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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Walnut Street Church Decision in the United States Supreme Court,	1
The Scriptural Doctrine of Giving,	41
Wales,	55
Social Science under a Christian Aspect,	86
Presbyterianism in Central New York,	104
The Book of Church Order,	125
The Law of Retribution,	140
The Final Philosophy,	162
The Creeds of Christendom,	199
Geographical Discoveries in Equatorial Africa,	220
Pan-Hellenism,	236
Philosophy, Calvinism, and the Bible,	252
Prayer Answerable without any Violation of Nature,	273
Whitefield and his Times,	298
God and Moral Obligation,	313
Report of Proceedings of the Edinburgh Council,	333
Lay Evangelism and the Young Men's Christian Associations,	543
Thornwell's Writings,	413
The Maine Law,	449
The Doctrine of Hell,	459
Cain: A Speculation,	475
A "New Testimony of the Rocks;" or, The Cuneiform Inscriptions and Biblical History in the Old Testament,	490
Gambling,	523
The Philanthropic Argument for Foreign Missions,	547
The General Assembly,	575
The Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations,	611
Berkeley and the Philosophy of Idealism,	656
The Failures and Fallacies of Pre-Historic Archæology,	672
Philosophy and Miracles,	698
Retribution: or, Sin Must be Punished,	716
A Philosophy of Man Impossible without Aid from Revelation,	732
The Wisdom of Man <i>versus</i> The Power of God,	742
CRITICAL NOTICES:	
Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesia Universalis: or, Creeds of Christen- dom, 169. Among the Turks, 171. The Papacy and the Civil Power, 175. The Origin of the World, according to Revelation and Science, 180. Theology of the Old Testament, 182. Biblical	

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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

WALNUT STREET CHURCH DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

Wallace's Reports. Vol. XIII., pp. 650, 8vo.

Presbyterian Church Case. Presbyterian Board of Publication,
Philadelphia.

McMillan vs. The Free Church of Scotland. Court of
Sessions, 1859.

*Opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the
Walnut Street Church Case.* Kentucky Reports, 1868.

*Argument of Mr. Bullitt, Counsel for Watson and Others,
before Supreme Court of Kentucky.*

The Walnut Street or Third Presbyterian church of Louisville, Kentucky, dates from 1842. In the spring of 1861 it had the Rev. Mr. McElroy as stated supply, Messrs. Watson, Gault, and Avery as elders, and a board of trustees elected biennially by the congregation; who, by a law of Kentucky, were a corporation to hold their house of worship. The attempts of the General Assembly, Old School, to legislate abolition and centralising politics into Christ's kingdom, by a usurped spiritual authority, of course produced many divisions in this border church. Messrs. McElroy, Watson, and Gault, with half of the congregation, sympathised with the invaded spiritual rights of the people; Mr. Avery and the rest, with the aggressive party. These divisions

at length drew the attention of Synod; who, in January, 1866, visited the church by a committee, which called a meeting of the congregation to choose a new stated supply and elect new elders. Messrs. Watson and Gault, a majority of the Session, caused that body to resist this call as irregular, and at the bidding of the Session, whom the Kentucky law of incorporation clothed with that power, the trustees closed the house against the meeting. The ground on which they declared the whole action invalid was, that the Synod had no original jurisdiction, and was therefore usurping the functions of the Session and congregation. When the Assembly of 1866 meddled in the matter, the Session resisted their order on the same ground. They were sustained in both positions by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. But a part of the people organised a meeting upon the side-walk, and went through the form of installing three new elders. These, admitting the eldership of Messrs. Watson and Gault, gave the radical party a clear majority in the Session. But Messrs. Watson and Gault, with a majority of the trustees, refused to recognise the newly elected as real elders. These began a suit in the Louisville Chancery Court, presided over by a radical Judge, for the possession of the house. This Court, in May, 1867, made a decision, recognising both parties as valid elders; and placing the house in the hands of the marshal of the Court as receiver with orders to obey the Session, in the use of the building, as dominated by the radical majority of [so-called] elders.

Meantime the famous "Declaration and Testimony" had appeared; and Louisville Presbytery, with Messrs. Watson, Gault, and McElroy, adhered to it. The Old School Assembly of 1866 had passed its notorious "*ipso facto* act," dissolving every court, and virtually deposing every officer who dared to exercise his constitutional right of protest. The Louisville Presbytery and Kentucky Synod had resisted in the only way possible for freemen, by declaring this ruthless act void, for its utter unconstitutionality; and they had, first accepting that separate attitude forced on them by the Assembly, at last united themselves with the General Assembly of the Southern Church in May, 1868. But the other party in the Walnut Street

church, availing themselves of the "*ipso facto* act," which pronounced the adhering members to be the church, to the exclusion of the others, claimed to be the rightful and sole successors to the property, and cleaved to the seceding Presbytery of Louisville and to the Northern Assembly. Thus the legal question became one between two rival congregations, and no longer between two parties in one congregation.

Meantime Messrs. Watson, Gault, and their friends, appealed to the Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court of Kentucky. This tribunal dealt with the case as between two parties in one church. It only decided that the street meeting of January, 1866, had been non-Presbyterian and void, so that the original Session, of which Messrs. Watson and Gault were the majority, was the true Session; and so entitled, by civil law, to control the trustees and the house. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky entertained the questions, whether the radical proceedings in the congregation and in the Assembly of 1866 were consistent with the Presbyterian Constitution, and it claimed the right and necessity to adjudicate those questions, so far as they touched the civil rights of members in ecclesiastical property. The radical party attempted to embarrass the decision by an injunction from the Circuit Court, but this was finally dissolved by the Supreme Court in September, 1868, and the house remained in the hands of the Court's Receiver, to be used for the lawful purposes of the congregation, under the direction of the original Session.

But in July, 1868, the radical party prompted three members of the church to sue, as citizens of Indiana, in the District Court of the United States. These were a Mrs. Lee and a Mr. Jones and wife. The last two were impoverished members of the Walnut Street church, residing ordinarily and naturally in Louisville; whom that party removed to the village of Jeffersonville, (just across the river,) and subsisted at a boarding-house there, during the short time needed, according to the laws of Indiana, to establish a claim of citizenship. In order to make it surer that the Federal Court would interfere with a case still pending in a State Court, these poor old people were made to

swear, in their bill, that the elders and trustees of the Walnut Street church refused all legal steps in Kentucky Courts to protect the rights of them, the plaintiffs, in the property. This part of their bill the new elders and trustees also admitted on oath. Yet the records of the State Courts at the time proved the allegation false.

The Southern party being speedily defeated, of course, before this Federal tribunal, and forbidden to have any share or use in the property, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was argued in Washington, the Chief Justice not sitting, in December, 1871. T. W. Bullitt, Esq., of Kentucky, appeared for the appellants, the Southern party, and Messrs. B. H. Bristow and J. M. Harlan for the defendants. The Reporter of the Supreme Court gives the argument of Mr. Bullitt, as exhibiting the one side, and the opinion of the Court, drawn by Mr. Justice Miller, adverse to the appellants, as exhibiting the other. The arguments of Messrs. Bristow and Harlan are wholly omitted. But it is well remembered, that while the counsel for the appellants discussed the law of the case with a judicial dignity, learning, and cogency worthy of its gravity and of the august tribunal, one at least of his opponents descended to the lowest attempts to prejudice the appellants' cause by ridicule and partisan charges of political disaffection.

The appellants, through their counsel, made two main points. The first was, that the Federal Courts had no jurisdiction, because the same case was still pending in a State Court; which, according to the Constitution and laws, was related to the Federal Courts not as an inferior, but a coördinate tribunal. Both the equity and courtesy, always practised hitherto, forbade a Federal Court to intrude into a cause still under adjudication in a coördinate tribunal of another (the State) sovereignty. This point was overruled by the majority of the Supreme Court on the plea that the cause as appealed, while substantially the same with, was now, in form, somewhat different from, the one before the Supreme Court of Kentucky. On this point Justices Davis and Clifford filed their dissenting opinion, supported by an argument. They then (consistently for them) declined to go into any dis-

cussion of the questions of ecclesiastical law brought up. Hence, this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which has introduced so momentous a revolution in our laws, goes forth unsupported by the sanction of the Chief Justice and of these two learned Associates. Our object is no farther concerned with the first point, than to note it as another among the many instances since 1865 in which Federal tribunals are engrossing new powers to themselves from the States.

The second point of the appeal raised the main question, with which alone we are now concerned. The appellants held, in accordance with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, that in this country Church and State are wholly independent of each other, and the civil law guaranteed to all absolute freedom of religious opinion and of religious action, so far as it does not infringe the law or the civil right of any fellow-citizen. That consequently no civil tribunal has any right to touch spiritual doctrines or rights as such; that the proper sphere of these civil tribunals is to protect and adjudicate all civil and secular rights, among which are, of course, all rights of property, real and personal; That while all citizens are, of course, free to unite in any species of combinations they please, and for any objects not contrary to law, they cannot, by the mere artifice of such voluntary combination, exclude a lawful civil tribunal from its proper jurisdiction over persons or property; that while all citizens have the inalienable right to combine in any spiritual or religious societies they may sovereignly please, for ends not contrary to law, yet such ecclesiastical societies are known and related to the civil tribunals, just as any other voluntary association for purposes of industrial enterprise, charity, art, or amusement; that the constitution, which such ecclesiastical society may please to elect for itself, is of the nature of a voluntary mutual compact as between its members, just as in the case of any industrial copartnership or art union; that hence, if a member of such ecclesiastical society use his right as a citizen of resorting to a secular tribunal to protect his secular right in and under such association, while such secular right is the only thing the civil tribunal may adjudicate, yet in adjudicating that right it may,

and often must, claim the prerogative of considering the ecclesiastical constitution which obtains between the litigants, and the question whether it is infringed; because this ecclesiastical constitution being the voluntary compact by which these parties have covenanted to regulate such secular rights between each other, the civil tribunal has no other means of exercising its legitimate jurisdiction over the secular rights in question, than to consider for itself the question of the parties' observance or non-observance of their own ecclesiastical compact. But the Court's jurisdiction over such question reaches only to the secular rights of a party in the premises, and may not be extended to meddle with his spiritual rights, duties, or opinions. This, the established doctrine of the British Courts, and the prevalent one of American Courts, was overruled by the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States. Their ruling is thus accurately summed up in the words of their Reporter :

"5. Controversies in the civil courts, concerning property-rights of religious societies, are generally to be decided by a reference to one or more of three propositions :

"(1.) Was the property or fund, which is in question, devoted, by the express terms of the gift, grant, or sale by which it was acquired, to the support of any specific religious doctrine or belief; or was it acquired for the general use of the society, for religious purposes, with no other limitation?

"(2.) Is the society which owned it of the strictly congregational, or independent form of Church government, owning no submission to any organisation outside the congregation?

"(3.) Or is it one of a number of such societies, united to form a more general body of churches, with ecclesiastical control in the general association over the members and societies of which it is composed?

"6. In the first class of cases, the Court will, when necessary to protect the trust to which the property has been devoted, inquire into the religious faith or practice of the parties claiming its use or control, and will see that it shall not be diverted from that trust.

"7. If the property was acquired in the ordinary way of purchase or gift, for the use of a religious society, the Court will inquire who constitute that society or its legitimate successors, and award to them the use of the property.

"8. In case of the independent order of the congregation, this is to be determined by the majority of the society, or by such organisation of the society as, by its own rules, constitute its government.

"9. In the class of cases in which the property has been acquired in the same way by a society, which constitutes a subordinate part of a general religious organisation with established tribunals for ecclesiastical government, these tribunals must decide all questions of faith, discipline, rule, custom, or ecclesiastical government.

"10. In such cases, where the right of property in the civil Court is dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or Church government, and that has been decided by the highest tribunal within the organisation to which it has been carried, the civil Court will accept that decision as conclusive, and be governed by it in its application to the case before it.

"11. The principles which induced a different rule in the English Courts, examined and rejected as inapplicable to the relations of Church and State in this country; and an examination of the American cases found to sustain the principle above stated."

The tenth paragraph contains the new construction of law, which we regard as so ominous to the liberty of Americans. To this our argument will be confined, and we shall disencumber it of all mere accessory circumstances. We wish neither to debate nor to decide the question, whether the old Session of the Walnut Street church acted discreetly or piously under the circumstances. We have nothing to do with the question, on which side of that quarrel the most unchristian things were said or done. Still less should the question of law be complicated with the political issues then dividing the people of Louisville, or with the passions they excited. We claim, also, that the question of law and right must not be complicated with the consideration whether it is desirable or seemly that bodies of Christians should feel themselves constrained to "go to law before the unbelievers." As individuals, we may profoundly deprecate such scandals. As ecclesiastics in a spiritual court, had we a place there, we might even incline to lay on the Christian conscience of brethren the literal construction of the Apostle's inhibition, "Why do ye not rather suffer the wrong?" As Christian citizens, we may exceedingly desire some safe policy which would discourage this species of litigation. But it is not for a tribunal of law to practise such policy. That is a work which belongs to church teachers and rulers; and its happy end can be gained only by inculcating a more vital religion and purer morals on Christians.

The court of justice can only adjudicate the rights committed by the laws to its protection with an impartial fidelity. When one said that a Federal Court "should lean away from a given jurisdiction," because the occasion for its exercise was to be lamented; Chief Justice Marshall replied, "Nay; *the Court may have no leanings*. As it may not grasp a jurisdiction not conferred by the laws, so it may not shun that legally belonging to it."

In discussing this issue between the Supreme Court of Kentucky and that of the United States, we shall consider, first, the law of the case, and second, the equity and righteousness of the principle in question.

I. In debating the state of the laws, we expressly admit,—

1. That the main point at issue has never been fixed by any statutory enactment in this country, either State or Federal.

2. That while many State Courts have been called to adjudicate virtually the point at issue, it had not hitherto been entertained expressly by the Supreme Court of the United States.

3. That the American decisions disclose a certain amount of vacillation, which is naturally accounted for by the novelty of the question; but the main current of the American decisions is in favor of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

4. That in such a state of affairs, a Court of last resort, deciding so vital a principle for Americans, should have risen above mere technicalities, even had they been adverse; and should have been guided by the high considerations of equity, and the lights of history in free Christian commonwealths, as applicable to the principles of the American States.

In arguing the law of the case, we naturally begin with the English decisions; because our equity practice, like our other institutions, is drawn from our mother country. Since we have here no church establishments like the British, we appeal to their decisions only when they regard the ecclesiastical property of their dissenting Churches; for their relation to the British commonwealth is that of independence like ours. The law has been perfectly settled there by the famous case of *Craigdallie vs. Aikman*, which went up from Scotland to the House of Lords, and was decided in

1813 by Lord Eldon, the Chancellor. (2 Bligh, 529.) The parties were members of a divided congregation in the secession body known as the "Burgher Synod," and their case had been twice inadequately and inconsistently adjudicated in the Scotch "Court of Session" on grounds not unlike those now advanced by Justice Miller. On appeal to the House of Lords, both decisions were overruled by Lord Eldon, and the following principles were emphatically laid down by him: That property conveyed to a dissenting society in Great Britain, for purposes of religious worship, *is a trust*, which the Court is to enforce, for the purpose of maintaining that religious worship for which the property was devoted. And in the event of schism (supposing the deed of gift has made no provision for such case,) the uses of the trust are to be enforced, not in behalf of a majority of the congregation, nor yet exclusively in behalf of the party adhering to the general body, but in favor of that part of the society adhering to and maintaining *the original principles*, to propagate which it was founded. This decision, recognised and followed in the case of the Attorney General *vs.* Pearson, (3 Merivale, 353,) has been adopted in all cases of this nature in Great Britain, and usually in America.

But under this decision the questions may still arise: Who shall exercise the trust in the case where the society has changed only its order, not its doctrine, or has gone into another connexion? The original constitution of the Church itself must decide. Who is to judge whether this constitution has been departed from? Hitherto the law has given but one answer: It is for the civil court, which is called on to protect the trust, to decide that question. In support of this may be consulted the American cases of *Gibson vs. Armstrong*, 7 B. M., 481; *Sutter vs. the Reformed Church*, 6 Wright, 503; *Smith vs. Nelson*, 18th Vermont, 566; *Kniskern vs. Lutheran Church*, 1 Sanford's Chancery, 439; and *Miller vs. Gable*, 2 Denio, 492. The Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky has been the first to violate this well established principle of British law. This tribunal has ruled, not only that a decision of a question of doctrine or order by the supreme Church court is final as to the

property trust, when the constitution of the Church authorises such supreme judicatory so to decide, but that this ecclesiastical decision must be final, even when wholly unauthorised by the Church's own constitution, and when violating the real original purpose of the trust. Such is the sweeping extent of the new doctrine.

Subsequent cases in Scotland elucidate and confirm the law as established by these British decisions, even by the slight irregularities which have since occurred. The Scotch Judge, Lord Meadowbank, in the case of *Galbraith vs. Smith*, (15 Shaw, 808,) in 1837, did indeed rule, that the last and highest decision of the Church court must conclude. But in the next case, *Craigie vs. Marshall*, A. D. 1850, (12 Dunlop, 523,) the Court of Session expressly overruled and reversed this decision as contrary to the doctrine laid down by Lord Eldon. But the most conclusive evidence in our favor, as to the state of the law in Great Britain, is the famous "Cardross Case," or *McMillan vs. the Free Church General Assembly*, decided by the Court of Sessions in 1859. The Rev. Mr. McMillan had been charged before his Presbytery, the Free Church Presbytery of Cardross, with immoral conduct on two counts. The Presbytery found him guilty on the second count, declaring the first not proven; and it affixed a certain ecclesiastical censure for that offence. McMillan appealed to Synod against this sentence on the second count; while his prosecutors filed no cross reference, complaint, or appeal as to the justice of the Presbytery's acquittal of him from the first count. The Synod simply affirmed the Presbytery's judgment. McMillan then appealed to the Free Church General Assembly. This body, swayed by Dr. Candlish, convicted McMillan on both counts; overruling his objection, that only the count on which the lower Courts had convicted him was before the Assembly by appeal, because, according to the Church constitution, the Assembly is not a court of original jurisdiction over the moral conduct of a minister. McMillan then went to the supreme secular court (the Court of Session) and demanded an injunction against the publication of the Assembly's censure. That tribunal *entertained his appeal*. The Free Assembly, relying arrogantly

on the claims of their famous "Protest," (in which they had aimed, at the disruption of 1843, guided by the best legal talent, as they supposed, to make sure of a complete independence of their spiritual authority from secular control, while taking the attitude of a separate dissenting body towards the State, refused to plead to the issue before the Court of Session. It has long been settled, that the Court of Session, the supreme tribunal of Scotland for all cases of equity and civil law, may not interfere with the criminal (or justiciary) courts, nor with the ecclesiastical courts of the established Church, so long as they remain within their proper jurisdictions; for the Constitution of Great Britain regards these last two courts as coördinate, and as equally clothed with their powers by the national legislature. And in the case of Paterson against the *established* Presbytery of Dunbar, who was dismissed for drunkenness by that Presbytery, confirmed by the Established Assembly in clear violation of Church forms, the Court of Session had refused Paterson all relief, holding that an established Church court had coördinate jurisdiction with theirs so long as they did not exceed their legal scope; and that irregularity of forms in pursuing a spiritual censure did not constitute an excess of jurisdiction. The imperious abolitionist divine, Dr. Candlish, supposed that, *a fortiori*, the Free Church courts must be irresponsible to all secular tribunals. But to their profound mortification the Court of Session ruled, that the Free Church being a voluntary and dissenting religious society, wholly unconnected with the State, its Constitution, as before the civil law, could only be regarded as an optional *private contract* entered into between its members; and that, consequently, any civil court of suitable jurisdiction, when appealed to by a citizen to protect any secular right supposed to be assailed by his brother-members in that society, must have the right to construe that private contract, the Church Constitution, so far as to protect the civil right claimed to be invaded. In this respect the independent or voluntary religious society stood on the same footing with any industrial, benevolent, or æsthetic association. Accordingly, the Court of Session affirmed the exception which McMillan had

made before the Free Assembly, and decided that since the constitutional compact, which the members of the Free Church had chosen to establish between themselves, did not give the Assembly original jurisdiction over the Presbytery's first count against him, and it was not before them by appeal, the Assembly's attempt to issue a censure on that count was void. And that body was restrained, under the civil penalties of libel, from publishing that church censure against McMillan until they had tried him on that count according to the forms of their own church compact. See Innes' Law of Creeds in Scotland, which will confirm in the most pointed way the principles claimed. So Lord Brougham, in the first Auchterarder case, 1842-3, rules, that "when any proceeding of a Church court, however strictly ecclesiastical in its own nature, *affects a civil right*, that proceeding, in its whole extent, falls under the cognizance and control of the courts of law." (Buchanan's Ten Years' Conflict, I., 427.)

Such is the last decision as to the state of the law in Great Britain. We have no call to claim that the American decisions go to this length of giving an aggrieved member this civil remedy even against a spiritual censure irregularly pronounced by his Church. The Illinois case of Chase *vs.* Cheney, which we shall cite in due time, may stop short of this. But this Cardross case powerfully demonstrates, and by the stronger reason our position, that a property right existing under ecclesiastical compacts must bring those compacts under the jurisdiction of the civil court so far as that property right is concerned. The Court of Session decides it is British law, even when affecting the more shadowy right of a party as to his social repute, a matter lying more immediately beside the spiritual censures which are the Church's only weapon. Then, *a fortiori*, this is law as affecting a tangible secular right in property. The mistaken hopes of the Free Church men, their reliance on their Protest of absolute spiritual independence, and the whole history of the Free Church from 1843, illustrate the force of this remarkable decision.

We hold, then, that the British decisions are for us; and Mr. Justice Miller, in the adverse decision which we criticise, clearly

concedes as much when he attempts to argue that they are, for special reasons, inapplicable to our country. His only hope of escaping their conclusive force is in those special reasons. Let us sum up the British law. We have shown :

1. That in Great Britain a dissenting Church, as to any civil interests held in it, stands before the law precisely as does every other voluntary association for industrial, literary, æsthetic, or philanthropic objects; and is subject to civil jurisdiction precisely in the same manner and to the same extent.

2. That the power of a dissenting Church judicatory is derived, so far as the civil law knows it, solely from the optional compact of its members, of which the expression is the Church Constitution, which they have seen fit to ordain between themselves.

3. Hence, whenever such Church judicatory has exercised an ecclesiastical power modifying a secular right of its members, in accordance with their own agreed compact, their Church Constitution, a civil court cannot interfere, but is bound to give effect to that ecclesiastical action on secular rights of their own voluntary members, without intruding into any question of motives or ecclesiastical grounds of action. And to that extent the rights of an inferior are as inviolable as of a superior Church court.

4. But when a citizen, otherwise entitled to the protection of the laws, who is a member of such dissenting or independent Church, claims the aid of the civil law against a secular wrong, which, he says, emerges out of a wrong ecclesiastical act of his Church, whether as to order or doctrine, the civil court must enquire whether that act is constitutionally valid or void; and in this enquiry the sole standard of judgment must be, next to the deed of gift itself, the Constitution of the Church.

But Mr. Justice Miller, while conceding the British law, argues that it is not fully applicable here, because in Britain certain Churches (among others) are established by law. He urges that the Lord Chancellor is not only a supreme judge in civil law and equity, but also a supreme ecclesiastical judge for the Established Church of England, the dispenser of a large amount of Church patronage, and the appointed avenger of

certain ecclesiastical sins of heresy and blasphemy. Hence his mind would naturally be swayed to meddle too much in dissenting Churches. Moreover, in Lord Eldon's time, especially, dissenting Churches were not free, in the sense of the American religious liberties, their members being subject to certain penal statutes for ecclesiastical actions or dogmas.

We reply, it is not enough to say that the peculiar circumstances of an established Church *might* warp the judgment of a Lord Chancellor; it must be shown wherein they have warped it. Again, Mr. Justice Miller has himself defined the relation of an American Church to the law, precisely as the British judges did the relation of a dissenting Church to British law. It is precisely with reference to that relation that they have adjudicated the principle we claim. It cannot be made to appear that the additional circumstance of the existence of a penal statute for heresy, or a claim for tithes, modifies the application of that principle to a property trust held under the voluntary compact between the members of that Church. We assert that *quoad* such property trust in things freely bestowed on that dissenting Church, at least, *it is free* in England, precisely in the sense in which an American Church is free in the United States. Then the principle of the law should apply to the trust in precisely the same way. Indeed, if the points of restriction on religious liberty of Dissenters, which remained in England, had any influence in the question, they should only make the principle apply with the more conclusive force under our American laws, because the principles on which that application was based in England (as stated in the four propositions of the previous page) apply all the more clearly under such institutions as ours.

Again: the English adjudications concerning trusts might plausibly have countenanced a certain range of license, from that "doctrine of uses," technically termed "*cy-pres*," which has prevailed in the English Courts. But the steady current of American law is to restrict that doctrine of uses with a rigid hand. We have wisely retrenched such judicial discretions within severe limits. For instance, where a trust declared by a testator is found void for lack of definiteness, we do not for a

moment allow the judicial tribunal to exercise its discretion in inventing an interpretation of the trust, or suggesting a kindred use; rather than allow this, we invoke the express provision of the Statute as upon intestate property! How should this peculiarly American principle bear on the adjudication of ecclesiastical trusts? Evidently it is in favor of our view. It requires the Court to construe the trust in strictest accordance with the design of those who created it. It dictates the duty on the Court of using the actual historical evidence which defines that original design in the fullest and most exact manner. Where is that evidence found? Chiefly in the Church compact, under which the trust originated. We claim, then, that if the British rule prevailed, notwithstanding their "doctrine of uses," still more should it prevail here where we have repudiated that doctrine.

In America, says Justice Miller, "the law knows no heresy," . . . "and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect." This is strictly true. And for that very reason the duty of the Court to construe and protect the trust exactly according to its original intent becomes the more stringent. Because the law is neutral to all doctrines; because the civil tribunal has no right, as such, to favor the one doctrine or the other; therefore there remains for it no other guide, in the performance of its sacred duty of protecting the existing trust, than the historical design of those who, in the exercise of their rights as freemen, saw fit to create it. And to ascertain that, the only resort is to the Church compact, under which it was created, or else the words of the deed of gift itself.

Justice Miller also argues, that because our civil laws leave all men free to join any association they please, not illegal, "all who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent, and would lead to a total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed." One answer is, that our principle extends the jurisdiction of the civil court only to property rights, so that

the whole spiritual and moral jurisdiction of the independent religious society is left unscathed. And the civil court, even in this low and limited sphere, employs that society's own voluntary constitutional compact as the authoritative standard. There is, then, no "subversion" of that free society's lawful ends; but only a restriction of such unlawful property wrongs as might emerge from its freedom when pushed into license. Another answer, which is perfectly conclusive as to American Presbyterians, is that they never gave an implied consent to an unlimited and irresponsible Church government. It never was a part of their implied compact with each other, that any ecclesiastical act of their Church courts whatsoever should bind. The Presbyterian Constitution is one of defined powers, and leaves to every inferior judicatory and individual member their reserved rights. The thing which they have covenanted is this: to submit to all the Church judicatories when acting constitutionally. Their maxim is, "*Lex rex*;" while their Constitution is their king, they have never sworn allegiance to "King Majority." If this power violates their spiritual rights, they find their remedy in the exercise of the freeman's right of protest, or in the last resort, secession. If it infringes their secular rights, they are entitled to the protection of the civil tribunal, just as all other citizens are.

The function and right of the civil government is to protect civil rights. It claims authority over all property questions between its subjects. It is not reasonable that some subjects should withdraw a part of the property in the commonwealth absolutely beyond the jurisdiction of the civil law merely by the artifice of covenanting in some voluntary agreement of their own. The voluntary society, however religious in its professed objects, can be known to the State as concerns property only as all other associations. None of them are clothed with any validity by legislative enactment of the State. Their tribunals *are not courts*, in the eye of the civil tribunal, and with reference to those secular rights the jurisdiction of which belongs supremely (so far as this world goes) to the State; however they may be courts to the covenanted members concerning the agreed objects of the association. If one such voluntary association may, by its

optional compact, extrude the commonwealth from its jurisdiction over one segment of property, all others may do the same; and we should reach this result, that the State would have to stand helpless and witness universal injustice, its hands tied by the circumstance that all the citizens had covenanted with each other to submit to the injuries of other organisations unknown to the law as to any valid power over the commonwealth's own sphere. Such would be the consistent result. But can this be law? Even in the extreme case, (to which the Presbyterian Church does not pertain,) where the members had covenanted to make their highest church court supreme and irresponsible in all its acts, so unwise a compact of individuals could not rob the commonwealth of its inherent jurisdiction over property rights. A church constitution thus extravagant might be quoted against the member appealing from it to convict him individually of inconsistency; it could not be quoted against the commonwealth, to estop her from her inalienable right and duty of protecting the property rights of citizens, even when the sufferers have been rash and inconsistent.

We come now to the actual state of the law, as determined by the American decisions. Mr. Justice Miller cites, as against us, many cases.* The reader cannot be dragged through the details of all these; nor is it necessary. While they disclose some uncertainty in the application of the correct principle, (a feature easily accounted for in American Courts,) none of them seem to have a strict relevancy to the issue before us. We select two in order to illustrate this assertion. One of these is the South Carolina case of *Harmon vs. Dreher*, decided by the learned Chancellor Job Johnstone. Dreher was a Lutheran minister, who was tried and deposed by his Synod for certain offences and anti-Lutheran doctrines. He sued for certain rights in the use of a church property, from which his deposition ousted him. Chancellor Johnstone says, giving the opinion of the Court, that

* *Shannon vs. Frost*, 3 B. Monro, 253; *Gibson vs. Armstrong*, 7 B. Monro, 481; *Harmon vs. Dreher*, 2 Speers' Equity, 87; *Johns Island Ch. Case*, 2 Richardson's Equity, 215; *Ferraria vs. Vasconcelles*, 23d Illinois, 456; and the recent Illinois case of *Chase vs. Cheney*.

by reason of the mutual independence of Church and State in South Carolina "the judgments of religious associations bearing on their own members are not examinable here; and I am not to inquire whether the doctrines attributed to Mr. Dreher were held by him, or whether, if held, they were anti-Lutheran; or whether his conduct was, or was not, in accordance with the duty he owed to the Synod or to his denomination." "When a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court, and not the ecclesiastical, which is to decide. But the civil court tries the civil right and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions, out of which the civil right arises, as it finds them." The last is the proposition on which Justice Miller seems to found himself. But it is irrelevant, in that it appears Mr. Dreher prayed the Court to entertain the motives and justice of the ecclesiastical sentence against him, while he did not charge that his church constitution had been violated in its forms in reaching it. He does not seem to have charged usurpation against the Lutheran constitution on his prosecutors. So that it does not appear that Chancellor Johnstone adjudicated any principle save the one we have already stated in our third proposition on page 13. But had the complainant raised the issue, that the ecclesiastical decision, which implied his ousting from the Lutheran property used by him, was void because violative of the constitutional covenants of the Lutheran Church, we have no evidence that Chancellor Johnstone would have decided it with Justice Miller.

The case of *Chase vs. Cheney* (Supreme Court of Illinois, January, 1871, American Cases, Vol. XI., 95,) turns out to be on our side. The Rev. Mr. Cheney, now a Diocesan of the "Reformed Episcopal Church," then a popular pastor in Chicago, had declined to obey the Romanising orders of his Diocesan, Chase, in the manner of celebrating divine worship and the sacraments. The Bishop had, for this insubordination, procured his ejection from his charge and its emoluments by a trial before the usual Episcopal court provided by their canons. Cheney appealed to the secular court, to retain his manse and salary, charging unfairness in the particulars of his ecclesiastical trial,

and injustice in its verdict. Thornton, Justice, delivered the decision of the Court against Cheney, saying:

“4. Where there is no right of property involved, except clerical office or salary, the spiritual court is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction.”

Yet the Court, while disclaiming the power to inquire into the spiritual jurisdiction for Mr. Cheney's relief, proceeds to argue the very question disclaimed. “Without asserting the power of this Court in cases of this character, yet, on account of the earnest, able, and elaborate argument of counsel, we will notice the objection that the spiritual court had no authority to adjudicate upon the alleged offence.” But it is more material to note that the Court (pp. 102 and 104 of its Opinion) bases its refusal to inquire into the justice of the ecclesiastical sentence against Mr. Cheney solely on the doctrine (which the Court elaborately argues) that his privilege of preaching and receiving the consequent pastoral emoluments in an Episcopal parish *was not his vested right*. And it adds expressly: “The civil courts will interfere with churches or religious associations when rights of property or civil rights are involved.” Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois is found with us on the principle of our case.

But Lawrence, Chief Justice, and Sheldon, Justice, dissent even from this qualified opinion, declaring that even in the case where only clerical office and salary are involved, if a citizen pleads before the civil court, that he is deposed by an ecclesiastical court “unlawfully constituted,” and thereby loses emoluments and support, he may come to the secular courts for protection. They say: “We concede that when a spiritual court has been once organised in conformity with the rules of the denomination of which it forms a part, and when it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its subsequent action in the administration of spiritual discipline will not be revised by the secular courts.” Their argument is, “The association is purely voluntary; and when a person joins it he consents that, for all spiritual offences, he will be tried by a tribunal organised in conformity with the laws of the society. But *he has not consented* that he will be tried by one not so organised.” We have

here the British doctrine precisely as stated in our propositions 3d and 4th, page 13.

The same doctrine is lucidly taught by the New York Court, in the case of *Walker vs. Wainwright*, (16 Barbour, 486.) In this case motion was made by Walker's counsel, that Wainwright, the Bishop, be required to show cause why an injunction previously granted, restraining a sentence of the bishop in accordance with the verdict of an ecclesiastical court for a time, should not be made absolute. The learned Judge decided:

"The only cognisance which the Court will take of the case, is to inquire whether there is want of jurisdiction in the defendant (the bishop) to do the act which is sought to be restrained. I cannot consent to review the exercise of any discretion on his part, or to inquire whether his judgment, or that of the subordinate ecclesiastical tribunal, is sustained by the truth of the case. I cannot draw to myself the duty of revising their action, or of canvassing its manner or foundation, any farther than to inquire whether, according to the law of the association to which both the parties belong, they had authority to act at all. In other words, I can inquire only whether the defendant has the power to act, and not whether he is acting justly."

We may actually claim the Chancery Circuit Court of Louisville, in whose adverse decision this discussion began, as virtually conceding the law to us. For that tribunal entered fully into the question of the constitutionality, as tried by the Presbyterian Church constitution, of the doings of the Synod's Committee in the Walnut Street church in January, 1866, and of the consequent results. And the conclusion reached is deduced in part from the assumption that the Synod, according to its constitution, had the undefined powers then exercised. So that even this Court has not adopted the doctrine of Mr. Justice Miller. Had it done so, its consistency would have led it, instead of entering into that discussion, to rule, simply, that a spiritual court, a Synod, having spoken, the secular one had nothing to do but to give effect to its ecclesiastical decree.

But there is one American case whose relevancy is so peculiar, and whose importance was so great, that it is unpardonable to omit it in this argument, as Justice Miller has sought to do. This is the Presbyterian Church case in the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, 1838, known as *Todd vs. Green et al.* The General Assembly of 1837 deemed that the "Plan of Union" with Congregationalists in New York and Ohio was corrupting the order and doctrine of the Church. Under the influence of an "Old School" majority, this Assembly declared that plan null and void for unconstitutionality, revoked it, and dissolved four Synods which had grown mainly out of it. It directed all true Presbyterians within these four Synods to reorganise themselves legally, as parts of the Presbyterian Church, and declared the remainder not to be, and never to have been, valid parts thereof. It was the logical sequel of these decisions, that it should charge its permanent officers, in organising a new Assembly in 1838, to drop from the roll the four Synods. In May, 1838, these officers were proceeding to organise a new Assembly in accordance with this action. When a "New School" member, whose commission was unquestioned, demanded that the names from the four Synods should now be enrolled, the Moderator refused. When the member appealed from his ruling to the house, the Moderator refused to put the question: on the ground that there was, as yet, no house organised enough to entertain it. Thereupon, by a preconcerted signal, the New School members, amidst much confusion, professed to depose this Moderator for contumacy, to elect a successor, Dr. Fisher, and to adjourn immediately to another place. The Old School members refused to recognise this action by voting; and, on the withdrawal of the other party, proceeded to complete their organisation in accordance with the acts of 1837. The New School body claimed to be the Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. As soon as possible, according to the law of Pennsylvania incorporating the trustees of the General Assembly, this body elected additional trustees, whom the old Board disregarded. One of these New School trustees, Mr. Todd, then brought an action against Dr. Ashbel Green and the remainder of the old Board, for the whole funds and estate held by them for the General Assembly, in the *Nisi Prius* Court of Philadelphia. Judge Rogers presiding. The form of the suit was a *Quo Warranto*, which raised the issue whether Todd, etc., were trustees; and this, in turn, de-

pended simply on the question, whether the body electing him was the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in America. Before the *Nisi Prius* Court, Todd and his associates gained their cause, in virtue of a charge of Judge Rogers, instructing the jury in their favor. The case was then carried up to the "Court in Bank," or Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, presided over by the eminent jurist, Chief Justice Gibson, and the decision of the lower court was reversed. A new trial was ordered, under instructions and rulings so explicitly in favor of the Old School, that the plaintiffs dropped proceedings. Such is the outward history of the case.

The body known now as the Northern Assembly, in whose favor Justice Miller has attempted to construct the new law, is composed by a fusion of Old School and New School. Each of these parties, for a time, rejoiced in a decision of the case in their favor; so that each of them ought to feel itself committed, so far as consistency can commit, to the upholding of the principle on which their victory was founded. But when we come to the examination of the two decisions, we find that, while contrary in practical result, they were perfectly at one in proceeding upon the rule of law for which we argue. The question whether Todd and his comrades were trustees, was held by both Courts to turn solely upon the question whether the body electing them was the General Assembly. And both the Courts ruled that this in turn depended upon the conformity of this body with, or its discrepancy from, the Constitution and Rules of Order of the Presbyterian Church. These questions were entertained by both the Courts. Both took jurisdiction over and decided upon the validity or invalidity of the "Plan of Union," of its repeal in 1837, of the consequent excision of the four Synods, and of the steps taken in the organisation of the two rival Assemblies; and the standard by which all were judged was the Constitution of the Church. They reached opposite conclusions simply by taking opposite views of these various ecclesiastical questions, over which both alike took jurisdiction so far as to ascertain the property-rights. Thus, the case is made all the stronger for us by the fact, that both the civil tribunals which adjudicated it,

while reaching opposite results, proceeded on the very principle which Justice Miller now seeks to disclaim. And all shadow of doubt whether we misconstrue them, is removed by these facts, that they not only allowed counsel the fullest debate on the point of jurisdiction from which the new decision would have precluded them, and actually adjudicated that point, but that they, in words, argue and assert the propriety and necessity of their doing so. The reader may consult the "Charge" of Judge Rogers to his jury, in the "Presbyterian Church Case," pp. 464, 482, and the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson, pp. 587, 594. The latter eminent authority rules (p. 587): The General Assembly, "having no corporate capacity in itself, is not a subject of our corrective jurisdiction, or of our scrutiny, further than to ascertain how far its organic structure may bear on the question of its personal identity or individuality." "Unfortunately, a *quorum* of the General Assembly may be constituted of a very small minority" (of the whole body,) "so that two, or even more, distinct parts may have all the organs of legitimate existence. Hence, where, as in this instance, the members have formed themselves into distinct bodies, numerically sufficient for corporate capacity and organic action, it becomes necessary to ascertain how far either of them was formed in obedience to the conventional law of the association; *which law, for that purpose only, is to be treated as a rule of civil obligation.*" So, on page 591, the Court, after arguing that the "excising acts" were constitutional according to the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, proceeds thus: "If, then, the Synods in question were constitutionally dissolved, the Presbyteries of which they had been composed were, at least for purposes of representation, dissolved along with them." "It appears, therefore, that the commissioners from the excised Synods were not entitled to seats in the Assembly, and that their names were properly excluded from the roll."

In the argument before the Court in Bank for a new trial, the chief part was borne by Mr. Sergeant of Philadelphia. Although, as counsel, he speaks here *ex parte*, his age, impartiality, vast learning, and high personal character gave to his views almost a

judicial weight. On pages 545-7, he expounds and asserts our doctrine thus: "What will you appeal to as a ground of argument? I say that the acts of the Assembly of 1837 were good. Why? Because I think they were right. What I think is, however, of no consequence to anybody else. We must have some rule. What is it? . . . Let us go to the constitution of the Church." Again: "If this Court can try a question as to the constitutionality of an act of the Church, we must be allowed the benefit of these same principles and rules" (by which the validity of a secular law would be tested in a Court.) "What are they? There is one great one: he who complains is bound to show that the act is in conflict with some express provision of the constitution" (of the Church.) But as our principle was adopted and proceeded on by both parties, in both Courts, there was little occasion to assert it in those trials.

The only apparent evasion from the force which we claim in this case would be the plea, that it is exceptional, because there were two rival bodies, each claiming to be *the supreme court* of the Church. The doctrine of Justice Miller is, that when the supreme church court has spoken, the civil tribunal cannot go behind it. But here two bodies, claiming to be such, have spoken; and therefore he must, in this peculiar case, go behind the *dicta* of both; and he would do it consistently with his views. But to this there is a fatal answer. The General Assembly of 1837 was the supreme court of the whole denomination, unquestioned by either party. This Assembly had spoken decisively; and there was no pretence that the Old School Moderator and Clerks in 1838 were not proceeding in strict accordance with its *dictum*, to organise an Old School Assembly in 1838. Hence, had Judge Rogers and Chief Justice Gibson held the doctrine of Mr. Justice Miller, consistency would have compelled them both to disinniss the suit of Todd and his comrades, on the ground that the secular tribunal was incompetent to scrutinise the supreme acts (or the logical consequences thereof) which the supreme court of the Church had in 1837 deemed itself entitled to perform.

The Northern General Assembly of 1872, representing a great

body constituted by the fusion of New and Old Schools, hastened with eagerness to place this new doctrine of Mr. Justice Miller on its ecclesiastical code, and to make it a part of the law of their Church. Both branches have thus signalised their glaring inconsistency. The New School have now condemned the very ground on which they did their utmost, in 1838, to seize the whole estate of the Presbyterian Church in America; and the Old School have repudiated the whole ground on which they engrossed that estate away from their New School brethren for thirty years.

We conclude this examination of the law, as revealed by the decisions, with two remarks. The utmost that can be claimed, after this review, concerning the current of the American cases, is, that it may be to some degree indecisive. Were such the case, surely it would be competent to the highest court of law in this American Empire, when called to settle this great principle of law for the first time, to rise above the plodding precedents of lower tribunals, if these were found inconsistent with the true equity of the matter, and to fix the unsettled point of jurisprudence by the broad lights of that equity, as reflected from the history of free commonwealths. But we have shown that the current of the decisions is virtually on our side. We shall also claim the support of the general equity in the case.

How alien the new decision which we combat is to the law as recognised by jurists, may appear from the fact, that already two Supreme Courts of States have been constrained to dissent from it. The Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of *Geo. H. Stuart against the Reformed (Cameronian) Church*, tacitly but distinctly disregarded the new law attempted to be set up. The Court of Missouri, in a recent ecclesiastical case, did the same thing overtly, declaring that not even the veneration due to the august tribunal in Washington could prevail to force them to countenance a doctrine so illegal. The enforcement of the new rule is, indeed, impracticable, without the exercise of a tyranny and injustice in particular cases, to which the minds of the American people will not be reconciled until many years of oppression shall have elapsed.

II. We now consider the equity of the case. We maintain that when an ecclesiastical decision is set up in a civil tribunal as a ground of a civil right, this Court must be competent to entertain the question, so far as the right of property goes, whether the ecclesiastical tribunal acted within its jurisdiction; and that the standard by which this question is to be decided is the ecclesiastical constitution agreed to by the members of that religious society. This almost self-evident principle of equity Mr. Justice Miller seeks to evade by saying, that the word "jurisdiction" is a vague one. Should the Church court find a sentence against any man's life or person, the civil court would, of course, set it aside; the former has exceeded its jurisdiction. So, he admits, should the Church court claim to decide against one of its members a property-right not grounded in an ecclesiastical decision, this claim would be utterly disregarded in any civil court where it might be set up. For there would be a just sense in which the Church court "had no jurisdiction." But Justice Miller thinks that in cases where the decision, implying the property-right, "is strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,"—"a matter which concerns theological controversy, Church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of its members to the standard of morals required of them,"—there the Church court has exclusive jurisdiction; and whatever may be the secular injustice alleged, it is incompetent for any civil court to inquire whether or not the Church court has construed its own organic law aright in assuming this jurisdiction.

But the position is inconsistent with the previous admission. Even Justice Miller limits his position to matters "strictly and purely ecclesiastical in character." But if this ecclesiastical decision invades a property-right, it is not strictly and purely ecclesiastical. The very issue which the complainant raises before the civil court to which he resorts for protection is, whether the ecclesiastical court has not exceeded its jurisdiction. That issue inevitably makes the ecclesiastical court a *party* before the civil tribunal; and how contrary to equity are all proceedings which make a party its own judge, no lawyer need

be told. Let this be weighed in the mind, and it will be clear that either the Justice's point must be relinquished, or the extreme ground must be taken, that all decisions, termed, by the Church courts announcing them, *ecclesiastical*, must stand unquestioned, no matter how iniquitous. In truth, the difficulty concerning vagueness of jurisdiction does not exist. The civil court has no spiritual jurisdiction; the Church court has none directly secular. And its indirect power of affecting civil rights by its spiritual decisions is defined by its own Church constitution.

This clear and simple limit will preserve us, so far as any human institutions in imperfect hands can be expected to work with certainty, from all the confusions and intrusions which are foreshadowed in such threatening colors by the "Opinion" of the Supreme Court. It is not claimed, that civil tribunals are always enlightened and just because they are secular. But it is claimed that ecclesiastical courts are not always so because they are spiritual in profession. And we firmly hold that the principles of our civil government give the citizens the additional safeguard of an appeal from the possible injustice of the fallible Church court, wherever vested civil rights are involved. We assert that, in all constitutional States, this safeguard is needed, and will usually be just and beneficial. Mr. Justice Miller's whole practical argument seems to proceed upon the assumption that secular courts, because non-religious, will usually be ignorant, unjust, or intrusive; while spiritual courts, because belonging by profession to the kingdom of heaven, will always be wise and just. Does history sustain this? It is unnecessary to remind the reader of the many instances in which apostate and usurping ecclesiastics have foully perverted their professed allegiance to the kingdom of righteousness, for perpetrating enormous wrong. But the possibility and likelihood that a pure and well-meaning clergy, if unchecked by secular authority, may violate the civil rights of their people, can be truthfully asserted without any libel on their actual character. To hold the scales of justice with an even hand, amidst all the complications of right arising in civilised society, requires not only virtue, but special knowl-

edge, and the judicial habit of thought. We concede to the body of our American clergy the *virtue*; but they do not usually possess the other acquirements. The scenes often witnessed in their ecclesiastical courts betray much want of that forensic experience and judicial skill so necessary in adjudicating civil interests. The tendency of the clergyman's education and life is to render him over-dogmatic. He is revered by his people "for his work's sake." His customary discourse is from a *rostrum* (the pulpit) where no forensic rival can test or sift his logic. His converse with sacred and divine topics betrays him into the tendency of sanctifying his own fallible conclusions, and even his prejudices, until he is prone to resent an attack upon them as impiety.

But Mr. Justice Miller argues that each denomination of Christians has not only its theology, but its digest of Church laws, which will probably be found extensive and complicated. Civil lawyers are not likely to be learned and skilful in these; the Church lawyers presumably are. Hence, the doctrine he discards makes the appeal, as he thinks, from the more learned tribunal to the one less learned. We reply, first, that the issue raised by him who is aggrieved in his civil rights in a Church court, never involves the whole theology and canon law of that Church, but only some definite questions, the standard for the settlement of which is the brief organic law of the Church itself. Surely it cannot be hard for an intelligent and impartial mind, skilled in general jurisprudence, to decide such questions. But the thing which the complainant wants is not more learned, but more impartial judges. We reply, second, that this objection only proves the want of a diligent and learned judiciary in a civilised State. The duties falling upon civil judges must often lead them beyond their special science. If this objection were allowed, it would reduce the jurisdiction of the civil courts to a narrow circle indeed! Thus, the jurist has long found himself compelled to annex extensive branches of the alien science of medicine so closely to his proper studies that it has currently received the name of "Medical Jurisprudence." The jurist may find himself constrained, in order to adjudicate a crime, or

a question of inheritance, to explore the mysteries of anatomy, of surgery, of physiology, of obstetrics, of toxicology, of mental pathology. Does he invoke the chemical or medical expert as a sovereign judicial authority on these points, and humbly remit to him the absolute decision of the scientific questions raised? No; he calls him to his bar only as a witness, whose testimony is but ancillary to the judicial decision. So, the judge in a maritime court, in order to decide correctly a question of insurance or salvage, may be compelled to inform himself of the details of naval architecture and of navigation. Because, unless the Court furnishes itself with this knowledge, the aggrieved citizen is deprived of his right of protection under its shelter. With what consistency can the Justice advance his plea from the intricacies of creeds and canons when he knows these facts? How can the jurist claim to dismiss the branches of theology and ecclesiastical law from his studies, when he knows that his noble science is thus continually laying all other arts, and all learning, under tribute to its beneficent ends?

The Reporter of the Supreme Court correctly states a part of its decision under his sixth proposition. If the property in trust was given to a Congregational church, which is independent in its order, in case of a schism the trust is to be bestowed by the civil court on "the majority of the society." The inadequacy of this principle is disclosed by a very simple question. Suppose this independent society should be found equally divided? To which of the equal members will the court give the succession? Here, at least, it must unavoidably take jurisdiction of the question, which of the two maintains the doctrine and order which the trust was designed to uphold. But after doing this, that court could not, in the next case, abdicate the righteous authority it had just exercised, and allow the party, which perverted the trust, to enjoy its possession, because merely of the accident that it had the major numbers. To act thus would imply, that numbers made error true and wrong right!

Under propositions 5th (1) and 6th, the Court ruled, that when a trust had been bestowed upon any ecclesiastical body for the expressed object of "supporting any specific religious doctrine

or belief," "the Court will, when necessary to protect the trust to which the property has been devoted, inquire into the religious faith or practice of the parties claiming its use or control, and will see that it shall not be diverted from that trust." Mr. Justice Miller, expounding this correct doctrine, speaks as follows:

"In the case thus made, it is the obvious duty of the Court to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use. So long as there are persons qualified within the meaning of the original dedication, and who are also willing to teach the doctrines or principles prescribed in the act of dedication; and so long as there is any one so interested in the execution of the trust, as to have a standing in Court, it must be that they can prevent the diversion of the fund or property to other and different uses. This is the general doctrine of courts of equity as to charities; and it seems equally applicable as to ecclesiastical matters." . . . "In such case, it is not in the power of the majority of that congregation, however preponderant, by reason of a change of views on religious subjects, to carry the property so confided to them to the support of new and conflicting doctrine." . . . "Nor is the principle varied when the organisation to which the trust is confided is of the second or associated form of Church Government. The protection which the law throws around the trust is the same. And though the task may be a delicate and difficult one, it will be the duty of the Court in such cases, when the doctrine to be taught, or the form of worship to be used, is clearly laid down, to inquire whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding or teaching a different doctrine, or using a form of worship which is so far variant as to defeat the declared objects of the trust."

Such is the concession to which Justice Miller is constrained by the force of indisputable law and equity. But it concedes our case. For the Presbyterian Church is notoriously characterised by a specific form of religious doctrine and order. Its creed is extended, particular, and absolutely definite. Its government is regulated by an express constitution of defined and limited powers. Hence, any man declaring a trust for the propagation of Presbyterianism as existing in the Presbyterian Church in the United States, must be understood by the Court as having designed to "devote it to the teaching, spread, or support of a specific form of religious doctrine or belief." It is also presumable, that a specific Church order may have had as real,

although not as sacred, a value in the eyes of the donor as a specific doctrine. Therefore the Court may be as much bound to protect a trust devoted to the maintenance of a given Church order as that devoted to a given doctrine or worship. But, since the order of the Presbyterian Church was notoriously definite and specific, every property devoted to Presbyterianism must be regarded as coming under the class of specified trusts.

Mr. Justice Miller admits fully that "religious organisations come before us in the same attitude as other associations for benevolent and charitable purposes; and their rights of property or of contract are equally under the protection of law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints." . . . "The principles on which we are to decide so much of it (the case appealed) as is proper for our decision, are those applicable alike to all its class."

This admission again gives us our conclusion. The acknowledgment must also be extended to all voluntary combinations of citizens, not illegal, implicating property-rights. This no judge of law will deny. Nor will it be denied, that property bestowed on a Church for religious uses *is a trust*. Nor will the third step of our argument be denied, that wherever a trust has been created, it may become the duty of the Courts to protect it, and to take whatever jurisdiction over the working of the association is necessary to that end. A mining company, for example, has a by-law enacted by its stockholders, that while six of its ten directors shall be a *quorum* for the transaction of ordinary business, no number less than the whole board shall sell any real estate of the company. But a sale has been made, by which a stockholder feels aggrieved. He seeks legal redress. He claims, in his bill, that the sale shall be voided, because actually made by only seven directors. Must not the Court entertain that question of fact, and, if it be established, must they not judge the pretended act by the by-laws of the association itself, and declare it void? It would be held by all a vain plea to urge that the Court had no power to go back of an act of a majority of the directory, or to adjudicate a question under a by-law of a voluntary association. This principle of law is surely too in-

contestable to require much defence when we see it regulating a multitude of decisions, and illustrated in a standard work like "Bryce's *Ultra Vires!*" It is too late to question the rule, that the act of an association or trustee affecting their trust, done *ultra vires*, may be declared void. But now, on what ground shall the civil court exempt an ecclesiastical association from the operation of this rule? It is confidently held that none exists in law or equity.

Indeed, the plainest principles of common justice are sufficient to make this clear. The citizen who chooses to devote his property to any person or object, not illegal, is entitled to have his wish and purpose guarded by the law. Thus, the main guide for interpreting a will is the design of the testator. Let us suppose that there is written in the will, in words, a specific bequest to "John Smith." But there are actually two John Smiths. Then the court will be bound, if necessary, to exhaust every means for ascertaining which is the John Smith that was in the mind of the testator. It will take parole evidence, and inquire into any facts, as to the relations, the affections, and even the words of the deceased man, which will throw light upon that question. If there were a spurious John Smith, who had assumed the name of the legatee, still more would it be the duty of the court to scrutinise every fact necessary to establish the identity of the real John Smith. In the Walnut Street church case, there were two churches and two Presbyteries of Louisville. Upon the plain principle of law just stated, the Court was bound to discriminate for itself the one of the two which answered to the design of the donor of the property; and no consideration of courtesy or respect for the asserted identity of either claimant could relieve it of this duty.

A consideration of the history of that great struggle, continued through so many centuries, and moistened with so much bloodshed, by which the Protestant states of Europe acquired the boon of spiritual liberty, will teach us the true bearings of the new doctrine concerning Church trusts. We will limit our inquiries to the state from which our commonwealths sprang. The perpetual effort of Rome, in her ambitious struggle to

dominate over the rights of men, was to make her ecclesiastical courts as independent of the courts of law as possible, and to grasp under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by means of churchly pretexts, as many secular rights as possible. She aimed to make all clergy amenable for secular crimes, such as robbery or murder, only to the spiritual courts. She claimed to adjudicate all cases of ecclesiastical property. Every wise statesman who ever struggled for the welfare of the British people, has seen the portentous tendency of these ecclesiastical usurpations, and has resisted them. Even the early struggles of the Norman monarch, Henry II., against Becket and Pope Alexander III., disclose, in the "Constitutions of Clarendon," a clearer appreciation of this contest than has been exhibited in our Supreme Court. Among the sixteen heads of those wise laws which mark the beginning of the "Reformation" in England (as a movement for secular liberty), we note the first and ninth asserted by the statesmen of England, and resisted by Becket and Rome. Every controversy touching a right of advowson, or ecclesiastical patronage, even when clergy were parties, was to be tried before the king's courts. Every challenge between a clerk and a layman as to the feudal tenure of the property in dispute, whether a lay or spiritual fee, was to be tried before the king's court with a jury of laymen. If that jury decided that the fee was spiritual, the question on its merits might go to the ecclesiastical court; if they decided that it was a lay fee, it must be tried before the secular court. Our laws know neither feudal forms of tenure nor rights of patronage as forms of personal property. But we have in these contested articles substantially the principle of equity for which we argue. The adjudication of secular rights belongs exclusively to the secular courts; and the question whether a given right is ecclesiastical, as soon as it is raised, reduces the ecclesiastical court from the grade of judge to that of party, who must submit his claim to the jurisdiction of the secular court. The able lawyers who guided Henry saw clearly that on no other plan could an effectual barrier be raised against the engrossment of wealth in ghostly hands. Wealth is power. They saw that just so soon as the spiritual power was armed with

wealth, whose tenure and use were amenable to its superior jurisdiction only, there was a rival and aggressive *imperium in imperio*, whose movements must be fatal to liberty. Using their wealth irresponsibly to the secular authority, these ecclesiastical authorities never failed in the end to use it for their own aggrandisement, and the engrossing to themselves of more exorbitant powers. Such is man's nature.

We come now to the age of Blackstone, when Protestant England had become fully established as a free Christian commonwealth. In this author (Book III., Ch. VII., p. 87, etc.) we read:

“These eccentric tribunals, (which are principally guided by the rules of the imperial and canon laws,) as they subsist and are admitted in England, not by any right of their own, but upon bare sufferance and toleration from the municipal laws, must have recourse to the laws of that country wherein they are thus adopted, to be informed how far their jurisdiction extends, or what causes are permitted, and what forbidden, to be discussed and drawn in question before them. It matters not, therefore, what the pandects of Justinian, or the decretals of Gregory, have ordained. They are here of no more intrinsic authority than the laws of Solon and Lycurgus.” “In short, the common law of England is the one uniform rule to determine the jurisdiction of our courts.”

Thus does the English law speak of the ecclesiastical tribunals, even of that National Church which is, by express law, established in the kingdom. These spiritual tribunals are, after all, only *courts* by sufferance of the common law; and can take no jurisdiction whatever, save what the secular law allows them. How much more true, then, in this country, where Church and State are absolutely separate and independent, is that proposition which we asserted, that Church courts *are not courts* by any valid force of law in their relation to the courts of law of the country. However they may properly be spiritual courts, in their ghostly jurisdiction and moral penalties, to those persons who have voluntarily joined the religious societies they represent; in the view of the law, they are no more than voluntary umpires, and stand on the same footing with all the other extra-legal boards of direction or reference, created by the optional combination of citizens. The inevitable corollary from this position is,

that whenever the decisions of one of these bodies touches a property-right which the Constitution and laws have committed to the guardianship of civil courts, such decisions have no validity save that which the law allows and confers.

The property of the Anglican Church was derived chiefly from her original endowments in lands and houses, and in tithes. Blackstone, in defining the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts touching this property, requires us to take the following distinction: They "have no jurisdiction to try the *right* of tithes unless between spiritual persons; but, in ordinary cases between spiritual men and laymen, are only to compel the payment of them when the right is not disputed." "If any dispute arises whether such tithes be *due* and *accustomed*, this cannot be determined in the ecclesiastical court, but before the king's courts of the common law." (*88.) "For *fees* also, settled and acknowledged to be due to the officers of the ecclesiastical courts, a suit will lie therein; but not if the *right* of the fees is at all disputable; for then it must be decided by the common law." (*90.) So, in claims for spoliations or dilapidations of ecclesiastical real properties, "if the right of patronage" (to that property) "comes at all into dispute," "then the ecclesiastical court hath no cognisance, provided the tithes sued for amount to a fourth part of the value of the living." (*91.) Here, again, the ecclesiastical power, even though regularly established by law for its own sphere, is jealously kept in subordination to the civil courts, wherever property-rights of citizens are involved in the Church's spiritual actions. The same principle of law should be applied, for the stronger reason, in an American State; because here the ecclesiastical tribunal is one unrecognised by, and otherwise irresponsible to, the State. In England every bishop, whose diocesan court in ordinary exercises this limited power, is appointed by the crown; as most of the inferior clergy receive their presentations from some secular order in the State. The Parliament, the representative legislature of the State, is the supreme Church court. The Lord Chancellor, the supreme judge in civil law and equity, receives his appointment direct from the king; and that judge is also the judicial head of the

Church. The last resort, in the question most purely spiritual, is to the Privy Council. But though the subordination of the Established Church to the civil power, which is her creator, be so complete and guarded at every point, still the wise and cautious spirit of British law restricts her jurisdiction over property-rights, especially of laymen, to the mere execution of undisputed claims. How complete will be the contrast, if Justice Miller's opinion remove from our ecclesiastical courts this last band of accountability, and leave these bodies, unknown as authoritative tribunals to the law of the land, and otherwise utterly irresponsible to it, to adjudicate property-rights at their sovereign option under the plea of their construction of their ecclesiastical constitutions!

This new departure receives a supremely ominous coloring when viewed in connexion with the rapid growth of the tenures in *mortmain* in our country, and the melting away of the old restrictions against them. Our revolutionary sires understood the peril to the future purity of the Christian religion and the future liberties of the people from this source; not only were they statesmen who had learned wisdom in the study of constitutions and histories, instead of the slippery *arena* of the "*caucus*" and the political ring, but they had been taught by the bitter experience of clerical oppressions and persecutions. They knew that this ghostly and perpetual tenure of property held in fee simple for professed spiritual uses, if allowed its natural course, tended to engross more and more to itself. The power of the spiritual physician over the sick and dying sinner is often supreme. The sense of guilt, the desire to testify repentance in the near approach of the eternal and tremendous award of divine justice, and to propitiate His favor by gifts of that worldly wealth now slipping from the grasp, become the most influential motives. Or if the dying testator has a more enlightened conscience and ingenuous heart, no disposition of his wealth can seem more noble than the bestowing of it in perpetuity, to extend to others that gospel which has purified and consoled his own spirit. Zeal for the same holy end will not fail to enlist the most self-denying and disinterested of the clergy in recommending and applauding such bequests, while the more ambitious and greedy of the holy

order will have their eagerness whetted by more ignoble motives, to seek these pious gifts. Thus, the history of every Christian state shows, that if these bequests are legalised, they will be sought by the Church and will be made to her. If the valves are opened, the stream will flow, beyond all doubt. It is flowing now, in all the American States, in constantly increasing volume. The Churches are becoming rich with real property and endowments in various forms. But when these riches have once come, a new danger emerges to reinforce the perilous tendency. The ecclesiastical riches become the inevitable objects of avarice. Worldly and greedy men are drawn to seek spiritual offices for the sake of the money and power with which they are now endowed; and the general character of the clergy undergoes a revolution. Of course this new clergy, greedy, mercenary, and ambitious, will not fail to wield every ghostly motive, with increasing zeal, to gather in these pious bequests. Such is the explanation of the process which at the Reformation had locked up half the real estate of Scotland, and one-third of that of England, and which held one-third of that of the French, even down to the great Revolution, in the hands of undying spiritual corporations. True statesmen at once comprehended the result. They saw this tenure in *mortmain*, where unchecked by law, subtract a third or a half of the wealth of the state from taxation, thus throwing an intolerable burden of taxes on the secular orders. They saw this ill-directed wealth taint and corrupt the ministry, until, from the holy messengers of a heavenly religion, they became an order of greedy and luxurious oppressors. They saw this professedly consecrated wealth practically breed in the state a new species of aristocracy, self-perpetuating, irresponsible, and separated by caste from the people who should have been their fellow-citizens. Such was the apprehension felt on this head by those great and wise men who founded the independence of Virginia, that they concluded there was no assured safety for their children's freedom save in tearing the tenure in *mortmain*, root and branch, out of their Constitution! The laws studiously and totally excluded that form of tenure; and for fifty years there was absolutely no legal recognition of real or personal

property-tenure for any spiritual corporation. Every acre of land, and every building, and every endowment they possessed, was held by some *extra*-legal expedient, under which the trust was protected only by the public opinion of an honorable people and the personal conscience of trustees and their heirs-at-law. Let the reader review the history of this tenure in Europe, and he will hesitate in pronouncing even the caution of the Virginians to be extreme.

But now, all is changed, and the old danger is forgotten. Our new "progressive" statesmen, ignorant or disdainful of the lessons of history, and wise only in demagogism and gain, heedlessly remove every restriction. Ecclesiastical corporations spring up by multitudes. The Church grows yearly in endowed wealth. Already its moral effects are seen. The Church courts of the great denominations obviously begin to feel the arrogance of power, and their atmosphere to savor of ecclesiastical policy rather than humble ministerial devotion. The clergy no longer attracts the unwilling veneration of the world, but is either contemned or courted as the great men of the world are courted. The line of distinction between Christian morals and worldly conformity becomes more faint. And now comes the Supreme Court of the United States, and gives the last fatal impulse, by making these Church courts irresponsible in the use or perversion of all the vast wealth they are destined to engross.

For every practical mind sees at a glance, that under this new ruling nothing is required of a grasping Church court to render it actually irresponsible, but that it shall have the hardihood to say that *it deems* its decision conformable to the Constitution of the Church. Does it ever cost anything to ambitious heady men, heated by prejudice and lust of power, to say this? But they have only to say this as a supreme Church court, and, according to Mr. Justice Miller, no power on earth can check their hand from the unjust grasp upon ecclesiastical property. The effect is to make each supreme court a veritable Pope, so far as Church property goes. Each one is clothed with the power of a practical infallibility, touching all the sacred property in its denomination, and all the property-rights of its members. This suggests a

final and crucial test for Justice Miller's doctrine. Let a lay *Papist* appeal to the law for protection in this land of freedom and equal rights, and we shall see how the new law will work. His bishop claims in his own person all the property of the Church in his diocese, in trust for "Holy Mother Church." This bishop acknowledges no ecclesiastical subordination to any save the Pope. He, the Pope, is the supreme ecclesiastical court. But, saith our Supreme Court, the ruling of the supreme ecclesiastical tribunal of the suitor's denomination must be unquestioned and final. So, when this American citizen appears at the bar of his own country to claim justice, Mr. Justice Miller tells him that a man who is a foreigner, living four thousand miles away, who scorns all allegiance to the American government, and who claims indeed to be an independent prince of a separate and distant state, has forbidden him to have even a hearing! With this *reductio ad absurdissimum* we leave the case.

The least perspicacious may see the bearing of this new law upon the rights and existence of the Southern Presbyterian Church. Its consistent application would rob us of every endowment, every printing-house, church, manse, burying-ground, and school, and every missionary or evangelistic fund, held in the name of the Church. Let us suppose that the Northern Assembly had held on its way consistently, in the species of legislation which it set on foot in 1865 and 1866; that it had persisted in the declaration actually adopted, making the constitutional position of the Old School Church, touching slavery and civic allegiance, to be the sin of heresy; that it had judicially required all Southern Synods, Presbyteries, and Sessions to try and censure their members for this sin; that when these courts treated the injunction with neglect, the Assembly had proceeded to deal with them for contumacy, had dissolved them by its *fiat*, and had pronounced any minorities of negroes or "carpet-baggers," however despicable, who professed to adhere, the true Southern Churches and Church courts, entitled to the succession to all the records, endowments, and real estate. What is all this more than was actually done by the Assembly

of 1866. in its "*ipso facto* act?" Let it be remembered, that to that enormous act, the Supreme Court has given its full sanction in the case of the Walnut Street church; and that in virtue thereof, the present occupants *actually hold that property to-day*. It is to be presumed that the Supreme Court means to be consistent. The Northern Assembly, then, has only to extend an enactment precisely identical to all our other churches; and they must expect to see their property follow the fate of the Walnut Street church. The only tenure by which Southern Presbyterians hold the possessions, bought with Southern labor and money, bestowed by the piety of our sainted Southern ancestors, for the purpose of upholding the doctrines and principles which we still maintain, but which the Northern Assembly has in part discarded and now assails, is the optionary forbearance, or timidity, or policy of that hostile and accusing body. Does one say, "They do not dream of wielding that power?" For their own credit, we hope they do not. But this solace is dashed by two thoughts. The first is, whether a free people can be content to hold rights so clear and dear by the mere sufferance of another association? The second is the pertinent inquiry, *For what end and use* did the Northern Assembly so eagerly engross this law of tyranny in its own code, *and for what purpose is it now retained there?* To promote "fraternal relations?"

ARTICLE II.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF GIVING.

An exhaustive treatment of this subject would fill volumes. From the time when God created man, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, to the time when the Spirit and the Bride say, "Come," and the final and universal invitation of the gospel is recorded, there is much of Scripture bearing directly or remotely on this doctrine. From Genesis to Revelation, the law and the gospel, the histories and the prophecies, the evangels and the epistles, the prose and the poetry, the victories and defeats, the prosperity and the reverses, the promises and the threatenings, the first Adam and the second Adam, the Saviour and his Apostles, the covenants of works and of grace, the fall and the redemption of man, furnish material for our subject. To do complete justice to the topic would require a perfect induction preparatory to a successful systematising of the Scriptural Doctrine of Giving. In this article, however, we propose an humbler task. Disclaiming anything like an exhaustive treatment, and equally disclaiming any originality, we shall present some points of the doctrine of Scripture on the subject of giving.

1. "Whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine;" Job xli. 11, last clause. These words furnish a starting point. We are God's by creation and by preservation and by redemption. This right of property in us, and in all that we have, is absolute upon God's part. There is, and there can be, no claim prior to his or superior to his. This claim he everywhere asserts. He not only reiterates it in his Word in every varied form, but ever and anon asserts it with emphasis in his providence. What is there that we can call our own as against this claim of God? Our lands? How often has God in his providence driven away the owner, a refugee from his landed estates. Our houses? How frequently in one hour does God reduce by storm, or by fire, the noblest mansion to shapeless ruin. Our cattle, our stocks and bonds, our gold and silver, and precious stones?

VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—6.

Who is there from whom God may not at any moment take away all these things, without the least violation of any rights of property therein? Our wives or children? Does not God continually assert, in reference to these, his claim as prior to any claim that we may have? Our bodies and our souls—those which we value as our most priceless treasures? Does not God continually, by disease and death, ever teach us that we are not our own? There is nothing, therefore, in the shape of possessions to which God does not continually and practically assert his claim. From our least possession to our greatest possession, life, there is nothing of which God may not at any moment, without a single note of warning, deprive us; and in so doing, he violates none of our rights of property. Manifestly, therefore, the doctrine of Scripture (as of providence) is, that we are *trustees*, and all that we have is a *trust fund*. This trust fund is to be used for our good and the good of our fellow-men, subordinately to the glory of God. This is exactly the position in which the Saviour places us in Matt. xxv. 14–30.

2. God has appointed a way by which we are to manifest our recognition of the fact that we are only trustees. As the borrower pays interest in recognition of the fact that the principal belongs to another; as he who rents pays a stipulated sum in recognition that the house in which he lives is the property of another; as the conquered province pays tribute in recognition of the sovereignty of the conqueror: so God requires of us some portion of our earthly goods to be specially devoted to his service, as an expression of our loyalty, and a recognition of him as sole original proprietor of ourselves and all that we possess. An illustration of this we have in the seven days of the week; all of our time belongs to God, just as all of our property. We are trustees under God of time as well as property; no less bound to use the former than the latter for the glory of God. Yet God lays a special claim upon the Sabbath,—one-seventh of our time,—to be exclusively devoted to his worship.

Giving of our substance for religious purposes is therefore a duty which we owe to God. This is not merely an inference from the preceding position, that we and all our property belong

to God; it is abundantly taught us in Scripture, by precept and by example. Take a specimen text from the Old Testament, "*Honor*" (imperative) "the Lord with thy substance, and with the first-fruits of all thine increase." Prov. iii. 9. Take one from the New Testament, "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye. Upon the first day of the week, let every one of you lay by him in store as God hath prospered him." 1 Cor. xvi. 1-2. We need not linger upon this point; for surely there are none who deny that the Scriptures enforce upon us the duty of giving a portion of our substance to God, for special religious purposes, in recognition of his absolute right of property in us and in our property.

3. When God created man "after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness," he invested him with dominion over his creatures. In the garden of Eden, before the fall, as God claimed a specific portion of man's time, so he reserved a specific portion of man's property. He was to keep holy one day in seven, and he was to regard as specially reserved for God the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Thus, from the very beginning, before man had sinned, did God teach him, that in reference both to his time and his property, there were sacred boundaries beyond which he was forbidden to pass. The Scriptures do not tell us how man spent the Sabbath in Eden; therefore it is with caution we presume to speculate. May we not, however, safely infer that Adam and Eve rested from their "worldly employments and recreations," and that on that day a part of their worship consisted in bringing "of the fruit of the ground an offering unto the Lord"? Such an offering, though rejected by the Lord when brought by Cain in his "estate of sin and misery," might yet be acceptable when offered by Adam in his estate of "original righteousness." But we shall not insist upon this point, simply throwing it out as a possible indication, that even before the fall man's religion consisted in part in the *worshipping of God with his substance*. To one point, however, let special attention be given. The first sin consisted in man's appropriating to himself that which God had

specially reserved. Man's first sin, then, was covetousness. Covetousness is a compound of selfishness and unbelief. So this first sin affords these two elements. "Covetousness," says the Apostle, "which is idolatry,"—loving and serving the creature more than the Creator, this is found to perfection in the first sin. Whether examined, therefore, by analysis or by scriptural definition, covetousness—acting itself out by appropriating to man's own use material things which God had specially reserved to himself—was the root of all evil.

As is generally now conceded, the "coats of skins" with which the Lord God clothed our first parents, were made from animals which had been offered in sacrifice. Thus this *first act of worship* on the part of a sinner, taught him not only to look to God for justification through the righteousness of another, but to worship that God with his substance; for these animals had been given to Adam as a part of his property. Again: in the opening of the new dispensation we read, "And when they were come into the house, they saw the young child with Mary his mother, and fell down and worshipped him; and when they had opened their treasures, they presented (compare in the Greek, Matt. ii. 11, and Heb. v. 1, 3, 7, viii. 3, etc.) unto him gifts: gold, and frankincense, and myrrh." Thus the first act of worship by sinful man to God in human flesh, the first act of homage offered to Jesus, was accompanied with a contribution of worldly substance. In the passage from Corinthians already quoted, the order given by the Apostle in reference to giving, was to be attended to regularly every Sabbath day,—the day specially set apart for the worship of God,—thus joining together God's claim to man's time and his claim to man's property. The same day which by early association reminds us of God our Creator, and by recent enactment reminds us of God our Redeemer, is thus made a perpetual reminder that because he is our Creator and Redeemer, we and all that we have belong absolutely to him; and therefore, by a double obligation, we must worship God by holding sacred to him not a portion of time only, but of our property also. "*Honor the Lord* with thy substance." The Hebrew word here translated "honor" is the same word which

occurs in 1 Sam. ii. 30; Prov. xiv. 31. In Psalms xxii. 23, it is rendered "glorify;" also in Psalms l. 15, 23; Isa. xxiv. 15. From the foregoing and innumerable other instances in the Old Testament and in the New, the deduction is indisputable, that giving is an act of religious worship, as much so as praying or singing.

4. In 2 Cor. ix. 6-11, occurs a remarkable passage. Here Paul teaches that giving is a *means of grace*; that is to say, that giving is a divinely appointed method for the Christian's growth in grace. This point may be argued from the immediately preceding one, viz., that giving is an act of worship, just as praying or singing; for every act of worship is a means of grace, and so strengthens all the other graces. The logical connexion is so manifest, however, that the bare statement is sufficient. Nevertheless, to show that our position is not merely deduced from the preceding head, let us turn to the direct teaching of Scripture, as found in the above reference. Would that it could be said of the Church now as Paul here says of the Corinthians, "For as touching the ministering unto the saints, it is superfluous for me to write to you." Notice, then, that it is concerning "giving"—"ministering unto the saints"—that the Apostle is writing. In the sixth verse he says, "He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully." This is a clear assertion, that giving bears fruit in proportion to its exercise; *i. e.*, it is productive as a means to an end. In the eighth verse the Apostle says, "And God is able to make all grace abound toward you;" it is therefore a means of "grace." In the tenth verse, "Now he that ministereth seed to the sower both minister bread for your food, and multiply your seed sown, and increase the fruits of your righteousness." Here we have three distinct ideas connected with giving, and thrown into the form of a prayer; but, a prayer offered under the inspiration of the Spirit, is equivalent to a promise. Now, then, we have here three distinct promises connected with cheerful giving and bountiful sowing: "Bread" shall be ministered for your own food; the means of giving ("seed sown") shall be multiplied; the "fruits of your righteous-

ness" (your graces) shall be increased. Nothing could more manifestly assert that giving is a means of grace. (Consult Hodge *in loco*.)

5. This position is still farther strengthened by another doctrine of the word of God, in which we are taught not only that giving is a means of grace, but that giving is itself a GRACE. Prayer is not only a means of grace, but prayer is itself a grace. It is unnecessary, however, to argue this point; the Scriptures are so plain that they need no interpretation, and leave no room for argument. In the eighth chapter of Second Corinthians, Paul, speaking on this same subject, says, "Moreover, brethren, we do you to wit of the grace of God bestowed on the churches of Macedonia; how that in a great trial of affliction, the abundance of their joy and their deep poverty abounded unto the riches of their liberality. . . . Insomuch that we desired Titus, that as he had begun, so he would also finish in you the same grace also. Therefore, as ye abound in everything, in faith, and utterance, and knowledge, and in all diligence, and in your love to us, see that ye abound in this grace also." In these verses giving is distinctly denominated a "grace," and classed along with "faith," "utterance," "knowledge," "diligence," and "love." Can any man claim to be a child of God who is devoid of the graces of faith, utterance, knowledge, diligence, and love? Neither can he claim the privilege of sonship who is lacking in the grace of giving. It is clearly the doctrine of Scripture, that giving is an act of worship, a means of grace, and a grace. Each of these three points mutually supports the other.

6. From all the foregoing, it becomes an interesting, important, and practical question, what *proportion* of our substance should be consecrated to God? From the nature of the case, the unregenerate heart cannot answer this question aright; for the carnal mind loves the property and hates the Proprietor. From the nature of the case, the Christian cannot answer this question aright; for he is only partially sanctified, and hence, to some extent, partakes of that same inability to deal with this question that attaches to the unregenerate. God himself, therefore, is the only one who can give a proper answer to this question; for

he alone is properly qualified. This raises an antecedent probability, that in the Scriptures we shall find an answer to this question. This probability is increased by considering that the Sacred Scriptures are given to us as a sufficient rule of faith and practice. This is increased again from the fact, that both in Eden and in every subsequent dispensation, in the Old Testament and in the New, the Scriptures have answered this question in respect to the proportion of man's *time*; and also, in so far as the Jewish Dispensation is concerned, has answered this question in respect to *property*. One-seventh of man's time has always been holy time; and at least, under the Jewish, that which immediately preceded the Christian, one-tenth of man's property was holy property. These considerations render it exceedingly probable that the Christian, who needs instruction on this point as much as the Jew, would not be left devoid of that instruction.

When we turn to the New Testament—1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2,—we find an “order” given to the churches of Galatia and Achaia. One element of that order is, that “every one” is to give “as God hath prospered him.” We must therefore govern our contributions by some definite rule of proportion, or this order of the Apostle is violated. Now would God require us to give according to proportion, (“as God hath prospered,”) and not furnish us with the rule? Yet that specific rule is no where found in the New Testament; it must therefore be searched for in the Old Testament. Here the tithe law is fundamental. This law has never been repealed. It was not a civil law, it was not a typical or ceremonial law; it was a moral law, standing side by side with the Fourth Commandment, affecting man's *property*, as the Fourth Commandment affected his *time*.

Those passages in the New Testament,—such as, “He that soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully;” “God loveth a cheerful giver;” “Every man, as he purposeth in his heart, so let him give;”—which are generally quoted to prove the repeal of the tithe law, are simply irrelevant. They refer to the law of the Christian's free-will-offering; and since parallel passages are found in the Old Testament, (*e. g.*, Ex. xxv. 2,) existing side by

side with the tithe law, the argument to be drawn from them is: since the free-will offering of the Old Testament did not counteract the tithe law, neither does the free-will offering of the New Testament.

Suppose, however, we grant that the tithe law has been repealed, what then? The argument now runs thus: God requires me to give "as" he "hath prospered" me. I find no specific law in the New Testament to guide me. In the Old Testament, from the patriarchal age on down, I find that the tenth has always been an acceptable proportion. In the Old and in the New Testament, more than the tenth (third and all) has been required; more than the tenth (half and all) has been required and accepted. I find no instance in the Old Testament, or in the New, to justify me in the belief that God will accept less than the tenth as my proportion, (for there is no record of less than the tenth ever having been offered to and accepted by God;) therefore I dare not offer him less, on the peril of having it spurned as *will-worship*. This conclusion is inevitable.

Consider again, in this connexion, the Jew, who had no claim upon him in the way of Foreign Missions, who had only to sustain Home Missions, was required to contribute one-tenth of his income for religious purposes; but the Christian, in addition to Home Missions, has been charged to carry the gospel to every creature. In the light of this fact, we ask earnestly, if the Jew gave the tenth, can that man be in the path of duty who, under the Christian dispensation, gives less than the tenth?

The true status of this question is precisely this: the burden of proof lies upon those who contribute less than the tenth. It is not incumbent upon us to prove that the tithe law is still in force; on the contrary, this is the presumption until the repeal is proven.

One general rule we would lay down in respect to proportion as certainly scriptural, *i. e.*, *give until you feel it*. Of the Jewish people in general the law required one-tenth; of the poor famine-stricken widow the prophet by God's direction required one-third; Zaccheus, under the impulses of a new-born soul, gave one-half; so the Pentecostal converts gave all; of the young ruler who was

self-righteous, rich, and covetous, the Saviour required all; the poor widow gave two mites,—all her living. “This poor widow hath cast more in than all they which have cast into the treasury.” Not more than *any* other, but more than *all* the others combined; not merely as much as, but “more than.” Certainly this seems a very high estimate; it is one, however, of exact truth. It was the judgment of Him who knows all things, even the secrets of the heart, and who cannot err in judgment. We naturally inquire, what is the standard of valuation? “For all they did cast in of their *abundance*; but she of her *want* did cast in all that she had, even all her living.” Superfluity on the one hand, penury on the other. SELF-DENIAL is the standard of valuation.

Why should self-denial be the standard? Is there any merit in self-denial? None. Self-denial is not meritorious, but it is the exponent, the test, and the measure of our LOVE. Jesus does not need our money; the cattle upon a thousand hills are his, the gold also and the silver are his. He could rain from heaven every Sabbath or every day a perfect flood of gold and silver and precious stones as easily as he rained manna to feed the hungry yet ungrateful Israelites. Jesus does not “love” “money.” He loves *us*, and loves to witness in us the expressions of our love to him. Who loves none gives none, and who gives none to the same none is forgiven. “How dwelleth the love of God in him?” To give without self-denial is to do what David refused to do—give unto the Lord that which cost him nothing. To give without self-denial is to worship God not in sincerity, but in hypocrisy; to worship him without the exercise of love in the act of worship. To give without self-denial is to fail to exercise the grace of giving, to deprive the act of all value as a means of grace, to deprive yourself of all the profit. “And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (love,) it profiteth me nothing.” Without love our contribution may profit others, but it will profit us nothing. The poor widow had two mites. She might have given one and retained the other. She believed the promises with all her heart, she loved with all heart, therefore she gave with all her heart, and gave all she had. Self-denial is Christ’s standard of valuation.

Self-denial is necessary to render giving an act of *acceptable worship*. SELF-DENIAL is necessary to save the act from HYPOCRISY.

Two very nice questions are sometimes propounded in connexion with this subject. Suppose one's income is so small that he cannot afford to contribute the tenth? The question is as much as if you should ask, suppose one is too poor to keep holy one-seventh of his time? The Sabbath law applies equally to the rich and to the poor; the tithe law applies to the poorest no less than to the richest. No man's poverty can justify the appropriation of holy time; no man's poverty can justify the appropriation of holy money. The other question is, suppose a man is in debt, must he not be just before he is generous? Before answering this question we digress for a moment to remark, that there is no power on earth, in Legislatures or Congress, which can release a man from the moral obligation to pay his debts. The Eighth Commandment requires the payment of our debts, and human law might as well undertake to release me from the moral obligation of the Third Commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," as to undertake my release from the Eighth Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal;" and it may be as justly said of the Eighth as of the Third Commandment, "That however the breakers of this commandment may escape the punishment of men, yet the Lord our God will not suffer them to escape his righteous judgment." A fearful day of reckoning awaits the men of this generation on the score of the non-payment of debts.

Having thus placed ourselves beyond misconstruction on this subject, we return to the question. Suppose a man is in debt, shall he give a tithe of his income? We answer, what right had you to go in debt? Do you not know it is forbidden in Scripture? Some will say, but mine is a "security" debt. Still we answer, what right had you to go security? Did not the Scriptures warn you against it? Still another says, my debts came upon me by misfortune. To which we reply, if you had not by a previous violation of God's law contracted debt, misfortune would neither have found nor left you in debt. Whether, therefore, by security

or otherwise you are in debt, the question you must now meet is, what right had you to encumber "trust funds" with a debt? God's claim to your property is prior to all others, even to your own claim. Therefore, whatever claim your creditor may have acquired to your time and your property, it must be held strictly subordinate to God's claim. What right have you to pay your debts by laboring on the Sabbath, God's holy time? What right have you to pay your debts out of God's reserved proportion of your property? You have just as much right to meet the claims of your creditor with *holy time* as with *holy property*. As you value your peace with God, stretch every nerve to pay your debts; but with equal emphasis, let us add, as you value your peace with God, touch not with unhallowed hands God's proportion.

7. Another point of Scripture doctrine on the subject of giving is, that it is *profitable*. It is remarkable that Solomon (Prov. iii. 8-10) introduces this topic with the pungent remark, "Be not wise in thine own eyes." Having thus given timely caution against the deductions of carnal reasoning on this subject, he proceeds, "Honor the Lord with thy substance, and with the first-fruits of all thine increase: *so shall thy barns be filled with plenty, and thy presses shall burst out with new wine.*" The poor widow who, in a time of famine, had just enough to furnish a meal for herself and her son, yet so divided the two meals as to make thereof a third meal for God's prophet, found it brought a hundredfold in this life; for the cruse of oil failed not and the barrel of meal wasted not until the famine was over. The Saviour says, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." Carnal reasoning cannot take this in. Only faith can "understand" that the man who has received one hundred dollars and counts it a blessing, can gain an additional and even a greater blessing by giving a portion or even the whole of it to God. "For the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." On the other hand the Scriptures teach, "There is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty." In 2 Chron. xxxvi. 19-21, we have a striking illustration how the grasping spirit of mammon brought a whole nation to ruin: "And they burnt the house of God, and

brake down the wall of Jerusalem, and burnt all the palaces thereof with fire, and destroyed all the goodly vessels thereof. And them that had escaped from the sword carried he away to Babylon; where they were servants to him and his sons until the reign of the kingdom of Persia: to fulfil the word of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah, until the land had enjoyed her Sabbaths: for as long as she lay desolate she kept Sabbath, to fulfil threescore and ten years." Four hundred and ninety years the Jews neglected to observe the law requiring them to rest their land every seventh year. Thus seventy years of rest had accumulated against them, whilst the longsuffering of God waited; at last the judgment came, and God sent them into Babylonish captivity for seventy years, "until the land had enjoyed her Sabbaths." Again, in Mal. iii. 8-12, we see how the nation had been brought to spiritual and temporal desolation by appropriating to their own use holy property. God traces it to its true cause—withholding the tithes; calls the sin by its proper name—robbing God; and promises, if they break off their sins by righteousness, to restore unto them their former prosperity in temporal and in spiritual things. There can be no question that the Scriptures teach that there is a profit in giving, a loss in withholding; a blessing upon the liberal soul and upon his property, the curse of God upon the person and the property of the stingy.

8. The Scriptures teach that covetousness, in general terms, that inordinate love of money which acts itself out in appropriating to our own use that which God has reserved for himself, or that insatiate greed which tramples every holy instinct under foot that we may acquire property, is a sin fraught with extreme danger. Did Noah overstep the bounds of prudence, and revel in the wine of drunkenness? yet Noah obtained forgiveness and admission to heaven; on the other hand, Achan coveted the wedge of gold and goodly Babylonish garment, and perished without offer or hope of pardon. (Reference, Josh. vi. 18, 19, and vii. 20, 21, 24.) Did Lot add incest to drunkenness? yet he is termed "righteous," and the Scriptures give proof of his final salvation. Balaam loved the wages of unrighteousness, and although he lifted his covetous hands to heaven and prayed, "Let

me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his," yet his dead body found on the battle-field amongst the enemies of the Lord, gave unmistakable index that he perished in his iniquity. Did David add to drunkenness (2 Sam. xi. 13) adultery, and to adultery murder? yet David is brought to deep contrition, and "the joy of thy salvation" is restored unto him; but Judas carried the bag, and because he loved what was carried therein, sold his Master for thirty pieces of silver, and went out and hanged himself; going as the son of perdition to his own place. Did Peter, although he had just participated in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, administered by Christ himself, yet deny that Master with bitter oaths and curses? still Peter is converted, strengthens the brethren, is restored to his commission to feed the sheep and feed the lambs, and now wears in heaven a martyr's glorious crown; on the other hand, Ananias and Sapphira "kept back part of the price," and the swift descending stroke of an outraged God sent them down to the bottomless pit. We will not assert that covetousness is the unpardonable sin; we would simply hold it up to view as a crowded thoroughfare leading down to eternal death. There is no instance in Scripture of any man's being saved whose prominent trait of character was covetousness!

9. Whilst the Scriptures thus, as we have endeavored to show, lay great stress on giving, yet they guard us against what would be a fatal mistake, viz., the supposition that there is any merit in giving. Paul assures us that we may give all our goods to feed the poor, and yet perish. No man is saved on account of his giving; we are saved solely through the righteousness of Christ; but this the Scriptures do teach, viz., that without conformity to Christ's example, we cannot be saved. What was that example? Preëminently one of love, of self-denial, of giving. He gave all he had for us; the man who is not willing to give all he has for Christ is clearly not his disciple.

10. We have seen that covetousness is a compound of unbelief and of selfishness. Now, genuine Christian liberality is a compound of faith and of self-denial, springing from love to God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, and love to man as the creature to be

redeemed and sanctified. Hence the Scriptures ever and anon point us to Christ and him crucified, as the proper source from which to draw the deepest inspiration for the performance of every duty. "Ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God," is the Apostle's argument. Again, "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich." Read the wondrous story as it is unfolded by the Apostle: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." At the foot of the cross, in sight of the crucified Saviour, who of his own free will, for the great love wherewith he loved us, descended from the bosom of the Father, and the highest throne of co-equal and co-eternal Godhead, to the depths of the likeness of sinful flesh, that he might expire in the agonies of crucifixion,—most ignominious and painful death,—in full view of such a scene, and realising that thus he bare our sins in his own body on the tree, to save us from the unspeakable agonies of ETERNAL DEATH, let us settle the whole question of GIVING. For in every call for money, it is THIS JESUS who solicits your contributions.

What, then, is needed to increase the contributions to the treasury? We have not space now for an exhaustive reply. We must content ourselves with simply saying, *we need prayer*; for if giving is a grace, it is the gift of God, and must be acquired by prayer, and strengthened by repeated prayer and repeated exercise. Thus may we expect this, like all graces, to grow and develope and mature. *We need faith*; faith in God as our God, as the God of the promises, as the God who cannot lie; strong faith, unwavering faith, overcoming faith. *We need sympathy*; sympathy with Jesus Christ in his grand undertaking to redeem the world from sin and Satan; to win back this rebellious province to its true allegiance. We need to sympathise with Jesus Christ in the travail of his soul, as he longs with ardent desire for the

fulfilment of the Father's promise, "the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." Give us a church thus animated with strong faith in God, and burning sympathy with Jesus Christ, and then shall the poor come with all their living, counting it their highest joy to cast it into the treasury of the Lord; and the rich shall come with their abundance and lavish it upon the cause and kingdom which they love, until the treasury of the Lord shall be filled to overflowing, and Jesus shall come the second time without sin unto salvation, and all the nations shout the glad acclaim, "HALLELUJAH: THE LORD GOD OMNIPOTENT REIGNETH."

ARTICLE III.

WALES.

Modern historical writers trace the origin of the Kymry or Cimbri—the ancient Britons or modern Welsh—to Gomer the eldest son of Japhet. They claim also that the Kymry of Cambria alone, through the vicissitudes of nearly forty centuries, are the only people in Europe—or, so far as history informs, in the world,—who have preserved their original language unchanged, and their patrimony still in possession of their own race and nationality.

The religion of the Kymry, previous to the Christian era, was Druidical. The authority and privileges of the priests of the Druidical order were very great. They sat as magistrates, deciding all questions of law and equity. They regulated and presided over the rites and ceremonies of religion. The power of excommunication, lodged in their hands, put the party against whom it was issued out of the pale of the law. They were exempt from military duties, taxes, and imposts. A tenth of the land was appropriated for their support. None but a Druid could offer sacrifice; nor was any candidate admissible to the order

who could not prove his genealogy from free parents for nine generations.

The canonicals of the Arch-Druid were extremely gorgeous. On his head he wore a tiara of gold; in his girdle the gem of augury; on his breast the breast-plate of judgment, below it the draconic egg; on the forefinger of the right hand the signet ring of the order; on the forefinger of the left the gem of inspiration. Before him were borne the volume of esoteric mysteries, and the golden crozier with which the *mistletoe** was gathered. His robe was of white linen, with a broad purple border,—the symbolic cross being wrought in gold down the length of the back.

Education, among the Kymry of Britain, was of a high order before the Christian era. The Druidic colleges, according to Cæsar's account, embraced a course of education in the profoundest subjects of physical and metaphysical philosophy, and were patronised by all the Gallic nobility on the continent,—the number of students in them sometimes numbering sixty thousand.

The earlier political organisation of the Kymry is a matter of peculiar interest to Americans. Every subject was as free as the king. There were no other laws in force than those which were known as "Common Rights." There were no slaves; the first slaves in after-times were the captives taken in war. The crown itself was subject to the "voice of the country;" hence the maxim, "the country is higher than the king," which runs through the ancient British laws, and was directly opposed to the feudal system afterwards introduced, in which the country itself was dealt with as the property of the king. The military leadership remained in the eldest tribe, the Kymry, and from it the military dictator, or pendragonite, in the case of foreign invasion or national danger, was to be elected, and, for the time being, vested with absolute power.

The usages of Britain could not be altered by any act or edict of the crown or National Convention. They were considered the

* This parasitic plant was used in their religious ceremonies. For modes of initiation and ceremonial observances among the Druids, see *Cambrian History*, London, 1857, by Rev. R. W. Morgan.

inalienable rights to which every Briton was born, and of which no human legislation could deprive him.*

The authority from which we quote, assigns the introduction of Christianity into Britain to Joseph of Arimathea, who fled, along with others, from Judea during the persecution conducted by Saul of Tarsus. Having spent a year in Gaul preaching the gospel, Joseph and his fraternity were invited to Britain by some eminent Druids, who had been among his hearers while sojourning upon the continent.

And here an allusion is necessary to the relations which grew up between the Druids and Christians. The religion of the Druids was preëminently patriotic. The spirit it infused into the people contributed no less than the military science displayed by a series of able and intrepid commanders, to render the tardy progress of the Roman arms in Britain a solitary exception to the rapidity of their conquests in other parts of the world. Hence, while all other religions had received its protection, that of the Druids had been marked out for extirpation by the Roman government.

It was not a matter for wonder, therefore, when the Romans began to persecute the Christians, that the Druids should have their sympathies awakened in behalf of the new religion. Let us refer to a few facts:

“Prior to Caius Julius Cæsar,” observe the classic authors, “no foreign conqueror had ever ventured to assail the shores of Britain.” Cæsar made his first attempt to conquer Britain B. C. 55, his fleet crossing the channel on the 5th of August of that year. After the severest contests with Caswallon, the British king, in which Cæsar was greatly damaged, he reëmbarked his shattered forces on September 23d. This campaign lasted fifty-five days, during which Cæsar had failed to advance beyond seven miles from the sea-shore, had lost one pitched battle, and had his own camp attacked by the victorious enemy.

* See Cambrian History, pp. 29, 30, 38, 39. The most learned jurists refer the original institutes of the Island to the Trojan Law brought by Brutus. Lord Chief Justice Coke (Preface to Vol. III. of Reports) affirms “the original laws of this land were composed of such elements as Brutus first selected from the ancient Greek and Trojan institutions.”

But Cæsar was determined in his purpose of conquering Britain. Treachery on the part of Avarwy, a prince of Britain, promoted Cæsar's purposes. Caswallon was defeated in the first engagement, but in the second was successful in driving the Romans back upon their camp. In the third battle the star of Cæsar recovered its ascendancy; but, from the subsequent manœuvres of Caswallon, Cæsar became convinced that he could not safely remain in Britain during the approaching winter. Peace was concluded, and Cæsar set sail from the island, September 26th, B. C. 54.

For ninety-seven years no Roman again ventured to plant a hostile foot on the British Island. But in A. D. 43, the Claudian invasion commenced; and, after a war of forty-three years, waged with fluctuating success, it terminated in the expulsion of the Romans A. D. 86. This invasion is remarkable for the able commanders produced by it on both sides. Caradoc, the British Pendragon, being defeated A. D. 52, and taken prisoner by treachery, was conveyed to Rome, where he was converted by the preaching of Paul A. D. 57.

In A. D. 53, on the death of Claudius, Nero succeeded to the throne. Arviragus, the British king, had been elected Pendragon in the room of Caradoc, and was still contending against the Roman power in the west of the Island. In A. D. 60, the Boadicean war in the east of Britain was added to the calamities already existing,—Caius Decius resorting to the severest measures in conducting the war. At the same time orders had been issued to the Roman commander stationed at St. Albans to extirpate Druidism at all hazards with the sword; and, with this view, to invade Mona. (Anglesey,) its chief seat in Cambria. The instructions were executed with the ruthless thoroughness characteristic of the Roman service. But while Druidic priest and priestess were being butchered on their own altars by the Roman sword, and the waters of the Menai were illuminated night and day by the glare of the conflagrations of the sacred groves, tens of thousands of Roman citizens were expiating with their lives the nefarious massacre. No sooner had the first intimation of the real nature of the expedition of Paulinus been made known, than

the war became a religious crusade. The massacre of the Menai produced a feeling of universal indignation and horror. Offers of support poured in from all quarters, and the queen, Boadicea,—Victoria—soon found herself at the head of 120,000 men. The war was marked on both sides by all the atrocities which have ever been the characteristics of religious crusades. Colchester was carried on the first assault. Verulam was in the same manner stormed, gutted, and burnt. London had once again failed in its allegiance. Against it the British army, now swelled to 230,000 men, directed its vengeance. Such of the inhabitants as possessed the means fled at its approach; the rest, including the Roman citizens and foreign merchants, took refuge with the garrison in the ramparts. They were escaladed, the city fired in four different quarters, public buildings and private residences reduced alike to ashes. "No quarter or ransom was given or taken in this war."* Tacitus estimates that before the engagement with Paulinus, more than 70,000 Romans had fallen either in garrison or in the field. Leaving this terrible example of a metropolis smouldering in ashes, quenched with the blood of its inhabitants, behind, Boadicea swept westward with her forces. After several battles she encountered the Romans in a last engagement. It was a deadly *mêlée* of heavy-armed legionaries, auxiliaries, archers, cavalry, and charioteers, mingled together and swaying to and fro in all the heady currents of a desperate fight over the whole extent of the ground. The fortune of the day towards sunset inclined to the Romans. The Britons were driven back within their entrenchments, leaving a large number dead on the field or prisoners in the hands of the enemy. The rest retired in good order, and prepared shortly afterwards to renew the conflict. In the interim, however, Boadicea died, and was buried with great magnificence. Under Arviragus and others, the war was continued with unabated vigor. Paulinus, worn out by his exertions, resigned in favor of Petronius Turpilianus.

In A. D. 64, the extinction of Druidism in the territories south of the Thames, and in those of Coritana and Icenii, was

* Tacitus.

completed by Turpilianus. The first persecution of the Christians by Nero took place the same year.

A. D. 70, an armistice was concluded by the Roman general with Arviragus, Vespasian being emperor at Rome. Many battles ensued between this time and A. D. 86, when, after a war of thirty-three years, and above sixty battles, the Romans were expelled from their last holds in Kent. The Claudian invasion thus ended had failed as signally as the Julian in its object of the territorial conquest of Britain. A triumphant peace terminated the heroic struggle which had been waged against incalculable odds by the British people, led by a succession of patriotic commanders, than whom none more worthy of eternal laurels have been crowned by the muse of history.

In A. D. 89, Arviragus expired amidst the regrets of the people whose liberties he had so largely contributed to preserve, and his son Marius succeeded to the crown.

In A. D. 114, Marius concluded a treaty with Trajan, by which Britain became an integral part of the Roman government, paying annually three thousand pounds weight of silver as a contribution to the general system of the empire, and retaining all its own laws and native kings.

In A. D. 120, Hadrian constructed his rampart from the Tyne to Solway Frith. From this date to A. D. 406, as a department of the Roman empire, Britain enjoyed more solid peace and prosperity than at any other period of similar duration. Intervals of twenty, thirty, and forty years of profound tranquillity occur.*

These outlines of the relations of the Kymry to the Romans are given thus briefly to avoid burdening our pages with lengthened details, and because their omission altogether would leave the main facts connected with the history of Christianity in the British Island out of view, thus leaving the subject not sufficiently illustrated.

From A. D. 120 to A. D. 406, Britain must be considered a department of the Roman Empire, but governed by its own laws and kings. Christianity meanwhile on the continent, and Druidism in Britain, continued to be proscribed by the Roman govern-

* Cambrian History.

ment with the same relentless animosity. Hence arose between them the sympathy of common suffering. The gradual expulsion of the Druids by a combination of causes beyond the Forth, left a free field for the evangelists of Christ; and the national will in Britain soon decreed a reformation in religion more complete and unselfish than that of the sixteenth century. It was effected in this manner:

Coelus, or Coel, the son of St. Cyllinus, the eldest son of Caractacus, succeeded his uncle, Marius, and dying left one son, Lluryg, or Lucius, who ascended the throne in his eighteenth year, A. D. 125. He had been educated at Rome by his uncle, St. Timotheus, the son of Claudia and grandson of Caractacus. In A. D. 155, finding the British people prepared to support him, at a national council at Winchester he established Christianity as the national religion instead of Druidism. He and such of his nobility as had not previously taken upon them the vows of Christian responsibility, were publicly baptized by Timotheus. The Christian ministry were thus inducted into all the rights of the Druidic hierarchy. The *Gorseddau*, or high Druidic courts in each tribe or country, became so many episcopal sees. The *Gorseddau* of the Arch-Druids at London, York, and Caerleon, originated a new dignity in the Church,—that of Archbishoprics.

In commemoration of this eventful change, Lucius endowed four churches from the royal estates; and the British Church, thus established, retained its national independence from A. D. 155 to A. D. 1203, when, in defiance of the repeated protests of its clergy, it was incorporated with the Roman Catholic Church, introduced into Britain by Augustine A. D. 596.

From the fact that the “nursing fathers and nursing mothers” of the British Church were the heads or members of the reigning dynasty, it was wont to be distinguished from other churches as “*Regia Domus*”—the royal temple; and the further fact worthy of note, remarks Genebrard, consists not only in this, that she was the first country which, in a national capacity, publicly professed herself Christian, but that she made this confession when the Roman Empire itself was yet pagan and a cruel persecutor of Christianity.

A remark here may be useful as illustrating the general principles which we wish to inculcate. It will be seen as we proceed, that so long as the British rulers fostered the Church established on the principles of the early Christians, so long it continued to prosper; but when the succeeding civil revolutions placed upon the throne a race of rulers holding adverse sentiments, a subversion of the Church was a necessary consequence of this blending of the political and religious institutions of the nation.

But we must proceed.

None of the first nine persecutions of the Christians extended to Britain. The tenth under Diocletian, which raged for eighteen years over the rest of the Empire, was put an end to in Britain in less than a year, at the risk of civil war with his colleagues, by Constantius. During its progress, however, the executions included three Archbishops, four Bishops, some Presbyters, and between ten and fifteen thousand communicants in different classes of society.*

On the death of Constantius, A. D. 306, the British legionaries elevated his son Constantine, then in his thirty-first year, on their shields and proclaimed him emperor. Educated by his mother in the Christian faith, he had early formed the resolution of putting Christianity over the whole extent of the empire on the same foundation that it had occupied for one hundred and fifty years in Britain. The scheme was carried out with unerring sagacity and unflinching perseverance through the arduous campaigns of twenty years. His pagan competitors, Maximian, Maxentius, and Licinius, succumbed in succession to his victorious arms. His legionaries, chiefly selected in Britain from his hereditary domains as being Christians of the British Church, supported him throughout with admirable loyalty. The example of his father was his guide through life. His mother Helena he always treated with the utmost respect and affection. He well explains the great objects of his life in one of his public edicts: "We call God to witness, the Saviour of all men, that in assuming the reins of government, we have never been influenced by other than these two considerations, the uniting of all our dominions in

* Cambrian History, page 120.

one faith, and restoring peace to the world torn to pieces by the madness of religious persecution."

Constantine remained the sole disposer of the Roman world during eighteen years, expiring at his palace near Nicopolis A. D. 337. He was the founder of secular Christendom, and indulged the vain hope that, by uniting mankind in one faith, he could secure the peace of the world.

The Roman government of Britain lasted two hundred and eighty-six years, when, in 406, its rule was cast off. Thus, as the British were the last to yield to the Roman arms, so they were the first to reassert their ancient independence and nationality.

But now a change comes over Britain. That movement of the northern nations, in which they overran the Roman Empire, began to extend itself beyond the confines of the continent. The Saxons, in a succession of invasions from A. D. 420 to A. D. 580, threw themselves upon the British Island, and, two hundred and twenty years after their first landing, succeeded in wresting the military supremacy from the Kymry. This tribe—the Kymry—were the oldest of their race in Britain, and held the supreme authority. The Lloegrians were a minor tribe of the same race, but occupying territory of their own. The Coraniaid, holding a region distinct from the other two, were the descendants of the emigrants from Troy upon the expulsion of the Trojans.*

The Saxons, fusing with these two tribes, became the main stock of the modern English. Their sovereignty gave way A. D. 1014, temporarily to the Danish, and permanently to the Norman A. D. 1066, as the Norman gave way in turn to the native British, restored A. D. 1485 under Henry Tudor.

In A. D. 430, while St. Germanus was engaged in suppressing the Pelagian heresy which had been broached by the President of the University of Bangor, the Saxons, Picts, and Irish invaded the country, and were totally defeated by this prelate at the head of the British army.

The British Church during this era continued to extend itself on every side.

In A. D. 500 Arthur succeeded to the throne. As the founder

* Cambrian History, page 28.

of European chivalry and the champion of Christendom against the pagan hordes of the North, he created a new era, new characters, and a new code in the military annals of mankind. Within a month after he was crowned, he had to take the field against a fresh league of the Teutonic tribes. The war was conducted on both the Christian and pagan sides with extraordinary vigor and determination, and was terminated by the decisive battle of Mont Baden,—this being the twelfth victory gained by Arthur over his combined enemies.

The Angles, Jutes, and Saxons, were the principal tribes leagued against Arthur, and they appear to have drawn their last man from the continent to sustain them in their struggle. Indeed, the greater part of the Odin lineage threw itself into this pagan crusade against Britain, carrying with them the whole physical and fanatic force of the warlike nations over whom they swayed a species of divine sceptre. The Odin pedigree of these chiefs was regarded by their followers as the guarantee of success and a certain pass to every Saxon who fell under their banner to the future joys of Valhalla. The possession of Odin blood, with these tribes, was the indispensable condition of kingship; the descendants of the god Odin, therefore, found in this relation their "divine right" to rule over mankind.

To meet this formidable heathen fraternity, Arthur organised the order of Christian chivalry, commonly known as that of the Round Table. Its companions were selected from all Christians without distinction of race, climate, or language; and they bound themselves to oppose the progress of paganism, to be loyal to the British throne, to protect the defenceless, to show mercy to the fallen, to honor womanhood, and never to turn their backs upon a foe in the battle-field.

The defeat at Mont Baden A. D. 520, was so crushing that it destroyed the Saxon confederation itself; nor did any foreigner attempt to set hostile foot on the Island till Ida the Angle landed A. D. 550 in Northumbria, eight years after Arthur's death. From A. D. 520 to this latter date, such of the Saxons as were not expelled or exterminated remained in peaceful allegiance to

the British throne, many of them serving in and contributing to its foreign conquests.

The foreign conquests of Arthur deserve a notice, though our aim is not so much to collate historical facts as to glean out of the annals of these early times the incidents of the religious movements of the Churches in their relations to civil governments.

Arthur had hereditary claims upon the Gallic dominions, and in five years (A. D. 521-6,) achieving its conquest, was crowned at Paris the same year that Justinian succeeded to the Eastern Empire. The conquests of the mother countries of the pagan nations themselves followed from A. D. 527-35,—Old Saxony, Denmark, Frisia, North Germany, and the whole of Scandinavia, as far as Lapland, being subdued in succession. From A. D. 535 to 541, the Arthurian Empire, extending from Russia to the Pyrenees, enjoyed undisturbed repose. Milan two years before had been taken by the Goths, and three hundred thousand citizens—every male adult—put to the sword by the brutal captors.

But Arthur was not content with his wonderful success. He must accomplish more; and therefore resolved to liberate Italy and add it to the Christian empire of Britain. He conducted his forces again to the continent, leaving his insular dominions under the regency of Modred, his nephew, and the king of Scotland. He had advanced as far as the Alps, when intelligence reached him that Modred had rebelled, and, aided by pagan levies, seized the throne. Retracing his march Arthur defeated the traitor in two engagements, and the third, lasting three days, resulted in the loss of no less than one hundred thousand of the chivalry of Britain, who fell on the fatal field. Arthur himself, sorely wounded, was carried to Avallon. His farewell words to his knights—"I go hence in God's time, and in God's time I shall return,"—created an invincible belief that God had removed him, like Enoch and Elijah, to paradise without passing through the gate of death; and that he would at a certain period return, reascend the throne, and subdue the whole world to Christ. The effects of this persuasion itself sustained his countrymen under

all reverses, and ultimately enabled them to realise its spirit by placing their own line of the Tudors on the throne.

The landing of Ida the Angle with sixty ships was the occasion of renewed wars to the successors of Arthur. Many and great battles were fought between him and the British, in one of which, at Gododin, the Britons were defeated with the loss of three hundred and sixty nobles. Ida himself fell in a subsequent battle by the hand of a prince of Cambria.

From the death of Arthur to A. D. 603, seven kings reigned over the ancient Britons,—Cadvan ascending the throne in that year. During all these reigns, the wars between the Kymry and the various hordes who landed or attempted to land from the continent and northern Europe, continued with little or no intermission.

But wars alone did not occupy the Britons. Columba, or Colum-kil, (the dove of the Church,) a Presbyter of the Hiberno-British Church, evangelised the western Picts and Scots (A. D. 565,) and founded the celebrated monastery of Iona, or I-colum-kil. His disciple, St. Aidan, in the next century converted the Northumbrian Angles.

The slave-trade among the Saxons flourished till as late as A. D. 1080, in all its revolting and unnatural turpitude. In that year Wulfstan, Bishop of Worcester, thus wrote: "It is a most moving sight to see in the public markets rows of young people of both sexes, tied together with ropes; execrable fact! wretched disgrace! Men, unmindful even of the affection of the brute creation, delivering into slavery their relations and even their own offspring."*

At an earlier date some of the children thus sold had attracted in the slave-market at Rome the attention of Pope Gregory, and this induced him to send a mission, consisting of Augustin and forty monks, A. D. 596, to convert the British Saxons to Christianity. They were well received by Bertha, the Christian wife of Ethelbert, the pagan regulus of Kent, and the old British Church of St. Martin at Canterbury was made over to them; but Augustin soon shewed that the real object of the mission was

* Cambrian History, pages 158, 159.

rather to induce the British Church itself to recognise Rome as the Papacy, or the "mother and mistress of all Churches," than to evangelise the uncultivated serfs of the heathen chief. Soliciting an interview with the Bishops of the British Church, his request was granted, and two conferences were held, the last one of which continued seven days. The British delegates disputed with great learning and gravity against the authority of Augustin, maintaining the jurisdiction of their own Archbishop, and affirming that the ancient Britons would never acknowledge either Roman pretensions or Saxon usurpation.*

Augustin, on the breaking up of the conference, threatened the Kymry that as they would not accept peace from their brethren, they should have war from their enemies; if they would not preach life to the Saxons, they should receive death at their hands. The insolence of this menace from a friar of a petty mission and one chapel amongst the barbarians of Kent, to a Church counting in Britain and on the continent four archbishoprics and thirty bishops amongst its officers, and such universities as Bangor and Llaniltyd amongst its establishments,† is only equalled by the falsehood implied in it,—that the British Church had never preached the gospel to the pagan invaders. All Scotland, Ireland, and North Britain had on the contrary either been, or were then, in the course of being evangelised by

*The conference closed by the British bishops delivering on behalf of the British Church and people, the following rejection of the papal claims, the oldest as also the most dignified national protest on record:

"Be it known and declared to you, that we all, individually and collectively, are in all humility prepared to defer to the Church of God, and to the Pope of Rome, and to every sincere and godly Christian, so far as to love every one according to his degree, in perfect charity, and to assist them all by word and deed in becoming the children of God. But as for further obedience, we know of none that he whom you term Pope, or Bishop of Bishops, can claim or demand. The deference which we have mentioned we are ever ready to pay to him as to every other Christian; but in all other respects our obedience is due to the Bishop of Caerleon, who is alone under God our ruler to keep us right in the way of salvation."—*Cambrian History*, page 145.

†The University at Bangor at times numbered ten thousand teachers and students.

missionaries of the British Church, many of them men of high birth and attainments. The Isle of Wight and other parts within easy access of the Canterbury mission were not, on the contrary, converted till fifty years after the conference.

Augustin found means, however, to execute his threat. At his persuasions, Ethelbert, whose Christian queen had taken Augustin under her patronage, instigated Edelfrid, the pagan king of Northumbria, to invade the territories of Brochwel, prince of Powys, who had supported the Kymric Bishops in their rejection of the Papal claims. Edelfrid, with an army of fifty thousand men, poured into the Vale Royal, and was encountered by Brochwel at Chester.

An incident of the most thrilling interest, connected with this battle, must not be overlooked. On an eminence near the field of battle were twelve hundred British priests of the University of Bangor, in their white canonicals, totally unarmed, assembled to offer up their prayers for the success of the Christian arms. Whilst the engagement was raging, Edelfrid, observing them, asked who the soldiers in white were, and why, instead of joining in the battle, they remained on their knees? On being informed that they were priests of Bangor, engaged in prayer to the Christians' God, "If they are praying against us to their God," exclaimed the ferocious heathen, "they are fighting against us as much as if they attacked us with arms in their hands." Directing his forces in person against them, he massacred them to a man. He then advanced to the university itself, put as many priests and students as had not fled at his approach to the sword, and consigned its numerous halls, colleges, and churches to the flames. Thus was fulfilled, exclaims the pious Bede, the prediction of the blessed Augustin; the prophet being in truth the perpetrator. Attempting to force the passage of the Dee, Edelfrid was repulsed by Brockwel, and a few days afterwards routed with the loss of ten thousand of his men by Cadvan,* the Kymric king, he himself escaping, wounded, and with great difficulty, to Litchfield. Cadvan pursued his victory by overrunning the country to the estuary of the Humber, and besieging Edelfrid in York. Peace

*Cadvan attained the Kymric crown A. D. 603.

was concluded by Edelfrid's acknowledging the sovereignty of the Pendragon over the whole Island, and surrendering among others his youthful relative, Edwin, king of Deira, as a hostage to the conqueror. The British army in returning halted on the scene of the devastation of Bangor; the ashes of the noble monastery were still smoking, its libraries, the collection of ages, were consumed, half ruined walls, gates, and smouldering rubbish were all that remained of its magnificent edifices, and these were everywhere crimsoned with blood and interspersed with the bodies of priests, students, and choristers. The scene left a quenchless desire for further vengeance on the minds of the Kymric soldiery.*

And all this was but an attempt, on the part of Papal Christianity, to carry out the plan of Constantine, the founder of secular Christianity, to unite all the dominions of the empire in one faith and thus restore peace to the world! It had been well for the world if that act of Augustin had been the only effort to produce uniformity of religious opinion among those professing the Christian faith.

Edwin, king of Deira, meanwhile had been educated by Cadvan with his own son, Cadwallo, who, on the death of his father, ascended the throne A. D. 628. Edwin had slain his uncle in battle A. D. 617, and recovered his father's throne. On hearing that Cadwallo had succeeded to the throne of the Kymry, Edwin, trusting to their early friendship, sent an embassy to the new king, requesting permission to wear a royal crown instead of the usual coronet of the sub-kings. Cadwallo peremptorily refused, stating that the usages of Britain had never permitted but one "*Diadema Brittannicæ*, or crown of Britain, to be worn in the Island." Incensed by the refusal, Edwin threw off his allegiance, and, on Cadwallo's invading Northumbria, defeated him in a great battle at Widrington. Cadwallo, after an exile of five years in Ireland and Armorica, landed at Torquay. Penda Strenuus, king of Mercia, and ally of Edwin, was then (A. D. 634) besieging Exeter. The siege was raised and the king defeated and taken prisoner,—receiving his liberty again on swearing allegiance to

*Cambrian History, pages 144-147.

Cadwallo. Struck with the charms of the captive king's sister, whose entreaties had procured his release, the Pendragon married her. The issue of this marriage was Cadwallader Sanctus, the last Pendragon and sole monarch of the British dynasty.

The career of Cadwallo from this date was so merciless that his name for generations afterwards continued a word of terror amongst the Anglo-Saxons. He bound himself by a vow, as sanguinary as that of Hannibal towards the Romans, that he would not leave an Angle alive between the Humber and the Forth, and he well nigh kept it. Sixteen victories of his, in various parts of the kingdom, are recorded by contemporary authors. Edwin and the flower of the Anglo-Saxon nobility fell before him at the battle of Hatfield Chase, in Yorkshire, (A. D. 633,) long the theme of mournful song and dirge to the Saxon scalds. Osric, Eanfrid, and, with the exception of Oswald, the whole Odin or Ida family of Northumbria, were extirpated by him, and the country reduced by sword and fire to a wilderness. Oswald collecting the remnants of his people led them (A. D. 635) against the remorseless Briton and his general Penda. Elevating the cross on an earthen mound, he and his army knelt around it and offered up a simple but fervent prayer, "that the God of battles would deliver them from the proud tyrant that had sworn the destruction of their race." The appeal was not in vain. Cadwallo and Penda were defeated with heavy loss. Success was not, however, of long continuance. Oswald was defeated and slain, and his dead body crucified by Cadwallo. This victory placed all Saxondom at the foot of the victor. Neither rival nor rebel disturbed the remainder of his reign. He died at London A. D. 664. Cadwallader Sanctus, the last Kymric monarch of Britain till Harry Tudor, succeeded to the crown. He is the "Cadwalla" of Bede and the Saxon Chronicle. Kent rebelling and killing his brother, he punished it with great severity. Finding it impossible to unite under one sceptre his father's subjects, the Kymry, and his mother's, the West Saxons and Mercians, he appears at an early period to have meditated retiring from the cares of royalty to a religious life. This determination was hastened by one of those visitations of the Almighty

which, more than all human revolutions or devices, have often changed the destinies of nations. It is described as follows:

“The Black Plague, called by the British writers the Vengeance of God (*Dial Duw*), broke out A. D. 670, and raged for twelve years. Famine as usual accompanied its progress; the mortality was such that whole counties were left without an inhabitant, such of the population as were spared by the epidemic falling victims to the famine or to despair. Companies of men and women, says Henry of Huntingdon, fifty and sixty in number, crawled to the cliffs and there joining hands precipitated themselves a body into the sea. The birds also perished in countless numbers. All distinction between Briton and Saxon was lost in this appalling state of things. Cadwallader abdicated the throne, and retiring to Rome died there May, 689.”—*Cambrian History*, page 150.

From A. D. 689 to A. D. 720 follows a period of confusion and impenetrable obscurity. In the north the Britons of Strathclyde (A. D. 684) had annihilated the army of Egfrid, king of Northumbria,—Egfrid himself, Beort his general, and fifty thousand Angles, falling on the field. No attempt, states Bede, writing A. D. 729, has since been made on “the liberties of the Britains; the Picts have recovered all their territories, and the power of the Angles has continued to retrograde.” The three kingdoms of the Strathclyde Britons, the British Picts, and the Scots of Ireland, finally united and became the kingdom of Scotland. The Highlands remained as before occupied by the primitive British clans of Albyn, and were not incorporated under one government with the rest of the Island till A. D. 1745.

In the south, Idwal, the son of Cadwallader, with Ivor, second son of Alan II., of Bretagne, and Ynyr, his nephew, landed, on the cessation of the pestilence, to recover his hereditary dominions. Idwal was crowned Prince of Cambria, Ivor established himself firmly on the West Saxon throne. By A. D. 725 he had put down a rebellion and annexed South Saxony to his possessions.

Henceforth the fusion of the British and Saxon dynasties and populations in southern England may be regarded as complete. Devon, however, and Cornwall, remained nearly pure British for some centuries longer. The curtain of history falls (A. D. 730) with the night of the Dark Ages on Britain.*

**Cambrian History*, pages 150, 151.

From A. D. 730 to 1066, there is little to be chronicled but a wearisome sameness of unavailing battles and exhibitions of barbarism. Of the country afterwards called England, Britons, Saxons, Angles, Jutes, Vandals, and other nondescript tribes, constituted the population, all distinct characteristics of race, language, and nationality being now lost in a common hybridism. West of the Severn, the eldest tribe of the Kymry held their hereditary domains untouched, cherishing an inextinguishable animosity against the Saxonised tribes eastward, and watching every opportunity that promised them a chance, however remote, of recovering the British sceptre now by the conquest or defection of their sister tribes passed from their hands. This isolation compelled them to reorganise their constitution on a miniature scale in imitation of the old empire; but while they maintained their own customs and laws, they submitted to pay an annual tribute to the king in London, whoever he might be.

It would neither interest nor instruct the reader to dwell on the gloomy details of these "night centuries;" of the useless and interminable battles which continued between the Kymry and the Anglo-Britons or Saxons. It is only necessary to say that the Saxon era was that of the Dark Ages in the Island of Britain; of barbarism unredeemed by scarcely a single trait on which the historian can pause with pleasure. Fifty-nine magnificent cities at the end of the third century adorned Britain south of the Forth, roads traversed it in every direction, Roman and British villas studded every salubrious or picturesque situation. All these perished during this gloomy period.

Coming down to A. D. 847, we find the Danes pouring their forces on every part of the British coasts. The weaker princes, leaguings with these new-comers, afforded them aid in gaining a foothold upon the Island, and they afterwards formed a leading element in the prevailing wars.

The monkish system attained its acme under Dunstan, Abbot of Glastonbury and Archbishop of Canterbury, A. D. 960. The political condition of England, as the region occupied by the Saxons, Angles, etc. was now called, was degraded to a degree never paralleled under any previous form of religion. The whole

kingdom paid tribute called *Danegelt*—a shilling on every hide of land—to the Danes. As thousands of these conquerors were settled in the country, Ethelred II., king of England, formed the design of assassinating them by a general massacre, which was accordingly carried into effect on St. Bride's Eve, Nov. 18th, 1002. It was followed by condign vengeance. Sweyn, king of Denmark, landed in England, ravaged it for ten years, and, A. D. 1012, expelled Ethelred and seized the throne. He was succeeded by his son, Canute the Great, under whom a large portion of the Arthurian empire—England, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—were reunited. He died in 1036. In the reign of his son, Harold I. (Harefoot,) Alfred, son of Ethelred, and more than a thousand Norman attendants, were murdered by Godwin, the Saxon earl of Kent. Hardicanute, his successor, left the throne after a brief reign to Edward the Confessor, surviving son of Ethelred, a feeble superstitious monarch, on whose demise, A. D. 1066, William, duke of Normandy, claimed the throne, and defeating Harold, his Saxon competitor, at Hastings, achieved the conquest of England in one battle October 4, 1066.

Though successful in England, the Danes, failing to effect a settlement in any part of Cambria, ceased their incursions. Passing by the reign of several kings, we find, A. D. 1037, Gruffydd ap Llewelyn occupying the Kymric throne. His reign was accompanied by an almost uninterrupted series of battles and forays into England, no less than one hundred and ten being enumerated, in which he himself was the prominent actor. He inflicted two signal defeats on the combined armies of the Danes and Saxons at Crosford A. D. 1040, and another on the Wye in 1041. In 1050 he gained another great victory at Hereford, and a fourth in 1053 at the same place. Hereford was razed to the ground, and the Cambrian prince returned, states Caradoc, with great triumph, many prisoners, and vast spoils, leaving the English frontiers a scene of blood and ashes.

The further narrative of Gruffydd's life is but a repetition, year after year, of similar scenes, affording a vivid illustration of what Sharon Turner terms "the insatiable appetite of the Kymri for war." Gruffydd was assassinated by a conspiracy of Harold,

son of Godwin, in the thirty-fourth year of his reign. His widow, Edith the Fair, married Harold, who, when all other efforts failed, discovered Harold's body on the field of Hastings. His daughter Nesta ascended the throne. Marrying Traherne ap Caradoc, the issue was Walter Dhu, the founder of the Stewart dynasty of Scotland.

The Norman conquest brought sadness upon the Saxons. With few exceptions the Saxon proprietors were everywhere deprived of their estates and reduced to villanage. The Feudal System, or the system of the victorious lord and conquered serf, was established in all its rigor as the Constitution of England in a convention of all the barons and clergy at Winchester A. D. 1088. The Norman or Franco-Latin was constituted the language of the government, the courts of law, and the public offices; the Saxon tongue was proscribed; a military survey of the kingdom and of every fief in it held by the conqueror's sword was made out. This work, the most complete and humiliating confession ever imposed upon a land of its total subjugation, was called by the unhappy Saxons "Doomsday Book"—the book of their doom; wherein as "little mercy was shewn to their race as there will be to sinners in the great day." The curfew bell, tolled every night at dusk, signalled the whole serfdom in every town and beneath the shadows of every castle, to extinguish all fire and lights in their houses, and retire to the cold, dark, and hopeless couch of the slave. No Saxon was permitted to dream of mingling his blood with a Norman; he could have but one name—the Norman possessed two—the latter designating his fief, and thereby marking him as one of the privileged class. For three hundred years no Saxon name occupies any but a servile position in English history. Extensive districts were cleared of their Saxon population, parked into royal and baronial forests, and stocked with deer. Mutilation or death was the penalty inflicted on any Saxon found with a weapon in these hunting grounds of his conquerors. We may well feel overwhelmed with astonishment that a nation, naturally so brave as the Saxon, should submit to groan for centuries in a state of such Egyptian shame and bondage; and we must be equally amazed at the fact that the clergy

united with the barons in depriving their fellow-men of the same color, of all the rights of freemen.

But while this unyielding prejudice against the Saxons operated as a complete bar to any union with their Norman conquerors, no such obstacle existed to a fusion with the Kymry. The barons along the frontier had received license from their feudal superior to conquer land in Wales, and to hold it as freely by the sword as the Norman king himself held England. These lords, however, marrying with the daughters of the Kymric princes and nobility, became themselves as much Kymric as Norman; hence we find them supported by the Kymry as often in arms against the Norman sovereign, as supported by their Saxon tenantry and foreign levies against the Cambrian sovereign.

Passing by the various contests which were waged between the Kymric and Norman forces, we come to 1,115, when Henry I. invaded Wales with an army of 120,000 men, but was repulsed by the combined Welsh princes. Eighteen of these invasions, attended with a loss of more than a million of men, are enumerated between A. D. 1070 and 1420. They were baffled with singular ability by the Welsh sovereigns.

The reign of Llewelyn the Great occurred within this period, during which some of the sternest engagements between the two kingdoms were fought. Ascending the Kymric throne, A. D. 1194, he sustained himself against the enormous odds of the Norman power for more than a half century. In A. D. 1235, peace was concluded with Henry III—Llewelyn, amongst other articles, stipulating that all the barons who had been confederate with him in the war should be reëstablished by Henry in their honors and estates, which was accordingly done. Llewelyn died April, A. D. 1240.

Passing on, we find that in A. D. 1254, Llewellan Olav, son of Gruffyd ap Llewelyn, was upon the Kymric throne, and had declared war against England. His principal antagonists were Edward and Roger Mortimer—the former claiming the principedom of Wales by the mandate of the Pope and by the gift of his father, Henry III. Edward had committed acts of cruelty which aroused the Kymry, under Llewelyn, and resulted in his

losing considerable of his territory as Earl of Chester. The war progressing, Llewelyn was again victorious over both Edward and Henry, when a truce for a year was agreed upon.

Hostilities being resumed, Cambria was, as usual, laid under an interdict, and Llewelyn and all his subjects excommunicated by the Pope. The only reply deigned by the Kymric prince was an invasion of the frontiers and the vigorous prosecution of the war until every Norman fortress in North Wales was captured and demolished.

In A. D. 1263, an alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Llewelyn and Simon de Montfort, the great Earl of Leicester, and founder of the English House of Commons—the earl affiancing his daughter Eleanor, niece of Henry III., and first cousin of Edward, to Llewelyn. Henry and Edward were next year defeated at Lewes, and both taken prisoners by Leicester, who, subsequently uniting with Llewelyn, fixed their camp at Ludlow. Here they received the submission of the lord marchers,* who surrendered their estates and castles into their hands. The war, after raging twenty-one years, was ultimately terminated by the peace of Montgomery, A. D. 1267, in which the absolute sovereignty of Llewelyn over all Cambria was fully recognised—all claims by the Norman crown on the allegiance of any Kymric noble abandoned, and Edward's pretensions to any lands or title in the principality formally resigned. The treaty was ratified by the king in person, and witnessed by Ottoboni, the Pope's legate.

It must not be overlooked here, that one of the early causes of the war between Edward and Llewelyn, was an attempt of the lieutenant of the former to supersede the British laws by the feudal system in part of Powys. Hence it was that the Kymry rallied in such force to the standard of Llewelyn.

It may be observed, also, that the interposition of the ecclesiastical power in behalf of the English, by hurling its curses upon the Kymry, seems to have been as impotent for good in that day as similar clerical denunciations have shown themselves to be in

*This was the title of the barons who had received license to conquer lands in Wales.

our own day. But we shall see much of this in the course of our investigations.

From A. D. 1267 to the death of Henry, in 1273, nothing occurred to interrupt the peaceful relationship between the two countries. During this period, Edward was engaged in the Crusades. On his accession, a war policy toward Cambria was instantly inaugurated. The treaty of Montgomery was ignored, and Llewelyn, in common with the Duke of Bretagne and King of Scotland, summoned to do homage for their dominions, at Westminster Abbey. He flatly refused to obey. Five successive summonses of Edward were issued with the like unavailing result. But love effected what arms and menaces could never have accomplished.

Eleanor de Montford, the fiancée of Llewelyn, now in her twentieth year, had been educated in France, and was living in great splendor with her mother at the French Court. Her hand being claimed by the Cambrian prince, preparations were made by the King of France for her voyage to Carnarvon. Edward intercepted her passage and took her captive. Llewelyn, to gain the object of his affections, consented to do homage for his principality in London. The humiliating ceremony was submitted to, and the nuptials solemnised with great magnificence, in full court, at Worcester, Oct. 13, 1278. In two years Eleanor died, leaving Llewelyn two daughters—from one of whom, Catherine, descended the Tudors. The spell was now dissolved, and soon hostilities were begun. The preparations of Edward for the war were on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. The English clergy voted him a twentieth of their temporalities—the nobility and prelates a fifteenth, and afterwards a thirtieth of their movables. The principal towns granted him loans; Scotland, Ireland, Gascony, and the Basque provinces, supplied him both with funds and treasure. Forty thousand masses, psalteries, and sacred processions were enjoined to be celebrated in all the churches and cathedrals for the success of the Norman arms. The usual religious manœuvre was not omitted on this occasion. Llewelyn was excommunicated, and Cambria laid under an interdict by the nuncio of the Pope, Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury.

Llewelyn, addressing his army, exclaimed: "We cannot contend for our liberties, but forthwith our souls are threatened with perdition; we cannot resist temporal tyrants, but we are told it must be at the cost of eternal salvation. Better is it, by a noble death in the field, to ascend at once to God and our fathers, than live on this earth slaves to any mortal power."

The Norman forces amounted to 120,000 men. David, Llewelyn's brother, had already stormed Hawarden Castle, on Palm Sunday, A. D. 1282, and put the garrison to the sword. Llewelyn, raising the siege of Rhuddlan, fell back with his comparatively few but veteran troops, towards Snowdon. Halting on the banks of the Conway, he offered battle to the Norman van, which, under Edward in person, pressed on his retreat. It was accepted. Edward was defeated, with the loss of fourteen standards—Lords Audley, Clifford, De Argenton, and many other superior officers, being left dead on the field.

Edward retired to Hope Castle, where he remained till July, waiting for bodies of pioneers from the border counties. Negotiations meanwhile continued between the ambassador of Edward, Archbishop Peckham, and Llewelyn. But the negotiations failed, because the Kymric Council sustained Llewelyn in his determination not to yield to the demands of Edward. On receiving the resolutions of the Kymric Council, the archbishop fulminated in due form the anathema of the Roman Church, pronouncing the whole Cambrian nation accursed, and laying the greater excommunication on the head of its prince.

Edward again took the field; but as winter was approaching, he had to hasten to strike the decisive blow, or failure would be inevitable. But again Edward was defeated, with the loss of Lucas de Tancy and fifteen knights, with a multitude of common soldiers. This left him no alternative but to fall back and prepare for another campaign.

North Wales being now, till the ensuing spring, considered safe by Llewelyn, he left David in command of Snowdon, and proceeded on his fatal journey to South Wales, to encounter the English army, under the Earl of Gloucester and Sir Edmund Mortimer. Edward, on hearing of this movement, ordered Oliver

de Dingham and other barons of the West to pass the Severn with all speed, and support Gloucester. Llewelyn moved forward successfully ; but exposing himself in the forest, apart from his army, he was set upon and assassinated.

The death of Llewelyn left the Kymry without a head. In A. D. 1284, the Statute of Rhuddlan was issued by Edward, with the view of superseding the ancient British by the English code of jurisprudence. Various estates were confiscated and divided among the Norman nobility. All the ancient national documents which fostered the pride and spirit of the Kymry were forcibly collected, conveyed to the Tower, and destroyed. The same Vandal policy was a few years afterwards pursued towards Scotland. The living oracles of freedom, the bards, were everywhere, as their predecessors had been by the Romans, hunted, and without form of law put to death. Tradition points to the court of Beaumaris castle as the spot wherein above a hundred of these patriot-poets were thus massacred under the eye of the Norman Attila himself.

The bards of that day were to the people what the press has been since the discovery of the art of printing. Despotism could not then allow the existence of the one, any more than tyranny can now endure the freedom of the other.

These measures only served to deepen the hatred of the Kymry towards their advisers and perpetrators ; so that wherever the Statute of Rhuddlan was attempted to be read, men moved away, and the place was left to the royal heralds. A conciliatory course was adopted by Edward, with little better success. The Archbishop of Canterbury made a visitation of the whole country, with the express view of conciliating the clergy ; all the grievances complained of received attention, and the churches damaged in the recent disorders were repaired. Every expedient was resorted to, as to taxes and feudal services, to induce them to forget their nationality, and bury in oblivion the struggles they had waged on behalf of freedom for eight hundred years against Teuton, Dane, and Norman. But all these approaches were regarded in their true light ; nor could Edward, by any concessions, elicit a recognition of his own claims to the Kymric sceptre.

“No Prince,” was the unvarying reply of the chiefs who formed the Council of the late sovereign, “shall reign over us, who is not born and resident among us, who is not free from all treason, who is not unable to speak a word of the English language.” To these conditions Edward finally assented; and withdrawing his own pretensions and those of his vassal, Mortimer, he nominated his infant son, Edward, born in Carnarvon castle, to the throne of the Principality. The baby prince was presented to the Kymric nobility in the hall of the castle, and received their allegiance; but the mass of the people still held aloof, regarding Madoc, the natural son of Llewelyn, a youth of fifteen years of age, as the true heir of the ancient lineage.

Edward, obtaining possession of the regalia of the ancient kings of Britain, returned to London, January 8, 1286. By the death of his eldest son, Edward of Carnarvon became heir apparent to the crown. As the conditions of the compact with the Kymry required that the prince should reside in Wales, and be educated in the Welsh language, the removal of young Edward to England annulled, in popular opinion, his title to the principedom. An uprising of the Kymry took place in South Wales, but was wholly suppressed in three years—the leader being captured, tried, hanged, and quartered. Encouraged by this success, Edward ordered the introduction of feudal taxation into North Wales. This led to an immediate organisation of the Kymry of Snowdon, under young Madoc ap Llewelyn, whom they proclaimed Prince of Wales. Edward, at this time was in Gascony, A. D. 1294, waiting for reinforcements, which, under his brother Edmund, were to set sail from Portsmouth; but on receiving intelligence of the rebellion, he counter-ordered their embarkation, enjoining Edward to march against Madoc. Obeying the order, he marched into Wales, and, November 11, 1294, was encountered by Madoc under the walls of Denbigh, and totally routed. Edward, on learning the result, returned immediately from his continental dominions, and, levying new forces, proceeded along the sea line and threw himself into the strong fortress of Conway. The castle was at once invested by Madoc, and every expedient employed to force the slayer of his father face to face with him

in the field. Though the fortress was reduced to famine, Edward persisted in his refusal to leave his position until the last flagon and the last loaf had been expended. Then, when Madoc felt secure of his prize, the Earl of Warwick appeared with reinforcements, and the siege had to be raised. Retiring to the fastnesses of Snowdon, Madoc was pursued by Warwick and defeated. In January, A. D. 1295, Madoc again encountered Warwick and defeated him, and six weeks later he was equally successful against the combined forces under Mortimer. Having carried his devastations to the gates of Shrewsbury, he awaited the approach of Warwick, Mortimer, and the Duke of Lancaster, who had united their armies. The engagement lasted throughout the day, and was not decided when night separated the combatants. During the night, treachery accomplished its work, and Madoc was delivered over to his enemies. At daylight, the Welsh no where seeing their chief, and believing him slain, broke up and dispersed in all directions. Nothing was known of the fate of Madoc, excepting that he had been betrayed in the night and carried off, to be disposed of according to the will of Edward.

Malgon Nychau, who had put himself at the head of the patriots of Pembroke and Cardigan, was also captured, and died the usual death inflicted by Edward upon the Cambrian chiefs who fell into his hands. He was quartered, and his limbs sent to Carnarvon, Chepstow, Pembroke, and Chester.

Morgan of Morganog submitted himself, on condition of retaining his land and immunities, to Edward, who received him in full court at Chester. The rest of the Welsh chieftains, on receiving assurances that none of their estates should be alienated from their families, laid down their arms; many were, however, arrested and incarcerated in the Tower.

Edward, in the wars which now ensued against the independency of Scotland, was opposed by William Wallensis, or William the Welshman—so called to distinguish his race from that of the Saxon, Norman, or Scot. William le Walys, or as it was afterwards corrupted, William Wallace, the hero of Scotland, was born in the kingdom of the Strathclyde Britons, his father being grandson of Gwilym Dhu, or William the Black, of Arvon, who had followed

from his native country of Wales the fortunes of Walter ap Traherne, the Stewart, into Scotland. His betrayal into the hands of Edward brought him a captive to London while the head of Llewelyn Olav was still exposed from its spikes. The eyeless sockets of the Wallensis of Cambria looked down upon the Wallensis of Scotland—both descended of the ancient British blood—both the martyrs of liberty—both done to death by treason's hands—as he passed to his mock trial, and thence to execution—an execution attended with the same revolting barbarities as that of Prince David at Chester. The Walys was trailed, yet living, along the streets, his feet bound to the horse's tail; he was then partially hanged, but whilst yet breathing was taken down from the gibbet, two gashes were made in the form of a cross on his body, his bowels torn out and cast into the fire, and his limbs, still palpitating with pulsation, divided into four quarters. Such was the end of as disinterested and pure a patriot as ever imparted lustre and dignity to the annals of a nation. He was executed at Tower Hill, A. D. 1305.

In A. D. 1317, the Kymry again arose under Sir Gruffyd Lloyd, but he was subdued and beheaded.

Edward I. died July 7th, 1307, whilst advancing a third time on Scotland, and was buried in Westminster Abbey. Edward II. discontinued the war; but in 1314 it was renewed, and the English king sustained an overwhelming defeat at Bannockburn, near Stirling, by Robert Bruce, June 25th. He was succeeded by Edward III., who ascended the throne in A. D. 1327. The foreign wars of Edward against the French resulted in his gaining the two great victories of Cressy and Poitiers. He revived the Order of the Round Table, under the title of the Order of the Garter, from the blue riband which formed its badge—its motto, "Who seeks evil, evil shall find him." He was succeeded by his grandson, Richard II., son of Edward the Black Prince of Wales, to whom, for his father's sake, in spite of the frivolity of his character, the Kymry continued till his death to be warmly attached. But he lost his kingdom and his life through the rebellion of the Duke of Lancaster, [who gained possession of his person through the treachery of Northumberland.

The legitimate heir to the throne was Meredydd ap Tudor ; and next to him, Owen Glyndore. Mortimer laid claim also to the Principality of Wales, as a descendant of Llewelyn the Great.

Owen Glyndore, through injustice and fraud, by which he was deprived of his estates and proclaimed a traitor, was forced to raise the Kymric standard and proclaim himself Prince of Wales. Attacking Ruthyn, September 20th, 1400, he burnt the whole town to the ground. The preparations of Henry IV. against Glyndore were on a great scale. The border castles were repaired and garrisoned by the ablest soldiers in his cause. All bards, minstrels, and rhymers, were placed under martial law by Parliament ; all Welshmen were incapacitated from holding office under government ; the Welsh language, the impregnable stronghold of patriotism and medium of freedom, was proscribed ; the importation of paper and instruments for writing prohibited, under capital penalties ; no Englishman was allowed, on pain of forfeiture of goods, to marry a Welsh woman ; every parish was declared liable for the felonies, robberies, and deeds of violence committed within its bounds ; complete amnesty was held out to all natives—Glyndore himself, and his cousin Rhys and William ap Tudor, excepted—who laid down their arms by a certain day.

The rigor exercised towards the bards was in consequence of their predicting the near restoration of the native dynasty to the sole headship of Britain. This they could do with but little risk of failure in their prophecies, as there was not a claimant for the crown of England in the field who did not boast of ancient British blood in his veins.* Accordingly, the country was deluged with such vaticinations, and every aspirant applied them with very plausible effect to himself ; but gradually they became concentrated on the true heir of the eldest line of Britain—heir also of the Lancastrian Plantagenets, and literally fulfilled in Harry Tudor. The bards, therefore, were dangerous agents to be allowed the freedom of speech or of the pen—there was then no press—and Henry IV. found it necessary to silence them.

The result of the whole of the severe measures adopted by the king was the reverse of what the English Government anti-

*Cambrian History, page 201.

pated. Every Kymric student at the universities, every laborer, artisan, and the very apprentices in the large towns, threw up their books and indentures, and traversing the country by night in bands, hastened to rally round the national flag. The bards multiplied their *Gorseddau*, and reintroducing the ancient Druidic modes of inscribing their compositions on revolving bars of wood, in the primitive vertical characters, taught the people esoteric means of communication hitherto confined to their own order. Every tree soon became a book, a message, a warning, a despatch, or a spirit-stirring appeal. Henry himself entered Wales with a powerful army, A. D. 1401, but unable to bring Glendore to an action, burnt the noble abbey of Strata Floridd, in Cardiganshire, to the ground. His retreat was attended with heavy loss from the privation and constant skirmishing inseparable from these expeditions. Glyndore, despatching Rhys Tudor to burn Welshpool and other towns, turned his own arms against Henry Hotspur. A harassing campaign ended in the retreat of the latter to Denbigh and Chester, leaving Conway and Carnarvon castles in the hands of the Kymry. In the autumn, the Flemish force which had marched from Pembrokeshire to cooperate with Hotspur, was defeated by Glyndore, with a loss of one-third their number. Progressing, Cardiff surrendered to him, and was spared, while nine castles in succession were demolished. The Anglo-Normans collected all their forces, and a bloody battle took place on Bryn Owen mountain; the action lasted eighteen hours, during which the blood on Pant-y-wenol, which separates the two ends of the mountain, was up to the horses' fetlocks. The victory of Glyndore was decisive.

The next year, A. D. 1402, Sir Edmund Mortimer, uncle to the young Earl of March, raised 12,000 men, and a desperate engagement took place between him and Glyndore, in Radnorshire. Mortimer was taken prisoner in single combat by the Cambrian prince, 1,300 of his men slain, and 2,000 surrendered themselves on the field.

The Friars Minor forwarded heavy sums of money to Glyndore to enable him to purchase arms and subsidize the malcontents in England.

The second expedition under Henry invaded Wales in three divisions, in August, A. D. 1402, and was attended with the same want of success as the first, being repelled with the loss of 5,000 men.

The Bishops of Bangor and St. Asaph Saxonising, Glyndore imprisoned the former and expelled the latter from Wales, demolishing their cathedrals. St. Asaph found means to be reconciled to the Prince, and proved henceforth a faithful subject. Glyndore's coronation was solemnised in the autumn, at Machynlleth.

The disastrous event of Henry's third expedition into Wales, A. D. 1403, undertaken in the spring of the year, confirmed the superstitious terrors of the English with regard to the powers vulgarly imputed to Glyndore. "Through his art magic," writes an old historian, "he caused such tempests of wind, rain, snow, and hail, that the like has in no age been heard of." Absurd as appears this complaisant way of accounting for defeat and military inferiority, it is certain that, had Glyndore at any time fallen into Henry's hands, he would have experienced the same fate as a few years afterwards was inflicted without shame or remorse on the Maid of Orleans by John, Duke of Bedford. Instead of the scaffold of the patriot, the stake and the faggot of the magician would have been his doom. Wasted with sickness and fatigue, the English army retreated to Worcester.

The injustice of Henry towards Harry Percy—Henry Hotspur—led that intrepid commander to seek an alliance with Glyndore. Raising an army, he precipitated a battle upon Henry, contrary to the orders of Glyndore, and was defeated and slain, and his forces routed. Glyndore was then ravaging South Wales. Henry attempted to follow up the victory over Percy, by a fourth invasion of Wales, but returned as quickly as he went.

In A. D. 1404, a league, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the two sovereigns, Glyndore and Charles of France. The war between Glyndore and Henry IV. continued, with varying success, until Henry of Monmouth—Henry V.—succeeded his father on the English throne, A. D. 1413. The new sovereign made conciliatory overtures to Glyndore, but, se-

ture in the affections of his people, this sovereign refused to make any concessions that would sacrifice the honor or nationality of his country. He died peacefully, September 20th, 1415. The title to the Principality on his death reverted to Owen Tudor.

"In the union of all the qualifications of a patriot, a general, a true knight in the field, and an accomplished gentleman in the hall, Glendore must be acknowledged the most interesting and polished celebrity of the fifteenth century. Between the setting sun of Llewelyn and the rising one of Tudor, he sheds a splendor on the intervening expanse of the Cambrian sky, which has equally excited the imagination of the poet and challenged the more sober admiration of the historian."*

Henry V., now on the English throne, was the rival prince to Glyndore, being descended from Nest ap Traherne, and born at Monmouth. Having declared war against Charles VI., King of France, and set sail with his forces, his campaign was terminated by the celebrated battle of Agincourt, in which he was victorious.

ARTICLE IV.

SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER A CHRISTIAN ASPECT.

Principia or Basis of Social Science: Being a Survey of the Subject from the Moral and Theological, yet Liberal and Progressive Stand-point. By R. J. WRIGHT. Second Edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. Pp. 524, 8vo.

The intricate questions growing out of a consideration of social phenomena have always had a fascination for the higher order of minds. The two most famous thinkers of antiquity agreed in expending much of their thought on these topics. The great orator and statesman of the Roman Commonwealth, the great lawyers of the Roman Empire, have given to the world the results of their reflection in this obscure department of intellectual inquiry. The modern world has not lagged behind the ancient

*Cambrian History, page 214.

in the effort to explore this *terra incognita*; to fix its boundaries and ascertain the marks that distinguish its character. Such names as those of Grotius, of Machiavelli, of Montesquieu, of Burke, of Puffendorf, and of De Tocqueville, have, from time to time, illustrated the annals and signalised the exploits of those who have engaged in these strange adventures. The jurists, historians, and philosophers of England and Scotland, and the fathers of American politics, have entered with alacrity into the same spirit of discovery which has animated the publicists and metaphysicians of the European continent. The atheistic and deistical writers who preceded the first Revolution in France, and their successors who have been themselves the *avant-coureurs* of the subsequent outbreaks, have devoted themselves largely—in some cases have devoted themselves almost exclusively—to the same perilous yet alluring investigations. The same tendency is somewhat noticeable also in the German school of idealistic Pantheists; eminently so in the case of Hegel and his immediate followers. This general subject has latterly received a vast augmentation of interest for a certain class of minds, from the impulse given to its further study by the appearance of the *Philosophie Positive* of Auguste Comte, and the much more recent lucubrations of Mr. Herbert Spencer. And lo! now there comes to the front Mr. R. J. Wright, whose formidable title stands at the head of this review, and whose portly octavo has already passed to its second edition. A brief notice of this work has already appeared in these pages, but it is worthy of further consideration.

The occasion is an auspicious one for the author; for although the work has been already some time before the public, it challenges new attention since the events that have grown out of the late *emeute* at Martinsburg. This would indeed be a favorable time to take a thorough-going view of *Communism*, from its earliest beginnings to its latest frantic ebullition. Such a view would require that the thoughtful critic should dwell upon the infidelity of Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which was the parent of his own uncouth "Leviathan," and in part, also, the parent of that still more offensive infidelity that, after a baleful

sojourn in England during the greater portion of the eighteenth century, crossed the channel to the main land of Europe, and gave birth, in due course of nature, to all the horrors of the Bastille and the Reign of Terror. Such a *résumé* as we have indicated would next carry us over the history of the various socialistic communities which have either perished from inanition, or else have contrived to eke out a forlorn existence under peaceful conditions.*

The ominous *motif* of the prelude which had now and then been audible in the perplexed chords that make up the body of the dreadful symphony, would at length be heard rolling like harsh thunder amidst the crashing dissonances of the *finale*. The vaticinations of Prud'hon, Ledro-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, and George Sand, as respects the golden future of the Commune and "*Le Droit du Travail*," would be confounded by the Red Republican orgies of '48, as well as by the blazing *façade* of the Hotel de Ville and the Tuileries, and the hunger-bitten faces of the populace who gazed upon the execution of Rossel. Such an examination would call for a searching analysis of the principles underlying the schemes of the French Socialists and English Chartists, and which furnish a lame apology for the Trades-Unions and the Workingmen's Associations of the type of the International. Such a task we may, peradventure, take in hand on another day; we shall certainly not do so now. The whole matter is exhausted in the debates of L'Assemblée Nationale, which were published in Paris in the year 1848. Both Thiers and De Tocqueville were active members of the Assembly.

The "Principia" of Mr. Wright invites us to perform a very different, and in some particulars a far more agreeable, duty. Our author, whilst owning to a desire for the realisation of certain dreams of his, as to what he styles "Limited Communism," has no sympathy with the excesses, whether in theory or in practice, which have made the very name of Communist a title

* There is an admirable conspectus of the various Communistic experiments in the United States, under the head of "Statistics," occupying the whole of subdivision III. of the fourth main division of Mr. Wright's Fifth Book. See "Principia," pp. 516-523.

of reproach not less among enlightened worldings than among well-instructed Christians. He declares himself a hearty believer in the truth of the Scriptures, and his most earnest aim to be the preservation of the interests of true religion. It would be very ungracious to suspect the honesty of this declaration, which is indeed confirmed by the tone and manifest object of the whole volume. It is quite another matter whether Mr. Wright can be set down as an orthodox believer. We have been altogether puzzled to know where to place him as regards the attitude in which he stands towards the Churches and the different religious opinions. He seems to have strong leanings in the direction of the symbolism of numbers and Swedenborg's doctrine of Correspondences, (see page 59 *et passim*), as well as of the Episcopal liturgy, and to have faith in the reality of supernatural grace and of the inspiration of the Scriptures; albeit he throws in a good word here and there for the Quakers, for the Mennonites, and other harmless and non-combative sects, and even for certain practices of the Romanists. There are decided tendencies betrayed throughout the book, in the direction of religious mysticism, and towards the end they culminate in a sort of Broad Church Quietism. He might be understood as holding the doctrine of unconditional decrees, though his remarks on this point are purely hypothetical. There is proof that he believes in the future punishment of the wicked, and yet it is possible he would not so readily grant that that punishment is to be eternal. After some characteristic statements in reference to La Grange's Calculus of Variations, in connexion with "spontaneous powers of reaction," and "the self-counterbalancing of evils and opinions," there occurs the following curious passage, in which his view is enforced by a singular piece of scriptural exegesis :

"There are limits, probably, even to the distance that lost souls can make, of separation from the race. The Psalmist says, although he 'make his bed in hell, God is there.' (Psalm cxxxix. 8.) And *vice versa*, what concerns us more to know—there may be limits to the distance the saved can rise above the lost."*

* Principia, p. 70.

Elsewhere, after mildly chastising Spencer for his figment as to the spontaneous disappearance of evils, our author says :

“ . . . Revealed religion alone can save society. . . : To ignore God, even in the spontaneous disappearance of evils, is to put stops to the working of the *Cause* of the spontaneous disappearance, and, therefore, stops to the disappearance itself. The spontaneous elimination and evanescence of evils, is only of *WEAK* evils ; unless on that *ETERNAL* and infinite plane, unknown to mortals, where evil itself may be shown to be weakness.”*

He accepts, with an important modification, Paley's Expediency doctrine, and makes it one of his foundation-stones. The modification is that no doctrine of expediency can be received, altogether regardless of the moral instincts, nor can these be taken without the other. Right and expediency, he holds, always go together, and can never swerve from “the great foundations of morality, namely, the sanction of God and the equality of the rights of men under the same circumstances.”†

The author of “*Principia*” refers so often, and nearly always so kindly, to writers of opposite opinions, that little can be gathered from the excerpts he makes from others on particular points as to the general point of view he occupies himself. This he describes on his title-page as one that is, “moral and theological, yet liberal and progressive.” It will be heeded that he does not say his standing-point is “Christian.” He appears to be in religion, what he certainly is in philosophy and politics, an independent eclectic. He swears by no master absolutely, and is not only a *beau sabreur*, but a free lance, from the beginning to the end of his long combat. His views as to the relation which theology bears to social science are (like his views on most other subjects) exceedingly peculiar. He thinks those who have actually done most to aid the science, are Socrates, (or Plato,) Fourier, Comte, and Herbert Spencer, whom he pronounces “the most profound scientific generalists of all time.”‡ Yet he believes a more likely class than either the ordinary statesman or the ordinary “physicists” to keep the cause, would be the true scientific theologians, if these could only spare the time for the

**Ibid*, p. 62.

†*Ibid*, p. 41.

‡*Ibid*, p. 36.

investigation. Theologians, he argues, are, by their training, the men best fitted for universal or general study, and quotes "Wells, whose occupation is the examination of heads," as saying that, as a class, theologians have the best heads in the world. (*Query*, Is our author himself a "theologian?") He finds evidence of the correctness of his preference for theologians as the men for this business, in what he calls "the success" of their communities. Nearly all who have succeeded in these attempts have been theologians, even if uneducated or renegade theologians. He also argues from the fact that ministers of religion alone can proclaim to kings (or rulers) the precise truths of which they stand in need, and corroborates his view by the marginal renderings* of Isaiah iii. 12, and ix. 16. Nor does he omit to mention "the brave and devoted missionaries, scattered over heathen countries," . . . who are making continual and valuable contributions to the science, gathered from their personal observation and experience. Mr. Wright also borrows a hint from a Dr. Craig, that clergymen (and physicians too) COULD be of great service, by collecting statistics of such a private and moral nature as are not to be got at in any other way.†

The following interesting extract might seem to disclose the fact that the writer is a Protestant—perchance a Presbyterian or Congregationalist. It is nevertheless certain that at least on his mystical side he has sympathies broad enough to include Mahometans and Pagans:‡

"The study of theology is the scientific study of religion, and therefore calls into exercise all the higher faculties of the mind. Hence it is one of the best preparations for earnest original study in any of the sciences. The success of the German and Scotch metaphysicians is chiefly owing to this cause. And even of the pre-eminent mathematical and physical scientists, Candolle's statistics show, as to the professions of their sires, that Protestant clergymen are more numerous than any other profession. And of the eminent men of the Christian world, a far larger portion of them are found to be the children of clergymen than of any other professionals. [*Sic.*]

"The *peculiar* fitness of the studies of the theologians, as discipline

* The volume contains several new interpretations of the Greek.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

and preparation for political philosophy, is further proved by the fact that at various times they have become the best and foremost political statesmen of the world. Ximenes, Wolsey, Richelieu, Cranmer, Talleyrand, and others, may be mentioned. And then, also, the fact that the statesmanship of Rome, which is conducted entirely by clergymen, is acknowledged to be the most far-reaching in the world. Remember, also, those old Puritan statesmen of Cromwell's day, who knew their Bibles and Catechisms even better than their laws—how readily they were turned into generals and statesmen, whom all the world wondered at, and who out-generalled and out-witted even the Romans themselves.”*

In his Preface, the author professes to have aimed to produce a book that could be safely recommended to students of divinity who thirst for knowledge and for real usefulness, and declares that in this spirit he offers the volume to his readers, “in the humble but earnest desire of being able to contribute his mite towards the Christianisation of politics, the promotion of real freedom and progress, and the improvement of society; firmly believing that the promotion of freedom and progress in this world is aid to salvation in the next world.”† Thus the author would seem to be a sort of Broad Church mystic;‡ but with very definite and often singular opinions on certain tenets in theology.

But if we have been puzzled to know what is Mr. Wright's religious status, we were at first quite nonplussed in the endeavor to find out exactly where he stands on the question of sectional politics. He speaks somewhere of the “great rebellion,” but elsewhere he expresses himself as follows: “Whenever the forms of government become so perverted that they essentially hinder the real *objects*, then rebellion becomes justifiable, if it is expedient.” (P. 247.) Furthermore, he commonly describes the contest between the North and South as the “internal war.” He might even seem to be a sort of State Rights man.¶ He avows a belief in the sovereignty of “precincts,” and (as we shall see) he defines his “precincts” as “very small and REFORMED ‘States.’” (P. 125.) In his view, “there is the certainty that

* *Ibid*, p. 31.

† *Ibid*, vii.

‡ Like other Communists, he lays great stress on what he calls “the higher life,” “the interior life,” etc., but understands these terms in a rather peculiar sense. See p. 455.

¶ See p. 143.

the greater a nation becomes, the less willing its rulers are to have it severed, and the greater is their power of evil, and the more severe they are apt to be towards dissenters or rebels. . . ." He holds that so long as human nature continues depraved, "nations cannot happily attain their maximum theoretical size previous to division; charity must make allowances for the imperfections of both sides." (P. 248.) He certainly maintains the justifiableness of revolutionary changes involving the permanent separation of the body politic, whenever the amount of grievances and the power of the persons or parties aggrieved have reached a kind of joint maximum. He even appears to admit, *in thesi*, a right on the part of "precincts" to "secede," but guards his theory from any dangers supposed to result from this concession, by the statement that the practical right to secede has been settled adversely by war. He, however, contends for a reduction of the "states" into his sovereign "precincts," and argues that "the arrangement into small States," such as he proposes, would have prevented anything like secession on a large scale; and that the organisation of the present "United States" into very much smaller States, "would make even the IDEA of 'State Right Secession' quite preposterous," and preposterous in an inverse ratio to the magnitude of the new States. Notwithstanding all this, he assigns extraordinary powers to the "nation," considered as a fundamental element in every system of government; and maintains that it would be competent to the nation to interpose in the case of "slave precincts," though only in time of peace. The defence our author makes of this position seems to grow naturally out of his novel social theory, and may not be at all due to "political" bias. The language he uses is somewhat ambiguous: "The real justification for interference by the nation, with the affairs of the slave precincts, is that these latter totally ignored the rights of the colored race either to precincts or to corporations. I mean this would be justification in time of peace." It may perhaps be inferred from this that Mr. Wright is a negrophilist, in the offensive sense of that term. There are passages which might appear to support such a construction.*

* Compare with this, *Principia*, p. 229, etc.

