witness, that recognition must be rational in order to ground certainty; and that is natural theology.

R. L. D.

The Fletcher Prize Essay. The Light: Is it Waning? Why? How much? And what shall we do? Boston Congregational Society: Congregational House, Beacon Street.

It ought to be a sufficient recommendation of this admirable treatise, that the above-named prize was unanimously awarded to its lamented author, the Rev. A. F. Dickson, by competent judges of its intrinsic and comparative merits. Mr. Dickson was eminently qualified for the successful execution of the task he had undertaken. He was gifted with powers of analysis of an unusual order, which were like blades of well-tempered steel, and which were constantly sharpened by profound philosophic studies. He was an exact scholar, and kept fully abreast of the age in every department of learning connected with his profession. His mind seemed to be at once microscopic and telescopic, penetrating the heart of the matter with metaphysical subtlety, and looking before and after with a long range of vision. He decomposes the light into its original elements, separates its prismatic colors, and

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then determines the relative position and motions of the heavenly bodies. He knew the difference between fixed stars and planets.

The title of the treatise is striking, and suggestive of many a luminous illustration. The Church he views as a "Light Holder" that God has set, like the sun, in the firmament. The question he discusses is: Is the Light waning, which the "Church was brought into being to concentrate, to order, and radiate afar—the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ"? He shows, first, that the light may only seem to wane, when, in fact, it is waxing brighter. The entrance of gospel light is more dazzling than the most radiant period of its subsequent progress, just as the break of day kindles our admiration more than the blaze of noon. The power of contrast is gradually diminished as "Christianity transforms social, moral, and intellectual life" into her own image, reflecting much of her brightness. Infidelity no longer appears as a system of mere negations, but covers its nakedness with garments dyed in gospel colors, mouths the language, and imitates the gait of the Christian. Superstition, too, "borrows all its gilding from Christianity." In the eloquent language of the author, "We see Christianity, like a lofty light-tower, irradiating alike the waves of *infidelity* that beat upon her rocky base, the dank marsh of *superstition* that rolls up its poisonous mists against her light, and the *myriad* interests of Christendom that flit like freighted vessels over the sea of time."

But while the light is not actually waning, it is often obscured and eclipsed by prevalent evils incident to an age of universal shallowness and of outward religious activity. The historical Church, the divine light-bearer, holds on her way, like the sun amid the revolving seasons—light and darkness, drought and flood, summer and winter; but individual Christians are imperilled, succumbing to the sudden and severe atmospheric changes; their spiritual health declines, false witnesses abound, the keepers of the light-house tremble, and the gospel loses its saving power over the world. The light is obscured by the wide diffusion of mere information without knowledge, and consequent clouds of delusion and sophistry. The fixed stars of "standard truths"

are lost in the nebulous mist, and public opinion staggers in the uncertain haze, and many who once worshipped at the shrine of truth have joined the irreverent and mocking multitude. Then follows a general disregard for Church authority and discipline. The type of piety that is not rooted in sound doctrine and religious principle is merely emotional, and evaporates in sentimental cant; in superficial worship and superficial work—artificial unction and formal routine. Underlying it all are the smouldering fires of scepticism, the smoke whereof darkens the air, “blurring the spiritual vision, weakening the life, and throwing the haze of uncertainty over those precious things which every believer ought so to hold as loyally to die upon them.” Religion and morality are divorced, the Church and its worship are secularised. Such are the tokens “that the vitality of the Church is declining, her vows are losing their sacredness, her doctrines are less loyally loved and defended, her work more slightly done, her sincerity alloyed, and her purity tarnished, *by her own children*. None can so wrong her but they.”

What now is the remedy for these alarming evils? How shall we dispel the mists and fog and poisonous gases that obscure and intercept the light. “It is evident,” says our author, “that the root of our disease is *a weakened hold of vital truth*; and the remedy must be a recovery of *strong convictions* of mind, heart, and life. And I have indicated reasons for believing that the *special* defect in our present convictions regards Christ’s relations to law and duty, and that if through the grace of the Spirit he should become a living presence with his people in this regard, the age of power and glory would immediately be born.” He whose convictions centre in the person of a “Redeemer administering a law” will walk in the light as he is the light, and have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness. Consecration to Christ, our Saviour and Lord, will make our conviction a practical living reality.

But it is impossible to give in the narrow compass of this notice a complete analysis of a work so rich in matter. It is a treasury of profound and suggestive thought. The canvass is small, but the picture of the age is there, with all its lights and

shades—not a shadow or a color omitted. One must be a close observer and study the picture in detail to see all the delicate tints and touches. Mr. Dickson is a master of the art of expression and a charming word-painter. But his diction is never superfluous, and nothing is added for the sake of ornament. His style is always original, fresh, sprightly, often brilliant, and dazzling—full of the unction of a deep and fervent piety.

His book is popular neither in matter nor style, and yet the reader who cannot readily grasp the gist of the argument will be affected by truth and error only as a weather-cock that is the sport of every wind. His indifference or indolence are proof against all human eloquence.

If all our ministers would take up the themes here discussed and present them in a series of pulpit discourses, the design of the treatise would be in a great measure accomplished. Such preaching we believe would be timely and fruitful. G. R. B.

A Short Method with the Dipping Anti-Pedo-Baptists. In Three Parts, with Appendices. By REV. THOMAS GALLAHER, Presbyterian Minister, LaGrange, Missouri. St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company, 207 North Eighth Street. 1878. Pp. 340, 8vo.

The author of this treatise never heard but three sermons from Presbyterians on baptism, but scores and hundreds of *harangues* from Anti-Pedo-Baptists. He has seen intelligent and pious men and women of the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches sit in silence and bite their lips while Campbellites and Baptists from the pulpit, or in the social circle, were caricaturing sprinkling and infant baptism. Sometimes this silence was prompted by self-respect and respect for the company present, but far oftener because so little had been read and heard from their own ministers on the subject of baptism, that there was a consciousness of the want of due information about it; and because so much had been heard from the Dipping Anti-Pedo-Baptists, as to produce a thorough disgust with the whole Baptist controversy.

In the author's judgment, Presbyterians have stood on the defensive long enough. He claims to be as charitable and generous

as truth requires, but does not wish to be more than that. He declares that he will "carry the war into Africa," put the dippers on the defensive, silence their batteries, and spike their guns, if not convince and capture the whole force. And in doing this, he purposes to write for those who "never rubbed against college walls." But he will not, as his opponents generally expect, allow "assumptions," nor permit "underholds," nor yield any "start in the race" for the prize of victory.

"The Baptist System," or "the Baptist Theory," a phrase he frequently employs, is explained by him to signify the following or similar doctrines, which have been taught for a little more than two hundred years:

1. That "*Bapto*" and "*Baptidzo*" signify the same act; so that dipping is baptizing and baptizing is dipping.
2. That *Baptidzo* always means "dip, and nothing but dip through all Greek literature;" "the command to baptize is a command to dip."
3. That none but those dipped by the Baptist Church are worthy communicants.
4. That connexion with the visible Church is only by connexion with some Baptist congregation.
5. That all in the visible Church must necessarily be "true believers," and "certainly regenerate," so that we may have a "Church without sin."

This is what he calls the *distinctive* "Baptist System," which, as he is aware, is not all of it accepted for truth by very many Baptists. For Baptists, as a people, hold much evangelical truth in common with other Christians, and very frequently are found holding Calvinistic doctrine in common with Presbyterians. What he opposes, therefore, in his "Short Method," is the "distinctive and schismatical theory" detailed above. And yet he maintains that "the most fanatical of the Landmarkers are the only really consistent Baptists." The author "knows of no Baptist who is entirely consistent with his own principles"—"a far greater number are revolting from the inevitable conclusions of their own doctrines."

Mr. Gallaher hopes to see the time "when all the best and

ablest immersionists in our own country will occupy the position of Dr. Landels, Dr. Brock, and other English Baptists on this baptism question." And he thinks that the masses of Christian people in the Baptist churches in America are restless under the restraints (far more prevalent in America than England) of close communion. It is for this reason, he says, that there is such a constant "hammering at and patching up" their theory of baptism. "An intelligent young man, a Baptist, assured the writer some two years since, that from extensive acquaintance with the Baptists of Missouri, he felt satisfied that a large majority of the Baptist Church of this State were at heart in favor of open communion. That young man was, at the time, principal of one of the largest public schools in central Missouri. We do not know that his statement was correct. But we do know that Baptists never can consistently give up close communion while they adhere to their (exclusive) doctrines of baptism and the Church." He rejoices, however, in "the privilege of communing with as pious and godly a section of the Baptists as can be found on earth. Such men as John Bunyan, Baptist Noel, Robert Hall, and Charles H. Spurgeon, not to mention thousands of lesser lights, have been more than willing to meet Christian brethren not Baptists at the communion table."

We can only add that the work consists of three parts. The first discusses *What is Baptism?* in thirteen chapters. In these the question of the *mode* of baptism is considered. The second part takes up the *subjects* of baptism, and is divided into fourteen chapters. The part third deals with "Perversions of Fact and History by Anti-Pedo-Baptists." These occupy four chapters. The Appendices are ten in number, and they handle in an able and spirited manner a number of interesting and important points.

J. B. A.

St. Paul at Athens. Spiritual Christianity in relation to some Aspects of Modern Thought; being nine Sermons preached at St. Stephen's Church, Westbourne Park, by the Rev. CHARLES SHAKESPEARE, B. A., with a preface by the Rev. Canon FAR-RAR, D. D. 12mo, pp. 167, muslin. Chas. Scribner's Sons.

The author informs us that these sermons were designed for

those educated sceptics in his charge whose tendencies were agnostic. He says: "The fundamental idea of the sermons is, that the very existence of the spiritual faculty in man, so persistent and so vigorous, is ground of faith in a supersensuous reality corresponding to this faculty and creating it." The line of the discussion is sufficiently indicated by the titles of the sermons: "The City and the Apostle," "Culture and Faith," "Sensuous and Spiritual Religion," "Paganism and Christianity," "Philosophy and Christianity," "Ancient and Modern Scepticism," "The Epicureans," "The Stoics," "Humanity and God."

The characteristics of the book may be said to be, first, a fine and pleasing flavor of scholarship and classicality, with a clear and elegant style; second, a strangely studied attempt to disparage the Apostle's "culture" and to praise his faith at its expense; third, a tendency to sustain rather than to rebuke the accusations of cultured sceptics (not against Christianity but) against Christians; fourth, a theology so indefinite as not only to be Broad-Church, but to raise the doubt whether it be not virtually Pelagian; and last, a lack of steady logical grasp in dealing with the problem the author propounds to himself. As instances under the second classification, we note, page 23, the concession that "in Tarsus some chance seeds of Greek culture had fallen" on Paul's naturally ardent mind. On page 25, "He saw (in Athens) little more than the idolatry." On page 26, of the names of Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle, "he had probably just heard and no more." On page 31, "Of the history of Athens he knew but little." A fuller acquaintance with Paul's writings would teach the author that the Apostle had the most accurate knowledge of Greek philosophy and literature; and that his inspired wisdom in making the doctrines of Redemption always dominant is mistaken for a lack of acquaintance with a culture which he designedly relegated to the background.

The type of the author's view touching inspiration may be surmised from the two following citations. Of Paul's vision of the man of Macedonia saying, "Come over and help us," he gives the following version (page 16): "The thoughts which possessed

him shaped themselves into a vision of a man of the West," etc. Page 99, he deprecates the setting up of "the authority of an infallible Church or the dead letter of an infallible book in opposition to the advancement of learning and to the progress of science." Page 154, "Though we cannot reason out the existence of God, we can feel it." "And this consciousness of the divine *is revelation*, the unveiling of the heavenly light to the mind," etc. It is a favorite hypothesis of the author, that at Paul's day pagan philosophy "had become devout." It had assumed "spiritual, ethical, and practical aspects." The philosophic heart "was not devoid of some measure of the Spirit." The people "must have heard within the walls discourses addressed, like the Christian sermon, to the spiritual part of man, and resulting in the conversion from the evil to good." The Christianity which Mr. Shakspeare would defend against "culture" is clearly not that of Acts iv. 12 or Rom. x. 13, 14. R. L. D.

Voices from Babylon; or, the Records of Daniel the Prophet.
By JOSEPH A. SEISS, D. D., Pastor of the Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia, author of "A Miracle in Stone," "Last Times," "Lectures on the Gospels," etc. Porter & Coates: Philadelphia. 1879. Pp. 391, 12mo.

This volume contains fourteen Lectures on the Book of Daniel, followed by a critically revised translation of that book, with a list of authors consulted, and an Index to all the matters discussed. The revised translation is "principally the work of the author's friend and co-laborer, Rev. R. F. Weidner, A. M., whose special studies in ancient Oriental languages and Biblical criticism well qualify him" for such an undertaking.

It is not often in this book-making age that we encounter so sensible, judicious, and learned a production as this, which is yet so unpretentious and modest. It is not designed in this commendation to express approval of all the author's views of the meaning of Daniel's prophecies. But what is intended is to say that the reader will be apt to find nothing suggested that is not well worthy of respectful consideration, while he will discover plentiful evidence throughout the whole of the author's studious

research, sobriety and yet vigor of thought, and sound orthodoxy of doctrine. The style is highly attractive, without any affectation of meretricious ornament. There is perhaps no book of the season that is more suitable for family readings of a Sunday evening or to put into the hands of thoughtful intelligent youth.

There are many beautiful and impressive passages with which it would be pleasant to adorn these pages. There is room to quote only two that will give the reader some idea of the author's way of thinking and writing.

“Though multitudes believe and preach that the age in which we live is the most glorious and hopeful that was ever known, and consider that we are now on the very threshold of a grand jubilee of universal intelligence, brotherhood, and liberty for all men, in which the golden dreams of so many ages are about to be fulfilled in the onward flow of human improvement and progress, it is in the very principles and foundations on which all this is hoped and prognosticated that I see the coming of the Antichrist. If men would only sift it to the real elements of which it is made up, they could not fail to detect in it the very spirit out of which the divinely-predicted Man of Sin must come.

“If men will look at what is most lauded and gloried in as the intellectual greatness of our times, they will find it summed up in a vaunting materialism which finds its life and crown in inspections and manipulations of the lower elements till it has come to be concluded in leading circles that everything is derivable from slime without a personal God or need of revelations from him. This is the spirit of the prevailing philosophies; of the popular theories of education, politics, and legislation; of the noisy reforms which propose to do away with human ills without the word and ordinances of Jehovah; and of many of the most favored religious activities which boast of having outgrown the ancient creeds and are eating away the vital substance of all sound doctrine. We have only to dig down into the inner kernel of modern thought and feeling in order to find lodged there, in one form or another, and more or less swaying the whole spirit of the age, a doctrine which enthrones, adores, and worships *Progress* as the great hope of the world, holds man to be an ever-improving growth, and practically accepts evolution as the bringer in of a glorious reign of wisdom, peace, and blessedness yet to come in this present world, without need of any kingdom to be brought to us from the heavens, or any changes by the miraculous power of God. This is the sum of the teachings of scientists, of the theories of government and law, and of the popular theologies. Even the faith held by most professed Christians is but the aggregate of changeable and growing sentiments, ever throwing off the old and putting on the new, rather than

the fixed literal revelations of God, which are the same for all ages alike. In other words, the heart, pulse, and ruling ideas of our times, exhibit all the indications of that very apostasy or 'falling away' which Paul fore-announced as the forerunner, beginning, spirit, and cause of the Man of Sin and his disastrous revelation. The seed is planted and growing, and meets in our age a congenial season for rapid development and speedy maturity.

"Accordingly also we, everywhere and in all circles and teachings, hear about *The Coming Man*. The idea is treated somewhat jestingly, but it is not a mere fancy, myth, or play on words. It expresses something which is inlaid in the theories and principles which in one shape or another are governing the thinking and the expectations of the great mass of the most active and potent existing minds. The feeling and constant implication in the noisiest as well as the most subtle of modern demonstrations, is that nothing is settled; that the great problems of human life, including society, government, philosophy, and religion, all yet remain to be solved; that what has hitherto been taken as final authority is not final and is no authority at all; that there remains to be wrought out a thorough reconstruction in all earthly affairs on other foundations than those which have served mankind in past ages; and that there must come a new order of the social fabric, with new regulating forces, exhibiting another style of man in all the relations of life. And as things now go, what the majority ordains and determines will be. But when that Coming Man who is thus developing, comes, he can be none other than this very MAN OF SIN, the Lawless One, the Antichrist, foreseen and foretold by the holy prophets; for the final concentrated maturity of human progress, cut loose from the time-honored laws and institutes of Jehovah, is the Antichrist. And with this manifest and inevitable tendency of things before our eyes, and the accepted thinkers of the world, including many amongst the most influential in the professed Church of God, abetting the conceit as man's great hope, ignoring the proper Christ of our salvation and virtually denying both the Father and the Son by the philosophies they entertain, what is it that we see but the preparing of the way for the Antichrist and the manifest token of the nearness of his revelation?" Pp. 297-300.

Another specimen :

"What then is to be understood by this fifth or Stone Kingdom? Alas that there should be any difficulty or diversity on this the chief and culminating portion of this imperial vision! But great and wide diversity there is, and hence also a vast amount of unsound and erroneous teaching among expositors.

"Some say that this stone kingdom is the United States! A learned professor of a theological seminary, lately deceased, has confidently given out that, in his judgment, 'there is no possibility of evading the force of

the argument which identifies the stone kingdom with the great republic of North America! With equal conclusiveness he might have said that it is the empire of Russia or the republic of Liberia. Our government is not a kingdom at all, in any proper sense of that word. Neither was it set up by the God of heaven any more than was Babylon, Persia, or Greece, or Rome, or any other sovereignty that has existed, if we except that of Israel. It has existed one hundred years, and yet it never fell upon the toes of the great image, as explained by Daniel, nor shattered or destroyed any kingdom on earth, nor showed capacity for crushing out all other governments. It is not able to govern any one of its own great cities with decent respectability, and how is it to take the rule of the whole earth? It is itself compounded of the miry clay and iron of the toes of that image which the stone is to dash to atoms; and how can it be the stone which does this crushing? So far from being cut out of the mountain without hands, human governments planted and fostered its colonies, and revolution and the power of human arms and passions wrought it into an independent nationality. From the common clay of humanity, by the common processes in the formation of governments, it has come into being, and every year only makes it the plainer that the forces of decay and dissolution are rapidly gaining on the forces of self-perpetuation. Instead of having in it the elements of inalienability and eternity, the power is continually passing from the sovereigns of to-day to other people. Where are the Presidents, representatives, and voters of one hundred years ago? There is also every intimation of the ordinary mortality in whatever characterises our government. Indeed, there is not one feature in all the prophetic description but is contradicted by this notion. I say *notion*, for an interpretation it is not." J. B. A.

1. *Eventide at Bethel*. By J. R. MACDUFF, D. D., Author of "Mind and Words of Jesus," "Footsteps of St. Paul," etc., etc. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1879. Pp. 277, 12mo.
2. *Wells of Baca; or, Solaces of the Christian Mourner and Other Thoughts on Bereavement*. By J. R. MACDUFF, D. D., Author of "Morning and Night Watches," etc., etc. "Who passing through the valley of BACA (*weeping*) make it a WELL" (Ps. lxxxiv. 6.) From the thirtieth London edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1879. Pp. 119, 16mo.
3. *The Widow's Trust*. By Mrs. MARTHA TYLER GALE. "Let thy widows trust in me" (Jeremiah xlix. 11). "And when the Lord saw her he had compassion on her, and he said, Weep

not" (St. Luke vii. 13). New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1879. Pp. 265, 16mo.

4. *Feeding on Christ: The Soul's Hungering and Thirsting, and Its Satisfaction.* By the Rev. W. P. BREED, D. D., Author of "Christ liveth in me," "Jenny Geddes," "Under the Oak," etc. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1,334 Chestnut Street. 1879. Pp. 208, 12mo.
5. *Pointed Papers for the Christian Life.* By THEODORE L. CUYLER, Pastor of Lafayette Avenue church, Brooklyn. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1879. Pp. 363, 12mo.

All these are good books. The first two, especially, are to be commended as possessing the usual characteristics of Dr. Macduff. The third is by an authoress not known to us. She appears to write with ink of her own black and deep sorrow. The design of the little work is to afford comfort to such as like herself have been widowed. The plan of her book leads her to seek consolation in studying whatever the Scriptures set forth regarding those who have been bereaved in this way. Accordingly, she introduces us to Naomi, Ruth, the widow of Sarepta, the widow in debt, Anna the widow waiting for Redemption, the widow of Nain, the oppressed widow, the widow of the two mites, ministering widows, and the widows indeed. The book is attractively got up, and will, we presume, serve well its useful and important purpose.

Dr. Breed's little book (No. 4) is more pretentious than satisfactory. He undertakes to expound passages of Scripture (as John vi. 41-58) without seeming to appreciate the difficulties involved in them. One lays down the book feeling that the writer says things that are true and good without giving him instruction or impressing more deeply on his mind what he knew before. It is very pleasant, however, to observe that this author can now write on a theme altogether religious and in no degree political. What we have had occasion to examine of his previous productions have savored more of *spread-eagle* than of *Presbyterian*

sentiment. The topic on which he treats in this book is strictly and highly evangelical.

The last book on our list is made up of detached pieces of all sorts and for various purposes, all, however, religious. They are filled with anecdotes and personal references. The writer tells us "Moody is my dear friend," and I "know Varley the evangelist," and I have "been to see George Müller, the great believer." There are numerous allusions to Europe and to Palestine and to Switzerland, in which countries our author has travelled. In a word, these little productions are very pious, but sensational. Their very title confesses this: they are "Pointed Papers." They would be nothing if not *pointed*. Now we can see how there may be a demand for such in our weekly religious papers, but all jumbled together in a book it appears to us they are out of place. It would be enough to give one a spiritual dyspepsia to read such a volume through. Who wants fifty cups of milk and water, or skimmed milk, poured down his throat in a day or even a week?

And yet these forty-nine brief essays are not bad—not one of them, so far as we know, is otherwise than good in its way. Only one feels in reading it, Well, here is another book that has been *made*. Book-making—and pious book-making too—is a trade now that has many followers. What Solomon said is infinitely more true and infinitely more harassing now than it could have been in his day: "Of making many books, there is no end." Oh for a law prohibiting the *making* of any more books for a given period, till we shall have digested what we have already perused! Oh that for a generation to come there might appear no more books of the *made* sort! Let us have for the rest of our lives only such books as are a real *growth*—the precious life-blood of a master spirit; such books as have not had money for their motive, nor an evanescent fame, but the necessity laid on the author to write or *burst*. Let there be a fine collected from every man who writes a book, unless he can prove that it was either to write or to die.

Of this writer it was said by the Philadelphia *Presbyterian* (and this is printed in a prominent way and place opposite the

title page), that he is "the best writer of pointed, racy, religious articles in our country." Pointed and racy religious articles—and this the best writer of such in the whole country! So the compliment, such as it was, passes into the title of the book: "*Pointed Papers for the Christian Life.*" As if it had been said, "Pickled peppers and rich cheese for all the liver-diseased people in the land." It is not what is pointed and racy that the Christian life requires, but the simple and sincere milk of the word, that it may grow thereby. And as to authorship, one single tract or essay wrung out of a good man's soul from the depths of his experience, and from the strength of his convictions, will outweigh and outlive a whole shelf of these dilettante high-pious effusions, come from where or from whom they may.

J. B. A.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The list of books for the quarter now ending opens rather grandly, with the new lights shed by a mass of hitherto unused manuscripts on the career of him whom no one cares to call the Viscount St. Albans. Mr. Spedding's great work¹ came into vogue years ago, and was in a manner popularised by Hepworth Dixon. Like Montagu, these two are apologists for Bacon, though with more show of reason. The relations of Bacon with Essex and with the Parliament are much cleared up. Mr. Rowley's address last February in Bristol, England, and Mr. Spalding's earlier memoir in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, take what we regard as the just view of Bacon's character, and the one that lies between the extremes of Macaulay and Montagu. Of the three *dii majores* among the painters, Angelo, Rafaello, and Da Vinci,² the third was the most comprehensive genius and the one now least known. All his pictures are disputed, and they are as few or as the equally contested *tableaux* of Giorgioni. "The Last Supper" is a wreck at Milan. The small dark canvas in Florence representing the head of Medusa will haunt one forever. It is a precipitous descent from Leonardo to the American,³ and even to the English artist.⁴ Sir *Edwin* has humanized brute beasts. Bayard Taylor's last poem is worthy of his pen.⁵ Read with Carleton,⁶ Bishop Ellicott⁷ is incontestibly one of the finest

¹Life and Times of Lord Bacon. By James Spedding. 2 Vols. Crown 8vo, 1849 pp., \$5. Houghton, Osgood & Co., Boston.

²Leonardo da Vinci. By M. F. Sweetser. 18mo, 145 pp., cloth, 50c. *Ibid.*

³Washington Allston. By M. F. Sweetser. 18mo, 192 pp., cloth, 50c. *Ibid.*

⁴Sir Edward [*Edwin*?] Landseer. By M. F. Sweetser. 18mo, 142 pp., 50c. *Ibid.*

⁵Prince Deukalion. By Bayard Taylor. 4to, 171 pp., vellum cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁶Carleton's Popular Readings. Edited by Mrs. Anna Randall-Diehl. \$1.50. G. W. Carleton & Co. New York.

⁷Ellicott's Commentary on the New Testament. Vol. II. 4to, 671 pp., cloth, \$6. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

scholars and exegetes in England. His great work is preëminently a critical commentary, but he is now trying his hand at a more popular exposition. No one else seems to be so familiar with the older versions, or to make so much use of them. He is sound on inspiration and strictly evangelical, and *semi-Calvinistic*. He favors the *descensus ad inferos*, baptismal regeneration, churchly traditions, and the possibility of the final lapse of believers. Refinement, both linguistic and logical, is carried by him to a point of excess; and his extreme caution sometimes borders on weakness and timidity. The Annotated Bible,¹ of which the first volume is here announced, is an acceptable edition to our *apparatus exegeticus*.

We think the "Theory of Development"² is like to be itself developed to death. Some of Bonar's hymns³ are very precious, and nearly all have value and beauty. Archer Butler's Sermons⁴ are among the most massive and noble of our day. Brown on the Second Advent⁵ is a very timely republication.

The great "Masque" is that of Comus; but this one⁶ has made some reputation in literary circles. "Jean Ingelow"⁷ is a combination of sounds and letters that has become a symbol of lyrical pathos and picturesque and animated prose. The author of "Characteristics of Shakespeare" merited to have her own characteristics set in biographic amber.⁸ With so lovely and fragrant a theme,⁹ the author of the next book on the Roberts's list must

¹The Annotated Bible. Vol. I. By John Henry Blunt. 4to., 750 pp., cloth, \$10. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

²The Theory of Development. By J. B. Mozley. 350 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³Hymns of the Nativity. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. 16mo., 160 pp., cloth, gilt edges, \$1. Robert Carter & Brothers. New York.

⁴Sermons. By the Rev. Wm. Archer Butler. Two volumes. 850 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Second Advent. By Dr. David Brown. Cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁶A Masque of Poets. 16mo., cloth, \$1. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

⁷Jean Ingelow's Poems. "Household Edition."

⁸Memoirs of the Life of Anna Jameson. By Gerardine McPherson. 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁹Flowers: Their Origin, Shapes, Perfumes, and Colors. By J. E. Taylor. With thirty-two colored illustrations, and one hundred and sixty-one wood-cuts. 12mo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

(at least with the aid of his plain and tinted pictures) have made a work that will be welcome, any how, in fashionable drawing-rooms and in the "apartments" of girls' schools. Retzsch's Outline Drawings¹ are full of character, and have Shakespeare for their subject. Fastidious critics express themselves in the most laudatory manner of the chronicle of our literature,² the first volume of which is presented by the Putnams.

Whether the felicity, the moral virtue, or the salutary conduct of the most industrious and mathematical, but also the most seductively epicurean, of insects are meant to be expressed in the quaint title³ of their unknown panegyrist, we wot not. This life⁴ of the famous English Premier is a good one, and may be taken as a fair set-off against the wonderfully clever diatribe that has just been reprinted, we see, from recent numbers of an English periodical. "The Bible of To-Day"⁵ is a title that grates upon our ears. The Bible of to-day is the Bible of our fathers, and will be the Bible of their latest descendants. The Bible of to-day is the Bible as well of yesterday and of to-morrow. We anticipate a treat in this new work of Professor Day.⁶

There is evidently an attempt to satirise the Churches, or certain Churches, under cover of describing the congregation and society of Chartville.⁷ "Various sexes" are doubtless peculiar to that locality.

The growing disposition to advocate the ancient heathen practice of burning the dead is, we suspect, largely due to the fear of being buried when alive. One of the most eminent medical

¹Outlines to Shakespeare's Dramatic Works. Designed and engraved by Moritz Retzsch. Oblong 4to., cloth, \$9; morocco, \$15. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

²History of American Literature. By Moses Coit Tyler. 8vo., 720 pp., cloth, \$5; half calf, \$9.50. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

³The Blessed Bees. By John Allen. *Ibid.*

⁴Beaconsfield. By George Makepeace Towle. 24mo., 163 pp. *Ibid.*

⁵The Bible of To-Day. By John W. Chadwick. 12mo., pp. 304. *Ibid.*

⁶Outlines of Ontological Science; or, A Philosophy of Knowledge and Being. By Henry N. Day. 12mo., pp. 441. *Ibid.*

⁷Modern Fishers of Men among the Various Sexes, Sects, and Sets of Chartville Church and Community. 16mo., pp. 179. *Ibid.*

writers of our time has lately discussed the question of the frequency of such burials, and decided against it. The common opinion is the other way. The subject (even when in more prosaic hands than those of Poe) is a ghastly one, but demands exactly such a consideration as is here undertaken.¹ The life of such a man as Bryant² by such a man as Dr. Osgood is apt to prove inviting. Richard H. Dana, of Boston, who died the other day over ninety, had made fame by his "Buccaneers" before Bryant was heard of. Bryant did as well as a lad in *Thanatopsis* as ever afterwards. He was, perhaps, the most coldly faultless of American poets. There was an element of fanaticism in him, but Bryant was a fine spirit and a pure and admirable character. The memoir of a Revolutionary soldier³ is always to be accepted with thanks. Gerrit Smith⁴ was the most amiable and cosmopolitan of the coterie. Of original Abolitionists, Mr. Frothingham is, we believe, a Buddhist priest.

Surely the Scribners have given us an *édition de luxe* in this superb quarto⁵ in honor of the land of the Jungfrau and the Matterhorn. The so-called discoverer of the circulation of the blood⁶ was a doctor in the reign of James I., and the man who said that Bacon in matters of science reasoned like a Lord Chancellor. He was doubtless a very great man; but we are equally

¹Premature Death: Its Promotion or Prevention. New York. 24mo., pp. 94. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

²Bryant among his Countrymen: The Poet, the Patriot, the Man. By Samuel Osgood, D. D., LL.D. 8vo., pp 34. *Ibid.*

³Soldier and Pioneer: A Biographical Sketch of Lieutenant-Colonel Richard C. Anderson, of the Continental Army. By E. L. Anderson. 16mo., pp. 63. *Ibid.*

⁴Gerrit Smith: A Biography. By Octavius Brooks Frothingham. 12mo., pp. 371. *Ibid.*

⁵Switzerland: Its Mountains and Valleys. With four hundred and eighteen illustrations after original drawings by eminent foreign artists. Engraved by A. Closs. Imperial 4to., richly bound in fine cloth gilt, morocco backs, silk registers, top edge gilt, \$18; the same bevelled, with all edges gilt, \$18; full morocco bevelled, full gilt, \$25. Scribner & Welford, New York.

⁶A History of the Circulation of the Blood. By William Harvey. With a portrait of Harvey after Faithorne. 8vo., cloth, \$7. *Ibid*

persuaded that there were times this very winter when *our* blood did *not* circulate. The acquisition of the Suez Canal and of Cyprus by Great Britain, and the Afghan trouble, have awakened fresh inquiry about India¹ and the countries bordering on India. The work of Dr. Stoughton² on our English Bible deserves our hearty commendation, and takes its place on the same shelf with Westcott, Eadie, Trench, Ellicott, and Lightfoot. It is more a popular than it is in any distinctive sense a critical work.

The best part of Lange³ is always the part that is not Lange. These commentaries fill a space that needed to be occupied, and in some respects they are without rivals in English. They are more critical and far less readable and popular than "the Speaker's" Commentary. A valuable needle is sometimes to be found in a bottle of hay. We suppose Lange's most worthy monument to be his "Life of Christ. The venerable and conspicuous name of the late Dr. Hodge was not needed as a voucher for the ability and interest of these essays.⁴ It is precisely certain of these particular essays, however, that will fail to be convincing to a majority of Southern Presbyterians. The volumes of the "Epoch Series" are in historical writing what cates and sugar-plums are in material cookery. This one⁵ on the Normans is no doubt in good part a skilled abridgment of the great work by Freeman. Apropos of material cookery, the reviewers go into

¹India and Her Neighbors. By W. P. Andrew. With maps and Appendix. 8vo., cloth, \$7.50. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²Our English Bible: Its Translations and Translators. By John Stoughton, D. D. Illustrated with upwards of thirty wood engravings. 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

³Lange's Commentary. (Vol. XI. of the Old Testament.) Isaiah. Translated from the German, with additions, by the Rev. Samuel T. Lowrie, D. D., Philadelphia; and the Rev. Dunlop Moore, D. D., New Brighton, Penn. 8vo., 751 pp., cloth, \$5; sheep, \$6.50; half calf, \$7.50. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁴Discussions in Church Polity. By Charles Hodge, D. D. From the contributions to the *Princeton Review*. Selected and arranged by the Rev. Wm. Durant, with a Preface by A. A. Hodge, D. D. 8vo., 544 pp., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Normans in Europe. By the Rev. A. H. Johnson, M. A. In "Epochs of Modern History Series." With three colored maps. 16mo., 293 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

ecstasies over Mrs. Terhune's last exploit.¹ Such books are peculiarly stimulating to invalids with morbid appetites. We are not of those who fancy artificial titles like that of Dr. Vincent, but his book on the Psalms,² we have little question, is a good one. How much Socrates owes to Plato will never be known. The Apology and the Phaedo are the first of the dialogues in personal and tender interest; and the Crito is their suitable companion.³ It is a pity the incomparable music of the Phaedo could not have been preserved unbroken. Yet how could it be even partially reproduced in a version?

The monograph⁴ from Bologna is a memoir of a somewhat noted Italian, at part of whose name the world once grew pale. Bologna is not only famed for its sausages (those of Florence are distinctly inferior), but for its picturesque site, its library, its museum, and its St. Cecilia by Raphael. Mezzofanti was once professor there; and a great Egyptologist, who publishes his own books there now, will expound to you in any language the remains of Copt or Etruscan, and not disdain your modest gratuity. There is no end of works (and elaborate works) on the writer⁵ who may be justly styled the glory of modern literature. The late Professor Hart, by his edition of the Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser (some thirty years ago), has given evidence of his competency for

¹The Dinner Year-Book. By Marion Harland. 12mo., 713 pp. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

²Gates into the Psalm-Country. By Marvin R. Vincent, D. D. 12mo., 315 pp. *Ibid.*

³Socrates: A Translation of the Apology, Crito, and Parts of the Phaedo of Plato. 12mo., 107 pp. *Ibid.*

⁴La Vita e le Opere di Giulio Cesare Proce. Monografia di Olindo Guerrini. In Bologna: Presso Nicola Zanichelli. 8vo., 516 pp.

⁵The Complete Dramatic and Poetical Works of William Shakespeare: With a Summary Outline of the Life of the Poet, and a Description of his most Authentic Portraits; Collected from the Latest and most Reliable Sources. By John S. Hart, LL.D. To which is appended a Descriptive Analysis of the Plot of each Play; together with an Alphabetical Index to the characters of Shakespeare's Plays, an Index to familiar passages, and a complete Glossary of the words used in the Text that vary from their modern signification. The Text edited by W. G. Clark and W. A. Wright. Royal 8vo., 896 pp. Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, Phila.

the sort of work he has here taken in hand. Mr. Hart was a man of sense and taste, and at one time paid close attention to Arabic and other Oriental tongues. He was generally recognised as one of our best English scholars. Germany is the place to go to if one would study the science that is related to any art, whether useful or ornamental: not excepting the science and art of agriculture.¹ It is pleasing to see the prominence that is given just now by our editors and booksellers to the name of Dr. Johnson. There is a new edition of Boswell.² There is also a miscellaneous book, with a preface by Matthew Arnold,³ of which it may be said that it is *multum in parvo*. We grieve over Matthew Arnold as we grieve over *Sainte Beuve*. Arnold is not such a just and catholic critic as *Sainte Beuve*, but he is as fine and discerning in his appreciation within his limits. The literary instinct of the two men (where unbiassed) is seldom at fault. Matthew Arnold has, moreover, the synthetic as well as the analytical faculty; he is poet no less than critic and scholar. Both the English and the French writer may be set down as delicately tutored pagans.

There is here a fit alliance between a gifted Virginian and Londoner,⁴ and the author of all error and falsehood. This new account of the French Revolution⁵ has received praise without stint from men whose praise is worth having. The standard works of Thiers and Mignet are not likely to be superseded in our time. The theoretical discussion of the problem brought for-

¹Zur Arbeiterfrage in der Landwirthschaft. Von Dr. Ottomar Victor Leo. 8vo., 49 pp. Oppelne Commissionsverlag von W. Clar's Buchhandlung.

²The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., including the Tour to the Hebrides. By James Boswell. 12mo., 689 pp. Henry Holt & Co., New York.

³Johnson's Chief Lives of the Poets: Being those of Milton, Dryden, Swift, Addison, Pope, Gray; and Macaulay's Life of Johnson, with a Preface. By Matthew Arnold. To which are appended Macaulay's and Carlyle's Essays on Boswell's Life of Johnson. 12mo., 439 pp. *Ibid.*

⁴Demonology and Devil-Lore. By Moncure Daniel Conway, M. A. Two volumes. 8vo., pp. 428, 472. *Ibid.*

⁵The French Revolutionary Epoch: Being a History of France from the Beginning of the French Revolution to the End of the Second Empire. By Henri Van Laun. Two volumes. 12mo., pp. 503, 454. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

ward by the Socialists was carried over from the Convention of the first revolutionary period in France into that of the second, where it was maintained by such men as Prudhon, Ledru Rollin, Louis Blanc, on one side of the question, and Thiers, Barthe, De Tocqueville, and Dufaure, on the other side. There is little to be added to their arguments. Professor Hitchcock may be relied on for a judicious treatment of the subject.¹ The origin and etiology of infectious diseases² call for a yet sharper scrutiny since the visitation of last summer. Mr. Bacon evidently differs from the Duke of Argyle as to the boundaries that are to be assigned to law.³ The Turnbells are not in the habit of printing indifferent books. This remark may help to recommend to notice the pastoral and other stanzas of Mr. Laurence B. Thomas.⁴

Dr. Pressensé⁵ is the more voluminous writer, and wields great influence, but in our judgment Godet is the most profound and attractive writer among contemporary Protestants in France. Dr. Weisse has hit upon a title⁶ which reminds us of the subject of a college speech which occupied ten minutes in the delivery—"The Origin, the Progress, and the End of all things." This is, however, a great book, though it is also a dry one. Ex-Governor Winthrop⁷ is one of the few hale survivors of the great men before Agamemnon, and was in his day the peer of Webster, Choate, and Everett. In occasional addresses he has the studied felicity

¹Socialism.. By Roswell D. Hitchcock, D. D. 12mo., 111 pp. Anson D. F. Randolph, New York.

²The Germ Theories of Infectious Diseases. By John Drysdale, M. D. 12mo., 74 pp. Balliere, Tindall & Cox, London.

³The Reign of God not "the Reign of Law:" A New Way (and yet very old) to Decide the Debate between "Science" and Religious Faith. By Thomas Scott Bacon. 16mo., 400 pp. Turnbull Brothers, Baltimore.

⁴A Dream of Arcadia, and Other Verses. By Laurence B. Thomas. 24mo., 87 pp. *Ibid.*

⁵The Early Years of Christianity. By E. de Pressensé, D. D. Translated by Annie Harwood Holmden. 16mo., 528 pp. Nelson & Phillips, New York.

⁶Origin, Progress, and Destiny of the English Language and Literature. By John A. Weisse, M. D. 8vo., 701 pp. J. W. Bouton, New York.

⁷Addresses and Speeches on Various Occasions, from 1869 to 1879. By Robert C. Winthrop. 8vo., 566 pp. Little, Brown & Co., Boston.

which used to be admired in Lord Napier and Sir Francis Head, and is now admired in Lord Dufferin¹ and the Marquis of Lorne. With the blood he has in his veins, the descendant and biographer of the *old* Governor is naturally a conservative of the most wholesome quality. This volume of speeches is dedicated to Chancellor Grigsby, of Charlotte, Virginia. A well known London house gives us another book on Russia; this time a history.² The theme is getting to be a little thread-bare; but the authority is high. Turkey³ has become as tiresome (or nearly so) as Russia; but Asia Minor is a part of Turkey that can never lose its interest, and is invested with an international importance by the treaty of Berlin. The author (in the literary sense) of this attractive specimen of press-work ought to know what he is writing about. There could be few more racy subjects than Emmet, Grattan, Curran, and the orators and wits, their contemporaries and compatriots, whose noble portraits now adorn the old Parliament House in the city of Dublin.⁴ William Cobbett⁵ was a sort of civilised Thersites. His English resembles that of Swift, and is a model of terse, downright, idiomatic brevity and point.

Not far from the city of Avignon, in the south of France, are the ruined chateau of Laura's laurelled eulogist, the "*valla clausa*" (so beautifully referred to by Carlyle in his *Essay on*

¹Canada under the Administration of the Earl of Dufferin. By George Stewart, Jr. 8vo., 696 pp. Rose-Belford Publishing Company, Toronto, Canada.

²The History of Russia, from its Origin to the Year 1877. By Alfred Rambaud, Member of the Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg. With six maps. Translated by Mrs. L. B. Lang. With genealogical tables and additions and corrections by the author. Two volumes, demi 8vo., cloth extra, 38s. [Just ready.] Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, London.

³Asiatic Turkey. By Grattan Geary, Editor of the *Times of India*. Two volumes. Crown 8vo., cloth extra, with many illustrations, and a route map, 28s. *Ibid.*

⁴The Irish Bar: Comprising Anecdotes, Bon-Mots, and Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of Ireland. By J. Roderick O'Flanagan, Barrister-at-Law. One volume. Crown 8vo., cloth extra, 10s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁵William Cobbett: A Biography. By Edward Smith. Two volumes. Crown 2vo. [*sic.*], £1 5s. *Ibid.*

Burns), the picturesque cliffs from which the Chateau frowns, the shrubbery and nightingales, and the pellucid fountain of Vaucluse, with its white-fleshed trout and its "*chiare e dolce acqua*," of which the writer of these famed sonnets¹ speaks. It is rarely that an economist is fitted, by nature or habit, to be a *littérateur*. Like Emanuel Deutsch and G. H. Lewes, Mr. Bagehot² was a man of letters as well as a man of science. The logical Bishop (afterwards Archbishop) of Dublin, and vigorous thinker and writer, Richard Whately, was in private a man of great wit and humor, and much eccentricity, and of most enviable character. His writings are of varied merit, but the best of them deserve a somewhat qualified but hearty laudation. This tractate on the Romish system³ has tardily won its way to the uncertain tribute implied in the fact of a second edition.

The way to find out things⁴ in the domain of physical science is a topic of great interest, and is, in the instance before us, handled by a *savant* of acknowledged competence. It is a mistake to suppose that the particular method of Francis Bacon is exactly the one now in use. It would be coming nearer to the truth to say that it is the method of Sir Isaac Newton. Deduction has a larger place given to it by the experts of to-day than was assigned to it in the *De Augmentis* and the *Novum Organum*. There used to be two Midians⁵ laid down on the charts. The famous African explorer was the very man to write about either one of them. John S. Mill was nothing if not metaphysical.⁶ His physical world, indeed, retained only a "permanently possible" existence.

¹The Sonnets and Stanzas of Petrarch. Translated by C. B. Cayley, B. A., Translator of Dante's Comedy, etc. Crown 8vo., 10s. 6d. Longmans & Co., London.

²Literary Studies. By the late Walter Bagehot, M. A. Edited, with a Memoir, by R. H. Hutton. Two volumes. 8vo., with portrait. 28s. *Ibid.*

³Romanism the Religion of Human Nature. By R. Whately, D. D., sometime Bishop of Dublin. New edition. Fcp. 8vo., 2s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁴The Art of Scientific Discovery. By G. Gore, LL.D., F.R.S.. Crown 8vo., 15s. *Ibid.*

⁵The Land of Midian Revisited. By Captain Burton. Two volumes. Demy. 8vo., cloth, 32s. C. Kegan Paul & Co., London.

⁶The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill. By W. L. Courtney, Fellow of New College, Oxford. *Ibid.*

His meaning is always as clear, and his reasoning patient and calm, as his opinions are often deeply erroneous. The next book on our English catalogue, we are assured on good testimony, is a highly interesting memorial of one who deserved better of the world than to be at once forgotten.¹ The Country Parson² is, of course, delightful.

¹Frederick Ozanam. Professor of the Sorbonne: His Life and Works. By Kathleen O'Meara. Second edition. Crown 8vo., cloth, 7s. 6d. C. Kegan Paul & Co., London.

²From a Quiet Place: A New Volume of Sermons. By A. K. H. B., Author of "Recreations of a Country Parson," "A Scotch Communion Sunday," etc. Crown 8vo., 5s. *Ibid.*

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXX.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXXIX.

ARTICLE I.

THE BRETHREN OF OUR LORD.

An interesting inquiry is suggested by the phrase, "The brethren of our Lord." Were they children of Joseph and Mary, our Lord's mother; or of Joseph by a former wife; or of Mary the wife of Cleopas, adopted by Joseph on the death of their father; or of Joseph by a Levirate marriage with the widow of his brother? For this last view few advocates have appeared, and these divided in opinion as to the person of the widow, whether Mary the wife of Cleopas or some unmentioned woman. Indeed the opinion is entirely based on suppositions, none of which can survive a critical examination.

Of the three others just given, the bulk of Patristic, Papal, and Protestant authorities favor the adoption of the third. Early authorities were divided between the first and second. Each has had distinguished advocates as well as the third during the last hundred years, within which period discussions on the subject of the inquiry have become more numerous and been distinguished by more zeal and ability than during any former period subsequent to the fourth century.

In prosecuting this inquiry, it becomes us to lay aside *à priori* considerations, traditions, and ecclesiastical dogmas, and examine with careful criticism those scriptures which formally or incidentally inform us respecting our Lord's parentage, birth, and house

hold relations. Though the conclusions to which such an investigation may lead may not deserve to be formulated as matters of evangelical faith, they may yet be highly important, either in sustaining truth of spiritual value or in dissipating superstitions and dogmas opposed to the divine word and pernicious to a true religious faith and practice.

We propose to present the statements of Scripture under three divisions. They will be given in the words of the inspired penmen, according to our authorised version, with such summaries of the context as may be necessary; and also with such explanations as in some passages the literal rendering of the Greek text may provide.

I. Our Lord's *parentage and birth* is the first section of the history. These are narrated only by Matthew and Luke. They follow, in extracts from each, according to generally accepted chronological order of the history. Gabriel was "sent by God to a virgin whose name was Mary," Luke i. 27, "being," literally, having been, "espoused to Joseph." 28: The angel said, "Hail! highly favored! the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women." To soothe her fears and her mental perplexity respecting "this manner of salutation," the angel reassures her. v. 30, "Thou hast found," or obtained, "favor with God," and adds the evidence, v. 31, "Thou shalt conceive in thy womb and bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name Jesus." 32: "He shall . . . be called the Son of the Highest, and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David." Mary seems at once to have believed this assurance, but was perplexed respecting the *mode* by which it should be accomplished, "seeing I know not a man," 34. Her marriage with Joseph was not yet consummated; otherwise she would not have been affected as Zacharias had been, 18. The angel then proceeds to inform her of the miraculous agency to be provided, 35: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore that holy thing that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." With this assurance, Mary replied, 38: "Be it unto me according to thy word." Luke ii. 4-5: "Joseph went up also . . . unto the city of David,

because he was of the house and lineage of David, to be taxed, with Mary his espoused wife, being great with child." 6: "while they were there," . . . 7, "she brought forth her first born son and wrapped him in swaddling clothes," etc.

Matthew i. 16, closes his "book of the generations of Jesus Christ, the son of David," by saying, "And Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ." 18: "Now," Greek *καὶ* (continuation and contrasted with the forms of the preceding verses literally; *but*, on the contrary,) "the birth of Jesus Christ was thus": "When," etc., or literally, for his mother having been "espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost." The clause "before they came together," may be understood in the wide sense of living in the same house, implying but not asserting the narrower sense of cohabitation, *cf.* 25. "*Found*," not merely *was*, nor, on the other hand, *detected*, but became *known* or *was discovered*, as often used in active or passive form.* Joseph was troubled, for being a "just man," 19, he was bound "to put away his wife" if his natural suspicions were well founded; yet he thought, in his affectionate regard for her, "to put her away privately." God however interfered, by the appearance of an angel in a dream, 20, "saying, Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife, for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost." 21: The name of the son she should bring forth was given as Luke i. 31, and it is added, "for he shall save his people from their sins," 22. As we understand it, the *angel* says: "Now (literally, *and*) all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, 23, Behold, a (Greek THE) virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel." 24: "Then Joseph, being raised from sleep, did as the angel of the Lord had bidden him, and took unto him his wife, 25, and knew her not till she had brought forth her son the first born." (E. V. her first-born son.)

*Matt. xxvi. 40, 43; Luke i. 30; ix. 36; xii. 37, 38, 43; xvii. 18; xxiv. 2; John v. 14; xi. 17; Acts v. 39; 2 Cor. v. 3; Phil. ii. 8; Heb. iv. 16.

With this scriptural narrative of our Lord's parentage and birth before us, let us examine its teachings on the family relation into which he was introduced.

1. The careful perusal of this history raises a presumption that there was a true marriage of Joseph and Mary. Instead of recognising any sundering of the betrothal, we are carefully informed that Joseph's purpose of effecting this, even in a manner not necessarily exposing Mary to disgrace, much less to death, was prevented by a divine revelation given in such a manner as to allay his natural apprehensions. He is called her "*husband*," and she having been espoused is taken to him a wife under divine bidding.

2. The careful critical examination of the salient points of this narrative confirms the presumption raised by its perusal. When Mary had received the angel's annunciation, Luke i. 38, we are told, 39, she "arose in those days and went into the hill country with haste, . . . v. 40, and entered into the house of Zacharias and saluted Elisabeth," who, 43, returned her salutation by saying, "Whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?" How long a time "in those days" may mean and how long after the annunciation Mary remained in Nazareth, are unknown to us. But Elisabeth's language indicates that Mary had then conceived. She "abode" with Elisabeth "about three months," 56. It does not appear by whom she was accompanied on the visit. Joseph is not mentioned. It is not as probable that some kinsman or suitable company went with her as that she had made known her condition to Joseph, and that the events recorded in Matt. i. 18-20 then occurred in Nazareth; that he, having taken her to wife, might properly attend her. At all events, the customs of the country and age would forbid a betrothed virgin or other unmarried female making such a journey alone. She went "in haste"—"in those days"—the space of time indefinite and yet including the time of the annunciation. These suggestions are made, not as speculations, but as explanations most consistent with the scope of the whole narrative. We must not be misled by the succinct account of Matt. i. 16-25, to suppose that her condition had been unknown

to Joseph till the birth of the promised son was imminent. Nor can it be supposed that either Elisabeth or Mary uttered the glowing words of joy and praise, Luke i. 42-56, and especially that Elisabeth saluted Mary as "the mother of my Lord," unless both were entirely satisfied that the fulfilment of the divine assurance to Mary respecting her destiny had already begun. We say Mary was now "married." The narrative gives no account of the ceremony of a wedding, a feast, guests, contracts, processions, and other attendant circumstances. But to "take Mary thy wife," and he "took unto him his wife," are expressions indicative of marriage, as usage both of the Old and New Testament writers fully shews. The passages cited below are only a small specimen. There was then a real marriage, and even if the time above suggested be not accepted, it occurred *before the birth of our Lord*.

3. The angel or the evangelist, equally authoritative, says "all this," the espousals, conception, and birth, "was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, Behold, (THE, E. V., a) virgin shall (conceive) be with child and shall bring forth a son," etc. That is, God thus ordered the means by which this enigmatical prophecy, one involving such an extraordinary event, might have a verification in well attested facts. It is interesting to discover the relation of the most prominent fact, the birth from the virgin, to the prophecy. We notice the use of the definite article before virgin, both in the Hebrew text and the Greek of Matthew quoted from the Septuagint. It is probable that our translators followed the Latin Vulgate, the Latin language having no article, hence the reading, "a virgin."

The Prophet Isaiah was specially directed to announce this strange prophecy to Ahaz, the representative "of the house of David," as a SIGN. Of what else could it be a sign for his comfort other than of the assured perpetuation of David's line? In doing this the Divine Spirit appears to have had in view a more ancient prophecy. It is recorded in Gen. iii. 15, and has received the name of *the protevangel*. God said to the serpent "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. It (Hebrew HE) shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt

bruise his heel." The first part of the verse has been accepted as a typical prophecy, setting forth the proverbial enmity between the human race and the race of serpents. This view is not set aside by the worship of the serpent by some pagans, for the ground of that worship is *fear*. But we are more concerned with the latter part of the verse—to the typical is added another direct prophecy. In this the "typical" seed or posterity of the woman becomes a person. "He saith not seeds, as of many; but seed, as of one," with a masculine singular pronoun and a masculine verbal form. Eve is a representative generally of her race, specially of the mother of this "seed," just as Abraham was his progenitor, respecting whose relation to the seed of promise Paul uses the language above quoted, Gal. iii. 16. But further, in this part of the verse, THE serpent, "that old serpent, the devil and Satan." Rev. xii. 9, and not his seed, is addressed. The serpent represented Satan, whose agent he was. The "seed of the woman who shall bruise his head" (Hebrew, him as to head) is "the Son of God who was manifested to destroy the works of the devil," 1 John iii. 8. The phrase "her seed" is equivalent to "seed of the woman." This relation of woman to seed is no where else occurrent in the obvious sense of this passage. In Gen. iv. 25, Eve says of Seth, "God hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel." But as born by ordinary generation and of Eve personally, Seth could not be "her seed" in the sense here found. The same may be said of seed (Hebrew, child) in Lev. xxii. 15. It was said to Hagar, Gen. xvi. 10, "I will multiply thy seed;" but we know that was said in respect of Abraham's descendants through Ishmael. So it was said to Rebekah, "Let thy seed possess the gate of their enemies"—Gen. xxiv. 60, addressed to her as the wife of Isaac. In Is. lvii. 3, the last two words furnish a barely possible exception to the remark on the singularity of our passage. But rightly translated these words are, "thou hast committed adultery." In the New Testament, Paul has given us the interpretation for which we see good reasons in the foregoing examination; not only was "the word made flesh," John i. 14, but Paul says, Gal. iv. 4, the Son of God was "made of a woman." This, as our narrative shows, was done by the agency of the Holy

Spirit, the recognised agent in executing God's purposes. As Eve was made without an earthly father, by God's almighty power, made of man's rib, so Eve's illustrious "seed" was made or created *of a woman* by the same power. We have no notice of Adam in the passage, Gen. iii. 15.

Now in view of what has been said, it is not a harsh presumption that from this singular prophecy an apprehension, more or less clear, may have arisen in the minds of holy men of old, that "her seed," of whom the victory over Satan was predicated, might be one born out of the ordinary mode. Then Isaiah, when the time for interpreting the old prophecy and clearing up all speculation had arrived, was specially instructed to formulate that interpretation in the words of prophecy, now fulfilled, as related by the Evangelist. The title of the child is added, "Emmanuel," to indicate his power to sustain the dynasty, as "David's Greater Son," of the perpetuation of which his birth was a sign. This titular name is fully explained, Is. ix. 6 (E. V.): "Unto us a child is born, a son is given: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God," etc. In ordaining means to fulfil the prophecy, God selected the virgin as the sole human parent. By the miraculous conception the child to be born was not only secured from the taint of sin, to which all born by ordinary generation were subject, but endowed with a HOLY human nature as well as a perfect divine nature. It is only for us to discuss what is revealed. Of possibilities of accomplishing God's plan, other than what is revealed, we need not speculate. The mother was secured from the slightest suspicion, not only of Joseph, but of all to whom the miraculous agency was made known, and by them believed. At the same time marriage with Joseph provided birth in wedlock, and the protection of a legal husband and a *legal* earthly father. All that prophecy required was met by an *antecedent virginity* of Mary. Yet while *using* that, for reasons already stated, God put no special honor on *virginity* as opposed to the married state. On the contrary, he honored marriage by choosing for his Son, who in all proper relations was to "be made like unto his brethren," a lawful family connexion. There is no evidence in Scripture that a subsequent

or perpetual virginity was appointed to Mary. On the contrary, we think a proper inquiry will result in shewing clear evidence of the opposite position.

4. The language of Matt. i. 18, "before they came together," and 24-5, "he (Joseph) did as the angel of the Lord had bidden him and TOOK UNTO HIM HIS WIFE, and knew her not till she had brought forth her son, her first-born," raises a presumption that Joseph's abstinence from marital relations was only a postponement limited by the birth. Calvin rather censures the discussion of the subject, not as involving indelicacy, but because "the historian has not informed us what took place afterwards." With due respect, we protest that this is a "begging of the question." Rightly interpreted, we hold the historian's language, with the characteristic delicacy of Scripture, *does inform us*. It is true that the particle *ἕως* alone, does not define, *necessarily*, the extent of the limitation which it signifies. Whether the assertion, closed by *ἕως* simply, reaches only to the particle or extends beyond it, must be determined by the context. The same remark occasionally applies to *ἕως ἄν*. Ordinarily *ἕως* in local or temporal clauses defines the limit of action or condition by the word following the particle: as, "go *ἕως* Antioch, Acts xi. 22; *ἕως* Athens, xvii. 15; "Till the days of David," Acts vii. 45; "Till the ninth hour," Mark xv. 33. Or after the limitation expires, in clauses of a general character, the act or condition is changed: "Serve me *till* I have eaten, and afterward thou shalt eat," etc., Luke xvii. 8; "until he find it," xv. 4, when ceasing to seek is implied. The use of *ἕως ἄν*, involves a conditional sense, the clause succeeding the particle expressing limitation of the action or state preceding it, but not defining extent. "Sit on my right hand *ἕως ἄν* I make thy enemies thy footstool," Mark xii. 36. This assures the session till the enemies are subdued. It may continue. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 28, intimates that some new phase of the mediatorial kingdom will then ensue. But we have not space for more examples of these two particles.* It is evident that the action or state preceding the particle is

*We refer only to Matt. xvi. 28; x. 11; v. 26; x. 23; Mark xiv. 25; vi. 25.

generally limited by it. But neither of these particles is that used in our passage. This is *ἕως οὐ*. When the verb following is indicative, this particle involves more precision. If the verb is subjunctive, a condition *may* be implied. But, as the other particles, this is one of limitation. *οὐ* following *ἕως* is regarded as elliptical for *οὐ χρόνον*. In nearly, if not quite, every case in the New Testament—

(1) The action or condition preceding the particle is arrested and more generally, expressly, or impliedly changed or reversed by the statement following. Thus:

(a) Leaven hid in bread “*till* whole leavened,” Matt. xiii. 33. Action arrested and another state of meal and leaven declared.

(b) “Cast into prison *till* he should pay the debt,” Matt. xviii. 30–34. Release on payment implied.

(c) “How am I straitened *till* it (the baptism) be accomplished.” The “baptism” was suffering “the wrath of God, the cruel death of the cross, being buried, and continuing under the power of death for a time.” Jesus having “accomplished” this, rose “triumphant over sin, death, and hell,” “to die no more.”

(d) The apostles were commissioned to preach the gospel in all the world,” Matt. xvi. 15; but our Lord directed them to tarry in “Jerusalem *till* endued with power from on high,” Luke xxiv. 49. They were then to be “witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem and all Judæa and Samaria and the uttermost parts of the earth,” Acts i. 8. The result was in accordance with these commands. *After* receiving the power they no longer “tarried in Jerusalem” than to fulfil the part of the commission requiring them to “begin in Jerusalem,” Luke xxiv. 47. Other examples of same purport are Acts xx. 21; xxi. 26; xxv. 21; 2 Pet. i. 19.

(2) This construction is still clearer when, as in our passage, the clause preceding the particle is a negative statement. Thus:

(a) “The cock shall not crow *till* thou hast denied me thrice,” John xiii. 38. The third denial was followed immediately by the crowing.

(b) They “bound themselves that they would neither eat nor drink *till* they had killed Paul,” Acts xxiii. 12. In that event of course taking food would follow.

(c) "Tell the vision to no man *till* the Son of man be risen," Matt. xvii. 9. The enjoined silence then ceased; *cf.* 2 Peter i. 17-18. This usage of *ἕως οὖν*, evidently sustains the presumption that the obvious sense of Matt. i. 25 is the critically correct interpretation. This view leaves the *precedent* and absolute virginity of Mary entirely unimpaired till the birth of her son, and implies, by the very structure of the sentence, that the meaning of "taking a wife" was no longer subject to any exceptional condition of the married parties.

5. It may be true that the mention of the "first born," in view of Ex. xiii. 2, does not *necessarily* imply subsequent births. Still we must remark that we find in genealogical lists only one apparent exception, that of Hur, 1 Chron. ii. 50. But he may have had sisters, not usually named in genealogies. Isaac, an only son of Abraham and Sarah, is not called first born. Matthew, who mentions this "*first born*," would more naturally be supposed to have in view subsequent births, as he mentions "the brethren and sisters" along with "the mother of our Lord," xii. 47, xiii. 55. We therefore confidently claim that the use of this phrase in Matt. i. 25 completes fully the elements of evidence, that Mary, "married maid and virgin mother," having now performed the uniquely holy and sublime office of bearing the "Lord's Christ," and fulfilled the great Messianic prophecy, passed her life not in the toils of the "will worship" of asceticism, but after the "manner of holy women of old time," inculcating and exemplifying the "sweet charities of a pious home."

II. The infancy and childhood of Jesus are illustrated by but few incidents in the gospel history, but they are striking and pertinent to our discussion. Immediately after the announcement of our Lord's birth to the shepherds by the angel, Luke ii. 16, "they came with haste and found Mary and Joseph and the babe lying in a manger," . . . 19, "and Mary kept all these things and pondered them in her heart."

After the circumcising on the eighth day and naming the child, 22, "when the days of her purification" . . . "were accomplished, they (see verse 27, the parents) brought him to Jerusalem to do for him according to the law" (Ex. xiii. 2), which

provided that the first born should be presented to the Lord. [The best texts give *their* for *her*, recognising thus that either Joseph participated with Mary or that the child was included with the mother in this *ceremonial* uncleanness and consequent purification.] The presentation in the temple followed and included the offering, which was the conclusion of the ceremony of purification (Lev. xii. 4; vi. 8). Simeon being present, broke forth into a song of praise, and, 33, "Joseph and his mother marvelled at those things which were spoken of him," "and Simeon blessed them." The narrative of Matt. ii. 1-12 informs us of the visit of the Magi, who, 11, saw "the young child and his mother . . . worshipped him . . . and presented gifts." Then 13 and 14 relate the flight into Egypt, under instructions given to Joseph by an angel of the Lord in a dream, and 19-23 two other revelations to Joseph by the same means, the first to take "the young child and his mother . . . to Judea;" the second, on the accession of Archelaus to the throne, to turn "aside into the parts of Galilee." We can but notice the prominence of the "young child" in this narrative, that phrase always preceding "his mother." Matt. ii. 23 says "he (Joseph) came and dwelt in . . . Nazareth"; Luke ii. 39, "they returned . . . to their own city Nazareth," 40, "and the child grew and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was upon him." Luke ii. 41 we are told the "parents" of Jesus "went every year to Jerusalem at the feast of the passover," 42. Such a visit was made when Jesus "was twelve years old." 43: At the close of the feast he remained behind," "Joseph and his mother not knowing it." 44: Missing him after a day's journey and not finding him "among (their) kinsfolk and acquaintance," 45-46, they "returned to Jerusalem, and after three days found him in the temple sitting amidst the doctors, both hearing them and asking them questions." 47-8: Participating in the astonishment of all who heard him, his mother rather reprov'd him, adding, "Behold, thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing." 49, 50: They did not appreciate his reply, "Wist ye not that I must be about my father's business?" 51-2: He readily went with them to Nazareth and was subject to them. "Mary kept

all these sayings in her heart." (See verse 19.) "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man."

On this narrative we remark—

(1) It preserves the scope of what was before related as *being the history of an ordinary Jewish family*. Abstracting the miraculous incidents, we find that the parents and child were housed in the quarters to which the exigencies of their situation assigned them; that Joseph, just as if directed by providential causes, had fled with his family to Egypt to escape Herod's murderous schemes; returned when Herod was dead, and diverted by the news of the accession of his son, went on to Nazareth. For nearly six years no incident occurring has been deemed of sufficient importance for narration. Then comes the visit to Jerusalem, when, as the Jewish writers say, the child has reached the period to become "a son of the law." Knowing the circumstances of Jesus' birth, *we* are prepared to find that this period of his life was one in which his consciousness of his true nature begins to be developed, and he is not only seeking but giving instruction. The parental solicitude for his safety is just what we would expect. But notwithstanding his evincing a regard to "his father's business," and assigning that as a reason for what to them was so inexplicable, he completely fills the picture of a "holy" child in returning to his home and continuing in subjection to his parents, and grows in preparation for the great work of his life. The language of Luke is fatal to the assumed superiority of Mary's virginal character, for "the young child" constantly precedes "his mother" in the order of the narrative, and not Mary, but Joseph, is the head of the family.

(2) The presence of the miraculous element in this family history, so far from vitiating its reality as such, really enhances our estimate of it, as recognised by God as one of the chief agencies in that scheme by which our Lord, "though a Son, learned obedience," "was made perfect (completely adapted) through sufferings," (Heb. ii. 10.) and thus "he that sanctifieth" (or redeemeth) and they who are sanctified (or redeemed) are all of one."

As part of the discipline by which his human nature, though entirely sinless, was trained, he was as a child "subject to his

parents." In his intercourse with his mother there was no language of ill temper, and yet an unexpected development of the other nature and the rising consciousness of the work the "Father had given him to do." He meekly acquiesced in the divine place, for "he came to do his will" (Heb. x. 9). Of the course of his subsequent life with his parents in Nazareth we have only the assurance of that growth in "wisdom and favor with God and man," by which his preparation for his work of life was conducted.

(3) His mother was perplexed but patient, and "keeping all these things in her heart" awaited the results with evident recollections of the wonderful revelations vouchsafed to her. The whole of this history, from the first revelation made to Mary to his mature manhood, is that of one well entitled to be called "wonderful." But the great bulk of the people recognised only his human nature, and till he had been two years in his work he was regarded by such only as the son of Joseph. The question is not what they might have known and believed, with a right interpretation of the Old Testament prophecies, such as Ps. ii. 45, 6, Is. vii. 14, ix. 5-6, and others, nor what the Zachariases, Simeons, Annas, and Elisabeths under divine revelation did receive, but it is what the people, misled by false interpretations of scribes, really believed. By many he was regarded as an impostor, a false Christ, by others a great teacher, by most perhaps as one in whom men "hoped" to find a temporal prince to relieve them from the Roman yoke. Even apostles, *after his resurrection*, still hoped he would "restore the kingdom to Israel." In the synoptical Gospels, he called himself "the Son of Man;" though in discourses with the Jews, as given by John, he declared himself "the Son of God," and as they rightly understood him, thus claimed "to be equal with God." He appealed to his works to testify as well as to God, devolving on men the responsibility of receiving or rejecting him when they had the means of knowing him. Still, such was his constant human development, that during his life, before the crucifixion, he was regarded by the masses, from the human point of view, and that not very discriminating. His family relations, his life in

Nazareth, to those not divinely taught, but misled from right views of his divinity, left the impression that though "wonderful" he was yet only a human being. This leads us to consider

III. The subsequent life and household relations of Jesus. Says Luke, in opening his genealogical record, iii. 23: "Jesus himself began to be about thirty years of age, being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph"; and John i. 45, Philip says, "We have found him of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph." John ii. 1-4 narrates the presence of Jesus and his mother and disciples at the marriage in Cana. To her evident suggestion of her belief in his wonderful power, by telling him "They have no wine," Jesus replied, "Woman, what have I to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come." John ii. 12: "After that he went down to Capernaum, he, and his mother, and his brethren, and his disciples." Luke iv. 16 records our Lord's visit to "Nazareth, where he had been brought up." The people heard his exposition of Is. lxi. 1. and "wondered at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth, and they said, Is not this Joseph's son?" On the same occasion, as some suppose, others a different one, we have accounts by Matthew and Mark. Matt. xiii. 54: "They were astonished, and said, Whence hath (this) man this wisdom and these mighty works? Is not this the carpenter's son?" (Mark vi. 3: "Is not this the carpenter?") "Is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren, James, and Joses, and Simon, and Judas? and his sisters, are they not all with us?" (Mark vi. 3: "Is not this the son of Mary and brother of James, and Joses, and Judas and Simeon? and are not his sisters here with us?") Both record, "and they were offended in him."

John vi. 42: "They said, is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?" We learn from Mark iii. 21 that our Lord's popularity as a teacher and worker of miracles attracted great crowds and created much excitement, so that "his friends went out to lay hold of him, for they said, He is beside himself." The marginal reading for friends is "kinsmen," and the phrase thus translated literally means "those from" or "those pertaining to him." Mark proceeds to relate, 22-30, the ran-

corous malice of his enemies, who, obliged to acknowledge his wonderful works, ascribed the power they evinced to the devil. The writer then returns to the incidents above introduced by narrating, 31-35, the result of the impression of his friends, in that "his mother and his brethren," 32, or "his brethren and mother," 31, desired to see him; as Matt. xii. 46, "desiring," or literally "seeking to speak with" him. Luke viii. 19 says, "they could not come at him for the press." Whether the interview sought was obtained we are not informed, but our Lord improved the occasion to state solemnly the nearness of those who would do the will of his Father in heaven.

John vi. 66 says: "Many of his disciples," taking offence at the terms of relation to him, "went back and walked no more with him." With this incident respecting discipleship there appears a connexion, topical, though not perhaps closely chronological, in the narrative of his interview with his "brethren," when "after these things," vii. 1, he had retired to Galilee. His "brethren" urged him to return to Judæa and attend the feast "that thy disciples also may see thy works. . . . If thou doest these things, shew thyself to the world," 3, 4. The evangelist explains this language of his brethren by adding, 5, "FOR NEITHER DID HIS BRETHREN BELIEVE ON HIM," evidently thus classing them with those, vi. 66, who "went back and walked no more with him."

This mention of the "brethren" separately from the "mother" may be followed in this sketch by a mention of the "mother" without the "brethren." John xix. 25: "There stood at the cross of Christ, his mother and his mother's sister, Mary the (wife of) Cleopas, and Mary Magdalen." This last mention of his mother in connexion with himself, before his resurrection, is full of interest as an example of his tender regard for her. He committed her to "the disciple standing by whom he loved," saying, "Woman, behold thy son," . . . and to the disciple, "Son, behold thy mother." There is no certain scriptural authority for any subsequent interview, though there are good reasons for supposing she may have been of "the certain (others)" and "other (women)" with "the women which came with him from Galilee,"

Luke xxiv. 1, 10, and xxiii. 55. We have now to add the last notice of a mention of "his mother" and "his brethren." Acts i. 14: "Then all (the apostles named, 3) continued with one accord in prayer, etc., with the women, and Mary the mother of Jesus, and with his brethren." And hereafter we hear not another word—in history, "Epistles," or "Revelations," of "Mary his mother," whether by that title or the appellation "the virgin" or aught else. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 5, speaks of "the brethren of the Lord," distinguishing them from himself, "as well as other apostles" and "Cephas," and in Gal. i. 19, names "James the Lord's brother." In Acts xii. 17, Peter, after his miraculous deliverance from Herod, says, "Go shew these things to James and to the brethren." We find mention of "James" again with no distinguishing title, in Acts xv. 13, taking a prominent part in the council. And Acts xxi. 18, on Paul's last visit to Jerusalem, he "went in with us to James, and all the elders were present." In Gal. ii. 9, James is named with John and Cephas as three "who seemed to be pillars" of the Church; and 12. Paul, introducing his address to Peter, whom he "withstood because he was to be blamed," mentions "certain came from James" to Antioch. And Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 7, recounting our Lord's appearances to sundry persons after his resurrection, says, "After that, he was seen of James." This prominence given to James has led many to believe him to have been the author of the epistle, as he mentions his name without the adjunct of "an apostle." We have thus given in scripture language entirely a history of our Lord's personal and domestic relations. We have seen, pages 440 and 448, that in the scriptural account of our Lord's parentage, birth, infancy, and childhood, the presumption in favor of natural and obvious interpretation is sustained by the careful critical examination of the passages. So we shall find in this section that the natural and obvious meaning that "the brethren and sisters" of our Lord were the children of Joseph and Mary is similarly sustained by the careful examination of the terms of the narrative.

(1) There is nothing, in the growth of the family, abnormal. On the contrary, in view of what has been presented, as only an

antecedent virginity was required by the scope and terms of the "prophecies going before," so not one particle of scriptural evidence can be adduced in the narrative of Mary's subsequent life and relations to sustain the dogma of a *subsequent* virginity. The family continues to reside in Nazareth; the son, Jesus, is represented by his neighbors, who had known his history, not only as the "carpenter's son," but also as a "carpenter." Once for all, it may be said, though hardly necessary, that we by no means regard the testimony that he was Joseph's son as that of inspired men. They relate the views of others, when, as Luke records it, he was "supposed" to be Joseph's son; or that such was the popular view presented in Philip's so calling Jesus, or a view prevalent long after he had entered on his ministry as well as on his visit to Nazareth. "Is not this Jesus the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?" John vi. 42, is language clearly intimating that Joseph and Mary were *both* then *living*. We know such was true of Mary from other evidence. And yet when these words were spoken Jesus had been two years preaching. The evidence is negative but no less strong. It shows that in the aspects and relations of the family there appear no incidents, such as preceded and attended his birth, to indicate an abnormal family or household relations of Jesus. This was God's plan for reasons already stated, page 448.

2. We have the words "brother," "brothers," "brethren," "sister," and "sisters," used in the New Testament (1) only of natural relations of a common parentage; (2) of national relations; and (3) of ecclesiastical relations. The usage of such words for near relations, not of common parentage but common ancestry, does exist in the Old Testament; but the New Testament supplies a term to denote this blood relation, which our version renders "cousin," "kin," "kinsfolk," "kinsmen," etc. It is *συγγενής*, "of the same race or stock." It has also *ἀνεψιός* for nephew, for which the Old Testament used a phrase. But the relation expressed by brother is the natural sense in the Old Testament, even when that term is employed with other terms, "father," "mother," or "sister," in their natural sense. Now, few as we find the notices of our Lord's household, we have four

instances in which "mother and brethren" (in one "sisters" also) are named together. Then we have either "mother and brethren" (or "brethren" alone in one case) distinguished from disciples in four instances. In that of "brethren" alone it is said expressly, "For neither did his brethren believe on him." On any other view than that the natural relation is meant, it is singular, to say the least, that these terms are united with "mother," the nature of which relation is certain; and equally inexplicable, that *συνεργηται* is never employed. It may be remarked too, that the use of "brethren," a double plural, or a collective rather than plural, which is used by English writers rather in an official, national, or congregational sense, instead of "brothers," has a misleading effect on the minds of merely English readers.

3. When our Lord's attention was called to his "mother and brethren seeking to speak with him," he used the terms to denote the most decided in attachment to him. Who are nearer than such persons if natural relations? Just such nearness he claims to those who "do the will of his Father." The relation of cousins would not afford an illustration on the same plane with that of mother. He mentions "sisters" also. Further, these relations, who were males, are called in Mark vi. 3, "James, Joses, Judas, and Simon." Three of these names, James, Judas, and Simon, occur in the list of the Apostles, Matt. x. 2-4, Mark iii. 16-19, Luke vi. 14-16. Lebbeaus (or Thaddeus his surname) of Matthew and Thaddeus of Mark is evidently the Judas of Luke. Now the identity of these with three of the names, Mark vi. 3, is thought to justify the assertion that they were our Lord's brethren, and of course being called sons of Alpheus, could not be sons of our Lord's mother. But the fatal difficulty that "none of his brethren believed on him," John vii. 5, excludes *them* from the apostolic college. The allegation that the clause just cited from John vii. 5 must be taken in a modified sense of *none*, equal to *most* of his brethren, or a modified sense of "believed," *i. e.*, not *fully* believed, seems a special pleading and is fully refuted by the list, Acts i. 14, in which all three names occur, and yet the writer adds mention of "his (Jesus') brethren," as additional parties in the assemblage of the "upper room." There is certainly no necessity that

identity of names so common as James, Judas, and Simon, should require an identity of persons. We have not space for discussing the questions respecting the sameness of Clopas, John xix. 25, and Alpheus, in the passages above cited, nor of the true reading of "his mother and the sister of his mother, Mary (wife of) Cleophas (English version, or Klopas, Greek), etc." It may be remarked, however, that we have two pairs of names separated by a comma and the names of each pair separated by "and," as is the manner in the lists of apostles in Matt. x. 2-4 and Luke vi. 14-16; and that on comparing Matt. xxvii. 56, "the mother of Zebedee's children," and Mark xv. 40, "Salome" appear to take the place of "the sister of his mother," John xix. 25. And thus there is no ground for *supposing* Mary (wife of) Alpheus or Cleophas, or Klopas, was our Lord's mother's "sister" and her children "the brethren" by being cousins of our Lord.

IV. But we are brought by the above to consider some objections to the views of "our Lord's brethren" now given and sustained by the examination of the passages quoted. We shall combine this consideration with that of the grounds on which the two leading conflicting opinions on the subject of our discussion are advocated.

1. These two opinions have evidently a dogmatic basis of common origin and character. Owing to the low, sensual view of marriage, growing out of Oriental customs which existed at the Christian era, there arose at a very early period in the Church a decided opinion among many religious teachers that *virginity* was a state of superior holiness to that of marriage. In the discourses of our Lord and the writings of the apostles, some favor seemed to be shown to this view. But such an interpretation was due to a misapprehension of special and exceptional cases as presenting the *law* of the gospel, instead of being merely permissive or commendatory provisions for those "able to receive them," Matt. xix. 12, or in view of the exigencies or "present distress," 1 Cor. vii. 26. For our Lord, Matt. xix. 4-6, explicitly reënacts the primeval law of marriage. Gen. ii. 24, and Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 2, ix. 5, 1 Tim. v. 14, Heb. xiii. 4, as clearly inculcate the lawfulness of marriage and its consistency with the

highest moral purity. In time of persecution, when alternatives of exile or death on the one hand and a denial of Christ on the other would more embarrass men with families, or when opportunities for preaching the gospel "in regions beyond" were less available to the married than the single, or in other exigencies of local or temporary influence, all exceptional, the unmarried might do better to remain so; but the instructions for such cases were by no means favorable to the asceticism and monasticism which made them not only of a permissive but obligatory force. Of all the ancients known as the "Fathers" none was more rigid in the adoption and practice of monastic asceticism than Jerome. While traditions had existed which, to favor the growing estimate of virginity, taught that our Lord's mother had no other children of her body except him, and that the "brothers of our Lord" were Joseph's sons by a previous marriage, and had not excited up to the middle of the fourth century any strongly marked opposition, the rapid growth of the ascetic views involved induced Helvidius, a Christian writer of Rome, to take a decided stand in opposing such views. In doing this he boldly advanced the scriptural view, and held that our Lord's mother had other children after his birth. He seemed to feel impressed with the conviction, on the one hand, that the popular estimate of virginity as opposed to marriage was greatly sustained by the widespread acceptance of the perpetual virginity of the mother of Jesus, and on the other, that a dogma so utterly unsupported by Scripture as this, as well as other forms of asceticism, must receive a death blow in the establishment of her true position after the birth of her first-born. His effort, whether particularly successful in repelling the force of tradition that "the brethren" were the sons of Joseph, excited a storm of indignation and virulent rebuke from Jerome. This writer introduced the view, then entirely novel, which has since most widely prevailed. If the scriptural view already presented be correct, of course that of Jerome falls.

2. We may examine some of his allegations. While the tradition had not presented any scriptural basis, Jerome, relying on *no tradition* whatever, professed to derive his opinions from critical examinations of certain scriptures. The explanations already

given of these, relating to the "brothers" as constituting a class, "none of whom believed," the improbability that the sons of some other mother would be constantly associated, not with their own mother, but with our Lord's mother, and cognate propositions, need not be repeated. The basis of Jerome's "critical" work is a series of suppositions, as that of the other theory is a tradition; neither resting on one word of Scripture. Prominent among these is the supposition that "James the Lord's brother," Gal. i. 19, was the son of Alpheus and cousin of our Lord. Not to notice the contradiction of John vii. 1-5, above shown to exist, only two other explanations of this language are feasible. Either James became a convert and then apostle, or he, as an eminent servant of Christ, was at once, by his virtues and his relation to our Lord, raised to a position of influence in the Church in Jerusalem, remaining its chief pastor when the apostles having "begun at Jerusalem" had gradually scattered to other fields, according to our Lord's commands, Mark xvi. 15, Luke xxiv. 49. That he was ever chosen as an apostle there is no evidence. Matthias succeeded Judas, Acts i. 25. Paul was a special apostle to the Gentiles. Or, as some suppose, Matthias's appointment was not recognised and Paul was chosen instead of Judas. The first is perhaps the soundest view. But we cannot discuss the question. At all events, "twelve" or "eleven" (for a time) are the uniform numbers designating the apostles in the Gospels, Acts, Epistles, and Revelation. But is it not said, "Other of the apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother"? Gal. i. 19. Certainly, but this language does not assert that James was an apostle. Paul went to Jerusalem "to see," literally *become acquainted with*, "Peter," 18, and remained "fifteen days." The chronology of Paul's movements after his conversion, Acts ix. 23-30, 2 Cor. xi. 32-33, Gal. i. 17-21, presents many difficulties, for the discussion of which there is neither space nor necessity here.

It was not pertinent to Luke's history to record the visit "to see Peter," nor to Paul's defence of his divine commission, to mention the visit "with Barnabas." The particle *εἰ μὴ*, here rendered *save*, denotes an exception to a positive statement, added outside of the sentiment expressed by it, and implies an ellipsis, in accordance

with the structure of the sentence; generally, of the verb expressing an act or condition. Paul says positively (literal rendering), "another of the apostles I saw not," *ei mh* (I saw) "James the Lord's brother." To express an exception as to apostles the Greek idiom would perhaps require *ektos* before *ei mh*. 1 Cor. xiv. 5; xv. 2; 1 Tim. v. 19; in all which the exception is inside the statement preceding, as *ei mh* often represents אִם-לֹא, so *ektos ei mh* אִם-לֹא-כִּי. Compare Luke iv. 25-27. There were many widows IN ISRAEL in the days of Elias, . . . and to NO ONE (denying absolutely sex in verse) was Elias sent, *ei mh* to *Sarepta* of SIDON, to a . . . widow." Many lepers were IN ISRAEL in the days of Eliseus, and NO ONE of them was cleansed, *ei mh* Naaman the SYRIAN." Supply *he was sent* before "to *Sarepta*" and "*was cleansed*" after "Syrian." In John xvii. 12, our Lord says, "Whom thou gavest me I have kept, and *not one* of them is lost, *ei mh*—the son of perdition" (*is lost*). Matt. xii. 4: "Was not lawful for him to eat (the shew bread) neither for them that were with him, *ei mh* for the priests only (*was it lawful*). 1 Cor. i. 14: "I baptized no one of you" (Corinthians) *ei mh*—(*I baptized*) "Crispus and Gaius." But neither of these was a Corinthian.