One of the strongest of these passages, however, contains a sentence with a bearing so equivocal as to throw all in doubt again as to his full meaning. The remark is made, that in human nature there are sympathies for the injured and down-trodden that will sooner or later bring about relief. Even if such a class are so far sunk in the social and moral scale as to furnish to the observer few specimens of the better points of human nature—"if they are so low that FACTS can say but little in their favor, then FICTION will take up their cause, and fancy will imagine and paint specimens of their imaginary heroes in unknown circumstances." In the same context there is an explicit reference to a work of Mrs. H. B. Stowe, in which (we may be allowed to say, in passing,) the authoress has notoriously relied on her imagination for her facts.

The new "Principia" fully recognise the mixture of motives that urged on the crusade against the Southern slave-holder, and places "interest" (covetousness) high in the list of those motives. "Animosity against the 'owners of cheap labor,' had as much to do with the cry for Union and Abolition, as sympathy for the colored race."*

On the whole, we regard the author as a theoretical dreamer, rather than as a sectional partisan. He expressly affirms the unassailable truth that "nothing is clearer than that the whole subject of the internal government of each of the States is, by the Constitution, left to the government of the State itself."† He admits that if the State, after secession, remains a State in the old sense of that term, the Carolina argument is perfect. He is, however, driven to deny that the State continues to be a State, or that "rebellion" (as he calls it) can take a State out of the Union. Yet he maintains that "rebellion" does take the political Constitution of the "rebellious" State out of the Constitution of the United States, and argues that the former "State" is now remanded to the condition of a "territory," in the sense of the law. Under this view, he holds that the rights of "loyal" individuals, as individuals, remain unimpaired; but that "their political State rights are gone." This would certainly be "hard

* *Principia*, p. 77.

† *Ibid*, p. 154.

lines" for the "scalawag" of our Southern provinces. So far, his theory corresponds exactly with that of the extreme wing of the Radical party; and his whole argument on this point is a nut for the so-called "war Democrats" to crack. Here, however, he parts company with the Stevens school, in the following remarkable paragraph:

"Nothing in this argument, however, is to be so construed as to deny the *right* of precincts to rebel, upon *sufficient* cause. The conflict of arms results in general from the uncompromised conflicts of opinion, and which are useless to discuss any further. It is a resort to which every living thing which believes in fighting has a natural right, upon just occasion. But after the resort to arms has been made and concluded in conquest, the rights of the conquerors are limited only by the laws of nations and by Christian morality. But the *expediencies* are a different question." (P. 155.)

There are many admirable things in this book. All manner of subjects are discussed, and usually with ability. We have here the *principia* of nearly all the sciences, both physical and moral, and many of their last results. The book abounds in shrewd and pithy observations and criticisms, and in valuable apothegms, which often show a large experience and much sagacity and reflection. But it would extend the limits of this article unduly to sustain this judgment by quotations. The remainder of our space must be reserved for a consideration of our author's peculiar scheme of social organisation. But in leaving this branch of the subject, we can appreciate and almost endorse the words of one of Mr. Wright's reviewers, when he says:

"In the fulness of its table of contents, . . . in the encyclopædic range of its topics, embracing 'high politics,' theology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, political economy, the science of government, the science of physical man, and miscellaneous topics relating to the development and progress of the race; in the minuteness of its sub-divisions, . . . in the originality of its punctuation-marks, . . . in the singularity of its syntax, . . . this 'Principia' is not merely an imposing and curious, but a ponderous and unique, book. As an illustration of a peculiar method of literary work, . . . it is the most extraordinary volume we have ever encountered."*

"Principia" is divided into five Books, of which the first con-

* The *Christian Era*, of Boston.

tains a Summary Introduction to Social Science ; the second, a discussion of the Precinct ; the third, of the Nation ; the fourth, of Corporation ; and the fifth, of Limited Communism. Every Book and the whole work proceeds from generals to particulars. The first Book is abstruse, from the condensation and the novelty of the views merely broached. It is, however, one of the most striking portions of the whole volume. It is sub-divided into two parts. The first part is on the principles of the study, and the second on the principles of the science itself. The first of these parts is very interesting, and presents little occasion for hostile criticism. The second part includes within itself the core of the author's general system. Much of the matter of this portion of the Book is recapitulated, explained, and extended in Book IV. (See p. 358.) The subject is far too complicated a one for a detailed consideration in the present article. Differing from Ballou* and other Socialists, in working from the Roman idea of *Centralism*, *i. e.*, of government descending from the greater to the less, Mr. Wright founds his plan on the rights of individuals, families, and precincts ; proceeding on the Greek and German (and he might have added Hebrew) idea of natural and artificial *federation* ; *i. e.*, of government ascending from the less to the greater. The sentence just concluded is a digest in our own language of whole chapters of the "Principia." Our author fancies he has discovered the fundamental constitutive elements of human society. These are seven. Of these seven, all but one are what he calls "the six units." These six units are units or measures of governmental right or power. They are also "moral personalities," inherent in the constitution of society. Their names are familiar ones. They are these: Individual, Family, Social Circle, Precinct, Nation, and Mankind. Each of these units is "*typical*" of all above it, and *vice versa*. Thus, no one unit has greater authority over the unit next below it, than the unit next below it has over its own immediate inferior, and so on. The two extremes in the series are perhaps to be excepted from

* The author of "Christian Socialism," a work which requires, as one of the principles "fundamental to the constitution of society," what Mr. Wright styles "such a subtlety" as the dogma of universal salvation.

the absolute generality of this statement—Mankind and Individual: Mankind, as the whole and absolutely superior; the Individual, as the social atom, and incapable of social sub-division. It follows, that nationality cannot absorb the rights of precincts, or family government absorb the rights of individuals, or indeed any one unit absorb the rights of any other unit. Our ingenious analyst insists that it is therefore wrong to treat precincts as if they were mere corporations, and to single out the nation as the only unit having real and original governmental power. Precincts are “free and equal” *in their sphere*, as individuals in their sphere, or as nations in their sphere. The authority of a nation over its precincts, is of the same *kind* (he holds) as that which would be exercised by a coalition of nations, a confederacy, or empire, over the included nationalities. In both cases, Mr. Wright would make the sovereignty to consist in the vast difference of DEGREE in the scale of power betwixt the governor and the governed. These coalitions and empires are themselves foreshadowings and intimations of the largest unit, Mankind; and our author puts the question whether the time will ever arrive when mankind shall be embraced under one confederated or imperial government. This event, he supposes, must be deferred till the coming of “that Great Man ‘who is Lord of the whole earth.’” The fundamental analogy is the family. This conception should also determine the relation of counties and townships to provinces, of provinces to states, and of states to nations.

One family occupies a locality, several families make up a neighborhood, several neighborhoods a township, and so on until we have arrived at the nation.

The interior principle regulating the definition and arrangement of the units is that of the tribe. The notion of the precinct or neighborhood is a modern enlargement of the tribe idea. And, according to the author of “Principia,” the tribe idea is originally the essence of the State. This he exemplifies in the Scottish clans, each subservient to its chief and all subservient to their king.

But in addition to the six units, there is a *seventh* fundamental

VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—13.

or analytical element of human society: it is that of corporation. This seventh element, however, is generically different from the other six. The six are instinctive, the seventh deliberative; the six are successive and mutually exclusive; the seventh may be placed indifferently either at the top or bottom of the series, and may either coincide in boundary with one or more of the larger units, or else may intersect and overlap them, and intersect them and overlap them in every imaginable way. The corporation is fancifully spoken of as a sort of *Sabbath* to the other fundamental elements.

The subject of corporations is treated of in an exceedingly learned and a really able manner; and this portion of "Principia" is the true vestibule to the most erratic and objectionable part of the whole volume, and no doubt the favorite part with the author, namely, the part on limited communism. Mr. Wright claims to have discovered the alleged fact, and certainly a remarkable one, that the ancient tribe idea has not disappeared from modern society, but is resolved into the three forms of social circle, precinct, and corporation.*

It is not necessary that we should go extensively either into the consideration of the precise nature of the six units, or into the examination of the argument by which the exact number of the units is determined, by which they are ascertained to be just what they are, and are contradistinguished the one from the other. Much that is said about them in this volume is true and important, much true and unimportant, much mere guess-work, much untrue or fanciful. As regarded by the author of "Principia," these fundamental units, though successive in the order of power, are contemporaneous at any given time; and though mutually exclusive as to their boundary lines, are only so in the same sense in which the statement holds good of a system of concentric circles. His idea of his seventh analytical element, corporation, would seem to be that of one or more circles, if you please, of an indefinite number of circles, of variable radii, laid over the area swept by the concentric circles, and laid over this area in such a manner that no reference is commonly had to the

**Ibid.*, p. 359.

coincidence of the superimposed curves with the curves previously described.

But it is not of corporation, but of the six units we are now to speak. Of these the first, the individual, is the atom of which all the others are composed; since mankind is made up of nations, and nations of precincts, and precincts of social circles, and social circles of families, and families of individuals. Few would be disposed to deny that society may be resolved into some such elements, but it certainly requires proof that the analytical units are just these six,—*no more, no less*. That the six are the very six given in this volume, and that the character of each is just what this volume says it is, is argued with a show at least of cogency. The writer's usual good sense appears to have deserted him where he tries to confirm his selection of the number *six* by a variety of fantastic analogies, although he is no where more curious and ingenious than in this very effort. Thus he finds the *hexagon* to be the best mathematical figure for purposes like those of the honey bee. He also finds six great classes of society; six principal crimes or vices; six main divisions in Roget's "Thesaurus of English Words;" six "infinities" in Ballou's "Christian Socialism;" six divisions in Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; six lines of progress, and six universal data, according to Herbert Spencer; six astronomical systems; six systems of crystallisation; six organs of sense; six eras in religious society; six sciences according to Plato; six states of the human mind; six mental faculties; six divisions of the universe, suggested by the classification of Oken; six sciences according to Hegel; six sciences according to Comte. More to the purpose is what Mr. Wright says about the combinations of the six units. These are combinations in concatenation and combinations in solution. Under the head of combinations in concatenation, he points out that the individual knows himself only by coming to the family; and both individual and family know themselves only by coming into the social circle, or into the local organisation or precinct; and all these again know themselves only through connexion with the nation, and the nation knows itself only by means of its relations to mankind. Similarly, going downwards, the nation can

appreciate itself only by appreciating precinct, social circle, and individual. So, too, of precinct in relation to social circle and individual, and of social circle in relation to individual. "Thus it is," he argues, "that the very principle which runs through the development of all human society, has only to be viewed from the opposite side to be seen to confirm the great doctrine of the right of some government influence being vested in all the units of society severally." (P. 88.)

Under the head of combinations in solution, which are described as of a more complex and versatile kind, our author favors us with a series of observations, the truth of which is in every case obvious, but the effect on the mind of the reader often surprising. Thus, three of the units, viz., precinct, nation, and mankind, involve the idea of location; whereas the other three are purely personal, viz., the individual, the family, and the social circle. Again: the six naturally divide themselves into three pairs, in each of which pair one unit is a part and the other a whole, viz., individual and family, precinct and nation, social circle and mankind; one pair, moreover, being personal, one political, and one voluntary or moral. Once more: by a different combination we arrive at three pairs, in all of which the units of each pair are connected by metaphysical and moral relations,—viz., individual and mankind, family and nation, social circle and precinct.* The author also finds three dualities, and points out certain whimsical analogies in chemistry and geography. (P. 89.) He also calls attention to an analogy of peculiarities, a solitary unit at the two extremes, and two connected pairs of units in the middle. As to the two extremes, one (individual) is a *no* society, a kind of zero, and the other (mankind) is the indefinitely remote ideal that is never completely realised. The other four make up the connected pairs, family with social circle, and precinct with nation. (Pp. 90 and 91.) It is impossible not to admire the patience and cleverness that are bestowed on these seemingly idle comparisons, no less than on the weightier matters that come more regularly under discussion. The condition prerequisite to a happy state of things among a people, is what our author calls

*See Principia, p. 89.

the balance of the units. It is the duty of society to find and keep this balance by giving to each unit its due proportion of influence.

The following sentence, with certain important qualifications, expresses the whole theory in a nutshell: ". . . , Every unit . . . has its own rights, which are inalienable, indefeasible, and indivisible. Therefore, in general, we may say, the sovereignty of the nation over the precincts within, and over relationships to other nations and mankind outward, IS LIMITED BOTH BY THE ETERNAL NATURE AND BY THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE UNITS."* This, however, is modified and practically neutralised by the singular statement, that in cases where there is conflict of authority or opinion, the lesser unit must perforce (though not of abstract right) yield to the greater. "Our doctrine," he says, "as to the rights of a nation may be summed up thus: the sovereignty of the nation consists, as to precincts, corporations, individuals, and families, not in superior rights, but in superior power; but with the right of judging in doubtful cases of jurisdiction; and on the other hand,—in reference to the unit above it, viz., mankind,—the nation has only its rights as one of the essential units, all being subject to their *peculiar* conditions of *position* and *locality*." (P. 226.) Of the six units, four, viz., individual, family, social circle, and mankind, are so commonly understood in the same way, that they need no further description; another, precinct, has already been sufficiently described; the remaining unit, nation, calls for a word or two of additional explanation. Mr. Wright, after giving the definitions of Scipio, Cicero, Augustine, Grotius, Comte, Mill, Wheaton, and Mulford, gives his own. This is, that "a nation is one of the spontaneous, natural elements or units of human society—a governmental union of individuals and precincts," having most, if not quite all, of eight characteristics which he specifies. The seventh and eighth characteristics would, in the judgment of experts, be missing, not only in the case of the Southern Confederacy, but of the American Union.† Yet it should be noticed that Mr. Wright contends for the universal presence, not of all, but of *nearly* all

**Ibid.*, p. 225.

†*Ibid.*, p. 247.

the criteria, and holds that the missing element will be different in different cases. "The *tout ensemble*," he says, "remains a 'constant,' yes, so constant as not even to disappear in 'differentiation.'" He does not, however, appear to allow the absence of two of the criteria. Mr. Wright would, of course, deny that our view is the correct one of the American Constitution; which having been formed not by a spontaneous impulse, but by voluntary agreement, would then lack only the seventh characteristic.

According to Mr. Wright, every precinct or small neighborhood possesses by nature, and should have granted to it by law, the same rights for the most part that the Constitution grants to its States severally.* The diminished size of his proposed States (precincts) would make necessary a number of alterations in "the State-rights granted by the Constitution." The mass of American "State-rights" should be divided between the nation and the precincts. Some of the powers of the individual State would be assigned to the precinct, or to its amalgam with its surrounding precincts; other of these powers would be assigned to the nation. On the other hand, some of the powers of the nation would be assigned to the individual precinct, or to its amalgam (league) with its surrounding precincts. (P. 143.) The States are throughout treated of by this writer as if they were the creatures, instead of being, as they demonstrably are, the creators, of the Constitution.

The author of this treatise holds some peculiar views in respect to his third unit, the social circle. It is impossible for us to take notice of them now. He admits that his whole scheme is in large measure a play of the imagination, a sort of phantasmal republic like that of Plato, or Utopia like that of More. The whole thing strikes us as being a fair but colossal delusion; and the procession of elaborated arguments passes before the mind's-eye like "an insubstantial pageant," or the dissolving views of a magic lantern. Great reliance is reposed on the general method of Comte and Spencer, who are continually quoted as high authorities in this volume. It is true the attempt is made to purge the method of its virtual Atheism. Yet, how can this be done without a sur-

**Ibid*, p. 143.

render of its fundamental principles? The corner-stone of Positivism is its doctrine respecting ultimate *causes*, whether efficient or final, that they can never be discovered, or if an ultimate efficient can be discovered that it is forever inscrutable. The sociological hypothesis of Spencer is of a piece with his psychological, "biological," and physical, and these are parts of a grand comprehensive hypothesis of evolution of everything in matter, in mind, and in history, "from homogeneity to heterogeneity;" an evolution hypothesis that is essentially the same with that of Wallace and Darwin—the same, though immeasurably expanded; but in comparison with which Darwinism itself is sobriety and caution. We are advocates of the theory that there is a progressive order in nature, and a historical development in the unfoldings of Providence. What we dispute is that these movements are due to an evolution of natural force. It may be conceded, too, that Comte and Spencer have made some valuable suggestions, of which Mr. Wright, so far as his judgment has been a safe guide, has been eager to avail himself. The inalienable rights of the social circle, of the precinct, and of the nation, are to a great extent imaginary. The so-called "science" of the Socialists is not yet worthy of the name. The elements of the problem are too refined, too numerous, too variable and transitory for the subtlest powers of analysis that have ever yet grappled with them. This, indeed, is fully admitted by our author, who grants that his whole work is tentative and experimental. His scheme of "limited communism" is in principle analogous to that of Fourier, but differs from all other proposed systems in many important particulars. It is far from our intention to open so large a subject in the present number of the REVIEW. Like all kindred schemes, if ever brought to the tests of theory or practice, it will be "found wanting." It is but fair, however, to say that Mr. Wright agrees with those sociologists who go in for a community of incomes, *not* of capital, and who are the friends of marriage; and that he founds his system not on principles of *justice*, but of *benevolence*,—in the form of the brotherly kindness enjoined in the New Testament. (See p. 444.) Coöperation and joint stock companies, he thinks, can furnish all that is de-

manded by simple justice. The final cause of the whole enterprise in which Mr. Wright is engaged, would seem to be to foster a species of perfectionism. He acknowledges that a commune is not likely to succeed which abounds in "*Bibliolaters*," who would settle everything irrespective of history, experience, science, or natural religion. He admits that one of his communes would be a shell to hold and receive life from a church of interiorists and saints. He admits that a commune, and by its very definition, aims at the identification of Church and State, in the love and choice of every individual. The scheme is perhaps the best communistic scheme ever proposed; but, like the rest, is visionary and chimerical, is founded upon false premises, is defended by invalid arguments, is beset with difficulties in practice, and is destructive in its influence on the Church and on society.

ARTICLE V.

PRESBYTERIANISM IN CENTRAL NEW YORK.

1. *Historical Sketch of Presbyterianism within the bounds of the Synod of Central New York.* By P. H. FOWLER, D. D.
2. *The Presbyterian Element in the National Life and History.* By Prof. J. W. MEARS, D. D. Utica, N. Y. 1877.

The first named work covers 755 pages, 12mo. The other is a pamphlet of 31 pages, bound with the first. There seems to be no special connection in these two productions, except that they may be said to be eulogistic of the Presbyterianism of Central New York specially, and of Presbyterianism as a system of doctrine and order, generally. The binding, paper, and print are neat specimens of such parts of a material book, and compare favorably with a fair proportion of the issues from the presses of our larger cities.

I. Dr. Fowler's work is one of a kind which we always welcome. Of course, the welcome must be modified by considerations

growing out of the character of the work. In any case, however, works of this kind constitute, as "Memoirs," important contributions to the material for the history of our common Presbyterianism. It must devolve on contemporary critics, having "more perfect knowledge" of particular portions of the history presented, to correct what may be erroneous in statement or unfair in inference.

The work before us presents, on its mere cursory examination, important defects of structure. There is no table of contents, no divisions and subdivisions, as books, chapters, and sections. The compiler, with a mass of material before him, might have put together such a work by merely selecting his scraps and arranging them, in an imperfect chronological order, and then writing, *calamo currente*, indicating the topics occurring by the use of headings to a few paragraphs or pages, printed in capitals, where his subject might change. There is, it is true, an index, attention to which is called by a slip on blue paper bound opposite to the title page, containing the words, "For Index see p. 748." A running title on the top of the pages, indicative of their contents, might have supplied, somewhat, the defects now noticed; but from the rather heterogeneous collection of subjects, some of which occupy only a few paragraphs, this mode of indicating contents would not have been satisfactory, though in some cases a great convenience. Thus, the subjects of "Revivals," "New Measures," the "Decades" of History, "Mr. Finney's" career, and "Hamilton College," could all have been indicated by running titles. These defects in the structure of the book greatly reduce its value as a book of reference. The author's half apology, in his introduction, for the "arrangement and treatment of subjects and style of writing," as the result of an "original intention" of preparing only a "single discourse," though evincing a half consciousness of the defects, hardly suffices to remedy them, and still less to relieve his readers of the trouble they occasion.

Owing to this defective structure of the book, it is really difficult to form a satisfactory conception of the author's purpose and scope in its compilation. True, one very patent purpose can easily be discovered. There can be no doubt of the apologetic

and eulogistic character of the production. Dr. Fowler shows himself to be an eminently charitable man. In the face of well-established *facts* respecting persons and acts, both of men and ecclesiastical bodies, the apologetic style is repeatedly adopted, and acknowledged errors, crimes against the best interests of society in some cases, are palliated, excused, or assigned to vices regarded as excesses of virtues. With a very few exceptions, (hard cases, which left, even for charity with its largest mantle, no capacity to effect concealment,) the great mass of the men and women brought on the stage are represented as heroes and heroines in the cause of religion. About two hundred and fifty such are named, nearly all of whom appear in our author's discriminating (?) accounts to have lived in the practice of great virtues and to have died in the "odor of sanctity." Of some notable exceptions we have more to say in another connection.

Justice to truth calls for a qualification to the ascription of "charitableness" to our author. It is a charity for all classes of men who pertain to his region. There is no cloak to cast over Southern men and the acts of the awfully wicked "Rebellion" and its authors, reputedly moved by love for slavery and unlawful power.

With the difficulties in forming satisfactory conceptions of the purpose and scope of the book, we very diffidently express the opinion that the writer designed to set forth, as worthy of all praise and imitation, the general course of the men, the churches, Presbyteries, and Synods, and all the institutions which they established or adopted, and which they zealously sustained, and all the measures by which the religious (?) work was conducted, in Central New York. Two results of success, in his effort, appear prominent: one to convince men that the solemn, prayerful legislation of the General Assembly of 1837-'8 was based on ignorance—(and perhaps prejudice)—at all events, was a great mistake, if not grievous sin; and that in the glorious, noisy, and sensational REUNION of 1870, the so-called "New School" partner in the structure of the present Presbyterian Church was equally with the "Old School" partner, in doctrine and order, worthy of the Presbyterian name, and meet to be partaker of its traditions and time-honored fame.

But it is now time for us to examine, with as much order as is practicable, some of the distinctly salient matters, in the treatment of which our author proposed to accomplish his great purpose.

1. The brief notices of the Synods and Presbyteries occupying the field, (Central New York,) with dates of organisation, changes of boundaries, and the construction of the present Synod of Central New York, are all doubtless valuable as "Memoirs" in the locality with which they are connected. Especially valuable, as introductory, are the following notices of Congregational bodies in the same field, as laying before us the facilities and inducements for the intimate relations of the Presbyterian and Congregational churches in after time. The book opens with these statistics, which occupy six or seven pages. Then follows a brief record respecting "Associated Presbyteries." The only reason for mentioning a body which seems to have had no special importance may have been to inform the world that this mixed multitude "originated with Rev. Jacob Green, a native of Malden, Mass.," "*father of Dr. ASHBEL GREEN.*" The "Physical Features of the Field," "Aboriginal Inhabitants," "Protestant" and "Catholic Missions" among the Indians, "French and Indian Wars," "Revolutionary War," etc., etc., may serve as the additional elements in what might have been termed "An Introductory Chapter."

We have the usual accounts of Indian cruelties, hardships of emigrants, and the prevalence of French infidelity, as to this modern "Canaan," which can be found in the history of other parts of the country, of the same period—the latter part of the 18th century. No "strange thing happened" to those hardy New Englanders, who sought new homes and more room; and while by no means desiring to depreciate the enterprise and energy they displayed, other "lands of promise" can offer as many or even more illustrations of Christian patriotism and zeal.

But even in these opening pages, there begin to appear exemplifications of the spirit of boast which appears to belong, as a permanent characteristic, to the sons of the "Plymouth Rock." The General Assembly and the New England Associations, espe-

cially that of Connecticut, commenced in 1789-'90 to send missionaries to this field. While the author takes notice of the Presbyterian contribution, his chief eulogy is given to the Congregational, singling out several ministers, originally or directly from New England, whose labors are specially noticed with extraordinary encomiums, albeit one was a pronounced Hopkinsian. Mention is also made of the constitution of the Assembly's "Committee," 1802, (afterwards, 1816, "Board,") "of Missions;" but the most numerous pioneers in the enterprise of evangelizing the land, and the most zealous, were from New England. It is stated, with manifest satisfaction, that the "Connecticut Association was foremost of all others, and no Presbytery or Synod could have more unreservedly coöperated with the Assembly." "Congregationalism widely affected Presbyterianism." "The missionaries scarcely thought of each other as Presbyterians and Congregationalists." The churches of each denomination were often organised by ministers of the other; and, as in few communities neither one could sustain its own peculiar institutions alone, efforts were made to coöperate, till it seemed desirable some systematised arrangement should be made to provide for a healthy action of the two in their connection. Thus originated the "Plan of Union" of 1801. This work is pronounced a "masterpiece of liberality and benevolence on the part of Congregationalists." The authors, beneficiaries, sufferers, and abrogators of this celebrated *unconstitutional expedient* have nearly all passed from this world, and this is no place to dissect motives, or scan with minute criticism measures which were well purposed and the authors of which were among the excellent of the earth. Still it may not be uninteresting to examine some of the fruits of these schemes before we agree that the efforts most directly connected with this "mixed commission" for preaching the gospel were the most desirable for the permanent welfare of sound doctrine and a scriptural piety.

2. It may be true that Presbyterianism gained largely in *numbers*, and this may be conceded to have been due to the expressed views of Congregationalists of that day, that our Form of Government and Discipline were best adapted to "new settlements."

Yet it must be remembered that then, as well as for years afterwards, it was a favorite opinion of Congregationalists that the two denominations were "one" in religious creed. And at that early period this may have been eminently true. Still, men and women who had grown up under a form of government which deposited all power in the congregation, though formally belonging to a church recognising the *authority* of Presbytery, (parochial or provincial,) would not readily accept, in practice, principles so contrary to those which had been imbibed in early life. Even if the "Plan" worked with no grating friction from this cause, cases would continually occur where public sentiment—(the great governing power of civil or ecclesiastical communities holding the pure democratic principle)—could be arrayed against the free course of Presbyterian government. Connect with this remark the natural influence of a philosophy which expatiates on "the greatest good of the greatest number," and honors *expediency* as its agent, and we can very readily believe this "mixed commission," even with Presbyterianism represented by the "largest number," would be strongly swayed to act on New England methods, and rather seek to test all measures by the question, "Will it succeed?" (or *pay* ?) than by, "Is it right?"

However sound in theory were the emigrant ministers from New England previous to the Plan of Union, the element thus mingled with Presbyterianism in government became, on the one hand, an element of weakening influence in guarding against the ingress of error; and on the other, provided a body of men, who, by national and old ecclesiastical affiliations, often fellow-students or fellow-alumni of the same Colleges and Theological Institutions, would naturally rather sympathise with those who might be the introducers of strange doctrines, from the teachings of Eastern men, and thus rather *discourage* than *sustain* sound discipline. And it is not in any captious or prejudiced spirit, but under convictions in which impartial men must coincide, that we express the belief that whatever may have been the sound Calvinism of the New England churches a century ago, there had been from the formation of THE "Plan of Union" and the various offshoots which grew out of it in sundry localities, a coin-

ident growth of laxity in doctrinal views in several centres of influence in New England. In one of these, Yale College, there had been some years before 1837 a culmination of the evil, which alarmed the friends of truth in New England as well as in other sections.

Now the permeation of the field occupied by Presbyteries and their churches by the members of the Congregational Associations and churches, necessarily introduced a considerable intimacy between the representatives of the two denominations. This legalised and encouraged, in official aspects, by the "Plan," thoroughly affected all portions of the Presbyterian churches in that section. Thus, even the nomenclature of ecclesiastical matters was modified. The New England mode of designation of churches by the term, "society," either as a substitute for "church" or connected with it, in place of "congregation;" irregular modes of worship, growing out of the independence of Congregational churches, so that each was a "law to itself," and especially facile admissions of members or the tyrannical enforcement of a popular verdict by the power of a public sentiment, often the result of prejudice or *ex parte* views, greatly marred the order and peace of the Household of Faith.

3. But one of the most disastrous fruits of the measures adopted was illustrated in the patronage and advocacy of "voluntary societies" for benevolent purposes at first, and a subjection to them as a result at last. The necessity or advantages of a non-ecclesiastical organ for publishing and circulating the Bible, and the plausibility of a scheme for disseminating an evangelical literature, reflecting the phase of Christian doctrine in which all Christians of evangelical sentiments might agree, blinded the eyes of men to the dubious advantages of similar schemes for missionary and educational enterprises.

We need not enter into a discussion of "voluntary" and "ecclesiastical" boards of missions, education, etc. The New School branch of the Presbyterian Church, very soon after the schism of 1838, in entering as a Church on the various schemes of Christian benevolence, discarded voluntary societies, and established executive committees to manage such schemes under the immediate

control and as the accredited organs of the General Assembly. When left without the conservative and more strongly pronounced Presbyterianism of the Old School, they readily found that by the voluntary society they could not efficiently cope with the overwhelming power of Congregationalism. Indeed, by some, the measures of 1837-'38 were as fully justified and advocated as they had been by the most zealous Old School men. The Education Society adopted the principle that aid should be rendered indigent young men preparing for the ministry as a *loan*, for the return of which a bond was exacted of the beneficiary. The "borrower is servant to the lender." Hence, every young minister who had come under such obligations could be made to feel, most keenly, the importance of active sympathy and coöperation with the managers of that institution. Meanwhile, the money returned by the "borrowers" might accumulate to become an additional element of power. And this power, thus possessed by these two features of the education society, was wielded by a few men, on whom rested no responsibility to the Church. The patronage of the Home Missionary Society was also, as was to be supposed, more naturally extended to ministers and churches either already in sympathy with the views of its managers, or which might soon be swayed to affiliating with an institution to whose agency they owed their privileges, to such extent as they derived support. And this Society owed no allegiance to the Church. Now, without averring or denying the charges of misfeasance, which were so extensively made and very extensively countenanced in 1835-'7 respecting these institutions, it is evident that their very *structure* and *locality* were calculated to give rise to mistrust in the minds of Presbyterians in the middle and southern portions of the Church. A spirited rivalry naturally arose between these and the Church institutions, formed to prosecute the work of beneficiary education and missions. Hence parties grew up, and dissensions arose in all parts of the Church.

It was obvious that in such a controversy the advantage was with the voluntary institutions. The Congregational element engaged in their support, united with that mixed Presbyterianism which had grown up under the operation of the "Plan," and

been extended all over the Church in greater or less degree by the permeating of Presbyteries and churches, especially in the cities, with the men of New England, who were converted in a very facile manner from Congregationalism to a Presbyterianism which they only accepted for "substance of doctrine," altogether constituted a power of immense capacity for evil or good to the Presbyterian Church.

But it requires very little acumen, with all the facts stated, to reach the conclusion that the *evil* would predominate. The state of the Church in 1831-37 evinced the existence of a wide-spread looseness in doctrinal views, and a great weakening of our government. With a literature for youth emanating from the *American* Sunday-school Union, for adults from the *American* Tract Society, candidates for the ministry aided by the *American* Education Society, and ministers sent out under the patronage of the *American* Home Missionary Society, it is only wonderful, and due to the intrinsic power of the system of doctrine taught and the administration of government conducted by the staunch Presbyterians of our Church, that the whole organisation was not thrown into disastrous disorder and weakness. It is now matter of history, as above seen, that whatever howls of "injustice," "tyranny," and "unconstitutionality" were uttered by members of the excised Synods and their friends all over the land in 1837, the New School "Branch" was exceedingly willing, in a few short years, to abandon voluntary societies and adopt executive organisations of the Assembly.

4. Of course our author would regard the influences of the "Plan" with no such sentiments as we have expressed. Perhaps it did not suit his purposes or views to trace that influence further than the modified good results which grew out of the greater efficiency of combining Presbyterians and Congregationalists in given localities, constituting the great bulk of the "settlements" in the region covered by the Synods of Utica, Geneva, and Genessee. And he candidly admits, that, when this irregular structure was pulled down in 1837, it "had waxed old and was ready to vanish." It had done its work—but only a *good* work. We have great reason to believe that along with whatever "good"

had been effected in Central [and Western] New York, immense evil had enured to the Presbyterian Church. The abolition of the "Plan" cut short the operation of the causes which might have continued to produce evil there and elsewhere, more aggravated and irremediable. But *the evil had been done*. The original causes were annihilated, so far as the Presbyterian Church could be responsible and efficacious. But neither the good nor the evil, which *had been produced*, could be undone. A kind of religious sentiment, especially on revivals and the relations of the Church to State matters, had been engendered under the "mixed commissions" and the mixed gospel they taught, which survives "to this day."

(1.) Our pages would be disgraced and made unworthy of the confidence of our readers, did they set forth any views at all depreciatory of the work of the Holy Spirit in those religious awakenings termed in our generation *revivals*. Nor would we be willing to be thought making any efforts detracting from the just meed of commendation of men who consecrate themselves specially as "evangelists," and are set apart in an orderly manner, for preaching the gospel in the "regions beyond."

Of the three hundred and twenty-five churches reported as having existed on the field now covered by the Synod of Central New York, "the Synod reported one hundred and sixty-seven to the last General Assembly (1876). About one hundred and eighty have *disappeared*, the churches having been disbanded or transferred to *Congregational Associations*, and in some cases two or more have been consolidated."

According to Assembly's Minutes of 1837, we find reported in the same region, as nearly as localities *then* can be identified with those named by our author as included in the bounds of the Synod of Central New York, about two hundred and twenty-four churches. In 1876 our author, as above stated, gives one hundred and sixty-seven, a reduction of fifty-four since the organisation of the New School Assembly. In the same region, in 1837, we find reported 260 ministers and 25,287 communicants, giving about 97 communicants to each minister, and 112 to each church. At the same period we find, in the Synods of Virginia and North

Carolina, 22,389 communicants for 189 ministers, or 118 to each minister, and about 80 to each church. But as this latter region was much more thinly settled (with white people), the excess of numbers to each church in New York is easily accounted for, while the average to each minister shews unfavorably for Central New York. We may make a fairer comparison by taking a number of Presbyteries, with the city of Pittsburgh as a centre, which lie in Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, and northwestern Virginia, with 143 ministers, 25,256 communicants, and 248 churches. Thus, there were 175 members to a minister and 102 to each church. Of the 143 ministers, 80 were pastors,—being four-sevenths. In the New York field, there were the same number of pastors out of 260 ministers, or only four-thirteenths of the whole.

It is very evident, then, that the growth of Presbyterianism in the region of the "Plan" had not been a healthy, nor had it been a permanent, growth. And yet, here is the remarkable fact, this was the region so celebrated for *revivals*, that our author enumerates two hundred places which were the honored scenes where were displayed these "jewels and crowns of Presbyterianism in Central New York." Five hundred and thirty revivals are reported in seventy years, nearly eight every year; though terms of years were not so highly favored. For the two hundred churches we have an average of more than two and a half each. In some places, during this period of seventy years, are numbered four, five, six, seven, etc., the highest being thirteen in Rome and fourteen in Utica. It has been said, "that fanaticism always follows in the wake of great revivals." We do, by no means, subscribe to this remark, unless discriminatingly qualified. The preliminary question must be considered, whether the revivals, so-called, are the work of the Divine Spirit by the means of grace, or the production of mere human agencies. And further, it is conceded that even in the latter cases, God's Spirit, "who worketh when and where he will," may mercifully overlook many things of human error and infirmity, and bless the word preached, even "of contention," mixed with unsound doctrine, and marred by the presence of unauthorised measures, treated with the respect and confidence due only to legitimate means of grace.

Now there are men living who well remember the controversies of Rev. A. Nettleton, D. D., with Dr. Taylor of New Haven, on important questions connected with man's "estate of sin," and the operation of divine truth in regeneration; and his controversy, about the same period, 1828-35, with Dr. Finney, on the subject of "new measures."

It is undoubtedly true that Dr. Finney's academical education was nearly a nullity, as a preparation for the study of theology, and that a few months engaged in this last work, under one or two pastors, was all the professional preparation he enjoyed. His early life was not blessed by domestic or any other religious training; and he says himself, that (though he of course solemnly avowed a belief in the Westminster Standards) he had never read them before his licensure. That any Presbytery should send forth such a licentiate, is evidence of criminal laxity and remissness in duty. Perhaps what our writer calls Mr. Finney's "towering form," "majestic mien," "imposing countenance," "royalty," "highest intellect," and "profoundest heart," "preëminently vigorous and intense mental and moral exercises," "earnestness, singleness, and disinterestedness," led the Presbytery to overlook his deficiencies in such homely attainments as a knowledge of the "Hebrew and Greek," and consequent inability "to search the Scriptures in their original tongues." Our author regards his "defective mental discipline and defective lore" as advantages. "His imperfect education permitted rashness for the destruction inevitable in reforms." "He rushed in, where discipline and learning would have kept him out." "Such a man," not for eminence in mental or moral gifts, or might in the Scriptures, but "magnificence in the pulpit," "towering and finely proportioned person," "princely, active movements," "expressive, vigorous, but graceful, gestures," "glaring eye," etc., etc., "must make turmoil and arouse opposition." Doubtless Mr. Finney taught much truth, and God blesses the *truth*; but he also suited the men and views of the region and period—our author being a witness and a specimen. "Extreme New School views of sin and native depravity, and of regeneration," "of the persuasive and moral influence of the Holy Spirit," and for "SUBSTANCE of

DOCTRINE," the "Calvinistic scheme," "theological views," "with which Dr. Lyman Beecher entirely accorded"—[a man is known by the company he keeps]—"intolerant, denunciatory, and defamatory," "headlong," "harsh," "irreverent and coarse," are terms taken at random from Dr. Fowler's paragraphs, headed, "His faults and mistakes." Dr. Finney's account of Dr. Nettleton's agreeing "with me on all points of theology, so far as I had opportunity to converse with him," is characteristic of New School untenderness for truth, by being but partly truth and well guarded by the saving clauses. Suppose he had *no* "opportunity to converse with him" on "points of theology," on which it is well established history to say, he and Dr. Nettleton did *not* agree—this whole statement is simply of the worst species of false testimony, a *half truth*.

Whatever "measures" Dr. Finney favored or repudiated previous to 1830—"rising" and "going forward to the front of the pulpit for prayer," "taking places on anxious seats," "publicly praying for persons by name, without their request or consent or knowledge," "public prayer and speaking by women," and "hasty admissions of converts to the churches"—it is well known, were practices rife in that region, and some of the fruits of the fundamental errors of New School theology—in investing human agents with the attributes of a divine, in the great work of a sinner's regeneration. Dr. Finney, "years after the cry of new measures had been raised," (in 1830) resorted to practices in conformity with his "extreme views." The Pastoral Letter of the Assembly of 1832 is testimony to the disorders and evils which were some of the fruits of the semi-Calvinism and diluted Presbyterianism which the course of events, from 1800, for nearly a third of a century, as already given, had legitimately produced.

In mitigation of the "extreme views" in doctrine, of which we have spoken, Dr. Fowler is very careful to tell us that "divine sovereignty" had been the "key note of the pulpit and the parish," so as almost to "impair human responsibility." Preaching is represented as having been regarded as "in some way and at some time" to "contribute to its legitimate results"—and prayer, "to lie before God, awaiting his notice, and in time, perhaps, to

secure his answer." Exactly—such is the *caricature* of the service of God's ministers and people to justify the opposite, Dr. Finney's exaggerated views, which would set man on the throne, to assume divine prerogatives, or dictate terms to the Almighty.

(2) Nor were these evil fruits all that may be justly ascribable to the causes mentioned. The descendants of the Puritans had retained, with firm steadfastness, the wrong views of an ancestry which, however justly revered for suffering for "conscience' sake," had, when separated from their persecutors, carried into their ideas of government the principles of those very persecutors. Men must be made religious by law. Those who would not yield to the word preached, must be subdued by force of penal enactments. Hence, Roger Williams was banished, and in subsequent days government must receive dictation of duty from the Church. The complicity of the United States Government with the institution of slavery, must be destroyed. Men often

"Compound for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to."

The Abolition fever, exemplifying the poet's shrewd saying, began to rage. That fanaticism which does "follow in the wake of" spurious or vitiated "revivals," found in the mixed multitude of incomplete converts and spiritually proud, self-righteous neophytes, crowds of ardent votaries. Men of conservative views, both North and South, even while questioning the sound economy of slave labor, held fast to the long-established interpretation of the Bible, by which the lawfulness of the institution was sustained. Professedly Christian men, on becoming Abolitionists, soon discovered they must recede from this view, or relinquish their newly adopted interest in the crusade against slavery. The same logic which led to the declaration that "the Constitution of the United States was a league with Satan and a covenant with hell," compelled such men to choose between the alternatives of rejecting the divine authority of the Scriptures, or abandoning the so-called cause of freedom. Dr. Barnes had not then, perhaps, given words to the sentiment, that "if he believed the Scriptures justified slavery, the Bible was no Bible for him." But Dr. Barnes was a boasted growth of this land of promise;

and we are not surprised that a man who could not find the Calvinism of the Westminster Confession in the Bible, was equally unable to find an interpretation which sustained slavery. True, Dr. Eadie, Scotchman as he was, with the prejudices and public sentiment of his Church and people to oppose, could find such an interpretation. But what are sound exegesis, reason, and authority, to men who, on a small scriptural basis, become authors of Systematic Divinity and Solons on civil government? What Dr. Barnes said he believed, and accordingly misinterpreted, rather than reject, the Bible. Not so T. D. Weld. Dr. Fowler describes him, with his ever-recurring fondness for eulogy of the most extravagant order, as "a prodigy in intellect, in genius and eloquence, and of royal sway." But "tearing away from his moorings," (as "a professed convert" under Mr. Finney, and "a candidate for the ministry,") "under the anti-slavery excitement, he returned his license, abandoned the Church, discarded the supreme authority of the Bible, silenced his golden-mouthed speech, folded his eagle wings"—there! that is as much bombast as we care to quote. Let it suffice that Mr. Weld went to nothing, or worse. Rev. Beriah Green's career is described in similar terms of nauseating bombastic eulogy, in order, perhaps, to conciliate all who admired him, and might be offended by the naked truth. He not only sank in the obscurity to which, with all his great powers, his abandonment of truth consigned him, but, in his downward career, he dragged others, and destroyed utterly, for all good to the Church, a once flourishing literary institution.

Gerrit Smith's wild course of Abolition, extravagance, and virtual destruction of mind, and perversion to at least a semi-infidelity, is another example of the fruits of a pervading unsound religious teaching, coupled with a substitution for true scriptural piety, of some one phase (or more) of so-called religious morality, with the types of spiritual pride and self-righteousness, and the denunciatory spirit, filled with all uncharitableness belonging to them, which constitute elements of religious fanaticism. We might name other examples, for their name is legion, but these suffice to illustrate the evils, the existence of only a few of which,

and those of minor kind, Dr. Fowler seems disposed to acknowledge.

(3) Nor is this all. To the Abolition phrensy, as a logical sequence, succeeded the watchword of the Free-Soil party, and the terrible phrensy of the war. Assuming, as the self-righteous must do, that they are right, while arrogating to themselves the only true patriotism, they charged men, avowedly resisting long borne tyranny, and arming to defend the principles of a constitutional liberty, with being rebels against "the best government the world ever saw." The language of Presbyteries and Synods is replete with outrages on truth, and perversions of fact, and aspersions on the motives and conduct of men who only asked to be left alone in the undisturbed possession of rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Government, and, in their moral aspects, abundantly sustained by a properly interpreted Bible.

In view, then, of Dr. Fowler's pæans of praise for the men and works of the Synods of the past or present names, occupying the region of Central New York, his almost indiscriminate approbation of the measures to advance religion, and what is called patriotism, at the expense of the Christian faith, we must demur to his verdict on the question of good or evil, effected by the union of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism. We must question, even conceding, as stated, a certain temporary benefit, whether the evils immediately ascribable to such amalgamations, did not far exceed the benefits. And when we trace effects following, during three-fourths of a century and still, elements obstructing the progress of a true Presbyterian Christianity, we must say that our hearts are filled with sadness. Regrets are useless, unless they serve as monitors of the future. The ready acquiescence of the fathers in the mingling of Presbyterian and Congregational elements, was excusable at the time; for their motives were good and their prescience unenlightened by past examples. Besides, the elements as to doctrine were then homogeneous, and, as to government, more nearly so than they have since been.

5. We are called to consider questions in anticipation of facts of our day connected with their solution. God has given us a

rule of faith and practice. The soundness of our interpretation of this rule, in our standards, has been illustrated in the growth and power of Presbyterianism during three centuries. Warned, then, by the history here reviewed, we need take heed not to admit or tolerate for a moment either doctrinal teachings impeaching or impairing our standards of faith or modes of Church Government, divine worship, or ministerial training, which lead to a departure from those practices, in time past, on which God has placed the seal of his approbation. Never has there been more reason for watchfulness for truth, more ground for apprehensions of the ingress of evil, under the guise of good, as in the times before 1825-'37, than now exist. With no organic union with the Presbyterian Church North, and no coöperative union with it or with Congregationalism, there is yet a fearful exposure to the growing tendencies of many leading influences which emanate from those bodies, and finding their way through reviews, magazines, and newspapers, are permeating all parts of our Church. Propositions respecting the text and credibility of parts of the Bible, the interpretation of other parts, the supremacy of the Decalogue, and kindred subjects, which, two generations since, would have aroused protests from all parts of the Presbyterian Church in this country, are now set forth as settled conclusions, under the light of the "advanced thought of the nineteenth century." There is a tendency in the world of fashion to a cyclical coma. So in some physical diseases, and so in some moral. We are already aware of the existence of the incipient stages of the epidemic of spurious revivals. Let us be timely warned, and give heed to no plausible plea for lay preaching as a legitimate institution, because of a few sporadic cases of apparent benefit, the true nature of which, or preponderance of evil over good, is yet to be seen. Let us not be deluded by a few cases of evangelist work in organised churches, attended by the same or similar extraordinary unauthorised measures by which the same kind of work, forty years ago, was distinguished. The end is not yet. The experience of the past may well give us pause and justify hesitation in endorsing men who, with whatever apparently good results, have already, in many cases, pro-

duced the same kind of evils, in weakened pastoral relations, dissensions, denunciation, and uncharitableness, which were the well-known results of the similar work of the same kind of presumptuous, self-willed, and dictatorial leaders in the revivals of Central New York—revivals designated “the jewels and crowns of Central New York,” but many of which proved, by their lack of durable lustre, to be pinchbeck ware.

Above all the sad lessons of this discussion, comes the solemn admonition to Presbyteries, to be stringently cautious in the training of candidates. With all legitimate exceptions of “extraordinary cases,” yearly added experience and observation should fix the minds of men, with the most careful attention, on the words of Paul, “*not a novice,*” “lay hands suddenly on no man;” and of John, “try the spirits.” We deeply regret that, in the reported proceedings of our fall Presbyterial meetings, there have been so few echoes to the recommendations of the last Assembly, touching this subject. What has been the end of the ever-recurring experiments for bringing out men, “practical” men, “men of the people,” who would “not preach over the heads of congregations,” by providing shortened courses of academical or professional study, and remitting the exacting demands for a preparation for the holy ministry, the benefits of which have been illustrated in the Presbyterian Church for three centuries! One failure succeeds another; but alas, with each failure how much good has been forfeited, how much evil has been incurred! Who can estimate the ever-growing evils—widening and deepening and strengthening, through nearly two generations, which resulted from the licensure of one man in 1823-’4, by a Presbytery of Northern Central New York?

But the space we have consumed admonishes us to close. We cannot do this better than by calling attention to a few thoughts, suggested by the pamphlet of thirty one pages bound up with this volume.

II. The laudable purpose of Dr. Mears, in this Address delivered before the Synod of Central New York at Watertown, October 18th, 1876, on “the Presbyterian Element in our VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—16.

National Life and History," seems to be the tracing of the influence of that system of faith and order of government which we call Presbyterianism, on the formation of our national character. A deserved tribute is paid to the character of the colonial settlers, whether Dutch, Scotch-Irish, or Huguenot, and to those Puritans of England, especially in so far as they reflected "the influence of the great Genevese Reformer," on the principles of their ecclesiastical forefathers. He gives at once the true reading of history, and a just meed of praise to that great man, John Calvin, in ascribing our very national existence "to forces set in motion and brought into play in history by the Reformation" he set on foot. To the five years spent by English Puritans in Geneva, he quotes Mr. Choate as ascribing "*an influence that has changed the history of the world.*" The outline of the patriotic temper and bearing of all elements of our common Presbyterianism,—Dutch Reformed, Huguenot, and especially Scotch-Irish, a race which "never produced a Tory,"—is a concise, but eloquent and comprehensive, summary of a history which ought to be in the hands of all Presbyterians. Equally commendable and worthy of profound thought is Dr. Mears's analysis of Calvinism, and his illustration of the influence of its principles in the formation of man's mental and moral character. He clearly establishes its claims to have furnished both in abstract principles and their concrete illustrations in the leading men and prominent communities in our population, the foundations of our national life—the frame-work, bone, and muscle of this Republican Giant. With such concessions to Dr. Mears's candor and regard for historic truth, we are constrained to take exception to some suggestions and intimations of sectional partialities and positions, indicating either an accord with certain modern views of Presbyterianism, or a disposition to cater to the views of those in Central New York who had grown up under a phase of Calvinistic faith and Church order tainted with the malaria of New Haven divinity and New England Congregationalism. Dr. Mears is pleased to recognise New England as belonging, "in a peculiar sense, to the whole country." This we accept as the most modest form in which eulogists of New England can be expected to set forth the

staple conception of its connexion with the whole country; a notion so often expressed in the form of "permeating the country with New England ideas."

This implied boast might be pardoned and set down to the account of a harmless vanity, did it not derive a very objectionable interpretation from clauses occurring elsewhere in the Address.

Thus, on page 18, along with a proper tribute to a pastor of the Third Presbyterian church, Philadelphia, for patriotic zeal in the Revolutionary war, we have a tribute to eighteen youthful "martyrs" who laid down their lives in the struggle of 1861-65. Here, as elsewhere in the pamphlet and in Dr. Fowler's volume, we are constantly reminded of the identity of the "patriotism" of 1776 and 1861. And the contests of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for liberty of conscience and the liberty of constitutional law, are constantly presented as like the contests of 1861-65, which were not for liberty of conscience or liberty of constitutional law, but for liberty to exercise a mean, dastardly tyranny over those who only claimed the right of self-government in matters as to which this right had been solemnly guaranteed by the express provisions of a Constitution in a government they had at least equally participated in establishing. How can the Presbyterianism of the fathers of 1776-89 be recognised as equally influential in two contests so essentially different in their causes? Dr. Mears gives us the clue to the answer.

After truthfully recognising Calvinism, discriminatingly and accurately described as the "chief factor in our country's life a hundred years ago," he proceeds to detail the modifications to which it had been subjected since that time. These are due to "elements," some of which harmonised with the preëxisting status of Calvinism; some "developments in directions overlooked by Calvinism, necessary to give greater elasticity to American manhood;" "some contributed the much needed æsthetic element." The meaning of all this and much more, going to shew the "needed" changes, is explained by "a needless rigidity and pertinacity among American Calvinists," to which are ascribed "dissensions, divisions, and temporary weakness," and "the increased prejudices of the outside world," making

them "ready to hear and swell the cry . . . of narrow-minded, quarrelsome, hair-splitting sect." We cannot but remember, as illustrating our author's views, the anecdote of a profane lawyer, who begged the Judge to prevent his opponent, who had irresistibly defeated his positions, from making him swear. It is not surprising that Dr. Mears thus recognises the "thirty years' separation" as only "a school of severe self-imposed discipline," and "reunion" as the result of "forbearance, generosity, and comprehensiveness;" the "separation," of course, a mere effect of "rigidity" and "pertinacity," in an effort to "enforce absolute uniformity of doctrine," and reunion the result of the disastrous failure, which Dr. Hodge comprehensively described in the memorable words, "when truth is lost, all is lost."

Did it never occur to Dr. Mears that the very tone of Presbyterianism he had so justly lauded, was just that to which its power as a "factor in our country's life" was due; and might he not have found in that from which has been eliminated so much of its primitive elements, and into which has been introduced so much of the modifying power of the "advanced thought of the nineteenth century," just the reason why the one stood forth so strongly and efficiently in the foundation of a liberty of constitutional law, and the other has become so ignobly distinguished as the abettor of tyranny, the author of the violations of its own Constitution, in the acts of the Assemblies of Pittsburgh in 1865 and of St. Louis in 1866?

In conclusion, we have only to apologise for the apparent disproportion to the intrinsic merit of both book and pamphlet, to which our remarks have extended. We make such apology, or rather explanation, in the simple statement, that in these, as in many other publications with which the Northern press is teeming, we find a constant source of perversion and misrepresentation of our South and our Church, and of our cause and character. The dropping of water wears away stone, and the unchecked, uncriticised productions of this sort must ultimately weaken the principles and enervate the energies of our people, so far as they affect the sentiments of the thinkers of our land, till, with us too, some future Dr. Hodge will mournfully exclaim, "WHEN TRUTH IS LOST, ALL IS LOST."

ARTICLE VI.

THE BOOK OF CHURCH ORDER.

The fact was developed in the last General Assembly, that the majority of our Church are in favor of amending the Form of Government and Discipline. This is as it should be. The Westminster Assembly, though free to frame a formulary of doctrines, was not free to frame a system of government. That Assembly was made up of four parties differing mainly on Church polity. They consisted of Episcopalians, Independents, Erastians, and Presbyterians. The majority at last agreed on the Presbyterian polity *jure divino*, but the British Parliament struck out the *jus divinum* principle, and inserted instead the *lawfulness* merely of that polity. The Independents could agree to this, as they held that no particular form of Church Government was taught in the Scriptures. The notion was generally held at that day, that the State might lawfully prescribe the government, discipline, and worship of the Church.

Although parties in the Christian world have since then broken loose from dictation by the State in Church matters, yet for a long time the Church was under restraint as to the matter of settling its polity for itself. Established principles do not easily give way to new theories. There is a strong disposition to walk in the old paths, and while conservatism is for the most part a good thing, yet the tendency of it is to shut out light from the mind by indisposing it to look at any theory which comes into conflict with long settled customs. Doctrinal theology has been pretty thoroughly discussed in the past history of the Church, but the same cannot be said of ecclesiology. This, we apprehend, has been mainly owing to the fact that the Church has not been as free on this subject as on others. The Southern Church has now a grand opportunity to settle Church polity on a scriptural basis. There are no extraneous influences to warp her judgment. After a struggle carried on for years by her leading minds, the majority of the Church have so far overcome old prejudices, and modified her staid conservatism, as to admit

that by a revision of her standards of Government and Discipline they may be improved. It has only been by the persistent ventilation of the subject that this posture of affairs has been brought about. To one who was fully informed on the subject, it seemed a strange fact that persons should so tenaciously adhere to the old forms, when the system we had was a compromise among four different parties, in which some things were left unsettled because they could not agree; and when even the compromise thus patched up was afterwards eviscerated by the British Parliament. The agitation of the subject, thus far, has done great good; it is only by such means that truth is elicited; and we hereby beseech the Church not to be in too great haste to finish the work of revision, as it is likely that still more light will be thrown upon the mind of the Church.

We hesitate not to avow our full belief in the *jus divinum* principle. In other words, we believe that principles of Church polity are as fully and clearly taught in the Scriptures as tenets commonly termed doctrinal. It has been charged that this is "High Churchism," but it is no more "High Churchism" than to affirm that the doctrine of the Trinity is taught in the Scriptures; no more than to affirm that the vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings is taught in them. "High Churchism" unchurches all ecclesiastical bodies which do not hold certain views, and hands them over to the uncovenanted mercies of God. We can affirm what we believe without unchurching others. We can contend that the Church state of others is imperfect, without consigning them to the uncovenanted mercies of God, on the same ground on which we maintain that persons can be saved, while at the same time they hold important doctrinal errors.

What right has human wisdom to undertake to improve upon the divine appointments? Shall we imagine that the Great Head of the Church could not foresee and provide for all the exigencies of his Church for all time? The charge to Moses was, "See that thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in the mount." (Heb. viii. 5.) If Moses might not make inventions of his own in the construction of the tabernacle, and the ordering of its worship, who shall dare to introduce "commandments

of men" in opposition to God's appointments in the Christian Church? Certain parties have been justly censured for adding new rites to those ordained of God. Is it any the less censurable to set up our own crude inventions in matters of Church polity?

If God has left us to our own discretion in framing Church polity, then might we proceed in the exercise of that discretion; but this we affirm is not the case except in some matters of circumstantial detail. It behoves us to keep in view the solemn language which closes up the book of God's word, "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." (Rev. xxii. 18, 19.)

The amendments thus far approved by the Assembly, are for the most part good. There are eight propositions sent down to the Presbyteries to be voted on, in regard to which it is not yet known how the Presbyteries will decide. In reference to these propositions, with the exception of two, we would express the hope that the Church will adopt them in the form contained in the last revision sent down to the Presbyteries. We regard it as being pregnant with disaster to the Church to allow any to vote in the calling of a preacher, except communicating members. We could name at least one large and flourishing church that was almost totally broken up by allowing outsiders to vote in the calling of a preacher. The Memphis rule is more objectionable than that in the last revision. Outsiders will not value a privilege of voting, when their votes contribute nothing towards the decision. We would regard it as a farce to take their votes at all in such a case, and we apprehend that outsiders will look upon it in the same light. Then the so-called "*examination rule*" is unnecessary, if the other rule remains, requiring preachers in passing from one Presbytery to another to subscribe their names to the formula of obligations required at ordination.

There is one radical defect, however, running through the whole of the revision, as last sent down to the Presbyteries by the Assembly. It is a defect, too, which pervades the whole of

the old Form of Government. It is that a principle is stated which is clearly unscriptural. The main object of this article is to vindicate the true scriptural ground on this point. We hereby warn the whole Church that there is a party in the Church which will never be satisfied with any revision that countenances the principle referred to. This party, too, is growing in numbers and influence.

The defect which has been referred to may be stated in this form, viz.: There is a greater difference made between the elder who both rules and ministers in the word, and the elder who rules only, than is warranted by the word of God. The principle which we have characterised as scriptural, is embodied in the following language of the Memphis revision: "The officers of the Church, by whom all its powers are administered, according to the Scriptures, are presbyters (or bishops) and deacons, whose offices are ordained, defined, and limited by God himself. As ecclesiastical rulers, these presbyters are of the same rank, dignity, and authority; but they are divided into two classes, viz., those who both teach and rule, and those who rule only." (Chap. i., Sec. 4.)

This language of the first revision of the Form of Government, sent down to the Presbyteries from Memphis in 1866, presents a rather different phase of Presbyterianism from that which has been commonly held in the Church, and also from that set forth in the old Form of Government. It was owing in large part, we apprehend, to the influence of Dr. Thornwell that such language was employed and such a proposition was affirmed in the Memphis revision. Dr. Thornwell had been laboring on the work of revision long before the late war, as a member of the committee charged with that duty, which was appointed by the undivided Church. At the formation of the Southern Assembly in 1861, he, being the only member of said committee adhering to the Southern Church, was made the chairman of a similar committee appointed by that body. It is true Dr. Thornwell died before the Memphis Assembly sat in 1866, but it is reasonable to suppose that the other members of the committee were influenced by his views; and there is no doubt that the Memphis

revision set forth those views in the section quoted above. In Dr. Thornwell's published writings the same view is expressed. In volume iv., page 139, where he treats of the nature of the elder's office, he says: "It is clear that in the Scriptures it is recognised under the terms, 'presbyter,' 'bishop,' and 'elder.' Even advocates of apostolical succession concede presbyters and bishops to be one. The primary notion of the elder's office is a delegated right to rule. All who are elders exercise rule, and all who exercise rule are elders; but among elders who are distinguished by this generic attribute of ruling, there is a clear distinction as to *function*. 1. There are those who labor in word and doctrine. The Scriptures recognise no order which *simply* preaches. 2. There are rulers, or governors simply," etc. Again, on page 234, of the same volume, we find the same view as maintained in his reply to Dr. Hodge in the Rochester Assembly: "The members of these representative assemblies must be of two classes belonging to the one order of presbyters. All of them belong to the one order of rulers, and *only as rulers*—chosen rulers, or representatives of the people,—can they appear in these courts. But they are of two classes, viz., (1) presbyters who rule only, and (2) presbyters who rule and also labor in word and doctrine."

Let no one be startled, then, when we can quote the authority of Dr. Thornwell, and of the Assembly of 1866, for the propositions that all *elders* are *bishops*, and all *bishops* are *elders*; and that these are only official titles of the same officers, who constitute the one and only order of "ordinary and perpetual" rulers in the Church by Scripture warrant. These officers, too, when appointed to the spiritual cure of a particular church, are, all of them, equally and alike *pastors*.

We now propose to prove these propositions from the Scriptures. In Acts xx. 17, 28, we have this testimony: And from Miletus he sent to Ephesus, and called the *elders* of the church; verse 28: Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves and to all the flock (*ποιμνίῳ*), over which the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops (*ἐπισκόπους*), to perform the pastoral work (*ποιμαίνειν*) for the church of God, which he has purchased with his blood.

1 Pet. v. 1: The elders which are among you, I exhort, who am also an elder and a witness of the sufferings of Christ. . . . Perform the pastoral work (*ποιμάνετε*) for the flock (*ποίμνιον*) of God which is among you, exercising the office of a bishop (*ἐπισκοποῦντες*). Thus it appears that all these elders of the Church had equally and alike the pastoral work in their hands. They were also called bishops, and there was a plurality of them in every church.

Everything stated in the Scriptures in regard to Church officers, harmonises with the foregoing theory. In 1 Tim. iii., and Titus i., the Apostle, in describing the qualifications of these officers, calls them both elders and bishops. In Phil. i. 1, the Apostle sums up all the people of God at Philippi under the expression, "the saints of God *with their bishops and deacons.*" The deacons not being church rulers, and bishops being the same as elders, the expression comprehends all God's people with their officers. Thus the passage is consistent with the theory above stated, and confirms it.

Now it may be observed that these are the *only official titles* found in the New Testament for church rulers below the apostles; and the office of apostle is easily proved to have been extraordinary and temporary. Presbyter (or bishop) and deacon are the only official designations for "ordinary and perpetual" church officers. It was an indispensable qualification for the apostolic office, that the person who held it had been an eye-witness of Christ's miracles and resurrection. (See Acts i. 21, 22.) It is absurd to speak of eye-witnesses, as such, having successors. After the last man had died, who was contemporary with Christ, how could any others be eye-witnesses of his miracles and resurrection? The Apostle Paul was miraculously qualified for the apostleship by Christ's appearing to him, and making such communications as were needful. None of the other characters mentioned in the New Testament were, strictly speaking, apostles; and it behoves any that claim to be the successors of those extraordinary officers, at the present day, to prove their miraculous qualification, which cannot be done.

It has been supposed that "preacher" and "evangelist" are

official titles for church officers. These terms are expressive of the work to be done, and are not official titles. Evangelist and preacher are synonymous terms; but there is a slight shade of difference between the originals of the two terms. "Evangelist," in its substantive form, signifies a "good messenger," or a "messenger of good." Divine wisdom has seen fit to employ two terms to describe the functions of preaching elders. A deaf-mute might communicate in writing the good message implied in the word *εὐαγγελίζω*. The term itself does not provide for the form or manner of delivering the message. *Κηρύσσειν*, to preach, implies the use of the living voice in communicating the good message. The work is the same in both cases, and is fully described by the two terms taken together; but neither "evangelist" nor "preacher" is an official title. The words describe the work that is to be performed, just as the terms "ditcher" and "ploughman" designate the work to be done on a farm, but are not expressive of official rank on a farm. Ditching or ploughing might be done by the master of the farm, but another term must be used to express his official rank as ruler.

In the same way must we understand other terms and phrases used to describe the work of making known the gospel; as, for example, "laboring in word and doctrine," "ministering in the word," and "minister" or "ministry." These terms refer to the work to be done, and are not official titles.

A similar case for illustration may be taken from the civil commonwealth. Judge or Justice is the official title for him who occupies the judicial bench. Some Judges are clothed with the power of granting the writ of *habeas corpus*; but their title still is "Judge," and not "grantor of the writ of *habeas corpus*!" So some elders are clothed with the function of laboring in the word and doctrine; but their official title still is elder or bishop, and not "laborer in the word and doctrine." The elder being clothed with the function of ministering in the word, his title still is the same, and not "minister of the word" or "minister."*

That this may be made further evident, we observe that the

* The writer is here quoting from his own report, submitted to his Presbytery last spring, on the "Book of Church Order."

word *minister*, as found in the English New Testament, is usually a translation of *διάκονος*. This is the very word which, as an official designation, belongs to the deacon proper; the English word deacon being in fact formed from this word.

This term, *διάκονος*, except when referring to the deacon proper, must be understood in its common acceptation as meaning *servant*. We find the following uses of the word: As applied to the apostles, 1 Cor. iii. 5: Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but *ministers* (*διάκονοι*) by whom ye believed? Eph. iii. 7: Of the gospel, whereof I Paul was made a *minister*. Col. i. 25: The Church of God, whereof I Paul was made a *minister*. Acts vi. 4: But we will give ourselves continually to prayer, and to the *ministry* (*διακονία*) of the word. Acts i. 17: For he was numbered with us, and obtained part of this *ministry* with us. Acts i. 25: That he (Justus or Matthias, whoever should be chosen by lot) may take part of this *ministry* and apostleship. Acts xii. 25: And Barnabas and Saul returned from Jerusalem when they had fulfilled their *ministry*, viz., the ministry of carrying a contribution to the poor saints at Jerusalem. A similar use of the term, *διάκονος*, as applied to apostles, is found in Acts xxi. 19; 2 Cor. ii. 1; 1 Tim. i. 12; Col. iv. 7; Rom. xii. 7; 2 Cor. vi. 3, 4; 2 Cor. v. 18.

The same word is applied to Tychicus and Archippus, Col. iv. 7, 17: All my state shall Tychicus declare unto you, who is a beloved brother and faithful *minister*. Say to Archippus, Take heed to the *ministry*, which thou hast received of the Lord Jesus, to fulfil it. If these men were not deacons in the official sense of the term, then this word must be understood as meaning *servant*, in the common acceptation of the term.

The same word is applied to Timothy, 1 Tim. iv. 6: If thou put the brethren in remembrance of these things, then thou shalt be a good *minister* of Jesus Christ. Shall we say a good *deacon*?

It is applied to him who would be chief among the apostles, Matt. xx. 26: But whosoever will be great among you, let him be your *minister*. It is applied to the Lord Jesus Christ himself, Matt. xx. 28: Even as the Son of man came not to

be *ministered* unto, but to *minister*, and to give his life a ransom for many. It is applied to Phebe, Rom. xvi. 1—she is said to be a “*servant* of the church of Cenchrea.” If Phebe was a *minister* in the sense in which the new “Book of Church Order” uses the term, then this settles the question whether a woman may preach the gospel. Some suppose this passage authorises the appointment of female deacons. We rather suppose the term should be understood in its common acceptation, as meaning *servant*. It is applied to Martha, the sister of Mary and Lazarus, Luke x. 40: Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to *serve* alone? Martha was cumbered about much *servings*. It is applied to Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Susanna, and many others, “who *ministered* unto him of their substance.” It is applied to civil rulers, Rom. xiii. 4: For he is the *minister* of God to thee for good. It is applied to all the saints of God, John xii. 26: If any man *serve* me, let him follow me, and where I am, there shall my *servant* be. It is applied to the household of Stephanas, 1 Cor. xvi. 15: They addicted themselves to the *ministry* of the saints.

It has been judged appropriate to make these numerous citations from Scripture, in order to show that all those passages which have been relied upon, utterly fail to prove that *minister* means an officer who is higher than a ruling elder, and whose position is “first in the Church, both for dignity and usefulness.” (See Book of Church Order.) It is a singular fact that the very word which, as an official designation, means an officer lower than a ruling elder, should be thought, in another translation, to point out another officer higher than a ruling elder.

There are other Greek terms in the New Testament translated *minister*; but these are to be understood as describing the work to be done, and are not the official titles of the workers. The workers were either apostles, Jewish high priests, civil rulers, or Christian people in general. This could be easily proved, were it necessary. It may be proper to mention one or two cases. In Romans xiii. 6, it is said of civil rulers, “for they are God’s *ministers*.” The Greek word here used is *leitourgoi*, compounded of *λειτος*, public, and *εργον*, work. Civil rulers, then, are God’s

ministers, in the sense of being public workers for God. In Acts xiii. 1-3, it is said that there were certain "prophets and teachers" at Antioch, who "*ministered* before the Lord." These were Barnabas, Simeon, Lucius, Manaen, and Saul. They were probably presbyters, as, by the direction of the Holy Ghost, they set apart two of their number, viz., Barnabas and Saul, and sent them far thence to the Gentiles. This would seem to have been an ordination. But the fact that the term was applied to civil rulers, precludes the idea of its being an official title for church rulers.

We think, then, that it is clearly established from the Scriptures, that Christ has appointed only *one order* of "ordinary and perpetual" church rulers. This accords with the almost universal testimony of historians, that by the original constitution of the Church, there was no priority of rank among presbyters. This was the opinion of Jerome; it was the opinion of John Calvin; last, though not least, it was the view of Dr. Thornwell, and of the General Assembly of 1866. The idea was *one order*, with two classes (1 Tim. v. 17)—one order, with different functions or gifts. It is precisely on this principle that we are to interpret 1 Cor. xii. 28: And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles; then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues. Some have supposed this catalogue had reference to different *orders*. If so, there were seven different orders in the primitive Church. We rather suppose it is a catalogue of *gifts* or functions. Of these gifts, some persons possessed more than one; and one person might possess them all, as was probably the case with an apostle.

We are not responsible for the logical results that follow from this principle, which is so clearly taught in the word of God. The Master himself is responsible for its logical consequences. We have been greatly surprised at hearing brethren, for whom we have high respect, affirm that the New Book agrees with this principle, and logically carries it out. To us, nothing is more absurd. We propose to state some particulars in which the New Book differs from the theory here maintained. Our view disagrees equally with that of the old Form of Government.

The New Book clearly makes three orders of officers, which are to be considered "ordinary and perpetual," viz.: (1) Ministers of the Word;" (2) "Ruling Elders;" and (3) "Deacons." (See chapter defining church officers.) We maintain that there is *one order* of presbyters, with *two classes*. The two positions are radically antagonistic. Our theory being adopted, then it logically follows that whatever rights and privileges belong to one class of elders, as members of a church court, equally belong to the other class. To make one class permanent members of the courts which are called Presbytery and Synod, and not the other class, is in contravention of this theory. The distinction between "*joint*" and "*several*" powers is perhaps a proper one; but we would not say "*several*" power of order, for that would imply more than one *order* of presbyters. Unless it can be maintained that the one class of presbyters hold permanent seats in certain church courts by virtue of the "*several*" power vested in them, the idea of such privilege must be rejected. If such privilege is in virtue of the "*joint power of rule*," then it must belong to all presbyters equally and alike. Our theory, therefore, would prohibit any presbyter from sitting in the higher church courts unless he be specially delegated by his constituents to occupy said seat. It follows, too, from our theory, that all presbyters are equally eligible to the Moderator's chair; and all are equally entitled to lay on hands in ordination. But whether or not these results logically follow from the theory of *one order*, in either case the theory itself is not shaken. We are attempting to show that the New Book does not harmonise with this theory.

There is another question arising out of our theory, viz.: Is it necessary for a presbyter to be re-ordained when he is to be clothed with the function of "laboring in the word and doctrine"? It is perfectly clear from the Scriptures that some presbyters did not exercise this function. (1 Tim. v. 17.) And yet they were presbyters, as completely so as any others. On this subject we would speak with modesty, but our prevailing conviction is, that a re-ordination is unnecessary. It would, however, be very proper for a service to be appointed to be observed when a presbyter is invested with this additional function. Paul and Barna-

bas had been preaching the gospel for a considerable period when by fasting, prayer, and the imposition of hands, they were set apart to the work of carrying the gospel to the Gentiles. (Acts xiii. 1-3.) There is no account of their having been set apart to the work of preaching by any sort of service. Previous to this, for aught that appears in the New Testament, they may have taken up this work of their own accord, having been moved thereto by the Holy Ghost. If so, their preaching was not official, in the sense of their having been formally appointed to the work, as above stated, by competent authority, under God. This being so, it would seem to follow that the difference in the two cases is, that he who assumes to preach of his own accord, is alone responsible for what he teaches; but he who is formally invested with the authority, is responsible to Church authority, under God, and carries in his hands the *imprimatur* of the Church, by which it too is responsible for what he teaches. It will not be denied that Christ has organised a Church on earth, and vested in it the power of rule. It therefore behoves the Church to have a care as to what is taught by her authority.

In carrying out this line of argument, the Church may, by divine right, invest a person with the office of presbyter, and at the same time clothe him with authority to teach. She may do one or both things at the same time, or she may at her discretion do either by itself, omitting the other; but when once the eldership is conferred, it would seem to be unnecessary to repeat the service. Its repetition would necessarily imply that the former ordination was invalid, or that the officer is advanced to a higher order.

In further carrying out this line of thought, we remark again, that by admitted theory all the courts of the Church are virtual presbyteries, and therefore the lowest court may induct one into the office of elder. Yet it might be within the discretionary power of the Church to say that the provincial presbytery, or second highest court, alone shall be permitted to confer the authority officially to "labor in the word and doctrine." It would not be inconsistent with this, however, for the parochial presbytery, or lowest court, to select one or more of their number

to conduct the worship of the Church in the absence of a regular preacher, and to expound the Scriptures and exhort. This would be tantamount to a license from the lowest court, but would only make said court, and not the whole Church, responsible for his teachings. The court would have the person constantly and immediately under their supervision, and they could at any time withdraw said power, in case his services should not be according to truth, or should fail to be edifying. By this plan our feeble churches, instead of dying out, as they not uncommonly do, could be sustained and built up.

In still further developing this view—it would be highly proper for the provincial presbytery to hold original jurisdiction over those invested with authority to “labor in the word and doctrine.”

Another discrepancy between our theory and the New Book may be evinced by what is found under the heading, “Of the Minister of the Word.” The language is: “This officer is first in the Church, both for dignity and usefulness.” We have shown that, by the original constitution of the Church, there was no priority of rank among presbyters. To affirm that the preaching elder is “first” as compared with ruling elders, is to make two orders.

If the foregoing argument is correct, it follows that the titles ascribed in the New Book to the so-called “ministers of the word,” as a distinct order, may be equally ascribed to all presbyters, according as they have specific works assigned to them. As the presbyter (any presbyter) has the oversight of the flock, he is properly called “bishop;” as he feeds the flock, he is called “pastor.” Any elder, by reason of serving the Church, may be called “minister,” that is, *servant* of the Church. Any elder, being clothed with the function of declaring the will of God to sinners, and beseeching them to be reconciled unto God, may be called “ambassador.” Any elder, bearing the glad tidings of salvation to the ignorant and perishing, may be called “evangelist.” Any elder, duly authorised to make proclamation of the terms of pardon to sinners, is properly called “preacher.” It is convenient to have these titles to designate the particular form of service in which a presbyter is engaged; but these are not official

titles, as shown above—none of them, except *presbyter* and *bishop*. The New Book ascribes these titles exclusively to the so-called “ministers of the word.” The entire paragraph needs to be wholly reconstructed, in order to make it conform to the theory of *one order* of presbyters, and it should be placed under the heading, “Of Church Officers,” instead of being under the heading, “Of the Minister of the Word.” Indeed, it may be observed, there is no need for a section with the heading, “Of the Minister of the Word,” as there is no Scripture warrant for such distinct *order of officers*.

Another discrepancy between the true theory of the Scriptures and the theory of the New Book, is that the latter makes ruling elders the “immediate representatives of the people.” This language implies two estates of church rulers; the one estate not being the “immediate representatives;” but the theory of *one order* makes them all, equally and alike, *representatives*; and this is according to fact, for they all come, equally and alike, “immediately” from the people, and are equally acquainted with the people’s wants and needs. This distinction is one for which no Scripture warrant can be cited. It evidently flows from the theory of two orders of rulers, the one of which hold permanent seats in the higher courts, the other sitting only by delegation from constituents. It is a relic of Prelacy, and does not belong to Scriptural Presbyterianism. The theory of one order of church rulers sweeps away this Prelatic relic.

Again, it may be very justly remarked, that the New Book makes provision for the calling of a *pastor*, when in fact the Church already has a plurality of pastors in its ruling elders. The phraseology in this case implies that only preaching elders are pastors, which is directly contradictory to the Scriptures.

Nothing, then, appears to us more absurd than to claim that the New Book conforms to the theory of one order of presbyters. It is the opposite theory that has given rise to the practice of calling ruling elders *laymen*, and to another practice, in some quarters, of allowing a “*rotary eldership*.”

The word *minister*, at the present day, is universally understood to designate a preacher of the gospel. We have seen that

it is not so used in the Scriptures. *Preacher* is the more appropriate and scriptural term. It might be inexpedient, and perhaps impossible, to change the use of terms in common practice; but is it proper knowingly to use terms in our formularies of doctrine which convey a false impression to the mind? Would it not be better to drop the term *minister*, as a distinctive appellation for one who preaches the gospel? Still, there would be less objection to the term *minister* as distinguishing the elder who preaches from the one who rules only, if it were distinctly declared, as was done by the Memphis Assembly, that they are equal in rank, dignity, and authority, as rulers.

Should it be alleged that this theory of one order is contrary to all past precedent in our Church, we reply, that even if it should be admitted that this is largely so, let precedent be given to the winds. We have only one guide for faith and duty. Woe unto him who either adds to it or takes away from it. Is it not true that whatever is not commanded in the worship of God, or the government of his house, is thereby forbidden?

Dr. Thornwell justly observes (Vol. ii., p. 487): "Few are sensible of the close alliance which subsists between partiality to error, and duplicity and fraud in conduct. They are shoots from the same stock, fruits from the same tree. He that lies to his own understanding, or, what amounts to the same thing, does not deliberately propose to himself *truth* as the end of all his investigations, will not scruple at deceit with his neighbors. The love of truth is honesty of reason, the love of virtue is honesty of heart; and so impossible is it to cultivate the moral affections at the expense of the understanding, that he who receives not the truth in the love of it, is threatened in the Scriptures with the most awful malediction that can befall us in this sublunary state—an eclipse of the soul and a blight upon the heart, which are the certain precursors of the second death."

We have quoted this language to show the strength of our own sentiments on this subject. We have carefully looked at the subject for nearly forty years past, and our convictions in regard to it have only grown stronger with the lapse of time; and we wish to put on permanent record our protest against the theory which

we have here opposed. We may not carry conviction to our brethren, but we must express our own. We solemnly believe that truth, though crushed to earth, will rise again sooner or later.

ARTICLE VII.

THE LAW OF RETRIBUTION.

John Stuart Mill tells us, in his *Autobiography*, that neither his father nor himself was a dogmatic Atheist. They did not deny the possible existence of a God, but the actual existence of such a God as the Bible reveals. The special difficulty, we are informed, which opposed their recognition of the God of the Bible, is the fact that he is represented as characterised by the attribute of retributive justice, and as conducting a moral government in accordance with its requirements. On speculative grounds they might have admitted the possibility of a Deity, but for moral reasons they were forced to reject the fact of God's existence! This, at first sight, would seem to be very curious in view of the fact that philosophers, who, like Kant, treat the argument for the Divine existence derived from the laws of the speculative reason as sophistical, insist upon the competency and the irresistible force of that which springs from the moral nature of man. But the position taken by the Mills is not so wonderful after all. It may be doubted whether, if the Bible had not affirmed the fact of eternal punishment, many of its readers would have denied the existence of God. It is the natural procedure of philosophy to seek a principle of unity upon which the multifarious phenomena of the universe may be reduced; and the existence of a God being admitted, that principle is found. The agony of the quest for a first and sufficient cause of all things is ended, and the reason rests in a mighty assumption which throws a flood of light upon the mysteries of the world and the problems of thought. Why should philosophy not receive a doctrine which affords a solution to some of her greatest perplexities? But the

revelation of a God, administering a moral government in accordance with the measures of retributive justice, evokes into the clear light of consciousness the fact of personal guilt, and clothes the future with the aspect of an eternal storm. No being who is conscious of sin or even of imperfection can contemplate with calmness the existence of such a God. He must either endeavor to convince himself that such a moral ruler does not exist, or suffer, in the contemplation of his relations to him, apprehension and unrest. There is no dogma which a sinner is so unwilling to admit as that of an eternal hell, and there is no way of getting rid of it but by convincing himself either that he is not a sinner, or that there is no God. The easier and more practicable of these methods of escape from the horrible doctrine is the latter, for the reason that while there is no immediate intuition of God in consciousness, there is of the fact of sin. We are not surprised, then, that Mill, or any other unbeliever in the Bible, should strenuously attempt to evade the grasp of retribution by a denial of the existence of a Being dealing out with even hand to the subjects of his rule the measures of retributive justice.

But of what avail is the rejection, on this ground, of the Divine existence, if universal consciousness and universal observation alike confront us with the fact of suffering? There is no avoidance of the torture of remorse by the sophistical effort to strip it of a feature which stamps upon it its specific character. We may deny its retributive nature as much as we please, but the agony remains. Nothing is secured by the denial of a God but the removal of the possibility of remedial measures by which his mercy might propose to deliver us from the doom inflicted by his justice; or, if that be considered a begging of the question, all that is gained by such a denial is the continuance of overwhelming calamities from which nothing short of Omnipotence can rescue us. In rejecting the existence of God because of his retributive justice, we discard the possibility of a merciful deliverance which could only be effected by a God. For it is certain that no measures of police, no efforts of philanthropy, and no combinations of human power, have been able to abate the mass of suffering under which the world for ages has groaned. If there

is no God, there is no help for wretched human beings. He, therefore, who rejects a God of goodness, because he is a God of justice, presses the last hope out of humanity, and drives it to the very hell from the jaws of which he professes to save it. A self-originated and self-evolved materialism in which it is an undeniable fact that might triumphs over weakness, that the strongest only survive the inevitable conflicts of the system, that the maimed, the sick, the puny, are pushed to the wall and kicked out of existence—a blind, mechanical scheme, the laws of which, like ponderous iron wheels incessantly revolving, crush the life out of soul and body alike, is a poor alternative to one conducted by a personal God, who, while he is just, institutes a grand remedial economy by which the exactions of justice may be relieved. By all means let us fall into the hands of one, who, while he thunders against us in wrath for sins we cannot disclaim, at the same time in accents of love whispers to us of pardon and reconciliation. Woe be to us, if our hope of deliverance from evils which even the Atheist cannot deny, is to be found in antecedence and sequence!

We have been struck by the fact, elucidated by inferences drawn from the self-recorded experience of John Stuart Mill, that human nature, however it may strive in speculation to dash out the conviction of the Divine existence, must have a God at whose shrine it pays its homage. So long as his amiable and gifted wife was spared to him, his worship was rendered to one who could only have been confessed to be his superior by his admission that she was divine; and when this goddess ceased to be, he sank into despair, until he discovered another object of supreme affection and allegiance in himself. Thenceforward, as he tells us, he contented himself without effort in the self-evolved happiness of his own energies as the sufficient goal of his being.

The argument by which Mill sought to establish his atheistic position was a simple one. We can only form any notion of a God from the analogies of our own being. If there be in the God whose existence is alleged an attribute of justice unlike any quality of which we are conscious in ourselves, we cannot admit that existence. But we are not conscious of an attribute of

retributive justice in ourselves. We are forced, consequently, to reject a God in whom that property is asserted to exist. We admit, in the main, Mr. Mill's first premise, but we deny that there is no sentiment of retributive justice in man. On the contrary, we maintain that it is affirmed in the individual consciousness, and manifested in the relations of human society, the structure of governments, and the facts of observation and of history. We might endeavor to establish this position, and then proceed to show that upon Mr. Mill's principle of the analogy between our make and the perfections of a God alleged to exist, we are compelled to admit that a God characterised by retributive justice does exist; or, at least, that such a supposition does not invalidate the doctrine of the Divine existence. It is not our intention, however, to pursue that line of thought. We assume, as we devoutly hold, the fact of God's existence; and led by the apprehension that there is a growing tendency to throw out of account the great principle of retribution, and to resolve the divine government into one of simple benevolence, we propose first, to indicate the general scope of the law of retributive, or, as it is otherwise denominated, distributive, justice, and then to point out its influence upon certain specific cases which appear to sustain an anomalous relation to it.

I. In the first place, then, attention is directed to the consideration of the fact that, in the government of God, there is a fixed connection between actions and retributive consequences.

It is not intended to assert that this connection is either, as to time, immediately, or as to degree, perfectly, exhibited in the present scheme of things; nor that there is always now a precise adaptation of the retribution to the action. But, reasoning inductively, we find a sufficient number of instances to establish the general principle. And if we adopt the belief of a future state, in favor of which nature presents a powerful presumption, and which the Scriptures definitely reveal, it is not difficult to explain the apparent anomalies which thrust themselves upon our observation. The retribution may be only delayed for a more thorough-going exhibition beyond the limits of this mortal life. God, in his natural providence, is now only affording us hints and

intimations, some feeble and distant, others plain and startling, of a future dispensation of rewards and punishments, conformable to the conduct of moral agents in the present state of existence. To the eye of reason, as well as to the mind of the believer in Christianity, the present scheme of things furnishes potential proof of the great fact that a moral government—and that of a righteous personal God—is begun, but not designed to be consummated, here. No adequate explanation of the existing state of the world can be reached, except upon this supposition. And, on the other hand, when this belief is entertained, it is found to be the key by which, at least in some degree, we are able to solve the mysteries of providence which confront us on every side.

Let us suppose that one who believes in the existence of God, and adopts the hypothesis that he is a Being of simple benevolence, goes forth to the examination of the order of things which he finds in the present world. Let him assume that the chief, if not the only, design of this benevolent Being, in the creation and government of the world, is purely to promote the greatest happiness of his creatures. He will inevitably be met by insuperable difficulties at every step he takes. The first fact which he would encounter is the existence of suffering in every conceivable form. How can he reconcile this condition of things with the fundamental hypothesis with which he commenced his investigations? How can these multiplied aspects of pain be harmonised with his notion of the pure benevolence of God? Why this cry with which the first breath of life is drawn, and these groans with which the last is expired? Why these lamentations, these sicknesses, these tears of anguish, these dying throes? Why this pestilence, famine, war, and death? Is it surprising that he finds himself balked at every stage of his inquiries?

The inadequacy of his fundamental postulate is in nothing more conspicuous than in the acknowledged failures, in their attempts to resolve this difficulty, of Natural Theologians who have based their conclusions upon what has been called "the greatest happiness principle." Even Paley—to whom as a Natural Theologian and an apologist for Christianity we cannot allude without profound respect—confesses to difficulties which he could not clear up, and mysteries which he could not fathom.

Nor will it answer to hold, with others, that the existence of pain and suffering tends to keep men from rashness and imprudence; or, with others still, that these apparent evils are designed to generate the virtues of pity and sympathy, and that they thus discharge a really beneficent office. Must men be preserved from one evil only by the production of another? Is it not conceivable, is it not likely, that such a Being as this hypothesis of simple benevolence supposes, would have projected and perpetuated a totally different scheme of providence? If this be the best plan to promote the highest exercise of virtue and the greatest amount of happiness, is it also the plan which is universally adopted in the government of God? Are other orders of beings, are unfallen angels, under the same sort of regiment? And will the glorified saints, when they leave this vale of tears, take their sufferings with them to heaven as indispensable instruments for promoting their highest bliss? Pure Benevolence, the mother of that brood of ills which afflict our poor human nature! Are these her children? This Moloch, devouring little children, gaunt and hollow-eyed Famine; this raven-winged angel, swooping with unsheathed sword over slumbering cities, Pestilence; this grim-visaged butcher of the human family, War; this savage and relentless monarch enthroned on the piled bones of races, Death—are these the progeny of Pure Benevolence? The images are monstrous.

Nor, further, will it do to say that happiness preponderates over suffering. That may possibly be the case, but how can we know it? We have not the faculties with which to institute the great equation. The difficulty here is analogous to that which is experienced in the attempt to settle questions of duty on mere grounds of expediency. The consequences of actions are so numerous and varied—they ramify into relations so remote and inappreciable, that it is impossible for the mind of man, limited as it is, to form a correct estimate of the final result. In short, it will be found upon trial that all these speculations in regard to the order of the world are overthrown at every step by actual experience and observation, or may be convicted of incompetency upon naked grounds of reason. And it is not strange if some

who began with these insufficient data have abandoned their vain attempts, and lapsed into a specious Pantheism or a more undisguised and consistent Atheism. The only method of arriving at some tolerably correct conception of the scheme of providence, as a whole, has been neglected, and the issue must needs be darkness, perplexity, and unbelief. The leading fallacy which vitiates the reasonings of those who have attained no satisfactory result from their investigations, is, that they do not attach sufficient importance to the existence and influence of moral evil. The phenomena of the moral domain are thrown out of the account. What an induction, which takes no notice of half the patent facts of experience! What observation, which is blind to the great, tremendous, revolutionary force of sin! It is a blunder exactly akin to that which marks the speculations of professed writers on morals, who treat every sinner as though he were Adam in innocence, who take no account of the existence of guilt, and the consequent derangement which it has introduced into the faculties and powers of the soul. As well might one, in describing the difficulties encountered by a steamship in crossing the ocean, omit to mention, among them, the fact that her engine had been blown to pieces by an explosion. It is as if in the nineteenth century some historian of the French monarchy should forget to notice the volcanic action of the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic Empire which was heaved up from its crater.

We can form no true or adequate idea of the scheme of providence without noting the agency of moral evil. Here lies the difficulty. "One would imagine," says the representative of scepticism in Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, "that this world had not received the last hand of the Maker, so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapors along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation; but how oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious! Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth; but how often are they defective, how often excessive!" And, on very much the same ground, Comte, the advocate of the Positive—or, as it is in fact, the Materialistic—

Philosophy, has not hesitated to make the bold assertion, that human wisdom is competent to improve the universe. Now, our ignorance of the present order of things, as a whole, as a vast and comprehensive scheme, and of the relation which particular events, though seemingly anomalous and by us inexplicable, sustain to the ultimate development of that scheme—our ignorance might suggest greater modesty in pronouncing judgment upon its apparent deficiencies. We are not prepared to take the ground, maintained by some, that the evils to which reference has been made are the incidental and unavoidable results of the operation of general laws, in which provision is not made for special and extraordinary cases. This may be a just maxim in relation to the scope of human legislation, and indeed upon it is founded the expediency of executive interference to relieve the too rigorous application of law in individual instances. But it is at least allowable to conceive that a Being who sees the end from the beginning, and takes in at one view all possible contingencies, could have provided against the occurrence of special anomalies however minute.

Nor is the way clear for us to endorse the view—although presented by a splendid living writer—that, “so far as these evils are merely physical, or bear a physical aspect, or are connected with other physical phenomena, they are not evils;” for, it cannot be thought to have been beyond the range of possibilities that a scheme of providence should have been constructed in which no provision would have been made for the occurrence of these physical evils. And it is difficult to suppose, had not moral evil been introduced as a disturbing element into the world, that these events would ever have occurred. They did not occur in Paradise; and if sin had not entered, the whole earth would now be an Eden—the garden of the Lord.

It must, too, be borne in mind, that the Scriptures represent the earth as suffering under these physical evils, which they unquestionably attribute to the intervention of sin, and describe as the curse which follows in its train. The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And according to this striking portraiture, it is earnestly looking forward—stretching

out its neck—to the day of the elimination of moral evil from the world, as the happy period of its own release from the oppression of the physical ills under which, for ages, it has writhed.

The truth is, that no sufficient explanation can be given of the fact of human suffering, except on the ground of its being either retributive or disciplinary. Admit that man is guilty, and you discover the reason of his sufferings; the very elements of nature become the ministers of the Divine displeasure, and the instruments of retribution. Sin has deranged the order of the world, and the sinner suffers from the recoil of this disturbing force on his own head. We are unable to see how under a just government there could be suffering without guilt; and equally difficult is it to apprehend how upon the supposition of guilt there should be no suffering. They are inseparably related to each other. To say that sin is not necessarily followed by punishment, is to say that the Divine Governor either cannot, or will not, enforce his own laws—laws which are the expression of his eternal and unchangeable nature. If we adopt the former supposition, that he cannot, we strip him of the attributes of Deity, and degrade him below the level of a petty tribal chief; if the latter, that he will not, we impute to him unfaithfulness to himself, and moral weakness in the administration of his government. Now, this principle which we are led to adopt from the consideration of the very nature, the essential elements, of a perfect government, is confirmed by actual experience. Experience attests the fact beyond dispute, that pleasure and pain are inseparably annexed to certain actions under the *natural* government, and reward and punishment to virtuous and vicious actions under the *moral* government, of God. It ought to be observed, also, that this law holds, notwithstanding the fact—which at first sight appears to militate against it—that certain acts, which are transgressions of the laws of nature and of conscience, are attended with present gratification. A little reflection will serve to convince us, that the pleasure attending these acts is evanescent and unsatisfactory, and that their ultimate and paramount results are such as to establish the great fact of retribution. The law of retributive justice is sustained by experience. Our moral nature attests it,

conscience vouches it, remorse proclaims it, the judgment of society pronounced on the conduct of individuals authenticates it, the sentences of human courts enforce it, and the swift action of masses sometimes, anticipating tardy legal processes in the case of atrocious criminals, lends it a special illustration. Exceptional and infidel thinkers, like John Stuart Mill, may scout a Divine Judge and retribution alike, but human nature utterly refuses to sink its God into nothingness, or his justice into a name.

Every dispensation of religion has proclaimed the principle of retribution. The Adamic proclaimed it. It uttered it in the words, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The patriarchal dispensation proclaimed it. It stamped it in the form of a visible curse upon the body of the fratricide Cain, and thundered it across the wild waste of waters in which the corpses of a world were floating. The Abrahamic period proclaimed it. It spoke it with tongues of fire, when the wicked and luxurious cities of the plain were calcined to ashes under its dreadful operation. The Mosaic period proclaimed it. It was impressed upon the nations when the jaws of the mighty chasm, cleft by the hand of omnipotence in a stormy sea at night, closed again upon the pride and flower of Egypt. It was enforced with peculiar emphasis and awful sanctions amidst the imposing solemnities of Sinai; the massing of two millions of human beings at the base of the mount, the smoke that rolled up like that of a furnace, the thick darkness that curtained in the seat of the august Lawgiver, the flaming fire that wrapped itself in the folds of the storm-cloud, the keen lightnings that gleamed like the sword of justice leaping forth to destroy the guilty, the quaking of the solid pile of rock as if smitten with palsy and reeling under the burden of Godhead, the bellowing and explosion of terrific thunders, the great sound of a trumpet waxing louder and louder, and sending its sharp and deafening reverberations to the extremity of the encampment—all smote in the law of retributive justice upon the appalled and fainting heart of the sinner, as if by the apparition of the judgment bar and the blast of the trump of doom. The Jewish dispensation proclaimed it. Its impressive ritual inscribed in letters of blood preached it morning and

evening day by day. The repeated confessions of guilt, the daily purgations, the perpetual offering of sacrificial life, the solemn expiation of the great day of atonement, the blood-dripping veil, the sprinkling of the mercy-seat,—these all uttered, as with a thousand voices, the indestructible law of retribution, and pointed, as with a thousand prophetic fingers to the atoning Lamb of God as the only deliverer from its curse.

The Christian dispensation proclaims, with increasing power, the same great principle. The death of Christ is the most signal instance of its operation. We have not room to discuss the theory maintained by popular writers of the day, that Jesus did not die in obedience to the demands of retributive justice, but simply in accordance with the claims of self-sacrificing love; or to comment upon the blasphemy of one of them,—Robertson of Brighton—that, in yielding to his own urgent sympathy, “Christ came into collision with this world’s evil, and he bore the penalty of that daring. He approached the whirling wheel and was torn in pieces.” Let us thankfully receive the instructions of the Scriptures on this vital point. They clearly teach us that he could not have suffered and died except as the vicar and substitute of the guilty, and that as he freely consented to take this position for them, justice and law dealt with him as in their place and stead. “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.” He bore the retributive consequences of our acts, and so we may be delivered from them by faith in him. The inference, then, is, that if God so dealt with his own beloved Son, holy, harmless, and undefiled in himself, when he became the sponsor of sinners and assumed their liabilities, there is no escape from retribution to those who reject his death as an atonement for their sins. “If they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?” Faith in Christ as our substitute, or eternal retribution,—these are the only alternatives before us.

In regard to the preceding views, a certain difficulty has been urged which invites our consideration. It has been contended that, on the supposition of a perfect government conducted by a Divine Being, the laws of its administration should be character-

ised by a fixed and undeviating uniformity, and be impartially and regularly enforced. If there be a scheme of government, its course should be so stable as to render it possible to forecast the results of actions. To this fundamental principle of a correct government, it is said, the pretended law of retribution is a manifest exception. The law, if any there be, is executed so irregularly that it would be impossible to foresee the retributive consequences of actions, and by that foresight to be guided in shaping our conduct.

We shall endeavor to prove that this difficulty is grounded in a fatal misapprehension of the extent and scope of God's moral government. It is vacated of force by the consideration, that the scheme of government under which we now live is not intended to be consummated in the present life, but a complete and adequate adjustment of rewards and punishments is laid over until another and a future state. Any theory which proceeds on the assumption that the existing state of things is final, is on that very account convicted of insufficiency. Based on this fallacious postulate, several hypotheses have been maintained. By some it is contended that the present state is one of unmixed happiness; by others, that it is one of unmixed misery; by others, that it is one of retribution, in which rewards and punishments are equitably and perfectly administered; by others, that it is one of punishment simply; and by others still, that it is one of mixed good and evil. It will be remarked, that the pervading idea of all these hypotheses is, that the present scheme is complete in itself, and designed to be final. It has no connexion with a future state, and therefore contemplates no development beyond the present life. The first four of these hypotheses Dr. Paley dismisses as scarcely worthy of mention; and with reason, as they are obviously inconsistent with the most cursory observation of facts. The last hypothesis is true, in so far as it holds the present to be a state of mixed good and evil. It needs but little reflection to convince one of that fact; but it fails to meet the difficulties involved, simply because it limits the scheme of government under which we live to the present order of things. It is founded on the false assumption that man, like brute animals,

is ordained to have his peculiar enjoyments limited to the present life. But as this hypothesis takes no account of the moral nature of man—the very point in dispute,—it is hardly worthy of serious refutation. A scheme of mixed good and evil, in which the good is assumed to be the preponderating element, may be adapted to merely animal existences, for they have the capacity for no other than animal pleasures; but to say that such a plan is adequately adapted to the moral condition of man, is to violate the analogies of nature, as well as our own sense of fitness and congruity. When animals, die their enjoyment has reached its maximum, and there can be, from the nature of the case, no disappointment; but in the case of man, as a moral being, death rends asunder his most cherished ties, annuls his earthly covenants, suppresses his temporal affections, and disappoints the fondest hopes built upon the continuance of his sublunary life. Even were it admitted, therefore, that, in so far as it is a system of merely sensuous enjoyment, the present scheme is complete, still as one of moral development it certainly is not.

It is not our purpose at this time to present either the probable or scriptural proofs of a future state of existence. The analogies of nature—as has been shown by a profound and judicious thinker—create a strong presumption in its favor. But even if that presumption be reckoned too feeble, or thought to be rebutted by counter presumptions, we fall back on the express declarations of that blessed gospel which has “brought life and immortality to light.” Waiving, however, the discussion of the question of a future state, we proceed to the matter more immediately challenging our attention.

There are two separate but concurrent lines of argument by which the fact may be proved, that the scheme of retribution by rewards and punishments is not completed in the present, and that its final development is postponed to a future, state, in which it will certainly be achieved. We may appeal, in the first place, to the consideration, that the decisions of conscience are not ultimate, but prospective and premonitory. It is a deliverance of consciousness, from which confessedly no appeal can be taken, that such is their character. We know, because we are conscious

that conscience is not the supreme court. We feel that it derives its authority from the fact, that it is a representative principle, reflecting the majesty and uttering the voice of God. Dispute its authority, and it refers you to him who seated it on the judgment-seat of the human soul, and sustains its sentences with the sanctions of his justice, and the power of his arm. We feel that conscience is a judge, but not the final Judge.

It is worthy of being considered, too, that the decisions of conscience are not unfrequently adverse to our apparent temporal interests. It evidently does not contemplate the present as a state of final recompence. It leads us to prison, to chains, to the fiery doom of the martyr, rather than sanction our adherence to liberty, fortune, and life, at the expense of duty and the sacrifice of principle. What, it is asked, would be the meaning of this, if conscience, which thus conducts us to suffering, disgrace, and death, did not refer us to another bar for our final sentence, and another state for our highest bliss? If it were not so, our moral nature would be a lie.

An appeal, moreover, may be taken to the fact, that the power of conscience is often most keenly felt in the dying hour, awakens the most distressing apprehensions and the most alarming fears just at the close of the present existence. And let us not be told that this is the result of education. Education? It was these fears of the future which brought Volney to his knees in a storm, and which rendered the death-bed of Voltaire too horrible a spectacle to be borne by his friends and associates. It was this that led the sturdy Hobbes to exclaim, when dying, "I am about to take a leap in the dark." It is this that has wrung a cry for mercy from many an infidel in his last moments. It is conscience, forecasting the hereafter, which "makes cowards of us all." Now, if the present state of moral action be final, how shall we account for these fears at the very termination of it, in cases in which a life-time has been spent in the attempt to efface from the mind of man all trace of a belief in the existence of conscience, and the reality of a future state? Ah, no! It is not education which alone inspires these fears. They start up from the profoundest depths of our being.

From these considerations it is legitimate to deduce the fact that the decisions of conscience are not ultimate, but that they represent and foreshadow the sentences of a higher tribunal, and point to a final retribution of rewards and punishments beyond the confines of the grave.

In the next place, it may be fairly urged, in support of the view that the present scheme of retribution awaits its completion beyond the limits of this life, that there is now an evident inequality in the dispensation of rewards and punishments. We would by no means be understood to imply that any one is unjustly dealt with by Providence in this world. No man has a right to complain of the evils under which he suffers. All are guilty and deserve punishment. "Wherefore should a living man complain, a man for the punishment of his sins?" But while it is true that none are unjustly treated, it is at the same time true that there is a real difference in the characters and conduct of men, and that the virtuous and godly man frequently undergoes more and greater afflictions than some who are vicious and ungodly. The fact now sought to be signalled is, that there is not in this world a perfect adjustment of reward and punishment relatively to the different characters and conduct of men. Proceeding on the erroneous assumption that there is a perfect exhibition of retributive justice in the present world, the friends of Job wronged the venerable servant of God by charging that his extraordinary sufferings were justly due to the commission of extraordinary sin. More careful observation, and a juster religious philosophy, would have convinced them that their principle was a fallacious one, and that the sarcastic retort of the sufferer—"miserable comforters are ye all"—was not a mere ebullition of spleen. It was, too, precisely this speculative notion as to what the course of Providence ought to be, which disturbed the equanimity of the Psalmist of Israel. He saw the righteous afflicted, and the wicked flourishing; nor was the difficulty solved until he went to the sanctuary, and there, under the teachings of inspiration, learned what the end of the wicked would be.

If, then, it be a fact,—and we cannot see how it can be dis-

puted—that rewards and punishments are unequally and disproportionately distributed in the present course of Providence, we are driven to the alternatives, either of denying the existence of a principle of retributive justice, or, if that be admitted, of concluding that there will be a consummation of the moral scheme in a future state, where the ends of justice will be fully met, and retribution meted out in exact conformity to the deserts of every individual.

Now, it would seem to be a fair presumption, on the ground of the analogy which pervades the respective economies of Providence, that the moral scheme will at a future day be finished because the present material or physical system not only evinces marks of exquisite skill, but of completeness and perfection. The few apparent exceptions to the perfection of that system, were they not assignable to moral causes, the interpenetration of moral agencies which impinge upon it, are so trifling as to furnish no evidence of a lack either of skill or power in its divine Author. And it may with great probability be urged, that after all—as has not seldom happened in regard to the speculations of scientific sceptics—what seems at first view to constitute exceptions to the completeness of the system are in reality no exceptions at all; the fact simply being that we are as yet ignorant of their particular adjustment to the general scheme. The presumption is, then, that if the material system be complete, the moral will not be left incomplete.

We are happily, however, not remitted in this matter to the mere guidance of presumption grounded in analogy. The Scriptures definitely reveal the fact, that the moral government of God, by a retribution of rewards and punishments, will meet its ultimate development in a future state. From a number of testimonies but one will be selected, which has always struck us as singularly forcible. The Apostle Paul, in his immortal sermon preached on Mars' Hill, declares that God "commandeth all men everywhere to repent, because he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance to all men in that he hath raised him from the dead." It would seem that the Apostle contemplated the resurrection of Christ as ratifying the

great principle of distributive justice, and as furnishing a proof that the future destinies of men will be assigned them in strict accordance with its requirements. The Apostle's argument appears to be briefly this: that as in the resurrection of Jesus, God exhibited to the universe convincing evidence that the Saviour's mediatorial engagements were fully met, and the reward dispensed to him on the ground of distributive justice, so the work of every man will hereafter be judged by referring it to the same pure and perfect standard.

The conclusion of the whole matter from reason and the Scriptures is, that a scheme of retribution is conducted, but conducted only partially in the present world, and that it will certainly be completed in another and a future state. The retributive consequences of actions are inseparably attached to them. The only possible escape from a bitter personal experience of them in all their fulness lies in the application of the sinner to the wonderful provision of grace which God has made in the mediation and atonement of his only begotten Son. Sin must be punished either in ourselves or in another for us. Either Jesus must bear its retributive consequences for us, or we must endure them forever.

II. There are, besides the general views already stated, some particular considerations touching the operation of the law of retribution, which ought not to be overlooked in a discussion of this subject, and which we will endeavor concisely to present.

In those cases in which wicked men seem to prosper, it deserves to be noticed that their temporal success is generally the result of their conformity, in some degree, to the very law which we are now considering. If a man should violate all the laws of Providence, and habitually disregard all the dictates of reason and prudence, it would be a singular anomaly if he should prosper even in the present life. A cruel and oppressive person may attend to his business with scrupulous exactness and fidelity. His industry secures his temporal success, and secures it in conformity to the law of retribution. His cruelty, however, through the operation of the same law, would entail upon him the reprobation of his fellows and the curses of the poor. A young

person of extravagant and dissipated habits might, by intense and habitual application to study, secure an enviable reputation for culture, scholarship, and ability. This result would proceed from an observance of the laws of Providence in certain respects, while the ultimate issue of extravagance and dissipation would, in accordance with the same laws, be penury and disgrace. It would appear, therefore, that the prosperity of the wicked may, as a general thing, be traced to their obedience to the laws of God's natural government of the world in some particular instances, while they may habitually infringe the laws of his moral government, and thus incur the punishment which is due to that violation. But it must be added that the temporal prosperity of the ungodly man, which to some minds conflicts with the supposition of a retributive providence, may, and if he continue impenitent will, become the instrument of a future retribution; and the blessings which he enjoyed in this life serve to enhance and aggravate his doom beyond the grave. "The rich man died and was buried; and in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments," and, from having fared sumptuously every day on earth, is reduced to the necessity of pleading for a drop of water to cool his tongue.

Let it be observed, too, that the wicked man, though he may seem to prosper, is, after all, not as happy as he appears to be. He may not suffer much from the infliction of physical evil, but he does suffer from the defect of positive happiness. To the satisfaction, the calm serenity, which result from the exercise of virtuous and holy affections, he is an utter stranger. And when the day of adversity comes—and come it sometimes does, as the shadow which an approaching judgment casts before it—when the reverses of fortune, the disappointment of hopes, and the desertion of friends, thicken like a stormy atmosphere around him, he is sustained by no sense of integrity and comforted by no abiding peace. He sits disconsolate among the ruins of the past, and if he ventures to look to the future, it reflects upon him the frown of an injured and angry God. Thus evermore is it true, as the Roman satirist has said, that "the path of tranquillity lies alone through virtue;" or, as a greater than Juvenal has

declared: "The wicked are like the troubled sea, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." "There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked."

The same sort of reasoning will apply to the suffering condition of the Christian. That condition often results from the neglect, the follies, and the sins of which he has been guilty. Through infinite mercy, it is true, he is pardoned. The condemning sentence of the law is lifted from his soul, for there is "no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus;" the punitive feature of his afflictions is extracted, and retribution has, through grace, given way to fatherly discipline; but it is, notwithstanding, a solemn reflection that even in his case repentance is often unavailing to avert all the natural consequences of the sins of youth. Disease resulting from carelessness or vicious indulgence, is not cured by religion. He may suffer under it all his days. It may contribute to shorten his life. It remains a perpetual and affecting proof of the folly and danger involved in violating any law of God, whether natural or moral. The sinful habits, moreover, which may have been contracted in youth, become, in after-life, the sources of his most violent and easily besetting temptations. Their guilt may be forgiven, and yet their natural consequences in the present life may follow with the certainty of an effect from a cause. Acts of filial disobedience may bring down the grey hairs of a parent in sorrow to the grave; infidelity to the relative duties of life may wound the hearts and mar the peace of kindred and friends. These acts may be mourned by those who committed them, and be freely forgiven by those who suffered from them; but who that has ever been guilty of them, can refrain at the last from the hot tears of a bitter though fruitless regret which rain down upon their ashes and their tombs? An offended God may have forgiven us; injured friends may forgive us; but how can we ever forgive ourselves? The blush of shame will crimson the face when we think of all that for which they are pacified toward us.

While, therefore, the strictly retributive element in the afflictions of the believer is removed through the vicarious sufferings and death of his glorious Saviour, the natural consequences of

his acts are often allowed to develop themselves. Their eternal results are suppressed—they will never be experienced, for Jesus has delivered them from the wrath to come—but their temporal effects, permitted still to exist, are taken up into the fatherly rule of God over the members of his family, and are employed as the instruments of his discipline, by which, under the sanctifying influence of his grace, his children are profoundly convinced of the evil of sin, reduced to a sense of their own nothingness, led to appreciate the divine glory, and qualified for their translation at last to the holy employments and the transcendent communion of the heavenly state. Materially considered, the corrective chastisements of God's fatherly rule are, to a large extent, the same with the retributive inflictions of his rectoral government. The relations involved, the influence exerted, the ends secured, in the two cases, are as widely different as law and grace, but the matter of them is frequently the same. They are formally distinct, but materially alike. Discipline, as long as it is needed, marches on the line of retribution. Parental justice often appears to produce the same results as judicial. And it is certain that if the fatherly hand of God should fall upon us as our sins intrinsically deserve, the effect in this life would be substantially the same as if the mighty hand of God as Sovereign and Judge were let loose upon us with its crushing weight. Hence, in part, the necessity of the perpetual intercessions of our merciful High Priest in the heavens in our behalf: hence the necessity, notwithstanding our free and full pardon in justification, of our daily prayers for mercy and forgiveness.

But we must not forget that the Christian, who, through faith, obeys the requirements of the gospel, is cheered while suffering under the ills of life, by a sense of pardon through the blood of the Lamb, and sustained amidst the shocks and vicissitudes of his sublunary existence, by a deathless principle of holiness and happiness. Friends may diminish, and foes may multiply; God is the strength of his heart and his portion forever. The world may frown upon him and dungeons threaten him, but

“The man resolved and steady to his trust,
Inflexible to ill, and obstinately just,

May the rude rabble's insolence despise—
 Their senseless clamors and tumultuous cries ;
 The tyrant's fierceness he beguiles,
 And with superior greatness smiles."

The martyr's stake may confront him and fagots blaze around him, but hallelujahs burst from his cracked and blistered lips, while his soul prepares to mount, as in a chariot of flame, to the presence of its Saviour and its God. And as the prosperity of the ungodly man in this world becomes an instrument of his future misery, so the present afflictions of the Christian go to constitute a salutary discipline, by which, as in a painful but temporary school, he is trained for the exercise of permanent holiness and the fruition of immortal bliss.

There is still another difficulty connected with this subject, upon which the remarks already made throw some light, but which merits a more special consideration. It is, that, according to the doctrines of the gospel, one who has passed his whole life in the commission of the most aggravated crimes, may, at the last, as in the instance of the dying bandit on the cross, be pardoned and receive the joys of immortality. What becomes of the law * of retribution in such cases? Does the gospel defraud distributive justice of its dues? We freely confess that this difficulty cannot be resolved by reason; the case could not occur under the simple scheme of Natural Religion. It can be explained alone, and it is explained, on the supposition of the introduction into the scheme of Providence of the principle of mercy and the fact of substitution. The Lord Jesus Christ having consented to become the substitute of the transgressors of law and the prisoners of justice, assumes their liability to punishment, and by bearing the penalty of sin for them, discharges them from the necessity of enduring it in their own persons. The principle of retribution is not affected—that remains in force; but the parties upon whom it actually terminates are changed. The release of the dying thief, for example, from the scope of the law of retribution, was an act of exceeding grace to him, but an act also of strictest justice to Christ. Jesus had met his liabilities and discharged them. The prisoner had not broken jail, nor had he been released by

mere clemency. Justice was not robbed of its dues. They were paid, fully paid, by the surety of the dying culprit, and justice could not demand from him a second payment of the same debt. This was his salvation ; this, this is our hope, that in the cross of Christ mercy and truth met together, righteousness and peace kissed each other. There the great law of retribution was written in the blood of Jesus ; but there, too, inscribed in the same precious blood, was the redeeming grace of God.

We have now reached a point in the treatment of this subject, at which it is possible, more fully than before, to answer the objection which has been urged against the law of retribution, as operating in the government of God in this world, namely, that it is so devoid of uniformity, proceeds so irregularly, as to render it impracticable for moral agents to shape their conduct in conformity with it. If there were not this want of uniformity and this irregularity which is complained of, there would be no room for obedience. The necessary tendency of retributive justice, unchecked, is instantaneously to inflict rigorous punishment upon the transgressor of law—that is, to destroy him. The introduction of the principle of mediation restrains this tendency, and arrests the retributive procedures of justice. An opportunity is thus furnished to sinners to escape the application of the law of retribution to themselves personally. The absence of fixed regularity, therefore, in the administration of that law; is a proof of infinite mercy on the part of God towards sinners. Their very hope consists in the fact that it is not executed to the full, either promptly or with perfect regularity. The sum of all is this : there is a sufficient uniformity in the exhibition of the principle of retribution in this world, to convince men of the tremendous nature and consequences of sin, and to advertise them of a future judgment in righteousness ; there is a sufficient *want* of uniformity to admit of an evangelical probation for sinners, and to give them the opportunity to avail themselves of the provision of redemption through the blood of the great Mediator and Redeemer.

VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—21.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE FINAL PHILOSOPHY.

The Final Philosophy; or, System of Perfectible Knowledge, issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion. By CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS, D. D., Professor in Princeton College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1877. 1 Vol. 8vo., pp. 609.

In the present state of human knowledge, the things that are most surely known are sometimes of the nature of negations. For example: the distance separating the earth from the sun is not yet accurately settled. It is known to be greater than ninety millions of miles, and known to be less than one hundred millions. It will probably require a few more years of close investigation to settle the exact proportions of the odd ten millions; and mean time, seed time and harvest, summer and winter, will continue in their orderly sequences. If the Force that controls these sequences will not stay its operations until science fixes its bounds and defines its potency, the inhabitants of earth will at least be sure of their food, because the maturity of the grain depends more upon this monotonous regularity than upon the exact definitions of philosophy. The sons of men have been gazing upward at the starry firmament for some sixty centuries, and year by year have added to the stores of knowledge; but the old challenge is still unanswered: "Canst thou guide Arcturus with his sons?" Indeed, the most that science can assert is, that these vast orbs are certainly so many miles distant from our system, and practically it does not matter whether this distance is measured by millions or quintillions. As for their proximity or their influence upon mundane affairs, science is entirely silent. Among the forces of nature they have their due place; but where their power terminates, man cannot know. The earth is too narrow for a parallax. Time is too short to measure the designs of eternity.

The author of the work under review is the Professor of the "Harmony of Science and Revealed Religion," at the College of

New Jersey, Princeton. The book may therefore be considered the sum of all that can be taught concerning this harmony; and in fact the author's conclusion defines the Final Philosophy as the perfection of this harmony. And the more modern deliverances from the famous thinkers of the world, seem to indicate a drift in this direction. It is true that prominent deniers or doubters have been growing more pronounced in their assaults upon theology, but the general progress of the age tends to agreement. Dr. Shields recognises the antagonism as existent, while he asserts as a primal axiom, the generic accordance of religion and science, because both are true, and truth cannot be self-contradictory. Theology contains within itself the promise of a golden age when all men shall reach the highest attainments in knowledge, because all men shall know the Lord. Science assures her votaries that all knowable truth is attainable by patient application, and promptly rejects all theories that cannot be sustained by experimental proof. To bring these two results in accord, is to say that faith shall be swallowed up by vision. Then shall we know, even as we are known.

The first division of Doctor Shields's book treats of the forms which science has assumed in its relations to theology; and he classes these forms under the four heads of "Antagonism," "Indifferentism," "Eclecticism," and "Scepticism." The first is the scientific postulate that Revelation and Reason are necessarily in conflict; the second recognises an innate antagonism between Religion and Science, but would somehow allow the two to work out their separate results upon the same general plane; the third—Eclecticism—essays to unite these divergent forces, making each minister to the other; on one hand affirming the truths of science by theological authority; and on the other hand, gilding the theological dogma with the endorsement of scientific demonstration. The last class embraces the unbelievers—those who deny revelation *per se*, and doubt scientific proof, scouting axiomatic truth, and in fact living upon the wholesale rejection of all knowledge, and aspiring to nothing above the life of the brute that perishes, or better than the condition of the molecule that floats in the sunbeam.

A large part of the work is taken up with the survey of these vast fields. The ordinary reader is overwhelmed by the array of historical names and facts, but is insensibly led on by the beauty of the author's style. More than two-thirds of the book is given up to this part of the discussion, and less than two hundred pages is devoted to the consideration of his true theme, or the "Harmony of Science and Religion." And while the rhetorical beauty is no where diminished, the second division of the work exhibits more acute, original, and logical argument than the more expansive portion already referred to. And it is specially noticeable, that Professor Shields does not affect to present a system of formulated philosophy which shall be the Final Philosophy. But he does reach the true ground, to wit, that there is indubitable truth in both Religion and Science, and therefore the reconciliation of these apparent antagonisms is both desirable and possible. In his opening chapter he uses this language :

"Our first argument, then, is, that religion and science are related logically. By their very definition it becomes inconceivable, if not impossible, that they should form two distinct kinds of truth, flying apart in everlasting contradiction. The scientific view of the universe, and the religious view of the universe, stand or fall together. Take either from the other, and you would have but half the truth, and that half without logical support. Imagine, if you can, science perfected without religion, all phenomena referred to their laws, and all laws to their causes, and you would still need the rational postulate of a great First Cause of those causes, and a great Final Cause of those laws, such as you can only find in the Jehovah of Scripture, the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, which was and which is and which is to come, God over all, blessed forever. Or, on the other hand, try to imagine religion completed without science, the one true God revealed in all the plenitude of his perfections, and you would still need, as a rational counterpart of this revelation, such an illustration of his perfections as the different sciences alone can afford: celestial physics to unfold his immensity, eternity, and omnipotence; terrestrial physics, to display his wisdom and goodness; and the psychical sciences, to approve his holiness, justice, and truth. If your science without religion would land you in the absurdity of a creation without a Creator, your religion without science would leave you with the abstraction of a Creator without a creation. But imagine now that Creator inhabiting yet controlling his creation; think of all natural laws as resolved into divine methods, and of divine attributes as expressed in all natural phenomena; and you will

see how perfectly logical, how absolutely reasonable, is the correlation and coalescence of science and religion." (Pages 11, 12.)

The temptation to quote from the book assails the reviewer upon every page, but the present purpose is rather to discuss a few points suggested by the thesis itself, on a popular rather than a scholastic side. The reader is cordially invited to a perusal of Doctor Shields's volume, which is presented by the publishers in very attractive style, printed on clear white paper, with good readable type.

Didactic Theology, in the present age, has attained a clearly defined position. With all the variations in creeds, the cardinal doctrines of Christian belief are certainly classified and affirmed with no uncertain sound; and in all evangelical sects, fundamental truths, generally in identical language, have the foremost place. But Apologetical Theology does not rest upon so distinctly defined a basis. The authenticity and authority of a Divine Revelation must needs lie at the bottom of all schemes of theology, but the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are by no means universally recognised as the only God-given rule of faith and practice. How many millions of the race have been deluded by the revelation through the False Prophet, who retained the essential dogma of divine unity, and gave up all besides? How many thousands have been ensnared by the profane revelations of Mormonism, the vapid mistiness of Swedenborg, and the miserable delusions of modern Spiritualism? The Christian takes the one Revelation, closing with its awful anathema against additions to the canon and against subtractions from it, and finds therein all the pabulum that the soul craves. And the real contest, therefore, is between those who cling to the Revelation as for the life of their souls, and those who either deny its authority *in toto*, or accept it with destructive limitations. Because the disputes between sects that accept the Revelation as from God, are, after all, but minor disputes when contrasted with the wholesale denial of the record. The often-quoted taunt touching the want of uniformity in doctrine among Christian professors, is a poor refuge for the unbeliever. If it be true that one is of Paul, another of Apollos, and another of Cephas, it is also true that all

are of Christ, and all profess to derive their creeds from the one Revelation.

The Final Philosophy that shall unite Science and Religion is not due in ante-millennial times. Science is the knowledge and classification of facts, and for the most part deals with material things. It does indeed find something underlying matter, of the nature of law, which it analyses as far as possible; but its rigid requirements forbid the acceptance of all things that may not be cognised by the senses. The avenues it traverses in bringing knowledge to the mind, must be fenced in on both sides. It restricts *a priori* and *a posteriori*. But as man, by searching, cannot find out God to perfection, Science can never bring the soul to the knowledge of God. On the other hand, Religion does not concern itself about the claims of Science, or enforce any of the deductions of Science. The avenues through which Religion enters the mind are not so strictly hedged in. It teaches man, first, out of a Divine Revelation containing formulated truth, of doctrine, of reproof, of instruction in righteousness. It teaches man, second, by occult communications from God directly to the soul. It institutes, third, an intercommunication, a system of question and answer, as between man and God, and fixes the law of this communion so accurately that man cannot ask for bread and be put off with a stone. Its phenomena are not variable. All things—the vast scope of God's creation—work together for good to the saint. No evil can befall him; no plague can come nigh his dwelling.

The essential value of scientific attainments can hardly be overrated. It has sometimes been thought a high test of piety to assail Science as the enemy of God, and to condemn its arrogant status, as denying all that is written, or as presenting its postulates as the substitute for Revelation. But in fact it does no such thing. It pursues its laborious way through ages and generations, gathering golden truth for the enlightenment of the race, and arranging its discoveries in symmetrical order. Here and there, some of its votaries have gone out of their way to assail all the symbols of Christian faith; but Science is in nowise responsible for these defections. Scientific unbelief differs in nowise from

ignorant unbelief, in the last analysis. And God, who equipped men for the pursuits of scientific investigation, and thereby distinguished them from all other known intelligences, did not limit them by theological dogmas. There is no moral quality in the shape of a crystal, yet there is a scientific law that regulates the formation. There is no moral relation subsisting betwixt the strata of geological orders, but there is an infallible certainty of their orderly recurrence. The truth of Scripture does not need the endorsement of Science. It is of authority because thus saith God. The fact that a vast world of organic remains is found in the chalk beds, does not need the endorsement of Scripture. It is entitled to credence because thus saith man. The Bible does not teach Christian science or unchristian science; but it does teach that man is a sinner and that Christ is a Saviour.

A reviewer, in commenting upon Dr. Shields's book, observes that "Science deals with the relations between man and nature; Religion, with those subsisting between man and God." This definition is faulty, in that it ignores the doctrine of One First Cause, and therefore of numberless relations subsisting between this First Cause and all the effects in the universe. If metaphysics is to be admitted among the sciences, it is not only a revelation, but also a necessary logical truth that He "by whom are all things," must necessarily be He "for whom are all things." The First Cause can be nothing less than the Final Cause. And it is certainly true that God as really formed Agassiz for his specific work in the domain of Science, as that he formed Calvin for his specific work in the domain of Religion. The querulous complaints about the antagonism between Religion and Science are very much like the squeamish piety that finds in the innocent amusements of earth a fatal barrier to growth in grace. There is a state of mind specially appropriate to the worship of the sanctuary and to the worship of the closet. There is another and a different state of mind, appropriate to social intercourse, to festive occasions, to the business affairs of life. God reigns in all, and God is glorified in all. It is not antagonism that distinguishes one state of mind from the other, but opposite sides of the same golden medal.

Science deals with visible phenomena; faith deals with spiritual things. Science takes nothing upon credence, but demands scrutable evidence at every step. Faith is the evidence of things unseen, and of things that cannot be seen. Science records the slow processes by which the thick-ribbed earth grew into cosmos. By faith we know that the things that are seen were not made of the things which do appear.

Finally: there is really no such thing as conflict, and really no demand for agreement, between Science and Revelation. There is such a thing as conflict between the King, God, and his revolted provinces. And when he accomplishes the reduction of all rule and authority, and all the worthy names that are named in the earth, he will manifest to the universe his wisdom and Godhead. In the day of his triumph, it will be found that the dying thief was as really a trophy of conquering grace as the most learned infidel who may have been brought to the feet of Jesus. And the Final Philosophy, when it is formulated, will not consist of compromises. Science will not relinquish one solitary *fact* that is contained in her rich treasures; and Revelation will not modify one jot or tittle of its claims. In the last days, the haughtiest crest that is worn by any creature in the wide universe, will be borne by the man whose wisdom culminated in the prayer, "God expiate me, the sinner!"

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesie Universalis: or, "The Creeds of Christendom." With a History and Critical Notes. By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Harper & Brothers: New York. 3 Vols. Large 8vo. Pp. 940, 900, 900.

This extensive and learned work has been for some weeks before the theological world, and has been noticed by the weekly journals. Its importance not only justifies, but demands a more deliberate review; and we hope to present such a one, in our next number, from a hand eminently capable, scholarly, and judicious. The present notice, therefore, is only designed to mark the appearance of the work and to give the guidance which scholars may desire in the purchase of the book. Of the mechanical execution we may say with truth, that the paper is excellent, the type, in the text of the work admirable, and even in the Notes clear and full, and the binding—the usual flimsy muslin—the opprobrium of the American Publishers.

Vol. I. is introductory, containing the doctrinal history of the Church, as embodied in its symbols. The systems of Vatican Romanism, Lutheranism as fixed in the "Formula of Concord," and Westminster Calvinism, are especially examined and compared.

Vol. II. contains the scriptural confessions, the ante-Nicene Rules of Faith, the Œcumenical, Greek, and Latin Creeds, from the Confession of Peter to the Vatican decrees; and also the best Russian Catechism, and the Old Catholic Union Propositions of the Bonn Conference.

Vol. III. is devoted to the Lutheran, Anglican, Calvinistic, and later Confessions, closing with some symbols never before collected. Contributions (with the authors' names) are also presented from a number of leading ministers, stating, on their

VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—22.

personal authority, what they deem to be the exact position of their several denominations.

The author claims, correctly, that there has been a chasm in theological literature which this work aims to fill. Other *Synagmata Confessionum* have been confined to one school of theology or another; and we have had no *thesaurus*, giving us a comparative view of all the creeds of Christendom. Dr. Schaff is fitted for the undertaking, not only by diligence and learning, but by his attitude as both European and American, and by his catholic spirit. We will merely note, in dismissing the work for the present, that this temper has prompted some declarations, in his case, as in most of the German Protestants, which Southern Presbyterians regard rather as latitudinarianism than catholicity. Criticising what he calls the scholasticism of the Westminster school of theology, he remarks, (Vol. I., p. 790): "It would be impossible now-a-days to pass such an elaborate system through any Protestant Ecclesiastical body, with a view to impose it upon all teachers of religion." Were Dr. Schaff better acquainted with the Southern Presbyterian Church, he would know that this is so far from being an impossibility, it is an actuality. We are still old-fashioned enough to stand up to what we profess, literally. There is, indeed, no "imposition" on any one; because there is, among all who are ecclesiastically authorised as "teachers of religion" among us, an intelligent, free, and hearty acceptance of all the parts of the one, consistent, and inseparable system, taught in the Scriptures, and thence digested into our standards. The different state of opinion and practice as to their standards in the Church and Seminary with which the author is now connected, probably betrayed him into speaking thus unwarrantably for others. In allusion to the propositions of our (and his) Confession touching predestination, he cordially admits those which affirmatively assert an election unto life. At one place he seems to contest the preterition which, negatively, leaves the finally impenitent to damnation. But at another he admits, as every consecutive thinker must do, that the preterition is unavoidably implied in the election, unless we strip God of his omniscience and free agency. He then concludes that the doctrine of preter-

ition "ought never to be put into a Creed or Confession of the Church; but should be left for the theology of the schools." To the Presbyterian mind this question is suggested: If it is a truth, why not avow it everywhere? Is it candid to teach our students what we will not avow to the public? But we pause; and request our readers first, to buy the book, as one which will afford them great store of valuable information; and second, to await a fuller analysis of its qualities in our April number.

Among the Turks. By CYRUS HAMLIN. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1878. Pp. 378. 12mo.

This most interesting and instructive volume comes to us in very attractive dress—in green colored cloth which is the sacred color of the Mohammedan, and with the Crescent impressed on the back and side of the book in a style of beauty that would charm a Turk. The Rev. Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, its distinguished author, was a missionary for thirty-five years at Constantinople to the Armenians, and his opportunities for learning all about the Turkish government and people were such as few men have enjoyed and still fewer could have improved as Dr. Hamlin did. He is a great genius, and as near being a "universal genius" as it has ever fallen to our lot to know personally. But if his gifts of intellect are extraordinary, they are not more exalted than his character is unselfish, lofty, and truthful. We feel it necessary to say this in recommending this remarkable book to our readers, being very sure that without some such guarantee its wondrous narratives will rouse the suspicion in some minds that the missionary philosopher is just *romancing*. Many of the strange incidents recorded occurred in the personal experience of the author. The reader who will take our word for it that Dr. Hamlin is incapable of exaggeration cannot but rise from the perusal of this book with a loftier estimate not only of the gospel itself, but also of the glorious work of modern Protestant missions and of its missionaries.

We venture to affirm that the chapter on Mohammedan law contains more information and of a more trustworthy character

than is to be found in any book to which readers generally can get access. It is manifest that the author has made himself familiar with the three folio volumes of D'Ohsson, inaccessible to most American students.

Dr. Hamlin is a native of Maine, and at present is serving as a Professor in the Congregationalist Theological Seminary at Bangor in that State. It is not probable that his health will admit of his returning to carry on that work of his creation, the "Robert College," on the Bosphorus. His son-in-law, the Rev. Dr. Washburn, has succeeded him in the Presidency, and is aided by a corps of Professors who are of various nationalities—American, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, German, Italian, French, and Turkish.

Foreign missionaries of many years' standing, if not naturally incapable of any such development, get to be, from the necessity of the case, *large-minded* men. Only in three or four instances, and in those not offensively, does the New England provincial spirit appear at all in our author when he has occasion to refer to the South. Did he know the South as well as he knows the East, we should count on him to defend us with pen and voice against the apparently immovable prejudice which still fills so many hearts in the regions around him. We must trust time and God's grace to work a change of feeling towards us there. Meanwhile our readers will find the very picture of our condition sketched by Dr. Hamlin when he undertakes (pp. 356–360) to explain how it is that Europe and America have such false impressions in some respects about affairs in the Orient. The condition of Turkey, he says, is reported, first, by *travellers*. They intend generally to report the exact truth, and, with some malignant exceptions, they do report what they have seen and heard. But not knowing the languages of the country, they get from the hotel a nice, intelligent, active dragoman who is what is called a "Levantine," owned by no particular *race* perhaps, but belonging to a class utterly destitute of truth, to which falsehood is sweeter than truth, and which is sagacious to know in a given case how much the traveller can be made to *swallow* without suspicion. Then, again, the whole class of Levantines are the

enemies of Turkey, never reporting anything good, and possessing stores of the bad as inexhaustible as their imagination. But another source of our knowledge of Turkey is the newspaper correspondent and the telegraph, and still another is, political pamphlets. A great association has been formed in England for the purpose of exposing the faults of Turkey. The testimony is mainly from travellers. Dr. Hamlin suggests the inquiry whether any government could pass unharmed through such an ordeal. And then he makes the supposition that such an association should be formed in the United States, with plenty of funds, to search out all the atrocious murders and poisonings, all the wife sellings and wife beatings in England, and all the mobs in Ireland and the colonies, and all the assassinations of landlords, where no conviction could follow on account of combined and universal perjury; and that all this should be constantly presented as a fair specimen of the English government and people, and nothing be presented on the other side: would such an association, he asks, be engaged in a wise or preëminently Christian work? If its publications were spread all over the world, would the result be a good, elevating, refining, moral impression upon the people of Great Britain? Then he reverses the supposition and puts it that some such association in England should go to work upon the American people in the same way, and asks if this would promote good feeling in this country towards England?—especially if by force of circumstances we were incapacitated to make any reply.

Precisely in this way have the Southern people been treated, and to a great extent precisely thus are they treated, now by the North and by New England especially. If there is one religious paper (to say nothing of political ones) that will allow a respectable Southern man to make a fair showing for his people in its columns, we do not know it; and yet those columns will be open at any time to the foulest and the falsest aspersions upon us. The South knows exactly what Dr. Hamlin means by "Levantines," though she calls them by another name; and she knows what travellers and newspaper paid correspondents frequently are; and she has had as full an experience as Turkey of pamphlets

written for political effect, and of what benevolent associations of philanthropists will sometimes do in the name of God and humanity. Yes, the South can match Dr. Hamlin's account (p. 250) of "the Bulgarian horrors," with which the Northern sensational press delighted to gratify the depraved taste of its readers, at first sixty thousand "horrors," and then but thirty thousand, and then only fifteen thousand, then twelve thousand, then four thousand, reduced at last to two thousand! Yes, and South Carolina and Louisiana can both match his account (p. 252) of the trial at Brusa before a Turkish judge, which was "a farce," although there were "twenty-one witnesses all in line and all testifying with one voice." In what are known as the "Ku Klux trials" in South Carolina it was easy to get an hundred or a thousand witnesses for very little money to stand "all in a line and testify with one voice" to whatever was desired.

On one occasion in Bulgaria—Dr. Hamlin describes it p. 270—a Greek teacher came to his room with "something on his mind." He wished to tell about the Turkish oppressions, and our author listened to him with eagerness. It was the old story, the harrowing story of a beautiful maiden seized by the governor and taken to his harem, and of his awful cruelties to friends of the poor girl who tried to rescue her. Dr. Hamlin took down the chief points, and was determined that the atrocity should be made public at Constantinople, and that England and America should hear of it. But, after a little, it occurred to him that "Greeks sometimes exaggerate, and that the story was a little too complete, rounded out into a fulness of iniquity a little suspicious." On inquiry he found that the whole was a fabrication, and the teacher only got off by begging in the most abject terror. But he had probably deceived others with the same story, and indeed, as Dr. Hamlin says, this very story, in all its chief points, is evidently the stock in trade of a certain class in Turkey who love to practise on the credulity of foreigners. And the South knows all about this *credulity* of the "foreigners" who ought to be, for they naturally are, our *brethren*; yes, the South knows all about the stories gotten up so constantly to practise on this credulity. And the worst of it is, that no testimony she can offer will be

listened to as against the falsehoods on which the Northern mind to a great extent has so long been fed.

This notice, as we have been viewing the picture of our poor South in Dr. Hamlin's account of matters in the East, has come, perhaps, to smack a little of what may seem to be severe; let us close it with one of our author's pleasant and piquant stories, which may put all parties into good humor again. "It is very hard for a traveller to disbelieve anything, especially if it is wonderful. There is a place on the Bosphorus called 'Jason's wharf.' A distinguished and eloquent divine asked what that meant. His attendant coolly told him 'that was where Jason and his Argonauts landed when they were in quest of the Golden Fleece.' 'What a conservator of historic truth tradition is!' exclaimed the learned traveller. He doubtless put it in his note book and has charmed his people with it. I was just behind him and heard it all. I did not wish to break his pleasing delusion by telling him that I had often seen the English steamer 'Jason' coaling there in the times of the Crimean war, and perhaps *that* might explain the name." (P. 271.)

The Papacy and the Civil Power. By R. W. THOMPSON.
New York: Harper & Bros. 1876. Pp. 750, 8vo.

It is a hopeful sign that public men, like the Hon. Mr. Gladstone in England, and the Hon. Mr. Thompson in America, are beginning to study the political bearings of Popery. The danger to free institutions, which Presbyterian ministers have been pointing out for fifty years—and for pointing out which they have been abused as bigots—now looms up so portentously from the growing pretensions and insolence of Rome, that politicians are beginning to study her principles and history in good earnest. It is "high time" that they did. Our author is now a member of the Cabinet of the President of the United States. But it does not become this journal even to surmise whether his elevation to that place is in any sort a reward for this service. Every Protestant and every patriot should reward him with his thanks, and with a serious reading of his thorough and able discussion.

The author begins by opening our eyes to the progressive and

rapid growth of the danger. The Papal population has increased in eighteen years from two and a half to six millions, while we have seven archbishops, fifty-three bishops, six vicars apostolic, priests by the myriads, monastic institutions by the hundreds, and four hundred public colleges and schools under the strictly Popish control of eleven hundred and thirteen teachers, mostly foreign and Jesuit, besides private schools innumerable. The calamities of the Papacy in Europe, and the expulsion of the Jesuits from Germany, centre their forces and wishes preëminently on the United States at this time. Our author's attention does not seem to have been turned to the fact that the land of the "Puritan Fathers," once so absolutely Protestant, has become the strongest seat of this Papal increase. In Massachusetts, one out of every three souls is now Popish! and taking New England as a whole, one out of every four! Thus it appears, that while the Puritans have been so busy preaching abolition and consolidation, repenting of slave-holders' sins, and transferring their wealth to their own coffers, they have betrayed their own home to an enemy worse than the hated South! This lapse is rapidly becoming a final loss, as is made very clear by the further fact that, by reason of the nomadic tendencies of the New Englanders, or of the effeteness of their once prolific race, or of the general prevalence of unnameable crimes against nature, the Papists have nearly all the increase.

Mr. Thompson's work is almost a church history of Romanism. It is written in a style courteous towards Papists, scholarly, ample, and even elegant, though blemished by too much iteration and discursiveness. This is to be regretted, because a much briefer and more compact statement and discussion would much better have subserved his purpose of awakening the Protestant mind. He traces the growth of Popery through the mediæval and modern history. He exposes, as Dr. Döllinger has done, its foundations in the pseudo-decretals of Gratian, and a multitude of other forgeries and robberies. He exhibits the Papacy, by the fullest lights of history, as always and every where the enemy of spiritual and civil liberty and constitutional government. This conclusion he supports by full citations of popular books now circulating among the Papists of our own land.

Three points are ably and amply elaborated. One is, that the equal liberty of receiving and holding property in *mortmain*, in most of the American States, is about to be abused by the Papists, to secure for the Pope, in another shape, "temporalities" so ample as virtually to replace those he has lost in Italy. Here, Church and State are independent. All Churches enjoy absolute autonomy. Our people and statesmen are oblivious of the perils—so well known in Europe—of allowing real estate to pass without restriction into *mortmain*. But the fatal feature is, that while the Protestant communion hold property by corporations which, though ecclesiastical, are at least Americans acting for America, and are numerous and divided and rivals, and thus mutual checks on each other, the vast and increasing Papal endowments are a virtual unit, the titles being held by the bishops for the hierarchy, which is a foreign body, with a foreign head, and that the prescriptive and necessary foe of American institutions and welfare. Thus, the unexpected result of our supposed freedom and equity is, that the scattered endowments of Popery in this country really constitute a "temporality of the Papacy," held and used against Protestantism and liberty with precisely that defiant irresponsibility to the civil power which Romanist Europe has found intolerable!

The second point is, that the doctrines of persecution and absolutism are inherent in the Popish system, and will assuredly assert themselves every where whenever the Pope has power. Popery, our author argues, is logically necessitated to punish the exercise of the right of private judgment with sword, imprisonment, and faggot. It is similarly bound to assail the right of secular self-government, which is the foundation of American institutions, wherever it is not in hands exclusively Papal and hierarchical. He grants that many patriotic and liberal Romanists among us are now blind to this dreadful tendency and averse to it. But he shows that their priesthood see and impudently avow it, even to the excess of justifying the Spanish Inquisition. Such are the thanks they give us for our magnanimous toleration of their alien religion here! In connexion with this, the boast of the liberality in the Constitution of the Maryland

colony, under Lord Baltimore, is effectually exposed. Mr. Thompson shows that this toleration of Protestants—upon paper—was a necessity and not a free choice with Lord Baltimore; and that in practice it was tyrannously abused to persecute Protestants in the colony.

The third point is the effect of the new dogma of the Papal infallibility, in making the Pope a universal despot and usurper. It claims that he is infallible, without Bishop, Council, or Church, in every point pertaining to faith and morals, the outward rights of the Romish Church and all its property, the proper mode of defending and all possible assaults upon them. The infallible Pope is to be judged by no earthly power on any of these points; and opposition to his claims on them, by any earthly power whatsoever, is declared to be anti-Christian, null, and void. Any one can see at a glance that this includes everything. If, for instance, the American Congress and President decide that the civil arm must not be used to coerce Protestants, the Pope has only to say that this touches the Church's prerogative, and to annul it. He is infallible in so saying, and every Romanist in the United States is absolutely bound, on peril of damnation, to make good the Pope's decision against the civil government, by any means the Pope orders, including insurrection and civil war. And the Pope will surely order this very thing as soon as Popery is strong enough to venture it. The author shows that the new doctrine has this extent, by the bold and insolent expositions of the ablest and most responsible Papists, such as Cardinal Manning. In a word, the close of this nineteenth century is to witness, amidst all our boasts of progress, light, and freedom, the most extreme excesses of Papal arrogance asserted by a Hildebrand or Innocent III. in the midst of the feudal age. The author does not conceal his apprehension that the insolence of Popery will necessitate in this country that direst of all curses, a religious war, before we have done with them.

But the most ominous feature of the danger, as it exists in this country, seems to have escaped the eye of Mr. Thompson. This is the unfailing disposition of unscrupulous demagoguism to use Popery for its partisan purposes. Popery is always ready

and willing to be so used, and to exact a good price for its services. In this country, we are always sure of having demagogues selfish and criminal enough to use it, and to promise its price. "Wheresoever the carcase is, there are the vultures gathered together." There is our supreme peril! It receives continual illustrations in the yearly traffickings between political aspirants and the hierarchy. The latter know how to keep their forces compactly in hand and to drive shrewd bargains. What they once win, they never disgorge. This danger has received a fearful illustration from another quarter—the use made of Abolitionism by political adventurers for their selfish purposes, in pursuit of which the Constitution and Union have been wrecked. Original Abolitionism was recognised by all men of sense, in all sections, as a folly, unclean, unpatriotic, and only mischievous. It remained nearly as impotent for mischief as it was contemptible, until demagogues saw in it a tool for selfish work. Then at once it grew into a destroyer. And this illustration of the parallel danger becomes startling when we remember that the Protestant public man who set the first example of this corrupt traffic with Popery was the one who became also the father of Abolitionism, Wm. H. Seward. Statesmen older than the Hon. Mr. Thompson remember well the once famous compact of Seward and Bishop Hughes, which made the former Governor of New York and gave him the influence to precipitate the "irrepressible conflict."

With one more remark we close. When the day shall come that the once Puritan but then Papal New England shall again invade the Constitution to destroy, in the interests of Popery, what is left of liberty, the only bulwark of resistance will be found wanting, that State sovereignty which Mr. Thompson's party has lately destroyed. What can be plainer than that every centralising step is only facilitating that final usurpation which our author dreads? The radical policy is but penning the game in one helpless fold, ready for the Roman vulture to clutch.

The Origin of the World, according to Revelation and Science.

By J. W. DAWSON, LL. D., F. R. S., F. G. S., &c. 8vo.
Pp. 438. Lockwood, Brooks & Co., Boston. 1877.

In comparatively modern times, the relations subsisting between the revelation of God and the discoveries of science, have attracted special attention. A number of books and essays, some very scholarly, and some far otherwise, have appeared; chairs in literary and theological schools have been endowed; conventions of partisans on either side have met and argued and dissolved; inherent antagonism on one hand, and inherent accordance on the other, have been proclaimed once and again. It is worthy of note, touching this discussion, that many godly men who are not scientific, either deride the claims of science, or solemnly protest against the cultivation of secular lore; while scientific men who are also godly, as earnestly contend for the essential unity to be discovered in the responses from the two oracles. The recent work of Principal Dawson is, perhaps, one of the most able treatises on the last mentioned side of the topic. The first three chapters of this volume treat of the "Mystery of Origins and its Solutions," and of the "Objects and Nature of a Revelation of Origins." Eight chapters, which comprise the bulk of the book, are devoted to the discussion of the "Creation of the Universe and of Man," and the concluding chapters deal with the all-important topic of the "Unity and Antiquity of Man," as the culminating product of creative energy.

In every step of this investigation, the author fairly confronts the record with the established facts of physical science. The dogmatic assertions of Holy Writ, in passages involving doctrine, are clearly shown to be opposed only by tentative postulates of science. The weight of probability, in such cases, when viewed objectively, is seen to lie as much on the side of revelation as otherwise; and the whole scope of Principal Dawson's work tends to strip from the debate a mass of suggestive hints that possess no logical value, and which abound in the writings of Tyndall, Darwin, and Huxley. So while the scientist can find no vestige of theological prejudice in this discussion, the Christian will find his faith strengthened by the study of the topic under such able guidance.

The paraphrase of the first chapter of Genesis, given by Principal Dawson, is introduced thus: "It may be well to present to the reader this ancient document in a form more literal and intelligible, and probably nearer to its original dress, than that in which we are most familiar with it in our English Bibles." The variations from the received text are all significant, but the most important are those which refer to the works of the fifth and sixth day, and especially to the use of the word create, (*bara.*) Professor Stuart, of Andover, says: "If this word does not mean 'to create' in the highest sense, then the Hebrews had no word by which they could designate the idea." It occurs only in three places in this ancient record: first, in the opening verse—"God created the heavens and the earth;" second, in the 21st verse—"God created great reptiles, and every living thing that moveth," etc., and, lastly, in the 27th verse—"God created man," etc.

The argument of the author may be briefly stated, as follows: The Bible asserts that the whole frame of the universe is the original creation of God. That the inorganic matter included in this first creation, may have assumed various and progressive forms, under laws originally enacted by God, and enstamped upon the material universe. That the creative power of God was put forth, *de novo*, in the product of living organisms first, and afterwards and lastly, in the production of man. And, finally, that Moses accurately records the gradations of evolution and creation, according to the clearest revelations of geological science. It is very remarkable, certainly, that a man living in the time of the Pharaohs should recount the steps of development exactly in their geological order, or, if this is denied, that he should so construct his story as to defy scientific contradiction.

It is a salutary change that has come over the Church, and produced so many able works in defence of Revelation. A generation has not passed away since the current idea of the Church was opposed to all scientific investigations, in so far as this scrutiny touched the doctrine of "six days of working, and one day of rest," as the English version literally teaches. In reality,

no *doctrine*, properly considered, is involved in the discussion. It is no more impossible for God to make all the universe in six seconds of time, than in six days. And there would be no more august manifestation of divine energy in the instant formation of the earth, with its vast fossil treasures, than in the gradual production of these great families of plants and animals throughout ages of time. The question is not, Could God possibly make the world and its inhabitants in six days? The inquiry is rather, What does God's Revelation say upon this point?

If the Bible did contain the announcement, that God began to create on a certain Monday and ceased to create on a certain Saturday, and that these six days were the ordinary days of twenty-four hours, man's acceptance of the statement should be coincident with its recognition as the Word of God. But the Bible does not contain this assertion. And the great value of Principal Dawson's book is its lucid exposition of the accordance of Scripture statement in the order and progress of creation with the ascertained facts of geological science. The one great doctrine of Scripture is, that man was God's latest creation, and lord of all that preceded him.

Theology of the Old Testament. By Dr. GUST. FR. OEHLER.
2 Vols. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

These volumes are among the most recent published in the Messrs. Clark's "Foreign Theological Library." The original work was published in Germany in 1873 by the author's son, Hermann Oehler, after the death of his father. It is made up chiefly of the lectures delivered by the author, supplemented by references to articles written by him in Herzog's Theological Encyclopædia.

In an introduction of seventy pages, the author discusses the proper notion of Old Testament Theology and its relation to cognate Biblical studies, and defines his own conception of this branch of Biblical Theology, giving also a brief outline of the history of the cultivation of this study, and a discussion of the method of Old Testament Theology and its divisions. He defines

the Theology of the Old Testament as "the historico-genetic delineation of the religion contained in the canonical writings of the Old Testament." In this able introduction, Dr. Oehler shows clearly that there is a necessity for such a department of Theology; and this necessity is felt by every one who attempts to study the Old Testament intelligently. There is a deficiency in English and American theology in this very point. No attempt is made, by a strict process of induction, confined entirely to the Old Testament, to ascertain accurately what doctrines it contains, what truths it embodies, and how those doctrines were developed in greater clearness as the light of Revelation became brighter. The Old Testament is either studied through the medium of Rabbinical writers, who have often only obscured the word of God by their traditions; or it is investigated from the stand-point of the New Testament exclusively. While the New Testament is the inspired and authoritative exposition of the Old, it is important that the Old Testament should be studied *as a separate Book*, as a foundation for the Systematic Theology which incorporates *all* revealed truth. Oftentimes expositors and theologians put into the faith of the old patriarchs and prophets the fulness of the light which we derive from the New Testament, but which *they* certainly did not possess. Old Testament Theology proposes simply to develop historically the leading ideas of each great period of Old Testament history.

The divisions made by Dr. Oehler, are: 1. Mosaism; 2d, Prophetism; and 3d, Old Testament Wisdom (in the "Chokmah.")

Under Mosaism is treated, 1. The History of Revelation from the creation to the settlement of the covenant people in the Holy Land. 2. The Doctrines and Ordinances of Mosaism, viz.: (a) The Doctrine of God and his relation to the world. (b) The Doctrine of Man. (c) The Covenant of God with Israel and the Theocracy. (d) The Mosaic Cultus.

Part II.—Prophetism—includes, 1. The Development of the Theocracy from the death of Joshua to the close of the Old Testament Revelation. (a) The times of the Judges. (b) Period of the Undivided Kingdom. (c) The Kingdom of the Ten Tribes. (d) The Kingdom of Judah. (e) History of the Jew-

ish Nation from the Babylonian Captivity to the Cessation of Prophecy. 2. The Theology of Prophetism. (a) The Doctrine of the Lord of Hosts and of Angels. (b) Man's Religious and Moral Relation to God. (c) Of Prophecy. (d) Of the Kingdom of God.

Part III. Old Testament Wisdom embraces, (a) Objective Divine Wisdom. (b) Subjective Human Wisdom. (c) Moral Good. (d) The Enigmas of human life—the struggle for their solution. (e) The Renunciation of the solution in the Book of Ecclesiastes.

From this brief analysis it will be seen that the book is neither History, nor Biblical Introduction, nor Typology, but just what the name implies—the Theology of the Old Testament. It is a valuable work, marked by fulness of learning, reverence of tone, and strong faith in the divine origin and authority of the Old Testament. The leading doctrines are brought out clearly and briefly, and the gradual progress of ancient Revelation, both in its delivery by God, and in its apprehension by the people, is plainly shown. It is just the book needed by ministers and theological students who wish to pursue what is an interesting and important, as well as one of the freshest departments of Theology.

In the getting up of the book as to print, paper, and accuracy, the well known name of the eminent publishers is a sufficient guarantee for all that is desirable.

Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament. By C. F. KEIL, D. D., and F. DELITZSCH, D. D., Professors of Theology. 25 vols. 8vo. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

The appearance about the same time of Dr. Schaff's Edition of Lange's "Bibel-Werk," of the "Speaker's Commentary" in England, and of this Commentary by Professors Keil and Delitzsch, is a proof of the deep interest felt by the Christian world in the exposition of the Old Testament, in spite of all the recent attacks upon it. Lange's Commentary has been much more widely advertised in this country, and probably more extensively sold, than the work under notice. Yet the Commentary of Keil and Delitzsch has points of advantage over that of Lange. While

not depreciating the ample learning expended upon the latter work, its very fulness and verbosity, the differences of opinion between writers, translators, and editors, and the multiplicity of side-lights thrown upon difficult points, have a tendency to perplex and confuse the mind. One rises from its perusal sometimes with a swimming in the head, and with such a variety of interpretations floating before him, as to prevent him from holding fast to any one of them.

The Commentary of Keil and Delitzsch is held in high esteem by many competent judges. In Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, American Edition, the commentaries of Keil on various books of the Old Testament are usually referred to as "*the best*," and the position of Dr. Franz Delitzsch in the theological world is too well known to require comment. This Commentary is the joint work of the two, not combined, however, on any one book; but they edit different parts of the Old Testament. Keil writes on the Pentateuch, (3 vols.); on Joshua, Judges, and Ruth, (1 vol.); on 1st and 2d Samuel, (1 vol.); Kings, (1 vol.); Chronicles, (1 vol.); Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther, (1 vol.); Jeremiah and Lamentations, (2 vols.); Ezekiel, (2 vols.); Daniel, (1 vol.); and the Minor Prophets, (2 vols.) Delitzsch writes on the Psalms, (3 vols.); Job, (2 vols.); Proverbs, (2 vols.); Solomon's Song and Ecclesiastes, (1 vol.); and Isaiah, (2 vols.) Thus it is seen that Keil writes on the Pentateuch, the Historical books, and the Prophets, with the exception of Isaiah; and Delitzsch writes on Isaiah, and on all the Poetical books except Lamentations. The two have worked together, however, and there is a unity of plan and of interpretation running through the whole work.

The Commentary is based wholly on the Hebrew text. Difficulties of grammar and philology are elucidated, and the criticism of the text is often minute without becoming tedious. The result is the confirmation of the present Hebrew text, with a few exceptions, on which many good critics are now agreed.

The exegesis is eminently judicious, sober, and accurate. The most important differences of interpretation are amply considered, yet not to such an extent as to become wearisome. The eminent authors are fully abreast of the learning of the day, and if they

seem conservative, it is evident that it is not from any want of acquaintance with the latest speculations. The conclusions reached as to the dates of some books, and as to the purport of others, may be rejected by some readers, but the Commentary never has been written which could be accepted as a whole. In short, for fulness of learning, for satisfactory treatment, for depth of appreciation of the sacred writers, for freshness in treatment, and for thoroughness in investigating the latest literature, this great work can hardly be surpassed.

As the commentaries on the various books can be procured separately, it is easy to test the Commentary by purchasing one volume by Keil and one by Delitzsch, and thus ascertaining whether it will prove best to buy the whole work. The print and paper are characterised by the usual excellence and beauty of the volumes of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, and this fact renders it a pleasure as well as a convenience to refer to them.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The books that are now coming in most plentifully are especially adapted and designed for the holidays. Children's books of course hold the first place in this class. Among the frequent exceptions to this rule, we notice first the volume on Homiletics¹ by a fresh thinker and eloquent divine. The author made a considerable local reputation in Philadelphia, where he was thought to resemble his English namesake in his leaning towards Broad Church. In Boston, we hear, he is thought to lean the other way. His church is the most costly and gorgeous of his denomination, and his fame has now become continental. Mr. Creighton's subjects² have been well chosen, and he has already proved that he is fully competent for such a task as he has here taken in hand. Godet³ is one of the most learned, gifted, and eloquent of French-speaking Calvinists. He was one of the chief ornaments of the Edinburgh Council. His Commentaries on Luke and John will become classic. If this is Dr. Adams⁴ of New York, his parables will be worth reading and probably edifying. Harvard sends out a new work on Scientific German.⁵ We give it a hearty welcome.

The well known Socinian, the late T. S. King, was on some vital points better fitted to treat of humanity than of Christianity.⁶

¹Lectures on Preaching. By the Rev. Philip Brooks. 12mo., 271 pp., cloth, \$1.50. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

²Historical Biographies. Edited by the Rev. M. Creighton, M. A., late Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. Consisting of Simon de Monfort; The Black Prince; Sir Walter Raleigh. With maps. 3 Vols., \$3. *Ibid.*

³Studies in the New Testament. By F. Godet, D. D. 375 pp., cloth, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

⁴Allegories. By the Rev. W. Adams. 16mo., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁵A Course in Scientific German. By H. B. Hodges, Harvard University. 12mo., 70 pp., cloth. Ginn & Heath, Boston.

⁶Christianity and Humanity: A Series of Sermons. By Thomas Starr King. Edited, with a Memoir, by Edwin P. Whipple. Fine Steel Portrait. 12mo., lxxx., 380 pp., \$2. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

Buckminster, Everett, and King are the three great lights of the Unitarian pulpit since Channing. Since Mr. Stedman's exhaustive analysis of Mr. Tennyson's traits as poet (in his "Victorian Poets of the Nineteenth Century"), perhaps little more remains to be said by others. Tennyson¹ has given the most subtle and beautiful expression to the thought and feeling that are most characteristic of our era. Nothing could be lovelier, more musical, more ethereal, than his early songs; nothing more scholar-like and dexterous than his translations from the Greek, and particularly from Homer; nothing more romantic in idea or more severe in style than his Idylls of the King. Tennyson's has been pronounced essentially a "*feminine*" mind; but what more robust and masculine than the ode on Wellington, Queen Mary, and the Charge of the Light Brigade? His faults are obvious, and his range somewhat circumscribed. He sees things indistinctly, as through a haze; his very language is sometimes hopelessly obscure—at times affectedly so. His dramatic power is small. As compared with his congener, Keats, he is thin and pale—Watteau after Giorgioni. Joseph Cook² has done exploits: he has turned the wheel of Massachusetts upside down—Hub and all. He is a man of extraordinary endowments and rare education. The infidelity of the unbelieving "Scientists" goes down before him as straw before a flail. His power of illustration is remarkable. His language is technical, but admirable. His views are generally sound, but in some instances wild. We again call attention to the Vest-Pocket Series.³

¹Complete Poetical Works of Alfred Tennyson. Favorite edition. With steel portrait and twenty-four full page illustrations. 16mo., ix., 409 pp., gilt edges, handsomely stamped in gold, \$1.50. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

²Biology: Monday Lectures. By Joseph Cook. 12mo., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³Vest-Pocket Series. Illustrated. Cloth, 50 cents each. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston: Favorite Poems. By J. R. Lowell. 108 pp. Undine. By LaMotte Fouque. 110 pp. Sintram. By LaMotte Fouque. 156 pp. Favorite Poems. By Alexander Pope. 96 pp. Favorite Poems. By Wm. Wordsworth. 111 pp. Favorite Poems. By Samuel Rogers. 96 pp. Favorite Poems. By Goethe. 94 pp. Goethe. By Thomas Carlyle. 94 pp. Burns. By Thomas Carlyle. 94 pp. Hemans. 95 pp. Collins, Dryden, and Marvel. 104 pp. Shakespeare: Songs.

Lowell is even better in prose, but deserves a place in this cosy set. LaMotte Fouque had a weird but charming fancy. Pope is not read now as he ought to be. Let alone the *poetry* (which some rather foolishly question), the *sense* is like that of Horace or Juvenal, and the dictation the perfection of literary art. Wordsworth has influenced modern thought quite as much as Coleridge. We can forgive Rogers his "Table-Talk and Porsoniana," when we recall the "Pleasures of Memory," and, as preserved by others, the old man's personal reminiscences, oddities, and wit. The fate of Rogers reminds us of his own line: "Our blessings brighten as they take their flight." Goethe bids fair to rank alongside of the few lonely names that come next to Homer and Shakespeare. It was a good thought to reproduce in two separate volumes Carlyle's famous essays on Goethe and Burns. The Scottish singer stands somewhat to Goethe as Pindar stands to Sophocles. Burns lacks Pindar's cultivation and uniform splendor, but the greatness of his soul was hardly less. Burns is, at the lowest estimate, the Simonides or Béranger of the Anglo-Saxon race. Collins has in some of his pieces fully equalled Gray, to whom he must be likened. Dryden's "Noble Negligence" is, in Cowper's judgment, better than Pope's consummate finish. Johnson to the contrary notwithstanding. Andrew Marvel is sure to rise in fame. He often shows as large as Milton; that is, when Milton's disk shows small. Mrs. Hemans, we presume, has got her literary deserts. The Songs of Shakespeare are as delicious as they are foolish. Their folly always has a dramatic propriety, and the most careless notes in them could have been uttered by no other bird in the forest. Alfieri,¹ and the Margravine of Baireuth,—the great Frederick's sister²—are the subjects this time of Mr. Howells's biographic

¹Life of Vittorio Alfieri. Vol. IV. of "Choice Biographies." Edited by W. D. Howells. 18mo., 357 pp., cloth, \$1.25. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

²Choice Autobiography. Edited, with Prefatory Essays, by W. D. Howells. "Little Classic" style. Vols. I. and II. Memoirs of Fredericka Wilhelmina, Margravine of Baireuth, sister of Frederick the Great. 268 and 295 pp. Vol. III.: The Lives of Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Thomas Ellwood. 18mo., viii., 369 pp. *Ibid.*

pencil. A superb work on the Rhine.¹ The "Telephone" is explained by an "expert."²

Mr. H. L. Sidney Lear is to be contradistinguished from Mr. Sidney Lanier, the author of the stupendous Philadelphia Ode. The first named contributes a series of volumes in the department of religious memoirs,³ whether from a Protestant or Romish viewpoint is not at once apparent. Another work, already issued by the same hand, might seem to be written in the interests of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The title-pages of the Biographies are all taking, with, possibly, the exception of the first, which at least piques the curiosity. The three great names are those of St. Francis de Sales, Fénelon, and Bossuet, all, it will be noted, Romanists. Another of the volumes treats of the priesthood in France. Two others are about artists, one of whom was a Dominican. The remaining volume relates the story of a French lady of the same persuasion.

The great statesman of Italy⁴ has had few rivals to his fame betwixt Metternich and Bismarck. The most entertaining account of him we have seen was by Wyckoff. DeFoe aimed to coin money by writing the history of the devil. Whatever be true of certain *men, man* (at large) will not be puzzled by Mr.

¹The Rhine, from its Source to the Sea. From the German of Karl Stieler, H. Wachenhusen, and F. W. Hackländer. Translated by G. C. T. Bartley. With 425 superb wood-cut engravings. Imperial 4to., cloth extra, full gilt, \$18; full Turkey, \$25; Turkey super-extra, \$30. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

²The Telephone: An Account of the Phenomena of Electricity, Magnetism, and Sound, as involved in its Action, with Directions for making a Speaking-Telephone. By Prof. A. E. Dolbear, of Tufts College. Illustrated. 16mo., 120 pp., 75 cents. *Ibid.*

³Christian Biographies. By H. L. Sidney Lear. 8 Vols., 12mo., 2,834 pp., cloth, \$10; Pott, Young & Co., New York, as follows: Henri Perreyoe; 12mo., 249 pp., cloth, \$1.25. St. Francis de Sales; 12mo., 280 pp., cloth, \$1.25. A Dominican Artist; 12mo., 300 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Madame Louise de France; 12mo., 312 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Revival of Priestly Life in France; 12mo., 336 pp., cloth, \$1.25. A Christian Painter of the Nineteenth Century; 12mo., 256 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Fenelon; 12mo., 484 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Bossuet; 12mo., 617 pp., cloth, \$1.25.

⁴The Life of Cavour. By Charles DeMazade. Translated by Geo. Meredith. 8vo., 375 pp., cloth, \$3. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Perkins.¹ The mediæval period is one of the most picturesque, as well as scholastic and theological, interest. Gibbon, Hallam, and Milman are worthily, though unpretendingly, followed by Mr. Menzies² in the Historical Manual Series. The century when "Occam's razor" cut so fine, the age of Dante, Petrarch, Tell, was also the age of the Second and Third Edwards in England,—of Crécy, Poitiers, and the taking of Calais; the age of the Second Richard and Wat Tyler's insurrection; the age of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce—of Stirling Castle and Bannockburn; the age of Chaucer and of Wyckliffe. This is the period outlined by Mr. Pearson's compend of English history.³ The splendid age of the great but little and bedizened monarch, called Louis Quatorze, is presented by Mr. Willert.⁴ If Professor Day has succeeded in *Æsthetics*⁵ as he has done in Rhetoric, he has done admirably. *Economical Science*⁶ was never more studied than now, and Adam Smith⁷ is still the highest name. Indians and fairies.⁸ The world's material progress is gauged by Mr. Putnam.⁹

We had been inquiring for just such a book as that of Mr. Henri Van Lann. The third volume crowns his work on the

¹Devil Puzzlers. By F. B. Perkins. 16mo., 200 pp., 50 cents; cloth, \$1. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

²The Middle Ages. By S. Menzies. Historical Manual Series. 16mo., 250 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³English History in the Fourteenth Century. By C. H. Pearson. Vol. VII. of Manuals of History. 16mo., 250 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁴The Reign of Louis XIV. By J. Willert. 16mo., 290 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Principles of *Æsthetics*. By Henry N. Day. New edition. 12mo., 400 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁶Economics; or, The Science of Wealth. By J. M. Sturtevant. 12mo., 375 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁷The Wealth of Nations. By Adam Smith. New edition. 12mo., 725 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁸The Enchanted Moccasins, and Other Legends of American Indians. By Cornelius Mathews. Moonfolk Series. Illustrated. Square 8vo., 338 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁹The World's Progress. By George P. Putnam. Twenty-second edition; revised to date. 8vo., 1,000 pp., cloth, \$4.50; morocco, \$7. *Ibid.*

History of French Literature.¹ Most books are on old subjects; this one is on a new subject, and one that is important and fascinating.* Mr. Linderman's discussion of the Legal Tender² question was briefly referred to in our last number. We are now prepared to say that it is not only the most authoritative, but, in all probability, the strongest argument that has yet appeared in favor of a gold basis, and in opposition to the coinage of the hypocritical silver dollar.

The history of philosophy, as of everything else, needs, of course, to be written over and over again. Morell and Chalybæus may never become obsolete, but they are already become a little antiquated. New Pharaohs are continually arising in Egypt, who discard all the prepossessions of those who went before them. Even Lewes and Ueberweg fail to come up to the very latest requirements. The most influential name in the German class-rooms just now is probably that of Kant, especially in ethics. The *novi homines* who have ascended to the famed metaphysical seats, are Schopenhauer and Hartmann,—the one the great pessimist, and the other the expounder of that "vast uncouth," "the Unconscious." Professor Bowen is favorably known as the author of the logic and of the abridged Hamilton—if so it may be styled. The present work is a credit to American thought and learning. The account of Kant is by some praised, by others censured. The chief merit of the book is the admirable

¹History of French Literature. Vol. III.; completing the work. By Henri Van Laun. 8vo., 400 pp., cloth, \$2.50. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

²Money and Legal Tender in the United States. By H. R. Linderman, Director United States Mint. 12mo., 175 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

*In the October number of this REVIEW, what should have formed a part of our notice of Mr. Anderson's History of France, on page 808, was inserted by mistake on page 803, as our notice of Mr. Van Laun's History of French Literature. What we had it in mind to say of Mr. Van Laun is set down above. There was another error in the October number, which we desire to point out. The name of F. A. Lange, the philosophic critic, was, on page 801, inadvertently confounded with that of J. P. Lange, the biblical commentator.

discussion of Hartmann and Schopenhauer.¹ Professor Marsh obtains a new edition of a dry but valuable treatise.² Alliteration in titles is the order of the day. The Final Philosophy³ is ably and soundly indicated by Dr. Shields. Faith and Philosophy⁴ is made up of lectures and essays of the lamented and truly able and learned Dr. H. B. Smith. The article on Strauss's "The Old Faith and the New," is eminently masterly. The venerable ex-President of Yale⁵ is as versatile as he is accomplished and every way skilled. As a Greek scholar and editor, he has had few equals in this country. He is a great authority in certain branches of biblical antiquities (witness his appendix to the article on Cyrenius in Hackett's edition of Smith's Bible Dictionary). In international law he ranks with the foremost. With certain theories of political science, no one since Lieber has been more profoundly conversant. The work of the late Henry William Herbert is followed up (under almost the same title) by Mr. Manley.⁶ There is an exquisiteness like that of Sèvres or Limoges about some of the *vers-de-société*.⁷ The Fern World⁸ is

¹Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. By Francis Bowen, A. M., of Harvard University. 8vo., 596 pp., cloth, \$3. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.

²The Earth as Modified by Human Action. By Prof. Geo. P. Marsh. New edition. Crown 8vo., cloth, reduced from \$4.50 to \$3. *Ibid.*

³The Final Philosophy; or, System of Perfect Knowledge issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion. By Prof. Charles W. Shields, D. D., of Princeton College. 8vo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴Faith and Philosophy; or, Discourses and Essays. By Henry B. Smith, D. D., LL.D. Edited, with an Introduction, by the Rev. Dr. George L. Prentiss, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁵Political Science; or, The State Theoretically and Practically considered. By Theodore D. Woolsey, lately President of Yale College. Two Vols. 8vo., nearly 600 pp., cloth, \$3.50 per volume. *Ibid.*

⁶Notes on Fish and Fishing. By J. J. Manley, M. A. Illustrated. 12mo., 363 pp., cloth, \$5.25. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

⁷Proverbs in Porcelain, and Other Verses. By Austin Dobson. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁸The Fern World. By Francis George Heath. With permanent Woodbury type frontispiece. Three full-page wood engravings, and twelve beautiful colored plates by Leighton Bros' process of nature printing. London, 1877. 12mo., cloth gilt, \$6.25. *Ibid.*

represented by the Leightons' new process. We defy any one to understand in detail a large part of "Prometheus Unbound." Shelley¹ reappears in Charles Algernon Swinburne; but is immeasurably less objectionable on the score of purity. It has been alleged that Shelley's early and audacious atheism was afterwards abandoned or modified. His death was not more tragic than his life was singular and girl-like. He stormed bakers' shops, and carried bread in his pockets. His scholarship was ripe and his fancy imperial. Perhaps no one ever made such music of the English language. Who does not love English pictures?² The Miracles³ of our Lord have again fit treatment at the hands of one whose appearance in print is the signal for general congratulation. Professor Hill is thought to have mixed up other sciences too much with that of rhetoric, but otherwise to have achieved success in a rather superfluous undertaking.⁴ Dr. Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy was the best extant; but was too succinct, and otherwise and increasingly defective. Dr. Krauth and now Dr. Calderwood⁵ have done whatever could be done to remove these objections, and to render the book indispensable to the student. "Beautiful Snow"⁶ are the two

¹The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Vol. IV., completing new edition. Edited by Harry Buxton Forman. 4 volumes. 8vo., cloth, \$6.25 per volume. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

²English Pictures. Drawn with pen and pencil. By the Rev. Samuel Manning, and the Rev. S. G. Green. With nearly two hundred illustrations. Royal 8vo., cloth, richly gilt, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

³Howson's Miracles of Christ. Two volumes. 16mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴The Science of Rhetoric: An Introduction to the Laws of Effective Discourse. By D. J. Hill, A. M., Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Lewisburg. Sheldon & Co., New York.

⁵A Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences. (Including the Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical. By William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. From the second edition, 1860, and the third, 1876. Edited by Henry Calderwood, LL.D.) By Charles P. Krauth, S. T. D., LL.D. \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁶Beautiful Snow, and other Poems. By J. W. Watson. A new, revised, and enlarged edition for the holidays. 8vo., finest tinted plate paper, bound in new designs in white, black, and gold, in morocco cloth, with gilt top, gilt sides, and bevelled boards, \$2; maroon morocco cloth, full

memorable words in a "poem" otherwise wholly commonplace. These two words are often repeated in the "poem;" they are not original, being spontaneously uttered by all talking children; they are not unambiguously words of verse, rather than of prose; they are not unequivocally, or at all events not unconditionally, true. Contrast with this Bryant's "Flake after flake falls in the dark and silent lake." The vexed question of the Prohibited Degrees,¹ which occupied so much time at the Triennial Episcopal Convention this year, is again discussed by the Rev. Mr. Brand.

Taxation is a subject that is well handled in the President's Message, and is engaging the earnest attention of our impartial legislators in Washington. The whole subject is shaken up and sifted by Mr. Burroughs.² The "Silver" side of the money question has one of its most plausible, and certainly one of its most clever, advocates in Mr. Groesbeck.³ A practical manual, showing how to paint china,⁴ is an agreeable novelty that we owe to Miss (or Mrs.) McLoughlin. The question recurs, does Mrs. (or Miss) McLoughlin herself possess this fine cunning? It is to be hoped so. It is well to remember, however, that the United States do not yet begin to vie in this art with the creators of the Sèvres, Berlin, and Wedgewood patterns. We may safely re-echo the commendations that have been bestowed upon the Royal Academy Album of Photographs.⁵ It is a book to make one's gilt sides, edges, and back, bevelled boards, \$3. T. B. Peterson & Bros., Philadelphia.

¹What Marriages are Lawful? An Inquiry Addressed to the Members of the Protestant Episcopal Church. By the Rev. W. F. Brand. 16mo., 66 pp., paper, 35 cents; cloth, 60 cents. T. Whitaker, New York.

²A Treatise on the Law of Taxation,—Federal, State and Municipal. By W. H. Burroughs. 8vo., 805 pp., law sheep, \$6.50. Baker, Voorhes, & Co., New York.

³Gold and Silver: Address Delivered before the American Bankers' Association in New York, September 13, 1877. By Wm. S. Groesbeck. 8vo., 32 pp., paper, 25 cents. Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati.

⁴China Painting: A Practical Manual for the Use of Amateurs in the Decoration of Hard Porcelain. By M. Louise McLoughlin. Square 12mo., 69 pp., 75 cents. *Ibid.*

⁵Royal Academy Album. Edited by L. Jennings, F. L. S. Forty photographs in the highest style of the art. Royal 4to., cloth, full gilt, \$25. Cassell, Petter & Galpin, New York.

mouth water, but not a book to buy. It is melancholy to think of the decadence of the old fashioned fairy tale. Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, M. P., writes admirable new fashioned ones. "The Chicken Market,"¹ by Henry Morley, is actually the only unmistakable fairy book on our list, unless we except "the Enchanted Moccasins." Another amusing alliteration announces a bright book² for boys.

Once more we have a play upon the letter "F."³ This book and the next (where the play is upon the letter "S")⁴ are as suggestive of the holidays as the window of a toy shop. Why should anybody care to write the history of the United States after George Tucker and George Bancroft? Bancroft is the standard history; but Bancroft is thoroughly wrong in some of his views, lacks foreshortening, is niggardly in his acknowledgments to others, and ambitiously faulty in his style. In many points the solid work of Professor Tucker is decidedly preferable. The work of Mr. Ollier and Mr. Chester⁵ may be a good one; on that we are silent. The completion of Mr. Grant's elaborate History of India deserves to be signalised.⁶ The Riverside Keats

¹The Chicken Market, and other Fairy Tales. By Henry Morley. With illustrations by Charles H. Bennet. Crown 8vo., 386 pp., cloth, plain, \$2.75. Cassell, Petter & Galpin, New York.

²Field Friends and Forest Foes. By Philip Browne. Entertaining descriptions of domestic and wild animals. 192 pp., full gilt sides, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

³Woodland Romances; or, Fables and Fancies. By C. L. Mateaux. With several hundred illustrations. F. cap, 8vo., 192 pp., black and gold sides, cloth, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

⁴Silver Wings and Golden Scales: A Graphic Description of Birds and Fishes. With many illustrations. F. cap, 4to., 192 pp., cloth, full gilt, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

⁵History of the United States. Vol. III. From the Earliest Discoveries to the Present Time. By Edmund Ollier and Joseph L. Chester. Complete in three volumes. Cloth, gilt, \$4 per volume. *Ibid.*

⁶History of India. Vol. II. By James Grant. With illustrations, consisting of portraits of the chief celebrities, British and native, connected with the History of the Empire, plans of battle-fields and sieges, views of places described, cities, temples, etc. Complete in two volumes. Extra crown quarto, 576 pp., each, cloth, \$4 per volume. *Ibid.*

and Coleridge¹ bring up a multitude of recollections of "the lake poets." Keats is one of our prime favorites. His work is like a goblet of chiselled gold—brimful of "the vintage of the South." Christabel, the Ancient Mariner, the Hymn in the Vale of Chamounix,—what of these? California² is pictured for us in the verse and prose of Mr. Avery. If his pictures correspond with the reality, and are meant to give us the landscapes of the Pacific coast, of the Sierras and cañons, of the Yosemite and Mariposa valleys, they should be fair, grand, varied, awful, and unique. Whether they are so, is a matter in reference to which we make no affirmation. Sir Edward Creasy adds another to the long catalogue of works pertaining more or less directly to the Turkish war.³ Since the appearance of our last number, the convalescent Sick Man has had what may prove to be a fatal access of his old malady. Turner's fame is largely due to the idolatry of Ruskin. After all allowances have been made, however, Turner must be regarded as the most original and brilliant of English water-landscape, and sunset-landscape painters. His early and most agreeable style was in imitation of Claude; his middle style shows him at his greatest height of attainment; his latest style is all smoke and fire. Mr. Thornbury gives us his biography,⁴ as does Paul de Musset of Alfred de Musset.⁵ The translation is by one of the well known magazine writers at the North. De Musset is a sort of French Tennyson, but far more impassioned, and one who (unlike the English laureate) has excited an intense admiration in the breasts of the common people.

¹The Poetical Works of Coleridge and Keats. Riverside edition of British Poets. Two volumes. Crown 8vo., cloth, gilt top, \$3.50. Hurd & Houghton, New York; H. O. Houghton & Co., Boston.

²California: Pictures in Prose and Verse. By Benjamin Parke Avery. 4to., cloth, gilt, \$5. *Ibid.*

³History of Ottoman Turks. By Sir Edward S. Creasy, M. A. Large 12mo., 560 pp., cloth. Henry Holt & Co., New York.

⁴Thornbury's Life of J. M. W. Turner, R. A. By Walter Thornbury. With illustrations fac-similed in colors from Turner's original drawings. 12mo., 636 pp., cloth, \$2.75. *Ibid.*

⁵The Biography of Alfred de Musset. Translated from the French of Paul de Musset by Harriet W. Preston. Square 12mo., cloth, gilt top, \$2. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

Mr. John James Tayler produces the "Last Series of Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty."¹

Whatever comes from Thomas Hughes is likely to be good. The "Working Classes,"² whether in America or Europe, have not always taken the proper courses to recommend themselves to the sympathy of the classes who are not supposed to work. [Query: May not a man work with brain as well as muscle? and if so, why is the labor of the fists any more meritorious than that of the cerebral hemispheres?] Dr. Immer³ has given to the world an excellent and very learned work on Hermeneutics, where good books were much to be desiderated. Principal Dawson⁴ is a Christian philosopher and man of science, and an able writer and lecturer. He is a strong advocate for the long (or rather indefinite) days in Genesis. Mr. Cox was the right man for the Grecian tales.⁵ Modern chemistry is as funny as Aristophanes,—we mean organic chemistry.⁶ This volume of outlines is doubtless a meritorious one.

¹Last Series of Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty. Discourses by John James Tayler. Square 12mo., \$2. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

²The Working Classes in Europe, and Other Essays. By Thomas Hughes and others. "Atlas Essays." 8vo., 183 pp., cloth, \$1. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York.

³Hermeneutics of the New Testament. By Dr. A. Immer, Professor of Theology in the University of Berne. Translated from the German by Albert H. Newman. With additional Notes and full Indexes. Crown 8vo., 413 pp., \$2.25. W. F. Draper, Andover, Mass.

⁴The Origin of the World, According to Revelation and Science. By J. W. Dawson, LL.D., F. R. S., F. G. S., Principal and Vice Chancellor of McGill University, Montreal. 12mo., cloth, \$2. Harper & Brothers, New York.

⁵Tales of Ancient Greece. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford. 12mo., 372 pp., cloth, full gilt, \$2. Jansen, McClurg & Co., Chicago.

⁶Outlines of Modern Chemistry, Organic: Based, in part, upon Riche's Manuel de Chimie. By C. Gilbert Wheeler, Professor of Chemistry in the University of Chicago. 12mo., 231 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXIX.—NO. 2.

APRIL, MDCCCLXXVIII.

ARTICLE I.

Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiae Universalis. The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes. By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. In three Volumes. New York: Harper & Bros. 1877.

A short notice of this voluminous work appeared in our last number, together with a promise of a more extended examination. This promise we now propose to redeem, according to the measure of our ability.

Dr. Schaff's design is a grand one. He proposes to set before us, in these volumes, not the results of the thinking of individual minds, not what the most illustrious doctors of the Church have thought upon questions no less awful than the being of God and the eternal destiny of man; but the products of the mind of the Church itself, of that vast community which professes to be the witness of God and of his Christ in the midst of a world full of darkness, pollution, and shame.

These creeds are not the expressions of *opinion* upon problems which have engaged and confounded the inquiries of philosophers. They are confessions of *faith* in the solutions of those problems by him who is the source of all truth, as he is the source of all being; solutions contained in a book divinely inspired, divinely authenticated, and divinely interpreted. The Church, in these creeds, declares that faith for which her members are willing to die and for which hundreds of thousands of her members have

willingly died; that faith which has confronted the lies of the devil from age to age, and will continue to confront them until the King of truth shall appear to settle the controversy forever. These creeds are the banners of the Church. They have passed through many a storm of fire and blood; and to him who is acquainted with the history of the Church, there is scarcely a line which does not tell of some struggle with the powers of darkness. No record is more worthy of our study.

The design of our author, it is needless to say, is not altogether new. There are very many collections of creeds. But so far as we know, his plan is more comprehensive than any which has been attempted before. His work, as the title implies, is a symbolical library of the Church universal. It contains, beside the principal creeds of the great historical churches, those also of many of the small "sects" and off-shoots of those churches, and even the confessions drawn up by individual doctors who are supposed to have had, or known from history to have had, a sort of representative significance. The comprehensiveness of the plan can be better indicated by some extracts from the table of contents. The creeds are contained in the two last volumes. The first of these contains "the Creeds of the Greek and Latin Churches." Under this head we find: I. "Scripture Confessions"—of Nathaniel, Peter, Thomas; the Baptismal Formula; the Mystery of Godliness; the Elementary Articles, (Heb. vi., 1, 2,) etc. II. Ante-Nicene and Nicene Rules of Faith and Baptismal Creeds—Ignatius of Antioch; Irenæus of Gaul, (three formulas); Tertullian, (three formulas); Novatian; Eusebius of Cæsarea; Cyril of Jerusalem, (two formulas); Epiphanius of Cyprus, (two formulas); Apostolical Constitutions, etc. III. (Ecumenical Creeds—The Apostles'; Nicene; Chalcedonian; Athanasian, etc. IV. Roman Creeds—including the Papal Syllabus and the Vatican Decrees of 1870. V. Greek and Russian Creeds—Mogilas, Dositheus, Philaret. VI. Old Catholic Union Creeds of 1874 and 1875. The second volume contains the Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches. Under this head we find: I. Creeds of the Lutheran Church. II. Creeds of the Evangelical Reformed Churches—(besides the well known

principal symbols, such as the two Helvetic, Heidelberg Catechism, the Gallic, Belgic, etc.); the sixty-seven Articles of Zwingli, 1523; the ten Theses of Berne, 1528; the Lambeth Articles, 1595; the Irish Articles, 1615, etc. The author gives us also the Westminster Confession in Latin as well as in English, and the Shorter Catechism of the same great Assembly of divines. III. Modern Protestant Creeds—Congregational Confessions, (Savoy, 1658; Boston National Council, 1865; Oberlin National Council, 1865); Baptist Confessions, (Philadelphia, 1686; New Hampshire, 1833; Free Will Baptist, 1866); Quaker, Moravian, Methodist, 1784; Reformed Episcopal, 1875; and last, but by no means least, we imagine, in Dr. Schaff's estimation, "The Nine Articles of the Evangelical Alliance," 1846. Our readers will perceive from this table that our author has performed a valuable service to the Church, and especially to our ministers. No pastor ought to be without a collection of the creeds. Yet very few of them are near enough to public libraries to have access to the collections of Hase, Niemeyer, Strütwolf, Augusti, etc. Still less have they salaries large enough to admit of their buying books such as these. But here is a book which contains all that is necessary for the ordinary uses of a pastor; and if he be too poor to buy, and has not the good fortune to have a friend of a longer purse who will give it to him, let him "sell his garment and buy one." It is a sword that he cannot afford to be without.

In these two volumes, however, Dr. Schaff appears only as a faithful collector and editor. It is in the first that he appears as an author; and it is the first, therefore, which claims chiefly our notice as reviewers. It is entitled "A History of the Creeds of Christendom." No one who is acquainted with the author's labors in the field of Church History can entertain a doubt as to his fitness to write such a history. His learning and his industry are known to all men, and are worthy of all praise. His impartiality is exemplary. This is, no doubt, due in some, perhaps in large, measure to the integrity, purity, and simplicity of his character. But he is not a little indebted, we think, to his German education for it. In his native country, learning is so

general, so extensive, so thorough, and literary activity and competition so great, as to secure speedy protest and exposure for any misrepresentations of facts, whether wilful or undesigned. Scholars there acquire a very wholesome habit of cautiousness in making statements of facts, or in proposing theories which, instead of affording a plausible explanation of the facts, do them manifest violence. There are exceptions, of course, to all rules: and polemics may be found in Germany to-day as bitter as Calovius, or as one-sided as Godfrey Arnold ever were. But the prevailing tone is what we have described. Even the infidel, by his impartial (or indifferent) researches, has advanced the cause of truth; and the scholars of the Papal communion in Germany have exposed themselves, by their moderation and candor, to the perils of the Prohibitory or Expurgatory Index.

Our author's charity is also large—too large. It does almost literally and absolutely "think no evil." He seems to forget at times, that "charity is no fool," that the "sins of some men are open beforehand, going before to judgment;" that there are human "dogs" to whom we are forbidden to give that which is holy, and human "swine" before whom we are not allowed to cast our pearls; and who, therefore, can be known or righteously judged to be dogs and swine. Even charity must discriminate, or incur the risk of rejoicing (or of making others to rejoice) in iniquity as well as in the truth. Universal praise is universal detraction, because it reduces all men to a level. As one example of the spurious charity we have ventured to ascribe to our author, take the statement on page 153, concerning Pius IX. and Cardinal Manning: "Both these eminent and remarkable persons show how a sincere faith in a dogma which borders on blasphemy, may, by a strange delusion or hallucination, be combined with rare purity and amiability of character."*

*Dr. Schaff says, in another place, (Vol. I., page 165,) of the dogma of infallibility: "It involves a blasphemous assumption, and makes the nearest approach to the fulfilment of St. Paul's prophecy of the man of sin, 'who, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God.'" (2 Thess. ii. 4.) Justly and manfully spoken. He also calls the Papacy (p. 185)—the whole system, as we understand him,—

Our readers, then, will please note that a man's purity of character is not necessarily destroyed, or even seriously impaired, by the sin of blasphemy. For Dr. Schaff finds at least two men guilty of this sin, who are not only of pure character, but have "*rare* purity of character." And this blasphemy, be it observed, was not a sudden explosion produced by powerful temptation, and then immediately bewailed in dust and ashes, but deliberately meditated and resolved upon by the Pope, who assembled the dignitaries of the whole body throughout the world to see him do it, and to sustain him by their suffrages in doing it; and constantly repeated and defended by the Cardinal, who is not only a blasphemer, but an apostate. What can Dr. Schaff mean? That a man's faith has nothing to do with his moral character? Then what mean the innumerable declarations of Scripture about the necessity of *faith* in order to salvation? "He that *believeth* shall be saved; he that *believeth not* shall be damned." What mean these three thousand pages about creeds from our author's own hand? Is it all mere history? Have these blood-stained confessions, after all, nothing to do with purity of character? Our author will not say so. He thinks worthier of the truth and of his own labors than to think so. What can he mean? That the Pope and the English Cardinal are not given to sensual vices and brutal pleasures, as so many popes and cardinals have been? That Pius is not such a Pope as Borgia, nor Manning such a Cardinal as Cossa? Or is purity so rare among Popes and Cardinals that average decency is to be regarded as *rare* purity? Or, is Satan to be considered a person of rare purity because he is free from these vices? Perhaps the meaning is uprightness in dealing with men. Then we ask, is a man's dealing with his fellow-men of more consequence than his dealing with God? Because a man respects the rights of his fellows, is he to be deemed of rare purity of character, although at the same time he is guilty, as Dr. Schaff believes he is, of an audacious usurpation of the prerogatives of his Maker? But, is it even dealing fairly a "colossal lie." As we cannot pretend to the overflowing charity of our author, we are glad to have his authority for characterising the system as it deserves.

with men, is it respecting their rights, to demand submission to a mortal like themselves claiming to be infallible, not only without evidence, but against the overwhelming evidence of reason, history, and Scripture, as bishops in the Vatican Council themselves demonstrated?

Dr. Schaff's good words in behalf of these two worthies, remind us of the like in one of Jeremy Bentham's biographers. After having said that "he had no doubt of Jeremy being an atheist," he proceeds: "We may be sorry for such things; but *if they are otherwise good men*, our sorrow will lead us rather to pity than to rage or hatred for them. As well might we rebuke those who are troubled with fever, as them that require to be convinced by touch, or taste, or ciphering, of the existence of a deity. Why may not men be suffered to believe what they please, or what they *can*, rather, about God and a future state, and all the mysteries of theology, as about any other subject of dispute or inquiry?" Dr. Schaff would be very ready with an answer to this foolish and wicked question. He has no sympathy whatever with those who assert that a man's creed is a matter of no consequence. If he had, he would never have taken the trouble to prepare these bulky volumes on creeds. And yet he has laid down a general proposition which involves two enormous errors. The *first* is, that blasphemy is not incompatible with rare purity of character; and the *second*, that the sincere belief of the blasphemous dogma is some sort of excuse for holding it and proclaiming it. Upon the first we have said enough. A few words upon the second.

By a sincere belief is meant, of course, a belief which is not pretended or feigned. Now we all admit that sincerity is better than hypocrisy. If a man professes to believe a lie, knowing it to be a lie, he adds the sin of hypocrisy to the sin of holding a lie. But how comes it to pass that any man believes a lie about God, especially a man who has in his hand what he professes to believe is a revelation from God, given for the very purpose of teaching him the truth concerning God? How came the Pope to believe the enormous lie of his own infallibility, if he was neither a dotard nor a madman? Had he never read the Bible?

Had he never read the history of his predecessors in the Roman See? If he had never read anything, the speeches of the anti-Infallibilists in his own Council might have convinced him. That he was not convinced—that he believed himself infallible—can only be accounted for by that awful judgment which the apostle describes in 1 Thess. ii. 11, 12. Our own opinion is, however, that the Pope and the Jesuits who rule him, no more believe that the occupant of the Roman See is infallible, than they believe that “virtue is its own reward,” or that “honesty is the best policy.”* The decrees of the Vatican Council are simply culmination of the aims which the Jesuits have pursued with unrelenting cruelty and craft from the very foundation of their order. They have always professed to be “*perinde cadavera*” in the hands of the Pope, because they always intended that the Pope’s hands should be moved by themselves. They professed obedience to the Pope’s commands, because they would see to it that the Pope should command nothing except what they suggested or approved. They aimed at making themselves masters of the whole body and of the world; and the shortest method of accomplishing that aim was to have but one authority in the body, and to govern that authority. They have succeeded at last. There is but one sword, extending to the ends of the earth, with the hilt at Rome.

But whatever may be Dr. Schaff’s charity for the persons or the blasphemers, he has none for the blasphemy. He gives no quarter to the Vatican decrees. We do not remember to have read a more conclusive argument than that which he gives us against the audacious and blasphemous claim of infallibility, in the first volume of this work. Even here, however, we must be permit-

*De Maistre (*Du Pape*, C. 1,) explains infallibility to be the same in the spiritual order that sovereignty means in the civil order. He demands for the Papal body only “that it should be allowed the right which is conceded to all sovereignties, of acting as if they were infallible. All government is absolute; and the moment it can be resisted under the pretext of error or injustice, it exists no longer.” (Schaff, Vol. I., p. 166.) If this were all that the claim of infallibility means, then indeed the Jesuits would be firm believers in it.

ted to enter a *caveat*. In noticing the Papal argument for infallibility, based upon such passages as Luke xxii. 31; Matt. xvi. 18; John xxi. 15;* our author concedes the truth of "Peter's primacy among the apostles," and admits that "this is the truth which underlies the colossal lie of the Papacy." He proceeds, indeed, to show that "the position which Peter occupied, no one can occupy after him." But truth will not permit us to concede any such primacy as that which the Papists claim for him. He was no more than *primus inter pares*. Dr. Schaff himself demonstrates this. He says, what so many writers have said before him, that "the New Testament shows not one single example of an exercise of jurisdiction by Peter over the other apostles, but the very reverse; that that apostle, in his Epistles, disowns and prophetically warns his fellow-presbyters against the hierarchical spirit; (1 Pet. v. 1-4) that Paul and John were perfectly independent of him; that Paul openly rebuked him at Antioch," etc. The Primacy of Peter, as the New Testament really presents it, is not at all what the Papists want. Their policy is to quote the passages and ring the changes upon them, without inquiring what they mean. It is only a variety of what Whately calls "the fallacy of quotations." For what purpose, then, the concession that these passages contain "a truth which underlies the colossal lie of the Papacy?" We can ascribe it to nothing but an amiable mania of the author for concessions. He cannot prove even the sin of blasphemy upon a man without taking off his hat and making his obeisance to him. For ourselves, we confess that we have more sympathy with the language of Paul to Elymas, when we are called to deal with impostors and hypocrites, who, for filthy lucre, are perverting the right ways of the Lord, and turning men away from the faith.

* We ought not to have said "based upon." The truth is, as Whately has some where observed, the errors of Romanism are not based upon Scripture, not even upon false interpretations of Scripture, but have arisen altogether independently of it. But having arisen, support is sought for them in Scripture. Hence, when the false interpretations of Papal doctors are exposed and overthrown, we make very little impression upon them. When all the Scripture props are knocked from under them, they stand as they did before; a very conclusive evidence that these proofs were not the support upon which they rested.

Another signal exception to the strictly historical character of the first volume is the fine argument against the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin. The history of the bitter contests concerning this dogma in the Papal body, furnishes a striking commentary upon its boasted unity, and goes far towards justifying the sarcasm of the Edinburgh reviewer. "Their unity is the unity of chaos. There was but one chaos; but in that one there was infinite confusion." Even our amiable author cannot find in this "colossal lie" a single element of truth. It is a pure invention of the same audacity and wickedness which has deified the Virgin; nay, set her above God and his Christ. Dr. Schaff's treatment of the dogma, both historical and polemic, is in his very best style, and is worthy of all praise.

The part of this volume which will be most interesting to our Presbyterian people is that in which the author treats of the Westminster Assembly and Standards. He has evidently taken great pains with it; and it would not be easy to find any where, in the same space, an account of the great men of that Assembly, and of the immortal symbols they produced, more impartial, or, we may add, more lively. We cannot, indeed, concur in all he says about the Confession and the Catechisms, for we are in full sympathy with them; and he is not and does not profess to be. But we think that we all owe a debt of gratitude to him for doing justice to a body of men who, though they extorted the admiration and praise of John Milton, yet afterwards, by their fidelity to truth, incurred his displeasure, and have been misrepresented and maligned ever since by a class of writers who had as little sympathy with Milton as with them. "Whether we look at the extent or ability of its labors," says our author of the Assembly, "or its influence upon future generations, it stands first among Protestant Councils. The Synod of Dort was indeed fully equal to it in learning and moral weight, and was more general in its composition, since it embraced delegates from nearly all Reformed churches; while the Westminster Assembly was purely English and Scotch, and its standards are to this day little known on the continent of Europe.* But the doctrinal legislation of Dort was

*"It is characteristic," says our author here in a foot-note, "that Dr. VOL. XXIX., NO. 1—2.

confined to the five points at issue between Calvinism and Arminianism; the Assembly of Westminster embraced the whole field of theology, from the eternal decrees of God to the final judgment. The Canons of Dort have lost their hold upon the mother country; the Confession and Shorter Catechism of Westminster are as much used now in Anglo-Presbyterian churches as ever, and have more vitality and influence than any other Calvinistic confession." (P. 728.) He also quotes Hallam as saying that "the Assembly was perhaps equal in learning, good sense, and other merits, to any Lower House of Convocation that ever made a figure in England"; and then adds the opinion of "one of the best informed German historians," expressed in these words: "A more zealous, intelligent, and learned body of divines, seldom ever (*sic*) met in Christendom." Such testimonies more than counterbalance the insolent and malignant slanders of Clarendon and his copyists.

Dr. Schaff finds some fault in the theology of the Westminster Assembly, beside its doctrine concerning the relation of Church and State, which has never been accepted by the Presbyterian Church in America. We feel strongly inclined to follow him into that field. We think it would not be difficult to show that the Assembly is right and that he is wrong. But it would lead us away too far from the purpose of this article. We must be permitted to say, however, that he is evidently not as much

Niemeyer published his collection of Reformed Confessions, the most complete we have, at first without the Westminster Standards, being unable to find a copy, and issued them afterwards in a supplement. Dr. Winer barely mentions the Westminster Confession in his 'Symbolik,' and never quotes from it. If German Church historians (including Gieseler) were to be judged by their knowledge of English and American affairs, they would lose much of the esteem in which they are justly held. What is *westward*, is a *terra incognita* to most of them. They are much more at home in the by-ways of the remote past, than in the living Church of the present, outside of Germany."

The Westminster Confession was probably better known (in the Latin translation) on the continent in the seventeenth century than it is now. We remember seeing it quoted by Beaulieu, in his "Theses Sedanenses," in support of his view of the nature of saving faith, as against the view of Luther and Calvin.

at home in the department of dogmatic theology as in that of Church history. In the latter it would be hard to find his equal; in the former, it would be easy.

Before passing to the more general remarks that we propose to make upon this work, we shall notice some of its slighter but very pleasant features. The style is very remarkable for a German who was old enough, before he made his home in this country, to have acquired a brilliant reputation in his own. It is almost always grammatical, generally idiomatic, sometimes even elegant. Occasionally he uses a phrase which is wholly colloquial, and once or twice one which borders on slang. This is not strange. The only wonder is that such blemishes are so rare. We think that the amiable author's expatriation has been a benefit to himself, to the country of his adoption, and to his own native country. His style has gained immensely in clearness. Perspicuity, it must be acknowledged, is not a prominent characteristic of the style of our German friends. It is impossible that it should be, so long as the principle upon which they construct their sentences seems to be that of putting in each all that it can possibly be made to contain. De Quincey's humorous description is hardly an exaggeration, at least in its application to the style of the theologians and philosophers. "The character of German prose," he says, "is an object of legitimate astonishment. Whatever is bad in our own ideal of prose style, we see there carried to the most outrageous excess. Herod is out-Heroded, Sternhold is out-Sternholded, with a zealotry of extravagance that really seems like wilful burlesque; . . . a sentence is viewed by Kant, and by most of his countrymen, as a rude mould or elastic form, admitting of expansion to any possible extent; it is laid down as a rude outline, and then, by superstruction and *epi*-superstruction, it is gradually reared to a giddy altitude which no eye can follow. . . . It is like an Act of Parliament, where the exceptions, the secondary exceptions to the exceptions, the limitations and the sublimitations, descend *seriatim*, by a vast scale of dependencies," etc. Sentences of this sort, he suggests, are not only of great calibre, but of very large *bore*. The want of perspicuity is also due, no doubt, to the fondness for speculation (in the German sense of

this word,) the "*mens pasta chimæris*." "The English," said Jean Paul, "have the empire of the sea, the French of the land, the Germans of the air"—and of the clouds. The "obscure" of their philosophy may be made "palpable"; but it cannot be made clear by any artifices of style. Even Cousin cannot do it without the aid of the philosophy of common sense, although a Frenchman, and therefore, either clear or—nothing. Dr. Schaff's thorough study of English literature, and his intercourse with the English and American people, have helped him mightily. We cannot remember a single sentence in this large volume of which the meaning, if not intuitively obvious, cannot be discerned without difficulty. We have noticed some instances of not very happy translation in the volumes containing the creeds, but these are from another hand, not his own.* And now, as he has become so familiar with the English tongue, we cannot refrain from expressing the hope that he will address himself to the task of completing his history of the Christian Church. If it is easier for him to write in German than in English, let him finish that great work in German; and then we shall venture to hope that he may still find as happy a translator as Mr. Yeomans.

Another pleasant feature of the Historical Introduction are the anecdotes (*anécdotes*), biographical, academic, literary, which are so plentifully sprinkled over his pages, especially in the foot-notes. They are interesting in themselves, and serve to relieve the strain of attention which is demanded by the grave matters of history or disquisition. We mention but one specimen of these *anécdotes*. It concerns the famous words, "*in necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in omnibus caritas*,"—the motto of peace-loving men for so many generations, and dear, of course, to our

* For example, in the translation of the French Confession, "justice" is several times rendered "justification," instead of *righteousness*. So also in Art. XIX., the words, "il convient tenir notre vie du lui, comme de notre *chef*," are rendered "we must hold our life from him (Christ) as from our *Chief*," where *head* would have been the better rendering. So again, "les uns" is rendered "the ones," which may be literal, and may be tolerated in colloquial English, but seems out of place in a grave document like this.

author. The words have generally been attributed to Augustine, but, it seems, erroneously. Lücke has devoted a special treatise to them, their age, their author, etc, and traces them to Rupertus Meldenius, the obscure author of "*Parænesis votiva pro pace ecclesie ad theologos Augustanæ confessionis*," (before 1635), in which the sentence occurs, "*Si nos servaremus in necessariis unitatem, in non-necessariis libertatem, in utrisque caritatem, optimo certe loco essent res nostræ.*" (I., p. 588.)

We propose now to gather some of the lessons which this collection of creeds and their history are suited to impress upon us.

1. And, in the first place, we are impressed with the necessity for creeds, if there be a necessity for the existence of the Church itself. "*Ecclesia sine symbolis nulla.*" The Church is an assembly, and an assembly consisting of persons who believe and have communion or fellowship in their belief. How is it possible that this fellowship can exist without a statement or expression of what is believed? Such a statement, be it long or short, is a creed. Those bodies of professing Christians, therefore, who boast, like the Campbellites, of having no creed, are really disclaiming the character and status of a visible Church. There is no bond of fellowship in the faith, if their boast be well founded. The truth is, it is not well founded. Men may associate for many purposes, for the accomplishment of which no faith (in the religious sense) is required. Men of all complexions of religious faith may unite to build a railroad, or throw a bridge across a river, or even to establish a civil government. But they cannot constitute a Church without faith, and without agreement as to the things which are the objects of faith. The Campbellites are, therefore, agreed as to certain doctrines which they profess to believe, or at least as to certain doctrines which they profess to disbelieve. Their positive creed may be very, very short, and their negative very, very long, but a creed they must have, or they could not continue to subsist as a religious association. It must be confessed, however, that so long as they refuse to inform us what their creed is, or continue steadily to deny that they have any, we are compelled to take them at their word, and to refuse to them the character and title of a visible Church; while, in the

exercise of that charity which believeth all things and hopeth all things, we believe and hope that there may be true children of God among them. It is a very significant fact, that in this voluminous work which we are reviewing, projected upon the most comprehensive scale, and written by a man of the most comprehensive charity, all he can find to say about the "Disciples" is contained in this short sentence: "These are very numerous in the West; they reject all creeds on principle."

Again, the great function of the Church is to bear witness to the truth. She is the representative on earth of the "Amen, the Faithful and True Witness," her Head invisible, in heaven. He is the Light, she is the Lamp; he the *lumen illuminans*, she the *lumen illuminatum*. She cannot perform this office by holding up a collection of writings and proclaiming, "This is my faith;" nor can she fulfil it by the preaching and writings of her ministers. They may misrepresent her testimony through ignorance or malice, as they have done a thousand times. She must have a standard by which the ministers themselves are to be judged, and to which all men may appeal. In short, she must have a creed.

Further, there must needs be heresies in the Church. Heretics, as distinguished from infidels, profess to believe the Scriptures. How can they be separated from the Church, except by a creed? Hence "forms of sound words" have been in use in the Church from the beginning. The matter of Scripture has been stated in words, about which there could be no mistake or misrepresentation as to their meaning. Men affect to doubt, as has been well said, whether the Bible teaches the Church doctrine of the Trinity, or the doctrines of the Calvinistic system. But who doubts whether the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed teaches the former, and the Westminster Confession the latter? Aye! the Church has been able to find words which, like the spear of Ithuriel, have compelled the spirit of evil to reveal itself. A jot or tittle, an iota, the smallest letter in the Greek alphabet, inserted in the middle of a word, was an excruciating test of orthodoxy in the fourth century, and, in spite of the sneers of Gibbon, subserved the purposes of fundamental truth. The presence or the absence

of the iota in a man's confession determined whether he confessed Christ to be the Almighty God or a mere creature.

Creeds are necessary, then, for a testimony, for the very existence of the Church as an organised visible body, and for its defence against the inroads of heresy.

2. We learn the necessity for growth and development in creeds. In the infancy of the Church, as in the infancy of the children who are trained from age to age in her bosom, the creed is naturally short and simple. Her faith, like the faith of infancy, is spontaneous, unreflective, unscientific. The "Apostles' Creed" exactly represents it. It is not only free from what have been called "the speculative elements" of doctrine, but omits some of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. It was simply impossible that the Church should be always satisfied with such a creed, if it was ever to pass beyond a state of infancy. The Arian and Pelagian had no hesitation in subscribing it. But if Arianism had never arisen to insult the majesty of the Redeemer, if no other form of heresy had assailed the foundation of the Church, the theology of the Church must have been developed by the very laws of the human intellect. Her spontaneous, unreflective faith had to be justified to her own mind. In reference to the relation (for example) of the Son to the Father in the God-head, the Church could not think long without feeling the difficulty of reconciling its monotheism with the worship of two persons, each of whom was represented in Scripture as the proper object of worship, and therefore God. The law of non-contradiction is a fundamental law of thought, and the mind is restless and impatient until it discovers the principle by which the apparent contradictions are reconciled. Many unsuccessful attempts may be made before the law of harmony is ascertained, but there is no rest for the mind until it is ascertained, or until it is demonstrated that, in the nature of the case, it can never be ascertained. The conclusions of the Nicene Council, therefore, were conclusions which the Church would have reached in the course of time, if Arianism had never arisen to compel the definition of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is vain to say that it would have been better for the Church if she had always been

content with the faith of her childhood; or, in other words, if there had never been any scientific theology; that a great many errors might have been avoided; that the "*rabies theologorum*," which afflicted the soul of Melancthon so grievously, would have had no cause for its existence. It would be as wise to say that it would have been better for mankind if there had been no science of chemistry, because that science has made men more expert poisoners than they could have been without it. Thinking is necessary to the progress of the race, and we must submit to the evils and abuses which attend it for the sake of the incalculable good which is its legitimate result. If the Church refuses to have a sound theology, the devil and his instruments will take pains to provide another sort of theology for her.

And this leads us to observe, that, in point of fact, the Church had no choice. Her faith was assailed. The "gates of hell" left nothing undone to subvert its very foundation. It had to be defended or surrendered. The result was not only the preservation of the faith, but a clearer knowledge of it, and a development of it. A clearer knowledge, because it had to be examined on more sides than one; on as many sides, in fact, as it had been assailed; and as "the science of contraries is one," the knowledge of the one contrary involves a clearer knowledge of the other. A development of it, because this is the necessary result of the many-sidedness of the examination. To illustrate our meaning, take the answer of the Westminster Shorter Catechism to the question (21st), "Who is the Redeemer of God's elect?" Here, in almost every clause, the "form of words" is determined by some error or errors by which the truth has been opposed—Arianism, Patripassianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism. So, also, in the question which follows (the twenty-second); the form of statement is determined by the errors of the Docetists, the Apollinarians, etc.

As the theology is developed under these conditions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the creeds should remain stationary. The creeds of the Church could not be the same after the Christological discussions of the fifth century that they were before, any more than the Church could be satisfied with the Apostles' Creed

after the Arian controversy had arisen. So, also, it was impossible that the doctrines which belong to soteriology should not have greater prominence in the symbols of the Reformation era than in any preceding era. If there is no life in the Church, or if her life is characterised, like that of Thyatira, by a zealous ministry of love at the expense of fidelity to the truth, then, indeed, she may not feel the obligation to testify for any other doctrines than those which are absolutely necessary to distinguish Christianity from Judaism, Paganism, and Mahometanism. We are constrained to believe that many of the union schemes of our own day have no better origin; that they are essentially humanitarian in spirit, and place the welfare of man above the glory of God. Theology, which is the knowledge of God, is relegated to a position subordinate to philanthropy, which is the love of man. This is a fatal error. For the good of man can never be promoted by any measure which obscures the glory of his Maker and Redeemer. The only effectual method of securing the interests of holiness is to bear a faithful witness for the truth. Truth is the mould of holiness, and without holiness no man shall see the Lord. The world has never seen a truer philanthropist than that great Apostle of the Gentiles, who, when the truth was in question, "gave way by subjection, no, not for an hour." A philanthropy, without God, has deluged a land with blood and marked its progress with dead men's bones.

It would really seem as if the lessons of history had been given in vain to these peace-makers. The course of the Church is strewn with the wrecks of such schemes. They have all failed, because they have all demanded that the Church should suppress her convictions of truth and annul her history; that the boy of ten should go back to the period of puling infancy, or that the man of mature years should abdicate all the dignity and strength which experience and reflection have conferred upon him. But the thing is impossible; and if not impossible, it is not to be desired. The first, original, genuine childhood has great charms; but a second childhood is a pitiable thing to contemplate. The simplicity of youth cannot be copied by age. Manhood has its cares and its conflicts, but they are cares and conflicts which en-

noble and elevate. Reflection conjures up a host of doubts and difficulties to torment us, but who, on that account, would be willing to abjure reflection? John Locke wrote a treatise to persuade the Church that no larger creed was necessary than the single article, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Why was he not satisfied with the same brevity and simplicity in philosophy? His "Essay on the Human Understanding" has certainly been anything but an "*Irenicum*."

We have said that the course of the Church is strewn with the wrecks of union-schemes. Let us glance at some of them. One of the first is encountered in the Arian controversies—that of the "Homoians." This was a proposition to abandon the use of only one word—*ousia*—which had been the cause of so much dissension, and a word, moreover, whose use involved an audacious claim of ability to comprehend the incomprehensible. Why not lay it aside, and adopt a formula in which Homoousians and Homoiousians might unite, and so extinguish the war which was a scandal to the world? The scheme was for a time successful. The powerful influence of the Emperor, the intrigues of the bishops of his court, the adhesion of the Bishop of Rome, Liberius, the reluctant subscription of the Councils of Seleucia and Rimini, finally made Homoism the acknowledged creed of the empire, as Homoiousianism had been before. But in twenty years from the victory of the Emperor and his episcopal politicians, Homoousianism triumphed in the Council of Constantinople. The Christological controversies of the following century gave rise to similar attempts. The Monophysites and Dyophysites were to be reconciled by a "Henoticon," according to which the history for the last hundred years was to be forgotten, the church was to go back to the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan creed, and all controverted points were to be carefully avoided. This Henoticon was the beginning of the schism between the Eastern and Western churches. A similar fate attended the conciliatory measures of Justinian, in the sixth century, and of Heraclius and Constans, in the seventh. The "Typos" of the last named Emperor was designed to quiet the Monothelite disputes, by restoring the *status quo*, that is, by commanding divines to speak

and write as if the controversies of the preceding thirty or forty years had not taken place.

After the Reformation, we have the like schemes for uniting the different branches of the nominal church and the same kind of basis proposed, if not for organic union, at least for "correspondence"—the oblivion of the past and the cessation of controversy. The scheme of Calixtus was to go back to the first five centuries—the "*consensus quinquesecularis*." This was practically to annul the history of the studies and conflicts of a thousand years. The labors of that great martyr in the cause of peace to realise his idea are almost incredible. Yet with what result? He "spun himself and his life out into one pitiful controverted conclusion." He was obliged to fail, because he was contending against the elementary forces of nature, and his proposals for peace became the signal for one of the fiercest wars that ever raged in Germany. One might have supposed that a man of great learning, as Calixtus undoubtedly was, would see from the first that his idea could never be realised before the millennium, and that then there would be no use for it. The creeds of the first five centuries were in possession of the Church and of every branch of it, and they were received by all. But this very fact was fatal to the scheme of the peace-maker. The reason is a very plain one. *Notwithstanding* the common reception of the Œcumenical creeds, the Church was divided into Roman, Greek, Lutheran, and Reformed. The very fact of division in spite of the *consensus quinquesecularis*, if properly considered, was enough to chill the ardor even of a Calixtus. The differences were as real as the agreements, and they could not be waved away by the wand even of such a wizard as he. This is the stubborn fact which his scheme had to encounter and against which it was doomed to be wrecked, and deserved to be. If he could have persuaded the churches that the differences were unreal or unimportant, then union or correspondence might have been established in *faith*. But the churches ought not to have united or corresponded upon any other basis than that of faith. The only body calling itself a Church which has succeeded in suppressing differences not upon the basis of faith, is the Papacy.

But with what results? One result was the monstrous doctrine of the dualism of truth—that the same proposition might be true in theology and false in philosophy, and *vice versa*; or the other monstrous doctrine, which has been ascribed to Occam, that God can make and unmake truth as it pleases him, and can authorise the Church to do the same. Another was the extinction of all love for truth and faith in it, and the erection, in the name of Christ, of a kingdom worldly in its aims, worldly in its means and policy, and caring nothing for God, heaven, or hell, except so far as these great ideas may aid its visible head and his advisers in accomplishing the schemes of their ambition and gratifying their lust for gold.

3. The last remark we make is that, while the study of this collection of creeds cannot fail to impress us with the differences which exist among Christians upon certain points of faith, it must impress us also with the real *consensus* of the Evangelical Churches upon others, and the most important. He who will take the pains to examine the creeds of these churches will find evidence enough that they have not only been governed by the same external standard, the Word of God, but that they have been led also by the same Spirit. He will also find that there is more real unity in the different branches of the Reformed body than there is in the one body of Rome, and that too in regard to the fundamental point, the way of salvation. Innocent III., in the thirteenth century, the historians inform us, was opposed to the formation of what he called “any new religions,” meaning new religious orders. The term was more happily chosen than he was aware of. Each one of these orders was a “new religion” in the sense of “denomination” as used by Protestants, except that they all agreed to submit to the Pope. But they were none the less jealous of each other on that account. The wars of the Dominicans and the Franciscans about the nature of sin and grace, fundamental elements of doctrine, soon justified the caution of the cunning Pope, to say nothing of their controversies concerning the immaculate conception of the Virgin. Then we have the controversies about sin and grace renewed between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, in the sixteenth century, which was

quieted according to the recipe of *Punch*—"the best way to crush a thing is to get a committee to sit on it." The congregation "de auxiliis" sat on the controversy for many years and smothered it. But it revived again in the next century between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, and the wish of Voltaire was at one time apparently almost realised, "to see the last Jansenist in the bowels of the last Jesuit." The unity of Rome is the unity of staves in a barrel. The staves are kept together by the hoops. There is no life, no organic unity, in the body considered as a religious body. There is life enough in it considered as a political corporation which is aiming, like its Pagan predecessor, to establish a universal dominion, an iron despotism which shall not suffer the slightest vestige of liberty to remain on earth. Not the slightest vestige of a church now remains at Rome, except the name.

The unity of the Evangelical Churches, on the other hand, is the unity of life. It is the unity of a living organism, not only admitting, but requiring, diversity. It is not a great iron wheel of which the different parts are only spokes having no other motion than that of the wheel itself, but a complicated structure of wheels within a wheel, like that of the prophet's vision, each having a sphere and a movement of its own, but all instinct with the spirit of the living creature. The individuality of the parts is preserved, yet all conspire for the accomplishment of the end designed for the whole. Each member of the system traverses its own orbit, obeying the attraction of the central sun, an attraction mighty enough to counteract the centrifugal force which, if left to its own operation, would drive them asunder forever. The *consensus* of the apostate churches, on the other hand, is a *consensus* in the denial of the great doctrines of salvation, and perfectly compatible with mutual anathemas of each other, as well as with a common anathema of those which hold the truth.

Let us hope that no further attempt will be made to disturb the true *consensus* of the Reformed Churches, by forcing a union which must be more or less insincere. Let us avoid the fatal error and the odious hypocrisy of Rome. Let us never forget that "fraternal relations" does not mean organic union or even "cor-

respondence," but the loving recognition of one Evangelical Church by another as a true Church of Christ. Above all, let us never forget the supreme importance of the truth itself, in which the glory of God and the salvation of men are so deeply concerned,—of that *doctrine*, which, however postponed in the esteem of many to the interests of peace, is, after all, as Calvin said, the "*sacrum vinculum fraternitatis beatæ.*"

ARTICLE II.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES IN EQUATORIAL AFRICA.

In a previous number of this REVIEW we gave a brief sketch of the various explorations that had been made, in different ages of the world, to solve two great problems in African geography, viz., the outlet of the Niger, and the source of the Nile. The first of these problems was solved, as is well known, about fifty years ago by Richard Lander and his brother, and the other at a much later period by the combined researches of Speke, Grant, and Sir Samuel W. Baker. Since the last mentioned discovery, the work of exploration has gone on with great spirit and energy, so that we have now a tolerably correct map, not only of the sources of the Nile, but of all the important geographical features of Central Southern Africa—a vast region of country that has heretofore been almost entirely unknown to the civilised world. Of the more recent and important of these explorations may be mentioned those of Sir Samuel W. Baker, in the service of the Khedive of Egypt; of the well known veteran African traveller, Dr. David Livingstone; Dr. Georg Schweinfurth, under the direction of Humboldt Institution; Col. C. Chaille Long, in the service of the Khedive of Egypt; Commander V. L. Cameron, of the British navy; and Henry M. Stanley, joint commissioner, as he is called, of the New York *Herald* and the London *Daily Telegraph*. The journals of all these travellers have been pub-

lished in regular book form, except those of Stanley, of which we have as yet only newspaper and desultory articles.

Sir Samuel W. Baker, during his recent sojourn in the lake regions, an interesting account of which is given in his book entitled "Ismailia," had less reference to geographical research than to the subjugation of the country to the authority of the Khedive of Egypt, with the ultimate view of breaking up the slave trade. With the means and military force placed at his command, he was entirely successful in bringing all the aboriginal tribes around Gondokoro, and between that and the northern borders of Victoria Nyanza, under the acknowledged authority of the Khedive of Egypt. At the same time he established military posts in various parts of the country, with the twofold purpose of suppressing the slave trade, and of protecting lawful commerce and making travelling more secure. So far as these particular objects are concerned, his undertaking may be regarded as eminently successful.

Col. Long's journey lay along the east side of the Nile, and for the most part parallel to it, from Gondokoro 5° north latitude, to the northern borders of Victoria Nyanza, very nearly under the equator; a distance in a direct line of about 300 miles. He crossed and recrossed the great river which connects the Victoria and the Albert Nyanza, and which now, by common consent, is called the White Nile. He found this river at one place spreading itself out into a small lake, a characteristic feature of almost all the rivers of this part of Africa. He traversed the country of Uganda in its full length and breadth, and was treated with great hospitality by M'tesa, the king, but was not permitted to explore the great lake as he desired to do. He did not, however, receive the same impressions of the mild and docile character of the people that Stanley did, who had visited the country a short time before, from the opposite direction.

Dr. Schweinfurth's researches lay altogether on the west side of the Nile. He left the Nile at its confluence with the Gazal, in 10° north latitude, and directed his steps in a southwesterly direction to the Monbutto country, which lies on the west side of the mountain range which shuts in the Albert Nyanza. The

only geographical discovery of importance made by him was the great river Wéllé, forming the southern boundary of the Monbutto country, and running in a westerly direction. We shall have occasion to refer again to this discovery, in the progress of this article. Although Dr. Schweinfurth made no other geographical discovery than the one just mentioned, he has made richer contributions to our knowledge of the botany, the natural history, and the geological features of those regions, as well as to the character and habits of the people, than any other traveller that has ever visited them. His statements bear the impress of truth and of close scientific observation; and his book is read with more than ordinary interest.

Commander Cameron in his undertaking seems to have had two objective points before his mind, one of which was to ascertain the outflow of the Tanganyika Lake, and the other to make his way across the continent from east to west. He succeeded in both of these, but not to his entire satisfaction as to the first, and not exactly in the direction that he intended as to the second. The Lukuga river, which he found flowing out of the west side of the lake in a westerly direction—probably makes its way through a break in the mountain chain to the Lualaba, and thus reaches the Atlantic. This point has yet to be settled, as no one has traced the course of this river for more than a few miles from the lake. From Tanganyika, Commander Cameron made his way to the town of Nyangwe, situated on the banks of the Lualaba river, 4° south latitude, and which had been previously discovered by Dr. Livingstone. Here he was strongly impressed with the idea of the identity of the Lualaba and the Kongo river, which is now known to discharge itself into the Atlantic about 6° south latitude. He was very desirous of following it down to its outlet, but his means were limited, and he could procure neither men nor canoes for the undertaking. In order to cross the continent at all, he had to lay his course in a south-westerly direction, and, ultimately, reached the western coast at Benguela, four hundred miles south of the mouth of the Kongo. While he failed to accomplish the particular object which lay near to his heart—the identification of the Lualaba and the

Kongo—his discoveries, nevertheless, have an important bearing upon the general geography of the country, especially as to the size and course of the southern tributaries of the Kongo.

At the distance of a few hundred miles from the Atlantic sea-coast, he must have crossed the track of Dr. Livingstone on his famous trans-continental journey from the Zambesi river to Loando St. Paul.

To give even an outline of the long journeys and important discoveries of the greatest of all African explorers, Dr. Livingstone, would require more space than would be compatible with the proposed length of this article. During the last years of his life, he discovered two great lakes on the west side of the mountains,—Lakes Bemba (Bangweolo) and Moero—both lying to the south-west of Tanganyika, the first between the 11° and 12° south latitude, and the second bisected by the 9° south latitude. He ascertained, also, partly by personal observation and partly by information obtained from the natives, that these two lakes were connected by the river Luapula, the Bemba flowing northward into the Moero. He had no idea at the time, however, that the Bangweolo was the true source of the Luálaba, which has since been ascertained to be the fact. These two lakes, with one or two others whose size and position have not yet been accurately settled, are separated from the Nyassa, the Tanganyika, and the Nyanza by a continuous chain of mountains, in a break through which it is probable the waters of the Tanganyika flow into the Luálaba. It had been conjectured before these discoveries were made by Livingstone, that there would be found a series of lakes on the western side of the mountains corresponding to those on the east side, which has proved to be the exact state of the case, as will be seen presently. The next great discovery of Dr. Livingstone, as has already been intimated, was that of the great Luálaba river at the town of Nyangwe. This town is situated on the 4° south latitude and 26° east longitude. It stands very nearly midway between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans—about one hundred and twenty miles nearer the latter. It possesses no importance in itself, except that it has for a long time been regarded as the western *terminus* of all the predatory wars of

the Arabs from the eastern coast. All beyond this was a *terra incognita*, even to them. No one felt any disposition to invade the unknown and mysterious regions beyond. Dr. Livingstone found the river here nearly a mile wide and flowing very rapidly in a northern direction. He was in doubt whether it was the same with the Kongo, and thus flowed into the Atlantic, or whether sweeping around to the north, it did not flow into the Albert Nyanza, and thus become a tributary of the Nile. Had he been acquainted with the discovery of the Wellé by Dr. Schweinfurth, which he was not, he would have seen at once that the latter hypothesis was inadmissible. Dr. Livingstone had neither the strength, the means, nor the men to attempt to follow the course of the Luálaba, and hence directed his steps back to the more familiar regions of the Tanganyika.

Mr. Stanley's explorations, as to their general results, are quite as important as any that had previously been made.

On his previous tour in Africa, where his only object was to find and convey relief to Livingstone, he seems to have been inspired with an ardent desire to make discoveries on his own account, and, no doubt, laid plans which he has since been enabled to carry into execution, but at no little cost of peril and hardship, and, perhaps, by means sometimes that cannot be fully justified. As has already been mentioned, we have up to the present time only newspaper articles on which to base our observations, and we cannot therefore speak with entire confidence as to many important particulars brought to light in the course of his journey across the continent. He left the coast near Zanzibar in November, 1874, with three white men and three hundred natives, whom he had enlisted at Zanzibar and on the adjacent coast. He carried a small American-built boat in sections, called the *Lady Alice*, forty feet long and six broad, to cross the rivers and navigate the lakes. He made his way first to Lake Victoria, which he circumnavigated, visiting Mtésa, the chief of the Uganda country, on its northern borders. It will be remembered by the general reader, that he spoke of this chief and his people as being specially prepared to receive the gospel. He next directed his steps southward to Lake Tanganyika, which he

also circumnavigated, with the view of ascertaining its outflow. From thence he made his way to the town, already mentioned, of Nyangwe, on the Luálaba, which had been previously visited by Livingstone and Cameron; and which, as has already been mentioned, was the western *terminus* of travel from the east coast. Even the Arab slave-trader had never gone beyond this point. It stands eight hundred and ten geographical miles from the Indian Ocean, and nine hundred and thirty from the Atlantic. On his arrival at the Luálaba, he found himself confronted by the same difficulties which had met Livingstone and Cameron some months earlier. Nobody to accompany him, no canoes to be hired, and frightful legends about the country beyond. But he was not to be daunted. He resolved to follow the Luálaba down to its outlet, wherever that might be. He had a strong conviction that it would prove to be the Kongo. He had already fought his way over nearly two-thirds of the distance which now lay between him and the Atlantic. The crowning glory of all his discoveries had yet to be achieved, and he firmly resolved to risk life and everything else for its attainment.

It is a grand spectacle presented by Stanley as he stood upon the banks of the Luálaba, balancing in his mind the dangers and uncertainties of the undertaking with the honor and glory of success. He staked everything on the issue, and after much parleying with the natives and the Arab traders he finally embarked with a little fleet of twenty-seven canoes, manned with one hundred and forty friendly natives, the *Lady Alice*, and one white man—the other two whites having died on the way. His downward course was an almost constant fight with hostile natives. He had, according to his own representations, as many as thirty-four separate engagements, and in most cases the enemy had every advantage as to the number and size of their canoes, as well as the number of men who were employed in managing them. His way was also greatly obstructed by rapids and cataracts in the river, especially where it leaves the eastern mountains to enter the great central basin, and again where it leaves that basin by breaking through the Sierra del Crystal mountains to enter the Atlantic ocean. Around these falls he had to carry his boat and

drag his canoes, and at one place to the distance of thirteen miles. In one attempt to pass over the falls with his boats and canoes, he lost his only surviving white companion, of whom he speaks in the highest terms of commendation. The course of the river from the point where Stanley embarked upon it, was very nearly due north until it reaches the 2° north latitude, then in a northwesterly direction for several hundred miles, and after that in a southwesterly course until it reaches and discharges itself into the Atlantic in 6° south latitude. The whole course of the Kongo from its rise in Lake Bemba to its discharge in the Atlantic, is estimated by Stanley at about two thousand nine hundred miles—one thousand one hundred miles from its source to the town of Nyangwe, and from thence to the Atlantic, the portion over which he journeyed, about one thousand eight hundred miles.

The question, then, of the identity of the Luálaba and the Kongo is settled by actual observation, the results of which, in a commercial, a religious, and general point of view, can scarcely be imagined. Stanley has not only placed himself in the forefront of all the great explorers of the age, but he has opened a door of access for religion, for commerce, and for civilisation to a large section of Africa heretofore unknown to the civilised world, but probably one of the fairest and richest portions of this great continent.

Bringing the results of all these various explorations together, we can form a well defined map of central southern Africa. First, then, is the great chain of mountains of the eastern section of Africa, running parallel to the sea-coast, and about seven hundred miles distant, and extending, so far as is known, from 4° north latitude to the 12° south latitude. The eastern slopes of this chain constitute what is called the water-shed for the parallel lakes of Albert Nyanza, the Tanganyika, and the Nyassa—the Victoria Nyanza being fed by isolated mountains immediately around it. The Nyassa, the southernmost of these lakes, was discovered by Dr. Livingstone soon after his return to Africa. It discharges itself through the Shire into the Zambesi, and thence into the Indian Ocean. The Tanganyika, the largest

and in some respects the most important of these three lakes, was discovered by Burton and Speke in 1857. The outlet of this lake has never yet been satisfactorily settled, but it is probable that the Lukuga, discovered by Commander Cameron, flowing out of its western side, makes its way through a break in the mountain into the Luálaba, and thus flows into the Atlantic. This hypothesis, however, needs confirmation, as no one has yet traced the course of the Lukuga more than a few miles from the lake. The Victoria Nyanza was discovered by Speke, who separated himself from Burton after the discovery of the Tanganyika, and reached the southern shores of the Victoria on his way back to the sea-coast. It was subsequently revisited by Speke; and by Grant and himself together, it was more extensively surveyed than on the first visit. Sir Samuel Baker has the honor of being the discoverer of the Albert Nyanza. The Victoria, as is now well known, empties itself into the Albert Nyanza at no great distance from the point where the White Nile takes its rise as a distinct river. The whole length of the Nile from its source in the Albert Nyanza to the Mediterranean is perhaps not less than two thousand five hundred miles. The peculiar characteristic of this river, however, is that it is as large where it emerges from the Nyanza as it is when it discharges itself into the Mediterranean.

On the western side of this chain of mountains there is a corresponding series of lakes, as the Bangweolo, the Moero, and several others, whose position and size are not yet distinctly settled. The Kongo, or Luálaba, takes its rise in the first of these lakes, spreads itself out in its northward course into Lake Moero, and perhaps into one or two other smaller lakes, before it reaches Nyangwe. This great river flows from its source in a direct northern course to the distance of one thousand five hundred miles, and, for the most part, near to and parallel with the range of mountains whose slopes constitute its water-shed. When it reaches the 2° north latitude in its northward progress, it turns to the west and then southwest, in which direction it runs until breaking its way through the Sierra del Crystal mountains it reaches the Atlantic in 6° south latitude. This great river of

more than two thousand nine hundred miles in length is the third, if not the second, great river in the world. It receives many large affluents both before and after it leaves the slopes of the eastern mountains. One that flows into it from the south, called the Ikalembe, is very nearly as large as the Kongo itself, and is perhaps more than a thousand miles long. Another from the opposite side, called the Aruwimi, which is probably the Wéllé described by Dr. Schweinfurth, and which is a navigable stream for many hundred miles, flows into the main stream not far from the mouth of the Ikalembe. No one acquainted with the lower Kongo will be surprised to find that its actual length is so great, or that it receives so many affluents in its progress westward. It is from three to four miles wide at its mouth, is said to be nearly one thousand feet deep, and rushes into the Atlantic with an immense force. Vessels sailing near the shore are always driven out of their course by the force of its current, whilst the sea to a considerable distance is discolored by the same cause. Captain Tuckey, of the British Navy, attempted in 1816 to explore this river, but in consequence of the swiftness of the current and the falls, he did not get more than one hundred miles from the sea-coast.

Our special object in this paper is to direct the attention of our readers to the great basin of the Kongo, which now opens such a wide door for the introduction of commerce, civilisation, and Christianity. This great basin, or valley of the Kongo, lies between the two great mountain chains of eastern and western Africa—the first already spoken of as running parallel to the eastern coast and about seven hundred miles distant, and the second also running parallel to the western coast, but not more than one hundred or one hundred and fifty miles distant—and extending from the head-waters of the tributaries of the Benue, the great southern affluent of the Niger on the north, to the head-waters of the tributaries of the Zambesi on the south. Thus, this basin will be seen to be about eight hundred miles broad and one thousand two hundred miles from north to the south, and to have an area of nearly one million square miles. There is, perhaps, no richer country, so far as natural resources are

concerned, in the world. It is well watered, has extraordinary facilities for inland travel and commerce, and, for a tropical country, is probably decidedly healthy. And yet, until the researches of Stanley and Cameron were published, the civilised world had no knowledge either of the size or internal condition of this great region. The Arab slave-traders had reached its eastern borders, but knew nothing of the country beyond, except what they could gather from the fabulous stories of the natives. The Portuguese have not only carried on trade with maritime tribes along its whole western frontier, but they have had permanent settlements at different points along the coast for three centuries, yet they knew little or nothing about the people or country beyond the mountains.

The limits of our article will not allow us to enter into any extended details as to the natural resources of the country or of the character and habits of the people. Nor would it be proper to do so until Stanley has published a full and minute account of his various discoveries and observations. It will not be amiss, however, to consider briefly a few points of great and general interest, viz. : 1st. The character of the people who inhabit this valley ; 2d. The commerce that is likely to result from its discovery ; and 3d. The great importance of this immense and populous basin as a field for missionary enterprise.

The inhabitants of this great region, with the exception of some dwarf tribes scattered among them, who may be regarded as the gypsies of Central Africa, belong to the great Ethiopian stock of the negro race, in distinction from the Nigritian stock which inhabits the valley of the Niger. Their being of the Ethiopian family may be inferred from their geographical position, and from the similarity which marks their physical characteristics, the form and structure of their agricultural and warlike implements, their customs, habits, and superstitions, but especially from the words and grammatical forms of their various dialects. Looking simply at the names of persons and places given by our travellers, it is evident that one great language, with dialectic differences, of course, extends from the eastern to the western coast. It may be seen very strikingly in the use of certain con-

sonant combinations, as *ny*, in the names of the three great lakes of Nyassa, Tanganyika, and Nyanza; in the use of *m*, with a sort of half vowel sound, before words that would otherwise commence with the letters *b*, *p*, *t*, and *v*, as m'tesa, m'polu, m'volu; and the letter *n* before a word that would commence with *ty*, as n'tyondo. It will also be observed that many proper names, especially those to designate tribes, commence with *wa* and end with *ana*. Now *wa*, in several of the dialects along the western coast, is the plural of *oma*, person; and so *awana* is the plural of *owana*, a child; when abbreviated into *ana*, at the end of words, it means children or descendants. Many words on the eastern and western coast are the same, as *oganga* for doctor or priest, and *olamba* for cloth of any kind. These affinities might be multiplied to an almost unlimited extent. If a complete vocabulary of all the words used by the four or five tribes residing along the seaboard, between the Gaboon and Loando St. Paul, could be collated, it would perhaps be found to contain four-fifths of all the words used from the equator to the Cape of Good Hope, including even the Bechuana, the Zulu, and the Kaffir families. SKW

As to the amount of the population of this great basin, no very trustworthy estimate can be made. Livingstone, Cameron, and Stanley, all represent the portions of it over which they respectively travelled, as quite populous. This is not the case in the regions around the lakes and between the lakes and the eastern seaboard. Here the slave-trade and the internal wars consequent upon it, have desolated the country and thinned out the population to a frightful extent. So for centuries the western coast was sadly scourged by the same evil; but there has been none of this traffic on any part of this coast for twenty-five or thirty years; so that the population is rapidly recovering its heavy losses. But whatever desolations it may have caused, either along the eastern or western coasts in former years, there is no reason to suppose that it ever reached the central portions of this great basin, with its desolating power. The distance was too great to convey slaves to either coast, without much greater facilities for transportation than they ever possessed. It is perhaps fortunate for

them that they did not know how to utilise their great rivers for this purpose. In view of these and other facts that might be brought together, it is perhaps safe to say that the entire population of this great basin does not fall short of 30,000,000.

In a social point of view, the inhabitants of this region of country occupy a very low place in the scale of humanity. Stanley and Cameron represent some of the tribes through which they respectively travelled, as comparatively mild and harmless, whilst others they found to be fiercest of savages. It is not surprising, however, that Stanley had to fight his way down the greater part of the Kongo. He was the first white man that ever attempted to traverse the country. It was impossible for the people to form any satisfactory conception either of the motives by which he was influenced, or of the results that would follow if he were allowed to pass unchecked through their country. It required more than a mere protestation on his part that his designs were of a purely friendly character. All the knowledge which these people had of the white man was that he was the enemy of their race. They knew him only through the cruelties and the oppressions he had practised upon the race, both in Western and Eastern Africa. They were familiar especially with the disturbances that had been caused by the Arab slave-traders in the regions of the lakes. They dreaded his presence among them as the worst calamity that could befall their country. Supposing Stanley to be one of their number, and that his little party was but the vanguard of a more formidable force to follow, it is not surprising that they made every effort to arrest his onward progress. The negro, in his primitive condition, always regards the products and commodities which white men bring to his country with intense covetousness, especially such articles as guns, powder, beads, rum, red woollen caps, and brass pans. There is nothing he possesses that he will not cheerfully barter for such articles. But at the same time he does not wish to have any direct communication with the white man himself, especially as he has no confidence either in his honesty or in his kindly feelings towards himself. He would prefer to get the coveted articles through the intermediate agency of other tribes.

His hostility, therefore, was not only natural, but was called forth by the novel and peculiar circumstances of the case.

Some of these tribes are undoubtedly cannibal, which places them very low in the scale of humanity. It is gratifying to know, however, that the practice is not general; and that even among those tribes where it does prevail, there are individuals and classes which regard it with disgust. Women never have anything to do with this brutalising practice, and sometimes they put forth all the influence they possess to keep their husbands out of it. It is not easy to point out the successive steps by which men reach this deep degradation. It only illustrates what human nature really is when left without the influences and restraints of the gospel. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that the gospel is abundantly able to lift this people even out of this deep degradation.

The Fijians, fifty years ago, were grosser cannibals than any portion of the African race. But this atrocious habit has not only been given up by that whole race, but the great mass of them are now basking in the light and bliss of a Christian salvation.

Apart from this, the people of this great region of country may be regarded as mild, peaceful, and docile in their general character; and for proofs of this, we might refer to the success of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the kingdom of Kongo two and a half centuries ago, or to the labors of the Protestant missionaries of the present day at the Gaboon, at Corisco, and at Cape Lopez. The cessation of the slave-trade in all these places has not only restored peace and confidence among themselves, but it is followed by a general desire to engage in those industrial pursuits which are promotive of their general welfare. They are also brought in this way into a more favorable attitude towards the gospel of Jesus Christ; and we confidently believe the time will come, sooner or later, when this land, so long buried in Pagan darkness, shall witness triumphs of God's sovereign grace as great as any that have ever visited our sin-ruined world.

These recent discoveries, there is no doubt, will soon be fol-

lowed by great commercial results. A railroad constructed around the first falls in the river, which is not more than one hundred miles from its outlet, or directly from the southern seaboard at Emboma to a point above the falls, which would not necessarily be more than eighty miles long, would in a very few years develop a commerce of immense value. A vessel launched above the falls, would find smooth navigable waters along the main stream and its various branches, of more than two thousand miles. And if by a canal or other means, such a vessel could pass around the second falls, its course through navigable waters would be more than doubled. Without any extraordinary cost or effort, therefore, the civilised world may very speedily be brought in easy contact with almost every portion of this great basin, and, by judicious measures, may set 30,000,000 people to work to bring together the rich resources of their country for foreign exportation.

Among the known products of the country may be mentioned ivory, beeswax, ebony, dye-woods, India-rubber, gum-copal, cotton, ground-nuts, copper ore, beni-seed, and palm-oil. The last mentioned of these products is likely of itself to become a most important branch of commerce. None of these articles have heretofore reached the seacoast, except an occasional tooth of ivory borne on the shoulders of men, over a great distance.

We know no limit that can be placed to the amount of palm-oil that may be prepared for exportation here, except it be in the demand for the article itself. It is now extensively used in England, France, Germany, and other parts of Europe, for lubricating railroad and other machinery, for the manufacture of the best quality of soap, candles, pomatum, and other articles of a similar character. In former times, the oil was derived exclusively from the red oily pulp that envelopes the nut. But recently, it has been ascertained that the kernel of the nut yields a finer quality of oil, and almost as much in quantity as the outer pulp; so that palm kernels are now reported in the Liverpool and other markets of Europe as an important article of commerce. The oil-bearing palm grows in all parts of this great basin. Cameron and Stanley both speak of finding great forests

of this growth; and as the manufacture of it requires neither skill nor labor, any quantity may be produced as soon as there is a demand for it. If we may judge of the progress of its development here by what has taken place along the western seaboard in the course of the last thirty years, its production and exportation must become immensely great.

We have no statistics at hand by which to form even an approximate estimate of the actual amount of palm oil now annually shipped from western Africa. Its growth is mainly within the last twenty-five or thirty years. Formerly, it was confined to the rivers in the Gulf of Benin and to a few points along the Grain and Ivory Coasts. Not more than twenty or thirty vessels were engaged in carrying on the traffic. Now it is gathered and exported, in less or greater quantities, at almost every town and village along a line of seacoast of more than 2,000 miles. Hundreds of sailing vessels are now employed, where fifteen or twenty in former times would have been sufficient. Two semi-monthly lines of steamers of a large class are plying between Liverpool and the coast, and yet they are found insufficient for transporting what the sailing vessels cannot carry. The palm-oil trade has taken the place of the slave-trade, and in actual value to the natives is perhaps worth ten times as much as the slave-trade ever was, even in its most prosperous times. Peace has taken the place of the perpetual strifes that formerly agitated the country; and the aborigines, as a matter of course, have more time and more heart to follow the pursuits of lawful commerce. Similar results, we have no doubt, will be realised in the great valley of the Kongo as soon as the people there are brought into active commercial relations with the civilised world.

But we look upon this great valley with special interest as an inviting field for missionary enterprise. For many long centuries it has remained locked up against the light of the gospel. The Christian world has scarcely known of the existence of this vast multitude of immortal beings. Ignorance, superstition, and barbarism, in all of their varied forms, have reigned here from generation to generation. Christianity has been shedding its

benign influences for centuries over other portions of the earth ; but so far as is known to man, not one ray of it has ever penetrated the overspreading darkness of this vast region. But now the country seems to be on the eve of a better state of things. A door of access has been opened ; and if the Church of Christ will interpret aright this intervention of divine providence, the time will not be far distant when the light of the gospel will shine brightly in every portion of this heretofore dark and benighted land. It is hoped that the climate will prove at least comparatively healthful. Missionaries, through the means of its multiplied water courses, would soon be able to extend their preaching tours in every direction. The language, as may be inferred from what is known of the dialects along the adjoining seaboard, may not only be easily mastered, but will be found to be a most suitable channel for conveying the knowledge of salvation to the minds of those by whom it is spoken. The Churches of Great Britain are waking up to the demands of this new call of Providence. Thousands and tens of thousands of dollars have been contributed with reference to sending the gospel to Eastern Africa, and especially to the regions around the newly discovered lakes. Missions have already been established on the shores of Lake Nyassa by the different Churches of Scotland. The London Missionary Society has its representatives on the road from Zanzibar to Lake Tanganyika. The Church Missionary Society, mainly through the agency of Bishop Crowther and his native associates, are pushing their enterprises up the Niger, even into the heart of Central Northern Africa. Hundreds of churches have been established along the western seaboard. The light of the gospel has penetrated to the heart of savage Ashanti. The great island of Madagascar, where a large portion of the population is African, has already received the gospel of peace. May it not be hoped, in view of all this, that the evangelical Churches of this country will be aroused to the claims of this great Kongo field, opened to their view by the indomitable courage of one of their own countrymen ? Stanley risked life and everything else to solve a geographical problem. Shall we as Christians be less courageous than he ? Shall we

not, now that he has laid this great field open to us, have the daring to go and plant the gospel standard there, and claim that whole land for its rightful Sovereign ?

ARTICLE III.

PAN-HELLENISM.

For months the eyes of Europe and the world have been turned eastward. Even before the declaration of war (April, 1877,) between Russia and Turkey, the "sick man" and his maladies engaged to a very great extent the public attention. And since that time this universal interest has been intensified in all that pertains to the races, nations, and countries, which comprise the great Turkish Empire ; and the rights and interests of these various people, the part they will probably play in deciding the issues now involved, as well as their possible future, have all been again and again discussed. In other words, the "Eastern Question," in its varied and multiform phases, has for at least two years occupied the uppermost place in the world's thought. But though so much has been said and written, this great "question" is by no means exhausted, as it is by no means settled.

One of the factors in this "Eastern Question" is Hellenism. For the time, indeed, this has not been very prominent ; it has had no eloquent orators to plead its cause in the world's ear, and no great empire to draw the sword in its behalf ; and yet in fact it is not of much, if any, less importance than its great rival, Pan-Slavism. And it may be that before the final settlement of these questions, Hellenism not less than Slavism will play an important part.

What, then, is Hellenism ? On what basis does it rest ? What are its dangers, and what its probable future ? This is the subject to which the reader's attention is invited. For the object of this article is not to suggest what part the Greeks will or

ought to play in the terrible drama now enacting on the bloody fields of Bulgaria and Armenia, or in the final settlement of these great issues ; but rather to discuss the more general question of Hellenism ; or, better still, to give some information in regard to this subject ; so that every reader may draw his own conclusion, express his own opinion, and, if he please, utter his own prophecy.

WHAT IS PAN-HELLENISM ?

In the kingdom of Greece—"Free Greece," as it is commonly called—in the islands of the Aegean Sea ; in the Turkish provinces of Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia ; in parts of Thrace ; in Constantinople, and in those portions of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, adjacent to the sea, there are about 5,000,000 of people who speak the Greek language, who profess the Greek or "Orthodox" religion, who love the Greek name, and who believe in the Greek nation. These people are all animated by one common sentiment, love of country, of Greece, and all that is Greek, and they are all cheered by one common hope, the hope of seeing all the Greek-speaking people free and united in one great nation, confederation, or empire. This idea of uniting together in one all the Greeks ; this hope of a great Greek empire ; this belief that such a result will one day be accomplished ; this sentiment, which occupies the first place in every Greek mind and heart, always and everywhere—this is Hellenism ; and it is Pan-Hellenism, because it is entertained by all Greeks wherever found, and because it in turn embraces all who speak the Greek language, and who profess and call themselves Greeks.

THE BASIS OF HELLENISM.

That such an idea, such a hope, does exist among the Greeks, no one who knows them will for a moment question ; and the more he knows of them, and the more of them he knows, the more will he see how real, how strong, how universal is this hope. But on what basis does it rest ? What foundation is there for this hope, what reason for this "Greek idea" ? Or is it a mere idea, a "baseless fabric," an unsubstantial dream of

visionaries and enthusiasts? These are important questions, and to them different answers will be given by different parties.

On the one hand, there are those who scout the very idea as foolish and ridiculous. The Phil-Hellenes, of whom there were so many forty or fifty years ago, who have seen all their bright visions of Free Greece and her heroic sons—worthy descendants of noble sires—sadly marred; the unhappy traveller, just returned from a tour in the Peloponnesus or Northern Greece, and yet smarting from his varied and vexatious experiences; the unlucky merchant, who, again, and perhaps for the hundredth time, has been outwitted by the shrewdness of a “crafty Greek”—these would, one and all, unite in saying there is no foundation for this hope, there is no ground for this expectation. The very idea of Hellenism is absurd. The people who, after forty years of independence, permit brigandage to infest their land to the very gates of the capital; who up to the present time have hardly a hotel or a decent mode of conveyance outside of Athens; who are ashamed to dig, but not to cheat; whose educated men almost all aspire to become politicians, and whose politics is but a scramble for place and plunder; who are ignorant alike of honor and of honesty, and who, as the Cretans of old, are “all liars”—for such a people to dream of empire and talk of dominion, is the very height of vanity, presumption, and folly. They not only will not, but ought not to, have more intrusted to them. They have not been faithful in that which is least; and Europe, instead of committing more to them, had better take from them that which they have, or place them under tutors and governors, who shall teach them the first principles of civilisation and good government.

On the other hand, all Greeks would give a prompt affirmative, though their reasons therefor might not always be the same. The peasant would probably lift up his eyes devoutly to heaven and say, “God will grant it.” The man of a little more intelligence would answer, Our fathers had these lands; they of right belong to us; Nature too evidently intended that these should form one country and be the inheritance of one people; and we all have a *feeling* within us that so it will be, and the time is

coming when this hope will be realised. The politician's answer would be, Europe is jealous of Russia and of Russian aggrandisement; what barrier so strong, so sure, so stable, as a compact, united Greek nation, embracing the territory now chiefly occupied by Greek-speaking people? Europe will one day see this, and will give it to us. The merchant would point with pride to the fact that Greeks have established houses in all the great commercial centres of Europe, and are not only the most wealthy, intelligent, and enterprising merchants of the Levant, but compete successfully with the merchants of all lands. And, he would add, this is the evidence of what we can do, and the pledge of what we will accomplish in time. The ecclesiastic would reply, Our Holy Orthodox Church bound us together as a nation, and kept alive the flame of patriotism during all those centuries of oppression and slavery; nor is this all: our religion, which has done so much for us, will do yet more, and will one day work out our complete national redemption. And the man of letters would say, We have the language of our fathers, and in that language a splendid literature, that has already moulded the character of nations and shaped the destiny of Europe and of the world; this language is our possession, this literature is our inheritance; we love and cherish it above all things else; our very children everywhere revere the teachings, as they study the writings of those master-minds of all the ages; the result will come; we shall be made worthy of dominion; and the power will be given us.

Such are the answers that would be given to these questions by the Greeks themselves; and such the reasons for the hope that is in them.

Now, without formally adopting any of the above opinions, on the one side or the other, as our own, we do not hesitate to affirm, that Hellenism is *not* a foundationless structure, *not* a mere baseless imagination. There are reasons why Greeks should entertain this hope; there is a basis for this "Greek idea;" there is some foundation for Hellenism. Let us see.

There is a Greek nation, a homogeneous people; and this is a very different thing from the kingdom of "Free Greece," which,

though the centre of all that is Greek, embraces only a small part of the Greek-speaking people, while the Greek nation or people, including all who believe and call themselves Greeks, numbers not less than five millions of souls.* And it is no misnomer to call these people a nation—the Greek nation. Very true it is, that most of them have no separate political existence, for they form a part of that great mongrel Ottoman Empire, which is made up of so many tongues, and tribes, and peoples. But they are, in fact, a separate people, with a national life as real and as true as any people or nation of Europe. They everywhere speak their own language, occupy their own quarters, have their own churches and schools, print their own papers, and love their own country. This devotion to Greece and all that is Greek is a most remarkable trait, and is not exceeded by the devotion and patriotism of any people in the world. It seems almost innate; the Greek has it from the first, and it grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength. Wherever he may go, he never forgets Greece; for her he lives, for her he labors, and he remembers her when dying. “*Moritur et moriens dulces reminiscitur Argos.*” The greatest benefactors of Greece have been men who have never lived in Greece, and some of them have never even seen her blue skies or trodden her classic shores. The “Father of Modern Greek Literature,” Koray, was never in “Free Greece;” while some of the most expensive buildings in Athens, and the greatest ornaments of that capital, are the gifts of Greek merchants who lived and died far from Greece, but who, living or dying, remembered—and that in the most practical way—“sweet Argos.”

Again, *this people are bound together by recollections of a glorious past.* They believe themselves to be the descendants of those old Greeks who made and filled so great a part of the

* The exact number of Greeks is not known, but the usual estimate is from five to six millions. Of these, there are some in the interior portions of Turkey, who cannot read or even speak the Greek language. Those spoken of in this article are *the Greek-speaking Greeks*, who occupy the regions above mentioned, and who are supposed to number about five million.

world's history. Whether this belief is well founded or not, its effect on the people who entertain it is the same; to them it is a reality. It would be manifestly out of place here to discuss the question of the identity of the Greek race; let one remark suffice, viz.: if dwelling in the same lands, having the same language, and possessing the same mental, moral, and social qualities and characteristics, prove the identity of a people, then the Greeks of to-day are rightly called Greeks.* But whatever others may think of it, every Greek firmly believes that he has (at least some of) the old Hellenic blood in his veins; and believing this, he has the memories of a glorious past to animate, encourage, and strengthen his hope of a glorious future.

Besides this, *the Greeks have a common religion.* They are all Christians—all members of "The Orthodox Anatolic Church." This has unquestionably, in the past, been a great bond of union, and is to-day one of the things which all Greeks have in common; by very many, "Orthodoxy" is supposed still to be one of the chief factors of Hellenism.

And again, *this people have a beautiful language and a noble literature.*

The modern is substantially the same with the ancient language, and is daily becoming more and more assimilated to it. The truth of this few who have been in Greece will question. And it is the aim of the scholars of Greece to eliminate from their language the "barbarous" and to reintroduce the "classical" words; and this is doing every day. Besides this, every educated man and woman studies, and many are able to read fluently, the ancient Greek; indeed, the only grammar taught in

* A recent writer says on this subject: "After all, national characteristics are very permanent and very hard to be shaken off, and it would seem strange indeed, if both these and the Greek language should have remained almost intact, and yet the race have either changed or been saturated with foreign blood. Foreign invasions and foreign conquests of Greece were common enough; but here, as elsewhere, the climate and circumstances which have formed a race seem to conspire to preserve it, and to absorb foreign types and features, rather than to permit the extinction or total change of the race." (Mahaffy's "Rambles and Studies in Greece," p. 19.)

all the high schools of Greece is substantially the grammar learned in the schools and colleges of America and Europe. There is, then, all ready for this people, and at comparatively little cost accessible to them, a literature unsurpassed in the world, and one that has exerted so great an influence upon the human race. And the ancient classics, so justly famed, every thoroughly educated Greek can and does read and study. Then there is that other and more valuable book, the Bible, which (the Septuagint of the Old and the original of the New Testament) can be read and understood yet more easily. "The humblest peasant, who reads his Septuagint or Greek Testament in his own mother tongue on the hills of Bœotia, may proudly feel that he has an access to the original oracles of divine truth, which Pope and Cardinal reach by a barbarous and imperfect translation; that he has a key of knowledge, which in the West is only to be found in the hands of the learned classes."* Compare in this particular the Greek with any other of those subject and oppressed races of the Turkish Empire, which are now beginning to long and strive for freedom and an independent national life, *e. g.*, the Bulgarian or Servian, and how great the difference, how vast the advantage for the Greek!

Or, *consider the geographical position occupied by this race.* Let the reader take a map of Southern Europe and draw a line from the northern part of the Sea of Marmora to the Adriatic Sea, a little north of Brindisi, then add the islands lying close to Greece on the west and south, as well as those between Greece and Asia Minor; and in the territory thus marked off nine-tenths of the Greek-speaking people will be embraced, *and nine-tenths of the inhabitants of this territory are Greeks.* There they are, dwelling together and apart—a homogeneous people, a nation in all but government. Why should they not have that also? Perhaps, after all, the unlettered Greek is not so far wrong when he says, "Nature intended us to be a nation."

Or, look again, and notice that just above the line thus drawn, there are found one and another country or race, belonging to the great Pan-Slavic family. Now, *if the policy of Russia be to*

* Stanley's "Eastern Church," p. 102.

unite all these together, and to push this great Slavic confederation or empire—and extend Russian influence as well—down to the shores of the Bosphorus and the borders of modern Greece; and *if* it be the interest and duty of Europe, or part of Europe, to check this Russian influence and this Slavic advance; what better barrier than a Hellenic empire or confederation? And who will say that these views may not one day prevail, and the politician's dream come true?

Or, look yet again, and mark how this people occupy the border-land between the east and the west. And, in fact, there is a meeting and mingling of Eastern and Western customs and habits, dress and ideas among the Greeks, especially in "Free Greece," to be found scarcely anywhere else in the world. Now, if Western ideas, civilisation, energy, and life, are to be given to the sluggish, dormant, half-dead East, what more suitable agent—if fitted in other respects—for this good work than the Greek people, so quick-witted and active, so full of life and energy and fire, and so ready to yield—as they are beginning now to do—to these newer and better ideas and influences?

Then to all this add the fact already alluded to, viz., that this whole people are filled, saturated, with this idea of Hellenism, this dream of empire, this hope of nationality; it is their vital breath, their very life, everywhere and always present with them. Probably no people ever entertained a hope so strongly and so universally, or so confidently expected its fulfilment; if we except the Jews, when waiting for the Hope of Israel.

Not long since, a plain man, a native and resident of Constantinople, said to the writer, "We carry our country in our heart. Wherever we go, we love and pray and live for Greece. We are one people now; we believe that we shall become one nation. We know not when; it may be a hundred years hence, but it will come. Why shouldn't it?" And in view of all these things we too may ask, Why should it not?

No thoughtful man, certainly no believer in a Providence that directs the sparrow's fall, will, with all these facts before him, scout the idea of Hellenism as a foolish politician's fancy, or a wild enthusiast's dream. Here is a people occupying an im-

portant central geographical position—as between the East and West—and retaining, through long ages of oppression and whole centuries of slavery, their religion, their language, and their separate national life; a people to-day as distinct, and yet as homogeneous, as united, as hopeful, as enthusiastic, as patriotic, as any nation on the face of the globe. The march of armies, oft repeated conquests, the iron heel of despotism, the intolerable yoke of Turkish bondage, all have not been able to crush out the national life, or to extinguish the national spirit. They have survived their conquerors—the Romans, the Goths, the Venetians, the Albanians, and (shall it be added?) the Turks; they have lived on in spite of the intermingling of foreign blood, and, what is worse, in spite of their own mental, social, moral, and spiritual degradation; they are still a people, a race, a nation *de facto*, if not *de jure*. Perhaps no race has been so remarkably preserved, and has itself so remarkably preserved its own distinctive race peculiarities and characteristics for so many ages, and under so many adverse circumstances, except the Hebrew race, God's own chosen people, whom, in so many things, the Greek resembles.

THE DANGERS OF HELLENISM.

Though much may be said, and truly said, in favor of Hellenism, its success is by no means assured. There are difficulties and dangers on every hand, and of various kinds; some from external circumstances over which the Greeks have little control, others from traits inherent in the race—as vanity, jealousy, love of money, lack of moral principle, mistaken ideas as to the real elements of national prosperity and strength, etc. But there are three chief sources of danger, from which it is believed the most serious consequences may be apprehended: they are *Politics*, *Education*, and *Religion*. Of these in their order.

Greek Politics.—To understand what follows, let it be borne in mind, that in many things the Greek is modelled after the British Constitution. Greece is a constitutional monarchy, the king appoints the prime minister, but, as in England, the ministry and parliament (a majority of it) are always agreed on questions of public and national concern, and whenever a ministerial

measure is defeated, the ministry at once resigns and a new one is appointed. Now, political parties in Greece are *not* formed upon different interpretations of the Constitution, or upon different theories of public policy; they are merely personal cliques, followers of certain men, adherents of certain "party leaders." The "leader" who can command a majority in the parliament is *ipso facto* prime minister. And there are always just as many parties as there are aspirants for the premiership—usually not less than five or six. Such is the basis on which parties are formed; and these various parties have just the same *principles*. It is readily granted that all have some love for their country, and desire her welfare and prosperity; but besides this general principle, there are a few special ones in which all are entirely agreed, and which all follow out with remarkable fidelity and constancy. They are: 1. "To the victor belong the spoils." 2. When out of office, get in as soon as possible, and by any means. 3. When in office, stay in as long as possible, and, while in, make as much as possible, without being over-scrupulous as to the way in which it is done. With such principles, Greek politics is but one universal race and scramble for place and power. One "party leader" no sooner comes into office than all the rest work, and often combine, for his overthrow, when one of them will succeed. And so it happens that ministries succeed one another with amazing rapidity—the tenure of office usually being from one day to twelve or eighteen months. Greece has had more prime ministers than years of constitutional government. Now add the further facts, that almost every educated man becomes a politician, and is either an office-holder or an office-seeker, and that the Hellenic "politician" is not more scrupulous, conscientious, or honest than his "fellow-brother" (to borrow a Greek phrase) in England or America, and one has a pretty correct idea of what Greek politics are. The practical working of such a system—if system it may be called—is just what might be expected, and is almost as bad as can be imagined. Under such circumstances a very Solon could accomplish but little for his country's weal. And with such a wretched condition of public affairs, the marvel is, not that Greece has done

so little, but that she has in fifty years accomplished so much. A country whose public men are almost all politicians, not statesmen, who seek first their own, not their country's, good, and whose people are content to be guided by such leaders, is large enough, however small in area and population. Before Hellenism can hope to succeed, or, if successful, to continue, there must be a reformation, thorough, genuine, radical, and complete in Grecian politics.

But Hellenism is in danger from another quarter—from *education*—using the word in its common and restricted sense. This, to many, may seem a strange statement; for education in itself is a good thing, while the desire for it is one of the best symptoms of vitality in a people, and its general diffusion one of the best preparatives for a vigorous national life. All this is unquestionably true. But there is truth in the homely proverb: "There may be too much even of a good thing;" certainly if the one "good thing" lead to the neglect and exclusion of other equally important and necessary good things. So it is here. If education be esteemed "the one thing needful"; if to attain it be the chief end of the nation and of every man in it, and if for this object a large proportion of the people's resources, both public and private, be expended, while agriculture, commerce, internal improvements, and other great material interests, are overlooked and neglected, then it may well be questioned whether education will prove a help or a hindrance to national advancement and prosperity. And this is just the condition of affairs in Greece and among the Greeks.

The system of free schools now universal in "Free Greece," and voluntarily established by the Greeks in many parts of Turkey, is much to their credit. But a few good hotels, and graded roads, and comfortable means of conveyance, would greatly benefit the land and enrich the people. The National University at Athens, supported by the Government, with its sixty Professors and twelve hundred students, is justly the pride of every Greek; but a single railway, connecting the port of Athens with the great system of European railroads, would not only make the Piræus one of the chief seaports of the Mediterranean, but

would quickly double, or triple, or even quadruple, the revenues of the kingdom. "The Olympia," "The Academy," and other public buildings, the gifts of wealthy Greek merchants, are at once an ornament to the city and a monument of Grecian patriotism; but a ship canal across the Corinthian isthmus, (probably costing no more) would do more for the real prosperity and benefit both of the capital and of the nation.

The trouble here is not that too much, absolutely, has been done for education, but not enough, proportionally, for other things equally important, useful, and necessary to the nation's life and the true prosperity of her people.

Nor is this the only evil growing out of this.. Few educated Greeks are willing to till the soil, or even to engage in commercial pursuits, while almost every man who has attended a Gymnasium or the University, though he "cannot dig," must needs go into politics, whatever his calling. But one of the prime necessities of Greece to-day is a better and more intelligent cultivation of her soil and an increase of her commerce; and one of the chief obstacles to her progress is the number and character of her politicians. Now, if education unfits the young Greek for agriculture, or even for commerce, but brings him into politics; and at the same time, if every Greek boy desires an education, and the means are usually at hand for his obtaining it—if these things be so, then it needs no prophet's ken to foretell danger ahead.

But besides this, and worse still, not a few literary men of Greece hold and teach not only that education is to be a means, or the chief means, of bringing about the freedom and unification of the Greek-speaking people; but maintain that education, especially the study of the old Greek literature, is to be *the one all-sufficient means* of working out the political and *moral* regeneration of the whole race! But to expect education (in its restricted sense) to accomplish what only religion can effect; to substitute the teachings of the ancients for the writings of "Moses and the prophets;" the philosophy of the schools for the grace of Christ; the literature of Greece for the Word of God; and

to anticipate like results, is as false in theory as it will be fatal in fact.

But the chief danger to Hellenism is *from religion*—the “orthodox religion.” This may seem yet more strange and paradoxical, but it is believed to be strictly true. We shall see. Every Greek belongs to the Greek or “Anatolic” Church, and professes the Greek or “Orthodox” religion. This Church and this religion he upholds, maintains, and defends everywhere and at all hazards. Said an intelligent young Smyrniote in the writer’s hearing a few months since: “There are two things which we Greeks love and cherish above all things else, Hellenism and Orthodoxy, our nationality and our religion. Our Church, more than anything else, has kept and made us what we are. We believe in it, we love it, we defend it.” And so with all Greeks, everywhere; they, too, all believe in, love, and defend their “One Holy Apostolic Church,” and their “Orthodox religion.” And we can sympathise with these feelings; it is not strange that they exist. No wonder that his Church is held in reverence and affection by every Greek; she is the most venerable of all the Churches, and has a literal “apostolic succession”; she still reads on every Sabbath portions of God’s word, “in the very language in which it was read and spoken by the apostles”; her rites and ceremonies, and her very superstitions, have been handed down for many generations; during the long ages of oppression and bondage, the Church was the one only relic of the past; it alone was left to remind the Greek of the blessings he had lost, and to excite within him the hope of better days to come; and in the great struggle for national independence—1821-’8—the Church played a most important part in preparing the people for the approaching struggle; and when the time did come, it was the Bishop of Patras who first, within the kingdom, unfurled and “blessed” the banner of revolution and of freedom! No marvel, then, that the Greek loves and cherishes his Church, or that he inseparably unites, as they all do, religion and nationality, orthodoxy and Hellenism.

But there is another and yet more serious mistake which almost every Greek makes: he knows of no other and no better

form of religion and Christianity ; and so he confounds "Orthodoxy" with Christianity ; "The Church" with the true religion of Jesus Christ.

Now, this "Orthodox Church" holds and teaches doctrines and dogmas, she enjoins and "blesses" customs and practices, she encourages and approves superstitions and errors, which every educated mind must reject as untrue, as unworthy of credence, and which no intelligent man or woman can or will believe and practise. The result—as always when dead formalism and intellectual activity exist together—is that all intelligent and educated Greeks, men, women, and children, are becoming sceptics, infidels, materialists, pantheists, nihilists ; or, to use one comprehensive term, they are all *unbelievers* ; they believe nothing, they have no faith. They cherish and defend the Orthodox Church ; they even conform to some of her forms and ceremonies ; but they believe not her teachings, they reject her dogmas ; and worse than all, together with the teachings and dogmas of their Church, they reject also the truths of God's Word, and the very Word itself, and so make utter shipwreck of all faith.

But a faithless nation cannot stand, an unbelieving race cannot long continue. And were Hellenism now an accomplished fact, were the "Greek idea" a grand reality, and yet the whole nation were faithless and unbelieving, there would be no hope for the Greek race ; the Hellenic nation would soon cease to exist ; it would speedily drop to pieces from its own immorality and corruption. And if this be so, how much more impossible for this race to be brought and bound together and united into one, when, with the spread of education, and the increase of intelligence, there is a corresponding spread of scepticism, and increase of unbelief, immorality, and irreligion ! This process, if continued, must prove fatal to Hellenism. And of the Greeks, as of God's people of old, it may one day be written : "We see, then, that they could not enter in, because of unbelief."

THE FUTURE OF HELLENISM.

What will be the future of Hellenism ? Will the bright vision of the Greek ever be realised in whole or in part ? And if so,

when and how? These questions are easy to ask, but who will answer them? When there are so many factors to this problem, and when so many of these factors are so uncertain and contingent, who will even venture an opinion?

One thing only shall be said in conclusion. This question of their future will be determined mainly by the Greeks themselves. If they prove themselves worthy, God will, in his own good time and way, give them the kingdom and the glory; if unworthy, he may justly take from them even that which they seem now to have.

If they continue the present wretched system of politics; if they pursue education to the exclusion of other vital, material interests; if they expect from Greek literature what only the Word of God can do for a people; and above all, if, while cherishing a fanatical regard for the externals of religion, they deny the truth and power thereof, then there is little hope for Greece or for Hellenism.

In these things, especially the last, there must be a great change, a thorough reformation. A people whose highest ecclesiastical authority—the “Holy Synod”—publicly proscribes, and, as far as in them lies, persecutes all Greek Protestants, while they overlook and excuse *Simony* in their own “bishops and other clergy”; whose priests warn their people not only against all evangelical teachings, but even against all reading of the Scriptures in Modern Greek, while they receive to their own communion, men, women, and children, who violate every command of the Decalogue, have yet to learn the very first elements of Bible truth and religious liberty. A nation whose “minister of religion and education” closes every school for Greeks, no matter how admirable its instruction, how superior its morality, or how purely scriptural its religious teachings, unless it has the Greek Catechism taught and expounded by a Greek priest, and a picture of the Virgin, or other saint, hung up in some conspicuous place; whose laws positively forbid all “*Orthodox*” parents, (*i. e.*, belonging to the Greek or Eastern Church,) whether subjects of Greece or of any other nation in the world, from sending their children to any school where “The Catechism”

is not taught and the picture is not worshipped; and whose Government, by public circular, expressly prohibits in all public schools of the kingdom, the reading of God's Word in the modern Greek; while the Sabbath is openly and constantly desecrated by court, priest, and people; while evangelical places of worship, and even Bible depositories, are stoned with impunity; while peculation on the part of officials is almost universal; while bribery and corruption, even in high places, is common, and while prostitution is legalised—such a nation is not "free," and can be called so only in the severest irony; its institutions and customs belong rather to the dark ages than to the nineteenth century. Such a people forfeit all claim to the sympathy, the encouragement, or the help of Christian men and Christian nations the world over; they show themselves ignorant of the most rudimental ideas of true freedom, and prove themselves unworthy of yet higher trusts, because incapable of properly exercising those already committed to them. Some of the principles, practices, and laws of modern Greece, as *now* held and enforced in that kingdom, are a blot upon a so-called constitutional government, and a disgrace to a so-called "free" country! Let the Greeks purge themselves, their Church, and their Government of these, or forever cease to talk and dream of empire. Woe worth the day when such Hellenism shall be extended further! It already embraces too much and extends too far.

On the other hand, if the Greeks are true to themselves, to their land, to their ancient renown, to their Church as it was in its purest days; if they make a legitimate use of their glorious history and their splendid literature; if they wisely improve their geographical position and their many natural advantages; and if, above all, they believe, receive, study, love, and obey the Word of God, they "shall be free indeed," and they may become, though now the least among the kingdoms of Europe, a truly great nation; a nation preëminently honored in carrying the light and knowledge of civilisation and true religion to the darkened peoples of the East; rivals, yea, superiors, even, in all that is truly great and blessed, of those old Greeks, whose

fame has filled the world. That *such* may be "the future of Hellenism," is the writer's most earnest wish and prayer. And doubtless every true lover of Greece and of the Greeks will join in a hearty amen!

ARTICLE IV.

PHILOSOPHY, CALVINISM, AND THE BIBLE.

No two truths ever conflict with each other. A truth once fairly established in one department of thought is never denied by any truth developed in any other department. Nay, more: all kindred departments, if they speak at all concerning the established truth, conspire to confirm it. We need not tremble, then, when we hear the sound of alarm coming up from some grand field where the reapers are gathering sheaves. The note of alarm will melt into song when the work of the reapers is done. It is with this conviction that we invite attention to the teachings of Philosophy, Calvinism, and the Bible, concerning the doctrine of Predestination. If true, the doctrine will be taught by each one separately, and it will receive the united support of all.

We begin with the teachings of

PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy teaches that *will is the basis of all things*. If it were possible, and we should pass along the chain of causation, through all the ages of the past, we would find that the farthest link in that chain is *Will, Divine Will*; this is the *causa causarum*, the fountain whence all things have flowed. Philosophy teaches this by teaching the doctrine of Spontaneity. We must, therefore, turn to that doctrine, learn what it is, and to what it leads.

I. Illustration and proof of the doctrine.

1. Let us go back, in thought, to a period before the creation

of the universe. God exists alone. Among other things which belong to him at this period, there are two to which special attention is directed, namely, the Divine Essence (Substance) and the Energy (Force) of the Divine nature. For the present, let other matters be dismissed, and let attention be fixed on these. Now, the Essence and the Force are so related to each other that one cannot exist without the other. Unless this is so, they can exist apart, without the fact of separation involving the destruction or annihilation of either. Let us, then, take them as existing separately. Now, if there be but one God, that God must be the Essence or the Force; for, at the period supposed, there is no other existence but these two. Suppose the Force to be God. Then the Divine Essence is not God, which is a contradiction; and if not God, the Divine Essence is a creature, created by the Force, which is absurd. On the other hand, suppose the Divine Essence to be God. Then the Force is not God; if not God, it is a creature; if a creature, the Divine Essence (God) existed before the Force; if the Divine Essence existed before the Force, then we have a God devoid of Energy (Force) creating. But to create involves the exercise of Energy (Force); hence, to say that God without Energy (Force) creates, is absurd. To escape these absurdities, we conclude that the Divine Essence and Energy (Force) are so related that they cannot exist without each other. God is a self-active substance. Force (Energy) is bound up in the indivisible simplicity of the divine nature—is inherent. To destroy one is to destroy the Deity; and therefore to destroy one is to destroy the other.

The above presents the theory of Spontaneity, as applied to its highest object, God, and shows the relation of Energy (Force) to the essence in which it inheres in that theory.

2. In regard to the soul of man, its essence and its energy (force), we may apply one of two theories. We may say that it was created according to the theory of Spontaneity or of Non-spontaneity. By the logical law of Excluded Middle, no third theory can be interpolated. Suppose it was created according to the theory of Non-spontaneity; then it will follow that the mind's energy (force) is not inherent; and if not inherent, it

comes into the mind *ab extra*. But the energy (force) of the mind determines all its activities (its activities are nothing more than various forms of developed energy (force)); an act of will is an act of mind; therefore, the energy of the mind determines its acts of will. Now, if the energy of the mind determines its acts of will, and if that energy is *ab extra*, it follows that a power *ab extra* determines the acts of will; but if a power *ab extra* determines man's will, man does not determine his will himself, and thus man is not free. But man is free; consciousness, the highest and last appeal, declares it. Therefore, we reject Non-spontaneity and accept Spontaneity.

Thus we find ourselves with Spontaneity as the true theory in regard to the human intellect. If so, the mind's essence and energy (force) are so related that they cannot exist apart. The human soul, like its Creator, is a self-active substance.

Doubtless the doctrine of Spontaneity applies to all spiritual beings—to angels and to devils, as well as to God and to men. It gives us the true metaphysic. If we surrender it, we must surrender the doctrine of human freedom; and with freedom gone, all accountability, reward and punishment, in home, state, church, time, eternity, ought to pass away forever.

II. Objections to the doctrine of Spontaneity considered.

All objectors to the doctrine must belong to one of three classes of persons: they must be (1) nihilists, or (2) believers in the existence of mind, or (3) materialists, that is, persons who say that there is but one substance instead of two, and that that substance is matter.

1. The nihilist must hold his peace; he can say nothing. He denies the existence of substance, and asserts that "all our knowledge of mind or matter is only a consciousness of various bundles of baseless appearances." Nihilism is an absurdity so repulsive to the human intellect that no mind in a healthy state assents to it. "Of positive or dogmatic Nihilism, there is no example in modern philosophy." A *bona fide* nihilist ought not to fear striking himself with a knife. It would be *nothing* exerting the energy of *nothing* to take up *nothing* with which to strike *nothing*—the wound would be *nothing*, and hence no hurt would

be done. Any argument founded on such a doctrine is founded on *nothing*, and must therefore fall to the ground, or, rather, to *nothing*.

2. Believers in the existence of mind cannot object to, the doctrine. If they reject it, they must accept the doctrine of Non-spontaneity, in some one of its forms. If they accept Non-spontaneity, they must, as we have shown above, accept the doctrine which it involves—that man is not free. And here they are contradicted and overthrown by consciousness, which, in every rational mind, bears witness to human freedom.

3. We have mentioned the first and second classes of objectors, not because objection has been made from them, but to remove all ground of objection. The only opponents of the doctrine of Spontaneity requiring attention, are those of certain modern scientists who belong to the third class, that is, *materialists*. The term *materialist* may not be acceptable; but let it be borne in mind that nothing more is meant by it than that the persons so designated teach that there is but one substance in the universe, instead of two, and that that substance is matter. We give two quotations from representative thinkers of this class, to show that we have correctly given their position as materialists, and as opposers of the doctrine of Spontaneity.

T. H. Huxley, in his lecture on the Physical Basis of Life, makes use of the following language :

“And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to demonstrate that any given phenomenon is not the effect of a material cause, any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.” . . . “And as surely as every future grows out of every past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law, until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action.”

Ernst Haeckel, in his History of Creation, teaches as follows :

“On the other hand, the theory of development carried out by Darwin, which we shall have to treat of here as the Non-miraculous or Natural History of Creation, and which has already been put forward by Goethe

and Lamarek, must, if carried out logically, lead to the monistic or mechanical (causal) conception of the universe. In opposition to the dualistic or teleological conception of nature, our theory considers organic as well as inorganic bodies to be the necessary products of natural forces. It does not see in every individual species of animal and plant the embodied thought of a personal Creator, but the expression, for the time being, of a mechanical process of development of matter, the expression of a necessarily active cause; that is, of a mechanical cause (*causa efficiens*). Where teleological Dualism seeks the arbitrary thoughts of a capricious Creator in the miracles of creation, causal Monism finds in the process of development the necessary effects of eternal immutable laws of nature."

These quotations show that their authors are monists and materialists; that is, that they believe that there is but one substance in the universe, and that that substance is matter. They also show that their authors reject the doctrines of spirit and spontaneity, and seek their banishment "from all regions of human thought." Let it be clearly fixed before the mind that they are *materialists*, in the sense which we have given to that term. Now, we wish to show that such materialism logically terminates in universal scepticism, and hence that we must refuse credence to its arguments presented under any form, at any time, or against any thesis. We think the proof lies in small compass, and is worth candid, close attention. First, then, this materialism is the doctrine which declares that there is no substance but matter—that there is no such substance as spirit. As Haeckel declares, it is Monism. Secondly, accepting its deliverance as true, we must account for all things in the universe as the products of matter; for, *ex hypothesi*, there is no other substance to produce them. Whenever and wherever a fact or series of facts, a phenomenon or series of phenomena, present themselves, whether in one department of investigation or in another, we must say of each and of all of them, that they are the products of matter. It seems to us that this is self-evident. With this fixed in our minds, we ask, in the third place, Whence came the Bible with its doctrines? The materialist, according to his own theory, must say that it is the product of matter. There is nothing else to produce it. What, now, does the Bible teach? It teaches the doctrine of spirit; teaches that spirit is a substance differ-

ent from matter, existed before matter, is superior to matter, created matter, and will flourish in immortal youth when matter is destroyed. Its God is a Spirit, omnipresent and eternal, who is the Alpha and Omega of the universe :

"Of him all things do come ;
By him all things consist ; to him, in march
Of Providence, the whole creation moves."

These teachings come from the Bible ; the Bible comes from matter ; therefore, these teachings come from matter. But according to materialism, there is but one substance, which is matter ; and hence these teachings are false. Who or what taught the falsehood ? Matter, materialism. As a lawyer would term it, it is a falsehood in a "material" point ; the witness is therefore discredited ; he cannot be believed at all. *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. If the only witness we have testifies falsely, what can we believe ? If materialism discredits itself by bearing false witness, we must doubt whenever it speaks, and this is universal scepticism. How can such a theory object to any thesis or overthrow any doctrine ? We may feel assured that, unless assaulted by an enemy stronger than this, Spontaneity will stand forever.

III. Thus far we have endeavored to illustrate and establish the doctrine of Spontaneity, and have also endeavored to answer objections. Let us now fix attention on that doctrine, and learn what it teaches. In illustrating the doctrine, we followed an anti-climax method, presenting it first as manifested in its highest object, God, and then descending to its manifestation in man. In the analysis of the doctrine which we now propose, we will follow the climax method, considering it first in respect to man, and then in respect to God.

1. The threefold division of the powers of the human soul into cognitions, feelings, and conations, is so well established, that we accept it here without discussion. This division is not intended to teach that there are three classes of mental phenomena, each separate from and independent of the other ; but rather that all the mental phenomena have three elements : one element being cognition, another feeling, and another conation. These elements

are inseparably blended in all the mental phenomena, from the grand aggregate of the soul's activities down to its simplest act. If proof were needed, we would make a direct appeal to consciousness. Let a man examine himself, and he will find that in every single act of his soul, or aggregate of activities, the three elements coëxist—cognition or knowledge, feeling more or less agreeable or disagreeable, and conation, energy put forth. Our present purpose is that this truth shall be borne in mind in reference to a single mental act. That act, however simple, has the three elements. In perfect harmony with what is here presented, we have the teaching of such an eminent metaphysician as Sir William Hamilton. In his lectures on Metaphysics, he says :

“In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not therefore to be supposed that these phænomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters ; in nature they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state ; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyse the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination. These elements are found, indeed, in very various proportions in different states—sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another—but there is no state in which they are not all co-existent.”

2. Our next step is to fix attention on a single mental act and its three elements, in order to determine which element must be considered the logical antecedent of the others. First, then, it is clear that every act is energy developed, and must be considered by us as having a beginning, a progress, and an end. No one doubts this, although an act may seem to be instantaneous. Time is a fundamental law of thought, which governs the phenomena of the *ego* as well as those of the *non-ego* ; and, in governing, it gives to each act its beginning, progress, and end. Now, the question is, which one of the three elements, cognition, feeling, conation, must be considered as occupying the position in the act which we call the “beginning” ? To answer this question, let us, in the second place, determine the relation which the three elements bear to energy. Cognition, knowledge, is a

result reached by developed mental energy ; it probably occupies the "end" in the act. If this is not true, we must accept the absurd proposition that the mind may know without putting forth energy. Cognition implies that energy has been developed, and it looks back to the energy as the cause, the condition, of its existence. In like manner, feeling is also a result reached by developed mental energy ; it probably occupies the middle, the "progress," in the act. The definition of feeling, in its two branches, pleasure and pain, shows that this is true. "Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. Pain a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power." A "reflex" is certainly in some sense a result. In addition to this, we may present the same consideration here as in regard to cognition. If feeling is not a result of developed energy, we must accept the absurd proposition that the mind may feel without putting forth energy. Feeling, as well as cognition, implies that energy has been developed, and it looks back to the energy as the cause, the condition, of its existence. So far, we have cognition and feeling as the results of developed mental energy. If this be true, energy must be their logical antecedent. But conation is itself but another name for energy, potential or actual. It therefore is the logical antecedent of cognition and feeling ; it occupies the position in the act which we call the "beginning."

3. We now stand with the conclusion that, in a single act, conation is the logical antecedent of cognition and feeling. With this conclusion in hand, let us go back to the origin of the history of the human soul. As soon as the creative fiat brings it into existence, it springs forward—begins the march through time to accomplish its immortal destiny. It does this, not because of an impulse from the Divine Hand, sending it onward, but because of the great law of Spontaneity, according to which it was created. It is a self-active, spiritual substance, possesses inherent energy, and puts forth its strength to go on—to go on forever. Let us look, now, to the first act in this wondrous movement. With the conclusion that we have in hand, conation is, in that act, the logical antecedent of cognition and feeling—it occupies the po-

sition which we call the "beginning." So, then, we reach the conclusion that, according to the doctrine of Spontaneity, Conation, Energy, Force, begins the history of the human soul.

4. We are now prepared to apply our conclusion to God. He is a self-active Spirit, and gives in his own being the highest manifestation of Spontaneity. Now, we cannot, by any sweep of thought, go back through the ages of eternity to the beginning of His existence, as we did in the case of a human soul. But we can and must reach the conclusion that, with him, as with man, conation is the logical antecedent of cognition and feeling. Of course no one doubts that He possesses these three elements. He possesses cognition or knowledge; for the Scriptures teach that He is omniscient; He possesses feeling, for the Scriptures teach that He is infinitely happy; and He possesses conation or will, for the Scriptures teach that He "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." To prove that conation is the logical antecedent of the other elements, we resort to the same argument that was used in regard to the soul of man. Cognition and feeling are results reached by developed mental energy. They imply that energy has been developed, and look back to it as the cause, the condition, of their existence. We must accept this conclusion, or, in rejecting it, accept the proposition that the Divine Mind can, may, and does know and feel, without putting forth energy. But that proposition is absurd. Our conclusion, therefore, must be accepted as truth. And according to it, if there was a beginning of the Divine existence, and we could reach it, we would find that the first element in the first act of God was conation. But God is essentially active, began to act as soon as he began to be; therefore, Conation, Energy, Force, is the first element manifested in the history of all things; it is the fountain whence comes the universe, that mighty river whose flow is from eternity to eternity. We may well pause and reverently contemplate this wonderful truth. In the stupendous fabric, whose magnificence is about us in mountain, plain, and sea, and whose splendors are above us in "the thousand lights that live along the sky," all things send out their lines of force through the eternal past to focalise "in the beginning," in

that unit Energy from which they sprung. That unit, Energy, is in God; the earth sings of his goodness, the heavens declare his glory, and on the higher plane of moral action the seraphim cover their faces with their wings and cry, "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts!"

But let us return to our argument, and finish it. Conation in man is twofold. First, it is Desire, which, to borrow from Sir William Hamilton, is a "blind and fatal" exercise of energy; secondly, it is Will, which, to borrow again from Hamilton, is a "free and deliberate" exercise of energy. But in God, Conation and Will are one and the same; because there cannot be a "blind and fatal" exercise of energy with Deity. And the will of God is that which gives us the divine decree, Predestination. With these points fixed, we feel authorised to give the argument as follows: Conation is, with God, the logical antecedent of knowledge and feeling; Conation is Will; Will begins to act as soon as it exists; Will, in acting, gives Decree, Predestination; therefore, Predestination stands with and in Conation, as the logical antecedent of Knowledge and Feeling.

Thus far, unless our reasoning has been unsound, we have shown that Philosophy teaches Spontaneity, and through it, the proposition that *Will is the basis of all things*, and as involved in that proposition, the doctrine of Predestination. This is all we proposed to accomplish. And we therefore pass on to a consideration of Calvinism.

CALVINISM.

Whenever Calvinism makes a deliverance concerning the general truth, it, like Philosophy, affirms that *Will is the basis of all things*. But as human redemption is its grand subject of discourse, it does, in the application of the general truth to that scheme, teach that the salvation of man rests ultimately upon the Divine will. Therefore it must and does hold to the doctrine of Predestination—Predestination is involved in this teaching, or flows from it.

I. Proof that the teaching of Calvinism is as we have given it.

In order to prove that we have not misrepresented Calvinism, we have only to appeal to authoritative expressions of its tenets,

and to the works of its recognised expounders. We give below what we trust will be considered a sufficient number of extracts to show that we are correct.

SYNOD OF DORT: "Election is the unchangeable purpose of God, by which, before the foundation of the world, he did from the whole human race, fallen by their own fault from original righteousness into a state of sin and misery, elect to salvation in Christ, according to the good pleasure of his own will, out of his mere free grace, a certain number of individuals, neither better than others nor more worthy of his favor, but involved with others in a common ruin."

WESTMINSTER CONFSSION OF FAITH: "God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass, upon such conditions."

CALVIN. "God proved by this very declaration (Rom. ix. 15,) that he is debtor to none; that every blessing bestowed upon the elect flows from gratuitous kindness, and is freely granted to whom he pleases; that no cause which is superior to his own will can be conceived or devised why he entertains kind feelings or manifests kind actions to some of the children of Adam and not to all."

Although, in speaking of predestination and foreknowledge, he says, "it is preposterous to represent one as dependent on the other," yet that he regards decree as logically antecedent to foreknowledge, is shown by the following: "If God simply foresaw the fates of men, and did not also dispose and fix them by his determination, there would be room to agitate the question whether this providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But since he foresees future events only in consequence of his decree that they shall happen, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree." (Institutes, Allen's Translation.)

After stating that "predestination exhibits itself in Adam's posterity," he says: "It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his own decree." (Institutes, Allen's Translation.)

TURRETTIN: Speaking of the divine predictions of future events, he says: "An prae-dictiones istas esse de rebus quas Deus decrevit facere? Sed nulla est ex rebus futuris quas Deus non decreverit, vel facere si bonae sint, vel permittere si malae; nec eas potest praescire nisi quia

decrevit." Are not the predictions themselves concerning things which God decreed to do? But there is nothing among future things which God did not decree, either to do if they are good, or to permit if evil; nor can he foreknow them unless because he decreed them. (*Institutio Theologiae*.)

He also gives the distinction of knowledge (God's) into *scientia naturalis*, (the same as *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, and *scientia libera* (the same as *scientia visionis*); and, among other things, says of them: "Scientia naturalis fundatur in omnipotentia Dei; libera (*scientia*) vero pendet ab ejus voluntate et decreto, per quod res a statu possibilitatis transeunt ad statum futuritionis." Natural knowledge is founded on the omnipotence of God; free (knowledge) of a truth hangs from his will and decree, by which things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition. It is but just to add that he also says—*scientia naturalis antecedit decretum*—natural knowledge antecedes decree. (*Institutio Theologiæ*.)

THOMAS BOSTON—"Yea, whatever He doth in time, was decreed by him, seeing it was known to him before time—Acts xv. 18, 'Known unto God are all his works from the beginning.' And this foreknowledge is founded on the decree." (*Illustration of the Doctrines of the Christian Religion*.)

In another place he says: "Hence we see God's certain knowledge of all things that happen in the world; seeing his knowledge is founded on his decree. As he sees all things possible in the glass of his own power, so he sees all things to come in the glass of his own will; of his effecting will, if he hath decreed to produce them; and of his permitting will, if he hath decreed to suffer them. Hence his declaration of things to come is founded on his appointing them. Isa. xlv. 7, 'Who, as I, shall call, and shall declare it, and set it in order for me, since I appointed the ancient people? and the things that are coming, and shall come, let them shew unto them.' He foreknew the most necessary things according to the course of nature, because he decreed that such effects should proceed from and necessarily follow such and such causes; and he knows all future contingents, all things which shall fall out by chance, and the most free acts of rational creatures, because he decreed that such things should come to pass contingently or freely, according to the nature of second causes. So that what is casual or contingent, with respect to us, is certain and necessary in regard of God." (*Illustration*.)

TOPLADY—"According, therefore, to the Scripture representation, Providence neither acts vaguely and at random, like a blind archer who shoots uncertainly in the dark as well as he can, nor yet *pro re nata*, or as the unforeseen exigence of affairs may require; like some blundering statesman who plunges, it may be, his country and himself into difficulties, and then is forced to unravel his cobweb, and reverse his plan of operations as the best remedy for those disasters which the court-spider

had not the wisdom to foresee. But shall we say this of God? 'T were blasphemy! He that dwelleth in the heavens laugheth all these miserable afterthoughts to scorn. God, who can neither be overreached nor overpowered, has all these post-expedients in derision. He is incapable of mistake. He knows no levity of will. He cannot be surprised with any unforeseen inconveniences. 'His throne is in heaven, and his kingdom ruleth over all.' Whatsoever, therefore, comes to pass, comes to pass as a part of the original plan, and is the offspring of that prolific series of causes and effects which owes its birth to the ordaining and permissive will of him in whom 'we all live, and move, and have our being.' (Thornwell's Collected Writings.)

PRESIDENT EDWARDS—"The foreknowledge of God will necessarily infer a decree: for God could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be; and that, because things would not be future, unless he had decreed they should be." (Works, Decrees and Election.)

JOHN DICK, D. D.—"This seems to be the place in which it is proper to introduce a distinction, which is usually made, of the knowledge of God into the knowledge of simple intelligence, or natural and indefinite knowledge, *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*; and the knowledge of vision, *scientia visionis*, which is also called free and definite. The former is the knowledge of things possible, and is called indefinite, because God has defined or determined nothing concerning them. God knows all possible causes, and all their possible effects. The latter is the knowledge of future things, of things which shall take place, and is called definite, because their existence is determined. They differ, you see, in their object; that of the former being all things that might exist; that of the latter being only such things as are to exist. The first kind of knowledge is founded on the omnipotence of God; he knows all things which his power could perform. The second kind of knowledge is founded on his will or decree, by which things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurity. God knew of innumerable worlds and orders of creatures which his power could have brought into being; but he knew of them, not as things which were to be, but as things which might be. But, he knew of the universe which actually is, as certainly to have a future existence, because he had determined to create it. Lastly, these two kinds of knowledge differ in their order, because the former preceded his decree, and the latter is subsequent to it." (Lectures on Theology.)

CHARLES HODGE—"God is said to know himself and all things out of himself. This is the foundation of the distinction between the *scientia necessaria* and the *scientia libera*. God knows himself by the necessity of his nature; but as everything out of himself depends for its existence or occurrence upon his will, his foreknowledge of each thing as an actual occurrence is suspended on his will, and in that sense is free. Creation

not being necessary, it depended on the will of God whether the universe, as an object of knowledge, should exist or not. This distinction is not of much importance. And it is liable to the objection, that it makes the knowledge of God dependent." (Systematic Theology.)

Again, he says: The "distinction between the possible and the actual, is the foundation of the distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. The former is founded on God's power, and the latter upon his will." (Systematic Theology.)

J. H. THORNWELL—"It (election) is absolute or wholly irrespective of works, having no other originating or impulsive cause than the mere good pleasure of God's will."

After a full statement of the doctrine of Predestination, of which the above quotation is a part, he says: "It would be no hard matter to show by quotations from Calvin and Turretin, and the published Confessions of the Reformed Churches, that the statement just given is a fair exposition of the views which have usually been regarded as orthodox from the period of the Reformation until now."

"The Scripture account of foreknowledge is simple and consistent: God foreknows all things because he decrees them, and hence the terms are frequently interchanged."

"While God as yet existed alone, supremely glorious in himself, before one particle of matter had been called into being, or a solitary soul was found to adore and reverence the perfection of Deity, he scanned in the light of an infallible omniscience, and fixed by the power of an immutable decree, all objects and events, whether small or great, whether grand or minute. He simply *wills*, and emptiness and desolation become peopled with a thousand inhabitants of a thousand ranks and gradations of being; the wheels of Providence begin to roll, and every creature, whether small or great, organic or inorganic, material or intelligent, walks in the track which an eternal purpose had settled and arranged. . . . He is the mighty Ruler of the universe, and his *will*, his *eternal purpose*, is supreme and irresistible through all the boundless ranges of existence. Amid the seeming irregularity and confusion which distract the world, amid all the failures in human schemes and calculations which are daily taking place, amid the horrors of war, the fall of kingdoms, and the ruins of empire, there is one grand, unchangeable purpose which never fails, but which meets its accomplishment alike in the frustration or success of all other purposes. Every event in nature or in grace is simply an evolution of that grand purpose, and could the thread of this purpose be traced by the limited intellect of man in all its bearings and relations, chaos would exhibit regularity, and order and harmony would rise from confusion." (Collected Writings.)

II. Remarks concerning these quotations.

We desire to make some observations concerning these quotations, in the hope that we may remove what may seem to be difficulties, and develop clearly what they teach concerning the subject which we are discussing.

1. Dr. Hodge does not look with favor upon the distinction of knowledge into *scientia necessaria* and *scientia libera*, and we therefore discard it. But, with Turretin and Dr. Dick, and perhaps others, he does recognise the distinction of knowledge into *knowledge of simple intelligence* and *knowledge of vision*, and, with them, he founds the former on God's power, and the latter on his will. It will also be observed, that at least Turretin and Dr. Dick teach that the former—knowledge of simple intelligence—precedes the divine decree; and that the latter—knowledge of vision—is subsequent to it. Now, in the first place, it will be observed that these theologians teach that the universe *as it exists*, and God's foreknowledge of it, both ultimately rest on the Divine will. Whatever, therefore, they may believe concerning things possible, we do, in regard to things actual, have from them an explicit affirmation of the proposition, that *Will is the basis on which all things rest*. And this proposition contains the doctrine which we attribute to Calvinism. In the second place, it is admitted that they teach that there is a knowledge—*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*—which preceded God's decree. This seems to contradict our thesis. But we think that reflection will show that what they teach concerning this knowledge, logically and fairly leads to the conclusion which they hold in regard to the *scientia visionis*. Let us see how it does so. They say that this knowledge of simple intelligence is founded on the omnipotence of God. Omnipotence is power, potential or actual; and power, with God, belongs to will, inheres in it. Therefore, a knowledge which is founded on the omnipotence of God is, through that omnipotence, founded on the divine will. This gives the conclusion, that in a *possible universe* ("things which might be"), as well as in the *actual*, knowledge is founded on will, decree. How could God know "the things which might be" as possible, without an act of the divine will creating, placing, them before the divine mind as possible existences? Power—will—

must speak them into possible existence before they could be known as possible existences.

2. The attentive reader will also notice that some of these extracts present the idea, that the salvation of man depends upon the will of God, in opposition to the doctrine that it depends upon foresight of faith, or anything else, in the creature. It is evident that this is but an application of the general truth to the scheme of human redemption. Holding the general truth, they must, to be consistent, teach that salvation is by grace. Calvinists have always proclaimed this doctrine—it is one of their distinguishing glories. They have often been condemned, and their system misconceived; but their enemies can never charge that they have robbed Christ of his office as the “Author and Finisher” of our faith.

3. Whether the above observations are accepted *in toto* or not, we apprehend no argument is needed to show that these extracts prove that Calvinism teaches the proposition, *Will is the basis on which all things rest*. Having reached this conclusion, we pass on to consider the teachings of the Bible.

THE BIBLE.

The Bible unites with Philosophy and Calvinism in declaring that *Will is the basis on which all things rest*. That this is true, is shown by several considerations, to some of which we invite attention.

I. The teaching of the Bible concerning God.

1. Everywhere the Scriptures tell us that God is active, that He is unchangeable, that He is the Creator of all things, and therefore existed before them. He “worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” With him “is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.” “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.” “All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made.” These things show that God was active before any created thing existed—a truth which no one will deny. If so, His activity was not derived *ab extra*, because outside of himself

there was no existing thing. Therefore, it was spontaneous. Thus the Scriptures attribute Spontaneity to God; spontaneity is deduced "by good and necessary consequence." But spontaneity, as has been shown, gives the proposition, that *Will is the basis on which all things rest*, and, as involved in that proposition, the doctrine of Predestination.

2. As a confirmation of the above, we call attention to the Hebrew name of God—his peculiar and proper name—יהוה, Jehovah. This name is derived from the verb יהרה, *to be, to exist*. "The origin of יהרה lies in the idea of *breathing*. . . . This idea is then transferred to the breathing of persons and animals; whence, *to live*, and *i. q.*, יהיה, *to be*." (Gesenius's Lexicon.) With these statements, it is easy to see what results. The name originates with the verb, the verb originates in the idea of breathing, breathing is action, and action, with God, originates in *will*. Therefore, the fundamental and true conception of God, which the ancient Church sought to embody in this tetragrammaton (and that, too, under the guidance of inspiration), points primarily to his activity, his spontaneity.

3. As a further confirmation, we call attention to the Greek word which is used to designate the nature of God. This word is *pneuma*, and is found in John iv. 24: "God is a Spirit," (*pneuma*.) It signifies *a breathing, breath*; and is derived from *πνέω, to breathe*. (Robinson's Lexicon.) Like the word Jehovah, it points to God's activity, his spontaneity.

II. The teaching of the Bible concerning created things.

1. It is easy to show that, according to the Divine word, created things have their origin in the power of God. "I have made the earth, the man and the beasts that are upon the ground, by my great power and by my outstretched arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me." "Howbeit, the Most High dwelleth not in temples made with hands; as saith the prophet, Heaven is my throne, and earth is my foot-stool; what house will ye build me? saith the Lord; or, what is the place of my rest? Hath not my hand made all these things?" But

power, with God, belongs to will, inheres in it. Thus will is the basis of created things.

2. This is confirmed by the scriptural words first used to designate existence. Those words are *הָיָה*, *to be, to exist*, and *הָיָה*, also *to be*. It will be remembered that the name Jehovah is derived from one of them. Both “signify primarily *to breathe, to blow*, which notion then passes over into the signification partly of breathing after, desiring, rushing, and partly of living, existing.” (Gesenius’s Lexicon.) Existence thus points to its origin in action, in will. “All existence, *הָיָה*, is, in its deepest source, will, *וָיָה* . . . ; for which reason, also, an immediate *θελεῖν* (John iii. 8), *i. e.*, a *thelein* not produced by the way of knowledge, is attributed to the entire life of nature unconscious of itself.” (Franz Delitzsch, D. D.,—Biblical Psychology—Wallis’s Translation.)

III. The teaching of the Bible concerning Predestination.

There are but two opinions in the theological world concerning the teaching of the Bible in regard to this doctrine which demand our attention here. One opinion holds that, according to the Scriptures, predestination is not founded on anything else; the other holds that it is founded on foreknowledge.

1. If the first opinion be the true one, our thesis is established. Predestination, and the scriptural terms denoting it—*προthesis, proorizo, ekloge*—evidently designate will and its action. We might pause here and seek to establish this first opinion. And in doing so, we would be entitled to introduce, and have estimated at their full force, all the scriptural arguments bearing on the question, which the great intellects of Calvinism have produced. But this is unnecessary. Let us therefore consider the second opinion.

2. At first view it would seem that the second opinion, if established, would overthrow our thesis. But we believe reflection will show that foreknowledge, considered in its scriptural terms, instead of overthrowing our thesis, actually establishes it. Let us see.

In the first place, the scriptural terms are prognosis and

proginosko. The former is derived from the latter, and the latter is all, therefore, that requires consideration. It is a compound of *pro* and *ginosko*. *Ginosko* is derived from the obsolete verb *gnoō* (Robinson.) *Gnoō* is derived from *noos* or *nous* (Cornelii Schrevelii Lexicon.) *Nous* primarily signifies *the seer*, perceiver (Robinson)—that is, *one who sees*. Thus, knowledge is primarily intellectual vision; vision is an act; the first element in an act is developed energy; energy inheres in will. Thus the second opinion gives us the same conclusion as the first—will is the basis.

In the second place, a confirmation of this view is given by Dr. Delitzsch:

“That which, or by means of which, the self-conscious spirit thinks and wills, is called *nous* (*mens*, *animus*, as distinct from *anima*), or, also, *dianoia* (*ratio*). According to its etymon, *nous*, from the Sanscrit root *gnā*, signifies spiritual perception and comprehension (for *gnous*, as *nomen*, *narus*, *navas*, for *gnomen*, *gnarus*, *gnavus*), certainly only the thinking nature; as, also, *mens* (*menos*, vide Passow), Sanscrit *manas*, is named from *man—mna*, to think; but the will (*thelesis*) allows itself to be taken up into the thought (*noein dianoeisthai*), inasmuch as all will is an endeavor of the spirit, from a ground that has become conscious, towards an object that has become conscious, and thus is enclosed on both sides by thought; as, again, the thought is a seeking—and, as such, a will—of that which is to be found. This is the universal scriptural view, on which account, e. g., רָצוֹן (רָצוֹן)—רָצוֹן, רָצוֹן, רָצוֹן—unites in itself the ideas of will or endeavor, and of thought. . . . Thus *voeiv* is the radical, ideal, penetrating thought and knowledge, directed to the essence of things, and which, in a word, are spiritual or rational, and the will determining itself in conformity thereto, distinct from the kindred psychical facts of presentation, perception, and desire.” (Biblical Psychology.)

This passage leads to the conclusion that the scriptural term *foreknow* includes two elements—knowledge and will. The following extract will show that, in the view of the same scholar, the Scriptures give will as the logical antecedent of knowledge: “Therefore, when we considered the triplicity of God as the archetype of the triplicity of the spirit, we everywhere gave will the precedence before thought and knowledge. According to Scripture, the will is the root of the Godhead and of the Spirit,

having its primary existence in God, and, consequently, also the root of the soul, having its primary source in the spirit." (Biblical Psychology.)

In the third place, additional confirmation is given by Turretin. In closing a statement, in regard to Prognosis, whose corresponding verb is used in Romans viii. 29, he says: "*Ita πρόγνωσις decretum de fine seu destinationem ad salutem, προορισμὸς decretum de mediis ad finem illum consequendum necessariis notat, ut Eph. i. 5;*" thus Prognosis denotes decree concerning the end or destination to salvation, Proorismos denotes decree concerning the necessary means for attaining the end, as in Eph. i. 5. (Institutio Theologiae.)

Let us now pause and mark the result which has been reached. Unless our argument has been unsound, the Bible gives the same conclusion as that given by Philosophy and Calvinism. Like them, it affirms that *will is the basis of all things*; and, like them, teaches the doctrine of Predestination as involved in that proposition.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

1. The truth, that *will is the basis of all things*, lies at the foundation of the Calvinistic system. It is the corner-stone; hence the discussion of it should not be relegated to the region of useless speculation. It cannot but be a duty to endeavor to ascertain whether or not the first principle of a scheme which controls the destinies of millions is correct. Whether, therefore, we have been successful or not, we have written with the hope of subserving the interests of important truth—truth which, although it may seem to be abstract, theoretical, yet, in its application, lays its power on all our practical concerns.

2. Calvinism does not, as some seem to think, destroy the doctrine of Free-will. On the contrary, it is the very system which saves that doctrine. If will be before all things, it must be free—there can be nothing behind it to control it. Hence it is, that the Westminster Confession of Faith and other Calvinistic symbols declare that God did "freely" ordain whatsoever comes to pass. In regard to man, Spontaneity, which teaches Predestination, also teaches the doctrine of freedom; man originates

his own action, is not controlled by another, and is therefore free. Calvinism must hold to Spontaneity, otherwise it is guilty of suicide.

3. The truth, that will is the basis of all things, does not conflict with the doctrine that the will follows the strongest motive—considering motive, as does Dr. Archibald Alexander in his work on Moral Science, as subjective in its nature. It is a law of the will's action, that it freely follows that feeling, or state of mingled feelings, which, on the whole, is most agreeable. At its origin, the soul by its conative powers acts spontaneously. This action gives rise to an experience of pleasure and pain. Instinctively, "blindly and fatally" at first, but "freely and deliberately" when the will as such commences action, the soul seeks to get rid of the pain and to hold to the agreeable. The feeling, therefore, becomes a motive, and the will follows that which is strongest; that is, that which, on the whole, is most agreeable. We will add just here, although it is outside the limits of this essay, that this doctrine of motive is no abstruse metaphysical formula, brought by Calvinism into the domain of theology, but is a simple, natural statement of a psychological fact and law, whose existence, it seems to us, is proved by the consciousness of every mind that attentively considers its own operations.

4. Calvinism has been often assailed, misunderstood, misrepresented, abused. It has had enemies within and without. Some have been superficial, ignorant. Some have been strong, malignant. Some have been strong and fair—Christian in spirit and in opposition. It was assailed in other ages, and is assailed in this. It is said that it has become antiquated. It is charged with fatalism, with substituting "philosophy, falsely so-called," for the teachings of Scripture, with dishonoring God, and with degrading man. Still it stands, and will stand. Philosophy is its intrenchment, and the Bible is its citadel. It cannot be overthrown without the destruction of both. Defended by these, it is like Gibraltar—stronger than all the seas and the guns of all their fleets. It was built for eternity, and will endure; because truth is its strength, and truth is "the strength, wisdom, power, and majesty of all ages." In storm and in calm it stands by the

cross of Jesus—it knows no other place to stand. In conflict and in peace it looks up to Christ as Lord—it knows no other King. It is not shallow, or narrow, or poor—dwarfing man's soul, or starving his spiritual life. It is deep as the counsels of God, broad as the sweep of his Providence, and reveals its treasures in the glories of heaven. It submits itself to will—the will of a sinless Sovereign. Standing at the cross of his Son, midway between two eternities, it seeks for intimations of that will. From the abysmal ages of the past, its rapt attention hears but one voice sounding through all the centuries—the voice of the Anointed One, when he began redemption's wondrous work, "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God." In the tragedy of the crucifixion, amid whose scenes it stands, it hears but one voice to send round the world to lift up and save the fallen—the voice of the Crucified, "Thy will be done." And looking far ahead to the glorious apocalypses of the future, towards which it moves with hope, it loses every other sound in the grand acclaim, "Alleluia: for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth."

ARTICLE V.

PRAYER ANSWERABLE WITHOUT ANY VIOLATION
OF NATURE.

We shall assume at the very outset of the present discussion, that the universe is neither the eternal and necessary development of the Infinite, as maintained by the Pantheist, nor an evolution from some primordial element, or elements, as maintained by the Positivist; on the contrary, that all things visible and invisible, matter and mind alike, are the product of intelligent power and will residing in an infinite uncreated Spirit.

On the supposition that either Pantheism or Positivism is true: the great questions respecting man's existence and destiny that so often thrust themselves upon the attention of the thoughtful,

are wholly impertinent. In either case there is no freedom, no responsibility, and no future in any wise connected with, or dependent upon, human agency. Man is but an infinitesimal force in the great cast-iron system which is moving on blindly and irresistibly to fixed results; and while neither Pantheism nor Positivism can assure him against a future, whatever may be its complexion, no forethought can affect either his position or his interest in it. He is like the debris that has been washed by a summer torrent into some passing stream; and whether he shall be cast out upon some jutting shore, thenceforth to move no more in the great current of being, or be borne onward forever, it is no concern of his—he is but a part of the moving mass, and must float with wind and tide. Under either aspect of the universe, there is no place for prayer, as it is understood in the vocabulary, and practised in the closet, of the Christian. The human heart may, indeed, still be oppressed with a sense of weakness and dependency; and emergencies may arise, when the language of supplication—some broken cry for help to a higher power—shall instinctively fall from human lips; but that is all: as a rational exercise of real significance, prayer cannot be admitted into the scheme either of the Pantheist or the Positivist.

Inasmuch, therefore, as we propose to discuss the aspect of prayer in its relation to nature, and prayer in its scriptural sense—the only sense, indeed, in which it can possibly have any value—we assume as a postulate, that the theistic conception of the universe is the true one.

And let it be distinctly understood, that we do not here raise the question as to whether there is, or is not, any efficacy in prayer; we only ask, Whether science can properly take issue with religion, when religion asserts that there is nothing in the constitution of nature, so far as that constitution is known, which forbids the possibility of prayer being answered in the sphere of the natural, without violence being done to nature itself. It is the creed of evangelical Christendom to-day, as it has always been, that there can be interpositions of the Divine will in the realm of nature without in the smallest degree affecting, much less destroying, the character of nature, as it was meant to be.

Christians believe that God can avert war, famine, and pestilence; that he can save from threatened shipwreck; that he can restore the sick to health; that he can protect against accident, and make danger harmless; and that all these things he can do without breaking in upon nature's order, or marring her sublime harmony. They believe not only that he *can* so interpose, but that he *has* often done it, and done it in answer to prayer. How it has been done, they may not be able to explain; but of the fact itself they have no doubt.

Is there anything in such a belief at war with what we know of our mundane system? A certain school of scientists says that there is; that such a faith is an invasion of nature's inviolable domain—an attempt to despoil her of rights which were vested in her at the beginning.

Now, it is just at this point that our inquiry begins. The scientist says that religion is unwarranted in the claims that she makes, and that nature repudiates them. But if so, where is the proof? Mere assertion will not do. Dogmatism is not argument. The real assailing party here is not religion, but science. If theology were now, as it was in the days of Galileo, the persecutor of science, claiming the kingdom of nature, no less than that of grace, as a part of her sacred empire, such claims might well awaken the indignation of the whole scientific world. But religion demands no such recognition at the hands of science. She does not refuse to accept even one of its well established facts. She is willing for any eye that will, to roam over the magnificent universe of God, and explore any volume that reveals the glory of the great Creator. She only asks to be let alone in the work intrusted to her. But if, in spite of all this, science assumes an attitude of hostility, she undoubtedly has the right to demand the cause of it. Where, then, we repeat, is the proof that science is right and religion in error?

It is evident that, if the proof is forthcoming, it must be furnished by nature itself. Revelation does not supply it, for revelation is on the side of theology. Nature, then, is all that is left to the scientist; and, indeed, it is all that he demands. Here he plants himself with confidence; and entrenching himself

behind nature's forces and laws and order, he launches forth his darts against the religion of the Bible. He means war, and war to the knife, we know; but we cannot yield till fairly driven from the field.

Prove that we are wrong, and we will give up our cherished faith, though surrender means orphanage, and that of the most woeful kind. But it is proof that we demand, and not the mere semblance of it—proof convincing, overwhelming, and not some mere bantling of a theory which the science of to-morrow may consign to the grave. Can such proof be supplied? We shall see.

It is evident that, in conducting the present inquiry, we must endeavor to ascertain *what is involved in the idea of nature, as nature discloses itself to science*: and at the very threshold we are brought face to face with the question, *What is Law?* Now, we remark that law is not force. It has no causative energy, and is capable neither of originating nor effecting anything in the realm either of mind or matter. Parental law may be authoritative and potent, in the sense that the parent has the right to issue it, and the ability to enforce it; but regarded simply as *law*, it is only a rule to which the conduct of the child is required to conform. The statutes of a State have no power in themselves to secure obedience in the citizen: they only express the will and purpose of the commonwealth in regard to the actions of its subjects. So, too, with those fundamental and indestructible laws which, in ordinary language, are said to govern the operations of the human mind; they mean nothing more, than that the mind, from its very constitution, if it use its activities at all, must act according to a certain fixed and regular order. So far, therefore, as *law* has any application whatever to intelligent agents, it is only an expression of force, and not force itself; and yet it is not the exponent of every kind of force, but of that specific kind which acts with regularity and uniformity. It is not the *steam*, which is the real propelling power, but the *measured motion* of the engine along its iron track.

And the same is true of what are called the laws of nature. It is not the law of gravitation, acting in concert with the first law of motion, that maintains the harmonious movements of our solar

system. The law of gravitation is nothing more than a scientific statement of the fact, that the force of gravity is not spasmodic and variable, but regular and determinate in its action; and the first law of motion, so far from either inducing or sustaining motion in a body, only indicates the direction which a moving body will take, unless deflected by some disturbing cause. The laws of vegetable growth do not develop the lily from the bulb, or the oak from the acorn: Each particular form of vegetable life has a germ of its own; and it is this living force, always acting according to a definite and unvarying order in the same species, and not the laws of growth, that gives each plant and shrub and tree its character and form. When oxygen and hydrogen are mixed in the ratio of eight to one by weight, and ignited by a spark of electricity, the result is water; and when the same conditions are observed, the result will always be the same; and this, we may say, is due to what the chemist calls *the law of definite proportions*. But, strictly speaking, it is the chemical affinity that oxygen has for hydrogen which produces the union of these two elementary substances, when electricity is used as an exciting cause. The law of definite proportions effects nothing; it is only the enunciation of a fact which holds true in every case of chemical combination, where two or more elements are the combining substances.

Law, then, under all its varied forms, may be defined as *the expression of force*. It is not itself an active agent. It is not even an instrument. There is nothing substantial or tangible about it. It is only a formula. It cannot be deified, for it has no existence except as a general proposition. It is the product of nothing. The only thing that can be affirmed of it is, that it indicates the presence of energy. Wherever force acts regularly and uniformly, there we have law, and no where else.

This view, however, would not be complete did we not advance one step farther, and trace the force which law expresses up to its source in a supreme intelligent will. If we adopt the theistic conception of the universe (and on any other theory our present inquiry is altogether irrelevant), we cannot stop short of this. Whatever the intermediate links, the great chain of created being

cannot be traversed until, ascending step by step, we reach the throne of the Uncreated and the Eternal. If matter and mind alike are the product of creative power and skill, the same must be true of all their multiform forces; and if law is only the exponent of force in regular systematic action, then the laws of nature, in their ultimate analysis, are nothing more than revelations of the intelligent will and purpose of the great Creator. They are the footprints of God upon the universe; and so far from hiding him from the gaze of his intelligent creation, they serve to reveal his omnipresence and proclaim his glory.

We do not hold with some, that God is the only active cause in the universe. Indeed, if this were true, God and his works would be confounded, and Pantheism be the necessary result. We maintain, on the contrary, and maintain on the authority of the testimony of consciousness, that there are forces in the cosmos which may be affirmed of the creature in distinction from the Creator—derived and dependent, indeed, but not on that account the less real. There is a potency in matter and there is a potency in mind, which a true philosophy can never confound with the mighty, living, ever active energy that belongs to God. The Creator and his works are distinct, and the line of demarcation that divides them can never be obliterated; still the connexion between the two is so intimate, that God's presence cannot be excluded from any part of the universe; every thing, animate and inanimate, lives and moves and has its being in him.

Nature, then, so far as we can apprehend it, is a vast concatenation of created energies, which owe their original collocation, together with their fixed and orderly method of acting, to the sovereign will of an Almighty Creator. It is not a chaos, but a system—not a discord, but a harmony. Theology recognises this fact no less than science. It delights to acknowledge that arrangement, order, and unity characterise the whole cosmos, both terrestrial and stellar. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, if the theistic conception of God is true. A being of infinite intelligence and power cannot be the author of disorder and confusion; or, if chaos should ever be introduced, we should be compelled to regard it as only a temporary invasion of order's domain—as but a

preliminary step to the introduction of a higher order than that which had been destroyed.

And, besides, the necessities of man require uniformity in nature and its operations. Whether we assume that the world has been arranged with a view to the accommodation of man as its highest occupant or not, it is at least undeniable that he does occupy such a position; and it is just as undeniable that he requires regularity and order in the great whole of which he forms a part, not merely as essential to his comfort and enjoyment and development, but as an indispensable condition of life itself. Where chaos reigns, life cannot exist. But for the diurnal revolution of the earth upon its axis, and the periodicity of its motion around the sun, and the fixed inclination of the equinoctial to the ecliptic, and a thousand other regularities in the working of nature's forces, the world would not be habitable. We can very well understand, therefore, why there should be order in the arrangement, and uniformity in the operations, of the multiform potencies that enter into the composition of the universe. There is a divine wisdom and a divine benevolence in the systematic and orderly character that belongs to the cosmos, and the devout theist loves to contemplate it. Law, indeed, is not his God; it is, however, a golden ladder up which he climbs into the presence of Jehovah, and worships with adoring love and praise.

And yet, with all the boasted uniformity of nature and its laws, and the thrusting forward of this fact on the part of some scientific men, with a view to overthrow one of the cardinal and most intensely practical truths of Revelation, it is a uniformity which is subject to many important modifications. In a certain sense, it is no doubt true that the laws of nature are always invariable. If the forces that *once* conspired to produce a certain effect, have the same conditions *a thousand times* present, the same effect will be a thousand times produced; and in this sense, we may confidently assert the invariableness of all the laws that belong to the Cosmos. It is a necessary and indestructible law of human belief, that like causes will always produce like effects. Hence it is that astronomy may be classed among the exact sciences. We may always count upon the regular succession of

day and night, and the periodic recurrence of the seasons. Having once discovered the laws of planetary and lunar motion, we can tell a thousand years hence when the sun will be in perigee and when in apogee; when the summer and when the winter solstice will begin; when a solar and when a lunar eclipse will occur; when the transit of Venus and when the occultation of Jupiter may be expected. The great changes which are constantly going on in our terrestrial system are but infinitesimally disturbing elements in the vast aggregate of forces that conspire to secure harmony in the movements of the planetary bodies, and thus practically count for nothing. The volcanic upheaval of a coast and consequent change in the distribution of the seas, or the depression of a vast tract of country under the shock of an earthquake; an eruption of Mount Vesuvius, or the disappearance of the Hercynian forest—great as may be the modifications which they introduce into terrestrial phenomena, will not appreciably affect the relation which, as a mighty moving mass of attractive force, our earth sustains to the other members of our planetary sisterhood—they will not cause even a momentary interruption of the “music of the spheres,” much less will they modify it to an extent that the ear of astronomy can detect. To this extent, then, we are warranted in saying that nature is invariable—always invariable, indeed, in the realm of the supra-terrestrial, because the mighty forces that exert their energy there, are subject to no dislocations and new combinations.

But when we descend to terrestrial nature, we find ourselves among phenomena that are continually changing, and changing to such an extent that they cannot be embraced under the dominion of fixed and unchanging law. There is a lack of uniformity in their succession, not because the same force works one way to-day and another to-morrow—not because the energy that belongs to force is capricious and whimsical—but for the simple reason that the same conjunction of forces is not always present. New conditions are continually coming in, and acting powerfully as modifying factors. The great complex system of causes that were at work to-day, has given a new complexion to the sum total of nature, and made it different from what it was at the close of

yesterday ; and advancing from this point, the history of tomorrow will not be the same as that of to-day. It may be true, indeed, that the same condition of atmospheric temperature and moisture and currents will always be followed by rain ; but what scientific knowledge can reduce the recurrence of these same conditions to anything like order ? Who can tell when drought is to scourge a land with want and famine, or some cyclone of unprecedented violence is to submerge whole islands and sweep thousands of their inhabitants into unexpected death ? Astronomy can fix the very day when any of the four seasons will begin ; but what knowledge of law will enable even the wisest scientist to foretell anything more than their general character ? Who can say whether any particular spring season will be early or late, wet or dry, mild or severe, uniform or variable ? Can science enunciate a law of periodicity in connexion with the appearance of those great armies of destructive insects which sometimes play such havoc with the calculations of the farming community ? Can it gauge the violence of these storms which sometimes devastate our Atlantic coast, and tell us months beforehand when they are to rise and when to subside ? Can it inform the planter of the approach of frost, and thus protect him against its depredations ? Science here is as powerless as ignorance. Grant that all such phenomena are due to the forces which are resident in nature as the scientist understands and defines it, it still cannot be denied that these forces are constantly being dislocated and arranged in new combinations, which disturb and change the previous order of things ; and these modifications, it is still further evident, elude the possibility of being embraced by us within the scope of law. It may be true that the same conjunction of forces will invariably be followed by the same effect ; but this conjunction does not always remain the same, and therefore the resulting phenomena cannot be reduced to any order and system. There is enough of regularity in the operations of nature to stimulate man to work with good hope of success, but not enough to make him master of the future.