These quotations will suffice. We add references to others. Matt. xi. 29; Mark ix. 9; John xix. 15; Acts xi. 19; 1 Cor. ii. 2, 11, etc. Any one with a Greek Concordance can make the examination. In one passage we have the ellipsis supplied. Rom. xiv. 14: "Nothing is unclean of itself, *ei mh* to him who esteemeth anything unclean to him it is unclean." In our passage then James is not reckoned an apostle, so he could not be either one of that name mentioned in the lists. This examination destroys Jerome's first argument and confirms all that has been said respecting "the Lord's brethren" as not belonging to any class otherwise named. This James is evidently the same who is mentioned, Acts xii. 17; xv. 13; xxi. 18; and Gal. ii. 9. He was also probably the author of the Epistle. He does not use the word "apostle" in inditing the Epistle, and Jude does not, but in verse 17 speaks of "words spoken of the apostles." If an apostle, he would have said "of *us* the apostles." Paul tells us 1 Cor. v. 7, that our Lord appeared to James after his resurrec-

tion. It may not be asserted positively, but it is by no means improbable, that he and his brothers constituted as eparate class from the apostles to whom our Lord sent the message—Matt xxviii. 10; John xx. 17: "Go tell my brethren, that they shall go into Galilee; and there shall they see me." For the angels sent the message to the disciples, Matt. xxviii. 7; and though Mary Magdalen, John xx. 18, "told the disciples that he *had spoken* these things," the record does not represent her as conveying this message to *them*. Or if we accept this as another communication to the apostles, the use of the term "brethren" is evidently that of Ps. xxii. 22; Heb. ii. 11, 12; Matt. xii. 49; xxv. 40. Jerome's argument in fact is self-destructive. He says as to "James the Lord's brother," that brother means "cousin" or "step-brother." Then in the passage "neither did his brethren believe on him," "brethren" must mean the same. Jerome cannot be allowed to play fast and loose. Again, if our Lord had no brother, the word "brother" must mean "cousin" or "step-brother" wherever it occurs. Then has Jerome proved that Cleophas' (or Alpheus') son *could not be an apostle* as effectually as that any son of Mary's could not. So his argument answers itself.

In conclusion, the question may be asked, of what benefit is this discussion. We reply briefly.

The tradition on which "the brethren of our Lord" were said to be "sons of Joseph by a previous marriage," and the view of Jerome which spread so rapidly and widely, were, as we have seen, adopted in the interests of asceticism, as specially illustrated in exalting the state of virginity over that of marriage. But the dogma of the perpetual virginity of Mary gradually developed a more widespread and pernicious evil than that of monasticism. This could not be universal either in practice or influence. Though "all error tends to practical vice" in some the tendency is arrested. The most flagrant crimes chargeable on the Papacy are by no means, however horrible and disgusting, confined to the results of monasticism. The "perpetual virginity of Mary," logically to the Papal conceptions, led to the dogma of the immaculate conception, which, long debated yet long believed, has within the last

thirty years been declared an article of faith by the late Pope, and of course is now to be accepted by the Faithful as an *infallible truth*. Her worship has long held a high place in the affections of the Papists. Her titles, however blasphemous, are accepted, and her intercession sought by her votaries as even superior to that of our Lord. The dogma has been accepted by many leading Protestant divines, who allege that the same reasons which required the antecedent virginity of Mary might at least possibly require it afterwards. It is also intimated by such that the rejection of a subsequent and perpetual virginity is only due to the superstitious reverence for Mary and the ascetic overestimate of virginity which are believed intimately connected with the dogma. But such forget that the Scriptures, by prophecy and didactic teaching alike, only *require* an antecedent virginity, and that no where in the Bible, subsequent to the narrative of the events preceding our Lord's birth, is Mary even called a virgin. We do not see why the views we hold should be termed matters of "taste and sensibility" alone. The antecedent virginity is clearly a teaching of the Word, and the subsequent is not. It is not a superstition, but a belief of the Word, which occasions us to shrink from the idea that our Lord might have been born of any other than a virgin. All these sentiments, which present the *subsequent* as of equal importance with *antecedent* virginity, grow out of the error that it was because virginity was a purer state than marriage that God selected the virgin to be the mother of our Lord; whereas, as we have shown, it was in accordance with his wisdom thus to *use* virginity as the means of introducing his Son as both "Son of Man" and "Son of God," virgin born, not purified but pure, not deified but divine, set apart in unique and awful solemnity from all mankind, "the second Adam, the Lord from heaven"; the "seed of the woman," "made of a woman," "of the seed of David according to the flesh," in due time to be "declared," not made, "the Son of God, with power according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead."

But the "sentiment" of this dogma has not only been of most disastrous power in engendering the widespread idolatry of the Papal Church, an evil we may deplore but can do but little to

remove or arrest; it has become an engine of great influence in conciliating Protestants to this abominable idolatry. Rome knows how to reach all classes. The ignorant and superstitious, who engage in the worship of the Virgin, may sin "ignorantly in unbelief." That worship is encouraged by the Papal hierarchy. To the more enlightened, both Papists and Protestants, the "sentiment" is presented in all the winning charms of music, painting, and sculpture, in prayers and hymns, Madonnas and the Child. You hear the music and the words in the school-rooms and parlors of Protestant teachers and parents. You behold the effigies and portraits in art galleries and the engravings of them in magazines. It is thus this great error wins votaries.

"Vice is a monster of such fearful mien
That, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
But, seen too oft, familiar to the face,
We first endure, then 'honor,' then embrace."

Doubtless many who have been carefully reared in the "doctrines according to godliness" have been gradually turned to regard the sentiment of this dogma as harmless, then the dogma as reasonable, and so gradually drawn to tolerate cognate corruptions of truth which distinguish the Great Apostasy, and at last become fully wedded to its soul-destroying heresies, in doctrines and puerile vanities in worship. Let this dogma of the perpetual virginity and its whole train of legitimate heresies and vices, be once rejected by the Protestant world, and men's vision be relieved of the glamour with which Rome has invested her favorite superstition, she who was divinely "blessed among women" would cease to be adored above her glorious Son, or have her name and true excellence prostituted to the purposes of an avaricious priesthood, and be hailed by men and angels as "highly favored" in having been only, as well as solely, distinguished as the "MOTHER OF OUR LORD!"

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ARTICLE II.

VAGRANCY.

It is not an accidental arrangement that makes what men call society. It is not even the development of the race, or the survival of the fittest. Because social life in some form is found wherever man is found. There is some invariable law that secures the "neighborhood" of men, and this can no more be subverted than can the physical laws that govern inanimate nature. In cultivated races the laws of social life are more inexorable than any other laws; and among savage tribes there are always social customs that are universal in their observance. The greatest races have always been those in which the most intense individuality was a distinguishing trait; but the separate, individual habit has always been manifested in social habits, no less inflexible in their operation because they were unformulated or observed merely by tacit consent. In Christian lands it is usually acknowledged that this all-pervading law of society is builded upon the brotherhood of a race having a common ancestor; and also upon the uniformity of obligation resting upon creatures having a common Creator. Indeed, there has never been a philosophical explanation of the laws of social life that proceeded upon any other foundation. "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth."

This introduction will serve to show that the doctrine of the essential unity of the race and the equality of all individuals of the race as sinners before God is in no wise controverted in this discussion. The differences that obtain are differences wrought by the sovereign agency of God, and they have their foundation in the uncontrolled will and purpose of God. But these differences do verily exist. They are recognised in Scripture, and in all the literature of the world. The division of the race into ranks and classes is as real as the separation of the race into individual members. Democratic theories that are erected upon the natural equality of men will not endure investigation; because there is no such thing in nature as exact equality *ab initio*; and

if there were, the different influences exerted upon different individuals widen the divergence from the cradle to the grave. It is by no means a self-evident proposition that God made all men free and equal and endowed each individual with any certain inalienable rights. And this precise form of statement has grown axiomatic from long use, and is invested with the power of a quotation from Holy Writ, while in fact it is a delusion invented by the devil.

The revelation of God and the history of the world teach the same truth as opposed to this foolish postulate. God created some men for domination and vast multitudes more for subjection. The Proverbs of Scripture are full of instruction upon this point. "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord." "Many will entreat the favor of the prince." "My son, fear thou the Lord and the king." "Put not thyself forward in the presence of the king." "The king that faithfully judgeth the poor, his throne shall be established forever." The exhortations of the New Testament to honor the king are frequent and emphatic, and there is no hint of democratic equality found in the word of God except in those passages where the total depravity of the race is portrayed, or the pious act of the subject, as in the case of the widow's mite, is placed upon an equality with the best deeds of the rich and powerful. In all such instances the contrast is between God the Infinite Ruler and man the finite subject. The vast mountains and deep caverns that cover the moon's surface do not prevent the essential rotundity of the satellite as seen from the earth; and to an inhabitant of the moon these pronounced inequalities would be a thousand times more apparent than the smooth rim of the golden surface is to the dwellers of earth.

It will be said that the true intent of the postulate is to assert the equality of all men in the eye of the law. The rich criminal does not differ from the poor criminal. The rich proprietor does not differ from the poor proprietor. The rights of property are precisely the same, and the most withering curses of Scripture are addressed to the oppressor who dares oppress the poor. The Lord is the special champion of the poor and needy and of him that hath no helper. The withheld wages of the laborer cry to

the Lord God of Sabaoth for vengeance. And as justice and judgment are the foundations of God's throne, so the earthly potentate has his throne established by justice. All these truths are self-evident, and they give emphasis to the argument herein presented. Because the power and authority that accompany wealth and station are here recognised, and the owner of this superior *status* is constantly warned against the misuse of this rightful authority. But the authority belonging to the official station is everywhere conserved in Scripture.

Nor is this all. It is not merely official station that gives authority and domination. There are many other factors recognised in Scripture and endorsed by the verdict of all civilised communities. The man who lives a godly life properly dominates his vicious and criminal neighbor. The man who has added learning to his native gifts properly dominates his ignorant neighbor. The man who inherits an honored name from gentle ancestry properly outranks his neighbor, who may be his equal in other respects. And the man who owns property rightfully dominates his neighbor who does not own. It is very easy to make an outcry against this divine arrangement. It is very easy to declaim against the tyranny of capital and to mourn over the sorrows of oppressed labor. And the kernel of agrarian heresy is in the idea that the "accident" of wealth confers no rights upon its possessor. But the Bible and common sense agree in ranking wealth among the powers that rule the world; and the conservation of property rights was important enough to form the subject of two, if not three, of the specifications in the second table of the Decalogue. The ownership of property is no more an "accident" than the ownership of the official authority of the sheriff. It were just as wise for the impecunious debtor to object to the sheriff's authority, when his goods were seized, as to assault the rights of property. The possession of property makes society possible, and the criminal upon the scaffold, dying by the hands of the sheriff, might well use the same plea, because his death is necessary to the stability of social life and relations. God made society, when he created Adam, and environed society with certain immutable laws, giving at least one-third of the penal code to the protection of property rights.

There can be no doubt that the civil war, among all its hideous evils, inflicted the curse of agrarianism upon this country. The invader of an enemy's territory soon learned to despise the rights of private property there. He could rob with impunity, and he did rob with unfaltering diligence. Whatever was portable and within reach was—taken ; and the taker, multiplied by thousands, returned to his home when the war was over, and under the beneficent reign of democratic theories, resumed his rights of citizenship, and sent his representative to the national legislature. In a multitude of cases the representative had also been a warrior, and therefore properly enacted such laws as would accord with the theories held by his constituents. In a multitude of other cases, the legislator was not a warrior, but only a robber armed with a carpet-bag, in which he carried the life, liberty, and happiness of great commonwealths through many dreary years. Like the sequelæ that follow such hideous diseases as diphtheria, these consequences of the war were more fatal than the original strife. These reptiles not only disgraced the body of which they were members, lowering the standard of manhood and morality there, but they also exerted a baleful influence upon the communities they misrepresented. Nothing else under the wide heavens did so much to transform the happiest peasantry on the face of the earth into a race of idle, discontented, and vicious vagrants. The exceptions to the rule are found nowhere except in localities where the former owner of the laborer conserved the interests of the freedman. They not only robbed the State with unsparing industry, but they also gathered up the scanty savings of the freedmen into one mass—and stole it also.

The commercial reverses of the past five or six years spread their influence over the whole land. Capital promptly withdrew from enterprises that had sure margins of profit in ordinary times. Men of good reputation, holding places of trust, became faithless, beginning a bad career in many cases by borrowing without the owner's knowledge or consent, and speculating with borrowed funds and losing them. Defaulters multiplied, and capital, always sensitive and timorous, withdrew more and more. Thus the land was filled with thousands of vagrants, losing remunerative em-

ployment, and an army of tramps invaded all accessible localities, growing more truculent as their ranks swelled, until to-day the vital question before all thinking men is, what possible remedy can be found for this most portentous evil. The ballot-box is not large enough to grapple with it. And if it were, these vagrants and their congeners control the ballot-box.

One more factor remains. Democracy glories in unlimited freedom. And the legitimate fruit of this upas tree, whose roots are nourished in the bottomless pit, are Nihilism, Socialism, Communism. The law says the Christian Sabbath shall be different from other days. The law says marriage is honorable, and promises protection to the institution. The Sabbath and the marriage relation are the two memorials of Eden that God has kept upon the earth, and Communism, Socialism, and all kindred doctrines of the devil, precisely assault these. Society, having some vague idea that its very existence depends upon the preservation of these institutions, offers some feeble resistance; but Sunday concerts in the large cities, Sunday trading, Sunday excursions, Sunday drunkenness and murders, monopolise the news columns of all the Monday papers. And divorce laws are probably more numerous in the codes of some States than any other laws that affect the social relations of men. The owner of a lager beer shop, without one particle of visible interest in existing society, insolently defies the authorities of New York, and is kept from outbreking violence only by the power of the police force and the dread of fine and imprisonment. Yet this vagabond is so much a power in the land that he numbers his followers by thousands. His most pronounced *confrère* is a Frenchman who boasts that his hand slew the Archbishop of Paris during the reign of the Commune there. Now he is a "citizen" and a sovereign.

There are two aspects of the subject that the Christian must contemplate. One is the horrible personal condition of the poor vagrant, as a sinner against heaven and an enemy of all that is reputable upon earth. No man with human sympathies can think upon the desolation of such a life without commiseration. All that is included in such words as home and kindred and honor, is denied to

the tramp, wandering with purposeless indifference over the face of the land. Enough food for present wants, and such shelter as will suffice to keep life in his gaunt body; such cast off garments as he can beg or steal in his wanderings—these are all. But no possible ray of hope in the future, unless the hope be founded upon such a general upheaval and disintegration of society as will afford him the chance to take—without dread of the law and its sanctions. Surely, if any combined effort could accomplish it, no pains would be spared, no outlay would seem too costly, to bring back these wretched outcasts to the ordinary decencies of life. When the tramp come to your door and tells you he is foot-sore and hungry and unable to obtain work, you dare not withhold food if you have it in possession. If he is suffering from cold, you dare not refuse the cast-off coat—if you have one. Yet you know that these slight charities encourage the recipient to continue his life of vagrancy. But the tokens of present suffering are before you, and they appeal with resistless potency to the beneficent instinct which God implanted in your nature, while you were yet in Eden!

It is quite easy to sit down and debate the question, *pro* and *con*, in the quiet of your library. You know, upon general principles, that each gift you make to the idle vagrant adds to the encouragements to vagrancy. You are helping to make thriftless penury tolerable. You are furnishing the object of your indiscreet charity with another proof that work is not a good thing, since idleness may be fed. Nay, you are saying to the tramp, "If you are an hungered at the next meal time, and are refused food at the next house, take—by stealth or violence—that which is refused." It is boldly asserted by the managers of the various benevolent corporations, that indiscriminate charity not only demoralizes the recipient, but also cripples these societies in their efforts to do good to the helpless poor. Still, no Christian man or woman can steel his or her heart against the present living fact, when a hungry man asks for bread. Perhaps he is not really hungry? Very true. There have been numberless cases where want was simulated. But try the other side of the question: Perhaps he *is* really suffering for lack of food! Do you not see that all other

questions sink out of sight the moment you are convinced that the applicant is actually needy? Well, suppose you are *not* quite convinced? The probabilities may lie in that direction, but you have no proof. Ah! you cannot *afford* to wait for proof. The probability overmasters you, and you give.

There is another point for the Christian to consider. There is some law in force that makes poverty an ever-present fact. "The poor are always with you." Sometimes, and indeed generally, poverty is the penalty attached to wrong-doing. But sometimes there is such a thing as virtuous poverty. There are thousands of women and children suffering to-day for want of food and raiment, because God has taken away the bread-winner. You cannot visit the penalty upon those whom God has bereaved. If you can make these thousands producers as well as consumers, you will do the greatest possible good, speaking economically, that can be done for them and for society. But this is not possible, and meanwhile they must be fed and clothed. It is not difficult to understand that God allows these cases; nay, that God produces these cases in order that the beneficent emotions and powers of his children may have constant exercise in the grace of giving. The commands of the Lord Christ to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and minister to the poor, are specially abundant and emphatic. And in one of his most awful discourses he makes the distinction between the sinners on his right hand and the sinners on his left hand to consist in the fact that one class was merciful to the poor while the other was not. The gracious words of welcome to the beneficent there, and the terrible curse pronounced against the others, are not for rhetorical display. Does not the appalling charge, "I was a stranger and ye took me not in!" sometimes flash upon the mind, as the unrelieved vagrant drags his unwholesome body away from your gate? He is a bold man who can confront that awful sentence with platitudes about indiscriminate charity.

Once more: Do not hug the delusion that your ready gift of the trifle solicited places you among the right-hand company. A dime is not enough to buy admission there. And you have not done all the things enumerated when you yield to your pity and

give your money. In fact, while stinginess, hardheartedness, callous indifference to human woe or human want, are hideously repulsive when brought out in sharp outlines, and in direct contrast with the opposite virtues—these virtues are not, in themselves, tickets of admission to the court of heaven. You cannot earn the inheritance. You must be “*children, then heirs.*” And it is the spirit of adoption whereby you cry “*Abba, Father*” that gives value to all your works of beneficence. Moreover, the feeling of pity for the destitute very frequently exists in the heart of the man who knows not God. It is the vestige, the indestructible remnant, of the manhood that God made in his own image, and the uncharitable man not only sins against God but also denies his manhood. So, when you give in heedless, spontaneous pity, do not claim the favor of God, because you have merely obeyed your normal instinct. Uncharitableness is not only ungodly. It is inhuman.

These brief suggestions are offered to prepare the way for the other side of the topic. The discussion is very important, and the exact truth should be stated, and all that can be said on the side of pity, forbearance, and charity, should be said with earnestness. But vagrancy is a tremendous social evil, and it is a growing evil. And the stability of all cherished institutions is threatened by the alarming increase of vagrancy in this country. While it is true that an innocent tramp is a thinkable entity, it is also true that a well defined case of virtuous tramping is nowhere on record. A man may wander from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, or from the great lakes to the Gulf, in search of remunerative work. This is conceivable. But when men are inspired by hunger for work, they are not usually gregarious. And the danger from this form of vagrancy lies in the fact that these prowling vagabonds go in bands; and already the papers are filled with accounts of assaults upon life and property committed by companies of these vicious nomads. The following article is from *The Charity Record of St. John's Guild* of December 21, 1878, published in the city of New York. The object of the publication is stated:

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“To place before the public in convenient form a statement of the needs of the deserving poor of this city.

“To discourage indiscriminate almsgiving by advocating the advantages of organised societies.

“To advocate the labor test as a remedy for mendicity.

“To represent the necessity for a ‘Sea-Side Hospital, for destitute sick children,’ to be established in connexion with the ‘Floating Hospital’ of St. John’s Guild.”

“TRAMPS.

“The return of winter is accompanied, as usual, by the return of an army of vagabond wanderers to the great cities, and principally to New York. They have renewed their operations by begging from house to house, and from the casually careless giver on the street, to the end that they may subsist through another hard season in idleness, and be prepared to renew their annual campaign throughout this vast country on the advent of genial weather.

“The attention of the charitable is respectfully invited to the fact that these impostors never apply for relief to any of the organised institutions of benevolence in the city; and their reason for not doing so is because they know their impositions would be detected. Their best method is to work upon the sympathies of those who lack the time or the disposition to investigate their representations.

“The purpose of this article is to attempt to dissuade those who have hitherto given to professional mendicants, whether at their homes or in the streets, from continuing a practice which, we feel certain, they would have long since discontinued if they had comprehended the variety of evil wherewith it is fraught. It is the misdirected generosity of these tender-hearted people that converts our city (among others) into a winter asylum for an army of outlaws who leave it in the spring to beg, steal, or intimidate, according as they think they may gain the most, among the wives and daughters of farmers, and among those who, from living in lonely places or by reason of age, feel compelled in a majority of instances to contribute to the support of a worthless class of non-laborers, that they may avoid insult, assault, or assassination, all of which have been repeatedly perpetrated by tramps in almost every section of the country. It is not only useless, but wrong, for city people to ignore the fact that the acts of tramps render many localities in the rural districts unsafe for residence in summer; and we respectfully suggest to the chance-almoners of city streets and homes that they, by converting cities into winter asylums, make themselves, unthinkingly of course, in large part responsible for the insolence, abuse, barn-burnings, assaults on women, occasional riots, and murders, which are committed by tramps in the open country every summer.

“The tramp, as a character, lacks the active principle of every virtuae

which renders men and communities moral, industrious, happy, prosperous and safe. The tramp's appearance at country houses, from which the male residents are absent, is regarded by the women almost always with fear and frequently with terror. To the public alms-houses should be left the care of tramps, because in these they can always be watched and controlled. Those of them who are not impostors, and who are legitimately unfortunate, can always prove their cases to some parties who are willing to furnish or find them necessary assistance.

"The charitable impulse which prompts careful housekeepers to see that even their crusts shall not be wasted, can be wisely directed; and the gifts resulting from this impulse may be made to confer real benefit on the most worthy of our poor. If such housekeepers will notify the Guild or other charitable organisations that food can be had at their addresses on certain days of the week, we can furnish a list of families whose worthiness is beyond question, and members of which would be only too glad to call for whatever would keep them from starvation.

"Cast-off clothing, if wisely bestowed, would bring much comfort to children and others who now shiver with the blasts of winter. It is indeed a pity that anything should be lost or wasted in a city where there is so much poverty and suffering; but it is even more to be regretted that any gifts, however trifling, should be squandered on a class of individuals who are thereby enabled to exist until the season returns when they may again go forth to endanger the lives and property of peaceable citizens."

Here is a tolerably fair statement of the case. Outside of the tramp organisation (for it *is* an organisation, with signs and passwords and some caricature of internal regulations), there is not a sane man in America who does not perceive the great damage such vagabondage inflicts upon the country. There are public prints, more or less in the interest of Communism and infidelity, that openly assert the doctrine that any attempt to arrest the evil must be an assault upon personal liberty. Can laws be enacted prohibiting purposeless wanderings of free citizens from State to State, or from county to county? Shall legislation forbid the gentleman of leisure taking a pedestrian ramble in search of health or recreation? And if not, will you discriminate against the poor citizen whose chief offence is his poverty, if he attempt the same? Questions of this sort can be multiplied indefinitely, and they cannot be put aside without consideration.

By way of answer, suppose you see a company, say six men, armed with tomahawks and knives, striding along the public

highway. Suppose you have read in the papers that murders and other outrages have been committed in adjacent localities. Will you stop these six citizens and ask their destination and purposes? They may answer very properly that it is none of your business. The organic law of America provides that no citizen shall be deprived of the right to bear arms. They are violating no law. They are accused of no crime, and you arrest them at your peril. You see a rattlesnake crawling across your path. You know rattlesnakes have bitten people, and people have died in consequence; but you do not know that this particular snake has ever done any damage. Shall you crush the life out of a possibly innocent organism formed by God? Because this is the analogous case! All the platitudes that have ever sickened the world cannot blot out the instinctive enmity existing between men and snakes. And all the agrarian nonsense of this democratic age cannot make vagrancy respectable. Society maintains its integrity by stamping out evils when they grow out of proportion, and society cannot afford to remain quiescent while tramps multiply in the land. All the vast destruction of property that accompanied the railroad riots so recently would have been averted if there had been no tramps. The working men who were "on strike" protested with indignant emphasis against the arson, robbery, and murder, although the strike was the signal for the riot! The trades-union, with lofty scorn, scouts enrolment in the same list with the Molly Maguires. Yet the Molly Maguire is only a trades-union that murders non-members. Indeed all trades-unions derive their efficiency from the terror they are able to excite in non-members of the same craft. And the organic law, that is, the common law of England, forbids these combinations explicitly, in that it forbids "conspiracy." It defines "conspiracy" as the combination of two or more men to injure a third. And this specification exactly meets the case. The very essence of these organisations is the truculent attitude they assume towards peaceable workers.

This allusion is not aside from the main subject. Because "the strike" makes compulsory idleness. The member of the union who dares to work when the union commands to strike

takes his life in his hand. It is far better and safer for him to turn tramp!

It is not the province of this REVIEW to form laws for the government of municipalities. It is the business of grand juries and legislatures to meet and overcome the evil. But it is the province of this REVIEW to warn all God-fearing people that the sickly sentimental charity that envelopes the tramp in gentle pity, that gives the vagrant the crown of martyrdom, is not the kind of charity that thinketh no evil. Vagrancy is sin. And the most hideous form of vagrancy is tramping. No sort of repression can be too stern and relentless that is enforced by legal enactment. And if legal forms should prove powerless to drive back this filthy, malarious, murderous tide, now pouring its unwholesome volume over the face of society, then a crisis has arrived in which society, Christian society, should read the old story of Amalek in the 15th chapter of I. Samuel, and listen attentively to the voice of God!

A man who feels conscious of his own manhood can stand on his threshold, and when he finds the truculent vagabond who stands without is no proper object of charity, he can drive him from his premises.

Suppose this man is compelled to leave his home the next day, with no defence under God, for his wife and daughters, but the present laws against vagrancy? Will not the grisly memory of that unlovely face that scowled upon him the other day, haunt his dreams? For this is the kernel of the topic! This wandering vagrant is becoming better and better known as the enemy of helpless women and children. And the time is already come, when women and children invest this vagrant with the attributes of the arch enemy of God and man—the devil.

ARTICLE III.

ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

Eternal Hope. By CANON FARRAR. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 12mo., pp. 225. A. D. 1878.

The Death of Death. By an ORTHODOX LAYMAN. Richmond, Va.: Randolph & English. 1878. 12mo., pp. 210.

We here group together two books which advocate the Restorationist theory of Origen. The first has as its *nucleus* the five sermons in Westminster Abbey, in the end of the year 1877, in which the author was understood to preach Universalism. But as presented in an American dress by the Messrs. Dutton, they are preceded by a long controversial preface, intermingled with many notes, and followed by five *Excursus* attempting to sustain its doctrine.

The doctrine of endless future punishments of the impenitent is one so awful and solemn that it is with painful reluctance the Christian sees it made a subject of controversy. The *odium theologicum* must be malignantly developed indeed, to make one forget that in proving the truth he may be only sealing his individual doom; and is assuredly doing it, unless he attain some degree of the Christ-like spirit of love. It is presumed that there is not a right-minded man in any Church who would not hail with delight the assurance that every creature of God will be finally holy and happy, provided only it could be given with certainty, and in a way consistent with the honor of God. If there are men who are glad to have the fact the other way for the gratification of their own malice or indignation, we have never met them, and we gladly relinquish them to Canon Farrar's eloquent invective. But we submit that he may be doing great injustice by confounding with this harsh temper an honest zeal for the integrity of Scripture exposition, which they fear he is violating; and a benevolent apprehension lest souls may be ruined by a cry of "peace, when there is no peace." We can conceive that good men may be actuated by these motives in opposing our author, and yet feel all the solemn and yearning compassion for lost souls

which he professes. And here is the answer to the charge he hurls constantly of the malignant harshness of the orthodox, that the worthiest and most deeply convinced men of that opinion have ever been the most self-devoted and affectionate laborers for the rescue of their fellow-men from the horrible fate which they believe awaits the disobedient. They have demonstrated their philanthropy by toils, sacrifices, and blood, much more valuable than the rhetoric of such as Canon Farrar.

His professed arguments against the orthodox view are many; his real ones are two. One is that common Christians act so little like men who live among a race rapidly perishing with an everlasting destruction. This argument is, alas, just, not as against God's truth, but as against us; and it ought to fill us with wholesome shame and to stimulate us to remove the pretext by the love and faithfulness of our toil for souls. His other argument is purely sentimental: that his sensibilities reject an idea so ghastly as the endless perdition of creatures; he cannot admit a thing so awful. The awfulness cannot be exaggerated; but it is forgotten that perhaps, if *sin* appeared to his mind as abominable as it does to God, and if he appreciated the rights of God's holiness and majesty as a creature ought, he would see that the doctrine is as just as awful, and therefore likely to be realised under such a Ruler. Thus he might be taught to transfer his abhorrence from *Calvinism to sin*, as the proper object of the unspeakable awe and revulsion.

If the reader expected from so scholarly a source something new and better than the staple arguments of ordinary Universalists, he will be mistaken. He gives us only the old exegesis, in the main, so often refuted, and the old, erroneous ground-view of God's moral government, as utilitarian. In this brief review no attempt will be made to refute his points in detail: only the salient peculiarities of the book can be briefly noticed. We cannot honestly withhold the judgment that this book is foolish, uncandid, and mischievous. Its attempts at argument are weak and self-contradictory, its misrepresentations are patent, and its tendencies are to lull impenitent men into a false security, by the delusive prospect of repentance after death. For instance, the

orthodox doctrine is uniformly painted as including the everlasting damnation of a majority of the human family, immensely larger than the number of the saved. If Canon Farrar knew enough to entitle him to preach on this subject, he ought to have known that nearly all the orthodox believe just the opposite. Although at some evil time or place the reprobate may outnumber the saved, they hold that by virtue of the redemption of the infants dying in infancy (nearly half the race) and of the teeming millennial generations, the major part of the race will ultimately be gathered into heaven, so that mercy shall boast itself against judgment.

He uniformly asserts that we hold all this immensity of penal woe embraced within the immortality of a lost soul as earned exclusively by the sins of his short life on earth. Surely Canon Farrar must know, that while we do not concur in his evident estimate of sin, and while we do not think that man can commit a little sin against an infinite God, the orthodox always assign an everlasting series of sins as the just ground of endless punishments. If he does not know our express dissent from the papal dogma, that beyond death the soul cannot merit, his ignorance is without excuse. His scarcely veiled preference for the papal theology over the reformed theology of his own Church suggests that probably he may hold some such error. But we do not. Hence, if the sinner persists in sinning everlastingly, justice may punish endlessly.

He represents the orthodox as teaching the odious idea that the saints will find an important element of their bliss in gloating over the despair and torments of those once their fellow sinners. Among his proofs are citations from Thomas Aquinas, who says that the happiness of the saints will be enhanced by the law of contrast; and from Jonathan Edwards, teaching that the knowledge of the nature of the torments from which divine grace has delivered them, will enhance the gratitude of the redeemed. Ought not an honest mind to have seen the difference of these statements from his charge? Canon Farrar, let us suppose, has been saved from a shipwreck, in which a part of his comrades have perished. But can he not apprehend how adoring gratitude and joy for his own rescue would be increased by comparing himself,

reclining safe and warm before the genial fire, with the battered corpses tossing amidst the sea-weed, while yet his whole soul might be melted with pity for them?

He preaches a sermon to refute the notion, falsely imputed to us, that the redeemed will be the small minority. It is from the text, Luke xiii. 23, 24: "Lord, are there few that be saved? And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate." Will the reader believe that he closes his sermon without alluding to the next words of our Lord? "For many shall seek to enter in, *and shall not be able.*" Had he permitted the last words to be heard, they would have refuted his Universalism: teaching the solemn truth of Prov. i. 28. that mercy may be defied until at last the selfish and unholy cry of remorse may be forever too late.

He labors in two places at least to prove that the Anglican Church designedly recognises his doctrine, in that she did, A. D. 1562, remove from her Articles the 42d, which rejected restorationism. Yet he knows that this indirect plea is fatally refuted by these facts: that the Litany expressly teaches the people to pray for deliverance from "Thy wrath and *everlasting damnation*;" that the Prayer Book, in the visitation of prisoners, and also of those under sentence of death, most expressly teaches the orthodox view; and that the "Irish Articles of Religion," adopted by the Episcopal Church of Ireland, A. D. 1615, and approved by the government, §101, declares "that the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, *there to endure endless torments.*"

On page 78 he claims, with a taste at least very questionable, the right and qualification to tell us, *ex cathedra*, what *αἰώνιος* means: "the word in its first sense simply means *age-long.*" Yet every lexicon in our reach concurs in saying that its probable root is *ἀει*—ever, and gives as the first meaning of *αἰώνιος*, "time long past and indefinite," and as the second, "of endless duration."

Canon Farrar feels much outraged at being called a "Universalist." He declares more than once that he does not deny the actual endless punishment of some sinners who remain obstinately rebellious. In other places he acknowledges that he does not

know what he believes touching the duration of hell. Only, he is a firm believer in future punishments, to be (possibly or probably) ended by the repentance of the offenders; in the case of how many, who die impenitent, he does not know. The sum of his theology seems to be here: that he will not believe in any more future punishment than he can help, because he does not like to believe it. Would not the common good sense of men decide that one whose own belief was in this fluctuating state should not attempt to teach others, lest if perchance the future should turn his doubts into certainty, he might find that he had misled his fellow-sinners to their ruin? Many of his violent dogmatisms are offensive when thus connected with his avowed uncertainty. Thus, among many admissions, page 84: "I cannot preach the certainty of Universalism." Yet he tells us of wicked men who declared that the doctrine of an endless hell, instead of restraining their sins, inflamed their indignation and sense of injustice against (the Calvinist's) God. With this feeling he evidently sympathises. The language certainly bears the appearance of taking part with these sinners against the representation of God given in the doctrine. Now, as he has confessed that there may be men sinful enough to be endlessly punished, would it not have been best to refrain from thus taking the culprit's side against justice, lest he should even be found to fight against God? He admits that a man may be bad enough to receive endless punishment. Yet in other places he denounces the horrors of the doctrine as intolerable to the loving mind. Here again, let it be supposed that the All-wise may see that all who die impenitent are bad enough to be justly punished forever. Can the author safely claim such an acquaintance with the evil of sin as to pronounce that supposition impossible? But should it turn out the true one, where will his argument be? He declares that the doctrine of punishment is wholly hardening and depraving in this world. Yet his hope of the salvation of multitudes after they go to a (temporal) hell is founded solely on the expectation that they will be so sanctified and softened by the punishment as to embrace the Christ there whom they wilfully reject here! His main argument is, that he cannot believe God's infinite placability can be

limited by a few years and a separation of the soul from an animal body; so that if the sinner in hell repents, God will surely stay his punitive hand. But he is careful not to advert to the vital question: *Will any such repent?* Thus his Pelagian leaning is betrayed. Again, his whole theory of punishment is utilitarian; he cannot conceive of penalty as inflicted for any other end than the reformation of the sufferer; and for penalty inflicted to satisfy justice, his softest word is "arbitrary." It is evident that he knows too little of the "systematic theology" which he despises, to be aware of the fatal contradictions and absurdities into which his theory leads him. The fact of the evil angels' condemnation to endless punishments is, too evidently, fatal to his whole argument. This needs no explanation for Presbyterian readers. It is sad to see the evasion. He informs us quietly near the close that he made up his mind not to complicate the inquiry into human destiny with that about the fallen angels! Had he done so, his whole structure would have tumbled into ruins.

The most prominent feature of Canon Farrar's attempted argument is, that he ascribes the belief in endless punishments to the seeming force of a few texts. But he would have us found doctrines, not on particular texts, but on "broad, unifying principles of Scripture," page 74. On the next page he cries: "I protest at once and finally against this ignorant tyranny of insulated texts," etc. Proof-texts seem to be his especial bane (except such as he shall be allowed to interpret for us in his own fashion). The naughty Orthodox prove too many things by them, which he does not like. They have even refuted by them his darling abolitionism! Now, while we all admit that a proof-text is only valid in the sense the Holy Spirit meant it to bear; and that in finding that sense we ought to give much weight to "the analogy of the faith;" yet we see in this outcry an injustice to the orthodox, and an absurdity. It was the author's duty to tell his hearers that the orthodox never have considered their doctrine of endless punishments as based only on a few "texts;" they always claim that they find themselves constrained, with reluctant awe and fear, to recognise it as based on the "unifying principles" of the whole Bible, as taught in many forms and implied in many of the other admitted

doctrines. And second, as the general is made up of particulars, we cannot conceive whence we are to draw those "unifying principles" except from the collecting and grouping of particular texts. If the author rejects each stone, individually, as a "text," of course he can reject any arch built of stones, no matter how firm.

In fine, his theology is not only against the texts, but it impinges against God's attributes, the fundamental principles of theology, and the facts of Bible history. It overlooks God's sovereignty and majesty, the true nature of sin, the true nature of guilt and penalty, the true condition of man as dead in sin and wholly disabled for any spiritual good accompanying salvation. It builds on the "benevolence theory," and makes man's welfare instead of God's glory the ultimate end.

The second work named, although anonymous, bears designed internal marks of being written by an Episcopalian. While its theory differs but little from Canon Farrar's, its author assures us that it is wholly independent of him. The exact position which the writer wishes to occupy is not clear. For when charged by an objector with a denial of "eternal punishments," he disclaims this construction, and says that he only held that "a hopeless punishment is nowhere taught" in Scripture. This would seem to give the following position: that on the one hand no sinner's doom condemns him inexorably at death or the judgment day to everlasting woe, and whenever a sinner in hell relents from his impenitence and prays for reconciliation, he will receive it; yet on the other hand it is still always possible and even likely that some will suffer everlastingly because they will in fact forever postpone repentance. This is the only sense we can attach to punishment *everlasting* and yet *not hopeless*. Yet the author afterwards declares that his "theory embraces in the harmony of the universe *every* creature of God, whether he be a human being or a fallen angel." He belongs therefore to that class of Restorationists to which Origen is generally referred. While regarding his argument as inconclusive, we must concede to him a pious and reverent spirit. Every trait of his book bespeaks the good man, the devout Christian, and the gentleman. In every respect save

the erroneous logic, in true eloquence, temper, and vigor of thought, he stands in favorable contrast with his clerical comrade in Westminster Abbey. We conclude, with the *Charleston News and Courier*, that, "although the argument burns with the fervor of impassioned feeling, it never ceases to be argument; while it rises at times to lofty eloquence, it never suggests, as does Dr. Farrar, the suspicion of rhetorical display."

Our review must again, for lack of space, omit all detailed examination of particular expositions and arguments. We limit ourselves, at this time, to the notice of one feature. This is the evident affinity between the Restorationist scheme and Semi-Pelagianism. We find both these advocates attempting to give their doctrine respectability by quoting the names of Greek Fathers who advocated or at least tolerated it. Prominent among these are Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Well, these are the very men whose theology was most infected by the arrogant views of Neo-Platonism touching the powers of human nature, and who were swayed by that pagan philosophy to deny or depreciate total depravity; and accurate readers of church history know that Theodore (the true father of Nestorianism) expressly adopted the view of Pelagius and Celestius, then becoming current among the Greeks, and conformed to it his conception of the hypostatic union. Our author reveals the logical tie again in a startling manner. He informs us that his scheme is expressly the sequel and application of Dr. Bledsoe's "Theodicy," which he lauds in the main to the skies. He dissents from him, in that Dr. Bledsoe was a firm assertor of everlasting punishments.

Now the readers of this REVIEW remember that this Theodicy of God's permission of sin is: that he cannot necessitate with absolute certainty the continuance in holiness of any rational creature, because such necessity would destroy his free-agency. Hence he claims for God, that he may plead he has done all for every lost spirit, human or angelic, which even omnipotence could do, compatibly with its nature as a rational free-agent. Because free-agency consists in the contingency and self-determination of the will.

This theory the author adopts with all his soul. On it he builds his hope of universal restorationism. While his lack of acquaintance with theological science prevents his use of its accurate nomenclature, his scheme, stated in that nomenclature, is the following: No sinner ever loses his ability of will to true faith and repentance, even amidst the obduracy and long-confirmed habits of hell. It is a part of his rational and moral *essentia*. Since death does not change this *essentia*, the "faculty of repentance," as he sometimes calls it, cannot be terminated by death. Indeed, no sinner can ever lose it, for in doing so he would lose his essential identity, and so his responsibility. Now, then, reject the horrible doctrines of "election and reprobation," claim Christ's sacrifice to be universal in design, dispense with the necessity of an effectual call, and suppose the gospel offer of reconciliation in Christ to be held forth forever, and our author reaches his conclusion, that whenever the souls in hell repent, as sooner or later all will, they will be pardoned out of it. Thus, page 87, he denies that sin is naturally and certainly self-propagating; hence he holds there is no ground for saying that sinners after death will never repent.

This unscriptural view of human nature is evidently the cornerstone of his system. But if the Bible doctrine is true, that man is "dead in trespasses and sins," that "no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him," then all the author's suppositions may be granted, without reaching his conclusion. He is sure, from his conviction of God's placability and fatherhood, which are immutable, that the day can never come, to all eternity, when the worst sinner who repents will be refused pardon in Christ. But will any who die impenitent ever truly repent? None truly repent here except they be moved thereto by efficacious grace; their original sin will not be less there. The "faculty of repentance" is not natural to man's *essentia* here; he cannot lose what he did not possess; it is the gift of special grace. Hence the very hinge of the whole debate is in the question *whether Christ will give effectual calling to the condemned in the state of punishment*. On that question the Scriptures say at least nothing affirmative. Would it not then be better for us all to be silent where we have

no authority to speak, and to avoid the risk of encouraging sinners to procrastinate repentance by a hope of amendment after death which they will find illusory.

The travesty which is given of the doctrine of predestination shows that the amiable author only knows it in the caricatures of its enemies. If he will study it in the statements of its recognised advocates, he will find in it none of the abhorrent features he imagines.

The author overthrows the theodicy of his own teacher, Dr. Bledsoe, in a most instructive manner. He argues that if men can and do abuse their free-agency, in spite of God's strongest moral restraints, so as to make everlasting shipwreck of their being, then Dr. Bledsoe's defence of God is worthless. For, although his omnipotence be not able to necessitate their holiness consistently with their free-will, his omniscience must have foreseen the utter shipwreck. So that the frightful question recurs as to the origin of evil: Why did not God *refrain from creating* these reprobate souls? Thus the author demolishes Dr. Bledsoe's theodicy. But now, he argues, let his scheme be added, that God's omniscience foresees no souls finally reprobate, that all penal evil is remedial to the sufferers, and that God will make hell itself a means of grace to all the lost, and he has a true theodicy. Alas that this also should be demolished as quickly as the other! If God's end in the creation of the universe is belittling, as his whole argument assumes, then why did not God also *refrain from creating* all such souls as he foresaw would require these frightful means for their final restoration, and stock his worlds with only such souls as would follow holiness and happiness, like the elect angels, without being driven into them by this fiery scourge? Surely the author will not attack God's omnipotence by denying that he was able to do the latter. Then we should have had a universe containing all the good which he supposed will be finally presented by the existing one, *minus* all the woes of earth and hell. These, including the penal miseries of those who die impenitent, which the author thinks may continue for multitudes of the more stubborn, through countless, though not literally infinite, years, make up a frightful aggregate.

Why did God choose a universe with such an addition of crime and woe when he had the option of one without it? The author is as far from a theodicy as Dr. Bledsoe.

The speculations of both these writers are obnoxious to this just charge: that in assuming an *à priori* ground of improbability against endless punishments, they go beyond the depth of the created reason. They tell us that when the everlasting penalty is properly estimated, it is found so enormous that they cannot be convinced that God is capable of inflicting it. Are they certain that they know how enormous an evil sin is in God's omniscient judgment? Does not the greater crime justify the heavier penalty, according to all jurisprudence? Before this question, it becomes us to lay our faces in the dust. But such writers would exclaim, if sin is indeed such a thing as to necessitate this fearful treatment by a "God of love," and if so many of our race are actually exposed to it, then should all men take wholly another view of this world and of life than that taken by the most serious believer! Then we ought to regard our smiling world as little less dreadful than a charnel house of souls! Then every sane man ought to be, as to his own rescue, "agonising to enter into the strait gate!" Every good man ought to be toiling to pluck his neighbors as "brands from the burning," like men around a burning dwelling which still includes a helpless family. There should not be one hour in this world for frivolous amusement or occupation; and all should be condemned as frivolous save such as bore, directly or indirectly, on the rescue of souls. The man not stony-hearted ought to "say to laughter, it is mad; and mirth, what doeth it"? on such a stage as this earth, where such a tragedy is enacting. Every just and humane mind ought to feel that it was little short of treason to human misery to expend on the pomps or luxuries of life one dollar of the money which might send a Bible or an evangelist to ignorant souls.

Well, if it should be even so? If it be so, the world is insane (Eccles. ix. 3) and the Church is shockingly below its proper standard of duty! But is this an impossible supposition? Unless these writers are justified in saying so, they are not justified in

leaping to the conclusion that the orthodox doctrine cannot be true because it is so awful. One thing appears evident, there has been *one Man* on earth who did appear to frame his whole life and nerve his energies in accordance with this solemn and dreadful view of human destiny. He seemed to live, and strive, and preach, and die, just as a good man should, who really believed the sinner's ruin to be everlasting. And this was the *one Man* who knew the truth by experience, because he came from the other world and returned to it. R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE IV.

CALVIN AND SERVETUS.

The relations which subsisted between these two celebrated persons, and the connection of the former with the latter's death, constitute one of the most interesting subjects of modern historical research. The first modern attempt to portray the life of Calvin, so far as we know, was one by a Genevese named Senebier, and the second, another by one Fischer—both simple biographical notices, very brief and meagre. Bretschneider also wrote a short memoir in the *Reformations-Almanach* on the *Genius and Character of Calvin*. In 1831-36 appeared *Genealogical Notices respecting Genevan families*, by J. A. Galiffe of Geneva, who "takes part against Calvin, though not very fairly and openly," says Dr. Paul Henry. In 1839 appeared the work of Trechsel in German, which Henry speaks of as expressly defending Calvin. During twenty years before and after this period Henry's "Life and Times of John Calvin" was in process of writing and publication. Dr. McCrie, it is said, was engaged at the time of his death on a "Life of the Reformer," but we are not informed if it was ever given to the public. Mignet, the author of a "History of the French Revolution," also wrote a work on "Calvin and the Reformation." In 1844 M. Rilliet de Candolle, who was, if we

mistake not, a Unitarian minister of Geneva, published his "Account of the Trial of Servetus." It appeared in the *Memoirs and Documents* put forth by the Genevan Society of History and Archæology. In 1848 M. Emile Saisset published his views of "The Prosecution and Death of Michael Servetus" in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Paris. In 1850 appeared a "Biography of Calvin," by Stähelin, a theologian of Basle, which gives even a fuller account than M. Saisset's articles, of the doctrines of Servetus, for which he had to suffer. Then in 1853 we get the *History of the Church* of Geneva, by Jean Gaberel; and in 1862, "*Calvin: his Life, Labors, and Writings*," by Rev. Felix Bungener, a Genevan pastor and an author of repute. In 1868 appears "Great Christians of France: St. Louis and Calvin," by the distinguished M. Guizot. Finally, Dr. Merle d'Aubigné, in eight volumes, has treated of *the Reformation in Europe in the time of Calvin*, and has given us very valuable information about the Reformer himself, but does not discourse at all upon his relations with Servetus. We must not close this list without mentioning that the Rev. Dr. Jules Bonnet, with the approbation of the French Government, explored its archives with great success and brought forth a large number of original letters of Calvin. They cover the period from 1528 to 1564, and have been translated into English from the Latin and French and published about 1858 by the Presbyterian Board at Philadelphia in four octavo volumes.

Guizot and Bungener, then, are the latest writers who have discussed the subject of this article. They are both Protestants. M. Saisset, Guizot tells us, is (or was) "a very distinguished philosopher of the contemporary French School"—he may or he may not be of the Roman Catholic Church. We propose to furnish our readers who may not have convenient access to the productions named with what we may be able to learn under the instructions especially of these three writers, respecting the great Genevese and his unhappy Spanish antagonist.

Let us begin by recurring to two new and daring ideas which Guizot says that Calvin introduced into the Reformation: the *first*, that Church and State were to be neither united nor separ-

ated, but only distinguished—they were two societies, two powers, each independent in its own domain, but combining in action and giving support to each other; the *second*, that the Church is not to be governed by “clergy,” but by elders, who are representatives chosen by the people. These elders were to constitute an ecclesiastical tribunal authorised to inspect continually and by discipline to control the life and morals of all members of the Church, and in extreme cases to have recourse to the civil power. Two bodies of elders are constituted, one called *The Venerable Company of Pastors*, who preached and administered the sacraments and also sat as members of the other body, called *The Consistory*. This second body was composed of twelve elders and six pastors (the popular element doubling the ministerial); and the election of members depended on a nomination by the Venerable Company and the choice of the Lesser Council and the confirmation of the Council of Two Hundred, both of which were political bodies. There was one more political body at Geneva, namely, the General Council, which consisted of all the citizens summoned to meet when needful by the ringing of the great bell. All these political councils existed at Geneva long before Calvin’s day. But the Reformer was not long there before he procured the passage of a law making it a crime for any one to summon this *mass meeting*, and thus he established and conserved popular freedom by confining authority to the hands of representatives of the people.

The French statesman concludes and declares that there was no ecclesiastical theocracy at Geneva in Calvin’s time. In all questions of faith and of religious or moral discipline the magistrates recognised the ministers and elders, but vigilantly resisted any extension of their power beyond due limits, controlled it within those limits, and even exercised due authority over these pastors themselves. Calvin unquestionably wielded great influence, yet even he was not beyond the reach of admonition by the magistrates. And he had enemies in Geneva—bitter enemies, who hated him with mortal hatred, seeking long and pertinaciously his overthrow and even his life. Two classes of these are to be especially named—both classes called *Libertines*: the one being local and

practical libertines, irreligious and immoral persons, both male and female, and the other an anti-Christian and Pantheistic sect who chose to be styled *Spiritual Libertines*. One class of these Libertines, or enemies of all restraint, are therefore sceptical, the other licentious, but both united eagerly against the Reformer. And it is Guizot's opinion that in his zeal for the proper regulation of morals and of conduct amongst the people, Calvin allowed himself to interfere with the rights of conscience and of personal liberty, and restricted individual responsibility within too narrow limits; and that in this way he furnished his foes with dangerous weapons against himself and prepared grave perils which he had afterwards to encounter.

Here let us turn to Bungener, who tells us of the "ecclesiastical ordinances" passed through the three political councils immediately on Calvin's return from exile, by which "the Christian State" sought "to make in the name of God such laws as might concur to the establishment and maintenance of the kingdom of God on earth." Amongst these is found a law requiring the pastors to assemble weekly for mutual instruction by Biblical exposition. "Should any difference as to doctrine arise, let them treat of it at first together; if that suffice not, let them call the elders; and if that suffice not, let the cause be brought before the magistrate to be set right." This was truly (as Bungener says) "a strange article"! It seemed to put the State over the Church as to doctrine itself. He views it as an expedient of the moment arising out of the need to consolidate at any cost an edifice that was to be assailed by so many storms. But perhaps, he says, it is not just to attribute this article to Calvin. The Council had at some length revised what Calvin and a commission acting with him had prepared, and its registers prove that their revision was not always in accordance with his views. And yet Bungener holds that the Reformer had very skilfully guarded the independence of the Church, although that was "sacrificed as it seemed in some articles, and compromised as a whole, by the very fact of the strict union between Church and State." He adds that "the Church's independence was cramped here and there, it is true, by inevitable contact with the political

power, but it was ever recognised and respected in its general features as an indestructible tradition"; and that "the Church of Geneva always had for *her* bishop—the company of pastors."

We are ready now to consider what Guizot says of the personal history and character of Servetus. He was born in the same year with Calvin, 1509, at Villanueva, a city of Arragon, Spain. He travelled through France, Germany, and Switzerland, and was strongly imbued with the novel opinions of the time. With him the Pope was "the most murderous of beasts," and Rome "the most shameless of harlots." Bungener says: "Hunted by the idea that the Reformers had stopped too soon, and that Christianity, in order to become true again, needed a restoration deeper and far more complete, he hoped to induce Calvin to place himself at the head of the work thus resumed." This was to "ask from him a declaration that till then he had only taught half a reformation." Guizot describes him as gifted with rapid insight, brilliant imagination, marvellous powers of acquisition, and wealth of novel theories, often rash, but sometimes ingenious and happy. Bungener says he blended in his studies law, physic, and divinity, and toiling like one of the sixteenth century, but daring as one of the eighteenth (he might better, we think, have said of the *nineteenth*), he pried into everything. In his first work against the Trinity and in the fifth book there is a passage which was unheeded by his contemporaries, but which contains the whole theory of the circulation of the blood. Guizot says that in Paris in 1534 he was both a student and a professor, giving and receiving lessons in medicine, mathematics, and astronomy, and turning his attention also to astrology. The extent and versatility of his powers attracted large audiences, but his exacting and quarrelsome temper soon embroiled him with the whole University, which distrusted his views and detested his person. He lacked modesty and was violent and abusive and full of presumptuous and arrogant self-complacence. He had previously published two books—the first "on the Errors of the Trinity," which Guizot says was vague and superficial, rash and violent, but written with vigor and a certain glitter of imagination and subtlety of thought. Both Catholics and Protestants received it with prompt and severe

disapproval. Almost immediately he published a second on the same subject, retracting the first, not as false, but crude and imperfect. In addition to attacks on the Trinity, this book disclosed a much more wild and impious pantheism than the first had done. It was the damage he did thus to his name in both Germany and Switzerland that drove him to Paris, where, as just mentioned, he quarrels with his associates. Leaving Paris he sojourns in different places, changing his name with every change of residence. At length in 1540 he settles at Vienne in Dauphiné for twelve years, under the name of Villeneuve, from his native city, enjoys high repute as a physician, and is in outward conformity a Roman Catholic. Dr. Henry says he lived there in the very palace of the Archbishop in perfect tranquillity, but as a hypocrite, for he submitted himself to all the practical requirements of the Church. Shortly before his death he remembered all this and expressed his shame to the magistrate at Geneva.

Bungener says that the movement at the head of which Servetus wished Calvin to stand was nothing short of "Anabaptist Pantheism—not Pantheism as in our day it is often taught or combated on the ground of social questions, but Pantheism as dogma," so that Calvin "clearly perceived in the system he proposed the very subversion of Christianity." Guizot refers to Stähelin as explaining that the fundamental principle of the whole book is the assertion of the one absolute and indivisible God and yet that God is all things and all things are God. M. Emile Saisset gives a more developed account of the doctrine of Servetus which yet is in full agreement with that of Stähelin—so Guizot declares. Bungener quotes what Servetus said at his trial in Geneva as setting forth his doctrine: "I have no doubt that this bench, this cupboard, and all that can be shown me, are the substance of God;" and when the objection was set before him by Calvin that then even the devil would be substantially God, he replied laughing, "Do you doubt it? All things are part and parcel of God." And Dr. Paul Henry tells us how, with a view of making the doctrine of the Incarnation appear ridiculous, he made blasphemous sport of holy things in words which, with

Henry, we grieve and tremble to copy, but which the truth of history bids us transcribe, and may the Holy One graciously forgive if we do wrong. He wrote thus: "If the angels in like manner were to take asses' bodies, you must allow that they would then be asses, and they would die in their asses' skins; they would be four-footed animals and would have long ears. So too you must allow that were you right, God himself might be an ass, the Holy Spirit a mule, and that He would die if the mule died. Oh the wondrously altered animal! Can we be surprised if the Turks think us more ridiculous than asses and mules?" There is, however, something even worse than this which Dr. Henry quotes from Servetus as follows, and again we say in pious horror of the blasphemy, may God forgive us if we do wrong even to refer to it: "He called the Persons of the Godhead inventions of the devil and the Triune Deity a hell-hound," or, as he otherwise expressed it, "a three-headed Cerberus."

In 1534 Calvin first met with Servetus in Paris. The latter had just published his first book upon the Trinity at Hagenau, and he had repaired to Basle and there sustained his views against *Æcolampadius*. Thence he went to Paris, declaring he would sustain them against Calvin. There is abundant evidence that Servetus regarded himself as a veritable Reformer—the last and greatest one. Evidently too he had strange fancies of his own, such as that somehow he stood connected with Michael the archangel whose name he bore. We have seen that he considered that the Reformers stopped short of the right point—he would inaugurate a very different kind of reformation (as Guizot says) from what was going on around him; or as Bungener expresses it, if the Reformers before him attacked only certain dogmas of the Church, he would aim at the very heart and soul of the Christian system. "I am neither Catholic nor Protestant," he said. And so he aspired to convert Calvin, and either destroy his influence, or else, as Bungener says, induce him to take the lead in this last and greatest reform. Accordingly he challenged Calvin to a public controversy at Paris, which challenge Calvin accepted and repaired to the appointed place at the set time. Servetus, however, for what reason it is not known, did not make his ap-

pearance. And Guizot suggests that there can be no doubt that some contempt for an adversary who had escaped in this manner from a contest was awakened in Calvin's mind. Subsequently Servetus writes many letters to the Reformer, who replies coldly but without acrimony. He gave him, says Guizot, wise and earnest advice, but was evidently careful not to enter into regular correspondence with him and anxious to avoid all appearance of intimacy, even as an opponent, with a man whom he did not esteem and whose views and ideas outraged all his own. To their common friend, Frelon, a bookseller of Lyons, he said, on the 13th February, 1546, the great lesson Servetus needed to learn was "humility, but it must come to him from the Spirit of God, not otherwise. . . . If God grants that favor to him and to us that the present answer turns to his profit, I shall have whereof to rejoice. If he persists in the same style as he has now done, you will lose time in asking me to bestow labor upon him, for I have other affairs which press upon me more closely. . . . And therefore I beg you to content yourself with what I have done in the matter, unless you see some better order to be taken therein." The Spaniard, however, continued to write, sending Calvin a great mass of his productions. He even expressed his wish to go to Geneva, but he required a safe-conduct and an invitation. But Henry, who states the fact, says Calvin would lend him no aid. And Guizot says that the Reformer was at length wearied out and replied thus: "Neither now nor at any future time will I mix myself up in any way with your wild dreams. Forgive me for speaking thus, but truth compels me to do so. I neither hate nor despise you; I do not wish to treat you harshly; but I must be made of iron if I could hear you rail against the doctrine of salvation and not be moved by it. Moreover, I have no time to concern myself any further with your plans and systems; all that I can say to you on this subject is contained in my 'Christian Institutes,' to which I must now refer you."

Servetus was deeply wounded by this language, which Guizot calls "haughty," and from this time forward there was an end of all direct correspondence on the part of Calvin. On the 13th of February, 1546, the same day that he writes as above to Frelon,

the Reformer pens his celebrated letter to Farel (Bungener by mistake says to *Viret*), in which, according to the translated letter in Bonnet's Vol. II., p. 33, he says: "Servetus lately wrote to me and coupled with his letter a long volume of his delirious fancies with the Thrasonic boast that I should see something astonishing and unheard of. He takes it upon him to come hither if it be agreeable to me. But I am unwilling to pledge my word for his safety; for if he shall come, I shall never permit him to depart alive, provided my authority be of any avail."

Dr. Paul Henry says "this was but an outbreak of anger, a threat uttered in passion." But he adds that the letter to Frelon of the same date expresses the kindly hope that his opponent might still be converted. This is true, but hardly consists with the imputation of passionate anger to the Reformer. His enemies, says Henry, have made the sentence referred to of vast importance for the want of grounds of accusation against him. They seem not to perceive that their complaint is unreasonable; for had Calvin really and in itself wished for the death of Servetus, he must have encouraged his coming to Geneva. It is incredible, continues Dr. Henry, how many fables have been founded on this expression—to what ravings even it has given occasion, and that up to the present time. And then he observes that Calvin in all simplicity always acknowledged that he thought Servetus deserved to die for his blasphemy. It appears to us therefore quite unnecessary, also unjust, to ascribe this declaration to passion. It was the Reformer's honest belief that a blasphemer ought to be put to death, and he expressed it coolly and calmly. And as Bullinger remarks, it is fundamentally better that this declaration was made beforehand than if he had acted towards his opponent with more circumspection, concealing from him what awaited him at Geneva. And further, there is manifest here the total absence of all personal animosity. This menace is made in 1546, a period in which the Spaniard showed him only great consideration and respect—indeed, almost admiring friendship. Calvin at that time could not have hated him personally, whatever may be charged on him afterwards, nor could this threat be other than a calm and solemn declaration of what he held that

duty would demand of him. Indeed, it appears to us that he may have honestly said even during the terrible trial seven years after, that, he had hated and did hate the errors—not the man. Whatever his faults, there were in Calvin no disguises. True to the spirit of his age and to the principles he holds and boldly professes, he is ready to sanction the execution of a blaspheming heretic, and so he gives him plainly to understand.

At length Servetus publishes his “*Christianismi Restitutio*,” which he expected to produce a greater social and religious revolution in Europe than the Reformation had done. But with mingled audacity and cowardice he does not declare himself its author. He procures the printing of it in secret in Vienne in the very diocese where he was living under the protection of the Archbishop. Eight hundred, some say one thousand copies, were struck off, and bales of them forwarded at once to Lyons, Châtillon, Frankfort, and Geneva. It was an octavo of 734 pages, says M. Saisset, and he adds that there appear to be extant now only two copies of this edition, one in the French National Library and the other in the Imperial Library of Vienna. The book bore no name either of author or printer, only the three initial letters of the name and country of Servetus were placed at the bottom of the last page: M. S. V.—Michael Servetus. Villanueva.

Lyons, says M. Guizot, was now the centre of Catholicism, and Geneva that of Protestantism; in both the book excited public indignation. Yet the people of Geneva marvelled that in a city like Lyons no steps were taken to stop the circulation of such a book and to discover and punish the author. Because, as M. Saisset mentions, Lyons had for its governor and archbishop the Cardinal Tournon, so celebrated for burning zeal against heretics, and by his side there dwelt Brother Matthew Ory, Inquisitor General of the Kingdom of France. Now there was a M. de Trie at Geneva, a French refugee and a zealous Protestant and follower of Calvin, who was in correspondence with a relative at Lyons, Antoine Arneys, who was an ardent Catholic. This latter accuses the Reformers of being without faith or discipline and of sanctioning the most unbridled licence. In his turn De Trie accuses the

Roman Catholic Church of inability to repress licence in her own domains and of indifference to it, and in proof he instances Servetus and his book recently printed at Vienne under the very eyes of the Archbishop. And then he substantiates his words by sending to his relative the title page, the index, and the first four pages of "the Restitutio." The Inquisitor, the Cardinal, and the Vicar General of the Archbishop of Vienne, take up the case, and Servetus is summoned for examination. After two hours, which interval those who upheld him acknowledged that he no doubt occupied in destroying all his dangerous papers, he appears, but puts in a denial that he held any heresy, and offered to have his apartments searched for any letters or other documents that could compromise him. Nothing of the sort was found. The printers also denied that they had ever seen the manuscript of the work of which four pages were shown them or that within two years past they had printed any work in octavo; and for proof they produced a list of their publications during that period. So the conclusion was reached that there was really no ground for any proceedings against the Spanish physician, Senor Villanueva.

But, Guizot says, the falsehood was rash and useless, and the reader may be disposed to add cowardly too. Too many, says Guizot, had been engaged in the production of the book; too many copies had been sent away; the initials M. S. V. pointed too plainly at the author; and Servetus himself had too often boasted of his work. The Cardinal and the Inquisitor apply to the source whence the first notification came for further light. They direct Arneys to write to De Trie for information and proofs. He sends some letters from Servetus to Calvin, which he was sure Servetus could not deny writing. But he tells Arneys that he had great difficulty in obtaining them from Calvin—"not that he does not desire to repress such execrable blasphemers, but that it seems to him that his part is, inasmuch as he does not bear the sword of justice, rather to confute heresy by sound doctrine than pursue it by other means"—and then he goes on to explain how he had prevailed over the Reformer's objections by pleading that, if he did not furnish him with these proofs, he, De Trie,

would be held guilty of having made reckless assertions. The effect of these proofs was the re-arrest of Servetus. The unhappy man was greatly troubled, and fell, says Guizot, into all kinds of strange and contradictory statements and denials. "If he had written these things, it was done heedlessly, by way of argument and without serious thought." "And then he is said (records the French statesman quoting from Dr. Paul Henry) to have burst into tears and uttered the most unexpected lie, denying that he was Servetus: 'I will tell you the whole truth. Twenty-five years ago when I was in Germany, a book by a certain Servetus, a Spaniard, was published at Aganou (Hagenau); I do not know where he was then living. When I entered into correspondence with Calvin, he charged me with being Servetus on account of the similarity of our views, and after that I assumed the character of Servetus.'" Upon this he was imprisoned, but he was treated with indulgence by the gaoler whose sick daughter he had cured, and was allowed to escape. For months there were no traces of him. Sentence was however pronounced against him by the Roman Catholic authorities at Vienne, and on the 17th of June he was condemned to be burnt alive.

M. Saisset is of the opinion that in all this affair De Trie was only a puppet in Calvin's hands, who dictated the letters which he wrote, and used him as an instrument for procuring the execution of his foe by the hands of the Roman Catholics. He says De Trie expatriated himself through religious zeal, but insinuates that "perhaps also this was necessitated by misfortunes in business." He speaks of him also as a "simple and uneducated person," though Paul Henry calls him "a noble Frenchman." Saisset says "the docile simplicity of William Trie and the fanatic zeal of Arneys were the two instruments which Calvin resolved to make use of to destroy his enemy." Accordingly the first letter written by M. de Trie to his friend at Lyons, Saisset maintains was "manifestly calculated with most adroit perfidy to induce Arneys to denounce" Servetus to the Inquisition. "Calvin (he says) denied all hand in this outrageous letter, but traces of him are to be seen throughout the whole of it, and it is to-day incontestable that he dictated it." His proofs are that Trie should

know that Servetus was the author of "Restitutio," and that he should also be acquainted with the contents of that book. The second letter of M. de Trie, written to his Lyons friend, Saisset maintains, was also dictated by Calvin, and he says: "Never did implacable hatred pursue its end by more tortuous paths." "Calvin (he says) shows himself in this letter more sagacious and more jealous than the very Inquisition." "He communicates to it documents it asked not for," and "at the same time he feigns to have had them extorted from him by a species of violence." And he thinks that in this "memorable letter the hypocrisy, the fanaticism, and the hatred (of Calvin) form a horrible assemblage."

These are very serious charges. M. Saisset no doubt believed them. But he offers no proof, though asserting that in this day they are incontestable. It does not appear to us very strange, if a bale of these books were sent to Geneva, that an intelligent and earnest Protestant sojourning there, like M. de Trie, should have seen and examined the book, and should have conversed with Calvin about it, and should have learned the source of it from him. These facts admitted, the rest is all plain and easy. He writes to his friend, defending the cause he has adopted from unjust accusations, and seeks with very proper zeal to turn the tables on him. Arneys feels the sting of the reproach against his Church and reports to the Inquisitor. Servetus denies and seems to disprove the charge, and De Trie finds himself in the position of a false accuser. With the plea that his good name is at stake he overcomes Calvin's scruples, declaring for him that he does not question the necessity of putting down the blasphemer, but that he is loth to undertake what does not devolve on him. All this seems to us very natural, and we can discover nothing tortuous, implacable, hypocritical, or fanatical about it. The letters of M. de Trie moreover impress our mind as in no respect characteristic of the Reformer, but as being just such letters as a converted Roman Catholic of education might be expected to write. But we have positive evidence to add to this negative sort. Modern jurisprudence allows every man to testify in his own behalf, and we can produce what Calvin himself said by way of self-defence.

Guizot tells us what he said as follows: "It is reported that I have contrived to have Servetus taken prisoner in the Papal dominions, that is at Vienne; and thereupon many say that I have not acted honorably in exposing him to the deadly enemies of the faith. There is no need to insist on very vigorously denying such a frivolous calumny, which will fall flat when I have said in one word that there is no truth in it." This appears to us to settle the question of fact. Guizot says well: "There are no errors or rather no vices with which it is so impossible to charge Calvin as with untruth and hypocrisy. During the whole course of his life he openly avowed his thoughts and acknowledged his actions; he left his native country forever and the country of his adoption for a long period, just because he was resolved to assert his opinions and to act according to his opinions." The French statesman says also that "it shows an extraordinary misapprehension of his character to imagine that this hesitation [that is, about giving to De Trie the evidence he sought for] was an act of hypocrisy and that the surrender of the papers was a piece of premeditated perfidy." No, Calvin's positive denial settles the question of fact—had he actually been the author of Servetus' arrest and rearrest, he never would have flinched one moment from acknowledging it: nay, he would from the very construction of his nature have openly declared and gloried in it. But, as Bungener says, "his enemies admit that the business was not conducted by him but by M. de Trie, who acted as his secretary. The question therefore is reduced to this—to know whether the secretary had orders to do what he did. Now we do not think that any man of good faith, at all acquainted with Calvin, can dare to suspect him of having said, 'It is not I,' if the culprit had been his agent."

But we have not heard the whole of Calvin's evidence. Bungener makes it plain, as he puts the case, that the Reformer is not chargeable even indirectly with laying a plot against Servetus. "It is a frivolous calumny," says the great, the candid, the honest Genevese, "there is no truth in it." Enough. His bitterest enemies ought to acknowledge that he never lies, and clearly he had in fact no hand in bringing Servetus before the Inquisition. That was the result of De Trie's simple-hearted efforts to rebut

the charges brought by Arneys against the Reformation. But now hear Bungener speak again: "Why speak of *culprit*?" And he proceeds to declare that Calvin did not think De Trie's conduct in any aspect blameworthy. And hear Calvin speak again, adding to what was quoted from him above these words, which must silence every doubt as touching the fact. "If (says he) the accusation were true, I would not deny it, and I do not think it would be at all discreditable to me." He felt, as Guizot says, a contempt for the untruth and cowardice practised by Servetus; he openly condemned him and his book from the very first; and he thought it was a right thing to prove Servetus the author of the blasphemies he had published and then denied; but in point of fact it was not true that he had caused his betrayal, and therefore he would not lie under the imputation.

Sentence against Servetus was pronounced by his Roman Catholic judges on the 17th June, 1553. He had been put into prison on the 5th April and had escaped on the 7th. No traces of him were found between that day and the middle of July. He appears to have wandered either in French or in Swiss territory, and when at a later period he was asked where he had intended to go after his escape from Vienne, he varied in his answers, sometimes naming Spain and at others Italy as his proposed place of refuge. But Guizot says: "I am inclined to believe that from the very first he intended to make his way to a much nearer spot." Accordingly on the 17th July, just one month after his fearful sentence at Vienne, alone and unknown he enters a little inn called the *Auberge de la Rose* on the banks of the lake at Geneva. He said that he wanted a boat to go across the lake so that he might go on to Zurich. He did not cross the lake, however, but stayed, says Guizot, for twenty-seven days at that place, greatly exciting the curiosity of his host, who asked him one day if he was married. "No," said Servetus, "there are plenty of women in the world without marrying."

Calvin afterwards said that he did not know how to account for the conduct of the Spaniard "unless he was seized by a fatal infatuation and rushed into danger." But Guizot thinks there is equally strong proof of premeditated design in this prolonged

visit. Precisely at this period the Reformer was in the thick of his contest with the Libertines on the subject of excommunication from the Lord's Supper, and at that very time they had some reason to expect a triumph. Ami Perrin, one of their leaders, was first Syndic. In the Council of the Two Hundred they were sure of a majority, and nearly sure of one in the Lesser Council, which possessed the executive power. And one of their party named Gueroult, who had been banished from Geneva but had just been brought back through the influence of the Libertines, was the corrector of the press to the printer Arnoullet at Vienne who had got out the *Restitutio*. Naturally he would be the medium between the Libertines and Servetus. Guizot finds no definite and positive proof of his intervention at this particular time, but is convinced, taking a comprehensive view of the whole case, that Servetus came to Geneva relying on the support of that powerful party, whilst the Libertines on their side expected efficacious help from him against Calvin.

But from the moment Calvin heard that Servetus was in Geneva, he appears not to have hesitated for one moment. Engaged in one fierce and perilous struggle, he instantly adds a second contest to the first. He aspires to gain a victory for Christianity over a Pantheistic visionary, and at the same time one for religion and morality over a licentious faction. He writes to one of the Syndics and demands the arrest of the Spaniard, and he is arrested on the 13th August, 1553. According to Genevan law there must be a formal accusation, and also a prosecutor who consents himself to be imprisoned and to hold himself criminally responsible for the truth of the charge. Calvin provided this prosecutor in the person of his secretary, Nicolas de la Fontaine, a French refugee. The first examination was held the day after the arrest, and the trial commenced on the 15th August. It lasted two months and thirteen days.

For the first fourteen or fifteen days, says Guizot, Servetus showed no lack either of moderation or skill, although both attack and defence were sharp and keen. He maintained the truth of the doctrines he had put forth, but was most anxious to show that they were not contrary to the Christian religion, that he had

never wished to separate himself from the Church, and that his aim was to restore Christianity, not to abolish it. The trial was soon transferred into a theological controversy, Calvin after the 17th August taking part directly in it. Servetus offered to shew Calvin his own errors and faults before the whole congregation, proving them by arguments drawn from the Sacred Scriptures. Calvin eagerly accepted this offer, declaring that he desired nothing so much as to conduct this trial in the church and before all the people. But the Council refused to let the case pass out of their hands, and especially as the friends of Servetus, more prudent than himself, were not willing, knowing how much more weight the Reformer's words would naturally carry with the people than the Spanish stranger.

The developments at the trial, Guizot tells us, both shocked and embarrassed the Council. Calvin had warm partisans and Servetus eager advocates and protectors, as the principal Libertine leaders, Ami Perrin and Berthelier. But there were, he says, impartial members of it, who were sorry to see Calvin take such a prominent part in the prosecution. These had moreover no desire to become judges in a trial for heresy. Yet they recognised the danger to Christianity from the Spaniard's Pantheism, and refused at any cost to appear to sanction it. And moreover they disliked and suspected Servetus. Sincere enough he was in his adherence to his own views, but they found him frivolous, vain, arrogant, irresolute, and worse than all, untruthful. He denied all connexion with the Libertines of Geneva or with even their agent Gueroult, who had corrected his book at Vienne. These obvious falsehoods withdrew from him all the confidence even of those magistrates who hesitated to condemn him. The majority of these judges, Guizot says, unquestionably desired to modify the character of the trial and make its personal animosity less apparent. They wished to appear the defenders of Christianity in general, and not any special theological system. And therefore they adjourned the trial several times, and put off the final decision as if dreading to pronounce it. Moreover, when by the advice of his supporters Servetus demanded that the principal Reformed churches in Switzerland—Schaffhausen, Berne, Zurich,

and Basle—should be consulted on his case, since on similar occasions they had always shown themselves far more moderate than Calvin, the Council granted the request and the Reformer did not oppose it.

But the time for procrastination at length passed away and the crisis of the two struggles going on in this little state arrived. With the instinct of the man of action, says Guizot, this was felt by Calvin, and on the 27th August, 1553, he utters from the pulpit the severest censures on the conduct of Servetus, and on the following Sunday, Sept. 3d, refuses to administer the communion to the leader of the Libertines, notwithstanding the requirements of the Council of State. The trial of Servetus suddenly changes its whole character. All moderation, all prudence is cast aside by the prisoner, who is led away by the hope of overwhelming an enemy now fiercely attacked and in danger elsewhere. Servetus becomes the violent accuser of Calvin, even to the demand for his death. The Reformer was in circumstances to feel the probability that this appeal might be a success. The Memoir of Servetus calling from the depths of his prison for Calvin to be likewise incarcerated and put on trial for his life, together with the answer which he gave to it, the Council decided to send to the Swiss churches. But they seem to have hesitated about submitting the case to the judgment of these colleagues. Should the Swiss churches not judge like Calvin, what was to be done? Should they judge like Calvin, it would become necessary to condemn Servetus; and amid their other Genevan disputes, says Bungener, the Council was not anxious to procure for Calvin a victory which might lead to more victories. The Reformer understood the situation perfectly well. His letters to Bullinger and Farel indicate his discouraged state of feeling. The possible absolution of Servetus appears to him the subversion of his work—of his moral and political work as well as of his religious work and the too certain indication that God no longer supports it. He goes so far as to hint that he might take his departure and abandon it all. So that instead of Calvin's being at this time all-powerful and dictating the sentence of Servetus, on the contrary, he had never been so nearly unable to do anything. Bullinger and Farel both

conjure him not to give way to these feelings and not to expose Geneva by his departure to the accomplishment of her ruin by her own hands. Farel boldly declares that the death of Servetus was indispensable, and that whoso said the contrary was a traitor or an imbecile. "I have always declared (said he) that I was ready to die if I had taught what was contrary to sound doctrine, and I cannot apply a different rule to others." So reasoned the stern spirit of the sixteenth century. The question of sincerity or of intentions is set aside—neither was possible in him who taught error. It was the Romish idea in all its rigidity but without its logic, for there can be no logic in this idea (as Bungener says well) unless the infallible tribunal is supposed. But this Romish idea is so deeply imbedded in the spirit of the age that we find even Servetus himself accepting it. In his Memoir to the Council he says he is "content to die if he does not succeed in confounding Calvin," and asks that Calvin may be "detained a prisoner like himself," and if proved guilty be put to death instead of him.

At length, on the 19th September, it is decided in the Council to apply for the opinions of Berne, Zurich, Basle, and Schaffhausen. On the 21st the necessary documents—the Memoir of Servetus and Calvin's answer, with other such papers—are dispatched. Three weeks elapse, and Servetus finding there is no answer, concludes that he has been misled as to his adversary's weakness. In prison, sick and forsaken by the Libertines who had urged him on, his passionate excitement gives place to dejection. To be a prisoner in the sixteenth century, says Bullinger, was horrible. Already on the 15th September he petitions the Council for some relief to his sufferings, and receiving no answer he again supplicates on the 10th October. His clothes are in rags, he is eaten up with filth, and the first cold of autumn torments him because he suffers from colic and other maladies. Is he exaggerating to excite sympathy? It is hard to understand how such could be the condition of a prisoner who had several of the Councillors and the First Syndic for his sworn friends, while the gaoler also, Claude Genève, was one of Perrin's confidants. However this may be, "the Council sent two of its members to

the prison with orders (says M. Rilliet*) to cause the necessary clothing to be given to the prisoner so as to remove the hardships of which he complained." This we get from M. Guizot.

Meantime, says Bungener, the fate of Servetus was decided, but out of Geneva. A messenger of State, commissioned to bring the answers of the Cantons, delivered them on the 18th October. Each of these answers was twofold—that of the Church or of the pastors, and that of the Government—in all eight. There was complete and awful unanimity. Servetus must die. Berne and Basle so indulgent two years ago to Bolsec, have now for Servetus none but expressions of their horror. All the answers, says Guizot, are cautious and guarded, though in different degrees, and all are sorrowful in their tone but unanimous in the nature of their advice. There can be no doubt (he adds) that they recommended severity. Here then, says Bungener, is the whole of Protestant Switzerland forming a jury and unanimously pronouncing a sentence of condemnation. No mention is made of extenuating circumstances, nor is there any solicitation either direct or indirect for pardon or indulgence, and yet all know that it is a question of life and death. The Council of Geneva could no longer hesitate; although meeting on the 23d October, they adjourn the decision to another meeting on the 26th. But it was felt that the whole of Protestant Christendom was demanding the death of the criminal. Several councillors, says Bungener, now perceived this, who till then had only seen in this affair a trial between the Spaniard in whom they felt but little interest and the Frenchman whom they did not like. They could henceforward therefore yield, not to Calvin, but to the whole body of Protestantism; and so the majority of the Council are decidedly against Servetus. Ami Perrin, however, is true to him, and first demands absolution pure and simple, which would have been the exile of Calvin and the final triumph of the Libertines. It was refused. He demanded then what had already been asked by Servetus, that the cause be brought before the Council of the Two Hundred. Calvin, says Bungener, had many enemies there,

*M. Rilliet de Cundolle, Unitarian minister at Geneva and author of a celebrated history of this trial.

and that Council was less bound by the previous advice of the Cantons. M. Saisset says that "in the Council of the Two Hundred the party hostile to Calvin was in the majority." He adds that Ami Perrin, "a second time defeated, next essayed to have the punishment made more tolerable, and that it appears that this was also the desire of Calvin, but that whether it was that the Council wished to follow the letter of the law which condemned heretics to the flames, or whether it was that they considered it an honor not to fall below the Catholic Inquisitors in point of severity, the more cruel opinion prevailed, and it was decided that Geneva also should have her *auto-da-fe*." And so, says Bungener, the Council still refused the reference to the other body, but "there is no one now who does not say, 'Would to God that Perrin had succeeded,' and we too say so with all the world." Yet, he says, it is not the less true that if the general state of affairs is admitted to have been such as we have described, the efforts of Perrin were neither those of a friend of the Reformation nor those of a wise politician, and to regret their failure may certainly be humane but it is also rather selfish. We think of ourselves and of the annoyance which this affair gives to us, and we make no account of the requirements of the moment misunderstood or betrayed by the Libertine magistrate. And Guizot remarks that at that period there was no hesitation on account of the atrocious torture of such a punishment and no scruple as to the right of inflicting it. Heresy was a crime and the stake its penalty. This was what Rome had taught mankind and what Protestantism had not yet untaught them. In that very year, 1553, at Lyons, not far from Geneva, several Reformers had suffered martyrdom, among them five young French students from the Theological Institute at Lausanne. And the Roman Catholic judges at Vienne had condemned Servetus to be burnt. Save for some scattered protests, says Guizot, which saved the honor of the human conscience, the burning of heretics was in the sixteenth century looked upon as the common right of Christianity.

But as to Calvin (remarks the French statesman), during the whole course of the trial he never had concealed his feeling of

what the sentence ought to be. On the 20th August after it had commenced he wrote to Farel: "I hope that he will be condemned to death, but I trust that there may be some mitigation of the frightful torture of the penalty." After the fulfilment of the sentence he wrote: "When Servetus had been convicted of heresy, I did not say a word concerning his execution; not only will all good men bear witness to this, but I authorise the bad to speak if they have any thing to say." On the 26th October, the very day on which sentence was passed, he writes to Farel: "Tomorrow he will be led to the stake. We made every effort to change the manner of his death, but in vain." These are Guizot's statements. "Observe (says Bungener) that he was not writing to some friend milder than himself in whose eyes he might wish to array himself with the semblance of humanity. The friend was Farel—more hostile to Servetus than was Calvin himself." Now why did the Council refuse this mitigation? Bungener answers, perhaps that they might not seem to adopt only in part the imperial canon law which recognises nothing but the stake for heresy; perhaps also (for we know that those who voted for the stake were not all Calvin's friends) not to give the Reformer a fresh victory by allowing him as it were the right to pardon or to mitigate.

But let us hear M. Saisset on this point: "Besides, it is just to say it, Calvin believed that one could do nothing more legitimate and useful than to choke the voice of heresy, and his sentiments on this subject were those of all the men of the sixteenth century, particularly of the principal Reformers. It is no doubt a contradiction on which it is not possible to insist too strongly, to see men whom they would have burnt at Rome as heretics assuming at Geneva the right to punish heresy with death—but this contradiction itself proves the perfect good faith of the Reformer. Led to the stake for the crime of impiety, they protested against the false application of the right, but never contested the right itself. Moreover they were influenced by a sort of horrible emulation to pursue heresy with as much zeal and to strike it with the same rigor as the Catholics. It was for them, Calvin especially, a point of honor. The legislator of the Reformation

was accused of destroying the principle of authority in religion : he gloried in showing to the world that in his hands this principle had not weakened. Everything concurred, then, to dispose Calvin to the most violent resolutions—vengeance, fanaticism, policy all ; add that he had gone too far to hesitate. Logician in hate as in everything else, he could not spare at Geneva him whom he had denounced at Vienne.”

Let us hear the same witness a little further. Speaking of the behavior of Servetus at the stake in yielding so far to the persuasions of Farel who attended him thither, as to recommend himself to the prayers of the people that each might pray with him and for him, the Reformer, it seems, had said that he did not know with what sort of conscience Servetus could do that, being what he was, for he had with his own hand written that the faith which reigned at Geneva was “diabolical, and that there was there neither God nor Church nor Christianity, because there they baptized little children.” “How then,” the Reformer had asked, “could he join in prayers with a people whose communion he should have fled from as holding it in horror?” Calvin had continued : “Servetus prayed as if he were in the very midst of the Church of God—in which he showed plainly that with him opinions were nothing. What is more, how came it to pass that he never said a word in defence of his doctrine? I ask you what it signifies that having liberty to say what he pleased, he made no confession neither on the one side nor on the other, no more than if he had been a block of wood? There was no danger of their cutting out his tongue; they had not gagged him; they had not forbidden him to say whatever seemed to him good.” All this Calvin wrote by way of denying that Servetus had any sense of religion or that his was “the death of a martyr.” M. Saisset says that never did theological fanaticism express itself in more coldly atrocious words, and at great length he pours out the most bitter reproaches on Calvin for the inhuman cruelty of these statements. “What! I would say to Calvin, it does not suffice you to take Servetus’s life, but you must also dishonor his death?” He admits it was right for Calvin to make war on the ideas of Servetus because he believed them false; right also to destroy his writings

because he held them dangerous; and that he should even lay violent hands on his person was a crime for which the age he lived in must share the responsibility. "But," says M. Saisset, "having smitten an unfortunate in his ideas, his books, and his life, at least have respect to his honor." We confess that this severity appears to us misplaced. On the one hand, as a martyr to truth, Servetus should have given when permitted some testimony to what he believed at the stake; on the other hand, as a sincere and consistent blasphemer of Christianity and reviler of Genevan Christians, he should not have asked for their prayers without some acknowledgment of his past errors. But M. Saisset will not admit anything of the kind, and goes so far as to insist on forcing Servetus into the true Church of God and excommunicating Calvin. His words are as follows: "This man who dies for an idea, these persons who pray with him and who touched with his sufferings endeavor to shorten them belong by the same title to God's Church. But you, Calvin, who denounce a personal adversary to the Catholic Inquisition, you who demand death where exile should have sufficed, you who preach against Servetus, he being absent and under the burden of capital condemnation, when you cap the climax of all these dark offences by undertaking to contest against evidence the good faith and sincerity of your enemy in order to travesty and dishonor his last moments, you do not belong at all, I dare affirm it in the name of that profound faith I have in an eternal principle of goodness and justice, you do not belong at all to the Church of God."