The modifications which we have so far observed as continually taking place in terrestrial phenomena, are due to unintelligent and

for the most part inanimate causes; some of them, like the earthquake and the volcano, lying comparatively dormant for years, and, when their gathering energies have become ripe for action, spending their destructive force in a moment, but leaving their mark indelibly upon the whole subsequent history of our planet; others, (and these by far the most effective as well as the most numerous,) introducing a minute and almost unnoticed change here and another there, and so on throughout the entire series; all of them conspiring to form new arrangements and centres of force, which, in their turn, give a modified aspect to nature. And thus it goes on continually, and will go on to the end of time, no day ever finding its fac-simile in any other day; there not even being any law of variation, as in arithmetical progression, by which the history of one century may be predicted from that of a previous one.

But there are other forces in connexion with our mundane system, which may properly be called *natural*, inasmuch as they enter into the great complex whole of terrestrial causes, while at the same time altogether different from the energies belonging to matter—we refer to the potent agency of human intelligence and will. Nor are these factors so insignificant that we can discount them as of no practical importance. The earth has been occupied by the race of man for nearly six thousand years; and to-day more than a million millions of human beings are at work throughout its broad extent, traversing its seas, tunnelling its mountains, dyking its rivers, draining its swamps, cultivating its land, cutting down its forests, digging mines, building cities, and employing their active, inventive industry in thousands of useful pursuits. Here is a great mass of mind and will ever active and ever devising new channels for the direction of its activities; exploring new continents and settling them, or materially changing the face of those that have been settled for centuries; opening up new fields of industry and occupying them with productive brain and muscle and capital; in some places reclaiming land which the sea had long held and claimed as its own, in others uniting waters which were separated by interposing barriers; introducing and utilising forces which before had been unproduc-

tive, and effecting such changes in the distribution and arrangement of others, that their modifying influence has been sensibly felt by terrestrial phenomena. Nature is not what it would have been if man were not here.

And let it be still further noticed that this human element, as it may be called, which enters with so much potency into the great aggregate of nature's forces, is not itself a constant quantity. Its effects cannot be determined by any algebraic formula. It is not the same to-day that it was when William the Conqueror landed upon the shores of England, or when Christopher Columbus discovered this new western world; not the same either in quantity or quality. It is always growing in bulk, and always changing in kind.

Let it be observed, however, as has already been stated, that terrestrial nature is not a discord, but a harmony. The great modifications which it is constantly receiving from causes which are always shifting their position and entering into new collocations and acting in new directions, do not interfere with the idea that it is a system. There is a power in the cosmos to absorb, so to speak, any seeming irregularities that invade it, and incorporate them into itself as constitutive and regular parts of its great working force. When the earthquake that visited Lisbon about the middle of the last century, lifted up the waters of the sea and sent a mighty tidal wave upon the devoted city, there was a momentary shock given to the existing order of things, and a change effected in the distribution of the forces then at work; but these forces, once readjusted, immediately began to coöperate with others, and to work as effectually towards the promotion of order as if their new arrangement were not due to a great catastrophe. We are told that Europe and Africa were once united at the Straits of Gibraltar, and that a tongue of land once reached over from the island of Sicily to some part of the Libyan coast. America and Asia at one time joined hands, and the waters of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean, in the remote ages, met and kissed on the northern and western shores of what is now the peninsula of Norway and Sweden. There was a time, therefore, in the history of our globe, when the distribution of the land and

the seas was very different from what it now is. Whether these changes were gradual and extended over a long series of years, or were effected by some tremendous dislocating causes, it is evident that they must have entered as important modifying influences into nature as it then was, and thenceforth established the ground for thousands of other changes which have since occurred. And yet there is such an elasticity about our mundane system, that it recovers without difficulty from any shock that it may receive, and soon reduces itself to order again. None of the forces that are at work within its limits can derange its machinery. If discord is introduced, harmony is soon restored. And thus order reigns, and will continue to reign; not indeed the order of the steam engine, which knows nothing but the perpetual recurrence of the same motion, whether it be rushing like the lightning, or creeping along its iron track; but order of a higher kind—a general order that pervades all nature and marks it as the servant of law, while at the same time admitting deviations, (and these of an important kind,) which make the record of each day different from that of the day before.

Such, then, is nature, as it appears to the inquisitive eye of science—uniform in its laws, yet ever varying in the distribution of its forces, and therefore, even in its most fixed and established order, always changing; nay, more—not only liable to perpetual dislocations and new collocations of its forces, but, with every birth of a human being, introducing into the great system of force already existing, a new potency, which may tell with tremendous influence upon succeeding centuries. It is a grand harmony, indeed, but not a harmony that is ever repeating itself in the same notes and the same tones. It is a mighty arrangement of forces, which fit into each other wonderfully, and work together in the promotion of one great end; but in its very constitution, provision has been made for the introduction of new and potent energies; and these once introduced, become integral parts of the great whole, fall naturally into their appropriate place, and begin to work as if they had been originally implanted in our mundane system.

And now the question with which we began comes up: Is

there anything in this idea of nature that militates against the doctrine of prayer as held and expounded by Christian theology?

1. And we submit, at the outset, that the presumption is in favor of the view of theology, on the ground that Religion is a more competent witness than Science, in regard to the matter under consideration.

The mere scientist may be all that he claims to be in his special department. It may be conceded that no name deserves a higher place than his, when we come to do honor to the discoverers and expounders of nature's forces and laws. But he certainly cannot be insulted when told that, in the department of religion and religious inquiry, his opinions are of no weight. Christians teach that there is a spiritual world no less real than the world of nature, and that supernatural regeneration is necessary, if the mind would be illuminated in spiritual things. The scientist may be very sceptical about all this, and may smile at what he believes to be only a fancy on the part of the Christian; but, after all, scepticism is the only ground that, looking at religion from his standpoint, he can honestly occupy. He may doubt, but a doubt is all that he is entitled to advance. For by his own confession he has never been regenerated, and regeneration, in Christian theology, is a condition of religious knowledge.

The Christian, on the other hand, has all the facilities for the investigation of nature that the scientist has. He has mind, and mind as thoroughly balanced and trained and equipped and logical as have the doctors of science. He has eyes, and along with them honesty and practical judgment. He can sweep the heavens with his telescope; he can study the strata of the earth and their fossil remains, and interpret them as justly as the unbelieving geologist; he can know as much of protoplasm as Huxley, and as much of Evolution as Darwin, and as much of Force as Herbert Spencer, and as much of physiology as the most undisguised materialist; he is just as competent, indeed, to discover and discuss and classify any and all of the phenomena of nature, as any man who claims distinction in the scientific world. Newton, who is said to have constructed, in his "Principia," the grandest monument that has ever been reared to human genius,

did not suffer any obscuration of intellect by being a devout believer in the truth of the Bible. Hugh Miller was not incapacitated for giving to the world "The Testimony of the Rocks," because he was a Christian. Nature is not niggardly; neither is the volume which she holds in her hands accessible only to a chosen few, and those few the men who make war upon the Christian's creed and the Christian's God. Her books are open, and what she reveals to one she reveals to all, Christians and unbelievers alike, provided they have eyes to read her records and intelligence to interpret them.

Plainly, therefore, as a witness in regard to the efficacy of prayer in the domain of nature, the Christian has the advantage over the unbelieving scientist. If he should assert that provision has been made in nature for the entrance of prayer as an efficient factor; and still further, that facts have come under his observation, and in connexion with his personal experience, which attest it, how can the scientist flatly contradict him? His testimony cannot be adduced, for that is only negative. A non-believer in prayer himself, he has never tried it, and therefore, as a witness, his evidence is worth nothing. And if he should rejoin by saying that the uniformity of nature and its laws makes the position of the Christian absurd and untenable, we have only to reply that Christian science does not so teach—Christian science, which has all the facts at its command that he has, or can have.

If an inhabitant of the tropics should contend that water could never be converted into a mass of solid ice, he might make (in his own judgment) an unanswerable defence by appealing to the uniformity of nature and its laws; a visit to New York in winter, however, would satisfy him that he had made too limited an observation to warrant so broad a conclusion. And if scientific men who now reject the facts of revelation, and thus preclude the possibility of spiritual enlightenment, could only be persuaded to shift their position to that of the Christian scientist, and thus be placed at a more elevated and commanding point of view, they might discover that their observation had been too contracted and their conclusions too hastily reached; that Christian science, in a word, was a more faithful interpreter of nature than the

science that opposed it ; that, whatever the uniformity of nature, its forces were not disposed in a way to exclude the idea of prayer, as an effective agent, from the practical working of the universe.

Such an invitation would no doubt provoke a sneer, and leave science just as incredulous and hostile and uncompromising as it found it. We insist, however, that so long as it refuses to comply with all the conditions of a competent witness which the nature of the case demands, it shall not presume to dogmatise. Theology may fail to convince science ; but it is at least justified in demanding that the mass of solid evidence which it brings to fortify its conclusions shall not be treated with disdain, or quietly pronounced false.

2. It is possible to conceive that nature may have originally been so constituted as to admit of answers to prayer, without having its general order in the smallest degree compromised or violated by such a provision.

Science surely will not make bold to say that it has mastered all the secrets of the Cosmos. The history of its development should teach it modesty. It should remember that it was many centuries before it outgrew its swaddling clothes, and that its claims to recognition do not reach to a very remote past. Boasting to-day is as unwise as it would have been two centuries ago. There may be potent agencies in nature which yet remain to be discovered, and there may be others which no power of sense will ever be able to perceive.

And why may not prayer be such a force ? To whatever extent the staunchest scientist may contend for rigid and unvarying order in the operations of nature's forces, he must admit that it is such an order as does not exclude the presence of myriads of intelligent personal agents. If there is potency in matter, there is likewise potency in mind. If gravitation and electricity and chemical affinity have a work to do in making nature what it is, so have the appetites and affections and intelligence and conscience and will, which are distributed over so large a portion of the habitable world. And why may not provision have been made for the instinct of prayer to occupy a place in our mundane system, as well as for them ? The feeling which lies at the founda-

tion of prayer, seems to be inherent in human nature, and inseparable from it. All ages and all nations, in their conscious dependency and helplessness, have been accustomed to turn for help to some Higher Power. Whatever the errors that have gathered around prayer, when viewed from a Christian standpoint, the fact remains that Pagans, Mohammedans, Jews, and Christians, alike have practised it. Even infidels themselves, in times of dire extremity, have been known to throw themselves upon their knees and cry out for Heaven's interposition in their behalf. And if it is indeed true, as one of the great advocates of Modern Doubt has said, that "in the enormous machine of the universe, amid the incessant whirl and hiss of its jagged iron wheels—amid the deafening crash of its ponderous stamps and hammers—in the midst of this terrific commotion, man, a helpless and defenceless creature, finds himself placed; not secure for a moment, that on some unguarded motion a wheel may not seize and rend him, or a hammer crush him to powder"*—if this is a true view of the universe and man's connexion with it, then infidelity itself confesses that we need the protection of a higher power; and the greatest boon that could be bestowed upon our race would be the privilege of knowing that we might appeal to Heaven for protection, and not appeal in vain. And why, we repeat, may not prayer come in to supply this want, the existence of which is admitted by even Strauss himself? If the appetites and affections and intelligence and conscience and will of man have a place in the category of nature's forces, why may not prayer be equally entitled to recognition as belonging to the same category? What ground has science for the invidious distinction which it makes between the faculties and capacities of the human mind as efficient factors in the universe, and prayer, which flows from what seems to be a universal and ineradicable instinct of the human heart? If, with all the fixedness and order of nature, provision has been made for the introduction of the one, why may not equal provision have been made for the introduction of the other? And the more pertinently and emphat-

* Vedder Lectures, 1875, p. 50.

ically may we ask this question, when the despairing wail of scepticism admits that, if prayer were effectual, a great desideratum would be supplied.

It may be replied, that the claims which are set up in behalf of prayer are altogether unique, and present no points of contact with the claims advanced by the universally acknowledged potencies of nature; that even its most strenuous advocates do not plead for its recognition as a working force, in the same sense in which the real forces of the Cosmos are efficient; that all the causes which science recognises, act in virtue of an inherent power to act and bring their energies to bear directly upon nature and nothing else, but that prayer is entirely different; it is only a string of words—the expenditure of articulate breath, and nothing more—and of itself can exert no more influence upon nature than the softest breathing of the zephyr. In order to be effective, therefore, it demands the introduction and intervention of a supernatural Power, which works *from without, not from within*, and which, as an altogether foreign force, attains its end by opposing and counteracting the forces which belong to nature. If, for example, says the unbelieving scientist, a sick child is to be healed through the instrumentality of prayer, in any proper and intelligible sense, then the skill of the attending physician is nothing, and careful nursing nothing, but everything is accomplished through the active operation of divine power breaking up the disease and miraculously working a cure. If a shipwreck is to be averted by prayer, then the fog which conceals the dangerous reef must be dispersed by a direct act of Omnipotence, thrusting itself forward into the domain of nature, overmastering its forces, and compelling them to give way before superior strength.

But what if miracles were necessary in order to make prayer effectual? Supposing for a moment that the only alternative presented to Christian theology was either to abandon its position or to believe in the miraculous as of daily and hourly occurrence, would there be anything even in this to frighten the believer out of his composure and transform him into a doubter? We trow not. For there is nothing in nature to warrant the scientist in

asserting that God does not even now give the miraculous a place in connexion with his government of the world. How does he know that almighty power has not been let down into that chamber of sickness, and that, in answer to the pleadings of a mother's heart, it has not subdued the disease which was ravaging the frame of her darling boy? How does he know that infinite mercy has not heard the piteous crying of a thousand souls, and swept off from the face of the great deep the treacherous mist which held the fate of hundreds of human lives in its dark impenetrable folds? If he taunts theology with a necessary belief in the miraculous in order to save its dogma of the efficacy of prayer, let him first show that the miraculous is no where to be found. Let him prove that any given phenomenon, which is the only thing patent to the senses, has been originated by no other than natural causes. For aught that he can tell, the invalid may have been healed through the employment of natural remedies, or by the direct intervention of God. The seemingly natural may be only the natural, or it may be the supernatural in disguise. But which of the two exhausts and explains the phenomenon, science cannot determine.

For let it be remembered that nature is not a monotonous system, moving day by day under the impulse of the same unvarying forces and with the same momentum, but one that is ever changing, both in the quantity of its forces and in their collocations and combinations. New potencies are constantly appearing in the sphere of the natural; and whenever they appear, they are at once received and incorporated with those already in existence; and the order of nature is no less perfect than it was before. If the intrusion of the new force, so to speak, should produce any appreciable discord in the previous harmony, it is only momentary, and the grand anthem continues to roll on as majestically as if a false note had not been struck. And upon the same principle, it is possible for the miraculous to descend into what is ordinarily the domain of the natural, and enclose itself in phenomena which strike the observer only as natural. If there is room in the Cosmos for the free and full activity of such forces as human intellect and will—forces which often oppose themselves to the

mere material forces of the physical world and displace them, or turn them in new directions, and arrange them in new combinations, and apply them to new purposes—why may there not be, everywhere throughout nature, room for the entering in of the divine will and the display of the divine power, without the least violence being done to general order? If such agency should interpose, it could most assuredly do so without falsifying a single fact of science, or introducing any more confusion into nature's previously established harmony, than an eruption of Mount Vesuvius, or the influx of a tidal wave. The miracle, having intervened and spent its force in the production of the contemplated effect, would lose itself at once in the effect, and nature move on in obedience to natural law, precisely as if there had been no interposition of the mighty hand of God. The new phenomenon, which it was beyond the power of nature to produce—nay, which was produced, if you please, by divine energy in defiance of nature's resistance—would immediately fall into line and take its place among the other phenomena of the Cosmos, just as readily as if it had only a terrestrial origin. As Christlieb remarks: "Miracles, as soon as they have taken place, range themselves in the natural course of things, without any disturbance arising on their account."

But a belief in the constant occurrence of the miraculous is not the only alternative presented to those who hold the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer. If it were necessary for them to go that far in order to save their faith, there is nothing in nature, so far as its constitution is known to us, absolutely to forbid it. But they do not need to take such a position. For why may not nature have been originally framed with so much nicety in the adjustment of all its forces, and with so divine a skill in the arrangement of all its elements, as, from its own inexhaustible resources, to work out answers to prayer just *when* and *where* they were wanted? With the almost infinite mass of all possible existence spread out before him, when as yet there was no universe, why may not God have selected that particular form of creation, out of the many which presented themselves, that would reveal him as a Father, hearing the cries of his dependent children,

yet at the same time preserve the order of nature and the uniformity of its operations intact? Did his creative act and the purpose of his providence not contemplate the existence and extreme illness of that Christian mother's child as well as the earnest prayers which were to be offered in its behalf? And if, in answer to those prayers, he had decreed to spare that child, could he not, in the exercise of his infinite wisdom, have so arranged all the details of creation that the skilful physician would be on hand at the right juncture, and the proper medicine be administered at the proper time; and thus that the child should be healed in answer to prayer, yet healed only by the employment of natural remedies? And so with regard to all other answers to prayer, which science considers incredible on the ground that they involve a direct impinging of divine power upon nature's fixed and unalterable order.

If we measure the divine by the human mind, we might refuse to believe in the possibility of the universe having been so constructed. But if God is absolutely infinite—infinite in power no less than in intelligence—who will make bold to say that this theory of the universe is impossible? And if it is not impossible, then certainly the theological doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is not absurd. It may be held with all the objections that science may bring against it, for it neither involves the necessity of the miraculous, nor supposes even the shadow of divine interference with the laws of nature. It is well known that the theory just advanced, as a possible settlement of the controversy between science and theology in regard to prayer, is the one proposed and maintained by McCosh in his *Divine Government, Physical and Moral*. He says that "God does not require to interfere with his own arrangements, for there is an answer provided in the arrangement made by him from all eternity. How is it that God sends us the bounties of his providence? how is it that he supplies the many wants of his creatures? how is it that he encourages industry? how is it that he arrests the plots of wickedness? how is it that he punishes in this life notorious offenders against his law? The answer is, by the skilful pre-arrangements of his providence, whereby the needful events fall out at the very

time and in the way required. When the question is asked, How does God answer prayer? we give the very same reply—it is by a pre-ordained appointment, when God settled the constitution of the world, and set all its parts in order.” These views, we believe, will not command the assent of many devout minds that delight in bringing God into a more intimate relation with human life than they seem to allow. We do not state them, however, under the strong conviction of their correctness which the Princeton professor seems to entertain; we only propose them as an alternative legitimately presented to Christian faith, when science would seek to overthrow it by confronting it with the fixedness of nature and its laws.

If the scientist should still object, that even this theory of the universe does not make prayer a *real power*, on the ground that the arrangements supposed have all been made beforehand, so that the effects would necessarily follow, prayer or no prayer, this is our reply: If he means that this would establish no causal connexion between prayer and the event, in the same sense that there is a causal nexus between an act of the will and the lifting of the arm, or between the pressure of the steam and the movement of the engine, he is undoubtedly correct; but no intelligent theologian will contend for any such connexion between prayer and its answer as this, so that the objection on that score is impertinent and invalid. If he means, however, that this view does not establish such an antecedence and sequence between prayer and the event, that the antecedent having failed the sequent would not fail, he is mistaken; for prayer is here contemplated as being logically prior to the event, in the mind of God, and nature has been arranged with a direct view to work out into actual occurrence the object which prayer seeks to realise. There may, indeed, be no causative connexion between the two, in the strictest sense; but there is such a connexion between them, at least, as gives prayer a determinate place in the mind of God, and moves him to arrange creation and its laws in such a way as will make it not an irrational exercise, but *practically* a power; and this is all that theology contends for.

The only other objection that can be brought against this view

by those who deny the efficacy of prayer in the sphere of natural law, is, that it gives to man a prominence to which he is not entitled; that it makes a regard to his convenience and petty wants occupy too high a place in the counsels of heaven. This objection, however, be it observed, really lies outside of the question which we are now considering, and may therefore be dismissed without further notice; for it is not a *scientific*, but a *philosophical*, objection against prayer. We are dealing with the question, Whether the idea of prayer is at war with the constitution of nature so far as we know what nature is; and not with another which is wholly different, namely this, Whether man is not too insignificant a being to have entered so largely into the divine consideration, as this doctrine of the efficacy of prayer would seem to imply that he has.

3. But there is yet another view of the universe which theology may interpose between itself and the assaults of science upon the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer. Why may there not be invisible spiritual beings, connected with our terrestrial system from the beginning, and therefore just as really forces in nature as human beings? And what is the absurdity of supposing that answers to prayer may be accomplished through their instrumentality, without the original end in creation being changed, or the inviolableness of nature's order being infringed? The Scriptures undoubtedly teach that there are such spirits; and not only that they exist, but that they are most intimately connected with the administration of divine providence in its bearing upon man's life and destiny. Now, to say the least, it would be arrogance and presumption in any man to deny the possibility of the existence of such beings. The omnipotent God, who created human spirits, could with equal ease have created purer angelic intelligences if he had so willed.

And if their creation was possible, it was equally possible for God to endow them with superhuman powers, and to assign them a place in the great mundane system to which man belongs; to give them a far keener insight into the mysteries of nature than he has given to man, and a far greater control over the secret springs of nature's energies than human beings possess.

And if such spirits, whose existence even science must concede to be possible, should actually exist, although invisible and doing their appointed work unobserved by human eye, they could not properly be called *supernatural* powers. Having been originally connected with our terrestrial system as integral parts of it, no view of nature would be complete that should fail to recognise their presence and influence as inseparable from the true idea of the cosmos. Having entered from the very beginning into the divine plan of creation, they could no more be regarded as supernatural than electricity, or the force of gravitation. They would fall into the same category with every other force that belongs to nature, and, in the strictest sense, might claim to be denominated *natural*. There would be no difference whatever between *their* relation to the present order of things and *man's* relation to it. The only radical difference between the two, would be a difference in the extent of their modifying influence upon that system to which both of them equally belonged.

Let it be further noticed, that, on the supposition of the existence of such beings, if they should interpose to make new dispositions and combinations of nature's existing forces, it would be no more out of harmony with established order than the similar actings of man on the same on a smaller scale. By a deliberate act of the will, man can break up a chemical compound, and set free its gaseous elements, and charge a balloon, and send it floating through the upper regions of the atmosphere in apparent defiance of the force of gravitation. He can change the bed of a river, and the waters thus diverted he can employ as productive capital, and effect results that determine the commercial supremacy of a nation. And thousands of other things he can do, which nature, as it was before he began to work upon it, never would or could have done. Yet who ever dreams that there is anything supernatural in this? And what scientist ever charges man's inventive industry with an attempt to break in upon nature's fixedness and order? There is, indeed, a violent invasion of nature, a seizure of its forces, a displacement of them, and a directing of them into new channels; and this is done by the superior power of human intellect and will for the accomplishment

of results that otherwise would have been impossible. But nature's order, though modified, is not destroyed. It was intended to be flexible, and from the beginning was made susceptible of being modified without being marred.

And on the same principle, if angelic beings exist as original component parts of our system, they might act similarly; yet nothing supernatural be introduced, and no confusion ensue. By a direct act of will, they might break up the continuity of nature, and counteract the tendency of some of its forces by opposing others; or even by the intervention of spiritual force, they might divert others and combine them in new forms for the production of new results, as is done every day by thousands of manufacturers all over the world.

Give them a place in the cosmos, like that which is universally conceded to man, and they can employ their gigantic powers on fields of action as much broader than those which are traversed by man's activities, as *they* are superior to him; and they can do it without producing any derangement in the general order that the sharpest eye of science could detect.

Admitting, then, the possibility of all that has been advanced upon the subject of angelic existence and angelic connexion with our world being real, as all must admit who acknowledge the personality of God and the spirituality of the human soul, why may not angelic agency be employed in answering prayer, with as little disturbance to the uniformity of nature's operations as is caused by human agency thousands upon thousands of times every day? And if it may, what right has science to tax theology with holding an irrational and absurd creed, when it avows its belief in the efficacy of prayer? If a Christian soldier, having sought the protection of God, comes safely out of a murderous battle, with no scar upon his person save a slight abrasion of the skin upon the temple, who can say that some unseen intelligence may not have been commissioned to deflect the well-aimed bullet from its fatal course and send it along a harmless path? Such an interposition must be conceded to be possible; and if it should actually take place, it would be only the intervention of a force belonging to nature, and accomplishing nothing more than could

be just as effectually accomplished by a sudden gust of wind, or the slender drooping bough of an intervening tree. It is true that a law of motion would be contravened, but contravened by the interposition of a force which was resident in nature—a phenomenon of too common occurrence to excite the wonder of even the most ignorant.

There would be no real difference between such an act on the part of an angel and that of a man who should strike aside the dagger of an assassin, and save the breast of his friend from its sharp and deadly thrust. In both cases there would be the mastering of mere material force by that of will, and nothing more. And if, in obedience to a previously given request, the man should be present just at the moment when his presence was needed, that would harmonise the case entirely with that of angelic interference to save the life of a Christian soldier on the battle-field, in answer to his prayer.

The only want of exact parallelism between the two would be in the fact, that in the one case human will acted *mediately* through muscular force, while in the other angelic will acted *immediately* upon a moving mass. This slight dissimilarity, however, would not be sufficient to vitiate the comparison. For even human will acts directly upon the material organisation with which it is connected; and if this is true of human spirits and the bodies they inhabit, it would not seem to be impossible for higher angelic intelligences to act with equal directness upon matter with which they have no organic connexion. There is nothing, then, in nature, so far as it reveals itself to science, to stamp with absurdity the idea that—

“Millions of spiritual beings walk the earth
Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep;”

and nothing to disprove the hypothesis of prayer being answered through their instrumentality. Their agency might be employed for healing sickness, averting calamities, subduing storms, and doing thousands of other things in answer to prayer, without the miraculous being introduced or any violence being done to nature's general order. For aught that science can tell, the beautiful dream of Doddridge may not have been all a dream:

the angelic arms, which were seen in a vision of the night as having, years before, received him falling from a horse, and thus saved his life, may have been the reproduction in a dream of what was a fact in his boyhood—they may have borne him up and saved him from a premature and horrible death.

And here we conclude our inquiry; not, indeed, having advanced any positive proof of the efficacy of prayer in the sphere of the natural—which it was not, however, our purpose to do; but having shown, as we think, and shown conclusively, that there is nothing in nature—and therefore nothing in science, which is only the interpreter of nature—to warrant the charge of absurdity which is brought by some scientific men against the idea of prayer as held by Christian theology. On this point, whatever may be the fact, there is no real *casus belli* between science, which is the interpreter of the works, and theology, which is the interpreter of the word, of God.

ARTICLE VI.

WHITEFIELD AND HIS TIMES.*

This is a prompt reprint of the English work, the first edition of which appeared in 1876. The typographical execution leaves nothing to be desired, and the first and second volumes, respectively, are graced by copies of the two engravings pronounced by Dr. Gillies, Whitefield's friend and first biographer, the most exact likenesses of the great evangelist ever taken.

Although several "Lives of Whitefield" have been given to the public, there was a place for this one, even after the lapse of so many years. Much fresh matter had come into the hands of the biographer, while preparing his other works—"The Life of

* *Life and Times of the Rev. George Whitefield.* By the Rev. L. TYERMAN. A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.

Samuel Wesley," "The Life of John Wesley," and "The History of the Oxford Methodists;" and he has executed his work after the improved manner of modern biographers. While, at every period, the study of the life of so eminent a servant of Christ must be profitable to all earnest Christians, it seems especially seasonable just now to present afresh and vividly his example for our consideration. We are now inquiring how the gospel should be preached to sinners; in some places, *what* gospel ought to be preached. Faith and Science, Creeds and Broad Churchism, Denominationalism and Christian Union, are confronting each other in unadjusted relations; and, as to modes of action and worship, Evangelism, Lay Preaching, Christian Associations, Religious Benevolence, Ritualism, Discipline, and Liturgies, are subjects demanding new consideration.

The relations between God and his creatures are unchangeable, and the subjective history of the Church depends upon the different manner of understanding and observing these relations. In every period of religious fluctuation, therefore, careful and conscientious inquirers should look back to what has been. The period covered by the life of Whitefield was characterised by a fermentation of opinions and modes of acting, which, for its violence and for its effects on the English-speaking Protestant Church, has not been paralleled since the Reformation. In the Church of England there was wrought a change in practical doctrine, in evangelical preaching, in spirituality, and in zeal, which marks the origin of High and Low Church, and all that this means for the past and present, and all it portends for the future. In Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, though more particularly in the last, as well as in America, the same causes operated, producing analogous though not identical results. Especially now arose the great Methodist denomination, which has so aggrandised itself in extension, numbers, and relative influence, that it now boldly bears on its advancing standards the name originally applied by its despisers in contempt.

Whatever of principle or practice belonging to the movement of this period and the philosophy of it, is of valuable application to the present condition of the Church, connects itself largely

with the life of Whitefield, and may be found in these two elaborate and trustworthy volumes.

In a wider yet more intimate view, here each spiritually-minded believer may contemplate the portrait of one who seemed to live only for Christ, and from his experiences, recorded unaffectedly by himself, the power of the grace of God, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the efficacy of prayer, and the rich rewards the Saviour bestows, even in this life, upon every follower who unreservedly consecrates himself to his service.

The pleasure and benefit to be derived from the perusal of these volumes, will not be marred for any reader by the slightest manifestation of a denominational spirit on the part of the biographer. Mr. Tyerman says with frankness, that he himself is in doctrine an Arminian, but, otherwise, no clue is given as to his Church connexion.

Since the Reformation, three notable movements have characterised English religious history. The first was the Puritan struggle under Elizabeth; the second, the appearance of the Quakers about the middle of the seventeenth century; and the third, the rise of the Methodist Church about the middle of the eighteenth century. The Puritans opposed the Church of England mainly because of its semi-Popish ceremonials, as they deemed them; the Quakers, in the first instance, because of what they considered its unchristian hierarchy; and Wesley and Whitefield were wounded by its want, in their day, of vital religion. It is noticeable, that neither one of the three dissented originally from the theology of the Thirty-Nine Articles. To do this has been reserved for a section still within its visible communion. The real though somewhat remote causes of these separations are found in the unquestionable fact, that the Church of England stopped far short of the other Reformed Churches in divergence from the Roman Catholic Church. This incompleteness of reform was, without doubt, due to the political origin of the Church of England. This well established historical fact is exhibited by Macaulay with a force that leaves no room for dispute, and a vividness that arrests the attention of every reader of his history. Of this view, a curious corroboration, more than two hundred

years old, is found in the Autobiography of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. This nobleman, as English ambassador at the Court of France, was endeavoring to dissuade Louis XIII. and his ministers from the war they were entering upon against the French Protestants. "I was often told," he writes, "that if the late Reformation in France had been like that of England, where we had retained the hierarchy together with decent rites and ceremonies in the Church, as, also, holidays in memory of the saints, music in churches, as well as divers other testimonies, both of glorifying God and giving honor and reward to learning, they could much better have tolerated it; but such a rash and violent reformation as theirs was by no means to be approved. Whereunto I answered, . . . that their Reformation was in great part acted by the common people; whereas, ours began at the Prince of State, and therefore was the more moderate."

Unlike the first great Reformation in England, the three minor ones had their origin, not from the prince, but the people. A brief view, therefore, of the social and religious state of the people at this period will help to a better comprehension of what we have to say of Whitefield and his times. We will epitomise what we find upon this topic in Green's History:

"Never had religion seemed at a lower ebb. A large number of prelates were mere Whig partisans, with no higher aim than that of promotion. The levees of the ministers were crowded with lawn sleeves. A Welsh bishop owned that he had seen his diocese but once, and habitually resided at the Lakes of Westmoreland. The system of pluralities turned the wealthier and more learned of the priesthood into absentees, while the bulk of them were indolent, poor, and without social consideration. A shrewd and prejudiced observer brands the English clergy of the day as the most lifeless in Europe, the most remiss of their labors in private, and the least severe in their lives."

The decay of the great dissenting bodies went hand in hand with that of the Established Church, and during the early part of the century, the Nonconformists declined in numbers as in energy. There was, no doubt, a revolt against religion and against churches in both extremes of English society. "In the higher circles, every one laughs," said Montesquieu on his visit to England, "if one talks of religion." Of the prominent states-

men of the time, the greater part were unbelievers in any form of Christianity, and were distinguished for the grossness and immorality of their lives.

At the other end of the social scale, lay the masses of the poor. They were ignorant and brutal to a degree hard to conceive of; for the vast increase of population which followed on the growth of towns and the development of manufactures, had been met by no effort for their religious or educational improvement. The rural peasantry, who were fast being reduced to pauperism by the abuse of the poor laws, were left without moral or religious training of any sort. Within the towns, things were worse.

In spite of this, however, England remained at heart religious. Even the apathy of the clergy was mingled with a new spirit of charity and good sense, a tendency to subordinate ecclesiastical differences to the thought of a common Christianity, and to substitute a rational theology for the worn-out superstitions of the past. In the middle class, the old piety lived on unchanged, and it was from this class that a religious revival burst forth at the close of Walpole's ministry, which changed in a few years the whole temper of English society. The Church was restored to life and activity. Religion carried to the hearts of the poor a fresh spirit of moral zeal, while it purified literature and manners. A new philanthropy reformed our prisons, infused clemency and wisdom into our penal laws, abolished the slave trade, and gave the first impulse to popular education. The revival began with a small knot of Oxford students, whose revolt against the religious deadness of their times showed itself in ascetic observances, an enthusiastic devotion, and a methodical regularity of life, which gained them the nickname of Methodists. Three figures detached themselves from the group as soon as, on its transfer to London in 1738, it attracted public attention by the fervor and even extravagance of its piety, and each found his special work in the great task to which the instinct of the new movement led it from the first—that of carrying religion and morality to the vast masses of population which lay concentrated in the towns and around the mines and collieries of Cornwall and the North. Whitefield was, above all, the preacher of the revival; Charles

Wesley was the sweet singer of the movement; John Wesley was the organiser of the Methodist Church. Of the three, this article has only to do with Whitefield. But first, we may add to the important historical statement quoted above, the somewhat angry invective of Whitefield himself against the clergy of his day:

"It is most notorious, that for the iniquity of the priests the land mourns. I have now conversed with several of the best of all denominations, and many of them solemnly protest that they went from the Church because they could not find good for their souls. The clergy neglect the work of their calling. Their sermons are but a week's study to please the ears of the people, or to advance their own reputation. If they were here, I would tell them to their face that they do not preach the doctrines of the Reformation. No! Seneca, Cicero, Plato, or any of the heathen philosophers, would preach as good doctrine as we hear in most of our churches. Our ministers subscribe to their Articles and think no more about them. Many, very many, of our clergy know no more of regeneration than Nicodemus did when he came to Christ by night. To talk of feeling the Spirit of God, is esteemed nonsense. They make no scruple of attending taverns and public-houses. They make no conscience of playing several hours at billiards, bowls, and other unlawful games, which they esteem as innocent diversions. Plurality of livings, and not the salvation of your souls, is the aim, and chief aim, of many, very many, of our present clergy. They don't catechise; they don't visit from house to house; they don't watch over their flocks by examining their lives. They keep up no constant religious conversation in families under their care. No, my brethren, these things are neglected, and if they were to be acted by any one, the person would be esteemed an enthusiast, and as righteous overmuch."

In a period marked by such religious characteristics, began the public career of Whitefield, by the preaching of his first sermon June, 1736, at the age of twenty-one. It ended thirty-four years later, September, 1770, when as yet he was only fifty-five years old. We read with amazement, almost amounting to incredulity, of the labors and results of this ministry of thirty-four years, as given in detail in the volumes before us. A bare summary affords a very inadequate notion of them. He preached more than eighteen thousand sermons in England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and America, to larger assemblies than ever listened to any uninspired man. He crossed the Atlantic thirteen

times, when navigation was tedious, perilous, and exhausting. Wesley, in his funeral sermon, says:

“Have we read or heard of any person, since the Apostles, who testified the gospel of the grace of God through so widely extended a space, through so large a portion of the habitable globe? Have we read or heard of any person who called so many thousands, so many myriads, of sinners to repentance? Above all, have we read or heard of any who has been a blessed instrument in the hand of God of bringing so many sinners from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God?”

It is stated of Whitefield, that for many years he was in the habit of preaching from forty to sixty hours every week, besides services of prayer and praise in every house to which he was invited. It is recorded that on one occasion, within something like six and thirty hours, without taking refreshment by sleep, he preached five sermons, expounded to four societies, and attended an exhaustlessly prolonged love-feast. That his pulpit exercises were as astonishing for their effect, as unexampled for their frequency, is well known. And while the thousands and myriads, referred to by Wesley, were mostly of the humble class, he had also, as admiring listeners, Lord Bolingbroke, Chesterfield, the Earl of Huntingdon, and his celebrated wife, the Lady Selina Huntingdon, the Duchess of Queensbury, and even the famous Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough; and in America, we find among his hearers, Benjamin Franklin, Governor Belcher of New York, and others not less famous. David Hume pronounced him the most ingenious preacher he had ever known, and said it was worth going twenty miles to hear him.

During his life-time, Whitefield prepared about sixty-three sermons for the press, and his correspondence was enormous.

The results of the Methodist movement upon the religious, moral, and social condition of England have been briefly set forth in the extracts given above from Green's History. Of this, a fair share must be allowed to Whitefield as its greatest preacher. A like statement, somewhat more particular, of the result in America, is quoted from the History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, by Dr. Abel Stevens:

“The Congregational churches of New England, the Presbyterians and Baptists of the Middle States, and the mixed colonies of the South, owe

their later religious life and energy mostly to the impulse given by Whitefield's powerful ministrations. 'The Great Awakening' under Edwards had not only subsided before Whitefield's arrival, but had re-acted. Whitefield restored it, and the New England churches received under his labors an inspiration of zeal and energy which has never died out. He extended the revival from the Congregational churches of the Eastern to the Presbyterian churches of the Middle States. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where Frelinghuysen, Blair, Rowland, and the two Tennents had been laboring with evangelical zeal, he was as a prophet from God, and it was then that the Presbyterian Church took that attitude of evangelical power and aggression which has ever since characterised it. Whitefield's preaching, and especially the reading of his printed sermons in Virginia, led to the founding of the Presbyterian Church in that State, whence it has extended to the South and Southwest. The stock from which proceeded the Baptists of Virginia, and those of all the South and Southwest, was also Whitefieldian. And, although Whitefield did not organise the results of his labors, he prepared the way for Wesley's itinerants. When he descended into his American grave, they were already on his track. They came not only to labor, but to organise their labors."

In addition to his labors more directly spiritual, Whitefield was wonderfully successful in collecting money for benevolent purposes; so much so, that it was a charge against him by his opponents, that he was impoverishing the realm by the amounts he drew from his hearers. His enormous collections may be fairly considered the beginning of the beneficence which now distinguishes the British churches. He founded the Bethesda Orphan House, ten miles from Savannah, still in existence; and, during the thirty years of his supervision, collected for it more than fifteen thousand pounds, of which he himself, serving without compensation, contributed above three thousand pounds. It is singular to observe, that the founding and support of this benefaction, so unimportant when compared with his career as an evangelist, he seems always to have regarded as the specific work of his life.

This scanty synopsis of his achievements and the results of them, may serve imperfectly to indicate the magnitude and importance of his labors; but anything like a fair view of them can be obtained only by a perusal of Mr. Tyerman's volumes.

Our wonder is enhanced when we see that Whitefield entered

upon his ministerial work at twenty-one, and at twenty-four had attained a prominence hardly inferior to any other period of his life. He was already the full compeer of Wesley, ten years his senior and much his superior in learning, and was exercising a controlling influence over men whom he might have been expected to look up to as guides, and was mainly, almost solely, directing enterprises, the importance and difficulty of which were in striking contrast with his youth. In this respect, the parallel is close between him and the younger Pitt. As evidence of his acknowledged importance at this early age, and of the commotion he was exciting, it may be mentioned that in the year 1739, when he was only twenty-four years old, more than forty publications were issued *against* the young preacher and the Methodists. Nor were his assailants men of inferior note. Among them were several Doctors of Divinity, and conspicuously the Bishop of London himself. Neither was this year peculiar in this respect. The opposition to him continued with undiminished if not increasing vehemence, and not unfrequently passed over into personal invective.

As we read this remarkable biography, we are conscious of feeling apprehension lest, first, his enthusiasm should be exhausted, and he become weary; or lest, second, it should be exaggerated into fanaticism, so as to destroy his usefulness; or third, that his followers, under like influence, should get beyond his control and break away from him; or, fourth, that his boldness in assuming pecuniary responsibility for his Orphan House should overwhelm him.

Let us now ask the question, from the answer to which we may hope to draw instruction also, from the contemplation of a life in itself so interesting, By what means did he accomplish so much? Not by the help of birth or position. His parents kept an inn, and he himself, in his "blue apron and snuffers, washed mops, cleaned rooms, and, in one word, became professed and common drawer, for nigh a year and a half." He was a servitor at Oxford; and upon the occasion of his ordination, was glad to receive in humility a gratuity of five guineas from the Bishop. It was not by force of supreme intellectual power. This was

never claimed for him by the most enthusiastic of his contemporaneous admirers, nor would any of his multitudinous published performances justify the claim, if made. Nor was it through his learning; for this can only be accounted as moderate. It may be said that he accomplished his achievements by his gift of oratory. This assigns a more satisfactory but still inadequate cause. He possessed, indeed, the qualifications of a supreme popular orator: a strong and ready understanding; a lively imagination, quick sensibility; a command of forcible words; a voice of matchless compass and modulation; a flexible, expressive, magnetic countenance, and a most dramatic but entirely natural manner. Certainly he was fitted to sway an audience; but much more is demanded for the true orator—mastery of his theme; sincerity and enthusiasm. These Whitefield possessed in the highest degree. Yet, possessed of every merely natural qualification, without something more, and that something supernatural, Whitefield never could have accomplished what he did. It was beyond the power of speech. Demosthenes, Cicero, Chatham, Webster—none of them could have done it. It was the power of the Holy Spirit dwelling in him, and making efficacious the truths he uttered on the hearts of his hearers. Why should we hesitate to announce this positively? It was a fact which, though spiritual, was as real as any outward fact connected with his history. God, in his gracious purposes to his Church universal, saw fit at this time to work a reformation in the Church of England, the blessings of which should not be confined to that branch of the Church, nor to England, nor to that period of time, but which should be liberally extended to other Churches, to other lands and continents, and into the distant future. He raised up for this end his agents; not Whitefield alone, but others also; and bestowed upon them a power which can proceed only from Omnipotence.

Another fact correlative to this is equally certain and equally important to be taken into consideration by those who would either account for the event or derive instruction from it. When God means either to reform or revive his Church, he prepares a people to hear as really as he qualifies a preacher to preach, and

by the same divine agency of the Holy Spirit. When we read the sermons of Wesley or Whitefield, we are sure that we cannot be mistaken in asserting that these same sermons, preached in any community we are acquainted with, and accompanied by whatever aids of personal delivery, could not produce an equal effect, nor anything comparable. Before Wesley and Whitefield had entered upon their work, already faithful ministers had been declaring the truth with power, as Doddridge and Watts in England; Howell Harris in Wales; the Erskines in Scotland; and Edwards, the Tennents, and others, in America. "Above all," says Mr. Tyerman, "in answer to the long continued prayers of the religious societies, and by the grace of God, the Holy Ghost the Comforter was now moving the masses of the people, and making them anxious concerning their personal salvation." Thus prepared, naturally and supernaturally, to preach to hearers fitted by the providence and grace of God to listen, and burning with zeal to establish in others the faith he himself had, and to excite in their souls the spiritual ardor which glowed in his own, Whitefield relied mainly and almost exclusively upon *doctrinal preaching*. "As (said Wesley) he kept to the grand doctrines of the gospel, may they not (he adds) be summed up in two words, as it were—*The New Birth* and *Justification by Faith*?" Included in these, as preached by Whitefield, were other cardinal doctrines, some of which were not fully accepted by Wesley—Election and Predestination; man's depravity and inability; and the final perseverance of saints—in a word, the complete Calvinistic scheme of theology. These doctrines, constantly pressed, Whitefield declares he did not adopt from the writings of others, for he had not read them, but was led into them by his own study of the Scriptures. Thus is the example of Whitefield added to that of the great preachers who preceded him, to establish the fact that those evangelists are mistaken who think that, even for immediate effect, doctrine should be held back or softened; much farther astray, and singularly so, are those who would substitute in any degree for spiritual truth, morality, philosophy, emotion, churchism, or ritualism.

We do not feel called on to raise here the question of the

scriptural lawfulness or the expediency of Whitefield's special methods of procedure—outdoor meetings; lay-preaching; services protracted into the night; emotional exercises; letters received and publicly read from converts and persons under conviction; the tests established for church membership, etc. These questions are important, but evidently must be discussed with reference to the occasions and circumstances to which they stand related. It is much more important to call attention to some of his more personal traits, to be imitated by every Christian, every minister, and especially by every evangelist.

And first is his absolute absorption in the work to which he had devoted himself, and his incomprehensible disregard of the great historic and social events in the midst of which he lived. He was born in the reign of George I., lived through the reign of George II., and for ten years after the accession of George III., and almost touched the opening of the American struggle; divided his time between America and Great Britain, and preached in all parts of both. Meanwhile, his correspondence was so incessant and minute, that it furnishes an almost daily biography; and yet we must look to the dates before we can synchronise his life with this period. We hear nothing of the Seven Years' War, the conquest of India, or the capture of Quebec, and nothing of the resistance of the American patriots, just culminating into revolution, nor a word about the political struggle which was convulsing England, or of the illustrious actors in it. Nor is his attention attracted to the splendid literature of the period. Bolingbroke, Chesterfield, and Dr. Johnson write about him, but he never mentions their names, unless one of them happens to be among his hearers. Such unconsciousness of everything apart from a central object, has its parallel only in Paul, who sees in Athens nothing but an altar, and in Rome makes no more account of Nero's palace than of the Three Taverns, and only quotes a line from the poets, because it serves for a text. "To know nothing save Christ," is for the evangelist, not only the kernel of theology, but also the key-note of success.

This singleness of purpose and action originated in his assured

and impetuous faith, his unswerving obedience to his convictions, his courage, and his exhaustless and irrepressible love to his Master and his fellow-men. His biography abounds in striking illustrations of his reliance upon prayer, and his abundant use of it, his large charity, his candor, and the steadfastness and tenderness of his friendships. His excessive labors, running into culpable neglect of himself, we have already mentioned. But how incomplete would be a still more extended catalogue of his supreme qualifications for his work, and how inspiring is the picture in his biography! Not that his character was free from faults, all of them obvious, and some of them serious. He was egotistical. Hardly have we an example of any man greatly successful in a really great work, who was not. So were Luther and Knox, and so was Paul, though the servant of all. Moreover, Whitefield was not altogether free from arrogance, was frequently rash, was sometimes censorious, and his enthusiasm seems to us, at least at this distance, to be veined with superstition. So freely may we speak of one we so much admire. And how little these blemishes affected the whole man, is made certain by the fact that never did a man have warmer friends; and by the further fact that his enemies, who were not insignificant, either in number or weight, assailed his work, his preaching, his writings, and not his personal character.

It is obvious that Whitefield cannot stand for a model closely to be copied by pastors or settled ministers. He was purely an evangelist, and that in the midst of a remarkable reformation; and churches are not to be ministered to regularly by evangelists, any more than the Church is to be maintained by a series of reformations. The only charge Whitefield ever held was a small parish in the then unsettled neighborhood of Savannah, and this for only three years, and scarcely more than nominally, for his actual residence there was but little more than half a year. His parish, as he frequently says in his letters, was the world. He delights to call himself "a gospel rover and ranger"—"a hunter of souls." To this wide evangelistic work he was evidently called by the Spirit of God. In this he expatiated, and for this he was gifted. He was cosmopolitan, if ever a man was. He

seemed in his characteristics to combine the courage and directness of an Englishman, the tenacity of a Scotchman, and the impressive fervor of an Irishman. His constitution endured all climates, and his simple habits were not offended by any style of living, while his warm sympathies gave him access to every class of society. Especially was his Christian charity so comprehensive that it embraced all true Christians of whatever name or denomination. Himself in communion to the day of his death with the Church of England, he fraternised cordially and without pretence with Moravians, Presbyterians, Quakers, Congregationalists, and Baptists. There were only two with whom he could not coöperate—the Roman Catholics and the Covenanters under the Erskines. In neither instance was the bigotry on his side. The treatment of him by the justly revered Erskines is a remarkable and instructive illustration of ecclesiastical narrow-mindedness.

No mere mortal frame could continue to endure the excesses in labor into which his zeal impelled him. Yet, up to the day of his death, at the age of fifty-six, the daily amount of his work was hardly diminished, though perhaps its efficacy was somewhat impaired. Often, during his career, nature had given him warnings by frequent prostrations, and repeated hemorrhages after preaching, that she would one day vindicate herself; but these warnings were unheeded. Our eyes blur with tears as we hear his pathetic cry the day before his death: "Lord Jesus, I am weary *in* thy work, but not *of* it! If I have not yet finished my course, let me go and speak for thee once more in the fields, seal thy truth, and come home and die"! His last sermon, two hours long, was preached to an immense multitude, near Exeter, Mass. After its delivery, he rode fifteen miles to Newburyport.

"Having taken an early supper, Whitefield was seeking the rest he so much needed; but the people assembled at the front of the parsonage, and were crowded into the hall, impatient to hear a few words from the man they so greatly loved. 'I am tired,' said he, 'and must go to bed.' He took a candle, and was hastening to his chamber. The sight of the people moved him, and, pausing on the staircase, he began to speak to them. He had preached his last sermon; this was to be his last exhortation. There he stood—the crowd in the hall gazing up at him with

tearful eyes, as Elisha at the ascending prophet. His voice flowed on, until the candle which he held in his hand burned away, and *went out in its socket!* The next morning he was not, for God had taken him."

The soil of Massachusetts holds in trust for the resurrection day the dust of many of God's true saints; of none more worthy of veneration than the great evangelist of the eighteenth century, who, born in England and buried in America, embraced in his warm love and wide labors both lands, and left a legacy of Christian example, not to be appropriated by either or both, but for a common possession for the Church universal for all time.

A brief general reflection shall close this article. Whitefield was an evangelist and a reformer. These two functions are not necessarily connected. Though the settled ministry is the scriptural order for the education of the Church and the dispensing of its ordinances, yet along with this a place may be found in every ecclesiastical organisation, according to its requirements, for evangelistic work. Our Methodist brethren, we think, have erred in making one half of this truth the *whole* basis of their system.

But reformations, from their very nature, cannot be provided for as normal occurrences. It is of sin that they are ever necessary. Of reformations, as they are represented in the history of the Church, it is important to notice that they formulate themselves into distinct organisations which express their characteristic principles. That of Luther produced Protestantism; that of Elizabeth gave birth to Puritanism; that of the eighteenth century gave rise to Methodism. This, again, is due to the fact that each was directed respectively against error in doctrine—an unscriptural hierarchy, unholy living, or an unchristian spirit, severally or together. To specify again: Luther and his coadjutors rescued the Church of Christ from the superstition, tyranny, and unholiness of the Church of Rome. The Puritans secured (for themselves at least) religious liberty; while Wesley and Whitefield were the apostles of spiritual religion, as opposed to formality.

From this lesson of history we should learn how to regard any reformation or revival which gains popularity by ignoring doc-

trine, disregards Church order or ordinances, compromises with worldliness, or propitiates false philosophy or mistaken philanthropy.

ARTICLE VII.

GOD AND MORAL OBLIGATION.

Optimism and Pessimism are not more distinctly opposed to each other, as systems of philosophy, than are the views of devout thinkers in relation to the present condition of things, as matters of fact. On one side, there are champions who contend for the positive gain in knowledge and virtue, distinguishing each generation of men from all preceding generations. On the other, there are doleful prophets, uttering solemn warnings and dismal forebodings, as they point to the increasing growth of fraud and corruption in the world. In view of the fulfilment of prophecy, both contestants can find the tokens of approaching culmination. The Optimist, rejoicing in the spread of knowledge, the achievements of physical science, the extension of gospel truth to remote corners of the world, discovers the dawn of the millennial glory. The Pessimist, deploring the increase of crime and vice, the indifference of the Church, the outspoken derision of scientific infidels, detects the gross darkness that is to precede the final catastrophe. For the second advent of the Lord shall be the signal for the utter destruction of all that know not God and obey not the gospel. But beyond the day when this cosmos shall "rock into ruins" under the breath of an angry God, there is the promise of a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.

Men are easily captured by "catch-words." The line of Tennyson,

"Nature, red in tooth and claw,"

has been quoted by an unbelieving philosopher of no mean rank, as an unanswerable argument against the existence of a bene-

ficent God. The crust of the earth contains the fossil monuments of a race of carnivorous brutes, whose ravages cursed the world in prehistoric times. And to-day, among fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals, an enormous proportion is predaceous, created with instincts that ensure the destruction of life. The drop of fluid under the microscope reveals swarms of animate organisms, rapaciously feeding upon still greater swarms of more minute tribes. And man, the highest known organism, is not so much sustained by the fruits of the earth as by the flesh of the lower animals. The theory that man was not carnivorous before the fall, is environed with difficulties. It involves a radical change in his physical constitution. It contradicts the instinctive desire for animal food, and it raises the question as to whether the human body, nay, the *risen* body, of the Lord, was inferior to that of Adam. For it is recorded of Jesus, that he partook of broiled fish after his resurrection. Man would not have been created with serrated teeth, unless the Creator intended him to eat flesh. And if it be answered that serrated teeth came since the fall, another question instantly arises: Did carnivorous teeth induce the appetite for flesh, or did feeding upon flesh produce the serrated dentals? That is, which came first, the eating of meats, or the appetite for meats?

So the catch-word here obtains its great emphasis. Nature, red in tooth and claw—Nature, universally predaceous. Therefore, Nature non-beneficent. Therefore, God, who made Nature, no better in moral perfections than the reptile idol-god on the banks of the Nile and the Ganges. And so the unbeliever concludes this impossible deity is represented as placated by nothing short of the blood of his own Son. Having made a world full of deadly antagonisms, and therefore made blood-shedding the normal occupation of the large proportion of creatures, God proposes redemption by the most monstrous act of blood-shedding that has ever stained the world's annals. And for two thousand years a succession of howling dervishes have been preaching "Christ crucified, the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

It is not probable that the most pronounced of modern deniers of Revelation will present a stronger form of indictment than this.

The Christian is familiar with the Scripture argument that accounts for the substitution of Christ for the sinner, in the infliction of the penalty. It was in order that "God might be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth on Jesus." And it was because there could be "no remission without the shedding of blood." But it may also be possible to show the force of this moral obligation, as stated in the second chapter of Hebrews, where the doctrine is announced with overwhelming cogency.

Men are accustomed to regard the orderly course of nature, in the revolution of the heavenly bodies, in the succession of seasons, in the regular recurrence of day and night, as the result of certain immutable laws. The ponderous earth, poised upon nothing, pursues her annual and diurnal courses through the ages, controlled by accurately balanced forces. In physics, inertia is described as that property in matter which tends to immobility, and yet as that property which tends to continuous motion, when motion is once begun. Thus the antagonism becomes agreement. The force called centripetal binds the planet to its central sun. The centrifugal force constantly tends to drive the planet away into space. The two forces are discordant; their combined effect is concord. If some outside influence of sufficient potency could arrest either operation, the earth would drop into the sun, or would sail away to the remote regions where other stars are suns.

Compared with the vast universe, so much of which is cognisable by the unaided vision, this planet is but a speck in the boundless realms of space. The revelations of later astronomical science make the immensity more manifest, and the relative insignificance of the earth more decided. Yet, practically, all the interests of man, considered only as a living organism, are confined within the narrow circle of the earth's circumference. And no system of moral philosophy that operates within these limitations, can rival the maxim quoted by Paul: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!" Considered merely as a race of sentient beings, men in the aggregate, compared with the universe, are less than the inhabitants of a solitary ant-hill, as compared with the earth. And man segregated, the individual, is less in pro-

portion than the smallest of the animalcula in a drop of ditch water.

It does not deliver the thinker from this humiliating conclusion to refer to the essential grandeur of man as an intelligence. Because outside of divine revelation, there is no possible proof that far higher and nobler races do not inhabit other systems of worlds. Among the numberless orbs that dot the expanse above, the sun that lights this system is but a pigmy among giants. And the Oriental myths of genii of almost limitless powers for good and evil, are the inevitable creation of nomadic tribes that lived constantly under the light of innumerable stars! In all the families of earth, wherever the knowledge of God has not penetrated or has been lost, the unfailing instinct of man has peopled space with imaginary gods. And man has never risen to his true proportions in the whole scope of human history, except by the apprehension of the first postulate of revealed religion: "Man was made in the image of God," and is therefore lord of all creatures. And the perplexity that besets him at each step of his progress in knowledge, is aptly described by the Psalmist: "When I consider . . . *the stars* which thou hast ordained, what is man that thou art mindful of him?" (Psalm viii.) And the Psalmist dispels the perplexity by the only thinkable conclusion: "Thou madest him for a little season lower than the angels, but thou crownedst him with glory and honor, for thou madest him to have dominion, and hast put all things under his feet."

The foundation of moral obligation is here revealed. Man was created by God, and therefore sustains relations to God. Man was created in the image of God, and therefore sustains relations to all other creatures. In the second chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the force of moral obligation reaches the highest point that may be expressed by human language, and the argument rests upon the majestic announcement that God is the First Cause and Last Effect of all things. "By whom are all things, for whom are all things." No creature can escape the obligation to serve the Creator. The duty is the consequence of the relation. God made all things for himself. The universe, physical, spiritual, mental, and moral, proceeds from God and

tends to God. That which should fail to glorify God—from the highest created intelligence down to the ultimate material atom—would not only subvert the beneficent plan of Deity, but would dislocate the entire course of nature. Such an entity is not thinkable, in logic or theology.

The second proposition is equally plain. You cannot think of the wolf as morally bound to protect the lamb. If you call in the aid of physical science, you will find that the wolf is bound by a law of its organisation to feed upon the lamb. It cannot subsist upon the grass that sustains the non-predaceous animal. The Christian does not stumble at the question, "Why did God create wolves at all?" because the fact of their existence is the proof that they serve a wise and beneficent purpose. "Nature, red in tooth and claw," is God's nature, and tends to God's glory; and the predaceous nature of the wolf has no more of moral quality than may be predicated of the upas tree, or the carnivorous plant of the tropics. But man sustains a relation both to wolf and lamb, and the moral obligation flowing from that relation compels him to conserve their enjoyment of the life that God gave them; because he is created in God's likeness, and is God's vicegerent. If, in his delegated authority, he is called to deprive either or both of life, he is bound to do it without cruelty, and as painlessly as may be, because he represents God, the Lord of life, who is beneficent. Man is lord of both wolf and lamb. He may need the skin of one for covering, and the flesh of the other for food. Or he may kill the first, because his life is destructive of the life of the second; and in either case, his act has no more of moral quality than would attach to his destruction of the bramble that damaged the growth of the fruit it shaded. Because he has regal authority over all creatures. "Thou hast put all things under his feet." The limitations to this dominion, on one side—the practical side—are the mere accidents of the fall. The limitations on the moral side are already indicated. "Be ye holy, because I am holy." And the sum of various exhortations of Holy Writ may be similarly formulated: "Be ye beneficent, because I am beneficent."

If this be the ultimate ground of moral obligation, as affecting

man, there is no need to seek for additional reasons or motives. It does not strengthen the argument to plead God's ownership of the creatures that may suffer from man's cruelty. This really detracts from the previous argument; because God has made man his vicegerent, and the domination man exercises is rightful. The lamb is the creature of God, but the subordinate creature, and was doubtless made originally for man's benefit and service. All the vagaries of vegetarian dreamers are mere sentiment, no where endorsed by God's revelation, either in the Bible or nature. Neither does it touch the devout thinker to whine about "Nature, red in tooth and claw." The Lord Christ destroyed two thousand swine at one stroke, by the utterance of one word. And these vital organisms were as really innocent as the dove, struck down and torn to pieces by the hawk. In fact, it is a misuse of terms to predicate innocence of the lower animals. They have no moral quality. And the force of God's remonstrance with Israel is derived from this fact: "The ox knoweth his owner—but Israel doth not know." The contrast is between the instinct of the brute and the knowledge of the man—that high intelligence, created in the image of God in knowledge. The one formula given by God overrides and dwarfs all other considerations. "Be ye merciful, because your Father is merciful"—and by implication—"because ye were created in his image and likeness."

The inexorable force of moral obligation is very much underrated in the world, because of the contrast with physical obligation perpetually present. Thus, monstrous violations of physical law are far more rare than breaches of spiritual commandments. A man draws back from the verge of the precipice, because he will be destroyed by the law of gravitation if he violates it. But he does not hesitate to dally with sin, which, if committed, will damage his future to all eternity. A man abstains from excessive indulgence of appetite, because there is a certain penalty annexed, which he dreads. And yet the tremendous sanctions wherewith God enforces the moral enactment is habitually disregarded. If the warnings and threats of the Bible were believed and seriously considered, the offender against the smaller moral

obligations would appear in his true proportions. The fate of the man with a millstone fastened to his neck, struggling with the remorseless sea, would seem a happy fate by contrast. The condition of the demoniac, dwelling in tombs and cutting his flesh with stones, would seem a happier condition.

Now it is not by accident that moral obligation rests upon mankind with such overbearing potency. It would not be possible to maintain the argument in its true force, except by constant reference to the high status of humanity as originally constituted. And it is the cognition of this fact which gives emphasis to the grand argument in the second chapter of Hebrews. The apostle begins by asserting the supreme domination of man, albeit made lower than angels for a brief season. God made him for domination. "But," says the apostle, "now we see not yet all things put under him," and therefore man has not attained his perfection and glory. Can God's purpose, promise, and prediction fail? The ready response comes: "We see Jesus, made (by the suffering of death) for a little season lower than angels, crowned with glory and honor." And here begins the argument, which is perhaps the most astounding argument of Scripture.

God, the underived, the eternal, the infinite; he for whom are all things and by whom are all things; the only conceivable Cause, uncaused; the uttermost link in the great chain of causation, along which philosophy has groped with toilsome step throughout the ages; the ultimate link, hidden in the abyss of coming eternity, where the circle will be complete, and the last effect will be riveted to the eternal throne: this unutterably glorious Being had certain sons in the world; nay, he had many sons, destined to glory, because they inherited the royal image. These sons had fallen below the level of angels, which were originally created only to serve (Hebrews i. 14), and therefore could not inherit regal glory (Hebrews ii. 16); but the eternal purpose could not be thwarted by the fall. "Thou *madest* him to have dominion." Can the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Can the thing formed reverse the decree of the Maker? Ah no! The sons made for glory must be

brought unto glory. And so the apostle states the awful obligation: "It became HIM, the First Cause and the Final Cause, to bring these heirs to their heritage through the sufferings of the Prince of their salvation." (Heb. ii. 10.) This is the first proposition.

The literature of the world no where contains a similar announcement. It is vain to search for analogies, for no analogy is thinkable. Herbert Spencer may codify a genesis of superstition from the annals of all human tribes, but the tremendous principles unfolded in Paul's argument have never entered into the heart of man. For here the Lawmaker is described as the one Original, and it is asserted that all that he originates tends to and terminates upon himself. Yet of this majestic Being, it is affirmed that it *became* him to restore a lost race by a special method. And this implies that there was no other method possible to Omnipotence, and therefore that the stress of moral obligation is something that inheres in the very nature of God, the unconditioned!

Sir William Hamilton reaches the conclusion that in pure metaphysics God is inconceivable, incogitable, because infinite, unconditioned. No limitations can be predicated of the Unconditioned, therefore the finite mind cannot apprehend the substantial entity. The Bible confirms the philosophy in asserting that "no man, by searching, can find out God;" and yet the scope of Revelation is to afford this precise knowledge. It is one thing to apprehend "the eternal power and Godhead" which are revealed in the works of nature and in the written Word; it is another thing to comprehend "the Almighty to perfection." But the sure postulate of metaphysics seems to set God entirely beyond the limits of finite scrutiny. Look for a moment at the case, as it really stands in every man's consciousness.

This matter of consciousness has been riddled into fragments by the disputations of various schools. The result of the most elaborate analyses is, that man does not know *all* of that which he knows. There is the object, external to the mind; there is the mind, the efficient agent in cognition; there is the medium,

the sentient organism, the channel through which the knowledge of the external reaches the mind ; and consciousness is made up of all three ! The assertion of the man in the Gospel, "One thing I KNOW, that whereas I was blind, now I see !" was the mere drivel of ignorance. The poor man did not know anything. He only asserted his knowledge of one thing, and though the very life of his soul depended upon that, it was denied him.

But no man is really deluded by this sort of reasoning ; because there are certain axiomatic truths that are known intuitively ; because there are certain phenomena of matter that are cognised by the senses ; because there are incontrovertible truths that are disclosed by the syllogism ; because there are eternally enduring realities that are apprehended by faith. And these domains are not rival domains, and one set of faculties does not attempt to invade the dominions of the other. And as all truth is one, as no truth in the universe of God can contradict any other truth, there can never arise an antagonism between faith and sense, or faith and science. "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." And though science may penetrate to the central fires of the globe, or scale the height where the remotest planet has its orbit, it is not possible to oppose this revelation of faith by a solitary fact. The only positive philosophy is faith. A philosopher who has the ear of the civilised world says "he can conceive of a world where two and two make five." If this is true, the most infallible postulates are merely tentative ; the testimony of the senses is a delusion ; the inexorable result of algebraic analyses is a snare ; and the most certain deductions of reason on a par with the chattering of magpies.

Before leaving this first proposition of the apostle—that it became God to do the thing—it is proper to weigh the force of the expression. It became him in such a sense, as that it was worthy of the character of God—decorous. And the original word seems to imply that because of the illustrious character of God—the Absolute—nothing else was possible to be done. So the emphasis appears to apply the stress of the moral obligation thus : *Because* God is the One Absolute—infinite, eternal, and immu-

table in his perfections—therefore he could save those sons predestined to endless glory no otherwise! As though there might have been a mode of salvation possible, other than the substitution of Christ, if some other than the First Cause, uncaused, had undertaken the work of redemption. That is, because of the perfection of the divine attributes it became God to save sinners in this way and in no other. This suggestion is upon the face of the sentence in the original.

The second proposition would be quite as startling but for the familiarity of readers with the phraseology of the Scripture. It occurs in the 17th verse of the second chapter of Hebrews. "It behoved him." As already seen, the first assertion that treats of this obligation, by the force of which "it became God" to make the Author of Salvation perfect through sufferings, is based upon the eternal fitness of things. But this second statement enlarges the obligation into inexorable necessity. The word involves the idea of debt to be discharged, and the whole passage, in all versions of the Bible, is unmistakable, as to the imperative form of the expression. The contrast is even wider. By the first proposition, it is conceivable that a God purposing salvation might have devised some less costly mode, if he had been anything less than the First Cause and the Final Cause. And as he is both of these, it follows that all events, from the creation of the first material atom, to the culmination in glory, must needs be orderly. There can be no defective link in that vast chain of causation. He could not lower the demands of law. He could not accept a modified penalty. Justice and judgment are the foundations of his throne. But—given the first proposition—the identity of the Surety with the people he redeems is of the nature of inevitable necessity. "It behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, in all things!" Now take these two statements together, and behold the marvellous symmetry of God's method of redemption.

Whether it be regarded as a mere human composition, or as the inspired word of God, the Epistle to the Hebrews is a unique production. The literature of the race does not contain a treatise on any subject to compare with it. And as this deals with topics

of paramount importance, supposing the future existence of man to be a reality, the pervading tone is one of high solemnity. No where else in the sacred volume is the doctrine of the Priesthood of Christ expounded with such wealth of detail; and as a commentary upon Leviticus, this Epistle illuminates the entire Mosaic ritual with the radiance of the gospel. All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and all scripture is profitable; but the student of Holy Writ dwells with ever-increasing rapture in this rich field, where the pearl of great price is surely found, always on the very surface. The whole tone of the Epistle is gentle and persuasive, the diction magnificent, and the logic irresistible.

The opening statement introduces two persons, and this duality is maintained throughout. God formerly addressed his Church through prophets; he now addresses the Church through his Son, constituted heir of all things, and "by whom God constituted the ages" (æons). It is worthy of special notice that the initial paragraph thus lays the foundation for the dual obligation examined in the preceding portion of this argument. God, the First Cause, marshals the entire scheme of providence through God the Son, the heir of all things; by whom also he constituted the ages. So the force of the obligation making it becoming in God the Father to bring many sons to glory through the substitution of the surety, made it *imperative* upon God the Son to take human nature by reason of his official relation as surety. So much appears to be involved in the statement.

But there is no where in this Epistle, or in any other portion of Scripture, the remotest hint that God was under obligation to save the fallen race. Such a doctrine is not only heretical in theology but is also absurd in logic. A salvation that is of grace cannot be compulsory. The free gift of God, which is eternal life, through Jesus Christ, cannot be of the nature of a debt. And here is revealed the true limit of moral obligation as affecting God. The covenant of works had been violated, and the gracious engagement of God to Adam was annulled. No eye pitied the lost wretch who fell. No arm could save him from his doom. And death was the inevitable penalty by the mere force of moral gravitation. It was the normal operation of a beneficent

law. Therefore God's eye pitied. It was the spontaneous exercise of a gracious attribute. God's arm brought salvation. It was in rigid accordance with inflexible law! Given the pity of God, then it became him to provide Incarnate Deity to suffer in the stead of the sinner.

The limitation holds with equal exactness in the case of the Redeemer. No conceivable obligation led him into the suretyship. The covenant of grace was freely entered into by Father and Son. But being made, it behoved him to become of no reputation, to take the form of a servant, to be made a man, and, being formed in fashion as a man, to become obedient even unto the death of the cross. "If it be possible!" he cried, in his mysterious agony. But it was not possible. The moral obligation was incessant as the very pulsations of the heart of God. By whom are all things: for whom are all things!

The prominent doctrine underlying this wonderful scheme of redemption is the *kinship* of the Redeemer. "Verily, it is not angels that he helpeth, but he helpeth the seed of Abraham" (verse 16). There are two reasons for this discriminating grace. The first is stated in the context. The angels were created for subordinate rank. Man was made for dominion, and would have had everlasting dominion but for the fall, which made him "for a little" inferior to them. And as the fall involved death, "even Jesus was made for a little lower than the angels, on account of his suffering of death." This seems to be the literal reading of verse 9. He was not inferior to angels because he was incarnate, human, but because, in becoming human, it behoved him, in all things, to be made like his brethren (to shew his kinship) in dying their death! Death—always abnormal—because the creature, made in the image of God, was made capable of everlasting life—death was at once the penalty and the degradation. And the envious hierarch who wrought the ruin in Eden, resenting this subordination to this new creature—man—thought to thwart the purpose of God by degrading the race. Sin entered the cosmos, and death through sin. This great angel became the "Prince of this world" by the conquest. And the Captain of Salvation cannot win back the inheritance, except by becoming

“flesh and blood, and through death destroying the prince of death—that is, the devil” (verse 14).

The second reason for the discrimination is the old covenant; and here again the power of moral obligation appears. God had said, twenty centuries before, “In thy seed shall all the families of earth be blessed.” He did not say seeds, as of many, but SEED, “as of one,” and this one was the specially ordained seed who should overthrow the angelic enemy, which Seed had been announced twenty centuries before Abraham. So, on the seed of Abraham “he taketh hold,” as it is rendered in the margin of the received text; the idea of taking hold to help being specially brought out in the late English version published by Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Here, then, is the statement of the obligation. Christ was not ashamed to call them brethren. He does not deny his essential manhood. He continually calls himself “the Son of man.” Redemption was not lawful, except by a kinsman. “The right of redemption is with thee.” (Ruth iii. 9.) Forasmuch as these children—royal children—were partakers of flesh and blood, and were bereft of crown and sceptre, and all their lifetime subject to bondage to the usurper who had the power of death, it behoved the Champion to come in mortal flesh. There were two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lie: the primal promise of the Seed in Eden; the covenant on Mount Moriah, sealed with the oath of God, because he could swear by no greater. So, when the predestined Deliverer comes out of Bozrah, he comes in dyed garments. He must be a faithful and merciful High Priest, who makes propitiation, through his own blood. And “in that he hath himself suffered, he is able to succour them that are tempted.” (Heb. ii. 18.) It is noteworthy here, that the Sinaitic Codex omits the words, “being tempted.” which were doubtless added by the Arian heretics, who found nothing in Christ’s death except the power of example!

The Scripture abounds in passages that refer to the inflexible nature of the obligations under which redemption is accomplished. “Ought not the Christ to have suffered these things?” (Luke xxiv. 26.) “Thus it behoved the Christ to suffer, and to

rise from the dead the third day." (Luke xxiv. 46.) In both these instances, the Lord announces the obligation as founded upon the prophecies, which "must needs be fulfilled." In his last discourses, as recorded in John xiv.-xvi., the necessity of his departure is declared, because the other Comforter (Parakletos) could not come until he departed, which reveals another stringent form of obligation. The salvation of the royal race which demanded the incarnation and substitution of one divine Advocate, also demanded the indwelling and vitalising power of another divine Advocate to complete the work. "If any one hath sinned, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, *who hath not sinned.*" (1 John ii. 1.) And his advocacy is potential, because he "is the propitiation for our sins." Himself sinless, yet the Substitute for sinners. Yet this is only the objective side. "Ye must be born again;" and must be born of the Spirit. Those who obtain the "right" to enrolment in God's family, are those who do not inherit the right from pious ancestry: they are not born "of blood." They do not evolve the energy from their native powers, from "the rich depths of their own humanity:" they are not born of the will of the flesh. They are not the trophies of moral suasion, wrought upon them from without by godly exhortation: they are not born of the will of man. But they *are* born of God the Spirit. (John i. 13.)

The whole course of this argument tends to show the force of obligation as existing in the very nature of God. The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, because no other method of salvation was possible to God himself. The Bible does not dwell much upon the inability of man to save himself. The proposition is too self-evident. But it does dwell emphatically upon the inexorable necessity for Christ's substitution. There is no hint that God wasted any force in solving the problem. "He so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son," because no less gift would do. And there is no greater gift thinkable. It is an unspeakable gift. And it became God to make this gift, and, therefore, it would not have become God to try any other method. The urgency was not in man. It was not the extremity of man's necessity. It was not even the piteous spectacle of a damned

race of intelligences hopelessly ruined. But it was the majestic, unhurried, inflexible, operation of moral force, the sum of Divine attributes—inhering in the nature of the First Cause and the Final Cause—that manifested its potency in grace, and that terminates by inevitable necessity in the glory of God.

All this grand scheme of redemption bears the impress of moral obligation. And as it behoved the Christ to suffer, it behoves the Spirit to sanctify. The work is not accomplished by the offering of the sacrifice. The benefits of redemption must be applied to each individual saint, through the agency of the Divine Spirit, Parakletos. The advocacy of the Spirit is specifically stated in Scripture: "We know not what things to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit maketh intercession with unutterable groanings." The prayers of the saints are motors of unknown power. The Bible tells, in detail, of one man whose prayer shut up the heavens for forty-two months, and whose prayer afterwards brought copious rains upon the parched ground. And the record specially emphasizes the fact, that it was a man "of like passions" whose prayer wrought these wondrous effects. But there were many thousands in Israel who suffered under that terrible scourge besides Elijah. He was himself miraculously sustained in life during its continuance; and the record clearly implies that the prayer which prevailed was presented at the proper time and under God's special direction. So, in all human history, if men were wise enough to note the points, there are times when the Divine Spirit inspires a special plea that brings the infallible response. As godly Thomas Godwin says: "God said at the beginning, 'Let there be light!' and there was light; so he says now, 'Let there be a prayer!' and there is a prayer which bringeth answer." The faith of the saint is not the spasmodic exercise of a faculty that lies dormant in his soul until the exigency awakens it. It is the constant pulsation of the life he received when he was born again. By the power of this life he has constant communion with God, but sometimes he gets into the throne-room and touches the sceptre. Do you discover no difference between the prayer you offer in the sanctuary, for the spread of the gospel, the peace and prosperity of the Church, the

presence of God in the worshipping assembly, and that *secret*, personal, distinct petition which you send upward from the closet, when the door is shut? Of all Christian experience, probably, men talk less about their closet prayers than about anything else. But there are praying men in the Church who think they *know* that only two intelligences have access to these hidden places—the prayer-offerer, and the prayer-maker, God the Holy Ghost! No angel ventures into these sacred chambers. The Church, in its organised capacity manifests to principalities and powers the glory of God. The saint in his individual capacity has special seasons of communion with God, with which principalities and powers are not permitted to interfere, and of which they probably have no knowledge. It was a pleasing fancy of the poet, that made an angel wait for the first penitential tear to bear it to the great throne. But no angel sees the first penitential tear. He would not understand its component parts. He could not sympathise with the emotions that produced it. He has no Father whose long-suffering love has been outraged. He has no Kinsman whose blood has been poured out for his transgressions. He has no Comforter who can unseal the fountain of his tears by whispering of pardon and peace.

As suggested once and again in the foregoing pages, the essential royalty of the “children who were partakers of flesh and blood,” underlies God’s plan of redemption. God’s plan is one plan, and it is the only possible plan. All its parts are congruous. It became the Father, who so loved his offspring, to give his only begotten Son. It behoved the Son to assume humanity and kinship, and to pass through the wilderness and Gethsemane and Golgotha. And it becomes the Spirit to strive with the wayward and wandering, to direct the staggering steps of the returning prodigal, awakened by his divine energy, and to change the saint from glory to glory, until he reaches the fulness of his stature. These are the explicit declarations of Scripture.

But the rigid law of proportions demands more than has yet been suggested. There must be a formal revelation from God to his children, and this is the special work of the Holy Ghost. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God. All the writers in this

sacred volume spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. No other speaking could have authority. It is written, "They were all taught of God," because man could yield credence and obedience to no other Teacher. There had been an instructor of very exalted powers, early in the history of the race, but his teachings brought death and destruction. The emphasis of the Divine rebuke is found just here: "Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof *I* said, Thou shalt not eat?" That is: Hast thou heard another teacher? Because God had highly exalted man, and given him a name above every other creature in heaven and earth, wherefore the tutelage of God was his birthright. In the old prophecies all authority hinges upon the opening sentence, "Thus saith Jehovah!" In the new, the one authoritative instructor is called Logos—the Word of God. And the whole record is filled with warnings against all other instructors, while it closes with a dismal anathema upon any who shall add to or take from this Revelation. Men are commanded to bring all teachings to the test of "the Law and the Testimony." Men are commanded to beware of those who "teach for doctrines the commandments of men. And going beyond the human race, the Scripture invokes curses upon the angels: "If an angel from heaven preach any other doctrine, let him be accursed!" These, and multitudes of other scriptures, warrant the assertion that by internal evidence, the Bible regards a revelation from God to man—a revelation of exact verbal inspiration—as that which it became God to make.

Here, again, the personality of the Divine Spirit is clearly revealed. Because, if God had merely spoken to fallible men in an audible voice, commanding them to write down his exact words, there would always be the suspicion of possible error—addition or omission. But these recorders were "holy men, who wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Suppose you take the Sermon on the Mount, or the long passage in John's Gospel, chapter xiv. to xvii. If you regard those utterances as written down from memory, or even taken down by a stenographer, at the time when spoken, you cannot divest yourself of the doubt that a word—a sentence—may have been omitted or supplied. The verbal accuracy and the verbal authority both depend upon

the indwelling inspiration of Matthew and John. God the Spirit must have moved the fingers of the writers with scrupulous exactness, or the *absolute* authority of the record is marred. And it is not the ordinary providential arrangement, by which God hath foreordained all things that come to pass. This was included, but God's special foreordination was, that Matthew and John should be specially inspired by the Holy Ghost *personally*; that is, by the person of the Holy Ghost, and each word of their inscription should be selected by this Divine Person as the exact word in the exact connexion. There are no synonyms in God's utterances! The Scriptures that are given by the inspiration of God, are the precise shades of thought that the Omniscient Omnipotent created in the minds of his selected instruments, in whom he dwelt—personally—while they were "moved" to inscribe his Revelation. The word of God is quick and powerful. But it could not be living and omnipotent if filtered through human imaginations. It is the very word of the very God!

To sum up the argument: Given a God who is Creator and Father, while he is also the First Cause and the Final Cause, then the children could have no higher end than to glorify God. And they could not properly glorify him, except by rendering honor, fear, obedience, service, love. The fatal barrier was in the fall, which made these exercises impossible. Therefore, this "middle wall of partition" must be taken away before the purpose of God in creation, and in the assumption of Fatherhood, could be accomplished. Now appears the primal obligation. It became God to save these sons by the substitution of Christ. Then, given a Redeemer, he must needs be a Divine Person and yet a kinsman. It behoved him to be made in all things like his brethren. Then, to fit the redeemed race for glory, it behoved the Divine Spirit to regenerate the redeemed seed, and this Divine Person must needs be Sanctifier and Advocate. No other method than this triple method is thinkable. No other method could possibly meet the moral obligation that is—so to speak—the sum of the infinite attributes of God.

But it is not enough that this method of salvation exactly accords with the moral and logical necessities of the case. You

cannot go out to an apostate world with no better arguments than those drawn from human wisdom. You cannot arraign men at the bar of the purest ethical philosophy the world has ever known. You may be able to silence all opposition, and perhaps the inexorable logic of the preceding paragraph is unanswerable, where men admit that God is, and that he is infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being, wisdom, power, justice, goodness, holiness, and truth. But logic is not invested with the authority that men will recognise and obey. It would *not* become man, created in the image of God, to render worship to the syllogism.

Therefore, it became God to make a revelation which should be the ultimate authority. And it became God to make just this revelation, now scattered over the face of the earth, and practically accessible to every family upon its surface. Not the Book of Mormon; not the Koran; not the Vedas, the most ancient rolls of human literature, it may be; not the philosophy of Chrysippus or Zeno; not the Apocryphal Gospels, even when enlarged and amended in the Lives of Christ by Crosby, Beecher, Hanna, or Farrar; not the misty vagaries of Swedenborg; not the profane babblings of modern Spiritualism; not the spontaneous outgivings of human conceit, the "spouting wells" that give forth higher laws, and that reach the world through such conduits as Paine, Frothingham, and Ingersoll. Surely, no sane man would suspect God of speaking through channels of this sort! But it became God to give the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and to ordain that the preaching of these Scriptures should prove the power of God and the wisdom of God. It became God, because it was "in the wisdom of God that the world by wisdom knew not God."

This revelation could come to men no otherwise than in a written word. Not by a Church, a succession of priests. Because it behoved Christ to be the one High Priest over the house of God. Not by a succession of prophets, who should hand down oral traditions from generation to generation. There is but one Prophet, who spake as never man spake. Not by regal authority, a succession of kings, "Defenders of the Faith," or Vicegerents of Christ, voting themselves infallibility! There is but one King

in Zion—Jesus, the King of kings. And as God has distinguished this race by the endowment of “discourse of reason,” it became God to speak to the race in accurate language, in words chosen by Himself, and so chosen with scrupulous exactness, that the addition of one word involves damnation to him who adds it.

It is very common to hear lectures upon the irresistible force of physical laws. The most common thought, perhaps, on the minds of thinkers, is the stable character of the laws of matter. This earth, poised in space, and continuing its regular revolutions through the ages, so ponderous as to baffle the power of human computation, and yet—*poised*, because of the inflexible strength of adjusted Law! If one could stand upon another planet, and watch the motions of earth with its vast interests, how much stress would be laid upon this visible proof of the power of physical law! If one could stand upon the sun, and scrutinise the revolution of its family of planets, so delicately adjusted that slight aberrations in a satellite of Jupiter revealed to the astronomer the existence of Neptune, how enormous would the force appear that kept the system in equipoise! But all the vast universe of God, considered only in its adjustments, connexions, and dependencies, is but the type and parable of the inflexible character of moral obligation. The earth shall pass away, the elements shall be dissolved in fervent heat, but the word of God liveth and endureth forever. And this Word is preached unto men in the gospel, whose grand lesson is, that Christ crucified is the Power of God, and the Wisdom of God.

ARTICLE VIII.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE EDINBURGH
COUNCIL.

We have recently received from Edinburgh a volume of near four hundred pages, in wide double column, entitled, "*Report of Proceedings of the First General Presbyterian Council, Convened at Edinburgh, July, 1877. With Relative Documents bearing on the Affairs of the Council, and the State of the Presbyterian Churches throughout the World. Edited by REV. J. THOMSON, A. M.*"

The volume is very beautifully printed on excellent paper; though the binding and the shape of the book is not to our taste. We learn, however, that this was rendered necessary in order to avoid subjecting the volume to duty when sent by mail to American subscribers. It can be obtained at about two dollars, including postage, when ordered by mail, from Rev. William Gillies, No. 13 South St. Andrew Street, Edinburgh, one of the Secretaries of the Council. It can be purchased of Thos. G. Royal, Bookseller, Jefferson street, Louisville, at some advance on the subscription price.

The delay in issuing this volume has probably arisen from waiting to ascertain how many subscribers would send in their names, in order, on the one hand, to run no risk in the publication, and on the other to ascertain how large an edition would be needed.

This volume must be admitted to be a very valuable addition to the literature of Presbyterianism. It opens with an interesting introductory article by Dr. Blakie, detailing the history of the movement for such a Council from its inception, including the proceedings of the Conference held in London in 1875, which framed the Constitution of the Alliance under which the Council met. An Appendix of near one hundred closely printed pages presents an encyclopædia of Presbyterianism in the world. If nothing else had been accomplished by the Council than this carefully prepared statement of the constitutions, relations, condition,

and statistics of the fifty bodies of Presbyterians scattered over the world, the time, labor, and expense of that body would not have been without recompence. This survey of Presbyterianism is presented under five general divisions of the field: the continent of Europe, the British Kingdom, the United States, the British Colonies, the heathen world. Under the first division is presented a survey of the Presbyterian bodies in ten countries of continental Europe—Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Bohemia, Russia, and Spain. Historical sketches of the rise and progress of these enslaved and oppressed churches are given, together with an account of their present organisation and statistics. Of these churches, Dr. Blaikie, who visited most of them preparatory to making this report to the Council, says:

“No old Church escaped persecution, and attempts were made in every case, on the part of the civil power, to restrict the liberty of the Churches; but in the case of the Scottish and other Churches these attempts were early resisted, and, to a large extent, overcome. The Anglo-Saxon Churches, though not wholly exempt from interference, conquered what was certainly comparative freedom; and the manner in which they have grown and prospered, and the influence which they have been able to exercise, attests the value of the struggles with which some of these Churches have been familiar. On the other hand, as a rule, the Continental Churches have been exposed, during all their history, to interference and repression. Many of them have been reduced to a very small remnant. But, in most cases, a faithful remnant has been continued, to keep alive the ancient spirit. Such churches as those of the Waldenses, Bohemia, and Hungary, appeal very strongly to the Christian sympathies, especially of the Churches of Great Britain and America.” P. 234.

The information contained in this survey of the continental Presbyterianism, we doubt not, will be almost wholly new to nine-tenths of the Presbyterian ministers in America, if not in Great Britain; and will be found to be exceedingly interesting. Nor can the survey of the British Presbyterian churches, both domestic and colonial, fail to be new and interesting to all intelligent office-bearers in the American churches. The elaborate view of the various bodies of American Presbyterians, prepared by Rev. G. D. Mathews, is very valuable. We have noticed some criticism of the closing sentence of the survey of the Southern Pres-

byterian Church, as presenting too desponding a view of the prospects of this body, in saying, "the lack of means, even to sustain the present ministry in their broken down churches, causes *discouragement and hopelessness* for the future." But this criticism overlooks the fact that these words are intended to refer, not to the condition of the Church generally, but to the great work which must be done for the negro. It had before been said of this Church that "in view of the calamities which have befallen this body, etc., *its success so far has been remarkable*." The writer then proceeds to show that, "in view of the vast territory to be evangelised, which is covered by it, and the hundreds of thousands of poor ignorant negroes, ever tending backward to heathenism, who must depend very largely upon this Church for a form of the gospel that will enlighten and civilise them, *no other body of Presbyterians in the world has a greater work to do, or, in proportion to the work to be done, less financial ability to sustain it*. The men are on the ground, or soon could be put there, who, from their rearing with the negro, and their acquaintance with his peculiarities, are far better adapted to do a great work of real evangelisation among them, than strangers from abroad. And the school at Tuscaloosa would, in a short time, send forth to them hosts of intelligent men of their own color to preach the pure gospel to them. But the lack of means, even to sustain the present ministry in their broken down churches, causes discouragement and hopelessness," (*i. e.*, in regard to the work for the thousands of negroes.) The attention of the writer of the paper had been called to the fact that the omission of the words, "in regard to the negro," might lead to misunderstanding; but in the midst of the bustle at Edinburgh the matter was forgotten.

The facts presented under the fourth division, relating to the British colonial Churches, will surprise many who have paid little attention to the subject. They show the energetic and expansive nature of Presbyterianism when not restricted and repressed by unfavorable influences, as in the continental churches. The Presbyterian bodies of the several British Colonies alone report

some one thousand three hundred ministers and one thousand six hundred and forty congregations.

The fifth division, the Presbyterian missions of the world, exhibits a force of near seven hundred European and American ordained Presbyterian ministers, with their multitude of native preachers and other helpers. The number of Church members, as representing the results of their labors so far, is not given. It will surprise those not very familiar with missions, to learn that in South Africa, beside the fourteen stations of the Reformed Church of France, and the forty-two stations of the Free Church of Scotland, the Reformed Dutch, together with an Independent Presbyterian body there, report one hundred and fifty-four congregations, one hundred and thirteen ordained ministers with innumerable helpers, and one hundred and eleven thousand Church members.

Though a full account of the so-called Evangelical Church of the German Empire is presented in this Appendix, yet, not being represented in the Council because not wholly Presbyterian, they are not included in the statistical table of that body. Of the Evangelical Church of the German Empire, which claims to have sixteen thousand congregations and twelve thousand ministers, Prof. Ebrard claims that the Reformed—that is, the Presbyterian Churches—have near half a million of Church members. Under the strong pressure of the civil government, the attempt has been made to force together, under one form of ecclesiastical rule, the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. The tendency of the process is to Presbyterianise Lutheranism somewhat, but in the nature of things, Presbyterianism cannot flourish under such Erastian notions as those of Kaiser Wilhelm and his Prime Minister Bismarck. Still, scattered throughout Germany, there are many noble witnesses for the doctrine of “Christ’s crown and covenant,” as against Rationalism and Erastianism. The signs of the times in the German Empire are not without hopefulness for genuine evangelical Presbyterianism. The power of Rationalism is evidently waning. The Erastianism of the politicians must ultimately give way under the combined influence of the Presbyterian Order of Church Government, which the govern

ment seems to prefer, and the rapidly growing public opinion, that the direction of religion is not one of the functions of the State. A general outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon the Protestantism of Germany, in answer to the prayers of the genuine Christians scattered in little bands throughout the Empire, would lead a powerful body of Presbyterians to wheel into rank with their British and American brethren. It is not among the impossible things, that within ten years the twenty thousand ministers now represented in the Council should be increased by an addition of ten thousand ministers and as many churches from the German Empire.

Turning now to the main subject of the volume—the proceedings and discussions of the Council—whatever any one may think of some of the details, there can be no question that, speaking generally, they are highly creditable to the intelligence, the churchly yet catholic spirit, the learning, and the orthodoxy of the Presbyterianism of the world. It was the purpose of many of the American delegates to urge the selection of the great missionary hero, Dr. Duff, as Moderator of the Council, with assessors to relieve him of most of the practical duties of his office. But Providence had ordered otherwise. The sickness of which he died seized him a short time before the meeting of the Council, and caused him to resign his place as a delegate to the body, with a view to visiting the continent in hope of relief. In this state of case, it was determined to have a different Moderator for each session; and the plan seems to have worked very satisfactorily. It was observable, however, that the American Moderators had notions somewhat different from those of their British brethren in regard to the forms of transacting business in deliberative bodies. They acted more promptly, and called for a formal vote on every proposition, while the British Moderators were more disposed to take propositions as agreed to without a formal vote. Under the British parliamentary method, there seems to be no limit to the offering of amendments. And when it comes to determine by vote, the last amendment is voted on as against the amendment next preceding, and that amendment which is carried is voted against the amendment preceding it,

until the original proposition is reached. This is obviously a very cumbersome method of proceeding; and in this, as in several other points of parliamentary proceedings, the American methods have at least the advantage of greater expedition and simplicity over the methods of the British bodies. The Council, however, adopted the following special rule to govern the process of voting, which to American ears will sound a little oddly :

"It shall be the aim of the Council to avoid voting ; but if a vote be necessary, when there are more than two motions, all the motions shall be voted on successively, and that one having the least number of votes then dropped. A vote shall next be taken on the remaining motions, and the same course followed until some one motion has a majority of all the votes given, and this shall then be considered to express the mind of the Council. The vote shall be taken by a show of hands, and the result declared by the President."

Fortunately there was little occasion for the use of this rule, and thus the difficulties that would naturally arise under it, should any excitement grow out of a great diversity of motions, were avoided. Indeed, the unanimity which characterised the proceedings of the body under the wise direction of its business Committee rendered any exciting divisions almost impossible. Some complaint was made of the restrictions laid upon full free discussion under the operation of a directing Committee. But obviously it was the want of time rather than any restrictions imposed through the business Committee that cramped discussion. The original purpose had been that the Council should meet in sections for the hearing and discussion of papers. But a short time before the meeting, this plan was changed, for some reason, by the Edinburgh Committee. The consequence was that a programme, projected on a wide scale, to be acted on simultaneously by several sections, was thrown upon a single meeting. Of course there must be great crowding, and restrictions became a vital necessity. But to say now, that such and such things could have been done otherwise, is but to say that our *backsight* is clearer than was the Committee's *foresight* in regard to the new and difficult experiment of a world's Presbyterian Council.

Of the subjects which came before the Council for consideration during the seven days of its sessions, Presbyterianism with

its Faith and Church Order naturally enough received the chief share of attention. We have, indeed, noticed a criticism of the Council, founded upon a sentence of Dr. Dykes's closing speech, intimating that its discussions were not distinctly enough denominational, but rather of a general nature, after the fashion of the Evangelical Alliance. Said Dr. Dykes, "If we gave one day to Presbyterian topics, we have given the rest to wider ones, such as the work of the ministry, the extension of the gospel, and the defence of the faith." Manifestly, by "Presbyterian" here, Dr. Dykes referred to topics relating solely to Presbyterian Church Order. Neither he nor any one else of ordinary intelligence would intimate that "the work of the ministry, the extension of the gospel, and the defence of the faith," are not "Presbyterian topics." And if, in this closing address, there be found anything that seems to be in the tone of the Evangelical Alliance rather than a Church Council, it should be borne in mind that Dr. Dykes represents English Presbyterianism which is in a woful minority, and, as he himself said, he spoke "as a delegate from England, where, if our branch is feeble, the other branches of evangelical Christianity are so strong." And if he exhibited less of the aggressive spirit of Presbyterianism, it was only natural. He did not claim to speak authoritatively for the Council. And a careful attention to this report of proceedings will show that even if Dr. Dykes had meant what his critic understands him to mean, he spoke very unadvisedly. For the topics of every day's discussion were Presbyterian topics; and the general tone of the Council was eminently *churchly* throughout.

It is to be regretted that the elaborate discourse, with which Prof. Flint opened the Council in St. Giles's Cathedral, is not published in this report of proceedings. It was, however, by special request of the Council, published very extensively in pamphlet form, as well as in the daily papers of Edinburgh. Prof. Flint complied with the Council's request, on condition of leave to omit in the published discourse some things from which Dr. McCosh and others with him expressed dissent. This statement is made in justice to Dr. McCosh and the dissenters, who

have been misunderstood as expressing dissent from important statements of his sermon as subsequently published.

This volume contains the papers presented in the Council, with a very fair summary report of the several speeches made on the topics introduced by these papers. Also, very good summaries of the speeches at the popular mass meetings held every evening. Of most of the papers presented—some of them only in outline, under the twenty minutes rule—it is not too much to say they were exceedingly valuable and well-timed. As presented in this volume, they make a stronger impression than when partially read before the Council, because, as published, we have their argument in its completeness. The first paper offered by Prof. Schaff, on the “Confessions of the Reformed Churches,” is just what might have been expected from his previous writings, his thorough acquaintance with the subject, and his profound and varied learning. Some apprehension had been expressed, that the subject discussed by Prof. Schaff would almost necessarily bring into the Council the question of attempting a reconstructed creed, presenting the spirit and substance of the creeds of the Reformation. But though in the closing section of the paper, Prof. Schaff suggested many advantages to arise from a “consensus of the old Reformed Confessions freely reproduced and adapted to the present state of the Church; in other words, the creed of the Reformation translated into the theology of the nineteenth century,” yet he suggested also, that “the expediency of such a work at the present time is, to say the least, very doubtful.”

A paper of Dr. W. Krafft of Bonn, translated and read to the Council by Rev. Alexander Cusin of Edinburgh, after classifying the several creeds of the Reformation, and down to the Westminster Confession, presents by way of illustration a Confession of thirty-one articles—citing under each article, after the fashion in which the Scripture proofs are cited in the Westminster Confession, the articles of the several Confessions which assert the propositions of the new article proposed by him. This able paper will be of great use to students, as showing not only that there is a real *consensus* of the Confessions of the Reformed Churches,

but that it can be expressed in one eclectic creed. And, except in two or three items, those who receive the Westminster Confession would not scruple to receive this eclectic Confession of Prof. Krafft.

The subject thus ably presented excited a lively interest in the Council, and led to the offering of a resolution by A. Taylor Innes, Esq., author of the "Law of Creeds in Scotland," appointing a committee to report to the next general Council, what are the present and former Creeds of the Churches composing this Alliance? What are the existing formulas of subscription? How far has individual adherence to these Creeds, by subscription or otherwise, been required from the ministers, elders, or other office-bearers, and also from private members of the Church? But the committee is instructed specially "not to accompany their report with any comparative estimate of these creeds, or with any critical remarks upon their respective value, expediency, or efficiency."

The appointment of such a committee, restricted by such instructions, met in the Council with unanimous approval, and will no doubt meet with the general approval of the Churches. If the work is faithfully performed, it will lead to the very desirable result of a more intimate acquaintance in each body with the inner life and forms of thought in every other.

Of the three papers on the "Principles of Presbyterianism," by Drs. Cairns, Hodge, and Robinson, it was gratifying to notice that they seemed to be received with favor in the Council just in proportion as they brought out Presbyterianism as a *jure divino* system in its government and worship—the view of it which obtains most generally in the Southern Presbyterian Church. It was regarded by many as a blemish in the able paper of Dr. A. A. Hodge, that he should reassert the un-American proposition that "the *revealed* will of the Divine King is in every department of civil and political life, the fundamental law to which magistrates and citizens are alike under obligation to conform;" and that he should represent those who assert that civil government rests not primarily upon the revealed word, but upon the revelation in nature, and is therefore equally obligatory

on nations that have not the revealed word, and who "demand an entire separation of religion from the sphere of civil government," as asserting that "the civil government lies beyond the realm of Christ's mediatorial kingdom, and is not included in the legislation recorded in the Scriptures." It is to be regretted that Dr. Hodge, under such circumstances, should reassert the fundamental error which has caused the division in the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and should throw the weight of his position at Princeton on the wrong side of the great issue which is hastening to the crisis in Scotland, and, indeed, in all the countries of Europe. It is precisely this assumption, that "the revealed will of the Divine King is the fundamental law of civil government," and that the civil government is to expound and apply that law as he understands it, that leads Kaiser Wilhelm to-day to tyrannise over the Protestant Churches of the German empire in undertaking to frame the order of their spiritual government for them. There may have been some apology for the mistake of the Scottish martyr fathers in admitting this fatal principle of the theocratic character of civil government three hundred years ago; but there is no apology now, especially for American Presbyterians, in clinging to a patent fallacy which has worked nothing but evil to the Scottish Churches for three hundred years past, while the principle of entire separation of revealed religion from the State has worked out such wonders of blessing to Christianity in America.

We cannot pass from this subject without noticing the admirable speech on the spirit of Presbyterianism, the same evening, by Lord Moncreiff, who spoke with great power, displaying his high intelligence as a Presbyterian. Indeed, nothing was more pleasing in the great meeting than to witness the unaffected Christian humility, the earnestness in Christ's service, and the modest, unassuming bearing of the several Lords who took part in the proceedings. The Earl of Kintore, Lord Polwarth, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, and Lord Moncreiff, as ruling elders in the Council, won fully as large a share of the warm Christian affection of their fellow-members as any others in it.

On the subject of preaching and the training of preachers, Dr.

Howard Crosby presented the paper which attracted most attention. The common sense, old-fashioned views of the functions of the preacher, he showed, are in entire antagonism to the New England theories of homiletics, and generally in remarkable accord with the views common among us in the Southern Presbyterian Church. "The aim of the Christian preacher," he said, "is not to civilise men, however naturally such a result may follow his faithful activity. . . . He is never to lose sight, or to let his hearers lose sight, of the divine revelation. Each effort of his mind and tongue is only to make God's truth more apparent in its relations and applications. If he turn to erect a philosophic scheme, the result of his own speculations, he is no longer a preacher of God's Word. . . . If he seek to amuse and delight his audience with elaborate rhetoric, he has abandoned his holy work. Whatever will turn the attention of his hearers from God's Word to man's word, is false preaching, however favorably it may be considered by the community."

The oral discussion of this topic was very animated. It was in this connexion that Dr. McCosh made the remark, for which he was subsequently so berated—and unjustly berated—by the American journals at the North. The only defect in his utterance was in leaving the application of it general to the United States, instead of confining it to his own region in the East. The offensive remark was the following :

"What, then, was the cause of the change in taste for the kind of preaching? The men who had gone over there from this country, (Britain,) had carried with them Biblical preaching, and that was the secret of their success; the desire of the people being to have preachers who would preach, not after the New England style, which gave forth the thoughts of the preacher, rather than the divine thoughts, but the Word of God in simplicity and power. Those, again, who were most popular, were not ashamed of using the old phrases of the Puritans, and they were not ashamed to divide their sermons into heads; for the people thereby remembered them all the more; and in New York, and all over America, that would soon be the style of preaching; and he thought it an auspicious circumstance that American brethren were learning to preach like this."

Now, in thus speaking, Dr. McCosh made no other mistake

than in supposing that the type of preaching in New York and the East, of which he knew something, might be taken as representative of other parts of the United States, of which he knew nothing. In this, as in some other things, he shows his want of acquaintance with the West and Southwest. But so far as relates to the section from which the berating has come, Dr. McCosh has no need to apologise or take back anything. If he can lay his hand on a *brochure* called "Charity and the Clergy," published in Philadelphia more than twenty years ago, in connexion with the discussion stirred up by Stephen Colwell's "New Themes for the Protestant Clergy," he will find a picture of New York and Eastern preaching painted not by any imported Briton, but by a "native to the manner born," which more than justifies all that he said in the Council. The writer, after commenting on the fashion of advertising the subjects of sermons on Sabbath in the Saturday newspapers, and presenting an illustrative list of subjects, embracing "Moral Beauty," "The Esthetics of Religion," "The Wreck of the Steamer," etc., etc., naively suggests, "it is remarkable that no enterprising Down East preacher has ever thought of startling the denizens of Gotham by announcing a discourse on 'Justification by Faith!' What a sensation he would make!" Our Eastern brethren are not apt to say, "Let the righteous smite me," etc. But they had as well keep quiet on the subject of their former style of preaching.

We are obliged to pass without special mention the papers on the eldership, at the sixth session, and the interesting discussion on the subject of missions, on the following day, in order to make room for a brief notice of the papers of Drs. Patton, McCosh, Watts, and Smith, on the "Unbelief of the Present Day." Dr. Patton's, on "The Underlying Principles of Infidelity," is a paper every way admirable. It is characterised by that power of analysis and clearness of statement which marked his argument in the Swing trial. It produced a profound impression in the Council, as very rich in suggestive thought. An American said to a venerable Scotch Doctor: "We regard Prof. Patton as the coming man of the Northern Presbyterian Church." "Sure

he maun be the *coming* man," was the reply, "for he is already come."

Dr. McCosh's paper on the view to be taken by Christian men of "Discoveries in Science and Speculations in Philosophy," was just what might have been expected from his large acquaintance with science and philosophy, and his skill as a reasoner. He is perhaps a little more inclined to make concessions to the scientists and philosophers than most of us, yet he deals none the less Titanic blows upon the heads of his adversaries.

The essay of Dr. Watts of Belfast, on the Personality of the Supreme Being, is among the very ablest papers in the volume. But such a theme is too subtle and abstract in its nature to discuss before such an assembly, under the restrictions of a twenty minutes rule.

The paper of Dr. Thomas Smith of Edinburgh, on Popular Infidelity, is in marked contrast with that of Dr. Watts, though also able, and well illustrates the widely different phases of the conflict between Christian truth and unbelief. Dr. Smith, after defining "*popular*" as not indicating *unintelligent* but *unintellectual*, proceeds to point out the numerous sources of the practical infidelity that prevails among the masses under the several heads of "Infidelity of Sentiment," "Infidelity of Science," and "Infidelity of Secularism." He suggests, touching the popular fictions of the day, that they are filled with dialogues and dissertations on religion, in which the theology is an unchristian theology; the god set up for worship not the God of the Scriptures, but a weak, silly, good-natured god, who would have his creatures to be good after a sentimental fashion, and happy in the gratification of their sensual and aesthetic tastes. If sometimes there is a recognition of the truths of the gospel, it is with a manifestation of bitter hostility to them. We entirely concur with the intimation of Dr. Smith, that no modern writer has done more to spread practical infidelity among the masses than Dickens, in his popular painting of character, in which all the good people are mere humanitarians, and all the scoundrels and fools are professors of evangelical truth. Dickens, while professing to hold up, not the real Christians, but only the hypocrites, to

scorn and ridicule, still takes care never to contrast with these some humble Christian, trying to adorn the doctrine of his God and Saviour by the good works that spring from faith and love, but always with some godless humanitarian who knows not Christ as a Saviour. This paper of Dr. Smith is, throughout, rich in practical truths bearing upon the popular unbelief.

On the whole subject of infidelity, the addresses which followed the reading of the papers were of great force and full of interest. Dr. E. de Pressensé of Paris presented the subject from the French point of view. Some of his points were: We must not exaggerate its triumphs. Infidelity itself is in a state of decomposition. Error, in its nature, is such as to bring about its own death in the act of showing the consequences which flow from it. The Idealism of Hegel has been put to flight and destroyed by Positivism, and this by the scientific idol of the day, Transmutation, which has come at length to produce its last and most frightful consequence, even that there is nothing real but *force*; and that right, justice, and goodness are mere chimeras. Modern humanity will recoil from this odious programme.

The more complete separation of politics from religion will relieve religion of the bitterness of feeling towards it, which it arouses when made a material force. To accept frankly the lay character of the State is the safety of the Church. We should recognise fully the independence of natural science in its sphere. The Church once was at the head of culture, and should be still. But above all, it is more important for us to manifest Christ *in us*, than to manifest him by reasoning; let him live in us, and speak through us.

Rev. Prof. Flint closed the discussion by some pointed suggestions, that the Church and Christians should take care how they cause unbelief by their spiritual deadness; their inadequate exhibition of gospel truth; their wrathful controversies. Rome has been the chief cause of the infidelity which prevails in some countries. The antidote to infidelity is the preaching of God's truth. As Dr. Crosby well said: "The Bible is God's attack on infidelity." Yet the Church should train up men for this speciality, and send them forth to meet the popular infidelity be-

fore the masses. The British and American Churches should train up a band of Christian scholars capable of repelling, on equal terms, the attacks of infidel scholars on the Holy Scriptures, and not continue in servile and dangerous dependence on German Biblical scholarship.

We have no space to glean from the papers on *Spiritual Life*, by Theodore Monod of Paris, and Dr. Andrew Thomson on the *Sabbath, a Help to Spiritual Life*; and of Dr. Sloane, on *Intemperance as a Hindrance to Spiritual Life*.

We cannot refrain, however, from making an extract from the paper of Dr. Wangemann, on the Ecclesiastical State of Eastern Prussia, which will agreeably surprise many of our readers. After setting forth the oppression inflicted upon the Lutherans in Germany, and the several ecclesiastical parties that have grown up there, Dr. Wangemann proceeds :

“The common, wide-spread idea, therefore, that in Prussia almost all the ministers have gone over to Rationalism is a ridiculously ignorant one. The old Rationalism was so completely laid prostrate by Neander and Tholuck, that at present nine-tenths of all the ministers in Prussia are Bible preachers, although certainly the important fragment of the transition party is not to be depended on; and only one-tenth are Rationalists, new and old. In our day, political party assuredly exerts an important influence on Church development. The Liberal party, which forms the majority in the Prussian Cabinet, consists, for the most part, of such as do not believe the divinity of Christ; yea, who do not understand or take any interest in the welfare of the Church; and as believing clergymen are at present, for the most part, Conservatives, these Liberals see, in believing theology, a dangerous element of opposition, and hence strive to keep it down.”

We confess to have been among “the ridiculously ignorant” on this subject, and have thought that the large part of the German ministers were Rationalistic. If once the true men of the German Church could unite in the Alliance with their British and American brethren, and bring to bear upon Germany the more enlightened ideas of the independence and spirituality of the Church, the next generation might see that Church disenthralled.

The speeches of Mons. Decoppet, Dr. Fisch, Van Scheltema, Charbonnier, and others, brought out an analogous state of things as existing in Holland, France, Italy, and other continental

churches. They excited an interest in the cause of continental Presbyterianism which the members of the Council will not soon forget.

The paper of Prof. Lorimer on the *Desiderata* of Presbyterian History, on the last day of the Council, set forth many important suggestions touching the importance of Presbyterian history as a means of spreading and maintaining our principles. As the editor of the "John Knox papers," Dr. Lorimer has won for himself a right to speak to Presbyterians on the subject of their history. That they need to be admonished on this subject is made painfully manifest by the fact that Dr. Mitchell, of St. Andrew's, the editor of the recently discovered "Minutes of the Westminster Assembly," has been obliged to suspend the publication of a second volume of the Minutes, embracing the discussions in that Assembly on the subject of church government, for want of patronage. It was in reference to this rather discreditable fact that a resolution was offered in the Council urging upon Presbyterians every where a generous patronage toward any scholars laboring, as Drs. Lorimer and Mitchell, to restore the history of the fathers, by purchasing and reading their publications.

Such are a few gleanings from this valuable and interesting volume. We advise our ministers and intelligent office-bearers to procure and read the report. We know of nothing published of late that is better adapted to inform and instruct our people touching the great principles of those great bodies who hold "the like precious faith with us" in regard to the doctrine and order of Christ's Church.

We judge that a thoughtful reading of this volume will go far towards answering the *cui bono*? which was so often raised when the General Council was yet only in prospect. It was deemed by the friends of the proposal for a Council then a sufficient answer, that, whether much good could come from it or not, the fact that such a gathering of the forty-nine other Presbyterian bodies of the world into a Council, and the Southern Presbyterian Church found not to be represented in it, must operate disastrously to our cause and the principles we represent. A

failure of this one body alone to be represented would but be playing into the hands of those Northern Presbyterians who have labored to convince the world that we are standing off from them on matters not involving any principle, but merely from pride and bad temper. That unless we would have "our good evil spoken of," and apparently justify the clamor at our sulkiness and unchristian spirit in the judgment of all the Presbyterian bodies of the world, we could not afford to remain out of that Council, even if it did not appear evident that great positive good should come from it. But now that the Council has been held and its official proceedings published, they suggest grounds for far more than a mere negative answer. Nor will it be out of place to close this brief and imperfect notice of this volume with a few suggestions, in outline merely, of some of the positive advantages accruing to Presbyterianism in general, and to the Southern Presbyterian Church in particular, from the General Council at Edinburgh.

In the first place, it was an advantage none the less important because of its intangible value. that one hundred and fifty Presbyterian ministers and ruling elders from this side of the Atlantic should have gone over the Ocean to meet with and to make the personal acquaintance of, and for two weeks commune with, each other of the great interests of the Presbyterian Church of Christ in the world. It is needless to enlarge upon the advantages of this personal acquaintance over all other methods of communication between Churches. Every one knows how much more force and distinctness it gives to the utterances of men when we get them by personal intercourse. And every one knows the advantage even of getting information touching men and churches in foreign countries from those who have personal knowledge of them. It is presumed that no one will deny the importance to the Church in one part of the world of a knowledge of the condition and prospects, the methods of work and the living spirit, of the churches in other parts. Without such information the tendency must ever be to narrow, inadequate views of the great body with which we are working, and the spirit and methods in which others work. The Apostle Paul

deemed this mutual knowledge of the affairs of each other by the churches a matter of importance, as his Epistles to the churches show.

In the next place, the bringing together for personal conference the representatives of the many feeble persecuted Presbyterian Churches and the feeble colonial Churches on the one hand, and the representatives of the great and powerful Churches on the other, is not only a great advantage to the feeble Churches by letting them see the strength of the great Presbyterian body—of which they form a part—and from this to take courage, but also to incite the stronger bodies to the exercise of that beautiful grace enjoined in the 26th Chapter of our Confession: "Saints by profession are bound to maintain an holy fellowship and communion in the worship, etc., as also in relieving each other in outward things according to their several abilities and necessities. Which communion, as God giveth opportunity, is to be extended unto all those who in every place call upon the name of the Lord Jesus." Any one may perceive at a glance the influence of such personal intercourse, between the representatives of the strong and of the weak churches in extending and giving life to this communion of saints. And in the present state of international intercourse, the communion of saints in different countries should be proportionally closer.

In the third place, it must, in the end, prove of great advantage to churches under the thralldom of Cæsar—some of them willingly submitting to it—to bring the principles of the free Churches of the United States stately under the notice of the enslaved Churches, and thereby awaken them to the great principles of our free system and the wonderful power and effectiveness of our system as compared with theirs. Shall we not avail ourselves of so favorable an opportunity to witness for our great principles against the Erastianism of other Churches, and demonstrate to them by our experiment of near a century the ability of the Church to support herself, relying simply upon the piety of her people?

In the fourth place, in an age when by reason of closer intercourse the public opinion of enlightened peoples has so much

power in restraining governments and influencing them in the direction of freedom, such alliance of the Presbyterians of the world tends to throw a protecting shield over their persecuted brethren and a restraint upon governments hostile to them, by letting their persecutors see that these small bodies are no fanatical, stubborn schismatics, out of sympathy with all other religions, but members of the strongest and most enlightened bodies of Protestants in the world.

In the fifth place, this alliance can be used as a powerful instrument against the influence of Romanism and infidelity by combining the moral influence of the whole Presbyterian body in the world in such formal and carefully prepared utterances as will carry with them a weight which no individual writer or any one local Presbyterian body could have in exposing soul-destroying errors and warning the people against them. The weight of this influence could be thrown with far greater effect upon those countries which more specially need the warning than the utterances of the feeble and scattered Churches of the continent overshadowed by the power of Romanism on the one hand and of infidel Rationalism on the other.

In the sixth place, such an alliance must enable the several Presbyterian churches of the world to carry on their great schemes of foreign missions far more effectively as a whole, by allowing each to become acquainted with the plans of the other, and thereby avoiding the difficulty of neglecting one part of the field and unnecessarily crowding laborers into other parts. Now that there are some 700 American and European ordained ministers in the field, with probably five times that many helpers—and the number constantly increasing—it is obvious that stated conferences of all the Presbyterian Churches are becoming more and more important with reference to the great missionary field. Let these reasons, out of many others that might be suggested, suffice for this view of the general advantages of such a Council.

In regard to the advantages of the Council to our own Church in particular, it is sufficient to say that through this Council, as "a great and effectual door," we have had the privilege of acquainting our brethren of the Presbyterian world with our

character as witness-bearers for the time-honored doctrines of the martyr fathers, and especially for the doctrine of "Christ's crown and covenant." It would be a mere affectation of modesty to forbear saying that the impression made by the delegation of the Southern Church upon the Council was favorable in a high degree; that very evidently our British brethren were surprised to find "this sect everywhere spoken against" no band of ecclesiastical malcontents, disposed to schismatic hair-splitting and of a malignant spirit, but Presbyterians fashioned in the old mould of the Scottish Reformers—catholic in spirit, but stern and uncompromising in the defence of the great principles of Presbyterian doctrine and church order. It was plain that the ideas of the British Presbyterians concerning us had been undergoing a revolution, and before the Council ended the revolution was complete. From the opening to the close, the delegation from the Southern Church was treated with marked kindness and consideration. And it was equally gratifying to find abundant evidence that the Southern Church delegation made an impression much to the advantage of the church they represented—and a very strong impression at that. Certainly, then, it is something to have succeeded, notwithstanding all the miserable misrepresentations of ecclesiastical adversaries, in getting out of an isolated provincial position and getting our testimony before the whole Presbyterian world. It was plain that many of the British Presbyterians regard the Southern as nearer in sentiment and spirit to them than the Northern Church.

It is a further prospective advantage likely to come as the result of this alliance that in time to come we may somewhat confidently look for aid from Britain in our efforts for the poor negroes. As the case was strongly put in the business committee of the Council, "our Southern churches, after all, must do nine-tenths of all that is done for the negro. Other churches may do much in establishing schools and missions here and there, and exhibit the work in tabular form. But we live among them, they are ever at our doors—we must, in the main, feed them and care for them. We, therefore, are the best agents through whom help from abroad can be administered to them." It was much

regretted by the Southern delegation that, owing to the great pressure upon the time of the Council, they failed to get before the body the paper of Dr. Stillman, which, not having been sent forward to the Edinburgh committee before the meeting, could come in only by some special arrangement. The paper, however, is published as one of the many papers that came before the Council without being read. Its circulation through this volume will effect good.

In conclusion, it may be added that none of the fears expressed in regard to certain evils that might arise from the Council have become actual. On the contrary, the venerable Dr. Begg, one of the few survivors of the band that fought under Chalmers in 1843, who, at the conference in London in 1875, and even up to the first and second days of the Council, was full of apprehension lest such a Council might in some way disturb the old landmarks, yet, seconding a vote of thanks, at the close of the Council, took occasion to say, in effect, that the Council had proved a great blessing, in that Scotland had needed an ecclesiastical tonic to brace them up to a firmer maintenance of their own scriptural principles, and he thought God had been pleased to send it in this Council. And to two or three ministers of the Southern Church he said, near the close of the Council, with tears in his eyes: "What a blessing that the Lord sent you all to us just at this time, when defections were beginning among us! Your unanimity was so remarkable that the Broad-churchmen were struck dumb in the Council, and but once or twice ventured to utter a word of dissent. How comforting to find men like you, from four thousand miles distance, coming up to add your testimony with one voice for the old doctrines and the old ways against Scotchmen themselves beginning to wander! Surely this Council is the most blessed providence for Scotland in thirty years past!"

We thoroughly concur with Dr. Begg as far as concerns Scotland; and more than that, our profound conviction is, that this Council was the great blessing of Providence to the Southern Church and to all the Presbyterian Churches of the whole world.

ARTICLE IX.

LAY EVANGELISM AND THE YOUNG MEN'S
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS.

In the spring of 1859, it was the writer's privilege to spend a Sabbath with one of the churches in the city of Cincinnati. The good elder, at whose house he was a guest, invoked his opinion of a movement which had recently been inaugurated at the West, of sending out pious laymen, two by two, to hold religious meetings and exhort, supplementing thus the labors of the regular ministry by an agency which, it was hoped, would reach a class of hearers not likely to be otherwise overtaken by the gospel.

The answer was promptly given in these words: Within six months your Presbyteries will be driven to crush the movement beneath the weight of their authority as an unmitigated evil. A judgment so adverse to the prevailing sentiment could not pass unchallenged; which led naturally to a more extended statement of his views, on the part of the critic now in his turn assailed.

Every Christian has the undoubted right to speak for his Master, of which he cannot be dispossessed by any court in Christendom. So long as he does this upon his individual responsibility, drawing from the stores of his religious experience, and within the circle where he is personally known, there is little danger of injury, and there may be much profit, to the general cause. Even though he should not always speak wisely, there is a limit to the evil threatened, in the fact that his testimony is only occasional, and is delivered to those whose knowledge of his character will enable them to attach no greater value to it than is deserved; and especially in the fact, that his utterances carry no official authority, as formal expositions of divine truth. But when the same man is sent forth under the sanction of a *quasi* appointment, to make a set address before audiences assembled expressly to hear him, it is not in the nature of things that he will restrict himself to that style of exhortation to which his simple experience might render him competent. The pressure of each occasion will force him from this narrower range to the

exposition of Scripture and to the elucidation of some doctrinal system. Just here lurks the peril. It requires the comparison of Scripture with Scripture to construct the science of theology, and to preserve throughout what the Apostle denominates "the proportion of faith." Without this, there is danger of understating some truths, and of overstating others. The logical connexion, which binds all the parts of a harmonious system, is overlooked. The whole scheme of grace becomes disjointed in their unskilful hands. Heresies inevitably arise from this disregard of the relations which one truth sustains to another. The result will be, that under the teachings of men who have no other desire than to build up the Redeemer's kingdom, errors will be sown broad-cast which it will require years of patient and painful labor to eradicate. Such was the ground of the judgment uttered by the writer nineteen years ago, which fell upon the ear of this pious elder as little short of blasphemy; but which proved to be a prediction so near fulfilment, that almost before the author of it could reach his home, the eye was greeted with announcements, in the Western journals, of *pro re nata* meetings held for the suppression of a religious crusade which had already begun to blight the peace and purity of the Church.

"*Tempora mutantur.*" A great civil war has shaken society from its poise since then. In all directions men have cut loose from their old convictions, and are now adrift upon the wild sea of speculation and experiment. The Church, so far as her destiny was committed to human care, could scarcely be expected to escape the general disaster. The melancholy spectacle has been witnessed of a false liberalism dismantling the fortresses in which the truth was intrenched; one hour of passionate impulse undoing a work of reform which it had taken a whole generation to achieve. This relaxation of principle is perhaps most conspicuous in the renewal of those measures which came so suddenly to grief nearly twenty years ago. The evil, which was then arrested in its inception, has in our time been allowed to expand and to mature its fruit. Pious laymen, endowed with affluence of speech, uniting with them others equally gifted with the power of song, roam as gossellers through the land. So far from invoking the

sanction of the ecclesiastical courts, it is their peculiar distinction to ignore their very existence. Self constituted, or else under the appointment of the Young Men's Christian Association—a body obtrusively non-ecclesiastical in its character—these lay evangelists subordinate to themselves the pastors and congregations wherever they go, imposing their measures and assuming the entire control so long as their labors are continued.

There are elements of success in such a movement at all times, and especially in the wake of a mighty revolution through which the country has just passed. All history shows the favor with which, in every upheaval of society, the insurrection against prerogative is greeted by the masses. In this case, many were attracted by the dash which did not scruple to set aside all the prescription and authority of the Church, and to exalt untrained mechanics above the heads which wore the mitre. To an appetite satiated with the sensations which it still morbidly craved, there was a stimulus in the novelty of this inverted cone, standing upon its apex and flourishing its broad base in the air. Let us not deny that there was also much presentation of the truth, spoken with simplicity and tenderness, and accompanied, as it will always be, with the gracious operations of the Holy Spirit. With all these elements of success combined, the movement once begun was driven forward by its own momentum. Its influence spread with its tidal wave across the sea, and broke in upon the staid monotony of European customs. It then swung back with increased vibration upon its native shore, and took the country captive under its magic spell.

Not a few, however, "through the loop-holes of retreat," looked upon this movement with suspicion and fear. The glamor of present success did not blind their eyes to the remote evils which must arise from the disregard of order and law. The history of the Church was too full of pregnant examples, showing how error of doctrine creeps in through breaches of government and discipline. The self-sufficiency evinced in the contempt of authority, will not long brook the restraint of a creed—the logical connexion between the two certainly entailing the one as the consequent of the other. Cautions were given as to the impending danger,

only to be disregarded. Nothing remained but to await the issue, when the Church should be called too late to mourn over the tares mingled with the wheat in her field. That hour may possibly have now come. The fruits of this policy have at least begun to ripen, in a degree which should challenge attention. The reaction cannot be far distant, which many have anxiously awaited; and to hasten which the suggestions that follow are respectfully submitted.

The argument most powerful in removing the scruples of many, and inducing a general acquiescence in this form of evangelism, is the seal of the divine blessing which is claimed to have uniformly rested upon it. Crowds are seen surging to the place of assembly wherever these ministrations are enjoyed, embracing multitudes who never before were drawn to any house of worship. Under the sweet influence of Christian song, tears flow from eyes unused to weeping, and stain the cheeks which are bronzed by exposure and toil. And, as the final result, a long list of converts is held up to view, who by this agency have been brought to bow before the cross of Jesus. A plea of this kind is the more irresistible, since it forestalls investigation as something profane; and the pious conscience shrinks with alarm from even the appearance of fighting against God. Those who daily offer the prayer, "Thy kingdom come," cannot but rejoice in the report of these wholesale conversions. If the agency should seem irregular by which it is accomplished, it is accepted as an example of that gracious sovereignty which "divideth to every man severally as it will," and worketh by what instruments it pleaseth. If there be one peril from which the Christian recoils with more dread than any other, it is that of being out of sympathy with what is manifestly the work of the Holy Ghost. In every case of doubt, the prudence of Gamaliel is called to remembrance: "If this work be of men, it will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God." This language accurately describes the attitude of many who could neither become the advocates nor the opponents of lay evangelism, but have simply awaited the issue which should reveal its true relation to the divine will.

The facts, however, must at length be sifted; and though the task of criticism is never pleasant, it may as well be undertaken now as later. Probably no revivalists ever understood before so perfectly the art of advertising themselves. In the large cities, the announcement of their coming is made months beforehand. Churches and pastors of every denomination are summoned to the work of spiritual preparation, and the expected arrival is made the topic of public discourse and of united prayer. No building or gymnasium can be found large enough to accommodate the crowds which are anticipated. Some immense structure must be erected, or else rearranged at the cost of thousands of dollars; and the resounding hammers of the carpenter send forth a daily proclamation of the wonders which are shortly to be seen. An excitable populace is thus kept in feverish expectation, until the doors are thrown open to the admiring rush. The spectacle within piques curiosity the more. Upon a large platform, just upon the level of a sea of heads, are seated the ministers of the local churches, lending the sanction of their presence, and bringing their vast personal influence to sustain the chief actors in the drama. An imposing orchestra, improvised by judicious selection from many church choirs, rolls up the grand symphonies, yielding at times to the fascination of some sweet Christian ballad exquisitely rendered by a single voice of uncommon richness. The exhortation which follows is marked by a quaint simplicity, denoting the earnestness which disclaims the arts of rhetoric, but which is nearly the perfection of colloquial discourse. The effect is not marred by an occasional trip in grammar, or a little falseness of pronunciation—both being evidence that success, if attained, must be ascribed to a higher inspiration than of earthly scholarship. Then comes the dexterous manipulation of the practised tactician, by which the masses are sorted into groups and thrown into the most dramatic positions. With the reserved force of acknowledged divines at command, the distribution is easily made. Established Christians are sent into chambers on one side, to invoke the interposition of heaven; inquiring souls are ostentatiously disposed of elsewhere, to be counselled and directed as they may require; whilst the large remainder abides under

the stimulus of preaching and of song, with all the reaction of a powerful sympathy, to recruit the ranks of the awakened and anxious. Who that knows anything of the contagion of feeling in a crowded assembly, drawn together by any common sentiment, will wonder at the impression produced by these measures—deepening in intensity with every circuit of the electric current between the poles of such a battery?

It is not doubted by us that sinners have been truly converted to God in connexion with most, if not with all, these efforts. We recognise with joy the fact that, by whomsoever proclaimed, the truth will never be wholly destitute of power. We believe, too, the predominant motive in all these labors to be a sincere desire to glorify God in the salvation of men. But the admixture of earthly elements has always seemed to us disproportionately great; and it has prepared us for the results disproportionately small as compared with “the pomp and circumstance” accompanying it all. We refer more particularly to the absence of permanent results which are distinctly appreciable. This may be accepted as the criterion of a true revival, whether it be upon a large or a small scale. It leaves the Church invigorated, its membership increased, the tone of general piety elevated. Sometimes a feeble church is lifted from the dust and sent forward upon a career of large prosperity; and in some instances we have known small communities so pervaded by the gracious influence, as to be openly purged of many vices by which they were once deformed.

The grand mistake of this lay evangelism is the one-sided idea, that Christianity can be propagated as a pure spirit without a body. Its effort is confined to the matter of simple conversion, and the neophyte is cast loose upon the world to take care of himself. This business is left, it is said, to the Church; which must come afterward and pick up these poor waifs and give them food and shelter. Ignoring the Church in all its labors, except to use it as a stool to stand upon in the first instance—nay, carrying this distrust and reserve to the point of carefully concealing to what body of Christians the evangelists themselves belong—it is not strange that as soon as the meetings are discon-

tinued, the whole movement collapses before the fruit can be gathered. The converts with few exceptions disappear, before the Church can mark them as belonging to her fold. Hence the want of fixed and tangible results; of which, it will be remembered, Mr. Spurgeon complained as to the work in London. In one of our own towns, where the revival was reported to be proportionally as great as that which challenged the attention of the world in the city of New York, we were told by one in sympathy with the movement, that every trace of it had disappeared within a week. It was said to be a spectacle for a life-time to see a large building filled with men who knew nothing of churchly usages, and to behold the fountains of feeling unlocked in bosoms seldom swayed by gentle moods; but the emotions proved to be born only of natural pathos, superficial and transient as the snow-flakes melting upon the warm earth. A testimony scarcely less remarkable was delivered to us, about a year ago, in reference to the New York revival itself, by a prominent divine of that city, to wit: that the general estimate now put upon that movement was, that it was simply a substitute for a whole season's work on the part of all the churches engaged in it. As soon as the tension was relaxed, a corresponding reaction set in; and it was impossible to gather up the spent forces and to put them into effective operation again. It is, of course, out of human power to strike the balance between these two agencies, and decide upon which the gain would lie. But few would consent to purchase the one at the expense of the other, except it may be the fanatics who would be willing to blot out of existence the visible Church forever. The sum of the whole matter is, that a large abatement of these extravagant pretensions must be made, and that the residuum of good does not exceed what would probably have been accomplished by the Church in her orderly and constant work. The only difference is, that by this ostentatious cry of "lo, here!" and "lo, there!" an occasional conversion takes place of one lying beyond the sphere of Church influence, but not beyond the reach of evangelistic effort, to which the Church herself is equally competent.

This analysis of the actual results may serve to ease the pain of

those who find themselves obliged, by an instinctive conservatism, to hold aloof from a movement which shelters itself under the claim of the divine approbation. Waiving, however, all this criticism, and accepting as real all the good that appears upon the surface, we are not prepared to render the favorable verdict which is challenged. A correct judgment of no policy can be formed which does not take into account the remote, as well as the proximate, results. A scheme may originate in the purest of motives and be advocated by the best of men, which is proved in the end to be neither wise nor beneficent. Hence expediency can never become the rule of human conduct. Finite wisdom is unable to see the end from the beginning: and unless the entire line be covered by our vision, it is impossible to foretell the disasters which may flow from measures the most approved. Fruits of promise may hang out as tempting to the eye as the golden apples in the garden of the Hesperides, which shall ripen at last into the apples of Sodom filled only with bitter dust. Unfortunately, the purest intention affords no protection against this miscarriage. Indeed, hazardous as the paradox may seem, we are not sure but that more lasting evils proceed from the errors of the good than from the machinations of the bad. There is John Howard, for example, in his visits of pity to the hospitals and prisons of Europe, until his name is consecrated as the synonym of benevolence. Yet out of this sprang that "rose-water philanthropy" which has well-nigh driven a robust justice from the earth. In fact, if the world could hang together a single year without its stern protection, it would long since have been expelled; as men are to-day striving, in the desperation of guilt, to banish it from the government of the universe and of God. A more familiar illustration may be cited in what goes under the name of the Temperance Reform; a movement, projected by conservative and well-balanced minds, for the purpose of extirpating the most prevalent and desolating of all vices. How soon was it lifted from its original foundation and rested upon principles which could not receive the sanction of those who acknowledge the inspiration and authority of the Sacred Scriptures. All this needs only a passing allusion here. But now, after the

lapse of half a century, we are still confronted by intemperance in its original deformity—the agent in its removal having succeeded only in flooding the land with an amount of irreligious scepticism more than an offset to the reformation which it vainly sought to achieve. In view of such gigantic failures, would that good men might be impressed with the responsibility of adhering, in all moral questions, to the principles and methods laid down in the word of God! And in view of this incompetency of human wisdom, we have a thousand times blessed God for having shut out all human devices in the constitution and laws, the officers and discipline, which He has given to his Church.

Just here is found the core of our objection to this whole system of lay evangelism, that it tampers with the order and organisation of that Church which is the Redeemer's kingdom upon earth. It required, therefore, no spirit of prophecy to anticipate the evils which must sooner or later be developed. Fortunately, the demonstration has come early enough to prevent their continuance and spread, if attention be aroused to their significance. We have, for example, already referred to the partial and one-sided presentation of truth, which must of necessity characterise the teachings of undisciplined and unfurnished minds.

A half-truth is always a whole lie. Taken out of the system to which it belongs, and where it is qualified and checked by other truths with which it is coördinated, and then magnified out of its due proportion by the enthusiasm which rides it as a hobby, it becomes the more pernicious falsehood from the trace of truth which it yet retains. We have unwittingly paraphrased one of Pascal's brilliant utterances, when he says, "Il y en a plusieurs qui errent d'autant plus dangereusement, qu'ils prennent une vérité pour le principe de leur erreur. Leur faute n'est pas de suivre une fausseté, mais de suivre une vérité á l'exclusion d'une autre."* By the force of natural logic the single error gathers other errors to its support, crystallising at length into a system which is harmonious and complete. In this manner we imagine the doctrine of the Plymouth Brethren to have grown up through its distortions and exaggerations of truth, importing

*Pensées de Pascal, Seconde Partie, Art. XVII., Sec. XIII.

into the Church the most subtle antinomianisms the world has ever known.*

Starting from the same mistake of confounding the visible with the invisible Church, and of expecting Christianity to be diffused and maintained without external embodiment and form, we are not surprised to find our lay evangelists charged with expressions † which, if they do not directly teach, must eventuate in, the errors of the Plymouth school. The reserve and caution, so natural in the outset of their career, yield to greater boldness as they advance; and, of necessity, their language will become tinged with their secret doctrinal sympathies. Already has theological criticism been challenged to their loose expositions of

*In the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, January, 1872, may be found a thorough criticism of the Plymouth Theology. A briefer summary of its errors we clip from a religious weekly just at hand: "Of all the dangers to which the Church is exposed at the present time, we believe there is none so great or so imminent as that belonging to the system of the so-called Plymouth Brethren. . . . Under the pretence of being more spiritual, and indeed of being exclusively devoted to spiritual principles, to the entire exclusion of everything else, it veils an entire repudiation of the main features of the gospel as given by Christ himself, and as most strenuously contended for by the Primitive Apostles. It may present variations in different parts of England and America, but as we have met with it, its one question appears to be, 'Are you saved;' and the one and only article of its creed to be that involved in an affirmative answer. . . . They disregard the Lord's Day, and deny that the law of God is our rule of life. They teach that none of the Old Testament saints have any part in the future glory. They deny the great doctrine of substitution in the sufferings of Christ; and teach that believers are not to confess their sins, even to God. They reject a great deal of the New Testament, terming it Jewish, as the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer, etc. They say St. Paul's teaching was of a higher order than that of the other apostles, whose teaching was 'Jewish,' and not intended for us. They contend that part of the time Christ was on the cross, he was not there as our representative. They ignore repentance as necessary to salvation; and say they are forgiven and saved, so that they have no need to pray, 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" Other developments of their system are of a character corresponding with these, making the whole of their religion consist of an internal persuasion of the mind, and of a total denial of most of the outward ordinances, especially that of the Christian ministry."—*Dominion Churchman*.

† See SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, April, 1876.

Christian truth; which, if unchecked, must soon take the shape of definite heresies. And if this result accrues at the very initiation of this policy, what shall the fruit be when it has outgrown the timidity of its youth, and time has gathered a full harvest from the fatal seeds that are sown? These equivocal teachings must awaken alarm as to a form of evangelism which, whilst it lives by the sufferance of the Church, refuses her jurisdiction and acknowledges no responsibility for the doctrines it proclaims.

Practice, too, involves principle. Indeed, it is the most emphatic expression of it, as being its appropriate and necessary fruit. The Christian public was not long since startled by the announcement that the leading lay evangelist in this country had not scrupled to administer the Lord's Supper to such as were willing to receive it at his hands. Yet what reason existed for surprise, except that one step should so soon follow another in this career of usurpation? He who could assume the rôle of a public teacher, without first authenticating his call before the Church, need scarcely hesitate to intrude into the mysteries of the sanctuary, and lift the veil which a pious veneration has always thrown over the sacraments. It may be alleged that, intrinsically, no greater sanctity attaches to these than to the preaching of the Word, since they both "represent Christ to us, and the benefits of the New Covenant." We will not stop to argue this point. Suffice it that a traditional reverence has always guarded with peculiar jealousy the ark containing the seals of the covenant. It required, therefore, a greater degree of assurance to invade this prerogative of the sacred office than the other; and the determination to assume both, was an open declaration against the necessity of an ordained ministry.

We do not care to discuss in this article the grounds upon which these various usurpations are defended. This would be only to repeat what has been sufficiently said in a previous number of this REVIEW, referred to in a foot-note on a preceding page. Our purpose is accomplished in simply drawing attention to the disorganising tendency of this whole movement, which can legitimately end in nothing short of the extinction of the minis-

terial office. If any private Christian may lawfully discharge all its duties, why should a particular order be set apart to the same? Should the Christian public be finally content to accept the lay preacher as a substitute for an ordained ministry, how can the Church effectually provide for the perpetuation of the latter? With what expectation of success can she require her candidates to accomplish, at large expense, a ten years' course of study, as well as to undergo a number of critical examinations, when they have only to step to the front and exercise any function of the ministry under the claim of a private call and the convictions of their individual conscience? With what propriety can she hedge in her ministers with the restraints of an articulate creed, and subject their work to constant episcopal supervision, when all control is escaped and every responsibility is evaded by a schismatical independence of authority? How long must this lay evangelism be worked successfully before these questions shall begin to be practically put, and find their answer in a gradual disintegration of the Church as a corporate society? We press these interrogatories. We are not going to offer any apology, at this late day, for the existence of such an order as the gospel ministry. This we will assume to have been adjudicated long ago by the authority of the Master in the Sacred Scriptures. The reader of these pages will agree with us in refusing to entertain this as an open question; and our end will be achieved if he is led with us to see that the real issue now is whether the Church shall have a ministry consecrated to the work of evangelising the world. Nay, rather, the issue is whether there shall be such an organisation as the Church on earth, to which shall be committed the oracles of God. The question is not whether these lay evangelists do more or less good, but whether the whole religious world shall be reduced to a state of chaos, in which darkness and light shall mingle again in strange confusion. When this issue comes to be fairly understood, the decision will be soon rendered which will restore order and law to their supremacy once more.

These grave irregularities could scarcely have sprung up, except from a soil previously prepared. Because of the historical and logical connexion between the two, we have coupled, in the title of this article, the subject of *Lay Evangelism* with that of the Young Men's Christian Associations. To the consideration of the latter we will devote the remainder of these pages. It is worthy of note that these Associations, when first formed, about twenty-five years ago, encountered no opposition from any quarter. Those who were the most jealous for the prerogatives of the Church as a divine institute, greeted the new organisation with the most cordial favor, and were behind none in the support rendered to its schemes. The explanation is to be found in the modesty and singleness of the end it originally proposed to accomplish. This was to throw a shield of protection around young men exposed in our cities and larger towns to unusual temptations. For this purpose the organisation was admirably contrived. It approached a young man fresh from the parental roof with the proffer of society and friendship, in the first experience of the heart-sickness which creeps upon us all in our first exile from home. It took him to well-lighted and cheerful halls, where he found himself surrounded with papers, magazines, and books; and what was more grateful still, where he is welcomed by companions of his own age and class, who wish him well. If unemployed, he is aided in the search for a situation, by an arrangement which is spread like a net-work over the whole city. He is guided to a boarding place where he will be associated with the good, and enjoy the largest degree of comfort which his means may allow. Last, but not least, a kindly influence persuades him to attach himself to some house of worship, in the Church of his fathers or in any other that he may prefer, where his character will be moulded under the gentle ministrations of the gospel. Evidently a broad field for Christian effort was opened just here; and the class to be profited could be most successfully reached by an agency which should be secular in its organisation, whilst it was mainly religious in its composition.

Of course, no association of young men could be formed upon a moral or philanthropic basis, without danger of degenerating

under worldly and sinful influences, and perhaps aggravating the very evils it was intended to relieve. The provision against this peril presents altogether the most peculiar feature in its constitution—that which places the government entirely in the hands of a particular class of members, who are required to be actual communicants in some branch of the Christian Church. Such were supposed to be not only fixed in their principles and habits, but to be under the control of the highest and purest motives which can direct human conduct. A more curious illustration of the shortness of human foresight cannot be found than in the history of this institution. Who could have dreamed, twenty years ago, that the perversion would occur upon the side exactly opposite to that which was so carefully guarded? Yet so it proved to be. The danger lay in what was contrived for its defence, and the defection arose from the piety which was meant to be its protection. Yet “vain man would be wise” enough to become the “Lord’s counsellor,” and improve upon his methods of providence and grace! The Young Men’s Christian Association found itself good enough to become the universal agent for regenerating the world. Through the excess of its virtue, it fell from the purpose for which it was organised, and undertook precisely the work for which it had pleased God to institute his Church. We say that it has abandoned the object for which it was originally created; for if attended to at all, it is in the most perfunctory way, and is scarcely mentioned in any reports of its proceedings. Instead of this, we learn of gospel meetings established, Bible readings instituted, Sabbath-schools organised, city tabernacles erected, mission services conducted, and itinerant laymen sent forth to evangelise the country. Not content with the quiet assumption of these churchly functions, it undertakes in some instances to supervise the operations of the very rival whom it supersedes. A circular was once placed in the hands of the writer, as in the hands of all his co-presbyters, requesting a report of all church Sabbath-school work to be rendered to the Association; and that, too, in face of the fact that just such reports were required to be regularly made to the higher church courts. It was mentioned, to the praise of the Association in

Chicago, some two or three years ago, that it prepared the lessons for all the Sabbath-schools in that city! and that a mammoth class of all the teachers was instructed every Saturday afternoon in the rooms and under the auspices of the same Association. It is hard to see what functions are left to the Church, when these have been absorbed by another agency. When the penitent apostle was restored to his office, we remember that it was indicated in the double injunction, "Feed my sheep, feed my lambs." But when the whole business of carrying the gospel to them that are without is assumed, together with the whole business of training them who are within—when the very lambs are to be taken out of the care of the Church, in whose bosom they are born—it is hard to see what excuse the latter has to live.

We are aware that this antagonism to the Church is warmly denied. It is not necessary to the present argument to charge upon these Associations the purpose to array themselves in a declared opposition. On the contrary, we accept as perfectly sincere their professions of respect, and of desire to aid the Church in the accomplishment of her sacred mission. Nevertheless we are compelled to charge that the collision actually exists; and that as two bodies cannot occupy the same space, one or the other must give way. What we allege is the *tendency* of these Associations, even though undesigned and unforeseen, to supplant the Church of God. Why, here is an order as compact in its structure as that of Masonry itself, ramifying throughout the world, with its local Associations in all our cities and towns, with its Constitution and laws, with its District Conferences and Annual Conventions, both National and Œcumenic—whose object is simply to convey the gospel to every class in society, and to bring the world to Christ. The ambition is a noble one; and we cannot withhold our sympathy from its aims, however we may dissent from its plans. But when it is considered that the Redeemer has established his Church upon earth for no other end but this, one cannot refrain from asking why all this religious zeal cannot find an outlet through her agency, rather than create another, which can do nothing more in its highest success except to occupy her place in the world. This question is the

more pertinent, and the surprise is the greater, when it is remembered that those who control these Associations are all of them members of the Christian Church, and are bound by earlier and holier vows to the service of the sanctuary. The argument from prescription is certainly in favor of the Church, as the first in existence, and as having the sanction of the divine appointment. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the advocates of the new institute to show cause why it should supersede the old; or if this be not designed, in what respects it supplies its defects as the better agency of the two.

The strongest defence of these Associations which we have met, is that they are necessary to reach the perishing masses in our cities who are not gathered into the regular churches. We are glad to be able to present the argument in the language of one who advocates the new agency distinctively upon this ground. The *Chicago Interior*, in its issue of January 10th, quotes with approbation the following testimony from Mr. Cook, the Boston lecturer:

"So far as my knowledge extends, the most important advances that have been made in America in reaching the unchurched masses in large towns have been effected through the Young Men's Christian Associations and city tabernacles."

It then proceeds from this text to discourse as follows:

"It seems to us that Mr. Cook has here struck upon the very facts which constitute the prime necessity, or *raison d'etre*, for the existence of the Young Men's Christian Association, and of those special evangelistic and aggressive agencies of which it is the nucleus. It is precisely the institution which is called for by all the exigencies of the restless, rushing, and largely irreligious masses that crowd our great cities. As a matter of history, it was this state of the case which first called such associations into being twenty years ago. And it is this unaltered necessity still existing in every American city which to-day demands their continuance and demonstrates their overwhelming importance. . . . What is to reach and save the multitudes of wanderers who never enter our elegant church edifices? Clearly nothing can do it, thus far nothing has ever done it, except those direct, persistent, concerted, and aggressive efforts which take as their inspiration the Saviour's own command, Go ye into the streets and lanes of the city, and compel them to come. This is the work, the watch-word, the design, the evangel, of the Young Men's Christian Association. It is aiming to carry the gospel of Jesus

Christ to the heathen tribes at our own doors, to the perishing heathen of our great cities. What it does the Church does, for the Church is only working through it as her instrument. Its constituent members are all members of the Churches. Nor can we see that there is one single movement which the Church of our day is making—not even that of sending the gospel to India or Japan—which is more in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Scriptures than this effort which the Young Men's Christian Association is making to save our cities."

The statement in the above extract, that these Associations were called into being in order to discharge this evangelistic function, only shows how completely their original object has been dropped out of sight. The new dispensation inaugurated very early after their organisation, is here mistaken by a respectable journalist for the period of birth. We do not wonder. The Old Testament career was very short, in the haste to reach the gospel of the New. Nor can we accept the proposition that "what the Association does the Church does, the Church working through it as her instrument." We had supposed this loose doctrine exploded forty years ago, when it pleased God to deliver the Presbyterian Church from Egyptian bondage, under this fatal principle, to the National Voluntary Societies. One of the great issues in the Reform of 1837 was that of "ecclesiastical responsibility"—that "the Church was to do her own work *in her organised capacity, through her courts and her own executive agencies.*"

As we have quoted the language of Dr. Thornwell, we may be allowed another luminous statement of the principle from the same pen :

"She (the Church) has no right to intrust her own peculiar functions to any agent, no matter how closely connected with herself. The duties of the Church are duties which rest upon her by the authority of God. He has given her the organisation which she possesses, for the purpose of discharging these duties. She can therefore no more throw them off upon others, than a man can delegate to his neighbor the care of his own family, and abandon himself to idleness and ease. If our Form of Church Government is such as God prescribes, it is adequate for all emergencies ; if our Church courts are based upon the platform of the Bible, God requires from *them* the discharge of their peculiar duties, and not from *another*."*

*Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. IV., pp. 160, 161, 222.

This grave assertion, that "what the Association does the Church does," is a melancholy proof how far the Church has drifted from her ancient testimonies. It only shows how the same great battle has to be fought over again for the principles of Church order, which are now being as faithlessly betrayed as they were not long since gloriously won. It might happen that all the members of the Church are also members of a Free Mason's Lodge. Would it follow that what the Lodge does the Church does? We ourselves do not belong to that secret fraternity, but we have never doubted that its objects are philanthropic and benevolent—indeed so full of kindness and charity, that many are willing to accept it as a good enough religion for them. So far as this goes, why not agree that the Church shall work through the Lodge as her instrument? Will it be replied that the case is not parallel, since the Young Men's Christian Association proposes to itself exactly the same ends with the Church? Then we have a human institute lying over against a Divine, its counterpart in every particular, and therefore its *substitute*. What shall be thought of the audacity of the proposition? Nay, as will presently appear, it is a substitute more effective than the original, which is displaced because it has proved a failure.

It is one thing to acknowledge the shortcomings of the visible Church as consisting of members in whom the work of grace is but imperfectly developed, and altogether another thing to propose to supersede her under the allegation of incompetency. Let us read the language in which this indictment is flung against her. In the same journal from which we have already quoted, the following "incontrovertible propositions" of Mr. Cook are repeated with warm commendation:

"That the American Church, as organised under the voluntary system, is not reaching the unchurched masses in our large cities, with due effectiveness; that the unchurched masses, or unseated parishioners in great towns, have often, in many cities of Great Britain and the United States, been reached effectively when addressed earnestly, in tabernacles and free halls for evangelistic services, by Young Men's Christian Associations, or by the union of Churches."

It is a sad truth that there are so many thousands, not only in

our cities, but throughout the land, who live without reference either to God or the soul, as though there was neither a judgment nor an eternity to come. But we must protest *in limine* against the use of terms which imply that they are in any sense excluded from the gospel, except by their own wicked choice. The expressions, so often repeated in the above extract, of "unchurched masses" and "unseated parishioners," are offensive, because of the implication that by some process they have been turned away by the Church, or deprived of rights and privileges which they were disposed to claim. The fact is, that they live in the light and under the sound of the gospel every day, voluntarily closing their eyes to the one and their ears to the other. The Church cannot justly be held responsible for their infidelity and irreligion, except in so far as she may fail to make the proper efforts for their reclamation. But when she has put forth all her resources, and when these boastful Associations have a thousand-fold exceeded the abundance of her toil, the sad fact will remain that countless myriads will still "reject the counsel of God against themselves."

This melancholy picture is not drawn to excuse the sluggishness or apathy of the Church in seeking their salvation, but to show the necessity for discrimination in the censures which are levelled at her head. Let her not be held responsible for failure to accomplish that which no agency can achieve, but only for failure to do all that was in her province and in her power to attempt. Let it be admitted, then, that the Church has slept upon her duty in this particular—that she has been too content with simply nourishing those within her fold, instead of going into the wilderness to seek those that were lost; but what would reverence and filial piety dictate as the proper course to be pursued by the loyal and loving children to whom grace has been given, to mourn over her lethargy? What, but to approach the venerable mother with weeping expostulation, and with the entreaty that she would accept and direct the youthful energy which another agency, it is said, has wielded with such marked success? Perhaps this success is not quite as transparent to some as to others.

But we are not disposed to the invidious task of challenging

results which are so ostentatiously proclaimed. The Church is venerable with age, and bears upon her front the scars of a thousand battles, and she can afford to smile at the enthusiasm of her youthful competitors, just "putting on the harness." A little longer experience may compel the painful admission of the German Reformer, that "old Satan was too strong for young Melancthon." However, we do not challenge the alleged result of this new evangelism, because the admission will serve our purpose as well as the denial. "The unchurched masses," or "the unseated parishioners," "have been reached effectively by the Young Men's Christian Associations," according to the testimony of Mr. Cook. Very well: but who compose these Associations? "They are all members of the Churches," says the *Interior*. What, then, was to hinder the very same work from being done by the very same men *inside* the Church as well as *outside* the Church? There would have been a great saving of expense and of friction in simply dispensing with a new machinery. There would have been enjoyed all the prestige arising from the antiquity, experience, wisdom, and piety of the Church, all which had to be exchanged simply for the enterprise and dash of the younger rival. But then the opportunity would have been lost of "burning incense to our own drag," and of pointing out the mistake in not organising the Young Men's Christian Association two thousand years ago. To us the coolness with which the wisdom and authority of the Master are impugned in this substituting a human scheme for a Divine, is simply appalling; and should these Christian Associations accomplish a thousand-fold more apparent good than the holdest advocate dare claim in their behalf, it is more than counterbalanced by the presumption and will-worship of the whole scheme, which must work out its complete destruction in the end.

The only other argument which appears to us worthy of mention in support of these Associations, is that they afford a common platform upon which the different denominations may unite in a common evangelistic work. In this form, their claim to our support is singularly modest, challenging our respect if it does not secure our adhesion. But the peculiar glory is claimed by

this organisation of being the only exhibition of that Christian unity so emphasised in our Lord's sacerdotal prayer, "that they all may be one—as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." With this extravagant pretension we are compelled to make issue. And we do it distinctly on the ground that the doctrine of Christian unity as expounded by these Associations is a heresy, and not the truth of God as laid down in Holy Scripture. The unity which the latter enjoins is "the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace"—illustrated by the apostle in words almost immediately following, "till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ, . . . from whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." (Eph. iv. 3, 13, 16.) The true unity is not that of Christians rolled up into a sort of ecclesiastical paste, but it is a union of parts coördinated together so as to form a symmetrical whole—a union of many members with different functions, constituting one body. It is the oneness of a common relation, through the operation of the same faith, to a common Saviour and Head; the oneness which springs from the possession of a common life, through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost; the oneness of a common affection between those having different gifts and different offices to discharge, but cheered by the same hopes and partakers of a common joy. It is therefore a unity which does not require the suppression of any convictions nor the smothering of any peculiarities, but which is only the more conspicuous as springing out of many differences, or, if you please, many contradictions. It is the unity of a thousand chords blending in the harmony of music, as contrasted with the monotony of a simple note in its endless prolongation.

The unity, however, which man would substitute for this, is the unity of mere organisation, hard, external, mechanical—to be attained by cultivating a supreme indifference to many portions

of divine truth which are offered up in sacrifice to the one principle of being *externally together*. This is the golden image which is set up for idolatrous worship in our day; and everything must be swept out of the way that hinders the formation of those imperial organisations which are to impress the world with their massive grandeur. So far as the Young Men's Christian Association puts itself forward as the representative and champion of this false unity, it is to be resisted. And if a fatal heresy lurks in its fundamental and constitutive principles, it is far from being the agency to which the evangelisation of the race may be safely committed. That we have not exaggerated the danger in this direction, may be conclusively shown. A crusade has been openly declared against all creeds and denominational distinctions as a schismatical rending of the body of Christ. At least one organisation has been effected, under the auspices of some of the most honored names in the Northern Presbyterian Church, expressly ignoring all differences of religious belief, and comprehending all who can simply say that they are Christians. This effort, too, is put forth as tentative and typical of the general Broad Church movement, which finds many advocates—the comprehensive, mammoth, creedless Church, which is to swallow up all the existing sects, through the negative excellence of possessing no distinctive feature which can possibly offend a single taste. That this is the logical result of the influence and teachings of the Young Men's Christian Association, is perfectly obvious. And it is but a little while ago the public was electrified by the announcement that the great Broad Church, in her magnificent proportions, was about to be launched in the deep waters, under the combined auspices of the Lay Evangelists and the Young Men's Christian Association. The statement has been denied, so far as to the particular names which were associated with it. But it is highly significant that such a project should have found its way into print. It must have been lying in somebody's mind, and have found expression from somebody's lips. Can it be the dim shadow, just a little premature, of a great scheme that is yet behind the curtain?

Not insisting, however, any longer upon this fantastic unity

of mere agglutination, let us turn to the more modest and practicable proposition that all the Churches shall combine upon the Young Men's Association as their common evangelistic agent. We have already shown that this cannot be done without a complete abdication of the trust for which the Church was herself created. It would work the forfeiture of her charter; it would be the final act of disloyalty to her great King, in which the Church formally disbands. She exists only for the discharge of certain functions; the remission of these to any other agent is simply *felo de se*. This puts an estoppel upon the transfer at once. It is not worth while to look at any of the advantages supposed to accrue, because the transfer is in itself unlawful.

If, however, we were to take up the subject under that aspect, it would be pertinent to consider whether any combination of the Churches is better than the generous rivalry by which, in their separate action, they are "provoked to love and good works." And if there are cases in which combined action would be better than separate, what is to hinder the different branches of the Church from uniting in joint action, in reference to these, in their organic and recognised character as Churches of Jesus Christ? Combining for a specific purpose in a way that is true and not fictitious, would not the effect be greater to say to the world, We come to you, not as the vicar or deputy of the Church, but as the Church herself, the *whole* Church uniting together as "ambassadors for Christ, to pray you, in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God"? There would be in this case a gain, not only in the *effectiveness*, but in the *safety* of the evangelism. The whole work would be under ecclesiastical supervision, conducted under the wholesome direction and restraint of a written constitution, with its necessary balances and checks.

This article has been written under a painful sense of the displeasure with which it will be received by many whom the writer esteems and loves. But the language is unambiguous in which his convictions have been announced, because he would arouse his brethren to examine this whole subject anew, in the light the developments of the present time are throwing upon it. As surely as the earth revolves upon its axis, there is yet to be a

great conflict for the very existence of the Church, as well as for the great doctrines of redemption and grace. The walls of Zion shall never fall; but to this end we must be careful that they are not undermined. In the portion of the Old Testament history now being studied in our Sabbath-schools, are some things full of prophetic warning to us in this day. Again and again we are told of the reformations under the pious kings of Judah, with this pathetic parenthesis thrown in: "nevertheless, the high places were not taken away." The heathen altars were destroyed upon every high hill, and the groves were cut down under whose dark shadows the licentious orgies of idolatrous worship were celebrated; but no pious zeal could arrest the irregular worship of Jehovah upon the high places where it had been conducted in the days of the patriarchs. We can easily supply the pleadings through which they were spared. Were not Bethel and Hebron and Carmel sacred in the associations of a blessed and hoary past? Did not Jehovah here and elsewhere reveal himself to the pious fathers of the Hebrew Church? Were they not convenient to many worshippers, whilst Jerusalem was distant? Nevertheless, it contravened the divine authority which had appointed a common worship on Mount Zion; and the mournful defeat in every reformation is pointed out in the continuance of a worship which was irregular, and under which the idolatrous worship of false gods found a shelter and a sanction. May there not be "high places" which need to be taken away in the Christian as well as the Jewish Church? May not the irregular worship, however sincere, lead to idolatry and ruin in the one case as well as in the other? If Uzziah is struck with leprosy as he offers incense in the temple of the Lord, may it not be a warning to those who undertake to be "stewards of the mysteries of God," not being "called of God as was Aaron"? If the long-suffering of Jehovah be conspicuous in not overtaking the trespass with immediate judgment, what if the sorer calamity should befall of allowing the sin to work out its own results? God grant that none of us may be left to "eat of the fruit of our own way, and be filled with our own devices"!

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Reason and Redemption, or, The Gospel as it attests Itself. By ROBERT B. WHITE, D. D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 8vo., pp. 351.

"Faith and Philosophy," or, Discourses and Essays. By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., LL.D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 8vo., pp. 488.

We group these books together because by their titles they class themselves in the same department of theological literature. We confess that we are inclined to do so by another reason: that they present to our apprehension so characteristic a specimen of the comparative culture and modes of thought among the leaders of the Northern and the Southern Presbyterian Church. Dr. White has been all his life a "working pastor" in our communion; for many years in the city of Tuscaloosa, Ala., and now in "the old Augusta church," the mother of Lexington Presbytery and the charge of those great fathers, Craig and Speece. The gratifying fact that our author still continues among us in the full vigor of his powers and activities imposes reserve in stating anything further of the man; his work is the property of the Church. Dr. Henry B. Smith, lately deceased, was the noted professor, first of Church History and then of Systematic Divinity, in Union Theological Seminary, New York City, one of the schools of the New School branch. Born at Portland, Maine, A. D. 1815, he was educated at Bowdoin and at Andover, and later, at Halle and Berlin, Germany. After a pastoral life of five years in West Amesbury, Mass., he served as teacher in Andover, and then as Professor of Mental Science in Amherst College. He was removed thence to the New York Seminary in 1850, where he spent the remainder of his active life, teaching Church History five years and theology eight, and dying in 1877. He was the founder of the *American Theological Review*, which united first with the *Presbyterian Review* (N. S.) and then with the *Princeton*, subsisting until after his death as the *Presbyterian*

Quarterly and Princeton Review. The book we notice is a posthumous collection, by Dr. Prentiss, of some addresses and essays, each one scholarly in itself, but the whole having but a slight clue of connexion. The first, which gives name to the volume, is his discourse to the Porter Rhetoric Society of Andover, 1849. It is followed by eleven others, Review articles, anniversary discourses, and his sermon as retiring Moderator of the (N. S.) Assembly, 1864. Of this, the two salient qualities are, that it argues with great tact and adroitness for the fusion of the two "Branches," and that it launches, of course, (according to the usual fatality of Northern religion) extensively into sectional politics. In theology he seems "moderately orthodox," as one would expect a man to be, who, to a really liberal and elegant scholarship and reputable Christian character, united that species of Congregationalism which has no difficulty in passing into Presbyterianism at the prompting of "sufficient reason."

The key-note of Dr. White's argument on "Reason and Redemption," may be found in a sentence of the Westminster Confession, Chap. I., §IV.: "The heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the concert of the parts, the scope of the whole, [which is to give all glory to God], the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation . . . are arguments whereby Scripture doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God." Dr. White might justly have claimed that his work is the full evolution of this conception at once so profound and practical. In his introduction he announces his design to be "to show that the plan of redemption, unfolded in the Old and New Testaments, *attests itself.*" This is done by using as postulates only the truths of natural theology and natural reason, without resorting to the evidence of history, prophecy, or miracles. The work is invaluable as presenting just that array of consistent internal evidences which, as the Confession and pastoral experience both indicate, must ever be the chief means for establishing solid faith in Christianity in the minds of lay readers. Dr. White at once places the student at the proper dividing point between faith and rationalism, by citing this maxim, p. 60: "Reason may verify what it could

not have suggested." For instance, there are truths in physics which only the genius of a Galileo or Newton could have made known, which can now, after their discovery and establishment, be intelligently taught to boys. The Professor of Geometry tells his pupil that a certain relation holds true between two elements of a figure, and requires him to study out the demonstration. The pupil succeeds in doing so, though, if unassisted, he would not have discovered the relation. So, in natural theology, some attributes of God never ascribed to him by unassisted pagan philosophy, receive solid proof from the light of reason. From this point of view Dr. White shows that the doctrines of redemption, although purely truths of revelation, yet, when stated, should commend themselves to a sound reason; and they evince their truth and divine origin at once in the connected facts, that men never discovered them, and yet they "dovetail" precisely with the soundest conclusions of natural reason and experience. And just in degree as the reason is lifted to a region of higher integrity and moral candor, the more complete does this fitting-in of the parts appear. To the dishonest or sophisticated reason and conscience, it is less apparent; as the moral rectification proceeds, the argument becomes more apparent. And this is a cumulative and conclusive proof that the highest intelligence and the purest mental integrity must meet in the absolute practical demonstration of the truth of the gospel.

The framework of the treatise is formed, then, by carrying out this argument in a series of progressive instances, through twenty-seven chapters. The successive stages of the argument exhibit the "fitting-in" of the facts of our rational consciousness and experience with the peculiar doctrines of redemption, by showing, for instance, that the gospel is predicated on just that fact of guilt of which man is most conscious when he deals with himself most truthfully; and that it proposes just that remedy for guilt which the conscience needs; that the gospel, in teaching the new birth, postulates and proposes to remedy just that disorder in the will which reason ascertains in her most profound [and most hopeless] researches into self; that the gospel clothes God with just those attributes which make him confessedly most ad-

mirable to man's reason, etc., etc. This line of argument re-introduces to the reader's attention the "common-places" of the theology of redemption, as the premises of the argument for their divine origin. True. And this is just one of the invaluable features of the book. By reason of this feature, it is at once a beautiful popular text-book of divinity, and an argument on evidences. While the doubting reader is studying the question whether he can trust the gospel as the true way of salvation, he is also learning the way itself. Thus we regard this work as better adapted than any book we know to realise what Bishop McIlvaine declared to be the prime feature of his work on "Evidences:" that while it was settling the question of evidences, it was leading the soul to Christ. Dr. White's work deserves to be the popular text-book of Christian theology in every intelligent Christian family in our Church.

The discourse on "Faith and Philosophy," by Dr. H. B. Smith, is really an attempt to readjust, against rationalists, the relative rights of *faith and reason*. It begins with a cumbrous and defective definition of faith. When it proceeds to define the other term, philosophy, it gives us descriptions, not of philosophy as it should be, but of three or four false philosophies, so-called. And the thesis really discussed is the relations, not between faith and any one philosophy, true or false, but between faith and reason. Notwithstanding this confusion of plan, the discourse is animated, scholarly, pious, and in some places eloquent. Its concluding pages are pleasing and instructive, as showing that the person and work of Christ furnish the central truth around which all the parts of Christian theology so arrange themselves as to gain a complete and luminous order, and that when so arranged they satisfy all the just demands of the reason and form the glorious and supernatural complement and crown of rational truth.

Among the later essays is a criticism on Dr. Whedon's work on the Will, extracted from the *Review* which Dr. Smith conducted. In this article he appears in a somewhat new light as a controversialist. Not without good provocation, doubtless, he applies the lash of satire with as unsparing a hand as the knife of analy-

sis, and leaves the Arminian hypothesis in a very dilapidated condition. Yet here also a certain lack of discrimination appears, in that the critic, though sound in the main, fails to distinguish clearly between objective inducement and subjective motive.

When these two books are compared, one perceives somewhat of that difference which was unavoidable from the circumstances of their authorship. The Southern book was written for the people; the essays of Dr. Smith were all addressed to professional audiences. While the one author was almost engrossed in the duties of pastoral life, the other was enjoying the learned ease of a professional life, with unlimited access to books, new and old. Dr. Smith's writings are, consequently, marked by a greater display of familiarity with German theology and philosophy. But Dr. White, without parade of many books, exhibits thorough comprehension of the different schools of philosophy (so-called) by which Christianity is assailed, and a mastery of that orthodox philosophy which coheres with it. His style is a model of precision and perspicuity. There is no sensational straining for effect, and he has consequently avoided all the exaggerations and crudities which so often result from that temper; but his classic and dignified English, always nervous and energetic, rises often into melody and power.

It is singular that in each case we are constrained to record the same defect against both these writers, and it is the only one we have noticed in Dr. White. On his 165th and 166th pages occurs a similar confusion to that noted of Dr. Smith, concerning the real nature of determining motive. Our author, recognising the propriety of conceding to the responsible free agent a certain self-determination, seems to concede that "motives" are not causative of volitions. Yet in the very next paragraph, he gives his emphatic adhesion to the doctrine of Dr. A. Alexander. This apparent confusion must obviously be explained by his failure to discriminate between what is so often heedlessly called "motive," objective inducement, the mere occasion of appetency and choice, and subjective desire, arising according to the soul's subjective *habitus*, the inward efficient of volition.

The Natural History of Atheism. By JOHN STUART BLACKIE, Professor of Greek at the University of Edinburgh. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1878. 1 Vol. 12mo. Pp. 253. Muslin.

This work is on the side of Theism, and professedly of Christianity. It attempts, as its name imports, to give a statement of the conditions and causes under which the atheistic tendencies of our day originate; although only the third and the sixth (the last) chapters are devoted to that end.

The first chapter is an ingenious and pleasing statement of the presumptive argument for the existence of a God, which the old writers called the "*Consensus Populorum*." The second chapter proposes to discuss the "reasonable ground of theism." It is a partial review of the theistic argument. Chapter third discusses the varieties and common root of atheism. Chapter fourth portrays polytheism. Chapter fifth discusses the question whether Buddhism presents us an instance of a religion without a God; a thing Prof. Tyndall has pronounced possible and natural. Our author concludes that, while Boodha taught no deity, yet he is himself a deity to his followers, to all intents and purposes. The sixth chapter is entitled "the atheism of reaction." Its object is to caution Christians against certain excrescences upon Christianity which provoke atheism by natural reaction, and which palliate and explain, while they do not justify, the tendency to fly into that dreary and monstrous theory. Among these mischievous excrescences or extravagances of the Christians he accounts the making of faith a substitute for and antagonist of works; the "five points" of Dort; original and inherited guilt; everlasting punishments; God's creation of the world out of nothing; Sabbath observance; opposition to dissipated amusements; and the large salaries of the British prelates. He thinks that, were Christianity stripped of all these perversions, with the help of Sabbath amusements, dancing and theatres, evolutionism, and a mild type of pantheism, it would be made so reasonable and amiable that the unbelievers would no longer have any pretext; and if they then ran into atheism, it would be wholly their

VOL. XXIX., No. 2—24.

own fault! The intelligent Christian will be more likely to conclude, with us, that were Christianity thus stripped and thus dressed in these new trappings, it would be too effete and worthless to justify the atheist's desertion even of his empty creed for its sake.

- Our readers may judge, from this specimen, emanating from one of the high places of Presbyterian Scotland, how that Gibraltar of orthodoxy is now honeycombed with scepticism. The style of the work is scholarly in one sense, (though tainted with some slang and slipshod,) animated, flowing, and exciting.

Forty Years in the Turkish Empire: or, Memoirs of the Rev. Wm. Goodell, D. D. By E. D. G. PRIME, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1877. Pp. 489. 1 Vol. 8vo. Muslin.

The author terms this compilation a *Memoir*. The reader will feel when he gets through it very thankful to him that it is not in fact a memoir, but a loosely-strung collection of Dr. Goodell's own letters and other writings. In other words, the contrast between the *subject's* and the *author's* contributions will make the reader very grateful that the former are so large and the latter so insignificant. Once already have we briefly called the attention of our readers to this volume, but the attractions of the simple and noble character it sets forth are so great that we invite a reconsideration of it.

William Goodell, the senior missionary of the American Board at Constantinople, was born at Templeton, Mass., in 1792. He died at his son's house in Philadelphia, in 1867, having taught the gospel in Malta and Beyrout, but chiefly in Constantinople, forty-three years. His missionary life covered the same epoch and witnessed the same events narrated by Dr. Hamlin, (noticed in our last number,) but it overlapped the latter at the beginning and end. As a witness of the beginning and establishment of the great revolution in Oriental Christianity and religious liberty in Turkey, Dr. Goodell is invaluable. To his good sense, practical wisdom, cool courage, and unflinching wit and

humor, he might add the crowning element of value: "*Quorum magna pars fui.*"

He was a New Englander of that old type, now, we surmise, rare in his native land, whose sturdy qualities created all that was great and successful in New England character—the son of a poor, honest, praying, Calvinistic peasant-farmer, reared in what a Yankee *tramp* would now disdain as squalid poverty of diet and dress, but in a noble and honest independence of sentiment, in the habits of unquestioning obedience, hard work, and punctual church-going, then in vogue. His parents were both devout and sincere Calvinists, of the old Congregational type. Doubtless he could truthfully ascribe all his after greatness to that nurture which a unique minister of another region described by saying: "My godly mother raised her children on switch and Shorter Catechism."

Every step of Dr. Goodell's noble career discloses the source of the economy, the hardihood, the invincible courage, the practical wisdom, the elastic humor which adorned it—primarily, indeed, sovereign and efficacious grace; but instrumentally, his hardy and Christian rearing on the little stony farm. One rises from this reading with the renewed conviction that none but men of similar origin, from Calvinistic families and the old-fashioned Bible and sabbatarian discipline, will save Mr. Goodell's native country from being another "sick man," like Turkey. Yet let it not be supposed that the religion of his home was one of surly austerity. The old, hard-handed, toil-worn father appears in the son's delightful portraiture as a meek and gentle patriarch, as full of generous self-sacrifice and love as of the fear of God; and the pious mother shines in a halo of tender devotion to her children's happiness. The irrepressible fun and "*bonhommie*" of Dr. Goodell never came from an austere or ascetic home.

The Christian people of America have become acquainted with the racy peculiarities of his mind and style from previous essays and books. All his pungency, quiet wit, and transcendent common sense shine in this compilation. He seems, like his colleague, Dr. Hamlin, to have reached the conclusion to which the reader is insensibly led along with them, that the Turk, while a

bad fellow, is decidedly better than either Jew, Armenian, Greek, or Russian, who assails him. Dr. Goodell's honesty constrains him to testify to a fact which seems to him unaccountable: that be the Turk more or less a scoundrel, he was usually a very kind master to his slaves, and that the domestic slaves of the land were, by all odds, in the most enviable condition of any of the poor classes of the motley population. Had he lived in the Southern American States, he would have seen and testified to the same fact. And the reduplication of instances might at length have opened his eyes to the truth that the natural tendencies of this scriptural relation are thus beneficent, so that the pleasing result is no anomaly at all, but the regular result of moral causes. The compiler, like all his modern kind, is under the universal fatality which disables him from keeping his heretical politics out of any place, however heterogeneous or sacred. Of course he cannot but drag them all the way to Constantinople, and into the missionary circle there. At a social reunion there, he tells us, the following was among the toasts drunk: "The Union as it was intended to be; and as it shall be." One is at a loss which most to admire, the biting irony of events in their infallible commentary on this "sentiment," or the stupendous (no other word is adequate) obtuseness of the compiler as to the satire. "The Union as it was intended to be," was a free confederation of sovereign states of white citizens, governed as well as organised under their own several wills. The Union "as it shall be," is an empire of subjugated provinces of negroes and whites living under laws thrust down their throats from without. That Yankee parsons at the antipodes, who had derived their constitutional law from Bunker Hill orations, and their ideas of the war from Mr. Seward's State papers, might for a time be gulled into the notion that the war was for the Union as intended by its founders, was not incredible. But that Dr. Prime should coolly advance this hallucination of theirs as tending to their honor in 1877, displays a magnificence of brass beyond which "the force of nature can no farther go." The Yankee empire is unquestionably "the greatest country in the world." It is pleasing to see, in Dr. Goodell's remarks on the festive

occasion described, that his good sense and good taste kept him from participation in these absurdities.

Let us turn to a more worthy topic. In 1841 Dr. Goodell met with his first bereavement in the death of a child of great promise, a son of nine years, at a time when the mother also was ill of a threatening disease. His thoughts and emotions are fully recorded in a long letter to his venerable father in America. We know of nothing in uninspired Christian biography more tender, solemn, and noble, than the mingling of his parental love and Christian faith. He wrote:

“For several days I had forgotten to pray *for his life*. . . . Whether he were to be removed from us by that disease or to be lent to us a little longer seemed of comparatively little consequence. And the idea of having my family broken in upon in that way was as nothing. I have for many years been looking for it, and endeavoring from day to day to live in reference to it. Temporal life seemed a trifle in comparison. Eternal life! oh, that was everything! It was this which occupied all my thoughts and called forth all my prayers. In regard to the other, my language and my feelings were just these: ‘If thou seest it will be best for the child, and best for the family, and best for thy cause, that he live still longer on the earth, restore him in thine own good time; if otherwise, I have not a word to say—*Thy will be done!*’ But for the blessings of salvation I felt that I might be importunate, and that I might take right hold on everlasting strength and say, ‘I will not let thee go, except thou bless me.’ I took him up and carried him to the Lord Jesus, and placed him in his hands, and said: ‘He is no longer my child, but he is thine. I can no longer provide for him and take care of him, but thou canst. He will no longer remain in my family; receive him into thine, and let him remain in thy blessed household. Wash him, cleanse him, make him whiter than snow, and fit him for thy holy presence and service.’

“Mr. Dwight’s family was sent for, and he and I by turns prayed at short intervals, till the dear object of so much intense interest was no longer a subject of prayer. As the last breath was quivering on his lips, I committed his departing spirit into

the hands of him who gave it. We placed him in the faithful hands of our beloved Lord, and we left him there. As I put my hands upon his eyes and closed them on all things below the sun, I prayed that he might open them on an eternal day."

Let these chastened and exalted sentiments be placed in comparison with the anguish of the sensitive but worldly heart under the same bereavement, like that of the learned, accomplished, moral man of the world, the great lawyer and historian, Henry Hallam. There all is rayless and freezing despair. In Dr. Goodell the cloud of affliction only softens and mellows the light of the healing beams of the Sun of Righteousness.

Boston Monday Lectures. By JOSEPH COOK. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. :

1. *Biology, with Preludes on Current Events.* 1877. 12mo., pp. 325. \$1.50.
2. *Transcendentalism, with Preludes on Current Events.* 1878. 12mo., pp. 305. \$1.50.
3. *Orthodoxy, with Preludes on Current Events.* 1878. 12mo., pp. 343. \$1.50.

The history of the Boston Monday Lectures is given in the following extract from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for January, 1878, which the publishers send with the volume on Orthodoxy :

"Mr. Joseph Cook was invited, early in September, 1875, by the Young Men's Christian Association of Boston, to lead the noon prayer-meeting in the Meionaon daily for a week, and to make on each occasion an address of half an hour in length. After four of these services, it was found that the audience had quadrupled in size. Mr. Cook was requested to continue his addresses daily through another week. On Monday noon, Sept. 23, the subject was 'Final Permanence of Moral Character; or, The Doctrine of Future Punishment,' and it was noticed that a hundred ministers were in the audience. Mr. Cook was then requested to speak on the Atonement on a Sabbath evening, in Park-street church. He complied with this request, and spoke to an audience filling the house to its utmost capacity. He was then invited by the Young Men's Christian Association to speak every Monday noon, in the Meionaon, for twelve weeks. October 25, his subject was, 'Boston Sceptical Cliques.' The *Daily Advertiser* had a reporter present, who reproduced a part of the address. The *Springfield Republican* began to call attention to the

large number of ministers and scholars who were present at the Monday Lectures. It was suggested in many quarters that these lectures should be continued regularly through the winter. Meantime, Mr. Cook was delivering one course of lectures at Amherst College, and another at Mount Holyoke Seminary, largely on Materialism, Evolution, and various biological topics. The Meionaon Hall seats about eight hundred persons, and in January, 1876, was completely filled by Mr. Cook's hearers. After four months had passed, the assemblies were occasionally gathered in Bromfield-street church. The lectures continued to be under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association until May, 1876, when, at a meeting in Bromfield-street church, resolutions were passed founding the Boston Monday Lectureship, and placing it, for the next season, under the care of a Committee, consisting of Prof. E. P. Gould of the Newton Theological Institute, the Rev. Dr. E. B. Webb of Boston, the Rev. Dr. McKeown, the Rev. Samuel Cutler, the Rev. Mr. Deming, the Rev. Edward Edmunds, and the Rev. W. M. Baker—men of different evangelical denominations. The lectures for 1875-76 continued eight months, and closed, with the forty-fifth of the course, on the last Monday in May, in Bromfield-street church.

In October, 1876, the lectures were resumed in the Meionaon; but the hall was found to be too small for the audience. It was, therefore, soon transferred to Park-street church. Two lectures were given in this large auditorium, when it was found to be much too small, and the audiences were crowded out into Tremont Temple. The first lecture there was given November 13, 1876. This hall will contain from twenty-five hundred to three thousand people, and was often more than full in the winter of 1876-77. During the delivery of a course of thirteen lectures on 'Biology,' and of eleven on 'Transcendentalism,' and of eleven on 'Orthodoxy,' it was often necessary to turn hearers away, as they could not obtain standing room."

The lectures on Biology oppose the *materialistic* theory of Evolution. In the first three lectures he sets before us the present state of the science, explaining the different theories of evolution, and pointing out the strategic points; and also showing that the views of the Materialists are not held by Lotze, and Beale, and Carpenter, the leading physiologists of the world.

Next he treats of the microscope and its revelations, and proves that the discovery of the bioplast does not explain the origin of life, nor bridge the chasm between the living and the not living. The wonderful performances of the bioplast, in changing dead matter into living matter, in throwing off the used up particles to be removed, and in weaving the different parts and substances of

the body, greatly strengthen the argument in favor of an immaterial something which works intelligently, according to a pre-arranged plan. The following extract is a good specimen of his style :

"We find under our astounded gaze nothing but colorless, glue-like transparent matter ; and yet we see it performing all these miracles of as many different sorts as there are different sorts of tissues to be woven. In a single nerve there is an unspeakable complexity ; but come to something a little more complex. Let us stand with open eyes before this revelation of Almighty God. Here is a nerve wound spirally around another fibre. How is it made to twine about its trellis-work ? Why, when that nerve begins to be formed in a living organism, these bioplasts in it are near each other. They begin to throw off formed material. The object is to weave so as to produce this delicate nerve, which is coiled spirally around the other fibre. The bioplasts were shoulder to shoulder, and they begin to separate. They weave and they carry a spiral nerve around that other fibre with perfect precision.

"Adhere to your clear ideas. Materialists say that all this is done by molecular machinery. Do they know what they are talking about, when they use that phrase ? They say that here are 'infinitely complicated chemical properties.' They say that all these things occur merely by 'a transmutation of physical forces.' Do they know what they are saying, when they utter propositions of that sort ? The tendency of the latest science begins to throw into derision all materialism of this kind. . . . The same causes ought to produce the same results. There is an almost measureless difference in your results ; but in all ascertainable physical qualities, this bioplasm is the same thing in every tissue."

One of the most interesting lectures in the series is on "The Nerves and the Soul," in which he explains the automatic and the influential nervous arcs ; showing that as the former are clearly arranged to be acted upon from without, so the latter are constructed with a view to influences from within. That is, there is an agent external to the body and independent of it, that controls the influential nerves, which is the soul.

Finally, in the light of the fact that life is the cause of organism, and exists before it, he argues that life may continue after organism is destroyed, and advances some strange views of *Ulrici* about the spiritual body.

These lectures on Biology are characterised by learning and keen logic ; but the great enthusiasm with which they were

greeted, was due to local causes. It was due to his speaking as he did in Boston, where religion had been brow-beaten by the Emersons and Parkers. It was due to his manly, fearless tone, at which Christians took courage and rallied behind him as their standard-bearer.

The lectures on *Transcendentalism* and on *Orthodoxy*, consist almost entirely of a discussion of Theodore Parker's views. His plan is to first ascertain the tests of all truth, (which he decides to be intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism,) and then to apply these tests to theories of religion. His object is to meet infidels upon their own ground, and argue, not from God's written word, but from the nature of things; and he does it well, proving that Parker's system was based upon a partial statement of the facts, and showing how the Christian religion alone harmonised with all the phenomena. Parker denied God's punitive justice, and omitted to notice man's consciousness of guilt.

In the lectures on Orthodoxy, the Trinity and the Atonement are discussed in the light of self-evident truth, and an argument is made to show that these doctrines are demanded by the nature of things. With regard to the Atonement, there is little that is new, though his thoughts are bold and well put; but some of his propositions about the Trinity seem fanciful, and on page 59 one of his statements needs modification to make it accord with God's word.

The lectures on Transcendentalism are not so good as those on Biology; and the lectures on Orthodoxy are not so good as those on Transcendentalism. There is a want of matter, which is evidenced by repetition, and by the greater length of the preludes.

In the lecture on New England Scepticism, he attributes the decay of religion to the fact that "Orthodoxy was slow to follow God" into Abolitionism. "Anti-Slavery was taken up by your eloquent Parker, and the Church lagged behind; . . . tardiness which left between the Church and God a chasm." (P. 282.) And in the succeeding lecture he elaborates this idea, and has much to say about the duty of the Church with regard to slavery

and secession. Does it not show strikingly the power of prejudice, that he failed to draw the logical conclusion? Many, like Garrison and Wright, were believers in the Christian religion until they turned Abolitionists, and then they became infidels and blasphemers. Is this the result of "following God"? Is it not an historical fact that they came to despise God's word, because it did not teach their doctrines?

We rejoice, however, that the lecturer's Abolitionism has not thus led him astray, and sincerely pray that his labors for God's truth may be blessed.

Pastoral Theology. By THOMAS MURPHY, D. D., Pastor of the Frankford Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1,334 Chestnut Street. 8vo., pp. 509.

The creation of a distinctive literature on pastoral theology has evidently been obstructed by the lack of a scientific conception of the subject, Dr. Spencer Cannon, for instance, defines it as a treating of the "qualifications, duties, trials, encouragements, and consolations of the evangelical pastor." Such is the usual idea conceived of this department. The difficulty which arises is, that such a treatment differs in nothing from experimental and popular books on Christian living; and dwells empirically upon matters of detail which do not admit of or require any other tuition than that of each man's own observation. Thus the treatise on pastoral theology is either wholly unscientific, or, like Dr. Cannon's, it becomes so by engrossing to itself the science of Church government, or some other department of theology. The definition of Dr. Murphy looks in the right direction. He says, in his opening chapter, that pastoral theology assumes the sciences of systematic, homiletic, exegetical, and ecclesiologic theology as already acquired, "and endeavors to teach how they may be best brought to bear upon the all-important work of gathering men into the fold of Christ and nourishing them there." Pastoral theology should be a *science of applied theology*, bearing the same relation to systematic and exegetical theology which surveying bears to plane geometry and planetary astronomy bears

to spherical and analytic geometry. It should take those scriptural principles both of anthropology and soteriology, which have been systematically demonstrated, and apply them to predict and to explain the causations of the effects produced by pastoral and ecclesiastical agencies on individuals and Christian society. Thus, instead of having some particular facts, based on empirical evidence, only true to the individual pastor's experience, and only applicable to identical instances, we should have principles, truths which express regular, spiritual laws, and guiding the intelligent student surely through multitudes of diversified instances. From this higher point of view, the science of pastoral theology remains in large part to be constructed.

Dr. Murphy's work, as was intimated, makes a valuable contribution in this direction. Without any original or profound insight, it is yet sound, judicious, and practical. His views on all subjects are conservative, sensible, scriptural; in a word, Presbyterian. His style is a good model of perspicuous, plain English; if never rising to a high level, yet never sinking into obscurity or degeneracy. It is understood that he has that title to teach his brethren arising from assured success in an important pastoral charge. In twelve chapters he exhibits, after his opening, the pastor in his closet, in his study, in his pulpit, in his pastoral visiting, in the activities of his church, in revivals, in the Sabbath-school, in the benevolent work of his church, in his session, in higher church courts, and in his intercourse with other denominations.

In his outline of the minister's qualifications he gives just prominence to the necessity of thorough and growing piety. The reader will notice with some surprise that this department includes no discussion of, and hardly a reference to, the "call to the ministry." The other noticeable omissions are, that the importance of expository preaching is not expressly urged, and that, in the very prudent and practical remarks upon the management of revivals, nothing is taught of the psychology of religious excitements, the means of discriminating the spurious from the genuine, or the influence of the artifices formerly called "the new measures."

The paper and print of this useful book are excellent, the binding, as usual with American books, inadequate. Every beginner would do well to buy and study it.

The A B C of Finance (Harper's "Half Hour Series"). By SIMON NEWCOMB, LL.D., U. S. Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C. 1 Vol. 18mo. Pp. 115. 1877.

This is one of the treatises evoked by the financial disorders of the last five years and the anarchical movements of last summer. Its title is just; in fifteen short chapters it expounds the rudiments of the science of money, and of production and consumption, in language and illustrations level to every honest mind. The author combats the delusions propagated by the demagogues of Congress and the Workingmen's "Unions" with views so plain, simple, and homely, (using that word in a good sense,) that only he who desires to deceive himself or others, can resist the demonstrations. The thought that rises to the mind of the reader is: "Would that every man, woman and child in this disordered country could read this little book with care." But perhaps the wish would prove vain, if carried out. That the financial policy of the country, public and private, is erroneous and mischievous, can be demonstrated by any man well informed in political economy or the history of commerce. But the proof, though emphasised by many a bitter experience, would fall ineffectual, for a reason similar to that which makes the demonstrations of the gospel so usually futile: "a deceived heart hath turned aside" the auditors. The real and operative rejoinder that neutralises the wholesome evidence is not logic, but lust. Men wish to take advantage of their fellows. The intellectual error which they impose on themselves is not the belief that their financial heresies are righteous and true; they know better in their inner hearts; but that they, in this case, can profit by the wrong and not be punished by the inexorable law of cause and effect. This is their delusion: not that stealing is not stealing, but that they can, in the present case, steal and not be caught.

Dr. Franklin was "wise in his generation" when he uttered

his proverb: "Dame Experience keeps a dear school, but it is the only one fools will learn in." Had he lived in our generation he would have seen cause to modify his proverb, making it nearer akin to Solomon's, (Prov. xxvii., 22,) somewhat thus: "Dame Experience keeps a dear school, and sensible men get a costly education in it; while fools cannot be taught in any."

The Mikado's Empire. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, A. M., late of the Imperial University of Tokio, Japan. New York: Harper & Bros., Publishers. 1876.

A beautiful volume of about 600 octavo pages, with 108 illustrations. The contents are arranged in two "Books," followed by "Notes and Appendices." The first 290 pages furnish a history of Japan from 660 B. C. to A. D. 1872. This is followed by "Personal Experiences, Observations and Studies in Japan, 1870-1875." We know nothing of the author except from this work, but presume that he is not accustomed to composition; at least, the specimen here given of his skill in the use of the English language is not favorable to the supposition that he has practised his pen except it may be in ordinary newspaper paragraphing. Nevertheless, Mr. Griffis is evidently a man of considerable culture and of extensive reading. The advantages he enjoyed for studying his large subject have moreover never been possessed by any preceding writer; and seeming himself to be fully conscious of this, his views of Japan are presented with confidence and courage. There was, indeed, almost nothing to be added touching "Old Japan," or Japan down to the period of those recent marvellous reforms which have served to fix the eye of the world upon a nation which to all appearance was "born in a day." The English edition of Kaempfer, published in 1727, has been the principal source of information to which all scholars have been compelled to resort, (and amongst others Mr. Griffis himself,) who would acquaint themselves with the long and tangled story of Japanese development through many centuries. The present volume is, however, valuable as a *résumé*—the most complete that has hitherto been attempted in our language—of the past history of this singular empire. But to this value is

added another which is peculiar, consisting of observations made under the most favorable circumstances, personally, and with the help of "cultivated native scholars, artists, priests, antiquaries, and students," into whose society our author was freely admitted, "both in the provincial and national capitals." It seems that Mr. Griffis, having been for some years a successful teacher of a limited number of Japanese students in New Brunswick, New Jersey, was invited by the Prince of Echizen "to go out to organise a scientific school, on the American principle, in Fukui, Echizen, and give instruction in the physical sciences." And going on this errand he was furnished with "letters of introduction to the prominent men in the Japanese government," and thus was furnished with opportunities for research and observation not often afforded to foreigners. "Nothing Japanese (he says) was foreign to me, from palace to beggar's hut. I lived in Dai Nippon during four of the most pregnant years of the nation's history. Nearly one year was spent alone in a daimio's capital far in the interior, away from Western influence, when feudalism was in its full bloom and the old life in vogue. In the national capital, in the time well called 'the flowering of the nation,' as one of the instructors in the Imperial University, having picked students from all parts of the empire, I was a witness to the marvellous development, reforms, dangers, pageants, and changes of the epochal years 1872, 1873, and 1874. With pride I may truly say that I have felt the pulse and heart of New Japan."

It would consume too much of our space to present even so much as an intelligible outline of the work which we have thus introduced to the notice of our readers. We are sure that no one can rise from its careful perusal without feeling that he has been greatly instructed in matters which every student of his race ought to know, and without entertaining a regard for the writer who has been at such pains to make his instructive pages interesting. It is pleasing to read in the closing paragraph of this valuable volume: "Gently, but resistlessly, Christianity is leavening the nation. With those forces that centre in pure Christianity, . . . I cherish the fond hope that Japan will in time take and hold her equal place among the foremost nations of the

world, and that in the onward march of civilisation which follows the sun, the Sun-land may lead the nations of Asia that are now appearing on the theatre of universal history."

The Power of Spirit Manifest in Jesus of Nazareth. By W. H. FURNESS. *Whoso would discover the historical truth contained in the accounts of Jesus, let him read between the lines.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877. Pp. 208. 12mo.

We are tempted to say of this production what Dr. Hodge said once of another: "This is a piratical little book." It hoists the flag of the gospel, but it is only to lure the unwary into danger and destruction. This age abounds with such works. Infidelity once sneered at Jesus and blasphemously ridiculed his person and name. But now it cannot find words to express its admiration of his character, albeit rejecting the testimony he so clearly gives respecting himself and his mission.

The very title of this book is a sample of its deceitful character, and its table of contents is prepared in the same style. A simple-hearted Christian might buy the volume, expecting, as he read its title, to be treated to an evangelical statement of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in Jesus without measure; and the table of contents would seem especially intended as a trap for believers of the Episcopal Church, discoursing to them about "Christmas" and "Easter," as to all believers about "Faith in Christ," and "the living God." It is a mean, shabby, cowardly, deceitful, rather than a blasphemous, form of infidelity we have now generally to contend with.

A Summer Vacation: Sketches and Thoughts Abroad in the Summer of 1877. By JAMES B. CONVERSE. Louisville, Ky.: Converse & Co., Publishers, 1878. Pp. 201, 8vo.

Mr. Converse went across the Atlantic with the delegates to the General Presbyterian Council to report its proceedings for his paper, and paid a hasty visit to Belfast and Dublin, London, York, and other interesting places in England, and thence went to Paris, Geneva, and the Alps. This volume records his experiences. In the closing chapter there is presented what the writer calls a day-dream and a reverie, in which he urges the advantages that might result from a confederacy of all the Anglo-

Saxon nations. Its duties would be three: *first*, to decide all disputes arising between its component parts; *secondly*, to sanction or refuse to sanction the external relations of these parts with the other nations of the world; *thirdly*, to provide a commission to settle private questions arising between citizens of the various nations entering the confederacy. The writer urges that, as the Reformed Churches are drawing together, the wish is natural that the Anglo-Saxon nations might also come closer to each other and grow in mutual respect and affection.

The Conversion of Children—Can it be Effected? How Young? Will They Remain Steadfast? Means to be Used—When Received, and How Trained in the Church. By Rev. EDWARD PAYSON HAMMOND, M. A., Author of "Children and Jesus;" "Jesus the Way;" "Jesus' Lambs;" "The Better Life;" "Gathered Lambs;" "Sketches of Palestine;" etc. Introduction by Rev. J. E. RANKIN, D. D., Pastor Congregational Church, Washington, D. C. "Feed My Lambs," John xxi., 15. New York: N. Tibbals & Sons, 37 Park Row. 1878. Pp. 368. 12mo.

It is undoubtedly a good and true and important idea that children can be converted in their earliest infancy, and that this is to be aimed at and prayed for by parents and teachers and ministers of the gospel. But when it comes to a forsaking of the family and the Church, and a gathering of little children by hundreds and by thousands apart from their parents to be addressed by sensational speakers, it is a different question. Mr. Hammond believes in this plan and has devoted himself for many years to preaching to little children as a separate class. We are believers in family and Church training, and look with suspicion upon all class-preaching and class-preachers, just as we do upon all associations and all movements designed to operate against specific vices alone.

It is but justice to Mr. Hammond to say that he appears to preach only Jesus to the little children, and that his book is filled with many touching histories of the lambs of the flock. He quotes opinions and testimonies from many quarters, and some of the names referred to by him have our highest respect. But many of the ministers who seem to be authorities with him are such as we have not been accustomed to regard with confidence.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Under the great law of averages, the past quarter has brought with it the usual instalment of new books and pamphlets. Gilbert White is emulated by an American lady in certain kindred recreations among our feathered natives.¹ The most lively interest in the ceramic art and its products has been awakened in this country by the display at Philadelphia. Mr. Prime has devoted much attention to this subject, and has given us one of the most attractive of the many contributions that have been made recently to the literature of majolica and polished clays.² The same house issues two *brochures*, containing two famous essays of Macaulay.^{3 4} The Dark Ages, as they are called, were not "irrecoverably dark;" and even in that darkness there were great lights to rule the night also. Such a guide as this Primer⁵ was sadly wanted. The popular treatise⁶ by Professor Newcomb follows a method that is at once historical and didactic. The work is the latest, and is pronounced one of the best of its kind now extant. Everything that Dr. Taylor writes is richly instructive. He is particularly happy in Old Testament biography.⁷

Two more of the Macaulay *brochures*. Sir William Temple's⁸

¹Our Home Birds. By Ella Rodman Church. 16mo., 314 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Benjamin Griffith, Philadelphia.

²Pottery and Porcelain of all Times and Nations. With Tables of Factory and Artists' Marks, for the use of Collectors. By William C. Prime, LL.D. Illustrated. 8vo., ornamental cover, cloth, in a box, \$7. Harper & Bros., New York.

³Warren Hastings. By Lord Macaulay. 32mo., paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

⁴Life and Writings of Addison. By Lord Macaulay. 32mo., paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

⁵A Primer of Mediæval Literature. By Eugene Lawrence. 32mo., paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

⁶Popular Astronomy. By Simon Newcomb, LL.D., Professor United States Naval Observatory. With one hundred and twelve Engravings, and five Maps of the Stars. 8vo., cloth, \$4.50. *Ibid.*

⁷Daniel the Beloved. By the Rev. Wm. M. Taylor, D. D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁸Sir William Temple. By Lord Macaulay. 32mo., paper, 25 cts. *Ibid.*

name is indissolubly associated with that of Swift. The ironical character of "the Prince" was first pointed out in England by the author of these essays. Walpole¹ receives a somewhat un-sparing criticism at the hands of a writer who never minces matters. The idea of this collection² is a good one, and it is made by one who wields a busy pen. Professor Whitney is generally set down as the highest American authority in matters connected with German. The exhibition which he here makes of the true readings of "Faust"³ is something one ought to be grateful for. Professor Joynes⁴ of Vanderbilt University has been improving on the useful books of Otto. "The Rhine from the Sea to its Source,"⁵ would not be so euphonious or unambiguous a title, but would better indicate the direction of the proper route. None of our readers are likely to buy this splendid quarto, but it bids fair to take a high stand among works of its class. The best thing to read on one of the Rhine boats is "Childe Harold." This and a good map are as much as two sharp eyes can attend to.

We congratulate visitors from the effete monarchies of the Old World on having for their guides along the highways and byways of American travel one so lucid as Mr. Lanier and so unimpassioned as Mr. Pollard.⁶ Mr. Fulton's⁷ book on Europe is said

¹*Machiavelli*: Horace Walpole. By Lord Macaulay. 32mo., paper, 25 cents. Harper & Bros., New York.

²Single Famous Poems. Edited by Rossiter Johnson. Square 12mo., 300 pp., cloth, \$2.50. Henry Holt & Co., New York.

³Faust. Whitney's German Text. 12mo., 230 pp., cloth, \$1.20. *Ibid.*

⁴Exercises for Translating English into German. Joynes—Otto Course. 12mo., 167 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵The Rhine from its Source to the Sea. From the German of Carl Stieler, H. Wachenhusen, and F. W. Hackländer. Translated by G. C. T. Bartley. With four hundred and twenty-five superb wood-cut engravings. Imperial 4to., cloth extra, full gilt, \$18; full turkey, \$25; turkey sup. extra, \$30. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

⁶Highways and Byways of American Travel. By Edward Strahan, Sidney Lanier, E. A. Pollard, etc. Profusely illustrated. 8vo., extra cloth, gilt, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁷Europe Viewed through American Spectacles. By Charles C. Fulton, Editor of the *Baltimore American*. New edition, profusely illustrated. 8vo., extra cloth, gilt, \$2. *Ibid.*

to be one of the very liveliest, most sensible, and most practical that have yet appeared. It is also possible, under another Cicerone, to keep to one's easy chair and yet wander in four continents.¹ The name Mr. Sullivan² has given to his book seems to be in imitation of Mr. Hepworth Dixon's "New Russia." We are apt to fancy that New Ireland and "Ould Ireland" will turn out to be pretty much the same thing. Those who love to go to first hand for their information, will go to the pages of Swedenborg and of "The True Christian Religion"³ for the authentic statement of the tenets held by "the New Church." The trouble is that, to the uninitiated, Swedenborg is unintelligible. "Noble's Appeal" is the book for those who are not prepared to fall into a trance like Balaam the son of Beor, but having their eyes shut.

The great work of Mr. Southall, on the Recent Origin of Man, is now followed up by another, to much the same purport, on the Mammoth (the *elephas primigenius*) and the Apparition of Man upon the earth.⁴ Mr. Southall has proved unanswerably that in certain conditions the mammoth and some of its contemporaries have survived the pre-Adamite epochs. What we think of the two allegories^{5 6} of John Bunyan goes without saying. It is delightful to know that the ancient popularity of these books is in no manner diminished, and that they are everywhere to be had and in forms both cheap and dear. The Lothrop's also invite our

¹Wanderings in Four Continents. Elegantly and profusely illustrated. 8vo., extra cloth, gilt, \$3. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

²New Ireland. By Alexander M. Sullivan, Esq., Member of Parliament for Louth. Cheap edition. 12mo., 524 pp., fine cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

³The True Christian Religion: Containing the Universal Theology of the New Church. By Emanuel Swedenborg. Rotch edition. 2 Vols., crown 8vo., extra cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁴The Epoch of the Mammoth, and the Apparition of Man upon the Earth. By James C. Southall, A. M., LL.D. Illustrated. Crown 8vo., extra cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁵The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan. With illustrations by Stothard, and vignette title engraved by Marsh, \$1.25; red lines, \$3. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

⁶The Holy War. By John Bunyan. Large clear type, sixty-eight illustrations. 8vo., cloth, \$2.50; Japanese leather, gilt, \$5; turkey morocco, \$7.50; 24mo. edition, small type, cloth, 30 cents. *Ibid.*

attention to three story-books for children.^{1 2 3} The names are taking, and the writers are in nearly or quite every instance authors of credit.

Mr. Palgrave is a man of exquisite literary taste, and his golden treasury of songs⁴ is among other song-books what the precious ore is among other metals. His claim to have used *all* the good songs may well be challenged; but it is indeed a jewel of a collection. Side by side with this are two more books of song and two more golden treasuries. The Ballad Book⁵ will be prized by some who are strangers to Percy, Ritson, Ellis, and Scott. The charm will never depart from the quaint stanzas of "Chevy Chase" and "The Nut-Brown Maid." Mr. Allingham's name is a guaranty of competent work. Lord Selborne⁶ has rivalled Mr. Gladstone as a writer of Latin hymns. In the present volume the former Lord Chancellor does not stoop to edit a book of praise in the vernacular. Sir Thomas Noon Talfourd, it will be remembered, was the author of some lovely verse in the drama entitled, "Ion," which, however, was rather pagan than Christian. The readers of the "Heir of Redclyffe" will know what to expect of his innumerable *coups d'or*.⁷ The loving messages of Miss

¹An Indian Princess, and Other Stories. By T. Apoleon Cheney, LL.D., Clara F. Guernsey, and Nora Perry. Large 16mo., illuminated cloth, 40 cents. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

²A Narrow Escape, and Other Stories. By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, Margaret Eytinge, and Rossiter Johnson. Large 16mo., illum. cloth, 40 cents. *Ibid.*

³Little Boy Blue, and other Stories. By C. A. Goodenow and other famous writers. Large 16mo., illum. cloth, 40 cents. *Ibid.*

⁴The Golden Treasury of the Best Songs and Lyric Poems in the English Language. Selected and arranged with notes by Francis Turner Palgrave, Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. 16mo., vellum, \$1.25; illustrated red-line edition, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁵The Ballad Book: A Selection of the Choicest British Ballads. Edited by William Allingham. With a vignette. 16mo., \$1.25. *Ibid.*

⁶The Book of Praise, from the Best English Hymn Writers. Selected and arranged by Roundell Palmer. Vignette title engraved by Marsh. 16mo., \$1.25; illustrated red-line edition, \$3. *Ibid.*

⁷A Book of Golden Deeds of all Times and all Lands. Gathered and narrated by the Author of "the Heir of Redclyffe. With a vignette. \$1.25. *Ibid.*

Willard will find their way to many hearts.¹ The same publishers give us three other religious books; all small and likely to be convenient.^{2 3 4} "The Simple Truth"⁵ is not likely to be told by Mr. Collyer, but he is sure to say striking things in hard downright English. The late Mr. Sumner's controversies with public men⁶ have aroused an interest they hardly deserve. Neither Coleridge, nor Shelley, nor, for the matter of that, Tennyson, ever wrote a more cunningly musical line than "Abide with me, fast falls the eventide."⁷ The poem, as a whole, is a *chef d'œuvre* of skill and sentiment, and merited this superb introduction to crowds of new admirers. More ballads,⁸ and also more alliteration. *Æsop*⁹ is a sage whose wisdom never becomes obsolete, and a writer whose brevity and point have seldom been equalled. Nowhere else is instruction so valuable compacted in a way more entertaining.

Dr. Kirk was a friend in boyhood and afterwards of Dr. James W. Alexander. He was an eloquent preacher, and otherwise a distinguished man in his denomination. His biography¹⁰ has many points of interest. Mr. William Rathbone Greg is the

¹Gathered Treasures: Loving Messages from God's Word. Arranged and edited by Miss M. J. Willard and Miss M. B. Lyman. A scroll in very large print, on a stick to hang up, \$1. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

²The Seven Words from the Cross. By the Rev. Wm. H. Adams. 12mo., cloth. *Ibid.*

³The Happy Year: Calendar, Memoranda, Choice Selections, and a Text for Each Day. Illustrated. 24mo., leatherette, 15 cents. *Ibid.*

⁴The Bible Reader. By the author of "The Unerring Guide." Designed especially for schools. 16mo., 50 cents. *Ibid.*

⁵The Simple Truth. By the Rev. Robt. Collyer. 32mo., 160 pp., cloth, \$1. Lee & Shepard, Boston.

⁶Personal Relations with the President and Secretary of State. By Charles Sumner. Crown 8vo., 32 pp., paper, 30 cents. *Ibid.*

⁷Abide with Me. By the Rev. Henry Francis Lyte. Illustrated. 4to., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁸Ballads of Bravery. By Geo. M. Baker. Forty full-page illustrations. 4to., 168 pp., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

⁹Æsop's Fables. One hundred illustrations. 4to., 256 pp., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

¹⁰The Life of E. N. Kirk, D. D. By the Rev. D. O. Mears. 8vo., 432 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

father of Mr. Percy Greg, the accomplished editor of the London *Standard* newspaper, and the author of a graceful volume of poems, many of which were suggested by a generous sympathy with the South in her military disasters. Mr. W. R. Greg is himself a writer of marked ability and evident sincerity, but unfortunately an advocate of most erroneous opinions.¹ The name of Lessing² is one of the highest on the roll of German authorship. His *Laocoon* is the most celebrated and not improbably the finest piece of art criticism that has yet appeared in Europe; and his "Nathan der Weise," and one or two of his other dramas, rank easily with the best of Schiller's. Lessing anticipated the "Absolute Religion" of Theodore Parker, as Parker anticipated the "Comparative Theology" of the school now so enamored of the *Rig-Veda*. We only wish Toschi³ could have presented us with engravings of the *Nibelungen Lied* in Munich and of the *Hemicycle des Beaux Arts* in Paris. "Transcendentalism"⁴ is discussed in much the same manner by Mr. Cook as "Biology."

Murillo⁵ is the theme of another of the pleasing artist-biographies issued by the same press. He and Velasquez are the *dui majores* of Spanish art. The "Immaculate Conception" in Madrid and his "Beggar Boys" are the works by which he is chiefly known. An epidemic somewhat like the one which has given people such a rage for Limoges and Sèvres, makes them run after Thoreau.⁶ The Boston literati have persuaded one another

¹The Creed of Christendom: Its Foundations contrasted with the Superstructure. By W. R. Greg. Vols. V. and VI. of the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library." 2 Vols., crown 8vo., cxiv., 154 pp.; vi., 281 pp., \$5. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

²Lessing: His Life and Writings. By James Sime. Vols. VII. and VIII. of "English and Foreign Philosophical Library." Crown 8vo., xix., 327 pp., xv., 358 pp., \$7. *Ibid.*

³Toschi's Engravings of Frescoes. By Correggio and Parmigiano. Twenty-four plates. Smaller edition. Square 8vo., \$5. *Ibid.*

⁴Transcendentalism. Vol. II. of "Boston Monday Lectures." With Preludes on Current Events. By Joseph Cook. 12mo., 305 pp., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵Murillo. Vol. IV. of "Artist Biographies." By M. F. Sweetzer. 18mo., 138 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

⁶Thoreau: His Life and Aims. A Study. By H. A. Page. With portrait and picture of Thoreau's house at Walden. x., 234 pp., \$1. *Ibid.*

that Thoreau was almost as great a "thinker" as—Emerson. It is in this character chiefly that he appears in the pleasant "study" of Mr. Page. In point of fact, Thoreau was something of a philosopher and something of a prose poet. His philosophy is fragmentary though interesting, but, for the most part, worthless. His prose-poetry is charmingly fresh and unaffected. Mr. Howells¹ is a prince among American light-weights in letters, and his subject this time is a prince among English heavy-weights. Mr. Cook in his third volume treats of "Orthodoxy."² Dr. Edkins of Peking comes forward with a seasonable crown octavo on the religions of China.³ The book is doubtless one of value.

Porter & Coates bring out Macaulay's History from electrotype plates.⁴ The great defect of the work is its enormous profusion. It is almost impossible to get a bird's-eye view of the whole; and the whole is but a history of one or two reigns. In this respect Hume is incomparably superior. Moreover, the more recent history is as prejudiced as a political broad-side. In point of robust sense and faultless and impressive style, it is one of the noblest of the English classics—for Macaulay is already a classic. Yet even here there is a drawback. The very splendor of the diction takes off the mind from the thing said. Here, again, Hume has the advantage. In reading Hume one lives among the characters and times described. In reading Macaulay, one is thinking of the author of the essay on Warren Hastings more than one is thinking of Halifax or Somers, of William or of Luxemburg. Another sin of this great writer (which he himself

¹Choice Autobiography. Vol. VI.—Memoirs of Edward Gibbon. Edited by W. D. Howells. 18mo., \$1.25. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

²Orthodoxy. Vol. III. of Boston Monday Lectures. With preludes on current events. By Joseph Cook. 12mo., 343 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

³Religion in China: Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People. By Jos. Edkins, D. D., Peking. Crown 8vo., xvi., 260 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Macaulay's History of England. From our electrotype plates from the last English edition, with all of Macaulay's corrections very carefully examined and revised. Five volumes, large 12mo., bevelled boards, gilt top, fine paper, and superior binding. \$1.50 per Vol. Porter & Coates, Philadelphia.

condemns in Gibbon) is a trick of taking things for granted where the ignorance of the reader demands a word or two in explanation. It is the error of a full mind. "The Silver Question" will now settle or unsettle itself.¹ "The Silver Country" requires more assistance in order to *its* settlement.²

Here we have a world of wonders.³ The sources are so various that "the find" must now and then be a profitable one. We cannot imagine any one less qualified, except on the score of his style, to speak of Creed and Conduct⁴ than the Rev. O. B. Frothingham—if we have not mistaken some one else for a too well-known namesake. Even Mr. Felix Adler has a better title to "tackle" a kindred subject.⁵ Mr. Adler is, if we are not misinformed, a Jew—a Jew of the most liberal type of reformers. Mr. Adler is certainly a man of learning, with fair pretensions to ability. Mr. Adler's opinions are, however, of no more intrinsic value than Mr. Frothingham's. A Bibliography of Bibliography⁶—a most happy thought. We confess to a fellow-feeling with Lamb in his preference for certain books in certain specified styles; for example, we cannot abide John Howe out of folio.

¹The Silver Question; or, Dollar of the Fathers vs. Dollar of the Sons. By David A. Wells. 8vo., sewed, 25 cents. G. P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y.

²The Silver Country; or, the Great Southwest: A Review of the Mineral and Other Wealth, the Attractions and Material Development of the Former Kingdom of New Spain, which comprised Mexico, and the Territory ceded by Mexico to the United States in 1848 and 1853. By Alex. D. Anderson. With hypsometric map. 8vo., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

³Wonder World. Stories from the French, German, Russian, Hungarian, Irish, Turkish, Hindostani, Chinese, Japanese, Swedish, Italian, and Hebrew. By Majory Deane and Mary Pabke. Illustrated by Lucy G. Morse. "Moonfolk Series." 8vo., cloth extra, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

⁴Creed and Conduct, and Other Discourses. By the Rev. O. B. Frothingham. 12mo., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

⁵Creed and Deed: A Series of Essays Published for the Society for Ethical Culture. By Felix Adler. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁶A Bibliography of Bibliography; or, A Handy Book about Books which Relate to Books: Being an Alphabetical Catalogue of the Most Important Works Descriptive of the Literature of Great Britain and America, and more than a few Relative to France and Germany. By Joseph Sabin. Two hundred and fifty copies only printed. 8vo., 151 pp., paper, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

Your scholar wants the most accurate editions, your bibliomaniac the rarest, and especially the first. Your bibliographer is one who thinks more about the outside than he does about the inside of books. Bibliography and scholarship: it is the old distinction of form and matter that marks the division of their respective aims. Yet, next to Dominic Sampson's man of "erudition," give us a skilled bibliophile, who, nine chances in ten, is also a bit of a scholar.

Lübke's¹ massive work on the History of Art is a book of great authority, as is evinced from the fact that it has already gone through seven German editions. It is exact and heavy; a book to be freely cited and seldom read. Dr. Klunzinger's² cloth octavo on Upper Egypt takes its place *en permanence* among the books of which Lane's "Modern Egyptians" stands at the head. Will England buy out the Khedive? Dr. Shedd is one of the most profound and muscular writers of the day. These "Theological Essays"³ are likely to prove a good corrective for those of Maurice. We cannot espouse, however, his doctrine of metaphysical Realism, or be made to believe that Augustine ever decided for that view. One of the most notable features of the age in which we live are the explorations that are going on of buried classic sites. Those of Troy, of Olympia, of Cyprus, possess the deepest interest: as does also that of Mycenæ and Tiryns, whose vast walls have excited so much wonder. Dr. Schliemann⁴ may have a bee in his bonnet; but, if so, it is a bee that does not sting, and makes honey.

¹Lübke's History of Art. By Dr. Wilhelm Lübke, Professor at the Polytechnic Institute, and at the School of Art, in Stuttgart. A fresh translation made under the superintendence of Edw. L. Burlingame, from the seventh German edition, recently published. Edited by Clarence Cook. With numerous explanatory and critical notes, and other original matter. Illustrated with nearly six hundred fine wood engravings. Two volumes. Royal 8vo., cloth, gilt tops, uncut edges, \$14. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

²Upper Egypt: Its People and Its Products. By C. B. Klunzinger, M. D. 8vo., cloth, \$3. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.

³Theological Essays. By Wm. G. T. Shedd, M. D. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

⁴Mycenæ: A Narrative of Researches and Discoveries at Mycenæ and
VOL. XXIX., NO. 2—27.

A lady on the Nile!¹ The book is one that is the fruit of much care and pains, and is a narrative of liveliness and good sense. There is in it much information that it were well to have, and it is brought out in a gorgeous array of gold and crimson. The personal relations of Goethe and Schiller are fully disclosed in this interesting series of letters.² Of the greater of the two poets, we had a word to say in a recent number. Schiller is the German grammar reader's joy. From Otto or Whitney to the "Mary Stuart," is from the hot and stuffy lecture-room to the green fields and open heavens. What could be finer than the soliloquy of "the Maid" of Are, where she describes her visions, or the battle and coronation scenes, or the death scene, in the same poem? Coleridge's sonnet on "the Robbers" may be judged extravagant, but all the world are of one mind as to the "William Tell." Schiller excels in dramatic characterisation, in description, in beauty of style, in pathos, in nobility of sentiment. Bronzes³ are as much entitled to a separate treatise as works in terra-cotta and porcelain. The advance of the Japanese in the art of making bronzes is simply astonishing. Poor old Harriet Martineau: her counterpart to the story of Gustavus⁴

Tiryns. By Henry Schliemann. Preface by the Hon. Wm. E. Gladstone. With views, plans, and cuts representing more than seven hundred types of the objects found in the royal sepulchres of Mycenæ and elsewhere in the excavations. 4to., 500 pp., cloth, \$12. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.

¹A Thousand Miles up the Nile: Being a Journey Through Egypt and Nubia to the Second Cataract. By Amelia B. Edwards. With *fac similes* of inscriptions, ground plans, two colored maps of the Nile from Alexandria to Dongola, and eighty illustrations engraved on wood from drawings by the author. Ornamental covers, designed also by the author. Imperial 8vo., 758 pp., crimson and gold, gilt edges, \$12. *Ibid.*

²Schiller and Goethe: Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe from 1794 to 1805. Vol. I.—1794-1797. Translated from the third edition of the German, with notes, by T. Dora Schmitz. 12mo., cloth, \$1.40. *Ibid.*

³Bronzes. By C. Drury E. Fortnum. With numerous wood cuts. *Ibid.*

⁴A History of the Thirty Years' Peace, A. D. 1816-1846. Vol. I., from 1816 to 1824. By Harriet Martineau. Four volumes. 12mo., cloth, \$1.40 per volume. *Ibid.*

acquires a new interest from her recent death. She was a strong-headed and wrong-headed woman—wrong-headed to the last.

Dr. Field is an admirable letter-writer, and we have to thank him for another good book of travels: this time from the East.¹ The newly discovered poems of Charles and Mary Lamb² have drawn all eyes once more to the gifted brother and unfortunate sister. Their chequered story is as darkly moving as the *Cædipus*. Charles Lamb is the most whimsical and, some maintain, the most delightful of the English humorists. He was also no mean critic; but is only so-so as a poet—albeit there are redeeming touches. The *Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures*³ never more needed an orthodox restatement, as it has never been more impugned by its professed friend. This doctrine is the sheet-anchor of all our hopes. If we had been asked to nominate an author who should write on the origin of nations,⁴ the first name to come up would probably have been Geo. Rawlinson. Old "Chaucer's Well"⁵ has had several new buckets let down into it lately. No one after Shakespeare strikes us as having more native genius, breezy imaginative story telling.

The Astronomer Royal not only tells us all about Cheops's Pyramid,⁶ but tries to prove the English are descended from

¹From Egypt to Japan. By Henry M. Field, D. D. Uniform with the former volume, "From the Lakes of Killarney to the Golden Horn." 12mo., 424 pp., cloth, \$2. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.

²Poetry for Children, and Prince Dorus. By Charles and Mary Lamb. Carefully reprinted from the recently discovered unique copies. 16mo., 224 pp., cloth, gilt top, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

³A Treatise on the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. By Charles Elliott, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the Northwest, Chicago. 8vo., cloth, \$3. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

⁴The Origin of Nations. By Geo. Rawlinson. In two parts. Part I.—On Early Civilisation; Part II.—On Ethnic Affinities. With two maps. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

⁵Poetical Works of Geoffrey Chaucer. With Poems formerly printed with his or attributed to him. Edited, with Memoir, by Robert Bell. Four volumes. (Bohn's Standard Library.) Per Vol., \$11.40. *Ibid.*

⁶Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid. By Piazzi Smyth. Third and much enlarged edition. With twenty-four explanatory plates, giving maps, plans, elevations, and sections. 12mo., cloth, \$6. *Ibid.*

the lost Israel. The literature of this last-named hypothesis, however absurd it may seem, is becoming rather an extensive one. Mr. Smyth is a great authority in science, and a pious Christian, but an enthusiast. The sermons of Canon Farrar,¹ in rebuttal to the Scripture statements about hell, get their notoriety merely from the fact that he preaches in Westminster Abbey, and wrote a fascinating but somewhat rationalistic Life of Christ. Farrar is a classical scholar and florid rhetorician, but not by any means a sturdy polemic. His arguments have been demolished by Professor Toy of Louisville and by the Rev. E. C. Gordon of Savannah, to say nothing of a host of others. Yet Farrar appears to concede eternity of future pain where he argues that a great "majority" of the lost will be saved. Several volumes of sermons are floated on the tide of Farrar's new-found popularity with the Universalists.^{2 3 4} Bismarck⁵ is the embodiment of all that is great and all that is odious in the modern German. He is the kite of prime ministers.

De Wette used to say that Bleek had a "charisma" for writing on biblical introduction. The remark is much more applicable to Paley⁶ in relation to the evidences. Greatly as the field of

¹Eternal Hope: Sermons on Eternal Punishment. By the Rev. Frederick W. Farrar, D. D., F.R.S., Canon of Westminster. Preached in Westminster Abbey, London. With Preface, Notes, Appendices, etc. 12mo., cloth, \$1. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.

²The Life of Christ. By the Rev. Frederick W. Farrar, D. D., F.R.S., Canon of Westminster. 8vo., without Notes, and Appendix, large print. cloth, \$5; two volumes, 8vo., half calf, \$10. *Ibid.*

³The Silence and the Voices of God. With other Sermons. By Frederick W. Farrar, D. D., F.R.S., Canon of Westminster. 12mo., 237 pp., \$1. *Ibid.*

⁴"In the Days of My Youth:" Sermons on Practical Subjects, Preached at Marlborough College, from 1871 to 1876. By Frederick W. Farrar, D. D., F.R.S. Thirty-nine sermons. 414 pp., \$2. *Ibid.*

⁵Bismarck: His Authentic Biography. With a General Introduction by Bayard Taylor, United States Minister to Germany. Profusely illustrated, and a new map of Europe. 8vo., 650 pp., scarlet cloth, \$2.50. Ford, Howard & Hurlbert, New York.

⁶Evidences of Christianity. By William Paley. With Annotations by Richard Whately, D. D. 8vo., 404 pp., cloth, \$2. James Miller, N. Y.

investigation has been enlarged, the treatise of this masculine thinker is as valuable (and it is almost indispensable) as ever. The Virginia Text-Book¹ should become a *vade mecum* with the Free Masons, not only of that. but of other States. Mr. Harvey,² it is said, would never once suggest the idea that Mr. Webster was a great man. In this the present author falls far short of Boswell, though resembling him in some of his traits. Bartlett's³ is the standard work on Americanisms, and a work of singular merit, though not faultless. Mr. Godwin's⁴ name is guaranty of conscientious and skilful work. The new Cyclopædia seems to take in a wider compass than Drake's.

Lecky's History of the Eighteenth Century⁵ is a much better book than his History of Morals. Both are tainted with Rationalism. The "Ancient Life History of the Earth"⁶ is well handled by Dr. Nicholson. De Tocqueville's work was "Democracy in America;" Sir T. E. May's is "Democracy in Europe."⁷ We have taken up the impression in some way that the book is one of extraordinary merit. This may turn out to be a total mistake.

¹The Virginia Text-Book: Containing a History of Masonic Grand Lodges, and the Constitutions of Masonry, etc., together with a Digest of the Laws, etc.; Also, a Complete Compilation of the Illustrations of Masonic Work, as Drawn from Preston, Webb, Read, and others. By John Dove, Grand Secretary of the Grand Lodge of Virginia. Fourth edition. 12mo., 378 pp., half roan, \$2. Randolph, English & Co., Richmond, Va.

²Reminiscences of Daniel Webster. By Peter Harvey. 8vo., cloth, \$3. Little, Brown & Co., Boston.

³Dictionary of Americanisms. By John Russell Bartlett. Fourth edition, greatly improved and enlarged. 8vo., cloth, \$4. *Ibid.*

⁴Cyclopædia of Biography. By Parke Godwin. 8vo., 1,200 pp., cloth, \$5. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

⁵A History of England in the Eighteenth Century. By Wm. E. H. Lecky. Two volumes, 8vo., cloth, \$6. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

⁶Ancient Life History of the Earth. By H. Alleyne Nicholson, M. D., Professor of Natural History, University of St. Andrews. 408 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

⁷Democracy in Europe. A History. By Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B., D.C.L., author of the "Constitutional History of England." Two volumes, 8vo., 500 pp., cloth extra, gilt tops, \$5. W. J. Widdleton, New York.

Our old favorite *Trench on words*¹ is reëdited and remodelled by Prof. Suplée of Benicia. *Trench* is fanciful, and innocent of Grimm's Law; yet few so instructive and entertaining. *Trench* was first to break ground in this direction in England. Mr. Powhatan Bouldin's *Home Reminiscences of John Randolph*² are of the most engaging and varied interest. The material, though in one sense old, is mostly new in print. The book is the fruition of a long deferred hope, and is in the main the gist of the recollections of Mr. Randolph's neighbors in Charlotte. The late Mr. James W. Bouldin, Judge Wood Bouldin, Mr. Wm. H. Elliott, Col. Th. St. Flournoy, Dr. C. H. Jordan, Dr. Plumer, Mr. Jas. M. Whittle, and Mr. W. M. Moseley, all appear as spokesmen in these important pages. The material is well worked up.

¹*Suplée's Trench on Words.* Arranged as a class book from the latest revised English edition by Thos. D. Suplée, Head Master of St. Augustine's College, Benicia, Cal. 12mo., 400 pp., \$1.50.

²*Home Reminiscences of John Randolph of Roanoke.* By Powhatan Bouldin. Danville, Va.: Published by the author. Richmond, Va.: Clemmitt & Jones, Printers. 1878. Pp. ix., 320, 12mo.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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JULY, MDCCCLXXVIII.

ARTICLE I.

THORNWELL'S WRITINGS.

The Collected Writings of JAMES HENLEY THORNWELL, D. D., LL.D., late Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary at Columbia, S. C. Vols. I., II. Edited by JOHN B. ADGER, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical Polity and History in the same Seminary. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. New York: R. Carter & Bros. Philadelphia: Alfred Martien. Louisville: Davidson Bros. & Co. 1871. Pp. 659, 622, 8vo.

The Same, Vols. III., IV. Edited by JOHN B. ADGER, D. D., and JOHN L. GIRARDEAU, D. D. 1873. Pp. 817, 640. 8vo.

These elegant and portly volumes have been several years before the public, as the dates upon the title pages will show; and yet, full as they are of the deepest and most inspiring thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the age, expressed in a style of the clearest and purest English, they have not, so far as we know, been commended to the attention of theologians and scholars in an extended review. Perhaps their extraordinary merit has been the cause of this apparent neglect. It might seem to indicate some audacity of enterprise, or, at least, some want of modesty, in an ordinary man, to make such an attempt. The men who are best qualified for the task were prevented from undertaking it, by their connexion with the lamented author, either as his editors or as his biographers; and other men have,

no doubt, been deterred by their consciousness of a want of ability to do justice to such a work, who would else have been glad to lay their tribute upon the tomb of one from whom they have received so much instruction and so much confirmation in "the glorious gospel of the blessed God." Those who are familiar with the history of THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW may be especially excused for a feeling of surprise that no extended notice of these Writings has appeared in this journal. They are aware that Dr. Thornwell was its main pillar; that the ablest articles that adorned its pages were the productions of his pen; that he—it may be said without invidiousness—did more to give it reputation than any other regular contributor, or, possibly, than all other contributors combined. But does not this very fact, combined with the fact that a large portion of these "Collected Writings" first appeared in the shape of articles in this REVIEW, constitute a sufficient apology for the seeming neglect? We think it does.

But now, having said thus much, our readers are no doubt asking, What apology can the present writer offer for his presumption? Our answer is, we have no apology but that of *love*. We are among the number of those who acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Dr. Thornwell which they feel can never be repaid. If we know anything of Christ's salvation; if we have any comfort of love or any fellowship of the Spirit; if we have any stability of faith in the midst of the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil; any joy in hope of glory, honor, and immortality: we owe it more to him, under God, than to any other human being, with the exception, perhaps, of her who bore us. Without the smallest affectation of modesty, we acknowledge our inability to do him justice. With but slender pretensions to theology or philosophy, we undertake to serve the purpose only of a finger-board to direct the attention of our readers who have not procured these volumes, or have not read them, to the treasures of theology and philosophy they contain.

We do not profess to be very familiar with the literature of South Carolina, but we know only three of the many distinguished men whose names adorn her annals, whose writings have

been collected and published—Calhoun, Legaré, and Thornwell. It is a little remarkable that in the case of all these, the largest part (in the case of Mr. Legaré, the whole,) of their literary remains consists of monographs, chiefly in the form of contributions to Quarterly Reviews, or in the form of discourses. In the works of Mr. Calhoun, there are two treatises only, both published after his death for the first time: one, a Dissertation on Government, and the other a Dissertation on the Constitution of the United States. These occupy the first volume. The remaining volumes are composed, if our memory serves us, of speeches. It is greatly to be regretted that the lessons of statesmanship and of political philosophy, which these speeches contain, were not collected and digested by the master himself, and thus handed down to posterity. We are free to confess to a regret still deeper, that a similar thing was not done by Mr. Legaré. No more splendid man has this country produced. He was familiar with the whole range of Greek and Roman literature, a learned and accomplished lawyer, a profound and judicious thinker, a noble orator, a fascinating writer, and there was little within the compass of the human faculties which his genius could not have achieved. We think that the subject of this present notice was greater than either Calhoun or Legaré. With natural endowments equally great, he had that strength which was derived from the dedication of his endowments to God who gave them, and from the discipline of all his faculties in the bracing atmosphere of revealed truth. We hazard nothing in predicting that his writings will be studied long after those of the other two illustrious men we have named shall have been forgotten.

The comparison may be extended a little further. Dr. Thornwell has been more favored in his editors. The works of Calhoun and Legaré were edited by Virginians, and, in the case of the last named, very poorly edited. Dr. Thornwell's editors were "to the manner born," if we may judge by their success; and they have done their work *con amore*, both as fellow-countrymen and as devoted friends. He was a man of refined and exquisite taste, and we do not doubt that he would have been perfectly satisfied with these volumes in every respect, with the

exception, perhaps, of the binding.* He loved sumptuously bound books.

The first volume, according to the arrangement of the editors, contains Dr. Thornwell's "Theological" writings; the second, "Theological and Ethical;" the third, "Theological and Controversial;" the fourth, "Ecclesiastical." We shall attempt, in this article, to give our readers some idea of the author in each of these departments, and that, either by quotations, or, where this is impracticable, by a summary statement of his views in our own words.

I. His fame as a theologian must rest ultimately, of course, upon his writings. The tradition of his extraordinary ability in handling the great doctrines of revelation, which is now kept alive by the gratitude and enthusiasm of his pupils, is doomed to fade, as they pass, one after another, from the world. We are thankful for what remains, but nothing can reconcile us to the loss of what has perished, but the fact that it was all ordered by the wisdom of the great Head of the Church, who makes no mistakes. We have, in truth, not much more than the foot of Hercules, and from this we may judge what the giant in his full proportions must have been.

The most valuable part of this first volume consists of sixteen Lectures prepared by the author for his classes in the Seminary. They were all written twice over, but were never prepared for the press. This accounts for the somewhat fragmentary appearance exhibited at the closing parts of one or two of them. The author proposed to divide Theology into three parts: the *first*, treating of God and of Moral Government in its essential principles; the *second*, of Moral Government as modified by the Covenant of Works; and the *third*, of the same, as modified by the Covenant of Grace. These Lectures cover with tolerable completeness the ground of the first two parts. They are occupied, therefore, with *Theology* (in the narrower sense) and *Anthro-*

* We do not mean to disparage the binding in its kind. It is excellent of its kind; but the kind is not the best. Would it not have been better to issue the work (after the manner of the French) in unbound volumes, and let the buyers have them bound to order?

pology. The most elaborate and the most striking discussions in this last department are those on Man and on the Covenant of Works, on the breach of the Covenant, the Fall of Man, on Sin—its nature, its pollution, and guilt, and on Degrees of Guilt. It would be difficult to exaggerate the ability with which these great subjects are handled. Let us tarry a moment on one or two points.

And *first*, as to the nature and purpose of the covenant of works, the great merit of our author, it appears to us, is the clearness with which he brings out the precise points of difference between the dispensation which goes under this name, and the dispensation under which man was by the mere fact of his creation; or, in other words, the difference between moral government absolutely considered, and the same as modified by the covenant. The Westminster standards throw no light on this question. They say nothing, in describing man's condition under the covenant of works, from which we can gather the import of the promise of life, or determine why such a promise could not have belonged to a dispensation of *mere* moral government. They make the condition of the covenant to be "perfect and personal obedience" (Confession of Faith, VII., 2), or "perfect, personal, and perpetual obedience" (Larger Catechism, Question 20). This is all. Now, what does "perpetual" mean? If it means throughout his whole career as an immortal being, then it is impossible to see how man's covenant condition differed from "the estate wherein he was created;" since his probation, in either case, must have been endless. The promise of *eternal* life would have no meaning. And, how, in this case, could the condition of *all* his posterity be determined by his acts? Suppose he had sinned in his one thousandth year, after he had begotten a multitude of children! The promise of life, if it means anything more than that he should live so long as he continued to obey—or, in other words, that he should not die until he sinned—is left without any explanation by the statements of our Confession and Catechisms. Dr. Hodge says (Systematic Theology, II., 119): "The question whether perpetual, as well as perfect, obedience was the condition of the covenant made with

Adam, is probably to be answered in the negative. It seems to be reasonable in itself, and plainly implied in the Scriptures, that all rational creatures have a definite period of probation." This hesitating statement does not give us much relief, as it seems to make the limitation of the probation not so much an act of God's favor as an act of justice which reason might demand. This view of Dr. Hodge's meaning is confirmed by his explanation, on the preceding page, of the promise, which might all be said if there had been no covenant at all. "As the Scriptures everywhere represent God as a judge or moral ruler, it follows of necessity, from that representation, that his rational creatures will be dealt with according to the principles of justice. If there be no transgression, there will be no punishment. And those who continue holy thereby continue in the favor and fellowship of Him whose favor is life." Plainly, if this be all that is in the promise, it needed not to have been made. It is impossible for God to frown, it is impossible for him not to smile, on a holy creature. The promise is not one of a life which, in point of fact, shall be eternal in its duration, if the man shall continue obedient forever, but of a life which is in its own nature inalienable, indestructible, eternal. It is exactly the promise, as Dr. Hodge goes on to state (inconsistently, we think), which Christ has secured for his people; and this is a life eternal, which every believer *now* has, is in actual possession of, though he be still compassed about with a body of death.

If the probation of the first man was limited in point of time, there could be the promise of such a life. At the close of the period of probation, Adam, if still faithful in his allegiance to his Maker, would have been put in possession of it. This life implied two things: *first*, that he should be justified and adopted, that he should pass from the precarious condition of a servant into the permanent condition of a son; and, *second*, that his will should be immutably determined to good ("*felix necessitas boni*"), that the "*posse peccare*" and the "*posse non peccare*" should be changed into a "*non posse peccare*." How this immutability of the will would have been produced, it is, of course, impossible to say. We are very well assured that it would not have been the

result of *habit*, as some theologians think. It would have been a part of the promise of life; not acquired at all, except in the sense that, the condition of the covenant having been performed, a title to the whole life promised was acquired.*

This view of the covenant, as involving the ends of justification and adoption, enables the author, as he thinks, to unify the two forms of religion, that of nature (or of man in a state of innocence), and that of grace (or of man a sinner and yet a prisoner of hope). Cocceius and the "federal" theologians of Holland unified with the idea of a covenant only. Our author unifies with the idea of justification, which is common to both the covenants. (See the Inaugural Discourse at the end of the first volume.)

The *second* matter we propose to notice is the discussion towards the end of the thirteenth lecture. The subject of this lecture is "Original Sin," and the author grapples with the question, How the verdict of conscience, which pronounces us guilty on account of our native turpitude, can be justified? It is purely a speculative question. It may not be possible to find a satisfactory answer. It is not necessary to find one. The fundamental "deliverance" of conscience must stand, whether we be able or not to apprehend the grounds of its truth. Our author's solution, proposed with great modesty and not without some hesitation, is as follows:

"The human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes an organic whole, with a common life springing from a common ground. There is an unity in the whole species; there is a point in which all the individuals meet, and through which they are all modified and conditioned. Society exerts even a more powerful influence upon the individual than the individual upon society, and every community impresses its own peculiar type upon the individuals who are born into it. This is the secret of the peculiarities of national character.

* A *caveat* ought to be entered here against an unguarded statement on page 278 of Volume I., in which the author seems to teach, that Adam had no positive holy character, but only the possibility of it, or tendencies to it; and that the positive character would have resulted from the deliberate determination of his will with reference to the forbidden fruit. That this is not his meaning is abundantly evident from the whole of the discussion, and especially from such formal and elaborate statements as that on page 231, in the lecture on "Man."

There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, and still another among the Romans. The Englishman is easily distinguished from the Frenchman, the Chinese from the European, and the Negro from all. In the same way there is a type of life, common to the entire race, in which a deeper ground of unity is recognised than that which attaches to national associations or the narrower ties of kindred and blood. There is in man what we may call a common nature. That common nature is not a mere generalisation of logic, but a substantive reality. It is the ground of all individual existence, and conditions the type of its development. The parental relation expresses, but does not constitute it—propagates, but does not create it. In birth, there is the manifestation of the individual from a nature-basis which existed before. Birth, consequently, does not absolutely begin, but only individualises humanity. As, then, descent from Adam is the exponent of a potential existence in him, as it is the revelation of a fact in relation to the nature which is individualised in a given case, it constitutes lawful and just ground for federal representation. God can deal with the natural as a covenant head, because the natural relation proceeds upon an union which justifies the moral." (II., pp. 349, 350.)

This passage has perplexed our author's friends. Some have gone so far as to say that he teaches the very Realism which, in his review of the "Elohim Revealed" (see pp. 515–568 of this volume), he had censured Dr. Baird for teaching; that he holds to a "numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity." As even "Homer nodded," it is of course not impossible that Dr. Thornwell may have done the same. But those who are at all acquainted with the working of his mind, and with his habits of thought, will admit that the presumption against his having fallen into such a gross inconsistency is very strong; so strong, indeed, as to require the plainest proof to overthrow it. Whether his solution is any more satisfactory than Dr. Baird's, or whether it is even intelligible at all, is not here the question; but whether it is the same solution as Dr. Baird's. On this question let the reader consider the following suggestions which have been sent to us by one of Dr. Thornwell's intimate friends:

1. The review of Baird was written in 1860, and at that time these Lectures were already written. The two compositions may therefore be considered as contemporaneous. If there is any inconsistency, Dr. Thornwell was not conscious of it.

2. In the two papers, he uses two distinct phrases with such

uniformity and consistency as to evince design and to show that he did not consider them as identical. In the Lecture he speaks of "a generic unity in man;" in the REVIEW he combats Baird's notion of "a numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity."

3. In the REVIEW he seems to affirm the view of the Lecture in contrast with that of Baird. (See Pp. 552 and 563.) The first of these passages is so conclusive, that we quote it entire :

"The connection by blood betwixt Adam and his descendants constitutes a basis of unity by which, though numerically different as individuals, they may be treated as one collective whole. There is a close and intimate union, though not an identity, among the members of the human family. They are one race, one blood, one body—an unity, not like that of the Realists, growing out of the participation of a common objective reality, answering to the definition of a genus and species, but an unity founded in the relations of individual beings. It is this unity, and not the fancied identity of Dr. Baird, that distinguishes the Family, the State, the Church, the World. That the human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes something analogous to an organic whole, with a common life springing from the intimate connection between the parts, is obvious from the very organisation of society. There is one unity of nations, in consequence of which national character becomes as obtrusively marked as the peculiarities of individuals. There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, still another among the Romans. The Englishman is in no danger of ever being mistaken for a Frenchman, and the Frenchman is not more distinguished from his Continental neighbors by his language than by his habits, his sentiments, his modes of thought. These facts show that there is a bond among men, a fundamental basis of unity, which embraces the whole race. What it is we may be unable to define; we know, however, that it is connected with blood. The basis is that which justifies, but does not necessitate, God's dealing with the race in one man as a whole. So that Adam's federal headship is the immediate ground of our interest in his sin, and his natural headship is the ground of the representative economy."

Let the reader now compare this passage with that quoted from the Lecture, and say whether the author did not, at least, *intend* to set his view in contrast with Dr. Baird's. He employs in both the same illustration of "the unity of nations" to set forth his idea of "generic unity" in opposition to the Realistic notion

of a "numerical identity." In the other passage of the REVIEW (p. 563), he says :

"We are guilty : conscience testifies that we are guilty—that our native corruption is sin. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alternative is : In ourselves or in another. Ourselves are out of the question. Therefore we sinned in Adam, and our history truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and determined it."

Here again he seems to intimate the doctrine of the Lecture as different from that of Dr. Baird.

One of the most striking and delightful features of these Lectures is the "unction" that pervades them from the beginning to the end. With the most relentless rigor of argument, a rigor which might satisfy any Doctor Irrefragabilis, or "*moulin raisonnant*," of a mediæval cloister or university, there is combined a fervor and sometimes an ecstasy of emotion which might satisfy a Doctor Seraphicus of the mystic school. The author was not of the opinion that because theology was a science, it ought to be treated as an affair of the intellect only. He did not think it unseemly to express those powerful emotions which the truth of God is suited to excite, because he was in the professor's chair and not in the pulpit. When he is analysing sin, he feels that he is handling a poison which has corrupted his own nature ; and while his clear and subtle mind looks down into the depths, his own soul recoils with horror and disgust from what he sees there. When he is treating of God, his soul adores while his intellect explores. He holds religion to be "the spiritual knowledge of God," and therefore "not a single energy, intellectual, moral, or emotional, nor a state of mind in which each energy succeeds the other so rapidly as to make the impression that it is composed of them all as separate and separable elements. It is the whole energy of our being carried up to the highest unity ; the concentration of our entire spiritual nature into one form of life ; a condition in which intellect, conscience, and heart are blended into perfect union. "Spiritual cognition," according to him, "includes the perception of the beautiful and the good. The

same energy which knows God unto salvation knows him in the unity of his being as the perfection of truth, beauty, and holiness. The perception of his glory is the effulgence of this unity." The author is "himself the great sublime he draws." God is contemplated by him as "the True, the Beautiful, and the Good;" and his whole being is poured out in these Lectures in a stream of mingled love, thought, and adoration. All who have sighed, from Spencer down, for an edifying method of treating the science of theology, for a method which should stir the heart and purify and elevate the affections while it informed and strengthened the mind, might find their ideal realised here. Students of theology cannot make themselves too familiar with such a model. Private Christians, who are unable to rise to the height of this great argument, may yet imbibe something of the *tone* of these discussions. There is here a bracing, invigorating, spiritual atmosphere which no one can breathe without advantage to his soul's health.

II. We come now to notice his labors as a moral philosopher. The results of his thinking in this department, so far as this collection is concerned, are contained in the "Discourses on Truth" in the second volume.* These Discourses were delivered as sermons to the students of the South Carolina College, in the regular course of his ministry as the Chaplain of the College. They were published by the author himself; and this volume, indeed, was the only *treatise*, with the exception of the collection of Letters on the Apocrypha, which he ever published. He speaks of it, with characteristic modesty, as "an unpretending little volume." But in this case, as in many others, the merit is in inverse proportion to the pretension. It is, nomi-

*We remember to have read a very thorough and masterly discussion of Paley's System of Morals from the pen of Dr. Thornwell in one of the Quarterly Reviews (the "*Southern Review*," probably, during the short time that he was the editor of it.) We trust that this article may appear in some future additional volume of his writings. For an account of this *Review* (not the "SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW") and Dr. Thornwell's connection with it, see Dr. Palmer's Biography, Pp. 397 *et seq.*

nally, a series of discourses preached in the ordinary routine of his ministrations as Chaplain in a College; it is, really, a series of profound discussions touching the very foundations of truth and duty—discussions so profound and searching, displaying such extraordinary subtlety and thoroughness of analysis, as to make it impossible that they should have been adequately understood, at the time of their delivery, by any other audience than one accustomed to listen to the more detailed expositions of the lecture-room. But they are not mere discussions. They are sermons, full of earnest exhortation, of pungent appeals to the conscience, of zealous remonstrances against all that is false, low, and dishonorable in human impulses and human conduct, and pervaded by a lofty and generous enthusiasm in the cause of truth and righteousness, which shows that the preacher is not contending for barren generalities of the schools, but for living principles which have moulded and controlled his own character and life. He speaks and writes in what the ancient masters of rhetoric called the “agonistic” or “wrestling” style; and there are few of his hearers or readers so athletic in stupidity or wickedness as not to feel the force of his reasoning, and yield to the influence of his intense enthusiasm. We find no far-fetched fancies, no coruscation of brilliant images introduced for the sake of coruscation, no effort to produce a “sensation,” no chasing of tropical butterflies for the amusement of an auditory; but a solemn simplicity of purpose and a unity of design such as befits an ambassador of God rushing in between the living and the dead. Nothing can divert his eye or relax the vigor of his arm, as he wrestles with dying men for their salvation. Happy or wretched are the young men who listen to such preaching! Supremely happy, if they give heed; supremely wretched, if they do not! Would that the lessons of these sermons might awaken the dull, cold ear of an age of sophists, economists, and calculators!*

*Among the papers of Dr. Thornwell the editor discovered the following note from Sir William Hamilton, which does honor to both these illustrious men:

EDINBURGH, 23d July, 1855.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell.

SIR:—I beg leave, to return my warmest acknowledgments for your

Before we pass from the sermons of Dr. Thornwell, we cannot refrain from calling attention specially to the one entitled "The Sacrifice of Christ, the Type and Model of Missionary Effort." We were in the Assembly in New York in 1856, before which this great sermon was preached, and shall never forget the impression it produced. Those who heard it seemed to be filled with awe produced by the greatness of the preacher; not only or chiefly by the greatness of his intellect, but by the greatness of his heart, filled and expanded as it was by the truth and by the mighty working of the Holy Ghost. It was of this sermon that Dr. Addison Alexander is reported to have said, "that it was as fine a specimen of Demosthenian eloquence as he had ever heard from the pulpit, and that it realised his idea of what preaching should be."

III. We come next in this rapid and imperfect review to notice the contents of the third volume, which, according to the arrangement and classification of the editors, contains the author's "Controversial" writings. The contents are distributed under the heads of "Rationalist Controversy" and "Papal Controversy." The first embraces three essays: one on the "Standard and Nature of Religion," the second on "The Office of Reason in regard to Revelation," and the third on "Miracles," their Nature, their Apologetic worth, and their Credibility. A few words on each of these.

The paper on "The Standard and Nature of Religion" was not so entitled by the author, but by the editors. It appeared in sections in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW as a criticism upon Morell's "Philosophy of Religion." This book of Morell was doing great mischief. It was applauded not only by

Discourses on Truth. I have read them with great interest and no less admiration. I was particularly pleased with the justice with which, it seems to me, you have spoken of the comparative merits of Aristotle as a moralist, and cordially coincide with your judgment upon Paley and other modern ethical writers. I need hardly say that I feel much flattered by the way in which you have been pleased to make reference to myself; and I remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

fools and sciolists, but even by good and sensible men, who had been deceived by its pious, hypocritical cant. We have a very distinct recollection of hearing a pastor of a large Presbyterian congregation in a large city say that he considered it one of the most edifying books he ever read. He was astounded when he discovered that its pious phrases were a disguise for the most radical species of infidelity, an infidelity which was not satisfied with denying that the Bible was authenticated as a divine message by sufficient evidence, but asserted and attempted to prove, by reforming Psychology, that any external revelation was an impossibility. In short, the infidelity of the "Philosophy of Religion" was almost identical with that which Henry Rogers so relentlessly demolishes and so mercilessly ridicules in the "Eclipse of Faith" and the "Defence of the Eclipse of Faith." It is indeed no new phase of infidelity. It is as old, at least, as Ammonius Saccas; and Mosheim's account of the Neo-Platonic doctrines reads, in some parts, as if it were intended to describe the modern form of the error. The ancient and the modern sprang from a similar source, Pantheism; and we find in both the same idea of an "absolute" religion, and the same hypocritical use of a phraseology which had been consecrated by the use of Christians to the expression of thoughts and emotions utterly different. None knew better than these deceivers "the fatal force and imposture of words," and they have practised the imposture, from Ammonius down to Morell, with fatal success. Give us any thing to contend with but a pious devil.

The criticism on Morell is divided into two parts. In the *first*, his book is considered as an argument, and the question discussed is: Granting his premises (the truth of his psychology), does the conclusion follow which he seeks to draw? In the *second*, the question is: Is his psychology sound? The *first* is a question of logic; the *second* is a question of philosophy. This whole discussion reveals the author's powers as a reasoner and a thinker more strikingly perhaps than any other of his productions, with the exception perhaps, as to his power as a reasoner, of the work on the Apocrypha, to be afterwards noticed. The first part is a complete and overwhelming logical discomfiture of

Morell. He has not left him an inch of ground to stand on. In the second part, if we do not find anything absolutely new, we find at least a very thorough-going explanation and defence of "the philosophy of common sense" against the German philosophy of the absolute, and against the scheme attempted by Cousin, of conciliation of the German philosophy with the Scotch philosophy of common sense. Here Dr. Thornwell shows himself a profound philosopher, as in the preceding part he had shown himself a masterly logician.

We quote a paragraph or two as a specimen of his manner :

"The philosophy with which Mr. Morell is impregnated is essentially arrogant ; and it is more to it than to him that we ascribe the pretending tone of his work. The pervading consciousness of the weakness and ignorance of men, the diffidence of themselves, the profound impression of the boundlessness of nature and of the limitless range of inquiry which lies beyond the present grasp of our faculties, the humility, modesty, and caution which characterise the writings of the great English masters, will in vain be sought among the leading philosophers of modern Germany and France. Aspiring to penetrate to the very essence of things, to know them in themselves as well as in the laws which regulate their changes and vicissitudes, they advance to the discussion of the sublimest problems of God, the soul, and the universe, with an audacity of enterprise in which it is hard to say whether presumption or folly is most conspicuous. They seem to think that the human faculties are competent to all things, that whatever reaches beyond their compass is mere vanity and emptiness ; that omniscience, by the due use of their favorite organon, may become the attainment of man, as it is the prerogative of God, and that, in the very structure of the mind, the seeds are deposited from which may be developed the true system of the universe."

"Within the limits of legitimate inquiry, we would lay no restrictions upon freedom of thought. All truly great men are conscious of their powers ; and the confidence which they have in themselves inspires the strength, intensity, and enthusiasm which enable them to conceive and to execute purposes worthy of their gifts. To the timid and distrustful, their excursions may often seem bold and presumptuous ; but in the most daring adventures of their genius they are restrained, as if by an instinct, from the visionary projects and chimerical speculations which transcend the sphere of their capacities, as the eagle, in his loftiest flights, never soars beyond the strength of his pinion. Confidence adjusted to the measure of power never degenerates into arrogance. It is the soul of courage, perseverance, and heroic achievement ; it sup-

ports its possessor amid discouragements and obstacles ; it represses the melancholy, languor, and fits of despondency to which the choicest spirits are subject ; it gives steadiness to effort, patience to industry, and sublimity to hope. But when men forget that their capacities are finite, that there are boundaries to human investigation and research, that there are questions which, from the very nature of the mind and the necessary conditions of human knowledge, never can be solved in this sublunary state,—when they are determined to make their understandings the sole and adequate standard of all truth, and presumptuously assume that the end of their line is the bottom of the ocean,—this is intolerable arrogance, the very spirit of Moloch,

* Whose trust was with the Eternal to be deemed,
Equal in strength ; and rather than be less,
Cared not to be at all.'—(Vol. III., Pp. 11. 12.)

The next paper, under the head of "Rationalist Controversy," is entitled "The Office of Reason in regard to Revelation." It was published in June, 1847, as the first article of the first volume of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW. The question which he considers here is not the office of reason in relation to doctrines *known* to be a revelation from God—where, of course, the understanding is simply to believe—but the office of reason where the reality of the revelation remains to be proved and the interpretation of the doctrine to be settled. The general principle is maintained that the competency of reason to judge in any case is the measure of its right. And—a distinction being made in the contents of Scripture betwixt the supernatural or what is strictly revealed, and the natural or what is confirmed but not made known by the divine testimony—it is argued that the office of reason in the supernatural department of revelation may be *positive*, but never can be *negative*, while in the natural it is *negative*, but to a very limited extent, if at all, *positive*. In other words, in the supernatural, reason may prove, but cannot refute—in the natural, she may refute, but cannot establish.

It is not to be supposed that this view of the office of reason would satisfy the infidel. In the first place, a difficulty would be made about the "supernatural" altogether. A professed revelation which contains supernatural elements is self-condemned. But in the second place, granting the supernatural, how shall we draw the line between it and the natural? The death of

Jesus of Nazareth, for example, belongs to the natural, in so far as it is an event in history capable of being established by the same sort of proof as the death of Cæsar or of Brutus. It is supernatural, so far as its *meaning* is concerned, its relations to the government of God and to the salvation of men. So we say and so the Bible teaches. We cannot know who this Jesus is, nor for what end he died, except by a revelation from God. But the infidel and Socinian think that all can be explained upon the principles of human nature and the principles of moral government. In the third place, the natural must not only be consistent with itself and with other natural knowledge, but has a right to demand that the supernatural shall show itself consistent with the natural. Here is the tug of war. It is perfectly plain that the Bible as a *revelation*, as that by which the supernatural contents of a divine message can alone be made known, must show itself to be such to the unbeliever by some external evidence which is palpable to the senses. The testimony of Jesus concerning himself is perfectly conclusive to those who are like-minded with himself. Their souls respond to his testimony readily and joyfully. "Though I bear witness of myself, my testimony is true." Amen! say all his people. But those who are not his people say: "Thou bearest witness of thyself; thy witness is not true" (not valid, not sufficient). The Saviour seems to concede the justness of the demand: "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. There is another that beareth witness of me, . . . the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." The evidence of miracles, therefore, is that which he presents to unbelievers.

This brings us to the *third* paper under the head of "Rationalist Controversy," the paper on Miracles, their Nature, Apologetic worth, and Credibility. It was first published in the *Southern Review* in July, 1857. Its peculiar value lies in the thorough analysis of the nature of testimony and of the conditions of its credibility. The possibility of an event is the sole limit to the credibility of testimony, and the possibility of the miracle is simply the question of the existence of a personal

God. The author furnishes a complete polemic against Rationalism as a method. He extracts it from our Saviour's reply to the Sadducees' question concerning the woman who had seven husbands. The Sadducees argued from *analogy*, from the principle that the unknown must be *like* the known (likelihood, probability); that if there was to be a resurrection-state, it must be like the present, must have relations similar to the present, must have the marriage-relation among others; and, therefore, it would be difficult to determine, in the case presented, whose wife of the seven the woman should be. The Saviour's answer exposes the fallacy of the method. "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God." Ye err in supposing that you are dependent upon analogy for a knowledge of the resurrection-state. You have an altogether different source of information: that of testimony, and the testimony of him alone who knows anything at all about the matter, God. This testimony is contained in the Scriptures which you, Sadducees, profess to receive as the word of God. Testimony does not depend for its validity upon the likelihood of its matter. but upon the competency and credibility of the witness. There is no limit to its credibility but possibility. And if you doubt the possibility of a state in which there shall be no marrying or giving in marriage, but human beings shall be like the angels,—consider "the power of God." This power is a sufficient answer to all objections drawn from the antecedent improbability, unlikelihood of such a state.*

The principles here laid down by the Saviour are exceedingly fruitful in their applications. All arguments from analogy are subject to correction by authentic testimony. All the theories of geologists are subject to correction by the testimony of the Scriptures, if the Scriptures bear any testimony in reference to the matter, and the true meaning of that testimony can be ascertained. Whether *this* application of the principle be allowed or not, the principle itself no sane man will dispute. Nothing can

*The illustrations of Dr. Thornwell's views here employed are taken mainly from his discussion of the same subject in a Baccalaureate Sermon on Matt. xxii. 29, published in this journal in April, 1851.

be idler than a controversy about this or that theory devised to account for certain facts, if credible testimony can be had as to the real historical origin of the phenomena.

Under the head of the "Papal Controversy," we find two discussions: the first on the "Validity of Roman Baptism," and the other on the "Romanist Arguments for the Apocrypha." Our author, like every other man who loves the gospel and knows what Romanism is, judged that system to be the greatest and most dangerous enemy which the gospel has to encounter in this world. He was an ardent patriot, and fully concurred in the opinion of LaFayette that the liberties of this country were in danger from the machinations of Papal priests. The "Syllabus" had not then appeared, in which Rome declares herself the enemy of all modern civilisation; but her whole history had shown that no part of the human race would be tolerated which did not acknowledge its subjection to her authority and was not willing to subserve her schemes of avarice and ambition. Hence he detested Rome with his whole soul, and was prompt to use his great talents in resisting her.

The treatise on the Validity of Roman Baptism originated in a speech made by him in the General Assembly at Cincinnati in 1845 against the validity. The decision of the Assembly in accordance with his views was, no doubt, due to his great speech; and when the decision was attacked by the *Princeton Review*, he felt bound to appear in its defence. The speech and the defence at once gave him great reputation throughout the Church; and Princeton gained nothing in reputation either for ability or learning in the contest with the young Timothy.

The paper adopted by the Assembly is a sort of brief of this article of our author. The principal ground on which the validity of Papal baptism is denied, is, that the sacraments belong to the visible Church, are its ordinances; where there is no Church, there is no baptism; but the Papal body is no Church; *ergo*, its baptism is no baptism. The General Assembly, in pronouncing Rome to be no Church of Christ, simply followed in the track of the Reformers. But in deducing the conclusion

from this position, that Roman baptism was not valid, they went further than the Reformers, and, we may add, were more logically consistent. We are constrained to admit that our author does not make out his case as against Princeton upon this particular point. Turretin, we apprehend, expressed the common view when he said that in Rome the sacrament of baptism was preserved "*integer quoad substantiam.*" (L. 18, Q. 14, ¶ 3.) So also in L. 19, Q. 18, he decides that the true doctrine concerning baptism remains in that body, as to its essence, and that therefore baptism administered in Rome is to be considered valid and not to be repeated.* This indeed was the counterpart of the Roman doctrine itself from the time of Stephen in the third century down; and the position of his great antagonist, Cyprian, who denied the validity of heretical baptism, was given up by the North African Church in Augustine's time. As before intimated, however, we think the position of our own Church more consistent, a position it had assumed as early as 1835, as to the question whether the Papal body is a Church, and precisely analogous to the position it assumed in 1814, as to the Unitarian body and its ordinances. Within the last few years it has taken a similar attitude as to the Campbellite body. The Church, in pronouncing this judgment, is of course not to be understood as denying that any members of these communions are saved. It simply affirms that they are destitute of the notes or marks of a visible Church.

This treatise of Dr. Thornwell is well worthy of attentive study, not only in its bearings upon the question of the validity of Roman baptism, but as a masterly discussion of Justification and Sanctification, the Water and the Blood. The denial of these by Rome furnishes the most terrible indictment against

*Turretin, in the 14th paragraph of this Question, gives three reasons why the baptism of the Papists is not to be "iterated:" 1. That the essence of the sacrament remains among them. 2. That its efficacy does not depend on the heretical administrator, but on Christ. 3. Because there are some remains of a Church in the Papacy; now baptism belongs to the Church, etc. He seems to feel that the Papacy must be in some sense acknowledged to be a Church, or its baptism must be pronounced invalid.

her. She has abolished the gospel; and those who are sayed within her pale are saved in spite of her.

The history of the origin of the other treatise needs not be recounted here. Its beginning was "accidental," as the beginning of many great works has been, or has been called. It is sufficient to say that a controversy begun in Baltimore was taken up in South Carolina by Bishop Lynch (then plain Mr. Lynch) of the Papal body. Pugnacity is a trait not unexampled among the priests in that State. We remember a famous instance of a controversy there, concerning the existence and authority of the "Tax Book of the Roman Chancery," an infamous production of Popery, in which all imaginable and unimaginable sins are set down, with the prices in money opposite, at which they may be committed. Bishop England was the champion on the one side, and the late Dr. Fuller of the Baptist Church, on the other. This controversy was transferred to Baltimore, or rather was *settled* there by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, in a single article against Bishop England, which he never, so far as we know, attempted to answer. Both these priests were a little unfortunate in having adversaries who were not only too much for them, but were perhaps the ablest men in the American Church. Certain it is, that the work of demolition performed by Breckinridge and Thornwell was complete.

The work on the Apocrypha was published in 1844, before the author had completed his thirty-second year. Critics who were not specially friendly to him, acknowledged their amazement at the learning displayed. The first and only separate edition was full of errata. The author was at a great distance from the press, and the proofs were badly read, though read by one of the most learned men in the city of New York. The errors, however, were chiefly in the Greek and Latin notes, and have no doubt been corrected by the painstaking editors of the Collection now before us. The title—"Romanist Arguments for the Apocrypha Discussed"—is a very modest one, and conveys a very inadequate idea of the range and completeness of the discussion. The author's mind was of such a cast that he could not be satisfied, like most controversialists, with merely answering the

arguments or refuting the positions of his antagonist. He could never be content with merely "Thornwell *vs.* A. P. F." He must go to the bottom of the subject, and produce a work which should have a permanent value, independent altogether of the occasion which gave rise to it, and which determined its force. He who reads this work will find that it is not only a discussion of Romanist arguments for the Apocrypha, but an able treatise on the Canon and a crushing refutation of Popery.

IV. We come now to consider the "Ecclesiastical" writings of our author, as contained in the fourth volume of this Collection. His influence as an ecclesiastic upon the Church at large was more direct than his influence as a theologian. As a theologian, he could scarcely have been said to have any peculiar views, any views in which he did not have the sympathy of the great mass of the Church. It was not so with his views of the nature, polity, mission of the Church. The organs of a very large and respectable party pronounced many of his positions to be mere "whimsies," and the same section continues to act upon the views he opposed as unscriptural and dangerous, as hampering and limiting the liberty which Christ had bought for his people, as compelling them to walk by rules, like Jews, when it was their privilege to act upon "general principles," like freemen. We proceed to notice some features of his ecclesiasticism.

1. He insisted upon the rigorous observance and application of the great principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice. He believed thoroughly the doctrine laid down in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession, that "the whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture," while he admitted fully, what the Confession also admits, that "there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be

observed." He urged that the liberty of the people of God was not a license to walk in the light of their own eyes, restrained only by the prohibitions of the Word, but that it consisted in being governed by the Word only, and in being "free from the commandments of men;" that the discretionary power contended for by the other side was a power to enslave the Lord's freemen, it being a power to make laws which the people were bound to obey; that this had been the history of the exercise of such a power, especially, on a grand scale in the Papacy and in the Church of England; and that the martyrs had contended against it even unto blood.

It may seem strange that we should seem, by implication at least, to charge eminent ministers in our own Church, who have solemnly adopted the Confession of Faith, with denying its doctrine on so fundamental a point. We do not mean to assert that they intend to deny it. We do not impeach their integrity. But we all know that even great men may hold doctrines unconsciously which cannot be reconciled. There have been few greater minds than that of Augustine, and few teachers have controlled the thinking of the Church as he has done. Yet Augustine held two sets of views, which were utterly at variance with each other; his views of grace, on the one hand, and his views of the Church and the Sacraments on the other. There was no conflict in his own mind. But the legacy he bequeathed to the Church in his writings contained both, and the conflict was obliged to come. It did come. The history of the Middle Age is, in great part, a history of this conflict. The Thomists represented the one set, and the Scotists the other set of doctrines. After the Reformation, which was itself a triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church, we find the conflict revived in the sixteenth century, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, and again in the seventeenth, between the Jansenists and the Jesuits. It does not follow, therefore, that because a great and good man holds the truth in the main, he may not hold serious error, which may be all the more pernicious by virtue of the reputation he has acquired in the exposition and defence of the truth.

We only mean to assert, therefore, in the case before us, that the brethren on the other side give such a latitude of meaning to the word "circumstances" in the Confession, as virtually to deny the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule, and to invest the Church with a discretionary power, limited only by the prohibitions of the word. The "general principles" by which they contend the Church is to be governed in matters of polity and worship, seem to be "regulative" only, principles which define only ends to be aimed at, or conditions to be observed; while the other side contends that the general principles are "constitutive" also, determining the concrete forms in which those ends are to be realised. The Scriptures, for example, not only lay down the regulative principle of the parity of the ministry, but they give us also the constitutive principle that the jurisdiction of the ministers is to be exercised jointly with elders who are not ministers, in courts called Presbyteries. Again, according to one view, the "circumstances" of the Confession are inseparable adjuncts of the action as such, and so surround it (*circum stant*) that they cannot be separated from it. According to the other view, circumstances are attending adjuncts which may be separated from it, but which need not be separated, if they are not forbidden in the Word. Of circumstances in the first sense, we have an example in the appointment of time and place for the assemblies of the Church, the use of Moderators, Committees, etc. *Every* assembly, sacred or civil, implies an agreement as to the time and place of meeting. *Every deliberative* assembly must have a Chairman and Committees, in order to accomplish its business with decorum and dispatch. Of circumstances in the second sense, we have an example in a liturgy, or in instrumental music. Public prayer can be performed, and was performed for two centuries, at least, without a liturgy; the service of praise for nine centuries, at least, without an instrument of music.

This statement will remind our readers of the Puritan controversy in the Church of England. That was mainly a controversy about these very circumstances, in connexion with the great principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule. The

“general principle” insisted on by the Puritan leaders was that nothing be added to the Rule; that the Bible was the charter, the constitution, the statute-book of the kingdom of Christ; that all which was not granted was for this very reason to be deemed prohibited; that all additions to the Word, if not explicitly prohibited, are at least implicitly prohibited in the general command that “nothing be added.” This was the ground upon which Dr. Thornwell took his stand in the controversy about “Boards;” denying that a board was a “circumstance,” in the sense of our Confession, and asserting that it was an unauthorised addition to the law given to the Church for doing its work.

We have dwelt the longer on this position of Dr. Thornwell, on account of its fundamental importance considered in itself, and on account of its importance in his own ecclesiology and churchmanship. The intrinsic importance of the principle cannot be overrated. It is a question whether the Church shall walk by faith in her great Head, or in the light of her own wisdom; whether she shall depend for success in her work on a worldly policy, or on the ordinances of Christ, administered by the power of the Holy Ghost. There have always been “two manner of people” in the bowels of the Church: a people who insist upon walking according to the rule given of God—“strict constructionists,” and a people who insist on the right to make additions to the rule as exigencies may demand—“latitudinarians;” a people who testify that “our faith must not stand in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God,” and a people who contend that our faith must stand in the wisdom of man as well as in the power of God. We believe “the Presbyterian Church in the United States” to be as pure as any other on earth; but even in *her* bowels these two manner of people are found. In how many of *her* congregations do the people humble themselves before God with fasting and prayer for the quickening power of the Holy Ghost, when the ordinances of Christ seem barren? In how many do they resort for help to inventions of their own? Is there no congregation in which the people trust more in the breath of a bellows than in the breath of the Spirit? None in which fairs and festivals are more relied upon for revenue than

upon the grace of God in the hearts of his people? How many Presbyterians, not to say Protestants, act habitually on the principle that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is their religion? We do not doubt that the hopes of final victory in this country and in England, which inspire the Papal hierarchy, are built upon the fact that the most pronounced Protestants are to so great an extent conforming themselves to the principles and maxims which have made the Papal communion what it is. Papal Rome was not built in a day. *Nemo repente fit turpissimus*. We are very far from being idolaters like the Romanists—a thousand voices will exclaim—and we do not intend to be. So, doubtless, the Church of Rome would have said at the close of the second century. But behold it now! and ponder the wisdom of the maxim, "*Obsta principiis*."

2. This principle of the Bible, and the Bible alone, led Dr. Thornwell to his position as to the nature and scope of the Church's mission. An opinion or feeling existed to a considerable extent, if it might not be called a prevailing opinion, that every good thing, good in the sense of conducive to the welfare of man in this life as well as in the life to come, fell within the proper scope of the Church's mission. She was to be a great philanthropist, as well as a witness for God and a preacher of salvation. She was to patronise every association which had for its object the relief of human distress, or the promotion of human comfort. She was to patronise even the government of the civil commonwealth, direct it or correct it, if necessary or practicable, since the temporal welfare of men was so dependent upon the character of its administration. Hence, resolutions of the General Assembly commending temperance societies, colonisation societies, and what-not. Hence resolutions condemning the institution of slavery. Hence, at last, resolutions asserting Federalism to be the true theory of the Constitution, and condemning the theory of "States' Rights."

Now, Dr. Thornwell did not deny that some of these things might be good things. Much less did he deny that the mission of the Church was a philanthropic mission; that the results of a faithful fulfilment of it would promote in the highest degree the

temporal welfare of men. He was a philanthropist of the highest style and of the most ardent sort; not a *humanitarian* philanthropist, but a *divine*. He held that the highest welfare of men was subordinate to the glory of God; subordinate, not hostile or opposed; subordinate, yet in harmony with it, moving in the same plane with it. The Church's *sole* function was to be a witness for God, to be an expounder and administrator of his revealed will, both law and gospel. She had no vocation to interfere with any human institution directly, but to declare the law for all moral relations, and to condemn all immoral. She had no vocation to manage benevolent societies, but to leaven the whole community with the principles of the gospel, which, while they are "glory to God," are also "good will to men." She had no commission to direct or to correct the political administration, but so to saturate the community with the spirit of Jesus Christ that magistrates would rule with justice, truth, and moderation, and the people would obey the laws with cheerfulness and for conscience's sake. He held that this legitimate influence of the Church was the more powerful for being *indirect*; that history would confirm this view; that in the so-called theocracies (New England, for example), where the Church was made τὸ πᾶν, the Church became corrupt by handling matters which were secular and did not belong to her; and, having become corrupt, lost her influence upon the community for good, and exerted an influence for evil.

It required no small nerve to maintain this view of the Church's mission. He would, of course, be charged with being unfriendly to colonisation, or temperance, and so on. But he had the sublime courage which the possession of God's truth, and the conviction that it *is* His truth, impart. He testified, whether men heard or forbore. If these principles had been acted on by the Church, how much sin and misery would have been prevented! But most men seem to be incapable of comprehending principles. Statesmen like Edmund Burke, and ecclesiastics like Thornwell, who, by the constitution of their minds and their intellectual training, are "seers," do not frequently appear. The vast majority must wait to see how a principle works, must wait for

results, in order to make up their minds. The process of reasoning in the minds of enthusiastic managers of societies is something like this: Whoever is opposed to *this* way of doing the good thing, is opposed to the good thing itself. You are opposed to *this* way of doing, etc. *Ergo, etc.* Others who are not managers, and who have no interest, or very little, in the object or the means, take some credit to themselves for voting to recommend it, and put on an air of pious surprise that any people professing to be good should oppose so benevolent an institution. Human nature is a bundle of contradictions; but in any large body of men, we may generally count, with a considerable degree of certainty, upon their showing more indignation when the wisdom of their own inventions is questioned, than when the ordinances of God are violated, provided these ordinances have not a *very* obvious bearing for good upon their temporal welfare.

3. Another position of Dr. Thornwell intimately connected with the foregoing, but a position not at all peculiar to himself, was one which concerned the relation of the civil to the ecclesiastical power, or of the State to the Church. The true doctrine was expounded very clearly by him in "the Letter of the General Assembly of the Confederate States of 1861 to the Churches of Christ throughout the World." We do not propose to dwell upon it here, as there is no difference of judgment about it theoretically in this country; certainly none in our own Church, and, we believe, none in any other. The Papal body, of course, abhors the American doctrine, and is plotting to subjugate the civil power to itself. This it has recently itself proclaimed in "the Syllabus;" and the Syllabus is simply a reiteration of the principles avowed by Rome since the days of Hildebrand, and before. We do not recognise that body as a Church at all, but as a political empire, like the Roman which preceded it; with this difference only, that the old Pagan maintained its authority and extended its dominion by the iron hand only; the Papal by ghostly means always, and by the iron hand when possible.

4. It is only in connexion with another position of Dr. Thornwell, that we have noticed at all his view of the relations of Church and State. The position referred to is contained in a

“Memorial” presented to the first General Assembly of our Church held in Augusta, Georgia, in the year 1861. It may be found in the fourth volume of his Writings, pages 549 *et seq.* From the doctrine and purpose of this memorial, we are obliged to enter our decided and emphatic dissent. If our readers have had the patience to read this article thus far, they will find no difficulty in believing us when we say that we record our dissent with the greatest reluctance. Yet it was in *his* school that we learned to call no man master. To him, if to any man, the line of Horace might be applied—

“Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri;”

and the independence which he exercised himself, he inculcated on others. In expressing the different views which we hold, we are not conscious of doing anything inconsistent with the profound veneration we feel for his memory. Indeed, we have a strong impression that we are not dissenting from a view of Dr. Thornwell's which he had long and carefully considered, but from one taken up and presented under the impulse of a glowing patriotism. Next to the interests of the Church, that which lay nearest to his heart, was the interests of the infant Confederacy. He longed to have it baptized with the name of Christ and dedicated to his service. If he were now alive, and could see who they are in the Northern States who are advocating his doctrine, we believe he would at least give the subject a thorough reconsideration. But this is more than enough of apology, even if any at all were called for.

The amendment he proposed to be made in the Constitution of the Confederate States (to the section providing for liberty of conscience), was in these words: “Nevertheless, we, the people of these Confederate States, distinctly acknowledge our responsibility to God, and the supremacy of his Son, Jesus Christ, as King of kings and Lord of lords; and hereby ordain that no law shall be passed by the Congress of these Confederate States inconsistent with the will of God as revealed in the Holy Scriptures.”

It is impossible for us to go into an argument here to show

that such an amendment to the Constitution would be utterly inconsistent with the theory of the relation of Church and State, as held in the United States and held by Dr. Thornwell himself; that it is a virtual confounding of the spheres of the two powers; and that its inevitable effect would be the infringement of the liberty of conscience. We content ourselves with simply recording our dissent and protest. The reader who wishes to see some of the grounds on which such an amendment would be resisted, may consult the article on "Church and State" in this journal for October, 1863 (Vol. XVI., No. 2). The views of that article have been immensely strengthened by events which have occurred since it was written; events which, we are firmly persuaded, would have led Dr. Thornwell to recoil from his position, or at least to give it a careful reconsideration.

5. We pass from this the only unpleasant part of our task to consider next his views of Presbyterianism. These are contained in the papers which his editors have published under the heads of "Church Officers" and "Church Operations" in the fourth volume. We must be brief in our notices of them, as the space allotted to us is almost exhausted.

And *first*, as to the relation of all Church officers to the Church itself, he held that they were *representatives*; that the rulers were representatives as to rule, and the deacons representatives as to their functions, the custody and distribution of the revenues. This view is opposed to the view, on the one hand, of Papists and High Church Prelatists, and, on the other, to the view of Congregationalism as distinct from Independency.*

* The terms Congregationalism and Independency are often used interchangeably. But when distinguished, the former has reference to the *subject (materia in qua)* of Church power: the Congregationalists holding that the power, both as to its *being* and in its *exercise*, is lodged in "the brotherhood;" the latter having reference to the nature of the unity of the Church: the Independents holding that every congregation stately worshipping in one place is a *complete church*, and therefore denying the authority of synods, or of all courts, above that which governs a single congregation. All Congregationalists are Independents, but all Independents are not Congregationalists. Independency is the genus, Congregationalism a species or variety. The Independents of Savoy (in

The Papists hold that all power, both as to its being and its exercise (in the language of the schools, both in "the first act" and "the second act"), is lodged in the clergy alone. The Congregationalists lodge it, in both acts, in the brotherhood alone. Hence their sameness of views as to the nature of the privilege of election of officers—both holding that election belongs to the power of government. But they draw very different conclusions from the doctrine that election belongs to the power of government. The argument of the Papist, as stated by Bellarmine, is: "The power of election belongs to government. It belongs not to the people to govern. *Ergo*, it belongs not to the people to elect." The argument of the Congregationalist is: "The power of election belongs to government. The power of election belongs to the people. *Ergo*, the power of government belongs to the people." The Presbyterian of Dr. Thornwell's school denies the principle which is common to both syllogisms, and asserts that election belongs only to the process by which the government is constituted: "*Pertineat ad gubernationem et regimen constituendum, non tamen est actus regiminis aut gubernationis.*" According to the view of Popery, the ministry is a *caste*, having no life in common with the people. According to the Congregational view, the ministry is simply the *proxy* of the people. According to Presbyterianism, the ministry is the *representative* of the people. The difference between a proxy and a representative is, that the former merely obeys the people and carries out their wishes, while it is the duty of the latter to consult the interests of the people, whether in accordance with their wishes or not. The eye sees *for* the body, while it is the body that sees *by* the eye.

The occasion for bringing forward the representative character of Church officers was twofold. It was asserted, or strongly insinuated as to the minister of the Word, that he was not a representative of the people; that he was a member of a sort of caste,

London) were not Congregationalists; at least their leader, John Owen, was not, as anybody may see by consulting his "True Nature of a Gospel Church." The Independents were strong in the Westminster Assembly, the Congregationalists were weak.

holding his place in the higher courts by a tenure independent of the people. It was asserted, or strongly insinuated, that the ruling elder was a representative of the people only in the sense of appearing for them as a proxy where it was inconvenient for them to appear *in propria persona*. In other words, it seemed to be attempted, in theory at least, to convert our government into a mixture of prelacy and democracy. In opposition to this mongrel government, our author and the brethren on his side contended that Presbyterian government was a government by assemblies, consisting of presbyters, chosen rulers of the Church; and these of two sorts, teaching and ruling presbyters, equal in rank or order, but differing in function; both representatives of the people, the one class more directly (like the members of the lower House of Congress), the other class indirectly (like the Senators of the upper House). According to this view, the ruling elder is called "the representative of the people" in our book, not as asserting that he is the only representative (to the exclusion of the minister), but for the same reason that the members of the lower House of Congress are called "representatives"—because that term is an adequate description of their office. The members of the lower House are representatives of the people as to law-making, and nothing more. The Senate consists of chosen rulers, who are representatives of the people as to law-making, and something more, to wit, as to certain "executive" functions.

2. This brings us to another question between the same parties: "What is the meaning of *presbyter* in the New Testament?" Is it synonymous with preacher or minister of the word? Dr. Thornwell denied, the brethren of the other part affirmed. The importance of the question is very obvious. If *presbyter* means preacher and nothing else, then there are no elders but preachers; then the officer known as "the ruling elder" is not entitled to the name; he is no *presbyter* or elder, has no proper place in a *Presbytery*, which is a college of *presbyters*; he is a mere proxy or deputy of the people, to make known to the *presbyters* (preachers) in *Presbytery* assembled what the humble wishes of the people may be. His *jus divinum*

is clean gone. He has no rights given him of God as ruling elder which the church is bound to respect. It was held that a Presbytery might be legally constituted without his presence; and that for him to assume the right to lay on his hands in the ordination of a minister because the Bible and our Book said a minister should be ordained by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, was sheer audacity. He had no such right on another account: "*Nemo dare potest quod non habet;*" "Like begets like."* Any number of wise saws might be quoted to show that a man who is not a preacher cannot make, or help make, a preacher; much less can a ruling elder, who is not even a presbyter or proper member of a Presbytery, help in such a work. All these plausibilities were blown to atoms by the arguments of Breckinridge and Thornwell. It was established beyond contradiction, that the meaning of presbyter was not "preacher," but "ruler;" that preachers are called presbyters, not because they preach, but because they rule; and, therefore, that there may be presbyters who do not preach. It was further shown, that in accordance with these views of the meaning of the term, the Apostolic Church had rulers who did not preach, and that this feature of the apostolic polity lingered in parts of the Church (North Africa, for instance) as late, at least, as the middle of the third century.† The right divine of the ruling elder having been established, it was very easy to show that his hands would not profane a minister's head in the ceremony of ordination, or interrupt the current of spiritual electricity as it was passing from the hands of the ministers, by showing that the elders of the whole congregation ordained of old the tribe of Levi, and that there was no current of spiritual electricity to flow or to be interrupted.

These discussions revealed the fact, that no small amount of

* Why not quote also, Dr. Thornwell suggests, from the parody of Johnson, "Who drives fat oxen must himself be fat"?

† Calvin says in his Commentary on 1 Timothy v. 17, after noticing that the passage implies that there were then two kinds of presbyters, and that all were not ordained to preach, "Ambrose (Bishop of Milan, †397) laments that this custom had become obsolete by the negligence of the teachers, or rather by their pride, because they wished to be eminent alone."

prelatical error still lingered even in the Presbyterian Church. This fact was specially manifest in the denial of the right of the ruling elder to lay on hands in the ordination of a minister. Ordination was practically treated as a sacrament. The administration of it, therefore, belonged, like that of other sacraments, to the minister of the word, and "a layman" like the ruling elder could take no part in it. Dr. Thornwell did great service to the Church in recalling its attention to the true nature of ordination, as simply a formal recognition and publication of the fact, that God, in the judgment of the Church, expressed by one of its courts, had called the ordained man to the office. There was nothing in the ceremony of ordination, therefore, which made it improper for the ruling elder to take part in it. Ordination does not make a man a minister, as the prelatical doctrine affirms. It is an act of a *court*, sitting under the law of Christ, which prescribes the qualifications of a minister, and finding a verdict according to the law and the evidence. It is an act precisely analogous to that of a court admitting a person to the communion of the Church. The law of Christ prescribes the qualifications of a church member. The court inquires whether A B has these qualifications; and if it finds that he has, the verdict is, that God gives him a right to communion. The Session does not make him a member, or give him a right to communion. It simply recognises the fact that the right has been given him of God.

3. Thus far, two distinctive features of Presbyterian polity have been noticed: *first*, its governing by parliamentary assemblies of representatives; *secondly*, its representatives being all presbyters, but of two sorts—teaching presbyters, and presbyters who rule without teaching. One more feature remains to complete the view; and that is the mode in which it realises the idea of the unity of the Church. The idea of the unity is realised by the elasticity of the representative system. Its method is opposed to that of Rome, which also attempts to realise the unity, as the principle itself of the unity is opposed to Independency. As against Independency, Presbyterianism holds that two or more congregations may be united under one government. This is

the principle. The extent of its application, or exemplification, is "a circumstance" common to human societies, which is to be regulated "by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word." If there was but one congregation of saints in the world, the presbytery governing that congregation would be the parliament of the whole Church. Let the congregations be increased a hundred or a thousand-fold, the unity of the whole would be represented by a parliament composed of presbyters from the parts. On the other hand, the *method* of realising the unity differs as widely from the method adopted by Rome as the principle differs from the principle of Independency. Rome realises the unity by a *graded* hierarchy composed of officers of different ranks and orders, the pyramid being capped by a supreme pontiff at Rome, who embraces within himself all powers and rights, and delegates, as he pleases, powers and rights to be exercised by all the officers below him. Presbyterianism realises the unity by a series of courts composed, all of them, of exactly the same officers, the highest court being, of course, the representative of the unity of the whole. These courts are the organs through which the one body acts. The life is in the whole and in every part; the life of the whole is in every part; and the life of the whole controls the life of every part. The judges of the lower courts, in some of the States of this Union, constitute "in bank," a court of appeals; but the same commonwealth appears in all the courts, confronting the criminal by the indictment, as an offender against its majesty, alike in the court of original jurisdiction and in the court of last resort. But let it be well observed, the General Assembly and the Session are composed of the same elements. Every ruling elder who sits in the Assembly belongs to some church session. "Of such a council as this," says Milton, "every parochial consistency is a right homogeneous and constituting part; being in itself a little synod, and towards a general assembly, moving upon her own basis in an even and firm progression, as those smaller squares in battle unite in one great cube, the main phalanx, an emblem of truth and steadfastness." (Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty, Chapter 6.) The Presbyterian

method of realising the unity of the Church protects the rights of its private members; the Roman method destroys them. Rome is a great iron wheel of which individuals and tribunals are only spokes. Presbyterianism is a wheel which contains within it a multitude of wheels, each having a life and movement of its own, yet all instinct with the spirit of the living creature, which is in the wheel.

We are now prepared for Dr. Thornwell's definition of Presbyterianism—the only satisfactory definition we have ever met with: "Presbyterianism is the government of the Church by parliamentary assemblies, composed of two classes of presbyters, and of presbyters only, and so arranged as to realise the visible unity of the whole Church."

Here we make an end. It has been a great delight to us to follow the track of the illustrious thinker whose writings we have been reviewing. We trust we have not failed to impress the reader, who has followed us to the end, with the conviction that there are treasures of thought in Dr. Thornwell's works which will amply repay the most assiduous study. Our exhortation to all, and especially to all students of theology, may be summed up in the line of Horace in reference to the Greek authors,—

"Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna."

ARTICLE II.

THE MAINE LAW.

By the above term is designated that prohibitory temperance law which was passed in the Legislature of the State of Maine, in the year 1851. For more than twenty years the subject of the use of alcoholic drinks had been warmly discussed, numerous Temperance Societies had been formed, and yet the evil was but little abated. With some the moral and social evils were chiefly dwelt upon, and moral suasion was the only force they would resort to as a remedy ; others, fully agreeing with them as to the evils, went one step further, to show that intemperance and moderate drinking were together destroying the wealth of the State. At the commencement of the century, Maine was believed to have untold wealth in her vast and noble forests of pine. The winters of the hard-working and stalwart farmers are uniformly given to "logging," and the summers to their farms. This winter industry was prosecuted with amazing energy, and the magnificent forests rapidly disappeared. By the middle of the century "logging" had become difficult and comparatively meagre in its results. The noblest forests from all the larger streams had been cut away, and the timber must be dragged over greater distances and to the smaller streams. Now what had become of all this vast wealth ? The fact was undeniable that the forests were gone and the State was none the richer. Yet the men of Maine had performed the labor and received the money. The truth at length burst upon the common sense of the people. The money had gone down their throats ; or, rather, they had drunk up their noble forests. Every man, and many a woman, had swallowed hundreds of pine trees six feet in diameter and sixty feet to the first limb. Business men of the largest experience and widest observation, attested that the Maine forests had not in fact brought wealth to the State. They had disappeared, and might as well have never existed, so far as Maine herself was concerned.

But there were thirteen distilleries in the State, doing an immense business, besides all that was imported from abroad. Al-

most every store sold intoxicating liquors by the glass or by the jug. The Temperance Societies could not stem the tide. The crime, the misery, the poverty, the desolated and wretched households, all seemed to demand that the tempter should be put out of the way. The pulpit, the press, and the platform, lifted up their mighty voices against it. They denied that the true principles of liberty secured to this nefarious industry the right to prey upon all the most sacred interests and rights of society. The liquor interest saw the rising of the impending storm, and armed for the fight. All that money and rhetoric and false reasoning could, was brought into requisition. Sympathisers from Massachusetts made common cause with them, and opened both their mouths and their purses. But the people of Maine have a way of looking at a thing pretty steadily and deliberately, and then deciding for themselves whether to do it or not. They are eminently a practical people; and when they clearly see a possible good to be attained, they go for it without being at all frightened by precedents or theories. After twenty years of discussion and fruitless experiment with license laws, they resolved to put the hateful thing away.

They had an indefatigable, valiant, and enthusiastic leader in the Hon. Neal Dow of Portland, and in 1851 the prohibitory law was passed. The following is the text of the first Section, and it shows with sufficient clearness the object in view :

“SECTION 1st. No person shall be allowed at any time to manufacture or sell, by himself, his clerk, servant, or agent, directly or indirectly, any spirituous or intoxicating liquors, or any mixed liquors, a part of which is intoxicating, except as hereinafter provided.”

Section 2d provides for the appointment of an agent on salary, with defined powers and limitations, to sell alcohol and other liquors for medical and mechanical purposes alone.

Other Sections (there are 36 in all) define the mode of prosecutions, the duties of Sheriffs, the penalties and fines to be inflicted, the powers and duties of municipal governments with regard to the traffic and to the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, so that any decent execution of the law closes all dram-shops, all tippling places, all bars at hotels, and drives the use of rum,

whiskey, and all their relations, into secret places. Any man can import from another State any quantity he pleases for his own use, but he cannot sell it, and all pretence at giving it away is futile in law.

Now how was this very stringent law received by the people of the State? Could it be executed? We answer, a majority of the people were ready for it. The matter had been earnestly and universally discussed. Not a township or village in the State had remained indifferent. Earnest men had canvassed the State many times during the fifteen years preceding the law. There was a general feeling that something more efficient must be done to save the State from the ravages of intemperance, and when the law was imposed, the great body of the farming population welcomed it, and there was no difficulty in its execution. Among them it was impossible to evade it. A vast majority were determined it should have a full and fair trial. Those who attempted to evade soon found it a losing business. Ten dollars fine and costs for the first offence; twenty dollars and costs for the second; twenty dollars, costs, and a month's imprisonment for the third, and so on. Moreover, liquors in store were forfeited. Against such a law no man could long make a stand, and all the liquor shops disappeared throughout the State.

In two respects, the effect was marvellous. The first and greatest was the sudden disappearance of three-fourths of the drunkenness which had afflicted so many families. There being no dram-shops, no place of gathering, of "treating," no daily temptation thrown in the way, the greater part would not take the trouble to obtain their rum or whiskey in quantity from abroad. Thousands of intemperate men rejoiced that the rum holes were out of the way, and they could now easily return to temperate habits. Of course some would find the means of intemperate indulgence still; but in all the rural districts the law fully answered the expectations of its friends, with regard to the diminution of drunkenness. The second surprising effect was in the diminution of crime. Some of the county jails became absolutely empty. This was signally true of Oxford County, one of the largest counties of the State, and having much terri-

tory sparsely inhabited. It was also true of Penobscot, Kennebec, Franklin, and York. Their jails were entirely empty. In Cumberland County, the most populous county in the State, there were but five prisoners four months after the passage of the law, and three of these were liquor dealers, who were imprisoned for violation of the prohibitory law. This jail had been usually overcrowded. In many places pauperism has entirely ceased, and in all the work-houses and alms-houses have been greatly lightened of their heavy burdens.

In the cities the law could be more successfully evaded by fraud or force, but even in them the change for the better was very marked.

The liquor interests in the mean time were organising for a general move against the law. The question fell into party politics, and after five years of successful execution, the law was revoked, and the licensed dram-shop again appeared in every village, almost in every street. The liquor interest had won what they called "a glorious victory." They had "buried the Maine Law so deep the archangel's trump would never rouse it."

But the truth was, their triumph brought upon them their worst defeat. They rushed into the liquor business as though all the people of Maine would now rise and drink revenge for their five years of abstinence. The people, however, were soon immeasurably disgusted with the results. Rescued men returned to drunken habits. Homes that had become peaceful and happy, were again scenes of unnatural cruelty and outrage. Fathers and mothers saw their sons yielding to temptation, crime multiplied, and disorder followed upon years of peace and quiet.

But the people again dethroned the liquor lords. They had had enough of poverty and crime at their hands. But for them the State would never have lost its noble forests, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, without being one penny the richer. But for them, the poor and miserable homes of the State would have been abodes of happiness and comfort. But for them, many thousands would never have gone down to drunkards' graves or the culprit's disgrace and doom, filling the hearts of their friends with shame and sorrow, and the hearts of their households with

anguish unutterable. The people, always slow to rise, were at length aroused, were rather forced to view the subject in relation to their own immediate and best interests, and they resolved to put away the accursed thing forever. The law was reëstablished with more stringent provisions than before, and it has become much more effective in the cities. It is probably at this day as well executed in them as any law is. There is far more private drinking in the cities than in the country. But this the law does not profess to reach. It stops the manufacture and sale. Any man may still get his demijohn or cask of liquor from Boston, and if he uses it in his own house in a legitimate way, nobody will disturb him. But if he forms a club and *gives it away*, the Sheriff will take him and his liquor in charge. Clubs formed in that way have recently been broken up in the city of Bangor.

The State has now had twenty-seven years' experience of this law. It was established in 1851, and no exception is to be made for the short time during which it was abolished, for that period constituted a very necessary part of the experience.

What now is its position? Has it grown stronger or weaker? This is a question of great significance. It is supposed that a people of ordinary intelligence is capable of comprehending the drift, tendency, and value of a law in the course of twenty-seven years. It is a simple trial, involving their common social and daily interests. If they cannot become acquainted with one of their own simple laws in twenty-seven years, so as to form a safe judgment upon it, pray how long a time should they have? One generation has nearly passed away in the mean time, transmitting its views and experience as it goes along.

Now it is capable of unquestionable proof that the Maine Law was never so firmly fixed in the convictions, judgments, and determination of the people as at present. Both political parties alike espouse it. This is very nearly a demonstration. For if either party saw the least hope of gaining more votes than it would lose by assailing it, who believes it would be unassailed a single week? At this day both parties accept it as a foregone conclusion that whoever attacks it digs his own political grave.

Another proof is, that every Legislature does something to make the law more efficient in its working and in all points conformable to sound and efficient legislation.

But a third and final proof is, that the attacks upon the law are outside of the State. There are many benevolent individuals, travellers, or residents of neighboring States, who are distressed about this law. We possess quite a collection of attacks upon it from outsiders. They are of two directly opposite views. One class is distressed because the law is so severely executed. It is impossible for a decent man, a gentleman, to obtain the liquor he needs. He must call a doctor and persuade him to give a medical prescription for it, and then ten to one the city agent, who alone can sell it, is not in his office. The poor thirsty traveller leaves the place with curses, but fares no better at the next. He indignantly claims the right to drink when he pleases, as much as he pleases, and to be as drunk or as sober as he pleases. The people of Maine reply, No, not by our permission. A drunken man is either a fool or a madman. Both are dangerous to themselves or others, in different ways. We will not allow you to become either on our soil, so far as we can legitimately prevent it.

But another class take the opposite ground, and ridicule the law as wholly inoperative, as worse than nothing. They report more drunkenness in Maine than ever before, and are quite concerned about our morals. According to them, the Maine Law has ruined the business of the State, driven away capital, and caused a vast increase of intemperance!

Now both these opposite representations cannot be true. If it be so difficult to obtain a glass of liquor that travellers bitterly complain, the State must be very far from general intemperance.

But there are perfectly reliable statistics which decide the question. It is admitted by all that secret distilling can hardly exist. The people very generally determined that it should not exist; and looking upon all who would engage in it as low, vile, lawless men, who would also steal and murder, but for fear and cowardice, the detection and summary condemnation to fine, imprisonment, and confiscation, are too certain to allow of its existence in any force.

Now, what do the most trustworthy statistics show with regard to the effect of the Maine Law in Maine?

First, as to *its open, authorized sale*: Before the passage of the prohibitory law, there were 2,000 places where rum and other liquors were sold, amounting to \$10,000,000 annually. Now there are about 100 town agencies, and their sales amount to \$100,000 annually, for medical and mechanical purposes; about fifteen cents per inhabitant, as shown by ex-Governor Dingley. The population of the State was then 450,000, and the cost of intoxicating liquors was \$22.22 to each inhabitant.

But to get at the real facts, we must add the private use and surreptitious sale, which are matters of conjecture. Few would place them so high as \$1,000,000. The population is now 625,000. This would give us \$1.75 to each inhabitant, against \$22.22.

On the old system we should now be expending, with our increase of population, \$13,888,000. The State doubtless saves full \$13,000,000 every year by this law. The people, being fully convinced of this, will not abolish the law in order to accommodate a set of would-be rum-sellers and rum-manufacturers—men who grow rich by making others poor, and whose ultimate influence upon society is best seen in the courts of justice, the jails, the alms-houses, *and the taxes*.

With these statistics the views of judicious men of the largest experience fully accord. Ex-Governor Dingley, after presenting an immense array of statistics of the past and present, adds, "Not only my own observation, but also the observation of every public man whose position has given him an opportunity to know the facts, sustain the whole drift of the statistics I have presented."

A mayor of the city of Portland, in a message to the City Council, affirmed, that "the quantity of liquor now sold is not one-fiftieth part as much as it was before the enactment of the law."

But it is true that in the cities—fortunately we have but few—the law cannot be executed as in the country. But the same is true of other laws. Theft, violence, fraud are tenfold more in

proportion to numbers than in the country. Further and more stringent legislation will ere long grapple with this evil, and the cities will not be allowed to cherish nests of poison, corruption, crime, and death any more than they would be allowed to have a pest-house for the diffusion of small-pox. Even in cities, however, the evil is very much restrained. Drunkenness and all the means to produce it are driven into hiding-places, and are regarded as works of darkness in the same category with theft and robbery.

But for the greatest achievements of the law; we must go into the country. Some time since we visited a farming town familiarly known to us in former times, and had a conversation with three of the intelligent farmers of the place about the Maine Law. As their views clearly represent the views of the great majority of men of their class, let us give them in substance and in a very compact form as from one man.

We said: "Mr. A., your roads are excellent, the houses and barns seem to be in good order, shade trees abundant, and many other signs of thrift, but we have passed two farms that are growing up into wood lands."

"Yes," he replied, "our population has diminished by nearly three hundred in the last twenty-five or thirty years; but our farms produce more than they ever did before."

Being asked for an explanation of that, he replied: "There are three chief reasons. One is our improved implements of agriculture. Our mowers, reapers, tedders, cultivators, etc., enable us to do more work with less hands. I am now an old man, but I can cultivate more land and produce larger crops than when I was twenty-five; for now the horses and oxen do the work, even to the digging of potatoes, which is a great crop with us."

"A second reason is, that we farmers have learned that in order to get a good crop out of the ground, we must put something into it to make the crop grow. We make a great deal of dressing for the soil in various ways that we never thought of in old times."

"But the third reason, and the greatest, is the Maine Law. Forty years ago there were seventy drunkards in this place with

only fifteen hundred inhabitants, and more than that number of *hard drinkers*. Now there are no hard drinkers and only two drunkards that I know of. Where *they* get their rum the Lord knows, or perhaps I should say the devil knows. They can't buy a drop in this town. The Maine Law has painted the houses and surrounded them with shade trees. We have better clothing, better furniture, more books and papers, better schools, and more property than we had forty years ago, although most of the young men go to the West."

"But;" said we, "what has improved your roads so much?"

"We are proud of our roads," he replied. "We know better how to make them so that they will stand and wear well. This going West is a foolish thing. A man who will stay at home and study his ground and study his crops and make a good use of all his advantages, will do as well here, in nine cases out of ten, as he will at the West."

We took pains to verify so far as possible these representations which were given with much good sense and judgment. Visiting quite a number of houses, we saw in some, small but well selected libraries. Forty years ago you might have seen the Bible, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, *Robinson Crusoe*, and possibly a *History of New England*. Now there were to be seen *Histories of England* and of the *United States*, and books of *Poetry*, of *Travel*, and of *Biography*. Besides these some *Agricultural newspaper* and other periodical literature lay on the table. Photographs, of course, adorned the walls; and it is well that they have taken the place of the miserable daubs which used occasionally to be seen. The signs of general comfort were unmistakable. The signs of increased intelligence were equally plain. Not wealth, but comfort; not struggling ambition, but quiet and contentment seemed to reign. If there was no startling progress, there was steady silent growth, which is much better.

The observations made by us in that individual place, we have made in a more cursory manner in many other places. We have passed through the whole length of the State from *New Hampshire* to *New Brunswick*, and have conversed with people of every class, and we can bear the most decided testimony that the

Maine Law is not only a great success, but it is most firmly established in the hearts of an immense majority of the people.

This is further proved, by the fact, that almost every year increases its efficiency. Its weak points are from time to time strengthened. Objectionable points are modified; but no one attempts to relax it; no one dares assail it. Whoever wishes to see the Maine Law in its present form, together with other liquor laws of the United States, can obtain a pamphlet of 138 pages postpaid, by sending his address with twenty-five cents to J. S. Stearns, Publishing Agent, 58 Reade Street, New York. The excellence of the Maine Law, however, is in its execution. The people sustain it. They have considered well the evils of intemperance and have decided to do away with them.

The present Legislature has only responded to the known sentiments of the people in passing, without one dissenting voice, the following preamble and resolution :

“Whereas, The use of alcoholic liquors as a beverage has a direct tendency to destroy domestic happiness, corrupt society, encourage crime, and drag men down to poverty, pauperism, degradation, and ruin : therefore,

“*Resolved*, That the noble men and women of the State of Maine, who have so faithfully and earnestly labored to suppress the evils of intemperance, and to reform and elevate the inebriate, are entitled to and should receive the commendation and earnest support of all good people in their own borders.”

In the enactment of the first law in 1851, the vote was, in the House, eighty-six to forty, in the Senate, eighteen to ten. In the passage of the last stringent addition to the law in 1877, *there was not a dissenting voice either in the House or Senate.*

Whatever may be the opinion of the Maine Law abroad, the above stated facts manifestly prove that the people of Maine like it, are determined to maintain and perfect it, and are reaping inestimable blessings from it.

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF HELL.

I. The doctrine of "eternal life," or of "heaven," is the most pleasing that God could reveal to man: and he has revealed it abundantly; so much so that the whole world should be filled with gratitude because of this clear revelation. The Church has been troubled by many a heresy—but no heretic ever had much of a following who denied the certainty of a future where all the toils and sorrows of earth shall give place to unending joy. There have, of course, been a great variety of opinions as to what precisely it is that shall constitute that bliss the promise of which is so largely given in Scripture; but such differences of view are always to be expected when men reason upon a subject as to the particulars of which they know so little and yet must feel so much. But that there is a heaven where immortal souls are appointed to dwell, no one with the light of revelation about him is permitted to doubt, although he may not tell just where it is, nor just how it is fitted up for man's eternal abode. And no one would doubt the existence of such an eternity of blessedness even were it revealed with very much less certainty than that with which it actually stands out in the great sky of gospel promise. It is so precious a truth—so bright a hope—so entrancing a prospect—as that a single ray from it were all enough to charm the belief of the most sceptical. Let us never cease to thank God for giving us such an inheritance to think of—an inheritance so sure, so grand, so satisfying; and never let us cease to lay the tribute of our adoring love at the feet of him, who, the Saviour of Men, has come to open the path which even the most timid feet may confidently take for reaching a home so safe, so rich, and so enduring!

If, however, we believe in the Bible at all—from which book alone we derive all our *sure* knowledge of a hereafter—we must believe that, as it teaches on the one hand the doctrine of heaven, so it teaches on the other the doctrine of "hell;" and that the contents of these two doctrines are just as diverse from each

other as sunshine and shadow, as day and night, as hope and despair; as, in short, the contrasting contents of the two places themselves. We must accept both doctrines or neither of them; for, in fact, they are just two opposite sides of the same great truth: the truth that *God reigns in righteousness*: a righteousness which draws to itself all that is its like, and which repels from itself all that is its unlike. If we examine the terms which inspiration has chosen for naming these two doctrines, we shall find this opposition expressed in them. They are translated in our English Scriptures in the use of two Anglo-Saxon words which well convey the significancy of the original terms. The one is derived from "*heafen*," *heaved up*; thus, the *elevated* place, a something raised as a mountain is above the level; and having upon it whatsoever is most bright, whatsoever has a face towards the perpetual sun, whatsoever is deserving of a throne-like glory. The other is derived from "*helan*," which means to cover, and thus to *conceal*—that which is deservedly left in darkness; depressed (as it were) under a weight which it cannot lift; and having wrapped up in it whatsoever is too low to be desired; whatsoever is too gloomy to be contemplated, and whatsoever should hide itself away in perpetual shame. Accordingly, those two nouns—the one 𐤇𐤍𐤔 Old Testament Hebrew, the other ᾍδης New Testament Greek—most frequently used to designate the place of lost spirits, and nearly always translated "*hell*," or its equivalent, mean precisely this: an *underneath* place. But, as if to complete the idea of which that of concealment is only fragmentary or partial, the Scriptures employ additional words with which to depict this terrifying night of eternity. More than once, *e. g.*, our Lord uses the word "*gehenna*," meaning all-and-ever-consuming *fire*, as indicative of hell; as in that verse in Luke (similarly in Matthew and Mark): "Fear Him who has power to cast into hell, *gehenna*." Akin to this is Isaiah's reference to "*Tophet*," or place of fire. And Peter, in his second epistle, brings to his aid still a fourth word, *Tartarus*: "If God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell"—to *tartarus*, *i. e.*, to endless *prison*—"and delivered into chains of darkness."

Nor are these the only terms selected for impressing upon Scripture readers the idea of hell. It is represented, *e. g.*, as the second death, as the worm that never dies, as the place where there is no possibility of rest, as a lake every wave of which opens to view the lurid jaws of a smoking furnace. So far therefore as Scripture *language* is concerned, the revealed aspect of hell presents us with this woful picture: it is a vast furnace-like prison-house where a black darkness reigns which is perpetually tossed into restless commotion by upheavings of ever-tormenting flame, and where the chained life is as the ever-renewed bitterness of death. A terrific picture, truly; the features of which might be greatly and minutely multiplied were we to introduce still other suggestions of Holy Writ.

But such descriptive language is figurative. Yes, it assuredly is. We do not see how any one can doubt it; although, strangely enough, learned and good men—not a few—have taken the words in all their literalness; just as some worthy matter-of-fact people have believed in the actual “golden streets” and “pearly gates” and “stately mansions” of heaven. All this, it must be granted, is the language of symbol. For, indeed, had not imagery been resorted to by the sacred writers, we could have been made to apprehend not at all, or very imperfectly—certainly with scant vividness—either the happy future or the wretched.

To our mind, however, nothing imparts a more terrible meaning to the doctrine in question than this very impossibility of placing it before us in the phraseology of dry historical statement, and that the inspired penmen were compelled to resort to high-colored simile. You may, in sober speech, narrate what is ordinary and easily conceived, and may, by elevating and swelling your phrases, adequately describe many things that are extraordinary. But, when your purpose is to pass beyond the region of human experience, to relate what is wholly unknown, you must appropriate the colors of fancy, and so enlarge your view upon the ground of something of the same sort that is *already known*, and may every day be seen or felt. There never has been known, by living man, the whole extent, or anything like it, of that anguish of which undying souls are susceptible when deprived of

every shield that might serve to ward off mental suffering or to ease its onset. Well, as *fire* is to the body—separating its very elements and biting into the inmost vitals through nerves of inflamed and maddened sensibility—so is the experience of *souls* when in contact with the shock of hell. In like manner the other images we have named are employed—being like so many fingers, each pointing in the same general direction, and all suggesting by means of what we now know, the infinitely intolerable *must-be* of what shall come, but is not yet known. The flippant sceptic, who derides the possibility of a future perdition on the ground that the Scriptural representations which paint it to his view, are merely poetic, would do well to call back his supercilious smile; for it is when upon this subject the inspired witnesses to the truth launch us out from the solid shore of historical and prosaic mention into the open and on every side yielding sea of fancy, that their utterances become the most terrible. They as much as say: let conjecture go as far as it can travel; let imagination take to itself the wings that never can tire; and still you will not overtake the whole truth; for an evil that has no limits cannot be expressed in the limited speech of men.

II. But it is not our principal purpose to discuss the mere forms of speech which the Holy Ghost has selected for impressing our minds with the doctrine we are considering. Too much may be insisted on as to these; too much about them has already been said in public prints and in pulpit oratory; so much as measurably to draw off attention from the main matter to be considered, leading people to quarrel over *words*, in forgetfulness of the greater *thing* to which they point. The chief use to be made of those descriptive figures, to some of which we have thought it advisable to call attention, is to prove (1) that there *is* a hell; and (2) that it is an unspeakably *dreadful* hell.

The leading question however is: *Why* is there such a place or state, and what is its use? This question is answered in that text—“these shall go away into everlasting punishment.” It is a place or condition of *punishment!* But, may not this punishment be inflicted elsewhere—in this world, for instance, or in

some purgatory? No; for in immediate connexion occur these words, spoken by the same mouth, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels"—words that give a more complete description of what we shudderingly term *hell*, than is to be found in any other single portion of Scripture—indicating at once that it is an actual state of existence; telling too the nature of the woe that is to be endured; and revealing the character of the persons who shall occupy it. It is where Satan has his seat; where devils have their award; and where all who resemble them shall be gathered. What makes this denunciation of punishment the more striking and this allusion to its inevitable curse the more appalling is the fact that our blessed Lord utters the solemn lesson. Indeed it is he who, oftener than any of the prophets or any of his apostles, refers to this dreadful condition of lost spirits; and refers to it in the least mistakable manner—he, the most attached Friend that mankind ever had or will have; at the same time, however, the most truthful and faithful; himself the inspiring source of all such knowledge to the sacred writers; and who was hindered in his teachings by no impossibility except the glorious impossibility of lying. All Scripture is indeed given by the inspiration of God, and so, wherever in the Bible this subject is alluded to, the reference must be received with all docility as unquestionably true; but, although it might be supposed that inspired men were sometimes, because of their being mere men, incapable of reporting with absolute precision the thoughts which the Spirit of Christ breathed from time to time upon their minds, certain swervings into error being possibly due to the imperfection of the medium of communication, yet here is the Inspirer in his own person, speaking "as never man spake," with an insight and an authority belonging to no other who ever moulded divine meanings into human words; and to him belief is constrained to yield, without a doubt, and without a fear of being in the least degree misled. Whilst we find the doctrine of hell imbedded in what Isaiah has written, in what Daniel has made known, in what the several Evangelists have left on record, and in what John in the Apocalypse has darkly foreshadowed, it is no disparagement to them if we

turn away from their exhibitions of Jehovah's threatenings of wrath, to fix our faith with a still firmer anchorage in the sayings of *Jesus*, their Master and ours, and who, in contradistinction from all others, is styled the "*faithful and true Witness*." It is he then, who speaks oftenest and most distinctly of hell; and always does he refer to it as a condition and also as a place of "punishment"; and if of punishment, it must of necessity be of deserved punishment: else even His depictions were a deception. We do not know what mere sentimental notions or shadowy dreams differing classes of men may have touching this matter. But, whatever they are, they ought to be dismissed or corrected, in the presence of a "thus saith the Lord."

III. For *what*, however, are men to be so terribly punished? Is there justice in it? And, if so, can this justice be made manifest? We might conclusively answer, there must be infinite justice involved, because it is the tongue of *God* which decrees the sentence and his hand which secures the execution; *God*, who having said that he has no pleasure in the destruction of the wicked, seems to go against himself in declaring this destruction certain; *God*, who so loved the world as to come, in the person of his Son, for its salvation; *God*, whose very offspring we are, and of whose souls he has declared that each of them is of more value to himself, as well as to its possessor, than all his other works; *God*, the good, the *best*, the most forbearing, the most forgiving, the most tender, the most lovable, aye, *essential love*—would or could *He* punish without cause, without most just cause, without an absolutely irresistible cause which even his power of mercy cannot set aside? Who can think it? Who can dare to think it? The whole Bible would fly in the face of such a man and rebuke the thinker so lost to thought!

But God, not content with resting upon his revealed character for justifying his threatenings of punishment, uncovers the spring that moves him. He tells us (need we quote half the Bible to show this?) that men, when punished, are punished for those acts of disobedience to his authority called *sins*. And is not this repeated affirmation of Scripture enough for the removal of all

doubt? No, reply some; for our sins, so far as we can see, are deserving of no such punishment as has been intimated. Well, it must be admitted, that perhaps no man can, prompted alone by reason, discover the full heinousness of his sinning; no, not even when the Holy Spirit himself opens up the scene of our ill-doing and flashes conviction upon the conscience with his revealing lamp. We believe sin to be an evil which only the mind of God is able perfectly to comprehend, for he alone fully knows against whom it is committed; an evil therefore as wide and as tremendous as are his own unbounded perfections, and partaking of his own inscrutable infinity. It is hence not surprising that men should make a mock of sin—why, they make a mock even of God! Because they understand neither it nor Him. Hence, one of the principal objects of revelation is the revelation of sin: and as the whole of revelation is an address to human faith, so is this special portion of it. That is, it is only when men believe what God teaches them of the nature of sin, as he regards it, that they are in a condition to estimate it aright, and to repent of it with due abhorrence. And we could easily prove, did space allow—prove from passages found in every part of the divine Book—that he regards it as an evil which has, literally, no bounds. Why, we can almost see this to be true in the current history of our world. What is it, if not a history of sin—that gigantic monster whose steps are steps of blood, and whose mighty march down the pathway of time, as it winds from the sword-guarded gate of deserted Eden through all lands and amid all peoples, is attended everywhere by the unceasing tread of the very armies of woe, leaving a curse upon all society, it sometimes appearing as if the entire earth were about to be converted into a premature hell, so that even bad men have now and then marvelled at beholding no hand of outstretching wrath again opening the windows of a second deluge—that predicted deluge of fire! Ah, we have no line—of reason or of philosophy—with which to measure sin. Why, even one sin—see how broad and deep the ruin it spreads; that sin, *e. g.*, which Adam committed, seemingly so small, yet “that brought death into our world and all our woe!” Or, yonder is a wretch who has the seed of mur-

der in his heart. How it grows! See, it becomes a very giant whose movements no earthly power can control; then it springs upon its victim; strikes, slays. But, no sooner does the dying blood begin to soak the earth, than conscience, a mightier giant still, awakes, to reign over a hell already begun in that now Cain-marked soul: awakes, never again to sleep! And what happens to that man? Justice pursues him, the law dogs his steps, fears haunt him, the gibbet claims him; and all men, instinct as they are with a sense of right derived from their divine Father, approve when the awful penalty has at last met the criminal face to face. But even his grave, on which every passer-by looks with shuddering awe, does not terminate his crime. Its consequences are long seen in the far-spread degradation and shame that go down from generation to generation to abase and torment his posterity. Well, if such a darkness settles about the path of him who has marred God's image only, what blackness of darkness may we not suppose attends, first or last, the being who strikes at God himself? and this he tells us every one does who deliberately breaks that law whose holiness is nothing less than the transcript of the divine character it expresses. So that all sin is, in its essence, atheism—is the impatient, often the passionate, sigh of the heart, of which the Psalmist speaks where he represents it as saying, "Would there were no God!"—of the heart, which, when God came visibly to earth and thus placed himself within actual reach of its enmity, was quick to slaughter where it could no longer endure! Sin is *Deicide* as well as suicide. But why attempt the impossible task of illustrating the greatness of sin? Its limits—if it have limits—are beyond our sight, even beyond the farthest flight of our imagination. Language has certainly no power to define it, nor colors to paint it. We must take God's own word for giving us an insight of its nature; yet not even that can we always understand, just because sin cannot be understood. It is "that abomination which *God hates*," and hates with a depth and a force of enmity which is boundless like himself. And that he has reason so to hate it who can doubt, unless it be the man that can boldly dare to give the lie to infinite truth?

But yet, why should he so punish it? men will still ask.

Why cannot he overlook it? We reply, that he *must* punish it; and must because he has said he *will*; which he never *could* have said if he *ought* not to do as he has declared. Yet, is he not a Father? and is it right for a father so to deal with sons, however disobedient, however truant, however guilty? Should not those arms of love—longer than any other that ever, with gestures of affection, moved towards erring children—be ever ready to embrace even the worst of them all? So those arms are, when true repentance recalls the wandering feet, and genuine contrition melts the opposing heart. Otherwise, law must take its course; for, whatever else may be set aside, law cannot be; and law says, “The soul that sinneth, it must die.” God is not merely the affectionate head of a *family*; he is also, and principally, the sovereign head of a *government*; a government, not of arbitrary, although of absolute, will; and a will to which, because it is at once infinitely righteous and infinitely authoritative, every other will is under infinite obligation to submit; constant submission to this will being the condition of the fullest and freest life, whilst constant antagonism to it is the contrary condition of perfect and everlasting death. It could not be otherwise; or, if it could, God would cease to be God and man to be man.

The question, then, is not whether we like or whether we wholly approve this state of things. When God took the throne we were not consulted, nor does he now ask us for our suffrages that he may continue to occupy it. We must take what is and abide by it. We are not, therefore, bound to show all the reasons, even if we knew them, why our actual relations to our Maker are the best. That these are best must be assumed, for it was he who adjusted them, no, not assumed, rather demonstrated by the simple and the conclusive argument, that thus has the all-wise and the all-good One decreed; and decreed, we must believe, because he *is* all-wise and all-good. We may fight against it, setting our reason above his, but cannot alter it. We may fret under his government—do fret—it must, however, still remain; and, whilst it remains, God will assuredly blast all life that is sought out of himself, and chase sin with his vengeance through the universe, according to that statement of the prophet

Nahum, "His enemies he pursueth with darkness." Sin's sure end is destruction, whatever momentary or temporal advantages it may yield. It was so in heaven, whence the angels fell; it will be so on earth where men have fallen. Oh, that day when the mask shall fall from the face of sin, and we shall see its hideous revolting visage; it will be a visage that shall haunt us wherever we are, and whithersoever we go, through all eternity; and then, at least, shall we perceive its hatefulness and its deadliness, and at the same time get a view of the justice that condemns it.

IV. We need not, however, be anxious to vindicate divine justice in its dealings with sin as a wrong done to law. For the Scriptures do not insist alone upon this, nor, we may add, even mainly. Whilst it is, indeed, true that God suffers no violation of his law to pass unpunished; and whilst it is furthermore true that his own honor, upon the integrity of which depends the welfare of all his creatures, must always strike off the hand that strikes at it; yet there is nothing more plainly revealed than the fact that God hates sin, not alone because it is a blow aimed at himself, but because it is ruinous to the sinner. It is the welfare of the transgressor that is ruined, as well as the glory of governmental order that is tarnished. In other words, there is a large and controlling sense in which God hates sin because he is *compelled to punish* it, as well as because it is so hateful in itself. He loves mercy. He loves sinners. The sin, therefore, that allows not mercy to have place, and that destroys those who commit it, is his special abhorrence. His "goodness," accordingly, no less than his "severity," is conspicuous in his treatment of sin. For by its punishment he seeks to deter from its commission, that men may not be ruined; and thus, too, does he bring home to our thoughts the heinousness of sin—making us thus "know and see" (as Jeremiah phrases it) that "it is an evil thing and a bitter to forsake the Lord our God."

Well, then, some one may ask, why did he permit its existence in the universe at all? He has not told us why; and were he to tell us, we are permitted to doubt whether we could understand

his reasons—certainly *all* of them we could not. We only know this, that its introduction fixed no stain upon *his* character; and with that knowledge we ought to be content. Nay; we know more than this—far more: we know that, so far as man is concerned, He has instituted a plan—the most surprising and the most effectual that any mind (even the angelic) can contemplate—for ridding the world of the consequences of sin, and even for turning this dread evil itself into an instrument of his glory. We allude, of course, to his plan of salvation, accomplished and made forever memorable by the suffering mission of his Son Jesus Christ. And it is this thought which brings us to the point where we are able to take that final view of the doctrine of hell which, of all others, is at once the most striking and the most satisfactory. We invite special notice to it.

V. We do not propose to describe what Christ has done, and is still doing, for the rescue of mankind from the curse and the power of sin. Every one knows the great old story by heart. But what does it all *mean*? It means this: that God has himself become man's Saviour; and become his Saviour, why? Because there was no other, and could be no other. Sin is so tremendous an evil that only he can deliver from it. And how has he undertaken to achieve a result so worthy of his love and so dependent upon his power? We answer: by introducing a new law into the administration of his government—the amazing law of substitution; so that what man could not do for himself, another should; and that other the very Almighty himself in the person of his eternal Son. To set forth the operations of this law is the main design of the gospel. Sinai's law says: Obey and live; Sion's: Trust and live, *i. e.*, substitute Christ's obedience for your own. In other words, that old law, which none can keep and which all have broken, is handed over to Him who alone can mend and honor it—at once its Author and Executor; and along with this transference goes out the gracious proclamation: Accept, O men, what He has done in your stead, and your sins are all instantly done away with as to their *guilt*; place yourselves under His controlling Spirit, and your sins are all gradually

done away with as to their *dominion*; you are at once winged for heaven. But, refuse to do this, and how runs the dread sentence? "He that BELIEVETH *not shall be damned*;" a sentence uttered by the Saviour himself just before his ascension to heaven; and containing almost his last words uttered to listening earth.

What, now, do we necessarily infer from all this? That men are lost—undergo God's punishing wrath; for the reason that, being perfectly free to do so, they choose to risk their chances under the law of the ten commands (the law of works) rather than take the offer of mercy under the law of the one command: Believe. Those ten commands they cannot obey; this one they *can* if they *will*. Behold, now, the full meaning of hell. It is not the vengeance of Sinai's law. That vengeance has been met. Hell is the penalty of that other and final law—the law of atonement: "for this is *the* condemnation, that Light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light;" a light this which shines in broken rays upon the heathen world; in fuller power upon the Christian world; and everywhere in sufficiency of strength to rebuke sin and commend righteousness. This Light is Christ. Hell, then, is the opposite of Calvary. As it is the Cross that lifts unto heaven those who, on the bright side, cling to it by faith; so it is this same Cross, loaded on the dark side by those who in their unbelief prefer its shadows, that sinks them to hell.

God could do no more than offer atonement, and by every argument press it upon human acceptance. Where, therefore, this fails, what is left except destruction? The heathen are punished because they yield not to God under the law of conscience, which carries a Christ-like goodness in its displays of rewards for all well-doing; we are punished because we yield neither to this law, so fully made known to us both in conscience and in revelation, nor to the law of deliverance from its curse as published in the person and work of Christ. We reject both authority and love. We will be our own law; and if so, we are ruined even beyond the ability of God to help us, who now to save would have to discrown his will and make ours supreme.

But this whole matter is made most clear in those sayings of

our Lord in the 25th of Matthew. In these he paints beforehand the judgment scene. He has before him all mankind whom he is about to separate—these to his right hand, those to his left. What is the rule by which he proceeds? It is all contained in the question: How did ye treat *me*? But we never *saw* thee, answer both classes. Yes, you did; for what ye did to the least of these my brethren, ye did to me. They were my representatives. They carried my cause. They constituted the subjects of my kingdom. They were my other and visible self. Did ye, then, minister to them for my sake? Yes? “Then, come, ye blessed of my Father,” dwell forever with me! Did ye, on the other hand, do likewise? No? “Then, depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels! Thus Christ, our final Judge, will not ask, were you a great sinner? or, were you a great saint? but, did you follow after me? Men are punished, therefore, because they persistently refuse to be anything other than sinners, when they have both the opportunity and the motive. They must, accordingly, remain sinners—this is their curse; and remaining such, what is God to do with them, except to send them to their own chosen place? Christ underwent our hell; and if we will not cordially accept this great fact, what is this but cordially to undertake hell for ourselves?