Yet M. Saisset has the candor to go on to say that however severely history should condemn Calvin in this matter, still it is not just to concentrate on him alone the responsibility for the stake at which Servetus was burnt. He says the Swiss churches contributed their influence in leading the Council at Geneva to pronounce sentence of death, and that the churches in Holland were not any more tolerant. He says, Melanchthon, the gentle Melanchthon, highly complimented Geneva and Calvin for what they did. Twenty years earlier (he adds) *Æcolampadius*, *Capito*, *Zwingle*, *Bucer*, all had held like views. "Such was the spirit (he continues) of this rude epoch. Catholics and Protestants,

nobody doubted that an error in religion was a punishable offence to be repressed by the magistrate. . . . Strange and terrible age when every thought might be a crime, when in the name of the gospel each party launched against all others anathemas and death." He proceeds to say that "Luther in the beginning of his career said, 'Why kill the false prophets when it would suffice to exile them?' but that encountering opposition his heart grew bitter and he also called for violence to succor truth." And so, he says, Calvin when he was himself a wanderer and in danger counselled mildness in repressing heresy, but that after the death of Servetus he wrote a book to establish the rights of the sword over error. So Beza maintained in the name of Protestantism the murderous doctrine. "In the next age Bossuet reaffirms it uncontradicted in the midst of a period of polish, of sweetness, and of light. To eradicate it two ages of philosophy have been required—Locke and Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau, have been required; the French Revolution has been required."

So far M. Saisset. Bungener, referring to the many slanders against Calvin, says he has "even been reproached by some on account of the green wood of which the pile of Servetus was made in order they say that he might die a lingering death. Thus at the very moment when Calvin was asking for a milder form of death for Servetus, they would represent him as employed in rendering his tortures more cruel. Besides, what are they thinking of? Green wood was a favor, for the victim would be stifled before the flames reached him. All this discussion moreover reposes historically upon nothing. The documents which deserve to be believed make no mention of wood either green or dry; and the whole is only one of the thousand fables which blind hate has heaped around the name of Calvin. . . . Let us quit these details once for all. In vain are the horrors of this fatal day magnified; they will never equal those of so many days which had been witnessed already and which were yet to be witnessed—we will not say by Spain, whose soil is made up of human ashes—but by the Netherlands, by Austria, by England under her bloody Mary, and by France under her devout and dissolute kings. If Servetus had perished at Vienne, who would now have spoken of him? Who

would notice the luckless unit which is lost on the enormous total of the victims of Rome? What Romanist in the sixteenth century had the audacity or even the thought of reproaching Calvin or the Genevise for the death of Servetus? The tardy horror with which it inspires the Romanists of our day will never, do what they will, be aught else than a tribute of homage to the Reformation, for it is Romanism that is attacked and condemned when the Reformation is condemned for having inconsistently done once what Romanism did every day upon principle." Elsewhere he says: "It is a great anachronism to charge Calvin with this fault, as though it was his own and one with which his own age might have reproached him. Lament that he had an opportunity to commit it; blame him for having committed it with the bitter zeal which is always and in all things to be condemned; but to accuse him alone of it when all his friends, *including the mild Melancthon*, all his enemies with the exception of Castalio, but including Bolsec, and the whole sixteenth century in short, approved and in some sort committed it with him, is to sacrifice him to the ideas of the nineteenth century as Servetus was sacrificed to the ideas of the sixteenth. But when this sacrifice of Calvin is demanded by Romish writers, when those who testify so much horror before the stake of Servetus, experience none before the thirty or forty thousand fires kindled by the Church of Rome in the same century, we no longer ask where is justice, but where is the most common honesty and the most ordinary decency?"

M. Guizot says he does not think the Reformer ever felt any regret as to his own conduct during the trial. He believed in his duty to suppress heresy in this manner as sincerely as Servetus held to his opinions, and his most intimate friends sought not to soften but to confirm his severity. The most advanced advocates of freedom of opinion, Guizot says, did not go so far as to say that honest error could not be a crime. Servetus himself when charged with saying the soul is mortal, exclaimed that if he ever had he would condemn himself to death for it. Yet, says Guizot, amongst even the Calvinistic Reformers some were averse to the capital punishment of heretics, and would not tolerate the reproduction in their own body of the cruelty they protested against in the Church of Rome.

M. Guizot also says: "This celebrated trial has become a great historical event and I have followed its different stages with scrupulous care. I have endeavored to disentangle its philosophical, social, and political aspects, and to describe them accurately. I have been anxious truthfully to delineate the character, opinions, passions, and attitude of the two opponents. It was their tragical destiny to meet each other and to enter into mortal combat as the champions of two great causes. It is my profound conviction that Calvin's cause was the good one, that it was the cause of morality, of social order, and of civilisation. Servetus was the representative of a system false in itself, superficial under the pretence of science, and destructive alike of moral dignity in the individual and of moral order in human society. In their disastrous encounter, Calvin was conscientiously faithful to what he believed to be truth and duty; but he was hard, much more influenced by violent animosity than he imagined, and devoid alike of sympathy and generosity. Servetus was sincere and resolute in his conviction, but he was a frivolous, presumptuous, vain, and envious man, and capable in time of need of resorting both to artifice and untruth. In an age full of martyrs to religious liberty Servetus obtained the honor of being one of the few martyrs to intellectual liberty; whilst Calvin, who was undoubtedly one of those who did most towards the establishment of religious liberty, had the misfortune to ignore his adversary's right to liberty of belief."

What we have thus laid before our readers is a fair and truthful representation of the views of Guizot and Bungenèr on the one side, and of Saisset on the other. The great French statesman is the authority from whom we have quoted most largely. Of course it is not to be understood that we accept all his representations as perfectly just to Calvin. The Reformer's case is a better one in truth than Guizot makes it to appear. He admires Calvin, but with heavy discount. Evidently he hates the Calvinistic theology. But on this very ground his testimony will go further with many than if he were a Calvinist as well as a Protestant.

A few observations of our own will close this sketch.

1. The candid reader will regard the case of Calvin and Servetus in the light of a very desperate encounter. It was a life and death struggle, and that between giants. These two so wondrously endowed men were, through the infatuation that seemed to get possession of Servetus and through the force of circumstances, formally pitted against one another. Lælius Socinus, the uncle of Faustus Socinus, who became the father of Socinianism, held opinions very similar to those of Servetus, was a young man of great intellectual power, with a strong leaning towards philosophical speculation, and passed several years in Germany and Switzerland on friendly terms with Calvin and the other Reformers. There is a beautiful letter of Calvin in Jules Bonnet's collection, to which Guizot refers, written to his "dear Lælius," which shows with what affectionate earnestness and forbearing tenderness he could treat a youth who was, as Guizot states, "incessantly expressing doubts as to the divinity of Christ, the truth of redemption, expiation, original sin, and the majority of the Christian doctrines," to which the Reformer held so tenaciously. But in the case of Servetus, there was a trial of strength forced on Calvin by his antagonist. And yet we have no belief at all in the statement that the Reformer either had a personal hatred of the Spaniard or ever plotted against him. M. Saisset's monograph is disfigured with constant charges against Calvin of management and tricks. But that sort of blemishes never did attach to the character of the great Genevese. Committed by principles which he held sacred to certain course of conduct towards Servetus (some of those principles held by most good men at his day), he acted accordingly, and his conscience upheld and sustained him throughout.

2. The candid reader will also bear in mind, when judging Calvin and the other Reformers and also the Council of Geneva who condemned Servetus, how, by the very relations sustained by them to Rome, they were compelled to be stern and severe in dealing with Pantheistic unbelief and blasphemy. There stood their watchful adversary, ready at every moment to make capital for herself out of the least toleration by them of such errors. But in the account he gives of Calvin's book published the year

following the death of Servetus to demonstrate the lawfulness of the sword as against heretics, Bungener points out how different was Calvin's intolerance from that of Rome. The Reformer does not advocate the State's punishment of error as error, but only the punishment of the heretic when he becomes the disturber of society; and he always supposes the case where there has been really a disturbance, a shaking of the social foundations, and serious danger resulting both from the gravity of the error and the activity of the heretic. It is for a civil offence solely that he calls for the action of the magistrate. But according to the Romish idea, as realised in the Inquisition and by all the tribunals which judged under the influence of the Church, it was heresy and heresy in itself that was smitten—heresy in its obscurest adherents just as in its most renowned apostles—heresy whether rooted after and discovered in the depths of the conscience, or zealously and defiantly and dangerously proclaimed in sermons and books. And hence ensues an important practical consequence: the system advocated by the Reformer could not have extended to every heretic nor to every opinion reputed to be heretical, but to extreme cases only, where error was diffused that subverted Christianity. Thousands were put to death by the Papacy as Protestants; Calvin never proposed to put any one to death as a Romanist. The men he would *smite* were such as Gruet and Servetus, whom all Christendom would have smitten as he did. This was indeed to go too far; but history, as Bungener well says, must take note of these differences. The intolerance of Calvin could lead to the stake a very small number of victims; Romish intolerance was at that very moment immolating its thousands.

3. Let the candid reader also observe that every particle of the special interest attaching to the death of Servetus is that it was a Protestant *auto da fe*. Had the Spanish physician been burnt at Vienne, had he been one of the millions of Rome's victims, we had never heard his name. Geneva did take his mortal life, but gave him an immortal history and a deathless though not honorable name.

4. It is not a pleasant but an imperative duty to maintain that Servetus's name is not an honorable one. M. Saisset claims

that in denying the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus Christ and original sin he awakened and roused up Socinus; and that in composing a rational Christianity where every mystery becomes just a development of philosophy, he was the prelude of Malebranche and Kant and Schelling and Hegel and Schleiermacher and Strauss; and also that this courageous and hardy genius well knew all along the scope and reach of his daring enterprise. M. Saisset acknowledges that the "theology" of Servetus, "profound but subtle and refined, is fallen into oblivion," and that "his Neoplatonic philosophy is shipwrecked," but he declares that "what has not perished and cannot perish is the grand idea of a rational explanation of the Christian mysteries." He says: "It pertains to the nineteenth century to accomplish this magnificent enterprise, but the honor of having conceived of it and essayed to realise it, at the cost of his quiet and his life, will suffice to consecrate forever the name of Michael Servetus. He had a place amongst the martyrs of modern liberty, but it is just to mark out for him another not less glorious amongst philosophic theologians, amongst the forerunners of Rationalism." How far Socinians and Rationalists and the disciples of all the philosophers named by M. Saisset will consider it complimentary to be represented as the progeny of Servetus, it is not for us to judge. All we care to deny in M. Saisset's statement as given is that Servetus can be held to be the true originator of the idea of explaining the mysteries of Christianity. The French reviewer has forgotten the Gnostics and the Platonising Fathers of the early Church and the Schoolmen. But the special point we wish to make respects the moral character ascribed to Servetus. Does he really deserve to be counted a martyr to anything good or great who had no brave words to utter at the stake when called on to speak what he pleased in defence of what he believed? Did either his death or his life proclaim him courageous and hardy, or not rather vacillating, weak, and cowardly, though impulsive and rash? And what shall we say of his characteristic untruthfulness? Many a Christian, many a Protestant, has suffered all that Servetus had to endure without falsifying, as he did constantly. Christianity glories in her martyrs, not alone

for their courage, but their truth. If Rationalists or Socinians— if unbelief in any of its forms is prepared to glory with M. Saisset in poor Servetus, we bid them welcome to the honor and privilege with every advantage to their cause that can accrue.

5. Very high is the compliment paid to Protestant Christianity in our being required to defend John Calvin in this matter. Had he been a Roman Bishop, Archbishop, Cardinal or Pope, who had ever heard that he burnt Servetus? The world expects no better of Rome, but takes her as it finds her and as it reads of her in authentic history. She has long been addicted to burning men, and does not disown nor condemn any such act that she ever performed. Never is she heard excusing one of her innumerable martyr fires on the ground that it was an error of the age, for she claims infallibility and the world expects her to justify every abomination that stains her history. But men expect better things of Protestantism; and neither Calvin nor any other nor all its leaders lay claim to being above or beyond errors and mistakes. Nay, the immortal Genevese shall at any time and to any degree which justice demands be censured if only the glory of the true faith of the gospel may thereby be increased. For who then is Calvin, nay, who is even Paul and who is Apollos but ministers by whom we have believed? For we do not glory in men. For all things are ours and the Church's—whether Luther or Calvin or any other Reformer, whether the martyrs or confessors, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas, all are ours, and we are Christ's and Christ is God's.

JOHN B. ADGER.

ARTICLE V.

CONTRARY CHOICE.

Whatever may be regarded as a subject of the foreknowledge of Deity, is properly represented as certain. As this foreknowledge is perfect, the future history of the universe is as distinctly present to the mind of the Creator as the events of the infinite past. There can be no exception to the statement; for any exception would be a defect of his knowledge. No degree of ignorance can be imputed to Him, whether we refer to the past, the present, or the future. The suggestion sometimes advanced that all divine knowledge is a knowledge of the present, does not justly represent the truth as we must necessarily apprehend it. We cannot conceive of events unrelated to time. God has not revealed himself in his absolute being, and reason cannot contemplate him under such a restriction. Besides, if it were possible, such a conception of Deity would be a limitation of his nature. Whatever may be his absolute mode of existence, we must admit that he is *capable* of regarding events in succession. A perfect foreknowledge of all future occurrences must, therefore, enter into every reverent conception of his boundless attributes.

If the future history of his creation is thus open to the view of the Creator, it cannot be denied that what he foreknows is known with certainty. There is no contingency with God. Neither curiosity nor doubt can be predicated of him. By a law of our own minds we believe that the future will assume a definite character. If known to the Almighty, it is definitely known in the most minute particular. A contingent event is one that may or may not be. But this language is relative to created intelligence. The mind of God cannot be so restricted. He sees the end from the beginning. "All things are naked and open unto him with whom we have to do." Faith and reason concur in this truth. The foreknowledge of God is therefore assured of the whole chain of future events, and of each successive link. As there is no point in space concealed from his inspection, so there is no moment of time to come that escapes his omniscience.

It follows that not only all creative acts, and all the processes of material nature, but every action of created intelligence must be embraced in the category of objects foreknown. Every sentiment of affection, every direction of desire, every movement of feeling, every impulse of passion, every phase of thought or volition, will necessarily fall within the boundaries of this immense domain. There can be no exception or exemption. If the sovereignty of God is universal, nothing can exist, originate, or occur without his knowledge and permission. The certainty of future volitions is as true as that of external changes in nature. That Judas would betray his Master on a given day, was as positively foreknown to his Maker as that the sun would rise and set.

Some authors have maintained that volitions are exempt from this law of certainty by the nature of the will. They contend that it is conceivable that the Creator should intentionally deny to himself all immediate knowledge of future volitions of responsible agents, and that mediate knowledge of such volitions is necessarily conjectural and imperfect. These suggestions cannot be admitted by those who hold the universal sovereignty of God. If there were a point in space which his intelligence had never penetrated, or a moment of life beyond his observation, that point or that moment would be a limitation of his empire. If the volitions of men or angels were independent of the divine will, then each would be sovereign in his own sphere, and the sphere of created will must be deducted from that of the Creator. The will of God and the will of the creature, being mutually independent, would divide the sovereignty of the universe. But the sovereignty of God is not now under discussion, and its relations to the present subject will be examined hereafter. The absurdity of such an abdication, on the part of an infinite and perfect God, is, however, so obvious as to require very little argument.

We are now concerned with the distinct attribute of knowledge, and insist that the suggestion that the Deity might intentionally abstain from knowing what he could know in the full exercise of his powers, is derogatory to his character, and inconsistent with any just estimate of his perfections. Why should he impose such a restriction upon himself? If we say it was in order to impose

upon the creature a proper measure of responsibility, we answer that this motive would have operated to conceal from the divine intelligence *all* the volitions of moral agents; but we know that in fact God has given us in revelation many evidences of his foreknowledge of human conduct. All prophecy is founded upon such knowledge. The suggestion is therefore inapplicable to a multitude of examples in which the Deity must have foreknown the future volitions of his creatures. And yet in these cases his foreknowledge did not diminish the responsibility of the agents. As, therefore, the foreknowledge of God extended to many actual volitions, no believer in revelation can, with any consistency, deny his foresight of all the volitions of his creatures.

But natural reason points to the same conclusion independently of revelation. The suggestion referred to, when plainly stated, amounts to this: When God created man, he knew nothing of his future character and history. The whole course of human affairs was a perfect blank. And even now, a shrewd conjecture is the only basis on which he can proceed in providing for the future dealing of his wisdom with mankind. It is clear that no believer in the government of the world by a supreme, intelligent, personal Deity, can ever adopt such an opinion. It involves consequences from which natural reason revolts. It implies that God's foreknowledge of the actions of all his intelligent creatures is a complete void. Conjecture itself is out of the question. All rational conjecture is founded in law. But, by the hypothesis, there is no natural law in volition. The will is not determined by any antecedent. Even a probability would indicate a certain approximation towards the discovery of a regulative law. The denial of law, the exclusion of causal efficiency from the domain of the will, renders all probable reason nugatory. We say, therefore, that this suggestion implies absolute ignorance on the part of the Creator, of the future course of the whole body of his intelligent creatures. Angels, men, and devils are hourly adding to the sum of the divine knowledge, and God is growing daily in wisdom, as each day contributes a new page to the history of the past. How profound must have been his ignorance before creation began!

Allusion has already been made to the fact that some writers endeavor to escape from the difficulty, by denying to God the attribute of foreknowledge altogether. They insist that time is not a condition of thought with the Creator, as it is with the creature. He knows all events as present to his apprehension. In his mental exercises, he anticipates nothing and remembers nothing. It is all an eternal *now*. His references to the past and the future are mere accommodations to the limited intelligence of his creatures.

As before stated, we cannot know the absolute mode of the divine existence. All our knowledge of God is necessarily relative to our own capacities. The preceding speculation extends beyond the sphere of human reason. It is absurd to endeavor to satisfy reason by a reference to hypothetical truths that lie entirely beyond its scope. It is evident that revelation affords no countenance to such a representation of the divine nature. It is a rational speculation in its terms. And yet reason cannot apprehend it. But this much is certain, that, if it implies an incapacity in the Almighty, it cannot be true. Now the use for which the suggestion is made is dependent upon that very incapacity. The question is not whether God is capable of apprehending facts as unconditioned by time and space, but whether he is not also capable of apprehending them under such conditions. If he is not, an incapacity is implied. If he is, then he does exercise that power. For it is inconceivable that God possesses any power which will never be exerted. Whatever therefore may be the mode in which he exercises his knowledge with reference to himself, there is an inexorable demand of right reason that we shall recognise memory and foreknowledge among his active powers.

We leave these speculations behind us, as unworthy of further consideration, and assume with confidence, as the dictate of Scripture and reason, that the boundless future is completely foreknown to the Creator in its consecutive form, and no less certain than the past. The next inquiry is the ground of this certainty. We propose to conduct it first in the light of sound reason, and afterwards in that of revelation. For it will afford the highest satis-

faction to discover that the two processes lead independently to the same solution.

At the outset we premise that the apprehension of certainty in relation to the future, implies, to our created intelligence, a pre-determination. We cannot predicate certainty, without a knowledge and appreciation of the laws that regulate the universe. Eclipses, transits, and comets are calculated by means of such knowledge. On the other hand, we cannot entertain a positive certainty of the execution of our own purposes for want of certain fixed *data*. Our subjective states are liable to innumerable changes produced by the volitions of surrounding agents, and by the unforeseen physical conditions to which we may be exposed. If the human mind were not subject to subjective change, and external circumstances were all under our control, the purposes we form for the future might be predicted with infallible precision.

It will be conceded therefore that, if the analogy holds, all divine purposes are foreseen by the infinite mind that conceives them. And hence all divine acts are foreseen distinctly by the Creator, and are the products of his power and will. God does nothing from a new impulse or extemporaneous design. This would imply change and imperfection. His acts are predetermined, and are independent of conditions. His purposes antedated creation. It was his preconceived design, at a given point of time to create angels, and at another to create man. He apprehended from eternity the certainty of these events. How, then, was that certainty related to his purpose? A certain future event is not one that simply *may* be, but that *must* be. The introduction of contingency is inconsistent with the premises. According to the laws of thought with which we ourselves are endowed by the Creator, we cannot conceive of certainty which is not established by antecedents. But, before creation, all antecedents must have been in the mind of the Almighty. His volitions, therefore, are the fountains of his creative acts. His purposes alone established the certainty of these wonderful events. Resolutions formed by an infinite mind must be accompanied by a positive assurance of the acts to which they relate. This con-

consciousness is not the result of calculation or inference. It is not an impression of overwhelming probability, but an intuition that the purposes of such a mind, unrestricted by conditions, will be fulfilled. The purpose is a cause, of infinite efficiency, and the effect is immediately apprehended as a certain result.

All this would be indisputable, if the analogy of human consciousness could be assumed. But such is our ignorance of the modes of the divine existence, that we can venture no farther than to affirm that it is the only view of the subject of which we are capable. If we are left to the resources of reason, we can discover nothing of the mind of God without applying to him the laws of thought with which we are endowed. His nature is unthinkable, except through the medium of that consciousness which is the condition of all speculation. All reverent conceptions of God must embrace a consistent view of his character, which can only be obtained by the reason through the channel we have indicated. If we think of him at all, we must think of him as constituted mentally like ourselves, yet on a scale infinitely great. And it must be admitted that this analogy is, for all practical ends, an index of truth. For as God is the author of our being, and has given us this medium of knowledge, we cannot without impiety accuse the testimony of our reason of falsehood. It is therefore a sound conclusion, or at least the soundest we can rationally attain, that God's foreknowledge of his own acts is based upon his purpose to perform them. His capacity of knowledge is one of his original perfections, and as independent as the rest. But the actual knowledge of a future fact cannot be imagined to exist till the fact has been determined. For if we speak of a future event as certain, we simply mean that the causes exist that ensure its accomplishment.

The same method will also lead us to trace the purposes of God to his previous subjective states. That is, he forms these purposes for reasons within himself, and his wisdom and goodness are the fountains of his volitions. We say he will never do wrong, and the proposition is founded upon our conception of the permanent influence of these principles upon his actions. The highest praise we can render to him is to affirm that he cannot do other-

wise than that which is supremely right. Reason therefore, as far as it can pretend to piety, attributes a certain *necessity* to his purposes and their execution. And, on the other hand, the same reason testifies that God is perfectly *free*. We are thus brought to inquire whether necessity and freedom may not coexist in the same moral agent.

The certainty of *physical* phenomena is obviously due to the adequate causes that produce them. We have presented the considerations that lead us also to conclude that, in the constitution of the divine nature, his actions are rendered certain by his purposes, and his purposes are induced by his perfections. If the latter relation is definitely fixed, we have in God's mental and moral nature a *law* as reliable as any he has imposed upon matter. If the purposes he entertains must needs accord forever with his wisdom and goodness, we have them as the invariable effects of permanent causes. This is nothing less than law. Knowing his perfections, an intelligent creature may as certainly predict that he will always take the best course, as that the sun will rise. Few theists will deny that such a necessity exists. They not only perceive the certainty, but recognise his perfections as the ultimate cause of it. The highest efficiency of causation is found in the permanent principles of the divine nature which determine all the actions of Providence. But at the same time it cannot be conceived that the freedom of God is in the least restricted by them. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire into the relations of necessity and liberty in the constitution of moral agents. Of such agents God is the highest and purest type. If the reconciliation can be effected in reference to him, there can be no difficulty in subordinate instances.

The definition of freedom is ever before us in the plain proposition, that the person in question may act as he pleases. Any exterior restraint impairs this liberty. In the divine nature, all restraint is wanting, and God, beyond dispute, acts as he pleases. But the question is legitimate, how it comes to pass that it always pleases him to do right. Does it simply happen to be so, or is the fact determined by precedent conditions of the mind? All our confidence in God is predicated upon the permanence of his

character. If natural religion requires this confidence, it must furnish a basis for it. We have this in the argument already adduced to show that God's course of action is determined by his perfections. To say that we know that he will always do right, and yet deny the existence of any efficient reasons for the belief, is contradictory and absurd. It must be clear therefore that all just conceptions of the nature of God include a necessary certainty of his choice, and an absolute freedom in that choice.

The nexus of these facts can only be found in the *unity* of God. Necessity and certainty are relative, but the absolute unity of God is the common point in which these relations meet. In the most precise language, it is God who is free and necessary at the same time. But philosophers are in the habit of discussing these principles as distinct, and attributing necessity to God's dispositions, and freedom to his volitions. This may be a convenient form of artificial analysis, but it ought never to be forgotten that it is artificial. In his nature God is a unit, and it is this unit that possesses a permanent character. It is at the same time this unit that is active in volition. But freedom cannot belong to volition in any other sense than the mind in the act of willing; and necessity cannot pertain to the dispositions in any other sense than the mind disposed. The same mind is permanently inclined to the supreme good, and freely performs it. Necessity and liberty coexist in the unity of God, without schism in his being, or discord in his counsels, and must be reconciled, if ever, as coördinate truths of the same indivisible nature.

Some authors seem to discover a conflict between determination and volition. But this is due, in part, to the association of necessity with coercion. Physical law must often override volition. The term Necessity, in its application to material phenomena, carries with it the idea of physical force. But in its application, through the poverty of language, to conditions and changes of an intellectual or moral character, such an association must be discarded. So far from operating contrary to the will, this necessity operates, in moral agents, through the will. This is eminently true of God. His will is an infallible index of his principles and desires. So long as these remain the same, his will must continue

to reflect them. If we say his will possesses the power of a contrary choice, we can only mean that his choice would be different if his desires or dispositions were different. His character determines his actions with an absolute and necessary certainty. The will is the channel through which the possibilities of thought are realised in experience. It is free, in the sense of exemption from coercion. It is free, in the sense that it acts as the individual mind pleases. But as an office of mind, or a subject of law, it is not and cannot be free. It must act forever in exact accordance with the prevalent desires of the spiritual unit. Volition is a function of the spiritual being, and liberty belongs not to the function but to the essence itself.

It is a common reply to such reasoning, that the power of contrary choice is involved in the very definition of liberty, and that moral responsibility depends upon it. But here is a case of perfect freedom without any such power. With God there is an infinite preponderance of motive in favor of rectitude. With the purely metaphysical question of equality of motives, we have nothing at present to do. In *moral* natures there cannot be such indifference. The question is, does such a power exist where the motives are all on one side? No meaning can be attached to a power which is not, never has been, and never will be exercised. No choice contrary to holiness can be even imagined to spring up in the consciousness of God. It is a mere fiction of sophistry, invented for the purpose of sustaining a theory of speculation. We add nothing to the praise of the Creator by ascribing to him such a power. It would only detract from the exalted character which reason imputes to him. Nor does the question of responsibility affect the case. For this cannot be predicated of the Supreme Being. And the glory of his righteous government consists especially in his want of liability to sin. Such a want, so far from implying imperfection, is the highest evidence of perfection. It remains therefore a necessary element of our most rational conception of God, that he cannot deviate from rectitude.

We think it will now be admitted that a definite result has been reached, and a law of spiritual life established. The principles of the spiritual nature being permanently directed to holi-

ness, the volitions and actions of the individual will invariably take the same direction. And yet the freedom of present choice will not be infringed. What God chooses to-day, he will continue to choose to-morrow, necessarily and yet freely. The necessity is imposed by the continuity of his perfections. The freedom is unquestionable. And difficult as it may be to reconcile the facts in our own consciousness, that difficulty does not impair the force of the facts. Now if this law obtains so evidently in the divine nature, it would seem to be equally applicable to responsible creatures. If absolute necessity does not affect *His* liberty, it may well consist with the free-agency of men and angels. That they are, in a certain sense, free, is a matter of consciousness. That their natures are permanently directed to sin or holiness, and the general tenor of their lives is shaped by fixed principles, may be denied by the unbeliever, but must be accepted by the Christian reader. But even the unbeliever must acknowledge that the analogy of the divine nature creates a powerful presumption in favor of a necessitarian theology.

At this point we assume the truth of revelation. And here it is evident that the foregoing rational inquiry results in the system of doctrine which Calvinistic creeds embrace. That God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, and that, at the same time, the liberty of second causes is not thereby impaired but established, is the keystone in the magnificent structure. The certainty and necessity of all events within the scope of God's foreknowledge, must include even the volitions of his creatures. And the difficulty is immediately started by Arminian and Pelagian critics, that this makes God the author of sin. But the inference is unwarranted by reason and directly contradicted by Scripture. All sinful volitions and actions take their rise in the principles and inclinations of the being that conceives them, and owe their malignant character to the nature of the individual. Sin sustains a twofold relation: a moral one to the motives that have actuated the culprit, and an historical and providential one to the decrees of God. It is the moral relation that imparts to it its true heinousness. The historical relation has no moral features, but simply connects it as a link with the vast chain of antecedents

and consequents which the wisdom of God has established. This is the best rational solution which our minds can frame consistently with our premises.

But we appeal now to the Word of God, in proof of the facts. Whether these facts can be reconciled with other facts, is another question. The Apostle Peter, in addressing the assembled Jews after the crucifixion, brings against them this indictment: "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and, by wicked hands, have crucified and slain." And again, the rest of the apostles, after he and John had been restored to liberty, in their thanksgiving to God, use this language: "For of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel *determined* before to be done."

The crucifixion of the Son of God was sin in its most aggravated form. Its criminality is clearly attributed to the wicked parties who instigated and executed it. Their motives were corrupt and malicious, and therefore the act was condemned. But the reverent reader cannot fail to observe that the *event* was one determined in advance by the counsels of heaven. The great difficulty presents itself in a concrete and unavoidable form. The death of Christ was from eternity necessary and certain, and predetermined in its minutest particulars, and yet the sinfulness of the transaction is traced by the finger of God, not to his own decree, but to the depraved bosoms of the perpetrators. A sinful act was committed in accordance with God's appointment, and yet no wicked suspicion is warranted that God was in any sense implicated in its criminality. A multitude of similar examples could be produced from the sacred volume. We refer to only one more, in which Joseph consoles his brethren by declaring, on two occasions, that their conduct in selling him to strangers was a fulfilment of the merciful *purpose* of God.

Several methods of escape from the plain tenor of these scriptures are resorted to by critics, who seek to vindicate the holiness of God by limitation of his other perfections. One is the denial

of the immediate knowledge of God in reference to the volitions of his creatures. The other is by denying his decree, whilst they admit his foreknowledge. We have endeavored to show the unsoundness of the former in the light of reason. Will it stand the test of Scripture? As a divine attribute, foreknowledge must be perfect and eternal. The Scriptures nowhere admit a limitation of any of his perfections. If God from eternity foresaw the sin of Judas, as is admitted, it must have been certain from eternity. Only two alternatives are possible in thought, pre-determination by blind destiny, or foreordination by decree. We do not find it possible to avoid some kind of necessity, if the scriptural view of the divine nature is conceded. Revelation is full of such ascriptions to Jehovah. If his power is infinite, as there represented, we cannot imagine him limited by any force outside of himself. Fate is out of the question. If necessity be admitted anywhere, it must be in his own nature. But these writers deny necessity. According to them, the actions of men are certain, yet undetermined. There are events in the future which may or may not be, and certainly will be. The absurdity of such reasoning is manifest, and it has the disadvantage of being in the teeth of the Scriptures, which declare that Jesus was delivered into the hands of his enemies "by the determinate counsel of God." Judas fulfilled this mission in the exercise of his volition, and, according to the theory, that volition was an uncaused event, one that might have been otherwise. And yet it is represented as eternally certain in the mind of God. Unless there is an end of all reasoning, this certainty must have had a cause. A *raison d'être* is demanded by the terms themselves. Such arguments must be abandoned. They are plainly contradictory, not only to the dictates of enlightened reason, but to the whole testimony of the Bible concerning the perfections of the Almighty.

Let us subject the doctrine to a test. In physical nature, cause and effect are acknowledged to be antecedent and consequent. Man must view them under the category of time. Make them simultaneous, and you destroy the relation. Now, according to those who admit that future sequences may be known to God as certain, including the uncaused volitions of men, the Creator does

not view these occurrences as future. They are in his knowledge simultaneous. In other words, what are to our minds antecedents and consequents are, to his mind, contemporaneous facts. They confess that our own reason and Scripture represent these facts to us in succession. But they maintain that in reality God regards all things as *present*. Cause and effect are therefore terms of accommodation to us. We do not deny that the divine knowledge is intuitive; but we do deny positively that this intuition excludes from it all recognition of the different modes of time. We insist that God regards phenomena in their temporal sequence and causative relations, as *really* as we do ourselves. If time and space are realities at all, they are realities to him, and if causality is valid at all, it is valid in his sight. The suggestion that all time is present time to God, springs from a conscious necessity to get rid of causation in phenomena of the will. But it is clearly untenable. Our nature revolts at the thought that time may be an illusion imposed upon creatures, and that the being of God is constituted so differently from the representations of Scripture. In fact an eternal present is an absurdity in terms, for the present is correlative of the past and the future, and, when they are wanting, all the terms of the relation vanish.

Assuming, then, the reality of succession in time for all physical causes and effects, the knowledge which God has of them is evidently a true *foreknowledge*. He sees the antecedent precede the consequent, and he knows the cause as necessary to the effect. But the question is, does he, or does he not, see *volitions* as future events also? This it is impossible to answer in the negative, if the truth is admitted concerning physical phenomena. It would be a most violent incongruity to acknowledge the one and deny the other. No one will be so bold as to propound such a suggestion. Well then, volitions are regarded by the Deity as future events, and his knowledge of them is *foreknowledge*. Now this foreknowledge is confessedly infallible. The volition is foreseen as certain. The event has not yet occurred, but it is certain that it will occur. Man may say it is contingent, that it may or may not be. But no such affirmation can be put into the mouth of

Omniscience. In *his* foreknowledge it is certain to be. (See Confession.)

This certainty of futurition is the great question to be settled. The foreknowledge of God is intuitive and not inferential. Its cause is the infinite nature of Deity. But how is the certainty to be accounted for? The answer of the critics is, that it is altogether uncaused. God foresees the volition intuitively, but that volition, up to the moment when it is realised, remains undetermined. Even God himself regards it as a *contingent* phenomenon, which may or may not be, although he knows that it will be! It is certain, and yet nothing makes it certain. It is positively foreseen, and yet it is possible for the will, at the last moment, to make a contrary choice, and frustrate the foreknowledge of the Creator! Now it seems to us that the foreknowledge of a certainty, implies certainty in the object. The volition is a true certainty—a realised phenomenon beforehand—or its future certainty appertains to some cause that ensures it. Either this must be admitted, or its objective certainty must be denied, and the certainty be merely subjective in the mind of God.

We contend that a subjective certainty in the mind must have an objective certainty in the event. The validity of the one is dependent upon the validity of the other. Consciousness cannot mislead, and most obviously the consciousness of God is veracious. If he foresees an event as certain, the certainty of the latter is assumed. But, this being granted, it follows that the objective certainty is valid, independently of the act of knowledge. When we see an external object, we know that its existence is independent of our senses, and is the cause of the perception. So we say in reference to God's foreknowledge of a human volition, that he foresees it as certain, because it is certain. If it were not certain independently of this foresight, there could be no validity in the foreknowledge itself.

It will hardly be denied that the future volitions are thus objectively valid, and not certain merely because they are known. We are then face to face with the question in its utmost simplicity. How does the volition come to be certain? It is given in response, that no cause is necessary for a new phenomenon of will. It is

known that it will come to pass, simply because it *will* come to pass. But how does this accord with the other truth, that it may *not* come to pass? If the certainty is not caused by God's foreknowledge, it may be considered apart from it, and the foreknowledge be treated as zero. Let us, with all reverence, and only for the sake of the analysis, suppose the suggestion of some Arminian writers to be true, that God may, by an exercise of his will, refrain from knowing certain facts of the future. Among these objects of his nescience may be the volitions of some of his creatures, which are nevertheless certain to occur. It is obvious that the event is still certain, even in the supposed absence of the divine foreknowledge. The fact is positively in the future, and, although unknown to God, might be known to him if he desired to know it. Now we have reduced the certainty to this point, that it is not the object of any mind in the universe, and still it is true. But what is it? It is not in any train of causes, according to the theory we are examining. All physical certainties are founded in permanent laws of nature. But here there is none. Down to the last moment that precedes the volition, a contrary choice is possible, and this would seem sufficient to render the event uncertain. And yet it is conceded that it is certain. What can be the meaning of this certainty that is predicable of the event which is at the same time uncertain to all intelligences?

Every rational predication must have a reason for it. To affirm anything, and be unable to assign a ground upon which it rests, is sheer imbecility. But this certainty of a volition that may or may not be realised, is founded upon no datum of any intellect, upon no ascertained premises, upon no experience. It stands upon nothing, and is as unsubstantial as a dream.

The foreknowledge of volitions which pertains to the Deity is fully admitted by almost all theologians. None will contend that his foreknowledge is the cause of these volitions. A very distinct line is drawn between those who affirm, and those who deny that they are due to causation. Some who call themselves Calvinists, are found on the negative side. It is with these alone that we hold this discussion. Their position appears to us singularly

weak and unfortunate. The Socinian, and even the Arminian, is far more consistent, for the reason that he makes fewer fatal concessions.

1. The Calvinist who accepts our standards admits, that "God did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of *second causes* taken away, but rather established."

An effort is sometimes made to escape from the natural and obvious purport of this language of the Westminster Confession, under cover of what are called "permissive decrees." Some distinction is no doubt allowable between different decrees of God. But we have shown conclusively that no distinction is admissible which may invalidate the certainty of the event. Volitions do "come to pass," and are therefore "unchangeably ordained" as effects of second causes. Besides, these Calvinists acknowledge the objective validity of the thing foreseen and foreordained. They must therefore understand "the contingency of second causes" in a sense consistent with this concession. They cannot interpret the facts in any way that would conflict with the certainty of the event. They cannot deny that there may be certainty of futurity which is consistent with liberty and contingency as understood by the authors of the Confession. This would be a plain contradiction, and yet into it they unwittingly fall.

The inspiring motive to this course of reasoning is, avowedly, to save the character of God. But this is not dependent upon human logic at all. And, besides, if it were, the theory of uncaused volitions offers a very feeble defence. For a permissive decree is just as inexplicable as any other. The origin of evil remains unsolved when reason is exhausted. Rejecting the Manichæan heresy, we are compelled to acknowledge that evil originated in time, and not with man, but with the first angels who apostatised. If the positive decree of God necessarily implicates him in its criminality, what must be said of his permissive decree? Angels were created by him with the full knowledge of their future fall. Might not sin have been avoided by abstaining from creation?

When we conjoin the unquestionable certainty of the event with the fact that it is foreordained, it seems to us that the vindication of Providence, by a resort to *uncaused* volitions, is impossible. Nor do we see the least necessity for such an effort. Faith lays down a far more satisfactory and defensible thesis, in the proposition that whatever God does is right; and our business is an *a priori* inquiry for the fact itself, not the vindication of the fact.

2. Again, the Calvinistic theologian accepts of course the doctrine of the Confession concerning the holiness of God, that it pervades his entire nature. Indeed, all Christians admit that this principle gives shape and direction to all his actions. Not only his will, but his inclinations and affections are holy. But since his holiness and his wisdom are perfect and infinite, his will is immutable. It cannot be denied that the will of God is permanently and unchangeably directed to the choice of moral good in preference to moral evil. Faith reposes with unshaken confidence upon this truth. Certainty, in its utmost objective validity, appertains to the future moral action of the Deity. But if the power of contrary choice is essential to volition, and God has a will analogous to ours, his will must determine itself in every act of volition. It is conceivable, under such circumstances, notwithstanding his holiness, that his will might act in direct opposition to the moral principles of his nature. The thought is shocking, but unavoidable, if this theory be true. We have no idea that it is held to this extent by any of our theologians. But if not, they must admit that there is some guaranty in the divine nature against such consequences. Either the will of God is permanently directed to holiness, or it is efficiently and infallibly influenced by associated principles in his nature. The latter supposition is stoutly denied by the critics under review. They hold that will ceases to be will when its action is determined by anything out of itself. But what will they do with the other alternative? Is the will of God permanently directed to holiness? If so, and his existence is eternal, how comes it so, unless we assume a *permanent* principle that gives unity to all his volitions? The only answer possible is, that it is the *nature* of the divine

will to prefer holiness. But the use of such a term significantly points to a *law* in the operations, a law of the series of volitions, that determines their constant character. And if the will of God is regulated by a *law*, neither the will nor the law is undetermined. A second cause is established.

Here, then, is the most independent of all beings in the universe, whose freedom is undeniably perfect, independent and free in the exercise of a will permanently and infallibly determined to holiness by a *principle* which is regulative of it. How then can it be maintained that the power of contrary choice is essential to the operations of the will? The concession of holiness as a fixed principle of the divine nature, is fatal to the theory.

3. Further, those who accept our standards, although they may question the analogy of the divine will to ours, admit, in regard to intelligent creatures, that there are several classes whose natures are *confirmed* in good or evil. Angels who have passed their probation, the redeemed in heaven, and unconverted men on earth, are all acknowledged to have a *fixed* nature, *determined* to holiness or sin.

How is it possible for these theologians, holding this doctrine in its integrity, to contend that the power of contrary choice is essential to responsibility? Angels and saints in glory are surely not irresponsible agents. The devils and lost men do not cease to owe obedience to the divine law. The unregenerate descendants of Adam, whose "minds are carnal, at enmity with God, are not subject to his law, neither indeed can be," are, in the language of Holy Writ, "sold under sin," and are confessedly determined to evil, are nevertheless held to a just and awful account for not exercising that power of contrary choice which, according to our Confession and the Bible, they do *not* possess.

It is said in reply, that this inability is an element of the penal state. Be it so. The difficulty is not removed. It is only increased. The penalty has God for its author, and, if sin is a part of that penalty, according to the method of argument adopted by the respondents, he is made the author of sin. But more than this, men are held responsible for these sins in spite of the bondage in which they are committed. The determination of their

wills by the fall, which took place thousands of years before they were born, does not, in the divine judgment, in the least impair the enormity of their guilt. Indeed, the more the will is determined to evil, the more guilty the individual is held to be.

These admitted facts seem to us effectually to close the door upon those who imagine that human responsibility and divine rectitude necessarily require that the will of a free agent shall be exempt from determination.

4. Again, the parties referred to, hold their peculiar views of the fall for ethical reasons which are contradicted by all the admitted facts we have recited. If it was required by divine justice that Adam should possess, up to the moment of his transgression, a will exempt from all determining influence, it follows with infallible necessity that all the foregoing articles of faith must be abandoned.

If the fall of man, and the entire history to which it has given rise, might have been frustrated by an exercise of the contrary choice of Adam, we do not see how the utmost ingenuity can sustain the doctrine of the foreordination of "whatsoever comes to pass." Even under cover of the notion of a "permissive decree," the trouble recurs. For a determination to permit that which was certainly to be, reads like nonsense. And if the foreknowledge of the event were denied (which it is not), the alternatives must have been before the mind of the Creator as objects of thought, and preference given to the series of facts which have actually occurred. The occasion, and the circumstances rendering the fall possible, must have been provided for in advance. Otherwise the foreordination amounted simply to a resolve that, *if* the tempter should assail our first parents, and *if* they should elect to transgress, no obstacle should be put in their way. But this would be a strange use of the word "*ordain*." And the word "*whatsoever*" distributes the ordination to each and all of the events, to the volition as much as anything else, and it follows clearly that, when it came to pass, it did so in accordance with a special ordination. This is precisely what the conceded certainty implies. And moreover, if no cause is implied in volition, how could the Confession declare that "second causes"

are established? The use of the word "*causes*" recognises the efficiency of the antecedents.

Again, this theory requires the abandonment of the Calvinistic doctrine of a regulation of the will of God by a principle of holiness. If a degree of influence proceeding from the highest principles of the soul sufficient to ensure the moral character of the volitions, would, as maintained, destroy their voluntary nature, then a less degree of such influence would proportionally weaken their voluntary character, and any influence from God's moral attributes over his will would be incompatible with his freedom. If the will of God does not point permanently in the direction of rectitude, its future exercises are unreliable; if it does, there must be a principle at the root of the will, and distinct from it, which regulates its action. It may be a misuse of terms to call this influence *control*; but it is evidently an efficient of certainty in the consequent events. But the theory under review sunders the will of God from all efficiency distinct from itself. The proximity of a principle of holiness may be the *occasion*, but never the cause of holy acts of the will. The will is independent of regulative principles, and retains the power of every moment changing its line of action. In other words, there is no guaranty for the continued rectitude of the divine conduct. We will do no orthodox divine the injustice of supposing that such is the conscious deduction. All we say is, that in our apprehension it is a necessary one.

Further, the doctrine of the confirmation of certain classes of creatures in sin or holiness, cannot be sustained along with this theory. It must inevitably perish. This is the point of collision that excites our greatest wonder. No two propositions strike us as more directly antagonistic than this: that a power of contrary choice is essential to a true exercise of the will, and this: that a moral agent may be rendered permanently holy or permanently wicked without destroying his free agency.

The bare statement of this antithesis is sufficient to illustrate the incompatibility of the terms. The contradiction is so glaring that we fear, in writing it down, lest, by some dulness of intellect, we may have misapprehended the first proposition. But so it

stands before us, and how to bridge the chasm and effect a reconciliation, is more than we can accomplish.

5. Recurring to the unquestioned certainty of future volitions, which is implied in every page of Scripture, and is the very foundation of the Covenant of Redemption, we find an effort made to break its force in this argument, by an appeal to the case of Adam. The object is avowed. It is not to *disprove* the certainty, but to counterpoise its influence upon dogma, by showing equal evidence of uncertainty or contingency in the statement given by Moses of the fall of man.

Such a course of reasoning is strange indeed. It cannot subvert the cause of truth to unsettle the human mind on any subject. If the objective certainty of volitions is once admitted as established, all contrary reasoning is sceptical in its tendency. But the citation of the case of Adam is peculiarly unfortunate, for the reason that, aside from psychological theory, it does not throw a particle of light upon the subject. The greater multitude of pertinent facts furnished in the history of the second Adam, point to him as a much more satisfactory illustration; and in the latter case, revelation leaves the matter in no doubt whatever. The divine will and the human will of Christ were in perfect harmony. If such a contingency as is claimed for Adam's volitions, had belonged to Christ, the permanency and certainty of that harmony must have been exposed to constant interruption. But the faith of the disciples justly reposed upon that certainty as an infallible ground of assurance.

The whole narrative of the Fall is embraced in a few sentences, not one of which imparts the least information to any inquirer on the question of determination. It is related in precisely the same simplicity which characterises the plainest historical portions of the New Testament. The latter always recognise the free agency of the persons introduced, as well as the *determination* of their volitions by anterior causes. No explanation of the mystery is ever given. In the case of Adam, we have nothing but the naked facts, and nothing is added that can throw any light upon the question of their origin. How, then, can these facts be appealed to as a counterpoise to the whole body of scrip-

tural proof which we have of the truth of the doctrine of pre-determination ?

In reality, the appeal is not to facts, at all, but to a psychological hypothesis. In the first place, such an appeal is not legitimate. In psychology, the question may appear to have two sides, but in theology it has but one. And in the second place, the psychological argument is not conclusive. Far from it. The attempt is made to rehabilitate the Arminian theory of the will, and yet confine its application to a small class of facts. If successful, however, it is obvious that it must be applied to every responsible nature. But it is not successful, as we proceed to show.

The argument is: Adam was created upright, and yet he fell. Therefore subjective principles afford no sufficient guaranty of continued innocence. It is plain that we are warranted, by the concessions already referred to and shown to be scriptural, in excluding theological considerations from the inquiry. It will not be denied that Adam might have been confirmed in holiness, without interfering with his free agency or his responsibility. The question is purely psychological for the present. There may be cases, therefore, in which subjective principles do ensure a holy life, without violence to freedom. The freedom of moral agents is thus consistent with determination. The case of Adam, if an exception in fact, is not an exception in any sense that implies incompatibility between determination and freedom. The second member of the foregoing syllogism cannot be true as a universal proposition. It is only possible in a case like that of Adam. Can it therefore be demonstrated that this example was an exception? We can conceive of no method of proof, in the absence of facts, but to establish the theory on a general principle of psychology; and then what becomes of the conceded cases of determination ?

The only fact in the history bearing upon the question, is the mutability of Adam's nature. This peculiarity of his being existed previous to the fall. It was in him from the first. According to the theorist, it was a quality of his will, and moral deterioration followed from its exercise. The subjective tenden-

cies of the moral nature coexistent with it, being incapable of changing themselves, could only undergo change through the will. But the will itself, being capable of spontaneous change, was the true origin of the entrance of sin into the soul. The will was mutable from the beginning, and needed only *occasions* to manifest its nature. Causes of change there could not be.

If this is a fair statement, which we honestly think it is, what follows? Holiness required a steady perseverance in obedience. Innumerable opportunities must occur in a state of probation to decline from the path of rectitude. With a will capable every moment of change, and no sufficient guaranty in Adam's moral principles to restrain him from aberration, his perseverance in obedience would have been the greatest wonder in the world. If under such circumstances he had continued steadfast, that result could never have been attributed to his mutable will, but to the influence of the motives presented to the mind. For leaving them out of the account, his volitions, shaped and directed by no regulative principle, must have occurred fortuitously; and as in casting dice a thousand successive aces would be incredible, so a thousand successive volitions, all virtuous, would be equally incredible. To account for continued innocence, we would therefore be compelled to ascribe *almost* the entire result to the motives themselves.

Now consider the fact that the motives, according to the theory, were at no given moment sufficient to ensure obedience, and that the will was at every moment liable to change; and we have conditions that, with *almost* perfect certainty, must have terminated in the fall. As Adam actually did apostatise, and these are the supposed conditions, who can wonder at the result? So much for the practical value of a self-determining will, in its application to a creature originally upright, but liable to fall. It does not, to any appreciable degree, relieve the question of any of its difficulties.

Still bearing in mind that the previous certainty of the fall is an admitted truth, we now inquire more directly into its relation to the present question. How does a contrary choice agree with it? According to this theory, the event was both certain and

contingent. Although there was a virtual certainty of its occurrence, still there was at least a possibility that it might not occur, owing to the fact that the will of Adam was the only true cause of its volitions. Every possibility is a supposable case. Let us therefore suppose that Adam had made the opposite choice of obedience rather than transgression. What would have become of the certainty?

But leaving also this pregnant question behind, we ask whether it is conceivable that when thought, and feeling, and conscience, are all in harmony with a given command, the will can normally violate it? Can we conceive of that perfect unit, the human mind, in a state of sanctity, with its spiritual tone undisturbed, with its moral judgment unperverted, with its faith in God unshaken, contemplating duty on the one hand, and sin on the other, and yet rejecting the former and choosing the latter? We find it impossible. But this must be possible, if a contrary choice in such a being is admissible. Let any degree of preponderance of motive be accumulated in favor of one alternative; still, according to the theory, the power to adopt the other remains. The *degree* of motive influence has nothing to do with the choice, except to furnish the occasion for its exercise. This is not always admitted, but it must be true nevertheless. If any efficiency is allowed to motives at all, the theory falls. For such efficiency, it is thought, deducts from the independence of the will, and the greater its degree, the less must be the power of the will; and the stronger the motive to do right, the less meritorious must be the act performed. Hence we maintain that the true question here is, whether the will of Adam exercised a choice contrary to the dictates of his conscience and understanding and in opposition to a real or apparent preponderance of the motives presented to him. Is there anything in the narrative to show that the volition was the primary phenomenon in the complex act of transgression? Is there anything in psychology that requires us to confine the causation of that phenomenon to the will itself? The narrative speaks for itself. The science of mind utters no uncertain testimony. We appeal, not to authority, but to the facts of observation that obtrude themselves upon our notice.

The veracity of consciousness is unimpeachable. In its light, it is unphilosophical to say that volitions are caused by volitions. Hence our theorists are careful to say they are caused by the will. But the will is simply the power of the mind to will; and a power is never strictly a cause. The true statement is that volitions are one class of mental actions, and, unless they are fortuitous, must be caused by principles in the mind that are *a priori* to volition. Nothing could be more unphilosophical or heterodox than to introduce a *fortuitous* element. And it would be absurd to make a limited succession of volitions depend upon itself. Therefore, inevitably, some principle in the mind is the cause of volition. It cannot be anything out of ourselves, which would destroy all responsibility, but must be sought for in ourselves, as something *distinct* from volition. This position is impregnable, unless we abandon consciousness as a confused and untrustworthy witness, and resort to a theory which is above consciousness—a process altogether absurd.

Space is not allowed for a further analysis, and this is unnecessary. If the foregoing statement, which is strictly in accordance with all psychology founded on our own consciousness, is applied to our first parents, their first sinful volition was determined, or proximately caused, by some principle in themselves different from volition. But our theorists appeal from this conclusion to Scripture and to consciousness. They cannot legitimately appeal to either. The Mosaic narrative reaches us only through consciousness, and thus the appeal to theology is one and the same with an appeal to consciousness itself. But they cannot call upon the latter to contradict itself, unless they are prepared to abandon the whole field to scepticism. They endeavor to explain the fall through a *new* psychology and a *new* theology; whereas they set out to reconcile it with the old. This is suicide. Our consciousness testifies that, in yielding to temptation, we find our sinful volitions determined by some principles in our minds not of the nature of volitions. If Adam's consciousness was different, his mind was differently constituted, and requires a new science for his case. But we know nothing of Adam's consciousness as such, and can find no theory upon it.

But they say *our* consciousness testifies that our wills are free. This begs the question. The will is the mind willing, and the mind is a unit. Consciousness testifies positively that the *ego* is free, which is a different statement. For this free agent is not the will dissociated from the other powers, but the whole personality. Our consciousness does not say the volitions of the mind are free from the mind itself. They are effects, if not fortuitous, and no effect is free. It is the mind, the personal *ego*, that is consciously free, and not its products. The whole confusion arises from attributing a substantive and independent character to the will, which is simply one of the powers of the mind.

This involves another grave error. What kind of a *cause* do we mean, when we speak of the cause of volition? God is the only First Cause recognised by theistical philosophers. We must therefore mean that our inquiry refers to a *second* cause. But second causes are always in their turn effects. Now this theory makes the second cause of volitions a new First Cause. It supersedes the Deity. Wherever in the universe a creature is found endowed with absolute sovereignty in his own will, a future history may originate which God can only prevent by annihilation. But this removes our question out of psychology into the domain of ontology, where the origin of evil again confronts us. Indeed, this theory does summarily solve that question. It teaches us that, relatively to God, events are not successive. Future events are *now* transpiring, and it is too late to prevent them. Adam's will was free, and freely originated his sin in time always present to God. Therefore it could not be anticipated.

Great as is the ingenuity employed to establish the theory of a contrary choice, we think it can be easily shown to be inconsistent with all valid philosophy and logic. The science of the mind is based upon the observed consciousness of *fallen* man. We know nothing of the consciousness of man in any other state. If the laws of mind as now observed, are inapplicable to Adam as he was before the fall, a different psychology must be invented to suit his case; and this must be purely hypothetical. It is admitted by the advocates of this theory that the volitions of fallen men are determined, proximately, by the subjective states.

In Adam's case, it is denied. If these positions are both true, it follows that the will of the one stands in a different relation to the subjective states from the will of the other. The mental constitution has been changed by the fall. The same philosophy cannot be applicable to both. But there is no philosophy applicable to Adam, because we cannot know his consciousness. On the other hand, we know our own, and might be satisfied with the information it affords concerning ourselves, if we were allowed to assume that Adam was differently constituted. To this there are insuperable theological objections, and our respected opponents would reject it as firmly as ourselves. The Bible, however, must be a paramount authority, and as this, according to the theory, clearly proves that Adam's mental constitution involved a power in his will of contrary choice, our own mental constitution must possess the same. We ought therefore to be conscious of it. But it is affirmed that we are not. The appeal is made to our consciousness itself, which the orthodox declare has ever testified against such a power. The only possible exit from the dilemma that we can discover is, that the relation of the will to the motives is not a part of the mental constitution at all; and this, we submit, is a negation of all psychology. For if consciousness does not testify to this fixed law of our nature, it testifies nothing. And with philosophy, must perish also that inexorable logic by which this theory is so skilfully sustained.

These writers, however, have no idea of giving up to their opponents the armory of syllogisms, or the philosophy from which these weapons are furnished. The appeal is constantly made to their established principles, and an effort is made, with gigantic force, to introduce into Adam's mental constitution a principle unknown to our philosophy. According to them, Adam possessed a power of contrary choice which we do not. It is thus attempted to add on, to the received system of philosophy, a special supplement, which may embrace the mind of unfallen man. It professes to be founded, not on consciousness, but on Scripture, and then we have the only philosophy of the mind which is practicable to us placed in direct antagonism to the word of God. This again is fatal to the science of psychology.

We not only accord to the gentlemen who maintain this peculiar doctrine the credit due to signal ability, but also a devotion to orthodox truth equal to our own. But truth is more sacred than persons, and we are compelled to suggest that their views, as they appear to us, are in conflict with certain venerable articles of our faith.

1. Our standards attribute the guilt of men to three things: actual transgression, corruption of nature, and representation in Adam. Now, according to explicit admissions, the guilt of transgressions is fully recognised, although they are determined by antecedent subjective states. But when the guilt pertaining to these states becomes the object of inquiry, the logician seems to recoil from the thought that guilt can be predicated of a mere state. It is maintained that a state cannot involve guilt unless it is self-imposed. The reason why an infant is pronounced guilty, is simply because it has brought corruption into its own nature by means of an act of will. This act, not being personal, must have been performed by the Creator, or by Adam as the child's representative. The latter alternative is selected as scriptural, and also because the former would make God the author of the sin. Adam therefore, as the child's representative, was the author of the necessary volition. The subjective state could not be sinful except as produced by a sinful act of will. Adam was then the true author of the sin, and it is imputed to the child on account of his federal relations. It follows plainly that the guilt of "original sin" is an *imputed* guilt, which is not the doctrine of our standards. "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's *first* sin, the want of original righteousness, and the *corruption of his whole nature*, which is commonly called original sin; together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it." "Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation." But natural generation is not imputation, and we hold that it was the guilt of Adam's first sin alone that was conveyed to his posterity in the latter way.

There is a guilt therefore in original sin that is not imputed, a guilt inherent in the corruption itself, distinct from imputed

guilt as it is from actual transgression. If so, we are not to look for it in its antecedents. It is not due to volition, and the theory breaks down in the middle. A precedent volition is not necessary to responsibility. A sinful nature is sinful, however it may be derived. If true of a child, it may be true of Adam. It was not therefore necessary, as is so ardently maintained, that an act of will must have been the first element in the transgression of Adam.

2. It can be further shown that this doctrine seriously conflicts with the text of our standards on the divine decrees. Purpose and foreordination may be qualified by permission, but cannot be legitimately explained away. Under every conceivable condition they must obviously involve the will of God. We distinguish, as our Confession does, between the decree and the execution of it. Attention should first be directed to the decree itself. This is called a purpose, and a purpose implies active volition. It is maintained on the other side that this volition was simply, not to interfere. But we are expressly informed that "God *executes* his decrees in the works of creation and providence." It was his purpose, therefore, not merely to permit others to execute them, but to provide for them by acts of his own. The creation of man was one of the means he employed for this end, and the condition and circumstances in which man was placed were according to his wise foreordination. The object of the decree was the end, the subsequent acts were the means. Now if the end was certain, as the object of God's decree—one of the all things that come to pass—the decree and the means must have been efficient. There is no escape possible. The efficiency of the decrees of God is as certain in one case as in another. In some cases it is direct, as when he said, "Let there be light, and there was light." In other cases, it is through his own appointed means, as when Adam fell. The efficiency of the means is essential to the certainty of the result. But there may be a difference in the nature of the means employed, and this may justify a distinction between absolute and permissive decrees. But no distinction can be admitted which would introduce an independent element which may frustrate the decree itself. If the power of a

contrary choice resided in Adam's will, God's purpose was conditional and dependent. But his works of creation and providence were intended for the very purpose of executing an ulterior design. We conclude therefore that God's permission simply signifies the absence of force, and the accomplishment of the determined purpose through the spontaneity and volition of the creature.

In this discussion, we intentionally refrain from the use of any authorities except that of the Bible and our Presbyterian standards. We beg leave, however, to introduce two very eminent names, to show that they are unavailable as authority on the other side. Our motto is, "*Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri,*" and we disclaim any dependence upon human opinion. We refer therefore to Sir W. Hamilton, a distinguished anti-necessitarian, simply to make it evident that he cannot be used by the opposite parties in the present discussion. It is well known that in enunciating his peculiar Law of the Conditioned, he reduces volitions to the category of the inconceivable. He holds that we can neither imagine a volition to be caused or uncaused. These are two unthinkable contradictories, one of which must necessarily be true. According to his express language, if we adopt the first alternative, the necessitarian scheme is established beyond a question. He adopts the second, that our volitions are uncaused phenomena; and, if his reasons were admissible, his opinion would be of immense weight against us. But what are those reasons? He appears to us to appeal to a positive dictum of consciousness, to this effect, that *we* are moral and accountable creatures, and that, therefore, our *wills* must be free from all determination. "In favor of our moral nature, the fact that we are free is given us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability." Here we cannot stop to inquire whether or not this argument is consistent with the previous denial of a positive dictum of causality in the mind, although he seems to refer us to a different dictum of consciousness in favor of freedom. We make a different point, which is that Sir William appeals to the consciousness of *fallen* man. But our respected brethren do not agree with him as to

this testimony. On the contrary, they hold the necessitarian view, in reference to the descendants of Adam, and, so far as they are concerned, the argument of Hamilton is altogether against them. On their premises, he would unhesitatingly have pronounced the doctrine of moral necessity the true one.

In reference to John Calvin, we claim him as an authority of immense importance in favor of our own views. One sentence will suffice. "It offends the ears of some, when it is said that God *willed* this fall; but what else, I pray, is the *permission* of him who has the power of preventing, and in whose hands the whole matter is placed, but his *will*?"

Here, we respectfully submit, the great Reformer means to declare, by a significant question, that to say God *permitted*, is to say he *willed* the fall. But it is admitted by all that to *will*, is, with God, to *determine*. No higher degree of efficiency can be expressed in language. It means far more than to be willing. It is action, energy, irresistible decree. Let it be observed that he says the *whole* matter is placed in God's hands. This leaves no possible escape from the conclusion that the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous an advocate of determinism as Edwards himself. How perfectly irreconcilable with his views is the present theory of a contrary choice, must be obvious on the slightest comparison. According to the latter doctrine, the moment before Adam transgressed, all determining causes of a fall were wanting. It was competent for him to take the opposite course, and secure eternal life, and there was nothing in the universe to prevent it. According to Calvin, God had willed the fall, and it was inconceivable that what he definitely willed could fail to come to pass.

Permanence of character manifestly implies perpetuity in the regulative principles of the soul. Liability to sin, on the other hand, implies the absence of this perpetuity in the regulative principle. This was the difference between Adam and angels confirmed in holiness, and it is the difference between Adam and his descendants. As we cannot enter into the consciousness of any but the last, we cannot construct a science of mind for the former. Neither do the Scriptures enlighten us upon the con-

dition of Adam's mind in which the difference consisted. A new psychology and a new theology for this peculiar case cannot be established. Outside of the present systems all is conjecture. We have seen that in a mind constituted according to this theory, whose volitions are independent of the mind itself and subject to no regulative law, their succession must be *fortuitous*, unless necessitated from without; and that, time being given, a departure from rectitude must be virtually certain. We admit, however, that the doctrine of determination requires a *law* to ensure the result. According to the present light furnished by the science of mind, that law is that certain fixed principles regulate mental phenomena. Our theology and our philosophy perfectly agree in this. As man is now, the tenor of his conduct is positively determined by his principles. The moral complexion of his volitions is conformed to his moral tone of thought and feeling. Our orthodox theology teaches us that a man's bad principles are native to him, and that he is "sold under sin." Our Lord compares human character to a fruit-bearing tree. "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." And yet he does not allow this determination to impair human responsibility.

In the case of man in his original state, we find the same responsibility. This proves the *free-agency* of both Adam and his descendants. Unless the principles of divine government have been radically changed, free-agency cannot, therefore, depend upon the absence of determination. Determination in Adam's case would not then conflict with free-agency. Hence it follows that our theology and psychology may be applied to Adam without his just responsibility being in the least impaired.

The difference between the first man and his descendants is that which the Scriptures reveal. We are fallen, he was liable to fall. His spiritual condition was intermediate between the human nature of Jesus Christ and that of unregenerate men. In other words, he was *peccable*. This implies the want of some principle that is necessary to insure obedience. He might have been created with such a principle in his nature, but he was not. Whatever this principle was, it did not pertain to the identity of his person. He was the same man before and after the fall. It

is not therefore essential to the existence of man. Nor does the want of it imply the absence of holiness. He was created upright, yet peccable. The consequences of the fall were penal, and among these was a loss of holiness. We can conceive of a suspension of the entire penalty, and then Adam would have continued to be guilty and peccable, but not fallen, in the sense belonging to ourselves.

It does not seem impossible, therefore, to account for the certainty of the fall. Man was created upright, but without the principle that was necessary to make his continued innocence certain. When Satan assailed him, he was not safe like Job in similar circumstances. His appetites and natural tendencies were permanent. His holiness was not. He was approached by a nature more subtle than his own, and with a malice thoroughly fixed. It is said that he might have resisted. But how long? The influences brought against him were powerful and permanent. His resistance was not so, because the persistent regulation principle was wanting. From the very terms, we are driven to the belief that his resistance was susceptible of gradual reduction. It is too often assumed that Adam was *perfect* in his holiness, without a ray of light from the Scriptures upon the subject. He was doubtless as innocent and holy as a peccable being could be. But a perfectly holy being, in the highest sense is one who, like the Son of Man, has within him a principle, copied from the divine nature, that will infallibly protect him from future apostasy. According to the Scriptures, Adam was destitute of such security.

But this digression in quest of the identical cause of volitions, is purely speculative, and is not essential to the argument. The law of causality does not depend upon a knowledge of particular causes. It lies at the basis of philosophy, and is a necessary conviction that every phenomenon must have a cause, known or unknown. Our reasoning is valid, if philosophy is valid.

It is vain to appeal to consciousness to contradict itself. We cannot be conscious of a power that never has been exercised. It is a great absurdity to suppose that, all the motives being on one side, the human mind may normally exert a contrary choice.

We cannot even conceive it. Yet this is what this theory supposes. But if a certain degree of influence is necessary to render the thought of choice possible, it follows clearly that every choice will correspond to the real or imagined preponderance of influence. If A influences B and C does not, we cannot imagine B. *without a cause*, to incline to C. If B is at the time indifferent to both parties, and his mind *in equilibrio*, the influence of A, when exerted, though it be purely moral, will as certainly prevail as any uncounteracted physical force. Our alleged consciousness, under such circumstances, of a contrary choice, if conceivable, would be useless in the argument, having no countenance from experience. But in reality there is no such deliverance of consciousness. Its testimony is, that, if our subjective thoughts or feelings demanded it, we might resist external influence.

In conclusion, we remark that this discussion, though abstract in terms, has a most important bearing upon the interests of religion. Once admit a power of contrary choice in Adam, and that power will be triumphantly claimed for all his descendants as the ground of responsibility. Two psychologies and two theologies will not be tolerated by the Christian world. In our apprehension, Pelagianism will be easily vindicated on such premises. A Calvinism which virtually denies God's *foreknowledge*, the causative influence of subjective states, and the culpability of human nature antecedently to voluntary action, will prove sadly inadequate to its own defence when its strongholds have been abandoned. It is far wiser to accept truths which we cannot reconcile, than to hazard them both in the effort to do so.

Far be it from our thoughts, in penning these lines, to canvass the motives, or impugn the loyalty of any of our brethren who may differ with us. We have no suspicion of a conscious departure from the path of truth. Let us be excused for the freedom of discussion in which we have indulged, in consideration of an honest zeal for the preservation of those bulwarks of faith which appear to us to claim a vigilant and unfaltering defence at our hands.

JAMES A. WADDELL.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT LOUISVILLE.

ORGANISATION.

There were very few of our Presbyteries not fully represented in the late Assembly. An unusually large proportion of the Commissioners were new men, and very many of them young. But no lack of ability was to be discovered in the body, while its patience and prudence and good temper were certainly remarkable. Not an unkind word was spoken and not the slightest manifestation was made of unfraternal confidence and affection. Dr. Peck, the retiring Moderator, preached an able and interesting sermon entirely without notes. Dr. Wilson was elected in his place by a very large majority of votes. In fact, it came near being a unanimous election—a tribute to his talents and learning and long and faithful services as Stated Clerk. Dr. Park filled the place he left temporarily vacant, and Dr. Bunting was elected by acclamation the temporary or reading clerk. The venerable Permanent Clerk, Dr. Brown, shewed his placid face as usual at his desk, evidently much improved in health. Thus the Assembly was organised and ready to proceed to its work. We propose to make no comments in the way of either censure or commendation of the manner in which the officers of the Assembly discharged their appointed duties, with a single notable exception, and that in favor of

THE COMMITTEE ON LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

The reverend chairman of this Committee, we have been informed, had signalled his firmness and his zeal for the discharge of the same duties at a late meeting of the Synod of Virginia, although we do not know whether that circumstance had aught to do with his appointment to the like office in the late Assembly. And never having sought for leave of absence from any church court, it is probable that we are not very good judges of the way in which a Committee on Leave should receive and entertain and dispose of applications; but we confess to a great admiration, in our inexperience, of the course pursued by Mr. Dinwiddie (of

Alexandria) and his colleagues. For example, on the last Saturday of the sessions, there appeared before them a venerable theological professor and ex-moderator (who himself gave us the account of the proceedings and was evidently very much entertained thereby), and the first question was, "Well, Doctor, what application do you propose to make to this Committee?" The Doctor stated his application, and the chairman with great formality wrote down the same. Then he turned and very courteously requested a statement of the Doctor's grounds or reasons for making such an application. By this time the Doctor had begun to wish himself out of the scrape, but he manfully stated his reasons, which the Chairman and Committee appeared to take into careful but silent consideration. At length the chairman very blandly spoke to this effect: "But Doctor, are you not aware that there remain several answers to overtures which have been reported by you to the Assembly and it has not yet had time to consider them?" Gently and softly the chairman proceeded: "And, Doctor, are you not also aware that you are published with the approbation and sanction of the Assembly to preach to-morrow in Dr. Robinson's church?" The venerable applicant was beginning evidently to reflect on these suggestions, when the mild-mannered chairman followed up his advantage with the remark very respectfully offered: "I would recommend, Doctor, that you withdraw your application;" and the Doctor answered that he had come to the same conclusion.

On the same day another Doctor of Divinity appeared, and the same formal courtesy asked and obtained and recorded the nature of his application, and then the grounds or reasons of it were respectfully called for. In this case the applicant was a very laborious worker but delicate and needing rest, and accordingly his plan was to get leave of absence after the afternoon session and ride from Louisville to St. Louis, where he expected to solace himself after severe and protracted toils with the Christian privileges of that city on Sunday and the delightful society of some near and dear relatives. At that time it was not anticipated that the Assembly could be dissolved that night. The Committee carefully meditated for some time on this application and its grounds

and then the courteous chairman broke the long silence thus: "But, Doctor, have you reflected that as you need rest you could secure it better by remaining here to-morrow than by spending Sunday at St. Louis, where you might be called on to preach?" This was a weighty suggestion, which must have produced some effect. He continued: "And, Doctor, does it not appear to you that to ride all night in a railroad car might be too much for your strength which you feel has been very much exhausted?" This logic could not be resisted, and the application was withdrawn.

Next came a legal gentleman, who was a ruling elder and who seems to have witnessed the scenes just described. The preliminary formalities being in his case also carefully gone through with and his reasons for asking leave of absence given, it appeared that his business at home absolutely required his attention and it was positively necessary that he should lose no more time at the Assembly. This statement threw the Chairman and his Committee into a brown study, but at length one of the members catching inspiration from the chairman propounded this question: "But are not you the man, sir, who on a certain occasion in the proceedings occupied the Assembly with a speech some hours long?" We are informed that upon this the applicant hastily gathered his hat and walking stick and politely bade the Committee a good evening.

It is not very long since our Assembly requested the Presbyteries in electing Commissioners to make sure that the parties chosen would make their arrangements to stay quietly and patiently for two full weeks at the meeting, should so much time prove to be requisite. It was a reasonable request. All honor to the Rev. William Dinwiddie and his Committee! They excused only four commissioners to go home before the close of the proceedings.

REPORT OF SUSTENTATION COMMITTEE.

This was read on the second day of the proceedings, immediately after the announcement of the Standing Committees appointed by the Moderator. The chief statements made in this report are as follows: The yellow fever epidemic in various ways operated to check the Sustentation work; the number and amount

of the collections for Sustentation, the Evangelistic work, and the Invalid Fund do not vary greatly from those of the year previous; the coöperation of Ladies' Societies and Sunday-schools is considered to be of great importance; receipts for Sustentation during the past year have been \$16,680, which is \$28 more than last year; for Evangelistic work the receipts are this year \$515 less than last year, the whole amount appropriated to 626 Presbyteries being \$6,725; the Invalid Fund receipts have been \$1,245 less; the Relief Fund is worth \$30,000, and annuities have been paid to families of six deceased ministers, amounting to \$1,800; the number of names on the lists of this fund are 83; twenty-six aged and infirm ministers and eighty-three families of deceased ministers have been aided from the Invalid Fund; and the "Committee of Sustentation" asks that its name be changed to the "Committee of Home Missions."

ACTION ON SUSTENTATION.

The Assembly recognised with honorable mention the fact of the two secretaries having voluntarily relinquished each \$250 of salary per annum; also agreed to the change of name asked for; also added words to the third Section of By-law No. 5, which make it indispensable to any grant of money for a church building that the sum appropriated by the Committee shall clear the same of debt; also removed the restriction which limits all appropriations to the Colored Evangelistic work to *five per cent.* of the whole receipts, leaving the amount to the discretion of the Committee.

We hope to be pardoned for suggesting to this "Committee of Sustentation" (now of "Home Missions") that their Annual Report contained too much *preaching*, and that the omission also hereafter of all that looks like advice to the Presbyteries would not hurt but help their cause. Moreover, greater simplicity and directness in the statements made, and less reference to what is "pleasing" or "painful" to the Committee, would improve these papers.

We must add that the comparisons which the Secretary of Sustentation allowed himself, when addressing the Assembly, to

make between the Foreign and the Home work and between these both and the Invalid Fund, appeared to us unhappy. For such an officer of our Assembly to feel it necessary for him to declare that he was "the honest friend and advocate of Foreign Missions," seemed to us a very strange thing. And it certainly was unfortunate for him to fall into any such train of remarks as required him to make this declaration. If there is, we will not say *jealousy*, but even *competition*, between Home and Foreign Missions, the question will and should be raised of separating them. The two causes were put at the one place any how not by deliberate preference on the part of the Church.

REPORT OF FOREIGN MISSIONS COMMITTEE.

The reading of this report followed immediately that on Sustentation. The main facts reported are: (1) That the whole of our Foreign Missionary force consists of eighty-six persons, thirty-seven sent from this country and forty-nine natives of the countries where they labor. Of the thirty-seven, fifteen are ministers and twenty-two assistant missionaries. Of the forty-nine, eight are ministers, eight licentiates, and thirty-three teachers and colporteurs. (2) Six additions only were made during the year past to the missionary corps, and all of these under very peculiar providences. Our means to carry on the foreign propagation of the faith have sunk to such a low ebb that except for extraordinary circumstances these additions would not have been ventured to be made. The Rev. T. R. Sampson and his wife were sent to Greece, but at the special charge of some friends, who will also provide for their support in the future. The Rev. J. W. Dabney (formerly of the Campinas Mission and having knowledge of the Portuguese language) finished his theological course at Union Seminary, and with his wife has gone back to assist at the Campinas Institute, where it is expected arrangements can be made for their entire support without charge to the Mission. The Rev. John W. Davis, of the Soochow Mission, married a lady of the Northern Presbyterian Mission at Shanghai, and so a valuable member is added to our corps in China. And Mr. A. H. Erwin at Barranquilla has been so blessed

in his humble but efficient missionary labors there, that, as the expense of his support will be very small, it has been decided to let him remain at his post. This is certainly a humiliating report touching progress for our Church in foreign lands. (3) The receipts for the year past were \$16,234, of which \$5,490 came from Sabbath-schools, \$8,815 from Ladies' Missionary Associations, and the remainder, \$31,928 from churches and individuals. The receipts of the year fall behind those of the year previous by \$990. The general debt is \$9,524. The number of contributing churches is 1,193, which is 108 more than contributed the previous year. More than one-third of our churches still contribute nothing. (4) *The Missionary* cost during the past year only \$442 more than its receipts. Had the one thousand copies sent free to ministers been paid for, it would have more than supported itself. (5) The work, all things considered, never wore a more encouraging aspect. It is believed that, notwithstanding the falling off of receipts for some years past, there is a growing interest in the cause among the great body of our people, and that the number is increasing who practise self-denial and make earnest effort to obtain means for helping this cause. And then the success had in missionary labors abroad is encouraging, from the numbers converted, and the increase of native laborers, and the flourishing condition of our various schools, and the cessation of violent opposition, and the more earnest attention given to preaching. The field is ripening; our great want is more men to gather the harvest. (6) Four more missionaries are specially called for abroad: two for China, one for Greece, and one for Pernambuco. To send out and support them for one year will cost \$10,000. The very existence of one of these Missions, that at Pernambuco, where the Rev. J. Rockwell Smith has labored for six years with very marked success, is now at stake. Mr. Smith has been quite alone for the last three years. It is considered necessary to send another missionary there without delay.

Dr. Wilson was then heard through a paper which he presented on his own responsibility. For three years past the contributions to Foreign Missions have steadily fallen off, so that now they are

\$15,000 behind what they were in the spring of 1876. At this rate in ten years there will be no contributions and no Missions from our Church. At the same time, through the blessing of God and in answer to our prayers, our Church work abroad has made great progress and calls for not less but more outlay. The Committee have in obedience to what was required of them enforced both at home and abroad the most rigid economy with the most discouraging results. Three of our Missions have been cast off; offers of service from many of our young people have been declined; those in the service have not been reinforced as was needful, and for them both health and life have been in this way exposed to serious risk; and many of our people have apparently become, under the cry that has been raised for retrenchment, more callous and indifferent to the claims of this sacred cause. The very moment the Committee began the work of contraction, the gifts of the people began to fall off; and they have continued to do so in a way that occasions serious alarm. And now in further proceedings of retrenchment and contraction, which of our Missions shall next feel the stroke of the axe? Or shall we, to save a few hundred dollars, cease to have a special organ of Missions? Or shall we undertake to carry on both Foreign Missions and Sustentation with only one Secretary? Or, shall we adopt the expedient of sending out our missionaries henceforth without the encumbrance of families, and require them also to follow some secular pursuit to aid in their own support?

Dr. Wilson's paper proceeded to urge that, in whatever way sought to be carried out, the policy of retrenchment in Foreign Missions is from the very nature of the case a suicidal one. It is not retrenchment, nor is it any readjustment of machinery which is now required, but the stimulation of our people to a higher standard of liberality. It is not the want of means, but of system and life, which cripples this cause.

ACTION TOUCHING FOREIGN MISSIONS.

The Assembly instructed the Executive Committee (1) to aim at the highest economy compatible with the greatest efficiency; declared that it would not consist with this efficiency to give to

Foreign Missions less than the whole time of one Secretary; expressed the conviction that the foreign department of our Church work has been managed with great economy. (2) It instructed the Committee to make every effort to extinguish the debt, but to contract the foreign work no further unless absolutely necessary to secure the speedy extinction of the debt. (3) It instructed the Committee to continue the publication of *The Missionary*. The Assembly also recommended that our churches be exhorted to greater liberality and our ministers and other officers be urged to do what they can to extend the circulation of *The Missionary* and the observance of the Monthly Concert. As to Dr. Wilson's paper, the Assembly recommended its publication and circulation at the discretion of the Committee.

REPORT OF EDUCATION COMMITTEE.

The main facts are, (1) That eighty-eight candidates under care of our Presbyteries have been aided during the past year—forty-five of them at Seminaries and forty-three in literary institutions. (2) That in accordance with instructions from the Assembly the appropriation to Seminary students was reduced from \$175 to \$125, and to college students from \$150 to \$100 each. (3) That the Secretary was able to visit only the two Synods of Georgia and Memphis, the two Presbyteries of Memphis and Cherokee, and some eight or ten churches; but he has diligently sought to extend and deepen an interest in the cause by appeals addressed to individual churches, with results on the whole very gratifying. (4) That the entire receipts of the year were \$11,456, and the expenses \$1,774. (5) That there were upwards of eight hundred contributing churches, and that of our sixty-four Presbyteries all except three coöperate in some form with the Committee. (6) That the number of candidates aided is this year nine more than the year previous.

ACTION TOUCHING EDUCATION.

The Assembly (1) declined making any change in the location of the Executive Committee (as was proposed from some quarter), or in the plan of aiding candidates whether in the seminaries or in

the colleges; (2) urged the continued policy of not incurring debt; (3) and recommended that every congregation have opportunity to contribute; (4) that the Secretary visit as far as possible Synods, Presbyteries, churches, and individuals; (5) that the concert of prayer on the last Thursday of February should continue to be observed.

The Rev. J. L. Rogers from Atlanta Presbytery moved to strike out "churches and individuals" from the recommendation touching the Secretary's visiting, on the ground that this looks towards the old agency system which our Church has abandoned. He failed, however, to secure the attention of the body to his important suggestion, and his motion was lost.

REPORT OF THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE.

The main facts are, (1) That the debt now stands at \$17,177, but there are reliable assets available during the next few months to reduce it to less than \$14,000. (2) That for the coming year the office expenses will be not far from \$3,500; and the amount required for interest about \$1,000. On the larger part of the debt interest has been reduced from ten to eight per cent. To meet this outlay, about \$2,000 will be provided by royalty on the the papers and the book business. Special efforts in every Presbytery to increase the circulation of our papers might result in an income from this source that would cover all expenses. (3) Of *The Earnest Worker* the edition is now 7,000, an increase of 2,000. Of *The Children's Friend*, 18,000 are printed—no increase of circulation. Had we 10,000 subscribers to the *The Earnest Worker* and 40,000 to *The Children's Friend*, our income from this source would be \$3,400; a little active effort in every Presbytery would bring this about. (4) A Presbyterial Sabbath-school Superintendent in every Presbytery is for this end and many others of great importance. (5) No favorable opportunity to sell the Publication House has yet occurred, but it may be safely regarded as having paid all its own expenses.

ACTION TOUCHING PUBLICATION.

The Assembly resolved, (1) That all collections and other

revenues above the Executive Committee's actual working expenses be appropriated to the extinction of the debt. (2) That the instructions of the last Assembly touching the sale of the House be carried out as early as possible. (3) That the efficient Secretary and Treasurer be recommended to visit Synods and Presbyteries as far as in his power to forward this cause. (4) That the Committee's papers be earnestly recommended for increased patronage in all our Sabbath-schools. (5) That the Committee's suggestions touching colportage and Sabbath-schools be recommended to the consideration of our Presbyteries at their next meetings.

READING OF ALL OVERTURES.

On the afternoon of the second day, as soon as the Publication Committee had finished its report, overtures from various Synods and Presbyteries to the Assembly were presented. It was moved to pass them to the appropriate Committee. Dr. Woodrow moved to read them all before reference. Objection was made by Elders Howison and McPheeters, because of the time it would consume; and the practice of former Assemblies and of State Legislatures was pleaded against this innovation. Dr. Woodrow urged that inasmuch as we have not the legislative custom of three readings of a bill, it was better to have all overtures read before reference. Thus all could know the substance of the overtures and have opportunity to reflect on them. Ruling Elder Livingston supported the motion and it was carried, and we believe the experiment gave satisfaction. The overtures were then read and passed into the hands of Dr. Peck.