But there must be a hell on another ground: on the ground of divine Love! Strange proposition, some may say. It is, however, true. For, dreadful as hell undoubtedly is, it is the least dreadful place in which the obstinately wicked can be confined; certainly far less to be dreaded than heaven, were it possible to give them a home there; the obvious reason being this, they have no fitness for such a habitation! So that the songs of heaven's praises would be less tolerable than the dirges of hell's curses; the sights of heaven's glories less endurable than the experiences of hell's shames; the beauty of heaven's King less supportable than the hideousness of hell's reigning spirit. All souls will go, each to its own heaven; and *hell* is the natural, though the awful, heaven of such as have sympathy, not with God, but with Satan. Reason, then, joins its voice with that of

Scripture in affirming the certainty of a hell; so that all men, in all ages, whether pagans or Christians, have accordingly united in tremblingly anticipating it, and in trying by one method or another to provide against it.

The very fact that, at this hour, there is such a hue and cry in condemnation of this doctrine, is itself a proof of its holding a place in the fears of the human heart; for men do not quarrel with a mere spectre!

VI. But, then, do not Christian believers in this doctrine go too far in declaring that the punishment involved in its statement is never to end? If there be any of our readers who think so, will they censure us as evading the arguments in favor of a temporary perdition—arguments which we understand, and whose plausibility we are ready to admit—if we simply refer them again to the text already quoted, where they have the word of Jesus himself, who, dropping all figures, says, as of a matter that cannot admit of a question, “these shall go away into *everlasting* punishment?” Yes; but is this word the correct translation of the original? To answer this, we need not perplex ourselves with a discussion of various Greek terms and idiomatic forms of speech. There is a more direct way. This text contains the same word a second time: “but the righteous into life *eternal*.” We know not why King James’s translators thought proper to change into “*eternal*” the very adjective they had just translated “*everlasting*,” there being no difference in the Greek—*αἰώνιον* in both instances. Now, we ask, what matters it whether, as Universalists have vainly tried to do, you prove that this term signifies a limited duration; or whether, as is assuredly the case, it here points to a boundless future; in either case it remains, that just so long as that “*life*” of the righteous shall continue, even so long will this “*punishment*” of the wicked endure. As vast a space in eternity as heaven shall occupy, so vast a space shall hell cover. If, some disastrous day, the saints’ abode shall crumble into nothing, on that same day—not sooner—shall the prison-house of despair be torn down. At the hour when God shall tire of his saved ones, at that hour—not before—shall Satan

ture of his lost ones. Indeed, God himself must die before heaven can be emptied of its holy glories, or hell be vacated of its infernal horrors; for, in describing *His* eternity, Scripture employs precisely that word which here, in the mouth of Christ, fixes the diverse destinies of the good and the bad.

And how clearly this same conclusion could be made to appear, by considering the nature of the soul itself, the nature of its habit of sin, and the very nature of its necessary punishment, any one can perceive who will take the trouble to think it out for himself. But, above all such metaphysical speculations, however interesting or convincing, we prefer a plain "Thus saith the Lord," there to fasten our faith. The man that goes hence, out of the present state of trial into the future state of retribution, in love with sin, will—must—persist in its love forever; and in this everlasting love is his everlasting hell: an eternity of evil his only bliss. So that he need not now ask—nor will he then care to know—*where* is hell; for, like Milton's Satan, he will exclaim, with terrific meaning:

"Me miserable! which way shall I fly
 Infinite wrath and infinite despair?
 Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell!
 —"All good to me is lost.
 Evil, be thou my good!"

VII. It is not pleasant to think upon this subject; it is painful to discuss it; but yet, we are bold to say, it forms a portion of *gospel truth*. "GOSPEL" truth, do we say? This gloomy lesson a part of the good news of salvation? Yes; that essential part of it which mercifully warns of danger; that night of revolving Scripture which, by its very darkness, directs despair towards the hope of day; that rough voice which, by its very harshness, prepares the ear for softer address; that signal of storm which urges outgoing ships to their safe anchorage. Can any one for a moment suppose that Jesus Christ opened up the terrors of "everlasting punishment" in order to alarm men, just that he might see them start and pale and tremble? Does he lead us to the brink of this dread abyss for mere tragic effect, and with no great practical end in view except only a scared look into those

flaming depths? Oh, it is His Love that occupies its tongue with hell, that it may cry the louder, Come not hither! This place, he tells us, is a reality—the awfulest that ever was contemplated. “But [He cries] avoid it, it *need* not be for you, my fellow-men; see, I plant myself in your path, to conduct your feet far elsewhere. Take my hand; it contains your life, and it is as warm with affection as it is mighty with help. Shun this wretchedness and shame, and walk together with me yonder upward way to glory and to God! Behold, there, at the close of our journey, my Father is mine and yours. I know Him well, know all His heart. It was He who sent me to bring you to Him. And I came, oh so willingly, though it was to tread the bloodiest and the hardest path that ever was known, but it was for you, dear, dear lost ones, I came; and I am glad of my humiliations *for your sake*—be ye only glad with me, and I will take you to a crown such as earthly royalty never wore, and to a kingdom such as worldly ambition never imagined!”

Blessed be the name of Christ, this his sacred mission shall not fail! It will, before the end come, we have reason to believe, have won more souls to heaven than there is star-dust in the milky way; more, far, far more, if we are to credit certain intimations of revelation, than hell shall ever be permitted to claim; until not a mansion in the Father's immense house shall be vacant, not a harp remain unstrung, and not a note be wanting in the many-voiced song of our Redeemer's praise; until even that great Heart which broke on the Cross for the honor of a violated law shall declare every deep of its love fully satisfied!

ARTICLE IV.

CAIN: A SPECULATION.

The skilful naturalist can take the fragment of a tooth of an extinct species of animal, and from it delineate an outline of its whole skeleton. Having done this, he can then determine its habits when it lived; what kind of food was necessary for its maintenance, the smaller animals on which it preyed; and, from the determination of these points, infer with some approximation to the truth, what kind of vegetable food these smaller animals lived on; and thus draw a tolerably accurate picture of the forests in which they roamed; and thence infer the character of the climate, the nature of the soil, the mean temperature, and many other characteristics of the geological period in which the animal existed. Thus, waving the magic wand of science over the cross section of a fossil tooth or bone, "the antiquary of a new order," as Cuvier calls him, causes the fauna and the flora of a buried epoch to rise up before the imagination in all their original perfection. The brief records of the history of the peoples who lived before the flood preserved in the writings of Moses, are not unlike those fossil remains which geologists have exhumed from the buried deposits of past ages. The first five chapters of the book of Genesis contain all that we know of the first fifteen hundred years of the life of the human race. How small a part of an eventful history could be crowded into five chapters! How absolutely necessary for the annalist to suppress all detail, and confine his narrative to the very briefest mention of the great facts which he desired to signalise and to transmit to the future! In such a condensed syllabus, there was no room for the gratification of the curiosity we may have in regard to ten thousand particulars. But we are not precluded from drawing legitimate inferences from what is authoritatively revealed. Such inferences, if valid, may become as really the objects of belief as the revealed facts which connote them. For example: we are not told that Adam and Eve lived in any kind of house or tent; yet it is fair to presume that they had a habitation of

some sort in which they took refuge from the inclemency of the weather. So, too, we are not told in so many words that Cain used a hoe; yet, as he was a tiller of the ground, it is perfectly fair to infer that he had some sort of agricultural implements. It is now our task to bring together the facts to be gleaned from the inspired narrative—to spread our fossils on the table—and then to draw from them the legitimate inferences.

First. Cain was at least one hundred and twenty-eight years old when he killed Abel. This proposition is based upon the statement that after the death of Abel, Seth was born; and that Eve regarded him as supplying the place of her murdered son. But we are told that Adam was one hundred and thirty years old when Seth was born. It is perfectly fair to assume that Cain was born within a year after Eve was presented to Adam as his wife. This would make Cain about one hundred and twenty-eight years of age at the time of the murder. Some commentators have fancifully supposed that Cain and Abel were twins. This is without any authority; but it is probable that Abel was only a year or two younger than Cain; so that at his death, Abel was probably one hundred and twenty-six years of age.

Secondly. The second verse of the fourth chapter of Genesis contains this pregnant statement: "*And Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground.*" In this verse, we have a very brief but distinct intimation of the existence in the community to which Cain and Abel belonged of a demand for that species of Division of Labor called by writers on Political Economy, "Complex Coöperation;" *i. e.*, "the separation of employments, the several sets of laborers being employed at different times and places, and in distinct pursuits, so that their coöperation with each other, though real, is not so obvious as in the case of simple coöperation, in which different hands coöperate with each other for the production of one commodity." That Cain and Abel pursued two distinct industries, so that one was known as an agriculturist and the other as a herdsman, indicates an advanced state of society and a populous community. It is perfectly clear upon a moment's reflection that neither of the brothers would have engaged in a separate occupation for himself

alone, or for himself and his own family and the family of the other alone. The only rational solution of this complex co-operative division of labor is to be sought in the demands of a large and populous community. A short quotation from Mr. Mill, intended to illustrate another principle, will serve the purpose of showing that the inference here drawn is legitimate :

"In the present state of society, the breeding and feeding of sheep is the occupation of one set of people ; dressing the wool to prepare it for the spinner is that of another ; spinning it into thread, that of a third ; weaving it into cloth, of a fourth ; dyeing the cloth, of a fifth ; making it into a coat, of a sixth ; without counting the multitude of carriers, merchants, factors, and retailers put in requisition at the successive stages of this process. All these persons co-operate in the production of the ultimate result—a coat. But these are far from being all who co-operate in it ; for each of these persons requires food and many other articles of consumption ; and unless he could have relied that other people would produce these for him, *he could not have devoted his whole time to one step in the succession of operations which produce one single commodity—a coat.*"

Now it is not essential to this argument to show that the contemporaries of Cain and Abel dressed in broadcloth, in order to prove that their demands for food and clothing created this division of labor. If the fleece of the sheepfold was used for clothing, (and this must have been the case ; for Abel would not have devoted himself to the raising of sheep simply to supply a demand for mutton,) and if Cain devoted his whole time to the production of cereals, it is perfectly evident that this complex co-operation of laborers must have been the result of the varied demands of a large community.

Thirdly. Another of our fossils we find in the statement that as soon as Cain became a fugitive, he went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod on the east of Eden, and there he was building a city. A very brief statement indeed, but full of significance. We know that Cain's wife went with him. But did no one else go ? Why should Cain build a city for himself and his wife alone ? Cities are never built except by people, and for people. A single man accompanied only by his wife would not have been able to build a city. He might have constructed a rude tenement of logs or of stones ; but after

thus providing for the comfort of his immediate family, he would hardly have engaged in building a city, unless it had been designed for inhabitants. Besides, as his pressing bodily necessities would have demanded all his labor for the provision of food, it is hardly to be admitted that Cain wasted his energies in building a city, which was to be a silent city, without inhabitants.*

But the building of a city implies not only inhabitants, but a considerable degree of progress in the arts of mechanical construction. A city could not have been built without tools; and the making of tools implies the existence of artisans and mechanics. Wooden tools could not have been used in felling timber or hewing stone. If a city was built, it must have been built with tools made of metal. But the use of metals in the manufacture of tools involves a knowledge of metallurgy and skill in the arts of mining and of smelting and reducing crude ores to a malleable condition. Such progress in the arts implies the coöperation of a large number of persons. Of course these arts never arose spontaneously. They must have been the result of a demand growing out of the wants of society. It is utterly irrational to suppose that men became miners and iron-founders, and tool-makers, and stone-cutters, and carpenters, without a pressing demand for such laborers. The demand for such industries could proceed only from a numerous population; and, inasmuch as savages may exist in large numbers without creating any of the demands enumerated, this population must have been not only numerous, but highly civilised. Further, the building

*Lange says: "Some have thought it strange that Cain should have built a city for his son. But in this objection it is overlooked that the main conception of a primitive city is simply that of a walled fortification." This remark of the great German commentator shows that he had formed his idea of the population of the earth at this time from the picture-books, and thought he was bound to apologise for Moses' inaccurate use of words. If Moses meant to say that Cain was building a "walled fortification," why did he not use *מִבְּצָר* or *מִצֹּר* instead of *עִיר*, which occurs more than one thousand times in the Old Testament in the modern sense of a city?

and inhabiting of a city involve something more than progress in the mere mechanic arts. Men in a primitive state of society do not congregate in large towns. For such association of many families, there is required a degree of progress in the social sciences and in the occupations and employments of civilised life. There must have been trade, (if not in the higher phase of what we call commerce, at least in the form of barter,) the exchange of commodities, or of commodities for labor, or of one kind of labor for another. It is for the ready interchange of these things that men seek proximity of residence, and hence the origin and growth of cities. Still further, men crowded together in a narrow space require restraint, inasmuch as the stronger are prone to trample on the weaker; hence the necessity for some kind of municipal law for the regulation of the intercourse of men living together in cities. This involves some of the most complex machinery of human society. And thus it might be shown that Cain's founding and building a city in the land of Nod involve a vast deal more than a superficial glance at the mere surface of the narrative would disclose. But our present object is to use this vestige of history only to prove that at the time Cain murdered Abel, there must have been a vast population on the earth.

The fact that Cain, as a fugitive, led out into the land of Nod a colony large enough to need a city and to build a city, warrants the inference that he left a large population behind him. It must have been a small proportion of the whole population that sympathised with him to such extent as to acknowledge him as the founder of a new state, although the number who constituted that proportion may have been very large. We shall see before we get through who these in all probability were. At this stage of the argument it is enough to suggest that probably all of Cain's descendants, constituting a clan, followed him into his exile. A writer in the *Journal de Paris* (Vol. LI., p. 6.) has made a very careful estimate of the possible number of Cain's descendants, Anno Mundi, 128; and he shows very conclusively that, at this date, Cain might have had 16,384 descendants—a number sufficiently large to found and build a city of consider-

able dimensions. This estimate is far below what is legitimate ; for it is based on the supposition that Cain had only eight sons and daughters in one hundred and ten years ; whereas the probability is that in one hundred and ten years Cain's immediate family numbered at least fifty-five. Upon this supposition, the probable number of the Cainites was more than a hundred thousand. Now Cain left behind him, when he fled into the land of Nod, all the descendants of Abel and of the other children of Adam and Eve. How many brothers and sisters might Cain have had ? Evidently, in the lapse of 128 years, Eve might have given birth to at least sixty-four sons and daughters. The descendants of Abel and of the other children of our first parents, may be very safely estimated at about one million of souls at the time of Abel's violent death. This will not appear incredible ; nay, it will seem more than probable, in the light of the following well authenticated historical fact :

When Jacob went down into Egypt, he was accompanied by fifty-six souls ; for it is certain that of the seventy enumerated in Genesis xlvii., at least fourteen were born in Egypt. Two hundred and twenty years after the descent into Egypt, that is, at the exodus, the descendants of these fifty-six persons numbered 603,550 males of the age of twenty and upwards, exclusive of the tribe of Levi. An accurate computation of the proportion which, under the existing conditions of human life, the males above twenty years of age bear to males under twenty, shows that proportion to be as 238 is to 243. Stating this proportion arithmetically, we have the following :

$$238 : 243 :: 603,550 : 616,229.$$

The last term of this proportion represents the number of males under twenty at the time of the exodus, which, added to the adult male population, gives a total male population of 1,219,779. To this number add the same number for females ; and the total population, exclusive of the tribe of Levi, was 2,439,558. To this is to be added the tribes of Levi, of which there were 22,000 males and probably as many females, which would give a total of 2,461,558—in round numbers, two and a half millions. Now this was a fact with which Moses was fa-

miliar ; for he himself had superintended this census one year after the departure from Egypt. If Jacob's posterity amounted to two and a half millions in a period of two hundred and twenty years, is it incredible that in one hundred and thirty years Adam's posterity should have increased to the number of one million ? Without resort to any other argument than that founded on the well known laws of the procreation and propagation of the species, it can be shown that the population of the earth, at the time of Cain's exile, was at least a million. In further confirmation of this proposition, we are not to lose sight of the fact that polygamy, which prevailed very generally, must have increased the population to an extent which we have no means of ascertaining. And now in the light of these probabilities, which border upon demonstration, what becomes of the infidel cavil that the passage, " 'It shall come to pass that every one that findeth me shall slay me,' recorded by Moses as the language of Cain, shows that Moses forgot himself, since, besides his parents, there was no human being dwelling on the wide earth." Or, as it is stated by another who would discredit the doctrine of the unity of the race : "In deriving the whole human race from Adam, and at the same time supposing the world so populous at the time of Abel's murder as to excite in Cain a well-grounded apprehension of the public resentment and punishment of his crime, Moses seemed to forget that there was nobody for Cain to be afraid of." Nobody to be afraid of ! when probably there was a population as large as that of the State of Virginia living all around him. Did it never occur to the minds of those who make these cavils that if Moses had been inventing a lie, this very cavil would have occurred to his own mind as readily as to theirs ? And had he been inventing a romance, did he not have sagacity enough to avoid putting into Cain's mouth language which he must have foreseen would suggest this cavil to his reader ? *Moses put these words on record, because he knew that Cain uttered them ; and Cain uttered them, because he was justly afraid of the vengeance of the hundreds and thousands of Abel's descendants and kinsmen who were incensed against the murderer of their revered progenitor and relative.* If Moses had been inventing a fable,

he was fully as shrewd as his modern critics, and never would have exposed himself to the charge of inconsistency. It is the simplicity and artlessness of the story that stamp it with the seal of truth. The point then, which is now insisted on as fully established is, that Cain retreated to the land of Nod, accompanied by a clan, to escape from the vengeance of a large population who sympathised with Abel, and mourned over his untimely fall.

We turn now to a consideration of the murder itself, and to an inquiry into the causes which provoked it. The conceptions ordinarily had of this homicide are derived from the pictures engraved in Sunday-school books. An open field, a fierce ruffian with a club in his hand, standing prone over a prostrate form, a few sheep in the background, and a rude fence of rails, compose the picture. The Scripture record is indeed very brief; but a thoughtful contemplation of the whole narrative may help us, without too large a demand upon the imagination, to fill out a more complete picture.

It is hard to believe that Cain was sufficiently irritated to kill his brother by the simple fact that Abel's sacrifice was accepted and approved while his own was rejected, unless it is to be considered as an occasion upon which a long-cherished grudge and an exasperated difference of opinion culminated in open and brutal violence. Cain and Abel had been grown men for one hundred years when the collision occurred. Was this offering of Cain's fruits of the earth and Abel's animal sacrifice done for the first time when they were one hundred and twenty-eight and one hundred and twenty-six years old respectively? We cannot believe that they had lived more than a century without ever having acknowledged God before in acts of religious worship. No, the presumption is that they had thus been worshipping God all their lives, each in his chosen way—Cain with vegetable offerings, and Abel with bloody sin-offerings. It is more than probable that Adam had offered sacrifices from the time of his expulsion from the garden of Eden, and that Abel had followed the instructions and example of his father; while Cain deviated from them, and persisted for one hundred years in offering simply of the fruits of the earth. But Cain, as we have seen, was the

father of a clan, numbering, according to the lowest estimate, sixteen thousand souls, and according to our estimate, one hundred thousand. He was thus the head of a party, and indoctrinated his descendants in heretical views in regard to sacrifices, of which he himself was the originator. Inasmuch as Adam knew that without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin, he must have taught his children the duty of bloody sacrifices. The reason no mention is made of Adam's sacrifices is that the necessity of offering them was never called in question until Cain's infidelity brought the matter into dispute. Then it was that the difference of opinion between him and Abel led to the bloody catastrophe of Abel's murder; and the sacred historian, in recounting this terrible tragedy, was forced to mention the dispute which occasioned it. Had it not been for this murder, it is probable that the mention of sacrifices before the flood would never have been made at all. The discussion between Cain and Abel may be presumed to have been a doctrinal dispute in regard to man's sin and his need of the atonement which Abel's bloody sacrifice prefigured and typified. Now the Apostle Paul throws light on this subject when he tells us in Hebrews xi. 4, that "by faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain." His faith was the belief of something declared. He believed what God had promised Adam—that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head; and, in consequence of this belief, offered such a sacrifice for his sins as God had appointed to be offered until the seed should come. In order to such a sacrifice by faith, three things were requisite: First, that the person who offered it should do so upon the previous appointment and command of God; otherwise it would not be by faith. Secondly, that he should consider it a sign and token of the promise of God made in Christ, and of the remission of sins through his blood. Thirdly, that he should present himself a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God.

As to the first of these conditions, Cain was right enough; because as he had learned from his father that God had appointed sacrifices, he seemed to acknowledge the duty of presenting them. But his bringing a bloodless sacrifice proved that he denied the

doctrine of the atonement, placed no confidence in the vicarious work of a Saviour, and imagined that his own oblation, which may have been more costly than Abel's, was all that was required for his acceptance before God. We see in Cain, therefore, the father of all the Socinians in the world. For "they deny the necessity of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, upon the ground that the essential benevolence and compassion of God must have prompted, and his supreme dominion must have enabled him to forgive men's sins without any atonement or satisfaction; and that there is nothing in his nature, government, or law, which threw any obstacle in the way of his at once exercising his sovereign dominion in accordance with the promptings of his compassion, and extending forgiveness to all upon condition of repentance and reformation." This was Cain's creed exactly; and Cain was the first Socinian in the world; and his creed landed him in fratricide. But error, especially religious error, is very aggressive. No doubt Cain sought to make converts to his infidelity. Infidels always do this; and it is likely that Cain succeeded in gaining a large number of adherents, probably all his own clan, and possibly many of the families of his nephews and nieces. Many of them would look up to him with respect as the elder son of Adam, and age always commands influence. He was evidently a man of violent temper and strong will; and a violent temper and strong will often serve to overawe the timid and more yielding members of society. Men who know they are in a minority often seek by extraordinary demonstrations to seduce others into adherence to themselves, and thus increase their consideration and influence. We may be sure that Cain had a party of followers among the million of his contemporaries. As this sect of antediluvian free-thinkers got all their theology from him, they would naturally regard him as the leader of their party and the champion of their cause. On the other hand, Abel would have been regarded by the orthodox Adamites as the representative of their views; and thus these two men may be supposed to have been pitted against each other in theological controversy for more than a hundred years without any definitive result. At length, wearied with the fruitless war of words, we

may suppose a proposal emanating from Cain, and acceded to by Abel, was made to settle the controversy *by a direct appeal to the divine arbitrament*. The proposal may be presumed to have been in form like the following: "Let us, on a given day, erect two altars, on one of which I will lay the choicest products of my fields—the finest of the wheat and the most luscious grapes and fruits; and on the other, do thou lay the spotless lambs of thy flocks; and then let us appeal to Almighty God to decide our controversy forever." Let it be observed that this is no imaginative suggestion. The case of Elijah and the priests of Baal furnishes us with the idea; for Elijah did this very thing, and God Almighty answered him by fire. *But may not Elijah have gotten his idea of such an appeal to Jehovah from some traditional account of just such a trial between Cain and Abel?* It certainly was no uncommon thing for God thus to manifest his acceptance of a sacrifice in the historical ages of the chosen people. For example: when Gideon offered his sacrifice upon a rock in the presence of an angel, "the angel put forth the end of his staff and touched the flesh, and there rose up fire out of the rock and consumed the flesh;" and when Manoah, the father of Samson, offered his sacrificial kid, the angel of the Lord performed a "wonder," (miracle), and a flame went up toward heaven from off the altar, and the angel ascended in the flame of the altar. And when Elijah brought the priests of Baal to the test, God answered him by fire falling and consuming the sacrifice. It is clear that such an appeal to the Divine decision is in perfect harmony with Old Testament incidents. No doubt it was to some such test that Abel was challenged. If the substance of all this is admitted as possible, not to say probable, then it is an allowable exercise of the imagination to picture the scene and the incidents of this great assize.

We may believe that the day having been set, and the place having been selected, both parties were duly advised by their respective leaders of the approaching trial, and both equally confident of a verdict in their favor. A beautiful plain, bounded by an amphitheatre of terraced hills on both sides of it, may have been selected. On the eastern slope the clansmen and descend-

VOL. XXIX., No. 3—10.

ants of Cain assembled, with all the insignia of their chief occupation as agriculturists in their hands or on their shoulders; on the western, directly opposite, the followers of Abel—his father and his mother, his whole family, and all his kinsmen who held his theological creed as to the necessity of a bloody atonement for sin. The altars have been for some time erected; and all that remains is to put upon them the sacrifices. Cain, proudly confident and boastful in demeanor, appears, followed by his attendants laden with the choicest products of his fertile fields and orchards and vineyards; and, with great ceremony, deposits them as offerings upon his altar. Abel, with his herdsmen, next appears on the scene, leading a spotless lamb to the place of sacrifice. The animal is then slain, and its blood is sprinkled on the altar, and the victim is laid upon it, together with the "fat which is the Lord's." And now the critical moment has arrived, when the opposing parties are awaiting in breathless expectation that sign from heaven which shall decide the long controversy. Like the priests of Baal, Cain, with his farmers and vine-dressers, cries from morning until noon, "O God, hear us, hear us!" "but there is no voice, nor any that answer." No doubt many triumphant exclamations and taunting jeers are tossed across the space that separates the adverse multitudes, for they are all men like ourselves; and much is said adapted to exasperate the hostility of the crest-fallen Cainites, as their appeals to the divine Arbiter are ejaculated towards a silent sky. Heaven is mute, and the wild glances which they cast from zenith to horizon fall upon a pitiless and echoless sky. For "unto Cain and his offering the Lord had not respect." But even yet he has not abandoned all hope. If Jehovah will not respond to his passionate appeals for a verdict, he may be equally deaf to the prayer of Abel and his followers. Victory being lost, the possibility of a doubtful issue still animates his hopes.

And now, Abel, the champion of the great doctrine of the atonement, comes forward; and as he approaches his altar, he kneels with uncovered head, and prays, "Lord God of my father, let it be known this day that thou art God, and that I am thy servant, and that I have done all these things at thy word. Hear

me, O Lord! hear ME, that this people may know that thou art the Lord God, and turn their heart back again to thee." Then the fire of the Lord fell and consumed the burnt sacrifice, "for the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering." The effect of this divine decision may be more easily conceived than described—shouts of triumph bursting forth from the adherents of Abel; shame, mortification, and muttered threats amongst the followers of Cain. And Cain, himself! How must chagrin and intense disappointment have overwhelmed him! him the proud and scornful leader of a numerous party of infidels, disgraced in the presence of the nation, and disgraced in a manner so signal that there was no loop-hole for retreat from his false position. He must renounce his defective creed, and cease to be the honored leader of a sect. Many of his adherents begin to abandon him, converted by the divine demonstration to the faith of Abel in a great atonement. No wonder the effect described by Moses followed this signal discomfiture. No wonder that "he was very wroth and his countenance fell." This is freely rendered, "Cain hung down his head and looked upon the earth." "This is the posture of one darkly brooding, and prevails in the East to this day as a sign of evil plottings." (Burkhardt, *Arabian Proverbs*, p. 248.)

Now, of course there is no authority in the Mosaic narrative for the foregoing dramatic grouping and incidents; but if it is admitted that they are consistent with the substance of the narrative, and serve to represent, as it were, pictorially the collision of two great theories of the plan of salvation, the realism of the representation may be justified on the ground of the vividness which it imparts to the concise statement of the annalist.

"And the Lord said unto Cain" (how God made this communication to Cain we do not know; it is enough that it was made), "if *thou* doest well, shalt not thou be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door." In this interview God gives Cain an opportunity to renounce his infidelity and become a true worshipper of himself by bloody sacrifices. "If thou doest well," that is, if thou do as Abel has done, thou, too, shalt be accepted; but "if thou doest not well," that is, if thou

persist in thine infidelity, "sin lieth at the door." Here sin is personified as a liar-in-wait, ready like a lion to spring upon and master him. The danger incurred by persistence in wrong-doing, that is, in denying the doctrine of the atonement by refusing to offer bloody sacrifices, is most vividly portrayed. "God," says Herder in his "Spirit of Hebrew Poetry," "spoke with Cain as with a froward child, and dissuaded him from yielding to that which was sleeping in his heart and lurking at his door like a beast of prey, warning him that one sin would lead to another." The little heed that Cain gave to this warning of the most High, is plainly seen in the unnatural and bloody tragedy that soon ensued, as a result of which the voice of a brother's blood called (for vengeance) from the ground.

We may suppose that Cain brooded over his defeat for many days; and that seeing his influence declining among his adherents, his anger against his brother, instead of being assuaged by the lapse of time, grew more intense and malignant. Vanquished in the end of the long debate, forced to admit that God had decided against him, he determines to cast off God himself forever, and, by one desperate deed, banish his brother from his sight. The Apostle John (1 John iii. 12) tells us the reason why the malice of Cain vented itself in fratricide: "And wherefore slew he him? Because his own works were evil and his brother's righteous." The word here translated "righteous" is *δικαια*; and this taken in connexion with what Paul says in Hebrews xi. 4, "By faith Abel offered unto God a more acceptable sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous (the same word *δικαιος*), that is, justified, demonstrates that it was the doctrine of justification by faith in an atonement for which Abel suffered as a martyr.

We are now brought in the conclusion to the last act in the drama. Cain entices his brother into the field, ostensibly to talk with him, but really to slay him. Where no eye could see, he sacrifices his brother to his malignant hate, and Abel's blood is shed in witness of the doctrine for the demonstration of which more precious blood was shed on Calvary, "the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better things than that of Abel."

The deed having been done, God makes inquisition for Abel's blood. "Where is Abel, thy brother?" "Am I my brother's keeper?" is the sullen and evasive reply. "What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood [*blood-drops*] crieth unto me from the ground. And now thou art cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand. When thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond [*literally, shunned and abhorred*] shalt thou be in the earth." "And Cain said, 'My punishment is greater than I can bear [*literally, my guilt is greater than can be taken away*]. Behold thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth [*literally, from the open, cleared, inhabited district*]; and it shall come to pass that every one that findeth me shall slay me.' And the Lord set a mark on Cain, lest any finding him should kill him." It is useless to speculate as to what this mark was. Guessing on such a point is fruitless. It is enough to know that God prohibited human vengeance upon Cain, and made exile from his home and farm his only punishment. "And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod" (*exile*).

The curse pronounced against him—that the earth should never again yield her strength to him—forced him to abandon his occupation as a farmer for one of those trades that find their chief employment in a city; and to this is to be ascribed the fact that his immediate descendants in the city, Enoch, became noted for their proficiency in music and the other fine arts, and for their skill as manufacturers of brass weapons, and as masons, blacksmiths, and lance-makers, and as workers in brass and iron.

ARTICLE V.

A NEW "TESTIMONY OF THE ROCKS;" OR, THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS AND BIBLICAL HISTORY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

We resume our inquiries on this subject. In the April number of this REVIEW for 1877 we presented an account of the discoveries and deciphering of the cuneiform inscriptions exhumed from the ruins of Nineveh, Babylon, and other places, in the region once occupied by the empires of Assyria and Babylon: and added a brief summary of the results of these discoveries, as bearing on the credibility of the historical books of the Old Testament. According to the intimation then given, we now propose to present some additional specimens of these "results," and also more extended and minute accounts of those already briefly stated.

I. In the tenth chapter of Genesis, Moses has given us "the generations of the sons of Noah." We need not discuss the question whether we have the names of all the immediate descendants, much less of all those of the third generation from Japhet, Ham, and Shem. The list of Ham's posterity includes several names of tribal or national communities. We notice, in verses 5th, 20th, and 31st, in very nearly the same terms, statements indicating that these lists of names constitute a genealogical, geographical, ethnographical, and linguistic chart of the earlier post-diluvian population. The records relating to Ham's and Shem's descendants are much fuller than those of the families of Japhet.

1. Recent investigations by antiquarians, both into the history and languages of Western Asia, by the aid of the cuneiform inscriptions, have led the best ethnologists to accept these "*Toledoth* (generations) of Noah" as a most admirable and trustworthy basis for the earliest histories of our race; for the inscriptions confirm, in an eminent manner, the credibility of this venerable and most ancient document of the Jewish Lawgiver.

Let us consider two historical statements occurring in the midst

of these lists of mere names. In chap. x. 7, "the sons of Cush" is followed by several names of countries, which were settled by his descendants. Then, verse 8, follows, "Cush begat Nimrod," who is said to have been a "mighty one in the earth." As Cush was Ham's oldest son, and Nimrod *may* have been the sixth son of Cush, we can hardly suppose he was born earlier than forty or fifty years after the flood, so that when he had reached his prime, nearly one century had elapsed since the flood. In x. 10, we are told of Nimrod "the BEGINNING of his kingdom was Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh, in the land of Shinar." In verse 22, we learn that Asshur was Shem's second son; and in verses 11-12, "out of that land (Shinar) went forth Asshur, and builded Nineveh and Rehoboth, a city [*margin* the streets of the city] and Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and Calah, the same is a great city," or, literally, "it is the great city."

2. These historical notices are, evidently, as to chronology, anticipative. The whole chapter, as above intimated, is of the character of a chart, covering, in its very significant family, tribal, and national names, a long tract of the history which Moses and others were yet to write. The history of the flood having closed, chap. ix. 18, the writer adds of Noah's sons, verse 19, "of them was the whole earth overspread." Then follows the episode of Noah's drunkenness and its results, and a statement of the length of his life. The history is resumed chapter xi.: "The whole earth was of one language and one speech." We are not informed how long Noah and his sons and families and descendants remained in Armenia. They became nomadic—xi. 2, "as they journeyed," or "*in* their journeying," indicates that fact. The verb rendered "journeying" is literally (a) "to pull up," then (b) specially "to pull up stakes" or tent pins, (c) then "to move camp," and so to journey from place to place. Our version adds "from the east" (or *margin*, eastward). But the Hebrew word, קָדַם first means *before*, *in front*, and as, to the Hebrews, in modes of speaking, the east was in front and the west behind, this word acquired the meaning of "east," and denoted generally all the regions *east* from Palestine, especially those each side of the Euphrates and Tigris and Armenia. When the word is com-

pounded with a prepositional prefix, it denotes *eastward* if connected with any word to which it shows a relation, but otherwise, as here, it may mean the *east*, in a wide sense, denoting all the region, as above mentioned. In later Hebrew writings (and once in Moses' writings, Deut. xxxiii. 15), its predominant meaning is "of old" or "of old time"—a signification suitable here, "in their journeying of olden time." In any case, there had been a movement from the north to the milder region of Shinar, and "they dwelt there." How long they *dwelt* before undertaking the tower, being defeated and dispersed by the divine power, we have no definite information. But we are told that in Peleg's "days" "the earth was divided." He was born 100, and died 339 years, after the flood. We are not told Nimrod's age. He was grandson of Ham. Salah, grandson of Shem, may be accepted as fully, or nearly, his contemporary. Salah lived, Gen. xi. 14-15, 403 years.

The Scriptures do not state the exact time when the "*beginning*" of Nimrod's kingdom occurred, nor when "Asshur went forth," etc. Nimrod, as a grandson of Ham and sixth son of Cush, was born, perhaps, between forty and fifty years after the flood. He would thus be about fifty or sixty years old when Peleg was born. Now, meanwhile Noah's descendants had reached Shinar. The building of the tower would not necessarily, nor even probably, be undertaken immediately, there being yet too small a population for such an enterprise: and the people "*dwelt*" in Shinar, implying time for settled abode. "The division of the earth" occurring in "Peleg's day," implies some relation to the arresting of the enterprise by "the confounding their language and the scattering of them abroad upon (not over) the face of all the earth." Gen. xi. 7-8. As "Peleg's days" covered a period of two hundred and thirty-nine years, it is allowable to place this event not earlier than one hundred years after the flood, nor later than three hundred and thirty-nine, when Peleg died. The necessary increase of population for the enterprise of building would be gained, by, say, one hundred and fifty or two hundred years after the flood. Some time was doubtless required for the process of building, till arrested by

the divine power. We may therefore approximate the settlement of the time of this event, and infer from what has now been said, that it was not less than two hundred nor more than three hundred years after the flood.

3. We now inquire of the best authenticated records, exhumed from the ruins opened on the Tigris and Euphrates. An inscription on the rock at Bavian, made by Sennacherib about 692 B. C., speaks of his having recovered certain gods carried away by the Babylonians four hundred and eighteen years previously, after a battle fought with the Assyrian forces under Tiglath Pileser I., that is, $692 - 418 = 1110$ B. C. Other inscriptions, found at Sherghat, give an account that during his reign Tiglath Pileser had rebuilt a temple which had laid in ruins sixty years; and that this temple had been built six hundred and forty years previous to its destruction or falling into ruins. It was then built $1110 - 60 = 1050$ years B. C. There may be some question as to the accuracy of this calculation, as there are uncertainties respecting the exactness of the time when the inscriptions were actually composed, and the periods assigned, both for the time the temple existed and that in which it lay in ruins. Though both Assyrians and Babylonians were remarkably careful respecting the records of their history, yet we do not know whether the matter of this temple presents accurately the period designated, as we cannot know whether it was given by dating from its foundation or its completion, and whether the time of its lying in ruins was from the date of its disuse or its actual destruction or falling into decay. But next, the most trustworthy opinions, derived from Berosus, Calisthenes, and other sources, do not give entirely satisfactory results respecting the period from 1810 B. C. to the "beginning" of Nimrod's kingdom. The earliest monumental king is Uruch, who styles himself "King of Ur," who built a temple in honor of Bel-Nimrod, or Nimrod of Scripture. He is identified by Rawlinson with a god called "Bel-Nipur," or as he renders it, "The Hunter Lord." So far as these monumental data aid, they confirm the Scriptures in assigning the "beginning" of the kingdom of Babylon to Nimrod. Uruch was perhaps as "King of Ur" a tributary to Nimrod and

then his successor. The words "king" and "kingdom" are not to be accepted, used in those remote days, as denoting a ruler with a splendid court and palace and large armies, or a dominion over wide regions and large populations. Both then, and as late as the time of Benhadad's "thirty-two" tributary "kings," (1 Kings xx. 1,) the terms often denoted no more than "chiefs" of tribes or petty principalities.

4. We are disposed then to accept the received dates of the Bible as substantially correct. The only desired modification is one which will give a longer period than usually allowed for the space between the flood and the dispersion. The accounts of Berosus, and of others based on his, assign 2,234 B. C. as the time of the "*beginning*" of Nimrod's kingdom. We *may* accept this date, supposing a very small "*beginning*." But allowing a hundred years longer from the flood greatly relieves the difficulty, and no settled facts forbid this.

The time then of the "*beginning*" of Nimrod's kingdom antedates that of any political organisation of Western Asia known to us, and perhaps of any in the world. We cannot here discuss the question of the greater antiquity of Egypt. It is possible, accordant with the views of some, that Nimrod may have first established the "*beginning*" of a kingdom in Egypt, or may have done so after his exploits in Shinar or Chaldæa, either by personal effort or the superintendence of others.

The period of Asshur's emigration was subsequent to Nimrod's work. He is recognised in the inscriptions as "the great God," "the great Lord," "the King of all Gods," who rules supreme over them, and sometimes is called "the Father of Gods." The Assyrian kings, with characteristic religious tone, ascribe their success to his aid, and they waged war, ravaged, and destroyed to extend his worship. All they did was done for his honor, as well as for their own and for the glory of the kingdom, and to teach his laws and set up the emblems of his dignity. Not more was the religion of the followers of Cromwell mingled with their counsels, recognised in their enterprises, and prominent in their victorious rejoicings, than was that of the Assyrians. "Asshur was the name of the god, of the founder of the king-

dom, of the country, of the town (long the capital), and of the citizen. To distinguish in what sense the word *Asshur* (or Ashur, as sometimes spelled) was used, there was a character, called a *determinative*, attached. What Mahomet was and is to the Mahometan, William the Conqueror to the Englishman, or Washington to the American, Asshur was to the Assyrian, with the added regard due to the great God. The name, Asshur, is a constantly recurring element in the formation of names, just as we have the divine names, El, Jehovah or Jah. and Adoni, either in full or abbreviated, in Jewish names of places and persons.

5. It may be well to notice the marginal reading of Gen. x. 11: "Out of that land he (*i. e.*, Nimrod) went out to Assyria," etc. But the word אַשּׁוּר would need the termination of the ך local, denoting direction to a place, also including, often, the idea of arrival. The allegation that Ninrod's name and fame were perpetuated in Assyria does not form a conclusive argument for this reading. For it is evident that whenever and for whatever cause unsuccessful rebellion and forcible expulsion or voluntary emigration "Asshur went forth," the cities he built existed as far back as 2,000 B. C. But there is no evidence that a separate and independent government existed. Nimrod, deified at his death, seems to have had his memorials in the neighborhood of Nineveh.

We see in this discussion that the credibility of the facts stated by Moses respecting these ancient empires, whatever chronological discrepancies may appear or really exist, is well sustained by the most trustworthy native "records of the past."

6. Corroborating these direct confirmations of the history of Moses, are some rather inferential yet sustaining illustrations of its entire correctness.

(1.) It is well known to readers on the subject that in the ruins of Babylon are found but few stones. Bricks, baked by fire or sun-dried, were evidently the almost exclusively used material. As the country was flat and subject to overflow by the waters of the Euphrates, mounds of solid brick-work, or with earth added, were prepared, on which the buildings might be erected. In the region of Nineveh, there has ever been an

abundant supply of the best building stone. Yet the same mode of preparing a foundation and the same extensive use of brick are evinced by the ruins. Moses' description of the building of the town, in using "brick for stone" and "slime for mortar" (having no limestone from which to procure lime), corresponds with facts now abundantly patent; and further, his giving precedence to Nimrod in time, is evinced by the fact that the Assyrians derived their plan of building from the Babylonians.

(2.) For a long time the Mosaic statement of "beginning" of Nimrod's kingdom, Babylon, Erech, etc., in the land of Shinar, and that of the "building of Nineveh, Rehoboth, Calah, and Resen" by Asshur, has been contested, on the ground that the origin of the kingdom of Babylon was attributed to a descendant of Ham, and that of Nineveh to a descendant of Shem, and yet there had been an almost identical style of civilisation—in religion, manners, language, and material and civil growth and power. All the grounds of this rejection of the Mosaic testimony are removed by the monumental records. The inscriptions on the bricks, by their position at the base of Babylonian ruins evidently the most ancient, present a language very different from that of later periods. Indeed, these archaic inscriptions are, both in the characters used, approaching the pictorial or hieroglyphic type, and in the vocabulary and grammatical structure of the language, monuments of a distinctly Cushite race, of decided ethnic and linguistic affinities with the Ethiopic and the speech of the people of Egypt, Phœnicia or Palestine. Abraham, who emigrated from "Ur of the Chaldees" about twenty centuries before Christ, it seems easily held intercourse with the people of the land "whither he went," and even with the Egyptians. His great grandsons, Joseph's brethren, whose grandmother and mother were both Aramæans, and Joseph himself, doubtless (on his first arrival in Egypt) needed interpreters, for their own tongue must, in the space of nearly two centuries, by their Aramæan connexion, have been greatly changed. The archaic language of Chaldæa has now been proved, from the sources above mentioned, while predominantly of the Cushite family, to have also contained distinctly marked elements of the

Turanian (Scythic), Aryan, and Semitic families of language. The "Chaldean" of the bricks is not that of the time of Nebuchadnezzar, which is more nearly allied to the Hebrew. Mistakes have been made even by such scholars as Heeren, Niebuhr, Lowth, and Gesenius, by a common application of the term "Chaldæa" and its derivations alike to the early and the later race inhabiting the lower Mesopotamia.

It is evident, in spite of Bunsen's sneers at believers in the Bible history,* *there was an Asiatic Cush*. The traditions of Greeks, especially Homer's lines, Od. i. 23, 24, of the Ethiopians: "They were divided at the ends of the earth, towards the rising and the setting sun;" Strabo's statement, on the authority of Ephorus, that "the Ethiopians were divided by the Arabian gulf into Eastern and Western, Asiatic and African;" the tradition as to Memnon, on the authority of Hesiod and Pindar, that he led an army of Susianians and Ethiopians to assist Priam, and, at the same time, was claimed as King Amunoph III., known as "the vocal Memnon," thus uniting Eastern and Western Ethiopians; the traditions of the Armenians, who apply the name Cush to Media, Persia, Elymas, and Aria; and the mythological names and genealogies, connecting the divinities of both regions, as holding common relations to each: all tend to confirm the monumental testimonies to the differences of ethnic and linguistic relations between the early Babylonians and Assyrians, and accord with the scriptural statement.

(3.) The only biblical statement touching the dimensions of the city of Nineveh are given by Jonah iii. 3, 4: "Nineveh was an exceeding great city, of three days' journey [literally, a walk † of three days]. And Jonah began to enter in the city a day's journey,"—or, a walk of one day. Various modes of explaining this, consistently with statements from other sources, have been proposed. The discoveries of Mr. Layard suggested to him one which appears most probable. In Genesis x. 12, after naming

* "The Bible mentions but one Cush—Ethiopia. An Asiatic Cush exists only in the imagination of interpreters, and is the child of their despair." (Philosophy of Universal History, Vol. I., p. 191, as quoted by Rawlinson.)

† See Ezek. xlii. 4.

Nineveh, Rehoboth, and Calah, Moses adds, "and Resen between Nineveh and Calah, the same is a great city;" literally, "it is the great city." Now if we read, "Nineveh and streets of a city," as the margin suggests, the word city evidently indicates Nineveh, the building of which involved laying out the streets; then the other two places are included, the whole in Moses' time having grown into one. Diodorus Siculus, 100 B. C., gives the dimensions nearly sixty miles around. Mr. Layard is satisfied that the dimensions of Nineveh, including its "suburbs," form nearly a parallelogram eighteen by twelve miles, which agrees with the account of Diodorus and confirms Jonah's statement. Jonah's "walk of one day" on entering the city is not connected with the measurement, but only informs us of his occupation, perhaps, in taking a general survey before proceeding to give his solemn and effective warning.

7. For many centuries after the "beginning" of Nimrod's kingdom and the "building" of Nineveh, there were alternately wars and seasons of peace between the people of Chaldæa or the Southern Mesopotamia, and those of the Northern Mesopotamia. The Chaldæan kingdom is supposed to have existed eight or ten centuries before the Assyrian people succeeded in establishing their independence. Then the inscriptions give us notices of alliances as well as disputes. The independence of Assyria was followed by its greater prosperity, till from a comparatively unimportant kingdom it grew to the dimensions and power of an empire; and ultimately first subdued its rival and then absorbed its territory into its own.

II. We thus far find no very important notices—indeed, none of certainty—existing between these Mesopotamian states and the chosen people.

1. Some suppose Chushan-rishathaim of Judges iii. 8-10, called "king of Mesopotamia," may have been an Assyrian monarch; but it is more probable he was the ruler of some part of the regions of Syria lying much further north than those then pertaining to the Assyrian empire, as the word Mesopotamia is literally "Syria of two rivers."

2. In 2 Samuel, 8th and 10th chapters, we have an account of the wars of David with the Moabites, Ammonites, the Syrians of Zobah (under Hadadezer), and of Beth-rehob, and other enemies; and in x. 16 we find, when the combinations against David had been broken up, that Hadarezer "sent and brought out the Syrians that were *beyond the river*," *i. e.*, the Euphrates. Now we know from the inscriptions that Tiglath Pileser I., about the year 1120 B. C., had subjugated the Aramæans or Syrians. At the close of his reign, troubles arose between Assyria and its former superior kingdom and now rival, Babylon. Of the results, no monuments have been discovered to inform us; and for nearly two hundred years we find few, and these unsatisfactory, records of any important events; even the names of the kings, for a large part of the period, have not come to light. Now, these "Syrians from beyond the river," thus incorporated by Tiglath Pileser in the kingdom or "empire" (as it is reckoned by historians), were without doubt then so loosely attached to Assyria that they retained their national name; yet in Psalm lxxxiii. 8, among the many nations and tribes whose efforts against David are deprecated by the poet, we read, "Assur is also joined with them," the writer thus indicating them by their locality and political relations. We are aware that high authorities have held this Psalm to be descriptive of another period—the wars in which Jehoshaphat was engaged, related in 2 Chronicles, 20th chapter. But there is no notice in that history of any auxiliaries of Syrians from "*beyond the river*" aiding Ammon and Moab. On the contrary, the auxiliaries named (verse 2) are expressly said to be "*from beyond the sea on this side Syria*," the Sea of Galilee or the Dead Sea being meant.

But while this mention brings into view the relations of a portion of the people politically connected with Assyria, it is not the relation of Assyria as such. The inscriptions, however, enable us to understand why this was the case. The Assyrian power was then too weak, or fully occupied in other wars with its powerful rival, to take part in arresting the growth of this rising power in Palestine. During the extensive warlike enterprises of Tiglath Pileser and his immediate predecessors, from

Asshur-ris-ilim back for a century to Tiglath-inin, the condition of the Hebrews was not such as to invite attention, and the relations of Assyria and Egypt had not then called for alliance with the governments of Palestine, by the one or the other, as in after-days, to facilitate the passage of large armies in their contests for wider dominion. The first manifestation of this policy mentioned in the Scriptures was, perhaps, the invasion of Judah by Shishak in the time of Rehoboam.

III. We are thus brought to that most interesting part of our inquiries, when the Assyrian government became connected with those of the Holy Land, either as an ally or *suzerain*; the first rather in form, the latter in reality; for the kings of Assyria, in the manner of other ancient imperial rulers, exacted tributes or enforced involuntary presents.

1. Before adducing examples of the confirmations of Scripture history derived from the monumental inscriptions of Assyria and Babylon, a few preliminary statements are important.

(1.) In the annals of the Assyrian monarchs, statements of warlike expeditions and conquests of various nations are presented. In most cases these monarchs had already become somewhat known in history, and also a knowledge more or less definite of the period in which they flourished already existed. In such cases, and by frequent recurrence of the name of the monarch, little or no difficulty in identification occurred. In others, however, less known, much obscurity surrounded the name. Then the spelling of a name, which had been translated or transliterated by the Scripture or classic writers who had used it, increased the obscurity. And still farther, as is well known of Scripture characters, two or three names were sometimes applied to one person. Diligent and careful study and repeated reviews of decipherments have removed nearly all occasions of doubt on this score.

(2.) The Assyrians appear to have kept a current chronology, to which the title, "Assyrian Eponym Canon," has been given. This was the indication of every year by the name of a king or some other eminent and well known person. And events were

recorded as occurring in the "Eponym" of such person. Fragments (more or less entire, and in great numbers) of such a Canon have been discovered, deciphered, and arranged in a tolerably good order. As the Assyrians did not adjust this Canon to the eras of Jewish or Grecian chronology, to them it was only valuable as a summary of their own history. It occasionally added to the name and year of the Eponym a brief historical statement. But Assyrian scholars have identified in this record, by means of trustworthy records of other nations, several names of persons of eminence; the special occasion of whose distinction, such as an accession to the crown or a great victory, has become a well known era. They have thus adapted to this Canon the chronology of the synchronous period as given by Grecian or Scripture authorities. Thus the Canon has become a valuable contribution to the settlement of many questions in the history of this remote part of the world, and of its remote periods, from 930 to 688 B. C. Still it has been found impracticable to form accurate synchronous histories of ancient nations. While there has been found the nearest approach to synchronism in the chronology of Assyria, Ptolemy, and our Bible, still many discrepancies exist. These are due to the causes which oblige the best scholars to speak cautiously, such as (*a*) different modes of reckoning time among different nations, and by the same nation at different periods; (*b*) doubtful decipherments and readings of the inscriptions, in the manner above mentioned, as to names occurring only once; (*c*) and this occasions doubts as to dates.

(3.) It has been found best, in the inquiries now before us, to accept the Assyrian chronology for events and persons belonging to Assyria and Babylon, and the Scripture chronology for events of the Jewish history: and then if the same event is mentioned by both, with different dates, to overlook such difference (never very great) as due to some such causes as above mentioned, or to periods of anarchy, or revolution, *interregna*, or other reasonable grounds for accepting the existence of error in the chronology of one or the other nation. In a similar manner differences may be adjusted when to the same date different events are assigned,

one of which, by other trustworthy evidence, may be known to have occurred at another time.

These remarks are made once for all, and suggest as a corollary, that even when apparent discrepancies in the chronology of our Bibles and the monumental records admit of no solution satisfactory to rigid criticism, we are not to conclude none is possible, for even a correction of biblical chronology is not a "denial of the faith;" and scholars, equally tenacious of the divine authority of the Scriptures, may yet differ as much as twenty years on the period when Uzziah, for instance, became king of Judah.

2. What has been said finds an application in solving some questions arising in examining the first case of an Assyrian invasion of the Holy Land recorded in Scripture. In 2 Kings, xv. 19, 20, we read: "Pul, king of Assyria, came against the land: and Menahem gave Pul a thousand talents of silver, that his hand might be with him to confirm the kingdom in his hand. And Menahem exacted the money of Israel, of all the mighty men of wealth, . . . to give the king of Assyria. So the king of Assyria turned back and stayed not there in the land." Also in 1 Chron. v. 26: "And the God of Israel stirred up the spirit of Pul, king of Assyria, and Tilgath-pilneser, king of Assyria, and he [Tilgath-pilneser] carried them away [the descendants of Reuben and Gad and half tribe of Manasseh, verse 18], and brought them unto Halah and Habor and Hara and to the river Gozan, unto this day." Before, but especially since, the introduction of the monumental records into the elucidation of Scripture history, this passage has occasioned not a little difficulty of satisfactory explanation, and consequently many schemes of solving the questions to which it has given rise have been proposed.

The name of Pul does not occur either in the Assyrian Canon or in any monumental inscriptions of Assyria. Some have supposed Pul was a usurper, aspiring to the throne in the first half of the seventh century—a period otherwise known to have been one of great trial and perhaps revolution in the kingdom. Others, that as a usurper, he had arisen in Babylonia, from which

it is known Assyria continued to be often harassed, even after it had become really a part of the empire; and as the name Pul is not properly Assyrian, but could be found on Babylonian bricks, Mr. Rawlinson rather favored this view. Mr. Rawlinson also presented another suggestion, that Pul and Tiglath-pileser were names of the same person, and, strangely enough, the passage in 1 Chron. v. 26 was quoted to sustain the suggestion. There it is said, "*he carried,*" etc., which most obviously refers to Tiglath-pileser. But as no act had been predicated of Pul, the pronoun, being in the singular, was understood to denote him and Tiglath-pileser as one person. But we need not discuss these various surmises. Mr. George Smith, in the Assyrian Canon, published shortly before his lamented death, favors the opinion that Pul is the name of a monarch first read as *Vul-lush*, then, on more correct decipherment, *Vul-nirari*. It is well known that the Hebrew affords only about half a dozen words of Hebrew origin, and several of them doubtful, in which the letter ך is initial: and as פ is a cognate labial, the spelling of Vul would, by the Hebrew writer, be very naturally varied to Pul.

The contraction of names was not unusual in Assyrian, as Agu for Agukah-rimi, and Ragmu for Ragmu-seinina-namari, and Shalman for Shalmaneser (Hosea x. 14). The earliest period in which Pul could be a contemporary of Menahem is 773-771 B. C. Then Shalmaneser III. was king of Assyria, according to the Canon. But in an inscription of Vul-nirari, he speaks of himself as "the king whom, *in his son*. Asshur . . . has renowned," thus pointing to his son, Shalmaneser, who was most likely, and according to a custom in other oriental kingdoms, as Judah for instance, as well as Assyria, associated with his father. In this way Vul-nirari or Pul might still be king, though Shalmaneser is so reckoned for that date, just as Jotham appears to have been reckoned as king in the dates, while Uzziah still reigned. Now we read in an inscription of Vul-nirari, that "he subjugated and took tribute and taxes from *Omri*," the name by which the Assyrian inscriptions frequently designate both the city and the ruler of Samaria, because Samaria had been founded by Omri

(1 Kings xvi. 24). The fuller name, often used, is Beth-khuūri, the Assyrian rendering of the Hebrew Beth-Omri, *i. e.*, the House of Omri—a mode of denoting a dynasty or government frequently occurring; the English and French nomenclature. “House of Stuart” or “House of the Bourbons,” etc., etc., furnishing parallel examples.

It only remains to say, that, with a very small margin for differences in chronological order, the time of Menahem and that of Pul synchronise. It was evidently at the beginning of Menahem’s reign that he paid the tribute; for it seems to have been in order to secure the aid of the Assyrian monarch in “confirming the kingdom in his hand.” It was a time of disorder, misrule, and assassination, and Menahem had reason to fear the fate he had brought on his predecessor Shallum, which Shallum had brought on Zechariah.

3. The next monarch from Assyria who came to carry on the subjugation of the kingdom of Israel, was Tiglath Pileser (in one monumental record read Takultipalesar, and in another, Tagultipalesar). The Assyrian authorities, as copied by the best scholars, assign the accession of this monarch to 747–745 B. C. It is evident from his inscriptions that he had much intercourse with the rulers both of Israel and Judah. In one place he mentions tribute from Menahem. This is not noticed in Scripture; but as it is said expressly of him, 2 Kings, xv. 29, that he came “in the days of Pekah,” it has been supposed the name of Menahem was used by his scribe for Pekah, having overlooked the fact of a change. It is quite probable, as Pekah had obtained the kingdom by murdering Pekahiah, a son of Menahem, that another Menahem, perhaps son of Pekahiah, not named in Scripture, had sought to avenge his father’s death, and it may be had some temporary success. Tiglath Pileser also names Azariah of Judah. This could not be Azariah (Uzziah), for he must have died before Tiglath Pileser’s accession. In 2 Chron. xxi. 17, we find the name Jehoahaz (the youngest son of Jehoram) called in chap. xxii. 1, Ahaziah, and verse 6, Azariah, where we know that Ahaziah is meant. This use of several names for the same person was not uncommon. Hence Ahaziah (or Azariah) as the

inscription names him, was evidently Ahaz. This view is strengthened by the fact that Azariah was a contemporary of Menahem, and it is presumable, as the scribe confounded Menahem of Israel with Pekah, he might as readily have confounded Ahaz and Azariah. Tiglath Pileser is mentioned again. Rezin, also named in the inscriptions of this king, who was king of Damascus, and Pekah, king of Israel, had united in an attack on Judah, in the reign of Ahaz. This is mentioned in 2 Kings xvi. 5, and Isaiah vii. 1. In 2 Kings xvi. 7, we read: "Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath Pileser, king of Assyria, saying, I am thy servant, thy son: come up and save me out of the hand of the king of Syria and out of the hand of the king of Israel, which rise up against me." Then verse 8 informs us how Ahaz "took the silver and gold which was found in the house of the Lord and in the treasuries of the king's house, and sent a present to the king of Assyria." Then the "king of Assyria hearkened to his request." He invaded Damascus and carried away the people captive to Kir, exactly fulfilling the prophecy of Amos i. 5, and slew Rezin. In Tiglath Pileser's inscriptions we find mention of the "Damascus besieged," and its king "caged like a bird." Several cities and "the house of the father of Rezin" are noted among the captured places, and "sixteen districts of Syria, like a flood I swept." The king was Rezin. A more extended account of the war against Ahaz by Rezin and Pekah is given in 2 Chron. chap. xxviii. From this it seems that they had devastated the land, Pekah cutting down 120,000 men in one battle, and his generals taking captive of Judah 200,000 women, sons and daughters, with much spoil—which were carried to Samaria, though subsequently restored; and Rezin carried vast multitudes to Damascus. The king of Assyria, as we have seen, by attacking Damascus, relieved the capital from the siege. But it does not appear that he really helped Ahaz, notwithstanding the costly present. When Tiglath Pileser had subdued and slain Rezin and utterly defeated Pekah and his successor Hoshea, instead of strengthening, "he distressed Ahaz." 2 Chron. xviii. 20, 21.

One hundred years before the days of Tiglath Pileser, in the time of Shalmaneser, we have notices of the incipient tributary

relations of Israel to Assyria. But the inscription relating this finds no corresponding mention in the Scriptures. By these various invasions, the kingdom of Israel had been nearly destroyed. Tiglath Pileser had carried captive the people of Naphtali and from the trans-Jordanic tribes. The fatal schism in the close of Solomon's reign and beginning of Rehoboam's, had weakened the great empire founded by David and ruled by Solomon, and Assyria had constantly and steadily extended her warlike enterprises westward. The successes thus far only whetted the appetite for conquest, which the victories of centuries had not appeased.

4. Next to Tiglath Pileser appears Shalmaneser IV., mentioned only in 2 Kings xvii. 3, and parallel, xviii. 9. Hoshea had succeeded Pekah, as Pekah his predecessor, by assassination, and he succeeded to a kingdom of diminished size and under tributary subjection to Assyria. Shalmaneser came up against him only to rivet the fetters by which his predecessor had been bound. "He gave him presents," 2 Kings xvii. 3, is but a euphemism for "he paid him tribute." On an obelisk in the ruins of Nimrod there are bas-relief representations of captives loaded with spoils such as Jews might be supposed to bring; and in the order of these records, those on the back part of the obelisk are assigned to the period including the time of Shalmaneser. Until the discovery of Sargon's Inscriptions, Assyriologists identified him with Shalmaneser, and ascribed to the latter these bas-relief records. But since that discovery, in view of the shortness of Shalmaneser's reign, only six years, this opinion has been somewhat discredited. At all events, the Scripture accounts of the fall of Samaria and the overthrow of the kingdom of Israel are so fully confirmed by Sargon's annals, that we at once proceed to notice these.

5. As already briefly stated in the REVIEW for April, 1877, the terrible disasters just mentioned were the results of Sargon's enterprises. We read, 2 Kings xvii. 3, 4: "Against him (Hoshea) came up Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, and Hoshea became his servant and gave him presents. And the *king of Assyria* found conspiracy in Hoshea, for he had sent messengers

to So, king of Egypt, and brought no presents to the king of Assyria as year by year. Therefore the king of Assyria shut him up and bound him in prison. Then the king of Assyria came up throughout all the land and went up to Samaria and besieged it three years." "In the ninth year of Hoshea," (the last of his reign,) "the king of Assyria took Samaria and carried Israel away into Assyria, and placed them in Halah and in Habor, the river Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes." We observe in this narrative, that the visit of Shalmaneser was evidently in the *beginning* of Hoshea's reign, inasmuch as Hoshea continued "year by year" to pay tribute; and as the siege lasted three out of the nine years of his reign, this payment must have been kept up several years. It is also evident that from the first payment, verse 3, there was a lapse of time to the period of Hoshea's defection. As Shalmaneser reigned only six years, the work of conquest was carried on by his successor, Sargon, whose voluminous annals are now before us. These supplement and explain the brief records given above, which are not repeated in the book of Chronicles. Sargon was the besieger and conqueror. Says he: "Samaria I besieged, I conquered; 27,290 people, dwelling in the midst of it, I carried captive; fifty chariots from among them I selected, and the rest I distributed; . . . and the *taxes of the former king*" (*i. e.*, we suppose, Shalmaneser,) "I fixed on them; I appointed a governor of mine over them." After naming several remote tribes of the Arabians, which he had conquered, and some of which he had destroyed, he adds: "The rest of them I removed, and in the city of Samaria I placed them." Though this special passage has not a verbal counterpart in the Scriptures, yet, besides the fact of the existence in Samaria, at the time of Nehemiah, of Arabians, we have the express statement of similar importations from Babylon, Cuthah, Ava, Hamath, and Sepharvaim—verse 24—and the immediate results of this importation on the religious condition of the people of Samaria as stated in the remainder of the chapter. This deportation was in keeping with that by Tiglath Pileser, 1 Chron. v. 26, already noticed, and was kept up till the time of Esar-haddon.

The very name of kingdom of Israel never more existed. The mixed inhabitants of Northern Palestine, and the low moral, as well as other, cultivation of the people of Galilee in the time of our Saviour, remained standing monuments of this harsh policy of the Assyrian kings, and the heavy wrath of the God of their fathers whom they had despised.

The crowning sin of the later monarchs of Israel, and the immediate provocation of Sargon's severity, was the constant effort for forming alliance with Egypt. The Assyrian was jealous of Egyptian growth; and as Palestine lay in the only feasible route for large armies from Egypt to Assyria, the vassalage of its two remnant kingdoms of David's empire was a prize in the contest for which by these two great powers, these kingdoms were laid waste. Their resistance to whichever monarch was superior—him of Assyria or him of Egypt—incurd exemplary retribution, of the kind and measure of which we have a specimen in the quotation from Sargon's annals already given. Isaiah xx. 1, dates the time of one of his prophecies by "the year that Tartan came into Ashdod, where Sargon, king of Assyria, sent him, and fought against it, and took it."

Sargon, as other wise generals, disliked "a fire in his rear." When he had despoiled Samaria and quelled a rebellion in Arpad, Damascus, and Samaria, by crushing a usurper in Hamath who had caused and led it, he turned his arms against the south, and having formerly struck heavy blows on the borders of Egypt, now proceeded to follow up his conquests. The immediate occasion of this enterprise, doubtless one long meditated, was the revolt of Ashdod, as its name imports, a stronghold, the Azotus of Acts viii. 40. With Ashdod other neighboring powers were combined. Against this alliance Sargon enjoyed his wonted success; and although he may not be said to have so conquered Egypt that it at once became a part of his empire, yet, by the conquest of the lands adjoining it on the northeast, he prepared the way for its final overthrow under the arms of his grandson Esar-haddon.

We close these notices of Sargon by a remark respecting his policy of "changing the abodes" of conquered nations. This

was not first adopted by him, for his predecessors had used it, as we have seen, notably in the course of Tiglath Pileser; but he carried out the plan to the fullest practicable extent. His deportation of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Israel was not at first supplied by importations from abroad. "And the Lord sent lions among them." 2 Kings xvii. 25. This ascription of the visitation to the direct agency of the Lord is entirely correct. But it was not a miraculous agency. It was of the orderings of that same wise and holy providence by which such an event follows the depletion of a country, and against the occurrence of which, in the time of the occupation of Palestine by the Israelites under Joshua, God was pleased to ordain that the native inhabitants should not be cut off too suddenly. Deut. vii. 22. It was not in Palestine only that Sargon carried out this policy. We find he transported the Tibarim to Assyria and replaced them with Assyrians; Hamath and Damascus had the places of captives taken to Assyria supplied from Armenia. Similar vacancies in Zayros and in Ashdod and Commukha were filled in like manner from other countries, Assyria and those of vanquished people. Thus the stronger races were weakened by dispersion, and the weaker races by the sundering at once of all the ties which bind natives of a country to their soil. Sargon's successors, down to Esar-haddon and the kings of Babylon, as Nebuchadnezzar, pursued the same course. In this way they proposed to strengthen the empire, otherwise endangered by its very extent, and enforce peace and order, as much by policy (if not more,) as by war.

6. Sennacherib, "the great king, the king of Assyria," 2 Kings xviii. 19, succeeded his father, Sargon. Our readers are doubtless familiar with the thrice-told narrative of his expeditions against Judah and Jerusalem. 2 Kings xviii., xix.; 2 Chron. xxxii. 1-22; and Isaiah xxxvi., xxxvii. It is needless to occupy our limited space with full quotations of either of these portions of Scripture. Those not familiar with the narrative will better understand what follows by a careful perusal of at least the chapters of Kings or Isaiah.

We have very full monumental records of Sennacherib. The VOL. XXIX., NO. 3—13.

narrative of his relations to Judah opens thus: "Because Hezekiah, king of Judah, would not submit to my yoke, I came up against him, and by force of arms . . . I took forty-six of his strong fenced cities; and of the smaller towns I took and plundered a countless number. From these places I captured and carried off, as spoil, 200,150 people, old and young, male and female, together with horses and mares, asses and camels, oxen, sheep, a countless multitude. Hezekiah himself I shut up in Jerusalem as in a cage, building towns round the city, to fence him in, and raising banks of earth against the gates, so as to prevent escape. Then upon this Hezekiah there fell the fear of the power of my arms, and he sent out to me the chiefs and elders of Jerusalem, with thirty talents of gold and eight hundred talents of silver,* and divers treasures, a rich and immense booty." Read 2 Kings xviii. 7 and 13-16. The apparent discrepancy in the "three hundred talents of silver," verse 14, and the "eight hundred" of Sennacherib's statement, was formerly variously and perhaps satisfactorily explained. But more recent discoveries show that the talent of silver was different in weight from that of gold, both in Palestine and Assyria, and that in Palestine three talents of the heavier weight equalled eight talents of the lighter in Assyria. These statements are made on the authority of most eminent Assyriologists and numismatologists, who will not be suspected of special *inclinations* to sustain the credibility of the Bible.

In verses 14-17 of the same chapter, we are told that Sennacherib was at Lachish at the time of the above-mentioned events. Of this fact we have bas-relief representations and inscriptions in explanation, showing the king conducting the siege, and others which represent him, after the conquest, seated on a throne, declaring the fate of captives: to some, flaying alive; to some, impaling—both means of a most cruel death; to others, deportation; and to a few, release. That the annals of Sennacherib contain no allusion to the disaster he suffered in the loss of his large army, is only consistent with the custom of all such monarchs, to record

* More than \$1,000,000.

only victories and successes. The Assyrians recorded the loss of the Egyptian capital, and the Egyptians, through Herodotus, the account (though incorrect in causes and details,) of this disaster to the Assyrians. In his annals, Sennacherib gives a list of eight names, "all kings of the *Hittites*," a general title of the various tribes or nations on the western sea. Among these is "Menahem of Samaria." The best and not improbable explanation of what might otherwise be reckoned a glaring anachronism, is the rational supposition that a descendant of Menahem and of his name undertook, on Hoshea's death, depopulation of the land, and general revolution, to reëstablish and occupy the throne of Israel.

Sennacherib may be said to have brought Assyria to the height of its glory in arms, in arts, and in political power. But his declining years were embittered by the efforts of Babylon to throw off the Assyrian authority, and he died the victim of the ambition of his sons. It is interesting to notice that his contemporary, Hezekiah, marks, in his history and reign, at once the culmination of the Judæan portion of the separated kingdom of Rehoboam, and also the first signs of its gradual decline. Sennacherib, who, having survived many years and warred successfully (after his great disaster) in other regions, had no more come against Judah, and had thus left Hezekiah a time of peace and prosperity, justifying the comprehensive eulogy of 2 Chron. xxxi. 21: "In every work that he began in the house of God and in the law, . . . to seek his God, he did it with all his heart and prospered." A eulogy as appropriate to his pious life after as before his conflict with "the great king." In his sin, in the matter of the messengers of Merodach-baladan, "God left him to try him," and then announced the final downfall of his kingdom; and though there was "fear in his latter days," they were saddened by the prospect of a melancholy future for his descendants and his people. No divine message comforted the closing years of Sennacherib, and to him no prophet lifted the veil from the scenes of the departing glory of his kingdom.

7. Esar-haddon ascended the throne through the bloody scenes of a civil and fratricidal war. The half brothers, the murderers

of their common father, were subdued. He then, perhaps to put an end to the continual outbreaks of the Babylonians, proposed to unite the kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon under one government, and for the first ten years occupied during part of his vacations from numerous wars the palace he had built in Babylon, and ruled over both kingdoms. Towards the close of his reign, he abdicated the throne in Nineveh in favor of his son, and ruled in Babylon alone.

The inscriptions of Esar-haddon, supplemented by those of Assur-bani-pal, his son and successor, give us evidence confirming the record in 2 Chron. xxxiii. 11-13, of the captivity of Manasseh: "The Lord brought upon (the people) the captains of the host of the king of Assyria, which took Manasseh among the thorns." This is perhaps better rendered, took him *with the thorns*, by which the nose or lip was pierced, in order to insert the hook with which captives were led, and of which the *bas-reliefs* present pictures. So God says to Sennacherib, Is. xxxvii. 29, "I will put my hook in thy nose." As the word here rendered *hook* is of common etymological origin with that for *thorn*, Job xl. 26, (E. V. xli. 2,) which is also used in 2 Chron. xxxiii. 11, this last passage might very well be rendered, "with the hooks," "and bound him with fetters and carried him to Babylon." We have already stated that Babylon and Nineveh were in turn the royal residences. Though Esar-haddon is not named in our passage, the captivity was effected by the "captains of the host;" and in his inscription he mentions Manasseh as one of twenty-two kings brought before him, as it seems, for review. Though the place of the review is not named, there is much in the context to intimate that it was Babylon. If it was Nineveh, that does not contradict the statement as to Manasseh's ultimate destination.

There is no very positive statement of Manasseh's release found on the monumental records; but there are statements in an inscription by Assur-bani-pal, which may be so interpreted. The question, however, is not regarded as of sufficient importance to justify us in occupying so much of our limited space as would be necessary for its proper solution. But the great feat of Esar-

haddon, so fully completed that his son was only engaged for a while in quelling some revolts, was the conquest of Egypt, which Sargon had begun and Sennacherib prosecuted. Nahum iii. 3-10, addressing Nineveh, says: "Art thou better than No-Amon [E. V. populous No, or nourishing No, *i. e.*, Thebes,] that was situate among the rivers, that had the waters round about it? . . . Ethiopia and Egypt were her strength, and it was without end [E. V. infinite.] Put and Lubim were thy helpers. Yet was she carried away; . . . her young children also were dashed in pieces at the top of all her streets." Various hypotheses have been advanced respecting the author, measure, and time of the great overthrow, by the mention of which the prophet warns the kingdom of Assyria of a like ruin a century before its fall. The inscriptions of Esar-haddon and his son tell the story. The cruelty of all Eastern nations, and especially of Assyria at that period, leaves no room to question the correctness of the prophet's picture. Esar-haddon subdued Egypt, drove the king Tirkahéh to the mountains of Ethiopia, and thenceforward boastfully styled himself either "king of the kings of Egypt and conqueror of Ethiopia," or "king of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Meroe, and Ethiopia."

Esar-haddon, however, having fallen into ill-health during the latter part of his life, Tirkahéh returned, drove out the Assyrian governors from Egypt, and resumed the throne. But his success was short-lived. Assur-bani-pal soon suppressed the revolt; and the chief boasting of his inscriptions is in the form of recounting what he had accomplished, in securing the conquests of his father and grandfather or repressing revolts.

By the blow now struck, the power of Egypt was stunned. Although the efforts of its people to retrieve its independency were occasionally successful, the success was temporary. The nation steadily declined, and has more and more fully verified Ezekiel's terrible picture, chapters xxix.-xxxii. It has long become "the basest of kingdoms," "ruled over nations no more," but ruled mostly till 350 B. C. by Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians, and thenceforward by Greeks, Romans, Saracens, and Turks, so that there has been, for all these centuries, "no more a

prince of the land." Isaiah had been sent (in the year when Sargon sent Tartan to Ashdod, Is. xx. 1-4) with a symbolised prophecy. As Isaiah was divinely directed (symbolically) "to walk naked and barefoot three years," "so shall the king of Assyria lead away the Egyptians prisoners and the Ethiopians captives . . . naked and barefoot . . . to the shame of Egypt."

Connected with the capture of Manasseh, Esar-haddon, Ezra iv. 2-9, probably effected the last deportation of the people of Israel, and introduced the people whose names are given in this passage: "Dinaites, Apharsathchites, (probably same as) Apharsites, the Tarpelites, the Archevites, the Babylonians, the Susanchites (of Susianna), the Dehavites, and the Elamites." Before noticing the correspondence of the nationalities represented by these names with Esar-haddon's accounts of his importations, let us see what light his language throws on the exportation of those whose places these supplied. He writes: "I gathered the kings of the Hittites and of the side of the sea, all of them." These are general terms for the inhabitants of Palestine and the country east of it, as far as the Desert and to the northeast to the Euphrates. According to Joshua i. 4, the country given to Israel was from "the wilderness and this Lebanon even unto the great river, the river Euphrates," (south and southeastern and north and northeastern boundaries) called "all the land of the Hittites, and unto the great sea," the Mediterranean, the western boundary. So Shalmaneser II. in his inscriptions, uses *Hittites* in this wide sense. Heth, second son of Canaan, was, Gen. x. 15-18, associated with Sidon, as progenitors of the various tribes which made up the families of the "Canaanites." Now Esar-haddon had "gathered" the "kings" of this region, and he includes in this, as we learn from the context, multitudes of people and other spoils. He then adds: "People, the conquest of my bow (or arms), from *the lands and sea of the rising sun in the midst*, I placed, and my general governor over them I appointed." That is, he transported the people with their kings to his dominions, and replaced them by Apharsites (Persians), Babylonians, Susanchites and Elamites "of the lands and the sea of the rising sun." This great importation is to be distinguished

from the settlers imported by Sargon, as they seem to have been for the most part from countries of the more remote east and the Caspian Sea.

Esar-haddon, we have seen, had transferred to his son the dominion of Assyria at Nineveh, and established his own government over Babylon. Under the successor of Assur-bani-pal, the Assyrian empire fell into decay, already greatly weakened by the inroads of Scythians; and the Babylonians succeeded to the possession of the southern, western, and large parts of the northern portions. Into the many questions connected with the descent of the kingdom from the rule of Esar-haddon to that of Nebuchadnezzar, it is not pertinent to our present purpose to enter, except to notice the general agreement, that he was the son of Nabopolassar, a general of the last Assyrian monarch, who, sent to resist the attacks of the Medes and Babylonians, had renounced allegiance to his monarch and joined the enemies who succeeded in overthrowing the kingdom. It seems generally conceded that in Nebuchadnezzar the Babylonian kingdom found at once its most eminently successful monarch in extending its authority, and the most distinguished in contributing to the grandeur and elegance of the capital and advancing a material civilisation of the most splendidly luxurious kind.

8. No historical annals of Nebuchadnezzar's like those of his predecessors have yet been discovered. This is less to be regretted, as his era approaches very closely that of authentic history. Indeed Berosus, whose credibility we have seen sustained by the inscriptions as to important facts, was a native of Babylon, and says he witnessed the defeat of the Egyptians by Nebuchadnezzar.

The monumental inscriptions of preceding reigns make frequent allusions to the contests of Assyria and Egypt. The geographical position of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel subjected them to the attacks of first one and then another of those great powers, each being desirous to secure the alliance or vassalage of the Jews so as to facilitate a passage one to the other. Meanwhile, in the waning condition of both Israel and Judah, such a relation was very tempting, especially in times of weak faith in

God or apostasy from him: We see in the history of Manasseh, Jonah, Jehoiakim, and Zedekiah, how all this was illustrated. In this way, during the threatened attacks of Nebuchadnezzar as recorded by Jeremiah, internal strifes in Judah weakened its power of defence and hastened the catastrophe of the nation.

But though Nebuchadnezzar left no historical annals that have come to light, his account of his great buildings, fortifications, canals, and reservoirs, of which remains are still traceable, and the immensely greater number of bricks stamped with his name than with that of any other, are strikingly illustrative confirmations of the notices of his greatness contained in the Bible. Indeed, they form an extended commentary on Daniel's description of him, in unfolding to him his memorable dream, related in Daniel, chapter v., and especially verse 30: "Is not this great Babylon, which I have built for the house of the kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honor of my majesty?" He built the great wall of Babylon estimated to contain 5,400,000,000 cubic feet. The wall indeed was rather rebuilt and enlarged by him. One reservoir made by him was 140 miles in circumference and 180 feet deep, the water used for irrigation; another, in Babylon, of vast dimensions. One of his many canals was 400 miles long, the traces still remaining. About one hundred sites of ruins, in the region lying around Babylon, attest his vast enterprises by containing bricks on which his name is inscribed. Well might this city be called the "beauty of the Chaldees' excellency," "the golden city," "the glory of kingdoms." Its "broad walls" mentioned by Jeremiah are described by the king; and its impregnable position, effected under his orders by the labors of thousands of captives from conquered nations, bade defiance to all the known methods of besiegers. In the inscription above mentioned the king uses this singular language: "Four years . . . in all my dominions I did not build a high place of power; the precious treasures of my kingdom I did not lay up. In Babylon, buildings for myself and for the honor of my kingdom, I did not lay out"—other negations follow, to the effect that he refrained from the worship of "Merodach my lord." No similar instance of the record of a king's inaction can be adduced.

To what period can allusion be made, unless to that of the miraculous punishment inflicted by God, as recorded in the fourth chapter of Daniel?

9. We conclude these notices with the case of Belshazzar. For a long time the confirmations of the Scripture account in Daniel, chapter v., derived from profane writers, failed to explain the apparent discrepancy with profane history, in that the name of Belshazzar is not mentioned by any author. Nabonadius (by Herodotus called Labynetus) is the name of the king ruling Babylon when taken by Cyrus. No satisfactory method of identifying Belshazzar with him or any other had been proposed. Now, however, on the cylinders of Nabonadius, discovered in the ruins of Mugheir, we find an inscription, mentioning the association of Nabonadius and his son *Belshar-uzur*, in a prayer, asking the protection of the gods for them, in terms indicating the co-sovereignty of the son. That he is spoken of in Daniel's report of the queen's language to Belshazzar as a son of Nebuchadnezzar ("thy father Nebuchadnezzar"), creates no difficulty, in view of the well known wide sense of the terms "father" and "son." The queen was, possibly, the widow of Nebuchadnezzar; for it is evident by the best chronology that Belshazzar was very young at that time. Nabonadius, we know from profane history, was pursued by Cyrus and taken at Borsippa, whither he had fled, after a disastrous battle fought before Cyrus invested Babylon.

10. We now propose to present a few specimens of illustrations of Scripture passages, taken at random from some hundreds collected in our inquiries on the subject of this article.

(1.) We read in Genesis iii. 1: "The serpent was more subtle (or cunning) than any beast." We remember our Saviour's language, "Be wise as serpents." Now we find in the Babylonian and Assyrian mythology representations of the god *Hoa*, who, among other attributes assigned him, has those of "knowledge" and "understanding," and is called the "teacher of man." His emblems were the "wedge" or "arrowhead," as the alleged inventor of the cuneiform writing, and also, more conspicuous, the

serpent, thus showing the existence of a traditional knowledge of the fact stated in Scripture.

(2.) In Joshua vii. 21, we have mentioned "a goodly Babylonish garment" among the articles secreted by Achan and which had excited his covetousness by their value. On some of the monuments of the most ancient periods are seen the representations of dresses which by their appearance on the bas-relief seem evidently of a most costly character, and though the texture is not obvious, the folds evince them of a high finish and finely woven. At the least, we have thus evidence of the early progress of the arts in Babylon which this narrative implies.

(3.) The reader of 1 Samuel xvii. 38, is disposed to inquire of what use an armor, such as Saul lent David, could be in David's case, who was only expert in slinging. But we find that Sennacherib's slingers were dressed in a "coat of mail to the waist, a tunic to the knees, closely fitting trousers, and short boots or greaves."

(4.) The Scripture accounts of military operations are most fully sustained by these sources. In 2 Samuel xx. 15, "They cast up a bank (a heap of earth with stones and wood) against the city;" 2 Kings xix. 32, "nor cast a bank against it," as methods by which besiegers approached the walls to shoot over them. In Ezekiel xxiii. 24, are mentioned "chariots and wagons" to convey the army, and "bucklers, helmets, and shields," defensive armor; Jeremiah iv. 2^a, "horsemen and bowmen;" vi. 23, "the bow and spear;" li. 3, the "archer," the "spear" and "sword;" 2 Samuel xvii. 25; Nahum iii. 3, as the means of offensive warfare; and preëminently the war-chariot, in places too numerous to cite. Of all these and whatever are mentioned in Scripture as appurtenances of war, the monuments give in bass-relief profuse representations, so that for a pictorial Bible nothing better could be supplied for illustrating the military narratives than copies of these works of ancient Assyrian art.

(5.) In the boastful speech of the Assyrian king, Isaiah x. 8-11, 13, 14, and especially the messages delivered from Sennacherib to the Jews by Rabshakeh (the chief butler) recorded in

2 Kings xviii. 32-35, xix. 10-13, we have the counterparts, in specimen, in the annals of Shalmaneser, Sargon, Tiglath-pileser, as well as Sennacherib; and the description of the haughtiness of the kings of Assyria by Ezekiel, xxxi. 3-10, and of the king of Babylon, by Isaiah, xiv. 6, 13, 14, and Daniel, v. 23, might have appeared drawn, in substance, from the annals preserved in the inscriptions.

(6.) The cruelties practised on the vanquished, as death, by flaying the victim alive, by impaling, by decapitation, by burning, or by torture; the maiming, mutilation, or blinding of prisoners, and slaying sons before a parent, Jer. lii. 10, 11; sending captives into the hopelessness of slavery, or that of expatriation, with similar specimens of inhumanity, well sustain Jeremiah vi. 23, "they are cruel and have no mercy;" Habakkuk i. 6, "a bitter and hasty (rash) nation" who "march through the land to possess dwellings *not theirs*;" Nahum ii. 13, Assyria, as a lion, who "still tore in pieces for his whelps and strangled for his lionesses;" and iii. 1, denounced as a "city of blood;" Isaiah xxxiii. 19, "a fierce people," and many other scriptural statements of similar purport. Indeed, we may well say that there is scarcely a feature of the character and conduct of the Assyrians and Babylonians drawn by the inspired penman which is not vividly and faithfully portrayed by the inscriptions and the stone or clay pictures which they explain. The reader of the Bible who has been rather inclined to regard some of the statements respecting these nations given by the writers of Scripture, especially the prophets, as poetical exaggerations, may dismiss all such views. To a great extent many of such statements are rather below than above the realities, as presented by these imperishable and unvitiated records. The heaviest charges against the Jewish people for their treatment of enemies, held by sceptics as either adequate to destroy our confidence in the inspired records, or at least to detract from the divine authority of their institutions, even when such charges apply only to sporadic cases, pale, in every element disgraceful to human nature, before the delineations of these heathen nations drawn by their own royal authors.

(7.) We close these summary illustrations by a brief allusion to the consonance of the statements of Scripture and the monumental records as to the extent and power of these ancient empires. The Scriptures give statements of the extent of Assyria, by indicating the regions incorporated into the empire through the names of representative nations. Sometimes a comprehensive statement is followed by such an enumeration as has been intimated. This is the language of the haughty monarch, 2 Kings xix. 13, "Thou has heard what the kings of Assyria have done *to all lands* by destroying them utterly." And it was more than a vain boast. In connection with this history, we find the names of all representative nationalities then known, recognised as those of vanquished people, Babylon, Egypt, and Ethiopia alone excepted. Media, the Mesopotamian lands, and all west and north, except Judah; and in preceding notices of the conquests of Tiglath-pileser, Shalmaneser, and Sargon, there is mention of particular nations, either as subdued by Assyrian arms, or as those to which the captured Israelites were removed. Then we find among the latter, Babylon, and the wars of Sargon had already brought Egypt and Ethiopia into that subject condition, that, though they continued to struggle for independence, the Assyrian power finally predominated. And when Assyria had fallen, the seat of empire was but transferred to Babylon, which next appears in Scripture as *the* oriental empire. Before it Egypt succumbed, and soon passes out of view of the Bible writings as an independent kingdom. Of the power of these empires, the Scriptures, in the books of Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, and Daniel, give vivid delineations. However brittle the tie by which tributary nations were held, till Babylon fell, she was the "ruler of nations," Isaiah xiv. 6. Of Nebuchadnezzar, says Daniel, v. 19, "all people, nations, and languages trembled and feared before him: whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive; and whom he would he set up; and whom he would he put down." And the rapid rise and extension of power to which Assyria attained during the period from Tiglath-pileser to Sennacherib, or Babylon during the period from Esar-haddon to Nebuchadnezzar, was followed by even more rapid disintegra-

tion in both cases. For in these empires the conquered nations were not actually incorporated so as to be integral parts of one great nation, but only subdued and ruled by the genius and martial power of monarchs for the time being. The effeminacy and weakness of Nabopolassar's successor brought on the decay of Assyria, and the Babylonian empire of Nebuchadnezzar fell to pieces under his inefficient successors. This aspect of oriental empires is clearly illustrated in that of David, which in less than fifty years was divided, and the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah, wasting strength in wars against each other, fell the prey of the stronger empires of the East.

IV. One great result of these enquiries will be stated in these concluding remarks.

For several centuries, indeed by the earliest defenders of the inspired authority and authenticity of the Scriptures, one of the strongest evidences adduced has been the striking fulfilment of prophecies respecting Assyria and Babylon. The howling waste and utter ruin and desolation of the great capitals and surrounding regions for two thousand years have been the wonder of all travellers in the East. We need not detain the reader by more than this reference to a subject so fully and ably presented by Keith and other writers on the apologetic value of fulfilled prophecy. These great cities were the ministers of God's judgments on his apostate people. In turn, they became the illustrations of his terrible indignation and wrath for their pride and cruelty, their luxury, lust, and debasing vices. Then having fulfilled prophecy in their overthrow, an overthrow even more wonderful than the splendor and power had been, they were left, for centuries, in their ruins, the mournful and silent, yet eloquent, witnesses of the truth of the divine word. Men looked for no more; but God, who, in his wise and holy providence, had preserved his once chosen and then rejected people the enduring miraculous fulfilment of prophecy, has, by his same providence, now summoned from the dust and desolations of generations new witnesses to his truth, only less wonderful, in that they are not miraculous fulfilments of prophecy. They tell the story of

the Bible, so far as the events narrated are synchronous with those related in the Scriptures: not *exactly*, that no suggestion of collusion may arise, yet *substantially*, that the testimony may be unsuspected. The record is in no known language of any age since it was used. The material could not be tampered with, nor the writing forged. The decipherers and translators have been representatives of no special type of an evangelical Christian faith, and some of no implicit Christian faith of any kind. They have not been of any one nation alone, and of at least three distinct languages. Human ingenuity could not devise a method to secure a testimony more trustworthy, more free from all grounds of suspicion. That the testimony is not to *all* the historical records of the Bible is of course admitted. But they are to a great extent to those which are of a representative character; and the confidence thus induced for these, by a perfectly logical course of reasoning, must attach to the rest to a most satisfactory extent.

As before intimated, we are probably only on the threshold of these inquiries. Another generation may stand amazed in view of new confirmations and illustrations that any especially of Christian lands ever yielded to doubt respecting passages now not clearly understood. Sceptics, yet professed interpreters of the Bible, but a short time before these discoveries bore fruit, denied (as is usual) what they found inconsistent with their *a priori* decisions or their imperfect historical knowledge: such as the biblical record of the founders and founding of Babylon and Nineveh, and the invasion of Chedorlaomer. All such scepticism has been set aside by these records. And we may rest confidently assured that from the same sources other similar difficulties will be virtually removed, and the day not be distant. when, with one accord, all will acknowledge all that "Moses in the law and the prophets have written" to be the wonderful, the solemn, and the effective verities of the God of truth.

ARTICLE VI.

G A M B L I N G .

To invite men in this busy age to a perusal of an elaborate discussion of gambling* may appear to a casual observer to be as unnecessary as it is likely to be in vain. Christians, it will be said, do not need, and gamblers will not read, such a discussion.

Any one, however, who has thought on the subject will admit that no cursory examination can fairly elucidate and clearly present the questions involved; and every attentive observer will perceive that, though the subject is important and practical, yet opinions both in the Church and the world with regard to it are vague, and practice as variant. By most Christians, gambling in some of its forms is condemned; by a few, in some of its forms it is indulged in. There are pious mothers who would be shocked to find their sons in the "gambling hell" pledging their patrimony on the turn of a card, yet they do not themselves hesitate to stake a dollar at a church raffle, thinking thereby to honor God. There are many pious men who forbid their sons the excitement of the race course, but they themselves plunge into the vortex of the Exchange and risk thousands on the future price of corn and cotton. Christian governments seek to suppress gamblers but foster gambling, and men of the highest integrity and respectability defend their patronage of lotteries by reference to the practices of Christian merchants and to the gambling schemes of the church bazaar.

Meantime, philosophers, statesmen, theologians, are not agreed as to the nature of gambling, and leave men in doubt whether it is *malum per se* or only *malum prohibitum*; if the former, whether the sinfulness consists in the abuse of the "lot," or in a violation of property rights; if the latter, whether the prohibition is to be based on the social position of the players, on the amount

* "Game" and "gamester" are perhaps more classical words, and certainly more common in England, than "gamble" and "gambler." We have retained the latter words because in general use in this country.

staked, or other accidents of time, place, degree, and tendencies. The common law of England never interfered with gaming when there was no fraud. The Statute 33 Henry VIII. prohibited cards, dice, and other like games to all below the rank of gentlemen, and that of 23 George II. imposed fines on servants who gambled at public houses, as well as on the master of the house who permitted it. The Statute 16 Charles II. allowed men to hazard less than one hundred pounds sterling, but not more than that sum at one time. During the reign of George II. all public lotteries were prohibited under heavy pecuniary penalties in order that the government might have a monopoly of this species of gambling for the purpose of revenue. So late as 1816-1828, France derived an income of fourteen millions of francs *per annum* from this source, and while almost all modern States at some period or other have utilized lotteries, and while some now do so, yet in others they have been abolished as public nuisances. In the United States all playing for money is as a rule prohibited by law. The courts uniformly hold that money lost at play cannot be recovered after it has passed into the hands of the winner, whether there be cheating or not; yet the loser may demand his money from the stakeholder before he surrenders it. In Indiana it has been held that winning at cards any sum of money, however small, is an indictable offence; but in New York the expense attending the use of the implements of the game, *e. g.*, a billiard table, may be played for without incurring the penalty of the statute against gambling.

In the midst of these conflicting statutes of the State, the trumpet of the Church gives an uncertain sound. By some of her honored teachers, we are told that the essence of the gambler's sin consists in his irreverent use of the lot; that to bet on a game of pure skill is not gambling, nor *malum per se*; that games of chance played for mere amusement are to be condemned, and that the insurance of property and life is not different, save as to accidents, from the lottery authorised by the State, or the pool-selling practised on the race-course. On the other hand, we are told that gambling like any other mode of procuring wealth is *per se* legitimate, and to be condemned, if at all, on account

of its abuse and certain tendencies which seem to inhere in it, bringing it within the scope of the law of love, which forbids what may wound the weak conscience of others and cause them to offend.

In consequence of this variant teaching, men and women abandon themselves to a practice, ever dear to the sinful heart, and gambling now, no less than among our German ancestors, is a monster vice, corrupting all classes of society, and of late years seriously interfering with legitimate commerce. More and more every year is honest labor in field, workshop, and counting-room getting under the control of men who recoil from the name, but who are animated by the passions and who are sedulously pursuing the life of the gambler.

“The Germans,” says Tacitus—*De Germania*, c. 24—“gamble while sober (which is wonderful) and as a serious business, so possessed with a mad desire of winning or losing, that when everything else is lost they will hazard on a last throw their liberty and their own bodies. The loser goes into voluntary slavery. Although younger and stronger than the winner, he suffers himself to be bound and sold. This steadiness of purpose in a wretched cause they call honor.” This description surely would not be misplaced if applied to many men now-a-days in Wall Street and in the great produce exchanges of the world.

Under these circumstances, a serious discussion of the subject is certainly worth the careful attention of Christians and patriots, and an invitation to consider it should not be in vain. The present article proceeds from a belief that such a discussion is timely; that it is possible to disentangle the subject from the difficulty and haziness which surround it, and to lay down definite principles by which the conduct of all should be guided.

The following order will be observed:

I. Gambling will be defined.

II. An argument will be presented to show that it is *malum per se*, and that its sinfulness consists essentially in a violation of property-rights, rather than in an irreverent use of the lot; that it is a violation of the eighth and tenth commandments, rather than of the third.

III. The specific differences between gambling and other methods of procuring wealth will be pointed out, with special reference to insurance.

I. *Gambling is the hazarding of property on the issue of an event, which, being unknown to the persons interested in the property hazarded, is to them equally contingent, and on this account is selected by them for the purpose of determining the question of ownership.*

In regard to this definition the following points are to be noted :

1. Any event, past, present, or future, the issue of which at the time the hazard is made is alike unknown to all the persons interested, may be selected to furnish the desired contingency which is to determine the question of ownership. "The decision of the lot" is a term commonly used in connexion with those events from the issue of which human skill and foresight as determining elements are supposed to be excluded, as dice-throwing, card-shuffling, money-tossing, and the like. When men stake property on "the decision of the lot," they gamble. They also gamble when they stake property on other events, the issue of which has already been or may yet be determined by human skill and foresight, but which is to them unknown, and so, for all their purposes, contingent. For example : an election already held, but the issue of which is unknown, the result of a race, the issue of a chess congress, as well as the state of to-morrow's weather, the future price of stocks or merchandise, may each or all be selected to furnish the required contingency. Men gamble when they make the ownership of property depend solely on the issue of an event which is to them at the time contingent, and which they select for that specific purpose.

2. To constitute gambling, properly, something which a man as respects his fellows may have an exclusive right to and use of, must be hazarded. Men do not gamble when they make appeals to the decision of the lot in mere sport, or in jest refer trivial questions to contingent issues of any sort. In doing these things they may be guilty of a simple waste of time, they may by

irreverent appeals to the judgment of God violate the third commandment; but they do not gamble in the usual sense of that word as it obtains among men. To do this they must hazard something of value.

3. In order to make the hazarding of property on contingent issues gambling, the question of ownership must be made to depend *solely* on the issue named. In all the affairs of life men are constantly hazarding their property on what to them are contingent issues. But profit or loss does not depend solely on contingency, but also on productive labor, the rewards of which are not on the whole contingent but certain.

4. In order to constitute a transaction gambling, the contingent issue upon which alone the ownership of property is made to depend, must be chosen for that specific purpose by the persons who hazard their property. The ownership of "treasure trove" is not ordinarily the reward of productive labor. It depends alone on the contingency of finding the treasure and not finding the owner. But the finder in finding and keeping it does not gamble. He does not hazard his own property on a contingent issue which he chooses for that purpose. This of course applies only to accidental finding. Search for treasure would be embraced under the third remark.

This definition as explained we submit is not overstrained nor framed to meet the exigencies of debate. It is an attempt, we hope a successful one, at stating with some degree of accuracy and completeness the common and correct views of men on the subject.

To illustrate: A and B contribute ten dollars each to a common fund. They propose to decide which of them shall own the entire sum by the issue of a rubber of whist. The winner of the game shall receive the money. In this transaction the ownership of the sum hazarded by each is made to depend solely on the issue of an event which is equally unknown and so contingent to both; an issue, moreover, which they select for the specific purpose of deciding the question of ownership. Let us suppose that A wins.

There is a manifest difference between this transaction and either of the following:

B gives A ten dollars in charity, or as a return for some favor or service rendered by or expected from A.

A works for B and receives ten dollars as his hire.

A finds ten dollars belonging to B, who, however, remains unknown to A as the owner.

C offers ten dollars as a prize for the best whist player; A and B contend, and the former wins; or C leaves ten dollars as a legacy to be given to A or B, according to the decision of the lot in some form or other. In either case A is successful and receives the prize, or the legacy from C's executor.

In the latter case we may say that C did wrong in selecting so absurd or impious a mode of choosing a legatee. A and B may be partakers of this guilt of impiety, but they do not hazard their own property; they did not choose this method of settling the question of ownership, and so are not gamblers. A receives a gift, or, if the term be preferred, "treasure trove," as distinguished from wages or winnings.

In the former case, it may be said that though A and B do not hazard money, yet they do choose the issue of the contest on which to hazard time, skill, and energy, and so are gamblers according to our definition. The reply is obvious. The ownership of this time, skill, and energy, is not made to depend on the result of the game. These elements of property form no common fund which is assigned to the successful competitor; they form no part of his gains or losses which his opponent does not equally share with him. The prize is a reward of merit. It comes like any other success in life. The whole affair proceeds upon the assumption that skill in whist-playing is something which in some way or other can confer benefit on men. Obviously those who can confer most of this benefit are entitled to reward. The contest is invoked to settle the question of superiority. Prizes are of the nature of wages.

We have taken an extreme case in citing a rubber of whist. It is not proposed to defend the indiscriminate offering of prizes, nor even to enter upon the vexed question of their utility and righteousness. We desire to distinguish a contest for a prize from gambling. The difference is this: In the former, no part

of the thing contended for is hazarded by the contestants as such; the acquisition of property is not based solely on a contingent issue, but also on the possession of superior skill or ability of some sort or other which is rewarded because of its real or supposed benefit to mankind. But it is to be especially noticed that when the prize is not offered by a person or persons other than the contestants, that when the thing contended for is something of value contributed to equally by those who seek to win it, then even if the trial be one of pure skill, those engaged in it are gamblers. The government, in order to encourage marksmanship, may offer a prize for the best shot in a regiment of sharpshooters, or such a prize may be offered by the officers and men of the regiment. But when the prize is made up by the men who contend for it, and *when an equal contribution is demanded from all who contend as an indispensable prerequisite of their entrance into the contest*, then the transaction is obnoxious to the charge of gambling. It is hazarding property on a contingent issue, and on this alone; one which the contestants select for the purpose of determining the question of ownership in the property staked.

II. We are to show that every such transaction necessarily involves a violation of property-rights, and consequently is *malum per se*.

To do this we shall show—1. That every such transaction involves the use of intrinsically unrighteous means of procuring wealth; and hence, 2. Involves necessarily the sin of covetousness.

1. Some accepted doctrines of political economy must be premised.

The wealth of a nation consists in the capacity possessed by its people for acquiring the necessities and comforts of life. The wealth of an individual consists in the property for the use of which, and the abilities, mental and muscular, by means of which, he can obtain from the common fund or from others those things which contribute to his welfare.

It is evident that the earth itself and the sun around which it revolves, constitute within the sphere of second causes the great

source of wealth, and that the labor of men is the active agency which produces it. But all that men can do is to combine into new forms preëxisting materials. This is as true of the farmer as of the manufacturer. Hence it is within the scope of man's powers to create, not materials, but only utility; hence the production of wealth is simply the production of utility. The term "utility" we employ in the most general sense. Whatever man regards as useful, whatever in the opinion of any one is regarded as contributing to the necessities or comforts of himself or others, we may consider, for all the purposes of this discussion, as of the nature of wealth, and the production of that thing as the production of wealth. The opinions held by any person as to the real or comparative value of a thing may be erroneous. Their correctness will depend on the judgment, taste, habits, education, prejudices of those who form them. Some articles sustain life by feeding or sheltering the body, others give comfort by gratifying the tastes or even by ministering to the vanity of men. All these classes of objects may be regarded as wealth. A trained pointer dog contributes to the pleasure of the hunter, and, as he thinks, to his profit. The trainer is as truly a producer of wealth as the farmer who grows the corn which sustains the life of the hunter, the trainer, and the dog. The difference between them is a difference of degree.

These principles are laid down by every accredited writer on political economy. Mr. J. S. Mill, it is true, in the body of his elaborate and able treatise on this subject, adopts a more restricted nomenclature. He does this, however, for a special purpose, with due notice, and after having laid down, with the soundest of his predecessors, as M. Say and others, the principles stated above. He says, that in addition to money, "everything else which serves any human purpose, and which nature does not afford gratuitously, is wealth also."* Marking the distinction between a nation's and an individual's wealth, he says: "In the wealth of mankind, nothing is included which does not of itself answer some purpose of utility or pleasure. To an individual anything is wealth which, though useless in itself, makes him to

*Political Economy, Vol. I., p. 23, Appletons: 1876.

claim from others a part of their stock of things useful and pleasant."*

Mr. Mill also accurately marks the function of labor in the business of production, and shows the necessary connexion between mental and muscular labor, and so gives to mental processes a real activity in production, even when that word is limited to the creation of utility which inheres in material things. For convenience' sake he limits the definition of wealth to *material* wealth, and productive labor to that which is engaged in creating utilities embodied in material objects; yet he distinctly enumerates other classes of utilities, which, though it is the province of unproductive labor (as defined by him) to realise, yet are of value, and even of permanent value, to mankind. If there is apparently a difference between the principles in regard to wealth and its production which we have enunciated, and those which are accepted by the ablest writers on political economy, it will be observed that it is a difference of nomenclature. In many respects, for a merely partisan purpose, Mr. Mill's definitions would suit us better than those we have adopted. But it is manifest, as he allows, that there may be a creation of utilities other than those which inhere in material objects. If the gambler's labor can justly be called productive in this wider sense, we propose to give him the full benefit of it.

It follows from the principles stated, that any expenditure of labor, either mental or muscular, which is not designed to contribute to the necessities and comforts of mankind, and which does not create utilities of some sort, is unproductive, and that occupations which require putting forth labor of this sort must be classed as useless and illegitimate. Those who follow them may *procure*, they do not *produce*, wealth. The thief labors. He procures the necessities and comforts of life by his toil. But his labor is wholly unproductive. He creates no utility. He simply seizes what others have produced. He lives at their expense.

It follows also from these principles, that there are but two methods of procuring wealth which are in accord with righteousness: by gift, or by production. Men must receive the necessities

* *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 25.

and comforts of life gratuitously from others, or by pursuing some calling which, contributing to the wants of their fellows, secures from these the means of supplying their own. We have to show that the gambler in gambling neither receives as a gift, nor earns, his winnings.

The first alternative has already been considered in part. No one pretends that the stakes are, in any case, "gifts" in the usual meaning of that word. But it is sought to relieve the transaction of wrong by alleging that the loser consents to his loss.

In regard to his consent to hazard his property, it is our object to show that this constitutes the essence of his guilt. The charge against him is, that the gambler has no right thus to pledge his means. In regard to his consent to part with his stake when the issue is adverse, it is obvious that it is enforced. It is not his choice that he loses. The loss is thrust upon him by circumstances which he does not control. He is as much "in duress," though of a different sort, as the traveller who has fallen among thieves. The traveller "consents" to part with his purse. The argument is a pistol; the inducement is his physical life which is threatened. So the gambler "consents" to part with his stake when evil fortune overtakes him. The argument is the scorn of that public opinion which he respects; the inducement is social recognition by his associates. The winner has no more legal claim on the loser's money than the robber has on the purse of the traveller. Nor is his claim more righteous; for neither has a right to institute a set of conditions which must, *ipso facto*, entail loss on one or the other. There is no enforced or God-imposed contingency in this, and this fact constitutes the head and front of the gambler's offence against himself, his neighbor, and society. In plying his avocation, he is compelled to use means which necessarily involve loss to some one. He produces absolutely nothing for which his winnings are a reward; he receives absolutely nothing for which his losses are the price.*

* In some games there is a percentage in favor of "the dealer" or "banker," making his gains in the long run certain. In respect of these gains, the remark in the text does not apply. They are by agreement allotted to him, who receives them for the use of the implements employed in the game. etc.

We will not institute a comparison between the gambler and the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the man of science, the teacher, the ruler, the policeman, or even the domestic servant. Though these do not in the narrow sense of the word produce wealth, they are engaged in useful occupations: they create utility, they contribute to the necessities and comforts of mankind. They receive, or are entitled to receive, the rewards of this productive labor. We will compare gambling with those occupations which afford, as it is said to do, excitement and amusement. Let us suppose that there is nothing indecent or objectionable in the performance of a set of dancers. Let us suppose that the persons who witness the performance need, or think they need, that sort of amusement. In a word, let us remove all the accidents which might make the performance sinful. Then the dancers confer a real benefit on their patrons. They create a sort of utility; a very poor sort, some will think; still they contribute to the amusement of others, and so earn a living.

A number of men contribute each a sum to make up a common purse. They agree to assign the whole amount to the man who shall draw from a holder the longest straw. Let us remove as before all the accidental circumstances which might render the transaction sinful. There is no cheating; they need amusement; they have the time to spare; they can afford to give the sum they stake for an hour's amusement. In this transaction it is claimed that excitement, pleasure, amusement, is created. Hence, each man, though a loser of a certain sum of money, has received an equivalent in return; and, as the excitement and consequent pleasure are usually in proportion to the amount risked, this conclusion holds, no matter how much money may be hazarded. We admit the premise, but deny the inference. For it is forgotten that those who created the utility, themselves enjoyed the benefits of it. The excitement results from the hazard. But the money did not hazard itself. The persons engaged contributed the amusement as well as the stakes. The winner did not create it all; but he receives, in addition to his fair share of the only thing produced, all the money. Each player contributes his share of

the amusement, and receives it back as his reward. All but the winner lose their share of the stakes, for which they receive absolutely nothing. So far as the money is concerned, it is neither given nor earned. The winner receives it without giving anything of value in return; the rest lose without receiving in return anything of value to themselves or others.

The same comparison might be instituted between the jockey club, who, in order to secure what they deem desirable ends, encourage horse-racing, and men who simply hazard money on the issue of the contests. The club who offer the prizes, the owners and riders of the horses, create utility more or less valuable, according to circumstances or the point of view of him who estimates it. They are entitled to their reward, viz., the gate-fees and offered prizes fairly distributed. The men who bet on the issue of the races do not contribute to the amusement of anybody but themselves, and in return for their trouble are amused. The ownership of the money they risk is made to depend, not on the results of productive labor of any sort, but on a mere contingency which has been named by them for this sole purpose. Hence the winner gives nothing for his gains, and the loser gets nothing for his losses. In this fact consists the essential wrongfulness of gambling. It is not right thus to acquire or lose property. In so doing, men violate that command which forbids "whatsoever doth or may unjustly hinder our own or our neighbor's wealth or outward estate." For it is manifestly unjust to take from another without giving him a fair equivalent in return; or unnecessarily to part with our own, save of course in charity, unless we receive value for it. To do so is to squander our property, which entails injury on ourselves and others.

It is urged in reply to this, that gambling produces a peculiar excitement, creates a unique pleasure of a most engaging character. As Mr. Fox, the celebrated English statesman, is reported to have said: "Winning money at cards is the greatest pleasure in life, and losing is the next greatest pleasure in life." Hence, if we are to admit as lawful any sort of pleasure, we must recognise as lawful the gambler's occupation, which alone produces this sort.

The reply is obvious. The pleasures of gambling arise from the gratification of various natural desires, all of which in their due exercise may be lawful. But as soon as a man is prompted to gratify his desires by unrighteous means, such desires become inordinate and sinful. This brings us to our second charge against gambling:

2. *It involves necessarily the sin of covetousness.* Covetousness is the inordinate love of wealth in any form. It is a desire to possess the comforts and necessaries of life, felt so strongly as to prompt to the use of unlawful means for their acquisition or retention. Whenever a man is willing to procure his own wealth at the expense of others, he is covetous. This is the motive which prompts men to the adoption of the gambler's method. It is the desire of procuring wealth without the trouble of remunerative labor; it is the hope of securing by the turn of a wheel or the issue of a game a sum of money in lieu of nothing. Other passions are exercised, but this is the master passion which animates the gambler. It is the gratification of this desire, greed of gain, which gives to gambling its peculiar charm.

Why do men institute a lottery for the purpose of raising funds for any purpose? The ready answer is, that it is the easiest and most practicable scheme. But why so? why do men find the lottery so admirably adapted to raising money? why will men contribute money in this way when they will contribute in no other? The only true answer is, that in subscribing to a lottery scheme, men entertain the hope that they will draw prizes. This is the inducement held out by the managers, and consequently covetousness is the passion they appeal to. Its availability arises from the fact that it affords a chance of getting something without giving an equivalent in return. And it is worth one's while to notice that the certainty of doing this on the part of the managers commends it to them.

The citizens of a town desire the benefits of a library. They are either unable or unwilling to pay for it themselves. They are ashamed to beg; or, if not, they fear that begging will not procure the requisite funds. They institute a lottery by means of which they obtain thousands of dollars without giving anything

in return. Covetousness is the motive which prompts the selection of this method of obtaining the desired benefits, and covetousness is the motive in others which makes the scheme practicable.

We call special attention to this use of the lot by Christians. A congregation wish to secure the means of erecting a house of worship, or of carrying forward some other pious work. Now they are either able to do this work or they are not. If the latter, then it is not required at their hands; if the former, they should give the money and perform the work. But to do this would require some, perhaps great, self-denial. They have recourse to the public; and, in order to secure their means, institute a lottery. Covetous themselves, because clinging to their money when God requires them to spend it on his work, they endeavor to throw the burden of that work on others; and to do this, seek to arouse in their hearts that passion which God brands as idolatry. It does not avail to say that the money is after all taken from the congregation themselves. The principle is the same. Even where this is the case, an attempt is made by each to escape from his share of the burden, instead of contributing his due proportion according as God has prospered him. The motive is still covetousness. Occasionally a man "takes a chance" because he desires to contribute, and this is the way in which he is invited to do so. He is not covetous, and without thinking he subscribes. But it is because all are not like him that the lottery scheme is adopted. For if they were, there would be no need of it. Men are naturally desirous of winning prizes. On this account the lottery is available as a means of procuring wealth in the Church as well as in the State.

The notorious fact that professional gamblers are as a class prodigal does not relieve them or their unprofessional imitators from the charge of covetousness. Robbers are as a class prodigal, and for the same reason. It is easy enough to be generous with other people's money. The gambler's charity, like the robber's, is of a very cheap sort—a truth which Christians will do well to remember.

These considerations, so far as church and pious uses are concerned, may have no weight with the Jesuit, who will receive

with the free-offerings of devout love the spoils of the robber, the hire of the harlot, as well as the gambler's gains, because he asserts that the end justifies the means. But surely Protestants, who reject this assertion as the doctrine of devils, should, with the money of the thief, reject also the winnings of the gambler.

Another objection, based on the admitted difficulty of classification, is urged against our argument so far as it depends on the unproductiveness of the gambler's methods. A Puritan might regard a dancing-master as creating no sort of utility, while he would rank the missionary's labor as in the highest degree productive; whereas his Cavalier neighbor might reverse the predicates. This difficulty of classification, however, does not invalidate our argument, or justify the gambler. He produces nothing that anybody can classify as useful in any sense. He creates no utility of any sort, for which he seeks his winnings as remuneration. As we have shown, even if the act of hazarding confer pleasure, each player receives in his own enjoyment a full return for the only thing which he can by any possibility be regarded as producing. For the money he wins he gives absolutely nothing; for the money he loses he gets absolutely nothing. Hence the gambler is strictly classed with the robber, the swindler, and every species of men who prey on their fellows. All alike seek to procure wealth without producing it. All that has been or may be allowed in extenuation of gambling may as justly be allowed of stealing. The thief as well as the gambler works. Both may have in part proper motives: a desire to secure food and shelter for themselves and their families, or a purpose to bestow their gains on some object of charity. Both alike are to be condemned, because for the attainment of their ends they make use of unlawful means. These means are essentially unrighteous, because they call for no productive labor; and, consequently, their employment necessarily entails loss on some one. The use of the gambler's methods of procuring wealth, like the use of the robber's, is essentially violative of property-rights.

We readily admit that there is a vast difference between the lady who stakes her dollar in a church raffle, actuated by pious

motives, and a burglar. So also there is a vast difference between the boy who robs his neighbor's orchard in sport, or to gratify his hunger, and the hardened robber. The fine lady who gambles for a few dollars must be compared with the petty pilferer; the professional gambler with the burglar. It is a fact which should engage the serious attention of all who ever gamble for any sum or for any purpose, that, whatever distinction the law makes between them, the heart of all true men, somehow or other, while it condemns both, will put the highwayman on a higher plane than the "black-leg."

IV. It remains for us to open up a fountain for the solution of doubts which the views we have presented may produce in the minds of some, by indicating the specific differences between gambling and other methods of procuring wealth, which, while recognised as legitimate, involve continually the hazarding of property on contingent issues. If it be *malum per se* thus to hazard property, how can the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, and others avoid condemnation?

The answer to this question is implicitly given in the definition of gambling.

1. In legitimate occupations, results are not *solely* dependent on contingencies, but mainly on productive labor, the rewards of which are on the whole certain. The harvest of a particular farmer from one field in any given year may be contingent on events which he cannot control. Even in this isolated case it is not, as in gambling, *solely* dependent on such events, but on others which he may and does, within the sphere of second causes, control. Moreover, by a certain fixed law, harvests are not in general the contingent, but sure, returns of capital combined with intelligent industry. In every pursuit of life which produces wealth by the creation of utility of any sort, the employment of adequate means commands success. In these evil days men have introduced into commerce so many of the nefarious practices of the gambler, that it is sometimes extremely difficult for the honest trader, desirous of giving a fair equivalent for all he gets, successfully to use lawful means. Notwithstanding this,

the natural risks of commerce are of the same essential character as those of agriculture, manufactures, and mining. The rewards of skilful and industrious trading are, *cæteris paribus*, neither more certain nor more contingent than the rewards of other pursuits.

This, then, is a specific difference between gambling as an occupation and other methods of procuring wealth which are classed as legitimate. The latter, requiring the productive energies of men, employs those means which, according to the appointment of God, within the sphere of second causes are certain, when intelligently and persistently employed, to command success; whereas the former, rejecting the productive energies of men, employs those means which do not and cannot make the results certain. Indeed, it is their uncertainty which is the ground of their selection. Were they as certain to command success as those which call for the use of man's productive energies, they would no longer answer the gambler's purpose. Hence—

2. Whatever of contingency enters into the results of productive labor is God-imposed, not selected by man. Here man seeks not to introduce, but to rule out, contingency; to make results certain. This is another specific difference between the gambler and the honest worker. The gambler out of a spirit of covetousness superimposes of his own choice contingencies which God has not seen fit to order. He is not content to use his talents for the benefit of others, leaving his profit or loss dependent on issues which God has made contingent. He seeks to enrich himself, without remunerative labor, by hazarding his property on an issue which he himself selects solely for this purpose.

This part of our subject may be illustrated by the operations of speculators, which are often referred to as similar to those of the gambler. There is a speculation in respect of place, and there is a speculation in respect of time. The former is usually regarded as legitimate. The merchant who buys cotton in New Orleans and ships it to Liverpool creates in so doing a utility by adding to the value of the staple. His profit is that enhanced value. Hence it is a principle of political economy that the

planter who sells to the merchant may receive a remunerative price for his produce, and the man who buys from the merchant may receive full value for his money, and yet the merchant realise a profit which will amply remunerate him and all employed by him for labor, superintendence, and hire of capital used in the transportation.

The enormous difference in the capacity of "raw" and of manufactured produce, to contribute to the comfort of men, may be seen by a reference to iron. A pound of "pig-metal" at the blast furnace is worth a few cents. The same turned into the hair-springs of watches is worth thousands of dollars, a difference sufficient amply to remunerate the merchants, the carriers, and the manufacturers, who have all contributed to the enhanced value of the commodity.

Now, what some merchants do in respect of place, others do in respect of time. They buy and hold goods, and by so doing add to their value. This enhanced value is not nominal but real, as much so as any value is real which is determined by the relation between supply and demand.

In his treatise already referred to, Mr. Mill says: "Speculators have a highly useful office in the economy of society; and (contrary to common opinion) the most useful portion of the class are those who speculate in commodities affected by the vicissitudes of seasons. If there were no corn-dealers, not only would the price of corn be liable to variations much more extreme than at present, but in a deficient season the necessary supplies might not be forthcoming at all. Unless there were speculators in corn, or unless, in default of dealers, the farmers became speculators, the price in a season of abundance would fall without any limit or check, except the wasteful consumption that would invariably follow. That any part of the surplus of one year remains to supply the deficiency of another, is owing either to farmers who withhold corn from the market, or to dealers who buy it when at the cheapest and lay it up in store."*

In other words, speculators play the part of Joseph in Egypt. They prevent extravagant and wasteful consumption in fruitful

* *Ut supra*, Vol. II., p. 285.

years in order to preserve corn for the years of famine. Legitimate speculation, therefore, creates utility by the wise use of capital; the just reward of this is the speculator's profit.

It is, of course, not denied that this branch of business, as any other, perhaps more so than many others, may be perverted; that men may use their capital for purposes of selfish and unjust aggrandisement. We are only concerned to show that there may be legitimate speculation in which men wisely employ their capital to enhance the value of property by holding it; that in so doing they confer benefit on others for which they are entitled to reward; that herein is a specific difference between the operations of the speculator and those of the gambler.

It should be carefully observed, however, that the utility of speculative transactions depends on the actual buying and holding of the commodities traded in, else they could not be forthcoming in times of scarcity. Hence the man who merely bets on the future price of an article cannot be protected by the plea which justifies the actual dealer. The buyer and seller of corn or cotton "for future delivery," which is never delivered, which cannot be delivered, because not in fact in existence, and which never was designed to be delivered, simply bet on the state of the market at the time named for delivery. The ownership of the amount hazarded is made to depend on an issue which is contingent because unknown; one that is selected for the sole purpose of determining who shall possess the property staked. No utility of any sort is created.

Here, also, we must admit that men may buy and sell "for future delivery" without incurring the gambler's guilt. A Manchester spinner may have surplus funds which he desires to invest in cotton, and yet wish to avoid the trouble and expense of actual present possession. He buys from a dealer who, for a stipulated price, agrees to deliver him a number of bales six months hence, which is the time the spinner will need it. A part of the price is paid at the time the contract is made, a part is reserved until its completion. The dealer may now sell his contract to another in order either to anticipate his profits, or to reinvest his money, or perchance to moderate his loss, which subsequent events show

the fulfilment of the contract will inevitably entail upon him. As long as there is a *bona fide* contract, which is based on cotton actually in existence, and which is ultimately delivered, all the transactions may be untainted with the sin of gambling. It is a fact to be noticed in this connexion, that most purchasers of real estate are made "for future delivery." No one thinks of charging them with impropriety, because as a rule they are *bona fide* transactions in which property is really bought and sold.

Unquestionably the practice of buying and selling produce "for future delivery" opens a wide door for reckless trading, for wild speculation, and other sinful courses. We are not defending this practice with its attendant evils, only not, in this connexion, pointing out its dangers. We seek to point out the difference between it and gambling. It is the same as that between any legitimate time-speculation and gambling. Where property is not bought and sold for actual delivery present or future, (and in property we include all that represents wealth—bonds, notes, stocks, etc.) where there is simply a bet on the future price of commodities; where money is staked and its ownership made to depend solely on a contingent issue growing out of the state of the market at a fixed time, irrespective of any labor bestowed or benefit conferred by the parties engaged in the transaction; then it is obnoxious to every charge we have brought against gambling in any form. Those so seeking to procure wealth are as widely to be distinguished from legitimate dealers, as the Egyptian who we may suppose bet his friend his patrimony that the price of corn would not exceed a stipulated figure in the third year of the famine, should be distinguished from the wise Joseph who bought the surplus during the years of plenty and sold it during the years of famine at a largely advanced price, thus enriching himself by conferring benefit on the nation.

It remains for us to indicate the difference between insurance and gambling. We take life-insurance for the sake of illustration because it admits of a simpler analysis.

Life-insurance proceeds upon two principles. One is that a man's life has a commercial value. His talents, skill, muscular energy, are capable of producing wealth. These form a basis of

commercial credit. A workman or professional man, otherwise without capital, may borrow money on his capacity to labor, if his expectancy of life be assured to him. Insurance regards only this view of a man's life. The other principle is that there is a law, fixed and uniform, determining within very narrow and clearly ascertained limits the average number of years of life remaining to men. This law has been discovered by means of a very wide induction of particulars. It is simply the ascertained method by which God does in fact portion out to men their life as the life of the individual stands related to that of the rest of mankind. For example: Take ten thousand men in ordinary circumstances at the age of twenty-nine years; ascertain the number of years which each has completed at death; take the sum of these numbers, and it will be found to amount to about 650,000. This is true of any ten thousand men at the age of twenty-nine; and in like proportion for any larger number. From this it is evident that at twenty-nine years of age, men in ordinary health and engaged in peaceful avocations, have an average expectation of life of thirty-six years. These ten thousand have already lived together 290,000 years; 360,000 remain to them collectively, or an average of thirty-six years to each. This ascertained average expectancy of life enables these men to adopt a scheme by means of which they may assure to each other its commercial value.

We will suppose a case for the purpose of exemplification, from which most of the accidents are discounted.

One hundred men ascertain that they have an average expectancy of life of twenty-five years. They agree to estimate this expectancy commercially at twenty-five hundred dollars, and to assure each other that each shall receive the sum either in life estimated at one hundred dollars *per annum* or in money. In order to do this they make up a common fund in years of life and money which amounts to \$250,000, of which each is to receive an equal share. It is left to the event of death to determine what shall be the proportion of money and money's worth in years of life to be allotted to each.

A lives twenty-five years :

He contributes in money	\$2,500 00
He receives in money	2,500 00

He has his share wholly in years of life, which at one hundred dollars *per annum* is \$2,500.00.

B dies before the end of the first year:

He contributes in money	\$100 00
He receives in money	2,500 00

Balance in his favor	\$2,400 00
To which add one year of life,	100 00

His share in value same as A's,	\$2,500 00
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C lives fifty years:

He contributes in money	\$5,000 00
He receives in money	2,500 00

Balance in money against him,	\$2,500 00
Which take from fifty years of life valued at	5,000 00

Leaving for his share	\$2,500 00 .
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Where the expectancy of life differs, as it always does when men are not of the same age, the difference is equalised by a difference in the amount contributed by each *per annum*.

We submit that this statement of the case, which lays down and illustrates the essential principles of life insurance, serves effectually to distinguish it from gambling. Property is not hazarded; and this is its specific difference. The only thing that is made to depend on contingency is the relative proportion of different sorts of property in each man's equal share of a common fund: whether that share shall consist more or less of money or the worth of money in years of life at a stipulated price.

It must, of course, be admitted that, if any and every "appeal to the lot" or to a contingent issue of any sort is, unless consciously made as an act of worship, to be condemned, then insurance is to be condemned. But even on this supposition, it is not to be classified with gambling. The latter is obnoxious to

other charges from which insurance is as to its essential principles wholly free. These principles do not in their just application involve any violation of property-rights.

We are aware that the "lot" question is a broad as well as a vexed question. It seems to us, after a careful examination of the whole subject, that the conclusions reached by the late Dr. Jno. M. Mason and others who have endorsed his arguments by accepting his views may be readily pushed to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The argument proves nothing because it proves too much. Philosophically it lands us in Pantheism, for it takes away all efficiency from second causes; and practically compels every man, in order to avoid the guilt of impiety, to be constantly engaged in distinct formal acts of worship. We admit that in one sense every act of man that is not of faith and does not contemplate the glory of God as its end, is sin; every conscious volition which does not proceed from love to God and terminate on him lacks an element of rightness. The ploughing of the wicked is sin. But except in this sense, we do not see how amusements otherwise lawful are to be condemned as impious because they involve thoughtless, or at least unnecessary and trivial, "appeals to the lot." If it be impious to play a game of whist only because the cards must be shuffled and dealt, then it seems to us it must be impious for a man to do anything which involves any appeal to contingent issues, unless he in so doing reverently appeal to the decision of God.

But it is wholly unnecessary for us to insist upon this view of the "lot question" in order to defend insurance from the charge of impiety. It does not belong to the category of amusements. We may admit for argument's sake that there is a distinction to be made between those "appeals to the lot" which are involved in the serious avocations of life and those which are made in sport. We may admit that the latter are to be avoided as impious. This does not affect insurance, for that is a serious, and, so far as property-rights are concerned, a lawful business. The eighth commandment "requires the lawful procuring and furthering the wealth and outward estate of ourselves and others." Insurance is simply a means of doing this. It does not hinder, it promotes

our own and our neighbor's wealth and outward estate. It is a mode of investment which is promotive of these interests. Hence a man insures his life or his property not in sport but as a duty. We have shown that, if sinful at all, it is not sinful because it involves any violation of the property-rights of himself or others. So far, it is a lawful method of promoting our own wealth and outward estate. It must, then, though done seriously, but not as a solemn act of worship, be condemned solely because it involves an appeal to a contingent issue. We claim, upon this view of the case, that every serious act which involves similar appeals must likewise be condemned. What act does not? Every investment of money, every purchase of land or stocks, money or bonds, every operation of the farmer, the merchant, and the manufacturer, involves a similar appeal. If there is any difference in the number or importance of the contingent elements, it is due wholly to accidental circumstances, and may be in favor now of one and now of another.

If it is impious for executors of wills to distribute equal portions of the estates committed to their charge to the legatees by lot; if it is impious for friends to make engagements contingent on the state of to-morrow's weather; if it is impious for a man to ask a woman to marry him, thus staking his happiness on the contingency involved in her answer: then we admit that it is impious for a man to insure his property or his life; and in fact to do anything else, save to engage in formal acts of worship. But if it is absurd to charge such acts, save in the general sense defined above, with impiety; if it is absurd to say that a man may not risk his property on the uncertain issue of a voyage, or of a harvest: then it is absurd to say that a man may not insure his property or his life; nay, it is much more absurd, for in insurance a man does not risk his property on the issue of death, but only the *form* in which it is to enure to his benefit or the benefit of his heirs.

The utility of insurance, and especially of fire insurance, as a practical question for the political economist, we do not propose to discuss. Our object has been to mark its specific difference from gambling, and to relieve it from the charge of impiety.

There certainly may be, we think there is, legitimate insurance, as there may be and is legitimate speculation; but there is not and cannot be any legitimate gambling. Stripped of every accidental feature, many of which aggravate its enormity a thousand fold; presented in its least objectionable form, it is still obnoxious to one charge: it necessarily involves the use of unrighteous means for the procuring of wealth, and consequently fastens the sin of covetousness on those who adopt them. Whether practised by the black-leg or the Christian, by the merchant or the jockey, by the street Arab or the fine lady, it violates those fundamental principles which underlie all property-rights: "Thou shalt not covet," and "Thou shalt not steal."

ARTICLE VII.

THE PHILANTHROPIC ARGUMENT FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

To one who thoroughly believes in the divine authority of the Scriptures, it seems very wonderful that any disciple of Christ should doubt the obligation resting upon the Church to prosecute the work of Foreign Missions. It is conceivable that, in consequence of peculiar conjunctures of providential circumstances, impediments and hindrances may lie in the way of its practical performance. But that there should ever exist a theoretical denial of the duty of the Church to address herself to its accomplishment, or even a trace of scepticism upon that point, is a marvel of marvels. The command of her Lawgiver and King is so express that there would appear to be, when the ability is possessed and the opportunity is furnished to undertake the work of evangelising the nations, no discretion as to interpretation and no option as to obedience. The only alternatives are, unquestioning compliance, or downright disloyalty. The attempt to restrict the command, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature," to the apostles themselves, is, for

obvious reasons, entirely unwarrantable. From the nature of the case, they could not compass its complete fulfilment. It was not in their power to reach every human being who was contemporary with themselves, and, of course, succeeding generations lay beyond the labors of those who, although inspired, were mortal men. It is plain that the command must be considered binding upon the Church as an evangelistic institute, as long as any portion of the race remains in ignorance of the provisions of the gospel. Every creature in every generation and in every clime ought to be evangelised; and until that is done, the command must continue to thunder in the ear of the Church: "Preach the gospel to every creature." Now this would be the case, were this command purely a positive one; were there no reason assigned for its imposition. A command may be arbitrary, like the injunction laid upon our first parents in respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; but if it proceed from God, his authority is involved, and no room is left for a question as to the duty to obey. A divine precept may be positive, but the duty of the creature to comply with it is moral. Were, then, the command of the Divine Master requiring his subjects to evangelise the world purely positive and arbitrary, the consideration by them of his supreme authority would be sufficient to suppress every rising suggestion of scepticism in regard to the reasons of obedience. The reasons for issuing a command and the reasons for obeying it are very different things.

But the wonder occasioned by the attitude of doubt and hesitancy on the part of some as to the work of evangelising the world, or, what is the same thing, of Foreign Missions, is enhanced, when we reflect that the reasons for the divine command which makes it obligatory are distinctly revealed, and would be conspicuous had they not been assigned. They are clear enough for any but the wilfully blind to see. The glory of God, the honor of Christ, and the advancement of the mediatorial kingdom, are reasons, from the divine side, which palpably underlie and enforce the terms of the Great Commission. They are all wrapped up in obedience to it. The authority of Christ, which sustains and illuminates it, ought to be sufficient to every mem-

ber of a society which has been redeemed by blood, and prepared by grace, for willing subjection to the mediatorial sway. But these patent inducements to obedience, added to the naked command, must serve impressively to commend it to every heart which is jealous for the divine name, and solicitous for the enthronement of Jesus in the affections of the human race. And this is not all. The reasons starting into life from the human side are scarcely less imperious for a prompt, earnest, and unflagging execution of the great command. The spiritual interests and the eternal destinies of mankind are implicated. Philanthropy, as well as piety, hastens the Church in complying with the vocation of her Head to evangelise a world lying in wickedness, and shadowed by death. The salvation of every human soul is conditioned upon its contact with the gospel of the grace of God. It alone is redemption for the lost. The heathen must have the gospel, or perish. The evangelisation of the heathen, and we may add of merely nominal Christians, as necessary to their salvation,—this is the great philanthropic argument for Foreign Missions. If the force and grandeur of an enterprise grounded in philanthropy is to be estimated by the nature of the end which it contemplates, that scheme must be eminently entitled to such a designation, which seeks not chiefly the rescue of men from temporal evils, and the melioration of their secular estate, but their salvation from eternal ruin, and their enjoyment of heavenly bliss. Not civilisation, but redemption; not science, but religion; not literature and the arts, but eternal life; not a remedy for the diseased and dying body, but a sovereign panacea for doomed and wretched souls; not disenthralment from human despotism, but emancipation from the tyranny of the devil and of sin; not deliverance from the miseries of earth, but from the pains of hell; not sublunary pleasure, honor, and wealth, but the imperishable glory and joy of heaven,—these are the boons which the foreign missionary—the ambassador of Jesus Christ, the almoner of evangelic blessings—offers, with outstretched hands, to the perishing hordes of our fallen race. This is philanthropy—noble, sublime, Godlike! Who that professes to be a lover of his fellow-men, would hesitate to engage in an enterprise so glorious?

Angels are postponed for human workers in the field of human wretchedness; and he who declines to have a share in this grandest of labors will miss an opportunity as irretrievable as it is splendid, will commit a blunder which must leave an ineffaceable mark upon his immortal career.

All this, it may be said, is but a begging of the question. We shall endeavor to show that it is but the anticipation of an irresistible conclusion. There are no doubt many concurrent causes of the painful, the appalling, indifference of some of the followers of Jesus to the work of Foreign Missions. Want of sufficient instruction by their spiritual guides, the absence of stated opportunities for the contribution of their means to this object, neglect of the study of God's word, the feebleness of the spiritual life, an imaginary inability arising from the straitness of their circumstances, a comparative estimate of the demands of the home and the foreign field, issuing in favor of the former to the entire exclusion of the latter from their regards, in opposition to the plain statement of Christ that the field is the world, and his imperative injunction to his Church to occupy it,—these reasons combine to produce the amazing apathy of many Christians to the noblest cause which can engage the affections, or enlist the energies, of men professing to be redeemed by Jesus' blood and renewed by Jesus' grace. But we have long been persuaded, and time only deepens the conviction, that one of the most potent causes of this strange insensibility to the claims of Foreign Missions is to be found in a want of reflection, or in a scepticism either latent and undefined, or pronounced and definite, in regard to the fact, so clearly disclosed in the Scriptures, that the evangelisation of the heathen is necessary to their salvation. Somehow or other, it is assumed that they can be saved without the gospel. This species of infidelity in the Church, which, so far as it goes, houghs the foreign missionary work, ought to be met, and we propose to make an humble contribution towards its removal. In discussing this subject, we will attempt, in the first place, to prove the necessity to the heathen of the gospel as a scheme of redemption; and, in the second place, the necessity to them of the knowledge of the gospel in order to their salvation.

I. The impression seems to prevail in the minds of some that the scheme of religion under which the heathen live does not necessarily debar them from the hope of salvation; that it need not be supposed to ensure their destruction; and that the benevolence of God will lead him to deal leniently with their failures to comply with its requirements.

1. In estimating the probability or improbability of this hypothesis, it will be requisite, in the first place, to fix as precisely as we can our conception of the religious constitution under which the heathen actually live. What is that form of the moral government of God to which they stand related?

The moral government of God may be considered as either simple and unmodified, or as modified by covenant elements graciously and supernaturally added to it as a naked dispensation of law. There is no evidence to show that under the former of these aspects the divine government has ever been, for any length of time, actually administered in relation to man. He never had an historical existence under a pure regimen of law. We may logically abstract the essential principles of moral government from the peculiar federal arrangements which have been superadded to it; but the Scriptures inform us that in its actual administration it has either been modified by the covenant of works, or by the covenant of grace. While therefore three general schemes of religion were possible, there have been only two under which man has historically existed—Natural Religion, and Supernatural Religion or the Gospel. Natural Religion was that of man as an innocent and unfallen being; and consisted of two elements,—the one naturally, the other supernaturally, revealed. The first comprised those essential principles of religion which were involved in the internal constitution of man—his reason and conscience, and in his relations to external nature as manifesting the existence and perfections of God. These, as they supposed no supernatural communications of God's will, we designate as naturally revealed. They were inlaid in the very nature of the human soul, or inscribed on the exquisite organism of the body and the magnificent fabric of the heavens and the earth. The second element of Natural Religion was the cove-

nant of works, which, as it could never have been reached by the natural reason, but was a product of a free and gracious determination of the divine will, could only have been imparted by a supernatural revelation.

The only other general scheme of religion which has been revealed to man is the Gospel, which is specifically distinguished by the fact that it is a religion of sinners. It contemplates man as fallen and ruined, and its very genius is that of a supernatural redemption. It provides a Saviour for the lost. Jesus incarnate, crucified, risen—this is its peculiar burden, its distinctive glory. As there have been two generic systems of religion, so there have been three distinct dispensations of the Gospel as a specific scheme. First in order came the Patriarchal, in which it pleased God to communicate to fallen man some knowledge of a Saviour by promise, and to preserve it in the minds of men by means of the institution of animal sacrifices. Next came the Jewish Dispensation, in which clearer information was imparted in regard to a Redeemer yet to come, and the sanctions of the law so clearly authenticated, and its requirements so tightly bound upon the conscience, as by their very stringency to drive the soul for deliverance to that promised Saviour. Lastly, inaugurated by our Lord himself, came the Christian Dispensation, in which the indestructible, but obscured and tarnished, truths of Natural Religion are republished and more authoritatively enforced, but the peculiar province of which is, by provisions wholly foreign to that scheme—by the vicarious righteousness of a crucified and risen Redeemer and the regenerating grace of his Spirit—to furnish salvation to condemned and polluted sinners.

Now, the question ought to be met, and, if possible, settled, under which of these modifications of the moral government of God does the case of the heathen fall? Are they to be regarded as living under the operation of one of the dispensations of the gospel, or as remanded to the original scheme of natural religion, or as related to the naked dispensation of law? It is well nigh universally conceded by evangelical writers, that they are neither under the Jewish, nor the Christian, dispensation of the gospel; but the position has been maintained, as by Richard Watson

in his Theological Institutes, that they ought to be considered as living under the Patriarchal; and that, as they may possibly have access, through some fragmentary traditions floating down through the ages, to the fountain of life in the first promise of redemption, they may be saved through faith in it. The first difficulty which this hypothesis encounters, is the fact that when a dispensation of religion has accomplished the temporary office assigned to it, and having reached the culminating point of its development and met the fulfilment of its end in an economy which succeeds and displaces it, it is, from the nature of the case, abrogated and passes away. There would appear to be an analogy, in this respect, between the succession of species in the realm of nature, and that of religious dispensations in the domain of grace. In either case, that which was once living and productive becomes fossilised and effete. It ceases to be an organ of life. If, for example, a Jew should now contend that he may be saved by the mere provisions of the Mosaic dispensation, he would assume that a religious constitution which has discharged its temporary function and has vanished away, is still living and operative. He would commit the mistake of seeking life in death. The same holds true of the supposed case of the heathen under the Patriarchal dispensation. That gave way to the Jewish, as it, in turn, lost its distinctive features and was merged into the Christian. In both instances, there was once held out the promise of a Saviour to come, of an atonement for sin to be made; and faith in that promise was ordained of God as the means of salvation. But that illustrious promise, reposing on the bosom of which patriarchs and prophets and all the saints of old lived in hope and died in peace, has been fulfilled; and its fulfilment was necessarily its extinction as a promise. The first advent of the Redeemer of mankind has been a fact for eighteen centuries, and, consequently, there is no promise of it now extended to the nations of the world. Faith in the first promise, therefore, would be faith in zero. Those who ground the salvability of the heathen in their relation to that promise rest it on a shadowy foundation. It is one thing to say that salvation was possible through a divinely ordained provision while it existed, and quite another

to say that it is possible through the same provision after it has ceased to exist. The Jew may tenaciously cling to the hope of salvation through a Saviour yet to come; and certain Christian writers may claim for the heathen—what, however, they themselves have never actually been known to maintain—that they may be saved in the same way; but that does not alter God's ordination which now conditions salvation upon faith in a Saviour who has already come.

The second difficulty in the path of the hypothesis under consideration, consists in the greater likelihood that the heathen, if they live under any dispensation of the gospel, exist under the Christian than under the Patriarchal. The reason is plain. The Christian religion has, at a time thousands of years subsequent to the promulgation of the first promise, been propagated by the most zealous, indefatigable, and, in all respects, the most extraordinary missionaries that ever published the knowledge of a system. The apostles, moved by the Holy Ghost, went everywhere preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and established distributing centres of evangelical knowledge in widely separated portions of the world. When we take into account, too, the fact that the providence of God seems to have wonderfully prepared the way for its dissemination; when we reflect that philosophy had reached the climax of its efforts and the maximum of its influence, and yet stood convicted as utterly unable to solve the momentous questions connected with the destinies of the race; when we remember the extraordinary facilities for the spread of a system arising out of the intercommunication between the most distant points of a vast empire controlled by a powerful central government: it is not difficult to see how a scheme professing to supply the deficiencies of the dominant religions and to meet the felt necessities of man, a scheme propagated by men, inspired of God, endowed with the gift of tongues, and supported by the most splendid miracles, would soon penetrate into every land, and be freely discussed by the advocates of every creed. If the extensive publication of religion is to be assumed as proof that it is widely known, this evidence of a general acquaintance with the provisions of Christianity by a large portion of the race is abun-

clantly clear. If it be urged that the impression of apostolic labors was not felt outside the limits of the Roman dominion, the answer is obvious, that this is taking for granted what from the nature of the case cannot be proved. The absence of Christian knowledge in any country is no evidence that the gospel was never preached there, for it is certain that the possession of Christianity has been lost in some of the very regions where it was not only originally established, but where for centuries it vigorously flourished. And here the dilemma occurs: either the knowledge of Christianity has been lost in certain parts of the world where it once obtained, or it is in part still preserved. If lost, then, *a fortiori*, it is more probable that the knowledge of the promise given to Adam has perished. If retained, then why contend for the access of the heathen to the provisions of the Patriarchal dispensation, when it is conceded that they are in contact with those of the Christian? But it is confessed that they are not under the Christian. The admission, in view of the facts which have been signalised, is fatal to the supposition that they are under the Patriarchal. If they have lost more distinct and recent knowledge, where is the probability that they possess the more ancient and obscure?

It does not affect this argument to say that the offering of sacrifices by the heathen supposes some acquaintance, through the medium of tradition, with the provisions of the first dispensation of the gospel. For, in the first place, the fact which has been signalised would no more prove their knowledge of the Patriarchal, than of the Christian, economy. In the second place, the sacrifices offered by the heathen are, materially considered, to a great extent at least, different from those which God required. In the third place, the ministers who offer them in behalf of the people were never appointed by God, and as no sinner has a warrant to discharge priestly functions for sinners except in consequence of a divine vocation, these intruders into the sacerdotal office are as profane as their sacrifices are worthless. In the fourth place, no sacrifice ever had any virtue except by reason of a typical relation, divinely ordained, between it and the only intrinsically efficacious sacrifice—that of Christ, the sole Re-

deemer of mankind. And it is needless to show that the sacrificial offerings of the heathen are utterly destitute of any such characteristic. This must have been true of the heathen previously to the first advent of the Saviour; and as no type has a retrospective value, it is nothing less than mockery of the sad condition of the heathen since that event to urge that their caricatures of gospel sacrifices can now possess any pretensions to saving efficacy.

There is another consideration which may be briefly mentioned as damaging to the maintainers of this hypothesis. It flows from their inconsistency with themselves. In the same breath, as could easily be evinced, they hold to the salvability of the heathen in consequence of their access to the first promise, that is, in consequence of their ability to know something of the gospel, and contend that they may be saved through the indirect application to them of the benefits of the atonement, that is, if the language mean anything, without their ability to know anything of the gospel. They are salvable through a knowledge of it: they are salvable without a knowledge of it.

This hypothesis has been discussed at some length, because we regard the supposition that the heathen live under one of the dispensations of the gospel as furnishing the most plausible support for the tenet of their salvability. But it is not necessary to pursue this special argument any further. The fact is, that it is of very little importance whether we can show or not that it is possible for the heathen to know somewhat of the gospel through some lingering fragment of a tradition concerning what has been called the *Protevangelium*, or that a saving knowledge of it was at any time in the past communicated to that portion of mankind which is conceded on all hands to lie under the pall of heathenish darkness, and the actual condition of which is admitted by Mr. Watson himself to be "affectingly bad." Whether they never had any other knowledge of a Saviour than that which sprung like a faint dawn from the first promise, or whether they subsequently received clearer light from Jewish proselytes and Christian missionaries—all this avails nothing. It is sufficient to know that they are now in utter ignorance of the first principles

of the gospel of Christ. This fact the Apostle Paul establishes in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and employs it as lying at the root of his whole succeeding argument. To say that the heathen are under a dispensation of the gospel, even were it so, is to talk of a blind man under the beams of the sun, or a dead man under the light of life.

It deserves to be added, that, if the doctrine were true that the heathen live under one of the dispensations of the gospel, the question as to the salvability of the heathen loses all significance; for the specific difference of the case of those who are denominated heathen is, according to general admission, the fact that they are destitute of the knowledge of the gospel. It is a wretched solecism to talk of the salvability of the heathen, if by the term *heathen* are meant those who live under a dispensation of the gospel and may have access to the promise of salvation which it contains. Who would ever dream of raising the inquiry whether such persons may be saved? It would amount to nothing more than this: Are those in a salvable condition who may be saved by the gospel? The conclusion to which this argument has fairly conducted us is, that the heathen cannot be regarded as living under one of the dispensations of the gospel.

2. But if they do not exist under the gospel, or, what is the same thing, under the operation of the moral government of God as modified by the covenant of grace, the question still presses, under what religious constitution do they live? Two remaining suppositions exhaust the possibilities in the case: Either the heathen are under the provisions of natural religion; that is, as has been shown already, of moral government as modified by the covenant of works; or they are related to a naked dispensation of law; that is of moral government, simple and unmodified by federal arrangements. That they do not live under the operation of the covenant of works may be evinced, in the first place, by a mere statement of the case. Natural religion, as involving in addition to the essential principles of moral government, the element of a covenant, was the religion of Adam in innocence, and potentially the religion of his race. The threatening of death was not in itself considered one of the distinguishing peculiarities

of the covenant, for it is evident that it was common to it with a simple government of law. A breach of the law, no matter how administered, must have issued in death. The effect of the federal arrangement upon that threatening was, in case of the fall of Adam, to entail it upon all his posterity, antecedently to their own conscious and personal transgressions. His guilt would be their guilt. The distinctive features of the covenant were the recapitulation of the race in a federal head and the promise to him and them, in the event of his obedience for a limited time of probation, of an indefectible life. It was a covenant of life, the rewards of which—justification and adoption—were suspended upon the temporary obedience of the federal head and representative. He fell; and the results of his fall to his descendants were the destruction of his federal headship as a ground of hope, and the forfeiture of the promise of eternal life. All that was distinctive of the covenant as one of life was gone. Nothing but the penalty remained as the lamentable inheritance of the race. The covenant having been broken, the execution of the sentence of death became simply a legal measure. The race, swept, by the fall of their head, from the platform of the covenant, were remanded to the original relation of individual subjects to the naked rule of law. But it must be remembered that this subjection of the race to the unmodified sway of law took place under a tremendous disadvantage. They were no longer innocent, with the prospect of enjoying reward so long as they might continue obedient. They were already guilty, and passed under the operation of a violated and condemning law. It is obvious that a covenant, as a purely positive institution, when once broken by a federal head and representative, is abrogated both for himself and his constituency. The failure of one of the parties to comply with its conditions dissolves the bond of the contract. To say, accordingly, that the heathen still live under the covenant of works, or what is the same thing, under the scheme of natural religion, in its integrity, is to say that they still enjoy the promise of life in Adam, their federal head; that sinners exist under a religious constitution which, from the nature of the case, was peculiar to a con-

dition of innocence. That they are under the penalty of the covenant proves nothing. The penalty is not the totality of the covenant. It is clear as day that no heathen man can now be justified under the operation of the covenant of works. That is all for which it is worth while to contend.

The view, however, has been maintained by certain distinguished Calvinistic theologians—as by Edward Fisher in his *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, and his annotator, the celebrated Thomas Boston—that the covenant of works was renewed and republished at Sinai. And even Dr. Charles Hodge, in his great work on *Systematic Theology*, says: “It [the Mosaic covenant] contained, as does also the New Testament, a renewed publication of the original covenant of works.” If by this it is meant that God at Sinai republished the moral law which, of course, had been embodied in the covenant of works, and reënforsed upon sinners the penalty of that covenant, what is said is true; but it is certainly extraordinary to hold that that implied a renewal of the original covenant. Something more is evidently conveyed by this language, to wit, that God has renewed the covenant of works with the individuals of the race, suspending the promise of life upon the condition of personal obedience. From that position we are obliged to dissent, and to maintain the view that the covenant of works never has been renewed with man since its violation by Adam.

The covenant of works cannot be confounded with a simple dispensation of law. It involved a serious modification of pure moral government. It was an arrangement of divine providence superadded to mere law, and containing peculiar and distinctive elements which contradistinguished it from a simple legal economy. The question, therefore, of the renewal of that covenant after its violation, is the question of its renewal as to these peculiar and distinctive features, and not the question whether the provisions which were common between it and naked law were reënforsed. That the covenant, as receiving its denomination from its characteristic elements, has never been republished, will appear from the following considerations:

- (1.) There was no promise made to sinners at Sinai, nor ever

since in the Old Testament or the New. of an indefectible life upon the condition of perfect personal obedience. They were already spiritually dead, and therefore could not obey and live, even in the lowest—the contingent sense. They were already under the curse of the covenant, and therefore could not expect its blessing. Its threatening was already fulfilled upon them, and therefore they could not be subjects of its promise. A promise to the dead that they should live if they would deliver themselves from death; a promise to the condemned that they should be acquitted if they would discharge themselves from condemnation; a promise to the accursed that they should be blessed if they would free themselves from the curse; in a word, a promise contradictory to facts, and suspended upon impossible conditions, is something which passes comprehension. The demand of the law for perfect obedience from those who have disobeyed it, and so have disabled themselves for obedience, is not only conceivable, but legitimate and necessary. But the promise of a broken covenant that it would give life to its violators is quite a different thing. It would be, in the same breath, to curse and to bless.

(2.) The limitations involved in the condition of the covenant of works certainly were not reappointed at Sinai. There was no limitation as to persons in a federal head. Federal head there was, and could be, none. Adam could not be, for he had already failed, and in all probability had himself been saved from the effects of his infidelity to his trusteeship through another federal head—Jesus Christ, the second Adam, the representative of sinners in a different covenant. But God appointed no other federal head of a legal covenant at Sinai; and as he has never dealt with men, in an economy contemplating the acquisition of life, except in a covenant-head, the doctrine that he reinstated the covenant of works at Sinai, or has ever done it since, is destitute of foundation. A covenant without a covenant-head is inadmissible.

Further, there was no limitation as to time. No definite obedience was assigned to man, as at first. God did not say at Sinai, Obey for a limited period, and I will justify you. What

he did was to reënforce the moral law, and then to publish the covenant of grace as the method of escape from its condemning sentence.

(3.) There was no imposition of a specific test of obedience—not a word about the tree of knowledge, nor any other positive institute, unless the position be taken that the positive institutions of the Mosaic economy were appointed as special tests of legal obedience. But that view would be opposed by insuperable difficulties. First, the covenant supposed to be so formed would not have been the original covenant of works, but one entirely new, as embracing characteristic elements different from those of the old. Secondly, it would not have been made through a federal head; for although Moses was in a certain subordinate sense a mediator, he surely was not a covenant-head and representative. Thirdly, a covenant involving as special tests of obedience the positive institutions of Judaism, could have had no practical bearing upon the race in general. And fourthly, the positive ordinances of the Mosaic economy had reference chiefly to the covenant of grace; they were typical of redemption through Christ. They therefore could not have had a peculiar relation to a covenant of a wholly opposite character.

(4.) There was, in the Sinaitic transaction, not a word about the tree of life in connexion with personal obedience. The only Tree of Life of which there was any intimation was one provided by another and a better covenant: one that grows, not in an earthly Eden, but in the paradise of God. God has never given to sinners any sacramental pledge, nor any promise of life, apart from Christ the Redeemer.

If now, as has been sufficiently evinced, there was, in the transaction at Sinai, no reappointment of the distinctive elements which characterised the covenant of works, there could have been no renewal of that covenant with man. All the proofs advanced in favor of its reinstatement amount only to this—that God reënforced by new and impressive sanctions upon the conscience that eternal and indestructible rule of righteousness to which the covenant of works had been superadded, and from which it had been torn away by the progenitor and representa-

tive of the race. The easy conditions of obedience, the facile terms upon which justification and eternal life might have been secured, which exuberant grace had annexed to the moral law, were stripped from it by the reckless infatuation of man; and it was left in its naked majesty and sternness, speaking no longer to the soul in the gentle whispers of love, but in the thunder-tones of retributive justice. The original covenant of works is forever abrogated as a covenant of promise, to all those for whom its condition has not been fulfilled by Christ, the second Adam: to them nothing of it remains but the penalty which entails spiritual and eternal death. In maintaining this view we are sustained by the opinion of Dr. Thornwell, that man, since the fall, is related to the covenant of works only as he is condemned under its penalty, having forfeited all connexion with its promise; and that the race, in their natural sinful condition, are treated as individuals under the general principles of moral government.

Let us now look in the face the mournful conclusion to which the argument thus far has led us. The heathen are not under the gospel scheme, in either of its dispensations; they are not under the scheme of natural religion, in its integrity, as involving the covenant of works; they are not under the simply legal scheme of unmodified moral government, as yet unviolated as to its requirements, and extending the promise of reward so long as obedience is rendered. What then? Nothing remains but to regard them as under the operation of a broken and condemning law.

There is no escape from this conclusion, so far as we can see, except upon one or the other of two suppositions: either that the Adamic race does not include the whole population of the globe, that there are races which did not descend from Adam; or, that the whole human race, although admitted to have sprung from Adam, are not involved in the guilt of his first sin.

In regard to the former of these suppositions, we would remark, in the first place, that it is an unproved hypothesis; and so long as it continues in that posture, it cannot be considered as invalidating the natural and ordinary interpretation attaching to the scriptural account of the origin of man. In the second place, the

evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the scientific hypothesis of the specific unity of the race, as derived from philology, ethnology, anatomy, psychological and moral considerations; and especially from the physical law of hybridity based upon a well-nigh universal induction of facts. In the third place, not only the unbroken *consensus* of the Christian Church, but the *usus loquendi* of the world at large, would have to be revolutionised in order to be accommodated to this hypothesis. The presumption against it, furnished by this consideration, is enormous; and another presumption, springing from the common beliefs and traditions of mankind, is equally powerful in opposition to it. In the fourth place, even were this hypothesis confirmed, it could exert no practical effect upon the conclusion of the preceding argument—that the heathen are under the scope of a violated and condemning law. If any general fact has been derived from a wide and all-embracing collection of particular instances, admitting of no exceptions, it is the universality of original sin. Now this universal effect must have a corresponding cause, and if there be extra-Adamic races, they must have had a relation to their progenitors similar to that which the descendants of Adam sustain to him. They must have sinned and fallen in them. No other conclusion can be entertained in consistency with the justice of God's moral government, unless we fly to the hypothesis of an ante-mundane existence of mankind—an hypothesis contradicted alike by the scriptural record and the facts of human consciousness.

The second supposition—that the whole human race, although conceded to have descended from Adam, are not implicated in the guilt of his first sin—might, did time permit, be disproved by the ordinary arguments, drawn from universal experience and observation, in favor of the fact that original sin is an all-conditioning law affecting the moral attitude of the race; and the irresistible inference, that it must have had its root in the guilt derived from a federal head and representative. It is sufficient to say that the hypothesis is flatly contradicted by the explicit testimony of God's word. No true believer in the authority of that word requires any further proof.

We return, then, to our conclusion, that the religious constitution under which the heathen live is one which relates them to the essential principles of moral government, and the sentence of a broken and condemning law. This is their condition by nature: in it they are born. But the Scriptures do not represent them as simply condemned for their participation in the federal guilt of Adam's sin. They declare that the heathen are condemned also for their own personal and conscious violations of law, and that they perish on that account. No more need be done in establishing this position than briefly to advert to the argument of the Apostle of the Gentiles in the Epistle to the Romans. He starts out with the tremendous assumption that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness." He then convicts the heathen as ungodly and unrighteous, and presents a portraiture of their moral condition which exhibits heathenism, not in the light of a system to be apologised for and excused as the result of weakness, but as the culmination of abominable crime. Not only had they apostatised from God; not only had they deliberately rejected him and spurned the patent evidences of his existence, perfections, and government flaming in the heavens and the earth; but they had proceeded to the last development of iniquity in substituting in the place of their divine Maker the vilest creations of their own debauched imaginations and the most contemptible objects of sense. What was this but to worship themselves, and what further insult is it possible for the creature to fling in the face of his God? The peculiar enormity of sin lies, not simply in the substitution and enthronement of the creature in the place of God, but in making that creature the sinner himself. For he is conscious of the fact of his own guilt, pollution, and degradation. He knows it not by observation, by external perception, or by report; he knows it by the sure, clear, indubitable testimony of his own consciousness. And in spite of such a conviction, to elevate himself to the place of Him whom he ought to be led by the indestructible laws of his being to acknowledge as his Creator and Supreme Ruler; to enthrone himself in the seat of One who is infinite beauty, holiness, and glory—this is the very climax of

outrageous and atrocious wickedness. He who would thus raise himself to the highest summit of heaven deserves to be plunged into the lowest abyss of hell. To worship any creature is bad enough ; but for a conscious sinner to worship himself implies a degree of depravity, the forgiveness of which would almost seem to be incompetent to almighty power and infinite grace. Such is the fearful ungodliness which the Apostle ascribes to the heathen ; and their unrighteousness was akin to it. There is no obligation which binds man to his fellow-man which they did not, like swine, trample into the mire. This picture which Paul so graphically paints of the heathen of his day, universal observation proves to be applicable to the heathen of this age. Now, argues the Apostle, they who sin without law shall perish without law, for they are a law to themselves. Here there is no denial that the heathen are transgressors of law, but only that they are violators of a specific law. They sin not against the requirements which it is the peculiar province of the Scriptures to enforce, since they could have no access to them. But they sin against the moral law inlaid in their nature, and thundering in the judgments of conscience. The standard of right and wrong, by which they judged either their own thoughts or their fellow-men, is the standard by which God will judge them. They transgress the law of God, and, therefore, justly perish.

If, then, the conclusion is irrefragably established, that the heathen live under the operation of a violated and condemning law, the argument against their salvability without the gospel is a short one. It is worthy of note, that Paul in his elaborate argument touching justification, presents the negative branch of it in one brief sentence. The question being, Can a sinner be justified by the works of the law? he answers no, "for by the law is the knowledge of sin." That is all he deemed it necessary to say. And it was enough. A scheme which convicts its subjects of guilt, and provides no relief from its condemnation, is manifestly incompetent to justify. It involves a palpable contradiction to say that the law which condemns can acquit; that the law which kills can make alive; that the law which curses can bless. Salvation from the effects of violated law is only possible

through an extra-legal and remedial scheme. There is but one such scheme. If a competent righteousness is necessary in order to justification, and the gospel alone furnishes it; if there is but one Mediator between God and men, through whom they can be saved, and the gospel alone reveals him; if atonement, regeneration, and sanctification are indispensable to fellowship with God, and the gospel alone provides them: it is perfectly clear that without the gospel there is no salvation to sinners. The heathen are sinners; therefore, the gospel is necessary to their salvation. They who hold the contrary are reduced to the absurdity of maintaining that those who are condemned by an infinite law can deliver themselves from its curse; that those who are dead in trespasses and sins can raise themselves to life; that those who are polluted with lust and stained with crime can exalt themselves to communion with God, and to the society of angels and of saints. Thus, in the strong words of John Owen, "they lay men in Abraham's bosom who never believed in the Son of Abraham; make them overcome the Serpent who never heard of the Seed of the woman; bring goats into heaven who never were of the flock of Christ—never entered by him the Door; make men please God without faith, and obtain the remission of sins without the sprinkling of the blood of the Lamb; to be saved without a Saviour, redeemed without a Redeemer, to become the sons of God and never know their elder Brother."

The attempt would be hopeless to evade the force of this argument by urging that the heathen may repent, and endeavor to furnish sincere obedience to the requirements of the law. Surely such a doctrine ought to be left to Socinians and Pelagians. The very core of a sinner's case is that, apart from a competent atonement and regenerating grace, he cannot repent. He is spiritually dead, and impotence must characterise all his attempts to perform spiritual acts. In regard to the ability of the heathen to render sincere obedience to the law, it is enough to say that it is simply absurd to suppose that a conscious transgressor can furnish any obedience, which could be considered acceptable by the divine Ruler, of a violated and condemning law. But were these suppositions not convicted by the most superficial reflection

of being mere dreams, of what conceivable account would such possibilities be, in the absence of any evidence that they are ever reduced to the semblance of fact in the actual condition of the heathen? The first instance of a penitent heathen, sincerely endeavoring to keep the law of God impressed upon his conscience, has yet to be afforded. It is, therefore, worse than idle to ventilate such views. They can only serve to weaken the efforts which the Church is making, in the face of other and formidable difficulties, to communicate to the pagan world that gospel of the grace of God, without which repentance for sin and obedience to the law are, according to the testimony of Scripture, entirely impossible.

II. We have thus endeavored, by a method of investigation which, to our mind, appeared to be the most satisfactory and conclusive, to consider the awfully interesting subject of the salvability of the heathen world. If, by a careful and painstaking consideration of all the suppositions which are possible in the case, success has been attained in ascertaining precisely the religious constitution under which they live, the way is cleared for a definite and certain answer to the transcendently important question as to the necessity of the gospel to the salvation of millions of our race. And here the discussion might be arrested, were it not for the consideration that it would, in that case, be liable to the charge of being incomplete. It would be urged that the whole issue has not been squarely met.

1. Not sceptics and indifferentists, but evangelical theologians, representing the doctrinal views of large and influential sections of the Church, take the ground that, admitting the necessity of the gospel, as a scheme of redemption, to the salvation of the heathen, it is not proved that the actual knowledge of that scheme is requisite to that end. On the contrary, it is held that they may be saved without it; that the benefits of redemption, though not directly applied to them, which would suppose some acquaintance with them, are rendered indirectly available to their case. The argument seems to be analogous to that which is urged in favor of the salvation of infants dying in infancy. As they are

incapable of knowing the provisions of the gospel and of exercising faith in them, and have never, from the nature of the case, rejected the atonement, they are indirectly saved on the ground of the Saviour's merits. So the heathen, never having heard of Christ, are not capable of unbelief in him and a rejection of his atoning sacrifice, and, therefore, may be saved through the indirect application to them of the virtue of that sacrifice. But what is predicable of infants is not predicable of adults, as the advocates of this theory admit when refuting the objections to infant baptism derived from their inability to believe; and as they grant that adult heathen are voluntary transgressors of moral law, the foundation of the fancied analogy is destroyed. It must be shown that they are indirectly saved by virtue of the atonement notwithstanding their conscious sins. Their actual transgressions must be accounted for; they start up in the path of this hypothesis, and "will not down at its bidding."

If it should be said that, as the merits of Christ's obedience may, according to the representations of the Scriptures, indirectly enure to the benefit of the unfallen angels, the same thing may be true in regard to the heathen; we reply, in the first place, that what may be affirmed of holy beings, may be unsusceptible of affirmation as to sinners. The cases are not parallel. In the second place, if the unfallen angels are benefited by the work of Christ, they know it. They, assuredly, are not ignorant of redemption. The cases, in this respect also, are not alike. In the third place, it is the "elect angels," and not non-elect devils, who would be so benefited, and the Arminian ought to be the last man to press the analogy.

But let us try to get an accurate conception of the view of those who contend that the heathen may be saved without the knowledge of the gospel. What, exactly, do they mean? Our information shall be derived from no less authorities than Mr. Wesley and Mr. Watson. They hold, that the purpose of redemption was not "an after-thought," but that it was a provision against the results of the fall; that Christ's atonement was not offered to secure the salvation of some, but the salvation of all; that the guilt of Adam's sin—that is, the liability of his descend-

ants to the consequences of that sin—is removed from every infant, whether dying in infancy, or surviving to maturity; that “a degree of spiritual life,” according to one writer, is imparted to every man, or, according to another, a portion of spiritual death is removed from every man, and that the grace of the Holy Spirit is communicated to all, sufficient to enable them—to do what? In the case of those who know the gospel, it is sufficient to enable them to believe in Christ. But in the case of those who do not know the gospel, what does this sufficient grace enable them to do? Manifestly, not to believe in Christ, for “how can they believe in him of whom they have not heard?” and these writers are conscious of the difficulties in the way of maintaining that position. What then? It enables them to obey, for justification, the moral law as relaxed and accommodated to their moral strength. This, then, according to this doctrine, which has not been caricatured, but fairly represented, is the salvability of the heathen. They may, through atoning provisions, secure their justification by personal obedience to law!

It may be thought that we have not correctly exhibited the doctrine of these writers, inasmuch as the position last indicated is inconsistent with that previously discussed in this article, namely, that the heathen live under the patriarchal dispensation of the gospel, and may therefore be saved by faith in the first promise which revealed Christ as a Saviour. That there has been no misrepresentation of their views will appear from the words of Mr. Watson. In considering the question of the salvability of the heathen nations, he says:*

“The dispensation of religion under which all those nations are to whom the gospel has never been sent, continues to be the patriarchal dispensation. That men were saved under that in former times we know, and at what point, if any, a religion becomes so far corrupted, and truth so far extinct, as to leave no means of salvation to men, nothing to call forth a true faith *in principle*, and obedience to what remains known or knowable of the original law, no one has the right to determine, unless he can adduce some authority from Scripture.”

A little further on, he remarks:

*Theological Institutes, Vol. II., p. 445.

“As we find it a doctrine of Scripture that all men are responsible to God, and that the ‘whole world’ will be judged at the last day, we are bound to admit the accountability of all, and with that, the remains of law, and the existence of a merciful government toward the heathen on the part of God: With this the doctrine of St. Paul accords. No one can take stronger views of the actual danger and the corrupt state of the Gentiles than he: yet he affirms that the divine law had not perished wholly from among them; that though they had received no revealed law, yet they had a law ‘written on their hearts;’ meaning, no doubt, the traditional law, the equity of which their consciences attested; and, farther, that though they had not the written law, yet that ‘by nature,’ that is, ‘without an outward rule, though this also, strictly speaking, is by preventing grace,’ (*Wesley’s Notes in loc.*) they were capable of doing all the things contained in the law. He affirms, too, that all such Gentiles as were thus obedient, should be ‘justified, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, by Jesus Christ, according to his gospel.’ The possible obedience and the possible ‘justification’ of heathens who have no written revelation, are points, therefore, distinctly affirmed by the apostle, in his discourse in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.”

These quotations are sufficient to show, that the inconsistency is not with us, but with those who hold that men may be saved by faith in a promise of the gospel, and at the same time justified by personal obedience to law.

Now, in the first place, it is clear that the whole theory has its root in the doctrine of universal atonement: and that doctrine is liable to the fatal objection that it makes a vicarious atonement secure possible and not actual results—a view which is opposed to the teachings of both the Old Testament and the New, in regard to the nature and effects of atonement. On that consideration we will not dwell; but as the doctrine of universal atonement can only be established by a disproof of the Calvinistic doctrine of Election, and that is pronounced to be a monstrous tenet, we are justified in fighting a battle or two on the soil of Africa. We might urge the unwarrantableness of conditioning an eternal purpose of God upon the contingent acts of men, as is done by those who make the foresight of faith and good works and perseverance therein to the end the condition of the decree of election; we might insist that election is in order to faith and good works, and not they in order to it; we might

show that faith and good works are constituent elements of the salvation to which men are elected, and, therefore, not conditions precedent to it; but we will content ourselves with applying the incisive edge of Occam's razor—the law of parcimony—to the neck of this alleged election. According to that law no more causes are to be postulated for an effect than are necessary to its production, and surely divine wisdom is not chargeable with its violation. Now, if God foresees that some men will persevere in faith and good works unto the end, he foresees that they will get to heaven, for that is the end. What then, we crave to know, would be the use of a decree electing them to get there? Echo answers, what? Further, if God elects those to be saved, who, he foresees, will persevere in faith unto the end, he elects the heathen to be saved on that condition—that is, he foresees that they will persevere in that which they never began to do. For it is conceded that they cannot believe in Christ. Either, then, they are saved without being elected, or there are two elections—one for the Christian and the other for the heathen. Neither of these positions can possibly be true. And as the Arminian and the Calvinistic doctrines of election are the only contestants worth mentioning, the disproof of the former is the proof of the latter. That being established, the doctrine of universal atonement goes by the board, and with it the inference from it of the salvability of the heathen.

In the second place, the supposition of the removal of Adam's guilt from every infant makes it entirely innocent; for, *ex hypothesi*, it is not guilty in Adam, and it cannot contract guilt by voluntary sin. It, therefore, has no guilt. But the evangelical Arminian theory holds that the infant who will live is infected with the corruption of original sin, which will develop into actual transgressions. He is, therefore, entirely innocent and depraved at one and the same time!

In the third place, the supposition of the impartation of a degree of spiritual life, or the removal of a portion of spiritual death, involves a contradiction. It makes a man partly dead and partly alive at one and the same time. Further, it entangles the Arminian theory in fatal inconsistency. For it maintains the

necessity of regeneration, which, if it mean anything, is the communication of spiritual life. Those, then, who are already partly alive, are by regeneration made alive. He is born, who lived before his birth.

In the fourth place, the hypothesis, for it is nothing more, of a relaxation of the moral law, and its accommodation to the strength of the subject, is not only opposed to the plain teachings of Scripture, but may be easily convicted of absurdity. For it represents the eternal and immutable law of God as a variable and fluctuating measure—a mere Lesbian rule. As the degrees of strength possessed by its subjects are innumerable, it becomes a graduated scale upon which are registered as many standards of morality as there are shades of difference in the moral condition of men. Such a doctrine would strain the credulity of the “Jew Apella.”

While, however, we have felt constrained, by what we conceive to be the interests of truth, to resist these views as unscriptural, we rejoice to know that many of those who hold them are active and zealous prosecutors of the work of Foreign Missions. The solution of the apparent anomaly is found in the fact, that though they maintain the opinion of the possible salvation of the heathen through the light which they possess, they see clearly that they are not actually saved in consequence of it. They are true philanthropists, and will not allow a mere theory to withdraw their minds from the real misery of the heathen world, or to render them insensible to the command of their Divine Master to his Church to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. What ought to be the zeal, in that great enterprise, of those who hold not only that the heathen are not, but that they cannot be, saved without a knowledge of the gospel imparted by the Christian Church!

2. In opposition to the doctrine that the heathen may be saved without a knowledge of the gospel, we briefly submit the following explicit declarations of God's word, for the whole question is one of divine testimony: (1.) There is no saving knowledge of God without the knowledge of Christ. “This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ,

whom thou hast sent." Paul, addressing the Ephesian Christians, speaks very precisely to the case of the heathen in their unevangelised condition. The passage is decisive as to the matter in hand. "Wherefore remember, that ye being in time past Gentiles in the flesh, who are called uncircumcision by that which is called the circumcision in the flesh made by hands; that at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world." The argument of the apostle is: While you were heathen, you had no connection with the Church of God—you were "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel;" therefore you had no knowledge of the gospel as a promissory institute in contradistinction from the law as a condemning scheme—you were "strangers to the covenants of promise;" therefore you had no acquaintance with Christ, and could have had no saving relation to him—you were "without Christ;" therefore you did not know the true God and were destitute of true religion—you were "without God;" and therefore, lastly, you were in a lost and hopeless condition—you had "no hope." These are clearly the steps in the apostle's argument. To be without the Church is to be without the gospel; to be without the gospel is to be without Christ; to be without Christ is to be without God; and to be without God is to be without hope.—no Church, no gospel; no gospel, no Christ; no Christ, no God; no God, no hope. (2.) There is no salvation except by faith in Christ, and no faith in him without some knowledge of him. The very terms of salvation which the Lord Jesus enjoined it upon the Apostles to proclaim to every creature are: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned." "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; but he that believeth not shall not see life." "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," said the apostle to the pagan jailor, "and thou shalt be saved." The implication is clear that no heathen could be saved in any other way. But none can believe on Christ who have no knowledge of him. "There is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall

call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" (3.) There is no conversion and no sanctification apart from the word of the gospel, and no salvation without them. "Being born again by the word of God." "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth." "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of God." "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord."

These declarations of the Sacred Scriptures are not to be confined to any section of the race; they are applicable universally to mankind—to the heathen and the nominal Christian alike. The Cross of Christ is the magnet of the world. "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." There are not two gospels, one for us and one for the heathen. "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." There are not two Christs. Than the name of Jesus, "there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved." There are not different salvations for the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the Negro. "As I live, saith the Lord, all flesh shall see my glory"—"all flesh shall see my salvation." That glory, that salvation, is Christ. To know him by faith is to be saved; not to know him is to perish.

This, then, is the great philanthropic argument for Foreign Missions—the evangelisation of the heathen as necessary to their salvation. Who is there that loves the Lord Jesus and the souls of his fellow-men who would not respond to this mighty, this irresistible, plea for the diffusion of the gospel, in the profoundest depths of his heart? If myriads of our race depend for their salvation upon their knowledge of the gospel, and we possess the inestimable boon, who would not exclaim, Hold not back the proclamation of redemption from the slaves of sin and death and hell? Let it fly upon the wings of every wind, and be borne upon the crest of every rolling billow, to the utmost limits of the world!

ARTICLE VIII.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

The eighteenth General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States met at Knoxville, Tennessee, according to appointment, May 16th (the third Thursday), at 11 o'clock a. m. The sermon was delivered by the Moderator, the Rev. C. A. Stillman, D. D., from 1 Cor. iv. 20, "For the kingdom of God is not in word, but in power." This discourse was at once an appropriate specimen of the preacher's characteristics, of what the opening sermon of a great Presbyterian court ought to be, and of the best type of that sermonising which has been, for a century, the glory of the Presbyterian pulpit. It obviously relied for its power, not upon any form of rhetorical clap-trap, all of which was conspicuously absent, but upon weighty scriptural truth, defined with transparent perspicuity, argued with breadth and courage, fortified with proof texts, and enunciated with the boldness and paternal gravity at once of the divine herald and the devoted pastor.

The true kingdom of God is his ransomed Church, in its essence invisible, and yet by God's ordinance incorporated in a visible form. The Apostle teaches that its essential being "is not in word, but in power." This implies (1) a contrast between mere form and expression and reality; (2) that every true branch has genuine power; (3) that, hence, the community which emits no spiritual power is not truly a Church; (4) that the degrees of power vary in different true Churches; (5) and that a Church approaches the ideal, just as it enhances its "power" as contrasted with its "word" or expression.

The power which defines the true Church, is that of God the Holy Ghost, in its origin; but expressing itself in and through the body, a true Church:

1. As a definite system of revealed infallible truth. The "kingdom is one of light." This truth must be something more than the mere "word," with which it is contrasted in the text; mere human declaration, form, and profession; it is that divine

truth which is abiding, quick, and a discerner of spirits. Hence the efficiency of a Church must ever be (other things being equal) just in proportion to the fidelity with which it teaches all the connected parts of the revealed creed, reflecting symmetrically and honoring the divine character. And this is especially vital to be considered at a time of relaxed doctrine and abounding unbelief, like this.

2. In an earnest and faithful ministry—which must have, first, a powerful and vital experience of God's truth and grace in their own souls, as well as talents and acquirements; and second, the appointed and orderly vocation appointed by the Redeemer in his Church. Such a living ministry, authorised by the Head, but, above all, quickened into spiritual life, through that truth which they preach, by the Almighty Spirit, is a living channel of divine power, and so of priceless value to the Church. Let the history of the ages testify, by their countless generations of ransomed souls brought to God and glory through this instrument! This view, while teaching the Church to value such a God-given ministry, also teaches the ministers themselves no lesson of pride or power, but the awful solemnity and responsibility of their office.

3. In a regenerated membership. The only true power in any visible Church is that of the portion of the invisible incorporated in it. The rest is all dead-weight, or worse. The regenerate members have spiritual power only as they have the Holy Ghost in them; they also are a living channel between God and a dead world, because he lives in them. Hence, accessions and numbers are to be valued only as they are truly converted. The only reason, as we think, why a minor membership is ordained for baptized children, is, that this most surely brings them, as means, to true spiritual life.

4. In believing prayer. The agencies of the kingdom are not mechanical, but vital; and prayer, which is the response of a living Church to the vitalising power of its Head, is the reaction, at once receiving and measuring the energy incorporated in the body. Believing prayer, the expression of godly desire and of a living faith in Christ's power and promise, is thus a real ele-

ment of the divine efficiency; not merely human, though man exercises it, but truly divine, because God inspires and answers it. In conclusion:

The end or result to which these elements of church power conspire is *the conquest and assimilation of the whole mass of fallen humanity*. Here is the enterprise, at once arduous and inspiring, which must engage the ardent loyalty and tax the faith of the Church and of her officers, until Messiah shall occupy his whole purchased heritage, and the whole redeemed earth sing, "Alleluia: for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth!"

THE ORGANISATION.

After prayer and singing, the retiring Moderator then constituted the new Assembly by prayer. The Permanent Clerk, reporting the creation of two new Presbyteries—"Maryland," in the Synod of Virginia, and "St. John's," in that of Georgia—presented a roll of seventy-one ministers and fifty-nine ruling elders, making one hundred and thirty commissioners at the outset. The whole number possible is one hundred and forty-five. And of these, six appeared on subsequent days, making the largest number present one hundred and thirty-six. The Rev. Drs. B. T. Lacy, of Missouri, J. H. Rice, of Tennessee, Thos. E. Peck, of Virginia, and J. T. Hendricks, of Kentucky, were nominated for Moderator. The last having been permitted to withdraw his name, Dr. Peck was elected, against his own protest. The skill and courtesy with which he performed his duties throughout the sessions fully justified the saying of one of his supporters, that the man whose modesty prompts him to decline the honor, is the very man whom the Church needs for his services. The Rev. J. H. Martin, of Atlanta, was unanimously elected Temporary or Reading Clerk.

EDINBURGH COUNCIL.

The afternoon of the first day was usefully occupied in the reading and reference of judicial and other papers; which will be noticed in their places. Drs. Robinson, Hoge, and Brown read, on behalf of the delegates to the first Council of the Alliance

in Edinburgh, their report of their attendance; which was referred to the regular Committee on Foreign Correspondence. This report, after relating the courteous reception of our delegates, referred to the printed journal of the Council, and claimed for its action the points of advantage stated in the April number of this REVIEW.

In recording the transactions of the Assembly which have permanent interest, we shall aim to save space by grouping together kindred subjects, without a servile regard for the order in time.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.

The three theological institutions under the care of the Assembly described themselves as pursuing, in the main, "the even tenor of their way." The Union Theological Seminary in Virginia reported (on the second day) an unchanged faculty of four, fifty-one students, an increase of three hundred and twenty volumes in its valuable library, and an aggregate of about \$240,000 in its various endowments. The Columbia Seminary, South Carolina, also reported (on the second day) the same faculty of four, thirty-nine students, and a generally prosperous condition. One of the cheering features of the situation is the cordial response which the money agent of the Seminary receives from the churches in his collections to remove the indebtedness of the Seminary and to reinstate its endowment. The Tuskaloosa Institute for training a colored ministry, after one year of work, reported (on the third day) one Instructor and three students. In our hurried age it requires some faith to avoid despising this result as "the day of small things." The faithful men who are laboring in this work may be consoled by remembering that, in 1825, Dr. John H. Rice began the exercises of the Union Seminary in Virginia with three students. An overture from one quarter of the Church, in its zeal for this cause at Tuskaloosa, moved the Assembly to send a special commissioner abroad to solicit, especially in the Presbyterian Churches of Britain and the north of Ireland, money for the rapid up-building of this Institute. This proposal the Assembly declined, wisely, as we think. Although Christians there have recently declared our peculiar advantages and fitness for

dealing with the religious welfare of the Africans in America, and our sore need of help in this task, we have no faith that any efforts will succeed in diverting the gifts of British Christians from the more attractive objects which engross their attention to the black men in the Southern United States. Our people have never had any experience hitherto encouraging a hope that the zeal of anti-slavery Christians will take any more practical form than that of anathemas against Christian masters. As before 1865, so now, Southern Christians must make their account to do, themselves, the main part of whatever is to be done for Southern blacks.

REPORTS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES.

The Executive Committees of Education, Publication, Foreign Missions, and Sustentation, are the hands by which the Church performs her general evangelical work. With the exception of Publication, which has been thoroughly revolutionised, they all remain untouched in their organisation and modes of working. The Assembly of 1877, upon news of the catastrophe which had befallen the Publication Committee, began a radical change by instructing the Committee and the new Secretary, the Rev. Jas. K. Hazen: 1. To ascertain whether the whole work of manufacture and distribution could not be advantageously done by contract. 2. To sell the Publishing House never paid for, and pay the debt contracted by its ill-judged purchase. 3. To retrench salaries and other expenses. 4. To convert the *Earnest Worker* from a species of semi-monthly religious journal into a monthly Sabbath-school magazine. 5. To prepare for re-opening the colportage work. The report presented by the new Secretary marched up to these five commandments with a directness, perspicuity, and honesty which carried to the whole Assembly the unwonted and refreshing conviction that he knew exactly what he was about. The Secretary evidently "means business." Contracts are made, and in successful operation, with parties in Richmond, Va., to print and distribute all the Committee's Sabbath-school periodicals, paying it a small but certain royalty upon each subscriber, and with parties in St. Louis, Mo., to purchase

the Committee's stock of books and pamphlets, and continue the manufacture of this part of its literature, paying it a royalty (ranging from ten to five per cent.) on all the publications sold. The Committee thus has a certain clear income, absolutely free from publishing risks, and increasing as its business increases. The Publishing House can be sold for enough to meet the unpaid debt on it (\$31,000), but is retained for a season, with the good hope of securing more; while, meantime, its rents pay the interest and charges. The salaries and expenses are reduced to a minimum. The *Earnest Worker* is now purely a Sabbath-school monthly, its expository matter (on the International Sabbath-school Lessons) prepared by our own ministers gratis, and is rapidly growing into favor. A safe plan of colportage, at the risk and charges of the Presbyteries, is devised, and is already in process of execution in some places.

Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, speaking once of the old Boards, said that while three of them ought to need a great deal of money, the fourth, the Publication Board, ought to have a great deal. The pecuniary resource which the Church ought to possess in this work is apparent from this one fact: there never has been a prudent publishing house in the land which, when commencing its career, would not have regarded the possession of the assured patronage, growing out of the wants and the *esprit de corps* of a large Christian denomination, as sufficient guarantee of a colossal fortune. The Harpers, Appletons, Scribners, Wilson and Henkel, and others, have actually built up colossal fortunes without such an advantage at the outset. Let the reader consider, for instance, our hymn book, a work paying no royalty to authors, of which every family, not to say member, in our Church must have a copy, and many of them of costly quality, of the manufacture and sale of which our Committee has the absolute monopoly. There is not a private publisher in the United States who would not have leaped at this one job as ensuring a little fortune. That the Committee has not made the fortune for the Church, is proof of the inferiority of such an agency to that of regular commercial private enterprise, for the economical prosecution of business. Hence, we cannot but regard the change to contract work as a

change in the right direction. The Church agencies have been accustomed to plead that their benevolent aims compelled them to sell cheap. One answer is, that the large secular publishers find their profit in selling many things cheap also. Another is, that the Church publisher has, in the zeal of the ministry and other devoted Christians, helpers in the work of distribution, who do not require compensation at the rate of fifty per cent. (or perhaps "cent. per cent.") for circulating the books among purchasers. The wisdom of the Committee will be shown in so utilising this zealous unpaid agency as to bring a large part of its manufactures into direct contact with "consumers" at retail prices. Here is the Committee's "bonanza."

The expositions of the "International Scripture Lessons," circulated by the Committee, are doubtless safe, being composed by our own ministry. But the concurrence of our Church, as a Church, in this sensational crotchet has always appeared to us as worse than questionable. The only intelligible argument we have ever heard in its favor, was in the following narrative, recited once in our hearing by Dr. Vincent, the chief promoter of the plan. Said he: "The Committee of the Sabbath-school Union for selecting the year's lessons convened at Niagara. A clerk of the hotel, noticing the prevalence of white cravats, asked me if all these were parsons, and what brought them here. I told him that they were the Committee from all denominations of the Sabbath-school Union, engaged in selecting the International Scripture Lessons for a coming year. He asked what they were for. I explained that the result was, that, on any given Sunday, all the little folks in Europe and America would be engaged, at once, in studying the same passage of Scripture. 'Why,' exclaimed he, 'that would be sorter kinder noice, indeed,' (in the most genuine Yankee nasal)." But now let common sense raise the simple question, Why should all the children, on all continents, be required to study the same passage on the same Sabbath? Ought this to be required? Nay; ought not the different grades of religious intelligence, the different providential dealings, the different wants, sorrows, trials, of different communities, to dictate the study of entirely different passages of

Scripture at the same time? What would be thought of the absurdity of giving out fifty-two texts, on which every pastor in Christendom should preach in order? Where would be the "words in season"? Where "the scribe instructed unto the kingdom, bringing out of his treasures the things new and old"? This fanciful scheme has never appeared to us as supported by any other consideration than one just childish enough for the thoughtless hotel clerk. But there is another objection, which should be fatal with every Presbyterian. It ensures for our children a Broad Church doctrinal instruction in Sabbath-schools. This Committee, by the very terms of its constitution, is bound to pretermit such passages of Scripture as seem to teach the distinctive doctrines of either denomination represented in it. And they must do this every year, for the same reason they do it one year. Thus, this shallow plan effects only this for us: it ensures for our children the study of an expurgated, emasculated Bible, stripped of all which the opposers of our peculiar doctrines may surmise can clearly support them. It is earnestly hoped that this will be the last year when our Assembly will countenance the plan. Only the customary impatience of the body to listen to a new idea prevented members from discussing the deception at the late sessions.

The reports on Education, Sustentation, and Foreign Missions presented the melancholy common feature of diminishing resources and contracted labors. The Committee of Education reports seventy-one candidates assisted, against seventy-four last year; and receipts of \$11,023, as against \$13,598 of last year. The Committee of Sustentation \$16,652, as against \$19,487 of last year; and the Committee of Foreign Missions \$47,225, as against \$55,121 last year, and \$61,273 the year before last. One cannot be surprised at the consequent statements, that two of our missions, the one to Colombia, South America, and the one to the Cherokee Nation, have been extinguished; and that not a single new missionary has been sent to any foreign station within the year. The three Committees concur in ascribing this shrinkage mainly to the reduced prices of the staple productions of the people's industry, and to the stringency in the finances of the

country. It is to be feared that this solution is but partial. The business men cry out of a pressure; but the crops of the country have been superabundant, with an unwonted freedom, in the main, from drought and pestilence. Again: if individual resources have diminished, the Church has increased in numbers; and there are more Presbyteries, congregations, and people to contribute. It is to be questioned whether there is not here another illustration of the lack of persistency in the Southern people. Is there not an efficient connexion between this drying up of the Church's resources and the prevalence of worldly conformities and pomps and luxuries of which pastors have so much complaint to make? A collector for a charitable work was once ushered into the parlor of a rich Christian. He found it extravagantly adorned. When the owner entered and began to foreshadow his refusal and apology, the good man dryly remarked, "Yes; I see that I was mistaken; it is evident that you have nothing to spare for God, having all this finery to maintain; I wish you good evening." May it not be that, as Christ comes into our homes, he makes the same judgment. Now that the Southern Church (so lately chastened and peeled, and able to make its liberality abound out of its deep poverty) has gone about reinvesting itself with "the pride of the eye, and the pride of life," it has less to spare for its Redeemer. On this plan, will it not have less and less, the more prosperous it becomes?

SYSTEMATIC BENEVOLENCE.

The reports on Systematic Benevolence show, in some parts of the Church, a gratifying advance towards universal concert of the congregations in giving; and, on the whole, a slow general advance. But many of the contributions are so small as to be evidently nominal and perfunctory. They betray their own history. The congregation has not, in any true sense of the word, *contributed* to the Lord's work of evangelism; but the appeal has been evaded by the careless tossing in of some "dimes and nickels;" or the good pastor, with an elder or two, has put in a few dollars, in order to avoid the charge of delinquency upon the congregation. These facts disclose two truths: that in a majority

of our churches and families, the duty of "honoring God with our substance" is neither understood nor believed in; and that genuine love for God and for souls, if it exists, is a very feeble spark. Men who work for souls, also give for souls; and these infinitesimal contributions betray an infinitesimal amount of gospel work done by such Christians for Christ. It is believed again, that no congregation has ever failed to cast in a good and respectable sum for these great causes, when pastor and Session bent their minds and hearts in good earnest to seek it. Such failure is, at least, absolutely unknown to us. If this fact holds, then the unavoidable inference is, that the total failure, or trivial amounts of collections, are proofs of apathy and neglect in pastors and Sessions. The constitutional plan on which our executive agencies are now required to raise their revenues, assumes that each pastor is up to the mark of zeal and knowledge as a promoter of the Church's associated work. Such ought to be the case, but such evidently is not the case. The old "agency system," which we have rightly discarded, with all its faults, had this capital advantage: that the leading minds, surcharged with facts and enthusiasm, were brought into immediate contact with the givers, in at least a number of the most populous and accessible congregations. Our Church has such minds. But they are now condemned to discharge their spiritual electricity into the hearts of the givers from a distance, and through the partially conducting *medium* of a pastorate partly timid or ignorant or indifferent as to the great work. Who can doubt that, could our "old man eloquent," the Secretary of Foreign Missions—whose temporary sickness detained him from this Assembly—stand in the flesh before each one of our eighteen hundred churches, and make them feel the beatings of that heart so full of Christ and the salvation of a lost world, every one of them would do, at least for the once, something not unworthy of the cause? Here, then, is the practical problem for the wisdom of our Church courts to solve: how the sacred charge can be conveyed in full power from the men "whose hearts God hath touched" to the whole heart of the Church, without resorting to unwholesome or unscriptural methods.

The one complete and sufficient remedy for all these cruel embarrassments of our Committees, is a "revival" of pure and undefiled religion.

JUDICIAL CASES.

Three judicial cases were issued by the Assembly, which seem of sufficient importance to receive permanent record here. The first was the complaint of Dr. Stuart Robinson and others against the Synod of Kentucky, in the matter of the Rev. I. W. Canfield, considered on the fourth day. This case began three years ago, in charges of unministerial and unchristian conduct, preferred in Louisville Presbytery against him; which were dismissed without final sentence. At a subsequent meeting, the Presbytery adverted to his course, as minister of Hebron church, and decided (without judicial trial), in the exercise of its general power of oversight, that he was of unsound mind, and therefore neither a suitable person to be subjected to trial and censure nor to exercise the gospel ministry. The Synod, on appeal of Mr. Canfield, decided that this action was irregular and unjust. The Presbytery, in obedience to this ruling, rescinded its action; but being of the same opinion as to Mr. Canfield's unfitness, both for preaching and for judicial censure, by reason of mental disease, it again took the following steps to comply with the Synod's injunction, and to exercise its needed function of oversight at once. Restraining Mr. Canfield again from preaching, it instituted an inquiry touching his condition in regular judicial forms; and having taken the evidence, referred the case, in that posture, to Synod for its decision. This reference was also accompanied by Mr. Canfield's appeal against it. The Synod, while rightly excluding his appeal, without going into the case judicially, in the claim of its general episcopal power, rescinded the restraining order against Mr. Canfield, and advised the Presbytery to dismiss the whole case, leaving him in the full exercise of his privileges as a minister. It was against this finding (which the Presbytery obeyed) the complaint against the Synod was taken to the Assembly.

After a full argument, the complaint was sustained by the

almost unanimous vote of the Assembly. The view which seemed to prevail was, that an episcopal power, such as the Synod at last claimed for itself, must obviously exist somewhere, in such a case; but according to the general tenor of the Constitution, giving jurisdiction over a minister primarily to his own Presbytery, if anybody could have such power, it must be the Presbytery; and the Synod could only get it from the Presbytery by virtue of its review or appellate powers; whence it followed that, if, as Synod ruled, its exercise in the first case by the Presbytery was irregular and unjust, its non-judicial exercise by the Synod was, *a fortiori*, more irregular; and that the final action of Synod was fatally inconsistent, in that it decided, without judicial process, the very case which it had before rebuked the Presbytery for deciding without judicial process. This peculiar case decides a very novel and interesting question. Nothing can be plainer than that a good man, visited by mental disease, but unconscious of his own affliction, might wish to exercise his ministry under circumstances where the scandal and mischief would be glaring, and a remedy from some quarter absolutely necessary. Now our Government does not provide expressly any "*verit de lunatico inquirendo*" for such a case. Supposing it has really arisen, where does the remedy reside? This decision of the Assembly answers: It resides in the Presbytery. And the Assembly has evidently confirmed the original conclusion of Louisville Presbytery, that, inasmuch as the affliction, if it exists, obviously makes the sufferer as unsuited for judicial process and judicial censure as for the duties of the ministry, it must proceed in the inquiry in its administrative and not in its judicial capacity; but all its proceedings are, of course, strictly subject to the review of the superior courts, who will reach and repair any injustice or error, by review or complaint.

The record showed that the original case had been one of great sorrow, in which pastoral troubles had been complicated with the sorest domestic bereavements: and that the sufferer ought to have the tenderest pity of his brethren. This sympathy the judgment of the Assembly fully expressed. It only aimed, in addition, to decide the law.

2. The complaint of Dr. R. K. Smoot and others against the Synod of Texas, grew out of the following history: A young gentleman, a stranger and visitor among the churches of the Presbytery of Western Texas, had seemed very useful in certain revival-meetings, as a singer of sacred solos, exhorter, etc. The Presbytery, at its ensuing regular meeting, made formal recognition of his work as a "lay evangelist," inviting him to a complimentary seat as such. It is true that the sense of the majority of the Presbytery dissented from the term describing him, but their Clerk thus recorded the action, and it stood thus on their minutes when reviewed in Synod. The Presbytery then, desiring to secure the continuance of these labors, encouraged the reception of the gentleman into membership in one of their churches; it not appearing to what branch of the evangelical Church he had belonged, or whether, certainly, to any; and they then proceeded, under the rule of the Assembly of 1869, to license him as a lay-exhorter and laborer. When this record came to be reviewed in the Synod of Texas, Dr. Smoot moved exceptions against the action and the "censure of the records." The Synod, however, positively approved the action recorded; and on the question of censure or approval, allowed the members of Western Texas Presbytery to vote, against the ruling of its own Moderator. It was chiefly against these two points that Dr. Smoot and others complained to the Assembly. This complaint was sustained by a strong vote on both counts. On the first, the Assembly did but reaffirm several previous decisions which, under our present Book, are obviously just: that a court whose records are under review may not vote on them. On the second count, the Assembly held that the Presbytery of Western Texas had manifestly transcended the rules. The church membership of the person in a church under their care was scarcely instituted in a regular manner. Again, either he was merely a layman when he was invited to a corresponding seat in Presbytery, or else his subsequent licensure was inconsistent, and a repetition of an act already done. Last, the rule of 1869, even if of unquestionable wisdom, does not sanction the licensure of the person in question as a lay-exhorter, because that rule was evidently designed to

apply chiefly to experienced ruling elders and other well-instructed members of our own churches, long known and approved for their religious experience, prudence, and moral weight, by residence in the places where they were to labor. But while the hasty action has been disallowed by the Assembly, no censure was expressed upon the excellent ministers and elders of this noble frontier Presbytery. On the contrary, there was a tender sympathy with their abundant labors and peculiar trials.

The Assembly also reinforced its position on this point by its answer, on the fifth day, to an overture from the Presbytery of Mecklenburg. The minute adopted contains the following: "The plain teaching of our standards is, that the word of God is to be preached only by such as are sufficiently gifted, and also duly approved and called to that office. (Larger Catechism, Ques. 158.) Indeed, the whole doctrine of our Church as to the ministry, and the regulations under which men are inducted into it, show that, in addition to the call of God, the authority of the Church is necessary to call and appoint them to this work—whether as pastors or evangelists—and no amount of apparent or even real good, which may be connected with the labors of unauthorised preachers or evangelists, can justify us in dishonoring the ordinance of Christ, and by this means disorganising his Church."

It is with peculiar pleasure we see the Assembly resolutely assume this ground. The principles are the same advanced in this REVIEW, in an article on this subject, April, 1876, and more recently, in April, 1878. We foresee, as arising from this source, a flood of innovation and excitement threatening the Church, or disturbing its peace and purity. It is time to erect the strongest breakwater. Hence we wish to signalise the principles which we before asserted, and which our supreme court has now announced with authority. The divine Head of the Church has selected and appointed his own instruments for the gathering and perfecting of his elect; and these are a presbyterate to oversee, and among them a class of teaching elders, to be the official heralds of his gospel. He has ordained the method in which these are to be called and instituted by his Spirit and Church.

It is enough for us to know that it is his will that his Church be thus upbuilt. Hence, conceding to a Moody or a Morehouse all that their friends can claim for them, that the Spirit has given them gifts and a call to convert sinners and edify saints, *that gift is Christ's clear command to them to enter the regular ministry* by that branch of the Church which they conscientiously believe most apostolic. Hence, by continuing their public labors as self-constituted evangelists, they are flying in the face of Christ's ordinance and undermining his Church. Further, even human prudence clearly confirms the wisdom and necessity of Christ's rule. For while the persons mentioned may be orthodox and prudent, their example encourages the ignorant and imprudent to usurp the same office. The safeguard which Christ has established against the publication of contradictory and heretical doctrines in the Church, is thus prostrated. And the assumption of a right to administer sealing ordinances by men to whom the Church has not extended the office power, confounds the very rudiments of Church discipline. It is true, as the Assembly points out, that Christ commands every believer to labor in his private sphere, to teach and commend the gospel, saying, "Let him that heareth say, Come." The Church should concede, within this private sphere, a wide scope to the zeal of the lay Christian of good character and knowledge in teaching Christ, so long as his labors do not become erroneous or disorganising. Let us suppose a case in which such a layman is led on to offer Christ, not only in the parlor, prayer-room, or Sabbath-school class, but to an assembled company or crowd of sinners. Here is the vital point of difference. Speaking by no ecclesiastical endorsement, and after no training or testing of his gifts by appointed presbyterial authority, his weight and usefulness are *bottomed solely on his neighbors' experimental knowledge of his knowledge and consistent character.* While not authorised by, yet he is working under, the watchful eye of the appointed presbyterial authority, which can check him the moment he trips. Such scope may be allowed a good layman, speaking only as a layman, to those who know him. He is indeed performing the same private lay function, enlarged only by the incident of num-

bers, which the friend performs to his friend in his parlor, when he speaks the things of Christ. But now let this zealous man launch out upon evangelistic journeys, and all is changed. On what bottom does he stand in that distant town, as a herald of Christ's truth? Not on that of his personal character; for his audience do not personally know whether he is an impostor and a reprobate. Not on the endorsement of any Church; for he has declined their ordination and *imprimatur*; and has wandered beyond the watch of his church session. He is a usurper and disorganiser. We repeat: if his gifts and inward call are real, then these are Christ's voice, commanding him to enter the regular ministry through the regular door, where the ministers stand ready to hail his accession with delight, and to honor him for all the eminency of his legitimate successes. Refusing this, he sets up his mutinous will against his Master's will. No law-abiding Christian may become his accomplice in this. It is true that God is very forbearing to human errors; and it is his blessed prerogative to bring good out of evil. But even a real blessing, coming to a place through these disorganised labors, may not be pleaded by us as authority to throw down Christ's appointed bulwarks.

3. The third judicial case, that of Dr. E. T. Baird's appeal against the Synod of Virginia, after "dragging its slow length along" in the Committee until the last day, was then taken up and issued. The appellant had sent in his papers the first day, in due time and order, but had been kept away by ill-health. When this was finally made known, and the Assembly was certified of his wish to be heard through counsel, (I. D. Jones, Esq., ruling elder and commissioner from Maryland Presbytery,) it was determined to proceed with the case. A preliminary question first occupied the attention of the Assembly, whether the appeal would lie against the Synod of Virginia at this stage. On this the Judicial Committee was itself divided, the chairman, Dr. J. H. Rice, holding that the appeal ought to lie; and the rest of the Committee submitting, through Col. Billups of Georgia, an able report, arguing that it should not lie. The grounds of this debate will appear in the history of the case.

In May, 1877, Dr. E. T. Baird's Presbytery, that of East Hanover, instituted charges against his moral and ministerial character, founded on a written statement submitted by him as to the now well-known deficit in the funds of the Committee of Publication. In this he promised to submit himself, waiving defence, to the censure of Presbytery, and was supposed to ask that body "to waive all forms and technicalities" in doing so. That court supposed itself authorised to proceed upon this writing; and assigning a prosecutor and a counsel, it instituted charges founded on the writing, tried the case without further citation of the accused or delay of "ten free days," and found a sentence of deposition from the ministry, and suspension from church-membership, until repentance. But Presbytery, in order, as it said, only to explicate certain points confessed by Dr. Baird, took and recorded oral testimony inculpatory of him. The ruling elder who prosecuted was also allowed to vote on the sentence. Against this sentence, Dr. Baird appealed to the Synod of Virginia, basing his appeal chiefly on the grounds of its excessive severity, and a misunderstanding of his writing as a confession of criminality, when he deemed it only an explanation of errors of judgment committed by him.

The Synod, at its regular fall meeting, found this appeal in order, and entertained it judicially, giving both parties unrestricted scope in their arguments. The appellant, while not asking for complete acquittal, intimated his own conviction that some further judicial inquiry, before some impartial tribunal, was proper. The Synod did not pass upon the merits of his original case, but found the sentence of the Presbytery invalid, because of its informalities, and thus "sustained the appeal *pro forma*." It also sent back the whole case to the Presbytery for a new trial, which it ordered to be strictly regular and thorough; and until the issuing of such new trial, it left the appellant "provisionally" under the sentence of deposition and suspension. It was against this finding of the Synod that Dr. Baird appealed to the Assembly.

Now, the grounds on which the majority of the Assembly's Judicial Committee held that the appeal should not lie in this

case were mainly the following : That, whereas the Discipline limits the right of appeal to persons who have stood a regular trial and submitted to a "sentence," the only trial and sentence hitherto had were virtually quashed in Dr. Baird's favor by the very action appealed from ; that the Discipline makes "the reading of the sentence appealed from" a necessary preliminary of the hearing of an appeal : but in this case, no "sentence" exists to be read ; because the usage of the Book evidently defines the word "sentence" here, not in the sense of any administrative decision regulating process yet to be had, but only of a verdict deciding something of the merits of the charge ; that the assignment of a different remedy, the complaint (which does not work suspension of the sentence complained of,) for all decisions of this class, implies the Book did not design an appeal to lie in such cases ; that the usage of all secular courts confirmed this conclusion, since no secular court of inferior jurisdiction would dream of arresting its career, in face of exception taken, until it had reached some definite verdict ; nor would any court of superior jurisdiction entertain an appeal before such verdict ; and finally, common sense confirms the view ; because if a litigious defendant is armed with this power of appeal, instantly suspending the action appealed from, against all decisions regulative of the process against him, he might obviously delay a righteous verdict forever.

Against the majority of his own Committee the ingenious chairman argued : That the precedents of the secular courts were not decisive here, because they follow the principles of the English common law, while the Discipline, borrowed from Scotch jurisprudence, is moulded on the equity of the Roman civil law ; that in decisions of sufficient gravity, of which the court appealed to is to be the judge, a defendant ought to be armed with the suspensory and defensive power of appeal, even against actions not decisive of his final guilt or innocence ; because that action may prejudice his means of self-defence, and injure his happiness for a long interval, and in a serious degree, before the ultimate remedy could apply ; and last, that the decision of Synod was virtually a "sentence," because, instead of simply *restraining* Dr.

Baird from his privileges during the pendency of judicial inquiry, it ordains that until then the sentence of deposition and suspension "shall remain provisionally in force."

The Assembly, almost without debate, held that the appeal should be entertained. The intelligent spectator could not but infer that the mind of the majority paid exceedingly little regard to the technical arguments of either part of its Committee. It was plain that the moving consideration was the wish to withhold no possible fair advantage from a defendant, over whom so fearful a sentence was impending; members felt that, if there was any weight in any plea against the particular action of the Synod, he should have the advantage of an immediate hearing. It should be recorded, also, to the credit of the Synod of Virginia, that this body scrupulously abstained from participation in this argument in the house, in a spirit of generous fairness to the appellant. We proceed now to the appeal itself.

While this paper made five points, in substance they reduced themselves to two, in addition to the original plea of misunderstanding of the statement on which he had been condemned in Presbytery, and undue severity of the sentence. One was, that the Presbytery was now disqualified from giving him an impartial trial, because it had almost unanimously recorded an adverse opinion already on his merits; and especially because it contained five influential members—the ministers who belonged to the Assembly's Committee of Publication with him—whose official action might somehow be found implicated in the history of that deficit out of which the accusation grew. The other was, that the Synod had virtually contradicted itself, to the appellant's injury, by first quashing the Presbytery's verdict for informality, and then leaving its weight upon him, as a "sentence" provisionally in force until his case was issued. These views were presented in his favor by his able counsel, with a seriousness, earnestness, and weight, which left the appellant's friends no grounds to regret his personal absence.

But it was at this stage of the proceedings that the Assembly made a ruling which we cannot but regard as erroneous and unjust to the defendant. One of the representatives of the Synod

(Dr. Armstrong), surmising that Dr. Baird's counsel was about to proceed into the merits of the original charge, demurred to their introduction in argument, and requested the chair to rule that the argument should be limited from them to the action of the Synod only. His motive was every way proper and generous to the defendant; for he wished not only to save the Assembly's time, then becoming very precious, but to avoid the necessity on his own part of arguing adversely to Dr. Baird on the merits of the original charge, which his counsel's arguing favorably might have necessitated. In the same connection, Dr. Baird's counsel made what seems the reasonable demand: that the recorded facts in the case, prior to its reaching the Synod, should be read as a part of its necessary history. Unfortunately, the house seemed to get these two distinct questions confused, and, by a vote of its own, decided them both at once. The perspicacious counsel did not fail, of course, in his protest against this decision, to point out that only the *history of the case from its beginning* could furnish an intelligible basis for its argument; and to predict, what the discussion verified, that the house would listen unavoidably to oral statements of, or at least allusions to, the very facts in the earlier history of the case, from the advocates of the parties, which it had just refused to hear from authoritative records! But still it was manifest to every spectator, that, while a technical error was committed by this decision, the defendant was not in the least prejudiced by it. Both parties were governed by such courtesy and magnanimous fairness, that the statements of either as to matters of fact, while in name *ex parte*, were accepted by the other as just as impartial and colorless as the records themselves.

The only question argued for the Synod by its commissioners (Drs. Armstrong and Dabney), was this: Whether the Assembly, if sitting in the Synod's place, could have made any other disposal of the defendant's appeal against his Presbytery than that virtually made. Neither the appellant nor any of his friends claimed an absolute acquittal without any further judicial investigation. The only trial yet had was quashed in Dr. Baird's favor. Our Discipline has made no provision for a "change of

venue;" but, on the contrary, it orders positively that process against a gospel minister shall begin in his Presbytery. It would have been a fatal solecism for the Synod, in quashing one trial for irregularity, to institute another before some tribunal not regularly known to the Constitution. The Synod, of course, recognised most fully the right of the defendant to be tried by impartial judges, and the sacred duty, in the tribunal that judged him again, to abstain from not only the *reality*, but the *possibility*, of unfairness or prejudice in any trier, and to give the accused the advantage of every doubt on this point. The Synod promised him the fullest ultimate reparation, if he could show that any injustice actually eventuated from this source, when once the merits of the case were regularly before it. But the question which the Synod had to weigh was this: Had it the power, at that stage, to disfranchise any given member of East Hanover Presbytery for unfairness, in advance of proof thereof, and in advance even of the accused man's definite challenge? Obviously it had not. The law is unquestionable. The right of challenge belongs by sacred right to the defendant; and the right of judging the challenge belongs by equal right to the court whose member is challenged in the first instance. Hence, the Synod had no lawful alternative, save to order a new trial before his own Presbytery. And this she took steps to make as favorable to the defendant as the law and the interests of justice allowed, by solemnly enjoining fairness, and accompanying their order with a *severe reminder* in the form of a summary dissolution of a verdict last rendered by that Presbytery for its irregularity.

In answer to the other main ground of appeal, the Synod pleaded that it was purely technical. Had they said, "We hereby *restrain* the appellant from all the functions of the ministry and church communion until this charge is issued," the practical result would have been identical: he was left "provisionally" under a sentence which restrained him from precisely these things; no more, no less. And if this restraint and suspense have continued long, the appellant has only himself to blame for this. Had he obeyed the Synod, and if he be innocent, as his

appeal assumes, three weeks might have witnessed his vindication and restoration to all his privileges. Or was it urged, that by using the word "sentence," concurrence in the Presbytery's judgment of actual, proved ill-desert was implied? The answer is, that the Synod fully rebutted that meaning, so far as it ought to have been rebutted, by saying that the sentence was only "provisional;" and by ordering a *new trial of the same charge*. It did not then signify its concurrence with the Presbytery in a verdict of *proved ill-desert*; for it required new proofs. But it did mean that such provisional restraining of an accused person from his franchises implies an opinion of his *possible* guilt; and that is true, let it be worded as it may. But the Synod did not admit even technical error here; for the Assembly of 1848, like the old Synod of 1720, expressly ruled that a court, after charges tabled which cannot be immediately issued, "*has the right to suspend*" a minister from his functions until the case has been issued. And the Assembly of 1824, in the case of Mr. Arthur, decided that even an informality in proceeding, which involves censure on the court, does not of necessity invalidate its sentence. (Baird's Digest, §§ 75, 77. Bk. III.) Now, the Synod found the informalities in this proceeding of East Hanover not sufficiently grave to involve censure. The Synod then was not bound absolutely to annul the sentence. In fine, a comparison of the minute of the Synod with the precedents will show that, not only did it do the fullest right possible to the defendant, consistent with the interests of justice and the honor of religion, but that its language is in accurate correspondence and nice adjustment to the best usage. The result was that the Assembly fully sustained the Synod, and rejected the appeal by a vote of 42 to 27. The vote, as divided, was: To sustain the Synod fully, 42. To sustain the appellant in part, 19. To sustain the appellant in full, 8. The last did not declare themselves as favorable to Dr. Baird's acquittal on the merits of the original charge; but as only concurring in all his grounds of objection to another trial before the same Presbytery. Those who sustained him in part, explained themselves as concurring in his exception to the point last discussed. The effect of the Assembly's action is to dissolve the

injunction on the Presbytery, and enable it to proceed at once to a new trial.

OUR CHURCH PAPERS.

Two Synods, Alabama and Memphis, overtured the Assembly, complaining of unchristian, denunciatory, and vituperative language in the religious papers, and asking the Assembly to consider and bear its testimony against this evil. The Committee recommended that the Assembly should reply: "Wherever these evils exist to the extent described in these overtures, it is the duty of the Presbyteries or Sessions with which the offending parties are connected to take action in the premises."

The motion to adopt evoked a long and animated debate, shared by Dr. S. Robinson, Col. Webb of Alabama, Dr. Bullock and Mr. Hill of Virginia, Gen. Prince of North Carolina, Mr. Darnall of North Carolina, Col. Billups of Georgia, Mr. Jarnagin of Memphis, Mr. H. L. McKee of South Alabama, Dr. Preston of Virginia, and Dr. J. H. Rice of Tennessee. The minute proposed, after several attempts to amend, was finally laid on the table; and the whole subject was thus dismissed without any action by the Assembly. Those who opposed action by the Assembly, either denied the existence of the evil to a censurable extent, and justified the use of strong language in the journals in reprehension of evil principles and deeds; or they denied that the evil was general among our journals, and required the transgressors to be specified; or they questioned the right of the Assembly to deal thus with offences which, if they existed, must be reached by personal discipline, beginning in the Presbytery or Session; or they argued that so rash a precedent would authorise the Assembly soon to meddle with the manner in which its people performed any other independent function, as for instance that of the attorney or banker; or they claimed that such witness-bearing by the supreme court of the Church was too solemn a remedy to be applied to a lesser evil. Even the minute proposed by the Committee on Bills and Overtures was objected to, as implying that the Assembly admitted the existence of the evil to a censurable extent; and it was urged that the only

proper remedy was the disfavor and withdrawal of patronage visited on offending journals by those who reprobated their violence. The advocates of action claimed that the Assembly was expressly clothed with power to watch over the morals and doctrine of the whole Church, and to admonish and repress anything of evil tendency, and that this court had often exercised such power, as in rebuking profanity, Sabbath-breaking, and drunkenness. They asserted that the evil complained of does exist to a degree to scandalise and disorder the Church, and that remarks were often made by decent men of the world upon a violence of language in the religious journals which far exceeded the worldly. They argued that the remedy of individual action, rejecting the offending journals, is not, and has not been, effectual; but, on the contrary, the evil example in high places tends to corrupt the taste and morals of our people, and to degrade our religion. They claimed that the use of violent language, except in extreme cases, is not necessary nor useful in the assertion of truth; and they pointed to the example of the purest and noblest of our secular leaders, who were always vigorous in action for the right, while moderate in epithets. It was noteworthy that the main strength of the protest on this side was in the ruling elders of the Assembly. It will be well for our theologians to remember that these officers, being more in contact and sympathy with the laity and the outside world, are in a position to sound a wholesome note of warning. That good taste and Christian feeling have more than once been justly offended in this matter, we have no doubt. Nor can there be a doubt of the power and right of the Assembly to admonish the Church of such scandals. Whether it was discreet in the Assembly to use its power in this case, may have been more questionable. It was apparent that the house laid the matter on the table, under the conviction that the ends of the movement had probably been gained sufficiently at this time by the debate.

THE REVISED FORM AND DISCIPLINE.

On the second day of the sessions, Dr. Armstrong, of the Committee on the New Book, began to move for the returns from

the Presbyteries. At a later date it appeared that there was not a majority in favor of its adoption : the Presbyteries being almost equally divided for and against it. But the 2d, 3d, 6th, 7th, 8th, with the third form of the 4th and the first form of the 5th, of the amendments proposed by the last Assembly were adopted by clear majorities, and are embodied by the Assembly in the Book. The Presbyteries are again invited to vote on the whole ; and at last, there is an opportunity for a square vote, which it is hoped may end the matter.

DR. PECK ON THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST.

The fourth day was the holy Sabbath. Nearly all the Christian places of worship in Knoxville and its vicinity were placed at the disposal of the Assembly and filled by its Committee on Devotional Services. The various preachers found the people of the place a church-going one. According to the usage, the First church, where the Assembly sat, was occupied by the Moderator. With excellent taste and judgment, he chose for his topic one germane to the dignity of the occasion and to the vital testimony of our Church, the exclusive and eternal priesthood of Christ, from Hebrews iv. 14. The gravity, scholarship, and power of this masterly discourse made the great audience feel that our whole Church had in the preacher a fit mouthpiece, and that no action of the Assembly itself could be more entitled to rank among the *res gestæ* of a great church-council. The true nature of priesthood, and the relation of Christ's to the work of all typical priests, were so triumphantly expounded from the Scriptures as absolutely to exclude all the figments of human expiation and absolution, the sacrifice of the mass, and apostolic succession and sacramental grace ; showing them to be profane and God-defying usurpations. Every sound Protestant was made to bless God that now again, when the surges of Popery are returning so proudly, there are voices among us, as clear and as bold as that of a Knox, to beat back the insolent waters. But the sermon was not merely polemic ; while the preacher demolished with his crashing blows these false gospels, he did not fail

to present Christ's priestly work as the sinner's refuge and the believers foundation of peace.

OUR CHURCH'S POSITION IN THE EDINBURGH COUNCIL.

The surprise of this Assembly was, probably, a motion made by Dr. Dabney of Virginia. As the Assembly, on the fifth day, was passing its routine-vote of approval upon its commissioners to the First Council of the Presbyterian Alliance, he proposed a minute to be adopted by the Assembly, defining its position in that body. Referring to former condemnations of our Church, by seven of the leading Churches composing the main bulk of the Alliance, for our refusal to place our churches on the unscriptural abolition platform; to the steady and uniform refusal of our Assemblies; to the express declaration of our Assembly, and of that of the great American [Northern] Church, that the forcible abolition of slavery did not change the moral, theological, or ecclesiastical *status* of the issue, or present any ground why the difference of principle should be condoned without reformation; and to the fact that the invitation to the Southern Church to enter the Alliance came from that side; the minute proposed to declare: That the Assembly understands its own presence, by its commissioners in the Alliance, as a virtual but distinct withdrawal by sister Churches of so much as was condemnatory of us and inconsistent with our self-respect and fidelity to our convictions in their former declarations against us; that it is only on this construction she consented to be present; and that she therefore claims this as her full and honorable acquittal, and her establishment among the sisterhood of Presbyterian Churches as full equal in all honors and credit. The mover disclaimed the desire to make a speech, as the proposal spoke sufficiently for itself. He occupied five minutes only in stating the reasons why the Assembly should now adopt some such minute. First, it was due to our commissioners. They had gone to Edinburgh and represented us with great tact and *éclat*. They had a right to be thus authorised by the Assembly to construe their presence in the only way honorable to themselves and their Church, because the alternative construction was

one disgraceful to them and us, and one which the mover knew every one of those gentlemen would indignantly disclaim and our churches would scorn, viz., that their appearance in Edinburgh without any *amende* from their accusers, was a tacit surrender of their position and of the honor of their Church to those accusers, and a tacit accession of the Southern Church, by its commissioners, to the abolition platform. Secondly, just as a patriotic commander in a defensive war entrenches the post which he has happily retaken from the invader, so it was the Assembly's duty, now that the talents and tact of our commissioners had won back this vantage ground for our injured name, to entrench it by such an express declaration.

An "order of the day" then supervened, which caused the motion to lie over until the eighth day of the session. It then appeared that a majority, including doubtless the special friends of the Alliance, had taken counsel privately, and resolved neither to debate, nor to accept, nor to reject, the proposal. When it came up at last, and the mover invited, without further debate on his part, a square expression of the sense of the house upon it; the motion was silently laid upon the table by a vote of 69 to 41. Against this curt evasion, a dissent signed by a large number, was recorded; with reasons for regretting the refusal of the house either to accept the mover's construction, (so fair and honorable to the majority,) or to give their own construction of their presence in the Alliance. The majority raised a committee to reply to a mere point of order in this dissent, and by an express and recorded vote, *forbade them to attempt a reply to its reasonings!* And so the matter ended—for the present.

To the clear and self-respecting mind of the home-churches, it will doubtless appear a singular question, why a statement so honorable to the majority and to the Church, so obvious and innocent, so self-evident that the majority itself expressly declared it not debatable, might not have been unanimously adopted. The line of tactics pursued leaves no way to ascertain the answer, save from personal declarations out of the house. All admitted that the propositions of the proposed minute were true, and each man, personally, held them. One objected that the mover was

taking an indirect way to overthrow the membership of our Church in the Alliance, and thus to circumvent the declared will of the Church in favor of it. Another surmised that nothing more was intended than a jest at the expense of the friends of the Alliance! All others saw that the mover appeared to be at once thoroughly in earnest, thoroughly fair and open, and thoroughly courteous. The real motive of the majority was possibly to be found in the intimation given out by some of them: that if our Assembly ventured to *announce* its position as really held by its officers and people, it would provoke from our present allies an angry denial and a re-assertion of all the accusations against us. It is to be presumed that the advocates of the Alliance understand their new associates best. Then the question which the Church will have to digest, against the convening of another Council, is: Whether a reconciliation thus grounded will prove either honorable or useful or safe.

RETRENCHMENT AND SIMPLIFICATION.

Overtures or memorials were reported from the Synod of Memphis, the Presbyteries of Mecklenburg and Brazos, and other sources, requesting the Assembly to take measures to simplify and cheapen its executive machinery, so as to abstract a smaller ratio of the funds contributed for expenses of administration, and thus to encourage the gifts of the people. The Assembly decided, instead of imposing this large and difficult topic upon the Committee on Bills and Overtures, to raise a special committee for the purpose. The chairman was the Rev. S. T. Martin of Mecklenburg Presbytery. He presented on a subsequent day an able report, arguing the feasibility and propriety of such retrenchments, and proposing the following changes:

1. To remand the work of beneficiary education for the ministry to the Presbyteries, with orders to collect and disburse their own funds to their own candidates, so far as needed, and to remit any surplus of funds to the Secretary of Publication and Education for distribution to the candidates of weaker Presbyteries, under the direction of a permanent Committee of Education constituted as the present.

2. To unite the duties of secretaries of Education and Publication in one man, with one salary.

3. To consolidate the secretaryships of Sustentation and Foreign Missions in one man's hands, with one salary.

4. In doing this, to continue Dr. J. L. Wilson during his life as "Secretary-Emeritus," with his present powers and salary.

5. To consolidate the *Missionary and Earnest Worker*, and have it issued by the Secretary of Publication.

6. To fix salaries and office and travelling expenses on the most economical basis.

7. To abandon the Relief scheme, and turn over the management of its funds to the contributors in any way they prefer.

8. To abandon the project of an Institute for educating blacks for the ministry, and remand such candidates to the tuition of pastors near them.

9. To hold only biennial meetings of the Assembly.

The guiding principles which, as the Committee held, point to these reforms, are not disputed by any sound Presbyterian. They are these: 1. That since Christ has given his Church her constitution and assigned her function, which is that of *spiritual teaching and rule*, she has no authority to do anything or undertake any enterprise not essential to this function. 2. Church agencies ought to perform these tasks with the *minimum* of secular business and attrition. 3. All transactions which can be as well or better handled by the subordinate courts, ought to be assigned to them, leaving to the higher courts only the general functions; because the lower are more permanent in their constitution, can meet oftener, and have more local knowledge, and because this policy tends to prevent the undue concentration of power.

The Committee was forewarned by friends, that by taking so wide a range of modifications, it might overtax the patience of the Assembly. But it preferred to present the whole case in a connected system. Only thus could the Assembly judge the parts of a simpler organisation intelligently. And it was obvious that all of the changes so extensive would neither be effectually commended to the judgment of the Church in one year, nor intro-

duced by one Assembly. Hence the friends of improvement preferred to throw before the mind of the Church all the questions which must in a short time enter into the pressing question of retrenchment: a question which the annually shrinking revenues of our Committees too plainly points out as imperative at an early day. To the suggestion that the proposal of so many and great changes at once would shock, by its appearance of sweeping innovation, the answer was made that almost in each case the change proposed was *simply a reversion to methods used by our Church itself up to a recent date*, and only modified tentatively. Publication and Education were actually managed by one Secretary from the incipiency up to 1874; Sustentation and Foreign Missions up to 1872. The Relief scheme is a confessed novelty. The Tuskaloosa Institute is but a year old; while for years after the policy of our Church was settled towards the blacks, the training of their ministers was left to the pastors; and the question of the new agency having been referred, only three years ago, to our most experienced Committee, that of Sustentation, the plan of an Institute was by them strongly condemned. Does our latest experience prove our experiments less successful than was hoped? Then a reversion to former and tried methods is in fact only conservative.

The surmise, formed from the customary reluctance of our Assemblies to listen to extended discussion on topics that have not enlisted its forensic interest, and its wonted impatience of delay during the later days of its sessions, was verified. After short discussions, chiefly on the part of the Committee, the whole report was laid on the table, *omnibus rebus infectis*. Thus again the recorder of opinions and events is left, in part, to what was spoken in private and in the Committee. In favor of the first two proposals, which form one point, it was urged that when once the Presbyteries assumed the main oversight of their own candidates, the simple function of receiving the *surpluses* of the larger, and distributing them to the weaker Presbyteries, would be entirely too insignificant to justify the salary or the labors of an able minister, and could be easily done by the methodical and efficient Secretary of Publication in a corner of his time.

That the Presbytery is the proper body to support its own candidates, was argued from their personal knowledge of and interest in them, and from the greater facility of enlisting aid for a concrete case, well known and deserving, than for an abstract corporation. It was claimed also that more money, by far, was raised and disbursed by the Secretary of Publication, for education, before 1874, than is now raised.

But it was argued, on the other side, that the separate organization of Education is doing good, because, while the collections under it have declined, and are declining, they have declined in a smaller ratio than the other collections; that the collecting of all the funds into a central treasury is dictated by the doctrine of the Church's unity, and by the exceedingly unequal distributions of the strength and the candidates, the little and poor Presbyteries of Holston and West Hanover, for instance, having had each eight candidates, and Louisville Presbytery now having not one; that even large Presbyteries, after trying the separate plan, have failed in it disastrously and been glad to return to the fold of the Assembly's Committee, or else have only sustained their candidates for a time at the expense of their missionary contributions. On the other hand, it was rejoined, that other Presbyteries have been, and are, thoroughly successful on the semi-independent plan, and that, moreover, they do exercise a far more intelligent and operative discipline over the candidates, stimulating the self-indulgent and pruning off the unworthy, who under the general Committee would have loitered along into the ministry.

The third and fourth resolutions also make up one measure. In favor of that reform it was argued that Dr. J. L. Wilson did actually administer both Sustentation and Foreign Missions, although carrying no light burden of years. The argument was: "That which has been may be." But it was replied, that both our Foreign Missionary and our Sustentation work were then in their infancy. Both were born to grow; and it was hoped that they would rapidly grow to such dimensions as to require all the energies of two able men. It was rejoined, first, that in fact they have not grown, but are shrinking; and second, that an able officer, when once the machinery is adjusted, can manage a

business of large volume with as much ease as a small one, or at least with only the addition of clerical assistance.

In advocacy of the fifth article, the Committee argued that it seemed but reasonable and natural the Church's publishing agency should have the Church's publishing done, the *Missionary* as well as the Sabbath-school journals; and that there must be economy in consolidating the *Earnest Worker* and it, [each now an 8vo. pamphlet,] at least in making one cover, one mailing, etc., answer for both. But it was represented that the Secretary of Publication was very adverse to this, because the reduction of the *Earnest Worker* to an exclusive Sabbath-school journal seems to give it great favor, and to extend its circulation; and the change might dash all this success. But it was rejoined, why should the addition of missionary intelligence, so interesting to every Christian heart, make the journal anything but more popular? And if it is true, as Dr. J. L. Wilson's wide experience proves, that the diffusion of missionary knowledge is the chief means of increasing the activity and gifts of the Church, then the annexing of that news to this widely-current *Earnest Worker* is the very thing which ought to be done. The Assembly ought to seize this opportunity to make the vital facts about its missions run through the Church on the wheels of this journal.

Under the seventh head it was urged, first, that the Assembly ought not to have committed the Church by creating the Relief scheme to the moral propriety of "life insurance," which has been denied by many of the great lights of Presbyterianism, and is at least doubted by many of our best pastors now.* It was urged, secondly, that such is the doubt and insecurity of all investments and their incomes, at this time, as admitted by the best business men, there is an almost criminal rashness in involving the pecuniary credit and the name and honor of the Assembly in obligations so extensive in time and amount. The reply was, that the securities now held by the "Relief Fund" seem to be good and sufficient at present, and may be made the objects of jealous watch; and that individuals, by purchasing the "policies"

* The debater might have pointed this argument by saying that our able and admired Moderator was a present instance of such opposition.

of the Relief Fund on the Assembly's own terms, have acquired vested rights against her, which cannot be immediately dissolved except by their consent. The rejoinder was, that then this very fact only illustrated the rashness of the scheme, and the necessity of delivering the Assembly from the snare as soon as it can be lawfully done.

Against the propriety of the Assembly's creating, at this time, a costly Seminary for the theological education of the blacks, the Committee argued, that its underlying assumption was at least doubtful, viz., that only blacks can evangelise the Southern blacks; that the candidates do not exist in our Church justifying such a provision, and we have no call in our straits to provide education for Methodist blacks; that when such candidates are found, they are almost invariably chained to the places of their residences by family-ties, secular occupations, and poverty; that the report of the Institute itself confesses the only hope of getting students in any numbers is by furnishing them full subsistence at Tuskegeese, as well as tuition, gratis; but it is obvious our congregations neither will nor ought to tax themselves, at this time, with the whole subsistence of black youths studying the classics; and that the hope of extraneous aid for such support is fallacious. Hence the Assembly had better retrace this misstep quickly; and, without relaxing its interest in the great and urgent work of African evangelisation in the South, remit the training of black ministers to the cheap and willing local efforts of the white pastors. On the other hand, it was argued that community of race did give to the black man, supposing him well qualified, better access than the white man to his people; that a great and effectual door is opened, especially at populous points in the planting States; and that it does not become the Assembly to recoil from a project so recently and seriously undertaken.

In favor of biennial Assemblies the chief argument was the economical one. It was admitted that the result would be to enhance the relative importance of the Synods, a result by no means to be deprecated. It was estimated that the *minimum* cost of an Assembly to the Church is \$8,000. Hence, this wholesome change will result in an annual average saving of \$4,000.

The discussion of these modifications has resulted, so far, in no action. It does not follow that it will continue barren. Presbyterians are cautious and stubborn in adopting changes; and, like other "conservative" folk, sometimes mistake the name for the reality of innovation, and religiously "conserve" what is in fact an innovation and excrement on their principles, because it happens to be the thing they are at the time accustomed to. Long experience has shown that our Assemblies are not the agents for maturing the opinion of the Church; their sessions are too hurried, and their temper too impatient of discussion when not stirred by the *gaudium certaminis*. And the topic which secures this favoring gale is more likely to be a "point of order" or a temporary measure of church politics than the sober questions of practice and efficiency. But seeds of truth dropped into the mind of the Church are apt to grow, it may be slowly. Hence the friends of these changes have no cause for discouragement, provided they be found real improvements. Such of them as are good will sooner or later be adopted, it may be in unexpected forms and on the motion of those now counted as opponents.

RAILROAD VIOLATIONS OF THE SABBATH.

The attention of the Assembly was called to the hopeful movement, now in progress, to check the wholesale desecration of the Sabbath by railroad and other transportation companies. The Assembly responded by giving the whole moral weight of the Church to this good work, and by appointing an able Committee, with Dr. James Stacy of Georgia, author of an excellent book on the authority of the Sabbath, as Chairman. No intelligent Christian citizen can doubt as to the extent and insolence of the breaches committed by these defiant corporations on the Sabbath laws of the States themselves enforced on the citizens, nor as to the demoralisation they spread through the country. But in order to succeed in the great contest which must be waged, if these transgressors are brought to reason, we must choose the proper position. Too often the professed arguments are such as appear to the despiser of the Sabbath either as a mere superstition or a mere boast. Even the rationalistic Jew or Lutheran from

Germany has learned how to put to shame the usual declamation about the "Sabbath of our fathers." They remind us that the Constitutions of these American States have professed to separate civic rights and Christianity, to make persons of all religions equal before the law, and to visit no civic disability on any citizen for any religious opinion. Now, say they, your Sunday is but a Christian observance at best. In the Church-sphere, let those keep it who think it right. But as for him, there is no more justice in forbidding his work or pleasure on that day than the Presbyterian's work on the Episcopalian's "Good Friday." Hence, the Sunday laws of these States are at points with their free principles and ought to be abolished or resisted, if allowed still to deform the statute books. Now, it will be no reply to this man's logic to quote the Christian Scriptures against him, or the sermons of our divines, or the Fourth-of-July declamations of our pious demagogues. Nor can he be silenced by telling him that he must submit, because the majority of the citizens are Sabbatarian in their views and wishes. He will answer that Constitutions and principles rule in this country, and not majorities; and he will ask you, whether Protestants will be ready to give up their Sabbath in any State where the Pantheistic, lager-loving Germans happen to win the majority? Nor will he be convinced by telling him that he is a guest in America, and therefore, like a well-mannered man should conform to the tastes of his hosts. He will reply that American Constitutions expressly promised him that, as soon as he was naturalised, he should not be a guest, but a full citizen, with rights independent of all religious differences. These Sabbath-breaking corporations and their demagogues will not fail to borrow this reasoning when we begin to urge them. We must be furnished with some better answer.

And the answer is, that God's Sabbath is not merely a Christian or an ecclesiastical institution, but also a civic, social, and national rest, ordained not only by the will of Messiah for the spiritual uses of redeemed men, but by *God the Creator* for the moral and social uses of all men as men. The record of its primeval institution in the Pentateuch, and its enforcement on all races and dispensations, is to be treated, not merely as a Christian document teaching the Church, but as an historical document be-

longing to man, and portraying the foundations of all social order. In other words, while we do not seek a Christian or a theocratic basis, we do demand a theistic basis, on which to construct any consistent theory of human rights and society. On any atheistic basis such construction is impossible, and the wickedest anarchy its only consistent result. A civilised commonwealth may tolerate dissent from Christianity or any particular form of religion; but atheism, dissent from theism, it cannot recognise: to do so would be its *felo de se*. Now, of theism the facts of the Pentateuch are the text-book, the whole world's primer. These facts must be recognised as the basis of the commonwealth. It is here, and not from Christianity as an ecclesiastical system, that the commonwealth, as a commonwealth, derives the right and duty to enforce on all human beings the Sabbath's outward rest. When the legislator has once occupied this impregnable position, he can then proceed to argue from the force of the physiologic law, which demands, by the very voice of nature, just this rest for the body and the spirit of man, and even of the domestic animals. He can show how essential the weekly rest is to the home, the family, and its civilising influences; and point to the fact that the nations who have no Sabbath have virtually no home. But the family is the integer of the State, and the domestic virtues are the sources of its welfare. The first work of our Christian laborers in this cause must be to teach these truths to our people and legislators. With all our boasts of Christianity, they are little known. When they are taught, we shall have a vantage ground from which to resist Sabbath desecration.

A few other subjects of interest occupied the Assembly for a time, but resulted in no action; such as the attempt to induce an annual election of the Stated and Permanent Clerks; and to reverse the decision of a previous Assembly (at the overture of the Greenbrier Presbytery) so as to make a ruling elder eligible for Moderator of a Presbytery. Space is lacking to enlarge on them.

Saturday night, after nine days' sessions, the Assembly was dissolved at about half-past 9 o'clock, to be followed by another in Louisville, Ky., in 1879. Thus closed a meeting of unusual harmony, in which not a single personal collision occurred, and from which, it is hoped, not a single bitter feeling was brought away.

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ARTICLE I.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

Recent discussions, conducted partly in this REVIEW, have directed special attention, and attached fresh interest, to the old but unexhausted, the perplexing but infinitely important, question of the Freedom of the Will. Almost from the dawn of philosophy, and the earliest development of theological doctrine, serious thinkers have, in testing their powers of reflection upon it, consciously touched the limits of the speculative faculty. Yet, as it never has been conclusively settled, each generation is attracted to its consideration as by an irresistible impulse. The agitation of it proceeds, and will, no doubt, continue, until the revelations of another and higher sphere of being have been reached. The relations of the question are too widely extended, its practical consequences too far-reaching, to admit of its being jostled out of the field of human inquiry. But important as it is, the keen and protracted discussions of it by the profoundest intellects of the past and of the present leave but little room for the hope of a solution upon merely speculative grounds. Kant and Hamilton have expressed the conviction that the intricacies of the subject cannot be cleared up in the domain of empirical thought. In the light of such confessions, we are not so presumptuous as to suppose that any lucubrations, the utterance of

which we may adventure, will materially advance the question, as a merely philosophical one, towards a final adjustment. But it has theological relations of the profoundest interest; and, in this regard, no seeker of truth, no lover of his race, need offer any apology for making an humble attempt to remove some of the difficulties by which it is surrounded.

The publication of the celebrated treatise of President Edwards—"that prodigy of metaphysical acumen," as Robert Hall fitly characterised him—was attended by singular and apparently contradictory results. On the one hand, sceptics of the rigid Necessitarian school congratulated themselves upon its production, and fortified their positions by its remorseless logic. On the other, the Calvinistic theology of this country, and, to a large extent, of Great Britain, has absorbed from it a powerful influence, and has been regarded by its opponents as having incorporated its principle of determinism as a component element of its structure. The explanation of so curious a fact is perhaps not far to seek. The infidel employed its philosophy to disprove the punishableness of sin, and the Calvinistic theologian to vindicate the sovereignty of God and the dependence of man. While it is true that even the doctrines of Scripture are often wrested from their true import, and abused in the interest of ungodliness, and that it is perfectly supposable that a like misapplication has been made of some of the principles of Edwards's work, it is still a matter of serious inquiry whether there were not legitimate tendencies in his system which, in a measure, justified that result; and whether the Calvinistic theology has not injured itself and crippled its rightful influence, to the extent of their appropriation. The scriptural doctrines of the divine sovereignty and decrees have been dreadfully perverted, and it is of great consequence that no theological or philosophical explanation of them should furnish a specious pretext for that abuse. Edwards was possessed of a wonderful metaphysical genius and of almost angelic saintliness of character, but that he was no exception to the law of human fallibility is proved by his paradoxical speculations in regard to the nature of virtue, the continuity of creation, and the constituted identity of Adam and his race. With the highest admira-

tion for the consummate ability displayed in his great work on the Will, we are persuaded that its theory of determinism is radically defective, and cannot but regret its continued prevalence even in a modified form. We heartily sympathise with a great deal of what is said in the work, and with its refutation of the Pelagian and Arminian hypotheses as to the spiritual freedom of man in his natural fallen condition. It is to its theory of necessity, as incompetently grounding human guilt, and as logically tending to the implication of the divine efficiency in the production of sin, that we are constrained to object; nor are we able to perceive how the apparently qualified shape, in which it has more recently been presented, saves it from being chargeable with these defects. No doubt, sinners, apart from regenerating grace, as a gift of sovereignty to be sought, or as already imparted, are bound by a moral necessity to sin, but God is not the author of that necessity; they are the authors of it, and are therefore responsible and punishable for its existence. It is in failing to show this, that Edwards and his school furnish an inadequate account of the freedom of the will. While we thus speak, we are conscious of a feeling of pain akin to that with which one finds fault with his friends. But truth is superior to friendship: *amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*. We are comforted, however, by the reflection that in criticising a peculiar hypothesis of theirs, no support will be afforded to the distinctive theological doctrines of those with whom they contend. We will endeavor in the course of these remarks to indicate the points in which the peculiar theory of the school of Edwards is inconsistent with the genius of the Calvinistic theology, and at the same time that theology will be incidentally vindicated against the hypotheses of Pelagianism and Arminianism. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the case, it is proper that we make some preliminary statements of an explanatory character, for the sake of clearness and in order to prevent misapprehension.

In the first place, the question of the freedom of the will is partly philosophical and partly theological; and it is necessary that something be said as to our conception of the relation which

these two aspects of it bear to each other. It is frequently taken for granted, that the methods of philosophical and theological procedure are entirely different. But it is evident that all science, whatever may be its object-matter, must proceed upon the one method of analysis and synthesis. The true distinction lies in the nature of the facts which they investigate, and the fundamental data upon which they found their proofs. In these respects, each has, to a great extent, its own proper domain, within which it is entitled to exercise its sovereignty independently of the other; and precisely to that extent, whatever it may be, neither has the right to protrude beyond its sphere and clash with the other. Faith cannot legitimately hold what the reasoning faculty, in its normal condition, can within its own distinctive sphere prove to be false. But there are some things which lie beyond the sphere of the discursive faculty, and its conclusions as to those things are, from the nature of the case, illegitimate and untrustworthy. Whenever it transcends its limits, its apparent demonstrations against the dogmas of faith are but deceitful sophisms. If then faith, in reliance upon the authority of an undoubted revelation, holds what is contradicted by such unwarranted conclusions, it is acting legitimately and in harmony with the fundamental laws of the mind. In like manner, when faith traverses the bounds assigned it, and dogmatizes in regard to matters lying outside its jurisdiction, it acts illegitimately and is liable to be contradicted by the reasoning faculty in the regular employment of its processes. Now, were philosophy and theology altogether distinct in the respect which has been mentioned, that is, their object-matter, their spheres would be wholly independent of each other, and it would follow that no principles or conclusions of the one could be considered as regulative of the procedures of the other. As neither would lawfully cross the path of the other, neither could impose limitations upon the other. But it is clear that the territory which they occupy, and rightfully occupy, is often one and the same. The original truths of natural religion, at least the essential principles of moral government, are precisely the things about which philosophy, especially in its ontological aspects, is chiefly con-

cerned. It is in this way that a science of natural theology becomes possible. But the Scriptures, while doing a great deal more, republish the truths of natural religion and assume and reënforce the essential principles of moral government. Here then philosophy and theology meet each other face to face, and the question must be settled, Which, in the event of a conflict, is entitled to precedence? That question is answered by the simple consideration, that the inferences which reason draws from the facts of consciousness and observation, may, in consequence of the deranging influence of sin upon the human faculties, be erroneous; but it is impossible that a supernatural revelation can err. God's philosophy must possess a higher authority than man's. Whenever, therefore, the inferential deductions of the reasoning faculty come into collision with the authoritative utterances of Scripture, the former must yield to the latter. In the event of a definite issue between them, philosophy must give way to a true theology, on the principle that a lower authority must bow to a higher. For a like reason, the undoubted principles of a correct theology—that is, of one which accurately represents the deliverances of a divine, supernatural revelation—must be held to be regulative of the conclusions which flow from a merely philosophical process, so far as common ground has been occupied. The Word of God cannot err. We maintain that it is warrantable to act in accordance with this law in reference to the matter now under consideration; and as we regard it as well-nigh universally conceded by all Christian parties to the controversy about the Will, that the Scriptures teach the doctrine that God cannot, in any proper sense, be the author of sin, we shall assume that truth as a standard by which to test the validity of the theories which shall be discussed. Whatever hypothesis contradicts that fundamental and regulative principle ought to be rejected. In like manner, we take it for granted that punishment and guilt are strictly correlative—that the absence of guilt implies exemption from punishment, and consequently that any theory which fails to ground punishment in guilt is, on that account, convicted of being defective.

In the second place, we do not admit the distinction, insisted

on by some writers, between ability and liberty.* They say that while man in his natural fallen condition has no ability for the performance of spiritual acts, he possesses freedom—he is spiritually disabled, but is still a free-agent. It strikes us that there is no distinction here worth speaking of. What is ability? It is the power to think, to feel, to will. So far as the will, therefore, is concerned, ability is precisely the power to will. And if the will is defined to be the faculty by which we choose, then the power to choose and the ability of the will are one and the same. But it is obvious that he who has the power to choose possesses what is denominated freedom; which is the same thing as to say that the ability and the freedom of the will are identical, or, what is equivalent, the ability and the freedom of the man. If the question then be, whether an unregenerate sinner has ability to will spiritually, we answer that he has not; and that is the same thing as to say that spiritually he has no liberty—spiritually he is not free. His inability as to spiritual acts is one and the same with the spiritual bondage of his will. He is able to perform natural and merely moral acts; he is free to perform them—these are equivalent propositions. He is unable to perform spiritual acts; he is not free to perform them—these also are substantially the same affirmations. He is characterised by ability in one sense and inability in another. Precisely so he is possessed of liberty in one sense, and destitute of it in another. If therefore we affirm, what is true, that the unregenerate sinner is devoid of ability and yet possessed of liberty, we are not distinguishing between ability and liberty; we are only distinguishing between one sort of ability and another sort of ability, or between one kind of liberty and another kind of liberty. Spiritual inability and natural liberty are perfectly consistent, but spiritual inability and spiritual liberty are contradictory. It is exactly

*C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., p. 291. Dr. Hodge, we think, misconceives Müller, when he represents him, in his *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, as distinguishing Formal Freedom (*Formale Freiheit*) in the sense of ability from Real Freedom (*Reale Freiheit*) in the sense of "liberty as it actually exists." Müller's formal freedom is the liberty of contrary choice—of otherwise determining; his real freedom is the liberty which consists with an already determined spontaneity.

the same as if we should say, spiritual inability and natural ability are consistent, or spiritual bondage and natural liberty; but spiritual inability and spiritual ability, or spiritual bondage and spiritual liberty are contradictory. The distinction between ability and liberty is not tenable. Adam at his creation was able to stand, liable to fall; which is the same as saying that he was free to stand and free to fall. His unregenerate descendants are unable to perform holy acts, but able to perform sinful, which is the same as saying that they are not free to perform holy acts, but free to perform sinful. Disabled as to holiness, not free as to holiness, are terms which express the same truth. Able to sin, free to sin, these also signify the same fact. This was the doctrine of Augustine and the Reformers, as could easily be shown from their writings, and from the symbols of the Reformed Church. The only trouble is that the term *ability* is unusual in its application to the power of sinning. But if men *can* sin, they are beyond doubt *able* to sin. I can, I am able: where is the difference between the two affirmations?

In the third place, we consider the distinction between natural and moral ability as having no force, so far as the question before us is concerned, which is one not in regard to the possession of faculties, but of the power to act. It is a distinction without a difference. For the end supposed to be contemplated—the thing to be done, is moral. Whatever natural ability, therefore, men may be conceived to possess for the discharge of moral duties is, from the nature of the case, moral. To deny moral ability is to deny natural. The true distinction intended is between a natural-moral ability and a spiritual ability. Now there is in natural fallen men a moral ability to some things, but they are simply moral. The conscience, for example, is by its very nature a moral faculty, and the Fall, although it has damaged it by entirely obliterating from it the spiritual life, has not destroyed it as moral. It is still 'the law of God within man. Natural men have in their constitution moral laws which are fundamental and indestructible; they have moral perceptions, they perform moral acts, they pass moral judgments, they experience moral emotions as sanctions of those judgments. The continued exist-

ence in them of this moral ability is the condition of the "law-work" of the Holy Spirit upon them, awakening and convincing them. That is one thing; but it is quite a different thing to say that they have an ability for spiritual functions, the discharge of which implies a principle of spiritual life. That sort of life no merely natural man possesses. He is "dead in trespasses and sins." He has no spiritual ability, though he has a merely moral ability which is natural. The whole question of the distinction between natural and moral ability in relation to spiritual acts is irrelevant and futile. The only question is, whether unregenerate men have any spiritual ability. That is the only kind of ability which could adapt them to the performance of spiritual acts; for example, to determine to believe in Christ and to repent of their sins. So far as merely moral acts are concerned, there can be no real distinction between moral and natural ability.

In the fourth place, we can perceive no validity in the distinction, deemed by some as important, between the freedom of the will and the free-agency of the man—between the power of the will to determine itself and the power of the man to determine himself. For, first, it is admitted on all hands that the will is especially and emphatically the faculty of action. This is implied in the current terms, a determined will, a strong will, an obstinate will, and their opposites, a vacillating, weak, yielding, will. For a long time the distinction of the mental powers which commonly prevailed among philosophers was into the understanding and the will, or into the intellectual and the active powers. Whatever may have been the defect of that division, it expressed the conviction that the will is the sphere in which the activity of the soul prominently resides. The group of powers which was conceived as active acquired its denomination from the will. The now generally accepted threefold division proceeds upon the supposition that it is necessary to distinguish the will, as peculiarly the organ of action, from the feelings as either the passive recipients of impression from correlated objects, or as mere impulses and tendencies to action. It is plain that each of these divisions is based upon the assumption that the principal seat of activity in the soul is in the will. Now to say that the man is a

free-agent, but that the will is not free, is to say that the very organ through which the agent principally expresses his activity is not free while the agent is; and that is equivalent to affirming that the agent is free as to his acts, but that the most prominent and decisive of his acts are not free. Secondly, an illegitimate distinction is made between the man and the will. What is the will, but a power of the man? If therefore the man is free, his will is free; else the unity of the soul is destroyed. And this becomes the more glaringly inadmissible when, in consequence of this unnatural schism, freedom is denied to the faculty which is by eminence that of action and restricted to those which are only active in a limited degree. Thirdly, the distinction under consideration violates the catholic usage of theology and philosophy. The freedom of the agent and the freedom of the will, as might without difficulty be shown, have nearly always been treated as identical. The distinction between them would seem to have been made by certain Calvinistic divines, in order to explain what they judged might be considered a paradox in the teachings of Augustine and the Reformers—namely that although the will of the unregenerate sinner is bound, the man is still a free-agent. Liberty of the will and liberty of the agent, says Dr. C. Hodge,* are “expressions not really equivalent. The man may be free, when his will is in bondage.” But there is no paradox of that kind in their doctrine which needed such an exposition. All that they affirmed was that the unregenerate sinner is a free-agent in certain respects, and not in others—that his will is, in relation to certain acts, bound, and in relation to others, free. The will of the agent is not free as to holiness, but free as to sin. The paradox—and it is a scriptural one—lies in the doctrine that the will is bound and free at the same time; but the apparent discrepancy is cleared up by the consideration that the will is contemplated in different relations. What is true of it in one relation is not true of it in another. It is, we conceive, a mistake to interpret Augustine and the Reformers as having observed a distinction between the freedom of the agent and the freedom of the will. But this distinction will probably meet us in the heart

**Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., p. 291.

of the discussion, and as we do not wish to beg the question, further remark in reference to it is reserved. What we desire is to prevent any misunderstanding of our own position. The question which it is proposed now to consider is not, whether the soul may be free, while the will is not; but whether the soul is free in willing—that is, whether the will is free. It is the old question of the freedom of the will which we intend to discuss, under the conviction that that is really the matter which ever has been and still is in dispute.

It is obvious, as has been frequently observed, that much of the difficulty attending the treatment of this subject arises from the ambiguity of the terms employed; and it therefore becomes every one who undertakes it to acquaint the reader with the signification which he attaches to them. In obedience to this requirement, we briefly signalise the sense in which some of the most prominent and critical terms will be used in the progress of these remarks. At the outset we encounter the term *will* as designative of the mental power about which the question exists. It is confessedly difficult to furnish a definition of the will which would be satisfactory to all parties. Let us by a brief analysis feel our way to that which we propose to give. There are at the root of the intellect proper, with its group of cognitive powers, fundamental laws of thought and belief which are regulative of its processes. There are æsthetical laws at the foundation of the feelings, in accordance with which their phenomenal manifestations occur. So at the basis of conscience lie implicitly the laws of rectitude—the ultimate principles of morality, which, when developed in consciousness by the concrete cases of experience, become the standards of moral perception and judgment. Now reasoning simply from analogy, we would conclude that there are also fundamental laws at the very root of the faculty which we denominate the will, by which its processes and acts are regulated. We do not undertake an exposition of such voluntary principles, but we venture the suggestion that the law of causal efficiency is entitled to that determination. A distinction must be taken between the fundamental law of causality which regulates the cognitive processes and that which underlies the energies of the will.

The former is a mere intellectual conviction of the necessary relation between effect and cause; the latter, the very principle itself which, in actual operation, furnishes the first empirical condition upon which the intellectual conviction is elicited into formal shape. Here precisely the fountain of causal activity in the soul is to be found. Were there room for the expansion of this mere suggestion, it might perhaps be shown that in the establishment of such a regulative principle at the root of the will, we would go far toward the proof of the inherence in that faculty of a derived, dependent and limited, but real, originating power—a power of the will, at least in its original condition, to determine itself to action. By virtue of this law, it becomes a true cause of acts, in contradistinction, on the one hand, from a substance manifesting itself in phenomenal properties, and on the other, from a faculty determined to activity by its mere spontaneity. In the next place, analysis detects the element of spontaneity in the will—that of conation or effort, in what according to the universal usage of language is termed *willingness*, the state of being willing as distinguished from the act of willing. The question has often been discussed whether desire belongs to the feelings or the will. Hamilton, in his Lectures which were his earliest productions, assigns it to the former category, but in his Notes to Reid, to the latter.* It strikes us that desire is the culminating element of the feelings, and constitutes the point at which they touch the will in the shape of inducement to the awakening of its activity. There then results within the will itself a corresponding spontaneous tendency—a *nisus* to action, which is susceptible of manifold degrees of strength. When inflamed to its highest stage of potentiality, it becomes the proximate motive to a determinate expression of the will. This is the *velleitas* of the scholastic philosophy. In the third place, we reach the deliberate election of the will, the act of choice, which is ordinarily known as volition. This is the product of the *voluntas* of the schoolmen. According to this analysis there are, besides the regulative principle of free causality lying at its root, two complementary factors constituting this special power of the

*Reid's *Collected Works*, *Active Powers*, Ess. iv., ch. iv., p. 611, foot note.

soul—that of conation or effort, and that of election or determinate action. We therefore regard the will as the faculty of effort and choice. First we have the conative and elective power and then the products of that power—conation and choice; just as we have in the understanding the power of cognition and the cognition itself, in the sensibilities the capacity of feeling and the actual emotion, and in the conscience the power of moral perception and judgment and the moral precepts and judgments themselves.

The terms *necessity* and *liberty* are correlative. Our conception of the one will be determined by that of the other. The exigencies of the controversy require but a single, though vital, discrimination, between necessity considered as the relation betwixt resistless physical force and the effects it produces—the necessity of “coaction” or compulsion, on the one hand, and, on the other, necessity as the relation between any influence and the results which certainly and unavoidably flow from it—what is ordinarily termed moral necessity. The first produces effects contrary to the will; the second, effects by means of the will itself. In the one case, the man is forced against his will—he is not a free-agent; in the other, though he acts with inevitable certainty, he acts willingly—he is a free-agent. Liberty, viewed in relation to the first kind of necessity mentioned, is, so far as the circumstances of one’s condition are concerned, the absence of physical constraint or restraint, the opportunity of acting as he wills; so far as his ability is concerned, it is his power to “do as he pleases”—to carry his volitions into execution in the external sphere. Considered in relation to the second kind of necessity signalled, liberty is either the power to act voluntarily, but unavoidably—that is, with no ability to act otherwise; or the power to act voluntarily, but contingently—that is, with the ability to act otherwise. This leads to the explanation of the term *contingency*. It may mean the quality of an act or event which renders it accidental or unintentional; or it may denote the absence of inevitable certainty—the possibility of the occurrence or non-occurrence of an act or event. In this latter sense it is not used as opposed to cause, but to necessity. In this sense we shall employ it, if at all, in these remarks. A contingent act

or event is one which may or may not be done, may or may not happen. The liberty of contingency, consequently, is freedom from all necessity.

As the terms *liberty* or *power of contrary choice* will frequently occur, as important, in this discussion, it is requisite precisely to fix their signification. They are not used as equivalent to *liberty of indifference*, expressing that condition of the soul in which no motives operate upon it, to induce determinate action; nor again as convertible with *liberty of equilibrium*, indicating that state in which conflicting motives are active, but in such equal strength as perfectly to neutralise each other. But they will be employed to designate the freedom of the soul to choose between alternatives, the power of otherwise determining—*facultas aliter se determinandi*.

Having made these explanations, in order to avoid confusion, we pass on to show that the theory of Edwards, either as held by himself or as modified by others who essentially agree with it, fails to ground the sense of guilt and to acquit God of the charge of being the author of sin, and is therefore an insufficient account of the freedom of the will. The point in which they all concur is the denial to the will of any self-determining power, that is, of any power to originate its determinations—of any real, causal efficiency in itself, and the affirmation that its volitions are efficiently caused by the sum of motives existing in the soul. They differ upon minor points—upon the question, how far the internal motives are affected by external circumstances, or, as the phrase goes, the subjective inducements by the objective; upon the question of the order of relative influence exerted by the different mental faculties and the dispositions and tendencies inherent in them; upon the question, whether the sum of motives operating upon the will excludes or includes the *habitus* of the will itself—upon these questions of detail interesting in themselves, but of subordinate value in view of the momentous subject of human responsibility, and the relation of the divine efficiency to sin, the advocates of Determinism differ among themselves. What we deem it important to call into conspicuous notice is the great point in which all forms of the theory are collected into

unity. What that point is, has already been briefly intimated, but it deserves to be made luminous. They agree in affirming moral necessity of all the acts of the will; that is, they hold that the acts of the will, whatever they may be, are unavoidable. They could not be otherwise than they are in any given case. The man wills freely, but he cannot will otherwise than he does. He acts in accordance with a force operating invincibly and inevitably through the will itself. That force is the spontaneity and *habitus* of the man himself. He always acts in accordance with it, never against it. The law which the adherents of the principle of Determinism coincide in enunciating is: As is the moral spontaneity of the man, so must be his volitions—the spontaneity determines the will; the will never determines the spontaneity. This is Edwards's moral necessity, a necessity not imposed in the way of physical constraint, but springing from the dispositions of the man himself. Now every Calvinist must admit the possible co-existence of such a necessity with the highest form of freedom. They concur in God, in the elect angels, and in glorified men. The only question is—and it is of the utmost consequence—Does this concurrence take place in every supposable case? Did it obtain in the instance of the non-elect angels and of Adam in innocence? We do not object to the possible concurrence of this necessity and freedom of will. We admit it as a fact in some actual instances. We deny that it must always exist—that it is the result of a universal and invariable law. But some writers* of the school of Edwards question the legitimacy of the term necessity as applicable to the voluntary acts of men. They regard the use of the term as misleading and injurious. They distinguish sharply, as Edwards did not, between necessity and certainty. All that they deem it requisite to hold is, that the connection between the spontaneity of the man and the acts of his will is certain. The former being what it is, the latter will certainly be in conformity with it. Now the essence of this theory of certainty lies in the inevitable operation of causes in producing effects. That is plain, not only from

*Alexander, *Moral Science*, ch. xv., p. 104. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., p. 285.

the express admissions of its maintainers, but from their doctrine that unless such an operation of causes is known, it is impossible that acts or events should be foreknown. It is affirmed that every cause, including those which operate upon the will acts with unavoidable certainty in producing its effects. And as the moral spontaneity of the man is the cause of his volitions, they spring with inevitable certainty from that cause. They must be as the spontaneity is. But that which must be so and so, which cannot be otherwise, is necessary, or language has lost its meaning. If, as these writers assert, the moral spontaneity always and certainly determines the character of the volitions, it follows that the volitions are necessary.* Edwards is more philosophical and consistent than those who thus attempt to refine upon his theory. The distinction between his moral necessity and their certainty is without foundation. What is inevitably certain is morally necessary. To say that God and elect angels and glorified saints, whenever they act at all, will certainly do what is right, is the same as to say that they will necessarily do what is right. This attempted distinction, therefore, does not destroy the unity of the theory held by these writers with that which was maintained by the great New Englander. The two theories are really one and the same, and accordingly we shall so treat them. Let us settle our view of this common theory. Its essence is that the will, morally considered, has, under no conceivable circumstances or relations, any power to act otherwise than in conformity with the moral spontaneity of the soul. Its freedom consists in its following the law of the spontaneity. It must be what it is. Now the question starts up, What determined the moral spontaneity which thus determines the will? What is its origin? What is the cause which produced it? For we are agreed in demanding a cause for every effect. It will not do to say, it is sufficient to know that the spontaneity belongs to the man himself, and in acting in accordance with it, he is only expressing himself. That may be true; but that accounts only for self-expression, as Dr. Thornwell well remarks,† not for self-

*Alexander, *Moral Science*, ch. xv., pp. 102, 106. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 285, 299, 301.

†Collected Writings, Vol. I., p. 250.

determination. How came the man to be conditioned thus and so? Did he have any voluntary agency in inducing that moral type of being which now characterises him beyond his power to change it; that all-conditioning law of sin which inevitably leads to sinful acts as its expression? Now either he did, or he did not. If he did not, he only develops his natural constitution when he sins. Not to sin would be to violate the original laws of his being. It cannot be conceived that he would be more to blame than is a poisonous plant in producing poisonous fruit in accordance with the law of its nature. If he did, then he must have done so by a self-determination of the will, that is, a determination uncaused by a preceding moral spontaneity; for, upon the supposition, he determined the spontaneity and was not determined by it. We charge the theory of Moral Necessity or Certainty with the great fault of making it impossible to show how man has determined his present sinful spontaneity. It confines inquiry to the present subjectivity of the soul; allows no question as to the genesis of the contents of that subjectivity. It asserts that it is enough to know that it is the nature of the man, no matter how derived, which determines the acts of the will.* But it is clear that if a self-determining power is denied to the will, it cannot be claimed either for the understanding or the feelings, as a special faculty. To affirm choice, resolution, decision, of these faculties, and to exclude them from the will, would be an intolerable infraction of the laws of language and of the inferences which its usage enforces. It follows from the theory, therefore, that the man comes into individual existence not in any sense self-determined, but determined by the will of another. And to such a conclusion the patent facts of the case shut up the theory. For it admits that men are born in sin—nay, are born totally depraved. There could, therefore, from the nature of the case, be no determination of self at all by the conscious activity of the man. He could not consciously determine himself before his conscious existence. He is born with a sinful spontaneity which his will expresses with inevitable certainty.

*Edwards, *Inquiry*, &c., Part IV., Sec. 4. Alexander, *Moral Science*, ch. xv., p. 102. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II., p. 308.

In this conclusion it is impossible to rest. Our fundamental intuitions demand that we go farther, and ask how the nature of the man came to be what it is; and the Scriptures, in measure, satisfy that demand. The advocates of the theory of Determinism themselves inconsistently but necessarily fall into the current of speculation which has set through the ages, and along with all other thinkers take the question beyond the limits of our present subjectivity. We shall meet them again in another field—the field in which the first instance of human sin took place, the real arena of this controversy. Back to the first instance we must needs go, or drivel upon the great inquiry.

Throwing out of account the Pelagian hypothesis as palpably inconsistent with facts and with Scripture, we encounter but two opinions which deserve serious consideration—that of the fall of every human individual for himself in an ante-mundane state of existence, and that of the fall of the human race in Adam. The former challenges consideration because of its advocacy by some of the acutest minds of modern times. We allude not so much to such thinkers as Kant and other German philosophers, for the data of Scripture were not held by them as, in any sense, regulative of their doctrines; but when a Christian theologian like Julius Müller lends his great powers to the support of this hypothesis,* we hardly feel at liberty to brush it aside as unworthy of notice. As, however, the class of writers with whose theory we are chiefly concerned have no sympathy with this view, we content ourselves with a bare outline of the argument which has convinced us of its fallacy. In the first place, the hypothesis is unphilosophical. 1. It supposes man to have existed transcendently, that is, out of time and place, or, to use its own terminology, out of time and space. But it is not only inconceivable that a finite being could exist without those conditions, and if so there can be no *thinking* about the case since it is unthinkable, and no supernatural revelation of it is pleaded as a ground for *believing* it; but the hypothesis involves contradictions. A finite being must be conditioned by time and place, as might easily be shown. It is the prerogative of the

* *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. II., ch. iii.

Infinite Being alone to exist out of those conditions. The notion of the finite is contradicted by the assumptions of this hypothesis.

2. It is self-contradictory. It is obliged to admit that man was finite in the supposed ante-mundane state of existence and therefore conditioned, and at the same time affirms that he was free from the most indispensable conditions of the finite—those of time and space.

3. It contradicts the laws of the human constitution. It is incredible that so critical and revolutionary a fact as a fall from innocence into sin by the conscious act of every individual human being should have entirely perished from the memory of the race. If it be said that the nature of the hypothesis assumes that the conditions of memory were absent in a transcendental and unconditioned existence, the same absence of conditions would have obtained in regard to the operation of every other faculty or power, and no intelligent action, consequently, could be conceived as having been possible. It is vain to say that no man remembers his part in the sin of Adam, and to urge that as equally a difficulty in the orthodox doctrine; for the simple reason that he is not held to have committed that sin as an individual, consciously and personally, but only representatively and legally; and men are not expected to hold in memory the acts of trustees performed before they were born. No American now remembers the acts of Washington or the framers of the Federal Constitution. Further, this hypothesis supposes every man to have fallen for himself; but, if he does not remember his fall how can he be conscious of guilt for it? This does not hold of the federal theory, because the knowledge of guilt in Adam is held to be derived from the divine testimony as furnished in the Scriptures. But we have no knowledge from any source of our fall for ourselves in a previous state of existence. It is simply a hypothetical inference. This consideration is damaging to a theory the very end of which is to ground our sense of guilt for having determined our present sinful condition. In the second place, the hypothesis is unscriptural.

1. The Scripture in its account of the genesis of man gives not a hint of it, which would be very remarkable upon the supposition of its truth. On the contrary, that account evidently implies that the human race

had its beginning in this world, and at the time of the creation of Adam. 2. The Scriptures represent the first man as innocent when created; consequently, he could not have contracted guilt in a previous existence. How could he have been brought into this mundane state in innocence, if justice had condemned him for a sin previously committed, for which no atonement had been made and accepted in that supposed "extra-mundane" condition? And this is the more remarkable when it is considered that Adam was destined to be the progenitor of a race, the first of a series of millions of intelligent beings, whose condition would even in the judgment of reason have been to some extent implicated in his, and is declared in Scripture to have been affected by his fall. 3. The Scriptures represent Adam as having been created. If creation as mentioned in Genesis, means a first beginning of man, as man, he could not, as man, have existed before. The hypothesis of ante-mundane existence involves two creations of Adam, and consequently an intervening annihilation.

These considerations suffice to show that the hypothesis has no probable support from reason, and none whatever from Scripture, and is simply a speculative attempt to adjust in one way what God has settled in another way in his Word. It furnishes a proof that to philosophy the problem of the will, in its moral aspects, is insoluble. Without a supernatural revelation it must have ever continued to elude the grasp of thought. But the Bible puts into the hand of philosophy the key to the otherwise insuperable difficulties of the question, by revealing the fact that God instituted such a connexion between the human race and its progenitor as implicated them in his responsibilities. It teaches us that his guilt was theirs. The Calvinistic parties to the controversy concerning the will in this discussion are agreed upon this point. Whatever may be their peculiar theories as to the precise mode of the derivation of Adam's guilt to his posterity, they concur in acknowledging that there was such a connection as made them in some sense actors in his first sin and inheritors of its results. It is not necessary, therefore, to consider here the subordinate aspects of the question of our relationship to Adam. All that is demanded for the present purpose is the doc-

trine as to our connexion with him in which the parties to the case are at one.

What has been already said is sufficient to show that, in prosecuting the inquiry in regard to the freedom of the will, it is absolutely requisite to separate the estate of man's innocency from his natural fallen condition. It is true that as he is born in sin man is determined in the direction of unholiness. His will has no power to choose that which is holy; that is to say, he has not now, as unregenerate, the power of contrary choice in relation to the alternatives of sin and holiness. He acts with freedom whenever he sins, but he has no power to act in the contrary direction. Now if it could not be shown that this was not his original condition, insuperable difficulties would emerge—difficulties which are not simply mysteries, but palpable contradictions both to the word of God and the fundamental principles of our moral nature. The theory of President Edwards and his followers strangely fails to note this obvious distinction between the case of man in innocence and that of his present and future condition, and therefore comes short of being an adequate account of the freedom of the will. As it is clear that men could not have determined themselves in the direction of spontaneous unholiness in their present conscious, individual existence, the question thrusts itself upon us for consideration, whether they so determined themselves in Adam. And that question resolves itself into this: Did Adam, by a free self-decision which might have been avoided, determine himself in the direction of sin? Here the issue is to be joined. This is the real place at which the discussion of the self-determining power of the will must be had. It is idle to transfer the question to the will in its present sinful condition. It is the case of Adam which is critical, typical, controlling. We are firmly convinced that only in it are the conditions furnished for anything approaching a settlement of this great debate. The question before us, then, is, Did Adam, in the commission of the first sin, act from necessity—that is, was his first sin unavoidable? or did he commit it by an unnecessitated and avoidable decision of his will? Now, either he was in some sense necessitated to the commission of the sin, or he was not. If he was,

then God must have been the author of the necessity, for it is alike un-supposable either that the devil was or Adam himself. The devil was simply the tempter to the sin, not the enforcer of it. The fact that God punished Adam for it proves that beyond a doubt. It is absurd to suppose that Adam could have imposed upon himself the necessity of committing the first sin. Did God, in any way, render the sin necessary or unavoidable? This raises the question as to the relation of his decree to the first sin of Adam. What then is that relation? Either God decreed efficiently to produce the sin; or, he decreed efficaciously to procure its commission; or, he decreed so to order and dispose Adam's case that the sin would be necessary; or, he decreed to permit the sin; or, he abstained from all decree in reference to it—he neither decreed to produce, nor to procure, nor to permit it. These suppositions, we conceive, exhaust the possibilities of the case, and they have all been actually maintained.

1. Did God decree efficiently to produce the first sin? It makes no real difference whether it be held that God immediately or mediately exercised his causal efficiency in the production of the sin. In either case he would have been the efficient producer and author of it.

In the first place, the following consequences legitimately flow from that position. First, the distinction between sin and holiness would be obliterated. For, whatever God does must be right, and as, *ex hypothesi*, he produced the first sin, it must cease to be regarded as sin. It must be considered as right. Secondly, as man was actually punished for the commission of the act, the fundamental intuition of justice, which we must believe was implanted in man's nature by God himself, is violated. We cannot regard it as just that man should be punished for what God himself did. Thirdly, God denounced death against the perpetrator of the act by which the forbidden fruit should be ate. If now, man was merely, in that act, a passive instrument in God's hands, God must be regarded as having denounced death against himself, the real performer of the sin. Or, if in view of the tremendous absurdity and the blasphemy of such a consequence, it be said that death was denounced against the human

instrument, then it follows that God having cautioned man against the commission of the act as fatal, caused him to commit it for the purpose of killing him. These consequences, logically deducible from the supposition that God decreed efficiently to produce the first sin, are sufficient to refute it in the judgment of every one who holds the doctrine of Theism.

In the second place, the idea of probation, upon this hypothesis, is inadmissible. Even in the case of an elect probationer, whose standing is secured by the infusion of grace, it is difficult for us to see how there can be a real probation, unless there be an intrinsic mutability of will and consequent liability to defection. The check to this possibility, imposed by the determining will of God, is in the interest of the probationer's holiness and happiness, and is therefore not inconsistent with the justice and benevolence of the Divine Being. But in the case of a probationer supposed by the hypothesis under consideration, there is no possibility of holiness, but on the other hand, an inevitable necessity to sin; and in that case the holiness and the happiness of the person on trial are rendered unattainable by the efficient causality of God. Further, while we cannot comprehend the efficiency of God's will and that of the creature in the production of holiness, we admit the fact without a protest of our instinctive sense of justice; but we are unable to make the same admission in the case of one whose election of sin is necessitated by the efficiency of God. In the instance of a non-elect probationer, the sense of justice requires the possession of the power of freely electing between the alternatives of holiness and sin. It may be added that these antecedent improbabilities suggested by reason are confirmed by the scriptural record of the facts of Adam's probation, especially the positive institution of the Covenant of Works, which plainly implied the possibility of the maintenance of his integrity. But we defer that line of proof to a future stage of the discussion.

In the third place, the hypothesis under review is opposed to the clear testimony of the Scriptures. They are full of God's condemnation of sin, and the expressions of his abhorrence of it as an intolerable abomination in his sight. He directly charges guilt upon the sinner, and assigns his destruction to himself.

He declares, "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." It is vain to plead the distinction between the decretive and the preceptive will of God in this relation, for that distinction holds only in the instances of those who have already committed sin. The case of one who commits his first sin cannot be reduced to the same category. It may be that while God commanded Pharaoh to liberate Israel, he efficiently willed that he should not; and that while he commanded the Jews to receive Christ as their Redeemer and King, he efficiently willed that they should crucify him; but it cannot be shown that while God commanded Adam in innocence not to eat of the tree of knowledge, he efficiently willed that he should. It is to us one of the curiosities of theological literature, that the distinction between the will of God as to the sins of sinners and as to the first sin of an innocent being, was overlooked by so acute a thinker as President Edwards, and denied by so judicious a thinker as Principal Cunningham.

In order to save the relation of God's efficient decree to the first sin, and at the same time avoid the difficulties which have been urged, many theologians, from the time of Augustine, have maintained the hypothesis of the privative character of sin. They held that God produced the sinful act, as an act, but not the sinful quality of the act. The act was a real entity, but the sin was a mere privation of a perfection which ought to have existed. Logical completeness in the treatment of the subject might demand a thorough-going consideration of this celebrated theory. Our limits, however, will not admit of it. We beg to refer the reader to the very able discussions of the question by Müller* and Thornwell,† as easy of access. We cite a single passage from the latter, presenting his second argument against the theory, which contains a splendid series of

**Christ. Doct. Sin*, Vol. I., Bk. II., ch. i.

†*Collected Writings*, Vol. I., p. 374 *et seq.*

dilemmas, and bears exactly upon the aspect of the subject that we are considering :

“The theory does not advance us one step in solving the riddle for which it has been so elaborately worked out. It leaves the question of God's relation to the origin of evil precisely where it found it. Evil, it is said, is no real being, no creature, therefore God did not make it. It would seem to be as legitimate a conclusion, therefore man did not make it; and another step seems to be inevitable, therefore it does not exist. But a perfection is not where it ought to be. Now the perfection either never was in the creature, or it has been removed. If it never was in the creature, then God certainly, as the author of the creature, is the author of the defect. If it was once there, but has been removed, either God removed it, or the creature. If God removed it, he is still the author of the evil. If the creature removed it, the act of removing it was either sinful or it was not. If the act were sinful, the whole theory is abandoned, and we have sin as something real, positive, and working; if the act were not sinful, how can sin proceed from a good volition? The truth is, the theory utterly breaks down when it approaches this great question, and the result of its boasted solution is that moral evil is reduced to zero.”

We submit a few additional considerations which have occurred to us. First, the theory confounds the causation of existing beings, as containing in themselves the power of action, with acts as phenomenal changes in the accidental qualities of such beings. None but God can produce the former; created beings may produce the latter. This distinction is grounded in consciousness, and assumed by the Scriptures. It vacates of force the famous dilemma: Sin is either a creature or it is not. If it is a creature, God made it. But that cannot be supposed; therefore in itself sin is nothing. Secondly, the theory proceeds upon the supposition that the good quality which is wanting in sin is a real, positive entity. If not, where would be the privation? Privation supposes the existence, actual or possible, of the thing which ought to be, but is not. Now, say the advocates of this theory, all real, positive things are produced only by God. They are created by him; but of course the creative act cannot be shared by the creature with God, and it would follow that no creature can produce the good qualities of acts, and consequently the possibility of probation and of the formation of character is destroyed.

Thirdly, supposing that a good creature sins, then his sin is the privation of some good quality which previously existed in him. But that good quality was a real, positive thing. It follows that a creature is capable of annihilating an existing thing which, *ex hypothesi*, could only have been created by God—of annihilating a product of God's creative power. But if, according to this theory, the creature can produce no entity, it is absurd to attribute to the creature the power to annihilate. As it cannot produce something from nothing, it cannot reduce something to nothing. Fourthly, if sin be a mere privation, a quality which ought to exist does not. But this can be predicated only of a creature and subject of government. God cannot be said to have been under obligation to produce it. The creature, therefore, ought to have produced it. But every good quality, as a real, positive thing, can, according to this theory, be produced by God alone. Now how can it be maintained that the creature ought to have done what, according to the supposition, only God could do? Either God ought to have produced the real, positive thing which is wanting, or the sinner ought. If God ought to have produced it, then, in the first place, he is affirmed to have been under obligation as to the state of the creature, which is absurd; and, in the second place, the sinner cannot be blameworthy for not doing what God only could do, and there is no sin at all. If the sinner ought to have produced it, it is conceded that the creature can do what, on this theory, God only can do; which is self-contradictory.

2. Did God decree efficaciously to procure the commission of the first sin? This is the position maintained by Dr. Twisse, the Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. He says that God did not decree *efficere*, but *efficaciter procurare*, the sin of Adam. This distinction amounts to nothing more than that between the efficiency of God as immediately and mediately exerted. For, if God efficaciously procured the commission of the first sin, he must, by his positive agency, in some way have rendered it impossible for Adam to refrain from committing it. He must so have ordered his nature or his circumstances or both, as to impose a necessity upon Adam to perform the sinful act.

VOL. XXIX., NO. 4—4.

Surely this is equivalent to the position that God was the real, though remote and indirectly operating, cause and author of the act. Adam was simply an instrument—a willing instrument—acted on in a way beyond his control. If God efficaciously procured the commission of the first sin, it is perfectly clear that Adam could not have avoided it. This supposition, therefore, is liable to all the objections which have been urged against the first, and with it must be dismissed as untenable.

3. Did God decree so to order and dispose Adam's case as to render his sin necessary, without himself proximately producing it? This is Edwards's position. We will let him define it for himself: "If by the author of sin is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow—I say, that if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin. . . . And I do not deny that God's being thus the author of sin follows from what I have laid down."* Again he says: "Thus it is certain and demonstrable from the Holy Scriptures [he had been proving from Scripture the relation of God's will to the sins of sinners], as well as from the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that God permits sin, and at the same time so orders things in his providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission."† This hypothesis is so nearly akin to that of the efficacious procurement of sin which has just been mentioned, and both of them so coincident in substance with the first as to the efficient production of sin, that it would seem not to require separate consideration, were it not that Edwards proceeds philosophically to vindicate his position by maintaining that there is an imperfection proper to the creature which, without the continued infusion of grace counteracting it, necessarily leads to sin. He thus states his doctrine: "It was meet, if sin did come into existence and appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature as such, and

* *Inquiry, &c.*, Part IV., Sec. IX. † *Ibid.*, Part IV., Sec. IX.

should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been if man had been made at first with sin in his heart, nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arose from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible that it did not arise from God as the positive cause and real source of it.* This is the hypothesis of a metaphysical imperfection of the creature which, as has been said, "disfigured the great work of Leibnitz," and came so nigh reducing the notion of sin to that of the simple finite as to threaten the distinction between sin and holiness, right and wrong. We briefly indicate some of the obvious objections which strike us as militating against this theory. In the first place, it imposes the limitations of human conception upon the products of the divine omnipotence. We have not the faculties to enable us to pronounce dogmatically upon the question, whether it be possible for God so to construct a creature's nature as to make the attainment of holiness the result of its constitution, without the continued infusion of fresh measures of grace. In the second place, in upholding this view, Edwards is out of harmony with the fundamental principle of his system of Determinism, namely, that moral acts are efficiently caused by the *habitus* of the soul. If "it could not have been made to appear that God was not the efficient or fountain of sin, if man had been made at first with sin in his heart, nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature," we ask, Whence the act which grounds the abiding principle and habit? If there be anything for which Edwards strenuously contends, it is that acts receive their denomination from the *habitus* of the man. But here the act determines the moral spontaneity and is not determined by it. To say that it could spring from a mere imperfection or defect of nature, and not from positive dispositions, is to give up the very essence of his theory. Further, it is to hold that sin may arise from a deficient and efficient cause at the same time, which is self-contradictory. *Quandoque Homerus dormitat.* In the third place,

**Inquiry, &c.*, Part IV., Sec. X.

upon this hypothesis, it is evident that God is the remote, though not the proximate, efficient cause of sin. If he so constructs a nature as that sin will be, without his intervention to prevent it, an unavoidable result, he is the real, though indirect, producer of that result. He must be conceived, in such a case, as forming the nature in order to sin. It is impossible, upon such a theory, validly to ground the sense of guilt and the right to punish. In the fourth place, the hypothesis is contradictory to Scripture as interpreted by the *consensus* of the Church. Adam was not created in a state of imperfection which made his sin unavoidable, without the determining influence of grace. He was able to stand, though liable to fall. He was in a sense imperfect as not confirmed in holiness, but his imperfection was not of such a nature as to necessitate his fall. He was richly endowed with the gifts of his divine Maker, adequately furnished for the maintenance of his integrity. As a specimen of the faith of the Church in regard to this matter we quote the testimony of the Scotch Confession: "We confess and acknowledge that this our Lord God created man, to wit, Adam our first parent, in his image and after his likeness; to whom he imparted wisdom, dominion, righteousness, free will, and a clear knowledge of Himself: so that in the entire nature of man no imperfection could be detected."* But as this point will be elucidated in a subsequent part of this discussion we will not dwell upon it here.

4. Did God neither decree to produce, nor to procure, nor to permit the first sin? Did he abstain from all decree respecting it? We have seen that he could not have decreed efficiently to produce it, nor efficaciously to procure it, nor to render it necessary by the constitution of man's nature. But was there no permissive decree in relation to it? Was there the negation of all divine decree concerning it? That is the view elaborately pressed by Dr. Bledsoe, in his *Theodicy* and elsewhere; and we cannot allude to him without the conviction that his recent removal by death, while he was engaged in debating this question of the will, imparts the solemnity of eternity to the present discussion. We shall all soon stand at the Judgment-bar to give account of the

*Niemeyer, *Coll.*, p. 341.

manner in which we have discharged our stewardship of truth. He held that if it be right to say that God permitted the sin of Adam, it is right to say that he could have prevented it. But he could only have prevented it by exerting his causal efficiency upon the will of Adam, and that would have involved a contradiction of his own will. For, in making Adam, he endowed him with a free will, capable of determining its own acts. But Adam in the exercise of that power sinned. Had God prevented the sin, he could only have done so by violating Adam's constitution imparted by himself, and so have contradicted his own design in making him free. The possible occurrence of the sin, therefore, lay beyond divine control. It is only its results which are subject to God's will. This hypothesis is liable to the following insuperable objections:

In the first place, it cannot be thought probable that a will derived from God could be entirely independent of his control. If this were the case with Adam, it is, for the same reasons, the case with all creatures; and it is conceivable that the wills of all the inhabitants of the universe might be in rebellion against the divine government without the ability of God to prevent it. The population of the universal system might break out into moral revolution, and the Supreme Ruler could not help it. He depends for the continued peace of his empire entirely on the free and uncontrollable volitions of his subjects. No exertion of influence on his part upon their wills can be conceived as determinate, without the supposition that God would contradict himself. Extreme cases are tests of principles, and the hypothesis before us cannot abide this test. It is altogether improbable that the spark of insubordination in a single will cannot, without violence to the freedom of the creature, be prevented from kindling the flame of sedition in other wills and spreading into the raging conflagration of a universal revolt. Power may crush the rebels, but grace could not prevent the rebellion! Every world might be converted into a prison and the universe into a collection of hells, because the independent sovereignty of the individual will may not be touched with the finger of God himself! This is freedom of will with a vengeance.

In the second place, this hypothesis contravenes the whole doctrine of Scripture in regard to the grace of God. On Calvinistic principles the theory must at once be rejected; for the indefectibility of Adam's posterity, on the supposition that he had stood during his time of trial and they with him had been confirmed in life, and the final perseverance of the saints in Christ Jesus, can only be accounted for on the ground of the controlling influence of divine grace upon the human will. But the hypothesis may be convicted of fallacy upon the principles of Dr. Bledsoe himself. He admitted the supernatural efficacy of grace in the regeneration of the sinner, and the immutable happiness of infants dying in infancy. He perceived the difficulty of reconciling his theory with the doctrine of regenerating grace as usually understood, but avoided it by a peculiar view of regeneration. He held that the understanding and the sensibilities may be regenerated, but not the will. God cannot touch that. It depends, consequently, upon the free and untrammelled action of the will in concurrence with the regenerated intellect and heart, or in opposition to them, whether the man will be saved or not. This curious theory of regeneration is easily subverted. It splits the unity of the soul. A part of it is allowed to be regenerated and the other part not. The man, therefore, is partly under the control of holiness, and partly under that of sin. He perceives the beauty and excellency of the divine character, for his understanding is purged from the blindness of sin; he loves God, for his affections are renewed; but his will is still in opposition to holiness until the question is decided by itself whether it will comply with the suggestions of the other powers of the soul. We have then the case of a man half alive and half dead, loving God and opposed to him; and that not by the presence of indwelling sin in all the faculties during man's imperfect condition upon earth, but by the supremacy of sin in the totality of one faculty—the will. Now, as it is perfectly supposable that, on this hypothesis, the will, subsequently to the regeneration of the other powers of the soul, may continue to reject the service of God, we would have the difficulty to meet, growing out of the death of the man while in that condition. He would, in that

event, seem to be in the case of Pomponatius the Italian philosopher before the Romanist Court, when he admitted that he held the impossibility of proving the immortality of the soul upon merely rational grounds, but at the same time believed it as a Christian doctrine resting on dogmatic authority. Well, then, the Court decided, Pomponatius must be acquitted as a Christian, but burnt as a philosopher. Dr. Bledsoe's man must be saved as regenerate and damned as unregenerate. Should it be replied that as the will is the paramount faculty and stamps the destiny of the man, so that on the supposition made he must be lost, it would follow that he would carry with him to hell a renewed understanding and heart, and the community of the pit would be surprised by the arrival among them of one penetrated by a sense of the divine glory and moved by the love of the divine holiness. If, further, it be said, in accordance with Arminian principles, that the grace of regeneration which operated upon the understanding and the affections is finally lost through the free resistance of the will, and the man passes into the eternal state in the condition in which he was previously to the admitted partial regeneration, we answer that the difficulty is ingeniously evaded, but not met. For it is certainly possible that a man in the regenerated state supposed may be cut down before his will has had a fair and full opportunity of expressing its resistance, and thus causing his final fall from grace; and, in that case, he would, upon the principles of Dr. Bledsoe, be unjustly condemned. But if that be conceded, then, as the only other alternative possible is that he should be saved, it follows that the man is taken to heaven with an unsubdued will in opposition to God and holiness. So that contemplating this theory of regeneration in any possible aspect of it, we cannot see how it can be shown to be consistent with the obvious teachings of Scripture or even with the dictates of common sense. If it be said that in this reasoning it has been taken for granted that Dr. Bledsoe allowed the sinful complexion of the will itself, we reply, certainly we have taken that for granted, for the obvious reason that as he constantly held that the will alone, by its free action, can determine a character either of holiness or sin, and at the same time admitted that the

character of man is sinful, it is plain that upon his principles the will is emphatically the organ and the seat of sin.

In the third place, the position that God cannot determine by his grace the attitude of the will and so prevent the commission of sin, is incapable of adjustment to the admissions of Dr. Bledsoe in regard to the case of infants dying in infancy. It is conceded that they are taken to heaven; but if so, they are transferred thither, either with wills determined or undetermined to holiness. If determined to holiness, it must be admitted that the grace of God accomplished that result, for the voluntary action of the infant is out of the question. If undetermined to holiness, it is affirmed that they are probationers in heaven, with wills incapable of being determined by grace, and, therefore, subject to the contingency of a fall. And although the circumstances surrounding them in a heavenly state would be highly favorable to the cultivation of holy habits, they would, upon this theory, commence their glorified career without any previous discipline of trial, and with the hazards inevitably attending the contingent acts of the will in relation to the establishment of fixed habits of holiness. The consideration that external temptation will be absent avails nothing, since the devil fell without the solicitation of an outward tempter. The only possible method of accounting for the security of infants removed to heaven, is by admitting the positive infusion of grace determining their wills in the direction of holiness. But to concede that is to abandon the hypothesis in question.

The same difficulty will hold in regard to believers in Christ dying soon after conversion. According to Dr. Bledsoe, their characters cannot be fixed at the time of their death, since that is the result alone of free and uncaused acts of the will, determining impulses and tendencies into habits. Their standing in glory must needs be contingent and insecure. In fact, the stability of none of the glorified saints can be pronounced perfect. Their only ground of security against a fall is in the fixedness of self-developed character. Upon the supposition, grace cannot confirm them. There would always be the possibility and the danger of some excursion of the imagination beyond its prescribed and legitimate sphere—a temptation to which Bishop Butler

thinks even saints in glory may be exposed, or some outburst of impulse in itself innocent, but tending in a wrong direction, as in the earthly Eden, which would threaten the bulwarks of habit with a surprising irruption and put wonted dispositions to an unexpected strain; and reasoning from the analogies of this life, furnished by instances of the best and most firmly established characters suddenly breaking down through the force of some inflamed appetency in spite of extensive reputation, high social standing, lofty ecclesiastical position, and every external guard by which virtue is fortified and assured, we would have reason to indulge an apprehension which would cast a shadow upon the prospects of the brightest worshipper in heaven. The Achilles' heel would never cease to be vulnerable.

These considerations, derived mainly from the admissions made by the advocates of the supposition that God did not decree to permit sin, would lead us to reject it as untenable. Of course, no Calvinist could for a moment entertain it, since he is bound by the fundamental principles of his system to hold that nothing can come to pass, in the sphere of being or that of act, without either an efficacious or permissive decree of God. The difficulty of speculatively reconciling the causal efficiency of grace exerted upon the will with its free determinations, is one which, under the present limitations of our faculties, it may perhaps be impossible to solve. Possibly, it may never be solved to thought; but may always remain a test of faith and of the submission of dependent intelligence to the supremacy of the divine will. But the denial of the existence of the difficulty, and the attempt to reduce the whole case, either with the extreme Arminian to the simple and independent efficiency of the human will, or with the extreme supralapsarian to the exclusive causality of God, plunge us into difficulties which deepen into absolute contradictions and hurl us in insurrection against the authority of the Scriptures. Adam was endowed with grace sufficient for him, but was under obligation to settle his character by the free elections of his will; and even those who are justified in Christ are enjoined to work out their salvation with fear and trembling, precisely because it is God who worketh in them both to will and to do of his good pleasure.

5. The only remaining supposition is, that God decreed to permit the first sin of Adam,* and we are entitled to regard it as logically established, if the other suppositions in the case have been disproved. If God neither decreed efficiently to produce the sin, nor efficaciously to procure it, nor so to construct the nature of man as by its imperfection to necessitate it, nor abstained from all decree in reference to it, it follows that he decreed to permit it. He decreed efficiently to produce Adam as an actual being, or he would have forever remained in the category of the merely possible. But having decreed to reduce him from that category to actual existence, God did not decree to prevent him from sinning. He may have done so if he had pleased. It pleased him to determine to permit him to sin. Having decreed to create Adam, he also decreed to endow him with the power freely to obey his law, "and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of his own will which was subject to change."† It follows that Adam was not determined to sin by any necessity of nature established by the divine decree, and further, that his sin was not rendered certain by that decree. The only possible way in which it is conceivable that the certainty of the sin could have been grounded in God's decree, is by attributing a causal efficiency to the execution of the decree respecting the sin, similar to that which characterised the decree to create Adam as an actual being. That would be to make the decree efficacious, and we have seen that it was permissive. It deserves, however, to be remarked that we hold it to have been permissive, specifically in relation to the production of the sin. God did not decree to produce it, nor to necessitate its produc-

*By some writers a distinction is made between the decree to permit sin and the decree to suffer it. If the distinction had any real force, we would be obliged according to the scheme of the argument to give a separate consideration to the question, whether God decreed to suffer the first sin. But when we speak of God's permission of sin, we do not imply his approbation of it, in itself considered. This simple explanation makes it apparent that to say, God permits sin, is substantially the same as to say, God suffers sin. We see no necessity accordingly for the disjunction of the two propositions.

† *Westminster Confession*, Chap. IV., Sec. 2.

tion; he decreed to permit Adam to produce it. At the same time, considered in relation to the whole case, the decree was not barely permissive. As he did not determine to prevent the sin—which he might have done—by the causal influence of his grace, or the hindering arrangements of his providence, God knew that it would be committed, and so must be regarded as having, on the whole, deemed it better that the sin should take place, rather than that Adam's will should by his intervention be confined to holy acts. Upon this point we cite the words of Calvin,* whose statements, especially in his Institutes, touching the relation of God's will to the sins of sinners have been intolerably misrepresented as applying to the first sin of Adam. After affirming it to be monstrous to hold that God by an implanted necessity of nature leads any creature to sin, and that it must be maintained that the only positive agency which he exercised in reference to the introduction of sin was that of permission, the venerable Reformer proceeds to say:

“We must now enter on that question by which vain and inconstant minds are greatly agitated: namely, why God permitted Adam to be tempted, seeing that the sad result was by no means hidden from him. That he now relaxes Satan's reins to allow him to tempt us to sin, we ascribe to judgment and to vengeance, in consequence of man's alienation from himself; but there was not the same reason for doing so, when human nature was yet pure and upright. God therefore permitted Satan to tempt man, who was conformed to his own image and not yet implicated in any crime. . . . All who think piously and reverently concerning the power of God acknowledge that the evil did not take place except by his permission. For, in the first place, it must be conceded that God was not in ignorance of the event which was about to occur; and then that he could have prevented it, had he seen fit to do so. But in speaking of permission, I understand that he had appointed whatever he wished to be done. Here, indeed, a difference arises on the part of many, who suppose Adam to have been so left to his own free will, that God would not have him fall. They take for granted, what I allow them, that nothing is less probable than that God should be regarded as the cause of sin, which he has avenged with so many and such severe penalties. When I say, however, that Adam did not fall without the ordination and will of God, I do not so take it as if sin had been pleasing to him, or as if he simply wished that the precept which he had given

**Comm. on Genesis*, Chap. III.

should be violated. So far as the fall of Adam was the subversion of equity and of well-constituted order, so far as it was contumacy against the divine Lawgiver, and the transgression of righteousness, certainly it was against the will of God; yet none of these things render it impossible that, for a certain cause, although to us unknown, he might will the fall of man. It offends the ears of some, when it is said God *willed* this fall; but what else, I pray, is the *permission* of him who has the power of preventing, and in whose hand the whole matter is placed, but his will?"

The testimony of Calvin in this passage plainly amounts to this: that Adam fell by the permissive will and ordination of God. In addition to this view, we must maintain that the case, as a whole, could not pass out of the controlling hand of the Supreme Ruler. Having determined to permit the sin, he "bounds, orders, and governs" it—such are the cautious words of the Westminster Confession—and so weaves it and its results into the grand web of his providential scheme as to secure the glory of his name, and, for aught that appears to the contrary, the highest welfare of the universe.

We have now seen that the relation of the divine decree to the first sin of Adam was of such a nature as not to involve, on God's part, a necessitation of its commission. And as it is inconceivable that either any other created being than Adam, or Adam himself, should have rendered it necessary or unavoidable, we might here rest in the conclusion, enforced by the law of disjunctive arguments, that the sin was not the result of moral necessity, nor of unavoidable certainty, but that it must have been produced by a self-determination of Adam's will. But as all human argumentation is imperfect, and what appears to the writer incontestable may to the reader need explication and reënforcement, we will endeavor to complete the proof by an examination of the account of the facts in Adam's case, which is given in the word of God. We shall thus be led, also, to a more particular consideration of the question, whether Adam's self-decision for sin was precisely a self-determination of his will. Taking, then, the Scriptures for our guide—and there is no other which is available—let us notice some of the features of Adam's condition in innocence which bear materially upon this subject.

1. It is the plain testimony of Scripture that "God made man upright." Rectitude was the internal law of his nature as he came from the hand of his Maker. His constitution was subjectively adapted to the objective rule of life under which he was placed. It is also distinctly taught that God made man in his image. Now it is the concurrent doctrine of theologians, excepting Pelagians, that this image was not merely natural, but was also moral, embracing, as the New Testament writers clearly show, knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. It is obvious, upon this view, that the moral spontaneity of Adam was not that of mere indifference to right and wrong, but was incipiently holy and projected positively in the direction of virtue. It follows, therefore, that God did not determine Adam to sin by the constitution of his nature, and that his first sin was not the necessary or unavoidable result of the moral motives which operated upon him. They were all right, and, unless holiness may be the cause of sin, could not have induced the fall. Adam sinned unnecessarily, in opposition to his moral spontaneity, and must consequently have been endued with the power of contrary choice—that is, the ability of electing between conflicting alternatives by a decision of his will, of otherwise determining than he actually did. This is plainly the teaching of Scripture, and if so, the great law of the Determinist school—that moral volitions are invariably as the moral spontaneity—is confronted with a case which cannot be adjusted to it, and that *the* case which determined the posture of all other human cases. Adam's sinful volition, formed in the teeth of his moral dispositions, not only cannot be accounted for on the fundamental principle of Determinism, but positively overthrows it as one of universal and invariable application. Further, the contempt which the Determinist pours upon the supposition of a power in the will of otherwise determining itself—a power to the contrary, and the metaphysical arguments by which he vindicates that contempt, all avail nothing in the face of the scriptural record which unmistakably implies its existence in the instance of Adam.

If the ground be taken, as has been done, that an evil principle, an unrighteous self-will, though it synchronized with the first

sin, was, in the order of production, precedent to it, a position is assumed which cannot be supported. For, we have seen, and all evangelical theologians concede, that God made man upright, and started him with dispositions and tendencies, which, so far as they were moral, were inducements to holy acts. How then is a sinful principle precedent to the first sinful act to be accounted for? Either the devil was the author of it, or God, or Adam. The devil is out of the question. God is equally so, even upon the express admissions of Determinists themselves. Edwards, as has been shown, inconsistently it may be, but truly, affirmed that in the first instance a sinful act must introduce into the soul a principle or habit of evil, and he indignantly denies that God implanted evil in the nature of man. If Adam was the author of the evil principle which in the order of production preceded his first sinful act, as no one can be the author of anything without willing to produce it, he must have put forth an act of will in order to the production of the evil principle in question, and as such an act must have been sinful, we have the circle: the first sinful act determined the sinful principle; the sinful principle determined the first sinful act. It is manifest that the hypothesis of an evil principle, precedent in the order of nature to the first sinful volition, is a paradox. Nor does it relieve the difficulties in the case to say that the evil principle was a concreated imperfection, a defect of nature—a *causa deficiens*. It has already been shown that neither Scripture nor reason justifies the supposition of the privative character of sin; nor can the Determinist consistently contend that principles and dispositions are the efficient cause of volitions, and at the same time assign a sinful volition to a deficient cause. Surely a thing cannot be the effect of an efficient and a deficient cause at one and the same time.

2. The facts as to Adam considered as a probationer deserve next to be carefully considered. Every Calvinist, to be consistent, must hold that moral necessity is, in some cases, coëxistent with conscious freedom. The cases of the elect angels, of unregenerate sinners, of confirmed saints, of Christ in the discharge of his mediatorial work on earth, and of God himself, are instances to him of the consistency of moral necessity with free agency.

But the question is, whether there be not conditions which render the two utterly inconsistent with each other. Is not the case of a non-elect probationer one in which moral necessity and free-agency are incapable of being harmonised? We maintain that it is; and that one of the great defects of the Edwardean school is that they leave out of account the broad distinction between elect and non-elect probationers. They reason upon the extraordinary assumption, that the cases may be reduced to unity under precisely the same conditions of moral agency. This we regard as a fault in their system which invokes particular inspection. Now Adam, and we think also the angels who fell, are instances which fall into the category of non-elect probationers. It is their peculiarity, that they were not influenced by the moral necessity which obtains in the case of elect probationers. For, if they had been the subjects of moral necessity, it must have been intended to secure either holiness or sin. If holiness, it failed, and a contradiction emerges; for a necessity which fails to accomplish its end is no necessity—it sinks into contingency. Whatever is necessary must be. If the moral necessity was intended to secure sin, as the necessity could not have been elected through a self-determining act in the first instance—that is, at the start of his being—by the probationer, but must have been concreated with him, it follows that God was the author of the necessity to sin, and that he was remotely, though not proximately, the producer of sin. Neither of the alternatives signalled can possibly be admitted, and we are consequently shut up to the position that in the case of a non-elect probationer moral necessity and free agency are totally inconsistent with each other. The specific difference of such a case is the possession of the power of contrary choice—of the will's power to determine itself *in utramque partem*. Neither sin nor holiness was unavoidable in Adam's case. His will was mutable; it could turn to either. The formula which precisely expresses his condition is: able to stand, liable to fall. Now it is perfectly clear to every Calvinist that this formula cannot be applied either to God, or to Christ as a probationer, or to the saint as confirmed in Christ Jesus; that had Adam stood and been justified it would

have ceased to be applicable to him; and that as he sinned, it did cease, in consequence of his having determined his spontaneity as sinful, to be further applicable to him. In the case of one who is now a sinner, the question is, not whether the moral necessity resulting from an established sinful spontaneity is consistent with free-agency in a certain sense; that is conceded by every Calvinist. But the question is, Did he possess originally the power to resist the introduction of that sinful spontaneity by virtue of a holy spontaneity with which his being began? Did he, in the exercise of the liberty of contrary choice, as free from all necessity, determine the moral principles and dispositions which now control his volitions? To these questions we must reply affirmatively. To state the matter differently: the question is not, whether God can, or ever does, causally determine the will of elect creatures. It is admitted that he both can and does. But the question is, Did he, in the instance of the first sin, causally determine the will of Adam, considered as a probationer who was not a subject of election? We hold that he did not. There are but two alternatives: either God efficiently determined Adam's will in the first sin, or he did not. There is no middle ground. If he did, the sin was unavoidable and could not have been attended with just liability to punishment. If he did not, as no other being could have efficiently determined Adam's agency, the sin was avoidable. If avoidable, there was no necessity which operated to its production. For, if a thing is necessary in any sense, it is not avoidable. To suppose that it is, is self-contradictory. But if Adam, as a probationer, was neither under the necessity to sin, nor to refrain from sinning, his case is peculiar. It cannot be assigned to the same class with the sinner unregenerate or regenerate, or with glorified saints, or with Christ as a probationer, or with the elect angels as probationers, or with the Deity himself. The only analogue would be the case of the non-elect angels who failed in their probation and fell from their first estate.

In addition to these considerations, it may be specially urged that upon the theory of Determinism the Covenant of Works, as an instituted element of Adam's probation, becomes inconceivable.

The formation of that covenant evidently supposed that Adam was able to stand and to secure the reward freely offered to him of justification for himself and his posterity. If to the divine mind it was impossible for him to stand, but his sin was unavoidable in consequence of the direct or indirect causality of God expressing itself either in the efficient production of the sin, or its efficacious procurement, or its evolution from an imperfect nature, the Covenant of Works cannot by us be conceived of except as a mockery. It stipulated conditions which could not be fulfilled, and tendered rewards which could not be secured. To that conclusion must every consistent sublapsarian be forced. If it be said, that the Covenant of Works was formed with the Second Adam with the full knowledge on God's part that Christ would inevitably stand during his time of trial, and the moral necessity of his performing the conditions of the covenant was not inconsistent with his free-agency as a probationer, we answer, that the cases of the first and second Adams, as probationers, were immensely different so far as the matter in hand is concerned. In this respect, they cannot be brought into unity nor subordinated to the same law. In the first place, they differed as elect and non-elect probationers. Christ was elected to be holy, as to his human nature; Adam was neither elected to be holy nor sinful. The election of the former was, in the order of thought, antecedent to his probation; that of the latter, subsequent. Adam was elected, if at all, as an unsuccessful and fallen probationer, to be saved from the sin to which he freely determined himself and his seed. In the second place, it is monstrous to suppose that any probationer could be divinely predestinated to sin, in any such sense as a probationer might be elected to be holy. No intuition of justice would impel a creature to object against his election to holiness and eternal bliss, and the consequent determination of his will by divine grace in order to effectuate the electing purpose. But the case is vastly different if we suppose him predestinated to sin, and so determined by the divine causality as to carry that ordaining purpose into execution. In the case of the "elect angels"—if those Scripture terms are to be interpreted in accordance with the usage of the inspired writers as to election—

it is likely that they were, by infused grace, prevented from falling and determined to holiness. In the case of Christ, whatever may have been the intrinsic possibilities as to his merely human will—and that question as irrelevant to our present discussion we will not turn aside to consider—we are obliged to believe that the very nature of his person, the genius of the Covenant of Redemption, and the plenary unction of the Holy Spirit which was conferred upon him by the Father, rendered it impossible for him to sin and determined him to holiness. But in the case of Adam, it is out of the question that a divine influence causally determined him to sin. He was endued with sufficient grace to have enabled him to fulfil the conditions of the covenant under which he was placed, but not sufficient to determine his standing. On the other hand, he was free to sin, if he chose, but not determined, by the causal efficiency of God, to its commission. The cases cannot be referred to the same law. God elects to holiness and determines to its production, but not to sin.

3. The nature of the specific test to which the obedience of Adam was subjected was such as to bring his will in immediate relation to the will of God. The command in regard to the tree of knowledge was positive, not moral! Adam was brought face to face with the naked authority of God. The very issue was, whether he would submit his will to that of his divine Ruler. God appears to have dealt with him, and with the race in him, as we deal with our children in the earliest stage of our government of them. We require them to submit to our authority, whether they can understand the reason of its exercise or not. And, accordingly, the first issue we have with them is in the sphere of the will. So, it would appear, was it in Adam's case. God required him to submit his will to His, without assigning any special reason for the requirement; and Adam in refusing to obey asserted his will as against God's will. The very core of the first sin was its unreasonable wilfulness. The will was the chief factor in its commission.

4. But inasmuch as we cannot conceive an act of the will to the performance of which no inducement existed, we naturally

inquire whether the inspired account of the first sin meets this difficulty. It does. There were inducements to the commission of it; but they were not motives which sprung from the moral nature of our first parents. Their moral spontaneity, so far from furnishing the motives to the perpetration of the sin, would, if it had been consulted, have urged them to its resistance. The narrative plainly enough indicates what was the nature of the inducements. They were, as Bishop Butler intimates, blind impulses, in themselves innocent and legitimate because implanted by God himself in the very make of man. The bodily appetite for food, and the intellectual desire for knowledge, were, in Eve's case, precisely the inducements upon which the great master of temptation put his finger. In the case of Adam, in contradistinction from that of Eve, it is more than a probable inference—it is one necessitated by the narrative—that the natural impulse of affection for his wife and sympathy with her operated as an inducement to the commission of his first sin. It must be admitted, that while we may accept Butler's theory as in all probability correct, that Eve fell through the lack of vigilance mainly, we cannot account for Adam's sin in the same way. The Scriptures inform us that he was not deceived as was Eve. His eye was directed to both alternatives. He saw clearly the issues involved, and deliberately resolved to break with his God and ruin his race. But we cannot avoid the conclusion that, as his moral dispositions and tendencies were all in the direction of holiness, the intrinsically legitimate blind impulses of his constitution started the train of inducements, inflamed the desire, which enticed the will in the direction of sin. Here were motives brought to bear upon the will; but it is obvious that, in their first presentation, they were in the control of the will. It had the power to resist them, or to comply with them. The instant it freely consented to entertain them directed to the forbidden object, that instant the fall began. Here then we have a reason why the will acted in a specific direction—used its *libertas specificationis*, and we see that it had the power to act or not to act in accordance with it. There was motive, but the will was, at first, master of the motive, not the motive of it. The innocent impulses

of man's constitution, when directed to a forbidden object and approved by the will, traversed the dispositions to holiness and dashed down the moral spontaneity. But, although, in the first instance, the will was not necessitated to action by these impulses, but had the control of them so that it could have resisted them, yet when it did freely consent to tolerate them, it surrendered that control, and was thenceforward mastered by them. Just so we often see it now in the natural and simply moral sphere. The first acts which threaten to form a habit are controlled by the will, but when a sufficient number of acts have been freely performed to constitute a confirmed habit, the will loses control and becomes a slave to that of which originally it was master. Of course, the man is responsible for consequences which at the last he has not, but at first had, the power to control.

The following testimonies from the Symbols of the Church are cited in order to show that in maintaining the preceding views we have advocated no novelties, but have trodden the road crowded with the footprints of the flock of Christ:

Confession of Basle: "We confess that at the beginning man was made entirely after the image of God, which is righteousness and holiness. But he fell into sin of his own free will (*sua sponte*)."*

First Helvetic Confession: "Man, the most perfect image of God upon earth, . . . when he was created in holiness by God, fell into sin by his own fault (*sua culpa*)."[†]

Gallic Confession: "We believe that God not only created, but also governs and controls all things, and disposes and orders according to his own will whatsoever comes to pass in the world. Nevertheless we deny that he is the author of evil, or that any blame can be transferred to him of those things which are wrongly done, since his will is the highest and most certain norm of all righteousness. . . . We believe that man, created in purity and integrity, and conformed to the image of God, fell away from the grace which he had received, by his own fault (*sua ipsius culpa*)."[‡] It thus proceeds to speak of the freedom of the will since the fall, indicating no distinction between ability and liberty: "Likewise, although he is endowed with will, which is moved to this or that, nevertheless since it is entirely captive under sin, he has no liberty to seek good except as he may receive it from grace and by the gift of God."[‡]

Belgic Confession. After speaking of the fall of some of the angels from the excellent nature in which God had created them, it assigns the cause of the standing of others: "But the others continued in their first

*Niemeyer, p. 88. †*Ibid.*, p. 116. ‡*Ibid.*, p. 331.

standing by the singular grace of God." In regard to man it says: "We believe that God created man out of the dust of the earth after his image, good, righteous, and holy, and manifestly perfect in all respects (*in omnibus plane perfectum*), who could by his own free decision (*proprio arbitrio*) adjust and conform his will (*voluntatem*) to the will of God. . . . But he knowingly and willingly subjected himself to sin."*

Heidelberg Catechism: "Did God create man thus depraved and perverse? By no means: yea, truly, he created him good and after his image, that is, in true righteousness and holiness, that he might rightly know God his creator, heartily love him, and live with him in blessedness forever."† There is here no imperfection of nature certainly leading to sin.

Second Helvetic Confession: "Man was created by God after his image in righteousness and true holiness, good and upright; but, at the instigation of the Serpent, and by his own fault, he fell from goodness and rectitude. . . . Man, before the fall, was without doubt upright and free, who had the power to remain in the good or to decline to the evil."‡ Here is the power of contrary choice.

Anhaltine Confession: "It is a most true judgment that God is not the cause of sin, neither does he will sin."||

Confession of the Marches: "God is by no means the author of any sin, but the fountain and author of all good, the hater and avenger of evil. . . . Although a natural ability of free will remains after the fall, as to things natural and civil, nevertheless there is no ability of it to supernatural and spiritual good."‡

The Czengerine Confession is still more express in denying that God can be the cause of sin.¶ The language of the Westminster Confession, upon these points, is so familiar that we refrain from quoting it.

We collect from these symbolic testimonies of the Churches of the Reformation: That God is not the cause or author of sin; that man was created with no imperfection of nature tending to sin, much less necessitating it; that he possessed the power of contrary choice by which he might by the decision of his will have determined to stand in holiness or fall into sin; that he fell by the unnecessitated election of his will; that the power of contrary choice still remains as to things natural and merely moral; and that there is no real distinction between ability and liberty of will.

Here we must arrest the discussion for want of room to prosecute it; but hope, with the leave of Providence, to continue it in the next number of the REVIEW.

*Niemeyer, p. 368. †*Ibid.*, p. 431. ‡*Ibid.*, p. 479. ||*Ibid.*, p. 638. §*Ibid.*, p. 672. ¶*Ibid.*, p. 549.

ARTICLE II.

BERKELEY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM.

A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

By GEORGE BERKELEY, D. D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. With Prolegomena and with Annotations, select, translated, and original. By CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D. D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology and Church Polity in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, etc. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Pp. 424, 8vo.

Dr. Krauth announces his desire that his edition of the great philosophic classic of Berkeley shall be in every respect the standard one. He has certainly spared no pains and labor on his part to make it such. The volume, which is beautifully printed, contains, first, Elaborate Prolegomena by Dr. Krauth, covering 147 pages, in which the editor discusses Berkeley's life, his precursors, the estimates, summaries, opponents, and critiques of Berkeley's philosophy, together with a full general outline of the relation of Berkeley's system of Idealism to the Idealism of Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The Prolegomena are followed by the preface of the *English* edition of Berkeley's complete works, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. This is followed by Berkeley's own Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, and the "Principles" themselves, covering only some ninety octavo pages out of 424 pages in the volume. The "Principles" are annotated throughout by Prof. Fraser, his notes being given at the foot of each page. In an appendix are given, (1st) Berkeley's rough draft of the Introduction as he first wrote it; (2d) Arthur Collier's introduction to the "Clavis Universalis," a work in which Collier teaches substantially the Berkeleyan philosophy; and (3d) Berkeley's Theory of Vision vindicated.

Then follow seventy-five pages of annotations, consisting of the notes of Ueberweg translated by Dr. Krauth, together with full additional notes by the editor himself: and the whole book closes with a full Index.

The publication of this volume has evidently been a labor of love with Dr. Krauth, and it contains a wealth of philosophical learning, all tending to assist the reader clearly to understand and to weigh the theory of Berkeley. It would be difficult to suggest anything more that could have been done to make this work the standard edition.

But the question will doubtless be asked, What good is accomplished by the publication of such a book? Has not Berkeley's theory been long ago exploded? and is it not looked upon now rather as a curious and visionary hypothesis, utterly foreign to any current modes of speculation? Even if this were true, the book might be valuable as a means of stimulating mental activity, and inciting students of philosophy to go down to investigate the foundations of human thought.

Dr. Krauth claims that "the Principles of Berkeley is the best book from an English hand, for commencing thorough philosophical reading and investigation. . . . No student can make a solitary real step in genuine philosophical thinking until he understands Idealism, and there is no other such guide at the beginning of this as Berkeley's Principles."

This being the case, it matters not whether Berkeley's philosophy be true or false, if it serves as a stimulus to the mental faculties, and is a good seed-plot of fresh and vigorous thoughts. The cluster of names gathered in these pages as opponents, adherents, or critics of Berkeley, is ample proof of the value of this book as an incentive to philosophical thought.

But Berkeley is by no means an antiquated thinker, nor has his theory only a historical interest. Many of his principles have passed into current thought. His "Theory of Vision" is now the accepted scientific belief, and some of his doctrines are held by those who are perhaps unaware of their obligation to the good Bishop. Dr. James Stirling, of Edinburgh, tells us: "Hamann, an authority of weight, declares that, 'without Berkeley, there had been no Hume, as without Hume, no Kant': and this is pretty well the truth. To the impulse of Berkeley largely then it is that we owe German philosophy!" Those critics who have most intelligently and candidly studied Berkeley are farthest

from ridiculing him, however they may disagree with him. The continued interest felt in his theory is shown by the publication of Prof. Fraser's edition of Berkeley's complete works, by the appearance of Ueberweg's German translation and annotations, and by the respect shown to him by all writers who have ever seriously undertaken the study of his philosophy. We find in a posthumous volume of essays, by John Stuart Mill, a criticism of Berkeley, in which he adopts and praises many of his principles, while not becoming an adherent of his system. So George H. Lewes, in his "History of Philosophy," defends Berkeley against the misrepresentations and shallow criticisms of some of his opponents, and speaks of him in terms of the highest respect both as a man and as a philosopher. The universal testimony of those writers, whose estimates Dr. Krauth has collected in his edition, assigns to Berkeley a high place among clear, forcible, and independent thinkers. But the publication of this volume has a special interest at this time. It is in every way timely, a valuable contribution of pure philosophy towards checking the advance of materialism.

It is not expected that every one who reads it will accept *in toto* the philosophy of Berkeley. Dr. Krauth does not, nor does Ueberweg, the German editor and translator. But they both respect Berkeley's clearness and force, and consider that he has dealt very heavy blows against the materialists.

It is in this aspect that we wish now to consider the book, not as finally settling the questions discussed in it, but as a help to every one in gaining a firm standing-ground in the midst of so many contrary winds of doctrine. An exposition or criticism of Berkeley's theory is beyond the intention of this paper. It must be premised, however, that Berkeley is generally misunderstood by those who have only the vague knowledge that he was an idealist—even denied the existence of matter. The proposition that matter does not exist seems so repugnant to universal belief and common sense, that most persons think it undeserving any serious refutation; and agree with Dr. Johnson, that a kick against a stone is a sufficient answer. No one can read the "Principles" without concluding that Berkeley saw and answered

all the most weighty objections that could be brought against his philosophy. He did not attempt to maintain a paradox which is absurd and unreasonable, but his arguments are irrefutable, if his premises be granted. He begins his work by a discussion of "abstract ideas." John Stuart Mill accounts it one of the greatest services ever rendered to philosophy, that Berkeley should so thoroughly have demolished these abstractions and substituted what may be called "symbolic ideas." That is, the relation which the general idea of any object bears to the class of objects it represents—is *symbolic*, and not *real*. "Universals," as such, have no real existence. they are but the devices which the mind employs in order to bring all its ideas to a condition of unity. Thus, for instance, the idea "triangle" does not and cannot correspond to some triangle which is neither equilateral, rectangular, isosceles, or scalene, but which is a combination of all possible triangles. But when we speak of the general class, "triangle," we always have present in the mind an image of some particular triangle, which is the symbol of the whole class; and by a mental accommodation this concept is stretched in imagination so as to cover all possible varieties of triangles; or else it is really changed so as to correspond with each particular triangle which may come before the thought. Now the *matter* which Berkeley refuses to believe in, is not that which presents itself to the senses of men. The phenomena of matter, extension, color, form, hardness, etc., he firmly believes to exist, declares that they are real and not imaginary. But, says he, philosophers inform us that these things are *not* the real existences, that they are but qualities which inhere in some substance back of them, unperceived by the senses but necessarily supplied by the reason. This is *matter* according to the philosophers, the unknown, unperceived substance in which all the sensible phenomena of an object inhere. Berkeley appeals to the "common sense" of mankind as to whether we can believe in the existence of such a substance. He wishes no man to turn sceptic and refuse to believe the evidence of his own senses; rather does he claim to uphold strictly the testimony of the senses. He says: "If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things,

he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what hath been said: There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which *will*, or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more *reality* in them than the former: by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense, the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of *reality*, it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a *real being* by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term *reality* different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see." In a note on this passage, Prof. Fraser says: "The metaphysic of Berkeley is an endeavor to convert the word 'real' from being the symbol of an unintelligible abstraction into that of the conscious experience of a mind." What we know, according to Berkeley, are certain mental phenomena. Shall we go back of these phenomena and affirm the existence of a "noumenon," a figment of the imagination called "matter," which binds together the phenomena in unity? But, it will be said, there must be something which thus *unifies* these phenomena, for we perceive them as existing in the same object, and we cannot imagine them to subsist independently. For the separate and distinct qualities which we perceive existing in any external object, we perceive also as existing in a relation of unity. "Very well," says Berkeley, "this unity we grant you. There must be a *synthesis* of the perceived qualities, in order to make the idea of an external object a unit; but how is this synthesis to be obtained? Not by putting behind the phenomena an unknown something called 'matter,' an abstract idea which is not symbolic of anything we know; but by a mental synthesis." The

only things of which the mind has any knowledge are *ideas*, either present to the mind, (that is, as excited by the objects causing them,) or recalled to the mind by memory, or compounded and combined in the mind by imagination. The existence of an idea depends on its being *perceived*—its “*esse*” is “*percipi*.” The existence of an idea outside of a mind is inconceivable. The very definition of an idea implies the percipient mind in which it exists. These ideas, then, are always *real* existences to the mind in which they exist. They may be caused by the perceiving mind itself, in which case they may have no other existence: that is, they exist in no other minds. Or they may exist in the mind as the products of the Divine Mind, in which they originated. In this case they have a real existence, for they exist in the Divine Mind, which is the ground and origin of all real existence. These really existing ideas then are found in other minds, where they have been implanted by the Divine Mind as the media of communication and of knowledge. Our finite minds can communicate with each other only by sharing the ideas which were created in us by the Divine Mind.

This is the peculiarity of Berkeley’s system, that all real existence is dependent on the Divine Mind and Will; that God has created not a universe of matter, but a universe in which what we call the attributes of matter really exist only in *mind*. It is this part of his philosophy which has been chiefly abandoned; for the propositions he advances cannot be disproved, except by denying the fundamental postulates of his system, and setting up others equally dependent on the reason alone.

But to dwell longer on the system of Berkeley is beyond the limits of an essay, as is also a comparison of his theory with that of Sir William Hamilton as to our immediate perception of an external object, or with that of John Stuart Mill, that matter is only “a permanent possibility of sensations.” Sir William Hamilton’s theory may or may not be true. We cannot here go into any examination of it, but quote Dr. Krauth’s note on the subject:

“Nearly all thinkers agree that there is no consciousness of the excitant (of the perceptive act); we only know the state which results from

it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' assumes that there *is* a consciousness of it—it is the only *non-ego* of which we are conscious: but as the great *non-ego*, the external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are compelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of a 'representative entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch school combated Idealism had reached a point at which 'there is no escape from confession but in suicide,' and Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' is the proof that 'suicide is confession.' "

Without pausing to discuss further the much argued question of the perception of the external object, let us proceed to inquire, What is the value of Idealism as an opposing theory to Materialism? Can we, by its help, make any stand against the encroachments of a materialistic philosophy? This was indeed one chief object of Berkeley in writing his treatise. He says:

"For, as we have shown the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend *material substance* has been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground."

It is evident that the tendency of modern scientific speculation is towards materialism; even though materialism is disowned by such men as Tyndall, Huxley, and Herbert Spencer. Many who are interested in current thought become sadly confused when they find that the existence of "spirit," or "soul," or "mind," is quietly ignored, if not directly attacked. These speculators slip away from the idea of personality as made known by consciousness; and in their discussions about sensation and association and hereditary transmission, the thinking, feeling,

willing *ego*, is entirely lost sight of. We may read page after page in some of these treatises, without getting a clear acknowledgement of the simple and fundamental truth, "I think—." The "scientific" speculator begins with outside existences. He combines two material substances, and gets a third possessing properties far superior to those of the elementary components. And so he continues, combining one compound with another, and obtaining a still higher set of properties, until he leads us gently and smoothly up to the highly organised and complex living tissues, and asks us: "Why are not sensation and consciousness and volition just as truly the natural properties of this highly organised substance, as the less wonderful properties are the results of combining simpler elementary substances?" The argument is plausible, and many who have followed the process of thought so easily are tempted to agree with the speculator.