THE GENERAL PRESBYTERIAN COUNCIL.

At the night session a letter was read from the Rev. Dr. H. A. Boardman of Philadelphia, inviting the Assembly to arrange for taking part in the coming Council. Some little disposition was exhibited to reopen the question of our Church's taking part again in this matter, but by a large majority it was decided to appoint a committee to nominate delegates to the Council to meet in Philadelphia in July, 1880. This committee consisted of W. U. Murkland, John B. Adger, and W. W. Houston, *ministers*;

and Alexander Sprunt, A. M. McPheeters, and L. L. Holliday, *ruling elders.*

It was resolved in committee that there should be had in the nomination (1) some regard to *continuity*, so that the delegation should not be entirely new, but embrace a few names of men attending the Edinburgh meeting. (2) That some general regard should be had to a geographical distribution of the selections, but that chiefly a choice should be aimed at of men who could really be regarded as representatives of our Church. (3) That a full list of delegates, both *principals* and *alternates*, should be presented to the Assembly with a view to shutting out all extemporised and partisan nominations on the floor.

Accordingly the following nominations were reported and the same were adopted by the Assembly:

*Ministers.**Principals.*

Stuart Robinson,
B. M. Palmer,
J. L. Girardeau,
C. A. Stillman,
J. Leighton Wilson,
Jos. R. Wilson,
J. A. Lefevre,
Thomas E. Peck,
Geo. D. Armstrong,
W. U. Murkland,
H. C. Alexander,
William Brown,
C. H. Read,
Jacob Henry Smith.

Alternates.

J. B. Stratton,
M. H. Houston,
James Woodrow,
J. T. Hendrick,
R. F. Bunting,
Isaac J. Long,
Jno. N. Waddel,
R. P. Fâris,
E. H. Rutherford,
Jno. W. Pratt,
W. E. Boggs,
T. A. Hoyt,
J. N. Craig,
George Howe.

Ruling Elders.

Jno. L. Marye,	Va.	Robert Stiles,	Va.
Thomas Thomson,	S. C.	James Fentress,	Tenn.
T. G. Richardson,	La.	W. P. Webb,	Ala.
W. M. McPheeters,	Mo.	H. H. M. Spencer,	Mo.
I. D. Jones,	Md.	J. F. Hart,	S. C.
Thos. A. Hamilton,	Ala.	T. J. Kirkpatrick,	Va.

<i>Principals.</i>		<i>Alternates.</i>	
W. C. Kerr,	N. C.	Jno. Dillon,	N. C.
Patrick Joyes,	Ky.	J. W. C. Watson,	Miss.
D. C. Anderson,	Ala.	J. L. H. Tomlin,	Tenn.
C. S. Venable,	Va.	H. B. McClellan,	Ky.
J. Randolph Tucker,	Va.	C. B. Moore,	Ark.
J. M. Baker,	Fla.	J. R. Blake,	N. C.
J. J. Gresham,	Ga.	J. A. Billups,	Ga.
A. P. McCormick,	Texas.	A. F. Hardie,	Texas.

The Stated Clerk was then instructed to reply to the communications from the officers of the Council and forward the names of our delegates.

SABBATH OBSERVANCE.

The permanent Committee on the Sabbath appointed by the last Assembly, of which the Rev. Dr. Stacy was chairman, made on the third day the following report:

“On account of the absence of the chairman in Europe during the past summer, it was late in the fall before the committee were called together, and not until after the meeting of most of the larger and more important ecclesiastical bodies had taken place. Since that time, however, your committee have been endeavoring faithfully to obey the instructions given, as far at least as other engagements would allow. They have been in correspondence with the New York Sabbath Committee, the Sabbath Alliance, and the International Association of Philadelphia, the New Jersey Association, and the Association of Maryland. They have communicated with only two of the Synods of our Church for the reason above stated. They have addressed, however, a letter to all the Presbyteries, asking them to place this subject upon their docket and consider the same at their spring session. They have also written to thirteen of the Conferences of the M. E. Church South. They have also been in correspondence with the Federation Internationale of Geneva, Switzerland. They have raised the necessary funds, procured and distributed over eleven hundred copies of the tract issued by our Committee of Publication styled “The Holy Sabbath,” sending one to each minister in our entire Church, as far as their address was known. They have endeavored also to enlist the sympathies and services of the editors of several journals of the different denominations, asking them to make this one of the more prominent themes, both for their editorials and selections. They have also sent a communication to the Southern Baptist Convention at Atlanta, to the Northern General Assembly now in session at Saratoga Springs, and to the Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in session at

Memphis, asking them to take action in the matter; and in addition to all this, they have been gathering statistics and all the information within their reach bearing upon the general subject, and endeavoring as far as possible to spy out the land and see how it lies.

“From a general survey of the field as far as we have been able to view it, we feel fully persuaded that the last Assembly has neither acted hastily nor yet given undue prominence to this matter, Notwithstanding the grave doubt expressed by one of our ecclesiastical bodies, to those who have closely inquired into the matter, it is obvious that there is a growing tendency to laxity in views on this whole question of Sabbath observance. The loose trans-Atlantic ideas are coming over with every tide of immigration. And though we in distant portions of the South may not yet feel the influence to any great extent, it is nevertheless stealthily creeping in, and like leaven, is quietly but surely working. The recent movements in Cincinnati and Louisville, the growing disposition on the part of the secular press to make their Sunday issues specially interesting and attractive, the increasing patronage of Sunday trains by professing Christians and even ministers of the gospel, many of whom do not hesitate to travel on Sunday trains to fill their appointments, the habitual silence of many pulpits on this subject, and last though not least, the lamentable example so recently set in the halls of the country, when the supreme law-making power in the land openly, and in the eyes of the nation and of the world, desecrated the sanctity of the Lord's day by appropriating it to the transaction of Congressional business, all furnish evidence of this laxity. And we may here remark that the present remoteness of the evil from us is no protection. Society, like the atmosphere above us, cannot be agitated in one direction without sending the influence in others. Any evil practice in one section, like the cold wave in the northwest, will soon begin to travel, and unless arrested will continue to spread, until the whole country is brought under its influence and feels its chilling power. Let the plague break out in any country, and how soon our authorities would be enforcing the law of quarantine. The action would be wise, the course commendable. Evil practices, like the plague, when once established will soon begin to spread in every direction. The time to fight any contagion is in its incipency.

“Whilst our rulers are so ready to look after the physical health of the nation, it is greatly to be regretted they are so slow in realising its moral necessities. The question of the Sabbath has much more to do with our political and social systems than many are ready to admit. It has a political as well as religious outlook. Standing in close connexion with the morals of the country, like any other question of morals, it must bear directly upon the question of national prosperity. The ordinance stands as the representative of the Lord, and cannot be disregarded, without to that extent disowning allegiance to the God of heaven.

The hebdomadal division of time being the foundation of God's scheme of creation, and also of redemption, is also clearly the foundation of his projected scheme of providence, with reference both to Church and State. He has ordained that man shall within six days do all his work and rest the seventh; and every law or action that ignores this regulation is contravening his plan, and everything that contravenes any of his plans must in the end work disastrously to all concerned. It is clearly to the best interest of the race closely to scan and rigidly to observe all the rules and principles of the Creator, as revealed either in revelation or nature—in one word, to keep as near the divine plan as possible. It is only in this way that the great problems of human civilisation and national reform can ever be solved. Real progress in mechanism has been attained only by a close observance and imitation of nature. When man departs from that scheme—when he sets his judgment against the divine judgment, and his law against the divine law—the scheme of the Great Architect is marred, the time of its completion delayed, and the interest of the whole jeopardised.

“Our legislators and rulers have generally acted upon this principle, inasmuch as they have in the main based our Constitution and laws upon the teaching of the Scripture. In this they have acted wisely. Queen Victoria uttered a great truth as well as a noble sentiment when, in response to the inquiry of the African king, she gave this answer, accompanying the gift of a Bible: ‘This book is the secret of England’s greatness.’

“Whilst our Constitution and laws profess conformity to the Word of God, there is one particular in which, in their practical workings at least, they are sadly in want of harmony with it. While the Scriptures say positively and unequivocally, ‘Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man servant, nor thy maid servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates,’ railroad and other corporations are allowed to ply their vocations as on other days. In the language of one of our correspondents, ‘The Sunday freight business is enormous, bringing terrible oppression upon thousands of men.’ So in the postal service. The running of trains, the carrying and distributing of mails on the Lord’s day on the thousands of roads and the ten thousands of post-offices in this broad land, is a great work, requiring a great number of employés and a vast outlay of physical labor. This robbing so large a portion of our citizens of their seventh day rest is a wrong done them, as they are unjustly deprived of a boon conferred by the Creator upon every creature. It is wrong done the law of God, as it casts contempt upon its authority. It is a wrong done the Christian Church, as it weakens its testimony, and in many instances interferes with its services. It is a wrong done

the whole country, as it places the entire nation in a position of antagonism to the divine law and the divine plan, which will necessitate chastisements and scourgings of various descriptions, if not final overthrow. Revolution must of necessity follow revolution, until the governments of this world are fashioned after the principles and teachings of the Scriptures. And it would be well for the people of this country to remember that there is no new world—no inviting Eldorado in the distant West—to which these principles may again be transplanted and begin the experiment anew. The struggle must be at home. The elimination, if ever effectual, must be wrought with our own hands, and here upon our own soil.

“In this action of the Government, it is impossible to see upon what principles of equity or righteousness its conduct is based. We are utterly at a loss to see with what consistency it can forbid in others what it allows in itself: how it can require individual citizens to cease from their daily toil, whilst it is driving its own business and carrying on its own work on the seventh day as well as any other.

“Nor can we see upon what principle of justice it can allow railroad and other corporations to carry on their traffic through the same period of seven days, while individual citizens are required to cease from theirs. That is a strange system of ethics, indeed, which condemns an action in an individual when he stands in his isolation, but justifies the same when he merges into the constituency of the Government or becomes a stockholder in some legalised corporation. It is needless for us to declare that the Word of God recognises no distinctions. If it be right for the Government and these corporations to violate the Sabbath, it is right for individuals to do the same. If it be wrong for individuals to do it, it is equally wrong for the Government and these corporations.

“It is not enough to say that it is a work of necessity and mercy. The Master in his exposition of the law has clearly defined the only exceptions to the rule, and it is utterly impossible to see how, upon any known principles of interpretation, this wholesale and constant discharge of regular and servile work can be made analogous to the few exceptional cases given. It is neither lifting the ox out of the ditch nor leading the ass to water. It is purely a question of gain. It is the same unconquerable thirst for riches that has influenced this people as the ancient people of God, to believe that there is more profit in seven continuous days of toil than in six of labor, with the seventh as a day of rest.

Nor is it an answer to say that the Sabbath is a religious institution, and that the Government is a political organisation, formed for temporal and political purposes solely, and therefore as such has nothing to do with religion. We most heartily indorse this sentiment, and most earnestly insist upon its rigid enforcement. As a Church, we are ready to affix our broadest seal to the doctrine of the eternal separation of Church

and State. Let the things of Cæsar ever be kept separate from the things of God. But this matter of a day of rest is something that concerns the kingdom of Cæsar as well as the kingdom of Christ. There are two distinct questions here before us—the one a moral, the other a religious one; the one a State, the other a religious question. The one concerns us as citizens, the other as Christians. It is to the former of these that we are now speaking. It is to the question that concerns us as citizens—that concerns our temporal interests and welfare as individuals, and our temporal prosperity as a nation, that we are directing attention; and we insist upon it, that this is a question for legislative consideration, inasmuch as it involves the question of morals, and the question of morals bears directly upon the question of national prosperity. God has so constituted the world that the temporal rests upon the moral and the moral upon the religious. The field of morals touches religion upon the one side and human government on the other, and, like the ocean separating two continents, is the property alike of both. No government can flourish without good morals, and no good morals can exist without a clear recognition of the teachings of Scripture. The true interests of the country demand that the Sabbath be protected, as the marriage relation, or human life and property, and for the same reason. If the Government has authority to forbid adultery, murder, and theft, because these things are enemies to its material progress and stability, for the very same reason it has authority to forbid the outward violation of the Sabbath law. It has nothing to do with the anger that is in murder, the lust that is in adultery, or the concupiscence that is in theft, for these things fall within the purview of religion. But it has the right to forbid the overt acts to which they lead, because hurtful to its interests. So it has no right to say that its citizens shall indulge in holy affections or attend religious exercises on the Sabbath, for these also fall within the scope of religion. But it has the right to require that its citizens shall abstain from all labor and every open and flagrant breach of the peace and order of the day.

“As to the questions, what can be done toward abating the evil, and what is our duty in the premises? we answer that our duty is very clear in one direction at least. ‘Ye are my witnesses,’ saith the Lord. It is the duty of the Church to bear testimony to God’s truth, and the teaching of the Scriptures on this subject, and as far as possible to train the public conscience aright. And not simply to bear testimony with the lip, but also with the life. Preaching, unsupported by practice, would be wholly ineffectual. A mere resolution, without observance on the part of ministers, elders, and members, would be utterly futile and vain. We hope, therefore, that the Assembly will first of all insist that ministers and elders and members of the church shall themselves set the example by rendering due respect in the observance of the day. For without this, any

deliverance on the subject, no matter how admirable, would only provoke the taunting retort, 'Physician, heal thyself.'

"Whether much can be done by way of petition will depend very much upon the style of the address, the zeal with which it is prosecuted, but especially upon the number and character of the petitioners. Two of the Synods (Alabama and North Carolina) have, through their respective committees, petitioned their Legislatures. The petition of the first was too late to be fairly before the Legislature, and was defeated. That of the second was so far successful as to secure a law forbidding the running of 'freight trains on the Sabbath.' If all the Christians of the different denominations could only be aroused to unite in one grand effort, we feel fully assured that much could be done toward abating the evil, and preventing any further encroachments upon the sanctity of the day.

"In several of the larger cities, and in a few of the States, there are Sabbath Associations, composed of members of the different denominations, which have been doing a good deal in a quiet way toward promoting Sabbath observance. If such associations could be formed in every State, they could doubtless do much toward restraining the obvious tendency to Sabbath lawlessness and desecration.

"An effort is being made to hold an international meeting of all the associations in this country and Canada, to meet some time in the fall, with a view of considering the whole subject, and devising, if possible, some measure for the arrest of this national evil. What the result will be remains to be seen. A similar meeting of the associations of Europe is also appointed to be held in the city of Berne in September next, from which we hope great good will come.

In the meanwhile we urge upon the Assembly the importance of continued agitation. Let this venerable court continue to speak upon this subject, and speak in no uncertain way, but in a loud and emphatic manner. Let its voice be heard throughout the land and even the world. Let its testimony be pointed, decided, unequivocal. Let her ministers be urged to present this subject to their respective congregations. For if this evil is ever reached, it must be through the agency of the Church; and even if not reached and corrected, it is only in this way that the Church can clear her skirts."

Motion was made by Ruling Elder Livingston to adopt. Dr. Peck wished the report docketed. Rev. J. P. Smith of Fredericksburg moved to refer to a special committee to recommend such action as might be necessary. Dr. Woodrow urged postponement, because the Assembly ought to be responsible not only for any report as a whole, but also for the reasoning and even the expressions employed. There should be nothing in such a

report which all the members of our Church could not defend or which could not be used authoritatively. While he saw nothing very objectionable in this report, he was of opinion that there were certain parts of it to which he could not commit himself. Dr. Peck's motion was carried.

On the next day the Rev. D. K. McFarland of Savannah moved to take this report from the docket and refer it to a special committee, which was urged by several speakers, and the motion prevailed. D. K. McFarland, J. L. Rogers, F. H. Johnston, *ministers*; W. G. Clark and W. V. Chardavoyne, ruling elders, were appointed.

On the ninth day this Committee reported, (1) commending the diligence and faithfulness of the Permanent Committee, and continuing the same with the duties and work imposed by the last Assembly; (2) recommending Synods and Presbyteries to consider this subject, and the appointment of Presbyterial Committees to investigate and agitate; (3) calling on ministers, officers, and members of the church to remember the Lord's day to keep it holy; (4) appointing the same Permanent Committee, with the addition of the name of Rev. J. H. Martin, D. D.

THE TUSKALOOSA INSTITUTE REPORT.

The main facts are, the much lamented death of Prof. A. F. Dickson; the appointment temporarily in his place of the Rev. J. W. Kerr, M. D., at sixty dollars per month; the attendance at the school this year of ten students; the good character maintained by those who had been previously at the Institute, and the appointment of Dr. B. T. Lacy as Financial Agent.

The Assembly adopted resolutions reported by the Committee on Theological Seminaries expressive of their interest in this important enterprise and commending it to the churches.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER CHURCHES.

On the fourth day came a telegraphic communication from the General Assembly at Saratoga, presenting "its cordial salutations to the General Assembly in session at Louisville, praying for them grace, mercy, and peace, through our Lord Jesus Christ.

In behalf of the Assembly and in the sympathies of a common faith and order, I am, etc., Henry H. Jessup, Moderator." To this the following response by telegraph was made: "The General Assembly at Louisville cordially reciprocates the kind Christian salutations of the General Assembly at Saratoga, and commends that body to the grace of our common Lord and Master, praying that his presence may overshadow it and its deliberations be directed for his glory."

Similar salutations were communicated by letter to "the Reformed Episcopal Church," "the Associate Reformed Synod of the South," and "the Cumberland Presbyterian Church."

The next day, however, a delegate from the Cumberland Presbyterian Assembly appeared in person. A letter from him addressed to the Moderator being referred to the Committee on Correspondence, a report was made by that Committee, declaring on behalf of the Assembly that "in determining no longer to send delegates to corresponding bodies (always excepting the General Synod of the Reformed Church), it was by no means our intention to control the action of these bodies in the matter. One reason for our action was our poverty. But the Assembly is delighted to receive delegations whenever sent to us, and cordially invites the Rev. R. H. Caldwell, the delegate to this body from the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, to address us this morning at 12 o'clock." Accordingly Mr. Caldwell addressed the Assembly and the Moderator responded.

Subsequently the Rev. C. H. Read, D. D., was appointed principal delegate to the General Synod of the Reformed Church and the Rev. J. A. Lefevre, D. D., his alternate.

Upon the presentation of the report last referred to, a discussion arose on a motion of Dr. Baird to rescind the rule limiting correspondence on our part to letters, except in the case of the General Synod. Dr. Baird held that each Assembly was entitled to regulate the matter for itself, and he was opposed to any fixed policy of correspondence. Dr. Adger opposed the motion, *first*, because of our poverty, and *secondly*, because a written communication can better express the views and wishes of the Assembly when there is anything special or particular to be said,

than a delegate who will say what he pleases. While our Foreign Mission work is suffering we can hardly afford to spend money on mere courtesies. The Rev. J. L. Rogers said we must have a settled policy—corresponding either in one or in the other way; and other bodies must know what that policy is, so that they may act accordingly. Dr. Boude favored rescinding, and would appoint the delegates, and then if they could not go on account of their poverty, let them write the letter and say they are too poor to go. Dr. Adger urged that if we only send letters, we cannot expect other bodies to send us deputations. But a previous Assembly had made a rule, and being a continuous body, respect should be had to what was done by our predecessors, unless good reason can be given for rescinding. The Assembly refused to rescind.

It now appears that the late Assembly at Saratoga of the Northern Church has followed us in this matter. It resolved to correspond with other Churches hereafter only by letter. Two good results may therefore be claimed for the rule our Assembly refused to rescind: first, we have probably killed off for all the Presbyterian bodies one of the most burdensome and pretentious of shams; and secondly, we have as probably settled the vexed question of Fraternal Relations with the Northern Church. It seems that they could not bring themselves to say those “few plain words,” and so now practically they will be *let off* from saying them without our yielding what we were so clearly entitled to claim at their hands. No one amongst us will object to an annual exchange of good wishes for the future between them and ourselves. And if they can afford to withhold from us the expression of their regret for past offences given, we certainly can well afford to do without it. That matter being thus finished and settled up, let us proceed to our next business.

ASSEMBLY OF 1880.

Historic old Charleston was nominated by Dr. Junkin as the place of its meeting. The Moderator said that Wilmington would like to have the Assembly, but he would take no step in the matter. Dr. Murkland said Baltimore would welcome them

heartily, but he did not wish to nominate it in opposition to Charleston. The choice of Charleston was unanimous.

THE BOOK OF CHURCH ORDER.

Dr. Adger made the following report from the Committee on Book of Church Order:

"The Committee appointed to examine the official returns from the Presbyteries of their votes on the Book of Church Order, have carefully performed that duty, and report to the General Assembly that an overwhelming majority of these courts have adopted the Revised Form of Government and Rules of Discipline as the law of our Church on those matters. The following table exhibits, in alphabetical order, the Presbyteries from which official returns are in hand, with a precise statement of the vote in each. In some cases the returns give us no figures, but we copy the expressions employed:

	<i>For.</i>	<i>Against.</i>	<i>Non liquet.</i>
Abingdon,	22	8	1
Arkansas,	21	—	—
Atlanta,	Adopted.		
Augusta,	18	4	1
Bethel,	22	5	—
Brazos,	4	3	—
Central Mississippi,	20	6	—
Central Texas,	11	10	—
Charleston,	13	2	—
Cherokee,	16	8	—
Chesapeake,	11	4	—
Columbia,	6	19	—
Concord,	Adopted without debate.		
Dallas,	Approved.		
East Alabama,	15	2	—
East Hanover,	26	1	—
Eastern Texas,	Adopted nearly unanimously.		
Ebenezer,	Adopted.		
Enoree,	18	13	—
Fayetteville,	17	17	—
Harmony,	32	8	1
Greenbrier,	23	1	3
Holston,	16	4	—
Indian,	Adopted unanimously.		
Knoxville,	3	11	—
Lafayette,	18	2	—
Lexington,	40	7	—

	<i>For.</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Non liquet.</i>
Louisiana,	10	1	—
Louisville,	23	2	1
Macon,	10	—	1
Maryland,	5	13	1
Mecklenburg,	Rejected.		
Memphis,	20	6	—
Missouri,	13	3	2
Montgomery,	23	10	1
Nashville,	16	20	—
North Alabama,	3	8	—
North Mississippi,	Adopted by two-thirds majority.		
New Orleans,	Adopted unanimously.		
Ouachita,	11	3	—
Orange,	37	7	4
Paducah,	Adopted unanimously.		
Palmyra,	Adopted.		
Red River,	5	4	1
Roanoke,	17	4	—
Savannah,	Adopted unanimously.		
South Carolina,	Adopted unanimously.		
South Alabama,	14	16	1
St. John's,	3	1	—
St. Louis,	23	5	—
Transylvania,	14	7	—
Tombeckbee,	12	2	—
Tuskaloosa,	20	—	2
Upper Missouri,	6	5	2
Winchester,	25	8	1
Western District,	6	8	—
West Lexington,	14	9	—
Western Texas,	12	13	—
Wilmington,	Adopted.		

"It will be observed that there remain seven more Presbyteries from which we have no official returns, namely: Chickasaw, Florida, Muhlenburg, Mississippi, Potosi, Sao Paulo, and West Hanover.

"The papers publish West Hanover as adopting by a vote of 16 to 9, and Potosi by a vote of 17 to 1, and Chickasaw by a vote of 9 to 7, and Florida by a unanimous vote. The papers say also that Mississippi has adopted the Book; that Sao Paulo has adopted, and that it is to be published by them in the Portuguese language, to set forth our Church to the people of Brazil; and that Muhlenburg declines to vote.

"According to all this testimony, therefore, most of which is official, it appears that one Presbytery, namely, Muhlenburg, declines to vote; in

one Presbytery, namely, Fayetteville, there is a tie vote; eight Presbyteries, namely, Columbia, Knoxville, Maryland, Mecklenburg, Nashville, North Alabama, Western District, and Western Texas, vote to reject: and the remaining fifty-six Presbyteries to adopt, some sixteen of them nearly or quite unanimously.

"The committee having had referred to them by the Assembly the overture from Abingdon Presbytery respecting the not binding of the new Book with the Confession or the Hymn Book for five years, and the overture from Paducah Presbytery moving the Assembly to incorporate the old Book's chapter on Preliminary Principles into the new Book as a preface, recommend that a negative answer be returned to both overtures."

The Rev. A. J. Witherspoon moved that the report be adopted. Dr. Park thought there must be a formal announcement to the Presbyteries by the Assembly before the new Book can become any part of our Church constitution. Dr. Adger said we are acting now under the provisions of the old Book, and shall so act until this report is adopted. But the old Book, where it treats of new constitutional rules (Form of Government, Chap. XII., §6), does not require the action proposed by the brother. It does say that before any new rules shall be obligatory they are to be transmitted "to all the Presbyteries, and returns be received from at least a majority in writing, approving thereof." This is all. There is nothing said about the Assembly ratifying what the Presbyteries have done. It is not called upon to enact anything about the matter. We have to count the votes and report the result, and when the Assembly shall adopt the report that a large majority of the Presbyteries have voted for the new Book, then immediately it becomes our law. But Dr. Park inquired what is to become of cases of discipline now in progress which were commenced under the old Book? What is to be done with them? Dr. Adger replied that the new points as to jurisdiction made by the Revision relate chiefly to appellate jurisdiction. Cases will come up for the most part just as they always did.

The report was adopted. Dr. Adger then offered the following resolution;

"*Resolved*, That while the General Assembly, in adopting the report of the Committee on the Book of Church Order, has declared that Form of Government and those Rules of Discipline to be of immediate force,

nevertheless it is the judgment of this body that, in the cases of appeal or complaint originating under the old Book, which may be coming up for adjudication by this Assembly at its present session, it is recommended no commissioners who come from any of the Synods appealed from should exercise the right of voting in those cases."

Mr. Hart of South Carolina—The resolution does not go far enough. It ought to apply to all pending judicial cases now issued.

Rev. Dr. Adger was tired of construing the lower courts as partisans, making a new case in every higher court as the case goes up. He thought it would do no harm for the cases already commenced to come up into the higher courts under the forms of the new Book.

On motion of Mr. Williams, Major Hart's amendment was laid on the table.

Dr. Boude said the new Book has been adopted by the Presbyteries. It is now law. We cannot set it aside. Dr. Junkin said the unanimous voice of the Assembly cannot set aside the law of the Church. The Presbyteries are all here, and we cannot say to them that we propose to set aside their law. Dr. Woodrow said the resolution was simply a recommendation advising certain parties to abstain from the exercise of some newly acquired rights during these sessions of the Assembly. Dr. Baird read the rule for amending the Constitution and gave its history. The General Assembly in Scotland had possessed the power to pass laws for the Church. The Government then packed the Assemblies so as to enact laws repugnant to Presbyterianism. At the second Reformation, the "Barrier Act" placed the power of making laws (so far as the Church has any such power) in the hands of the Presbyteries. Our rule (in the old Book) for amending the Constitution corresponds in nature and design to the Scotch Barrier Act. Dr. Park then offered the following substitute for Dr. Adger's resolution:

Resolved, That the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, meeting in Louisville, Ky., May, 1879, hereby declares that the new Book of Church Order has been adopted by a large majority of the Presbyteries, as shown in their official reports to this body, and said New Book of

Church Order is therefore declared to be the law of the Church from and after the date of the dissolution of this Assembly."

Dr. Adger objected to this substitute as unnecessary, because the vote of the Assembly has already declared the new Book adopted. But he would vote for the substitute if the last words were omitted, and he moved to strike out "*from and after the date of the dissolution of this Assembly.*"

Rev. J. L. Rogers—The Assembly has adopted the report of the committee which has made the new Book the law of the Church. The announcement has already been made in the report we have adopted. Then he had a very serious objection to this resolution. If we have a right to postpone its action ten days, we have the right to postpone it five years. We are merely a declarative body. We do not make the law. The Presbyteries have made it. The Assembly can merely declare it. It cannot suspend it.

Dr. Woodrow rose to a point of order, and contended that a reconsideration of the vote declaring the new Book adopted was the only way to reach the end aimed at.

The Moderator ruled that the report of the committee merely gave the information of the vote to the Assembly, and the Assembly has not yet authoritatively announced the adoption of the new laws.

Rev. J. L. Rogers, resuming his argument, claimed that in adopting the report of the committee the Assembly had already made all the declaration necessary, and so had already recognised the new Constitution. Having done this, we have no power to suspend its action for a single day.

Dr. Junkin thought if the ruling of the Moderator was the voice of the house, some of us had voted under a misapprehension. We ought, therefore, to vote over again.

Dr. Woodrow appealed from the decision of the chair. Forty-one voted for sustaining appeal and fifty-nine against it. The Moderator's ruling was sustained.

Col. Livingston asked if we adopt Dr. Adger's amendment what becomes of the equities that grow out of cases already in litigation? There are *rights* that will be affected by the *immediate*

adoption of the new Constitution. The Assembly has no power to make law. But what is law does not become operative until formally announced. We have a right to reconsider it. If we should find that many of the Presbyteries had adopted the new Book by informal votes, so it is not really adopted, we would reconsider the action. And we can reconsider this vote if in taking the vote you have passed an *ex post facto law* affecting the rights of those in course of process. You do a thing the Constitution of the United States forbids the civil powers to, and which justice and equity forbid an ecclesiastical court to do.

A motion to lay the whole matter on the table was lost.

Mr. Converse said the point he had wished to make was that, by reason of the judicial cases now pending, the vote declaring the new Book adopted should be delayed until these cases were disposed of. It is now too late to take that course. The new Book is now the law of the Church. But the appellants have prepared their cases and have a right to be heard under the forms which prevailed at the time they laid their appeals before this Assembly. The resolution ought to be modified accordingly.

Dr. Grasty thought the Assembly could not now go back and inquire whether the new Book is adopted.

Major Hart moved that the whole matter in regard to the question of the revised Book, which was then in order, be laid upon the table, to make way for a substitute. Lost.

Rev. W. W. Houston said: The only question arising is the adoption of a paper making the Revised Book the organic law of the Church. Now, can the Presbyteries adopt a book of their own accord? I do not see that this Assembly has adopted the Revised Book as yet. The sentiment of the Presbyteries has been ascertained, and it remains for the Assembly to decide the question finally. It is incumbent upon this body to proceed to enact that the Book shall become the organic law. The question then arises as to when it shall be declared the law of the Church.

Dr. Adger inquired of the last speaker if in his judgment it would be competent for the Assembly to say that this new Book shall not be the law? Mr. Houston in reply said, "I maintain that on this floor I have the right to refuse to vote for this Book.

I am independent. The remedy is with the Presbyteries; they can refuse to send us back here if they see fit, because we vote contrary to their ideas. Dr. Adger rejoined that the brother's answer and his argument reach the very point towards which all the arguments offered here to-day against the immediate authority of the new Book do manifestly tend. He says squarely what all these other brethren ought also to say out, that the Presbyteries do not make the law. He says distinctly, what they all should also admit, that the Assembly can adopt or not adopt the new Book, just as it pleases. He says we are not instructed. I join him in holding that we are not to come to any Assembly *instructed*, but that does not prevent the Presbyteries from exercising their right of adopting or rejecting constitutional rules. And the brother is certainly wrong in saying the General Assembly can make law. Let that part of the old Book be pointed out which squints in the slightest towards the brother's view of the question. The Presbyteries are our law-making power. It is necessary for us to follow their commands.

Mr. Houston—Have the Presbyteries approved or adopted this Book?

Dr. Adger—They have voted to approve and adopt. They have sent in their votes to us on the subject, and I think the jig's up.

Major Hart—There is little difference of opinion in regard to the adoption of the Book. The substitute proposes to postpone its operation for ten days. It could just as well and legitimately be postponed forever. This is a body which can enact legislation, and it can construe its own legislation.

Dr. Adger—Will you allow me to ask you a question?

Mr. Hart—I want to ask you first whether an offence in the old Book is identical with an offence in the new Book?

Dr. Adger—Teetotally different.

Mr. Houston—Then we will have an *ex post facto* law. I know of no law since *Magna Charta* that will try a man for an offence committed before the passage of the law.

Major T. Sparrow, of North Carolina, said he wished to propose a substitute that would tide them out of the trouble. If Dr.

Adger had reported next Friday instead of to-day, the difficulty would have been avoided. This Assembly could not disregard the fact that the Presbyteries were the law-makers. When, then, is the Book to become a law? I think it requires the action of this Assembly to make it the law. He wanted the question postponed until Friday.

The amendment of Dr. Adger to Dr. Park's resolution, both offered during the morning session, was put to the house and carried.

Rev. T. E. Converse moved the following amendment to Dr. Park's resolution: "Yet this Assembly recognises the right of those having judicial cases now pending in this Assembly to have the same issued in accordance with the forms of the old Book."

Rev. C. L. Hogue cited the practice of the civil courts.

Dr. Woodrow—There are certain principles of justice which every one should observe. When any man is tried in the Church, he is tried by the law. What law? Why, that which prevailed at the time of the commission of the offence. We are not trying to enact any *ex post facto* law. The mode of procedure has been changed from to-day. Any question arising has to be decided by all the Church, not by a part. This body certainly has not the right to disregard the action of the Presbyteries by usurping any power.

Mr. Rogers asked if cases could not come up just as they always did.

Dr. Adger—Certainly.

Mr. Converse's amendment was put to the house and lost.

Dr. Park's resolution, as amended by Dr. Adger, was then put to the house and carried.

Rev. J. L. Rogers offered a resolution directing the preparation of an index to the new Book of Church Order, and the publication of an edition of 3,000 copies, to be bound in a volume with the Confession of Faith. It was referred to the Committee on the Book of Church Order.

Rev. Dr. Boude moved that the Committee on Revision be directed to revise also the Directory of Worship, and report to the next Assembly. Referred to same Committee.

Dr. Murkland moved that the Rev. Dr. J. A. Lefevre, of Baltimore, be added to the Committee on Revision. Carried.

Subsequently the following additional report from the Committee on the new Book was presented and adopted :

The Committee on the Revised Book has considered the paper offered to the Assembly by the Rev. J. L. Rogers, touching an index to the Book of Church Order, and the publication of 3,000 copies to be bound up with the Confession of Faith; also the question referred to it of a revision of the Directory of Worship, and also the letter from a member of the East Hanover Presbytery, detailing certain typographical or clerical errors and alleged omissions, alleged to have been discovered by him, in the present edition in the Book of Church Order.

Your standing committee on the Revised Book understands that the Assembly has decided to revive the Revision Committee, having voted to appoint as a member of it the Rev. Dr. J. A. Lefevre. It would therefore recommend that the papers and questions named above be all referred to that revision committee; also, that that committee be empowered to cause to be corrected any and all manifest typographical or clerical errors which they may find or have pointed out to them in the present edition; also, that the Committee of Publication be instructed to have struck off from the stereotype plates as many copies of the Book in its present form as may be called for by purchasers; and also that the Revision Committee be authorised anew by this Assembly, as was done by a previous one, to prepare a revised Directory of Worship; and to make full report on all these matters to the next General Assembly.

It has become necessary in reviving the Revision Committee to reorganise it. Your standing committee would recommend that it consist of the following named ministers and elders: B. M. Palmer, G. D. Armstrong, Stuart Robinson, Thos. E. Peck, James Woodrow, *ministers*; Thomas Thomson, W. W. Henry, *ruling elders*.

For the Committee.

JNO. B. ADGER, Chairman.

On motion of Dr. Boude, the name of R. K. Smoot, *minister*, was added to this committee, and on motion of Dr. Peck, the name of Jno. B. Adger, *minister*, was added to the same as its chairman.

The reviewer may be pardoned, in view of his relations during the past and at the present to this revised Form and Discipline, if he here ventures to offer a few observations respecting it.

1. There probably never were two Church papers of no greater size than the Revised Form and Rules which occupied and shared the painstaking consideration and labor of so many different ec-

clesiastical thinkers. It is not the production of any man or any committee. Perhaps not less than one hundred of our most experienced and best qualified ministers have made substantive contributions to these two works, while several hundred others, some more and some less addicted to this kind of studies, have had a hand in bringing these documents to their present shape. Whole Presbyteries have worked on them, and that at more than one period. In fact it may be said with strict truth, that this new Book of Order is really the work of our whole ministry and eldership.

2. The benefit has been immense to our whole Church of the twenty-one years' study of Church Government, which this new Book has made necessary. Some who thought themselves wise and claimed to be especial lovers of peace, declared war against these harmless books as sure to be the occasions of strife and dissension amongst us, but we believe the conviction is now general, perhaps universal, that this was a false alarm. Our Church has been benefited, not damaged, by all the discussions the Book has occasioned. The whole ministry and eldership understand our system much the better for all this study of Church polity. Nor could such an amount of thorough and careful inquiry and consideration of these matters have in any other way been secured on the part of the office-bearers amongst us. For ourselves, the twenty-one years past seem to us to have been so profitably devoted to these questions, that one of the best wishes, as it appears to us, that any man could wish for our Church, would be that it might have occasion to occupy the twenty-one years that are to come in the very same way. And if it were not that some may consider it extravagant, we might venture the statement that probably pure, thorough, scriptural Presbyterianism—the system revealed by our Head in his word—is really better understood in our Church than in most of those which proudly float the Blue Banner.

3. During the twenty-one years our Church has been working upon this Book, it has many times appeared to be in great danger of final rejection. But the truth we suppose to be really this: that the Church never did favor the rejection, but the ad-

verse voting generally signified merely the desire for more thorough revision. And one thing very notable is that the Assembly has always in the extremity come forward to save the Book. Whatever men might say or do against the revision at home and in their Presbyteries, it was always so ordered in providence that when the commissioners came together in the Assembly the majority of them proved to be favorable to this work.

4. It is frequently a difficult task to get a very simple bill passed through the two houses of any legislative body. But in this case there were more than threescore Houses, and of hard-headed Scotch-Irish Presbyterians at that, through which it was endeavored to have passed two bills, you might call them, composed each of a number of chapters, and covering many difficult and disputed points. Humanly speaking, this was almost a hopeless undertaking, and yet in God's good providence it has been successfully brought about, and that with an overwhelming and most decisive majority.

5. And yet we are of those who hold that the Book is very far indeed from perfection. It is not what we ourselves desired. Several things are in it which by no means satisfy us, and some of these we hope to live yet to see corrected. And there are two or three such which we, for one, are ready immediately to join with others in the effort to amend. It is a great consummation to have adopted the Book, and now let us, with the Presbytery of New Orleans, hope that the Church will proceed to perfect it as much as it may be given her to accomplish.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON SYSTEMATIC BENEFICENCE.

On the sixth day Dr. Read read the report of this committee. Fifty-nine out of sixty-six Presbyteries had sent up statistics in respect to this matter, answering to the call from the Assembly for such details. And, on the whole, there is reason for congratulation and hopefulness. Yet, from a careful analysis and comparison of these reports, it is manifest that the burden (if that is the proper word) of supporting and extending our Church is not distributed properly, but is left by some to be borne by others. In the Committee's judgment, there is a demand for enlarge-

ment and not contraction of our aggressive operations as a Church. And if by appropriate instruction and appeals; if by the education of a true Christian conscience among our people, and especially among our youth and children, in the consecration of themselves and their substance to the service of God; if by the encouragement of a steady and growing habit of true Christian benevolence among all our people, we can strengthen and enlarge each and all of our agencies, it would be, as the Committee believes, for the spiritual profit and enjoyment of the individual members of our churches, for the advancement of our prosperity as a branch of the Church of Christ, and for the glory of God.

It is true, that a well, fed by a feeble spring, may be pumped dry; and it is also true that the same well, seldom and sparingly drawn from, may become dead and foul with mephitic gases. A liberal heart devising liberal things is in a healthier state than a selfish penurious heart studying retrenchment toward God and his cause. The beneficence of the Church—its contributions—should doubtless be wisely and economically appropriated; but that kind of retrenchment which excuses or encourages indolence or parsimoniousness will dwarf individual piety—if there can be true piety with such a disposition—and will spread mould and blight upon our individual members and churches.

It is recommended that the several Presbyteries, pastors, and sessions take this matter into careful consideration, and promptly devise what may seem to them the best means, in their respective fields, to instruct and encourage their people in the duty and grace of systematic Christian benevolence.

OVERTURES.

Dr. Peck, from the Committee on Bills and Overtures, offered the following reports:

Overture No. 1. From the Presbytery of New Orleans, asking the Assembly “to take under its special consideration the matter of the religious instruction and conversion of seamen and boatmen.”

The committee recommend the adoption of the following minute, to wit:

First—The Assembly commends the efforts of the Presbytery of New Orleans to bring seamen under Christian influence.

Second—The Assembly recommends to the several Presbyteries who have access to this class of people to do all they can for their evangelisation.

Third—The Committee of Sustentation be, and is hereby, authorised to grant such aid as may be in its power to this enterprise, subject, however, to all the regulations which are given this Committee in making similar appropriations. Also, that the Rev. A. J. Witherspoon, Chaplain of the Seamen's Bethel, of New Orleans, be requested to coöperate with the Sustentation Committee in the furtherance of this important enterprise in our seaport towns and cities.

Fourth—The Assembly affectionately commends to the prayers and alms of its people that class of men that go down to the sea in ships and do business in its great waters, and invites them to pray for the coming of that day when the above classes of the sea shall be converted unto the Lord, and mariners shall become missionaries to carry the gospel to the distant parts of the earth. Adopted.

Overture No. 2. From the Presbytery of Central Texas, asking the Assembly to say whether the action of the last Assembly, in tabling without discussion a paper offered by Dr. Dabney on the subject of the relations of our Church to the General Presbyterian Council, is to be understood as actually or virtually surrendering our former position, or yielding up any or all the testimony made by us touching the matter contained in said paper.

The committee recommend the adoption of the following minute :

“The action of our Assembly in sending delegates to the General Presbyterian Council, and in tabling the paper alluded to in the overture of the Presbytery of Central Texas, is *not* to be understood as implying any change in our position upon questions of difference between ourselves and other bodies, or any surrender of our testimony.” Adopted.

Overture No. 3. From the Presbytery of Mecklenburg, asking the Assembly “to raise a committee to prepare a paper upon the doctrine of the Diaconate, with special reference to the agencies of the Church.”

The committee recommend that the request be granted, and that this Assembly appoint such a committee, to make a report to the next Assembly. Adopted.

The Committee was appointed with the Rev. Dr. Jno. L. Girardeau as its chairman.

Overture No. 4. From the Synod of Alabama, asking the Assembly “to declare lawful and valid the meeting of that body on the 28th November last,” which, in consequence of the prevalence of yellow fever, had been irregularly convened. The committee recommend that the request be granted, and that said meeting of the Synod of Alabama be declared lawful and valid. Adopted.

Overtures Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11. Overture No. 8, from the Presbytery of Concord, No. 10, from the Presbytery of Ouachita, and No. 11, from the Presbytery of Montgomery, ask the Assembly to take measures to secure retrenchment of expenses in the management of its various schemes. Nos. 8 and 9 (the last named from the Presbytery of Ebenezer) ask particularly for the consolidation of the Committees of Education and Publication.

The committee recommend the adoption of the following answer to the foregoing overtures:

While this Assembly has not sufficient data before it to justify any important changes in the management of its various schemes of benevolence, or even to determine whether such changes are needed, yet, in deference to these overtures, hereby appoint a committee to investigate this whole subject and make a report to the next Assembly.

Second—The question of consolidation of the Committees of Education and Publication, referred to in overtures Nos. 8 and 9, is hereby referred to said committee.

The committee report further that in overture No. 8, from the Presbytery of Concord, there is a request that the Assembly will "consider and adopt the plan of biennial Assemblies alternative with biennial meetings of the several Synods." They recommend that this request be answered in the negative. Adopted.

Rev. S. Taylor Martin, of North Carolina, remarked that he did not wish the Assembly to act hastily, without sufficient information and careful consideration. His only object had been to have the question of retrenchment and reform thoroughly examined. He would therefore vote for the report.

The report was unanimously adopted.

The Committee on Bills and Overtures subsequently nominated the following committee on Retrenchment, and they were appointed: Ministers—A. C. Hopkins, S. T. Martin, R. G. Brank, C. W. Lane; Ruling Elders—D. N. Kennedy, W. D. Reynolds, W. T. Poague, Jas. Hemphill, Henry Merrill.

Overtures 6 and 7. An overture from the Presbytery of Abingdon and one also from the Presbytery of Louisville, in regard to the ordination of Mr. G. W. Painter by the Rev. J. L. Stuart.

The main facts in the case were as follows: Mr. Painter, a candidate under the care of Abingdon Presbytery, and for some years a teacher in connection with the mission in China, was ordained to the ministry of the gospel in that country by the Rev. J. L. Stuart, an evangelist and missionary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and a member of the Presbytery of Louisville.

There are two questions proposed to the General Assembly, viz. :

First—Is the action of Mr. Stuart in ordaining Mr. Painter valid ?

Second—If so, to which Presbytery, Louisville or Abingdon, does Mr. Painter belong ?

The committee recommend the adoption of the following minute in answer to these overtures :

First—The ordination of G. W. Painter by the Rev. J. L. Stuart, both of the missions in China, is hereby declared to be valid.

Second—Inasmuch as that Mr. Painter was a candidate, at the time of his ordination, under the care of the Presbytery of Abingdon, he is hereby declared to be a member of that Presbytery.

A committee is hereby appointed to report on the whole subject of the office and powers of the evangelist ; his relation to the General Assembly and the Presbytery at home ; his relation to the Church gathered among the heathen ; and his relation to his fellow-evangelists in the same missionary field ; and said committee shall report to the next General Assembly by a proposed additional chapter to our Form of Government, or otherwise. Adopted.

On this subject Dr. Murkland moved that the committee consist of Drs. J. A. Lefevre, J. L. Wilson, and T. E. Peck, to which Dr. Jno. B. Adger was added.

Overture 12. The Committee on Bills and Overtures would report an overture from the Synod of Texas, and an overture from the Presbytery of Western Texas, asking a repeal of the act passed at Mobile in 1869, authorising the appointment of private members of the Church to hold meetings under the control of Presbyteries. Your committee recommend that the request be granted, and suggest the following :

Resolved, That the action of the Assembly in 1869, authorising the appointment of exhorters under the control of the Presbytery, be and the same is hereby repealed. Adopted.

Overture 13. From the Presbytery of St. John's, asking that the General Assembly substitute for the present form of blanks for Presbyterial reports one suggested by the Presbytery.

Second—That the Assembly instruct the Secretary of the Committee of Publication to reduce one-half of the blanks of the Presbyterial reports to one-half the present size.

Third—That the Assembly instruct the Secretary of the Committee of Publication to cease the publication of blanks for sessional reports on Systematic Benevolence, and issue in their stead blanks containing the topics for narratives as adopted by the Assembly of 1877.

The committee would recommend that the first and second requests of the overture be not granted.

In answer to the third request, the committee would recommend that the Secretary of Publication be instructed to issue the blanks containing the topics for narratives as provided by the Assembly of 1877, and also continue to issue the blanks for sessional reports on Systematic Benevolence. Adopted.

Overture 15. Resolved, That the General Assembly be overtured to publish, in its Appendix to the Minutes, the amount received from the several Presbyteries, assessed upon them by the Assembly, together with a statement of the disbursements of the same.

The Committee recommend that the request be granted, with the difference that all the receipts by the Treasurer be published, together with disbursements from the entire fund. Adopted.

Overture 16. From the elders of Freeport and Euchee Valley churches, in the bounds of the Presbytery of Florida, asking this General Assembly to transfer said churches to the care of the Presbytery of East Alabama; also to change the boundary of said Presbyteries so as to make the dividing line between these Presbyteries to be the Choctawhatchie River.

Your Committee would recommend the request to be granted when the Synods of Georgia and Alabama shall consent. Adopted.

Overture 17. From the Synod of Texas, asking the General Assembly to dispense with an official reporter for subsequent Assemblies. The Committee recommend that the request be not granted. Adopted.

Overture 18. From Dr. James Park, of Knoxville, asking the Assembly to answer the following questions, to wit:

First—Is it competent for a Presbytery to adjourn to meet in the bounds of another Presbytery, either within or beyond the territorial limits of the Synod of which it is a consistent part?

Second—At a meeting of a Synod, if another Presbytery than that within which the Synod is sitting, desires to hold a session to complete unfinished business, or to transact new business, can it be done orderly and constitutionally over the motion of its Presbytery itself? or must it be by special dispensation of the Synod?

Third—Is it competent for one Presbytery to interdict the meeting of another Presbytery in its bounds without the dispensation of the Synod?

The Committee recommend the adoption of the following answer, viz.:

These questions can only be answered by reference to general rules or principles. A Presbytery consists of all the ministers and one ruling elder from each congregation within a certain district, and is therefore bounded by strictly geographical limits. In the judgment of this Assembly no Presbytery ought to meet beyond its own bounds without strong reasons, or without the consent, expressed or implied, of the Presbytery within whose bounds it proposes to meet, and, if the Presbytery be within the

bounds of another Synod, without the consent of that Synod also. The Assembly would recommend its Presbyteries not to hold meetings during the sessions of Synod, unless such session be necessary, or be ordered to be held by the Synod. Docketed, and subsequently laid on the table.

Overture 19. From Dr. James Woodrow, proposing the following question for answer by the Assembly, viz.:

“From whom is it proper for the General Assembly to receive overtures, according to the Constitution?”

The committee recommend the adoption of the following answer: In the judgment of this Assembly all overtures to the highest court of the Church ought to come from the lower courts, and not from individuals; and further, that the highest court ought not to be asked for advice and instruction (Form of Government, Chap. V., Sec. 6, Art. V.) in any case in which the said “advice or instruction” may be given with equal edification to the Church by a lower court. Adopted.

Overture 20. From the Synod of Kentucky, asking the Assembly to reconsider the action of the Assembly of 1878 approving the action of the Presbytery of Louisville “in restraining from the exercise of the functions of the ministry a minister deemed irresponsible for his words and acts by reason of unsoundness of mind, without the usual judicial process.” And the Synod furthermore asks the Assembly to make such a deliverance on the subject as shall obviate any liability to misinterpretation, or danger of the introduction of principles or usages at variance with the regulation of our standards and threatening to the rights and liberties of our ministers and people.”

The committee recommend that the Assembly make the following answer:

“While it might be competent for one General Assembly under such rules as the Constitution provides to grant a new hearing of a case which has been judicially decided by a previous General Assembly, yet, inasmuch as this memorial simply asks for a deliverance in a case adjudicated by the Assembly of 1878, this Assembly declines to grant the request of the memorial, for the reason that no deliverance *in thesi* can modify or set aside a judicial sentence.” Adopted.

But of all the overtures reported on by Dr. Peck, *number five* on worldly amusements was the one which had excited the deepest interest, and in fact created the most anxiety. A long and unprofitable and perhaps harmful debate was anticipated when the subject, connected as it had been with a case in Atlanta out of which it actually grew, should come up. Great was the relief afforded by the very admirable report submitted from Dr. Peck’s Committee, as follows:

Overture No. 5. From the Presbytery of Atlanta, asking the Assembly for definite instruction upon the following points, to wit :

First—Are the deliverances of 1865, 1869, and 1877, on the subject of worldly amusements to be accepted and enforced as law by judicial process ?

Second—Are all the offences named in them to be so dealt with, or are exceptions to be made ?

Third—Are the deliverances of all our church courts of the same nature and authority, so far as the bounds of these respective courts extend ?

In answer to these questions the committee recommend the adoption of the following minute :

I. This Assembly would answer the first question in the negative, upon the following grounds :

First—That these deliverances do not require judicial prosecution expressly, and could not require it, without violating the spirit of our law.

Second—That none of these deliverances were made by the Assembly in a strictly judicial capacity, but were all deliverances *in thesi*, and therefore can be considered as only didactic, advisory, and monitory.

Third—That the Assembly has no power to issue orders to institute process, except according to the provisions of Book of Discipline, Chapter VII., in the old, and Chapter XIII., in the Revised Book: and all these provisions imply that the court of remote jurisdiction is dealing with a particular court of original jurisdiction, and not with such courts in general. The injunctions, therefore, upon the sessions to exercise discipline in the matter of worldly amusements are to be understood only as utterances of the solemn testimony of these Assemblies against a great and growing evil in the Church. The power to utter such a testimony will not be disputed, since it is so expressly given to the Assembly in the Form of Government, Chapter XII., Section 5 of the old, and in the Revised Form, Chapter V., Section 6, Par. 6; and this testimony this Assembly does hereby most solemnly and affectionately reiterate.

In thus defining the meaning and intent of the action of former Assemblies, this Assembly does not mean, in the slightest degree, to interfere with the power of discipline in any of its forms, which is given to the courts below by the Constitution of the Church; or to intimate that discipline, in its sternest form, may not be necessary, in some cases, in order to arrest the evils in question. The occasion, the mode, the degree, and the kind of discipline must be left to the courts of original jurisdiction, under the checks and restraints of the Constitution. All that is designed is, to deny the power of the Assembly to make law for the Church in the matter of "offences," or to give to its deliverances *in thesi* the force of judicial decisions.

II. The second question, which is, "Are all the offences named in the deliverances of 1865, 1869, and 1877, to be dealt with in the way of judi-

cial process, or are exceptions to be made?" needs no answer after what has been said in answer to the first.

III. In answer to the third question relative to the nature and authority of our different church courts, this Assembly would say that the nature and authority of all our church courts are the same, so far as the bounds of these respective courts extend, subject, of course, to the provisions for review and control of the lower courts by the higher. The power of the whole is in every part, but the power of the whole is over the power of every part.

The perplexity about the nature of the deliverances in question has arisen from confounding two senses in which the word discipline is used in our Constitution. One is that of "judicial process," the other is that of inspection, inquest, remonstrance, rebuke, and admonition. The one is strictly judicial or forensic; the other is that general oversight of the flock which belongs to the officers of the Church, as charged by the Holy Ghost with the duty of watching for souls. The one cannot be administered at all except by a court of the Church; the other, while it is a function of that charity which all the members of the Church are bound to possess and cherish for each other, is yet the special and official function of the rulers, to be exercised with authority toward those who are committed to their care. In the judgment of this Assembly great harm is done by the custom of identifying, in popular speech, these two forms of discipline, or, rather, by forgetting that there is some other discipline than that of judicial process. Many an erring sheep might be restored to a place of safety within the fold by kind and tender, yet firm and faithful, efforts in private, who might be driven farther away by the immediate resort to discipline in its sterner and more terrifying forms. The distinction here asserted is recognised in the Word of God, and in our Constitution, for substance at least, in the directions given for the conduct of church members in the case of personal and private injuries. (See Chapter II., Article III. of the old Book of Discipline, and Chapter V., Paragraph V. of the Revised; also Matthew xviii. 15, 16.) If scandal can be removed or prevented in such cases more effectually, oftentimes by faithful dealing in private with offenders, than by judicial process, it does not appear why similar good results may not follow from the like dealing in the matter of worldly amusements.

There was at the first reading of the report some misconception of one part of it. Dr. Woodrow said the whole was so admirable that he hesitated to object to any of it. And yet while it is certain that ministers may admonish against wrong-doing, they may not have the right to admonish any particular wrong-doer. The Assembly itself cannot exercise the least power over any member of the Church without first trying him. Dr. Peck ex-

plained that some things are binding on all Christians by the law of charity while others are official duties. It is the duty of all Christians to help one another, but it is the special office of the deacon to attend to such duties. We are all of us to say to all men, Come; but it is the special duty of ministers to preach. It is the duty of every Christian to rebuke any church member when he sees sin upon him; but pastors have the official function of doing this very thing. They are to recall any of their flock who may be going astray and rebuke them for their evil ways. And it is also the official duty of ruling elders to do this. Dr. Woodrow rejoined that the Book of Order gives to *admonition* a special technical sense, but this paper uses the word in a popular sense which must breed confusion. The Church as a whole has already done what we are now attempting to do. It would be a mere piece of surplusage to adopt the report as it is now. First, we say "admonition" is reproof by a church court and then we say it is reproof by a minister. Dr. Adger called for the reading of the paper again, and said Dr. Woodrow seemed to him to misconstrue its purport. He could discover no inconsistency between the report and the Constitution. He read from the Revised Form on the ruling elder as follows: "Evils which they cannot correct by private admonition they should bring to the notice of the session." There is no conflict between this "private admonition" and the other "admonition" which belongs to the court. Moreover, it is the very language of the new Book which Dr. Peck quoted when he said that "all those duties which private Christians are bound to discharge by the law of charity, are especially incumbent on ruling elders by divine vocation, and are to be discharged as official duties."

Rev. J. L. Rogers then moved, with consent of Dr. Woodrow, to insert the word "private" before the word "admonition," and this was carried. Whereupon the paper was adopted, we believe, with entire unanimity.

In connexion with this matter may properly be considered the Assembly's action touching

THE SYNOD OF GEORGIA AND THE BLOCK CASE.

On the fifth day of the sessions, the same on which the report

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on "Wordly Amusements" was considered, but before its consideration, Dr. Woodrow moved to take from the docket the Records of the Synod of Georgia. It was carried. He said then that the Assembly ought always to know exactly what it is doing when it approves the records of any Synod, and he read the following from the Minutes of the Synod of Georgia at their sessions in Atlanta in 1878:

"The Committee appointed to report a paper expressing the opinion of the Synod in the case of the appeal before it, beg leave to report recommending that the following be adopted as the decision of the Synod in the case of appeal of Mr. Frank E. Block from the decision of the Presbytery of Atlanta confirming the sentence of the Session of the Atlanta Central church, by which he was suspended from the privileges of church membership. The Synod find:

"First—That laws exist in our Constitution which are applicable to all offences, including under that term popular amusements of all kinds, when these are in their own nature sinful, or from attendant circumstances become so.

"Second—That when common fame charged Mr. F. E. Block, a deacon of the Atlanta Central church, with having violated a law of the Church in connexion with dancing, it was the duty of the Session of said church to investigate this charge in obedience to commands of the General Assembly as contained in its deliverances made in answer to Drs. Ross and Dabney and the Presbytery of Atlanta, in the years 1865, 1869, and 1877.

"Third—That the proceedings of said Session, in conducting the trial to which this investigation led, were irregular, First—In failing to specify with sufficient particularity in the charge, what law of the Church had been violated. Second—In failing to observe the requirements of its Book of Discipline in Chapter IV., Section 5. Third—In including in the sentence specifications of offences not set forth in the charge.

"Fourth—That the decision of said Session was not sustained by the evidence.

"Fifth—Therefore, on these grounds, the Synod reverses the decision of the Presbytery of Atlanta in this case, and the sentence pronounced upon Mr. F. E. Block by the Session of the Atlanta Central church, and it restores Mr. Block to the privileges of church membership."

Dr. Woodrow then said, that in the whole of this trial, as conducted on one side, it was maintained that the deliverances of the General Assembly were church law. The Synod determined, by a large majority, that the Constitution was the law, and that it has no

right to interfere with any member of the Church of God, unless by that law. It was asserted by some in the Block case that there are injunctions, orders, and commands sent down by the Assembly, which must be obeyed by the lower courts. In discharge of the administrative power of the Assembly, it may utter commands, which must be obeyed at the peril of disloyalty.

We express the opinion that the Constitution, and that alone, is the law of the Church by which offences are to be tried, and that the deliverances of the Assembly are not to be counted as making or shaping the law of the Church. The Synod decided that the Assembly has no right to enjoin as to morals and duty, except as these injunctions are in consonance with the standards of the Church. The administrative injunctions of the Assembly (as conceded by all) *must* be obeyed by all. The injunctions on morals—are they binding in the same force on the lower courts? The Synod decided that this difference is to be recognised.

Rev. J. G. Richards thought it would be better to postpone the consideration of the report of the Committee on Synod of Georgia until after the report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures. His motion to that effect was carried.

Accordingly, as soon as the vote was taken on the report touching "Worldly Amusements," the question came up on approving the records of the Synod of Georgia, and they were approved.

COUNSEL IN JUDICIAL CASES.

The following resolution was offered by Dr. Adger and adopted by the Assembly:

Resolved, That where our Book says that an accused person may, if he desires it, be represented in the superior courts by "any member of the court" (or as the old Book expressed it, "by any minister or elder belonging to the judicatory"), the design, according to the judgment of this Assembly, is not to allow an array of counsel, but the privilege is to be limited to the aid which one advocate can give to him."

STANDING COMMITTEE ON SABBATH-SCHOOLS.

Reports had been received from sixty-five out of our sixty-six Presbyteries, the only Presbytery not reporting being Sao Paulo.

Of our 1,873 churches 1,044 have reported Sabbath-schools, which is an increase over last year. Nine colored schools are reported—an increase of six. Twenty-five Presbyteries report their schools in whole or in part under the control of Sessions. Many schools report their pastors as preaching regularly to the children. Only seventeen Presbyteries report their schools as making use of the *Earnest Worker*, *Children's Friend*, and lesson papers of our Committee, and only twenty-one report the Catechism taught in their schools. As might be expected, those schools which receive the supervision of our pastors and Sessions and which use our standards, give most unmistakable signs of prosperity.

“Your committee have considered with care that portion of the report of the Committee of Publication which related to the Sunday-school work, and recommend to the Assembly the following action thereupon :

“First—No part of the work of the Church to-day demands more careful supervision and control from the courts of the Church than our Sabbath-schools. The efficiency, thoroughness, and success of the work as an agency of Church progress, must be greatly promoted by its systematic organisation under presbyterial and sessional authority.

“Second—It is manifest that the Church should afford to those who are engaged in a work so important, so vital to its welfare, every facility to prepare themselves for its successful prosecution ; that our Presbyteries and Sessions should establish a higher standard of qualification for the teachers' work, encourage teachers to attain it, and afford them the means of doing so.

“Third—That in the multiplicity of books and the variety of Sunday-school aids that crowd themselves upon the notice of our schools, many of them having no Church responsibility or control, there can be safety for our Church and Sabbath-schools only in the closest scrutiny by our constituted authorities of everything that is used in our schools.

“Therefore the plan proposed by the Committee of Publication, and already adopted by many of our Presbyteries, is most heartily approved by the Assembly, and our Presbyteries are earnestly recommended to appoint Presbyterial Superintendents of Sabbath-school work, whose duty it shall be to take the supervision of that work within their bounds, gathering for the information of the Presbyteries and the Assembly the statistics, promoting the formation of institutes and normal classes for the training of teachers, scrutinising carefully the Sabbath-school literature used in the Sabbath-schools, and using such effort as they may to introduce the books and papers that have the approval of the Church.

“In order that there may be presented to the General Assembly and

the Church the facts full and complete in regard to this work, it is recommended that the first of January of each year the Superintendents of Sunday-schools report to the Committee of Publication the statistics of the work within their bounds, in order that full and accurate statements may be laid before the General Assembly."

Rev. H. Moseley, Drs. J. H. Nall, Hazen, Murkland, and Read, Rev. Messrs. F. H. Johnson and J. P. Smith, all spoke earnestly and instructively on the subject of Sabbath-schools. Dr. Nall and Mr. Johnson urged the coöperation of parents with the Sabbath-school teachers, and the importance of sessional supervision. Drs. Murkland and Read and Mr. Smith dwelt on the value of training children in Sabbath-schools in giving for the Saviour's cause. Mr. Smith said one hundred thousand children are in our church schools, but fifty thousand more who belong to us are ungathered and untaught. Eight hundred of the churches of this Assembly have no Sabbath-schools. On the other hand, he dwelt on the fact that the little children have contributed thirty thousand dollars for the cause of Foreign Missions.

Dr. Hazen said: It may be assumed that no agency of our Church is doing so much to mould the character of our children and youth as the Sabbath-school. Many parents remit this work to the Sabbath-school. The pulpit does not reach them. In view of it, he laid down three propositions: first, this subject imperatively demands the attention of the courts of the Church; second, it should be kept constantly under the scrutiny and authority of our Church courts; and, third, the teaching of the Sabbath-school teachers should be closely watched. In reference to these points, we find that many schools elect their own teachers; the Sessions pay no attention to them; the books used—the hymn-books—some of them teach doctrines absolutely false; some of these hymns about death are much nearer to heathen mythology than Christian doctrine; some of the Sabbath-school papers teach what is injurious. Ought not these agencies, then, all to be brought under the care of our Church courts?

Last year the Assembly committed the Sunday-school work to the Committee of Publication. The Committee recommends the appointment of a Sabbath-school Superintendent in every Presbytery, to organise institutes and normal classes, and interest the

churches in the work of training the teachers. We can see the necessity for some such work in our Church. We can coöperate to a certain extent with other denominations, but we must have our teachers trained as Presbyterians. We do not want to send them off to summer institutes and conventions to be trained. We want them trained under our Church. Some of our friends seem afraid that this plan tends to centralisation. It has been successfully tried in the Synod of North Carolina, which presents encouraging statistics. But we want more than statistics—we want training.

The difference between a Sunday-school convention and a normal class is this: the former is designed to get up enthusiasm; the latter is a class of teachers of a school studying systematically under a competent teacher, pastor or elder. The Board of Publication in Philadelphia have prepared an excellent series of papers for this purpose.

JUDICIAL CASES.

Two of these were before the Assembly. The first was that of Mr. I. W. Canfield. In 1877 the Presbytery of Louisville was led to investigate the question whether Mr. Canfield was or was not of unsound mind. After giving him due notice and hearing witnesses, it was decided that he was so far unsound as to be unfitted for the ministry, and Presbytery restrained him from preaching. Synod on appeal rescinded the Presbytery's action by a mere resolution, without a formal examination of the case, either as a question of appeal or complaint, or of general review and control. The Assembly of 1878 sustained the complaint of Rev. Stuart Robinson and others against the Synod by a vote of 106 to 2. And it declared that the Presbytery proceeded properly in restraining from the exercise of the functions of the ministry one deemed irresponsible for his words and acts by reason of unsoundness of mind, without the usual forms of judicial process; also that the Synod was incompetent to interfere with the right of a Presbytery to judge of the qualifications of its own ministers. (See Assembly Minutes for 1878, p. 629.) Thus he was re-manded to the position of a private member of the church.

Subsequently he brought charges of falsehood, slander, and disturbing the peace of the Church before Presbytery against Dr. Robinson. The charges were referred to a committee, of which Rev. T. E. Converse was chairman, and it reported them "litigious, trifling, and irrelevant." Mr. Canfield appealed to the Synod of Kentucky, and his son joined in the appeal. Synod decided that as Louisville Presbytery, in the exercise of its episcopal and visiting powers, had decided Mr. Canfield should be restrained from exercising the functions of the ministry, and as the Assembly at Knoxville had confirmed the action of Presbytery, the complainant was estopped from bringing or maintaining his proceeding therein. This as to I. W. Canfield. Touching W. Q. Canfield, his own absence barred his appeal, and indeed as he had never submitted to any judicial trial himself, and was not an original party, he could not appeal. Against the Synod's refusal to entertain his appeal, Mr. Canfield complained to the Assembly at Louisville.

The Judicial Committee made two reports on this case, one from a majority of seven through Col. J. A. Billups, ruling elder, chairman of the Committee, and the other from a minority of six through Mr. R. R. Howison, ruling elder. The majority reported that the case should be dismissed because the action complained of is not a subject matter of appeal or complaint. The minority reported that charges having been brought against a minister of Louisville Presbytery, and the Presbytery having decided not to entertain those charges, that decision was in the nature of a judicial action, and therefore was subject to review on appeal or complaint, and that religious freedom was endangered by denying this complainant a regular and orderly hearing.

In favor of the majority report, Col. Billups urged that before an appeal can be taken there must have been a decision of a case under judicial process; and also that no complaint can be based except on a judicial decision.* The action complained of in the Presbytery was not reached as the result of judicial process. The

*The reader will observe that this is one point where the new Book differs from the old. "Every species of decision" may now be complained of.

Presbytery acting as an inquest dismissed the charges, and had a right so to act, and neither appeal nor complaint can be taken against their action, which was not judicial.

Mr. Howison denied that Presbytery could act simply as a jury of inquest. If charges are brought before it by a competent person, and it dismisses those charges summarily, an appeal will lie. Mr. Canfield's unsoundness of mind might debar him from the ministry, but as a member of the church he may bring charges.

Col. Billups urged that the complaint was not from a decision rendered against Mr. Canfield, and therefore it is no complaint. Much has been said about liberty. But there is a great difference between denying a man an appeal from a decision against himself, and denying him the right to *persecute* another man. There must be discretion somewhere to determine whether a groundless prosecution shall go on or be stopped.

Mr. Howison said that Presbytery certainly has a discretion, but it is to be used properly, discreetly, and rightly, and that is a question for the higher court to determine.

Dr. Adger said courts have rights as well as individuals. The Presbytery decided the charges frivolous and not in self-defence, but persecution of another man. I stand by the Louisville Presbytery, and will not vote that frivolous and malignant charges must needs be entertained. And I claim that the Judicial Committee is to protect this court from cases which ought not to be introduced.

Rev. S. Taylor Martin (one of the minority of the Judicial Committee) said if the Judicial Committee was not to consider merely whether the appeal was regular, but also whether the matter was proper to be brought up, the report might have been different. In numberless cases the conviction is forced on the mind of a Judicial Committee that the charges are frivolous, and that mountains made of mole-hills, to the scandal of the Church, and yet those cases must be investigated, and the Judicial Committee cannot stand in the way.

Dr. Adger said, Let me ask the brother where he finds the law that restricts the Committee to looking simply at *regularity*?

Mr. Martin—It has been custom.

Dr. Adger—I deny that the Judicial Committee is confined to the consideration of regularity merely. It has the right to protect us. Mr. Howison has intimated that probably we shall soon see when the case is taken up that it will be dismissed. Then the Committee should have kept it out.

The question was put and the minority report adopted. The case was then taken up. The Moderator charged the court as usual. Col. Livingston of Georgia and Gen. Johnston of North Carolina, both ruling elders and members of the Assembly, appeared for the complainant. The records were read. Col. Livingston in his speech for the complainant urged the point that being debarred the ministry he still had the rights of a member, among which is the right to bring charges. The Moderator called on the Rev. Harvey Glass to respond for the Synod, and he made the point that Mr. Canfield being declared by his Presbytery and by the Assembly to be irresponsible for his words and acts, could not bring a case before any court; otherwise we are at the mercy of every idiosyncrasy and every idiocy, and our courts have no protection. The Rev. T. E. Converse also spoke in behalf of Synod, dwelling on the provision of the Book which requires that charges be not entertained from persons known to be malignant or litigious. Gen. Johnston closed for the complainant, urging that the proceedings were all brought regularly before the Presbytery, and that the charges were proper to be received, and that the decision not to receive them was proper ground of appeal. Then the members of the Assembly were all successively called on to express themselves, but it was agreed that no one should exceed five minutes in doing this. The greater part of the speakers held that Presbytery is endowed with discretion as to all charges brought before it, and that there was in this case no judicial decision, and therefore nothing to appeal from or complain against. The vote being taken, fifty-six were found to be for sustaining Mr. Canfield's complaint, but sixty-nine against sustaining it.

After mature reflection, we are confirmed in our judgment that this was a right decision, only we regret that the majority had not been very much larger. The Presbytery is the judge of the

qualifications of ministers to preach, and it is the judge of the fitness of individual members to bring charges or give evidence, and also of the fitness of the charges brought, or the evidence offered, to be received. If a student in divinity is refused licensure, he cannot under our old Book appeal to Synod, nor yet can he complain. The Presbytery is the sole judge of his qualifications. So if a member is not allowed to table charges, he can neither appeal nor complain under the old Book to Synod about it. The decision is with the Presbytery, and it is not in any sense a judicial decision, any more than the decision not to license or ordain a candidate. If a deranged minister is not fit to preach and may be restrained by Presbytery, so also after he is remanded to a private member's position, that derangement will most probably unfit him to be the accuser of a minister or other individual, and this matter is entirely within the Presbytery's discretion.

Touching the powers and duties of the Judicial Committee, it seems to us preposterous to say that it is bound to introduce every case which has been brought forward in a regular way. We may distinguish between what is *regular* and what is *in order*. We have known the Judicial Committee of a Synod to report that a case was not *in order* because the appeal itself was filled with vituperative abuse of the Presbytery appealed against. And the Synod sustained that report and rightly. We can conceive that one who appeals on good grounds from a lower to a higher court amongst us may by reason of excitement temporarily lose his mind, and in preparing his appeal, otherwise perfectly regular, say many things of many different kinds which would warrant a Judicial Committee in reporting the appeal as not *in order*. We submit that if there is no law for what we are saying, there ought to be. It is Presbyterian to do things by representatives. The court cannot directly look into every detail. We appoint a Committee on Bills and Overtures to take all overtures into consideration and prepare answers for Presbytery, or Synod, or Assembly to adopt. And ordinarily the report of such a committee is final, and it ought to be. Now the Judicial Committee in our system has or ought to have as much power and as large discretion as the Committee on Bills and Overtures. We have in

adopting the new Book on commissions certainly adopted this principle, that power may be given to such committees to decide such points. When the Presbytery of Louisville referred the charges brought by Mr. Canfield against Dr. Robinson to its Committee, and they reported that those charges were "litigious, frivolous, and irrelevant," was it a very great stretch of power or discretion the Committee exercised? Was it needful to detail the whole to the Presbytery? If so, what was gained by referring to a committee? We refer to committees to *save time and keep order*. And it would be very strange if liberty or justice or truth any more than order were endangered by this Presbyterian way of doing business by representatives.

The following is the minute adopted by the Assembly to set forth the significance of its decision in the case of Mr. Canfield:

The General Assembly, in refusing to sustain the Complaint, while recognising the right of every member of the Presbyterian Church to bring before the courts any matter of personal grievance or affecting the honor of religion, yet mean to affirm on the other hand the competency of the court to exercise a sound discretion as to the propriety of considering any such matter brought before it; and, so far as appears from the facts before the Assembly in this case, the Synod of Kentucky and the Presbytery of Louisville did not exercise this discretion improperly. But, though the General Assembly approves of the decision of the Synod in dismissing the complaint, it is not to be understood as approving of all the reasons assigned by the Synod for that decision.

The other judicial case was that of Ruling Elder E. E. Bacon, complaining against the Synod of Missouri. Mr. Bacon was a member and a former acting elder of the church at St. Joseph, Mo. The case grew out of the publication in a newspaper in St. Joseph, Mo., (the *Herald*.) of an article described by the Session as an offence to the church and an injury to the brethren, the responsibility for which lay with Mr. Bacon. The Session of the church charged that this publication was not only offensive, but was in violation of a covenant previously agreed upon between Mr. Bacon and his pastor, Dr. Campbell. The article stated that Rev. R. S. Campbell had been charged with crookedness in getting a revivalist to preach in the church, and with lying on general principles, by a Mr. Landis. In preparing to meet his

trial, Mr. Bacon claimed that a very large number of persons be cited as witnesses. The Session felt it impossible that all these persons could (in the nature of the case) have any knowledge of the case, and declined to cite them, yet holding themselves ready to receive any one whose testimony should, in the progress of the case, become necessary. Mr. Bacon also desired, after the court had been constituted, to challenge one member of the Session, but this was refused. He was found guilty and admonished of the offence, and suspended from the sacraments until the case should be finally decided.

From this he appealed to the Presbytery on seventeen grounds, such as the failure to specify accuser, the failure to call for a plea, the refusal to cite his witnesses, the ruling out of his questions to witnesses, the admitting as testimony a letter from a person not present to be qualified, prejudice on the part of members of the court, and inconsistency of the verdict with the evidence. The Presbytery took up the appeal, and reversed the decision of the Session upon these grounds. Mr. Sanders and Rev. H. P. S. Willis gave notice of complaint against this decision of the Presbytery.

The grounds of their complaint were, that Presbytery proceeded to trial at a *pro re nata* meeting, with a very small attendance, when the pastor of the church was absent in Europe; and allowed matters extraneous to the testimony and to the records to be heard before the Presbytery. The complaint asserts that the original charges were regularly made, and that the accuser was named, viz., the Session.

The Synod reversed the action of Presbytery and sustained the verdict of the Session, not, however, approving the refusal to cite witnesses. From this Mr. Bacon complains to the General Assembly, upon the ground that injustice has been done to him.

Mr. Bacon was allowed on Friday to state his case, which he did, as follows: The interests of the whole Church are concerned in this case. It is not fair to take exception to the smallness of its *pro re nata* meeting, for there were seven members present; at the previous meeting there had been but eight, and at the subsequent fall meeting there was no quorum present. The verdict

of only temporary suspension was unnecessary, because a speedy trial could be had; and the suspension has not been temporary, because eight communions have now elapsed. Temporary suspension was to last until I will make a formal engagement of peace. The verdict requires me to bury all my grievances against the church. I had no grievances against the church, but against Dr. Campbell. This is outside of the indictment, but within the verdict. The verdict was reached irregularly and without regard to constitutional rights. As to the Session, if delicacy forbade Dr. Campbell to act as Moderator, did it not forbid him to sit as judge? Dr. Campbell also testified in the case without previous notification. Two of the elders had expressed their opinion in the case, and were, therefore, incompetent to vote. Rev. Mr. Claggett's letter was admitted as testimony without his personal presence. To the second charge, therefore, there is but one witness, and this witness does not testify to any promises or compact. The first charge (*viz.*, publishing, etc.) does not specify that the publication was sinful. It does not show that I volunteered any publication, but simply answered the questions of the reporter, and asked him not to publish the matter of the difficulty. The preliminary suspension was severe and wrong. The refusal to cite witnesses was fatal. The ruling out of my question to a witness deprived me of testimony. This ruling seems to decide that a court can proceed to try a man, hearing only such witnesses as the court may choose.

The Rev. J. M. Cheney was called upon to represent the Synod, which he did substantially as follows—first, however, reading a letter from Mr. Claggett to the effect that he should not be mixed up in the quarrel:

It is with great hesitation that I undertake the case, because it brings me into antagonism with the venerable father who complains before you. Every word uttered by me will be uttered for him. I think no greater calamity could fall upon him than for this Assembly to remand the case to the Synod. I think I am speaking against time. I think every member has made up his mind. When I went to hear the case of the Session, I thought the Session had acted unreasonably, and the Presbytery right.

But when I went into the Synod, I thought otherwise. Now the complainant does not deny having given an interview to the reporter and communicated certain facts to the aforesaid reporter. I am sorry to have to revert to the testimony of Mr. Sanders, the young reporter, and Mr. Voltz, the night-clerk of the hotel. These two young men contradict each other in their testimony. They are youths who will stick by a friend. Whenever any question arose which would have damaged Mr. Bacon if answered, the latter said "I object," and the boys refused to speak. Let me refer to the compact entered into between Mr. Bacon and Mr. Campbell, the pastor. It is hardly necessary to say that a compact implies previous antagonism between the two. This venerable father had taken discord into his embrace. An attempt was made by Mr. Claggett, the evangelist, and Mr. Frazier, the elder, to effect a reconciliation between Mr. Bacon and Mr. Campbell. The four prayed together in the pastor's study, and they resolved to bury the discord. There is the sworn testimony of Mr. Claggett and Mr. Frazier, which shows that the discord was buried. But it was resurrected by Mr. Bacon and given to the reporter. It is evident that the compact was broken, and that in a most aggravating way. Mr. Bacon after giving the information said, "Don't publish any of this"—which admonition he must have known the reporter would not regard.

Mr. Bacon says that the court refused to cite certain witnesses, and he makes this one of the reasons for his complaint; but when the case came up and he was asked if he were ready for trial, he answered "Yes." Was he ready if twenty-three important witnesses were denied to him? If he had given some idea of the testimony and claimed that it was relevant, the court would not have hesitated to cite the witnesses.

The Rev. J. G. Fackler also spoke for the Synod: So far I have not yet spoken in the Assembly. If any one in this great Church court should speak on this subject, it is myself. My peculiar relations to the congregation would be affected by the disposal of this appeal. There are influences at work in this case which no man can fully explain, but which any man of sense can feel the moment he enters the atmosphere of that congregation. The

Session who tried this case, I know them, I know their love for the Church, their standing in the community. I received six of them into the Church. I know their desire for peace. Hence the mildness of the sentence. No unprejudiced man will dare to deny that they are intelligent and just and fair-minded; as businessmen, some of them, ranking among the most successful in the land. That Session knew things in connexion with the animus of this case, and the party on trial before them, that this Assembly can not know. But the Session knew it, and for months they and the whole church, at least ninety per cent. of it, had felt it most keenly. The desire of the Session for peace prompted them to decide upon the milder form of admonition, when they might have gone much farther. There had already appeared in the local papers the most scandalous articles about the pastor and the church. Mr. Bacon knew, the Session knew, everybody in St. Joe knew it. The fact of Mr. Bacon having ceased to act as an elder, by his general unacceptability, should have shut his mouth. He knew when that reporter, boarding at his own house, came to him for news about the Presbytery, and met him at the depot, what his object was. Why did Mr. Bacon go to that Presbytery? He was not a delegate. Why did he not refer the reporters to Mr. Sanders, who was a delegate and presumed to know what was done? The principle of *discretionary* powers in courts of original jurisdiction applies also to this case. The Presbytery then reversed the decision of censure. There is a decided contradiction in testimony between Sanders and Voltz, before the Session. Dr. Campbell was his own witness on the second charge. Col. B. B. Fraser and Claggett's letter are confirmatory of this. Mr. Bacon says the conduct of the Session is censured by the citizens of S. Joseph. What he means by citizens I hardly know. I know what the effect of sending this case back is likely to be, in part. I tell you deliberately, it will be disastrous, if not absolutely ruinous.

Dr. Woodrow arose in behalf of the complainant and spoke substantially as follows:

The desire has been expressed by the respondents that justice should be done by the Assembly. It is worth while, before

going farther, to inquire by what road we shall go to reach that end. Let us have the fact distinctly before us that we are not despots. We have passed beyond that earliest stage of society. We must proceed according to the Book of Discipline, and if we deviate from it, we are acting unjustly. Now in this case, on the one side is merely a weak individual, and on the other hand a powerful Synod. This man has been deprived of a dear right—the right to sit at the communion-table. It is said that he is a troublesome fellow in the Church. That may be, but you must not decide the case according to the impassioned speeches of those who spoke here to-day. It must be decided by the law and the evidence. There is no accuser, in the first place: no accuser is named, and the law expressly requires it. Mr. Bacon has been drawn before the court upon charges which no one would father. What is the first charge? It is that Mr. Bacon told a reporter of a newspaper the truth about a meeting, for all that appears to the contrary. Is there anything wrong about that? Would I be guilty of anything wrong if I were to tell one of the enterprising young reporters who sit at this table something that happened here at a late hour last night? There is no proof that Mr. Bacon told the reporter anything with a malicious intent. Mr. Bacon gave this young gentleman some few facts about the meeting, which he proceeded to dress up for a spicy article.

No part of the process was conducted according to law. One of the privileges given an accused party is that of summoning witnesses. Now, the Session refused flatly to summon the witnesses asked for by the accused. Another injustice done the accused was, that whenever he put to a witness such a question as "Did I do this, or say that?" the moderator of the Session ruled the question out. Why? We can not help thinking that it was fear lest Mr. Bacon should prove himself innocent. They were questions looking towards his exculpation. Though witnesses were not cited and questions were debarred, letters were allowed to be introduced against the accused without any authority.

I have gone over the points necessary to be presented in this

case. There are many other arguments I might employ, but I do not wish to trespass upon your time. This Assembly should not be influenced by unworthy considerations, nor swayed by threats. but it should aim to arrive at the truth, whatever the consequences may be, for God blesses the right. I hope, therefore, that our brother will be restored to the full privileges of the Church.

It was moved that members be limited to five minutes each in expressing their opinions.

An amendment was proposed that they be limited to one minute. Lost. Another amendment that they be confined to three minutes. Carried.

The roll was called and an expression of opinion was obtained from several members. A vote was taken, and resulted in forty-one votes for sustaining the complaint, and sixty-five against so doing. The following is the minute reported on this case:

Your Committee appointed to bring in a minute expressing the mind of the Assembly touching the complaint of Mr. E. E. Bacon against the action of the Synod of Missouri, would beg leave to report the following: The vote of the Assembly in not sustaining the complaint is understood as confirming the sentence of the Session of the First church of St. Joseph, but is not to be construed as giving its sanction to the irregularities in the conduct of the trial, namely: in declining to cite all the witnesses nominated by the accused, and in receiving as collateral testimony the letter of Rev. W. H. Claggett; but as expressing the sense of the Assembly as to the substantial justice of the sentence pronounced by the Session and confirmed by the Synod.

We cannot forbear to remark, that the irregularities on the Session's part in conducting this trial appear to us to have been simply monstrous. And we are utterly unable to comprehend how a body that was so largely filled with the desire to protect individual liberty in the case of Mr. Canfield making charges against others, should have been (as it appeared to us) quite indifferent to individual rights and liberty of conscience in the case of Mr. Bacon. He may have been troublesome to his pastor, and differed with him about different matters. That, however, may not have been altogether his fault. To differ with one's pastor is not necessarily a crime in the free Christian common-

wealth—the Presbyterian Church. We voted with the forty-one. If the fifty-six who were for maintaining Mr. Canfield's rights had been as favorable to Mr. Bacon, his case would have gone back to the Session and been reviewed. Let him patiently submit now, however, to what he may think, as we do, great injustice. Many other Presbyterians and Christians have had to do the same thing. To suffer wrongfully is often the lot of the best men. Behold, we count them happy which endure.

JOHN B. ADGER.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Conference Papers: or, Analysis of Discourses, Doctrinal and Practical; delivered on Sabbath afternoons to the Students of the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. By CHARLES HODGE, D. D. Edited by A. A. Hodge, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 373, 8vo.

The editor explains the origin of these papers thus: The professors at Princeton Seminary have always been accustomed to hold a "conference" with the students on Sabbath afternoons, on "themes relating to the life of God in the soul, and to the practical duties having their root therein." The discussions were from the first mainly, and at last exclusively, in the hands of the Professors. Dr. Hodge's share in them was apparently extempore; but after his death evidences of methodical preparation were found in the existence of two hundred and forty-nine accurate briefs. These constitute the volume before us. As printed, they range from one to two pages 8vo. This brevity of course implies that each paper is, in part, but an outline of the author's designed train of discussion. The editor has classified them, without much regard to the date of their delivery, under ten heads: papers discussing, 1. God and his Attributes. 2. Christ, his Person and Offices. 3. The Holy Spirit and his Offices.

4. Satan and his Influence, Sin and sins. 5. Conversion: Entrance upon the Christian Life. 6. Christian Experiences, Characteristics, and Privileges. 7. Christian Responsibilities and Duties. 8. The Means of Grace: Scriptures, Ministry, Sacraments, etc. 9. Death and the Consummation of Redemption. 10. Last Words (prepared during the last year of his life).

Dr. Hodge was never pastor of a Christian church, except as his students were his pastoral charge. These briefs give the Christian world a specimen of what he would have made his pastoral and homiletical instructions to his people, after we make a fair allowance for the fact that he knew his audience to be a special one, qualified to appreciate a treatment of theological truth more abstract than would be suitable for a promiscuous congregation of Christians. Each paper has actually or virtually a scriptural text. The author's prevalent method is, first, to establish and explain some point of doctrine in theology, and, second, to show its bearing and influence on the Christian affections and actions. The reader will find the first half of each lecture marked by the well-known traits of Dr. Hodge's theological writings: learning, precision, force, and calmness. It is in the latter half of the lecture that he discloses the experimental unction which is so pleasing a feature of these papers, and which reveals an aspect of his Christian character so little disclosed in his scientific and controversial writings, and indeed so painfully missed there by some of his readers. This unction does not appear, indeed, in the words of the brief heads of application here set down, but in the devout thoughts suggested; and it found its pleasing expression no doubt in the extempore expansion and the tones and countenance of the speaker.

The examination of this book suggests a fear lest some ministers may unwisely pervert it to the uses of a book of "skeletons of sermons." Such abuse is always to be deplored, because whether the outlines thus borrowed be judicious and scriptural or not, they only impoverish the mind and enervate the force of the plagiarist. In this case no one would probably protest more earnestly than the deceased author against the perversion. His papers are briefs of sermons in this: that they have each a text,

expressed or implied, and that they have heads. But we surmise that the sermoniser who unwisely attempts to use them as crutches will sorely encumber himself. If he has enough of the capacity of the preacher to know what the true sermon is, he will soon find that the aspects in which doctrinal truth are presented, however masterly for Dr. Hodge's peculiar audience, are not sufficiently homiletical for the purposes of the ordinary pastor; that the divisions are too numerous; and that the treatment is often too abstract. We earnestly advise ministers, instead of attempting any such misuse, to buy this book indeed, but to use it exclusively for the purpose for which its materials were prepared by the author: for their own devotional reading and personal edification in Christian principles and emotions.

If we may predict the place this posthumous work will fill, we would describe it as associated both by resemblance and contrast with "Jay's Exercises." It should fill a similar place with that work, once so popular, in the devotional reading of believers. But these believers must be somewhat prepared to nourish themselves with the "strong meat," and not the milk only, of the Word. Dr. Hodge's essays are like Jay's, in brevity, piety, scripturalness, judicious unction. They offer the devout soul just the instrumentality which will aid him to realise the result of the Psalmist: "While I was musing, the fire burned." They are both perspicuous in expression. But in many things they are unlike. Hodge gives his reader none of that easy and pleasing expansion of the thought in which Jay delights, but he leaves it to the reader's independent reflection to follow out for himself the weighty, or luminous, or tender thoughts suggested. Jay gives but a few points, and they of the more obvious, in each "exercise." Hodge crowds and packs whole sections of Bible truth into one paper, and does not spare to include among these the most abstruse and the most fundamental. The reader who proposes to skim him as he does his religious newspaper, will find himself wholly at fault and out of his depth. He who is willing to study and ponder, will find a deep and good soil, fruitful of growth to his soul.

R. L. D.

Sermons Doctrinal and Practical. By the Rev. WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M. A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Vol. I., edited, with a Memoir of the Author's Life, by the Very Rev. THOMAS WOODWARD, M. A., Dean of Down. 12mo, pp. 474. Vol. II., edited from the Author's MSS. by JAMES AMIRAUX JEREMIE, D. D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. Pp. 408. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1879.

The gifted author of these sermons needs no formal introduction to our readers. He was removed from the scene of his earthly labors only about thirty years ago, but the star of his fame now shines in the zodiac. He was one of the undoubted geniuses which this century has produced; allowed by Providence to display his great powers only long enough to show how big they were with promise, and then snatched away from the gaze of admiration on earth to the sphere which ever swallows up the *spolia opima* of time. Prefixed to the sermons before us is a delightful memoir of the author, by his intimate friend, Dean Woodward, the only defect of which is its tantalising brevity. It reads like a short romance of intellectual achievement and pious deeds, the object of which is, with the license of art, to group ideal excellences into a single human life. From it we extract a few facts for compression into this brief notice.

William Archer Butler was born at Annerville, near Clonmel, Ireland. His father was a member of the Established Church. His mother was a Romanist, and through her influence he was baptized and educated in the communion to which she belonged. About two years before his collegiate course began, he sought in confession the relief which his sensitive spirit craved under convictions of sinfulness. "The unsympathising confessor," the memoir tells us, "received these secrets of his soul as if they were but morbid and distempered imaginations, and threw all his poignant emotions back upon himself. A shock was given to the moral nature of the ardent, earnest youth: he began to doubt; he examined the controversy for himself, and his powerful mind was not long before it found and rested in the truth." This incident is instructive, as it reveals the reason why afterwards the exclusiveness of his hierarchical theory could not repress the

evangelical fervor of his preaching and the catholic regard which he avowed for all Christ's people. He had been taught by the Holy Ghost the true nature and consequences of sin. The depth of anguish, to which a condemning law and an accusing conscience had sunk him, prepared him joyfully to appreciate the sweetness and fulness of that rest which no elaborate ritual can give, and which the agonised spirit finds alone in Christ under the tuition of his Spirit. He felt that he belonged not only to an outward organisation of definite limits, but to the great company of convicted, believing, and penitent sinners. There is no teacher like the Holy Ghost, and no primary lesson so valuable as that which impresses indelibly upon the soul the unutterable evil of sin.

Years afterwards Professor Butler devoted particular attention to the Papal controversy. Large books of his manuscript were filled with collections upon the subject, which death prevented him from using. He, however, published in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal* a series of "Letters on Mr. Newman's Theory of Development," which were marked by great ability and are now stamped with a classical value. The student of that question could no more neglect them than he could the masterly discussion of Principal William Cunningham.

Butler pursued his studies at Trinity College, Dublin. While still an undergraduate he evinced the marvellous resources of his intellect by contributing to the *Dublin University Magazine* a series of essays, of an historical, critical, and speculative character, sufficient, if collected, to fill several volumes, among which were able articles on Berkeley's Philosophy, on Sismondi, on Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences, and on Oxford and Berlin Theology. He became President of the College Historical Society, and distinguished himself, in that capacity, for an eloquence which was as precocious as his other gifts. He received the prize in the examination for the newly instituted position of Ethical Moderator, and developed so great a talent for philosophical study as to lead to the creation of a chair of Moral Philosophy, so as to retain his distinguished services in the University. This gave him the opportunity of producing those Lectures on Ancient Philosophy which were afterwards collected and

published, and which, though fragmentary in consequence of his early removal from his work by death, filled a vacuum in British philosophical literature, and, as far as they go, will retain from their permanent value a place by the side of the more elaborate and finished works of the great Continental writers.

Professor Butler, according to the testimony of his biographer, discharged with fidelity the laborious duties of a pastor of a large parish, and rose to great distinction as an eloquent preacher. But "roses are pleasant to the gods"—as sung the Grecian bard—and this brilliant flower was not destined to long bloom on earth. Having preached a splendid sermon at the ordination of the Lord Bishop of Derry, he went home to die at the early age of thirty-six years. During his last illness, "one ejaculation was constantly on his tongue, 'Christ my righteousness!'" With those powerful words he silenced the apprehensions of nature in her last conflict, and passed unchallenged to the communion of the Church triumphant.

Professor Butler preached for the most part without manuscript; but the fifty sermons before us show that he did not neglect the maxim of Bacon in regard to writing, and at the same time furnish evidence of his untiring industry. The attentive reader of them must, we think, be struck with the unusual combination of qualities which they exhibit: philosophical subtlety of analysis, metaphysical power of argumentation, deep spirituality, emotional fervor, and brilliance of imagination. Nor is there wanting a diction, which, though not as elegant as that of Robert Hall, is easy, flowing, and impressive. No reader can fail to be impressed by the vigor of the thought, felicity of illustration, beauty of imagery, and close application of truth to the conscience, which characterise these sermons. They are, in our judgment, vastly superior to those of Robertson of Brighton, which, however they may sparkle with new and unexpected turns of thought, owe much of their popularity to their half-formed and deceitful generalisations, and their introduction of the garb of orthodoxy into novel circumstances and unexpected relations. One could hardly help being surprised at the sight of "a bishop dancing a horn-pipe." Butler is no such trifler with truth. One feels as he follows

his burning words that he is in the hands of a sincere, cautious, and reverent thinker; one who is entitled to wear the cap of the philosopher, but who habitually doffs it in the presence of God's inspired Word, who possesses the magical power of the orator, but ascribes all spiritual results not to human eloquence but to the quickening and illuminating energy of the Holy Ghost. So far we have spoken of these sermons in terms of unqualified commendation. We yield them the praise belonging to the products of sanctified genius; they are acute, beautiful, eloquent. But we should fail to meet the responsibility attaching to a criticism of sermons, if we did not express a judgment in regard to their theology. What views of truth do they present? A sermon without theology is a miserable mockery. It may be an astute philosophical disquisition, a convincing ethical essay, a production in which metaphysical, moral, and rhetorical qualities may be powerfully blended—it is a mere oration, a jejune lecture, a simple impertinence, without theological truth. That is the differentiating quality of the sermon. Without it the most cogent exhortations are but paroxysms of wasted strength. Professor Butler is theological in a degree. He discusses certain dogmas with ability and enthusiasm, but he professes to abjure the systematic presentation of truth, and especially disputation in reference to the relations of truth to truth in a theological scheme. He says:

“My own object (I will confess it) has long been to strive after that great and single thought of which all these controversies as to the work of Christ in relation to the soul of man—his righteousness imputed and his holiness imparted—seem to present us but detached and lifeless portions. These disputations give us truth indeed, but truth partial and imperfect: it is as if one should labor to reflect the whole amplitude of heaven in each of the scattered fragments of a broken mirror. And when these poor fragments are bound together in the framework of a human system, the case is little mended: they are fragments still; the joinings and fissures are too palpable—they still cross and distort the image.”

Now this is somewhat curious, for two reasons: in the first place, Professor Butler's mind was cast in a philosophical mould, and therefore was impelled to seek unity in diversity. This he expressly intimates in the extract just given. But if by analysis

he succeeded in discovering a fundamental principle of classification, namely, union of man with God, answering to the mysterious unity of Persons in the Godhead, the question is, how he could help by synthesis employing that ultimate truth as a basis upon which a system of truth should be logically constructed. And if it should be said that one may rest in the result of the analytic process, we are inclined to answer that that is impossible to a philosophical intellect. A spontaneous construction of a system would be a necessity, if not a reflective. But why in a sermon which is intended to instruct and move the popular mind, should the analytic process be instituted, if the synthetic be rejected? They ought to stand or fall together. In the second place, Professor Butler elaborately expounds certain particular truths—the Trinity for example. Now we hold that an adequate explanation of an articulate member of the body of truth cannot be furnished without a comparison of it with other related members, and an adjustment of it, as the Professor himself was wont to urge, to the whole analogy of faith. But the standard to which the individual truth is brought is itself the very system as a connected whole which the preacher considered it useless to construct in a scientific form. We think therefore that he here speaks from a certain insensible prejudice, and in happy inconsistency with himself. It is, however, true that one finds it impossible from these sermons to collect the school of doctrine to which the author belonged. He seems to have been in some sense an eclectic. He utters no uncertain sound as to the doctrines of theology proper—the Trinity, the Person of Christ, and cognate truths. In regard to Election, he professes a studied reserve, while acknowledging the fact. We cannot tell exactly whether he is, in this matter, mainly a Calvinist, an Arminian, or a Faberite. The vital doctrine as to our relation to Adam he accepts both in the aspects of imputation and inherence; but what precisely the ground or mode of the imputation is, one finds it hard to discover. Regeneration, Justification, and Sanctification are all on his lips, but the reader must keep his eyes open to the exact meaning in which the terms are employed. It strikes us that he will detect the influence of a sacramental theory, which exaggerates the

effect of a natural union to Christ as the channel through which saving blessings are conveyed, and which obscures the federal relation as of comparative unimportance. We would be careful not to misrepresent one whose genius we so much admire, but he was a High Churchman and maintainer of a personal Apostolic Succession, and it would be strange if his doctrinal views had not received a tincture from his ecclesiastical. High Churchman and advocate of a permanent Apostolate, however, as he was, we believe that he had been taught of the Spirit the evil of sin and the grace of redemption; and the walls of a rigid churchism failed to confine the catholic affection for all Christ's true people which the instincts of a renewed nature compelled him to express. It is worth notice how the fact of conversion in the case of this distinguished man modified, checked, regulated the natural consequences of a Prelatic High Churchism.

We would like to examine the doctrinal utterances of the author in detail, but our space forbids. The great defect of these able, beautiful, eloquent discourses is their failure to signalise a Federal Theology. The omission is damaging. The very type and mould of theology is wanting. Had these splendid sermons been as much pervaded with the indispensable doctrine of the covenants as were those of his illustrious fellow-churchman, Bishop Hopkins, there would have been need of but little qualification of our praise.

J. L. G.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The books that have been brought to our notice since our last issue have chiefly a literary or a utilitarian, rather than a speculative or a scientific interest. The last age but one was an age of original production. The same is true, though hardly to the same extent, of the age immediately succeeding it. This interval betwixt the past and the present was, however, largely drenched with publications of a frivolous or ephemeral nature. Our own is emphatically the age of reprints. The literature that is thus revived is in the main wholesome as well as stimulating. The period we live in is evidently in training for some great work in the future. The English house of Scribner & Welford lead off with the prince of German critics¹ and one of the most charming of British writers upon art and poetry.² Both these have lately been referred to in these pages. The anticipated account of the famous Goldsmith's Bridge over the Arno at Florence and of the marvellous exploits of Benvenuto Cellini would be enough of itself to tempt buyers to the little book³ about the toils of jewellers. A kindred attraction may be found in the companion volume⁴ which treats of equally delicate, and as some may think equally beautiful, labors in a material that is the more difficult for being less precious and more fragile. We have already bespoken the friendly regards of our readers in behalf of Mr. Hay-

¹Lessing's Prose Works. Selected Prose Works of G. E. Lessing. Translated from the German by E. C. Beasley and Helen Zimmern. Edited by Edward Bell, and containing Laokoon; How the Ancients represented Death; Dramatic Notes. With fine frontispiece of "The Laokoon," from the original marble. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth, \$1.40. Scribner & Welford, New York.

²Mrs. Jamieson's Characteristics of Women, Moral, Poetical, and Historical, as illustrated in Shakespeare's Heroines. 12mo, cloth, \$1.40. *Ibid.*

³Gold and Silversmith Work. By John Hungerford Pollen. With numerous woodcuts. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴Glass. By Alexander Nesbitt. With numerous woodcuts. 12mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

ward's Essays.¹ These are commonly taken from the pages of the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews*, and are largely though not exclusively of a biographical description. The history of these two mighty periodicals is one of the most remarkable chapters in the history of the nineteenth century; and it is doubted in respectable quarters whether Smith and Brougham and Jeffrey and Gifford and Lockhart and Cornwall Lewis wrote any better than our co-evals who have succeeded to their renown. It must be admitted, indeed, that relatively to the whole mass of contemporary criticism, the authority of these venerable and still lusty organs of cultivated opinion has been greatly lessened. After all the works that have appeared of late on the land of the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies, the costly octavos of Wilkinson² hold their ground as occupying somewhat the same position in respect to the ancient Egyptians, that is maintained by Lane's cheap duodecimos in relation to the modern. The period of the Renaissance³ is the birth-time of that portentous age which, following hard upon the splendid gloom and death-like repose of the mediæval centuries, is still busy garnering the harvest of the Reformation. The "groaning and travailing" of humanity, as she emerged once more into the unfettered life of art, of letters, and of poesy, from the time of Petrarch, and still more from the fall of Constantinople, to the death of Leo X., was more conspicuous, and its results were more imposing in Italy than anywhere else.

¹Selected Essays. Historical, Literary, Biographical. Chiefly from contributions to the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews*. By A. Hayward, Esq., Q. C. 2 vols., crown, 8vo., \$4.50. Contents: Sydney Smith, Samuel Rogers, F. von Gentz, Maria Edgeworth, Countess Hahn-Hahn, DeStendhal (Henry Beyle), Alexander Dumas, The British Parliament, Pearls and Mock-Pearls of History, Vicissitudes of Noble Families, England and France, Lady Palmerston, Lord Landsdowne, Lords Dalling and Bulwer, Whist and Whist-Players. *Ibid.*

²The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians. By Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson, D. C. K., F. R. S., etc. A new edition, revised and corrected by Samuel Birch, LL.D., etc. With numerous colored plates, illustrations, and woodcuts. 3 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$33. *Ibid.*

³The Civilization of the Period of the Renaissance in Italy. By Jacob Burckhardt. Authorised Translation by S. G. C. Middlemore. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$9.60. *Ibid.*

The dash of irony in Mr. Sullivan's¹ outpouring against the workingman redeems his work from the charge of brazen impudence. It is refreshing now and then to meet a man who is unwilling to express a crazy preference for manual over intellectual labor. The funny pictures will greatly help the sale of the book; which, by the bye, is not dear.

In the midst of the tremendous conflict between the two big American Dictionaries, we are glad to be able to point to an unpretending rival² on the other side of the water. In our judgment the test should not be the consideration of size, but that of merit. Webster's was once valuable for Webster's own definitions, and is still valuable for Mahn's unequalled etymologies. Worcester's, whilst rivalling the other in fulness and accuracy, comes much nearer to the English standard of spelling. The eccentricities of Webster's spelling have we know been to a great extent purged out of the late editions. The English work ought to give us some new words and also the current pronunciation.

The name of Brugsch-Bey³ calls for no introduction at our hands as that of one of the most eminent of living *savans*, and whose *specialité*, like that of Lepsius, is Egypt. His lucubrations on the miraculous passage through the Red Sea appear to evince that the learned author may be tinctured with rationalism.

It is cool and reinigorating to turn from the sultry Nile to

¹The British Workingman; by One who Does not Believe in Him; and other Sketches. By J. F. Sullivan. Engraved by Dalziel Brothers. Illustrated with over one hundred humorous and amusing sketches. 4to, boards, \$1. *Ibid.*

²Stormonth English Dictionary. An Etymological and Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language. Including a very copious selection of Scientific Terms. For use in Schools and Colleges, and as a Book of General Reference. By the Rev. James Stormonth. The pronunciation carefully revised by the Rev. P. H. Phelp, M. A., Cantab. Crown, 8vo, 775 pp., \$3.75. *Ibid.*

³A History of the Pharaohs. Derived entirely from the Monuments. By Henry Brugsch-Bey. Translated from the German by the late Henry Danby Seymour. Completed and edited by Philip Smith, B. A. To which is added a Memoir of the Exodus of the Israelites and the Egyptian Monuments. With colored Plates and Maps. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth, \$12. *Ibid.*

the fiords of the vikings and the fabled realms of the Valhalla.¹ Alma Tadema is one of the finest artists in Great Britain. There is an absorbing interest attaching to the first telescope that was ever used, and that is preserved to-day in the Museum of Florence. The fame² of the man who made it is rising, if not among the devotees of science, at least among the votaries of philosophy. He is now said to have preceded Francis Bacon, not only in the outline but in much of the detail also of his "Novum Organum."

Of the "Utopia"³ we have lately had our say. All such books were suggested by Plato's Republic. It is always a subject of congratulation when the man who is best informed on a given topic comes forward as an instructor in that branch. If this may not be said of the late Sir Gilbert Scott in relation to building in the Middle Ages,⁴ it is at any rate true that Sir Gilbert was absolutely the only man in the British Islands who perfectly understood the art of "restoring" old churches.

Ladies love the lore of flowers;⁵ but few and far between are the visits of virgins to the counters of country—or of city—book-sellers who brook the thought of throwing down a guinea for the gaudy lesson. The region that lies about the foot of the hill on which stands the ruinous memento of old Fiesole, can show chapters and urns that are⁶ older, and in many ways more inter-

¹Studies in the Literature of Northern Europe. By Edmund W. Gosse. With a frontispiece designed and etched by L. Alma Tadema, A. R. A. 12mo, cloth, \$4.80. *Ibid.*

²Galileo Galilei and the Roman Curia. From Authentic Sources. By Karl von Gebler. Translated. 8vo, cloth, \$4.80. *Ibid.*

³Utopia: Written in Latine. By Syr Thomas More, Knight, and Translated into English by Raphe Robynson, Anno MCCCCCLI. With copious Notes and a Biographical and Literary Introduction by the Rev. T. F. Dibdin. Printed from Sir Henry Ellis's copy, with additional Notes and Corrections. Portrait and engraving of the Family of Sir Thomas More. 8vo, cloth. Boston, Lincolnshire, 1878. \$8.40. *Ibid.*

⁴Lectures on the Rise and Development of Mediæval Architecture. Delivered at the Royal Academy. By Sir Gilbert Scott, R. A. With over five hundred illustrations. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, \$16.80. *Ibid.*

⁵Flower Lore. The Teachings of Flowers: Historical, Legendary, Poetical, and Symbolical. 12mo, cloth, gilt, \$5. *Ibid.*

⁶The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria. By George Dennis. A new

esting than those of Greece. Such diaries as that of Lady Willoughby have a rare charm; but one that is far inferior to the charm which invests these two^{1 2} mouldy but ever memorable records of the cavaliers. The true way to master history is to read books like those of these quaint old worthies. Of the two, Evelyn is the most comprehensive (embracing as it does not only the ten years of Pepys but fifty-five others), but Pepys is the most laughably odd and whimsical.

The great book of the quarter is undoubtedly Mr. Froude's³ life of Julius Cæsar. We confess, too, that from our college days there has been a rebellion in our minds on this subject: so that while our reason has been convinced by the advocates of the Republic, our imagination and our feelings have been captivated by those who, like Louis Napoleon and Mommsen and Froude, have deplored the taking off of the foremost character in Roman antiquity. None of our readers needs to see the bill of fare when the banquet is served by the same hands that furnished forth the story of Elizabeth and Mary Stuart. Mr. Cable promises something pleasant in his "Old Creole Days."⁴ Scholars will be indulgent towards the new contribution⁵ to German philology. John Ruskin⁶ is a man of genius but an unsafe guide. Judge

edition, revised and enlarged so as to incorporate the most recent discoveries. With twenty maps and nearly two hundred illustrations. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth extra, \$16. *Ibid.*

¹Evelyn's Diary. From 1641 to 1706. By William Brady. With Memoir. "Chandos Classics Edition." 12mo, 619 pp., cloth, 75c. *Ibid.*

²Pepys's Diary. From 1659 to 1669. By Lord Braybrooke. With Memoir. "Chandos Classics Edition." 639 pp., cloth, 75c. *Ibid.*

³Cæsar. A Sketch. By James Anthony Froude, M. A. With a portrait engraved on steel and a map. Crown 8vo, 578 pp., cloth, \$2.50. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

⁴Old Creole Days. By George W. Cable. 16mo, 235 pp., extra cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵Hilfs-und Uebungsbuch beim Unterricht in der deutschen Sprache. By Wm. R. Rosenstengel.

⁶Ruskin on Painting. With a Biographical Sketch. Forming No. 29 of Appleton's "New Handy-Volume Series." Paper, 30c.; cloth. 60c. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Jones's History of New York¹ during the Revolution should be thankfully accepted and at once shelved for reference.

The same competent pen which gave us the Great German Composers, now recites the story of the Great Italian and French Composers.² The theme is a delightful one for lovers alike of music and of memoirs. The first volume of Heilprin's important work on the Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews³ awakens hopes and misgivings that can only be realised (or be removed) by the succeeding volumes. It is pleasant to find the little *chef d'œuvre*⁴ of that exquisite writer, Emile Souvestre, done into English again. There is but one nearly faultless art journal, and that is the superb French work, *L'Art*.⁵ We advise any who care to get it to buy the bound volumes at the end of each year. Bonar's prose is almost as sweet and quite as searching as Bonar's verse.⁶ Montaigne⁷ is more than a French Charles Lamb and Sir Thomas Browne in one. The old French, though, is very provoking. We vary from our rule in recommending Mr. Coulson's novels.⁸

¹History of New York during the Revolutionary War and of the leading events in the other Colonies at that period. By Thomas Jones, Justice of the Supreme Court of the Province. Edited by Edward Floyd De Lancy. With Notes, Contemporary Documents, Maps, and Portraits. Printed for the New York Historical Society in "The John D. Jones Fund Series of Histories and Memoirs." 2 vols., 8vo, 713 pp., cloth, gilt top. *Ibid.*

²The Great Italian and French Composers. By George T. Ferris. Number 28 of "Appleton's New Handy-Volume Series." 18mo, 248 pp., paper, 30c.; cloth, 60c. *Ibid.*

³The Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews. Translated and Critically examined by Michael Heilprin. Vol. I., Cr. 8vo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴The Attic Philosopher in Paris; or, a Peep at the World from a Garret, being the Journal of a Happy Man. *Ibid.*

⁵L'Art. First quarterly volume, 1879. Folio, cloth, \$10; paper, \$8. J. W. Bouton, New York.

⁶Truth and Error. By the Rev. Horatius Bonar, D. D. 18mo., 280 pp., cloth, 60c. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

⁷Montaigne. By the Rev. Lucas Collins, M. A. Vol. VII. of "Foreign Classics for English Readers." Edited by Mrs. Oliphant. 16mo, fine cloth, \$1. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

⁸The Ghost of Redbrook. A Novel. By the author of "The Clifton Picture," etc. 8vo, cloth and paper. *Ibid.*

“The Scattered Nation” will never cease to challenge the attention and quicken the astonishment of mankind. The alleged tendency which now exists on the part of the Jews to buy up and populate the Holy Land will perhaps increase the disposition to examine Mr. DeGroot’s volumes¹ on Jewish antiquities. The most profound and difficult of the Gospels has again met with a new expounder;² who does not aim at the scope (at once wide and deep) of Lampe or of Godet, but will bear a comparison rather with Ryle. It is a precious privilege to be “with Jesus,”³ whether it be “alone” or in company. Another valuable book of reference will be discovered in Mr. Watson’s Dictionary.⁴ If so be, it must be so: Quinby must be Bee-keeping,⁵ and we keep beeing with him. Before him were Huber, Langstroth, and Lubbock.

James must be carefully distinguished from Robert, otherwise known as “Satan.” Montgomery. Robert had small claims to notice, but hardly deserved the frightful castigation bestowed upon him by Macaulay. James⁶ is one of the most vigorous as well as graceful and tender of our sacred poets. Mrs. Osgood⁷ by some means disarmed the more poignant and equally truculent criticism of Edgar Poe, and is worthy of a name even by the side of Mrs. Hemans;⁸ of whom in fact we have begun to tire.

¹Israelites and Judæans: Their History, Legends, Laws, and Religion. By M. G. DeGroot. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, \$2.50. James Miller, New York.

²Notes on the Gospel of John. Explanatory and Practical. By Geo. W. Clark, D. D. A Popular Commentary upon a critical basis, especially designed for Pastors and Sunday-schools. With illustrations. 12mo, 236 pp., cloth, \$1.50. American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia.

³Alone with Jesus. Gleanings from Closet Readings. By J. C. Lamphier. New edition. 16mo, 192 pp., cloth, 85c.; cloth gilt, \$1. N. Tidbals & Son, New York.

⁴Dictionary of Poetical Quotations. By John T. Watson. New edition. 12mo, 506 pp., cloth extra, \$1.50. Porter & Coates, Philadelphia.

⁵Quinby’s New Bee-Keeping. By L. C. Root. The Mysteries of Bee-Keeping Explained. With one hundred illustrations. 12mo, 270 pp., extra cloth, \$1.50. Orange Judd Company, New York.

⁶The Poetical Works of James Montgomery. Collected by himself. 8vo, cloth extra, \$2.50. John E. Potter & Co., Philadelphia.

⁷The Poetical Works of Mrs. Frances Sargent Osgood. 12mo, cloth extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁸The Poetical Works of Mrs. Felicia Hemans. Edited by Henry T. Tuckerman. 12mo, cloth extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

Neither of them compares with Mrs. Browning. The late Henry Tuckerman contrived to write elegant essays and pleasing stanzas. Since Tom Moore's¹ centenary his literary reputation has been going up rather than down. Moore was a true patriot and a man of spirit as well as fancy, wit, and feeling. His morals were easy, but he was devoted to his "Bessy." Pope's "Iliad"² and "Odyssey"³ are far from Homer's, but are justly popular. Taine⁴ is already a classic.

Whether the Messrs. Putnam's Barrister⁵ has given us a law book or something for the laity, is a question we leave the reader to find out independently. By every one who delights to repair to the "well of English undefiled," Dr. Leffingwell's⁶ efforts to please them will be appreciated at their deserts. It is curious to fall in with a pagan preaching about Christianity. Mr. Frothingham's poisoned syllabus⁷ is not likely to do much damage, as it will be taken by few people whose minds have not been previously corrupted. The title page should have borne the additional words, "By one of themselves." If reading only made the ready man, Dr. Wilder's work⁸ would possibly make us proof against nearly every juncture. Dr. Alden is a man of considerable force. His "Thoughts"⁹ are this time "on the Religious Life."

¹The Poetical Works of Thomas Moore. 12mo, cloth extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

²Homer's Iliad. Translated by Alexander Pope. With valuable Notes and Commentaries. Edited by W. C. Armstrong. 12mo, cloth extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

³Homer's Odyssey. Translated by Alexander Pope. With valuable Notes and Commentaries. Edited by W. C. Armstrong. 12mo, cloth extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁴History of English Literature. By H. A. Taine, D. C. L. Complete in one volume. 12mo, 722 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Thomas Crowell, New York.

⁵Briefs by a Barrister. By Edward R. Johnes. 16mo, 123 pp., cloth, \$1.50. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

⁶A Reading Book of English Classics. Edited by the Rev. C. W. Leffingwell, D. D. 8vo, 403 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁷The Assailants of Christianity. By O. B. Frothingham. 8vo, 49 pp., sewed, 20c. *Ibid.*

⁸Emergencies and How to Meet Them. Compiled by Burt C. Wilder. M. D. 16mo, 36 pp., sewed, 15c. *Ibid.*

⁹Thoughts on the Religious Life. By Joseph Alden, D. D. 16mo, cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXX.—NO. 4.

OCTOBER, MDCCLXXIX.

ARTICLE I.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

In the remarks which we propose to make upon this subject, we have in our view the needs of the great body of private members of the Church rather than the needs of the ministers of the gospel; although we are not without hope of being able to say something which may serve to impart additional clearness to the views of some ministers who have not made the subject a matter of special study. Observation and experience have convinced us that there is not a little confusion, if not some error, in the notions entertained by many intelligent Presbyterians in regard to the nature and design of this ordinance, and to the mode in which it conduces to the sanctification of believers. Fatal errors in regard to it were taught in the Church for ages; and so inveterate have these errors become, so thoroughly had they poisoned the life of Christians, that even the great men who were raised up by Divine Providence and employed as its instruments in the work of reform in the sixteenth century, failed to reach any harmony of views among themselves concerning it; and an ordinance which had been established by the Saviour as the most impressive symbol of the union and communion of his people, became the occasion of bitter contentions and divisions. Its mission, like the mission of the Redeemer himself, seemed to be that of bringing a sword, not

peace, on the earth. The history of the Church scarcely records anything better suited to humble us and make us distrustful of our unaided understandings, than the debates at the colloquy of Marburg, and especially the obstinate weakness of Luther in defending a position as utterly untenable as that of the Papists themselves. The cask preserves the odor of the first liquor that is put into it; and the error of Luther still lingers in the noble Church which has been called by his name. But are Presbyterians free from error in regard to this ordinance? Their doctrinal standards are, as we believe; but we also believe that the ghosts of the departed errors of Popery still linger about the communion table even in our own Church. This is our apology, if apology be needed, for the present writing.

We have in the New Testament four several accounts of the institution of the Supper. The last of these is found in the eleventh chapter of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians; and being the last in the order of time as well as the most complete, it was doubtless designed by the Saviour to be the chief directory for the Church in celebrating this ordinance. So the instinct of the Church seems to have decided; and we shall be guided in what follows by this directory.

I. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that this ordinance was instituted by the Lord himself. "For I have received of the Lord," says the apostle, "that which also I delivered unto you" (verse 23). It is no ordinance of man, but an ordinance of God in Christ. It is a *positive* institution, not *moral*; that is, the obligation to observe it rests not upon "the nature of things"—the nature of God, the nature of man, or the relations of God and man as modified by the gospel—but upon the sovereign appointment of God. Given a knowledge of the gospel and of those new relations which the death of our Lord Jesus Christ has constituted betwixt him and us redeemed sinners, then the obligation to remember his death, with the liveliest emotions of gratitude, faith, and repentance, immediately arises and suggests itself. The relations cannot be recognised, without feeling the obligation. This is the *moral* side of the matter. But to remember him and commemorate his death in this par-

ticular method, to wit, by assembling before a table, and eating bread and drinking wine together, would never have suggested itself to us in the way of duty. No obligation would have been felt, and none would have existed. But the moment the command is given—"Do this in remembrance of me"—the obligation arises. It is created by the command. This is the *positive* side of the matter.

There are some inferences of immense importance to be drawn from this fact, that our Lord by his own sovereign will ordained this feast.

1. If it be an expression of his sovereign will, and no reason exists for celebrating the Supper but the bare command, then a refusal to go to the Lord's table involves the guilt of *rebellion*. Rebellion differs from other crimes in this, that, while other crimes are transgressions of particular laws or commandments, this crime is aimed at the very source of all law, the authority itself upon which all law rests and by which alone it can be enforced. Murder may be committed by one who is thinking of nothing but the gratification of a private purpose or impulse of cupidity, lust, ambition, or revenge; but rebellion is always an attempt to subvert the government itself, or, at the very least, a denial of allegiance to it. Such was the crime of our first father in Eden. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was of the nature of a positive institution. The prohibition, "Thou shalt not eat of it," and that alone, created the difference between it and the other trees of the garden, as to man's right of enjoyment. It was the expression and the symbol of God's sovereign right to control his creature. To eat of the fruit of that tree, therefore, was to deny that sovereign right, and to say as plainly as an act could say, "I will not have this God to rule over me." It was not the transgression of a single commandment; but a comprehensive repudiation of man's whole allegiance, an exhaustive denial of God's right to issue any command at all. So here: the refusal to obey this command, "Do this in remembrance of me," on the part of any one who understands the case, is equivalent to a rejection of the whole authority of Jesus Christ. It is a very solemn and emphatic way of saying,

“I will not have this man to reign over me.” Let this be pondered by those who say that they can be as good Christians out of the visible Church as in it.

2. If this ordinance be a symbol of Christ's supreme authority in the Church, and there is no valid reason for observing it but his command, it will follow that he who goes to the Lord's table, with the consciousness of being impelled, only or mainly, by the desire to obey him, to remember him and his death, in the way that he himself has appointed, has good reason to look for a blessing. His obedience, as such, will be rewarded. We do not mean that a mere mechanical compliance with the law of this ordinance, or of any other, will entitle a man to receive a blessing; much less are we believers in what has been called in the Papacy the *opus operatum*, that the sacraments produce their appropriate effects whenever administered, unless some bar is opposed to prevent their operation. Our meaning is that beside the effects which an ordinance is adapted in its own nature to produce, a special manifestation of God's favor may be expected to follow the essential spirit of obedience itself; and that where this spirit of obedience exists, the other effects, which have been alluded to, may be more confidently expected to take place. To illustrate: the memorials of a Saviour's broken body and of his blood shed, are adapted by a law of our nature to awaken certain emotions and to call into exercise certain spiritual faculties or habits, such as love, gratitude, faith, repentance, etc.; and this awakening and exercise might take place in the heart of a sincere believer (a Quaker, for instance), when the divine institution of the ordinance was not clear to his own mind, or even when it was clear to him that it was not of divine institution, but was only a pleasant ceremony of purely human origin. What we contend for is that such a believer would not be entitled to expect as large a blessing as another who should come with a full assurance that it was Christ's own ordinance he was coming to, and that he was coming because he believed it to be Christ's.

3. This view is important, further, as helping to settle the question, in a given case, whether a person ought to go to the communion. If it were a mere question of privilege, one ought

perhaps to wait for absolute assurance of his right. But if it be a question of duty, then a lower degree of evidence ought to convince him that he is bound to perform it.

II. It is a *teaching* ordinance: it is designed to set forth some fundamental doctrines of the gospel. All teaching is by signs. The two kinds of signs which God chiefly employs in teaching us are words and symbols. Words, indeed, are symbols in a certain sense; but they are here distinguished as a class of signs differing from symbols. Words are in their origin signs addressed to the sense of hearing. A word is a *vox*; and if it be not a sign also, it is a *vox et præterea nihil*. The written word is simply the record of these sign, as written, appealing no doubt to the sense of sight, but appealing remotely to the ear. Symbols appeal to the eye mainly. In the sixth chapter of John's Gospel, we have the record of a discourse of our Saviour, in which he announced to the people the same great truths which are set forth in the Lord's Supper. (See especially verses 35, 48-58). The comparison of that discourse with 1 Cor. xi. 24-26 will give us a clear idea of the difference between teaching by words and by symbols. In the one, the Lord appears as describing the sacrifice which he was to offer for the sins of the world, and the method by which that sacrifice should become effectual for the life of the sinner. In the other, the Lord appears as actually presenting his flesh to his people under the symbol of bread, and they appear as actually receiving and eating it. (Compare John vi. 51-58 with 1 Cor. xi. 24.) It is the same truth in both; but in the one case conveyed in the language of words; words in the highest degree figurative, but still words; in the other, conveyed in the form of symbolical elements and actions. Considering the Supper as a system of signs, its whole value lies in the truths which it presents and exhibits.*

*We have taken for granted, it will be observed, the common Protestant interpretation of the words, "This is my body:" this is the sign of, or this represents, my body. This is not the place for exposing the absurdities of the Papal doctrine of transubstantiation—a doctrine fatal to all rational belief in the Bible as the word of God, and the mother of the most desolating scepticism.

Now note one or two important inferences from this view :

1. There is no special mystery about this ordinance. It began to be called a "mystery," a "tremendous mystery," in the Church so early as the middle of the second century ; and as words react mightily on thought, men began to think that there must be a mystery in it ; and as they could not find any, it became necessary to put some into it. Hence the very word "Sacrament," which meant mystery :* hence the doctrine of the "Real Presence" in all its forms. If this simple memorial of Christ's death could not be made a miracle for the senses, it must at least become a mystery for faith. Something must be put into it, to justify the extravagant language which was commonly employed in regard to it.

The mystery is not in the ordinance. How men can be taught by the use of visible signs and symbols, it is not harder to understand than how they can be taught by words. Not as hard perhaps. The mystery is in the truth, not in the vehicle ; the mystery of the incarnation, of "God manifest in the flesh" ; the mystery of grace, condescension, and love in the Saviour's death ; the mystery of the believer's vital union with his Saviour ; the mystery of glory, when that life which is now "hid with Christ in God" shall be revealed in the revelation of Christ "our life" ; all these mysteries are real and ineffable. But they may be and are set forth in the preaching of the word as well as in the Supper. Is there any mystery in preaching ?

2. This view furnishes an answer to the question, how the Lord's Supper conduces to the sanctification of believers. The answer is, by the truth it sets forth. Its operation is not physical. Men ate the manna in the wilderness, and died the death of the body. Men have eaten the bread of the Supper and have died the death both of the body and of the soul. Its operation is not magical ; its effects are not like those ascribed to the wizard ; the

*The Latin version of the Bible which goes under the name of "The Vulgate" commonly uses the word *sacramentum* to represent the Greek work *mystery* ; and the English reader by substituting "sacrament" for "mystery" in Ephesians v. 32, will understand how ignorant people might be made to believe that the Bible makes marriage a sacrament.

words of institution are not an incantation. All such notions are the dreams of drivelling superstition, or the devices of an ambitious and avaricious priesthood, unsupported by any evidence and in the highest degree insulting to God. There is too much reason to fear that there are remains of this superstition lingering in the minds of some Christians who are far from deserving to be described as superstitious.

The truth is the only instrument that God uses for the sanctification of his people (John xvii. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 13; Jas. i. 18; 1 Pet. i. 22-25; ii. 1, 2); while his Holy Spirit is the only sanctifier. Peter, in the passage just cited, compares the word of God to the seed which determines the nature of the life and all its manifestations. Paul uses (Rom. vi. 17) the figure of a mould or type to express the relation of the life of a believer to the truth—"that form of doctrine whereto ye were delivered" (see the rendering in the margin). The metal must be fused in order to take the impression of the mould; the wax must be softened in order to take the impression of the seal. This softening and fusing of the heart is the work of the Holy Spirit alone. He alone gives the life, and he alone invigorates and develops it; but he imparts it and develops it according to the truth as recorded in the Scriptures and symbolised in the sacraments. It is as easily understood, therefore, how the sacraments conduce to our sanctification as how the reading or preaching of the word does. There is a great mystery in the Spirit's operations (John iii. 8) both by word and sacraments; but the mystery is not greater when he works by the latter than when he works by the former.

There are two circumstantial differences, however, which it may be well to note in passing—

(1) The truths presented in the sacraments, especially in the Lord's Supper, are presented in a more condensed form than in the word. The light in the old creation, to borrow an illustration from Owen, was sufficient to illuminate the world while it was diffused everywhere before the work of the fourth day; but it was more glorious and penetrating when reduced and contracted into the body of the sun. So the truth concerning Christ

scattered up and down the Bible is sufficient for the illumination of the Church; but it is far more glorious when reduced and contracted into the Lord's Supper. All the rays of Christ's glory are here converged, as it were, into one burning focus, and consequently better suited to set the soul of the believer on fire.

(2) The other difference is that, in the Supper, the power of the truth is increased by the active part which the communicant takes in the celebration of the ordinance. There are symbolical actions as well as symbolical elements used in the Lord's Supper. The action of the administration in offering the elements to the communicants is symbolical of the free offer of Jesus and all the benefits of his redemption to those who will truly receive them. "Take, eat," etc. The action of the communicants in taking the elements and in eating and drinking them is symbolical of their reception of Jesus and the benefits of his redemption. In reading or hearing the word, there is no profession made as to the state of mind and heart of the reader or hearer. In the act of communicating, there is a profession made of receiving and resting upon him whose body and blood are symbolically offered to them; and, by a law of human nature when such a profession is sincerely made, the truth is brought nearer to the soul of him who makes it, and is in more favorable conditions for making an impression.

We come now to consider more particularly what the truth is which is symbolised in the Supper. "My body broken for you" (verse 24); "this is my blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins" (Matt. xxvi. 28. Compare Mark xiv. 25; Luke xxii. 20). The fundamental truth here set forth is the substitution of Jesus for the sinner, of his life for the sinner's. This was the theory of the bleeding sacrifice under the Mosaic law. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement (Hebrew *covering*) for your lives; for it is the blood that maketh a covering by the life that is in it" (Fairbairn's rendering: see his "Typology"). Life is substituted for life; the life of the victim for the life of the sinner which has been forfeited to the law; the life of the victim becoming, thereby, a covering for the for-

feited life of the sinner; and hence an at-one-ment,* a bringing-into-one, a reconciliation, of God and the sinner—these are the great ideas set forth in this precious ordinance of the Church, ideas without which the gospel is but “the play of Hamlet without the part of Hamlet.”

The great purpose of the ordinance is to set forth the death of Christ. “As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew (announce, proclaim) the Lord's death till he come” (verse 26).

We are so familiar with this simple rite that we are not as much impressed as we should otherwise be with the strangeness of it. Men are accustomed to celebrate the birth-days of great benefactors of their country or their race. Their death-days have been lamented and deplored as putting a permanent arrest upon their beneficent career. “In that very day their thoughts perish.” The death-days of the Christian martyrs were celebrated by their brethren with appropriate ceremonies; but they were celebrated as their *natalitia*, their birth-days, upon which they entered into glory, honor, and immortality. It must be borne in mind also that these days of martyrdom could never have been celebrated, if Jesus had not died; that his death alone made them birth-days into glory. The death of Manes was celebrated by the Manichæans; but it was no doubt in impious imitation of the Church's festival.

But the death of Jesus is not only celebrated by the Church, that vast communion of his worshippers; but celebrated as a festival, as a feast of thanksgiving, as a Eucharist. How strange! There must be something very unique about this death; some quality or feature in which it refuses to communicate with any other death which has ever occurred amongst

*Atonement is here used in its proper etymological sense of *reconciliation*, expressing the result of an expiatory offering rather than the process of expiation itself. This last is the ordinary acceptation of the word, and that in which our authorised version of the Bible uses both noun and verb, with rare exceptions. One of these exceptions is in Romans v. 11, where the Greek word rendered “atonement” means *reconciliation* and is so rendered by our translators in the margin.

men. What is it? The answer is that the death of Jesus was to him what the death of no other man could ever be to that man—the very end and purpose of his birth. Jesus was born for the express purpose of dying. His body was prepared (Psalm xl. 6; Heb. x. 5) in order that it might be broken; his blood was made to flow in its channels, in order that it might be shed. It is indeed “appointed unto all men once to die”; but this is not the end for which they were created. But the body of Jesus was created for this end (see John x. 18). This was the commandment or commission of the Father, that the Son should come into the world and take a human life, in order that he might lay it down, and then take it again. Upon the supposition that Jesus was a mere man and a mere martyr, this passage of John is utterly unintelligible. If he came into this world, as some monk of St. Bernard might go out among the snows of the Alps, not for the purpose of offering up his life, but only at the risk of losing it, in the prosecution of his benevolent mission, then the gospel history is an insoluble riddle. No! No! He was indeed the wisest of all teachers, the most illustrious of all the martyrs of philanthropy; but he was infinitely more: the great High Priest, performing a sublime and noble act of worship in the offering up of himself a sacrifice to divine justice for the glory of the Father and the salvation of the lost. The Unitarian would place him in the same class with Paul. Paul is indignant at the outrage done to his Master. “Was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul?” In the esteem of that great Apostle, Jesus stood alone, in solitary glory, the Saviour of sinners. The only glory Paul claimed was that of preaching the unsearchable riches of this Saviour “without charge” to his fellow-sinners (1 Cor. ix. 15–23).

The death of Jesus, then, was not a mere incident in his history which might or might not have taken place, and yet the religion he taught have remained the same. It constitutes, together with his resurrection from the dead, the very *essence* of his religion. So Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, sums up the religion which he preached; and it is a true instinct which has led the Church to regard the Supper as her most significant symbol and

ensign. Around it her fiercest battles have been fought both with avowed enemies and with pretended friends.

This view explains the impotence, the confessed impotence, of the Papacy to give peace to its deluded votaries. It has taken away from the laity the cup, the symbol of the blood, and it virtually denies the efficacy of the Saviour's death by the *repetition* of his sacrifice (Heb. x. 1-4, 11-14) in the abomination of the Mass. Compare now the views of one of its "saints" who died more than a century before transubstantiation became the established dogma within its domain, and more than three centuries before the "communion in one kind" became the established dogma. In a direction for the visitation of the sick which is ascribed to St. Anselm of Canterbury, we have the following:*

"Dost thou believe that thou canst not be saved but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, Yes; then let it be said to him, Go to then, and whilst thy soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment; and otherwise I will not contend nor enter into judgment with thee. And if he shall say unto thee that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and my sins. If he shall say unto thee, that thou hast deserved damnation; say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits for my own, which I should have, and have not. If he say that he is angry with thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger."

He who, by an unction from the Holy One (1 John ii. 20) knows this death, can afford to despise the "extreme unction" administered by a juggling priest, *in articulo mortis*.

The peculiar efficacy of the blood of Jesus is indicated by calling it "the blood of the new covenant." The new covenant suggests an old. Blood was the life of all the covenants before Christ, from Abel down. With which of these old covenants does the Saviour tacitly compare the covenant sealed with his own blood when he calls it the "new" covenant? Evidently the

*Cited by John Owen, *Treatise on Justification*, Sec. 2. Works (Russell's Ed., London, 1826). Vol. XI., p. 22.

covenant of redemption which was sealed with the blood of the paschal lamb, as recorded in the twelfth chapter of Exodus. This is the most natural supposition under the circumstances. The Saviour was at this very time celebrating the feast of the Passover with his disciples. The Passover covenant was that which then occupied their thoughts. The Sinaitic covenant was more a covenant with the Church as redeemed than a covenant for its redemption; a covenant for the nurture and sanctification of pardoned sinners rather than a covenant for the pardon of sins; although the fact that it also was sealed and ratified with blood shows that the great idea of expiation was not suffered to drop out of the memory. A bloody sacrifice for expiation must continue forever to be the ground of all communion of even redeemed sinners with God. That the Passover covenant is referred to by the Saviour is further manifest from 1 Cor. v. 7: "Christ, our Passover, is sacrificed for us."

Such being the reference, the blood being the blood of redemption, the people of God are reminded of the great truths, (1) That they needed to be redeemed. All Israel by nature were in the same condemnation with the Egyptians. The sovereign election of God and the blood made the only difference. (2) That this redemption was to be accomplished—(a) by a work of righteous judgment upon the serpent's seed (compare Ezek. xxix. 3 ff.; Rev. xii. 3; xiii. 1, 2; 1 John iii. 8); and (b) by the suffering of the woman's seed typified in the lamb. (3) That the efficacy of the expiation for the salvation of the seed of God depended upon its being "sprinkled," which could only be done by *faith*.

All this may be readily applied to the redemption achieved by Jesus. There is one important difference, however, between the blood of the paschal lamb and the blood of "the lamb of God" with regard to their efficacy. There was no intrinsic power in the blood of the paschal lamb to protect the house of an Israelite. The life of no mere animal is an equivalent for the life of man. The efficacy, therefore, was due only to the sovereign appointment of God. Far different is the efficacy of the blood of him "who through the eternal Spirit (or, by an eternal Spirit, *i. e.*, by means of a divine nature—compare Rom. i. 4) offered himself

without spot to God." It is real and intrinsic, so that if we could separate (which is not possible) the offering of Jesus from the appointment of God, it would still be efficacious to "purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God," in the case of every sinner who should trust in it. (See the argument of the Apostle in Heb. ix. 13, 14, where the whole force of the "how much more" lies in the fact of the intrinsic efficacy of the blood of Christ.) It is impossible that the soul which has been sprinkled with his blood should ever be lost, not only because God says it shall not be, but because "the nature of things" forbids it, the nature of God, the nature of Jesus, the nature of his priesthood, the nature of his sacrifice. Truly we have strong consolation who have fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before us (Heb. vi. 18). All this is confirmed by the fact that the believer is made a partaker of the life of Christ. The Israelites ate the flesh of the Paschal lamb; but there was no community of life between them and the lamb. But there is a real community of life between the believer and his Lord. He lives in the believer by his Spirit, and the believer lives in him by faith; is a member "of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones" (Eph. v. 30, and compare John vi. 53-58). This is a great mystery; as real and glorious as it is incomprehensible—the union of Christ and his Church.

Another comforting inference to be drawn from this reference to the covenant for redemption out of Egypt, is that the safety of the believer depends wholly upon the sprinkled blood, and not upon his personal character; though it is true that the believer has been sanctified also. We are strongly tempted here to quote in illustration of this point more than one eloquent paragraph from Dr. Stuart Robinson's "Discourses on Redemption," Discourse 5. But as we take pleasure in believing that this precious volume is very widely circulated, we shall content ourselves with a single paragraph:

"Here is a genuine child of faithful Abraham, who has sometimes obtained a glimpse of the great truth involved in the shed blood, and experienced, in view of it, inexpressible comfort and peace. But the weakness of the flesh, and the temptations of sin, and the harassing cares of life have overshadowed his spiritual vision, and hidden the light from

his view. The remembrance of many a sin returns and sits heavily upon his conscience, and thereby darkens his views of the great doctrine of the atonement for sin. But still, at the command of Jehovah, through Moses and the elders, he prepares the lamb, and sprinkles the blood. Yet as the shades of night thicken and all are waiting in anxious suspense for the blow of vengeance and of deliverance, imagination is busy, and fears and terrors, as dark spirits, rise from the depths of his soul. And now unbelief suggests in view of the array of past sins which memory parades before him, 'Can a little blood, sprinkled on the door post, blot out *such* sins?' Can the mere acceptance of such a call and command from Jehovah purge the conscience of such guilt? However this blood might avail for the sins of the poor wretch who under the burden of transgression cries out, for the first time, to Jehovah in his distress—yet can it avail for one who hath proved faithless to vows, and buried out of sight his very covenant, under a multitude of transgressions? O thou of little faith! hast thou not listened to the promise? He said not—'when I find a tenement wherein there is no sin, I will pass over.' Nor—'when I find one who has, on the whole, not gone far astray, I will pass over.' Nor—'when I find a strong and active faith like Abraham's, I will pass over'—but, 'When I SEE THE BLOOD, I WILL PASS OVER.'

Here a difficulty may be raised. We can understand, it may be said, how all the Israelites could be "passed over" if they had the blood upon the door-posts, no matter what their personal character might be; how Korah, Dathan, and Abiram could be as safe as Moses himself; for this was a redemption from mere temporal death. But surely, we cannot assert that the blood of Jesus confers safety from the stroke of eternal death in the same way. We answer, that the bondage from which the blood of Jesus delivers is the bondage of sin, the bondage of its curse and of its dominion in the soul; and wherever there is true faith in his blood, there is deliverance from the dominion as well as from the guilt of sin. The deliverance from its guilt is absolute and perfect, and is the same in all believers, and the same at the moment they first believe, in degree and in kind, as at the bar of God when they shall be "openly acknowledged and acquitted." There are, and from the nature of the case can be, no degrees in justification; for the meritorious ground thereof is the righteousness of Christ imputed. To that glorious righteousness nothing can be added, and he who is clothed with it is as fully justified as the Saviour himself is. But in sanctification there are degrees—

all degrees from the first blush of dawn to the splendors of the noonday. Our *title* to the heavenly inheritance, if we be true believers, is absolutely perfect from the moment we believe; our *fitness* for the inheritance is a thing of growth. The two, however, cannot be separated. Wherever there is any true faith in a sinner, there we find a man who is both justified and sanctified. Still, the safety of the man is found in his justification, and that depends upon the blood (Rom. iii. 24, 25; v. 9); and as all believers are equally justified, they are all equally safe. The sensible evidence of the justification may and does vary according to a variety of circumstances, and, among these circumstances, the degree of sanctification; but the justification is the same in all, and, consequently, the safety from the stroke of death. Hence, when the question is, are we safe from the stroke of the destroyer? let our eye be fixed upon the blood! Let us "take ten looks at Christ for one at ourselves!"

III. The supper is a *sealing* ordinance. By this is not meant that it makes an impression upon the soul as the seal upon the wax. This belongs to it as a sign or system of signs, as presenting the truth to our minds. This has been already explained and guarded; and the sovereign agency of the Holy Ghost as the only sanctifier and comforter has been emphatically asserted. The meaning is that this sacrament, like that of baptism, is a seal appended to the gospel, the charter of our salvation, for the purpose of confirming to our weak faith the promises of God (see Rom. iv. 11; Acts ii. 38, 39; Heb. vi. 16-18). We are all familiar with the use of seals for a similar purpose among men (Gen. xxxviii. 18, 25; Jer. xxxii. 10, 11, 12, 14, 44).* God has given us his word, his oath, his visible seals; so that it would seem to be impossible to doubt. When we handle the elements

*A peculiar and almost mysterious importance has always been ascribed by jurists to the great seal of England. "It is held that, if the keeper of the seal should affix it, without taking the royal pleasure, to a patent of peerage or a pardon, though he may be guilty of a high offence, the instrument cannot be questioned by any court of law, and can be annulled only by an Act of Parliament."—(Macaulay's History of England, Vol. II., p. 487; Harper's Edition, 1849.)

of the Lord's Supper, we hold, as it were, Christ and his salvation in our hands; we see them, we feel them; we incorporate them with our very selves. If we believe the evidence of our senses, why should we doubt that Jesus and his salvation are ours?

On the other hand, by partaking of the Lord's Supper, the communicants seal their engagement to be the Lord's (Shorter Catechism, Question 94). This engagement is first made in baptism and then solemnly renewed from time to time in the other sacrament (Confession of Faith, Chap. XXIX., §1). In every celebration of this ordinance there is an exchange of seals between God and the believer (John iii. 33); a fresh ratification of the covenant of grace, in which God promises to be the Father and God of the believer, and the believer promises to be his son and to render to him the obedience of a son. It is a fresh pledge of God's faithfulness to us, and a fresh pledge of our faithfulness to him.

It follows from this view of the Supper as a seal, that it is valuable and valid only so long as it is appended to the gospel charter. Cut off the seal from a human covenant or deed of conveyance, and it becomes utterly worthless. It conveys nothing, it confirms nothing. Hence the worthlessness of the sacraments, so called, in the Papacy, which has virtually denied the fundamental doctrines of the gospel; and has so far laid aside the gospel as to make the sacraments the whole of religion.* According to its teaching, a sinner may be saved without knowing anything of the gospel, if he will only submit to the manipulations of the priest. It teaches that the sacraments not only signify grace, but convey it in every case in which a bar is not opposed to its operation. The sacraments, therefore, in the Papacy do all that the gospel can do, and a great deal more: they save the soul, which the gospel never does without them. The Bible teaches that the sacraments (with the exception of baptism in its application to infants) are intended for the con-

*"By these (the sacraments) all true righteousness begins, or being begun is increased, or being lost is restored." Concil. Trident. Decretum de Sacramentis, Sess. 7. Procœmium.

firmation of faith in believers; Rome teaches that "by them all grace begins." Hence, no preaching is done, worth speaking of, in the Papacy, where it is the exclusive religion. The pulpit is almost as silent as the grave in Mexico and Colombia. They have cut off the seals and thrown away the charter; and with the seals, as magical charms, they pretend to work wonders which no eye can see. Let us guard against their fatal delusions, and bear in mind that the sacraments are only appendages to the gospel, and are utterly worthless without it. The sacraments are monuments without inscriptions, and their meaning and intent can only be known by the record.

IV. The Supper is a *commemorative* ordinance. "Do this in remembrance of me." The idea of a commemoration is implied in a great deal of what has already been said in explaining the significance of the rite. We here consider it only as the commemoration of a great event, the death of Jesus Christ. In this relation, it belongs to the mass of proofs by which the facts of the gospel history are authenticated to us. The celebration of this festival can be traced back through all the centuries to the time when Jesus is affirmed to have died, and no further. The Church has always professed to celebrate it in commemoration of his death. The reality of that death is therefore indisputably established. A similar argument might be used to establish the reality of his resurrection from the observance of the first day of the week (Sunday) as a commemorative ordinance; though, for obvious reasons, this argument is not of equal strength with the other. But we may take this occasion to remark that the death and resurrection of the Founder of Christianity are the only events in his history which God has commanded to be commemorated by the celebration of certain ordinances. All other commemorations are without authority, and tend only to impair the sense of obligation as to the observance of these two. In point of fact, the day of Christ's birth was not commemorated by a Christmas for nearly four centuries after his birth. Further, the *anniversary* celebration even of the death and resurrection of Jesus is without authority; and seems inconsistent with the proprieties of the case as acknowledged by those branches of the

Church which observe these anniversaries. Why celebrate once a year, on Good Friday, an event which they celebrate once a month, and even daily? Why celebrate once a year, on Easter, an event which they celebrate every week?

Again, the commemorative character of this ordinance furnishes an answer to the objection which is often felt without being uttered, that it is a bald and simple ceremony. Even in our ordinary human life, no other than a simple memento is needed of a dead or absent friend; a ring or a lock of hair is sufficient. We cannot help observing the difference in this respect between the Jewish economy and the Christian. If we have never seen and conversed with one whose character and office we have been taught to respect and love, we need a minute and circumstantial description of his person, his voice, his features, his gait, in order to recognise him when we see him. But having seen him and conversed with him, a very simple memorial is sufficient to recall his image and to evoke from the depths of the heart the emotions which he was accustomed to inspire when actually present. So to the Church before his advent, a very minute description of the Christ was needful; and accordingly we find a complex system of symbols and types foreshadowing him, his priestly, kingly, and prophetic offices, and the leading events of his history. But to the Church since his advent in the flesh, these things are not needed; and the multiplication of ceremonies in the Christian Church is a melancholy proof of the decline of love to him and of an eclipse of faith. We have indeed not seen the Saviour with our bodily eyes, but we have what is better (see John xvi. 7), the presence of the Holy Ghost, the "Paraclete," whose office it is to reveal him to us, to take of his things and shew them to us, and so to glorify him (John xvi. 14). Where the Church has a large measure of the Spirit it will feel that the simple memorial which Jesus instituted is enough; when the Spirit withdraws, and in proportion as he withdraws, the attempt will be made to compensate for his absence by ceremonial symbols which appeal to the senses and the imagination. We must walk either by faith or by sight. A life in the Spirit is a life of faith; a life without the Spirit is a life of sense. Hence the horrible perversion of

the Supper in the Papacy. Jesus is not known by faith through the Spirit; and his very flesh and blood must be brought down under the "species" of bread and wine. Nominal Christians worship a wafer as their God!—an idolatry as brutal and senseless as that of the Israelites who worshipped a golden calf which their own hands had made as the God who had brought them out of Egypt.

The simplicity of the Supper is its recommendation. If it had a great intrinsic value, if it had any quality so charming or imposing as to fix the attention upon itself, there would be danger of its significance, Christ and his salvation, dropping out of sight; the symbol would be in danger of usurping the place of the thing symbolised. The victors in the Grecian games were content with a wreath of laurel: the glory was not in the crown, but in the victory. The instinct of patriotism has chosen as the flag of a country a worthless piece of bunting, or, at the most a piece of silk; and when the flag is given to the breeze, it is not the beauty of the cloth or of its folds which makes the heart of the patriot swell and throb, but the thought of the country it represents, the institutions, the laws, the wisdom of the cabinet, the prowess of the field of battle, the blessings of home and fireside, in a word, the glory of the country and of its history. So the Christian of lively faith looks upon this simple ordinance of the Supper, the banner of the Church, and remembers with exultation the death by which death itself was slain and the principalities and powers of darkness spoiled; he remembers the storms of fire and blood through which that banner has passed, and in which it has been held steadily and heroically aloft. He remembers the many instances in which he has himself conquered by this sign, or rather, the many instances in which the Saviour whose death is there represented has, by the power of that death, given him the victory. He looks upon it as the sure and certain pledge of final victory for the Church and for himself.

V. This leads us to note the relation of the Supper to the second coming of our Lord, as suggested in the 26th verse: "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death *till he come.*" This is not designed merely to fix

the limit, in point of time, beyond which the ordinance is no longer to be observed. It does this; but why is the celebration to cease? Because then the whole work of redemption will have been accomplished; that which was virtually done when Jesus upon the cross cried "It is finished" will have been actually done; the whole body of the redeemed will then be complete—complete as to its number and complete as to all the parts and effects of redemption, the glorified spirit united with the glorified body, and the ransomed Church received with songs and everlasting joy upon its head into the marriage supper of the Lamb. Meantime, until the Church shall be blessed with that vision of her Lord, she is to celebrate and shew forth his death in the observance of the Supper as the pledge and earnest of his coming. As this ordinance is a proof that he did come once "to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," so it is a pledge, that, having put away sin, "he shall appear the second time without sin unto salvation unto them that look for him." There is a parallel here again between the Paschal Supper and this. The Passover was a commemorative ordinance, commemorative of a redemption; but it was also prospective in its character. It looked back to the redemption of the Church out of Egypt: it looked forward to the redemption achieved upon the cross, and further still to that which Paul denominates "the redemption of the body." It is but one redemption throughout, in different instalments, as there is but one Church in different stages and different forms of manifestation. Hence every earlier instance of redemption is a pledge and earnest of the later and of the last. Hence the Exodus out of Egypt, the death of the Lamb of God upon the cross, the advent of that Lamb again in glory, are all connected by an internal, moral, spiritual, and indissoluble bond. They constitute a golden chain like that in Rom. viii. 30. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find, in the vision of the rapt Seer of Patmos (Rev. xv.), "the song of Moses the servant of God," as well as "the song of the Lamb," sung by the harpers on the glassy sea. The victories are the victories of the same Redeemer and for the same Church: and it is meet that the whole body of the redeemed should sing both songs.

The principles upon which this connexion of the different parts and stages of redemption rests are obvious enough. They are the immutability of God's nature, the immutability of his purposes and plan, and the necessary harmony and consistency of the parts of his plan. What he begins, he will complete (Phil. i. 6), and he must always act like himself. The Apostles Peter and Jude use the same kind of argument to prove, against the Universalists and scoffers, that there must be a final judicial discrimination between the righteous and the wicked (2 Peter ii. 4-9; Jude v. 7). There has been; therefore there shall be. The arguments (many of them at least) used against the possibility of eternal punishment, if valid, would prove that God has never punished the wicked. But God has punished the wicked. Therefore the arguments are not valid. They are dashed in pieces against the mountains of *facts*. So redemption is an accomplished fact, and the believer in Jesus may argue, with perfect assurance, from the beginnings of redemption to its ultimate and glorious completion. The worthy communicant who sits down, with fear and trembling perhaps, at the Lord's table, shall as certainly sit down at the marriage supper of the Lamb as it is certain that he lives.

VI. The mention of a "worthy" communicant suggests the last topic upon which the reader will be detained, the qualifications for communion. Read 1 Cor. xi. 27-32. (a) It is plain that there is a worthy and an unworthy eating and drinking in this ordinance, and hence that it is not for all persons. It is not a mere exhibition of the truth, as in the preaching of the word. It is a setting forth of the covenant with its seal; and those alone are entitled to communicate who are in covenant with God and cordially accept its promises and its conditions. (b) The worthiness does not consist in being perfectly free from sin. The table is spread for those who are still encompassed with bodies of sin and death, and who sigh for deliverance. (c) Nor does it consist in a strong faith. Faith which is as a grain of mustard seed, if it be indeed faith, may say to the mountain of sin, "Be thou removed and be thou cast into the sea," and it shall be done. The feeblest faith has its hold upon Christ, and therefore upon

salvation; and the seals of salvation belong to it. The Lord has babes in his family as well as adults; and Christ is the food for both—milk for the one, strong meat for the other. This is an ordinance for the nourishing of the weak as well as of the strong. The father is pleased with the stammering, inarticulate speech of the child in the arms which is not yet able distinctly to recognise its filial relation to him, as well as with the clear manly address of the full-grown son who rejoices in that relation. Given the adoption, whether clearly recognised or not, and the right to this ordinance exists. (d) Nor does it consist in entire freedom from doubt as to “being in Christ, or as to due preparation” for the ordinance. The Larger Catechism of our Church says (Question 172): “One who doubteth of his being in Christ, or of his due preparation to the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, may have true interest in Christ, though he is not yet assured thereof; and in God’s account hath it, if he be duly affected with the apprehension of the want of it, and unfeignedly desires to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity: in which case (because promises are made, and this sacrament is appointed, for the relief even of weak and doubting Christians), he is to bewail his unbelief, and labor to have his doubt resolved; and so doing, he may and ought to come to the Lord’s Supper, that he may be further strengthened.” (See the whole of the elaborate and admirable exposition in this Catechism, Questions 168–175. (e) It consists in a knowledge of the Lord’s body, an ability to discern and an actual discerning of that body (see verse 29). The word “discern” and its related words are several times used by the apostle in this context. Thus exactly the same word occurs again in verse 31, and is rendered in our version “judge.” So also the simple verb in verse 32, and the corresponding noun in verse 29 (unhappily rendered “damnation” in our version: as the reading is “judgment,” which is given in the margin. Compare the corresponding verb, in the first clause of verse 32). The dominant idea in verses 27–32 is that of judging and discerning or discriminating. This process is twofold, so far as the determination of our right to the Lord’s table is concerned—(1) A judgment as to the Lord’s body (verse 29); that this feast is no common

meal, at which men are to satisfy their natural hunger, much less to drink themselves drunk (see verse 21); that it is a solemn act of worship; that this body of Jesus is to be "discriminated" from every other human body that was ever made in this, that it was made for the express purpose of being offered in sacrifice to God, for expiation and propitiation (see the exposition given in the preceding part of this article). (2) A judgment of ourselves (verse 31 and compare verse 28 and 2 Cor. xiii. 5): "of our being in Christ; of our sins and wants; of the truth and measure of our knowledge, faith, repentance, love to God and the brethren, charity to all men; of our desires after Christ, and of our new obedience" (Larger Catechism, Question 171). As the observance of the Lord's Supper is a reasonable service, nothing less can be demanded of a communicant than a state of mind and heart corresponding with the truth exhibited in its elements and actions—a state of mind and heart which may be comprehensively described as one of faith. A worthy eating and drinking is an eating and drinking by faith. Faith is the mouth by which the flesh and blood of the Saviour are received (John vi. 35, 40, 53–57; Confession of Faith, Chap. XXIX., Art. VII). He must be received as he is exhibited and offered, and in no other way. If he is exhibited and offered as a perfect satisfaction to divine justice for human guilt, as an expiatory sacrifice which has met all the demands of law; as an exemplary sacrifice also, illustrating the spirit of true obedience to the Father, a spirit of absolute self-renunciation for the glory of God and the good of man; then, in order to be worthy communicants, it is indispensable that we should have some apprehension of the justice of God, of the malignity of our guilt as sinners, of the necessity of satisfaction; that we should have some sympathy with the spirit of Jesus, some readiness to deny ourselves for the glory of God and the good of men. He who does not feel himself to be guilty of death, and who does not long to be holy, cannot be a worthy communicant.

Saving faith in Jesus Christ receives and rests upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel. He is offered to us as our King, as well as our Priest, and we cannot truly receive him without receiving him in both offices. It is a fatal

error of the Papacy and of its imitators among so called Protestants, to disregard the interests of personal holiness and to attempt to put God off with a ceremonial service which would be despised if offered to themselves by their fellow-men. Holiness in his Church is the very end and purpose for which Jesus gave his body to be broken, and no man can be said "to discern" that body who does not feel this to be true. He may not be able to formulate, after the fashion of the theologians, this and other truths set forth in the Supper; but there will be a spontaneous and unreflective recognition of them. If Jesus, the holy, harmless, and undefiled One, did not die for the purpose of bringing his redeemed into the likeness of himself, then the Bible, the Church, the sacraments, have all alike been given in vain. To be left to the corruption of our nature is to be left to the worm that never dies.

THOMAS E. PECK.

ARTICLE II.

THE MINISTERIAL GIFT.

We often see persons exercising a control over others at once so subtle that it is scarcely felt and so powerful that it does much toward shaping their lives and destinies. There is no conscious wearing of a heavy yoke or of galling chains. The will suffers no very disagreeable check, yet there is another will which governs as potently, in its sphere, as that of an emperor with armies to enforce his behests.

The sphere of this power is sometimes the family, and it may be noticed that the person in whom it resides, though often one of its younger members, usually has his or her way in matters of common concern in the little commonwealth, while the rest, without any great show of rebelliousness, and generally almost unconsciously, fall into line and quietly acquiesce.

Again, we see one originating and carrying forward great enterprises, and so controlling the opinions, energies, and purses

of others, that railroads, steamboat lines, and great factories are the result.

Occasionally a man appears who can exercise this control in a much larger sphere, and we see him swaying the masses at will, moulding the political views of his countrymen, and standing at the helm of the great concerns of the State.

Sometimes the sphere is that of morals and religion, and the world is better or worse for ages because one man or woman has lived in it.

What is the secret of this power?

In many cases it may be due in great part to wealth, social position, or other circumstances exceptionally favorable to the exercise of it. Yet we often see persons with all these adventitious advantages who never in any very marked degree influence their fellows. The real cause is generally far more in the individual than in his surroundings. The answer to the question may then be made, that the cause from which such effects spring consists of certain acts, words, or looks; that, in short, there is no other way in which they can be produced by a human being except through what may be observable by the senses of those over whom the control is exercised. It may be urged that this must be so, unless we propose to call in the aid of sorcery, mesmerism, or some of those mysterious powers which, in this age, the educated, at least, suppose to have no existence except in the imaginations of the vulgar. Still we feel that this power does not reside in acts, words, or looks. These may be the channels through which it reaches us; but we instinctively refer it to a fountain which sends its streams from some point beyond and behind them. For instance, we may take what has ever been a most potent means of affecting others—the expression of the countenance. We may be told that expression is nothing else but certain changes of the form and coloring of the face; that it cannot possibly be anything else, because nothing else is presented to the senses of the observer. Still we cannot help feeling that the tremendous effects which have been produced by wrath or pity, hatred or love, depicted in a human face, must have had some other cause than the changes in form and color in a small

piece of mere matter. We could not find in this an adequate cause for the dismay or the exultation of the multitudes, the breaking of hearts, or the sweet joy of requited love.

When we see the eye brighten and the face wreath itself in smiles, we feel that there is a cause for these changes, and it is this cause which produces a reflected gladness in us. We do not rejoice with happy faces, but "with them that rejoice." When we see the brow clouded and the eyes shedding tears, if we are affected, it is because we feel assured that these are but the signals of distress in the hand of a sorrowing or suffering soul within. Our sympathy is not with the tears or the sad looks, but with the sad soul. We do not weep with the sorrowful countenance, but with "them that weep." Personal influence may be due to such things as manner of speech and action in one sense. That is, it may be dependent on them for reaching the person toward whom it is directed. One foot of wire in the telegraph may be absolutely essential to the transmission of the electric current; but this one foot of wire is not the whole cause of the effect produced by its transmission. It may be the sole cause at the point which it occupies. But this is not the only nor the most important point. A far more important point is the one behind it where the battery originates the movement of the current. The foot of wire may be a *sine qua non* for the production of the effect; but it is only an infinitesimal part of its whole cause. So these words, acts, looks, etc., through which the power of which we have been speaking reaches and acts upon others, may be a *sine qua non* for the production of its effect; but the power does not reside in them. It is merely transmitted through them. Its source is a soul beyond, so to speak, and behind them. The soul is the fountain of power as fully and solely in this case as is the battery in the other. To make this entirely clear, suppose an automaton so cunningly contrived as to counterfeit precisely the appearance and manner of a human being. Suppose it to speak just such words accompanied with just such tones and gestures as have melted us to tears. Would we be affected in the same way, knowing that a mere automaton was before us? By no means. The movements of the India rubber features would be mere

grimace instead of expression. Its tears would be to us nothing but so much water, and its lightning glance would be but common fire, and not that which flashes through the orator's eye from the lighted altar of a human soul within.

The fact that the real seat of personal influence is the soul, leads naturally to the conclusion that the character of the influence is, as a general rule, determined by the character of the soul from which it flows. There may be seeming exceptions. Some who are eminently pious are exceedingly reticent and modest, so that to the superficial observer there seem to be cases in which there is "a fountain sealed" from which no streams of influence flow out to purify and bless. But those who have a better opportunity of deciding know that the influence which comes from the meek and quiet spirit, while it may not reach a very large number, is all the more potent in the case of those who are the subjects of it, because of this very silence and quietness. The modest and beautiful life has been like the precious ointment which "bewrayeth itself" while it lasts, and afterwards the aroma lingers long where the vase has been broken. The influence of the mother of the Wesleys was as profound and powerful in them as theirs was wide-spread on others.

On the other hand, it may seem that an exception is found in the case of the ostentatious hypocrite, who, with great skill, keeps up an outward show of godliness, and becomes a leader in good enterprises. Here, it may be said, is a soul of the worst type, while the influence exerted is productive of great good. Now in order that such a person may be proven to be a hypocrite, his hypocrisy must be known to some other persons. We are incapable of taking an exact measurement in such things, but we may safely assert that it will be difficult for any one to prove that the good which such a person has done will not be overbalanced by the evil effect of his hypocrisy upon those to whom it is known, and through them upon others. The more prominent and active he has been, and the higher the position he has attained, the more baneful will be the effect of his bad character when exposed; and perhaps this effect will be worst in the case of those who have been the subjects of his supposed good influence before.

But if it be admitted that a really good influence has sometimes been exerted by one who has a bad character, we have a case of consummate acting and the possession of a skill so rare that it would be unfair to speak of it as affecting the general rule, that the character of the soul determines the character of the influence exerted on others. Even Garrick could not act so skilfully in the usual intercourse of society (Goldsmith being witness) as to perfectly counterfeit nature, and we may take it for granted that very few have the histrionic ability to live lives of a perfectly concealed hypocrisy. When the hypocrite does in unguarded moments allow his mask to slip a little aside so as to give a glimpse of his real character, his influence becomes a subtle poison that permeates the very marrow of society. Nothing perhaps has done more to sap the foundations of faith in real goodness and true religion than the occurrence of such cases.

As a general, if not universal rule, as is the soul, such is the influence. Whether the sphere be a vast one like those in which such giants as Luther, Calvin, Knox, or Wesley have moved, transforming nations and turning the current of history, or that of the neighborhood or the home, this rule holds true. The amount of the influence will be determined by the capacity, and its quality by the character of the soul.

This is a very serious matter. How it ought to send us to our knees and to our Bibles! For us who are Christians, and who know, by a sad and a blessed experience, something of what sin is and what an escape from its guilt and power is; for us who have looked over the frightful brink of that ruin toward which sin hurries on a soul, and through unspeakable mercy have had opened to us a door of hope through which we have had glimpses of a glory and happiness brighter than our brightest dreams, it should be no light question, Toward what destiny is our influence propelling those with whom we come in contact? Our influence, whether exercised in a large sphere or a small one, whether powerful or feeble, cannot be entirely negative, just as the immortal soul within us cannot be negative in its character. We are helping either to save men's souls or to destroy them. Since the character of the influence is determined by that of the soul,

how important it is that our first aim should be personal holiness—not holiness of words, professions, or even of living only, but holiness of soul!

Reflections such as these must come home with force to every Christian; but there is one class of Christians for whom the truth from which they naturally spring has a more awful and glorious meaning than for others, namely, ministers of the gospel. Not only is their sphere of moral and religious influence usually a larger one than that of private Christians, but theirs is a peculiar office. They are the commissioned heralds of the great King. They have been sent forth under a call which comes directly to their hearts from the King himself through the agency of his Spirit. They have been moved to "desire the office of a bishop;" and if motives contrary to their engaging in the work have obstructed their way and caused them to hesitate, the Holy Spirit has made the burden of obligation weigh so heavily on their consciences that they have been forced to cry out, in their hearts if not with their lips, "Woe is me if I preach not the gospel."

The earnest desire of every true minister is not only to escape the woe impending over him if he preach not the gospel, but to save souls. When we examine the work of different ministers we find very great differences in the matter of success. Some are instrumental in saving thousands, while others labor for years, and so far as they or their friends know, lead few or none to the Saviour.

There are differences in natural ability, in learning, in the position occupied by different ministers, in the numbers they can reach, in the susceptibility to religious impressions of those under their charge, and above all, there may be differences in the sovereign dispensation of the Holy Spirit, without whom no soul has ever been born into the kingdom of grace, which may in part, and in great part, account for the difference in success. Besides this, it may be said that what is apparent success may not always be real, and that what seems to be failure at the time may prove the groundwork of great and permanent success in the sequel. What may be a grand work in the world's estimate, may shrink

to very small proportions when it shall have been submitted to the test of that fire which "shall try every man's work of what sort it is," consuming the "wood, hay, and stubble," whilst that of one who has been a wise builder and has built on the true foundation, with only "gold, silver, and precious stones," shall, in the end, charm with its beauty and astonish by its magnitude.

Still every unprejudiced observer must conclude that there is a difference in the success of different ministers which is due to a difference in the ministers themselves—and that difference in something else than mere abilities, whether natural or acquired by cultivation.

This difference may be accounted for, in great part at least, by the rule that the character of the soul will determine that of the influence exerted. There may be a measure of piety and zeal in one case which is lacking in another, and the influence exerted will differ accordingly. When these qualities are seen and felt by the people in the words and efforts of a minister, we behold the effect of a powerful magnetism which tends to lead them in the way in which he is walking. He is successful in leading souls to Christ and to heaven, because his own soul is under the constraining power of the love of Christ. He is like the pastor of the "Deserted Village" who "allured to brighter worlds and led the way." Here it may be permitted to suggest whether it would not be well for every discouraged minister to ask the question whether, after all that may be said about the hardness of heart which characterises the ungodly, and the slothfulness and insensibility of church members, a purer and stronger love for Christ on his own part and a more unselfish desire to save souls, would not be the best remedy for his troubles.

The whole world is akin. God "hath made of one blood all nations of men."

"How then should I and any man that lives
 Be stranger to each other? Pierce my vein,
 Take of the crimson stream meandering there,
 And catechise it well; apply thy glass,
 Search it, and prove if it be not blood
 Congenial with thine own: and, if it be,
 What edge of subtlety canst thou suppose

Keen enough, wise and skilful as thou art,
To cut the link of brotherhood, by which
One common Maker bound me to the kind."

There is a kindred more intimate than that of blood. There is an affinity of souls which is universal. There may be great differences and bitter animosities, but there are many points in which the most cruel foes are at one; in which the hearts of the learned and the ignorant, the good and the bad, the young and the old, show the marks of a universal brotherhood. Hence it is that the most powerful earthly source of influence on men is the soul of a brother man. Hence it is that when a soul is powerfully magnetised, those with which it comes in contact are, as if by some spiritual induction, made sharers in its magnetism.

The great need of every minister is to be drawn nearer to Him who "will draw all men unto himself," that each in his turn may become, so to speak, magnetised with the power of attraction. We need to have a profound experience of the power, glory, and blessedness of salvation. In order to this we need a new Pentecost for our own souls. We cannot attract others to heights of attainment to which we do not first go ourselves. Our preaching cannot produce in the hearts of others such an overwhelming sense of the importance of eternal things as is necessary to awaken them from their carnal dreams, and move their palsied hearts to heavenly efforts, if such feelings are strangers to our own bosoms. The loftiest eloquence, the most impassioned oratory, will be powerless in this case. Such ministrations may awaken wonder and admiration, but cannot save souls. There is in them too much of the automaton, while the soul is wanting. On the other hand, if the love of God be shed abroad in our hearts, the most quiet manner and the homeliest language will not conceal the fact, nor suppress the throb which passes from our hearts to others as we draw them about the cross of a suffering Saviour.

Here a most interesting question presents itself. Does not Christ give to his ministers, through the Holy Spirit, a peculiar power corresponding with the peculiar office to which he calls them? Ministers are among those gifts which he received, when he ascended on high, to give to men. They are by no means the

least among these gifts; for they are given "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, till we all come unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." They have a special and important function in the economy of the "body of Christ." He calls them by a special call to the position they occupy, by his Holy Spirit. Now the question is, does he also endow them with a special fitness for the place they occupy and the duties they are to perform? The office is unique. The call to it is divine. Is there not also a unique and divine work in the soul of every true minister of Christ? In other words, is the ordinary work of grace which is essential to the saving of every soul, the only work done in the soul of one who is called to the office of the ministry? The natural conclusion from reason and Scripture alike, would seem to be that there is wrought in the soul of every man who is called to this peculiar position and set of duties a peculiar work to fit him to be an able and faithful minister of the new covenant.

We find our Saviour, after his crucifixion and resurrection, before he ascends on high, giving the following directions to his disciples: "Tarry ye at Jerusalem until ye be indued with power from on high." Luke xxiv. 49. The word here translated "power" is not *ἐξουσία*—(power, in the sense of authority), but *δύναμις*—(power, in the sense of ability).

Again, in Acts i. 8, we have the record of a promise given them during the same period: "But ye shall receive power (*δύναμις*) from on high, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me," etc.

Now, on the day of Pentecost, the Holy Spirit was poured out according to the promise, and the power was received. That power was manifested partly in speaking in foreign languages, but also in some very powerful preaching, such as Peter most certainly was not prepared to do before this. Was this "power" bestowed simply for the working of miracles—the use of which in the Church was temporary—or was it bestowed also for the performance of the work of preaching the gospel, which was the

“great commission” which the disciples were to execute? There can be but one answer to this question.

The Apostle Paul does not leave us in doubt as to whether the great Head of the Church did bestow upon him, in addition the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit, that special charism which specially fitted him for his ministerial work. This fitness, too, was evidently not the result of mere natural endowments. Says he, “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves. But our sufficiency (*ικανότης*, fitness) is of God, who also hath made (*ικάνωσεν*, fitted to be) us able ministers of the new covenant.” 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6.

It is also plain that this work of God, by which Paul was fitted for his office, was not the mere conferring of authority. It was an internal work. “For he that wrought effectually (*ὁ ἐνεργήσας*) in Peter to the apostleship of circumcision, the same was mighty (*ἐνήργησε*) in me towards the Gentiles.” Gal. ii. 8. The “fitness” was gained, then, through a divine work within the souls of Paul and Peter, fitting each for his special ministerial work. As far as apostles are concerned, the question is settled. There was a work within Paul and Peter which is not shared by all Christians, and is distinct from that ordinary work of grace whereby every soul is saved. Now the question is, is a special work wrought in the soul of ordinary ministers to give them a “sufficiency” for the work in the church to which they are called?

Timothy was not an apostle, and his case would seem to be like that of any other pastor or evangelist (he seems to have been both at different times), with the exception that he lived in the apostolic age. In 2 Tim. i. 6, Paul addresses Timothy as follows: “Wherefore I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.” It is maintained by many, and perhaps rightly, that this refers to the confirming of the power to work miracles by the laying on of the apostle’s hands.

In 1 Tim. iv. 14, we have the words, “Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.” Now suppose that it be granted that the first named passage does refer solely to the be-

stowment of the power of miracles, does it necessarily follow that this one does too—in short, that they both refer to the same gift? It is true that the word translated “gift” is the same in both passages; but it is a word that does not designate specifically the kind of gift. This word (*χάρισμα*) seems to have been generally supposed to mean a miraculous spiritual endowment; but on examination we find that it is used in the Scriptures in a much more general sense. It occurs seventeen times in the New Testament, being used sixteen times by Paul and once by Peter. In the Epistles to the Corinthians it does sometimes refer to miraculous gifts of the Spirit; but in Romans it means the gift of justification, or of salvation in general (Rom. v. 15, 16; vi. 23); spiritual privileges and graces which accompany effectual calling (Rom. xi. 29); those gifts which fit the various members of Christ’s body for the functions they are to perform (Rom. xii. 6). In only one instance can it be claimed that it has an exclusive reference to miraculous endowments, and there the claim is more than doubtful.

It is thus evident that it is scarcely more restricted to this class of spiritual powers than is our English word gift. Indeed, it is a word of just as general application as our word “gift,” with the exception that, according to its power (*χάρισμα*) it refers to the source whence the gift comes, namely, grace (*χάρις*) in the giver. Hence, if in any passage this word has the specific meaning referred to, this is decided not from the use of the word, but from the context. The gift then which was in Timothy, “with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery,” is not the same as that which was in him “by the putting on of Paul’s hands,” by any necessity arising out of the use of this word. Does the context impose any such necessity? In the one case we have the laying on of the hands of an *apostle*, in the other of a *presbytery*. In the one case the gift is in Timothy *through* (*διὰ*) the laying on of hands, in the other *with* (*μετά*, along with) it. Besides this, in the case of the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, it is said that it was “through prophecy,” which makes this transaction look very much like another in which another presbytery laid their hands on Saul and Barnabas and sent them forth to the work for which

the Holy Ghost said, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul." This looks like Timothy's ordination—the conferring of the ecclesiastical authority to use the gift which was in him, whereby he was "fitted" for the work of the ministry. When we look further into the context, we find, in the verse immediately preceding this the exhortation, "Till I come, give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine," and in the one following it, "Meditate upon these things: give thyself wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear unto all." These are just the means by which his ministerial "gift" would be best cultivated and used; but we see no such appropriateness on the supposition that a gift of tongues or working other miracles is referred to.

This conclusion falls in precisely with the fact that Paul asserts of Timothy, as well as of himself, that he had his sufficiency (*ικανότης*, fitness) from God, "who also," says he (2 Cor. iii. 6), "hath made us able ministers of the new covenant."*

It seems perfectly clear that apostles and the ministers who labored with them received "gifts" which constituted their "sufficiency" for their ministry, and that these gifts were "in" them through a work of God "wrought in" them. Was this to cease after their day, and were ministers of later times to have no such sufficiency and no such inworking of God in them? Were the ministers of later times to differ from other Christians in nothing else but an ordination by ecclesiastical authority?

In a passage already referred to (Rom. xii. 6, etc.) the Church of Christ is represented under the figure of a body with its various members for different functions, and the members of this body are described as "having gifts (*χαρίσματα*) differing according to the grace that is given to us;" and it is added, "Whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith; or ministry, let us wait on our ministering; or he that teacheth, on teaching; or he that exhorteth, on exhortation," etc.

Now this passage asserts that "gifts" are possessed by "every one" (verses 5 and 6) according to the functions to be discharged by each. Among these are mentioned "ministry," "teaching,"

*It must be remembered that Timothy united with Paul in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians. See 2 Cor. i. 1.

and "exhortation." Prophecy has ceased in the Church since the completed revelation has superseded the necessity of it; but the other functions must be exercised as long as there are people to be ministered to, taught, and exhorted. Then surely the appropriate "gifts" must continue.

We conclude, then, that the case is made out that he who by a special and divine call introduces men into the office of the ministry, does also confer special "gifts" for making them "able and faithful ministers of the new covenant." These "gifts," though of the same general kind, vary in different individuals to fit them for the discharge of specific duties—ministering, teaching, exhorting; or for various fields of labor, as in the cases of Paul and Peter; but in the case of every true minister, it is that internal work whereby his "sufficiency," which is of God, is attained.

What are the practical inferences from such a truth? One surely is that men should be very careful about entering the ministry. It is not a mere "profession" which any pious man is at liberty to choose.

Another is that those who have been intrusted with so precious a "gift" should beware of "neglecting" it. It evidently does not supersede the necessity of effort any more than does that bestowment of divine grace whereby each soul is saved. As the communication of new life to the soul and the conferring of grace sufficient for gaining the victory, in the case of each believer, is the great encouragement to "strive to enter in at the strait gate," so this gift, instead of inclining the minister to relax his efforts, should be a spur to his energies, since this alone gives him the sufficiency which is of God, and will alone enable him to "finish his course with joy."

At once how blessed and how awful is the position of the minister of the gospel! In the mystical body he is not one of the ordinary members, but, so to speak, one of those "joints and bands" whereby "the whole body having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God." He is commissioned and gifted for the purpose of taking part in that glorious work in which Christ "will draw all men unto himself." It is his life business to save souls. How blessed to be the instru-

ment in such a work! Whether we consider salvation as to its boundless wealth of blessing to a human being, and endeavor to take in its length and breadth and height and depth, or cast our eyes along its brilliant pathway through the future and try to form some conception of its limitless duration, the view is one which overwhelms with its grandeur and dazzles with its glory.

How then can one having this gift pine for earthly honors and pleasures? How can he sink with discouragement when, in answer to his cry, "Who is sufficient for these things?" he receives the assurance, "Our sufficiency is of God." How can a minister among perishing souls neglect the gift that is in him? Surely he who rows the life-boat with a careless hand, and is dilatory in laying hold on those that are sinking, is less to be blamed than he. How glorious the future of him who is faithful! What must heaven be to one, who, like another "Great Heart," has conducted many pilgrims thither! "They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars forever and ever."

P. P. FLOURNOY.

ARTICLE III.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE EVANGELIST.*

The Evangelist's *potestas jurisdictionis* is still a subject of discussion in the Presbyterian Church, and there is a loud call for a yet more exact definition than the Assembly's deliverance of 1876 has furnished. The justification of the writer's participation in the debate and of this present contribution towards the solution of the question, is the simple fact that it has pleased the Assembly's Committee of Foreign Missions, for some years past, to make him its chairman and thus bring him into official and responsible connexion with the practical application of the controlling principles of the work.

* This article was prepared before the meeting of the last General Assembly, but its publication was unavoidably postponed.—Eds. So. PRES. REVIEW.

At the outset it must be premised, that the whole question can find the materials of its solution only in the general principles that underlie and inform Presbyterianism. The Form of Government, in its distribution of ecclesiastical power and in the constitution of its courts, barely recognises (Chap. IV., Sec. II., Par. VII.) the evangelistic office, and then leaves it to be administered without the help of constitutional enactments. By common consent, however, we have for our guide the following *à priori laws*, which must give shape to every Presbyterian structure. (1) That the power of the whole is *in every part and over the power* of every part. (2) That whenever two or more parts, in each of which is the power of the whole, coexist in time and space, they become *joint possessors* of this one common power, and must provide, by courts and distribution of power, for the realisation of the Church's unity. (3) That this distribution must be made (1 Cor. xiv. 14) according to *Decency and Order, i. e.*, so as to exclude deformity and inefficiency and secure an "incorporation" of the Church's beauty and energy. (4) That the most unbecoming and paralysing disorder of all is the co-existence of two jurisdictions in the same matter at the same time over the same subjects. This last principle is most rigorously enforced in our existing Constitution. The Presbyterian Church must require her evangelists to conform to these general principles, or else her work through them will be, not a Presbyterian Church, but only an incoherent aggregation of individual Christians.

The evangelist may be defined as a temporary officer of the Church with an extraordinary mission and authority to wield ecclesiastical power in an extraordinary way. He is (1) a *temporary officer*: the office will not endure throughout the gospel age, but will cease (Is. xi. 9; Mal. i. 11) when the occasion shall cease. He is (2) an officer *of the Church*: he is not ordained into some abstract or super-ecclesiastical office existing outside of the visible Church, but into one that exists *only in the Church*: so that the Church goes with him, works through him, and is responsible for his evangelistic character and work: in short, like every other repository of ecclesiastical power, he is the representative of the Church whose office he bears. (3) The mission of

the evangelist is *extraordinary*: the "chief end" of his governmental power is to bring into being the regularly organised church *where* it does not exist *and cannot go* in its ordinary courts. The Church has her regular method of "increase and multiplication" for all places to which she *can go* in her complete and proper form; but her commission (Matt. xxviii. 18-20) requires her "to increase and multiply" also where she cannot go in her full organism, and this is the work that distinctively pertains to the evangelist. It may be said that he is appointed to a *quasi-creative* work, rather than the administration of an established order. This is the differentiating characteristic of the office, marking it out at once temporary and extraordinary. Hence (4) ecclesiastical power must reside in the evangelist in an *extraordinary mode* until the appropriate body is prepared for its permanent habitation.

Fields of evangelistic labor are of two kinds. They may be (a) either circumscribed destitute places within or adjoining the territory of the established Church, or (b) the distant and undefined regions beyond. Now, from the mere inspection of the case, one is irresistibly impelled to believe that the *measure* of the evangelist's power is the work which his field requires him to perform. Ordination to the work of an evangelist implies that the officer has all the power of an ordinary minister and *so much more* as is necessary to accomplish the extraordinary end of the office.

I.

In the case of the aforementioned "circumscribed" destitution, the necessary work to be done is the formal creation of a *particular church and no more*. In order to fulfil this mission the Presbyterian evangelist lawfully receives and exercises (a) the power of a Session in all respects: he examines applicants for church membership, accepts or rejects their profession of faith, admits them to the sealing ordinances, and administers discipline until a Session is formed. He also exercises (1) the power of a Presbytery *in one respect*: he organises such persons into a normal Presbyterian church and ordains over them qualified and acceptable men as ruling elders. Thus he brings into existence

the particular church with its parochial court; and just *here his extraordinary power is exhausted*. He has no power to ordain a pastor over the newly created church, or to ordain or license one of its members to labor in word and doctrine under his superintendence: because (a) the Presbytery is at hand to perform these acts according to the ordinary and regular operation of church power; and (b) the new church, by the fact of its organisation, instantly comes under the jurisdiction of the Presbytery within whose bounds and by whose evangelist it had been founded. The product of a Presbyterial evangelist's energy is precisely such a particular church as the existing Constitution defines; and the moment the organisation is completed the organic product is, *ipso facto*, a member of the Presbytery, as completely as the child of Christian parents, by the fact of its birth, is a member of the Church. The enrolment of the new church on the evangelist's report, like the baptism of the child on the parents' presentation, is but the regular recognition of a preëxisting fact, and its omission does not alter the *status* of the new member. Any further exercise of extraordinary power by the evangelist over that particular church, would be *confusion*—two jurisdictions at the same time in the same matter over the same subject. The power to produce such an ecclesiastical absurdity does not exist in the Presbyterian Church in its ordinary form, and of course cannot be delegated for exercise in any provisional and extraordinary form.

II.

The Presbyterial evangelist appears to be the only one that our Book immediately contemplates in its incidental notice of the office, and has been passed under review only to clear the way for the chief subject of this paper, which is *the power of jurisdiction of the Foreign Missionary*, or the evangelist in the "undefined" regions (*in partibus infidelium*) beyond the boundaries and reach of the organic Church as such. The analysis of the Home Missionary's official power has been given, as conceded substantially on all hands, because the more complex case must be governed by the same principle, *i. e.*, that the extent of the destination is the measure of the extraordinary power which the

Church must delegate to her evangelist in order to remove it. It appears to be self-evident that no other principle is practicable or conceivable. Now, in the foreign field, the Presbytery as well as the parish church is wanting, and the general evangelist must be endued with power of corresponding extent. Besides (a) the extraordinary power of the Presbyterial evangelist, the foreign missionary must have additionally (b) the full power of a Presbytery. He may ordain qualified and acceptable men as native pastors over the churches which he has gathered and organised; he may ordain native evangelists, who shall stand to him in the same relation that the Presbyterial evangelist sustains to his Presbytery; and he may exercise the power of discipline over these ordained officers, and decide appeals from the Sessions, until a Presbytery is created. He also has (c) the power of a Synod *in one respect*: he may organise the native churches and ministers into a regular Presbytery, ordering the Sessions to elect, in due time, ruling elders as commissioners to the proposed Presbytery; convoking, at an appointed time and place, the ministers and elders who are to compose the body; and presiding at the first meeting until a moderator is elected. But just *here his extraordinary power is exhausted*; because the new Presbytery, by the fact of its organisation, becomes immediately a member and constituent of the General Assembly whose evangelist brought it into existence. It has and must have the same precise ecclesiastical status that it would have if it had been constituted by the Church according to the distribution of power made by our Constitution. There remains nothing but the *ordinary* recognition of the fact, which of course cannot be done *extraordinarily*. The "chief end" of the general evangelist's office is, such a particular Presbytery as our Book defines. Most certainly the missionary may sit in the native Presbytery and give counsel as a corresponding member, and may reasonably expect his counsel to have great weight; but his authority and its executive energies have passed over, as a cause into its effect, from their temporary and provisional seat to their permanent and proper home. The foreign, like the domestic missionary, can only repeat his acts in another field. He cannot assign the new Pres

bytery to a Synod, or approve or censure its minutes, or, when it becomes sufficiently large, divide it into two or more Presbyteries, or unite two native Presbyteries into one, or out of three Presbyteries constitute a Synod: because the native Presbytery is under the same jurisdiction and has the same *status* as himself. Otherwise we should have *confusion*—two jurisdictions in the same matter at the same time over the same subject.

All these positions appear to be necessary inferences from the underlying principles of our Constitution and the necessary limits of extraordinary power. Their validity, it seems, can be impugned only (a) by denying the Presbyterian dictum which forbids the possible coexistence of two identical jurisdictions—a ground which no one has formally taken and perhaps no one will formally take; or (b) by denying the validity of the writer's inference concerning the status *in ecclesiâ* of the native church and Presbytery. It has been maintained, for instance, that, after a body of believers have been admitted to sealing ordinances by the foreign missionary and have had ruling elders and a pastor ordained and installed, this primary court possesses all church power and may perform all the functions of the whole Church, because it is at once the parochial, intermediate, and general Presbytery of organic and complete Presbyterianism—a germ which develops by a force *ab intra* into the full grown tree. Indeed, the writer is aware of no Presbyterian doctrine on the subject antagonistic to his own, whose truth would not depend on and flow from that very pre-supposition. This misleading generalisation, however, proceeds on the hypothesis of a *total absence* of the organic Church from the foreign field, *which is not the state of the question*. The native church is not the product of a super-ecclesiastical energy, as the wine of Cana was the formal creature of a supernatural force. It is cordially conceded that, if there were a church of such an origin, or even a body of two or three Presbyterians (like Adam and Eve), the doctrine would be true with all its necessary inferences, as far as that particular church was concerned. But such a fact would be an ecclesiastical *miracle!* The very difficulty of *the actual question* is that the subject matter is a fact ecclesiastically natural, extraordinary indeed, but *not*

miraculous. The terms of the problem presuppose *the presence and agency* of the Church, in an extraordinary way, for the very purpose of *starting* the regular organism, which, of course, is that of the existing Constitution: otherwise the evangelist is not an officer *of the Church*. The Presbyterian missionary has no power to organise a church on the principles of the Prelatical or Independent church order, or on the principles of any other Presbyterian constitution than his own. For instance, our missionaries exert their power *in our name*; and the product must be in as true and real organic connexion with us as a church organised by Presbytery or a Presbytery constituted by Synod. So far as the new church has any form at all, it is at every stage that of our Book. In whatever respect its form is incomplete, the evangelist is, for the time being, the complement thereof. When the form has been completed, not by evolution *ab intra* but by additions *ab extra*, his occupation is gone. If this pre-conception is accurate, then, in the inchoate church, there can be no *vacancy* in the ecclesiastical sense of the word. It must first once occupy its appropriate place before there can be an occasion for the regular succession. The most "formless" condition in which we can conceive the material of a future ecclesiastical cosmos is that of two or three believers converted in a heathen land. To them the Presbyterian evangelist fills every office. When ruling elders have been created, then the evangelist is at once bishop and presbytery. When a parochial bishop has been created, then the evangelist is presbytery. When a presbytery has been created, then cometh the end, and the evangelist's ever-receding extraordinary power must all be delivered up. At every stage the organic product is of the evangelist's own kind—genus, species, and even variety.

It is also freely admitted that, at any point in this progress, the native church may, for good and necessary reasons, withdraw from her natural connexion with the mother church; and thus achieve a *status* of equality in church power with the parent; and take up, self-moved, the development at the point where it was left off. But this would be *revolution!* For a constitution to be constructed on principles that provide, either periodically

or paroxysmally, for *revolution*, is an undreamed-of absurdity. No one maintains that there can be such a thing within the world of Presbyterianism. The multiplication of churches by Presbyterian evangelists in the heathen world is indeed an extraordinary and temporary mode of procedure, but it is *not* revolutionary; it is normal to the Church, and her immanent laws provide for the emergency. But the severing of the slip from the parent stock and the setting of it out as a separate plant of its kind, is not a work of regular growth. It is a work of dismemberment and violence from without. The circumstances which justify and require the exercise of this inalienable right of revolution, do not come within the limits of this monograph.

Nor is it denied that different denominations may band together to do a foreign missionary work, directed by a board of managers that have no ecclesiastical responsibility. But this, again, is not the state of the question. The question concerns the status of those churches which are founded and gathered by the evangelists of the supreme court of a Presbyterian Church. It is to be presumed that the churches founded by the missionaries of a voluntary society have no ecclesiastical connexion, but are in the position, substantially, which is achieved by revolution. This whole procedure, however, is extraordinary, uneclesiastical, and not within the limits of this discussion. Our question is the practical one, "What have our evangelists the right to do?" It appears to be no weak confirmation of the view herein maintained, that it gives the same ecclesiastical status to the work of both the foreign and the domestic missionary. All admit that the work of the latter is in immediate connexion with our Church. Is then the former an ecclesiastical officer of a *different order*? If not, how is it to be admitted that his work bears a different relation? Are our officers ordained to do work which stands in no vital connexion with the Church that ordains and supports them?

Furthermore, if the view we are resisting is to be accepted, there is no reason of *principle* why our Church should maintain a separate Foreign Missionary agency. If the churches founded by our men and money have no more original union with us than those founded by other missionaries, why not send our men and

means to the American, or the Northern, or the Reformed Board? Whatever reasons of *expediency* may be alleged for separate action, there are none of principle. On the writer's view, every reason that can be given in justification of our separate ecclesiastical existence, may be urged for our separate missionary operations: and, in addition, it might be urged that, on the opposite view, the expenses of a separate work ought to be altogether saved. The whole nature of the case, therefore, seems to require that we hold firmly to the doctrine, that the evangelist is an officer of the Church who wields individually the power of church courts, as far as may be necessary, in order to establish the Church in fields where the Church in her courts cannot go.

The question is here suggested, whether the different Presbyterian denominations ought to aim to perpetuate their distinctive organisations in foreign lands. The question does not necessarily belong to this discussion and cannot here be logically treated. It is the writer's conviction that *they ought not to be perpetuated*. But, notwithstanding this opinion, he believes that every child is *the child of its parents*; and that, whilst the parents may resist an unsuitable marriage, they may not, in this matter, either force an unwilling obedience or refuse consent without just and important reasons. The existence of separate Presbyterian organisations is itself anomalous, and there *ought not to be any reasons to justify the anomaly*. Every reason that requires these distinct Presbyterian denominations *ought to be taken away*, and then there would be no occasion for even a temporary transfer thereof to foreign fields; but all this does not change the stubborn fact, that it lies in the fundamental nature of Presbyterianism that every church which claims to be Presbyterian, must, in all her governmental acts, proceed as if she were *catholic*. To assume voluntarily any other attitude is to stand self-convicted of anti-Presbyterianism. Her great principle is that the Church is one and catholic, and to the realisation of this principle she is bound by every instinct of her constitution.

III.

Another question, on which diversity of doctrine and practice

prevail at home and abroad, is easily answered from the same point of view, *i. e.*, that the extraordinary end, as the measure of extraordinary power, is the only rule that can be applied *without confusion*. The question is: Who are the subjects of the evangelist's jurisdiction? We answer that they too must be *extra ordinem*—outside of the organised Church and her jurisdiction. It seems to be an identical proposition, when it is said that the proper object of extraordinary power is also extraordinary. The governmental power of the foreign missionary does not extend to foreign believers who may be resident or laboring in the same field with himself but having a regular and responsible connexion with the church at home, unless they voluntarily seek dismissal from their former church relations and identify themselves with the native church. For instance: when our Church sends out women or laymen to labor under the evangelist's superintendence, he indeed directs their labor, but he has no ecclesiastical jurisdiction *over them*, because they have at that very time a definite place within the ecclesiastical order. He cannot change their ecclesiastical status, or discipline them for offences, or ordain one of the laymen as pastor or evangelist: otherwise we should have *the same disorder* of two jurisdictions in the same matter at the same time over the same subject. It is not a question of "Jew or Gentile," "Greek or Barbarian," or "American or Chinese": *it is a question of jurisdiction*. It matters not what blood may be in his veins, he must first be within and under the evangelist's extraordinary power before its energy can affect him. If he wishes it otherwise, he must make it otherwise. Furthermore, if we should admit (say) that the foreign missionary has a right to ordain a fellow-laborer, who is a layman, to be an equal evangelist, then we have the monstrous conclusion, that every one of our missionaries can perpetuate and multiply general evangelists in the full sense of the word—a work which the Church has always kept and must forever keep in her own hands. *Every repository of extraordinary power must have separate appointment from the original source. "Potestas delegata delegari non potest."* Even when the foreign missionary ordains as evangelist one that is properly the subject of his jurisdiction, *he is not a*

general evangelist, and cannot become one without appointment from home. *He* cannot ordain another, but only has such limited authority as a Presbyterian evangelist possesses, and for the wise use of this he is responsible immediately to the general evangelist. In the noted case that has lately occurred in one of our own Missions, let the General Assembly cure the irregularity if it will, but let it also distinctly forbid its recurrence.

IV.

The actual facts of the Foreign Missionary work, however, generally present a still more complex problem. A "Mission" is usually composed of more than one general evangelist, and there arises the question: What is the relation of these evangelists of the same Mission to each other as to the exercise of extraordinary power? Is it joint or several? According to the principles of this paper we must answer that *the power is joint and not several*; and must be administered by the "Mission" as a body, or a temporary "distribution" must be made according to the exigencies of the case and after the analogy of the existing Constitution. The evangelists are each "parts" in which is the power of the whole, but this common power is *over* the power of every part, and must be exercised by the whole body, or a system of evangelistic courts. It is not a matter of expediency or privilege, but of vital Presbyterian principle, that is here insisted upon. The same principles that lie back of our Book, lie back of our evangelists, without which they have no *authorised* existence.

When co-evangelists preach the gospel in the same field, and some of the hearers profess to be converts and apply to be received into the communion of the Church, it is not possible that these applicants are subjects of two jurisdictions at the same time in this same matter. It cannot be allowed that, in the same church, whether forming or formed, there is a power to admit and reject the same person at the same time, or to declare an accused both guilty and not guilty. But, if this power is not to be wielded jointly in the same particular Mission, then each evangelist's private opinion is an authoritative judgment, and, as

is well known, these judgments are often contradictory, one pronouncing a certain custom (say polygamy or feet-binding) a bar to communion, another not. This would be disorder of the deadliest sort, and defeat the very end of the evangelist's office. The same principle applies, only with greater force, to the exercise of the higher governmental powers. It cannot be that the same man at the same time and place, is eligible and ineligible to ordination, or liable to be ordained by one at one moment and deposed by another at the next, or to be recognised by one evangelist as a Presbyterian minister and discounted by another at his side. The Church has no liberty to do her work on principles that make such *extraordinary confusion*. We have here, therefore, a clear case of joint power. What, then, is the proper way of its exercise? Evidently it is substantially, though not formally, the method of the Church at home. It must be exercised jointly by these officers, either in convention or by a distribution of power. If its exercise in convention would result in a deadlock, then by distribution. It may safely be assumed that no one holds that the particular distribution of church power made in our Form of Government is *jure divino*. Another, in some respects different, would be allowed and required by the nature of Presbyterianism if it should appear to be more conformable to decency and order. In like manner these co-evangelists, having no ready-made distribution, must nevertheless make one according to unwritten law, *i. e.*, Presbyterian principles of church power. Thus will they do the work of an evangelist in the most becoming and efficient way, and thus create the Presbyterian Church "where never was one before." As a matter of fact, in most Foreign Missions, this very thing is done informally by common consent and common sense. Some one of the most experienced and judicious missionaries exercises the power of final judgment after conference with his brethren. It would perhaps be more decent and orderly that some one be formally appointed to the exercise of the power of final judgment, to decide only such questions as are lost by a tie vote in the convention of all the general evangelists of a particular Mission. But, whatever may be the proper way out of this particular difficulty, it

seems necessary to hold that evangelists must exercise their power jointly and not severally, when they coexist in time and space.

V.

It is also, perhaps, proper to add that the evangelist is a *responsible* officer of the Church. Office and responsibility go together. The opinion is sometimes met with, that the evangelist is an extraordinary irresponsible officer, bearing some true analogy to an apostle as such, so that the Church cannot control his work or review and reverse his decisions. This would be to make him "the whole" and not "a part;" another Church, and not a church officer *within* her ecclesiastical order. To be irresponsible to the Church, the officer must be *inspired and immediately appointed by Christ*: and then *he* is over the Church and the Church is responsible to *him*. Apostles had indeed independent, several, and irresponsible jurisdiction under all circumstances; and their common inspiration—that indispensable qualification of an apostle—justified the fact, made it becoming, and excluded confusion. But every officer of the established visible Church, according to Presbyterianism, is under and responsible to the whole; and the right of appeal and complaint by the subjects of evangelistic jurisdiction, is just as orderly and inalienable as in any other case. The appeal must be made to the court whose immediate evangelist is appealed from: in case of the Presbyterian evangelist, to the Presbytery; in case of the general evangelist, to the General Assembly. Presbyterianism cannot afford to concede that any of its officers are apostles or anything like them.

J. A. LEFEVRE.

ARTICLE IV.

PROFESSOR FLINT'S SERMON BEFORE THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF EDINBURGH.*

“Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.”—John xvii. 20, 21.

These words contain truths and suggest reflections which are manifestly appropriate in the circumstances in which we are met. Any remarks which may help you to enter into the spirit and meaning of them cannot be other than seasonable. Let Christ himself, therefore, be our teacher, let the speaker merely repeat what he taught, and may the Holy Spirit guide both speaker and hearers to a right understanding and a hearty reception of what he taught; and may the truth thus understood and received be profitable unto us for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.

The circumstances in which the words of the text were first spoken could not have been more fitted than they were deeply to impress the truth on them—on all Christian hearts and consciences throughout all lands and ages. When our God breathed them forth in prayer, he had just instituted the ordinance which was to commemorate until he come his own death. He had immediately before his view the cup which his Father had prepared for him to drink, the agony of Gethsemane, the sufferings and the shame of Calvary; yet with divine unselfishness, his

*This very admirable Inaugural discourse we have been anxious to lay before our readers ever since its delivery, but until now have never found the requisite space. Our opinions of the sermon were expressed fully in October, 1877, when reviewing the proceedings of the Council. Since that review was written and published it has become clear that sentiment in our Church has settled down into the determination to adhere to the Council. Opposition to it in the Louisville Assembly was by no means earnest, and a very weighty delegation of fourteen ministers and fourteen ruling elders were appointed to attend the meeting in Philadelphia in 1880.—EDS. SO. PRES. REVIEW.

thoughts were occupied about others, and his affections were going forth towards others. He was doing what he could to comfort, to encourage, to enlighten the few sorrowful, perplexed, disheartened men who were beside him and whom he was so soon to leave. But his care and his love were not confined to them, or to the small number of persons scattered through Judea who trusted that he would redeem Israel, and whose affections were still not wholly withdrawn from him, although their hopes were overclouded or extinguished. He knew that the doubts and fears of his disciples were, so far as they regarded himself, altogether vain. He knew whence he came into the world and why he came: who sent him, and for what he was sent; that his work was one which could not fail; that the Father would glorify the Son, that the Son might glorify the Father; that the Father had given him power over all flesh that he should give eternal life to a mighty people gathered out of all the nations of the earth. He knew that the honor of God and the salvation of men were alike dependent on the success of what he had undertaken. He looked, therefore, beyond the apparent defeats and passing sorrows of the present, and beyond the sufferings of the immediately impending future, and he saw that despised gospel which he was about to seal with his blood spreading beyond Judea, beyond the farthest bounds of Roman rule, over lands whose names his contemporaries knew not. He saw, too, it was to outlive empires the foundations of which had not been laid, to destroy whatever was opposed to it, to pass through the strongest vicissitudes of thought as gold through the fire, to diffuse light and life through all the coming ages. He saw it gaining to God and to himself the countless multitudes of the redeemed, and his loving heart embraced them all, and out of the fulness of his heart he prayed for them all, and his prayer was "that they all might be one."

UNITY THE BEST GIFT.

In praying thus, he asked, we may be sure, the very best thing for them which he could. He had already on this memorable night bequeathed to his followers his great gift of peace; he had laid on them his new commandment, "Love one another;" and now he

asked for them what included both—that *unity* which could only be obtained through obedience to his law of love, and which was inseparable from such peace as he had to bestow. But that we may know the worth of what he asked on our behalf, we must know what it really was. Its nature has often been grievously misunderstood, and the consequences have been most lamentable. In every sphere of thought and life there is a serious danger of taking a false unity for the true. The aim of all philosophy, for example, is to reach a true intellectual unity, and the love of unity is its very source and life; yet it has also been the chief cause of its errors, and all false systems of speculation, like materialism and idealism, positivism and pantheism, are simply systems based on false unities, on narrow and exclusive unities. There is a unity of political life which is rich in blessings; and there are caricatures of that unity which have only originated cruel and perfidious acts, foolish and unjust measures. But nowhere have erroneous views as to the nature of unity been so mischievous as in the province of religion. In the name of Christian unity men have been asked to sacrifice the most sacred rights of reason, conscience, and affection. Independence of judgment, honesty, brotherly love, and every quality which gives to human nature worth and dignity, have been treated as incompatible with it. In former days it was thought that Christian unity could be forced upon men with violent and bloody hands; and in later times it has often been supposed that it could be promoted by wrathful words and the arts of worldly intrigue. Throughout the whole duration of the Church, the unity which our Saviour prayed that his followers might enjoy has been widely confounded with kinds of unity which have no necessary connexion either with Christian peace or love, and which may be, and often have been, the occasions of most unchristian discord and hatred.

THE ORIGIN OF UNITY.

What, then, is the unity which Christ prayed for when he asked on behalf of his followers "that they all might be one"? Well, this at least it certainly is—a unity of supernatural origin. It has its foundation not on earth but in heaven, not in man but

in God. It is not of this world nor of the will of the flesh; it is not a mere expression of the likeness of human nature in all men; it has its root and source in the eternal nature of God—in the infinite love wherewith he loved us before the world was. It supposes a reception of the word or doctrine of the apostles regarding Christ, and consequently faith in Christ himself as the God-man, the brightness of the glory and the express image of the person of the Father. It is the natural and necessary expression of the common relationship of believing men to the one God, the one Saviour, and the one Spirit. There is one faith, one baptism, one hope on earth, because there is one Father, one Redeemer, one Sanctifier in heaven. Unity on earth below is the result of a unifying work accomplished by God, who is in heaven above, through redemption in Jesus Christ. Sin produced disunion. It separated men from God and men from one another. Christ came to undo the work of sin, and bind together more firmly than ever what it had torn asunder. Through faith believers are made one with him; through his sacrifice they are made one with the Father; through being in the Father and the Son they are one among themselves—one in faith and feeling, in spirit and life, in their principles and their sympathies, in their affections and aspirations.

Such, whatever else it may be, is Christian unity. But this of itself is sufficient to separate it by a broad and clear boundary, yea, by an enormous chasm, from a unity which is in the present day frequently set forth in opposition to it—the unity proclaimed and glorified by Positivists, Humanitarians, and Socialists—the unity of mere human brotherhood. This is a comparatively new enemy of the faith. It may be said to have entered into general history with the French revolution; it owes its very existence to the Christianity which it is set up to rival. But the signs of the times seem clearly to indicate that under some form or another, or rather that under many forms, what has been called the religion of humanity, which is just the belief in the brotherhood of men separated from belief in the fatherhood of God, fraternity divorced from piety, unity detached from its supernatural root, will be one of the chief enemies which Christianity must contend with.

Merely ecclesiastical questions will probably have far less, and social questions far more importance assigned to them in the estimation of Christian men in the future than they have had in the past; and all Christian Churches, it is to be hoped, will henceforth realise better than they have hitherto done that their duty is to conquer the world around them, and transform it into a part of the kingdom of Christ—to sanctify society, and to stamp the image of the Redeemer on all the relations of life. But in attempting to accomplish this task, Christian belief will assuredly be resisted by worldly unbelief, and yet in such a struggle the foe of Christianity, to oppose it with any chance of success, must be neither wholly worldly nor wholly unbelieving; it must have some positive truth, some generous faith, some cause capable of eliciting enthusiasm. The world will not be conquered, not generally influenced and governed, by mere doubts, mere negations. But where is unbelief to get a truth, a faith, a motive which will serve its purpose? I answer that unbelief, although so fertile in doubts and negatives, is so poor as regards the positive truth which can alone support and ennoble life, that it must borrow it from the very system which it seeks to combat, and can have no other originality than that which it gains by mutilating the truth which it borrows. To the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man it will oppose the latter alone; to Christian unity what it will call a broader, but is really a narrower thing, a merely human unity; to the whole truth, the half truth. And for many a long day Christian men and Christian Churches will have no more urgent work to do than to show by words and deeds, by teaching and conduct, what is the whole truth and what is only the half truth; that the temple of human brotherhood can only be solidly founded and firmly built upon the Eternal Rock, on which rests Christian faith; that the world can only be reconciled to itself by being reconciled to its God; that human unity can only be reconciled to itself by being reconciled to its God; that human unity can only be realised in and through Christian unity.

THE MODEL OF UNITY.

The unity which Christ asked for his disciples is, I remark

next, a unity which has not only its foundation, but its standard or model in heaven. Christ's prayer is not only that his people may be one, but "as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." The union of believers not only flows from the union between the Father and the Son, who is the Mediator between the Father and us, but should resemble it as much as the relationship between finite beings can resemble that between infinite beings. The unity which Christ came to realise on earth was one meant to reflect and express in a finite form the perfect unity of the divine nature. That unity, as Christianity has revealed it, is very different from the mere abstract unity of speculative philosophy—the wholly indeterminate unity of which nothing can be affirmed except that it exists; very different also from the solitary, loveless, heartless unity of the God of Mohammedanism; it is a unity rich in distinctions and perfections; the unity of an infinite fulness of life and love; the unity of a Godhead in which there are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, a trinity of persons, a diversity of properties, a variety of offices, a multiplicity of operations, yet not only sameness of nature and equality of power and glory, but perfect oneness also in purpose, counsel, and affection, perfect harmony of will and work. It is in this unity, in the contemplation and fruition of which poets like Dante, saints like St. Bernard, and divines like Melancthon, have supposed the highest happiness of the blessed to consist, that we are to seek the archetype of the unity of believers on earth.

It is one of the most marked, and one of the grandest characteristics of Christianity, that it continually sets before us the heavenly, the divine, the perfect, as the law and rule of our lives. As Moses was commanded to make the tabernacle for the children of Israel in all things according to the pattern shown him in the mount, so is the Christian commanded to frame his conduct in every respect according to the perfect model of heaven. To be perfect as God is perfect; to do our Father's will on earth as it is done in heaven; to love one another as Christ has loved us: that is the uniform tenor of the teaching which we receive from the gospel; and so here our Saviour's words remind us that we

are to be one as the Father and the Son are one. If, as those who would found a mere human brotherhood dream, heaven were empty or wholly inaccessible to our faith, if there were no Father and no Son, or at least none to be known by us, if there were not in the Godhead itself an intimate indwelling of person in person, a perfect communion of spirit with spirit, an infinite love, all-comprehensive, all-pervasive, all-unitive, would there be any real and adequate standard assignable to the unity of men with men, to the love of man for man? When one who disbelieves in God and his Son tells his fellow-men to be one, can he also reasonably and consistently tell them in what measure or according to what model they are to be one? No! He can find no rule in the history of the past, stained as that has been with hatreds and dissensions. He must not be content with merely pointing to good men, for clearly the best human lives have been very defective and in many respects warnings rather than examples. If he say, "Love and be at one as far as is for the greatest good of all," he gives us a problem to calculate instead of an ideal which can at once elicit and measure, which can at once sustain and regulate love and unity. If he say, "Love and be at one as you ought," he forgets that the very question is: How ought we to love and be at one? Human unity is a derived and dependent unity, and its standard can only be in the ultimate and uncreated source of unity, in the indwelling of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father.

THE NATURE OF UNITY.

The words of our Lord, I remark next, indicate to us not only the true foundation and the true standard, but also *the true nature of the unity which he prayed for*. What he asked was that all his followers might be "one in us"—one in the Father and in himself, one in the Father through belief in himself; which can only mean that what he desired was that his followers might all possess a common life, might all participate in the mind which was in him, might all walk not by sight but by faith, not after the flesh but according to the Spirit, and might all consciously feel and outwardly manifest that they were thus really one.

This is of course a kind of unity which embraces all Christ's followers without any exception. The Church of Christ, which is the body of Christ, contains every human being, of whatever kind or tongue or nation, who has that life which is not of this world, but hid with God in Christ, and it contains only those who have it. Therefore the Church, the body of Christ, is one. It is one in itself, because one in its Lord; one in its many members, because these members are all united to him who is the Head of the Church—the sole Head of the Church. The headship of Christ and the unity of the Church are two aspects of the same truth. Christ is the Head of the Church, because he is the life of all, the guide of all, and the Lord of all who are within the Church; their life through the agency of his Holy Spirit, their guide through the instrumentality of his Word, and their Lord through the redemption of them from sin to his own blessed service. And just because Christ is thus the sole Head of the Church, in the plain scriptural sense of the great doctrine, the Church itself is one. Without him it would have no centre of unity, no coherence of parts, no sameness of life, no harmony of sentiments, no commonness of purpose, while in him it has all these.

Has them, I say, and not merely *will have* them. The unity of the Church is not simply a thing to be hoped for, prayed for, worked for; *it is also a thing which already exists*, and the existence of which ought to be felt and acted on. Christians are certainly far, far indeed, from being one, as Christ prayed that they might be one—completely one—*one as he and the Father are one*; they are far from that, because they are far from being perfect Christians; but in so far as they are Christians at all they even are to that extent already one. To be a Christian is to be, through change of nature, through newness of life, one with all other Christians. Now, I know scarcely any truth about Christianity which we are more apt to forget, and which we more need to remember than just this, that Christian unity already exists as far as Christianity itself does; that we do not need to bring it into existence, but that Christ himself, by his work and Spirit, brought it into existence; that any unity which we are

entitled to look for in the future must be merely a development, an increase of that which already binds together Christian men of all denominations; not a something of an essentially different nature. The great duty of Christians in this matter, some seem to think, is to ignore their differences, or to conceal them, or to get rid of them anyhow; they appear to find it difficult to understand how there can be a unity coexisting with and underlying differences, and wholly distinct from the uniformity which can only be gained by the surrender or suppression of differences. This is a very superficial view, for it represents Christian unity not as a living and spiritual thing at all, but as a mere dead outward form of doctrine or policy. It is also a very dangerous view, for it tends directly to the establishment of ecclesiastical despotism, the discouragement of the open expression of individual convictions, and the destruction of faith in the sacredness and value of truth. To me it seems that the chief aim and desire of Christians as to unity ought to be to realise their oneness notwithstanding their differences; to estimate at its true worth what is common to them as well as what is denominationally distinctive of them.

Christian unity does not require us to undervalue any particular truth, or to surrender any denominational principle, or even individual conviction which is well founded; it merely requires that our minds and hearts be open also to what is common, catholic, universal; that we do not allow our denominational differences and individual peculiarities to prevent us from tracing and admiring the operations of the Spirit of grace through the most dissimilar channels. There may be Christian oneness where there are also differences which no man can rationally count of slight moment. The differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics are of the most serious kind—religiously, morally, and socially; yet obviously the feelings to which Saint Bernard gave expression in the hymn, “Jesus, thou joy of loving hearts,” and those which Charles Wesley poured forth in the hymn, “Jesus, lover of my soul,” had their source in the same Holy Spirit and their object in the same divine Saviour. There is a great distance, and there are many differences, between the Roman

Catholic Church of France and the Free Church of Scotland; but Fénelon and M'Cheyne were of one Church and one in their spiritual experience. Saint Bernard and Pope Alexander VI., Fénelon and Cardinal Dubois, were united in the Church of Rome; who will dare to say that they were one in Jesus Christ? Saint Bernard and Charles Wesley, Fénelon and M'Cheyne, were ecclesiastically far apart; who will dare to say that they were *not* one in Jesus Christ? I trust that Protestants will never think slight the differences which separate them from the Church of Rome; and yet I hesitate not to say that when Protestants in general are clearly able to discern the oneness, even beneath these differences, and cordially to love whatever is of Christ and his Holy Spirit, even when it appears in the Church of Rome, a greater step will have been taken towards the attainment of Christian unity than would be the mere external union of all the denominations of Protestantism.

As to the differences between these denominations, they might surely exist and yet prove merely the means of exercising and strengthening Christian unity. If we can only be at one in spirit with those who agree with us in opinion, there can be little depth or sincerity in such oneness. The love which vanishes before a difference of views and sentiments must be of a very superficial and worthless nature. And, as a plain matter of fact, it is neither merely nor mainly the differences of principle or opinion between the various denominations of Christians which mar and violate their Christian unity, but the evil and unchristian passions which gather round these differences. The differences are only the occasions of calling forth these passions. If they did not exist at all, the same passions would create or find other differences, other occasions for displaying themselves. It is not when one body of men holds honestly, openly, and firmly the Voluntary principle, and another the Establishment principle, that Christian unity is broken; but when those who hold the one principle insinuate that those who hold the other are, simply in virtue of doing so, ungodly men, or men who disown Christ as the life and guide, the Lord and Head of his people; when, instead of cordially acknowledging and rejoicing in what is good

in each other, each exaggerates what is good in itself, and depreciates what is good in the other, or even rejoices in its neighbor's humiliation or injury; and when those who represent them contend, by speech or writing, in a manner from which a courteous and honest man of the world would recoil, then, certainly, Christian unity is broken—visibly, terribly broken; for then the Christian spirit itself is manifestly absent, or grievously feeble.

All the differences of principle which separate most, at least, of our Christian denominations might redound to their common honor, and reveal rather than conceal their common unity, had their members and spokesmen only a little more justice, generosity, and love; a little more grace and virtue; a little more of the spirit of that kingdom which is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. They might set a high value on their distinctive principles, and yet rejoice that what they held apart was so small a portion of the truth in comparison with what they enjoyed in common. It may, perhaps, be quite reasonable that for the sake of one principle, as to which they differ, two denominations should stand apart, although on a thousand other principles they are agreed; but it cannot be reasonable that their divergence of views as to the one principle should shut their eyes and hearts to the fact that as to the thousand others they are agreed. And yet there is, as all experience proves, a very great danger of thus allowing distinctive principles to obscure or prevent our recognition of common principles. It is the penalty attached to all undue exaltation or glorifying of what distinguishes us from our Christian brethren. And met, as we are, as a General Presbyterian Council, I hope we shall be on our guard against such a danger. God forbid that the Presbyterian Churches of the world should have so little received the spirit or learned the law of Christ as that they should in any degree confound Presbyterian unity with Christian unity, or vainly boast of what is but an outward form, or say or do anything to hurt the feelings or the usefulness of other Churches which are as dear to the Saviour as themselves, and which are separated from them by so thin a partition wall as a mode of ecclesiastical government. We have come together as Presbyterians, but with the wish to pro-

mote Christian unity; and the very thought of Christian unity, if apprehended aright, must save us from unduly and offensively magnifying any secondary unity, any outward distinction.

UNITY NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THINGS ON WHICH CHRISTIANS
DIFFER.

Christian unity we have seen to be a *spiritual unity which links together all Christians and underlies all the differences which distinguish them from one another. It is a natural and necessary consequence of this truth that Christian unity, although it may lean to such secondary unities as identity of doctrine, or uniformity of ritual, or oneness of government, ought never to be identified with them.* Christian unity may be where there are none of these things. It might not be where they all were.
Take doctrine.

Not Identity of Doctrine.

Christian unity undoubtedly involves in its very essence a oneness of faith, for the Christian life is one of confidence towards God as a reconciled Father in Jesus Christ—a confidence which is gained through belief in Jesus Christ, while that belief is gained through assent to what Scripture testifies of Jesus Christ. This unity of a living faith naturally finds expression in a unity of doctrine or creed. God and Christ are one, and the testimony of Scripture regarding him is a self-consistent whole, and the longer, the more impartially, the more freely and honestly, the more reverently and profoundly that testimony is studied, the more likely, or, if you will, the more certainly, is unity even of doctrine to be the result. And it has been the result. The harmony of the creeds and confessions, not of Presbyterianism alone, nor even of Protestantism alone, but of the whole Christian world, is most comprehensive. While the harmony of the chief Protestant creeds and confessions is, of course, far more so, it shows us a unity of doctrine, surely abundantly sufficient for almost every want of practical Christian life. One would call this unity or harmony of creed remarkable, were it not obvious that no very different system of the doctrines could be evolved out of the Scriptures by the collective labors of large masses of men one

in spirit than that which has been derived from them and embodied in the creeds of the Churches.

But while all this is true, and Christian unity thus naturally tends to produce a doctrinal unity, we must never confound these two things. A man may err very widely in creed, and yet have a sincere believing soul. He may greatly misunderstand many an instruction of his Lord and Master, and yet reverence him far more, and love him far better, and, therefore, since love is the fulfilling of the law, much more truly obey his will than a wiser and more instructed brother, whose exegesis of the New Testament is perfect. A Church might have a faultless creed, to which all its members unhesitatingly assent, and yet be devoid of Christian unity because of the Christian faith of spiritual life. Mere orthodoxy is deadly heresy. The purely intellectual unity, reached through its purely intellectual assent, is no operation of the Spirit; but where the Spirit is not, life is not; and where life is not, death is. Life, however, is unity, and death is dissolution.

Besides, while Christian unity tends to doctrinal unity, there may never on earth be doctrinal identity. Whenever there is mental activity—free, honest, independent inquiry, such as there is whenever there is either intellectual or spiritual life—research is ever advancing; and the first results of advancing research into the meaning of either God's book of nature or his book of revelation, are always discordant and unsatisfactory. There are conflicting opinions entertained on many questions regarding heat, light, and electricity; there are rival schools in geology and natural history; there is hardly a single subject in mental, moral, or political science about which there is not the greatest possible diversity of opinion. In all these cases, however, the continuance of free research will bring order out of chaos, harmony out of confusion; yet will the perfect order and harmony of nature be discovered and demonstrated only when science has fully comprehended nature, and there is no room left for fresh research. It is not otherwise with regard to revelation. We can only have an absolute harmony of opinion as to the Bible when there are no more new truths to be derived from it, or new questions raised concerning it; when its interpretation is perfected, and research

regarding it completed. That will not be, I believe, before the day of doom. Certainly it will not be in our day, for never was Biblical research more actively pushed forward in all directions than just now. Never, therefore, were the Churches more bound, while conscientiously guarding old and assured truths, to beware of dogmatism as to new views, or of trammelling unnecessarily advancing research. The free action of spiritual life in the form of investigation and criticism, when displayed in fields hitherto little trodden, and in questions hitherto little studied by us, may apparently produce, or really produce for a time, only contradictory and destructive theories; yet in God's good time it will assuredly bring about unity and peace, and minister to faith and virtue, as it has done in fields already traversed, and as to questions now settled.

NOT RITUALISTIC UNIFORMITY.

Perhaps Christian unity—unity of spirit—also *tends to ritualistic uniformity* or uniformity of worship. There are two grounds on either or both of which they may be maintained. It may be argued that there is a divinely appointed form of worship defined in the New Testament with sufficient distinctness, and that Christian men will, sooner or later, be all convinced of this, and will of course adopt that form of worship. It may also be argued that there is an absolutely best form of worship, and that when the spiritual life of the Church is sufficiently deepened and quickened it must assume that form as alone fully appropriate. And these two arguments may be combined; indeed, if there is a divinely appointed form of worship, it can scarcely be other than the absolutely best form of worship, the one most suitable in all lands, ages, and circumstances.

I have neither the time nor the desire to examine either of these arguments, but certainly I am unconvinced by either of them. I cannot see that there is one exclusively divine form of worship prescribed by Scripture and binding in all its regulations on men in all places and at all times, or that there is one absolutely best form of worship, identical and unvarying, no matter what may have been the history, or what may be the

characters and circumstances of the worshippers. Hence, although I can hardly doubt that the more enlightened and earnest piety becomes, the less value will it attach to accessories and imposing forms, the more suspicious will it grow of what is symbolical and artificial, and the higher will be its appreciation of the forms of worship, which with the greatest simplicity, naturalness, and directness, bring the soul into contact with the realities of worship, I can feel no certainty that there would be uniformity of worship even if there were perfect unity of spirit, and shall judge no man's worship by my own ideal of the form of worship. To his own Master each man standeth or falleth. The unity of worship, which is all important, is not in its form at all, but in its being in spirit and in truth. The form is entirely subordinate to the spirit. The true spirit is restricted to no one form, for the Holy Ghost has condescended to bless and to act through the most diverse forms. Therefore let us not rashly pronounce any of them common or unclean.

NOT ONENESS OF GOVERNMENT.

Ritualistic uniformity, then, is not only not to be identified with Christian unity, but probably not even to be included in the idea of Christian unity. The same must be said of oneness of ecclesiastical government or policy. Yet nothing can be more manifest than that within certain limits and conditions Christian unity must work very powerfully towards ecclesiastical oneness—towards the union of Churches. The main reason why not a few Churches stand apart is unhappily to be sought and found not in their principles, but in their passions. Jealousies, rivalries, recriminations against one another, assaults upon one another, most unseemly and improper in themselves, and most injurious to the Christian cause, are exhibited, instead of Christian graces or practices. The strength and energy which should have been applied to the conversion and sanctification of the world are far more than wasted in warring with one another, in "biting and devouring one another." All this is, of course, the very opposite of Christian unity, and must disappear in order that Christian unity may establish and display itself. Wherever there is a real

growth of religious life, a sense of the sinfulness of such a state of things, and of the evil which it causes, must spring up, and the desire for brotherly communion and coöperation be experienced. The spirit of love and peace, of zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of men, working from within, cannot fail gradually to effect many an ecclesiastical alliance and union, and in all such cases there will be a clear gain to Christianity. There may be unions, however, which have no root in Christian unity, which are prompted by worldly motives, and effected from without. These merit no admiration, and are not likely to promote much the progress of the kingdom of Christ. A true union between Churches must be rather grown into than directly striven for. Just as he who would be happy must not aim straight at happiness, but cultivate piety and virtue; so Churches which seek such a union as God will bless will only reach their goal by increasing in love to God and to all mankind.

I do not know that we are warranted to affirm, with confidence, much beyond this as to ecclesiastical union. There are not a few who hold that the Church, as the body of Christ, must become externally, visibly, organically one. This is the sort of unity which the Church of Rome has ever maintained to be an essential characteristic of the true Church. Thus, to be one is the ideal which she has so steadily striven to realise; and the ambition of attaining that ideal has been the inspiring cause of most of her crimes. It is a unity, I am persuaded, which would be pernicious if it could be attained, but which fortunately cannot be attained; an ideal which is a dream—a grandiose dream—and also a diseased dream; an ambition which is foolish, if not guilty. The notion of a universal Church in this sense is precisely the same delusion in religion as the notion of a universal monarchy or a universal republic in politics, and in fact implies that that Utopia is a truth which can be and will be realised. Human hands are utterly incompetent to hold and guide aright the reins of universal sway either in religious or civil matters. A universal Church would be as surely a misgoverned Church as a universal empire would be a misgoverned empire.

Before we can even affirm, with rational confidence, that all

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Churches can come to have the same kind of government, not to speak of the same government, we must have convinced ourselves that there is one kind of church government which is alone of divine origin and authority. This is not now the prevalent view, perhaps, in Protestant Churches. Most Presbyterians, probably, while claiming for Presbytery that it is "founded on the word of God and agreeable thereto," will not deny that the same may be said of other forms of church government. The unity of the Church, the unity of believers, cannot, in their view, be bound up with any one kind of government. It is a unity not to be sought for elsewhere than in the love of God the Father, the cross of Christ, the work of the Holy Spirit, and the hearts of believers.

There are many truths in my text still unnoticed, but I shall only mention, and merely mention, the one which is most prominent. The oneness of Christians is not simply described as a blessing to themselves, but as what would be a blessing to the world. If Christians sincerely and fervently loved one another, and loved the Father and the Son, and showed by their whole conduct how precious, how joyous, how divine a thing Christian love was, the world could not but be influenced by the sight; the love of Christ's disciples towards one another would guide it to the love of Christ himself, and the love of Christ to the love of the Father; and so the world would believe that God really had sent his Son; would cease to be the world; and would joy and glory in its Redeemer. If those who call themselves Christians were all really so; if they were one in Christ and strove to be perfectly one; if amidst all differences and distinctions, they had a profound affection for one another; if their very controversies were models of courtesy and their very disputings examples of meekness and humility; if brotherly communion, even with those ecclesiastically widest apart from them, were earnestly sought by them and brotherly coöperation habitual to them, the effect on society would soon be very visible. The sarcasm of the unbeliever would be silenced; the native loveliness of the gospel would be made manifest; and Christians, thus one in heart and life, in affection and action, would come, with a moral might un-

known by the world for ages, to the help of the Lord against the mighty.

“Nothing,” said one of the greatest of English philosophers, “doth so much keep men out of the Church, and drive men out of the Church, as breach of unity.” “Keep your smaller differences,” was the exhortation of the Reformer of Geneva, “let us have no discord on that account; but let us march in one solid column, under the banners of the Captain of our Salvation, and with undivided counsels from the legions of the cross, upon the territories of darkness and death.” Now, unto Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto Him be glory in the Church of Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end. Amen.

ARTICLE V.

THE PUBLIC PREACHING OF WOMEN.

In this day innovations march with rapid strides. The fantastic suggestion of yesterday, entertained only by a few fanatics, and then only mentioned by the sober to be ridiculed, is to-day the audacious reform, and will be to-morrow the recognised usage. Novelties are so numerous and so wild and rash, that in even conservative minds the sensibility of wonder is exhausted and the instinct of righteous resistance fatigued. A few years ago the public preaching of women was universally condemned among all conservative denominations of Christians, and, indeed, within their bounds, was totally unknown. Now the innovation is brought face to face even with the Southern churches, and female preachers are knocking at our doors. We are told that already public opinion is so truckling before the boldness and plausibility of their claims that ministers of our own communion begin to hesitate, and men hardly know whether they have the moral courage to adhere to the right. These remarks show that a

discussion of woman's proper place in Christian society is again timely.

The arguments advanced by those who profess reverence for the Bible, in favor of this unscriptural usage, must be of course chiefly rationalistic. They do indeed profess to appeal to the sacred history of the prophetesses, Miriam, Deborah, Huldah, and Anna, as proving that sex was no sufficient barrier to public work in the Church. But the fatal answer is: that these holy women were inspired. Their call was exceptional and supernatural. There can be no fair reasoning from the exception to the ordinary rule. Elijah, in his civic relation to the kingdom of the ten tribes, would have been but a private citizen without his prophetic *afflatus*. By virtue of this we find him exercising the highest of the regal functions (1 Kings xviii.), administering the capital penalty ordained by the law against seducers into idolatry, when he sentenced the priests of Baal and ordered their execution. But it would be a most dangerous inference to argue hence, that any other private citizen, if moved by pious zeal, might usurp the punitive functions of the public magistrate. It is equally bad logic to infer that because Deborah prophesied when the supernatural impulse of the Spirit moved her, therefore any other pious woman who feels only the impulses of ordinary grace may usurp the function of the public preacher. It must be remembered, besides, that all who claim a supernatural inspiration must stand prepared to prove it by supernatural works. If any of our preaching women will work a genuine miracle, then, and not until then, will she be entitled to stand on the ground of Deborah or Anna.

A feeble attempt is made to find an implied recognition of the right of women to preach in 1 Cor. xi. 5. "But every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered, dishonoreth her head: for that is even all one as if she were shaven." They would fain find here the implication that the woman who feels the call may prophesy in public, if she does so with a bonnet on her head; and that the apostle provides for admitting so much. But when we turn to the fourteenth chapter, verses 34, 35, we find the same apostle strictly forbidding public speaking in the

churches to women, and enjoining silence. No honest reader of Scripture can infer that he meant by inference to allow the very thing which, in the same epistle and in the same part of it, he expressly prohibits. It is a criminal violence to represent him as thus contradicting himself. He did not mean, in chapter xi. 5, to imply that any woman might ever preach in public, either with bonnet on or off. The learned Dr. Gill, followed by many more recent expositors, supposes that in this place the word "prophecy" only means "praise," as it unquestionably does in some places (as in 1 Chron. xxv. 2: The sons of Asaph and Jeduthun "prophesied with the harp"), and as the Targums render it in many places in the Old Testament. Thus, the ordinance of worship which the apostle is regulating just here, is not public preaching at all, but the sacred singing of psalms. And all that is here settled is, that Christian females, whose privilege it is to join in this praise, must not do so with unveiled heads, in imitation of some pagan priestesses when conducting their unclean or lascivious worship, but must sing God's public praises with heads modestly veiled.

We have no need to resort to this explanation, reasonable though it be. The apostle is about to prepare the way for his categorical exclusion of women from public discourse. He does so by alluding to the intrusion which had probably begun, along with many other disorders in the Corinthian churches, and by pointing to its obvious unnaturalness. Thus, he who stands up in public as the herald and representative of heaven's King, must stand with uncovered head: the honor of the Sovereign for whom he speaks demands this. But no woman can present herself in public with uncovered head without sinning against nature and her sex. Hence no woman can be a public herald of Christ. Thus, this passage, instead of implying the admission, really argues the necessary exclusion of women from the pulpit.

But the rationalistic arguments are more numerous and are urged with more confidence. First in natural order is the plea that some Christian women are admitted to possess every gift claimed by males: zeal, learning, piety, power of utterance; and it is asked why these are not qualifications for the ministry in

the case of the woman as well as of the man. It is urged that there is a mischievous, and even a cruel impolicy in depriving the Church of the accessions, and souls of the good, which these gifts and graces might procure when exercised in the pulpit. Again, some profess that they have felt the spiritual and conscientious impulse to proclaim the gospel which crowns God's call to the ministry. They "must obey God rather than men;" and they warn us against opposing their impulse, lest haply we be "found even to fight against God." They argue that the apostle himself has told us, in the new creation of grace there is neither Jew nor Greek, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free." In Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female" (Col. iii. 11; Gal. iii. 28). But if the spiritual kingdom thus levels all social and temporal distinctions, its official rights should equally be distributed in disregard of them all. And last, it is claimed that God has decided the question by setting the seal of his favor on the preaching of some blessed women, such as the "Friend," Miss Sarah Smiley. If the results of her ministry are not gracious, then all the fruits of the gospel may as reasonably be discredited. And they ask triumphantly, Would God employ and honor an agency which he himself makes unlawful?

We reply, yes. This confident argument is founded on a very transparent mistake. God does not indeed honor, but he does employ, agents whom he disapproves. Surely God does not approve a man who "preaches Christ for envy and strife" (Phil. i. 15), yet the apostle rejoices in it, and "knows that it shall result in salvation through his prayers and the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ." Two very simple truths, which no believer disputes, explode the whole force of this appeal to results. One is, that a truly good person may go wrong in one particular; and our heavenly Father, who is exceedingly forbearing, may withhold his displeasure from the misguided efforts of his child, through Christ's intercession, because though misguided, he is his child. The other is, that it is one of God's clearest and most blessed prerogatives to bring good out of evil. Thus, who can

doubt but it is wrong for a man dead in sins to intrude into the sacred ministry? Yet God has often employed such sinners to convert souls: not sanctioning their profane intrusion, but glorifying his own grace by overruling it. This experimental plea may be also refuted by another answer. If the rightfulness of actions is to be determined by their results, then it ought evidently to be by their whole results. But who is competent to say whether the whole results of one of these pious disorders will be beneficial or mischievous? A zealous female converts or confirms several souls by her preaching? Grant it. But may she not, by this example, in the future introduce an amount of confusion, intrusion, strife, error, and scandal, which will greatly outweigh the first partial good? This question cannot be answered until time is ended, and it will require an omniscient mind to judge it. Thus it becomes perfectly clear that present seeming good results cannot never be a sufficient justification of conduct which violates the rule of the Word. This is our only sure guide. Bad results, following a course of action not commanded in the Word, may present a sufficient, even an imperative reason for stopping, and good results following such action may suggest some probability in its favor. This is all a finite mind is authorised to argue in these matters of God's service; and when the course of action transgresses the commandment, such probability becomes worthless.

Pursuing the arguments of the opposite party in the reverse order, we remark next, that when the apostle teaches the equality of all in the privilege of redemption, it is obvious he is speaking in general, not of official positions in the visible Church, but of access to Christ and participation in his blessings. The expository ground of this construction is, that thus alone can we save him from self-contradiction. For his exclusion of women from the pulpit is as clear and emphatic as his assertion of the universal equality in Christ. Surely he does not mean to contradict himself! Our construction is established also by other instances of a similar kind. The apostle expressly excludes "neophytes" from office. Yet no one dreams that he would have made the recency of their engrafting a ground of discrimination against their equal privi-

leges in Christ. Doubtless the apostle would have been as ready to assert that in Christ there is neither young nor old, as that in him there is neither male nor female. So every sane man would exclude children from office in the Church, yet no one would disparage their equal interest in Christ. So the apostle inhibited Christians who were implicated in polygamy from office, however sincere their repentance. So the canons of the early Church forbade slaves to be ordained until they had legally procured emancipation, and doubtless they were right in this rule. But in Christ there is "neither bond nor free." If then the equality of these classes in Christ did not imply their fitness for public office in the Church, neither does the equality of females with males in Christ imply it. Last, the scope of the apostle in these places proves that he meant no more; for his object in referring to this blessed Christian equality is there seen to be to infer that all classes have a right to church membership if believers, and that Christian love and communion ought to embrace all.

When the claim is made that the Church must concede the ministerial function to the Christian woman who sincerely supposes she feels the call to it, we have a perilous perversion of the true doctrine of vocation. True, this vocation is spiritual, but it is also scriptural. The same Spirit who really calls the true minister also dictated the Holy Scriptures. When even a good man says that *he thinks* the Spirit calls him to preach, there may be room for doubt; but there can be no doubt whatever that the Spirit calls no person to do what the Word dictated by him forbids. The Spirit cannot contradict himself. No human being is entitled to advance a specific call of the Spirit for him individually to do or teach something contrary to or beside the Scriptures previously given to the Church, unless he can sustain his claim by miracle. Again, the true doctrine of vocation is that the man whom God has designed and qualified to preach learns his call through the Word. The Word is the instrument by which the Spirit teaches him, with prayer, that he is to preach. Hence, when a person professes to have felt this call, whom the Word distinctly precludes from the work, as the neophyte, the child, the penitent polygamist, the female, although we may

ascribe her mistake to an amiable zeal, yet we absolutely know she is mistaken: she has confounded a human impulse with the Spirit's vocation. Last, the scriptural vocation comes not only through the heart of the candidate, but of the brotherhood; and the call is never complete until the believing choice of the brethren has confirmed it. But by what shall they be guided? By the "say so" of any one who assumes to be sincere? Nay verily. The brethren are expressly commanded "not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God." They have no other rule than Scripture. Who can believe that God's Spirit is the agent of such anarchy as this, where the brotherhood hold in their hands the Word, teaching them that God does not call any woman; and yet a woman insists, against them, that God calls her? He "is not the author of confusion, but of peace, as in all the churches of the saints." It is on this very subject of vocation to public teaching that the apostle makes this declaration.

The argument from the seeming fitness of some women, by their gifts and graces, to edify the churches by preaching, is then merely utilitarian and unbelieving. When God endows a woman as he did Mrs. Elizabeth Fry, it may be safely assumed that he has some wise end in view; he has some sphere in earth or heaven in which her gifts will come into proper play. But surely it is far from reverent for the creature to decide against God's Word, that this sphere is the pulpit. His wisdom is better than man's. The sin involves the presumption of Uzzah. He was right in thinking that it would be a bad thing to have the sacred ark tumbled into the dust, and in thinking that he had as much physical power to steady it and as much accidental proximity as any Levite of them all. But he was wrong in presuming to serve God in a way he had said he did not choose to be served. So when men lament the "unemployed spiritual power," which they suppose exists in many gifted females, as a dead loss to the Church, they are reasoning with Uzzah: they are presumptuously setting the human wisdom above God's wisdom.

The argument then, whether any woman may be a public preacher of the Word, should be prevalently one of Scripture.

Does the Bible really prohibit it? We assert that it does. And first, the Old Testament, which contained, in germ, all the principles of the New, allowed no regular church office to any woman. When a few of that sex were employed as mouth-pieces of God, it was in an office purely extraordinary and in which they could adduce a supernatural attestation of their commission. No woman ever ministered at the altar as either priest or Levite. No female elder was ever seen in a Hebrew congregation. No woman ever sat on the throne of the theocracy except the pagan usurper and murderess, Athaliah. Now Presbyterians at least believe that the church order of the Old Testament Church was imported into the New, with less modification than any other part of the old religion. The ritual of types was greatly modified; new sacramental symbols replaced the old; the temple of sacrifice was superseded, leaving no sanctuary beneath the heavenly one, save the synagogue, the house of prayer. But the primeval presbyterial order continued unchanged. The Christianised synagogue became the Christian congregation, with its eldership, teachers, and deacons, and its women invariably keeping silence in the assembly. The probability thus raised is strong.

Secondly, if human language can make anything plain, it is that the New Testament institutions do not suffer the woman to rule or "to usurp authority over the man." See 1 Tim. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xi. 3, 7-10; Eph. v. 22, 23; 1 Peter iii. 1, 5, 6. In ecclesiastical affairs at least, the woman's position in the Church is subordinate to the man's. But, according to New Testament precedent and doctrine, the call to public teaching and ruling in the Church must go together. Every elder is not a public teacher, but every regular public teacher must be a ruling elder. It is clearly implied in 1 Tim. v. 17 that there were ruling elders who were not preachers, but never was the regular preacher heard of who was not *ex officio* a ruling elder. The scriptural qualifications for public teaching, the knowledge, piety, experience, authority, dignity, purity, moral weight, were *a fortiori* qualifications for ruling. "The greater includes the less." Hence it is simply inconceivable that the qualified person could experience a true call to public teaching and not also be called to spiritual

rule. Hence, if it is right for the woman to preach, she must also be a ruling elder. But God has expressly prohibited the latter, and assigned to woman a domestic and social place, in which her ecclesiastical rule would be anarchy.

This argument may be put in a most practical and *ad hominem* (or *ad fœminam*) shape. Let it be granted, for argument's sake, that here is a woman whose gifts and graces, spiritual wisdom and experience, are so superior her friends feel with her that it is a blameable loss of power in the Church to confine her to silence in the public assembly. She accordingly exercises her public gift, rightfully and successfully. She becomes the spiritual parent of new-born souls. Is it not right that her spiritual progeny should look up to her for guidance? How can she, from her position, justify herself in refusing this second service? She felt herself properly impelled by the deficiency in the quantity or quality of the male preaching at this place, to break over the restraints of sex and contribute her superior gifts to the winning of souls. Now, if it appear that a similar deficiency of male supervision, either in quantity or quality, exists at the same place, the same impulse must, by the stronger reason, prompt her to assume the less public and obtrusive work of supervision. There is no sense in her straining out the gnat after she has swallowed the camel; she ought to act the ruling elder, and thus conserve the fruits she has planted. She ought to admonish, command, censure, and excommunicate her male converts—including possibly the husband she is to obey at home! if the real welfare of the souls she has won requires.

The attempt may be made to escape this crushing demonstration by saying that these women consider themselves as preaching, not as presbyters, but as lay persons—that theirs is but a specimen of legitimate lay preaching. The answers are, that stated, public lay preaching is not legitimate, either for women or men, who remain without ordination (as was proved in this REVIEW, April, 1876); and that the terms of the inspired prohibition against the public preaching of women are such as to exclude this plea.

Let us now look at these laws themselves: we shall find them

peculiarly, even surprisingly, explicit. First, we have 1 Cor. xi. 3-16, where the apostle discusses the relation and deportment of the sexes in the public Christian assemblages; and he assures the Corinthians, verses 2 and 16, that the rules he here announces were universally accepted by all the churches. The reader will not be wearied by details of exposition; a careful reading of the passage will give to him the best evidence for our interpretation, in its complete coherence and consistency. Two principles then are laid down: first, verse 4, that the man should preach (or pray) in public with head uncovered, because he then stands forth as God's herald and representative; and to assume at that time the emblem of subordination, a covered head, is a dishonor to the office and the God it represents; secondly, verses 5, 13, that, on the contrary, for a woman to appear or to perform any public religious function in the Christian assembly, unveiled, is a glaring impropriety; because it is contrary to the subordination of the position assigned her by her Maker, and to the modesty and reserve suitable to her sex; and even nature settles the point by giving her her long hair as her natural veil. Even as good taste and a natural sense of propriety would protest against a woman's going in public shorn of that beautiful badge and adornment of her sex, like a rough soldier or a laborer; even so clearly does nature herself sustain God's law in requiring the woman to appear always modestly covered in the sanctuary. The holy angels who are present as invisible spectators, hovering over the Christian assemblies, would be shocked by seeing women professing godliness publicly throw off this appropriate badge of their position (verse 10). The woman then has a right to the privileges of public worship and the sacraments: she may join audibly in the praises and prayers of the public assembly, where the usages of the body encourage responsive prayer; but she must always do this veiled or covered. The apostle does not in this chapter pause to draw the deduction, that if every public herald of God must be unveiled and the woman must never be unveiled in public, then she can never be a public herald. But let us wait. He has not done with these questions of order in public worship: he steadily continues the discussion of them

through the fourteenth chapter, and he there at length reaches the conclusion he had been preparing, and in verses 34-35 expressly prohibits women to preach publicly. "Let your women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted to them to speak" (in that public place) "but to be in subordination, as also the law saith. And if they wish to learn something" (about some doctrine which they there hear discussed but do not comprehend) "let ask their own husbands at home, for it is disgraceful for women to speak in church." And in verse 37 he shuts up the whole discussion by declaring that if anybody pretends to have the Spirit, or the inspiration of prophecy, so as to be entitled to contest Paul's rules, *the rules are the commandments of the Lord* (Christ), not Paul's mere personal conclusions; so that to contest them on such pretensions of spiritual impulse is inevitably wrong and presumptuous. For the immutable Lord does not legislate in contradictory ways.

The next passage is 1 Tim. ii. 11-15. In the 8th verse the apostle having taught what should be the tenor of the public prayers and why, says: "I ordain therefore that the males pray in every place" (in which the two sexes prayed publicly together). He then, according to the tenor of the passage in 1 Cor. xi., commands Christian women to frequent the Christian assemblies in raiment at once removed from untidiness and luxury, and so fashioned as to express the retiring modesty of their sex. He then adds: "Let the woman learn in quiet, in all subordination. But I do not permit woman to teach" (in public) "nor to play the ruler over man; but to be in quietude. For Adam was first fashioned: then Eve. Again, Adam was not deceived" (by Satan) "but the woman having been deceived came to be in transgression" (first). "However she shall be saved by the child-bearing, if they abide, with modest discretion, in faith and love and sanctity." In 1 Tim. v. 9-15, a sphere of church labor is evidently defined for *aged single women*, and for them only—who are widows or celibates without near kindred. So specific is the apostle that he categorically fixes the limit below which the Church may not go in accepting even such laborers at sixty years. What was this sphere of labor? It was evidently some form of diaconal

work, and not preaching; because the age, qualifications, and connexions all point to these private charitable tasks, and the uninspired history confirms it. To all younger women the apostle then assigns their express sphere in these words (verse 14): "I ordain accordingly that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house, give no start to the adversary to revile" (Christians and Christianity). Here is at least strong negative evidence that Paul assigned no public preaching function to women. In Titus ii. 4, 5, women who have not reached old age are to be "affectionate to their husbands, fond of their children, prudent, pure, *keepers at home*, benevolent, obedient to their own husbands, that the word of our God may not be reviled." And the only teaching function hinted even for the aged women is, verse 4, that they should teach these private domestic virtues to their younger sisters. Does not the apostle here assign the *home* as the proper sphere of the Christian woman? That is her kingdom, and neither the secular nor the ecclesiastical commonwealth. Her duties in her home are to detain her away from the public functions. She is not to be a ruler of men, but a loving subject to her husband.

The grounds on which the apostle rests the divine legislation against the preaching of women make it clear that we have construed it aright. Collating 1 Cor. xi. with 1 Tim. ii, we find them to be the following: The male was the first creation of God, the female a subsequent one. Then, the female was made from the substance of the male, being taken from his side. The end of the woman's creation and existence is to be a helpmeet for the man, in a sense in which the man was not originally designed as a helpmeet for the woman. Hence God, from the beginning of man's existence as a sinner, put the wife under the kindly authority of the husband, making him the head and her the subordinate in domestic society. The Lord said, Gen. iii. 16: "Thy desire shall be unto thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." Then last, the agency of the woman in yielding first to Satanic temptation and aiding to seduce her husband into sin was punished by this subjection; and the sentence on the first woman has been extended, by imputation, to all her daughters. These are

the grounds on which the apostle says the Lord enacted that in the church assemblies the woman shall be pupil and not public teacher, ruled and not ruler. The reasons bear upon all women, of all ages and civilisations alike. Hence the honest expositor must conclude that the enactments are of universal force. Such reasons are, indeed, in strong opposition to the radical theories of individual human rights and equality now in vogue with many. Instead of allowing to all human beings a specific equality and an absolute natural independence, these scripture doctrines assume that there are orders of human beings naturally unequal in their inherited rights, as in their bodily and mental qualities; that God has not ordained any human being to this proud independence, but placed all in subordination under authority, the child under its mother, the mother under her husband, the husband under the ecclesiastical and civil magistrates, and these under the law, whose guardian and avenger is God himself. And so far from flouting the doctrine of imputation as an antiquated barbarism, these Scriptures represent it as a living and just ruling principle, this very day determining, by the guilt of a woman who sinned six thousand years ago, when combining with the natural qualities of sex propagated in her race, a subordinate social state and a rigid disqualification for certain actions for half the human race. Between the popular theories of individual human right and this sort of political philosophy, there is indeed an irreconcilable opposition. But this is inspired! The only solution is that the other, despite all its confidence and arrogance, is false and hollow. "He that replieth against God, let him answer it."

The inspired legislation is as explicit to every candid reader as human language can well make it. Yet modern ingenuity has essayed to explain it away. One is not surprised to find these expositions, even when advanced by those who profess to accept the Scriptures, tinctured with no small savour of infidelity. For a true and honest reverence for the inspiration of Scripture would scarcely try so hopeless a task as the sophisticating of so plain a law. Thus, sometimes we hear these remarks uttered almost as a sneer, "Oh, this is the opinion of Paul, a crusty old

bachelor, an Oriental, with his head stuffed with those ideas of woman which were current when society made her an ignoramus, a plaything, and a slave." Or, we are referred to the fable of the paintings of the man dominating the lion, in which the man was always the painter, and it is said, "Paul was a man; he is jealous for the usurped dominion of his sex. The law would be different if it were uttered through woman." What is all this, except open unbelief and resistance, when the apostle says expressly that this legislation was the enactment of that Christ who condescended to be born of woman?

Again, one would have us read the prohibition of 1 Cor. xiv. 34, *οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν*; "it is not permitted to females to babble." Some pretended usage is cited to show that the verb, *λαλεῖν* is here used in a bad sense only, and that the prohibition to a woman to talk nonsense in public address does not exclude, but rather implies, her right to preach, provided she preaches well and solidly. No expositor will need a reply to criticism so wretchedly absurd as this. But it may not be amiss to point out in refutation that the opposite of this *λαλεῖν* in Paul's own mind and statement is "to be silent." The implied distinction then, is not here between solid speech and babbling, but between speaking publicly at all and keeping silence. Again, in the parallel declaration, 1 Tim. ii. 12, the apostle says: *Γυναικὶ δὲ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω*, where he uses the word *διδάσκειν*; concerning whose regular meaning no such cavil can be invented. And the apostle's whole logic in the contexts is directed, not against silly teachings by women, but against women's teaching in public at all.

Another evasion is to say that the law is indeed explicit, but it was temporary. When woman was what paganism and the Oriental harem had made her, she was indeed unfit for ruling and public teaching; she was but a grown-up child, ignorant, capricious, and rash, like other children; and while she remained so the apostle's exclusion was wise and just. But the law was not meant to apply to the modern Christian woman, lifted by better institutions into an intellectual, moral, and literary equality with the man. Doubtless were the apostle here, he would himself avow it.

This is at least more decent. But as an exegesis it is as unfair and untenable as the other. For, first, it is false that the conception of female character Christianised, which was before the apostle's mind when enacting this exclusion from the pulpit, was the conception of an ignorant grown-up child from the harem. The harem was not a legitimate Hebrew institution. Polygamy was not the rule, but the exception, in reputable Hebrew families; nor were devout Jews, such as Paul had been, ignorant of the unlawfulness of such domestic abuses. Jewish manners and laws were not Oriental, but a glorious exception to Orientalism, in the place they assigned woman; and God's word of the Old Testament had doubtless done among the Jews the same ennobling work for woman which we now claim Christianity does. To the competent archæologist it is known that it has ever been the trait of Judaism to assign an honorable place to woman; and the Jewish race has ever been as rare an exception as Tacitus says the German race was, to the pagan depression of the sex common in ancient days. Accordingly we never find the apostle drawing a depreciated picture of woman: every allusion of his to the believing woman is full of reverent respect and honor. Among the Christian women who come into Paul's history there is not one who is portrayed after this imagined pattern of childish ignorance and weakness. The Lydia, the Lois, the Eunice, the Phœbe, the Priscilla, the Damaris, the Roman Mary, the Junia, the Tryphena, the Tryphosa, the "beloved Persis" of the Pauline history, and the elect lady who was honored with the friendship of the aged John, all appear in the narrative as bright examples of Christian intelligence, activity, dignity, and nobleness. It was not left for the pretentious Christianity of the nineteenth century to begin the emancipation of woman. As soon as the primitive doctrine conquered a household, it did its blessed work in lifting up the feebler and oppressed sex; and it is evident that Paul's habitual conception of female Christian character, in the churches in which he ministered, *was at least as favorable as* his estimate of the male members. Thus the state of facts on which this gloss rests had no existence for Paul's mind: he did not consider himself as legislating temporarily in view of the inferiority of the

female Christian character of his day, for he did not think it inferior! When this evasion is inspected it unmasks itself simply into an instance of quiet egotism. Says the Christian "woman of the period" virtually: "I am so elevated and enlightened that I am above the law, which was well enough for those old fogies, Priscilla, Persis, Eunice, and the elect lady." Indeed! This is modesty with a vengeance! Was Paul only legislating temporarily when he termed modesty one of the brightest jewels in the Christian woman's crown?

A second answer is seen to this plea, in the nature of the apostle's grounds for the law. Not one of them is personal, local, or temporary. Nor does he say that woman must not preach in public because he regards her as less pious, less zealous, less eloquent, less learned, less brave, or less intellectual, than man. In the advocates of woman's right to this function there is a continual tendency to a confusion of thought, as though the apostle, when he says that woman must not do what man does, meant to disparage her sex. This is a sheer mistake. His reasoning will be searched in vain for any disparagement of the qualities and virtues of that sex; and we may at this place properly disclaim all such intention also. Woman is excluded from this masculine task of public preaching by Paul, not because she is inferior to man, but simply because her Maker has ordained for her another work which is incompatible with this. So he might have pronounced, as nature does, that she shall not sing bass, not because he thought the bass chords the more beautiful—perhaps he thought the pure *alto* of the feminine throat far the sweeter—but because her very constitution fits her for the latter part in the concert of human existence, and therefore unfits her for the other, the coarser and less melodious part.

But that the scriptural law was not meant to be temporary and had no exclusive reference to the ignorant and childish woman of the eastern harem, is plain from this, that every ground assigned for the exclusion is of universal and perpetual application. They apply to the modern, educated woman exactly as they applied to Phœbe, Priscilla, Damaris, and Eunice. They lose not a grain of force by any change of social usages or femi-

nine culture, being found in the facts of woman's origin and nature and the designed end of her existence. Thus this second evasion is totally closed. And the argument finds its final completion in such passages as 2 Tim. ii. 9 and chap. v. 14. A few aged women of peculiar circumstances are admitted as assistants in the diaconal labors. The rest of the body of Christian women the apostle then assigns to the domestic sphere, intimating clearly that their attempts to go beyond it would minister to adversaries a pretext to revile. Here then we have the clearest proof, in a negative form, that he did not design women in future to break over; for it is *for woman as elevated and enlightened by the gospel he preached* that he laid down the limit.

Every true believer should regard the scriptural argument as first, as sufficient, and as conclusive by itself. But as the apostle said in one place, that his task was "to commend himself to every man's conscience in God's sight," so it is proper to gather the teachings of sound human prudence and experience which support God's wise law. The justification is not found in any disparagement of woman, as man's natural inferior, but in the primeval fact: "Male and female made he them." In order to ground human society God saw it necessary to fashion for man's mate, not his exact image, but his counterpart. Identity would have utterly marred their companionship, and would have been an equal curse to both. But out of this unlikeness in resemblance it must obviously follow that each is fitted for works and duties unsuitable for the other. And it is no more a degradation to the woman that the man can best do some things which she cannot do so well, than to the man that woman has her natural superiority in other things. But it will be cried: "Your Bible doctrine makes man the ruler, woman the ruled." True. It was absolutely necessary, especially after sin had entered the race, that a foundation for social order should be laid in a family government. This government could not be made consistent, peaceful, or orderly, by being made double-headed; for human finitude, and especially sin, would ensure collision, at least at some times, between any two human wills. It was essential to the welfare of both husband and wife and of the offspring, that there must be

an ultimate human head somewhere. Now let reason decide: was it meet that the man be head over the woman, or the woman over the man? Was it right that he for whom woman was created should be subjected to her who was created for him; that he who was stronger physically should be subjected to the weaker; that the natural protector should be the servant of the protégée; that the divinely ordained bread-winner should be controlled by the bread-dispenser? Every candid woman admits that this would have been unnatural and unjust. Hence God, acting, so to speak, under an unavoidable moral necessity, assigned to the male the domestic government, regulated and tempered, indeed, by the strict laws of God, by self-interest, and by the tenderest affection; and to the female the obedience of love. On this order all other social order depends. It was not the design of Christianity to subvert it, but only to perfect and refine it. Doubtless that spirit of wilfulness, which is a feature of our native carnality in both man and woman, tempts us to feel that any subordination is a hardship: so that it is felt while God has been a father to the man he has been but a stepfather to the woman. Self-will resents this natural subordination as a natural injustice. But self-will forgets that "order is heaven's first law"; that subordination is the inexorable condition of peace and happiness, and this as much in heaven as on earth; that this subjection was not imposed on woman only as a penalty, but as for her and her offspring's good; and that to be governed under the wise conditions of nature is often a more privileged state than to govern. God has conformed his works of creation and providence to these principles. In creating man he has endued him with the natural attributes which qualify him to labor abroad, to subdue dangers, to protect, to govern. He has given these qualities in less degree to woman, and in their place has adorned her with the less hardy but equally admirable attributes of body, mind, and heart, which qualify her to yield, to be protected, and to "guide the home." This order is founded then in the unchangeable laws of nature. Hence all attempts to reverse it must fail and must result only in confusion.

Now a wise God designs no clashing between his domestic and

political and his ecclesiastical arrangements. He has ordained that the man shall be head in the family and the commonwealth; it would be a confusion full of mischief to make the woman head in the ecclesiastical sphere. But we have seen that the right of public teaching must involve the right of spiritual rule. The woman who has a right to preach, if there be any such, ought also to claim to be a ruling elder. How would it work to have husband and wife, ruler and subject, change places as often as they passed from the dwelling or the court room and senate chamber to the church? When we remember how universally the religious principles, which it is the prerogative of the presbyter to enforce, interpenetrate and regulate man's secular duties, we see that this amount of overturning would result in little short of absolute anarchy.

Again, the duties which natural affection, natural constitution, and imperious considerations of convenience distribute between the man and the woman, make it practicable for him and impracticable for her to pursue, without their neglect, the additional tasks of the public preacher and evangelist. Let an instance be taken from the nurture of children. The bishop must be "husband of one wife." Both the parents owe duties to their children; but the appropriate duties of the mother, especially towards little children, are such that she could not leave them as the pastor must, for his public tasks, without criminal neglect and their probable ruin. It may be said that this argument has no application to unmarried women. The answers are, that God contemplates marriage as the proper condition of woman, while he does not make celibacy a crime; and that the sphere he assigns to the unmarried woman is also private and domestic.

Some minds doubtless imagine a degree of force in this statement, that God has bestowed on some women gifts and graces eminently qualifying them to edify his churches, and as he commits no waste he thereby shows that he designs such women at least to preach. Enough has been already said to show how utterly unsafe such pretended reasonings are. "God giveth no account of his matters to any man." Does he not often give most splendid endowments for usefulness to young men whom he then removes

by what we call a premature death from the threshold of the pastoral career? Yet "God commits no waste." It is not for us to surmise how he will utilise those seemingly abortive endowments. He knows how and where to do it. We must bow to his dispensation, whether explicable or not. The case is the same in this respect with his ordinance restraining the most gifted woman from publicity. But there is a more obvious answer. God has assigned to her a private sphere sufficiently important and honorable to justify the whole expenditure of angelic endowments: the formation of the character of children. This is the noblest and most momentous work done on earth. Add to it the efforts of friendship, the duties of the daughter, sister, wife, and charitable almoner, and the labors of authorship suitable for woman; and we see a field wide enough for the highest talents and the most sanctified ambition. Does self-will feel that somehow the sphere of the pulpit orator is more splendid still? Wherein? Only in that it has features which gratify carnal ambition and the lust for carnal applause of men. But let it be noted that *Christians are forbidden to have these desires!* Let then the Christian comply with God's law requiring him to crucify ambition, and the only features which made any difference between the private and the public spheres of soul-culture are gone. The Christian who, in the performance of the public work of rearing souls for heaven, fosters the ambitious motive, has deformed his worthiness in the task with a defilement which sinks it far below that of the humblest peasant mother who is training her child for God. Does the objector return to the charge with the cavil, that, while the faithful mother rears six or possibly twice six children for God, the gifted evangelist may convert thousands? But that man would not have been the gifted evangelist had he not enjoyed the blessing of the modest Christian mother's training. Had he been reared in the disorderly home of the clerical Mrs. Jellaby, instead of being the spiritual father of thousands, he would have been an ignorant rowdy or a disgusting pharisee. So that the worthiness of his public success belongs fully as much to the modest mother as to himself. Again, the instrumentality of the mother's training in the salvation of her children is mighty

and decisive: the influence of the minister over his hundreds is slight and non-essential. If he contributes a few grains, in numerous cases, to turn the scales for heaven, the mother contributes tons to the right scales in her few cases. The one works more widely on the surface, the other more deeply; so that the real amount of soil moved by the two workmen is not usually in favor of the preacher. The woman of sanctified ambition has nothing to regret as to the dignity of her sphere. She does the noblest work that is done on earth. Its *public* recognition is usually more through the children and beneficiaries she ennobles than through her own person. True; and that is precisely the feature of her work which makes it most Christ-like. It is precisely the feature at which a sinful and selfish ambition takes offence.

The movement towards the preaching of women does not necessarily spring from a secular "woman's rights" movement. The preaching of women marked the early Wesleyan movement to some extent, and the Quaker assemblies. But neither of these had political aspirations for their women. At the present time, however, the preaching of women and the demand of all masculine political rights is so synchronous, and is so often seen in the same persons, that their affinity cannot be disguised. They are two parts of one common impulse. If we understand the claim of rights made by these agitators, it includes in substance two things: that the legislation at least of society shall disregard all distinctions of sex and award all the same specific rights and franchises to women and men in every respect; and that women, while in the married state, shall be released from every form of conjugal subordination and retain independent control of their property. These pretensions are indeed the proper logical consequences of that radical theory of human right which is now dominant in the country. According to that doctrine, every human being is naturally independent, owes no duties to civil or ecclesiastical society save those freely conceded in the "social contract"; is the natural equal of every other human except as he or she has forfeited liberty by crime. Legislation and taxation are unjust unless based on representation, which means the

privilege of each man under government to vote for his governors. If these propositions were true, then, indeed, their application to women would be indisputable. And it would be hard for the radical politician to explain why it was right to apply them in favor of ignorant negroes and deny their application to intelligent ladies. We here see the great danger attending the present misguided woman's movement. Neither the politicians nor the American masses cherish the purpose of being logically consistent; and both are in the well-known habit of proclaiming doctrines for which they care nothing, and which they do not mean to hold honestly, as "stalking horses" for a temporary end. But their demagoguism has given a currency and hold to these political heresies whose extent and tenacity make them perilous. God has made man a logical animal: the laws of his reason compel him to think connectedly to some degree. Hence false principles once firmly fixed are very apt to bring after them their appropriate corollaries in the course of time, however distasteful to the promulgators of the parent errors. To the radical mind, possessed with these false politics, the perpetual demand of these obvious corollaries by pertinacious women must apply a stress which is like the "continual dropping that weareth away a stone." They can quote the Declaration of Independence in the sense these radicals hold it: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are by nature equal and inalienably entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." "All just government is founded in the consent of the governed," etc., etc. It is true that this document, rationally interpreted, teaches something wholly different from the absurd equality of the radical, which demands for every member of society all the specific franchises which any member has. The wise men of 1776 knew that men are not naturally equal, in strength, talent, virtue, nor ability; and that different orders of human beings naturally inherit very different sets of rights and franchises, according as they are qualified to enjoy and employ them for their own good and the good of the whole. But they meant to teach that in one very important respect all are naturally equal. This is the equality which Job recognised, ch. xxxi. 15, as existing between

him and his slave: the equality of a common origin, a common humanity, and immortality. It is the equality of the golden rule. By this right that human being whom the laws endow with the smallest franchises in society has the same kind of moral right to have that small franchise respected by his fellows as the man who justly possesses the largest franchise. It is the equality embodied in the great maxim of the British Constitution, "that before the law all are equal." This is true, although Britain is an aristocratic monarchy and rights are distributed to the different orders very differently. Earl Derby has sundry franchises which the British peasant can no more possess than he can grasp the moon. Yet in the constitutional sense the peasant and the Earl are "equal before the law." If indicted for crime, each has the inalienable right to be tried by his peers. The same law which shields the Earl's entailed estates equally protects the peasant's cottage. As the men of 1776 were struggling to retain for America the rights of British freemen, which the king was unconstitutionally invading, their Declaration must be construed as teaching this equality of the free British Constitution. So when they said that "taxation without representation" was intrinsically unjust, they never dreamed of teaching this maxim as to individual tax-payers. The free British Constitution, for which they were contending, had never done so. They asserted the maxim of the commonwealth. Some representation of the commonwealth taxed, through such order of the citizens as properly constitute the representative *populus*, is necessary to prevent taxation from becoming unjust.

But this, the true, historical, and rational meaning of these maxims, is now unpopular with radicalism; it cannot away with the true doctrine. And for this reason it has no sufficient answer for the plea of "women's rights." The true answer is found in the correct statement of human right we have given. The woman is not designed by God, nor entitled to all the franchises in society to which the male is entitled. God has disqualified her for any such exercise of them as would benefit herself or society, by the endowments of body, mind, and heart he has given her, and the share he has assigned her in the tasks of social

existence. And as she has no right to assume the masculine franchises, so she will find in the attempt to do so only ruin to her own character and to society. For instance, the very traits of emotion and character which make woman man's cherished and invaluable "helpmeet," the traits which she must have in order to fulfil the purpose of her being, would ensure her unfitness to meet the peculiar temptations of publicity and power. The attempt would debauch all these lovelier traits, while it would leave her still, as the rival of man, "the weaker vessel." She would lose all and gain nothing.

One consequence of this revolution would be so certain and so terrible that it cannot be passed over. It must result in the abolition of all permanent marriage ties. Indeed, the bolder advocates do not scruple to avow it. The destruction of marriage would follow by this cause, if no other: that the unsexed politicking woman, the importunate manikin-rival, would never inspire in men that true affection on which marriage should be founded. The mutual attraction of the two complementary halves would be forever gone. The abolition of marriage would follow again by another cause. The rival interests and desires of two equal wills are inconsistent with domestic union, government, or peace. Shall the children of this unnatural connexion be held responsible to both of two sinful but coördinate and equally supreme wills? Heaven pity the children! Again, who ever heard of a perpetual copartnership in which the parties had no power to enforce the performance of the mutual duties nor to dissolve the tie made intolerable by violation? It would be as iniquitous as impossible. Such a copartnership of equals, with coördinate wills and independent interests, must be separable at will, as all other such copartnerships are.

This common movement for "women's rights" and women's preaching must be regarded then as simply infidel. It cannot be candidly upheld without attacking the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures. We are convinced that there is only one safe attitude for Christians, presbyters, and church courts to assume towards it. This is utterly to discountenance it, as they do any other assault of infidelity on God's truth and kingdom. The church

officer who becomes an accomplice of this intrusion certainly renders himself obnoxious to discipline, just as he would by assisting to celebrate an idolatrous mass.

We close with one suggestion to such women as may be inclined to this new claim. If they read history they find that the condition of woman in Christendom, and especially in America, is most enviable as compared with her state in all other ages and nations. Let them ponder candidly how much they possess here which their sisters have enjoyed in no other age. What bestowed those peculiar privileges on the Christian women of America? The Bible. Let them beware then how they do anything to undermine the reverence of mankind for the authority of the Bible. It is undermining their own bulwark. If they understand how universally in all but Bible lands the "weaker vessel" has been made the slave of man's strength and selfishness, they will gladly "let well enough alone," lest in grasping at some impossible prize beyond, they lose the privileges they now have, and fall back to the gulf of oppression from which these doctrines of Christ and Paul have lifted them. R. L. DABNEY.

ARTICLE VI.

THE ALTERNATIVES OF UNBELIEF.

Anti-Theistic Theories. Being the Baird Lecture for 1877.

By ROBERT FLINT, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. New York: Scribner & Welford. 1879.

This is the successor and companion volume to the eminent author's lecture on "Theism," which appeared in print two years ago. The former volume was didactic, this one is polemic. The design of the first treatise was to establish by positive argument the doctrine accepted by theists. The aim of the second is to undermine by logic the foundations of infidelity. We can heartily applaud these works of the famous Scotch teacher, and

would confidently set them over against the writings of his celebrated namesake, the American physiologist and materialist. Despite certain obvious defects that might be pointed out, the Baird Lecture for 1877 is especially worthy of commendation as being not only able and conclusive, and far from superficial, but also to a gratifying extent original. We propose now to make an examination of the different postures that have been assumed by infidelity in the past and present; as well as of the various attitudes in which that infidelity has been, or may yet need to be, confronted by Christianity. In doing this we shall have to forego, except in a single instance, the guidance of the valiant Greatheart of Presbyterian apologetics in the British Islands.

The possible opinions as to the existence of God may be grouped as Theistic and Anti-Theistic. The theoretical positions which have at any time been taken by the opponents of the divine origin of the Scriptures may be set down at six or seven, or at the utmost at eight, nine, or ten; and these, as we shall presently see, are logically reducible to a much smaller number. These six, eight, or ten positions appear to exhaust the possibilities of the situation. Atheism, Pantheism, Polytheism, Dualism, Deism, Agnosticism, Pyrrhonism: *voilà tout!* Materialism (where not, inconsistently, theistic) is but another name for Atheism, or Agnosticism, or else may be regarded as a strange sort of Pantheism.

Rationalism is either a wide term equivalent to Naturalism, or else denotes one phase, or several phases, of deism, pantheism, or atheism.

Pessimism is essentially atheistic, for the reason that if it does not expressly challenge the divine existence, it virtually denies a God by stripping the idea of all benevolent and moral attributes.

This seems to finish the catalogue. Infidelity, it is true, may continue to pass through its customary metamorphoses, but it is believed that a sharp, critical scrutiny will always be able to detect "the old familiar faces" under every imaginable variety of new disguises.

The Anti-Theistic positions, then, are as follows:

That of Atheism, which, conceding nothing, denies the divine existence;

That of Pantheism, which, conceding God's being, denies his personality;

That of Polytheism, which, conceding the divine existence and personality, denies the divine unity.

That of Dualism, which, while it concedes the divine existence and may concede his personality and even his unity, denies the divine self-sufficiency; and

That of Deism, which, conceding God's existence, personality and unity, and his self-sufficiency, denies the reality, and in some forms of it even *the possibility*, of the divine revelation and attestations, and in its most advanced utterances, the reality, if not the possibility, of the divine providential government, and indeed of the divine activity in the world.

There are two others necessary to complete the list. They are those of Agnosticism or Positivism, and Scepticism or Pyrrhonism. By Positivism is intended not merely the theory of Auguste Comte and his acknowledged school—headed by such men as M. Littré, J. S. Mill, G. H. Lewes, and Mr. Frederick Harrison, but also the broader theory of Mr. Alexander Bain, Mr. Herbert Spencer, Professor Huxley, Dr. Tyndall, Dr. Maudesley, and many on the continent of Europe, together with their English and American *confrères* and disciples. We are aware that the English thinkers of this class many of them oppose what some of them consider Comte's fundamental postulate of the three states of human knowledge, and that they in some instances ridicule his scientific pretensions and in chorus disown his intellectual paternity, preferring to trace back their paternity to Hume. Professor Littledale has suggested the term Agnostics* as a proper designation for all who occupy the ground assumed by Comte and his retinue with regard to the futility of pushing our inquiries into the region of ultimate causes, whether final or efficient, and with regard to the vast realm of *the unknowable*. The term Positivists has, indeed, been rightly or wrongly fixed upon them,

*The credit for this name has recently been claimed for Professor Huxley. See *New York World*, August 19, 1879.

and it is perhaps too late in the day, even if it be desirable, to have it changed.

Pyrrhonism, or Scepticism in the distinctive sense, holds *sub judice* the propositions which are categorically denied by one or several of the preceding theories. Agnosticism might be classed as a variety of partial Scepticism, but for its characteristic and categorical assertion of the divine unknowableness. Scepticism is, however, a term often used popularly and broadly to denote infidelity in general, especially when not very sure of its conclusions.

These various theoretical positions can be classified in different ways, according as we select this or that principle of classification, or this or that point of view from which to make the classification. We might class them as forms of *denial* and forms of *doubt*. The forms of denial would then include all but the different branches of Scepticism. The forms of denial might then be further subdivided into Atheistic, Polytheistic, and Monotheistic Infidelity. Under Monotheistic Infidelity, on this plan, would fall Dualism, Deism, and Agnosticism.* The forms of doubt, on the other hand, would branch into universal and partial Scepticism; the universal being represented by Pyrrho—its abettors “doubting that they doubt;” the partial by those who with Hume admit the existence of our subjective states and processes but question their trustworthiness, and by the eclectics whether utterly capricious or more plausibly rational. The forms of denial might be grouped under the heads of *Naturalism* and *Supernaturalism*; and this without once raising the vexed question that agitated the fathers and the schoolmen, and has been since discussed by Trench and Wardlaw, by the Duke of Argyll, by Mozley, by President Hop-

*We are aware that we are here using the term “Monotheistic” with a latitude that requires explanation and may be considered unjustifiable. “Monistic” is the term usually employed; but this word has relation to the question of *substance*, and what we want is a word having relation to the question of *supreme cause*. We employ the description simply for the nonce and to give symmetry to our classification. Agnosticism, sharply defined, will be found to be situated exactly on the dividing line betwixt Theism and Atheism, but to have a decided slant towards Atheism. We first class it as Monotheistic and afterwards as Atheistic.

kins, and by Dr. McCosh, as to the definition of a miracle and its relations to the natural. The difficulty of that question is largely due to the ambiguity of the terms "law," "nature," "natural," and "supernatural." The term "Supernaturalism" is here taken roughly to indicate those forms of negative opinion which do, and the term "Naturalism" to indicate those which do *not*, allow of the extraordinary or miraculous interpositions of the Deity in the affairs of the world. Atheistic infidelity would then lie wholly under the head of *Naturalism*, and Polytheistic wholly under the head of *Supernaturalism*, while Monotheistic would lie partly under one head and partly under the other. Monotheistic Naturalism would embrace Deism, Pantheism, and Agnosticism; and Monotheistic Supernaturalism, if we exclude Mysticism and Traditionalism, would take in certain exhibitions of Dualism as well as Mohammedanism, Judaism, Swedenborgianism, and Mormonism, together with the better forms of table-tipping Spiritism.

The first conflicts of Christianity were with heathen Polytheism and Judaic Monotheism. At a later period Monotheistic infidelity was encountered and vanquished in its Mohammedan form. For the most part, however, from the second century to the Reformation, the contentions of the Church were conducted chiefly within her own pale, and her conflicts with the Moslem were not so much spiritual and intellectual as carnal. Even as late as the age of the Reformers, the scimitar of the Turk, who had long before obtained a foothold in Southern Europe, was still to be seen flashing for a brief interval before the gates of Christendom; just as in an earlier age the battle-axe of the Crusader was to be seen brandished for a time under the walls of Islam. But in both cases the conflict was not for national conversion, but for extermination, or else enforced subjection. The watchword of the Mussulman was "Death, Tribute, or the Koran;" the battle cry of the mediæval Christian was, "No mercy to the paynim."

The intellectual labors of the Church before Constantine were chiefly directed to the establishment of its creed and the overthrow of heresy. The intellectual labors of the Church during the heart of the Middle Ages were chiefly bent on the task of

forging the two-edged weapons of the scholastic logic, which were afterwards to be employed in the interests of the Romish hierarchy, and also, to a certain extent, in those of the Reformed theology. It is true that some of the early heresies, as for instance, Gnosticism and Manichæism, had their origin in Greek and Oriental heathenism; but they did not become heresies until the attempt had been made within the Church itself to support them by the divine authority of the Scriptures.

The Revival of Letters inaugurated a magnificent revolt against the despotic sway of Romanism and the fetters of mediæval scholasticism and superstition. The revival of true religion, the consolidation of the Reformed Churches, and the systematic statement of sound theology, followed in the two succeeding centuries. It was not to be wondered at that the new wine of intellectual liberty, which was broached, and which began to be largely quaffed, in the days of Erasmus, of Luther, and of Zwinglius, should then as well as subsequently be attended with excesses. These excesses first made themselves known in the ravings of the Anabaptists of Germany. The same heady ferment resulted two centuries later in the birth of modern infidelity. It was the undoubted right of private judgment that was thus sadly perverted. Many causes conduced to the production of this lamentable consequence. The philosophic innovations of Francis Bacon, the speculations of Descartes, of John Locke, of Bishop Berkeley, of Hume, the austerities of the Puritan commonwealth, and the violent reaction that followed at the period of the Restoration, were leading causes which contributed to make the beginning and middle, and, indeed, the whole of the eighteenth century the palmy period of Deism. Deism and deistic and neological rationalism of Germany are however largely due to the perverse thinking of such men as Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Toland, as well as of Hobbes and Spinoza* in the century preceding. The logical tendencies of Deistic naturalism, the abuse of the prerogative and of the power of the nobles and the clergy in France, the transparent impostures of decadent Romanism, the fierce recalci-

*German Rationalism began with Semler, who took his cue from Spinoza's "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus."

tration of the impetuous French people under the direction of the tribune and the *Encyclopédie*, concurred to make the epoch of the French Revolution the palmy period of outspoken Atheism. Meanwhile Scepticism had attained its zenith in the person of the most subtle of its advocates, David Hume. The scene was now shifted, from England and from France, to Germany. The intellectual system of that great thinker, Immanuel Kant, and especially his discussion of the categories of thought, and of the Relative and Absolute, prepared the way for the refined and thoroughgoing idealism of Fichte, of Schelling, of Hegel, of Bruno, of Strauss, and of Feuerbach; and all these influences united in making the latter part of the first half of the nineteenth century the palmy period of continental *Pantheism*. The wonderful success of the Baconian philosophy, especially as applied by Bacon's successors, in the department of physical science, the experience doctrine of Hume, and his theory of causation as developed by Brown and James Mill, the brilliant but sophistical generalisations of Comte, and the recent metaphysical and scientific disquisitions of John Stuart Mill, of the late Geo. H. Lewes, of Mr. H. Spencer, of Professor Huxley and Mr. Darwin and Dr. Tyndall, and their allies and pupils, have agreed in making the present or latter part of the century the palmy period of the so-called Agnosticism or *Positivism*.

Without holding the favorite tenet of the Comteian system, that there are three states through which the human mind successively passes in the attainment of knowledge, to wit, the "Theological" or "Fictitious," the "Metaphysical," and the "Scientific" or "Positive"; we do hold that the human mind does pass through successive states, which are, however, not definite in number or uniform in kind, of *erroneous* opinion, whether in arriving at the truth, or (as is more generally the case) after having once determined to renounce it. We are inclined to believe, moreover, that Positivism (or Agnosticism), so far from being the finality of truth, is more likely to turn out to be the finality of error. That the system of the Positivists (or Agnostics), at least in its current theological positions, is essentially an erroneous system, we doubt no more than we doubt the existence of

the Pyramid of Cheops; and there are many signs that in Positivism Infidelity has at last reached the end of its tether.

Let us again revert to the classification of the various infidel positions. Leaving out of view, for the nonce, the forms of doubt, and confining our notice to the forms of denial, we are shut up to a choice between Polytheistic, Monotheistic, and Atheistic, infidelity. The war with Polytheism, as we have seen, has been brought to a happy conclusion. In principle, as in actual influence upon the world, Polytheism, considered as a system of opinion or as a factor in the civilisation, is dead. A few enthusiasts, indeed, and *laudatores temporis acti*, continue from time to time to advocate the rehabilitation of the religious system that is embodied in Greek and Roman Paganism. Taylor, the translator of Plato, is one of the very small number which has ventured to do so in terms. There are others who are ready to defend, but not eager to revive, the classic mythology. Gibbon in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," and Taine in his entertaining little volume on Greek Art, have been among its foremost apologists. Middleton, the biographer of Cicero, and Matthew Arnold, have betrayed similar leanings. There are others again who, like Theodore Parker, and many living writers, seek to combine all the forms of ancient and modern belief on religious subjects, whether Polytheistic or Monotheistic, into one absolute religion. The only tolerable defence, however, that has ever been offered for Polytheism is on the alleged ground that it is after all only a disguised, albeit it may be a somewhat perverted, form of Monotheism. This ground has been taken in exculpation of the old Egyptian religion, of the Greek and Roman religion, and also of Buddhism and Brahmanism and the system of Zoroaster. Granting argumentatively the validity of the defence here set up, it is manifest that Polytheism *as such* thereupon falls, having confessedly resolved itself into Monotheism. The removal of this ground of defence leaves Polytheism theoretically defenceless and indefensible. It is clearly no defence of Polytheism as a system to shield its adherents under the pretext of their unavoidable ignorance, or to argue that worship of any sort is pleasing to the Deity. These pleas confess judgment on them-

selves at once, by admitting in the very plea itself the truth of Monotheism.

The fact is, that if there is one point upon which all theoretical unbelievers of the present day are agreed, it is that the hypothesis of a multitude of deities is suited only to a condition of imperfect intellectual development. The highest spirits of classic antiquity had shaken themselves partially or entirely loose from the integuments of the pagan mythology. The philosophers of the old world were either Atheists, Pantheists, or Dualists. Dualism, in one of its principal forms, is itself resolvable into Pantheism. This is where the two principles which Dualism postulates are not conceived as ultimate and aboriginal, but as derivative from a common source—the absolute or infinite. Dualism pure and simple, has its home in the Orient. The Gnostic and Manichæan tenets do not here fall under examination, and for the obvious reason that Gnosticism and Manichæism were attempts not to demolish but to transform the Christian faith; that is to say, they are species not of infidelity but of heresy. The most persuasive guise in which Dualism can present itself has always been that in which the two eternal principles that are assumed are God and matter. This seems to have been the view of Aristotle; though certain of his opinions as to the nature and relations of these two principles were altogether extraordinary and peculiar. The distinction is in many cases in point of fact, a shadowy and indeterminable one between this and the other form of Dualism—the one, to wit, which at last resolves the dual principles into a primal unity. Dualism though infinitely subtle as a speculation, and though it affords a satisfactory and most enviable *théodicée*, is at best after all an awkward device; since it clogs Omnipotence, and confines the Sovereign of the Universe as by a ball and chain to a substance which equally with himself possesses self-existence, which is exempt from his control, and which *ex hypothesi* must perpetually offer checks to the free exercise of his activity. Dualism clearly stands in conflict with the *independence* of the *être suprême* whose existence and whose unconditional perfection it asserts. The logical tendencies of the system are thus towards Atheism, in one direction, or else towards Pyrrhon-

ism, in another. "To this complexion must it come at last." So the matter is regarded from the view-point of a theist or the impartial logician. But the anatomical remains of Dualism are contemplated by our nineteenth century sceptics very much as the bones of the megatherium or iguanodon are regarded by the transient visitors in our museums. It is only as it appears (at least in glimpses) under the mysterious drapery of esoteric Buddhism, that the theory of a *dual* production of the world finds any special countenance to-day among anti-Christian thinkers; and then more as one of the most interesting phases of an ever-fluctuating religious opinion, or as a symbol of what is in itself really different and inscrutable, rather than as a just expression of objective truth. The intellectual opponents of the Christian Scriptures, at least where there is any show of manliness about them, will nearly all unite with us in the averment that if there be a great first cause, that cause is, upon a review of the whole evidence, plainly not dual, or manifold, but *one*.

We take this occasion to say our final word about Dr. Flint's book. One of the most striking things in it is the argument by which the author elaborately and cogently demonstrates that the boasted Monism of the Scientific Materialist breaks down at last in a species of Dualism, if not in abject pluralism. A large part of the praise demanded for Materialism grows out of the claim that is set up for it as a strictly unitarian scheme of the universe. But the elementary substances in the material world are no longer regarded as even four, but (after all reductions) are admitted to be probably somewhat numerous. The Monism so widely lauded, then, is a monism not of substances, but of *kinds* of substance. Above all, after the most searching analysis, there always remains the inexorable duality of *Matter* and *Force*.

We are thus reduced to the alternative between Monotheism and Atheism. Polytheism, as we have seen, belongs wholly to Supernaturalism, Atheism wholly to Naturalism, while Monotheism belongs partly to one and partly to the other. Monotheistic Infidelity having its affinities on the one hand with Naturalism and on the other with Supernaturalism, we come at once to the two heads, Monotheistic Naturalism and Monotheistic Super-

naturalism. Omitting Dualism, as already strangled in the form of Gnosticism and Manichæism, and as being in every sense effete except as it may disclose itself in the esoteric principles of Buddhism and kindred or derivative Oriental systems, nearly all of which, as it would seem, with Brahmanism and its congeners, may perhaps be ultimately resolved into Pantheism or else directly into Atheism, we have left under the head of Monotheistic Supernaturalism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Mormonism, Swedenborgianism, Spiritism.* It is noticeable that it is true alike of all these systems, that they not only concede the possibility and fact of a supernatural revelation from God, but admit also that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, in whole or in part, contain, though they do not constitute, such a revelation. Judaism errs not only in denying the claims of the New Testament, but in coördinating the Old Testament and tradition. The remaining systems err respectively in subordinating the authority of the Bible, so far as they accept that authority at all, to that of the Koran, of the Book of Mormon, of the writings of Swedenborg, of the communications of the *séances*.

Of the three last enumerated, Mormonism is suited only to the ignorant, Swedenborgianism only to the cultivated, and Spiritism only to the insane. Not one of the three has any pretensions that can recommend it to the world at large. Spiritism is based upon a manifest logical *non sequitur*. Admitting its alleged spiritual phenomena to be facts of some kind or other, they are fully explicable on grounds that carry us far away from its conclusions. So large a number of those pretended phenomena, however, have been shown to lack confirmation as to evince that the system rests for its support, in part at least if not wholly, on a basis of deception and imposture. Swedenborgianism, conceding a literal interpretation of parts of Scripture, yet volatilizes the sense of the sacred Word by a peculiar and untenable principle of exegesis, and agrees with Traditionalism† and Mysticism

*The word "Spiritualism" is more in vogue in this sense; but it is too bad that Bedlam should be permitted to rob philosophy of so good a word.

†"Traditionalism" would perhaps be the better term, if there were only authority for it.

in supplementing, and thus virtually destroying, the inspired rule of faith. Mormonism is a wretched imposition in travesty of that of the false prophet, and like the system of the Arabian imposter is kept up by a combination of force and chicanery and by appeals to self-interest and sensuality. The Book of Mormon has never been venerated in pretence or in reality except by the Latter-Day Saints themselves—the signs are not ambiguous that the days of this stigma upon the fair fame of America are already numbered. This leaves only Judaism and Islam: and by Judaism is meant not that ancient theocratic system which afterwards developed into Christianity, but that effete system which (in the form but not the spirit of ancient Judaism) survived the date of this predicted coalescence, and which set itself up in direct antagonism to the Christian faith. With this understanding of the term, Judaism was, as we have seen, confronted and vanquished by the Church in the first century of the Christian era, and by the veritable witnesses of Christ's resurrection. It is, moreover, so far as it accepts the Scriptures at all, included under Traditionalism. The arguments against the religion of the Koran are familiar to our readers, and are ably as well as popularly handled in Dr. R. B. White's "Reason and Redemption." The system of Mohammed, as is generally acknowledged, had its birth, if not in ambition and greed, certainly in fanaticism and fraud; was promulged by robbery and slaughter, and recommended by licentiousness; it does not rebuke but tolerates and rewards the depraved inclinations of the human heart; it is destitute of the requisite credentials; it is at best an amalgam of second-rate Judaism and third-rate Christianity;* it has found no permanent acceptance at the hands of other than the Oriental races; and even among the Oriental races has acquired but a doubtful foothold. The books of Buddha are more potent to-day in the eastern hemisphere than are the writings of Mohammed; whilst it stands true that neither one nor the other has made any considerable, and at the same time lasting, headway in the western world.

*See this point made out triumphantly by Milman. *Latin Christianity*. Vol. II., Book IV., Chap. I., pp. 116–119. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1874.

Mysticism and Traditionalism also deny that the Bible is the *only rule* of faith. They are, however, for the most part historical corruptions of Christianity itself, and commonly concede the inspiration of part or all of the Scriptures. So far as they do not make these concessions, they have little influence, and fall under some one or other of the heads already given. The opinions of heretics and other errorists who admit the general truth of Christianity and its divine origin, are excluded under the definition.

The known forms of anti-Christian Supernaturalism are not more easily disposed of than is the fallacy on which they and all other conceivable systems of the same character are based. Once admit the existence of a God and the principle of Supernaturalism, and there is not a link missing in the invincible evidences of the Christian Scriptures.

Taking up now the forms of Monotheistic Naturalism, we find them to be these three: Deism, Pantheism, and Agnosticism. These three systems agree in denying the validity of the evidence which establishes a supernatural revelation. But this ground can be consistently taken only by those who also occupy the position of Atheism. Once admit the existence of a personal God,* and you are driven by the rigor of a remorseless logic to admit the credibility, and therefore the fact, of the gospel miracles, and consequently the divine verity of the Christian Scriptures. By this summary process it is obvious that we have eliminated Deism. Nor can Pantheism or Agnosticism hope to fare better in this argument. Pantheism and Agnosticism are both but disguised forms of Atheism. Pantheism indeed professes a sincere belief in the being of a God; but the Deity by which it swears has neither personality nor, according to the Germans, true substance, as the infinite of which it speaks in its latest or Hegelian form, is confessedly resolvable into zero, and all existence is by it held to be reducible to a process of thinking.

But Pantheism has no other logical issue but outright Atheism. Its fundamental postulate is that all the opponent forms of Mono-

*This is incontestably established in Butler's Analogy and conceded by John Stuart Mill.

theism and Polytheism limit the infinite. But it is at least equally clear (as has often been shown) that Pantheism itself, on the same principles, limits the infinite. The existence of the phenomenal or finite world necessarily, on these principles, involves a limitation upon infinite being. There is therefore no infinite. The finite becomes everything and the infinite nothing. There is therefore no logical escape from the utter denial of the infinite, which carries with it the utter denial of a God: but this is point-blank Atheism. Hegel and Feuerbach have upon their own strictly idealistic principles made the same disposition of Pantheism. The only real existence is thought. The universe is at bottom a process of dialectics. In the regressive process of analysis, the absolute, at the farthest remove of philosophic scrutiny, is zero. "Das seyn ist das nichts." Everything and nothing are the same; and the relation is one of identity that is established between the ultimate existence (God) and non-existence. In this manner Pantheism inevitably resolves itself into undisguised Atheism.

Pantheism is equally reducible to *Pyrrhonism*. Thus: Personality involves a limitation of the infinite; therefore the absolute is impersonal. By parity of reasoning it may be shown that the existence of a phenomenal world involves a limitation of the infinite. It follows that there is no phenomenal world; which is in flat contradiction of universal consciousness. One of the fundamental principles of Pantheism thus leads unerringly to a scepticism of the sort professed by Hume, or rather to that other and suicidal sort which doubts that it even dubitates and which has been well denominated philosophic idiocy.

Let us now refer again to the classification, and sum up our results. Infidelity consists of forms of denial and forms of doubt. The forms of denial may be embraced under the heads of Naturalism and Supernaturalism. Anti-Christian Supernaturalism eliminated, there are left the various forms of Atheistic and Monotheistic Naturalism. Monotheistic Naturalism comprises Deism, Pantheism, and Agnosticism, which, as we have seen, are severally resolvable into Atheism. Monotheistic thus finds its logical debouchure into Atheistic Naturalism, or (dropping the now unne-

cessary term) into sheer *Atheism*. *Atheism*, too, is thus seen to be the inevitable logical issue of all the forms of denial. We are thus shut up to a choice betwixt *Atheism*, on the one hand, and some of the forms of doubt, on the other. The forms of doubt may be comprehended under the heads of Universal and Eclectic Scepticism. Universal Scepticism properly so called is that once attributed (though erroneously, we are persuaded) to Pyrrhon, who is said to have doubted the existence of his very doubts. This form falls into the fallacy which lands us in the infinite series of doubts, and is thus guilty at the outset of palpable intellectual suicide. Under the other head, that of Eclectic Scepticism, would then fall all other conceivable forms of doubt, including the so-called Universal Scepticism of Hume, who admitted the fact and extent of the mental judgments or feelings, but denied the validity of the mental conclusions and affirmations. As there is no warrant for believing the fact of the mental phenomena that is not equally a warrant for holding to the validity of the primitive mental judgments, Hume in consistency of logic would be compelled to occupy common ground with the imaginary Pyrrho, and forever doubt that he had ever doubted, whether he the doubter had ever lived long enough to doubt whether he had even doubted his own doubts.*

*The system of Hume begins as well as ends in absurdity. "Universal Scepticism," says Sir James Mackintosh, "involves a contradiction in terms. It is a belief that there can be no belief. It is an attempt of the mind to act without its structure, and by other laws than those to which its nature has subjected its operations. To reason without assenting to the principles on which reasoning is founded, is not unlike an effort to feel without nerves or to move without muscles. No man can be allowed to be an opponent in reasoning who does not set out with admitting all the principles without the admission of which it is impossible to reason. It is indeed, a puerile, nay, in the eye of wisdom, a childish play, to attempt either to establish or confute principles by argument which every step of that argument must presuppose. The only difference between the two cases is, that he who tries to prove them, can do so only by taking them for granted; and that he who attempts to impugn them, falls at the very first step into a contradiction from which he never can rise." See *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Science*, Art. Theme. Quoted from Morell's *Modern Philosophy*, p. 224.

There is therefore no valid ground on Hume's principles for asserting, as Hume does assert, the real existence of "impressions and ideas." The unavoidable result in logic is the indefinite series of dubitating exercises which have made stark Pyrrhonism the laughing-stock of ages. The issue of this summary procedure is too obviously unavoidable, however, not to have scared off the prince of modern sceptics.

Accordingly Hume endeavored to stop short of the Serbonian bog of absolutely universal scepticism, and admitted the reality of "impressions and ideas." That is, (to translate his meaning into modern phrases,) he admitted the *datum*, but questioned the *veracity*, of consciousness. But the validity of this particular admission is (as we just now said) inconsistent with Hume's doctrine (which, of course, is on his own showing itself invalid and just as likely to be erroneous as true) of the invalidity of all our knowledge. The only authority there can be for affirming the reality of the *datum* of consciousness, is the assumed *veracity* of consciousness on that point; the veracity, that is to say, of a faculty on one point the veracity of which on all points is stoutly denied.

All forms of Sceptical Rationalism are, in the meanwhile, at the mercy of the same argument which, as we said a while ago, eviscerates Deism. The entire sceptical fabric, therefore, is without logical basis, and at the first assault of discerning reason must tumble. The forms of doubt thus removed, we are shut up to the alternative of affirmation or outright denial, and the question is soon narrowed down to the old dilemma between Atheism and Faith.

This is no mean result of the battles between the truth and error. Infidelity has been effectually unmasked. The hands may be those of some new and specious delusion, but the voice will ever be found to be that of this ancient enemy. But the matter does not stop here. Atheism itself, though more logical than the other forms of infidelity, is as untenable as the most untenable among them.

By a rigid process of exclusion there have now been eliminated from our catalogue all the several forms of infidelity except these

two: Atheism and Agnosticism. The first of these is by no means an obsolete system. In point of fact, as a system having extensive prevalence, dogmatic Atheism is distinctly an outgrowth of those social and moral, even more than intellectual, tendencies which culminated in the French Revolution. Lord Bacon could lay his finger on no more than *two* plainly marked cases of Atheists in antiquity. Their number was considerable in the days of "the Terror." Men like Vogt and Büchner, or even like Haeckel and Helmholtz and Clifford, are not so often to be met with now as men like Darwin and Lewes and Buckle and Galton. The profane and sanguinary orgies in Paris in the latter part of the eighteenth century opened men's eyes as they had never been opened before to the iniquity and atrocious folly of Atheism. The world was now enabled for the first time to judge Atheism as a system not locked up in the breast of some eccentric philosopher, or limited to the closet of some poetic dreamer, but diffused somewhat more generally among the people. A very wide diffusion of Atheism among the people has never taken place on earth. The criterion laid down by our Lord is not peculiar to Christianity. Atheism has been judged by its fruits; and the enemies as well as the friends of the Christian religion have united in the condemnation of a system which in theory involves a denial of the utility and even the possibility of all religion that is worthy of the name, and when put in practice removes the foundations of morality and social order. The reproach implied in the charge of Atheism is one that will never be wiped out while man continues to be man. Atheism is more or less prevalent in the world to-day; but it has been compelled in a majority of instances to assume a disguise. In what we have to say on this topic we of course employ the term Atheism in its reference to the theoretical system so denominated. There is also such a thing as Atheism in a practical sense; but Atheism is in that sense but another name for ungodliness of life. But Atheism, even in the theoretical acceptance of the term, may be taken with latitude or with precision. We thus arrive at the distinction between virtual and veritable Atheism. In all careful discussions the term is taken with precision, and used of that

kind of Atheism which is veritably, and not of that kind which is only virtually such. Virtual Atheism is a description which may be applied to any form of infidelity which, though not consciously Atheistic, is yet capable of a logical reduction to Atheism.* But Atheism that is veritably cherished in the heart may and does assume two forms. Atheism may be either dogmatic or tacit. Dogmatic Atheism is that form of Atheism which is not only self-conscious but self-avowed. It is the categorical denial that there is a God. It is in this form that the absurdities and ruinous consequences of Atheism have been shown up in such a light that there has been a general abandonment of the system. The familiar difficulty of proving (and so of asserting) a negative here takes on colossal proportions. John Foster has profoundly observed that a man must himself be invested with divine attributes before he could be warranted in denying the divine existence. Among other things he argues that unless the Atheist had been everywhere he could not know that somewhere there might not be convincing evidences of a God. This argument has been applauded by two of the most illustrious theologians and orators of Great Britain: but on equally high authority has been pronounced sophistical, on the ground that the Atheist would be justified if he could in reality find *one* place that was destitute of the manifestations of a God. We are inclined to the opinion that Foster's argument is sound. Its soundness appears to be evinced from the following consideration: The propositions are distinct: A. There is a God; and B. The existence of a God (if there be a God) must be everywhere manifest. Both these propositions are true; but the second ought to be surrendered sooner than the first. The second of these propositions implies the truth of two others, viz., that if there be a God anywhere he must manifest himself there: and, if there be a God, he must

*We cannot but think Archbishop Whately is rather hard in his strictures on Lord Bacon because Bacon insists on making the ordinary distinction between the ancient pagan Polytheists and veritable Atheists. The old pagan systems admitted the existence of a great first cause, but erred as to its personality, or its unity, or its independence. See Whately's Bacon's Essays, p. 139. London: Jno. W. Parker & Son, West Strand. 1856.

be ubiquitous. There are, however, three conceivable hypotheses, any one of which might be reconciled in thought with the proposition of a first cause. They are these: that the first cause is manifest everywhere; that he is manifest in some places and not in others; and that he is manifest nowhere.

It will be observed that the question here is not whether the confessedly immense and omnipresent Jehovah of the Scriptures be ubiquitous, but whether the postulated but debateable *first cause* of natural theology be ubiquitous. The necessary ubiquity of a first cause ought to be given up before surrendering the doctrine of the existence of such a cause. Even conceding the necessary ubiquity of the first cause, the doctrine of the universal manifestation of such a cause ought to be surrendered in preference to the doctrine surrendered by the atheist. The absence of divine manifestation *anywhere* might warrant one in provisional scepticism. The absence of divine manifestation *everywhere* would warrant one in utter Pyrrhonism, were one gifted with immensity or omnipresence. In no event can the atheist under present conditions be justified in his extreme assertion. The professed enemy of credulity, he is thus demonstrated to be the most credulous of mortals. But the premiss of the atheist has no basis in fact. The manifestations of the eternal power and Godhead of the world's Creator and Architect are as universal as they are plain and undeniable. Theologians of Paley's time found a cure for Atheism in the human eye. Theologians of the time of Professor Calderwood prefer to take their argument from the Cosmos viewed in its integrity.

The chief or sole reliance of many is on the testimony of instinct, or of conscience. There is only one conceivable escape from the force of the general argument for the being of a God. It is evasion. It is a summary arrest of the intellectual process which legitimates the premises of the syllogism. This is the ingenious *pis aller* that has found expression in the system of Agnosticism—or the doctrine that God is unknowable—the only form of contemporary infidelity which we have not yet submitted to examination. The most well-defined shape that Agnosticism has put on has been Positivism in the narrow and strict sense, the

scheme of Comte; but the term has been invented to cover and describe all who accept the modern doctrine of the unknowable; including the entire school of British and Continental men of science who stop short of explicit Atheism, and yet deny the fact, and commonly the possibility, of the Supernatural. Agnosticism may seek to justify its affirmation of the hopelessness of looking for a first cause (whether efficient or final) in any one of three ways. All these three ways involve the assertion that a first cause is unknowable. According to one form of Agnosticism, the first cause is unknowable because it does not exist. This is evidently but a phase of open or secret Atheism. It is commonly tacit, as distinguished from dogmatic Atheism. It is Atheism, in other words, under a domino: Atheism that is conscious of itself, but does not dare to show its hand. This appears to have been very nearly the attitude presented in the outset by the celebrated founder of French Positivism.

A second form of Agnosticism insists upon the *fact* of a first cause (in some sense), but declares that the *nature* of that cause is wholly unknowable. This is the position of the coryphæus, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and his school, including his clever American disciple Mr. John Fiske. There are "better moods" in which this seems to be the hypothesis which has most attraction for such minds as that of Professor Tyndall. This is a scheme of Monism which is materialistic, idealistic, or absolutely neutral, at the pleasure or whim of the individual brain that assents to it. In the theoretical aspect given to it by Mr. Spencer, and at times by Mr. Tyndall, the scheme is strangely similar to that of Schelling or of Spinoza. To all intents and purposes, however, the scheme of the scientific infidels of our day of the school just referred to is the baldest Materialism. The God they worship is little else or nothing else than *force*.

Agnosticism in its third and purest form declares the *fact* as well as the *nature* of the first cause to be unknowable, and holds the mind in suspense betwixt opposite conclusions. This is the proper attitude of your true Positivist. This is ordinarily the ostensible attitude of Professor Tyndall. Whilst Comte was personally and at heart (notwithstanding the caveat of the late

Mr. Mill) an Atheist, the scheme Comte invented was expressly contrived so as to be non-committal on the question as to the *fact* and *nature* of an ultimate cause. With all his mental perturbations and pathetic moral and æsthetic yearnings, this was, as it should seem, the habitual attitude also of John Stuart Mill. If we may be pardoned for using just here a parliamentary figure, Agnosticism in this form is an attempt to get rid of the question by a motion for indefinite postponement. If we are permitted to press the image still further, that motion the common sense of mankind at large has over and over decided to be out of order. The effort of Mr. Spencer to ground the doctrine of the unknowable in Sir William Hamilton's peculiar theory of the incogitable fails under the pressure of a logical dilemma. Either Sir William's theory was the same with Dean Mansel's, or not. If it was, then it has been thoroughly refuted; for it has been effectually pointed out that Mansel's famous argument is a sophism that depends on treacherous assumptions and the use of equivocal terms. If it was not, then the fundamental dictum remains unproved. But even were it otherwise, the whole system of Agnosticism topples to the ground when once the sovereign and intuitive law of causation has established itself, as a law not only of subjective but of objective validity. The entire structure of Agnosticism falls with Hume's shallow and exploded doctrines of experience and of cause. If Immanuel Kant deserved no other credit, he would (notwithstanding his own deplorable defects and errors) be entitled to our admiration for his overthrow of the great intellectual iconoclast of the last century in Scotland. Scepticism has ever had the fate of Actæon and has been eaten by its own dogs.

Agnosticism is thus even in its best form equivalent to virtual Atheism. In its more audacious expression the Atheism is hardly veiled. But all Agnostics may be driven peremptorily to the ground of the outspoken or dogmatic Atheist. On the assumption of the Agnostic, (so far at least as he ventures to avow it,) the existence of a God, even if the fact be unknowable, is nevertheless *possible*; in other words it *may* be true, even in our ignorance, that the being of whom we are thus ignorant exists.

But if it is true that a God exists, it may be also true that he has given to his creatures a supernatural revelation and supported it by supernatural credentials. Thus there follows from the acknowledged premises of Agnosticism the credibility of the supernatural, and then by a remorseless logical process (as before shown) the truth and divinity of the Christian religion. It is a sad mistake to suppose that nothing has been gained to the apologetic argument by past conflicts. The only ground that infidelity can now stand on with the slightest color of plausibility is by the denial of the credibility of the miracles; and that ground is at once swept from under the feet of those who do not take upon themselves at the same time to deny not merely the legitimacy of the proof, but also the reality of the fact, of the existence of a God. Atheism alone can assume the astounding burden of this responsibility.

So monstrous and incredible a thing is Atheism in all its phases and under all its disguises; and yet into this gulf of outer darkness must sink all those who under whatever name recalcitrate from the logic of the Theist. "To this complexion must it come at last." Atheism or Faith: this is the last and only alternative for the rational mind that is not given up to utter Scepticism.*

*When these words were written the writer had not seen the review of Strauss's "New Faith" in the *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review* for April, 1874. The article is from the pen of one of the editors, Dr. H. B. Smith of New York, and contains the following statements: "Infidelity sometimes 'serves the law it seems to violate.' Logically and ruthlessly carried out, it reveals its inmost nature, and sets before the vacillating half-believers just where their scepticism tends. A thorough-going and uncompromising Atheism or Pantheism may thus unwittingly render essential service to the Christian faith. In putting forth its full strength it may unveil its essential impotence. Thus this last volume of one of the ablest modern antagonists of our faith shows the utmost that can be said against it, without reserve or qualification. It exhibits the old and the new faith in their sharpest antagonism. We can see what we must give up if we abandon Christianity, what we have left if we accept the new belief. It is, said Strauss, in substance, Atheism or Christianity: there is no logical middle ground. This is the vital sense of his 'Confession.' And this is a great point gained in the whole argument. The issue is definitely made. Visors and masks are raised. The sentimental semi-infidels are forced to face the storm. Some scientific men.

The intermediate ground is effectually commanded by the guns of the Theistic argument. All other forms of Supernaturalism except that of the Bible may be considered as "creeds outworn"; and all other forms of Naturalism except that of the Atheist, are "twice dead, plucked up by the roots." *Ventum ad supremum.* We could not ask a better or an easier quarrel. Let it then be insisted upon and made plain by the defenders of Christianity that the whole argument of infidelity takes the straight course to Atheism. The sophism here is in the original postulates. It is an appalling instance of the *reductio ad absurdum*. Then in the name of common sense, common morality, and human welfare and peace, let those postulates perish. There is, as we have seen, but one alternative. We are in this plain dilemma: "If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him." With this presentation of the matter we need not be at a moment's loss for our decision. As Dr. Johnson would say, we know there is a God, and "there's an end on't."

In what light, then, are we to regard Agnosticism? Simply as a new and very subtle device in evasion of the inevitable issue. Seeing that the choice lies between Faith and Atheism, and that Atheism is as unpopular as untenable, Positivism is a hopeless effort to adjourn the decision of the question altogether by a motion for indefinite postponement. We have demonstrated the futility of this expedient. There is no adjournment of the question possible, and there is no half-way house between Theism and Atheism.

There are many ways of meeting the Positivist, but this is the who talk vaguely and plausibly all round the only real questions in debate, will be obliged to leave rhetoric and use logic, and boldly meet the inevitable consequences of their own principles. For Strauss has, at last, no reserves, no concealments! he has dared 'the uttermost.' Vague phrases find their clear statements. Unreal compromises are brushed aside. What others whisper to the coterie he proclaims from the house-tops. Those who reject a personal God (he argues) must accept a blind and Godless evolutionism. It is, with him, God or Darwin; 'the choice lies only between the miracle—the divine Creator—and Darwin.' (I., 204.) 'Everything or Nothing.' *Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review*, Vol. III., New Series, No. 10, pp. 261, 262.

best; or at all events the most intelligible and summary. The world is acquainted with Leslie's "Short Method with the Deist." In like manner, this is our short method with the Positivist: to unmask his pretensions, to show him up in his true colors, to prick the bladder of overweening confidence on which he is floating, and to judge him by the bad company he keeps, and by the vulgarity and wretchedness of his extraction and certain destiny.

Ah, but this is the *odium theologicum*! Not so: we are not referring to the men who espouse the system, but to the system itself. The men may be, many of them doubtless are, sincere; but *the system* is a fraud upon the world, being nothing but masked atheism; and it is difficult to keep one's patience and maintain one's decorum in the presence of a colossal and iniquitous sham. It is important nevertheless to preserve our equanimity and Christian serenity in the face even of this most deadly foe. It behooves us to be wise as serpents and harmless as doves. The danger is most formidable when its approaches are the most insidious. This, however, need not be made the occasion of vituperative malediction, but should nerve us to renewed resistance. Atheism, as has been shown, is not difficult to answer when stripped of its disguises. Let it then be our unceasing effort to apply to it in all its fickle shapes and all its chameleon variations of color, the Ithuriel spear of truth, and thus to reveal its proper form and complexion to our fellow-men. One of the masks of Atheism we have seen to be the negations of the Positivist. Let it be ours to strip that mask off. The rest will be short work. Any child can then administer the *coup de grace*. How is this to be done? In two ways: *first*, by elaborate and exhaustive confutation; tracking the argument of the adversary with deliberation and competent learning, and with unruffled composure, into every den of logical error and every nook and cranny of sophistical absurdity in which it may have been driven to hide its diminished head; *secondly*, by exposing the radical vice which inheres in its fundamental principles. The former method is indispensable to an adequate and philosophic reply that shall exhaust the subject and set the question at rest forever. Atheism, Deism, and Pantheism have in turn been met and confounded

with such a rejoinder. A similar answer is now much to be desiderated to Agnosticism.

The directions given to the Syrian army in the days of Ahab might be repeated now: "Fight ye not with great or small, save only with the king."* The king in this case is Herbert Spencer.† When he falls, the battle with the others will be virtually ended. Darwin leans on Huxley and Tyndall, and Huxley and Tyndall lean on Hume. It is the Indian fable of the elephant and the tortoise again. Spencer on the other hand leans partly on Hume, partly on Mansel (or Hamilton), and partly supports himself by his own unaided exertions. In a certain sense, and to a great extent, Spencer may be said to be without visible means of support. The thoroughgoing overthrow of Spencer is logically tantamount to the overthrow of Tyndall, Huxley, Maudesley *et al.* The Spencerian position as to the unknowable is confessedly the same too with that of Comte. The overthrow of that position, on deep and broad grounds, carries with it therefore the overthrow of Agnostic Positivism in all its branches. Considering the fundamental character and wide prevalence of this Spencerian doctrine of the unknowable, it has hardly yet received the overwhelming and crushing demolition which is loudly called for by the exigencies of the hour, and which it far more richly deserves than ever did the *ignis fatuus* of Darwinism. In the meanwhile the other method of rejoinder is open to every one who is endowed with "discourse of reason" and who is capable of understanding the drift of a syllogism.

H. C. ALEXANDER.

*2 Chron. xviii. 30.

†Spencer is the *ostensible* king. There are many who think, however, that *Hume* is the *real* king—albeit not similarly tricked out in the royal robe of grandiloquent pretension.

ARTICLE VII.

DAVIDSON'S HEBREW GRAMMAR.

Introductory Hebrew Grammar. By Rev. A. B. DAVIDSON, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Hebrew, etc., in the New College, Edinburgh, Scotland. Second Edition. T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh, Publishers. 1876. Price, Six Shillings.

“No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick, that they which come in may see the light.” If, however, a burning candle should be found by us, having been lighted by another, the fact that we did not originate the light is no reason why we should not give it prominence. The question is not, Who originated the light? but the question is, Is it a brilliant light-giver? If there be a source or fountain of light, it should be made as prominent as possible. If it could be elevated so high as to enlighten the world, it would be our duty to bear it aloft that the world might walk in the light of it. It is with the hope of rendering more prominent a light in which we have been walking with delight for some time that this article has been undertaken. May the time soon come when Bible-students the world over shall walk in the light which this work sheds upon the original of the Old Testament. Gratitude for substantial benefit received from the instructions of the author and the study of his work, ought to be sufficient to prompt us to pay to him the tribute we now offer; while the desire to make known to the public the existence of so valuable a work ought to act upon us as a more powerful stimulus.

THE AUTHOR.

Before proceeding to the consideration of the book, it may be well to speak a few words concerning its author. Were his name as widely known as his worth deserves, nothing of the sort would be required. As it is, however, a few words may, with some, be needed. Dr. Davidson, as the heading of this article indicates, is Professor of Hebrew, Chaldee, Arabic, etc., in the New, or Free Church, College in Edinburgh. Notwithstanding his youth, for he has scarcely reached middle age, and notwithstand-

ing the fact that his department is the one usually esteemed most uninteresting by students in theology, his classes are always large and his students unusually enthusiastic. Indeed, one rarely finds in any seminary or university a professor who is more highly appreciated. Neither is his worth prized by his students alone, but by scholars throughout the United Kingdom. In the Old Testament Revision Committee, of which he is a member, we are informed that he holds the highest rank. The books which have appeared from his pen, owing to his youth and the weight of his labors, are few in number, but of the first rank as it respects merit. They are as follows: Two editions of his Hebrew Grammar; a small work on the Hebrew Accents; and a Commentary on Job, Vol. I. The only adverse criticism we have ever heard on any of these was the lack of the second volume of his Commentary on Job. The value of the first volume of this Commentary can best be exhibited (as we are not now offering to review it,) by giving the estimate which scholars have placed upon it. A professor at Cambridge, England, expressed it as his judgment of the worth of the book, that Dr. Davidson's Church ought to debar him from all other labor until he had finished so valuable a work. The man who worthily fills the pulpit formerly occupied by Dr. Candler, Sr., told us that he had all the Commentaries on Job, both English and German, and that this work was worth more than all of them together. Dr. T. D. Witherspoon, while lecturing on the Book of Job, said that he found in Davidson's Commentary all that he found in all other books, and more besides. One more fact with reference to our author, in his department: not many years ago an endowment fund was raised, which should furnish a yearly prize of a hundred pounds sterling to be given to the student who should pass the highest examination on Hebrew. The only other qualifications required were these: he must have been a student of one of the Scotch universities and have just recently finished his course on Theology. Now, in the year 1875, six of those prizes had been given, and out of the six the pupils of Dr. Davidson had received three, notwithstanding the fact that there are in the kingdom four Universities, three Free Colleges, and a United Presbyterian College, besides an Independent Hall, and perhaps others.

THE WORK NEEDED.

It can scarcely be regarded as an error by authors, teachers, or scholars in this department of study, when it is asserted that this work is greatly needed by the English-speaking people of the world. After all that had been done in the line of Hebrew grammars, very much had been left undone. Even the author of a work on this subject, unless he had the self-complacency of the great Ewald, would not presume to think that his work had furnished all that could be desired on the subject. The book, as soon as its worth is known, will certainly be received with delight. We think we are correct in saying that a very large class of students, during their theological course, contract a great dislike to the study of Hebrew. In our own case the conviction was forced upon us that something, somewhere, was sadly wrong: either that the language was one of multitudinous anomalies, or that the grammars were very imperfect, or that we were of all men the most stupid. The last of the three possible solutions, sad as it was, might have tortured us for life, had not a kind Providence thrown us under the tuition of Dr. Davidson and into the study of his Grammar. The pleasure and profit afforded by that experience were wonderful. It was something like that which the student of nature experiences while watching a bud bursting and unfolding into a flower and then maturing into ripe fruit; or, like the development of a germ into a shapely tree. For, first of all, we were soon convinced that we had indeed found the germ, the true and proper germ, out of which all would naturally develop. At first, we had to learn a few things, and then wait to see what their uses might prove to be, but it was not long until these appeared. Then all became easy, natural, and delightful. Every step was a step in actual development; a real advance made in the knowledge of the language. And notwithstanding the fact that the whole volume, including paradigms and vocabulary, falls a little short of two hundred pages, yet we found all the wants of the ordinary reader of the Hebrew Bible met in this small work. One wonders, when he begins looking over the elaborate works of Böttcher, Ewald, and Olshausen, how the masses of knowledge contained therein were ever condensed into so small a space; he soon learns, however,

that they are very elaborate in details, great treasure-houses, as it were, while his is a brief well-arranged system of principles. Generally speaking, the Germans do not write easy concise text-books; elaboration is rather their peculiarity. Bickell's *Grundriss der Hebräischen Grammatik* is, however, a marvel of concise, systematic, and exhaustive writing on the subject. For an advanced student this is a book that affords pleasure and profit; a beginner would fail to catch the meaning in many places. But to return strictly to the subject. We were surprised, most of all, at the explanation of so many apparent anomalies and their arrangement under their appropriate heads. This prevails to such an extent as to lead us to the conclusion that there are no real anomalies or irregularities in the language, that all the peculiar forms arise naturally and are susceptible of explanation. If this conclusion is too strong, it is not much beyond the mark, some evidence of which we hope to give before this article closes. Of course, no system could rightly explain errors of transcription; a few odd forms, perhaps, have grown out of many successive alterations, but if so, they are few. Order generally can be shown.

CHIEF ATTRACTIONS.

There are several features of the book to which special attention must be called before any feature is handled singly. The book is superior, 1st, in the order of arrangement. Everything follows on in an easy and natural order. 2nd, in the fact that it is an exercise book. Every principle is put into actual practice, teaching the student to build up the language. But 3d, the highest virtue of the book consists in this: it develops the whole language from a germ, and that the true original germ, and that germ, strange to say, is *vocalic*. Although the vowels were for so long a time unwritten, yet they are the systematic part of the language; and the apparent framework of the language, the consonantal system, is of the two rather subordinate, at most only coördinate.

THE ROOT OF THE SYSTEM.

This vocalic system, then, is really the root of the system which our author gives to explain the language. The explanation, de-

velopment, and application of this vocalic system will therefore constitute the body of this short critique. The author's estimate of the importance of the vocalic system was strongly expressed in the preface to his first edition. His words, as nearly as we can recall them, were these: "A thorough acquaintance with sections three and nine inclusive is absolutely indispensable. Whosoever entereth not by this door, but climbeth up some other way, will find himself hurled down outside the walls of the citadel of Hebrew, with broken resolutions." The force of this remark can only be appreciated by those who study Hebrew on this system, after having been baffled in trying to master the language in some other way. We shall now attempt, as briefly and as plainly as possible, to give the elements of that vocalic system which we prize so highly.

THE VOWELS.

The only natural place for us to begin in this explanation is with the vowels themselves. The vowels all fall under three classes, viz. :

The	A class,	I class,	and U class,
Pronounced	<i>ah</i> class,	<i>ee</i> class,	and <i>oo</i> class.
Naturally long vowels,	<i>ā</i>	<i>ē, ī</i>	<i>ō, ū</i>
Pure short	<i>a</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>o</i>
Tone long	<i>ā</i>	<i>ē</i>	<i>ō</i>
Vanishing	<i>‘ā</i>	<i>‘ē</i>	<i>‘ō</i>

In the table just given it will be observed that each class has in it vowels which by their nature are long, and must remain so under all circumstances; certain vowels which are short by their nature or the kind of syllables in which they are found; and certain others which are long by reason of their proximity to the accent or vanishing into sh^evas, because of their distance of removal from the accent. Careful attention to all of these features of the vocalic system is of the last importance, but the great pivot around which the whole system turns is that principle of lengthening and shortening vowels which are changeable, according to their nearness to or distance from the accent. In order to take the principles as they come, however, we shall first call attention to those vowels which are unchangeably long. These

are sometimes what is called fully written, that is, they have the vowel sign and the weak consonant which coalesces with it both, thus אָוֹ, אָוֹ, אָוֹ. Other long unchangeable vowels are originated by contraction. These vowels remain under all circumstances. The pure short vowels, however, never have the corresponding weak consonant, and are short by virtue of their position in shut syllables; this is generally true. The vowels, however, which are of chief importance in inflection are the tone-long vowels. These are not long by nature, but become long or short by virtue of their relation to the accent. The whole truth with reference to them is summed up in a few words, thus: "The final accented shut syllable and the pretonic open syllable have tone-long vowels, and before the pretonic the vowels are indistinct." The worth of this brief rule can only be appreciated when the student has observed for a long time its extensive application. In order to the clearer understanding of this principle a few illustrations and words of explanation may be given. *E. g.*, we write דְּבָר in the singular, but the plural is דְּבָרִים, the *qamec* which was under the dalet being contracted into *sh'va*, since the addition of a syllable in the plural removes it further back than the pre-tone. Should a second syllable be added, the other *qamec* would perish, thus making two indistinct vowels side by side. In that case a short vowel, *hireq* usually, would be required under the former of the two in order to render distinct pronunciation possible. It will be further observed from the table already given, that, while there are five naturally long vowels and five pure short ones, there are only three tone-long ones. This is explained by the fact, that each of the second and third class tone-long vowels represents two—thus, a tone-long *hireq* and a tone-long *seghol* are both *cêrê*, while a tone-long *hôlem* and a tone-long *qibbûc* are both *ô*. Any of these, by removal from the accent, vanishes into *sh'va* simple, and in case of the gutturals, into composite *sh'va*. Of the influence of gutturals upon the system, however, we shall speak shortly. Before leaving the present point, it will be necessary to note a few exceptions to the rules given above. First, the rule which requires a long vowel in a final accented shut

syllable is not fully carried out in the case of verbs when they have a final *a*; in that case they always write *ā* for *ā*, except in pause. Second, the law which requires a long vowel to precede the tone is violated characteristically in verbal inflection; so much so, indeed, that this may be regarded as the law for verbal inflection. The loss of the pretone in the inflection of nouns of the third declension will also attract attention. These principles form the foundation of the study of the language, they pervade the whole system, and when once mastered they pilot the student through many dangers. They are, however, subject to certain modifications by the presence of

THE GUTTURALS.

To these modifications our attention must now be turned. The great peculiarity of gutturals is their preference for the *a* vowels. A final guttural must be preceded by *pathah* or *qamev*, a *pathah* furtive stealing in, if there be no other *a* vowel at hand. They require a composite *sheva* if that breathing be vocal, and even prefer it when silent. A guttural letter points itself and the preceding consonant. A guttural letter cannot be doubled. These are the principal facts which concern us, and they modify the system already given to a noticeable degree, but leave all of its main principles intact. It is here that guttural verbs get their peculiarities, and here that nouns containing gutturals get their peculiarities, as it respects their vowel pointing. The same laws of expansion and contraction continue to exert themselves normally.

THE WEAK LETTERS.

Another paragraph, kindred to that just given, should be introduced at this juncture: that is a paragraph on the weak letters. These four letters—Aleph, He, Vav, and Yodh—while not really vowel letters, perform functions which are vocalic, and in certain positions may be regarded as vowels simply. Their influence upon the inflection of verbs in which they occur is especially great. The laws which govern them are set forth under four heads by our author; the substance of these, with some notice of their application, will now be given.

1. At the beginning of a syllable they are real consonants,

and often maintain themselves, but not always. But at the end of a syllable, after a full vowel they generally lose their consonantal power and are silent. Vowels naturally long are often so marked, e. g., אָוֹרָה, יָוֹרָה. This is the law which operates so largely in Lamedh 'Aleph and Lamedh He verbs. But the next law to be given operates also in Lamedh He verbs.

2. "Even at the beginning of a syllable, immediately after a consonant, these letters can hardly maintain themselves: they generally surrender their vowel to the preceding vowelless consonant, and quiesce after the vowel which they have given up, or even fall out of the form altogether, thus *yaqwim*=*ya-qim*, *yaqwum*=*ya-qim*, *hushwab*=*hu-shab*." This law, it will be seen at a glance, is one which exercises great influence in the inflection of 'Ayin Vav and 'Ayin Yodh verbs. The middle radical here, being Vav or Yodh, will in the imperfect of all forms become the initial letter of the second syllable. In point of fact it appears as a silent letter, or is lost out of the form, as is seen in the illustrations just given.

3. The third law given by our author is this: "When the letters *w y* (Vav and Yodh) stand between two vowels they many times are lost in the vowel stream surrounding them; they disappear and the two vowels are represented by that one which, being *characteristic* of the form, was the stronger, which is generally the latter of the two; or the two coalesce and form a new sound. Thus *qawam*=*qim*, *mauweth*=*meth*, *qawum*=*qim*." This law operates on the perfect and other parts of 'Ayin Vav and 'Ayin Yodh verbs, causing them to appear in the form of monosyllables, as we always find them.

4. Still one more law for weak letters is given, which is of less frequent application. It is this: "One of the weak letters *w y* may be changed into another under the influence of a strong preceding characteristic vowel resolved to maintain itself; the weak letter passes into another homogeneous to the vowel: *yivrash*=*yivrash*=*yirash*."

The vocalic system of the Hebrew language is now set forth; we hope that it has been done with sufficient clearness to be intelligible and sufficiently in detail to meet the purposes of this article. Simple as it is, it is the most intricate portion of the grammar.

and the key to almost the entire language. That which follows is largely an application of the principles of that system.

MODE OF DEVELOPMENT.

It may be well just here to turn aside from our consideration of the details of theoretical principles, to the more practical development of them into the language, as the student finds them in the Grammar. A great deal of wisdom is displayed in the arrangement of the parts in the Grammar, so that ease, naturalness, and progress might all be combined. Starting from the germ already given, we find everything developing from that, and see the language growing and forming itself naturally; and all the time the whole system is becoming rooted in the memory by the writing of appropriate exercises. Passing the points to which attention has already been called, we meet with several sections which are so plain that they will not require special comment. These treat of the accent, article, pronoun, preposition, and conjunction. After these we begin with the noun and the verb, in each of which we shall have a most valuable field for meditation. In order to the easy advance of the learner, both the nouns and the verbs are given piecemeal, the wisdom of which is perceived by every student.

DECLENSION BASED ON THE VERB.

At this point of our investigation we come upon an entirely new and most interesting fact in the development of the language: it is the relation of the declensions to certain portions of the verb. The facts in the case are these. There is a relation in fact, and a correspondence in form, between classes of nouns and particular parts of the verb; and from this fact a principle of classification is gotten, which, being natural, is simple and exhaustive. Even where no connexion in meaning is found between the noun and any verb, its form throws it into a given class. Proceeding upon these principles, our author has arranged all nouns under three declensions. 1st. Those which have *ā* in the tone, pretone, or both. These have the same form as the perfect of verbs; *e. g.*, לַחַם is the verbal form, while

זָכַר דָּבַר and נָבַד are nominal and adjective forms. A glance at them shows their similarity in form to the perfect of verbs, and in many cases their identity in origin. It is quite apparent that these must all undergo the same modifications in declension. This is the first declension. The second, which is given after the treatment of the regular verb, consists of those which have a resemblance in form to the imperfect of verbs. These are the nouns often called *segholates*. They are properly monosyllables, although a second vowel appears in writing, a furtive vowel having been slipped in. Thus מֵלֶךְ appears מְלֶכֶךְ, קָטַל appears קִטְלָה, בָּקַר appears בְּקָרָה. Nouns of this declension are divided into three classes according as their primary vowel was *a*, *i*, or *o*.

As one class of words, resembling the perfect of verbs, has been arranged into a first declension, and as another class, resembling the imperfect of verbs, has been arranged into a second declension, so we find the third class which resemble the active participle *Qal*, *e. g.*, מְקַטֵּל מְסַפֵּד arranged into a third declension. This class, besides its likeness in form to a part of the verb, has a peculiarity, which the other declensions lack, which may be called verbal; that is, it loses the long vowel of the pretone under declension. Aside from the facts already given respecting nouns, nothing further need be given until we enter upon irregular verbs and the nouns which are connected with them, because our purpose is only to present the unusual virtues contained in the book, and not those principles found in all other works of the same sort, unless those well known facts have particular uses made of them in this work.

The regular verb for this reason will be passed over lightly, being found in the same form in all grammars, and needing but little comment. There are, however, a few remarks which may be made with profit. Special effort is made to explain all vowel and all consonantal changes which occur, and all are satisfactorily explained. The closing section calls attention to facts, which, if observed, render the various parts of the verb easily recognised, *e. g.*, where the first radical has *sheva* vocal; where the second radical has *sheva* vocal; where the first radical is doubled; where the second radical is doubled. These and such like points are of great value and should be carefully noted.

IRREGULAR VERBS.

Passing over now from the regular to the irregular verbs, we find the laws which affect the vowels, and the law which connects nouns with verbs, working themselves out with the most varied results. In strictness of speech, these verbs are not irregular; that is, they are not made up of anomalous forms, of which no account can be given, but they are regular after their kind, following out the combination of principles involved in them. It is a great comfort to know this. If, in a language whose verbs have so many parts as Hebrew and Arabic verbs have, many anomalous forms should be found, the student's heart would sink within him; but where system is found to prevail, and can be mastered, labor becomes a great pleasure. That is the case here. Some reference to the modifications produced by gutturals and weak letters has already been made; more particular notice must now be taken of the several irregular verbs and their corresponding nominal forms.

PE NUN VERBS.

The irregularities of this class of verbs arise from the Nun solely. They are simple, natural, and hence briefly stated. Nun at the end of a syllable is assimilated to the following consonant, which is doubled. At the beginning of a syllable it often falls away if not supported by a full vowel, *e. g.*, infinitive construct *Qal*, in which case the letter *Taw* is added as a terminal vowel. Nominal forms occurring under this class of verbs have Mem as a prefix, *e. g.*, מִפֵּל מִפָּה. The changes which affect nouns of this class are easily understood by us, because of similar changes which we observe with the letter *n* in other languages. The nominal forms occurring under this class are more deserving of notice, because by observing the forms given to nouns by these various classes of irregular verbs we are able to understand why they are found in their present peculiar forms. The fact is, they only partake of that form which their verbal origin or likeness gives them.

GUTTURAL VERBS AND THEIR NOUNS.

We come now to guttural verbs. These, of course, gain their peculiarities from their gutturals, and are to be explained by the

laws which govern the gutturals. If we did not fear that the details would weary the reader, we should be glad to present each of the three classes, with a minute account of each peculiarity; but for the sake of brevity we shall content ourselves with a few general laws. In each of the three classes of guttural verbs, the guttural fondness for a vowel appears. The impossibility of doubling is also a marked feature, and the usual tendency to lengthen the letter which otherwise should have been doubled is very striking. The change of *a* and *i* into *e* before a guttural and its reappearance in a *hateph* is a striking peculiarity. With these few remarks we shall pass from the guttural verbs to the nouns which come under them, as their consideration will be of more value than that of the verbs which originate them. Nouns under Pe guttural verbs are of the following forms;

חָכֵם	construct	חֻכָּם	plural	חֻכָּמִים
עָגַל	"	עֻגָּל	"	עֻגָּלִים

Nouns from 'Ayin Guttural Verbs.

נָהָר	construct	נְהָר	plural	נְהָרִים
נָעַר	"	נְעָר	"	נְעָרִים

Nouns from Lamed Guttural Verbs.

שָׁמַח	construct	שְׁמָח	plural	שְׁמָחִים
מִזְבַּח	"	מְזַבַּח	"	מְזַבְּחִית

Only a few specimen cases are given above, and these not involving all the various peculiarities; but these have been chosen as selections from the more interesting, and they have been given for the purpose of showing how valuable a system it is that traces these forms to their origin, and which thus explains whatever might otherwise have been regarded unaccounted-for peculiarities. Special comment on these forms is not needed, as the examples present those peculiarities to the eye, and the laws for gutturals already given explain them.

PE YOD AND PE VAV VERBS.

Pe Yod and Pe Vav verbs will not demand any extensive treatment at our hands, because the weak letter being initial causes fewer changes than if it were in the middle of the word.

There are indeed a number of peculiarities observable in these verbs, but they arise out of the fact that some of the verbs originally began with Vav and a part with Yod. Now, however, Yod is always found as the initial letter, or almost always. When, through the influence of the prefix in inflection, the letter originally initial is thrown to the end of a syllable, the letter is always Vav, and unites with the vowel of the preformative. These cases are found in the *Niphal*, *Hiphil*, and *Hophal*. Thus $\text{הָוֹשִׁיב} = \text{הוֹשִׁיב}$, $\text{נִוֹשֵׁב} = \text{נוֹשֵׁב}$. These changes, it will be observed, agree with the laws for weak letters which were earlier noticed in our observations. A number of verbs in this general class show the Yod in the *Hiphil*; a few assimilate it. Some of these things have to be retained in the memory merely as facts, or as rules of very narrow application.

Nouns from Pe Yod verbs are of the form עָרְדָה , which form is sometimes found in the infinitive. Some nouns also have Mem as a preformative, as מְוֹלָד and מְיָטָב , also מִצָּע with the initial letter assimilated.

'AYIN VAV AND 'AYIN YOD VERBS.

Since the Vav or Yod in the 'Ayin Vav and Yod verbs is the middle radical instead of the initial one, the peculiarities arising from these two letters are more varied, making the verbs themselves and their associated nouns all the more interesting. The two letters, Vav and Yod, have in these verbs become more thoroughly identified than in the class just now considered, yet in the *Qal* they are distinguished. The principles of Section 9 of the Grammar, that relating to weak letters, must here be called in to explain the intricacies of these verbs. The use of these principles appears in the *Qal* preterites, that is, in the words as we find them in the dictionaries. Thus we find טוֹב , $\text{מָתָה$, קָם , but these are contracted forms for טוֹב , $\text{מָתָה$, and קָם . The explanation is to be found §9: 3. "When the letters *w y* stand between two vowels they many times are lost in the stream of vowels which surround them: they disappear and the two vowels are represented by the vowel characteristic of the form." In §9: 2, we learn that even at the beginning of a syllable, imme-

diately after a consonant they can hardly maintain themselves, but generally surrender their vowel to the preceding consonant and quiesce after the vowel which they have surrendered. This occurs in the infinite, where קָרַם becomes קָרַם. Like contractions occur in the *Hiphil* and *Hophal*. These are the two modifying principles which operate chiefly in producing the peculiar forms of these verbs. Without further application of them to the verbs, we shall proceed to the consideration of the nouns which fall under this class.

NOUNS FROM 'AYIN VAV AND YOD VERBS.

Specimens under the first declension are קָרַם, סָגַר, מָתָה, מְנוּחָה, etc.

The declension of these forms, being regular, is not given.

Specimens under the second declension:

מָתָה	construct	מֹתָה	plural	מֹתָיִם
אָוֶר	"	אֹוֶר	"	אֹוֶרַיִם
זֵיתָה	"	זֵיֹתָה	"	זֵיֹתָיִם
חֵילָה	"	חֵיֹלָה	"	חֵיֹלָיִם

The richness of nouns in number and variety under this class of verbs, enforces the idea already presented of the great worth of a system which traces nouns back to their origin, and arranges them under the heads where they belong. Thoroughgoing principles are characteristic of this work.

The similarity and dissimilarity of the double 'Ayin verbs to the class just now considered has caused our author to place the two classes side by side. The peculiarities of nouns under the class of verbs just now to be given will be found to be very interesting. We shall therefore proceed to the consideration of

DOUBLE 'AYIN VERBS.

This class of verbs, gaining all of its peculiarities from the fact of its second and third letter being alike, is very simple: having for the most part monosyllabic stems, and doubling the second radical, excepting in those cases where the nature of the

form demands its repetition, *e. g.*, participles and absolute infinitives *Qal*, etc.

The nouns under this class of verbs double the second radical when it is not a guttural. This doubling of the second radical in declension throws the pretone in an open syllable, and thus takes away the necessity of having a long vowel in the pretone. Specimens of this class are:

קָל	feminine	קָלָה	plural	קָלִים
רַע	"	רַעָה	"	רַעִים
עַם			"	עַמִּים
צָל			"	צָלִים

A few nouns from other sources have the same peculiarities of declension as those which arise from this, *e. g.*, a few under Pe Vav and Yod verbs, some also are from verbs Pe Nun. Even when memory must be taxed to remember the originating verb, it is a comfort to be able to trace them all out by systematic laws.

LAMED HE (LAMED VAV AND YOD) VERBS.

The only remaining class of verbs demanding our attention is the class called Lamed He, really Lamed Vav and Yod verbs. This class owes its peculiarities to the weak letters, and finds the explanation of most of those peculiarities in Section 9. When the third letter is final it is always He, and always unites with the characteristic vowel. When not final and immediately following a vowelless consonant, it surrenders its vowel to that consonant and disappears. When at the end of a syllable, and yet not final, it is silent. This is a brief indication of the laws governing this class of verbs. The nouns which are found under this class present some variety. The following are examples:

עָלָה	construct	עָלָה	plural	עָלִים
גָּדַר	"	גָּדַר	"	גָּדַרִים
חָלַי	"	חָלַי	"	חָלַיִם

These specimens present the chief peculiarities that are found.

CLOSING OBSERVATIONS.

This closes the detailed examination of the work in hand. To

the learned reader, it may appear that we have dwelt too much upon details; to the beginner, we may not appear sufficiently clear in our explanations and examples; while to those who know the work in question, we may appear too servile. In answer to all we have only to say, that an effort has been made to set forth the leading features of the book in such a way as to enable all to understand its character and to so appreciate its worth as to purchase and use the book. The means adopted have of necessity been to give the principles of the book, which has sometimes been done in the author's own words. Originality was not intended. Having walked in the light, we seized the torch, endeavoring to bear it aloft that others might see it and walk in the light of it. How well this has been done let the reader judge. Thus much we venture to prognosticate: whosoever purchases this book and masters its principles will find more satisfaction thereby, and gain more knowledge of the language, than he has ever gotten from all other sources combined, unless those sources have discovered to him the principles therein taught. The vocalic system, with its modifications, the association of nouns with various parts of the verb, and the derivation of nouns from verbs, are only a few principles, it is true, but they are thoroughgoing, explaining almost everything. Search and see if it is not so.

When Professor Davidson entered upon his work as Tutor in the Free Church College as assistant to Dr. Duncan, it was scarcely possible to find a man fitted for such a position; when the tutorship becomes vacant now, the question is, Who, of all the suitable candidates, shall gain the position? We think the statement quite in bounds when we assert that the Free College turns out every year enough qualified men to fill all the Hebrew chairs in the kingdom. Not that their reading has been extensive, but the solid foundation has been laid. May the time soon come when our own land shall teem with students learned in the Hebrew Scriptures, having been enlightened by the same torch which we here attempt to raise! For whatever may have been gotten from other sources, we claim superiority for this book over all others that have ever appeared in the English language.

ALFRED JONES.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE RECENT ORDINATION AT HANGCHOW.

Our Assembly which met at St. Louis, upon an overture from members of the Presbytery of Hangchow asking that that Presbytery be dissolved, appointed Drs. T. E. Peck and J. Leighton Wilson with the undersigned, a committee to consider and report to the succeeding Assembly on two questions: *first*, on the question of the constitutional power of the Assembly to establish or dissolve Presbyteries on foreign soil; and *secondly*, on the question whether our missionaries abroad should become associated with natives in the composition of Presbyteries. Both these questions were answered by the committee reporting at Savannah in the negative. For the first answer the reasons given were as follows:

1. Our Assembly as a representative body can superintend only those churches which are its constituents. It cannot have *under its care* any churches in foreign countries unless those churches through Presbyteries legitimately established are prepared to send and do send commissioners competent to represent them in its deliberations.

2. A Presbytery is likewise a representative body, and cannot be set up by any outside power where there are no churches to be represented. A Presbytery must grow out of churches associating together through their sessions.

3. According to our Constitution it is for Synods to erect new Presbyteries. If our Assembly cannot create one at home, *à fortiori* it cannot abroad where it represents no churches and can claim no representative power.

4. Besides these constitutional objections, there is one of a different sort, *viz.*: that we ought not to propagate our own distinctive Presbyterian body in China and other various parts of the world, but simply disseminate our principles and doctrines. All Chinese Presbyterians should, if possible, be united in one national Church of their own. The churches founded by our evangelists abroad are free-born and have the inherent right of

self-government through rulers whom the Lord authorises them to elect, and they must according to Presbyterianism associate together through Sessions, and so the higher courts grow by natural development.

Here arises the question, what is the evangelist? And the answer given is, a minister commissioned by the Presbytery to go into foreign or frontier parts with extraordinary powers. Along with the several power of preaching he carries also in his single hand, because an *extraordinary* officer, the "power of jurisdiction," and may organise churches and ordain church officers and exercise church discipline, which belongs in the settled church state only to our courts. He is not an apostle. He is not a prelatie bishop. He goes to found and to plant, but he goes still as a member of his Presbytery and responsible to it. And he is also in a more general way under control of the General Assembly through its Executive Committee of Foreign Missions. But just as the Assembly may not intrude into the sphere of the Synod at home, nor violate the inherent rights of the churches abroad so far as to set up a Presbytery by its own act in any foreign land, so it may not by the same kind of action interfere with the proper function of the evangelist, the sole founder of these native churches, the sole appointed agent for introducing among foreign converts the advantages of ecclesiastical organisation, thereto commissioned and authorised by his Presbytery under a direct responsibility to it for the time, mode, and circumstances of his exercising that authority. Any such step by the Assembly must be unconstitutional and also unscriptural and therefore void.

To the *second* question a negative answer was given on two grounds: *first*, the missionary is an evangelist, and in the nature of things his office cannot be mixed up with the pastorate; and *secondly*, the proper development of native church resources requires that the native ministers should be put prominently forward as the shepherds of the flock. The accepted policy now, with those most enlightened about Foreign Missions, is to train native churches to self-government and self-support and to efforts for propagating the faith in the regions beyond. All we have to do is to carry the *seed corn* of the bread of life to the nations,

planting it amongst them, but letting them raise themselves the successive crops which are to feed them and the other surrounding nations to the ends of the earth.

The subsequent history of this report is a little singular. Printed copies of it were put into the hands of every member of the Assembly that it might be read and considered by every member. Somewhat late in the sessions the report was taken up and seemed about to be adopted. But the Rev. Mr. Primrose of North Carolina, who had served for years as an evangelist in frontier and destitute parts, raised objection to some expressions in the report, and seeing that the pressure for time would hinder free discussion, the undersigned, who was the author of the report, moved to refer the subject to the next Assembly, which was agreed to. By some misapprehension this reference did not appear on the Minutes, and the report was not taken up at the next Assembly, and so it has quietly been dropped out of sight. It is, however, to be found in the Appendix to Minutes of the Assembly of 1876.

The Assembly at Savannah, however, adopted formally the position that it has no constitutional power to establish or dissolve Presbyteries, and accordingly that the brethren of whom the Assembly of 1874 proposed to constitute the Presbytery of Hangchow are now and have been *de jure* members of the same Presbyteries to which they belonged at the time of such action.

It appears to us that there has been also a very general acquiescence throughout our Church in the other doctrine of the report, viz., that the pastors of churches organised abroad should ordinarily be natives and not missionaries, and that missionaries should sit in foreign Presbyteries as corresponding members only.

The way was thus left by the Assembly open for the organisation by our evangelists abroad of native churches of the Presbyterian order, and for the ordination by them of native church officers and for the natural rise and development of all the courts of the Church. It seems to be admitted by us all that the Foreign Missionary may ordain "qualified and acceptable men" (men whom the native churches shall *call*) to the pastorate, and may also ordain native evangelists. To this work he is commissioned

by his Presbytery, and to deny that they can authorise him to do this work of ordination is to deprive our Presbyterian system of needful elasticity. It is in fact to shut our Church polity out from any possibility of spreading through heathen lands. If there can be no ordination except by the classical Presbytery, and if there can be set up no classical Presbytery until teaching and ruling elders who are pastors of churches are at hand, why then manifestly there can be neither beginning nor progress of Presbyterian church order abroad. All of us agree, then, that the evangelist in heathen lands, though but one man, may ordain native church officers. Outside the settled church state, Presbyterians have no objection to the one-man power of rule.

But it was not very long after this decision was formally reached in our Church before there arose amongst our missionaries in China a question as to the application of the principle to one who was not a "native" but a foreigner, to one who was not to be a "native pastor or evangelist," but a missionary of our Church, employed by it like the other missionaries in China. Mr. G. W. Painter of our Hangchow Mission, had pursued the regular course of studies at Union Theological Seminary, but because of some doubts in his own mind about his call to the ministry offered himself to our Committee to be sent to China as a teacher, and to do what else he could for the spread of the gospel there. He was accepted and sent forth, and has been a useful laborer in the Mission. No one but himself ever doubted his fitness for the ministry, and recently he was himself relieved of his doubts. Then, his ordination to the work became desirable and necessary, and the question arose how was he to get set apart by the Church to the gospel ministry—the Holy Ghost, as he was now fully convinced, having inwardly and irresistibly called him to it. There were two or three ways between which the choice was to be made. Should he go home and be ordained? Should he repair to a Presbytery of the Northern Presbyterian Church in India? Should he be ordained by one of our evangelists in China?

To the first plan it was to be objected that it would cost a great deal of money and time.

To choose the second plan might be to accept ordination from

such a Presbytery as our General Assembly had decided could not be legitimately set up.

On the other hand, it might be objected to the third plan that it would bring a foreign believer, who is still in regular and responsible connexion with the church in his own country, under the jurisdiction of the evangelist, whilst it is disorderly to have two jurisdictions on the same matter, at the same time, over the same subject. Such a believer, resident or laboring as a Christian layman in the same field with the evangelist, cannot, it might be said, come under the governmental power of the Foreign Missionary unless he shall be first dismissed from his former church relations and identified with the native church. Now there might be no native church for him to be dismissed to and no native Presbytery for him to come under, and his own Presbytery might well hesitate to dismiss him to the migratory care of an evangelist who is always liable to remove to another field. It might be quite impossible, then, for him to be relieved of his connexion with the church in his own country. Still the objection to the "two jurisdictions" might be held so tenaciously as to demand that nevertheless a large and heavy expense of time and money must be undergone in order to overcome it.

The attentive reader will have discovered a direct reference in what has just been said to the position taken in Article III. of this number of our journal by a very distinguished minister of our Church. He does not hesitate to pronounce the recent ordination at Hangchow an "irregularity," and he would have had the late Assembly not only "cure the irregularity" but "also distinctly forbid its recurrence." He lays it down as "an identical proposition that the proper object of extraordinary power is also extraordinary." We question if this is a correct statement. The power exercised by apostles was extraordinary—was it never exercised on ordinary persons in ordinary circumstances? Or, if *object* here means *end*, were the ends aimed at by the apostles in every exercise of their extraordinary power, extraordinary ends? Again, our distinguished friend and brother lays it down as a Presbyterian *dictum* that "the coexistence of two identical jurisdictions is impossible." He declares in very emphatic terms

that "the coexistence of two jurisdictions in the same matter at the same time over the same subjects" is "the most unbecoming and paralysing disorder," and that this "principle is most rigorously enforced in our existing Constitution." The point he would establish is that Mr. Painter, being the subject of the jurisdiction of a Presbytery at home, could not be the subject of an evangelist's extraordinary power abroad. Our thoughts recur at once to the case of Paul who laid hands on Timothy while he was of course under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the elders of some synagogue or church, and possibly also after he had received the laying on of the hands of some Presbytery. We do not know where this Presbyterian *dictum* so called is to be found, nor are we aware what there is in our existing Constitution which does so rigorously enforce it. According to our friend's own showing, the "product of the Foreign Missionary's power must be in as true and real connexion with us as a church organised by a Presbytery." The church which a Presbytery organises is under the government of the Synod and the General Assembly, as well as the Presbytery. The church which an evangelist abroad organises is under his jurisdiction, and through him is under the jurisdiction of his Presbytery (as this argument would establish), and also his Synod and Assembly. Every Foreign Missionary is under the jurisdiction of his Presbytery and also specifically of the General Assembly's Executive Committee. Every Session is under the jurisdiction of its own Presbytery and yet of the Synod and Assembly also, and that in reference to the same matter and at the same time. Every ruling elder is under the jurisdiction of his Session, and at the same time and in the same matter is under the jurisdiction of his Presbytery and Synod and Assembly.

We are therefore unable to perceive where lies the "*confusion*" which is said to arise from "two judicatories in the same matter, at the same time, over the same subjects;" because there is an acknowledged gradation in all these jurisdictions, and in every case the jurisdiction is very carefully defined and limited in our Constitution.

In fact, unless we greatly mistake, there is a most important

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word and a most necessary idea left out of our brother's statement regarding the two impossible jurisdictions. Very properly he declares that according to our system "the power of the whole is *in every part and over the power of every part.*" Here now at once there are two jurisdictions supposed, respecting the same matter and at the same time, viz., the jurisdiction of the part, and the jurisdiction of the whole over that jurisdiction of the part. But the one evidently is not *independent* of the other. This is the word that is wanting to make the succeeding statement a correct one: it is most unbecoming and paralyzing disorder to have two *independent* jurisdictions coexisting in the same matter, at the same time, and over the same subjects.

But will it be alleged that there was any *independent, improper, undue* authority exercised by our evangelist who ordained Mr. Painter? Can it be alleged that any "unbecoming or paralyzing disorder" has sprung or can spring out of the act? In the circumstances it was an act necessary to carry out what appeared to be the will of the Master and promote the interests of the Church, and to save *the Church* at the same time from serious inconvenience and damage; and there was no assumption of independent jurisdiction. In extraordinary circumstances two brethren in China acted in a way that certainly was extraordinary, and yet, as it appears to us, altogether legitimate. It is an error, we say with great deference, to allege that one part may not in certain particular cases assume jurisdiction over the subject of another part for the common good. Our Form of Government, the old as well as the new, provides for just such acts, and they are not to be considered acts of independent authority illegitimately assumed. It cannot be doubted that it would not be wrong in certain cases not thus to assume authority. It would have been wrong for Mr. Stuart not to have assumed authority in this case. A minister, an elder, a Session or a Presbytery, in certain conceivable cases, may be bound to assume authority not technically nor officially theirs, to reprove and admonish officially a church member or minister who sins flagrantly within their ecclesiastical territory far away from his own Session and Presbytery. A Presbytery which knows of bad conduct within its territory by a

minister not subject to its jurisdiction *must* take up the case and send notice of the facts to the body which has jurisdiction. A church member or officer moving into the bounds of another Session or Presbytery than his own and neglecting for twelve months to procure the transfer of his relations and the court having jurisdiction itself also neglecting to transfer them, the other into whose bounds the removal has been effected *must assume jurisdiction* and notify the other body.

Our esteemed friend from whom we are venturing to differ says, "The question is: who are the subjects of the evangelist's jurisdiction? We answer (he says) that they too must be *extra ordinem*—outside of the organised church and her jurisdiction." He means evidently to say they cannot be members of churches at home, because the evangelist must not assume jurisdiction over any such in any way. Well, to test the principle let us take an extreme case: suppose such a missionary in China passing through some city far inland were to find a dozen or twenty resident American Presbyterians not organised into a church, and one of them was fit to be their pastor and two or three others to fill the other offices, and there was no likelihood of his or of another missionary's passing that way again; should he hesitate to organise and ordain because they had not previously obtained letters of dismissal from home? But really we must insist that, in the case before us, the ordained as well as the ordainer was in a very just and controlling sense outside of the organised Church and her jurisdiction. Take another extreme case to test the principle: the foreign believer resident or laboring in the missionary field and called to be ordained a minister, has not the money to bring him home to America and then take him back to China; and the Church has not the money either. What now is to be done? Shall we agree that as he cannot come home, so he cannot be ordained? And has the Lord, indeed, made our Presbyterian polity like a cast-iron machine that cannot give one inch? When he calls to the ministry an American resident in China and the man desires to obey the call, and there is present one whom the Church has authorised to ordain men outside of her limits, does our polity require this lawful authority to abstain

from proceeding to set this man apart, and on the ground that formally he is connected with some home church and Presbytery from whom he cannot well be separated in an orderly way? Why, most certainly the man is just what our brother demands—he is *extra ordinem*, he is outside of the organised Church and her ordinary jurisdiction. So in fact are all our laborers, ordained and unordained, in the foreign field. Our friend says that women or laymen sent out to labor under the evangelist's superintendence are to be directed by him in their work, but that he has no ecclesiastical jurisdiction over them because they have at that very time a definite place within the ecclesiastical order. But we ask, can this possibly be the correct view? Our brother loves to run the parallel between the Domestic and the Foreign Mission: now how is it in this country? When a church member removes to a distant place where he cannot join a church, when he is even known to be engaged in Christian work there, and possibly has been sent out there under some sort of ecclesiastical appointment, does our discipline regard him as still under the jurisdiction of his own particular church? On the contrary, the Session certifies and is responsible for his standing only to the time of his leaving its bounds. The evangelist stands in a different relation to his Presbytery, because it has sent him forth and he makes constant report to it. But the church member, "the women, the laymen whom the Church sends out to labor" for life in a foreign country, are they under the watch of their respective Sessions still? If not, are they under the watch of the General Assembly or its Executive Committee of Foreign Missions? Would our brother venture to take that ground? If not, must he not admit either that they are utterly beyond all watch and supervision, or else consent to put them exactly where he says they cannot be, under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the very evangelist who directs their labors?

Whatever may be true as to this particular point, we feel disposed to insist that according to all the principles of Presbyterian church government and the express rules of our Discipline, lay members of our communion, both male and female, who live in foreign countries, are very especially to be acknowledged to be outside of the organised church and her ordinary jurisdiction.

The evangelist himself is outside of the Church, but these others are outside in a more special sense. A company of Christians cast upon an island in mid-ocean, from which they cannot escape, though having their names on church rolls at home, and being in one sense still connected with various ecclesiastical bodies there, must nevertheless be confessed to be to all intents and purposes *outside*, and may without any delay proceed to organise themselves into a Presbyterian church. Now, we feel disposed to insist that the case of such a company differs from that of believers resident in a distant foreign country only in degree of *outsideness* and not as to the reality of it.

We would not charge our distinguished brother with holding a theory which bears the aspect of mere ritualism. But we may venture to suggest that free as he is, of course, from that sort of error, many who will agree with his theory of the ordination of an American resident in China by a missionary there, will be very apt not to be so free from it. There is more or less of superstition amongst Presbyterians about ordination. What is ordination? What was the thing to be done in Mr. Painter's case? It was simply the official and authoritative setting apart formally of a man, the devoting of him by proper church authority in the name of the Church and her Lord, to a church work and office. Is it any more or greater than baptism or the Lord's Supper? Is it any more or greater than the organising formally a church? May not our Church in foreign and frontier parts perform this simple act through an evangelist as well as gather and organise a church there by him? Well, it is agreed by all that outside the settled church state and in a foreign land, this may be done if the person to be ordained is a Chinese or a Hindoo, a Mexican or an African, but if he be a white man and an American some would be disposed to say that it may not be done. One evangelist might ordain a Chinese, but at least three ministers and one elder constituting a Presbytery are necessary to ordain an American "*clergyman*." Mr. Painter cannot be comfortably and with entire assurance considered to be or entitled "*the Reverend*," if one man away off in China, quietly and without the slightest observation, sets him apart, though having full authority

to ordain in those outside regions; no, it is necessary to his clerical dignity and full official standing that he take two long and expensive voyages in order to get ecclesiastical authority from the fountain-head, which is the Presbytery. There is, of course, a great difference in the ordaining of men of different races, and, as might be supposed, it is in favor of the lower race and the weaker and feebler natural qualifications. One evangelist is competent enough to declare officially that a poor, dark, ignorant man is called and authorised to preach; but several ministers and one elder at least, acting together, are necessary in order to publish that a lighter colored and more intelligent man is set apart to this work. Yes, to make an American missionary, to make what is called a "General Evangelist," this is more than any missionary can do. This is a work the Church has always kept and must forever keep in her own hands. It would be simply monstrous that every missionary can perpetuate and multiply "general evangelists" in the full sense of the term. *Every repository of extraordinary power must have separate appointment from the original source.* This is what ordination by a Presbytery can, but ordination by an evangelist cannot, communicate. *Potestas delegata delegari non potest.* A Presbytery has original power, not delegated to it by the Lord nor from any other quarter; but the evangelist's power comes merely from the Presbytery and not from the Lord, and is delegated power, and he may not delegate it to another missionary. And if he should ordain an evangelist, the ordained could not be a "general evangelist," but only a "Presbyterial evangelist," and responsible always to the general evangelist that ordained him. Such is the mighty difference between ordination by a missionary abroad and a Presbytery at home. There is some mysterious potency in the latter that does not belong to the former.

We are brought now to a consideration of the second main position assumed by our friend, which relates to "the status *in ecclesia* of the native church and presbytery." It seems to be maintained that the foreign church organised by an evangelist abroad is just as truly and closely connected with our Church and our church courts as the church organised in this country by

a domestic missionary—perhaps within the very limits of one of our Presbyteries. Precisely “the same ecclesiastical status” is claimed for the work of “the Foreign and the Domestic Missionary;” that, is the one is regarded as in no degree more outside of our Church than the other. Foreign missionaries “exert their power in our name, and the product must be in as true and real organic connexion with us as a church organised by Presbytery or a Presbytery constituted by Synod.” The idea seems to be repudiated that just as soon as one church is organised and elders ruling and a teaching elder and deacons are ordained and installed, there is a germ there which might develope by a force *ab supra* and *ab intra* into the full-grown tree. It would be denied, we suppose, that so much being done, it would be conceivable that the missionary might even pass on beyond to found the Church in another region. The idea rather is that the foreign missionary must needs in all cases remain where he founds one church and gather others, and having ordained native pastors and evangelists, it is not for them through the force of a development from above and from within, but for him, exercising even synodical power (as it is said), to organise these churches and ministers into a regular Presbytery. He will “order” the Sessions to elect commissioners, he will “convoke” the ministers and elders, and he will “preside” until a moderator is elected. The evangelist abroad is stringently limited as to any power over Americans living there; but over the native brethren his authority is quite wide, and he looks to us, as he is described by our friend, very considerably like a prelatical bishop. But, as we are glad to know, an end is to come shortly to his power—the new Presbytery accedes to all his authority. And then that Presbytery “becomes immediately a member and constituent of the General Assembly whose evangelist brought it into existence.”

Now, with great deference, we feel compelled to say that much the larger portion of all this we are utterly unable to accept. In the *first* place, we must object to the representation of the immediate connexion with our Church of every product of the foreign missionary’s labors. The Church, it is emphatically declared, goes with the missionary and works through him. We accept

the latter but not the former statement. The foreign missionary is not *in* the Church but *outside* of it; he is, as Paul expressed it, "in the regions *beyond*," that is, beyond the ordinary bounds of the Church, beyond the settled church state. And this is the reason why we properly call him a *foreign* missionary, the reference being not so much to a political, or geographical, as to an ecclesiastical exterior. We have home missionaries in the Church or near church bounds, and we have foreign ones outside and beyond its limits. And in the *second* place, we must object to the representation of the dependence of the native churches and their pastors on the missionary. The necessary work to be done by the presbyterial evangelist, it is said, is "the formal creation of a particular church and no more;" but "the 'chief end' of the general evangelist's office is such a particular Presbytery as our Book defines." The idea is that the presbyterial evangelist exhibits as the product of his labors a particular church which is a constituent of the Presbytery; but the general evangelist glories in nothing less than a Presbytery as the product of his labor—a Presbytery which is a constituent of the Assembly, and in creating this Presbytery the general evangelist wields even synodical power. He is, indeed, a very high functionary—this general evangelist. Now we can see no such great difference between a presbyterial evangelist and an evangelist sent beyond the bounds of any Presbytery. Both are members of Presbytery, and neither is commissioned by the Assembly or has any specific relation to the Assembly except that the support of the one is provided by the Assembly's Committee, and that he is appointed to his field by that Committee, and is in a general sense by it controlled and directed there as well as supported. But we hold that there is a vital force and an all-comprehensive energy in every ecclesiastical germ, that is, in every particular church, that is planted by a foreign missionary. It is, indeed, at once "the parochial, intermediate, and general Presbytery of organic and complete Presbyterianism;" it is potentially the *whole Church*, perhaps, in that country and among that race. The particular church with its Session—that is the true and perfect seed, the germ which may develop into a great tree, for

where organised life is, there must and will be, through God's blessing, growth also. And so the missionary, it is very conceivable, may do well to pass on as soon as he has organised a single church with the Presbyterian polity complete. Just this did Paul and Barnabas when they preached and gathered a few converts in the different towns of Asia Minor—in each place they organised a little church, ordaining over it elders, and then they passed on. And when these little churches got some strength they reached forth their hands to one other and became one organic body—a classical Presbytery. Now we object to the dependence in which all these Presbyterian churches are represented as standing toward the general evangelist, so called. We do not admire the picture drawn of this evangelist ordering, convoking, presiding, disciplining both Sessions, elders, pastors, evangelists, as if he were a veritable prelate. We must say that the whole distinction drawn by our friend between what he calls the general evangelist and the presbyterial, and between the American evangelist and the native, smacks to our taste too much of the prelatie. And if this representation is to be accepted, then there is an end to our Presbyterian principle of the parity of all ministers, and in fact of all presbyters as such.

In the *third* place, we must object to the statement that the classical Presbytery which the general evangelist is to organise becomes “immediately a member and constituent of the General Assembly whose evangelist brought it into existence.” Because, *first*, this expression is unsuitable—the evangelist did not in any true sense bring it into existence. He was the Lord's humble instrument in converting believers and the Church's agent in organising them into churches, and his humble services were employed to help on the development that was to come *ab supra* and *ab intra*. He brought nothing into existence. And again, the General Assembly of the Church in the United States has no right to control nor yet to absorb these foreign churches. They are free-born. They do not belong to American Christians or Presbyterians any more than these belong to them. They do not come under “our Constitution” at all, as seems to be supposed. They do not belong to our denomination. And in our judgment

it is not desirable to have them directly connected with our Church, not yet to have those other Presbyterians in China, India, Africa, or any other country, who have been gathered and organised into churches by Presbyterian missionaries of any branch, connected in each case with the General Assembly which sent those missionaries forth. This position was taken in the report on the Hangchow Presbytery made to the Savannah Assembly; and whilst of course we are altogether liable to fall into mistakes, it is our belief that that position is generally accepted in our Church.

There is yet another position taken and urgently pressed by our friend, from which we are compelled very positively to differ. It concerns the questions, What is "the Mission?" "What is the relation of evangelists from our Church dwelling together for a time in the same city? What is the nature of their extraordinary power in such case—is it *joint* power, or is it *several* power? The answer given very emphatically is that their power is joint and not several. But it appears to us that the overwhelming objection to this view is its making the "Mission" to be a court of the Church, and a new kind of court at that. It is made to be a representative body with no churches to represent. It is made to be a Presbytery with no ruling elders present. It is made to be a government ruling through *clergy*. Each of these objections, it seems to us, has immense weight.

The argument which is expected to reconcile us to this unpresbyterian account of the "Mission," is, that if the power wielded in it is not joint then each evangelist's private opinion is an authoritative judgment, and these judgments will often be contradictory. But do not church courts pronounce contradictory judgments? If single evangelists differ about anything, it is "disorder of the deadliest sort" and "defeats the very end of the evangelist's office." But how then when the bodies of rulers who wield joint power differ from one another? We cannot see that there is "extraordinary confusion" upon the one plan, with none on the other. The truth is that Chinese Christians have the same rights to private judgment that American Christians enjoy, and neither individual missionaries nor a whole "Mission" must undertake to

make any laws which cannot be clearly deduced out of the Bible. It is the Word of God which is to have decisive weight, and not the opinions of one man or of a body of men.

It is said "these coevangelists having no ready-made distribution, must nevertheless make one according to unwritten law, *i. e.*, Presbyterian principles of church power." But we rejoice that they must not undertake to make a new kind of Presbyterian court essentially different from those set before us in Scripture. To do anything of that kind would not be "to create the Presbyterian Church, where never was one before." This new kind of court proposed to be created thus, it seems to us, would be a mere hybrid—the mongrel offspring of Congregationalism and Prelacy. These evangelists in regulating those affairs that are common to them as they stand related to the Executive Committee may well act as a "Mission" or as a "Station;" but neither of these can be in any respect identified with a Presbytery. Neither of them can wield any ecclesiastical power. The evangelist is sent forth to act under his individual responsibility, and he cannot merge that into the responsibility of any new sort of ecclesiastical court.

The reasons why jurisdiction must in the settled church state always be joint are founded in circumstances existing there and not abroad. As soon as the church is organised and settled on foreign soil, then and there all power of rule must be joint. Because the Church is a free commonwealth and is to be governed always by her chosen representatives. But the evangelist belongs to a different order of things. He has jurisdiction in his single hand, because where he has any right to be, there is no church organisation. In any city of heathendom whensoever the church is so far set up as to call for a joint administration of ecclesiastical rule, it is time for the evangelist to pass on to the regions beyond.

We confess that it appears to us rather strange that our friend did not take the ground that the ordination under consideration should have been performed by "the Mission." Inasmuch as that has created "the Presbyterian Church where never was one before," why might not the individual concerned have obtained a dismissal from his church as a member and from his Presbytery

as a candidate and put himself under the ecclesiastical authority and care of "the Mission in China." It is strongly insisted that all the extraordinary powers of general evangelists "must be administered by the Mission as a body;" that "when coevangelists preach the gospel in the same field . . . their power is to be wielded jointly in the same particular Mission;" and that this is "not a matter of expediency or privilege, but of vital Presbyterian principle," and that except in conformity with principles like this, which "lie back of our Book and back of these evangelists, they have no authorised existence." All right, then; but why was not this "Mission," composed thus of men each one fully competent to ordain, and acting on vital Presbyterian principles jointly, the very body to have ordained Mr. Painter? Surely, since any one of these general evangelists had full power to ordain a Chinese pastor or a Chinese evangelist, all four of them conjoining their high powers might have been able to ordain one American. Oh, but Mr. Painter was a candidate of Abingdon Presbytery, and moreover each one of the four evangelists in China was himself under jurisdiction to a Presbytery at home, for two of them belong to Louisville and one each to Harmony and Concord. It comes then to this, that in the former part of the paper of our respected brother "the coexistence of two identical jurisdictions is impossible," but in the latter part of it these members of Louisville, Harmony, and Concord are nevertheless to be controlled by a "Mission in China" which is to hold in its hand for joint administration all the high powers with which each of them was endowed by his own Presbytery.

JNO. B. ADGER.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Studies on the Baptismal Question; including a review of Dr. Dale's "Inquiry into the usage of Baptizo." By Rev. DAVID B. FORD. Boston: H. A. Young & Co., 13 Broomfield Street. New York: Ward & Drummond, 116 Nassau Street. 1879. Pp. 416, 8vo. Mailing price, \$2.25.

The appearance of Dr. Dale's successive volumes on Classic, Judaic, Johannic, Christic, and Patristic Baptism, numbering in all some eighteen hundred octavo pages, has certainly constituted a great event in the history of the Baptist controversy. The author before us styles it "the *hugest* work that has ever appeared on this subject." It is evident all through his book that Mr. Ford also regards Dr. Dale's work as made of the *toughest* kind of stuff. His references everywhere to the great modern Presbyterian Pedobaptist author are for the most part highly respectful. Indeed, the tone and spirit of Mr. Ford's book are worthy of all praise. He is not a bitter controversialist, whether he is a fair one or not. There is a vein of good humor running through his work which somewhat relieves its otherwise intolerably wearisome minuteness of mere verbal discussion. And he professes, let us rather admit, *manifests*, the kindest spirit towards brethren of other Christian Churches, and really seems very anxious to be *catholic* if the miserable little strait-jacket he wears would only let him. Let us add that he is evidently a man of large reading, and has made himself very familiar with many parts of the Baptist controversy, but that he shows the effects on his mind and his heart of his being, unfortunately for him, on the wrong side of it.

We repeat, the advent of Dr. Dale amongst the Baptists was *an event*. Our brethren are beginning to reply to him. This is one of their answers. But we expect there will never come any end to them. Dale will last our brethren, we anticipate, until the end of time. The whole controversy as to the mode is in its nature *verbal*, and Dr. Dale's books, so huge and so tough, will give the Baptists full employment in these strifes of words until

the crack of doom. He will give many of them a great deal of trouble and vexation, but we doubt not hundreds of them will experience the greatest possible delight in plunging into the thick of the contest which he arouses afresh.

Mr. Ford says in his preface, that "by the disuse of Greek type and by frequent translation of Latin quotations we have sought to furnish a treatise which our intelligent laymen could for the most part easily understand," etc. The *translation* is well enough, but the *disuse* is to be regretted for many reasons. As to "*our intelligent laymen easily understanding*," we are extremely dubious. Alas, what can the average "intelligent" Baptist layman, who has not been far better educated than Americans generally, whether Baptists or what not, comprehend as to these disputed questions that are *all Greek* to him, whether printed in one or another sort of type? That is just the misery of this whole controversy about the mode of Baptism: in the nature of things the common reader, if he is a Baptist, must meddle with what he cannot possibly understand. Our brethren are great on *Believers' Baptism*, and have much to say of the unconscious babe who does not understand and so cannot believe; but we are persuaded that belief in immersion is, by thousands of the immersed, grounded on very little understanding of the arguments and reasonings given for that belief by Baptist scholars. So far as comprehension by the subjects is concerned, we would in multitudinous cases as soon take the "unconscious babes." Yes, if a certain mode of Baptism is the only legitimate mode, and is necessary to one's being in *the Church*, why then the poor unfortunate ordinary Baptist layman must just flounder about in all the uncertainties of this controversy about a Greek word down to the very end. But why talk of "intelligent *laymen*"? Does not Mr. Ford know that even in Massachusetts, where he lives, there are many ministers, both Baptist and Congregationalist, who are not exactly prepared to go into all the niceties of this endless discussion? Mr. Ford might as well—yes, much better, have made use of his Greek type. We Presbyterians, in America at least, cannot boast that we have any learning to spare; and sure we are that our Baptist friends have not for any great

length of time been here in the South, or at the West, or in the North, or even in New England or Massachusetts itself, overburdened with that precious commodity. And yet these good Baptist folks are now, and have been from the beginning of their short history as a denomination, puzzling their brains everlastingly over one Greek word and filling the world with the din they make about it. Certainly our Lord never could have designed to afflict his people with such endless questionings about a word written in a language dead to them. Nor do Presbyterian or any other kind of Protestant leaders so torment and distress their people. It is only our Baptist laymen who are in this disturbed condition. It is only their ministers (some few of them scholars) who are insisting continually on the absolute necessity of a form, or rather of a certain *mode of observing a form*, and that, where possibly, at best, it may be doubtful, and, perhaps, was designed by our Lord to be always doubtful to us, what precisely a certain Greek word means. And the Baptist layman, wanting, of course, a "*Believer's* Baptism," but not understanding Greek himself, how can he believe with the independent certainty of his own mind what that Greek word really does mean? What a blessed relief from this condition of uncertainty of mind do laymen in all other Christian Churches enjoy, who are taught by their ministers that the main thing in Baptism is not the application of the person to the water but of the water to the person, in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost.

Mr. Ford's work consists of thirty-two chapters. That our readers may have some idea of its contents, we name the subjects of a number of these chapters, as follows: General Characteristics of Dr. Dale's Work and Theory; A Dale (J. W.) Overwhelmed; Water Baptism not a Drowning; Water Baptism more than a Wetting; Classic Figurative Baptizing; Judaic Purifying Baptisms; Judith's Baptism at the Fountain; Intoxicating Baptisms; Alleged Change of Meaning in *Bapto*; *Baptizo* and the Prepositions; *Baptizo* without the Prepositions; Baptism of the Multitudes by John; Baptism of Couches; Baptism of the Three Thousand; Baptism of the Eunuch; Baptismal Burial; Infant

Baptism; Household Baptisms; Baptismal Monuments of the Early Church; Infant Baptism in the Early Church; A Retrospective View—Christian Union.

Throughout the whole it is constantly Dr. Dale's positions which are chiefly considered. There are endless references to "the Fathers," their authority being far more appealed to than that of the *grandfathers* or inspired writers of Scripture. The discussion is very much in detail and is therefore very wearisome—all the more so because Mr. Ford deals so much in what he charges on Dr. Dale, viz., "unnecessary and disagreeable gibing," and "abundance of skilfully refined satire and taunts." Instead of serious discussion we have good-natured fun, and when argument fails wit is frequently attempted, and we find our author "gracefully mocking at his adversaries." When this is continued page after page, and when the whole thing through chapter after chapter is just an endless "doting about questions and strifes of words," the effect on all readers except such as have water on the brain, must needs be unhappy.

To give an example of Mr. Ford's good-natured way of getting along with the difficulties that beset the theory of our immersionist friends, let us tell the reader in brief how he disposes in his nineteenth chapter of what has been urged as to the impossibility of John's immersing "Jerusalem and all Judea and all the region round about Jordan." First, he admits that eighteen months was the utmost length of John's ministry, part of which period he was in prison. Then he refers to various estimates, by respectable authors which make the numbers baptized by John to be five hundred thousand; or, two millions; or, three millions of persons. He says then, in a sportive way, that he thinks the method suggested by Dr. Guise would have been expedient, to wit, for the people to stand *in ranks* near the river and John passing along before them to cast water upon their heads with his hands, or some proper instrument. And he adds, "We only hope that our Saviour was not thus baptized with others '*in ranks*' or '*with any instrument.*'" Now, for our part, we do not see why John might not have used a hyssop branch, standing in the water or at the water's edge, and with it sprinkling multitudes; as our

Lord, it was prophesied, would sprinkle many nations, and as the priests of Israel, who were types of him, continually sprinkled the altar of sacrifice and him that brought the sacrifice to the altar. But our good-natured Massachusetts Baptist brother contents himself with this *mere* sportive answer, and passes on to tell how some writers have said that "to have immersed one every minute John must have stood breast-high in the water every day for nearly two years," and then he says he wishes those writers had estimated how many individuals could have been sprinkled, not in crowds, but separately, with pronouncement of formula in each case. But the point is that immersion did and sprinkling did not demand separate and individual administration, so that the former mode did, but the latter did not, involve an impossibility. But our friend makes no further attempt to remove the impossibility, but proceeds to state another alleged difficulty, viz., "the matter of clothes." Then against all these "real or imaginary" difficulties he quotes the canon of Dr. Carson: "When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility." The canon is, of course, a good one. But Mr. Ford says that to make out the *impossibility* alleged, we must prove three things, viz., what was the exact time of John's active labors, what was the exact number baptized, and that John could have had no assistants; and that we must also show that John was *always* obliged to stand in the water waist-deep. And he goes on to affirm that administrators of baptism in the early Church "generally stood outside the bath while depressing the head of the candidate slightly forward beneath the water. This process requires but little muscular effort and not so much time, nor so 'much water' as our backward immersions." So here is an admission, which we think many of our Baptist friends will severely censure good-natured Brother Ford for making: "our backward immersions are not exactly like those of the early Church." And here too is a mode of administering the ordinance of Baptism which, if our reverence for sacred things did not forbid, we could ridicule as keenly as any Baptist of them all ever did our "baby sprinkling." For the idea strikes us as very ludicrous,

of the candidate for Christian Baptism being required to get into a bath face downward, so himself baptizing his whole body, and then the immerser coming up behind and bobbing the candidate's head merely, with a "slight depression forwards beneath the water," and then calling that *his* immersion of the candidate!

After twenty-five chapters on *the mode*, Mr. Ford comes to treat of the *subjects* of Baptism. Let us look at his chapter *twenty-sixth*, on Infant Baptism. He sets out with some three pages of "concessions" from Pedobaptists (most of them Germans), not one of which concessions has the least weight in the argument. Then at length he says, "But it is better to appeal to the law and to the testimony." But his way of making this appeal is to allege that if, as Augustine held, unbaptized children are in danger of damnation, then there ought to have been in the New Testament "*the plainest possible command*" to baptize them, and that if our Lord had intended infants to be baptized he would certainly have added a clause to the apostolic commission ordering the infant seed of believers to be baptized with their parents. Now Mr. Ford must know that he could not possibly have made an insinuation more offensive to Calvinistic Pedobaptists than this, that they hold to the damnation of unbaptized infants: but, passing this by, we have to remark that his language about the necessity of another clause to the commission shocks us. He says of our Lord, "had he but added a single clause to the commission thus: 'Go ye and disciple all nations, baptizing the disciplined ones *and their infant seed* . . . teaching the adults at the time of their baptism and the infants when they shall have become old enough to receive instruction, to observe, etc.'—this would have been plain enough *and none too plain.*" The italics are Mr. Ford's. So then when Scripture is not composed precisely according to his notion it is not plain enough; and if it were composed precisely after his dictation, it would be *none too plain*, but still he might be satisfied. Alas, this is the difficulty with too many of those whom Mr. Ford represents. They are not content with the Bible as it is. Scripture is plain enough for those who come to it without any preconceived ideas of their own; but when men take up crotchets, they will not obey God's Word unless it

gives them *the plainest possible command*. When God sees fit to enter into special and everlasting covenant with Abraham, confining his Church thenceforward to the patriarch's family and excluding all else; when he expressly commands infants of eight days to have the seal of this everlasting covenant applied to their persons; and when Paul tells us this covenant with Abraham has not been and never shall be disannulled, but if we be Christ's we are Abraham's seed and heirs with him of the everlasting promises; and so when the New Testament plainly presents to us this Abrahamic covenant as the charter of the Christian Church and so that Church as being precisely the same Church with the one that was more fully organised in Abraham's family and in fact with the one that was set up by our Redeemer at the Fall (for Christ has never had but one Church on earth, seeing that a Head with two bodies would be a monster)—all this would seem to be plain enough for any docile believer. But here is one who considers himself *a believer of the believers*, and all this is not plain enough for him; and, indeed, he frankly tells us that in this matter of baptizing infant children he sees so much that looks to him unreasonable and unsuitable, so much that is improper and wrong, that *the plainest possible command from the very lips of the Master himself* would to him be *none too plain*. After this, of course it is not necessary for us to consider what Mr. Ford may have to say in the remainder of this chapter touching what Christ said about "the little children coming to him," or what Peter said about "the promise being to us and to our children," or what Paul said about our children being "holy." If he is so set against Infant Baptism that the plainest command Christ could give would be none too plain to overcome his objections, we shall just have to leave him to settle his own account with the Master.

On the whole, we do not suppose that with inquirers of intelligence, candor, and reflection, this book will at all strengthen the Baptist cause, although we judge that it is well calculated to mislead ignorant and unwary persons.

J. B. A.

Cæsar: a Sketch. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 12mo., pp. 550. 1879.

The American publishers' latest circular informs us that this work has already passed to its sixth edition in this country. Few things can be more timely for educated Americans than to study the fate of republican Rome; and few hands are more capable than Froude's of painting it in vivid colors. The parallel between the old-world-Republic and the American holds completely through the earlier and middle acts of their histories. Shall it hold in the endings? This is the question which should "give all men pause." Both communities began their existence under regal government; both early threw it off, adopting in its stead a constitutional republican form; both sought to secure the liberty of the citizens along with stable order, by distributing out the powers of government to several coördinate centres, each protected against its fellows by the constitution, so as to check each other; both adapted their institutions to peoples who were agricultural in their pursuits, simple and economical in habits, nearly equal in fortune, and sturdy in their virtues; both ran a brilliant career of success and power while those virtues lasted; both acquired extensive territories by annexation, and with them wealth unimagined by their plain forefathers; both found the institutions adapted for a small, simple, and virtuous people, equal in their fortunes, ill adapted for a vast and rich empire; both saw leaders of factions arise, lured by the enormous prizes of power and wealth, to pervert or trample on constitutional restrictions; both parties in both learned fully the doctrine that office and its emoluments are the spoils of successful partisanship; both had their first civil war, in which the appeal was taken from the Constitution to force; and Rome had several other civil wars, ending in the Empire.

The tenor of Froude's narrative and summing up is, like Mommsen's, to glorify and justify Julius Cæsar. The English artist, as we should expect from his race and training, happily declines to follow the German in those inexcusable judgments which render his work, notwithstanding its erudition, a crime against public morals and a pestilential plague-house for the souls

of young readers. Mommsen is an avowed unbeliever in Christianity, and an implied materialistic or idealistic Pantheist. His judgment of grand transactions in history is always that the successful is the right; being the fated development of τὸ πᾶν, God (if there is a God) evolving himself in the series. The party that fails is, therefore, with him the villain party. The interests of material progress are the only sacred cause; and the man who questions any of its new demands for the sake of truth, or pledges, or constitutional covenants, is simply a fool and a criminal in one, who deserves to be crushed out. With Mommsen, of course, the triumphant Cæsar is all right, because able, unscrupulous, and successful. The virtuous Cato, "the last of the Romans," (although admitted to be sincere, honest, pure-handed in office, in an era of almost universal peculation, consistent and patriotic) is in his eyes a contemptible "pedant," who deserves just what he got, and whose heroic and tragic end can excite no sentiment but that of scorn and levity. The attempt is hardy, indeed, thus to reverse the judgment of friends and enemies alike, on Cato's cause, for nineteen centuries! And the outrage on morals is as monstrous as it is audacious: to require us thus to sneer at all that is ennobling in admitted courage, disinterestedness, honor, truth, constancy, and misfortune; because the victim was often unwise, and was at last—a victim. This philosophy of history is worthy alone of

"Mammon the least erected spirit that fell."

Froude, with his more sturdy British heart, fortunately stops short of it. But he also employs all his wondrous art, at the zenith of its vigor, to defend Cæsar's career, his ruthless invasions of foreign states, his attack upon the government of his own country, his massacres, sacks, and burnings. Stripped of the glamour of an almost faultless style and sophistical logic, the argument becomes this: Cæsar had a right to invade Gaul and Britain, whose people had committed no crime against him except that they wished to retain the independence they were entitled to; because the Germans might possibly come some day through Gaul to invade North Italy, as they had done in the days of Marius. Cæsar was right in overthrowing the constitu-

tion under which he held office, because the most of the senatorial party were greedy rascals. Cæsar knew that if he did not play usurper Pompey meant to do it. Cæsar was so conscious of his own position that he did not murder his defeated political opponents, as was the fashion with others. This species of moral justification may appear sufficient to a historian who lives among those enlightened British statesmen who force the accursed opium traffic on China and sustain Turkish misrule for the sake of "British interests," and subjugate independent nations to secure a "scientific military frontier" for possible future wars. But to the Christian reason it sounds marvellously like the argument we hear from rumsellers and pickpockets. We submit that such reading is not wholesome for inexperienced minds. It is of vital importance that the protest and the exposure should go along with the poison, gilded and sugar-coated though it may be.

Doubtless the Roman constitution had outlived its conditions of usefulness. As a municipal form, for town-and-county government of one district, it was the best the pagan world had seen. But when the town council (for such the Senate really had been) and the town meeting of free-holders, and the municipal officers, were to handle, instead of the interests of one town and its adjacent lands, the affairs of a continental empire, it became simply an impossible government. From having been a frugal, just, and energetic home government, it became a frightfully rapacious, mischievous, and feeble imperial government. Of course this outcome should have led men of all parties to study wholesome and just amendments, and to adopt them as fast as was prudent. But those who were corruptly interested in the plunder of a world wanted no amendments. Of course, then, this state of things justified divine Providence in ordering such a revolution as suited his vast and wise plans of retribution and beneficence. But this no more justifies the instruments he permits in their selfishness to work out his ends, than Nebuchadnezzar's fulfilment of prophecy justified his wicked invasion of Judea. Froude would do well to study the 10th of Isaiah more thoroughly before he writes any more history. Pompey and the Senatorial party were conservatives from selfish motives? Prob-

ably so. But we are yet to see proof that Cæsar was a democrat for disinterested ones. The former had at least this element of decency in their position, that the constitution they upheld was the existing and legalised one, from which both they and Cæsar received their offices. We cannot but remember, when we are pointed to the decadence and disorders growing under the conservatives, that Cæsarism did not mend matters. Such proconsuls as Verres, such riots as those of Cinna, Clodius, and Milo, such a set of free-holders as the city rabble living on the state-donative of corn, were very bad. Julius Cæsar, while he lived, put a stop to that. But it was his system revived which gave Rome the infamous delations and murders of Tiberius, the frantic cruelties of Nero, and the selections of brutes for Cæsars by the "legionaries." Froude is himself candid enough to confess, that, if the patrician rule resulted, in so large and rich an empire, only in oligarchy, the triumph of radical democracy could mean nothing but military despotism. This is true. Rome had but these two alternatives; because neither the condition nor beliefs of the ancient world made confederation possible. Thus far the final teaching of history seems to be, that the only mode by which both liberty and virtuous order can be made to coexist in a great country, containing a diversity of just interests and offering splendid prizes to partisan ambition, is by such federative compacts as unite the parts for common defence and mutual traffic, and yet sacredly respect the independence of the separate interests. Has the world yet learned enough justice and self-command to make this system less impossible than it was for Rome and her "allies"?

R. L. D.

Moses the Lawgiver. By the Rev. WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, D. D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1879. Pp. 482, 12mo.

"The characters of the Old Testament" often furnish popular and attractive topics for a series of evening discourses. The human mind loves to deal with truth in the *concrete*, and the more so where it is associated with a living, acting *person*. Besides, the history of the world for the most part centres in the

lives and work of those who have been the prominent actors upon the stage of its progress. Thus the Bible, which records the history and progress of the Church, is largely a book of biographies. And the various *characters* which are brought out in its pages afford at once the most attractive and the most popular exhibitions of the truth it contains. No wonder, then, that the discussion of these characters has been a favorite method of pulpit instruction, especially in the afternoon or evening services, when it seems to be almost a necessity that some systematic plan be pursued.

Dr. Taylor appears to follow a somewhat different method from the common one. Instead of taking up the prominent characters in course, he selects one as the subject of a series of discourses. The volume before us, which is made up of a course of Sabbath evening lectures delivered in the regular ministrations of the pulpit, is the fifth of the kind which he has recently given to the press. Similar volumes, entitled "Elijah the Prophet," "David, King of Israel," "Daniel the Beloved," and "Peter the Apostle," have preceded this one.

Moses, the great Lawgiver of Israel, in the eventful history of which he was the central figure, and in the grand work which he performed in the development of the Church, affords much attractive and valuable matter for pulpit discourse. The following table of contents of Dr. Taylor's volume, covering twenty-six lectures, indicates what an extensive and fertile field of biblical discussion is here presented for a pastor to enter and cultivate: "The Birth of Moses;" "Training and Choice;" "The Burning Bush;" "First Appearance before Pharaoh;" "The Ten Plagues;" "The Passover;" "The Crossing of the Red Sea;" "Marah, Elim, and Sin;" "Rephidim;" "Jethro's Visit;" "Sinai and the Decalogue;" "The Golden Calf—Aaron's Weakness;" "Intercession;" "The Tabernacle and its Symbolism;" "The Mosaic Legislation;" "Final Incidents at Sinai;" "Murmurings:" "Miriam and Aaron's Sedition;" "The Report of the Spies;" "The Korahitic Conspiracy;" "The Sin of Moses, and the Death of Aaron;" "The Brazen Serpent;" "Balaam;" "Deuteronomy;" "Death and Burial of Moses;" "Characteristics of Moses." These sev-

eral topics the author handles with ability, vigor, and practical force. His plan is first to bring out distinctly and clearly the facts recorded, and then by way of direct application deduce practical lessons therefrom. While the whole style of the book is simple, lucid, and popular.

Dr. Taylor in these discourses is no doubt doing a good work for the Church. They must prove instructive and valuable to his own hearers. But beyond the sphere of his immediate pastoral charge he is setting his brethren of the ministry an example worthy of imitation both as to his industry in the preparation and publication of such lectures, and also in this method of pulpit instruction. How much more profitable, both to pastor and people, must be the preparation and delivery of such a course of systematic and well-considered discussion than the random sermons which, in the second service of the Sabbath, are too apt to be upon trite and familiar themes which require little preparation! We would therefore commend not only this admirable volume to our readers, but also this method of pulpit work to our brethren of the ministry.

T. H. L.

Principles of New Testament Quotation established and applied to Biblical Criticism and specially to the Gospels and Pentateuch. By JAMES SCOTT, M. A., B. D. "Truth, like a torch, the more 'tis shook, it shines." Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1877.

Considered in reference to *the substance* of its doctrine and argument, this book deserves almost unstinted praise. It also possesses the fortunate peculiarity of being somewhat unique. The only book of the same sort, or rather on the same subject, which we happen to remember, is Gough's *New Testament Quotations*. Gough's work, however, is little more than a conspectus in parallel columns of the Hebrew and Chaldee text of the Old Testament, the Septuagint version of the same, and the New Testament Greek; together with annotations and a copious index. The work of Gough, furthermore, presents the alleged parallels between the New Testament and the Apocrypha and the Rabbinical writers. Mr. Scott also has an index which gives in one

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view all the New Testament citations; but his book is preëminently a discussion of principles, and a vehicle of useful and convenient exegesis. The book is a thinnish duodecimo of 158 pages, in large type, on thick paper, and with broad margins; and we recommend it strongly to our theological students and ministers.

The author's learning is as evident as it is genuine. He betrays thorough familiarity with his chosen subject, and unusual familiarity too (except in the case of experts) with Hebrew and Greek, with German and Hermeneutics, and with Hellenistic and Patristic literature. The discussion proper is preceded by an Introduction of thirty-eight pages; and we do not know where in the same compass to find a better historical and critical view of the recent school of neological interpretation on the Continent and in Great Britain. Our author deals stalwart blows against such men especially as Bishop Colenso and Professor Smith of Aberdeen. The defence of the Pentateuch, and of Deuteronomy in particular, is admirably succinct and conclusive, and at the same time entirely popular. We are rejoiced to see that Mr. Scott is as sound as a dollar "on the vital point of Inspiration" and upon the related question of the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch, which he correctly perceives is indissolubly connected with that of its divine origin. The argumentation in this earlier part of the book is close and trenchant. The opinions of errorists are classified according to their philosophic principle and severally refuted. The upshot is expressed thus:

"Such has already been the disastrous issue, according to the testimonies of Tholuck, and of Krummacher in his *Autobiography*, among the youth of Germany; the religious literature of which, while nobly distinguished by profound biblical research and discovery, is yet sadly disfigured by intellectual aberration. Christendom owes Germany a standing debt of gratitude for brilliant achievements in the field of learning; but it were weak and foolish to be either fascinated or forced by the arguments of negative critics into an attitude of hostility to the supreme authority of the Scripture." (P. xxxix.)

Prefixed to the Introduction is a list of the works referred to in the volume, extending from Alford, à Kempis, Matthew Arnold, Thomas Aquinas, Bacon, Bengel, and Baur, to Ueberweg,

Vitringa, the Vulgate, Webster and Wilkinson, Winer, and Witsius. The treatise proper is composed of five parts. The first of these treats of the formulas, and the forms, of quotation; the second, of the principles of interpretation; and the third, of analogous quotation. The fourth part contains a vindication of the several methods of quotation, and the fifth, an application of principles, and a conclusion to the entire argument.

The first part is made up of two sections. The first of these concerns itself with the formulas of quotation. The author descants on the importance of the subject; refers to the number of quotations and of quotation passages, and to the sources of quotations, and their classification. He also has something to say about formulas of citation, and their classification; as well as about unaccredited citations by Satan and uninspired men, which he pronounces irrelevant. We remark here that such unaccredited quotations may be important in their bearing on the canon, if not on the text. The author is very judicious in his observations respecting the Tempter's quotations in the desert.

The remaining section concerns itself with the forms of quotation. These are classified as literal, substantial, synthetic, analytic, and idealistic. Particular instances are taken up and examined. The subject of "Quotations" is then disembarrassed, and the field of view contracted and simplified, by the elimination of the topic of "Allusions."

The second part, the one on Principles, also consists of two sections. The first has to do with the connexion between the forms and the principles of quotation, with the classification of principles, and the examination and illustration of instances. The principles of interpretation are shown to be psychological, grammatical, analogical, synthetic, and prophetic. The analogical principle is considered in relation to facts, [other] principles, and doctrines.

The third part, the one on Analogous Quotation, is embraced under five sections or chapters. Of these the first has reference to Patristic quotation from the Old Testament, and to its sources; as well as to the quotation formulas made use of by the Fathers, and to the formulas employed by the New Testament writers.

The next section classifies the Patristic forms of citation, as literal, substantial, synthetic, paraphrastic, and eclectic; and touches upon Patristic allegory, its causes and its effects. The third section reviews the methods of the Patristic citation of the New Testament, under the heads of the literal, the substantial, the synthetic, the idealistic. The topic of Patristic allusion, its nature and degrees, is then handled, and the allusions are discriminated as general, special, and literal. The logical value of literal allusions is estimated, and certain guiding principles of judgment are laid down. A review is then made of the whole matter of Patristic citation; and its formulas and forms in earlier and later fathers, are shown to be similar but progressive. A parallel is found in the nomenclature of Gospels. In connexion with this is treated the subject of citation from memory. The paucity of the copies of the Scriptures is adverted to. The principles of Patristic are shown to be kindred with those of New Testament interpretation, and yet in certain points different from them. Allegory is considered in regard to its nature, causes, and results; and a parallelism is indicated between the Fathers on the one hand, and the New Testament writers on the other, in respect of doubtful citations. The penultimate chapter (or section) treats of ecclesiastical citation. The reader is here aided by a table of reference. The Vulgate citations are noticed, and the progress towards a more exact method is pointed out. Regulating principles are laid down; and the attitudes, and opinions, of Aquinas, à Kempis, Calvin, Bacon, Owen, Grotius, Butler, and Rutherford, are compared and weighed in the balance. The final section of this part considers the subject of classical quotation. The citations of philosophers from the classics are viewed as the connecting link. The formulas and forms are shown to be similar here to what they are elsewhere. Bacon and Quintilian are examined. The analogy and difference between written citation and written reporting are ably pointed out; also a certain diversity in the reports of the same things in the Old and New Testaments, and in Josephus and classical historians.

The fourth part, which exhibits a vindication of the methods of quotation in the New Testament, has but two sections. In the

first the author recapitulates his principles and results. There is perhaps some unnecessary repetition here, and there may be traces of imperfect analysis. The fact that the Septuagint is preferred in citation is established, and the reason for that preference unfolded. The looser forms are not due merely to citations from memory; nor are they always reconcilable with the Hebrew on the basis of various readings. The conditions of the problem, and the *status questionis*, are distinctly stated. Literal quotation is proved to be the normal form. The primary object of all citation, however, is to reproduce the sense; and freer forms are manifestly compatible with this object. The same free methods are employed by ecclesiastical and classical writers, and are founded on reason and expediency. The objections of the sceptical are, as we have seen, opposed by analogy, and are moreover self-contradictory. The fact of the alternate use, and disuse, of the Septuagint, is explained. The validity of the general principles of the New Testament quotation becomes obviously a presumptive proof of its accuracy. Difficulties and discrepancies were to be expected; and the modes of their solution that have been proposed are pointed out at the end of the chapter. The remaining section discusses once more the principles of interpretation. The relation is indicated which subsists between the forms of quotation and the principles of interpretation. The Old Testament was rationally written and should be rationally expounded. The psychological and grammatical principles are vindicated. The inspired author's view-point is to be allowed for. All texts, whether literal or tropical, are to be interpreted grammatically. The extremes are to be avoided of literalism and allegorising. The figures are then compared and briefly defined, of metaphor, synecdoche, prosopopœia, enigma, allegory, parable, proverb, symbol, and type. "Analogy" is inaccurately included in this list as given in the table of contents. The close relation between the parable and the simile might have been more distinctly mentioned, as well as the points of identity between the parable and the apologue. The principle of analogy is defended on logical grounds. What is said throughout the book on this whole subject of analogy is to our mind defective. What is said just here is well enough.

The door is not sufficiently closed elsewhere, we think, against the principle of accommodation. On the other hand, the definition and criterion of true types are not perfectly satisfactory. The distinction between a type and a symbol is not accurately or tersely drawn, and the definition of a type does not allow for "things" and "numbers" that are typical. The author of this book errs on the safe side, if he errs at all, in his limitation of the typical area in the Old Testament. The relation of type to prophecy is signalised. The general characteristics of prophecy are set forth. Special classes and kinds are indicated: such as direct and indirect; Messianic and non-Messianic. Just here there is too much of the leaning towards a principle of analogy rather than towards a principle of identity, that tends to strip certain portions of ancient Scripture of their true and far-reaching, though mystical, sense. The mutual relations are well traced of the divine purpose, prophecy, and promise. The key is given for the solution of parallel difficulties. The method of synthetic interpretation is explained, and its basis evinced. Alternative views are then considered, and the rival theories of the Gnostics, Rationalists, and Anabaptists.

The fifth part, which applies the principles, is also embraced in two sections. The first deals with the proofs of the external unity of the canon. The evidence of Patristic quotation for the authenticity and credibility of the Old and New Testaments is presented. The argument is shown to be cumulative. The various attacks on the Gospels are examined. The historical, rationalistic, and mythical theories are investigated and confuted. The Protevangelion hypothesis is stated and vigorously combated. The problem is solved of the similarity and dissimilarity of the Gospels. A reflex argument for the credibility of the Gospels from their inspiration is ventured upon. The doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration is made sure by scriptural proofs. The last section dwells on the internal unity of Scripture and exhibits the two covenants, of Works and Grace; the two economies, of Law and Gospel. The elements of the covenant of Sinai are summed up as moral, ceremonial, civil. The dispensations are ultimately identified; and that on grounds historical, moral, prophetic, exe-

getical, doctrinal, and apologetic. The *rapport* is explained that subsists between dispensation and revelation. The second is the law of the first. The first is variable; the second, fixed. The consequences are guarded against of confusion on this topic. Apologetic inferences are drawn from the unity of dispensations. The Author of Nature is the God of Providence. Gnosticism is attacked. The common origin of spiritual principles is in the divine essence. There is progressive development in *the disclosure*, without increment to the absolute sum of divine truth. The morality and religion of the Old and New Testaments, Mr. Scott holds, differ in degree, not in kind. The first part of this statement has to be explained and qualified or else rejected. The historical and doctrinal proof of the foregoing averment is adduced. The book winds up with a consideration of the Decalogue. Its character is delineated and its permanence established. The Decalogue and moral law are identified. The Decalogue is vindicated against modern attacks. Difficulties are solved or referred to a principle of solution. Then comes the conclusion.

In discussing these varied topics the author shows much fullness of knowledge and no little intellectual force. The whole treatment is pervaded by a spirit of orthodox piety.

The *style* of the book is compact and nervous, but sometimes obscure. This want of perspicuity generally arises from an ambiguity in the reference of pronouns, and the frequent use of such terms as "former" and "latter." It is far better in all such cases to repeat the noun. This removes the possibility of misunderstanding. The author of this capital book ought to give his days and nights to the perusal of Macaulay. We detect a few inaccuracies. "Would" stands for "should" in the third line from the top of page xxxii. The sign of the infinitive is prefixed to the adverb on page 18, thus: "to loosely reckon." This form of structure is, however, becoming very fashionable. There is an exceedingly awkward and hardly intelligible sentence near the bottom of page 41. The exegesis (on page 35) of Gal. iii. 16 is not perfectly satisfying. There is a fine example of mixed metaphor on page 42, towards the end. The scriptural clause, "I know whom I have believed," is misquoted, and we observe

one or two misprints which are not included in the table of errata.

H. C. A.

The Old Preacher's Story; or, Portraits from Life framed for future use. By Rev. L. P. BOWEN. "According to the election of grace." St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company, 207 North Eighth Street. 1879. Pp. 628, 12mo. Price, cloth, \$1.50; paper .

This is a religious novel, and a Presbyterian one at that. We cannot say that we admire religious novels in general, and we do not know that we ever saw a real out-and-out Presbyterian one before. But we must candidly acknowledge that we have read this one with great interest and admiration. Who the Rev. L. P. Bowen is, we know not, except that his name is on our Assembly's list as a member of the Presbytery of Palmyra (Synod of Missouri), but living at Newtown, Maryland, and apparently not in charge of any church. The story of the old preacher is a very beautiful story, with a plot underlying it that is quite romantic, and yet not beyond reasonable bounds of probability. The writer's style is extremely pleasing, and the story is made a vehicle for the introduction of numerous living questions of the time in our Church, which are all discussed, so far as we observed, soundly and in a very edifying manner.

J. B. A.

Walks to Emmaus. By the late Rev. NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D. Edited by his Son, Rev. WILLIAM H. ADAMS. "And they said one to another, Did not our heart burn within us while he talked with us by the way and while he opened to us the Scriptures." Luke xxiv. 32. First Series: January—February. Boston: D. Lothrop & Company, Franklin Street, corner of Hawley. 1879. Pp. 360, 12mo.

The title of this book was discovered in one of Dr. Adams's note-books projecting new literary labors. The plan of the editor is to furnish two sermons of his venerated father's for every Sabbath in the year, morning and afternoon, and so the work is to constitute "a Christian year." He gives good measure too; for this first volume, covering January and February, furnishes sermons for not less than ten Sabbaths, a fifth Sabbath being allotted

to both February and January. At this rate we shall have not less than sixty Sabbaths in one year of sermons. But we will not complain of this liberality, Dr. Nehemiah Adams having been a prince of preachers. The whole series is to be complete in six volumes.

We think the editor is fully justified in claiming for these sermons of his father the merit of both originality and perspicuity. And we can truly say that we have seldom read sermons which we consider equal on the whole to these. That on *Foreign Missions* is one of the grandest sermons in the language. We recommend it and the one on *the grace of giving* to all our brethren who desire to know how to present those subjects to their people. For ourselves, we fully purpose in our future preaching to make this volume a study. And we shall await impatiently the appearance of those which are to follow. J. B. A.

Prophecy. A Series of Lectures by the late Rev. A. P. FORMAN, D. D. With an Introduction by Prof. W. HENRY GREEN, D. D., LL.D. "Search the Scriptures." St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company. 1878. Pp. 551, 8vo.

This is not a learned work, nor yet perhaps is it worthy to be called an original one, but it is a sober and apparently judicious presentation of the subject in a way that is calculated to be useful. It ought to be interesting reading to all who love the truth and desire the coming of the kingdom. There are no rash, wild speculations in it. The important subject of prophecy is just handled as one might expect a solid Presbyterian divine to handle it for popular use.

As to the time of our Saviour's coming, Dr. Forman holds that it will be when the day of general judgment arrives. And this will be at the close of God's present administration of the affairs of this world. Then will be the times of the restoration of all things (Acts iii. 19-21), which includes the great predicted conflagration and the coming of the new heavens and the new earth. Until this time our Lord will be carrying on in the midst of the heavenly throne his priestly and mediatorial work, and he

cannot *come* (so Dr. Forman holds) until after the number of the redeemed is made complete and they are all gathered in.

Professor Green of Princeton "commends the sobriety and general accuracy of this excellent treatise," and calls it "a safe and judicious presentation in a compendious form of the contents of the prophetic word." J. B. A.

Difficulties of the Immersion Theory. By Rev. S. E. AXSON. Adopted by the Committee of Publication at Richmond, Va. Rome, Ga.: Albin Omberg, Printer and Stationer. 1879. Pp. 113, 16mo.

The author of this little treatise published it first in successive numbers of the *Southern Presbyterian* newspaper. At the request of many brethren those numbers now appear in book form. And like many other precious and valuable things, they come to us done up in a small package. We have no hesitation in expressing our sense of the good service rendered to the cause of truth by Mr. Axson in preparing this little book. We could wish that he might go on and write up (or write *down*) the whole controversy. With his pellucid style of reasoning and of writing, and with his calm and kindly manner of dealing with our Baptist brethren, and the difficulties *in* which or *with* which they have immersed themselves, it seems plain that he might even deliver some of them who are in danger of drowning. As to our own people, our young people, our simple, honest, earnest, humble inquirers, he could save many of them from being harassed to death with imaginary proofs for the immersion theory, and establish them in a confident and satisfactory belief in what the Scriptures do certainly teach on this whole subject. This, Mr. Axson will really do in a great many cases, we do not doubt, by means even of this little volume. But Southern authorship is a rare thing and a slender thing. And whenever we meet a Southern Presbyterian with a pen like Mr. Axson's and with a spirit and temper like his, we cannot refrain from crying out to him, *Write, print, publish.* This is a capital beginning of a popular treatise which would survive his preaching labors and do good for generations after he shall be gathered to his fathers.

We need books just precisely of this sort to put into the hands of our people and of others who want to know what we believe. *William the Baptist* is a capital book, but this appeals to a different class of readers and will answer a different purpose. This is an argument, and a very fair, calm, cogent argument, briefly and kindly presented. It rouses no opposition and excites no prejudice, but appeals to the sober, candid, good sense of the reader. And we believe in multitudes of cases the appeal must carry conviction with it.

The reader can best form an idea of what this little work is if we now give him the titles of the several chapters, fifteen in number: (1) The immersion theory void of Christian charity; (2) Not adapted to all nations and places and times; (3) Difficulties suggested by the word *Baptizo*; (4) Difficulties suggested by the Greek prepositions; (5) Want of harmony between the symbolic import of Baptism and Immersion; (6) Baptism in the river—John's Baptism; (7) Was Jesus Christ immersed? (8) Baptism with the Holy Ghost; (9) Baptism in the city—Pentecost; (10) Baptism in the house—Saul of Tarsus and Cornelius; (11) Baptism in the prison—the Jailer; (12) Baptism in the desert—the Eunuch; (13) Buried in Christ in Baptism; (14) Antiquity of Immersion; (15) Baptism in a nutshell. The reader will observe how many of these are the same topics which Mr. Ford handles, whose book is noticed in this number of our REVIEW. We are willing to have thorough comparison between them.

J. B. A.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Under this head we shall deviate from our usual practice, and in some instances mention works which may still be in the press or shortly forthcoming. For the sake of variety our selections this quarter are wholly from English houses. Readers of Trevelyan's *Life of Macaulay* will be glad to know more of the noted editor¹ of the *Edinburgh Review* and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; whose correspondence with such men as Campbell, Jeffrey, Brougham, Scott, Carlyle, Macaulay, Bulwer, Mill, Dickens, and Thackeray, makes this book highly valuable. The politics of bees and men^{2,3} are likely to be better dealt with by the distinguished baronet than was prehistoric civilisation. The member for Birmingham⁴ is the great living exponent of the Cobden school in English state craft, and at the same time the most popular and, as many think, most gifted man at the English hustings. Hume's disciples are increasing apace.⁵ Few are so well fitted to write about the mind as the author of the "Philosophy of the Infinite."⁶

George Combe⁷ was a quiet enthusiast, with a wrong-headed theory; but was a man of great self-reliance and tenacity of purpose, and on many subjects displayed much useful common sense.

¹Macvey Napier's Correspondence. Edited by his Son, Macvey Napier, 8vo, 11s. Macmillan & Co., London.

²Addresses, Political and Educational. 8vo, 8s. 6d. By Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M. P., F. R. S., etc. *Ibid.*

³Scientific Lectures. By the same. With illustrations. 8vo., 8s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁴The Right Hon. John Bright's Public Addresses. Edited by J. E. Thorold Rogers. 8vo. *Ibid.*

⁵A Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Being an Essay on the Foundations of Belief. By Arthur J. Balfour, M. A., M. P. 8vo, 12s. *Ibid.*

⁶The Relations of Mind and Brain. By H. Calderwood, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh. 8vo, 12s. *Ibid.*

⁷Education: Its Principles and Practice, as Developed by George Combe, Author of "The Constitution of Man." Collated and edited by William Jolly, H. M.'s Inspector of Schools. 8vo. With portrait by Jeans. 15s. *Ibid.*

The growth and modification of the English Constitution is one of the most fruitful, no less than attractive, topics of modern inquiry. As bearing upon this topic, as well as for its own sake, the recital of the facts relating to the Succession¹ to the English monarchy is likely to awaken interest among those who are not already well *up* in the history. The approved work of Professor Jevons² on Political Economy may be commended without hesitation on the score of its talent and knowledge. The character of Bishop Selwyn was one of such exceptional force and worth as to make his biography³ as profitable a study as Mr. Tucker has made it an agreeable one.

There is a weird and potent charm exerted over a growing number of cultivated Englishmen by the lore of Scandinavia. The literature of Iceland⁴ in particular has now fallen into the hands of one who should be a highly competent expounder. The work of Mr. Rupert Browne⁵ seems to be made up of lively essays on a variety of subjects. These memoirs of the old painters⁶ are by men like N. d'Anvers, author of an elementary art history; Percy R. Head, Lincoln College, Oxford; Richard Ford Heath, B. A., Oxford; C. Vosmaer (who is Englished by J. W. Mollett, B. A., Officier de l'Instruction Publique in France); Joseph

¹The Succession to the English Crown: a Historical Sketch. By A. Bailey, M. A., Barrister-at-Law. Crown, 8vo, 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

²The Theory of Political Economy. By Prof. Jevons, M. A., F. R. S. New Edition. Revised and Enlarged, with New Preface, etc. 8vo. 10s. 6d. *Ibid.*

³The Life of Bishop Selwyn. Second Thousand. By the Rev. H. W. Tucker. 2 vols., 8vo, cloth, 24s. W. Wells Gardiner, London.

⁴The Home of the Eddas, By Charles G. Warnford Lock, member of the British Scandinavian Society, Fellow of the Icelandic Literary Society, etc. With a chapter on the Sprengisandv, By Dr. C. LeNeve Foster, B. A., F. G. S., etc. Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, London.

⁵Club Cameos: Portraits of the Day. With sixty-two illustrations by Rupert Browne. 8vo, cloth, extra, 14s. *Ibid.*

⁶Illustrated Biographies of the Great Artists. Six volumes are now ready. Each volume is by a different author, and is illustrated with from fifteen to twenty full page engravings, printed in the best manner. The price of each volume is 3s. 6d. *Ibid.*

Cundall (from the text of Dr. A. Woltmann); and W. Roscoe Osler, author of certain occasional essays on art, from recent investigations at Venice.

The Memoir¹ of the Baltimore girl who became the toast of the royal circles in the old world is just now much in vogue in fashionable circles in England, and sheds light now and then on the history of Europe and on the traits of the First Emperor. We group together five books of travel and adventure. Three carry^{2,3,4} us towards the setting sun. One takes⁵ us to an ice-ribbed zone where for a great part of the year the sun does not set. Still another⁶ lands us in the torrid zone, and among the barbarous, yet gallant—though unfortunate, and now discomfited—Zulus. Mr. Vivien² appears to have been accompanied by the artist Bierstadt (who, by the by, is also a friend of Du Chaillu), and to have vied with him in the effort to fill their common portfolio with drawings. Why is it that our English cousins have either melodious, or at any rate aristocratic names, or else "jaw-breakers"? The author of the present dietary⁷ (with its grim title) has one of the second sort.

We can easily anticipate from Farrar's Life of Christ what kind of a book Farrar's Life of Paul⁸ is going to be. We may

¹The Life and Letters of Madame Bonaparte. By Eugene L. Didier. Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d. *Ibid.*

²Wanderings in Western Lands. By A. Pendavis Vivien, M. P. With illustrations. Demi 8vo, cloth extra. *Ibid.*

³Sporting Adventures in the Far West. By J. M. Murphy. *Ibid.*

⁴Up the Amazon and Madeira Rivers through Peru and Bolivia: a Journey across South America. By E. D. Mathews. With map and illustrations. Demi 8vo, cloth extra. *Ibid.*

⁵The Great Fur Land: or, Sketches of Life in the Hudson's Bay Territory. By H. M. Robinson. With illustrations. Demi 8vo, cloth extra. 12s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁶Kafirland: a Ten Months' Campaign. By F. N. Streatfield. Crown 8vo, cloth extra. 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁷Food and Dietetics. Physiologically and Therapeutically considered. By F. W. Pavy, M. D., F. R. S., Physician to and Lecturer at Guy's Hospital. Second Edition Revised and Enlarged. 15s. J. & A. Churchill & Co., London.

⁸The Life and Work of St. Paul. By the Rev. F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge: Canon of West-

be sure it will be exquisitely florid in style, richly superficial in learning, sophistically weak in logic, seductively Broad-church in theology, and sentimentally unsatisfactory in exegesis. Bishop Ellicott's useful Commentary¹ for the people is at length complete and has been noticed elsewhere in these pages. It is hardly possible that there should be too many books about Palestine.² Few believers can go there, and all must want to know all they can respecting "the glory of all lands." Besides every new pair of eyes sees something that other tourists have failed to mention. The coryphæus of the Liberal party is also a rare scholar, a great churchman, a feller of trees and abuses, and the most prolific of periodical writers of the day.³ We are not displeased to see his biography (not his *life*) attempted, but it is too soon.

The idea of the Encyclopædic Dictionary⁴ is a grand one, and we believe is destined to be worthily carried out. The visitors to Philadelphia, or even to Vienna, did not know Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria, as do last year's visitors at Paris. Such will all remember the gorgeous turbans on the Boulevards and the gilded pipes and cigar cases and olive-wood ornaments near the Troca-

minster, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen; Author of the Life of Christ, etc., etc. Two volumes, demi 8vo, cloth, 24s. Cassell, Petter & Galpin, London.

¹New Testament Commentary for English Readers. Edited by C. J. Ellicott, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Vol. I. (Fifth Edition) contains the four Gospels, 21s. Vol. II. (Second Edition) contains the Acts of the Apostles to Galatians inclusive, 21s. Vol. III. (just published) contains Ephesians to the Revelation inclusive, 21s. *Ibid.*

²The Holy Land, illustrated from the original drawings. By David Roberts, R. A. With historical descriptions by the Rev. George Croly, LL.D. *Ibid.*

³The Life of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P., D. C. L. By George Barnett Smith, author of "Shelley: a Critical Biography," "Poets and Novelists," etc. With two steel portraits. Two vols., 18mo, cloth, 24s. *Ibid.*

⁴The Encyclopædic Dictionary. A new and original work of reference to all the words in the English language, with a full account of their origin, meaning, pronunciation, and use. By Robert Hunter, M. A., F. G. S., Member Biblical Archæological Society, etc. Assisted in special departments by various eminent authorities. *Ibid.* Vol. I., extra cr. 4to, cloth, 10s. 6d. In press.

dero. Both classes would be at once pleased and instructed by M. Edmondo de Amicis.¹ The gulf betwixt Morocco and Albion, great as it is, is no longer as great as some people suppose. Mr. Escott has a noble "*coign of vantage*" in his theme.² The Americans showed rather small in the picture galleries of the *Champ de Mars*; but have a chance now to duplicate³ themselves favorably across the Channel. Mr. Houghton gives us dilatory droppings⁴ from a harvest that has long been hoarded. A Year's Cookery⁵ is seldom served as is done by "Phyllis Browne" at one meal.

The Donnellan Lectures⁶ for the past twelvemonth are on a great subject, and are undoubtedly worthy of perusal and of a place in the library. It is a little odd to find an authority on plants poaching upon the preserves which contain the animals.⁷ The critique of Mr. Gladstone upon Macaulay's History has given a new zest to the scarcely waning interest in the state of the Church of England⁸ during the eighteenth century. The

¹Morocco: its People and Places. By Edmondo de Amicis. Translated by C. Rollin-Tilton. With nearly 200 original illustrations. Extra crown 4to, cloth, 24s. *Ibid.* (In the press.)

²England: its People, Polity, and Pursuits. By T. H. S. Escott. Two volumes, demi 8vo, cloth, 24s. *Ibid.* (Ready shortly.)

³American Painters. With eighty-three examples of their works engraved on wood. By G. W. Sheldon. Demi 4to, cloth, gilt edges, 21s. (Shortly ready.) *Ibid.*

⁴Gleanings from the Natural History of the Ancients. By the Rev. W. Houghton, M. A., F. L. S. Illustrated throughout. (In the press.) Crown 8vo, cloth, 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁵A Year's Cookery. Giving dishes for breakfast, luncheon, and dinner for every day in the year, with Practical Instructions for their Preparation. By Phyllis Browne, author of Common-Sense Housekeeping. (In press.) *Ibid.*

⁶Christ Bearing Witness to Himself. Being the "Donnellan Lectures" for 1878-9. By the Rev. Prebendary Chadwick, D. D. Crown 8vo, cloth, 5s. (In press.) *Ibid.*

⁷Animal Life, Described and Illustrated. By E. Percival Wright, M. D., F. L. S., Professor of Botany in the University of Dublin. Profusely illustrated. (In the press.) Super-royal 8vo, cloth, 15s. *Ibid.*

⁸The English Church in the Eighteenth Century. By C. J. Abbey, Rector of Checkendon, and J. H. Overton, Vicar of Legbourne. Two volumes. 8vo, price 36s. Longmans & Co., London.

state of the same Church before the first quarter of the sixteenth century is laboriously described by another English clergyman.¹ Still a third, and far more famous, clergyman of the same Church, and already a classic historian, publishes several lectures² on certain sacred epochs, which were delivered in the imposing fane at Ely.

This³ is the book of which even Matthew Arnold was led to say that it has left the tree of life all stripped and bare; and its pretentious author is the man who was so unmercifully trounced by the Bishop of Durham. Bosworth Smith has shown himself capable to discuss the country⁴ and countrymen of Hanno. The account of San Marino⁵ will be gratifying to the friends of republics, as well as to those who love curious history and abstract speculation. The septuagenarian has his hands full;⁶ and reminds one of a sermon once preached on the text, "They who have turned the world upside down have come hither also." The Roman Catacombs, as is well known, are full of early Church history. Their value as witnesses can never cease, and we now have a compilation⁷ from the elaborate work of De Rossi.

¹A History of the Church of England; Pre-Reformation Period. By T. P. Boulton, LL.D., author of a Commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles. 8vo, price 15s. *Ibid.*

²Four Lectures on some Epochs of Early Church History, delivered in Ely Cathedral. By the Very Rev. Charles Merivale, D. D., Dean of Ely. Crown 8vo, 5s. *Ibid.*

³Supernatural Religion: an Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation. Complete Edition, thoroughly revised, with New Preface and "Conclusions." Three volumes, 8vo, 36s. *Ibid.*

⁴Carthage and the Carthaginians. By R. Bosworth Smith, M. A. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo, Maps, etc. 10s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁵A Freak of Freedom; or, the Republic of San Marino. By J. Theodore Bent, Honorary Citizen of the same. With map and illustrations. Crown 8vo, price 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁶The Problem of the World and the Church reconsidered in three letters to a friend, by a Septuagenarian. Third Edition, with an Introduction by James Booth, C. B. Crown 8vo, 5s., cloth. *Ibid.*

⁷Roma Sotterranea, or an Account of the Roman Catacombs, especially of the Cemetery of St. Calixtus, compiled from the Works of Commendatore De Rossi with the consent of the author. By the Rev. J. Spencer

The career of the Bishop of Argyll and the Isles was one that evidently needed to be chronicled,¹ and the biographer appears to have done his work in a highly respectable way. We embark again upon not wholly unfamiliar² waters: this time under strange guidance. Everything pertaining to the methods and restrictions of Quarantine³ is now caught up with absorbing avidity by our health boards and medical officials, and also by certain of our politicians. Mr. Scott's Summer beneath the Chestnuts⁴ has cast a pleasant shadow into nooks that lie far beyond the Apennines. The jaunt in the Cevennes is said by the English journals to have met with a most charming describer in Mr. Stevenson.⁵

The three works which follow are on physical science. The first is the great argument⁶ of the celebrated naturalist, M. de Quatrefages, against Darwin and Evolution. The French *savant* betrays no prepossession in favor of the Christian religion, or of the Biblical view of things. So far from it, he is understood to reject the account in Genesis of the origin of man. The second is a disquisition⁷ by the equally famous German, the Evolutionist

Northcote, D. D., Canon of Birmingham, and the Rev. W. H. Brownlow, M. A., Canon of Plymouth. Now complete in three volumes, 8vo., copiously illustrated. *Ibid.*

¹Memoir of Alexander Ewing, D. C. L., Bishop of Argyll and the Isles. By Alexander Ross, D. D. Second and cheaper Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth, price 10s. 6d. C. Kegan Paul & Co., London.

²Studies in Philosophy and Literature. By Professor W. Knight. Crown 8vo, cloth. *Ibid.*

³The Laws relating to Quarantine. By Sir Sherston Baker, Bart. Crown 8vo, cloth, price 12s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁴A Nook in the Apennines: A Summer beneath the Chestnuts. By Leader Scott, author of "the Painter's Ordeal," etc. With frontispiece and 27 illustrations in the text, chiefly from original sketches. Crown 8vo, cloth, price 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁵Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes. By Robert Louis Stevenson, author of "An Inland Voyage," etc. With frontispiece by Walter Crane. Crown 8vo, cloth, price 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

⁶The Human Species. By Professor A. de Quatrefages, Membre de l'Institut (Academie des Sciences) and Member of the Royal Society. Crown 8vo, cloth, 5s. *Ibid.*

⁷Freedom in Science and Teaching. From the German of Ernst Haeckel. With a Prefatory Note by T. H. Huxley, F. R. S. *Ibid.*

Haeckel; who is introduced by his apostle Huxley. Haeckel, it may be remembered, is the man who received such a setting down a year or two ago at the hands of the venerable and illustrious Virchow. The third is by an American professor, whose reputation is unknown to us, but whose book¹ has a suggestive title. We have been in Dorsetshire, and are naturally interested in its dialect.² Tennyson's "Somerset Farmer" will give one a crude idea of what it is like, being written in a somewhat kindred idiom. The work³ of the late Mr. Kay is lauded to the echo in the *Academy* and other English journals.

The next brace of books on our list have affinities that are at once biographical, literary, and theological. The first of these relates to the vexed question⁴ about Calvin and Servetus, which was not long since considered at large in the pages of this REVIEW. The simple truth is the Romish party would have been only too glad to destroy Servetus, had it fallen to their lot to do so. The fate of Servetus was not attributable to Calvin, but to the spirit of the age. The other of the two books⁵ is a learned account of Wiclif and the early English Reformers. Then we have a brace of masterly works on history⁶ and mythology⁷ by one of the first

¹Modern Chromatics. With Applications to Art and Industry. By Ogden N. Rood, Professor of Physics in Columbia College, U. S. A. With 130 original illustrations. Volume XXVII. of "The International Scientific Series." Crown 8vo, cloth, price 5s. *Ibid.*

²Poems of Rural Fife in the Dorset Dialect. By William Barnes. New Edition, complete in one volume. Crown 8vo, cloth, 8s. 6d. *Ibid.*

³Free Trade in Land. By Joseph Kay, M. A., Q. C., of Trinity College, Cambridge, author of "The Law relating to Shipmasters and Seamen." Edited by his Widow. With a Preface by the Right Hon. John Bright, M. P. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth, price 5s. *Ibid.*

⁴Servetus and Calvin. A Study of an Important Epoch in the Early History of the Reformation. By the late R. Willis, M. D. 8vo, cloth, price 16s. *Ibid.*

⁵John Wiclif and his English Precursors. By Gerhard Victor Lechler. Translated from the German, with additional Notes, by Peter Lorimer, D. D. Two Volumes. Demy 8vo, cloth, price 21s. *Ibid.*

⁶A History of Greece, from the Earliest Period to the end of the Persian War. By the Rev. Sir George W. Cox, M. A., Bart. New Edition. Two Volumes. Demy 8vo, cloth, price 36s. *Ibid.*

⁷The Mythology of the Aryan Nations. By the Rev. Sir George W. Cox, M. A., Bart. New Edition, Two Volumes. Demy 8vo, cloth, 28s. *Ibid.*

scholars and writers in England, a man whose books are praised without scruple or abatement by the *Edinburgh Review* and the other principal organs of critical opinion in Great Britain.

If Mr. Edwin Arnold's poem¹ is what the critics say it is, there can be no question that it is one of the most remarkable productions of the century. The purely literary merit of it is certainly exceedingly high, and the amount of Oriental learning in it is beyond our capacity of estimation. This alleged union of splendid poetry and colossal (though in this case special) learning puts one in mind of John Milton. We cannot, however, avoid the suspicion that much of the favor shown Mr. Arnold by the reviewers and *dilettanti* is owing to the dramatic, or personal, *heathenism* which pervades "The Light of Asia." Psychology and Metaphysics were decried by Comte, but upheld by such Agnostics as Lewes and Huxley. The posthumous issue² of Mr. Lewes derives interest not more from his death than for the brilliancy of his mind and the audacious extremes of false opinion to which he allowed himself to be carried. "The Foregleams of Christianity"³ is vigorously praised in the Romish organs.

¹The Light of Asia; or, the Great Renunciation (Mahabhinischkramana). Being the Life and Teaching of Gautama, Prince of India and Founder of Buddhism (as told in verse by an Indian Buddhist). By Edwin Arnold, M. A., F. R. G. S., C. S. I. Small crown 8vo, pp. xvi.—244, handsomely bound in cloth. 7s. 6d.; or sewed, 6s. Trubner & Co.; London.

²The Study of Psychology: Its Object, Scope, and Method. By the late George Henry Lewes. This work forms the First Part of the Third Series of the author's "Problems of Life and Mind." Demy 8vo, pp. viii—190, cloth, price 7s. 6d. *Ibid.*

³The Foregleams of Christianity. An Essay on the Religious History of Antiquity. By Charles Newton Scott. Crown, 8vo, 6s. Smith, Elder & Co., London.

THE
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

Vol. XXX.

APRIL, MDCCLXXIX.

No. 2.

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Is published Quarterly, in January, April, July, and October.

TERMS.—Three Dollars per Volume, payable in advance. Single numbers, One Dollar.

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