But there is one link missing in this chain of argument. Where is the starting point, the *ego*, the perceiving subject, to be found, and whence is it to be obtained? We seem to be brought gradually up to it, but we really started *from* it, and the "evolution" by which we reach the mind itself, is purely a *mental* evolution—the operation of the mind itself. The mind traces out, recognises, and believes in these combinations, yet when the mind itself is reached in the process of thought, its distinctive peculiarity is ignored. This distinctive peculiarity is its knowledge of itself—its power to recognise itself as distinct from the material adjuncts by which it operates. Or to put the argument in a concrete form: I know and follow this train of thought, but I find no place in it for the introduction of *consciousness*, except by the action of a set of factors of which *consciousness* can testify nothing, yet which can be known only *through* (but not *in*) *consciousness*. That veracious traveller, Baron Munchausen, tells an entertaining story of his descent from the moon by means of a rope of straw. He tied one end of the rope to the moon's horn, and let himself down to the lower end of the rope. Then he cut off the upper end of the rope and *tied the cut end to the lower end*, and so proceeded, cutting and tying, until he reached the earth.

The process of reasoning up to mental phenomena by a gradual approach from the qualities of inorganic matter, much resembles Munchausen's descent from the moon. In the outset we cut ourselves entirely loose from consciousness, and tie the broken cord of our reasoning to something outside us, and so proceed until we get into ourselves again, through a process of reasoning about things outside ourselves. When entangled in such arguments, it is well for us to reach a clear and unshaken conviction as to what we really know and what we do not know. If we can grasp clearly and hold firmly the simple truth that the thinking substance—call it mind, soul, spirit, *ego*, what you will—this thinking substance really exists, that it knows *itself*, and recognises itself as acting, or is *conscious*, then we have reached a fundamental truth. We have come down with Des Cartes to the granite foundations of all thought and we cannot be lightly moved.

Now this truth is admitted in so many words by men who yet endeavor to slip away from the consequences of their admission. John Stuart Mill in a posthumous essay on Immortality, thus speaks of Mind as the only reality :

“Feeling and thought are much more real than anything else; they are the only things which we directly know to be real. all things else being merely the unknown conditions on which these, in our present state of existence or in some other, depend. All matter, apart from the feelings of sentient beings, has but an hypothetical and unsubstantial existence; it is a mere assumption to account for our sensations: itself we do not perceive, we are not conscious of it, but only of the sensations which we are said to receive from it; in reality it is a mere name for our expectation of sensations, or for our belief that we can have certain sensations, when certain other sensations give indication of them.” “Mind (or whatever name we give to what is implied in consciousness of a continual series of feelings) is in a philosophical point of view the only reality of which we have any evidence; and no analogy can be recognised or comparison made between it and other realities, because there are no other known realities to compare it with.”

So also Huxley, in one of his “Lay Sermons,” touching the “Discourse” of Des Cartes, after describing the manner in which Des Cartes sought to reach a certainty as the first principle of philosophy, continues thus :

“What, then, is certain? Why, the fact that the thought, the present consciousness, exists. Our thoughts may be delusive, but they cannot be fictitious. As thoughts they are real and existent, and the cleverest deceiver cannot make them otherwise. Thus thought is existence. More than that, so far as we are concerned, existence is thought, all our conceptions of existence being some kind or other of thought. Do not for a moment suppose that these are mere paradoxes or subtleties. A little reflection upon the commonest facts proves them to be irrefragable truths.” “Nor is our knowledge of anything we know or feel more or less than a knowledge of states of consciousness. And our whole life is made up of such states. Some of these states we refer to a cause we call ‘self;’ others, to a cause or causes which may be comprehended under the title of ‘not self.’ But neither of the existence of ‘self;’ nor of that of ‘not self;’ have we, or can we by any possibility have, any such unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of the states of consciousness which we consider to be their effects.”

The doctrine of Herbert Spencer and of Alexander Bain is, that matter and mind have no separate and independent existence; that of “these antithetical conceptions of spirit and matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the unknown reality which underlies both.” It would be unjust to set this down as materialism, for pure materialism is disavowed by these writers and by many who accept their theory. The truth is, that the definition looks both ways, and can be taken in either a spiritual or material sense as may be preferred. It would seem impossible to induce the large mass of reflecting men to hold this theory pure and simple. For, why not suppose, as seems so much simpler, that matter is the known reality, and what we call spirit only its highest known form of manifestation? The Christian theist wishes to look upon the “unknown reality” as something not comprehended or comprehensible indeed, but as truly grasped by faith, and revered as God. Spencer’s theory seems to give up our only certain knowledge, namely, our consciousness of our thoughts and feelings, for a vague belief which leans on “an unknown reality!” Certainly we must confess that we know even ourselves inadequately, yet this knowledge, imperfect as it is, is the only certain knowledge we have. And if we give up our *knowledge* of the existence of this real something that thinks and feels and wills, (no matter by

what name we may call it,) we can easily persuade ourselves that there is nothing in the external universe, no Being above this world of ours, who thinks and wills. This is the natural and necessary outcome of materialism—atheism: and it has always been recognised as its legitimate offspring. We must retain our faith in the human spirit, (to give a name to this conscious soul-thing,) or our belief in the Divine Spirit will ultimately vanish.

Let us turn now directly to the problem itself. How do we know the existence of any external material object—for instance, a tree? The answer is given, "Because I see it, or perceive it." But do we perceive or see the tree itself? We can follow the rays of light to the image on the retina, we can follow the effects produced in the nerves up to the sensorium, but there we must stop. At once, by some subtle magic, the undulations of light waves, and the vibrations of nervous matter are replaced by the *mental perception* of the tree. How, when, where, the transition took place; what is the nature of the connexion between the material and spiritual parts of the act; is the question of questions in psychology. If we examine ourselves, we know certainly only this: a certain impression is made upon the senses, and our consciousness of the effect of this impression gives us what we call the *perception* of the external object—the excitant of the perception. There can be no perception without the perceiving subject. But there may be perception without the actual existence of the perceived object. We may be vividly impressed with the reality of an object which has no existence save in the excited condition of our own nerves and brain. We may dream of a tree and it may seem as real to us as if we actually saw the object. Or we may call up, by the "visualising power," the image of some well known tree, with perfect accuracy. How, then, can we be sure of the external existence of any object which is perceived by us, since the information which reaches us as to any object must come through the channel of consciousness? When an acute and subtle reasoner like Berkeley explains away the objective reality of the substance underlying the phenomena of color, form, size, etc., perceived in the tree, what answer can we make to him? The most certain knowledge we

have, is the knowledge of an instantaneous mental state, whether the impression be made through the senses or directly through consciousness. Everything else depends on the memory, the representative faculty, or on a train of inferences from certain present phenomena. Yet our "common sense" believes in the existence of any particular tree which is actually seen with the waking eye, or which is even remembered as existing, in spite of the idealist's argument. The proof which may be said to force conviction on the mind as to the fact of the real existence of a material and external world, is not the knowledge of specific and isolated objects, but the knowledge we gain of relations existing between those objects, the orderly arrangement of the universe, and the laws of nature which control all things. Our belief in the existence of any single external object may be shaken by our knowledge of the fact that we are liable to misinterpret the testimony of the senses, and also to substitute subjective impressions for objective realities. But can we persuade ourselves that the great classes and groups and orders of natural objects are but mental creations? Can the botanist believe that all the orders and divisions of plants known to him, have no existence but in his own mind? Or can the anatomist believe that comparative anatomy is based upon imaginary existences? Are we not convinced that law and order prevail in an external material universe? And do not they furnish us with a stronger proof of the reality of that universe than does our knowledge of a single specific object? Yet this stronger proof (for stronger it certainly seems) implies in us a mind to perceive and appreciate this law and order, and certainly seems to demand a designing Intelligence as the cause of law and order. For what are law and order? Are they real objective existences, or are they mental creations? do they depend purely on our empirical knowledge of the universe around us? Either natural law and the order of nature exist *per se*, or they exist only in relation to our minds. That is, natural laws must be either only "invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by our experience," or they must have an independent existence apart from our experience.

Assuming, then, that they are invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by experience, does it not follow that were our experience swept away, were every sentient creature on this globe annihilated at once, these natural laws would cease to exist? Certainly they would cease to exist *as known to us*, and it may be said we have no right to ask whether they could have any other and independent existence. But though Positivism may decline the question, man's reason craves an answer to it. We believe that these laws would continue to exist. We believe, as science teaches, that these natural laws existed for untold ages before any percipient intelligence made its appearance on this planet. We believe that when the solar system, and the universe beyond, existed only as a nebulous mass, according to the scientific hypothesis, these natural laws existed, that the forces acted in accordance with these laws upon the nebulous mass and gradually evolved its symmetry and order out of chaos. Here religion, science, and philosophy are all at one, so far as belief is concerned.

But what were these natural laws if here on earth no percipient mind existed, when they could not therefore be defined as "invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by experience"? Did they exist as forms of matter, or properties of matter, or potentialities of matter? This is an incomprehensible, if not an unthinkable, proposition.

But if these natural laws existed *then*, they must have been related to something. We may say *now*, in this age, that they are related to our experience, our intelligence; but to what were they related in the very dawn of cosmical history? There seems to be no insuperable obstacle to our believing that they were related to a great Intelligence—even to the Divine Mind. For it is belief, and not knowledge, upon which we must rest at this stage of our inquiry. The belief in invariable natural law stretches far beyond the horizon of our present or past experience. The scientific investigator, in his theories, carries these laws with him back into the earliest dawn of creation or evolution, and holds that they existed then, and we fully share in this belief. But must we not ask this question as to the relation of these laws to

thought in that period? To us the knowledge of these laws is a source of wonderful power over natural forces, and we can forecast future discoveries by means of hypotheses based on belief in the ceaseless and unvarying action of these laws. Why may they not have existed then in the dim dawn of cosmical history; not as "experiences," but as "invariable co-existences and sequences" based on a Divine Intelligence and a Divine Will? In this way Berkeley accounts for natural laws. "Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature, and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas in the ordinary course of things." This is the same view of natural laws that is held by Hume, Brown, Comte, and John Stuart Mill, that they are "co-existences and sequences known to us by experience." Now Berkeley demands that we shall believe them to be produced by the Divine Intelligence, and that our mental conceptions of these laws are but the ideas which God implants in our minds as the means of our gaining a knowledge of the external world.

If, then, law and order have a real and independent existence apart from us, and exist not simply when perceived by us, on what does that existence depend? On matter? Such a thing is inconceivable. For the laws of nature are the methods of acting of those forces which have caused the universe as we know it. To make these laws properties of matter would be to confound effect with cause and stultify all thinking. Can we hang these great conceptions on nothing? Must not natural laws seek and find their home "in the bosom of God"? The conception of the mental or spiritual is necessarily antecedent to that of the material. And if so, supposing the doctrine of evolution in its widest sweep to be true, can it disprove the existence of a God, who knew from all eternity how his work should be evolved in the course of ages? When Tyndall proclaims to us, "I discern in matter the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," are we not compelled to ask, "Whence the discerning *ego* which reads into matter these 'potencies' which seem well nigh infinite?"

If natural law and the order of the universe, as known to us, are after all only forms of our own intelligence projected upon nature, why may not that intelligence project the whole of external nature also—its substance no less than its form; and the mind of the thinker be left, as Fichte imagined it, alone in a vast universe of its own creation? The supposition is not a whit less probable or less philosophical than the supposition that in the beginning matter was, and nought else, and that in some way matter evolved force, and force evolved law, and force working by law evolved a Kosmos, and through the course of ages a conscious intellect was at last evolved, which recognised all this process and woke up to the mystery that Itself was the greatest mystery of all. "But," say the opponents of the theistic conception, "we do not suppose matter to have been the only thing existing, we assume that there was force also;" and it turns out that they believe this force to have acted, not blindly nor vainly, but in accordance with fixed and immutable law. And then recur all the perplexing questions which we have hinted at, touching the relation of law to intelligence. It may be said that such an argument is inconclusive, and this is true. But this train of thought certainly seems to render the argument for bare materialism inconclusive also, and to leave us ready to accept with gratitude the theistic belief that an Intelligence is at the origin of all things, and that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

It may be said again, that the only consequence of idealism is the scepticism which Hume developed from Berkeley's arguments, and which Huxley upholds to-day as the most rational philosophy touching the origin of all things. But we may safely conclude that absolute scepticism is an impossibility for the vast majority of thinking men. We must learn to use scepticism rightly, before we can settle down in faith. We must learn to doubt the tacit assumptions and outspoken sneers of some who wish, under the powerful name of scientific thought, to get rid of mind in man, and of God in the universe. We must go down to these fundamental principles, these eternal antitheses which have

divided and are likely to divide the philosophical thought of man during his whole existence.

As the conclusion of our investigations, we lay down the following propositions which seem to stand on a firm basis of positive knowledge :

1. There exists something (we may call it "Mind," or "the *ego*,") which knows, and recognises itself as knowing, feeling, or willing. This knowledge, which we term consciousness, is the most certain to which we can attain.

2. Consciousness implies not merely the knowledge of an instantaneous mental state. but along with each specific act of consciousness there exists the recognition of self (or the *ego*) as something previously existing, and as having been the subject of like or unlike mental experiences in the past. Thus our knowledge of self is really our consciousness of the permanence of the *ego*, through all the changing mental states which it experiences.

3. All human thought is conditioned by the fundamental antithesis of the *ego* and the non-*ego*; or the "self," and "not self."

4. All our knowledge of the non-*ego*, or the "external world," comes to us invariably through the channel of consciousness. If we analyse each impression believed to be made upon us by an external object, we find it to imply not only the belief in some external cause (external to the *ego*), but also a knowledge of self as recognising that cause and assigning it to the non-*ego*.

5. The conviction of the existence of an external universe is produced in us, not so much by our contemplation of any specific object, as by our acquired knowledge of the existence of groups of related objects. These groups of related objects lead us to the perception of law and order as existing in the external world, so far as known to us. This applies, not to our instinctive common sense *belief* in an external world, but to our speculative attempts to prove the existence of such a world.

6. Law and order, as known to us, are either merely products of our own experience, or they are not such products. If they are, we do not know whether they existed prior to our experience of them; and hence we can form no scientific hypothesis as to

the method of evolution of the cosmos. If they are *not* products of our experience, but have an independent existence, we cannot conceive of them as properties of matter, but as qualities of intelligence and will, which necessitate our belief in the existence of a Divine Mind.

7. If our intelligence acting through its experience can create the ideas of law and order, then our intelligence is able also to create the idea of a material external world; and we can have no evidence as to the existence of anything except mind.

8. Pure idealism cannot shake our faith in the existence of a material universe; but it can be employed to show that pure materialism is quite as absurd and unreasonable, and as directly opposed to our fundamental convictions.

9. We can thus convince ourselves speculatively of the real existence of the Mind or Spirit as the source of all our knowledge. Thus we are left open to all the converging lines of argument which prove that, behind all substance and law and order, there exists a Divine Intelligence and a Divine Will.

ARTICLE III.

THE FAILURES AND FALLACIES OF PRE-HISTORIC ARCHÆOLOGY.

The Epoch of the Mammoth, and the Apparition of Man upon the Earth. By JAMES C. SOUTHALL, A. M., LL.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Illustrated. Crown 8vo., pp. 430.

In a former number of this REVIEW, (January, 1877), an extended notice was presented of Mr. Southall's first work, entitled "The Recent Origin of Man." Great as were the merits of that volume, we felt confident that its author had just entered upon a career of investigation well suited to his genius and taste, and that other productions of his pen, on kindred subjects, would

in due time appear. This expectation has now been verified in the present work, which, although less voluminous than its predecessor, is justly regarded as an equally important and successful contribution to the mass of our scientific literature.

The path of inquiry to which Mr. Southall has devoted his fine abilities and untiring energy, is, from its nature, secluded and obscure, and one which, in its objective details, presents few attractions to the general reader. But the truth which such efforts are destined to evolve, possesses an interest to which no pure and cultivated mind can be insensible. The past physical conditions of the planet we inhabit, and the changes wrought by time and the fluctuations of climatic forces upon its surface, would of themselves amply reward the labor spent in their investigation. A far more varied and attractive field is presented by the organic kingdoms of nature, their origin, their changes, and their periods of development and decline. But the interest culminates in intensity when our own species becomes the absorbing theme. The light which science is able to throw upon the history of man will ever be hailed with warm appreciation by those who recognise the dignity of his place in creation, and acknowledge the importance of his future destiny. The several steps that are necessary to the discovery of truth, may be wearisome to the plodding observer; but the results, if promotive of human welfare and elevating to human hopes, cannot fail to enlist the warmest feelings of our nature. Nor, on the other hand, can the sincere friend of his race contemplate the opposite results without an interest of another kind. The obliteration of our present knowledge, the overthrow of faith, and the extinction of hope, if ever to be achieved by science, would be a mournful consummation of its labors.

Such, then, is the obvious importance of these calm inquiries into the testimony which observation can extract from nature in reference to the world's chronology. They are not mere speculations, or the disjointed notes of an idle curiosity. Grave and solemn issues are involved. Great truths are the objects of pursuit, and great errors are to be successfully exposed. The veil is to be lifted from many a dark recess, and the gaze of mankind

turned in upon the records of the past. The obscure pursuits of the archæologist and antiquarian may thus be brought out into public view, and the general reader be enabled to survey the scene in which faith and unbelief are engaged in their conflict of ages. It may be of no small benefit to us to discover, in the light of such books as these, that human nature, with its various vices and infirmities, accompanies human effort into every sphere, and that the votaries of science may be not only as noble and great, but as ridiculous and contemptible, as any other class of men.

There is no legitimate quarrel between scientists and theologians; but the polemical spirit is natural to both, and this spirit has betrayed itself in no small degree during the controversy, initiated by geology, concerning the age of the earth. The world should know that all the prejudice and sophistry usually charged by the parties upon each other, is not, in this case, confined to one side. The assailants of the old faith have not been a whit behind their opponents in rancor or unfairness. All the affected coolness and composure which they feel bound to exhibit as philosophers or searchers after truth, is not sufficient to hide the *animus* of their efforts to undermine and destroy a system around which the hopes and affections of mankind have clung with sacred devotion for so many thousands of years. The methods adopted by many of these men to accomplish their purpose are an instructive study, and furnish abundant illustration of the recklessness and depravity of our common nature. But overlooking the moral features of the controversy, the candid reader may be entertained and amused with an exhibition of the alleged facts and pretended logic employed by some of these savans in their work of demolition. The grave theologian may deal with them with a becoming severity, but others may be allowed to examine their proceedings in a calm, judicial manner, to follow them patiently in their various paths of exploration and discovery, and to sift and weigh with cool deliberation the statements and arguments in which they come before the world. For such a task Mr. Southall is eminently fitted, by temper, genius, and mental discipline. There is noth-

ing of the sectarian or partisan about him. His examinations are conducted with an ardor purely intellectual. The success of his first volume has justified our commendation. Ignored by his Northern countrymen, he is appreciated abroad, and his valuable labors have been recognised by some of the most eminent scientists of Great Britain and the Continent. He cannot remain unobserved even in the United States. His merits will at last overcome the political prejudice that continues so shamefully to exclude from recognition the best intellectual products of the South.

Comparing the present volume with its predecessor, we are pleased to find that much more pains have been taken by the author to bring his discussions within the range of public observation. It is smaller, more compact, more easily handled, studied, and enjoyed. Much of the material formerly used has been excluded, new observations have been introduced with less detail and more effect, and the argument has been restricted and reinforced in a manner well calculated to impress its conclusions upon the reader. The book is, in fact, a new volume on the same general subject, in which the most recent phases of the pending controversy are discussed with the preciseness and vigor they demand. Of the Megalithic Monuments, which occupied much space in the former work, little remained to be said. A new examination is made of the Lake Dwellings, the Bone Caves, and the River Gravel, as also of the "Recent Changes in Physical Geography." The explorations of Dr. Schliemann at Troy and Mycenæ have undergone a fresh review, and interesting discussions of the remains at Solutr  are introduced, which add new interest to the scene. But in addition to these subjects, which are common to the two volumes, the present work contains several chapters upon still more recent observations in the Old World and in America, which cannot fail to attract the attention and engage the admiring interest of the reader.

Before entering more particularly into the character of the contents of "The Epoch of the Mammoth," we will doubtless be pardoned for indicating, with some distinctness, the nature and status of the question at issue. Many geologists and other scien-

tific observers, professing a pure devotion to the cause of truth, claim to have discovered in the stratification of the crust of the earth, and in a multitude of vegetable and animal remains brought to light by their explorations, convincing evidence that man has lived upon our planet much longer than the Bible, literally interpreted, has taught us to believe. Their estimates vary from decades of thousands to many millions of years. The frequent publication of these opinions has naturally aroused the friends of Revelation to inquire into the alleged facts upon which they claim to be founded. Theologians as well as scientists profess an earnest love of truth, but the truth they defend has been supposed to rest upon infallible historical proof. The records of science and those of history are thus brought into apparent conflict, and the two classes of advocates are arrayed in lines of battle confronting each other. Each party makes truth the stake and the prize. It is important, however, to ascertain what they respectively mean by the term. If they are aiming at the same ultimate object, why are they thus contending? Is truth *in the abstract* worth the prolonged agony of so desperate a conflict? Surely not. No mere abstraction can justify a war of many generations. The mere knowledge of truth offers no benefit to mankind, independently of the nature it contains. This is easily shown. There is a choice between optimism and pessimism. If the Christian system is true, and heaven is within reach of all mankind who may desire to reach it, a certain objective fact is presented to the mind. If Nihilism be the true system, another and opposite object is before us. But the mere knowledge of either can be of no advantage to any one, irrespective of his conduct, his hopes, or his fears. The cognition of the fact, without influence upon our feelings or our lives, would be simply an addition to the records of memory, and contribute nothing to our happiness or welfare. Truth, therefore, to be of any value, must be considered in its objective and subjective relations. Under this view, there is an infinite difference between Christianity and Nihilism. Now, the truth for which the Christian is contending is a positive and eternal good, and we have a right to be informed, on the other hand, what that truth is for which the scientist exhibits as much

zeal as the missionary, and compasses sea and land to fill the world with his proselytes. There is an affected way of writing and speaking on this subject which is discreditable to the candor of the parties. The abstraction of Truth is set up on a shrine, and, with an apparently holy ardor, which few Christians can equal, her devotees insist that all men shall fall down before the object of their worship. But when we seek to discover what is meant by the worship and what is the real divinity they have enshrined, they are absolutely dumb. The solution is, that, under the name of truth, a multitude of theories, fancies, and prejudices is comprised. The object of devotion takes its form and hue from the temper and taste, the education and habits, of each individual zealot. With some it is Pantheism, with others Materialism, and with others still a mere Negation.

The contest, then, is not between one and another class of the advocates of truth, but between Christianity and certain substitutes therefor. Even supposing Revelation to be utterly untrue and all religion a sham, it is reasonable for thinking men to demand of what character the substitutes are to be. The division of religionists into a great number of sects and creeds is a standing reproach. But all agree in one positive offer of future happiness to those who embrace the proposed conditions. On the contrary, we find the many sects of those scientists who are engaged in the crusade against Christianity, agreeing in no offer whatever, promising no benefit to the world, but simply holding out the prospect of reaching, in a course of ages, a barren knowledge of facts, which may or may *not* conduce to the benefit of mankind. For it might turn out to be true, according to the hypothesis, that the world is hastening, without remedy, to a hopeless catastrophe! Such information, we confess, we would rather be without. It would be benevolent to conceal from a destined victim the knowledge of his inevitable doom.

We venture to assume that science, as well as religion, must invest the truth which she pursues with a certain preconceived character. Knowledge, to be worth knowing, must be such as promises to improve and benefit mankind. But on this important question, no answer can be obtained. Sceptics are busy in

their efforts to pull down and destroy what they denounce as superstition, but they are challenged in vain to point out, even in general terms, the advantage to be derived from the change. The whole proceeding wears the appearance of infatuation. Columbus would have been a madman, indeed, if he had plunged into unknown seas without some better excuse than an idle curiosity. True science ought to be distinguished from its counterfeits by zeal for the advancement of our race in virtue and happiness; and we insist that its followers shall exhibit distinctly the advantages they expect from their successes. It is no sufficient answer to proclaim that they are in the pursuit of *facts*. Truth can accomplish no good whatever, unless it is of such a nature as to contribute to the refinement and elevation of society, to the purity, dignity, and virtuous happiness of man. All rational and legitimate inquiry must begin with a belief that good will attend the effort. A theory must precede all inductive processes. Without some conception of the beneficial result, all such pursuits are like the staggering of a blind man through a pathless wilderness.

The candid thinker cannot avoid seeing that, in this view of the case, there is a powerful presumption for Christianity, derived from the contrast it presents to every opposing system. Christianity offers to our race the highest conceivable perfection and an eternal enjoyment. We are not aware of any bright promise being held out by sceptical science, in any of its forms. Conceding to many of its cultivators a sincere love of truth, we may still ask what the world could gain by their labors, even should they result in the overthrow of all religious institutions. What satisfactory assurance can they give us of a life of happiness beyond the grave? What efficacious remedy do they propose for the evils of the present life? The presumption is overwhelming that the best system is the true one. For the followers of science must necessarily propose some good from their pursuits to justify their zeal, however vague their professions may be. They assume that the increase of knowledge from accumulated facts will, in some undefined way, greatly further the cause of civilisation. They insist that truth thus acquired will necessarily elevate as

well as enlighten their fellow men. But Christianity has *already* done this, and, in addition, has given hope and strength to millions on the bed of death. We say the best system is the true one, because, if truth owes its value to its beneficent results, we should expect to find it where these effects are most evident. It would be a very strange philosophy which should acknowledge that a false system gives assurance of richer blessings than any true system can claim.

But we will not discuss the Christian evidences. We aim simply to show that those speculative observers of Nature whose opinions and calculations are now indirectly under review, are engaged in laborious efforts to establish they know not what, upon the ruins of a faith that has already proved an inestimable blessing to mankind. Their speculations are not only wanting in the presumption of truth, but wanting in that high moral element which a proper regard for the best interests of others would imply. Surely a true philosophy will not engage in the work of disorder and destruction, pulling down and demolishing the venerable institutions of the past, without any definite plan of reorganisation and reform to compensate the world for its loss. This would not be philosophy, but madness.

So much for the spirit of this crusade. What shall be said of its *method*? Believing in the unity of truth, we have no aversion for the work of patient observation in which many investigators are engaged. We hope for a great amount of good from their labors in the end, although it is to be feared that generation after generation must perish before these hopes are realised. But whenever the result shall come, it must have an appreciable value as an element of progress. Facts well ascertained, and duly classified, are among the most precious of human acquisitions. No conscientious and intelligent Christian can object to the accumulation of facts from nature. The Church is founded on just such materials. But there is a wide difference between facts and fancies, and an equal difference between observation and inference. Here is the point of departure in the career of error. These speculative gentlemen, who have suffered so much in the hands of Mr. Southall, have shown themselves to be as credulous

as any of the victims of superstition, and as precipitate in their deductions as the most impulsive theorist. We had always understood that an interpreter of nature ought to be remarkably quick to see, and slow to believe, and, above all men, cautious in making up generalisations in advance from an inadequate number of observations. Our information must have been erroneous. The number of details is enormous, but a well established fact, bearing upon scientific results, is extremely rare. The gold bears such a small proportion to the mass of earth produced, that the mining must be regarded as a very discouraging operation. And yet the parties engaged in it startle the world continually with sensational announcements of success. On the question before us, relating to the chronology of the Bible, we have frequent bulletins of discoveries that are thought to settle the difficulty beyond controversy. But the alleged facts are soon punctured by some other sharp observer, and immediately collapse. In all candor, we must give these gentlemen due credit for an exalted degree of imagination—a faculty better adapted for the realm of poetry than for the work of observation.

We agree with Mr. Southall, that it is difficult to reason with parties who manifest so supreme a contempt for logical principles. How, for example, can a man rationally refute Prof. Tyndall, who refers the origin of the universe to *chance*, and its construction to *necessity*? The proposition appears to the logician palpably contradictory—an absurd blending of two opposite theories. How can one argue with Mr. Darwin, who builds up a system of development founded upon protoplasm, and leaves the protoplasm itself without a foundation? Is it at all superior, in the light of reason, to the cosmogony of the Hindoos, the earth on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise? The difficulty is to treat with seriousness opinions that appear to be founded upon no discoverable premises, and to be propagated by suggestions rather than by argument. The same method is pursued by the eminent authorities whose geological and antiquarian speculations are especially subjected to criticism in the volumes before us. Fancy takes the place of facts, and conjecture is substituted for reason-

ing, until chronology is lost in a wild succession of disordered dreams.

It does not seem to have occurred to the assailants of Revelation, that *written* records are our principal source of information after all. The facts to which they appeal are conveyed to us through this channel. If written history is untrustworthy, what reliance can be placed in the publications of science? The testimony of Moses comes to us in at least as credible a form as that of Sir Charles Lyell or Sir John Lubbock. If the one states a fact, and the other a conflicting fact, which are we to believe? It is evidently a question to be determined by the credibility of evidence. In a large majority of cases, we have no experimental knowledge of the facts. Everything depends upon the testimony. And yet these gentlemen will not listen to the testimony of sacred historians, and insist that written records cannot be received in contradiction of the facts of observation, forgetting that these facts reach us through similar channels. And it ought also to be remembered, that observations cannot be mutually contradictory, unless they belong to the same system. A present impression is never in conflict with a record of the past, where there is nothing in common between them. But the present is brought into comparison with the past by the faculty of reason. No matter what the facts may be, their significance depends upon their rational bearing upon some hypothesis. In regard to the origin of man, there are but four possible solutions: 1st. An eternal existence. 2d. A creation of material, and development from the union of protoplasmic cells. 3d. An immediate creation at a time indefinitely past. 4th. The Mosaic History. Into each of these doctrines, the *supernatural* must enter. For all is supernatural which cannot be accounted for on natural principles. No objection can lie against one of the hypotheses that does not apply to the others. Our facts, being regarded as valid for one or another of them, can only operate against a particular system by establishing some other in its place. One hypothesis involving the supernatural must give way for another. Every relevant fact, therefore, which is brought to light by observation, must be such as will tend to establish some cosmical theory which is mar-

vellous and incomprehensible, and open to the very objections from which scepticism is endeavoring to escape.

We may even concede that many of this class of writers are honest in declaring that they have no definite hypothesis in view; and still it remains true that all relevant facts must range themselves under one or another system. But it is certain that the overthrow of *superstition* is the professed object of others, and here we find them plunging headlong into conclusions far more favorable to superstition than any historical record can be. For it is obvious that imagination must revel in a field of speculation, in which the landmarks of history have disappeared. And such is the scene of these observations, in which many of the most eminent scientists of our day are diligently laboring. The importance of Mr. Southall's investigations is greatly enhanced by considering the nature of his undertaking, and the destructive tendency of the efforts of his antagonists. His is a conservative task; theirs, a work of revolution. And what a revolution! Suppose them successful. To construe the consequences in the most favorable terms, the world would be abandoned to natural religion, which would assume innumerable forms, according to the diversities of human opinion. Countless ages must elapse before the most rational system could gain the ascendancy; and, in the meantime, mankind, released from the restraints and deprived of the salutary influences of Christianity, but left to the tender mercies of heathen superstition, must contend, helpless and hopeless, against the evils they cannot escape.

This is the mildest representation we can give of the probable consequences of success. A much darker picture may reasonably be drawn. A sudden overthrow of Christianity appears to us the heaviest of all calamities. With Christian faith, Christian morals must go down. A civilisation, like that of Greece in the time of Pericles, and of Rome in the age of Augustus, may be secured without its influence; but who would desire to see such a civilisation restored on the ruins of that which we enjoy? Peace without independence or liberty, culture without virtue or purity—these would be a poor compensation for the loss of all the spiritual motives by which these western nations are now con-

trolled and preserved. Nothing could be expected but a rapid descent of mankind into sloth, slavery, debauchery, and crime.

It will be understood that we have no quarrel with facts, but feel it to be a privilege and duty to deal with the testimony by which they are promulgated, with the same freedom which opposing parties assume in dealing with the testimony of apostles and martyrs. We should rather say that we are bound to show them an example of fairness and candor. Let them once adopt a definite faith, and seal it with their blood, and then we shall be the last critics in the world to withhold from them that respect which is ever due to a sincere advocacy of truth.

The author of the "Epoch of the Mammoth" is not an observer himself, but is engaged in research among the observations of others. He appeals to facts, but these facts are such as scientists themselves have recorded. The evidence is their own. It will astonish many a reader to find that these alleged facts are, for the most part, directly opposed to the theory constructed upon them. The theory is, that man has occupied the earth for hundreds of thousands or millions of years, and in every part of the globe has passed through three successive stages, represented by the stone age, the bronze age, and the iron age. The age of stone is divided into two immense periods, called Palæolithic and Neolithic, from the comparative degree of polish and finish discovered in the stone implements by which they are distinguished. In his former work, "The Recent Origin of Man," Mr. Southall had demonstrated that the stone age, in many instances, overlaps the others. A critic endeavoring to evade the force of this argument, has very poetically represented the theory as follows: "Like the three principal colors of the rainbow, these three stages of civilisation overlap, intermingle, and shade off the one into the other, and yet their succession, as far as Western Europe is concerned, appears to be equally well defined with that of the prismatic colors." But the poetry of the picture is sadly marred by the facts. It will be found that the overlapping is from beginning to end, and the iron goes back to primitive times, whilst the stone comes down to our own.

Sir John Lubbock furnishes us with a characteristic illustration. VOL. XXIX., NO. 4—10.

tion of the rational method adopted by the class of observers to which he belongs. Referring to the great change in the climate of Europe effected by the transition from the Palæolithic to the Neolithic age, he remarks: "These and similar facts, though they afford us no means of measurement, impress us with a vague and overpowering sense of antiquity." Should a theologian declare that a diligent and devout study of the Scriptures is calculated to impress us "with a *vague and overpowering sense*" of their inspired character, the sentiment would be denounced by these same parties as mystical and superstitious. Yet they do not hesitate to erect, on such premises, a pretentious claim to accurate observation and convincing argument.

It is not proposed to dissect Mr. Southall's present volume, or attempt to exhibit the order in which his subject is treated. It will suffice to say that the "Epoch of the Mammoth" is a continuance of his discussion of the Origin of Man, in a more succinct form and more popular style, and likely to add greatly to the reputation he has acquired among the cultivators of science in both hemispheres. We prefer to avail ourselves of his researches to make good our estimate of the labors of such men as Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Boyd Dawkins, and others who have contributed so much to the agitation of the pending question.

Is it true that the history of mankind is always preceded by a savage state, or that this savage state in any country implies a longer existence than that commonly received? In order to establish the affirmative, it is obviously necessary to show, from the remains discovered in various parts of the globe, that a savage state existed *before* the historic period, and that, in some part of the world at least, it occupied a vast tract of time. Now it cannot be denied that history extends further back in Central Asia and Egypt than it does in any other country; and few will dispute that, as far as their history goes, it reveals a wonderful civilisation. Archæology is, therefore, bound to demonstrate an epoch in those regions in which that civilisation gradually emerged from a savage state. It would be a plain contradiction of authentic history to trace it by migration to any other quarter. Is

it possible to prove this primitive condition of the Assyrians and Egyptians by characteristic remains? If it cannot be done, we think it may be shown that the enormous conjectures of the scientists are unworthy of a passing notice. In reference to this point, we employ the evidence they themselves have furnished, and find it not only deficient, but self-destructive.

It is not denied that the implements characteristic of savage life, and especially savage warfare, are found abundantly among the ruins of these great empires. Such remains of primitive man may be deposited in any country by the invasion or passage of inferior tribes. The Indians on our western border at the present day might leave the traces of their existence among the habitations of a civilised community. Flint arrow-heads and stone tomahawks picked up in a succeeding generation, would be no proof that the red man is of an older race than the white inhabitants. When an Egyptian conqueror levied auxiliary troops among his savage subjects in the interior of Africa, and marched them down the Nile, what was there to prevent the occasional deposit of their weapons of war upon the soil, to be collected by some modern antiquarian for his museum? It is obvious that the discovery would not warrant the conclusion that the tribes to which such weapons belonged were older than the Egyptians themselves. Archæologists insist that the implements must be found in *older* geological formations. And here Mr. Southall is positive, after the most laborious investigation, that the evidence is altogether wanting. "Behind the Pyramids, and the ruins of the old Chaldean cities, there is, as we have said, no human footprint. Man appears to have intruded upon the scene suddenly and abruptly, and his advent was at once signalled by the erection of those great tombs and temples which are the first objects to betray the presence of a guiding and intelligent mind." In proof of this assertion, he declares that the palæolithic implements discovered in these countries are never found in geological strata or other positions indicative of greater age than the old monuments around them. This fact was announced in his previous work, and an effort was made by able critics to impair its force; but, after all, no proof of the kind

required has been produced. The remains are not in the geological horizon that underlies the dates of the historical period. Sir John Lubbock states that he found such remains on the slopes of the hills above the level of the inundation of the Nile. But what has that to do with the question? If an observer should find American coins in the same localities, would that prove that the builders of the Pyramids were a *modern* race? The argument would be precisely the same. In such an inquiry, the situation and association of the objects discovered are everything. When these gentlemen are constructing a theory for Western Europe, they are strenuous in their efforts to show that the palæolithic implements are found *beneath* the formations containing more modern remains. They must be associated with the fossils of extinct animals. They are pointed out at great depths in river gravel, or in limestone caves under deep beds of stalagmite. But in Egypt and Assyria they attempt to evade these very conditions, and cite with an air of triumph the discovery of such objects in tombs and temples, and *on the surface of the ground*.

We think we may safely maintain not only what the author asserts, that there was no stone age in Egypt and Assyria, but roundly and emphatically that there was no stone age any where. This expression implies a distinct epoch, clearly distinguishable by characteristic features from other ages of the world. But where are these characteristics to be found? The archæological authorities admit an overlapping of one series over others, and in many instances it appears that the lapping extends across number two to number three. Now we ask, in all soberness, if lapping can be allowed in chronology? Can one period of time extend across another? Neither analogy nor reason will permit such a division. It is not only arbitrary but absurd. But our objection is not simply a verbal one; it also questions the right of any class of writers, treating of chronology, to speak of an age in a vague sense of time, and confine its application to any one country. Why should a stone age be affirmed of France or Spain, without any correspondence of date with the great empires of the East? The *world* has had no stone age, and it is of small importance,

in this controversy, whether particular regions have witnessed such an epoch or not. For it is clear that the researches of Rawlinson, Layard, and Smith in Assyria, and those of Champollion, Wilkinson, and Mariette in Egypt, have revealed nothing like such a period in these birth-places of civilisation, and there is no evidence whatever that any region of the globe contains an older population. If this be so, as we propose to show, the theory of a stone age, belonging to the chronology of man, is utterly dissipated.

The inquiry is by no means as complicated as the multitude of details handled in the controversy might be supposed to indicate. The simple question is, whether any proof exists, in any part of the world, of a race of men more ancient than those who founded the great empires of the East. We have shown that there is none among their own ruins. The archæologists point to Western Europe, and assure us that many parts of this region abound with evidences to the point. The proof upon which they rely is furnished by the alleged discovery of characteristic remains in situations and associations that indicate a vast age—eight or ten thousand years for the Neolithic and two hundred thousand or millions for the Palæolithic age. The *situations* are in geological beds beneath a series of formations that require a certain length of time for their deposition. The *associations* are with the fossils of extinct races of animals. We will endeavor to ascertain the *character*, rather than the *quantity* of the evidences accumulated under these two distinct heads, having learned in various schools of experience to distinguish between weight and numbers in the matter of facts. For, with all due respect to the parties concerned, we hold that this is not a question to be determined by the cumulative force of irrelevant details.

There is one glaring defect in the calculations of Sir Charles Lyell, and his most eminent living disciples, which fills us with astonishment. We refer to the fallacious assumption of *uniformity*, in the processes of deposition and erosion, upon which all their enormous estimates are founded. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the fallacy. The cone of Tinière, near the Lake of Geneva, was formed by deposition to the height of thirty-

two feet six inches. Four feet from the top Roman relics were found. As the process was arrested about two centuries ago, fourteen or fifteen centuries from that time would carry us back to Roman occupation. The four feet, or forty-eight inches, were deposited during this period. This would give us an average of three and a half inches in a century. M. Morlot proceeds on this basis to estimate the age of the different classes of relics found at different depths, and concludes that the whole cone is ten thousand years old. But the calculation proceeds, from beginning to end, upon the hypothesis of an equal *depth* of deposit in equal times, instead of an equal *amount* of material. It has been demonstrated that, if the quantity was uniformly equal, the thickness must have been less and less, for the plain reason that each successive coat, enlarging the mass of matter, would be extended over an increasing area, and thus admit of less and less depth in a vertical direction. This obvious suggestion would reduce the estimates considerably. But the uniformity is gratuitously assumed, and the probability is equally obvious that, at some periods of the past, the activity of the forces employed in the accumulation may have been vastly greater than at others. Is it not strange, then, that the geologists should attach so much importance to conclusions that rest upon such flimsy premises?

Similar estimates are frequently made from stalagmitic floors in caverns where very ancient relics have been exhumed. This is one of Sir Charles Lyell's great arguments. But no uniformity in the process can be discovered, even at the present day. In some localities it is very slow, in others extremely rapid, and so great are the discrepancies, that Mr. Dawkins, one of the highest authorities since Lyell's death, now admits that "the thickness of layers of stalagmite cannot be used as an argument in support of the remote age of the strata below." Thus it happens continually, in this sceptical camp, that divine providence divides their tongues, as at Babel, and renders their testimony as contradictory as it is vain.

Another illustration is derived from the discussion of the *peat*, and the relics it contains. To this formation, as it is found in the valley of the Somme, geologists are in the habit of ascribing

an enormous age. M. Boucher de Perthes estimates it at thirty thousand years. They assume here, as elsewhere, a uniformity of growth that has no warrant in the history of such deposits. The whole calculation depends upon it as an essential link in the reasoning, and yet it is coolly taken for granted, in opposition to a multitude of conflicting facts. For example: M. de Perthes reports that numerous stumps of trees, standing where they grew, are found covered up in this peat, rising sometimes to a metre in height. He allows about one and a half or two inches, as the progress of accumulation in a century. The tops of these stumps must, therefore, have stood uncovered and undecayed, at least eighteen hundred years from the time the peat began to grow around them. There is not a farmer in the United States who would believe such a statement on the oath of all the scientists in the world! It is simply impossible, unless the stumps are of stone, and even then we would expect the object to be so much changed as to be undefinable.

Again, the valley of the Somme itself has furnished Lyell, Lubbock, Evans, and others, with what they regard as a powerful argument for antiquity. They find beds of river gravel high up on the sides of the valley, and calculate the time that must have elapsed since the river began to cut its way through the soil. Assumed uniformity once more lies at the basis of the estimates. As the gravel beds contain human relics, the age of the human race, in that region, is computed in enormous numbers. But it is shown to have been impossible for the stream, at its present magnitude, to have excavated the soil to such an extent. It would have been only about *half an inch deep*. But if the stream was vastly larger, what becomes of the uniformity? In point of fact, there seems to be every reason to believe that a mighty stream was poured through the channel in some period of the past, resulting in the deposits upon which so much stress is laid. It may have been a strange phenomenon, but not by any means so unaccountable as these freaks of perverted reason that mark the observations of the day. It is strange, indeed, that men who are making reputations, should be so reckless in their deductions. We are furnished with abundant proof of the rapid growth of

peat which utterly destroys the hypothesis of uniformity. The Earl of Cromarty, in 1666, found a fallen forest which had been covered up by it in fifteen years. This would give us a rate of about *ten or twelve* feet in a century. A Roman road is found in Perthshire, under from seven to fourteen feet of peat. At this point, it is eight feet deep, showing a growth of *at least six inches* in a century, but probably much more. In Ireland, vessels containing *butter* have been found at great depths in the same formation. Such facts are cited simply to show the *variability*. It is the same with stalagmite. M. Clausen dug up the stalagmite in a cavern in Brazil, and returning in a few years, found his excavations obliterated by the new incrustation. In a cave near Buxton, England, Roman relics were found under *six feet* of stalagmite. A relic of the twelfth century was found at Gibraltar, under *eighteen inches* of stalagmite. Again the uniformity is destroyed, and it is too plain for argument that calculations on the basis of a uniform rate in the peat or the stalagmite, are absolutely worthless as scientific results. We find it hard to be patient or even courteous under such demands upon our credulity.

Archæologists not only assume a fixed rate of accretion where variability belongs, and thus endeavor to prove the antiquity of man from the *situation* of his remains, but they employ a false premise in reference to their *association* in age with the relics of extinct animals, such as the Mammoth, the Cave Bear, and the Irish Elk. The reader will hardly require to be reminded that such an argument is vain, unless we know how long ago these animals became extinct. Dates are as necessary in chronology as a meridian in navigation. The whole demonstration depends upon the possibility of determining the time when the Mammoth and his contemporaries ceased to exist in Western Europe. But this is impossible. And yet it is everywhere assumed as a known truth in the calculations. A leg of the Irish Elk, with *tendon, skin, and hair* on it, was found in the County of Wexford, Ireland, in 1864. Skeletons of the same animal have also been found at Carragh, in Ireland, in a comparatively *fresh* condition. Two perfect heads of the Mammoth were found near Holyhead

in 1847, under three feet of peat, and although rare, several other instances are discovered in localities inconsistent with an excessive age. But it must be added that the Mastodon, an animal of very similar character and habits, is common enough in America, on or near the surface of the ground. None of these facts, however, can compare in importance with the details we possess concerning the carcasses of the Mammoth found in Siberia, a country separated from Europe by no formidable barriers. If this animal is recent in Siberia, it would be extremely unreasonable to attach a very distant date to his remains in the adjoining Continent. Immense quantities of the bone and ivory of the Mammoth are found at the present day in Northern Russia itself, and in Siberia, not only the fossils, but the skin and flesh are frequently exposed, and become the food of wolves and dogs. The ball of the eye in one case has been preserved, and is now in the Museum of Moscow.

These facts speak for themselves. If the climate of Northern Russia and Siberia was adapted, not many centuries ago, to these huge herbivorous animals, no necessity compels us to date their final extinction in Western Europe thousands of years before. As to proof of their great antiquity, there is none, except the supposed antiquity of man, which is the point to be settled. Do these gentlemen propose to demonstrate the age of the Mammoth from his association with man, and the age of man from his association with the Mammoth? We will not assert it, but must be pardoned for saying that the argument in our eyes assumes something of that form.

We are pleased to notice that some able investigators on this side of the water have manifested more sobriety and moderation than the leading scientists of Europe. The computations from the lake shores, made by Prof. Andrews, of Chicago, are far less exaggerated than those to which we have hitherto referred. And the reader will find the chronological estimates of other gentlemen, derived from St. Anthony's Falls, very interesting and suggestive. The Report of Prof. N. H. Winchell, State Geologist of Minnesota, made in 1876, contains a very careful calculation of the age of these falls since the earth assumed its present physical

condition. Within that time, they are supposed to have receded *eight miles* from Fort Snelling, at the junction of the Minnesota with the Mississippi. They were first discovered by Father Hennepin in 1680, and described by other observers at various periods since. These successive descriptions have furnished the basis upon which the calculation is made, and the average result is given as eight thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine years since the process of erosion began. The calculation is based upon three distinct observations, and the date assigned to the falls is the average of three different results. The last of the three periods, reaching from 1766 to 1856, gives the estimate six thousand two hundred and seventy-six years for the whole distance. This is considered the most careful and reliable, and brings down the date to a reasonable point.

But it will be observed that these estimates proceed, like all the others that have been noticed, upon the same principle of uniformity. That the rate of erosion has always been the same, is not only unknown, but altogether improbable. It is indeed highly probable that the Mississippi, in former times, poured down a larger stream, and with much greater force than it does at present. And besides, it is not known how long a time elapsed between the commencement of the work of erosion and the appearance of man, and consequently such a calculation has no bearing upon the chronology of the race.

We have another criticism to make upon the *spirit* in which many archæologists conduct their efforts to build a false chronology upon imaginary premises. We refer to the frequent use of *authority* in support of their views; and by authority, we mean the *opinions* of eminent investigators. Nothing is more common than the attempt to strengthen a weak position by citing the opinion of Sir Charles Lyell, or Sir John Lubbock, or Mr. Dawkins, or Mr. Evans, when the question refers to the significance of some discovery. The use of authority by theologians and ecclesiastical writers is often denounced by the cultivators of science as an obstacle to the progress of truth. And yet, in their own sphere, they make as much use of this kind of influence as they charge upon others. This inconsistency we are unable to

reconcile with candor and fairness. We might cite a multitude of examples to the point, but shall content ourselves with a few which will be shortly introduced. In the meantime let us call attention to the *character* of some of these opinions. We find them in many instances altogether unworthy of the distinguished names by which they are supported. It is humiliating to detect authors of a world-wide celebrity endeavoring to evade the force of facts, and to break that force by insignificant suggestions. It seems that Lyell and others lay much stress upon the peat of Denmark, in which they trace the three ages by the succession of the remains of pine, oak, and beech forests at different depths, the pine being the lowest; and they suggest that pine has not been a native of Denmark in "historical times." Now when we speak of "historical times," the reader is apt to think the reference is made to the history of the *world*. Such an expression has no significance, when applied to a small locality. The "historical times" of Chicago, or San Francisco, would cover a very small number of years. If the expression was employed to indicate the time within which the history of Denmark commenced, there is really no importance in it, and we can conceive of no motive for its introduction. But these phases, "pre-historic" and "historical," have a general meaning that bears with considerable force upon human chronology. We are called back to the earliest date of human annals, and through that point the plane of history passes, dividing our chronology into two distinct periods. All facts occurring before that date are pre-historical. All subsequent facts are historical, or within historical times. When, therefore, these gentlemen remind us that the pine has not been a native of Denmark in "historical times," the language is equivocal, and can only encourage exaggerated estimates by being taken in a sense inapplicable to the facts. The historical times of Denmark are so recent that, in that sense, the statement amounts to saying that the pine has not flourished there in very modern times.

It is stated as the former opinion of Sir Charles Lyell, that the river gravels of the Somme are eight hundred thousand years old. In a subsequent work, he comes down to two hundred

thousand. Both of these opinions, supported by such a name, have doubtless left a profound impression upon his readers. But, with all due respect to that great geologist, what shall we say of the weight of his opinion, when it varies in a few years in a quadruple ratio? The second estimate from the facts is precisely one-fourth of the first. And his distinguished follower, Sir John Lubbock, is equally headlong in his inferences, as shown in his prompt acceptance of the statement of Calvert concerning Miocene Man. The latter professed to have found traces of human workmanship eight hundred feet beneath the surface, in the face of a cliff on the Dardanelles. The evidence consisted in a supposed carving of a horned animal on a fossil bone. The object was subsequently examined by Professor, now President, Washburn, of Robert College, Constantinople, and the carving found to be purely *imaginary!* Both Lyell and Lubbock lent their names to the supposed discovery of Dr. Dowler, of New Orleans, who estimated the skeleton found under sixteen feet of mud in the Mississippi, at fifty-seven thousand years old. The error was soon exploded, and much ridicule visited upon Dr. Dowler, but Lyell and Lubbock continued to be as high authority as ever. Such is the fate of mediocrity. Such is the immunity of fame!

The interesting excavations of Dr. Schliemann at Hissarlik and Mycenæ are a positive and conclusive proof of the non-succession of the Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages. We have not space for the results, and simply state that the five relic-beds discovered at the former, and the various exhumations at the latter place, exhibit these ages as mixed, or contemporaneous, down to 700 B. C. This is at least true of the site of Troy, buried as it is under the successive ruins of three other cities. The tombs of Agamemnon and his family at Mycenæ, have not, we believe, been satisfactorily identified; but the confusion of the relics is as great as in the others, and we are at a loss to explain the *silence* of archæologists on the subject. Surely the five relic-beds on the site of Troy ought to illustrate and confirm the theory of the three ages, if it had any foundation anywhere. If a boat load of bricks is found at the bottom of the peat, it is ascribed to *accident*. If relics of polished metal are found in an old forma-

tion, they are set aside as *exceptional*. Will this confusion at Hissarlik and Mycenæ be disposed of in the same way? This silence is another illustration of the spirit of which we complain—the spirit of *evasion* in reference to facts that contradict the hypothesis. For the credit of science, we hope the silence will soon be broken. The facts require explanation, and, if possible, the beautiful *spectrum* of ages gently fading into one another, ought to be found spanning the classic plains of Troy.

But what does the reader now think of Pre-historic Archæology as a numerical science? Where is the exactitude of dates that might be expected in a chronological system? To us it appears to be a chaotic mass—

——“rudis indigestaque moles;
Nec quidquam, nisi pondus iners; congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.”

And this pretended science is offered as a substitute for faith in the chronology of the Scriptures! The latter can never be overthrown by such a scheme, for the reason that, making due allowance for differences of interpretation, it is founded upon definite data, and sustained by positive testimony. If this testimony were absolute, and determined the age of man to a day and an hour, we do not understand how any geological argument could disprove it. Well ascertained facts might indeed contradict it. But this would be a conflict between facts on one side and on the other, and the question would be determined by a preponderance. Here, however, is a conflict between documentary proof and theory; for it is evident that the facts are utterly wanting on the side of Archæology, whilst on the other side many of the alleged facts are confirmed rather than weakened by its testimony. Since Geology began to be cultivated, it is evident that the Book of Genesis has been to a considerable extent illustrated by its developments. The points of correspondence are so remarkable that the points of apparent conflict lose all their significance. It is difficult to believe that Moses knew anything of this modern science, and yet his testimony as to the order of creation is precisely the same with that of the stratified rocks. Nor does he recognise the permanence of species in vegetable

and animal life more positively than science itself. The theory of Darwin contradicts geologists no less than it contradicts the Scriptures. If, then, the sciences of observation, unknown to the ancients, are found, in certain important points, to correspond with the testimony of the Scriptures, under circumstances that force upon us a conviction of their inspiration, what result can be expected from a collateral science than further confirmation of their truth? The only effect upon the scriptural history that observation can possibly have, is to modify interpretation, or to confirm it; and this process goes on from age to age without in the least impairing the authority of the sacred record.

We repeat, therefore, and insist, that Archæology must establish certain dates that cannot be questioned, and that cannot be reconciled with any interpretation of Scripture consistent with inspiration, before it pretends to a new chronology. Mere argumentation will not answer the purpose. There are tremendous arguments on the other side, and these are founded on a vast array of *facts*, beginning in our present consciousness, and running back through the resurrection of our Lord into the remotest antiquity.

In this controversy we rejoice to know that nothing is to be feared from the learning any more than from the logic of the champions of unbelief. Attributing no value to the Bible, they give it little of their attention, and know little about it, except the difficulties discovered here and there in the text. The evidences of Christianity and of inspiration, derived from a thorough acquaintance with its contents, they habitually ignore, and speak and write on these subjects with a flippant disdain to which nothing but profound ignorance could give birth. On the other hand, the number of learned theologians who are now familiar with the facts and fallacies of science is constantly increasing, and we feel assured that the bane will be followed by the antidote, through every portion of the vast domain of truth or speculation. But our confidence does not rest in human learning. Truth is from God, and is immutable. It is unassailable from without, because of its strength within. Christianity is established upon evidences independent of scientific results, and as we have already

asserted, the two classes of facts do not lie in the same plane and cannot conflict with each other. If a Divine Personage, attesting his character and commission to our own senses by indubitable miracles, should appear in the midst of us, and declare that man was created a certain number of years ago, no amount of evidence from science, sufficient to disprove the assertion, could possibly be accumulated by millions of observers. Nor could our faith be shaken, even if the supposed facts were within our own experience. For, on the one hand, would be a divine testimony, and on the other a series of *inferences*, the product of our own reason. But such a conflict of consciousness is not supposable, and we can only imagine a contradiction of human testimony against the witness from heaven. In this case we could have no choice. The divine testimony would outweigh all the reports of scientific observers from all parts of the world.

Now we maintain that such a witness *has* appeared, and his words are attested to us by records and relics more trustworthy than any that science can produce. These evidences fall within the historical period. They leave no room for doubt, and are so clear that doubt is a sin against truth. The Eucharist is a sacred relic with a twofold inscription, perfectly inexplicable upon any theory inconsistent with its origin in the facts it represents. If it were possible to find any other relic that would seem to contradict it, it might, if demonstrated with equal clearness, neutralise its impression, but could not destroy it. But such a discovery is impossible. A prior fact cannot be overthrown by a subsequent one, simply for the reason that it is already established, and excludes the possibility of sufficient contrary evidence.

Unless there is a flaw in our proof of the fundamental facts of Christianity, it is irreverent to entertain uneasiness on account of the labors of scientific men. Their results, if true, can go no further than to shed light upon the inspired records, and this is precisely what the explorations of Christian travellers and antiquarians in the East are continually accomplishing, to the satisfaction of every conscientious student of the Scriptures. Is there any such flaw in our system of evidences? Those who affirm it ought to point it out. This brings us to our last point, which is

that this war upon Christianity, through archæology, is indirect and disingenuous. Every fair principle of investigation requires, that the foundations of faith should be scrupulously examined before they are attacked. The undermining process is not creditable to the votaries of science. We do not object to their labors, but to their spirit. Why do they long so earnestly to "connect humanity with geological phenomena," in the exultant strain of Agassiz? If the Christian religion is the object of their dislike, and they are seeking its overthrow, they must already know of some defect in its spiritual character, and some falsehood at the bottom of its evidences, to justify their abhorrence. If so, it would be far more creditable to indicate these defects, than to approach the question indirectly through the chronology of the Pentateuch.

The thanks of the Christian public are due to Mr. Southall for his manly bearing in this controversy, and the successful handling of his subject in the present work. We trust that he will be abundantly encouraged in future efforts to weigh and measure the results of scientific observation, and that he will afford us new occasions hereafter to pass merited encomiums upon his services in the cause of truth.

ARTICLE IV.

PHILOSOPHY AND MIRACLES.

Perhaps the most curious manifestation of human character is found in the readiness with which men embrace superstitious opinions that will not endure scientific scrutiny, on one hand, and the equal readiness wherewith men reject facts endorsed by the testimony of God, on the other. The world is full of illustrations on both sides. In all lands and throughout long centuries, the belief in ghosts with occult powers was as common as any prevalent non-provable hypothesis of modern times. And to-day, men of sound minds are easily deluded by the trickeries

of Spiritualism, believing in materialisation, and adopting without demur other nonsensical theories of its professors. Against this ready credence on the part of multitudes of sane men, there is opposed the stubborn unbelief of the world, which rejects the dogmas of revealed religion without investigation. The degree of culture, as the word is commonly used, does not alter the case. Thoroughly educated men believe in weeping virgins, liquefying blood, and canonised bones, and the most unmistakable ignoramus scouts the doctrines of grace with sublime complacency. The difference between the atheism of Colonel Ingersoll and the unbelief of Tyndall is really a difference in the breeding of the two men. Tyndall is polished, even in the utterance of his most extreme opinions, but the animus is the same in both cases; and if, in the marvellous grace of God, both should be brought into the family of the saints—the household of faith—the same difference of breed would be manifested in their Christian walk and conversation, though both would have the same title to the divine inheritance.

In the primary sense of the word, the Miracle is that which excites the wonder of the observer. In ordinary thought it is that which is either contrary to natural law, or above and beyond its scope. It is not an accidental variation in the ordinary course of events, but a positive obrusion of a novel power, producing abnormal results. In the best definitions, it is described as that which is supernatural, though not unnatural. The miracles of Holy Writ are not the creation of monstrosities, though they are always the token of occult power. And they are frequently called "Powers." But as they betoken some ethical relations between the miracle-worker and the subject of the miracle, they are also called "Signs," and as Archdeacon Trench shows, this is the most appropriate and comprehensive word by which these wonders are designated in the Bible. In the discussion of the topic, this threefold sense of the word will be kept in view.

To present the topic a little more elaborately, the acts of Him whose name is "Wonderful" may properly be called miraculous. This is the observation of Trench in his commentary upon the

names of the miracles. But he also notes the remarkable fact that the miracles of the Lord are never so designated in the original Greek. They are called "signs and wonders," "powers and wonders," but never "Wonders" separately; and he charges the accepted version with faultiness in that it gives undue prominence to the naked idea of amazement or wonder by this translation (miracle), whereas the prominent idea is nearly always that of a sign or a power. The work miraculously wrought had always some special ethical significance, which was always specially emphatic, because it manifested the power of God. And the whole scope of the excellent work of Trench on the Miracles is to demonstrate these infallible connexions.

The first observation suggested, taking the record of Bible miracles for statements of fact, is, that none of them can properly be called abnormal. They never violate law. In many cases the very opposite proposition is plainly true. The restoration of sight to the blind was a restoration of the natural powers to the visual organs. And all the miracles of healing that are recorded in Scripture, are clearly within this category. Even the raising of the dead, which was the restoration of native powers to Lazarus, cannot be shown to violate any natural law. Because death has never been anything else than the penal sanction by which the law of life was enforced. It is quite customary to speak of man as mortal—created under a law of mortality, and having even at his birth the seeds of decay in his organism. It is quite common to hear the announcement that death is the only certain event in human history, so far as that history is future. But the precise contrary is true. Man is not only said to be immortal in Scripture, but every power in his complex organism does constantly tend to life, and constantly repel the encroachments of disease and decay. And there will be a generation on the earth sooner or later, that will never die. "We shall not all sleep!" (1 Cor. xv. 51.) And while the daughter of Jairus, the man of Nain, and Lazarus, all died again, after their miraculous restoration, the miracle itself, in each case, was the orderly working of the one law of life which shall be operative again, when these three shall arise at the second coming of the Lord. And each one of these, in

place and degree, served as the sign of the faithfulness of Him who brought immortality to light in the gospel.

It is noteworthy that the miracles recorded in the Apocryphal Gospels and attributed to Christ, are all of them monstrous in conception, and altogether outside the definition above given. The transformation of human intelligences into brutes, for example, would be an utter violation of all the laws that regulate human existence. And there is no sufficient cause given in the narrative for this visitation, except a petulant malignity altogether foreign to the character of Christ. These false histories are in themselves miracles of absurdity and profaneness.

Independently of revelation, there is such a thing as the cognition of deity. All races of men have had one or more objects of worship. And as races have been more and more cultivated in the past ages of the world's history, the worship of the mythical gods has fallen into neglect. The native necessity for a god of some sort peopled the heavens with deified passions; but as the systems of philosophy advanced, these gods retired into obscurity. In one school, the gods were formally acknowledged, but represented as withdrawn from the contemplation of mundane affairs. In another, the essential unity of the godhead was distinctly announced as a cardinal principle, but this deity was merely the soul of the universe; and in both, the general idea of law with penal sanctions, is conspicuously absent. Nevertheless, the logical necessity for a god as the author of creation is always suggested. Epicurus, hearing that chaos was the first creation, instantly inquired for the creator of chaos, as the necessary First Cause. But his philosophy, based upon his axiom Latinised into "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," dwindled down into gross materialism. Space and atoms were the gods of his worship, and the majestic march of providence was the fortuitous agglomeration of atoms, from which also he derived the soul and the rational powers of men. It is noteworthy, in passing, that Mr. Tyndall has reached the same conclusion two thousand years later. Zeno and his followers also admitted the existence of deity, but chained this divinity in the gyves of inexorable fate. The Stoics also anticipated Mr. Tyndall by twenty centuries, in making the divine intelligence

only the soul of the universe. They were rather more highly educated, however, than their modern disciple, in that they formally affirmed a doctrine analogous to Calvinistic theology, to wit: "that the influence of fate, and the necessary relation of things, did not affect either the operation of divine providence or the free agency of men." It was a wonderful stride in the right direction that formulated this doctrine two or three centuries before the Christian era.

These two sects or schools of philosophy we have introduced for a special reason. The "Miracles," confining the term to those supernatural works of Christ recorded in the Gospels, were wrought when the Stoics and the Epicureans divided the civilised world between them. There were other schools of philosophy, it is true, but these occupy by far the most prominent place in sacred and profane annals. Practically, these two systems were only pure selfishness on one hand, and callous indifference on the other. Epicurus taught the doctrine that the ultimate good was personal happiness. Epictetus, the Stoic, had no better maxim than that which taught sublime indifference to the decrees of fate. The gospel at its introduction as a formulated system, was confronted by these two, and the cardinal maxims of the gospel precisely cut these up by the roots.

In the only encounter that is recorded, the champion of Christian philosophy met and silenced these scholars on Mars Hill. The familiarity of Bible readers with the account, as given in the last half of the seventeenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, prevents the ready apprehension of the tremendous power of Paul's argument. He was conveyed to this high court as the setter forth of the "newest thing." This newest thing was nothing less than two new gods, Jesus and Anastasis. And the precise thing required of Paul was some form of credential that should be of sufficient potency to give these deities a place in their Pantheon.

But whatever else might be taught in all forms of mythology, true science had reached one of two conclusions. First, that all things were the product of chaos, and chance was the ultimate founder and fountain. Second, all things proceeded from an

equally blind necessity, and the ultimate force in nature was law. Between these opposite extremes, Paul might bring in any new phase of philosophy, and the verdict of his audience would depend upon his leaning to one or the other of these bold assumptions, and to the preponderance of Stoic or Epicurean philosophy in the assembly.

Notice his method of dealing with this double heresy. He does not quote from any revelation, but bases all his argument upon a chance inscription upon one of their altars. Eminently religious, O Athenians! because among all the countless altars you include one to a possible deity. A God unknown, and yet a possible God; because man is so constituted that the cognition of God is a swift intuition. "You cannot think rightly without thinking God," says Thornwell. (Vol. I., p. 72.) Whatever this may be (the personal pronoun is not in the original) that you cognise, and call the unknown God, *that* is the thing I now make known. And the primal postulate contains the seminal truth of all theology: "God made the cosmos!"

There can be no doubt that the Apostle asserts this proposition in direct contrast and antagonism to the Epicurean philosophy. The cosmos is set over against the chaos; the orderly arrangement of the universe against the fortuitous flight of atoms.

The second postulate assaults the Stoical theory of fate. God is a giver. The comforts of life do not come by chance, and do not come in the rigid grooves of law. They are the gifts of a beneficent Intelligence. The Stoic cannot afford to despise the power that controls fate. Here again is the analogue of modern absurdity. If the monads of Leibnitz are as dynamical as he makes them, who made the monads? If in matter may be found all the potency of life, who invested matter with this astounding attribute?

The third postulate sweeps away all the arrogant assumptions of these philosophers. The wisest of their instructors, and the most debased barbarians; the highly spiritual Hebrew and the most polished materialistic Gentile, are placed upon a dead level. God who made the cosmos, and who is perforce the bountiful giver of good, hath made of one all nations of men. The essen-

tial unity of the race is at the foundation of the gospel scheme. Jesus and the resurrection would be impossible if they did not affect mankind as a unit. "He layeth not hold on angels." because they are many and diverse. He layeth hold on the seed of Abraham, because it is the same seed that was predicted in Eden—the seed of the woman.

The fourth postulate, which the apostle reaches by such easy steps, is overwhelming in its force and grandeur. God the maker and benefactor of a race of creatures essentially *one*, a race living in God, moving in God, and having their being in God, is something more than Creator. Even the poetry of the polished Greek had invested God with fatherhood. Aratus had written, "For we are also his offspring." Therefore the offspring of God should not liken their Father to idols of silver or gold. Because these insensate forms could not adequately represent men. How much less could they represent God the Father? And the relation involved, by inexorable necessity, honor, reverence, obedience, fear, and love, on the part of the offspring.

Then comes the final postulate. This relation must be established all over the cosmos. God commandeth all men everywhere to enter into sonship by repentance. The only possible security was in sonship, as he says elsewhere: "If *children*, then heirs;" and swift retribution awaited the impenitent, of necessity. And the certainty of this retribution was to be found in the resurrection of the Judge. The two new gods, Jesus and Anastasis, are one. Jesus, the one heir, offers his inheritance; "if children, not only heirs, but joint heirs with Christ;" and if not children, then aliens, outcasts, barbarians, and slaves. Fit victims, predestined victims, doomed to dwell in the blackness of darkness forever!

At this point philosophy draws back. The resurrection of the body is a miracle, and miracles are essentially incredible to the philosopher. It contradicts the experience of mankind; it renders the teaching of all known history nugatory. If a man die, shall he live again? Pythagoras, teaching the unity of the god-head, invested man with a double soul, and provided for its immortality by transmigration. But no philosopher had hinted at the miracle of the Resurrection.

Now, precisely opposite, precisely contrary to the philosophy which rejected the miracle, the demand for the miraculous display of divine power comes into view. The Jews require a sign.

The history of this people as contained in the inspired record is one continuous story of miracles. God interposed in their national affairs, and in the events of their individual lives. Their prophets were cognised by the performance of miracles. And their faith was, in its ultimate analysis, a faith in the exercise of supernatural power in their behalf. Their God was a very present help in all times of trouble. The bread that sustained them, and the life-giving water that followed them in the wilderness, the Pillar of Fire and the Pillar of Cloud—all these were supernatural manifestations. Nothing could be more reasonable than the demand—"What sign showest thou?" The credentials of the teacher or the leader must be analogous to those presented by all former messengers. "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him." That is, "these signs" (*σημεία*). The word indicates a convincing token; that which banishes doubt, and therefore makes the authentication complete.

The value of the gospel miracles cannot therefore be overestimated, theologically considered. For while the Lord Jesus might have performed the functions of his royal and priestly offices without these (*σημεία*) signs formally exhibited, he could not have established his prophetic authority without them. The teacher coming from God must authenticate his mission by the methods selected by God himself. The demand of the Jews, (John ii. 18), "What sign showest thou?" was eminently rational, and the Lord answered it promptly by promising the culminating miracle of the gospel—the Resurrection. "If Christ be not risen, your faith is vain." And, with marvellous accuracy, Paul presents this solitary argument, at the close of his debate on Mars Hill, as already shown on a previous page. God hath spread before the world this notorious infallible sign, token, assurance—in that he hath raised Jesus from the dead! If human wisdom had conducted that debate, the miraculous birth, the wonderful life, the wonders wrought by the hand of Christ when

he tabernacled among men, would have been employed to enforce the argument. But Paul having reached this culmination by the stately march of logic, without an appeal to the dogmatic authority of revelation, suddenly unveils the new goddess, Anastasis the sign of God, and proclaims it the one infallible assurance that Christ would judge the world in righteousness.

In 1st Corinthians i. 22-24, the whole case is presented. "The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks require wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto the called, whether Jews or Greeks, Christ, God's power and God's wisdom."

In the Epistle to the Ephesians i. 19, 20, the exceeding greatness of the mighty power of God is instanced as being wrought in Christ "when he raised him from the dead." Therefore the preaching of Christ crucified was the preaching of Christ risen. Because the resurrection involved the previous crucifixion, and because Paul did not preach a dead Christ. "If Christ be not risen, our preaching is vain." The address of Paul before Agrippa (Acts xxvi. 23) agrees with this precisely. In his peroration, summing up all his teachings in one sentence, he avers he taught nothing except "the Christ would suffer, that he first, by *resurrection from the dead*, would shew light both to the people (*i. e.*, the Jews), and to the Gentiles." And in the 8th verse of the same chapter, at the opening of his discourse, he asks: "Why is it judged a thing incredible with you, if God raiseth the dead?" The whole force of the challenge is in the unlimited power of God.

The teaching of philosophy would never reach this culmination. Human science deals only with facts and their relations, and science cannot find a solitary example of the fact in question. There had been cases of restored life, after death, under the old dispensation, and the Lord raised three dead persons during his personal ministry, and his apostles restored life after his ascension. But all these died again. The one resurrection that has occurred in the history of the race is the resurrection of Christ, and this is carefully distinguished from all other restorations of

vital functions in Romans vi. 9: "Christ being raised from the dead *dieth no more*; death hath no longer dominion over him!" And in the same argument, wherein he repeatedly announces the fact that Christ's resurrection was his people's resurrection, as his death was their death, he exhorts them, "Let not sin reign in your *mortal* bodies," which shall pass under the power of death though "ye be risen in Christ."

This one resurrection therefore is Paul's answer to the legitimate demand of the Jew. It is the sign of God and the power of God. And the true philosophy of this sign was in the fact that the risen Christ had been crucified. It is specially noteworthy that this master debater selects the two words which are here accurately rendered. "The Jews demand a sign. I present to them a power, and God's power. It is a sign, token, assurance, and all that is miraculous, while it is also all that is dynamical! It is the power of the Omnipotent. Christ crucified!" This wicked and adulterous generation sought a sign, and no sign was given except the sign of the Prophet Jonas—which was the sign of the Resurrection! What sign shewest thou? The answer is identical: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will rear it up"—on the morning of the resurrection.

Here, then, is the force of Paul's unfailing theme: Christ crucified, yet risen. If considered only on its human side, the most atrocious murder ever committed under judicial forms. If considered on the divine side, the most wondrous exhibition of grace that human minds can estimate. God so loved an accursed race that he gave his only begotten Son to crucifixion in the room and stead of malefactors.

But this crowning miracle of God invites the scrutiny of philosophy also. The Greeks seek after wisdom (*σοφίαν*). And the apostle presents the same thesis—Christ crucified, the philosophy of God. In place of your dreaming systems. O Stoics and Epicureans, behold the symmetry of God's philosophy! All that the wisdom of the world has produced and formulated; all that the profoundest philosophy has reached; all mental and moral excellence in the teachings of your grandest instructors; all the virtue and purity that adorned their lives—all these have the

same fatal defect: they have their foundations in the dust; they terminate upon the creature. And in the place of your faulty systems, I preach Christ crucified—no tentative philosophy, but the wisdom of God, and *ipso facto* infallible; the power of God, and *ipso facto* irresistible; and terminating in the glory of God, and *ipso facto* eternal. It antedated all systems. It will endure when all others are annihilated. Consider these three postulates, and see if you can match them or either of them with the proudest achievements of finite philosophy.

The accurate formulæ of Calvinistic theology, which is only another name for the philosophy which Paul here announces, will furnish all the argument.

Since the era when Paul announced this thesis, the world has made enormous strides towards the accomplishment of its destiny. There were several sciences to be investigated and formulated—theology, anthropology, psychology, ecclesiology, Christology. These have received due attention, each in its turn, and although the fields are in no wise exhausted, they have all been well tilled. The world has now arrived at eschatology—the science of last things—the final philosophy. And this philosophy of Paul exactly includes all of these. Christ crucified, the philosophy of God, touches the science of God, of man, of the soul, of the Church, and by the miracle of his resurrection takes hold on the tremendous events of the last times. In the resurrection, all is arranged with inexorable order: “Christ the first fruits; then they who are Christ’s at his coming.” And *because* Christ crucified rose from the dead, all the people of Christ shall rise when he comes the second time, at the end of the dispensation. He is called the first fruits because his resurrection was the *earnest* that secured the total harvest. In human law this principle has had a prominent place for unknown ages. The payment of a part, as earnest of the whole, binds the whole as really as a clean title-deed. The complaint of the Jews (Mark ii. 24) that the disciples sinned in plucking the corn on the Sabbath, derives its force from this established principle. Their act was a constructive harvesting of the grain. And it was unlawful to harvest on the Sabbath day. And so the Holy Spirit, in the first chapter of Paul’s

Epistle to the Ephesians, is called the earnest of the inheritance of the saints. They are born into the royal purple by the power of the Holy Ghost, and this initial work is the pledge and security of the entire inheritance, including crown and throne.

It was not a mere arbitrary decree of God that made Christ crucified the wisdom of God. The apostle carefully states the case in the context: "After that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God to save his elect by the preaching of this foolishness"—that is, Christ crucified. Humanly speaking, nothing could be more foolish than to preach salvation by the power of a dead man. But in the wisdom of God the death of Christ was made

"Death of death, and hell's destruction."

because when he was lifted up, he drew all men after him. He had exhausted the penalty, and his death was the death of his people. If ye be risen with Christ, fix your attention on crown and sceptre. He sits at the right hand of God, and holds your royal insignia in trust for you!

Philosophy knows but two entities—matter and force. Divine philosophy may accept the same analysis with a modification. Let matter stand for the finite and force for the infinite. The moral force inseparable from the character of God as revealed in Scripture, or cognised by human intelligence, could save a lost race no otherwise than by Christ crucified. It became God to save men, to save them by this method, and consequently by no other method. God must be just while he justifies. Justification is not possible otherwise than by faith, and faith can terminate upon no other object, for justifying righteousness, than Christ crucified and Christ risen.

To sum up the argument. Let the philosopher take his stand upon the unmistakable verities of to-day. What he knows most surely is *ego* and *non-ego*. This is not revelation; it is not logic; it is not the testimony of his senses. It is the cognition of an ultimate fact by intuitive perception. The earth is not I. The sky is not I. And the Maker of earth and heaven is not I. And sky and earth are enwrapped in ten thousand times ten thousand cosmical relations, connexions, gradations, and depen-

dencies, all orderly and all beautiful and all beneficent. Wisdom, power, and goodness are manifested in all the phenomena of nature. As far back in the remote past as human history extends, day and night, seed-time and harvest, summer and winter, have succeeded each other with unfailing accuracy. And nature has been ever bountiful, scattering her gifts with unlimited profusion over the surface of the earth. So boundless are these bounties that all the men that have been born into the world since the creation could to-day be supplied with all legitimate wants if none had ever died. It is demonstrable by mathematical processes that all the race of Adam could stand to-day within a smaller area than the State of New York includes in her boundaries.

Now, Philosopher—you who cognise the *ego*—what is your relation to all these and to the Maker of all? It was not you, or your ancestor, or a countless multitude of beings like you, that built the earth and spread abroad the sky, and established the vast dynamical machinery that made the universe cosmical. If you say, No, but chance, or evolution, or insensate law, provided this magnificent dwelling place for man, then your philosophy is not so wise as that of the fetish-worshipper, who finds a God in the dead toad he wears as an amulet. Because he has at least an organism for a deity. And a dead toad bears in his wrinkled carcase more tokens of force that are scrutable than you can shew in these mystical gods of your worship. Because he has a muscular system that obeys the mandates of something analogous to your own will, which fact you can verify a thousand times by examining the habits of his living kindred.

Suppose, then, you admit the existence of an unknown force, the soul of the universe, the next fact that meets you is your own antagonism to this unknown entity. Because all the beneficent appliances around you do not secure your undisturbed happiness. You have physical pain. You endure mental tortures. You have violated some law, which, through chance or evolution, or by direct personal enactment, is interwoven into the structure of your mind and body. Something, *non-ego*, is against you! It is a Force.

This much is clearly visible, or else logically necessary, by deduction from that which is known. And there are no thinkers in the universe, that are akin to Adam, who can escape the conclusion. It is not difficult to show that all the products of master minds have their real origin here. Auguste Comte, sincere, earnest, and brilliant, is driven to the construction of his system by this overbearing conviction. The publican in the temple has been overtaken by it, and smites his breast in anguish that words cannot describe. The one makes a positive philosophy. The other reaches the last postulate of the final philosophy and cries, "God expiate me." He too knows that the force is against him, and his application, as plain as human language can make it, is to Christ crucified—the force of God, (*Χριστὸν Θεοῦ δύναμις*.) "God expiate me the sinner!"

Which of these two went down to his house—justified!

It would seem inevitable that the thinker, surveying the complicated yet cosmical creation, would infer that this was itself a miracle in the three senses already noted. It is the most marvellous work in its merely physical relations that can be presented for investigation. It betokens the exhaustless power of God the Creator, and it is an ever-present sign of God's purpose to bring the dominant race of intelligences to glory. Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, the glories in reserve for the saint. But the splendid cosmos declares his glory and shews forth his handiwork, and is a gorgeous type of the enduring inheritance. It is a pitiful philosophy that offers to man nothing better at last than a charnel-house! It is a contemptible ambition that aims at nothing beyond ownership in a tomb!

Therefore, if the *non-ego* includes God who wrought this primal miracle, you have all around you the proofs of a wisdom that is infallible. You have only to scrutinise the law that keeps the moon in her orbit or that brings the sun from Capricorn to Cancer making the recurrence of seasons, to see the excellent wisdom that has ordained the succession. No conclusion can be more certain than that "the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished." (2 Peter ii. 9.)

And the power of such a being must needs be irresistible. He that upholds all things by the word of his power is mighty to save, and the salvation was completed in that great exhibition of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.

Admitting for a moment that the revelation which Christians admit and obey is the very word of God, it is noteworthy that this record itself contains the announcement that man will disregard the authority and deride its claims to inspiration. And these Scriptures also give the precise reason for and explanation of this enmity upon purely logical grounds. The carnal heart is itself enmity against God. Man does not like to retain God in all his thoughts. Men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil. Men will not come to the light lest their evil deeds should be reproved. It is a birthright in Spain that allows the sons of a certain race to wear their hats in the presence of the king; and there was a time when man might enter the presence of the King of kings with his own crown upon his head. But he has lost this birthright, and he must veil his crest in his approaches now. Through repentance, which is humiliating, he must regain the birthright; and God calls upon him from all states and conditions, from throne or dungeon—"all men, everywhere"—to repent. And he gives the one miraculous sign, to wit: Christ crucified; and the one infallible assurance, in that he hath raised Christ from the dead.

It is therefore to be expected that man should resist the authority of God. In so far as mental philosophy is formulated, its clearest postulates accord with the scriptural dogma. Can two walk together unless they be agreed? Can light have fellowship with darkness?

But it is passing strange that the unbelieving philosophers of to-day should boldly face a debater like Paul of Tarsus. If these two epistles to the Corinthians, nay, if this initial chapter in the first epistle, be examined as a merely human production, if the argument contained in this short passage from the 22d to the 25th verses be carefully scrutinised and compared with the entire scope of revelation, it is easy to demonstrate its essential superiority to

all the forms of philosophy that the wisdom of the world has produced. There is nothing like it known among men. The overwhelming majesty of the theme, the simple solution of the problem, alike tend to place this short passage high above all the maxims that ever came from Porch or from Academy.

Because the apostle recognises the one inexorable fact, that man, as constituted by God the Maker, incessantly demands these two things: first, the sign; second, the logic.

In so far as the Christian religion is of authority as a dogmatic system, it must needs be substantiated by a sign from God. None but God can dominate the soul of man made in his image, and man dare not yield credence or obedience without a token from God. It is always right to demand, "What hath God wrought?"

But there is something more. God has endowed man with the logical faculty, and man is always at liberty to demand, "What hath God spoken?" If you go to him with such a token as the liquefying blood of a dead saint, or a holy house of Loretto, your token has precisely the same logical value as the temple of Diana at Ephesus which came down from Jupiter. Your token will not answer the demand of the enlightened soul.

But Paul presents an historical fact with the calm confidence of an eye-witness, and invests this simple fact with all its value as a token, and all its convincing power as an argument. Christ crucified is as established a verity as the life and death of Nero. Christ risen is as established a verity as the existence of the Christian Church in the world. The philosopher who denies the resurrection of Christ is no wiser than the ostrich who hides his head in the sands of the desert to escape his pursuers. The history of the world for two thousand years bears, on every chapter of it, the recital of this one fact, to wit, that one Jesus was crucified without the gate—*whom Paul affirmed to be alive!* And upon this solitary affirmation the record of all civilised races upon the earth is builded. If it be a mere delusion, there is no fact that can be made certain throughout all these long ages. The men on the earth to-day do not know that Aristotle or Plato lived, that Trajan or Constantine reigned over Rome, that Charlemagne

founded his western empire, that Charles V. and Philip II. cursed the earth with their cruelties. No events anterior to the eighteenth century are more certainly known to men to-day than the death and resurrection of Christ. No proofs of the existence of Christopher Columbus can be found on this broad continent, so tangible, so unanswerable, as the proofs of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, that are scattered all over the ages since apostolic times. It is the sign of God, and it cannot lose its dynamical efficiency, because it is the power of God.

So also in its philosophical aspect, this unique system challenges comparison with all systems known among men. Ananias is a far higher goddess than Venus or Juno. God who made the cosmos, is better than Chance who made chaos. Paul is wiser than Epicurus. And he sums up his philosophy with such astounding simplicity that the wisest of the sons of men cannot add to his words or take away one redundancy. His logic here he calls the wisdom of God: a system so grand in its outlines that finite powers cannot measure its proportions or conceive of its unspeakable results; yet a system so simple in its orderly arrangement that the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err if he essay the investigation of it. The lettered objector, in earnest search for truth, presents his plea in the agony of desperation in this wise: "I am blinded by sin, and so hopelessly blinded that I cannot perceive the symmetry of the gospel scheme. I am condemned by the law, because I have no rectitude of character that my fellow-men could approve, and certainly none that would commend me to God. I am under bondage to an inherited corruption and to a life-long habit of sin. I am utterly powerless to extricate myself from this lost condition!" Here is a case that might awaken pity in the heart of a monster of cruelty. And Paul makes his ready answer: "Christ crucified! who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption!" All these shackles fall from the limbs of the free noble, made in the image of God. The wise man, the scribe, the disputer of this world, are all answered and silenced. The miracle of the world is Christ crucified. The sign of God's beneficent interference in the affairs of man is Christ crucified. The power


of God, in bringing many sons unto glory, is Christ crucified; and the wisdom of God, in meeting all the demands of justice, holiness, and truth; in causing righteousness and peace to kiss each other; in sending mercy and truth, the heralds of grace to an apostolic world, without disturbing justice and judgment, the foundations of his throne; in remaining a just God, and yet becoming a Saviour—this glorious wisdom brings all these into agreement in Christ crucified.

Here, then, is presented a carefully formulated philosophy, challenging the scrutiny of men and angels, and culminating in a miracle of grace. And God's only reason for presenting the system is found in the majestic announcement with which Paul concludes: "Let him that glorieth, glory in the Lord." And the first statement of the Calvinistic creed exactly accords with this exhortation.

To gather up the points herein suggested, the philosophical arrangement of the argument may be presented in this wise: The being, wisdom, power, and goodness of God are written all over the orderly courses of nature. The regular recurrence of beneficent phenomena, proves the existence of an Almighty Intelligence, who has ordained the laws that make recurrence certain. And men cannot escape the conviction that such an Intelligence is infinite in all his attributes. In his working, therefore, all that is outside of or beyond the reach of recurring forces is miraculous. He cannot touch man, who is finite, any otherwise than miraculously. And you cannot conceive of such interference without an instant perception of the sign and the power. It is wonderful; it betokens something having an ethical quality, and it is dynamical. So the entire scheme of "special providence," as it is technically called, is a scheme of miraculous interposition. Men talk of the age of miracles as they talk of the Miocene epoch; whereas there has never been any other age than the age of miracles since God made his first creation. God's government of the universe is always wonderful, significant, and potential, while the regular, incessant, and invariable operation of inherent forces, sustains the same relation to God's providence that the bass sustains to a musical composition or an instrumental ac-

companiment to a song. The composition is builded upon the bass—the song is in harmony with the accompaniment, but both bass and accompaniment are very small parts of the whole, so far as this whole is forceful or significant.

And, considered philosophically, by such an intelligence as Gabriel for example, (“which things angels desire to look into.” 1 Peter i. 12,) nothing could be more entirely wonderful, significant, and forceful, than the “sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow them.” (1 Peter i. 11.) There is no other thinkable solution of the problem, if God would save the world he made so wonderfully and furnished so elaborately. The philosophy of wonders is the philosophy of providence, and its crowning mystery and crowning glory is in its provision of a possible salvation for the wisecracs who doubt the existence of God and who deny the power of his grace.



ARTICLE V.

RETRIBUTION ; OR, SIN MUST BE PUNISHED.

The ways and acts of God, properly understood, are ever good and true and beautiful. If any suffer or perish at last, the fault is not with the great and wise and merciful Creator, but in the rebellious, wilful creature. “God made man upright.” Moreover, our first parents were hedged about with helps and checks innumerable. Jehovah made man free. True, the Creator demanded a test, in the form of obedience, from the creature; but Adam possessed a perfectly unconstrained freedom of choice. In regard to the forbidden fruit, he could eat or not eat, as he chose. This was fair and just. For had God compelled man to do, or not to do, then virtue could never have existed. For the creature’s services, in order to be acceptable, must always be voluntary. Adam, therefore, was put upon trial, but under the most favorable surroundings. He fell. Even after the fall, however, mercy was in the ascendant. For to the creature, fresh from the

sin of Eden, the promise was made that "the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head." Furthermore, altars were prepared, and Abel, with others of like spirit, offered sacrifices thereon, which the All-Holy was pleased to accept. Again, Noah, a preacher of righteousness, faithfully warned the wicked, while the flood approached. And when that destruction was over, a knowledge of the way of life lingered with the patriarchal family that were spared. And had the posterity of Shem, Ham, and Japhet been faithful in their generations, no syllable of truth would have been lost to any part of mankind. Then again, God raised up prophets and leaders, and the light shone for all who were willing to behold it. And once more, when the fulness of the times had come, God sent his only begotten Son, born of a woman, made under the law, a Redeemer for every one who desired to be saved. In addition, this Christ, the Saviour of sinners, commissioned ambassadors to go forth and to preach the glad tidings to every creature. Yea, they were commanded to go into all the world and to offer life to every one of every age and in all conditions.

And if it be inquired why God made man at all—foreseeing, as he did, the creature's fall and consequent destiny—it can be responded that here is question that it is as incumbent upon the objector, as on the believer, to answer. Man is here, sins, suffers, dies. These are facts, and how will the sceptic explain them? When the objector's God—whoever he may be—created man, was such a creator ignorant of the things that must follow? If so, what will the universe come to, managed by a head so unfit? But if that Creator, whom the objector worships, knew all things beforehand, then why did he bring man into existence to sin, suffer, and die? To sin and suffer without a remedy, to die without a hope!

But let us ever bear in mind who it is that sits in judgment on the ways of the Almighty. It is the sinner himself. And will self adjust the "wavering balance" rightly when self is at stake? Will the thief, for instance, pass sentence on theft, when self is accused? Will self condemn murder, when self is the criminal on trial?

We meet—every one of us—two facts in the way, that no force can destroy or annul. In the first place, transgressors suffer here, and suffer because sin bites and stings. Secondly, there is a voice within, that declares that peace can never come until iniquity be put away through atonement for, and forgiveness of, the same. And where is there the slightest intimation in the Scriptures or out of them, that the creature will find those or either of them, in any world but the present?

And if the “propitiation” provided for the soul this side of the grave be rejected, what awaits the creature beyond? Must not each spirit go to its own place? And if there be no hell, then why did Christ appear? Why was he made under the law? To what end was he crucified? Surely, if none are to be saved thereby, the crucifixion of Jesus was the refinement of cruelty. But to save from what? is the question. From sin? Was it to do this, that Christ came? Then his mission was a failure, for ALL SIN and come short. Was it to save from punishment? Then we behold a failure again; for the whole race is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward. Was it to save from death? Failure is still manifest, for all men die. “There is no discharge in this war.” Was it to make eternal punishment impossible? This very impossibility, according to the theory of “general mercy,” already existed in the essential nature of Jehovah. Eternal punishment and divine goodness are so antagonistic that for one to exist is the inevitable destruction of the other. Why, then, did Christ come? Whom did he come to save, and FROM WHAT?

The soul that sinneth shall die. Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the Book of the Law, to do them. For God will by no means clear the guilty. Against these solemn decrees the mind of man has ever rebelled. Cain, THE FATHER OF RATIONALISM, held to a religion without faith, murdered Abel, and then, under the just judgment of God, exclaimed, “My punishment is more than I can bear.” And the transgressor in every age has been heard to say that the “revealed way of the Lord is not equal.” For the soul in ruins vindicates its wrong-doing by charges of injustice and partiality brought

against another. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are on edge." It is in vain that the Almighty declares that the son shall not bear the iniquities of the father; neither the father the iniquities of the son—the unbeliever persists in saying "the way of the Lord is not equal."

Unsanctified reason struggles to discredit Revelation, to undermine authority, and to fill with rash fallacies the mouth of the detractor. Scepticism is embodied and reëmbodied in diversified creeds. Jehovah is a terror to evil-doers, and hence the wicked do not like to retain God—the God of the Bible—in their knowledge. Any scheme, however wild, improbable, or absurd, is preferred, provided it banishes correction and unfetters the spirit in its practices of lust. But God does not leave himself without a witness, even in the heart of the vilest and most obdurate. For there are accusing thoughts, which, ever and anon, stir the conscience and testify to the record that "the wages of sin is death."

And what is sin? Is it not "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God?" And since sin "utterly indisposes, disables, and makes opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclines to evil and that continually," since it is a total corruption of man's nature, is not death the inevitable result? For what is spiritual life but the converse of this? In a normal state there is no conflict between mind and body on the one side, and God's commandment on the other, for all are very good. But sin is a paralysis. Yea, it is a spell that eradicates good and inaugurates evil. And it is of the nature of lust, when it has conceived to bring forth sin, and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth DEATH. There can be no exception to this rule. Were it otherwise, law would cease to be law. Look, for example, at the leper. The disease that infests his body is incurable from the start. For from the crown of the head to the soles of the feet, the vitals are involved. Hence, sooner or later, without divine help, destruction is sure. Through weary days, the frame of the sufferer weakens and fails from the burden and horror of a putrefying disease. And as leprosy deals with the body, so sin deals with the soul. In both cases, the sources of

life are irretrievably destroyed. And with neither the one nor the other are there any needed forces from WITHOUT, to make death certain.

The wages of sin is death. It is vain to suppose that effects can be removed while the cause still abides. And as death is the only possible offspring of sin, nothing can initiate life that does not before hand extirpate guilt. The idea, therefore, of mercy without expiation, or forgiveness without redemption, is simply contradictory. For sin and its wages, either here or hereafter, are indissolubly conjoined. And as the leper can never be pure while the leprosy remains, so the sinner cannot be healed while a "venomous disease infects his vital blood." Moreover, in any scheme of "general mercy," the sentence of the judge must be one and the same for the innocent and the guilty. Under this plan, the vilest transgressor needs neither penalty nor sacrifice to satisfy justice. The Holy God, in the final day, will treat with equal favor the righteous and the wicked. In his eye, according to this plan, it will be unessential whether the law is obeyed or its sanctions contemned. For "general mercy" abrogates authority, blends virtue and vice, and levels in the dust the very throne of the Almighty. Worth has no reward and iniquity goes unpunished, while "evil is called good and good evil." And with government thus overthrown, mercy descends into cruelty and righteousness is turned into wrong, while the pure dwellings of the saved in glory must be identified forever with the foul haunts and habitations of the vile. And, of necessity, from rectitude so perverted and associations so antagonistic, would emanate a gloom, in the blackness of whose dread shadows the just and the unjust would alike be confounded.

Hence, "general mercy" for the offenders becomes special vengeance to the upright. For let it be remembered that no scheme of rationalism that looks to "general mercy," ever accepts, much less proffers, any method of redemption from without. The sinful and sinning soul is thrown back upon its own energies wholly. What it is to be, must be developed out of self. But, given the factors, leprosy in the one case and sin in the other, and leave out all superhuman checks and interworkings, and the

issue, in the end, is as irreparable as doom. It is not more infallibly certain that gravitation holds worlds to their orbits, and every creature, animate or inanimate, to its place, than that "THE WAGES OF SIN IS DEATH." So long as the malady is uncured, the worm must do its work. And it is this spiritual incompatibility between falsehood and truth that fixes the soul forever to its lot. And thus, in the deep nature of things, the occupant of one place cannot pass to the abode of the other. There may be changes, but the bad only become worse; and wider and deeper grow the developments of sin, as the everlasting ages roll. And ever and forever the dead soul, amid the thickening gloom, beholds the extent and magnitude of its irreparable loss.

Nor does the objection hold good, in the meanwhile, that the disposition, nature, and allotments of man were encompassed from the beginning by inflexible necessity. True, in one sense, all died in Adam, and mankind, without exception, are conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity, and go astray from the womb speaking lies. But man, in the first place, was a voluntary agent, and what Adam did in the garden and what we do now is the result of a freedom that cannot be made more free. Nor does it answer to say that death reigned from Adam to Moses and has ever reigned, even over those who sin not after the similitude of Adam's transgression. For under this economy of the Almighty, no detriment arises to those who are incapable of being called by the ministry of the word. For infants dying in infancy are made partakers of the great salvation through Christ, and without faith. The death penalty of the future is meted to those, only, who sin wilfully.

And if it be asked why each person born into the world was not placed upon trial for himself, it can be responded that through the federal relation, only, does salvation seem possible to any individual of the race. For if none died in Adam, neither can any be made alive in Christ. Besides, if our first parents, with the society and surroundings of Eden, failed to obey, is it not certain that every child born of this guilty fallen pair would have departed from the commandment? For such opportunities for obedience as were granted to Adam could never have been assigned

to any of his seed. God created the first man in righteousness and true holiness, and everything in the garden corresponded thereto. But if in spite of all, Adam fell, can it be doubted that his posterity, without exception, born of sinful parents and encompassed by sinful habits, would also have sinned and come short? But had the soul been put upon trial for itself alone, and fallen, then, likewise, must life have come only through self. For the destruction of representation on the one side, destroys it fatally on the other. And after trial, in such form, to each member of the great household of Adam, "dead" as all must have been "in trespasses and sins," there could have remained—the federal headship gone—nothing but a "certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries!" For since the fall of Eden, "by the deeds of the law there can be" no flesh justified in God's sight. "All sin, all go astray. There is none righteous, no, not one." And yet the Scriptures say: "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the Book of the Law to do them." And since it is indubitably sure that righteousness cannot come by the law, the only conceivable prospect for the lost is to draw nigh to Jesus under that "new covenant" which abolishes the death inherited from the first Adam, and bestows eternal life upon the believer, through Christ Jesus, the second.

Christ, therefore, is our only hope. It is he that hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of another, shall many be made righteous. The law entered that the offence might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord." And thus "the righteousness of God, without the law, is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets, even the righteousness which is by faith in Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all them that believe. For there is no difference, for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God, being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus—whom God hath set forth to

be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past through the forbearance of God ; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth." Here, then, are the plan, providence, and compassion of God, over against the rebellion and folly of man. "God concluded all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, and who hath been his counsellor? And who hath given to him and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For OF HIM, and THROUGH HIM, and TO HIM, are all things ; to whom be glory forever. Amen."

Let the reader hold fast to the thought that this DEATH is not simply physical and temporal, but also spiritual and eternal. Nor is it needed in the argument—though manifestly true in itself—to assert that the inequalities of the present DEMAND an adjustment in the future. It is obvious to all that the deserving, in our world, often suffer, while the vicious escape or are rewarded. Nor can it be responded, fairly, to this acknowledged fact, that in the very act of doing right, the just man is fully compensated, while the wrong-doer ever smarts under the dread consciousness of guilt. For the agonies of the wicked under remorse only verify the premise. For if sin be a bitter thing in this earth, why should it cease to be a bitter thing in that world which is to come? If God is not too merciful to punish the culpable IN TIME, why shall he be too merciful to visit with this vengeance the same guilty soul in that eternity that approaches? Ah! only demonstrate the existence of sin, either in this world or the next, and ITS WAGES are sure. And what if the pure in heart do always possess an inward consolation, is the fulfilment of God's covenant with the righteous a credit that the graceless offender can appropriate to himself? Can A vindicate his own robberies upon the plea that B always makes the losses good? Does not the LAW still hold its claims?

But if the "thrones" are to be set, how can it be otherwise
VOL. XXIX., NO. 4—15.

than that the awards of "That Day" shall correspond exactly with the character and antecedents of the party to be judged? And if this principle be correct—and who dare deny it—then when the sinner appears before the Judge, the only sentence possible in the case is that fearful one, "Let him that is filthy be filthy still." And hence that wild threnody of despair, which shall echo through the dark bosom of hell forever, is the logical consequence of iniquity whose germinal was in time. Even while we write the sinner is condemned. Execution has been stayed, and only because "that grace of God that bringeth salvation has appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lust, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world." But only let this heavenly lure be gone, and the soul is lost forever. For the only LIVING thing within the sinner is the still small voice of grace which entreats him to awake. Allow THIS to depart, and all else is death. Look at the corpse. It is cold, pulseless, and without breath. The members—hands, feet, etc.—are physically the same, but that which gave them power and motion has departed. THE LIFE PRINCIPLE IS GONE! So long as the spirit remained the body was alive, but no sooner does the inward occupant flee than corruption sets in. This is what men call death. So much for the body. Turn now to the soul. It has already sinned and come short. The whole head is sick and whole heart faint. Why then is not the sentence speedily executed? The answer must be that the breath of the Almighty within delays the retribution. But when the Holy One withdraws, as he will in eternity forever, then "the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched" shall begin straightway their direful work.

Mankind, in their legislative enactments, unwittingly it may be, justify the ways of God. The mandate, "whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed," is recognised by human courts. Body for body is the verdict, even where the creature sits in judgment on the creature. But yonder at the "Throne" the soul shall be tried for SOUL-MURDER. Now if sin has its wages in the present world, with man as judge, shall not sin get its award in the next world where Jehovah sits in judg-

ment? If body death is just when the body is destroyed, is soul death too great when soul murder is made out? And besides, there arises to view once again that antagonism between virtue and vice which is inherent and unconquerable. For evil and good can never be agreed. And hence in the awards of eternity the righteous is simply admitted to that for which he has tastes—to that for which he is fitted—to that which corresponds with the yearnings of his nature. The wicked, on the other hand, is assigned to his own place—to the only place in the universe for which he is prepared. Society, as constituted at present among men, ejects from its bosom the defiled and offensive, and this when the infection complained of is only a disorder of the body. Look at the leper. “The priest shall pronounce him utterly unclean. And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be rent, and his head bare, and he shall put a covering upon his upper lip, and shall cry, Unclean, unclean. All the days wherein the plague shall be in him he shall be defiled; he is unclean; he shall dwell alone. Without the camp shall his habitation be.” This law of the leprosy was enacted for the physical protection of a community of earth; but upon a moral arena, and in the very presence of God, is it not monstrous to suppose that there shall exist the LICENSED interminglings of purity and filth? that the world that now is will empty its reeking dens into the golden streets of the Holy City, and while the morally unclean defile with their plague-spots the fair residence of the saints, no authority shall obtain to banish the leper and force him to dwell without, alone in his habitation? Are we to witness in the heavenly world a spectacle at which humanity revolts even upon earth? For let it be remembered that the difference between the sinner in heaven or in hell is one of LOCALITY only, and not of CONDITION or ESTATE. EVERYWHERE the wages of sin is death.

The man of science with telescopic gaze sweeps the heavens to ascertain the law which moves and binds and governs these uncounted worlds in the immensity of space. Do the same principles of attraction exist and regulate THERE which are the bond of material union HERE? To the depths of this vast abyss

is matter essentially the same ; and does the mechanism—the metes and bounds of every shining orb—point with inexorable logic to an all controlling, never deviating MIND? And do these very heavens so declare the glory of this one “incorruptible God, who is over all blessed forever,” as to exclude the bare possibility of another who works independently, according to the counsel of a diverse but co-equal will? If the keen scrutiny of science so reveals (and who shall deny that it does?) throughout the wide circle of the spheres, is not the conclusion analogically irresistible, that he who allows no change in the order, essence, and harmony of the material universe also ordains ONE MORAL LAW to bind all intelligent creatures, wherever they exist, and however remote their abodes? This WILL of the Holy and Omnipotent One is accomplished not only in the armies of heaven, but with equal sovereignty and power among the inhabitants of the earth. But if the Lord be the true God, “whose goings forth have been from old—the Most High that liveth forever,” whose law and dominion are immutable, infinite, and everlasting, and his kingdom from generation to generation,” then if death is the wages of sin in one world, DEATH MUST BE ITS WAGES IN EVERY OTHER!

The righteous man in the present life struggles with many adverse influences. Sense and materialism oppose. Another law in his members wars against the law of his mind. But when the justified soul goes up to glory, it leaves behind all that encumbers. The felicities of the redeemed shall never more be fettered by sin. For carnal motions cease, and the pious spirit enters an arena for which it has yearned and whose blessed communings are infinite joy. On the contrary, the sinner meets the bar of God with innate guilt, unwashed, and “passion raging like a sea.” The heart desperately wicked, and with every expedient for purification far in the background, appears before a Judge who cannot look upon sin, and that “will by no means clear the guilty.” And even if the trial were renewed many times over, the sentence must be the same, for “the wages of sin is death.”

And in this view it will be seen that hell is no creation of the Bible, but a great and awful fact that existed antecedent to all revelations! Its necessity is illustrated every day and every hour

in man's habits and in that nature of man that lies deeper down than habit. And while Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to light in the gospel, he did not unfold for the first time the doctrine of retribution. For in unregenerate souls of every land and clime, even where the gospel has not gone, the dread intimations of conscience point with assurance to the revelation of the righteous judgment of God. And even when the refractory dream of some future haven of rest, the heritage which they seek is not a kingdom of purity and peace, but simply a refuge from punishment and an inheritance of lust.

But how preposterous the hope! For the sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law, and these two will be present, whether the soul ascends up into heaven or makes its bed in hell. Solitude and darkness, a dwelling-place in the uttermost parts of the sea, cannot divide the spirit from its guilt nor exile the offender beyond the limits of law. God's prerogative is without bound. Anywhere in the universe man's sin shall find him out. The more therefore it is considered the deeper grows the thought that the wages of sin is death—that the soul has in itself the seeds of everlasting woe.

Although the argument, for the most part, has been based upon the essential qualities and consequent recompence of sin, yet it needs to be solemnly considered that in correspondence with this, the nature and justice of God demand for the transgressor a righteous retribution. For Jehovah's law is immutable, and he who is infinitely just can by no means clear the guilty. A God of love who is also a God of purity, must have a part in the punishment of sin. The Holy One of eternity expelled Adam from the garden, sent the Deluge when he saw the wickedness of man was great in the earth, destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone, visited Pharaoh with plagues, and slew the first-born of Egypt. He put a mark in the forehead of Cain, struck Ananias and Sapphira dead for lying unto the Holy Ghost, and many a time sent the sword and pestilence on the earth. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord."

And now, if God is compelled to limit or soften the punishment

of transgressors in eternity, by the same process of proof it could be demonstrated that it is obligatory on him to cut short the inflictions of time. It could be shown—by the theory referred to—still farther, that mercy and justice demand it of Jehovah that he should force upon the uncounted millions born and living in sin, altars, sanctuaries, and light. But by this method, too, the mighty Sovereign of the universe sitting on his august throne is not only stripped of his prerogatives before the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, but sunk to a level even below the commonest judge among men. For in looking around us we behold legislatures enacting statutes, human judges expounding them, and juries deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. But the great God, who ought to combine in his person the authority of these three, is, according to the new theology, not allowed to exercise the functions of either. It has come to this, that the creature not only claims to be the judge in his own affairs, but undertakes to lay down rules for the regulation of the Almighty. Man not only virtually denies that the Judge of all the earth will do right, but ventures to inquire of the Creator, “Why hast thou made me thus?” Nevertheless, theorise as men may, suffering has existed for ages within the human soul and without, and still exists. But if God allows suffering to be present in one world, who dare say that he will abolish it hereafter in all others. On the contrary, if death be the wages of sin here, does not analogy teach that death must be the same wages hereafter? The change of venue does not alter the principle involved. For, as before stated, the removal of the body or soul from one locality to another makes no essential alteration in its condition or state; just as the leper, transferred from a dungeon to a king’s palace, will bear along with him the same whited spots. The difficulty, either with sin or an incurable disease, is to be found not in the mercy of the physician or judge, but in the desperate nature of the maladies themselves.

Nor can any fairly object to this. For the household, society, and the state, are constituted in the idea of censure and award. To abolish punishment would be to break down parental

authority, to open every jail, to throw wide the penitentiary, and to uproot the gallows. It would be to turn loose upon the community the thief, the debauchee, and the assassin. The only terror to desperate evil doers would be gone, and no man's property, honor, or life, could be safe. That sense of security which now pervades the public mind would be exchanged for abiding apprehensions. The gentler members of our household would not dare to go abroad, while the very sanctuary of home would be constantly in danger of the inroads of the desperado. But, thank God, a little wisdom is still left in the land. Legislatures enact laws against crime, and juries do not think that sorrow on the part of the thief, or of the keenest remorse in the soul of the murderer, are sufficient of themselves to make atonement for the outrage. On the contrary, courts, composed of men, not only condemn but punish the criminal. Every practical and sensible man understands how utterly futile and visionary would be the effort to control the vicious by the golden rule of love. Whenever there is law there must be annexed a penalty for disobedience.

But if an earthly court punishes the offender, can it be expected that the infinitely perfect Governor of the universe will allow the culprit to go free? yea more, to receive the transgressor, the murderer it may be reeking in gore, into the company of the glorified and pure? Ah! that this cannot be, we have distinct and oft-repeated warnings.

There is the account of the "rich man who died and was buried, and in hell lifted up his eyes being in torment." Besides, between this lost soul and the saved a great gulf had been "fixed." In "the last day," God, we are told, shall separate the righteous from the wicked, as the shepherd divides the sheep from the goats. To those on his left hand the Judge will say, "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." With not a whit more clearness does the Bible declare the safety of the righteous than it unfolds the danger and doom of the wicked. If the one is to enter into eternal life, the other is to go away into eternal punishment. "Aionion," as every scholar knows, is the word used to describe alike the duration of blessed-

ness and the period of suffering. And if it be taught by this word that the wicked are to be cast away only for "an age long," or for a season "something above and beyond time," then the happiness and glory of the redeemed must be limited to the same term. It is thus seen that we cannot raise the guilty to heaven without at the same time unsettling the foundation of the justified and saved. And such are ever the inconsistencies and folly of error, especially in those attempts of the wise of this world to improve upon the teachings of the Scriptures.

And with what shadow of justice, after all, can the transgressor complain that punishment awaits him for sin? Does he not disobey wilfully? Is there not an inward monitor that confesses to the commandments of the Lord, that they are right and true? Is there a human being on the earth sunken so low who does not acknowledge the excellency of virtue and the sting and anguish of sin? Is it not because the hearts of the children of men are fully set in them to do evil, that any refuse to conform to the precepts of the gospel? Does not nature even utter her voice? There are the heavens which declare the glory of God and the firmament which showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night showeth knowledge. The Almighty speaks to us in the foundations of his mountains and in the valleys which are spread forth. Bounties and beauties without number unfold the goodness of God, while the volcano, pestilence, and storm are intimations of his wrath. And to these things, which are seen, heard, and felt, even by the savage, correspond the sure words of an inspired prophecy. For in the Scriptures we meet mercies manifold, but mingled with threatenings. Jehovah first exhausts the treasuries of his grace. He gives his only begotten Son to die and redeem the wicked. He sends the Holy Spirit to convince men of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. He not only provides a ransom for the "chief of sinners," but commissions living teachers to go into all the world and disciple the nations, offering salvation to every creature without money and without price. The preacher is bidden to proclaim it the wide world over, that Jehovah is willing to save to the uttermost; that the blood of Christ cleanses from all sin; that God takes

pleasure in the death of none, but solemnly avers, by his life, a desire that the wicked should turn and live.

And now, after such gifts, sacrifices, invitations, preparation, forbearance, and love of God the Father and his only begotten and well beloved Son, shall a sinner that refuses the offer and despises the mercy go free, without punishment and without reproof? Shall earthly courts sentence and execute the culprit who has trifled with human rights, and the soul that has outraged every law, contemned God's compassion, trampled upon a loving Saviour, and murdered itself, be allowed to escape? If so, how appalling the thought: a God insulted, his statutes derided, the blood of his co-equal scouted, and yet no arm in the universe able or willing to avenge! It cannot be. Let the wicked therefore beware when God riseth up. For when he visiteth, what shall the sinner answer?

In conclusion, what shall we do? In view of a bare possibility of eternal doom, would it not be wise in the soul to make its peace with God? The strife is unequal. "Let the potsherds of the earth contend with the potsherds of the earth, but woe to him that contends with his Maker!" With the blood of Calvary flowing, why should any perish? "Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else." "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool." Only "be ye willing and obedient" and "I, even I, am he that shall blot out thy transgressions for my own sake, and will not remember thy sins." O sinner, BELIEVE and BE SAVED.

VOL. XXIX., NO. 4—16.

ARTICLE VI.

A PHILOSOPHY OF MAN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT
AID FROM REVELATION.

The sum of the main truths of religion, as given in the Scriptures, is: That God is infinite in his being and attributes; that he is the Creator of all things; that man lives under a law imposed upon him by his Creator; that the conditions of this law are, that perfect obedience insures eternal happiness, and disobedience works eternal misery; that man has broken this law, and thus incurred the penalty affixed to it; and that through Jesus Christ an offer is made to all who will accept it, of release from the penalty of disobedience and of the gift of eternal happiness.

We may here distinguish two sets of truths connected into one series: 1. The announcement of what may be called the natural and necessary relations between the Creator and man. 2. The two facts—man's disobedience, and the coming of Christ, and what is implied in each respectively.

Now, of these truths, the first set, though made known by revelation, *might* have been reached by *a priori* reasoning; the second could not have been ascertained by such reasoning (as, indeed, no mere fact can be); but when once made known, commend themselves to our reason as the only conceivable, and, therefore, the true causes of the actual condition of things as made known to us by observation and testimony. If this be so, then the scheme of religion as presented in the Bible is in accordance with the original principles of human nature, though undiscoverable by human powers, and this, again, is a strong argument that the Bible is a revelation from God.

To develop these propositions is the object of what follows.

English historians tell us that the first known inhabitants of Great Britain were Celts; that the island was afterwards conquered and held by the Romans, taken possession of by the Saxons, afterwards invaded by the Northmen, and finally subjugated by the Norman-French.

None of these facts could be ascertained by reasoning. Our belief of them rests upon the authority of earlier records. But should the facts be questioned, ample proof of the truth of them can be adduced from the actual condition of the English language. In it are found, at present, words from the languages spoken by these several nations in such numbers and such relations as to preclude the doubt that the nations themselves once occupied the soil, in whole or in part. Let us now apply this analogy. Suppose we find that nothing but the statements contained in the Scriptures will meet the requirements of our reasoning from the original principles of our consciousness and the observed facts ascertained by a survey of the actual condition of man, what is the obvious conclusion to be adduced? This general view will make intelligible the method of this article.

It is assumed that God, infinite in power, wisdom, and benevolence, created all things. It is sufficient for what we have in hand to signalise only these three of his attributes. By a necessity of thought, we must believe that he created all things for a purpose. The contradictory is *unthinkable*. It would weaken this demonstrative proof to offer a subsidiary argument drawn from the evidences of design actually observed in nature. From the infinite power and infinite wisdom of God, it follows immediately that everything created by him was *perfectly adapted* to accomplish the purpose of its Creator. This perfect adaptation (including its effect) of every being to accomplish the purpose of its creation, is the *law* of its being. Therefore, we give this definition of the term, *law*, as used in the following pages:

Law is the mode of being or action assigned to the constitution of whatever exists. The Creator has given to everything its constitution in order that it may thereby accomplish the purpose of its creation, and thus has given to everything its *law*.

From the nature of law as above defined, it results that a violation of law brings destruction as a necessary consequence. Law is the mode of being assigned to whatever exists. The law ceasing, the existence dependent on it necessarily ceases at the same time. Thus, the law of life, being that nutriment must be supplied: withhold the nutriment, and life ceases.

The laws determining the constitution of beings, are of two sorts—*mechanical* and *moral* laws. Whatever is subject to mechanical law, may be called a machine; and whatever is subject to moral law, a moral being. Between machines and moral beings, is this fundamental difference: a machine cannot disregard the law of its constitution; a moral being may. Hence, the further difference: we cannot, even in thought, attach the notion of merit to a machine for acting in obedience to a mechanical law; while we instinctively praise or blame a moral being for compliance with the moral law of its constitution.

Nothing can be more exact than the risings and settings of the sun (speaking phenomenally): its steady progression northward during the summer, to a given line in space; its instant solstitial pause; and then its retrogression to a corresponding line in the south, whence it resumes its annual career. All this awakens our admiration; but we never think that any credit is due to the great luminary for its exact and beneficent regularity: it cannot do otherwise. But when we see the Apostle Paul, in obedience to the heavenly vision, suddenly reversing his impetuous course, and with undaunted courage and unflagging zeal pursuing the career of duty, through perils and persecutions, to a martyr's death, we not only admire what is done, but crown with praise the doer.

So, also, the perfect well-being of a moral being is called happiness: we cannot predicate happiness of a machine.

Thus God's creation arranges itself for our contemplation into two distinctly marked classes—that of *machines*, and that of *moral beings*. We cannot doubt that, in point of time, the creation of machines came first. Orbs of limitless magnitude and in inconceivable numbers occupied, without filling, space, each a separate existence all bound up into unity, and all in complex motion. To the vegetable machines was assigned the vital principle, and to the animal machines spontaneity was superadded. The complexity and intimacy of the relations between all these machines, at once distinct and mutually dependent, may be considered infinite, and all these relations were provided for by law. Some laws excluded change, as those of the heavenly bodies, and some

laws required continual flux, as the progression and reproduction of vegetables and animals. But whether of stability or variation, the law was perfectly obeyed. No atom of matter could be lost, no second of time could be wasted, and the viewless wind was as obedient to the law as the revolving earth. The glory of the Creator had been sufficiently manifested by the grandeur, the number, and the perfection of created machines performing their functions with absolute conformity to his will, as expressed in laws that could not be broken. The idea of the Infinite Mind as to a mechanical universe was attained. If, then, the Creator would make any further exhibition of his omnipotence, it must be, not by creating more machines, but something else different from machines. But whatever is subject only to a law that cannot be broken, is a machine. The creature, therefore, that is not to be a machine, must be relieved from the condition, must be under a law which can be broken. Such a creature existed when man had been created, not a *machine*, but a *moral being*.

The question is sometimes asked, Could not the Creator have so made man that he must of necessity have been obedient to the law of his moral being as the earth is obedient to the laws of motion? If man had been thus created, it is plain that he would have been a mere machine, and virtue nothing more than moral *vis inertivæ*. But we have supposed that it was the purpose of God to create something different from a machine; and therefore to man must be given the at once high prerogative, and the fearful responsibility, of being able to act contrary to the law of his being. Yet observe, that the character of law is not thereby so affected as to render a moral law less imperative than a mechanical law. Each law is the will of the Creator as to the creature, and each is therefore supremely obligatory, demanding perfect service. A law (being the will of the law-giver) requiring anything less than perfect obedience, is inconceivable. Put into other words, the opposite would be, that the law-giver willed the doing of a particular thing, and yet was willing that it should not be done—a contradiction of terms, and an impossibility in thought.

It seems to be a corollary from this, that, whenever the con-

stituting law of any creature is inoperative, the destruction of the creature must follow. As obedience to the law is the condition upon which the Creator wills the existence of the creature, the condition failing, the will is reversed, and the reason for being ceases. This is certainly the case with mere machines. If the earth could disregard its centrifugal impulse, it would be absorbed by the sun in fiery ruin. If its centripetal attraction were unheeded, it would dash hurtling among the celestial orbs, to final destruction in the realms of limitless space. If water and air should vary their constituents, they would cease to be the elements they are. And so, analogously, the refusal of a moral being to obey the law constituting him such, must end in moral death. As an argument tending to prove that this is the law of moral being, may be adduced the fact of the progressive deterioration of every one under the power of a dominant vice. Possibly, also, to the operation of this law we may refer the cause of the present degradation of savage tribes.

Thus, by a fair, unforced explication of some of the several elements implied in the relation between the Creator, God, and his creature, man, we have secured this result: man, by the constitution of his nature, lives under a law perfect in its requirements and absolute in its authority. This law is a moral law, the essence of which, as contrasted with a mechanical law, is, that it is not self-executing, but may be disregarded by the subject of it; with this condition, however, attached as well to moral as mechanical law, that disobedience must work out ultimate destruction.

All this reasoning is strictly *a priori*. Let us now compare it with the obvious facts of man's actual condition. We assume that man was created perfect. A contrary supposition would imply weakness or carelessness or malevolence in the Creator. This is incompatible with our conception of God as all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good. Briefly, if the material universe was not created perfect, it is because God either could not or would not make it so. Of man, his moral creature, no less can be said. Here let us say, that by assuming perfection, we do not mean to raise any question whether God's creation, material or moral,

might not have been different, but only to assert that it was created with a perfect adaptation for what he designed it to be. To the sun might have been given a possible diameter triple its actual one; but the sun, as created, is perfect for its intended function. So man might have had a station nearer than he has to the angels; but as the man he was intended to be, he was created perfect. As such, is he perfect now?

Man's complex nature may be considered in the three aspects—physical, intellectual, and moral. Physical perfection implies freedom from bodily weakness and disorder. Intellectual perfection would require the power of perceiving and understanding all needful truth; and moral perfection would ensure a full and free love to all goodness, and undeviating adherence to what is known to be right. The undisputed fact, established by the mere inspection of man in his actual condition, is that in these elements of his threefold nature, he is imperfect. His body is the prey of disease; his mind labors in perplexity over the truths most necessary to its well-being; and his moral nature, weak and perverted, with difficulty withstands a tendency to utter abasement. Man was originally perfect; he is now, undeniably, imperfect. He has therefore been changed.

As to when or how this fatal change occurred, we would speculate in vain. The discovery of facts is outside the domain of reason; and yet, without the knowledge of this fact, it is impossible to construct a philosophy of man which shall reconcile the deductions of reason with the facts of present observation. In one book, and only one, this fact, which, in the nature of the case, does not admit of discovery by reason nor of proof by evidence, is made known. In the Bible, one of the earliest and most fundamental announcements is—the fall of man!—his change from a perfect to an imperfect being! As without a knowledge of this fact, a philosophy of man would be impossible, so, without the revelation of it, the system of doctrine contained in the Bible would have no basis on which to rest.

But according to the principle laid down, the violation of the law of his constitution must work the ultimate destruction of a moral creature. Yet man has violated this law, and has, never-

theless, not been destroyed. The destruction of a moral being implies a total disregard of the distinction between right and wrong, and the annihilation of conscience as a guide or reprover. This is not the actual condition of man. What we mean may be significantly, though not logically, expressed by saying, man is not perfect, but he is not a devil. How shall we reconcile our reasoning with the fact? If the reasoning is true and the fact certain, there is but one possible way of bringing them together. Something must have been *interposed* to avert the operation of the law which tended to work ultimate destruction. The law of gravity causes a descending stone to fall until it reaches the earth. A stone has begun to descend, and yet has not fallen to the earth. Why not? We know assuredly that something has been interposed to prevent its reaching the earth. Man has begun to fall, but has not reached what we may conceive to be the ultimate point of his descent. Why not? Something has been interposed to arrest his inevitable tendency to the ultimate destruction of his moral nature. But what could be thus interposed? Human reason has no element with which to frame an answer; speculation has no material out of which to shape an hypothesis.

But in the Bible is found—in the Bible only is found—not a suggestion, but an articulate revelation which makes plain the insoluble problem. To develop this revelation, and to enforce it upon the attention of mankind, is the one great object of the Scriptures.

Man has violated the law of his moral constitution, and has thus brought himself within the scope of inevitable destruction; but—he is not destroyed. He has fallen; but his fall is not complete. *Christ has interposed!* This revelation explains the mystery; this revelation is the sum and substance of the Bible. Observe now, the consistency between the nature of the law which was broken and the interposition which has been provided. The law broken was not a mechanical self-executing law, but a moral law, depending for its observance upon the will of man. So, the interposition provided is not a mechanical absolute interposition, (as in the case of the supposed arrested stone,) but

a moral interposition, requiring for its full efficacy, to be accepted by the will of man. We say, *full efficacy*, because, that some of the benefits of Christianity are without conscious voluntary acceptance received both by individuals and nations, is at once the doctrine of Scripture, and a fact of observation. The sun warms the sand on the sea-shore, but does not fructify it.

If, however, all existing imperfection in God's creation necessarily implies violation of constitutive law, what shall be said of what seems to be imperfection or deterioration in the physical world, which could not disobey the mechanical law of its constitution, and therefore, according to our reasoning, ought to have maintained the perfection of its original creation? Why are there arid deserts, destructive storms, malarial vapors, poisonous plants, and noxious animals? We must say this, first, that what we take for imperfection may not be all such; and second, that we cannot know to what degree the material and the moral world are so implicated that they reciprocally act the one upon the other for good or for evil. According to revelation, a physical act of disobedience instrumentally wrought the moral deterioration of man, and we certainly know, that as we are now constituted, the physical acts of ourselves or others affect potentially our moral nature. How then shall it be considered impossible, or even improbable, that a change in the moral nature of man, the head of creation, should affect the condition of the material universe? Whatever may be the soundness of any speculation on this point, the statement of the Bible is unequivocal, that the earth was cursed for man's sin; and thus offers the only conceivable reason why it should be cursed—should be imperfect—at all.

It is a pleasant thought, though not bearing logically upon the discussion in hand, that we may suppose that two objects in nature are presented to our contemplation in the original perfection with which they issued from the hand of God. The starry firmament was above the effects of man's fall; and the deep ocean, meant for the perpetual purifier of earth, was preserved from the contamination of man's sin.

Thus, as we have seen, two facts are indispensable as links in

the chain connecting the requirements of absolute reasoning, and the unquestionable testimony of experience—a change in man's original condition, and some sufficient interposition as the cause of his present condition.

The Bible announces these two precise facts as the collateral, fundamental doctrines of revealed religion. The fall of man is the necessary initial of the Christian religion; for Christianity is in its essence and whole scope remedial and restoring. If there had been no ill, there would be no place for a remedy. If nothing had been lost, nothing could be restored. The Bible in its first verse presents the only foundation and justification for all else contained in it: *In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.* In its very earliest pages it gives us an account of the fall of man. Let us group together some of its teachings as to this fact.

1. Man is distinctly informed that he is under a moral, and not a mechanical law. He is forbidden to eat of the tree in the midst of the garden, which implies the power to do so, or to refrain from doing.

2. The requirement of perfect obedience is made known: "Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye *touch* it."

3. The principle that disobedience of the law works destruction is announced: "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

4. It is impossible for man to avert the destruction which disobedience necessitates. If he could, he would have power over the original law of his own constitution, which is inconceivable. This powerlessness of man is symbolised by the flaming sword, which makes hopeless any attempt to reënter Paradise.

5. The interposition is co-instantaneous with the fall. The germ of redemption is planted in the first edge of the wilderness: "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head."

6. Here we have a glimpse of the effects of disobedience on a moral creature when no interposition is provided. Satan sinned—sinned, as far as we know, but once. He fell immediately to the lowest depths, irretrievably and without hope.

These things, we think, are clearly set before us in the Bible

account of the fall. It seems to us equally clear, that having been revealed, they offer to us the only reasonable explanation of some of the most momentous observed facts in the present condition, and as far as we are acquainted with it, in the past history of mankind.

While the principles set forth and illustrated in the foregoing discussion connect themselves with the fact of the origin of moral evil, they do not touch the solution of it. Also, they require the acceptance of the doctrines both of God's sovereignty and man's free agency, but demand no philosophical reconciliation of the two. Furthermore, they are suited to prepare us to receive with docility the great doctrines of the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit and justification by faith. Should one of the heavenly bodies swerve from its appropriate course, it could not by possibility, of itself, return to its orbit. The very law of its constitution, which if obeyed, would secure it, when disobeyed, makes certain its farther deviation. So man, ceasing to be holy, can never make himself holy again. He must be born again : he must have the benefit of the interposition of something external to himself—justification by faith.

In the light of these principles, we apprehend the foundation of the important truth of revelation—that to merely neglect this great salvation, is to perish. The ruin has been wrought. Its final accomplishment is only suspended by the gracious interposition of a Saviour. The benefit of this interposition is merely offered ; it is not mechanically applied. It must be accepted by a free act of the will. This act withheld, the offered interposition is, for its ultimate end, unavailing, and the results of the fall work themselves out, without remedy, forever.

ARTICLE VII.

THE WISDOM OF MAN VERSUS THE POWER OF GOD.

The Apostle of the Gentiles reminds the Corinthians that, from the very beginning of his ministry among them, his reliance for success was not upon the means upon which they were accustomed to rely for conviction and persuasion,—the resources of logic and rhetoric,—but upon “the demonstration of the Spirit and of power.” This does not mean merely a great or powerful demonstration, as if the Holy Ghost were only a mightier logician or a more eloquent orator than any man could be, that his words were weightier and more persuasive than “the enticing words of man’s wisdom.” The difference he signalizes is one of kind, not one of degree only. It is a demonstration of power, energy, physical force, (we use the word physical, simply in opposition to the notion of mere “moral suasion,”) not only presenting the evidence for the truth, but opening the mind to receive it and appreciate it; not only proving Christ to be the only Saviour, the only satisfying portion of the soul, but purging and renewing the soul in order that it might embrace him and rejoice in him; in short, a demonstration which consists in “effectual calling,” “whereby the Spirit, convincing sinners of their sin and misery, enlightening their minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing their wills, doth persuade and enable them to embrace Jesus Christ freely offered to them in the gospel.”

The purpose of all this was that “the faith” of the Corinthians “might not stand in the wisdom of man but in the power of God;” that the faith of believers, as to the efficacy of the gospel and the successful prosecution of the work of the kingdom of God, might not stand in any devices of man, but in the power of the Holy Ghost energizing his own ordinances. This opposition between the wisdom of man and the power of God, in relation to the faith of the Church, we propose to illustrate.

1. There is a sphere in which human wisdom and divine power are not opposed to each other. In the sphere of nature they are

in entire harmony; we might say, even coincident with each other. The wisdom of man, so far as it is exercised in the production of mechanical results, has its foundation in the uniformity of nature, the order of established causes, the system of invariable sequences, in the material universe around us. The instinct of our intellectual constitution prompts us to expect this uniformity. We learn, by enlarging the sphere of observation and experiment, by accumulating a number of particulars, to distinguish between real and apparent sequences, and to determine the essential conditions in which one event succeeds another. Experience modifies and corrects our confidence in the stability of nature, but does not originate or strengthen it. Now it is this confidence in the laws of nature which gives rise to mechanical skill; without it, the right hand would soon lose its cunning. The desired results are produced by accommodating ourselves to these laws, to the properties of things, and to the conditions under which these properties manifest themselves. We become the masters of nature by becoming her servants, and lead her by following her. Hence the famous *dictum*, "Knowledge is power;" the wisest man is the strongest man. But whose power is this? Evidently, the power of Him who is the author of the constitution and course of nature. We hesitate to adopt the statement, that what we call the laws of nature are only general descriptions of the divine operations considered as uniform and invariable, because it would seem to deny that there is any real power in "secondary causes." This we do not deny; we believe that fire has a power to burn. Yet there is a sense in which these laws may be said to be the conditions under which the power of God is ordinarily exercised; and the highest wisdom of man consists, in this department of his activity, in the nicest accommodation of his instruments to these conditions. This power is really, though perhaps unconsciously, the ground of our faith, when we trust in the elastic force of steam to drive our engines, or in the processes of agriculture and the influences of sunshine and shower to provide our bread. In this aspect of the case, the wisdom of man and the power of God are in entire harmony with each other.

2. So far as the activity of man is concerned merely about

physical laws, the result is always the same, under the same physical conditions, whether his moral character be good or bad, whether he lives in the fear of God, or lives only to himself. But in the affairs of common life, the result often shows that there is no such necessary connexion between means and ends. God will assert his own glorious sovereignty, and will have that sovereignty to be recognised; and, therefore, when the *moral* agency of man is concerned, the very wisest schemes are often baffled and confounded. M. Comte himself has again and again remarked, says McCosh, that the phenomena which are the most simple and general and therefore the most easily arranged into a science, are those "which are at the farthest distance from man," and he has furnished the observations from which the conclusion has been legitimately drawn, that "man is impotent in regard to the objects whose laws he can discover, and that he is ignorant and dependent in regard to the objects nearest himself and with which he is most intimately connected;" in other words, that "man's knowledge is in an inverse proportion to his power," that his knowledge is greatest when his control is least: so that while he can with unerring precision predict, centuries beforehand, an eclipse of the sun, he cannot tell whether he shall die a rich man or a beggar; nay, whether, the next moment, he shall be alive or dead. The laws by which the world is governed are sufficiently general to lay the foundation for the exercise of prudence and foresight, but at the same time variable enough in their results—whether through the necessary limitations of the human faculties, or the exercise of the divine sovereignty, it matters not—to show that man is not the architect of his own fortune and the arbiter of his own destiny. The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance (the unknown or unacknowledged cause of these diversities) happeneth to them all. For man also knoweth not his time; as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that are caught in the snare, so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them. Consider the work of God; for who can make

that straight which he hath made crooked? In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: hath God also set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him. Even in the life that now is, then, God will have our faith to stand not in the wisdom of man, but in his own power, who worketh when, where, and how he pleaseth. In the very midst of our mechanical and organic theories of the universe and of providence, he rouses us from our Epicurean dreams, by the frustration of our best contrived plans and the disappointment of our most deliberate calculations.

3. But it is in reference to the life to come, and the manifestation of the divine glory in the conception and execution of the plan of salvation, that the opposition between the wisdom of man and the power of God comes out most impressively. Indeed, it seems to have been one of the chief purposes of God in the inspired record of the history of his Church to establish and illustrate this great principle—that the faith of his people must stand not in the wisdom of man, but in his power. When the nation of Israel was about to be set apart as the witness of his existence and government, the dispensation was introduced and authenticated by *miracles*, by visible interpositions of the power of God, outside, if not in contravention, of the “laws of nature.” A miracle is an effect produced by a direct and immediate exercise of power, and an effect palpable to the senses. Such an effect is always a divine σημεῖον, a sign of the presence and power of God, since all power but his is and must be exerted by means of law, indirectly and mediately. The agency of the Creator is concerned in the production of the grain from the seed, by means of the ordinary properties of the soil and the influences of the atmosphere; it is concerned also in raining down manna from heaven upon his people in the wilderness; in the ministry of the ravens to Elijah at the brook Cherith—the most voracious of birds bringing him bread and flesh in the morning and bread and flesh in the evening; in sustaining the same prophet forty days and forty nights without food; in the multiplication of the widow’s oil by the hands of Elisha and the feeding of a hundred men by the same prophet with twenty barley loaves; and in the

feeding of thousands by the Saviour with a few loaves and fishes. The power of God, we say, is exercised in all these cases. But how different the impression in the first case and in the rest! In the first case, the finger of God is not seen; in the remainder, it is palpable, and with more or less distinctness, according as the exercise of the power is more or less visibly direct.

If the Israelites had been fed by the harvests of their own hands, as the Egyptians were, how would the world have known that their God was other and greater than the gods of their enemies? But fed and clothed and defended and delivered *as they were*, the verdict rendered even by their enemies was, that their Rock was other and greater. Now, why such a dispensation as this? Plainly, because the ancient Church was to live by faith in the power of God exercised in the way of an "extraordinary providence," and must be educated to that end. The faithless generation quailed and fainted at the report of the spies. God swore in his wrath that they should not enter into his rest, because they still argued and acted upon the principles of human wisdom and worldly prudence. "The giants, the sons of Anak, are there, and cities walled up to heaven; how can an undisciplined multitude like ours, cumbered with the care of women and children, hope to conquer a warlike race fighting for their homes and their altars?" Sound reasoning truly, and commendable prudence in any other people, but not in men who had witnessed the plagues of Egypt, the drying up of the Red Sea, and the instantaneous discomfiture of an armed and disciplined host with the mightiest monarch of the world at its head; in men who were at the very time miraculously sustained by food from heaven, and surrounded on all sides by multiplied evidences that the God of nature and providence was on their side. They ought to have believed that those impregnable walls would fall down, if need be, at the very blast of their horns, and the stout hearts of those sons of Anak melt like wax at their approach, under the secret touch of Him whose presence had made the solid mountain to smoke and tremble. They had not the faith which was indispensably necessary to qualify them for the rest of God in the land of promise, and were therefore excluded. They could not enter

in because of unbelief. And many years rolled by, years of painful discipline, but discipline under the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night, before the younger generation were prepared, by faith in the power of God, for the conquest and permanent possession of that country in which the dust of Abraham had long reposed, the pledge of Jehovah's faithfulness, and the memorial of his own.*

And how gloriously were these lessons renewed under the administration of Joshua and the Judges, when, with the most contemptible weapons of war, the blowing of rams' horns, lamps and pitchers, the jaw-bone of an ass, and an ox-goad, the deliverance of Israel from oppression was accomplished and their victories achieved! And how certainly did disaster and disgrace befall them during their whole history, when they forgot the King of Israel, who is spirit and not flesh, and trusted in horses and chariots for success in battle! Saul was one of the most conspicuous examples of confidence in his own wisdom, and, very naturally, was one of the greatest troublers of the people. He acted in the affair of the Amalekites with the best intentions—*ad majorem gloriam Dei*; he saved the best of the spoil for the honor of the Lord. But how is his officious service received? "What meaneth this bleating in mine ears? and the lowing of the oxen which I hear? Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry. Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being

*The use the Apostle makes of this history in the third and fourth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews is very striking. In the case of the Jews we have—1. A promised rest. 2. An extraordinary providence. 3. A faith in such a providence, contradicting the natural instinct of the mind, which prompts it to look for unvarying uniformity in the sequences of nature. In the case of man, under the gospel, we have—1. A promised rest. 2. The righteousness of Christ imputed for justification. 3. A faith in that righteousness contradicting the natural tendency to look to a personal, inherent righteousness as the ground of justification.

king." See 1 Sam. xv., and compare, for the manner in which Saul executed his own vengeance upon "the priests of the Lord," 1 Sam. xxii. 17-19.

But let us look a little more narrowly at some of the instances before referred to, and discover, if we can, the principles embodied in them, by eliminating the transient and accidental from the permanent and essential. It is not an uncommon error, we apprehend, even among intelligent Christians, to suppose that, because the age of miracles is passed, the Church of God stands in a totally different relation to his power from that in which it stood when miracles were wrought. If this supposition were well grounded, it is plain that the records of God's interpositions in the past by miracle would furnish little or no support to our faith except as proofs of his omnipotence, and, therefore, of his ability to aid the Church in the exigencies of her history. This assurance is, indeed, a great thing. But then the question must arise, will God exert this power, and are we entitled to expect and pray for it? It is often said, specially in reference to the success of the ministry at home, and still more specially of the success of the foreign missionary work, that the Church labors under the great disadvantage of not being sustained in her work by miracles. Now, to say nothing of the lessons of history in regard to the efficacy of miracles in the conversion of sinners: that human unbelief was obstinate enough to resist even such evidence; that Christ's own nation, the visible Church of God of that day, not only disowned and rejected him in spite of all his splendid works of power and beneficence, but insulted him by ascribing those works to a collusion with the fiends of darkness; that the heathen, though so powerfully impressed by the miracles of Paul and Barnabas as to be with great difficulty restrained from offering them divine honors, were yet, a little while after, with no difficulty persuaded to stone them:—not to dwell, we say, upon these lessons of history, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact, that the very purpose of the miracle is to reveal a power which is actually exercised and always exercised in the Church by the Spirit of God. The miracle is simply a removing of the veil, that the Church may see the reality behind it. The daz-

zling flash of lightning which illuminates for an instant the road and neighboring objects for a traveller in a very dark night, most certainly does not create those objects which it reveals. The bright light, bright above that of the meridian sun, which prostrated Saul and his companions on their way to Damascus, and the voice which came from the excellent glory, were tokens indeed of the presence and majesty of Jesus, but neither nor both constituted the power which melted and moulded Saul of Tarsus into Paul the Apostle. That power was identically the same with that which every sinner has experienced who has passed from death unto life. The power of God alone can quicken a dead soul; and every instance of regeneration might be called a miracle, if the fact were palpable to the senses of other men. It is as really a miracle, with the exception just named (the capability of being recognised by the senses), as the taking of Jericho, or the defeat of the Midianites by Gideon—the two instances which we propose very briefly to analyse.

In both these instances we find, first, that all the circumstances are so ordered as to show that the whole efficiency is of God, and that the result is due to the direct and immediate exercise of his power. Secondly, that while means are commanded to be used, these means are not natural or physical causes, but conditions under which God, in a way of sovereignty, proposes to exercise his power immediately. Thirdly, that the means are of a sort to require the activity of the Church, to be used by the Church. God's people must be "co-laborers" with him. The walls of Jericho might have been thrown down and the Midianites routed, as the army of Sennacherib was afterwards destroyed before Jerusalem, without the coöperation of the people; and the simple announcement beforehand of the certainty of the event and of the time of its occurrence, would have been sufficient evidence of the presence and power of God. But God would not do the work without the activity of his people. That activity was a *sine qua non*; and its exact mode was minutely prescribed. In this way, and in no other! Fourthly, that yet there is a natural correspondence, to a certain extent, between the means and the ends. The people were to compass the city in a certain

order, in a kind of order of battle, and not as an unorganised mob. Everything was to be done with decorum, as became the people of God. The men who were chosen to overthrow the Midianites were picked men. An army of cowards, it might have been supposed, would suit God's purpose better, as it would make his power more conspicuous. Not so: the cowards were sent home to their wives and children. There was a correspondence between the nature of the work to be done and the character of the instruments to be employed in doing it.

We find the same principles recognised in the New Testament. It is in special application to his preaching that Paul, as we have seen, asserts that our faith is not to stand in the wisdom of man but in the power of God. First, preaching has been ordained as a means of salvation to sinners in order that the efficiency may be acknowledged to be God's and not man's. The treasure has been put in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God. Preaching is "foolishness" to the natural man; but to the spiritual man it is the occasion of revealing the power of God. Secondly, it becomes the occasion of revealing the power of God, because there is no natural efficiency in it to convert the soul. A dead sinner cannot be argued or persuaded out of his grave by any logic or eloquence of man or angel. God alone can raise the dead; and that, too, only by an immediate exercise of his power. Preaching is one of the conditions he has ordained in which this power is to be exercised. Thirdly, this ordinance of preaching is to be observed by the Church, with the greatest zeal and fidelity, as an ordinance of God; and with a steadfast faith in the promised power of the Spirit. Earnest and unceasing prayer is to be made to him that the supply of ministers may be maintained and augmented, and that all who preach may "*so speak, that great multitudes may believe.*" The Church is never to forget that her great work in the world is "prophesying"—prophesying to the dry bones and prophesying to the Spirit; that she is a co-worker with God; that the means by which the victory is to be won, is "the sword of the Lord and of Gideon;"—not the swords, but the "sword;" not the sword of Gideon and the Lord, nor even the sword of the Lord only, but

“the sword of the Lord and of Gideon.” The power of God threw down the walls of Jericho in, with, and under the marching round of the church and the blowing of the horns. So Paul ventures to say to those same Corinthians whom he had so solemnly warned against the sin of making the wisdom of man, or anything else save the power of God, their trust, “I have begotten you through the gospel.” Fourthly, there is a correspondence, to a certain extent, between the nature of the end and the character of the means. Truth is the natural aliment of the mind. The good which the truth of God presents and offers to sinners is the only good in which the soul can rest and be satisfied. The presenting of this truth to men by men, and not by angels, is another instance of correspondence. Sinners can better secure attention from sinners, in speaking of sin, and sinners saved can better secure the attention of sinners to be saved, in speaking of salvation, by the operation of the principle of sympathy. Hence the immense importance of the cultivation of the ministry; its improvement in knowledge, in utterance, and, above all, in faith, love and all the other graces of the Holy Ghost. That is a very striking and significant record concerning Paul and Barnabas, alluded to above, that when they came to Iconium, “they so spake, that a great multitude believed.” The exercise of God’s power is represented as determined, in some sense and to some extent, by the manner in which Paul and Barnabas spake; and the manner would be determined, of course, by the spiritual condition of these ministers at the time; and this again would be determined, more or less, by their habitual spiritual condition. There is no special mystery in the statement. The very reason why God has chosen men as his ministers is a reason why some men are more efficient ministers than others, and why the same men are more efficient at one time than at another. The fact that all the real efficiency is of God is a reason why the Church should take special care in the training of her ministers, and why her ministers should take special heed to themselves first and then to their teaching. The Quakers’ conclusion from their doctrine of the Spirit as to the training of the ministry is therefore a gross *non sequitur*, even if the doc-

trine itself be true. Paul was an inspired man, and appointed to be the great theological writer for the Church of all time; but he was an "educated man" before he became an apostle, and his inspiration did not, in his own judgment, absolve him from the obligation, much less extinguish the desire, of self-improvement by reading and study. When aged and a prisoner, and waiting for his departure and for his crown of glory, he begs Timothy, when he comes, to bring not only "the cloak left at Troas with Carpus" to keep his body warm; but "the books and specially the parchments," (these last, probably, the "adversaria" or common-place books, in which he had jotted down thoughts suggested by his readings and meditations).

We propose now to compare with these teachings of God's holy word concerning the relations of his ordinances to his own power and sovereignty, on the one hand, and to the agency of the Church, on the other—some practices which have been authorised and tolerated in the Church. These practices may be distributed under two heads: 1. Those which are clear additions to God's ordinances. 2. Those which involve a wrong use of God's ordinances.

1. As to the first, we remark that they are all self-condemned as additions. The doctrine of our Confession of Faith is as follows: "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word; and there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed." That this is also the doctrine of Scripture may be seen by consulting the passages cited by the Confes-

sion in the foot-notes. The "circumstances" here referred to are the necessary adjuncts of human actions as such. Time, place, decency, and order are such circumstances. If, for example, there is to be social worship, there must be, as in assemblies for any purpose, an agreement as to the time and place. Every deliberative body, whether of divine or human constitution, must have a presiding officer, if the business is to be done with decorum and despatch. The fourteenth chapter of First Corinthians, as also the eleventh, which are referred to in this section of the Confession in the way of proof and illustration, show what our book means by "circumstances." Under this rule the use of a liturgy or of an instrument of music in the public worship of God, under the Christian dispensation, is to be condemned. No trace of a written liturgy in the Church before the fourth century has been found, nor of the use of an instrument in the service of praise before the ninth. Either, therefore, during all those centuries the Church did not perform the offices of public prayer and public praise with order and decorum, or these additions, which have been made since, are unnecessary, are not "circumstances," in the sense of the Confession.

This definition of the discretionary power of the Church is the only ground which we can hold against Rome. The Church of England, in limiting the discretionary power only by the *prohibitions* of the word, has found itself exceedingly embarrassed in defending itself and its Protestant character against the Romanising party in its own bosom. And we may add that even "the Reformed Episcopal Church," noble as is its testimony for great and fundamental doctrines and against fatal errors, retains a germ of mischief and corruption in retaining the principle of a hierarchy in its government, upon the ground of its having been long in use in the Church and its not being prohibited in the word of God. It seems to us very much the same in principle to say that, as the word of God does not prohibit the government of the Church by a graded hierarchy, we may establish such a government, and to say that, as the word of God does not prohibit the celebration of the Eucharist without the cup, the "*communio sub una*" may be practised. The results of that

view of the Church's discretionary power which limits it only by the prohibitions of the word, ought to give pause to every man who loves the gospel and values the liberty wherewith Christ hath made his people free. True freedom consists in being the slave of Christ, and in emancipation from the bondage of "the commandments of men." The liberty, on the part of the rulers of the Church, to make laws which Christ has not made, is simply and really the liberty to put an intolerable yoke upon the necks of the people. It is true both of the Jewish and of the Papal Pharisees, that "they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers." So truly does this spirit of cruel tyranny belong to the essence of this false principle, that we see its working even in the free Presbyterian Church. We have all heard of instances in which the organ has been introduced into a church against the wishes and protests of some of the holiest people in it, people venerable for their age and services, and at the instigation of persons who were venerable neither for age, nor holiness, nor services. If the sufferers whose feelings, and perhaps faith, have been outraged, remonstrate, it is considered a sufficient answer to the remonstrance to say that "it is unreasonable for people to make such an ado about so small a matter." It never occurs to these petty tyrants to ask, why, if it is so small a matter, *they* should make such an ado about it, and trample upon Christ's little ones for the sake of it? The question, here, is not whether the organ be lawful or not. Supposing it to be lawful, nothing can justify its introduction into a church against the wishes of any of the people of God, but a clear command of Christ, either expressed or implied.

This instance suggests another most painful, and yet most instructive, feature of this power as it has been actually exercised. Some of the worst abuses that now exist in the Papal body began with "the people," not the best and most enlightened, but the more ignorant and superstitious. After the establishment of the Church under Constantine, a great influx of the heathen into it took place. They were unwilling to abandon all their heathenish customs, and asked to be tolerated in continuing to observe them.

The better and wiser class of rulers recognised the evil and the peril; but they yielded from the fear "of driving off some from the Church and of preventing others from coming in." They succeeded no doubt. The heathen in the Church were not driven off, and others came in. Some sinners were saved who otherwise—to speak after the manner of men—would not have been saved. But with what result in the long run? The so-called Church of Rome of to-day—a body utterly apostate, whose prevailing power, as we Presbyterians and Protestants generally believe, is destroying and not saving. Who can estimate the mischief wrought by this trust in the wisdom of man, during the weary centuries of darkness, agony, and blood, from Gregory I. to Leo X.? Who can number the souls that have been sent to perdition by acting on the principle of "*οικονομία*," or, as the Jesuits express it, "that the end sanctifies the means"? Who can fail, when he considers what "this doing evil that good may come" has ended in, to sympathise with the indignant exclamation of the Apostle—"whose damnation is just"?

But the rulers who, against their own judgment and convictions, yielded to the wishes of the people, and practically abdicated the authority with which Christ had invested them, what account can they render for preferring to follow the will of the people rather than the will of Christ? Will they say that the voice of the people is the voice of God? Will they say that to God's face? What better can they say than what Saul said, when called to account for not executing God's vengeance on the Amalekites—"the people spared the best of the sheep and the oxen to sacrifice unto the Lord thy God, the people took of the spoil, etc.;" or than what Aaron said, when called to account for making the golden calf—"let not the anger of my lord wax hot: thou knowest the people, that they are set on mischief . . . So they gave me; then I cast it into the fire, and there came out this calf"? But neither Aaron's plea nor Saul's availed them anything. Aaron is charged with gratuitous cruelty to the people, in yielding to them; "with bringing a great sin upon them," and "with making the people naked to their shame among their ene-

mies." Saul is informed that, as he had virtually abdicated his authority, according to his own confession, he shall be forced actually to abdicate the throne of Israel, for one who will do all God's will, not his own or the will of the people.

2. The other class of abuses are those which involve a wrong use of ordinances which God has instituted. This is a notorious feature of the Papal body, which has ventured to "frame the mischief by a law," to formulate the error into an article of faith. The eighth Canon of the seventh Session of the Trent Council denounces an anathema against any one who shall say that grace is not conferred by the sacraments *ex opere operato*. The doctrine is, that the sacraments convey grace by the mere fact of the administration, provided the person receiving them opposes no bar to their operation, by an intention to commit, or the actual commission of, mortal sin. An infant, for example, is always regenerated in baptism, because it is incapable of committing sin at the time of receiving baptism. In other words, the ordinances are not "means of grace," in the sense which we have before fully explained, conditions without which the exercise of God's sovereign power is not to be expected, and yet conditions to the mere performance of which the power of God is not tied (see Confession of Faith, Chap. XXVIII. 6); but "laws of grace," physical causes, which produce their effects by a power inherent in themselves. As fire has the property of burning, so baptism has the property of regenerating. As the burning property of fire may be neutralised by the operation of some other law, so the regenerating property of baptism may be neutralised by the law of mortal sin. In the use of God's ordinances as means, we are obliged to acknowledge the sovereignty of his Spirit, in the use of them as laws; that sovereignty is not recognised, but the Spirit is regarded (if regarded at all) only as the invisible nexus by which the physical cause is connected with its effect. Most men, in witnessing the production of a neutral salt by the combination of an acid and an alkali, do not think at all of the power of God which has given the properties to these substances, but only of the chemist whose manipulations have produced the desired result. So in the "christening" of an infant,

most Papists are thinking, we apprehend, only of the manipulations of the priest.

In formulating this doctrine, the Papal body has only formulated an impulse or instinct of our fallen nature, which prompts us, when we have failed to present to God the faith or other spiritual conditions to which his promises have been made, to rely upon the ordinance itself, as if God had so tied himself to it, as to make the effect certain if the ordinance is observed. We have an instance of this perverse instinct at the very beginning of the history of our apostate race. "And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever," etc. (Gen. iii. 22.) This passage is sometimes interpreted to mean that God drove out the man from Eden, in order to prevent him from acquiring an immortality in sin and corruption; as if the mere eating of the tree of life would have exempted him from the stroke of death. It seems to us in the last degree unreasonable to suppose that any creature could be invested with that life-giving power which God challenges to himself as his own sovereign prerogative. "Man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The true meaning of the passage, in our judgment, is very different. The "tree of knowledge of good and evil" was so called, because it was the symbol of God's supreme authority, which makes good and evil to man. Whatever God commands is good because he commands it, and whatever he forbids is evil because he forbids it.* Man, in eating the forbidden fruit, emphatically denies this great principle, and claims by his own will to know (or make) good and evil for himself, becomes "as one of us," or makes himself a god. The "tree of life" was so called

*It is hardly necessary, we trust, to inform the reader that we are not unmindful of the claims of "immutable morality." There are two questions which engage the special attention of the moral philosopher. One is, what is right, and the other is, why are we bound to follow it—the nature of virtue, and the ground or rule of obligation. In answering the first, he appeals to the nature of God as the eternal standard of rectitude: in answering the other, he appeals to the supreme will of God. This will ordains to be observed things which are in themselves right,

because it was the sacramental sign and seal of the promise of life which belonged to the covenant of works, and which would have been fulfilled to man if he had performed the condition of the covenant. If he had acknowledged God to be the all-disposing Lord, he should have had God for his all-comprehending Good. But man failed. He made his own will his law, and yet he attempts to seize upon the promise of life by stretching out his hand to its sacramental sign, as if the promise of life were so bound up with, or so inhered in, its visible sign and seal that the possession of the last necessarily implied the possession of the first. In short, the delusion under which he labored, and which God mercifully rebuked and defeated by putting the tree beyond his reach, was this very delusion of an efficacy in the sacrament *ex opere operato*. The history of the Church is full of instances of the same delusion. The Israelites thought, that, wicked and idolatrous though they were, they had God on their side and must be victorious, if they only had his ark with them. Their enemies seemed to be under a similar delusion, when they got possession of the ark as a part of the spoils of war; they supposed that the God of Israel, too, was in their possession as a conquered divinity, until desolating judgments convinced them of their mistake. One of the commonest and one of the most crying sins of Israel, and one which the prophets constantly rebuke, is this sin of trusting in God's ordinances, without God and against God. To such a pitch of infatuation and madness did they go in this sin, that God pronounced the very sacrifices which he had himself appointed an abomination to him.

Now, to this sin we are all inclined. The Churches of Christ may not convert the abuse and abomination into a law or an

and things which are in themselves indifferent—and the difference between these classes of things has given rise to the distinction between "moral" and "positive" commands. The obligation to obey a "positive" command, however, is moral; and a positive command is better fitted to express the idea of supreme authority, because there is no reason for obedience to a command of this sort, but the expression of will; whereas, in moral commands, the inherent rightness of the thing commanded is an additional reason for obedience. "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right."

article of faith, as the Papists have done. They may and do protest against it as a grave error; and yet practically act as if the error were not an error, but the truth. Does not many a young Presbyterian minister, just from the Seminary, and with all "the arguments" at his tongue's end, feel as if no adversary could resist him? Does not many an experienced minister, who has found out, long ago, that "old Adam is too strong for young Melancthon," occasionally say to himself, when he has preached "a powerful sermon,"—"Surely they cannot resist that"? Does not many a church, when it has invited some "evangelist" or "revival-preacher," and he has graciously accepted the invitation, say to itself—"Now we shall have a revival"? Meantime, there is no special seeking of God by prayer, by repentance, by humiliation, by lamenting the sins which have grieved away the Spirit of God. None of these things are felt to be necessary. The Spirit will come with the "evangelist." Now, what is all this but the delusion of *opus operatum*? And what other effect does the history of the Church entitle us to expect, if we so dishonor the Holy Ghost, than that he will depart, and leave us to eat in bitterness of the fruit of our own way, and to be filled with our own devices? to leave us with our man-converted converts and our man-sanctified saints? with our backsliders and apostates become "twofold more the children of hell" than they were before they passed through our patent process of regeneration?

The foregoing considerations will enable us to form a judgment concerning two very common abuses in our own Church; and we bespeak the candid consideration of our brethren, who do not see them (or, have not seen them) in the same light that we do. They and we, we trust, have the same grand end in view—the glory of Christ and the enlargement and edification of the Church.

The first of these practices which we propose to notice is that of the use of "machinery" in "revivals." By "machinery" we mean all those "measures" over and above the means which God himself has appointed, which have been invented by "evangelists" or "revival preachers" for the purpose of awakening careless

sinner: such as "the anxious bench;" "the altar" to which inquirers are invited in order to be specially prayed for; the reading of letters (which have been procured by solicitation) from young converts or from inquirers; "silent prayer" of the congregation; the calling on certain classes in the congregation to arise and separate themselves from the rest; the roaming over the congregation of certain persons for the purpose of making appeals to individuals; the calling upon certain descriptions of people in the audience to sing certain hymns, and the requiring of the rest not to sing; the demand for unusual postures in parts of the worship, as, for example, kneeling in singing, etc., etc. Measures of this sort are justly called "machinery." The use of them demands no spiritual gifts, no spiritual frame of mind, no piety, nothing, indeed, but the power of physical endurance and—*brass*. We do not deny that some of them have been used by good men, and with an earnest desire to do good; but there is nothing in their own nature which forbids their being used by men who have not one spark of genuine piety. Accordingly, we find that they have been successfully used by wicked men and hypocrites. They belong to the same class of things with the nummeries of Rome. The priest performs the ceremonies prescribed in the ritual, and the business is done. The character of the priest has nothing to do with the efficiency of the ritual. Whether he be a Hophni or a Zadok makes no difference in the result. The patient or recipient "gets through" alike in either case.

If this be a just view, if these measures are a sort of machinery, this is enough to condemn them. God's measures are of a totally different sort. They are moral, not mechanical. They demand for effective use not only piety in the *habit*, but piety in *exercise*. Paul and Barnabas so spoke at Iconium, that a multitude believed. It is conceded that God has sometimes graciously made the preaching of unconverted men the means of salvation to sinners. But he has also sometimes made the repetition of a godly man's sermon by a mocking mimic the means of conversion to a boon companion. He has sometimes condescended to speak by the mouth of a Balaam, or even of an ass. People have been converted, we doubt not, at meetings where the machinery has been

fully, and, we may add, shamefully worked. But all this is nothing to the purpose. The question is not what means God may be pleased to use himself, but what he requires or permits the Church to use; and if he has appointed means which demand ordinarily, for their efficiency, high moral and spiritual conditions, then measures which may be as effectively used without as with such conditions cannot be supposed to have his approval; and the use of such measures is arrant will-worship, and betrays a larger faith in the wisdom of man than in the power of God.

We have said that this machinery may be referred to the same class of things with the mummeries of Rome. This suggests a more serious objection to it. The mummeries of Rome have an intimate historical and logical connexion with the Semi-Pelagian position of that body. It is not a question of vital importance, which of the two was chronologically first, the abuse in practice, or the error in doctrine. If both belong to the same organism, it matters not whether the head or the foot came in first. It is enough, for our warning, to know that the head and foot are members of the same body; and that if one be admitted, the other will be apt to follow in time. No such ordinance as that which the Papists call baptism could have a permanent place in a body which was not at least Semi-Pelagian in doctrine. And so it may be truly said that the machinery in question is thoroughly Semi-Pelagian in its affinities. It was introduced in modern times by churches of that doctrinal tendency; it was worked *con amore* by the Pelagianising party in the Presbyterian Church, and condemned by the Presbyterian Church at the time of the schism of 1837; and if not condemned again and put down, it will bring on another Semi-Pelagian schism. It is altogether out of harmony with the doctrine of our Church concerning man's condition as a sinner, and concerning the agency of the Holy Ghost in regeneration. One or the other must in the long run be given up.

This suggests another objection. The use of this machinery brings a multitude of unconverted people into the Church who would not otherwise come into it. The appeal is made to mere natural sensibilities and sympathies; people, specially the young,

honestly mistake this natural feeling and mere impressions on the imagination for religious conviction, or for the sentiments which result from religious conviction; and, without time for testing their sentiments and for manifesting their real nature and origin, they are hurried into the Church and assume the irrevocable vow. A few months are sufficient to reveal the fact of self-deception to a multitude; but they are in the Church; they commit, the greater part of them, no "offence" to warrant their excommunication; and they remain in the Church and of the world. Hence, another fruitful source of apostasy from the faith. By the terms of the supposition, such church members have no spiritual relish for the distinctive doctrines of the gospel; in particular, there is nothing in them which says Amen to the teachings of God's word concerning the desperate power and malignity of sin, and concerning the almighty and sovereign power of the Holy Ghost. The real problem of sin has never been anxiously revolved by them, and they are, consequently, unable to appreciate the Bible soteriology whether of the Son or of the Spirit. The temptation to the preacher, in ministering to such a people, is to say nothing on these topics because the people are not interested in them; and from saying nothing about them, to proceed to direct assaults upon them. This is not an altogether imaginary description of a process of degeneration. If we have not misunderstood the history of Socinianism in the New England churches, its progress was, to a very great extent, due to "the half-way covenant" and other measures which filled the churches with unconverted people. A spiritual experience of the reality and power of the truth is the only security for its preservation. The world in the Church!—this is the great peril. This is doing more to help the cause of Rome and of infidelity, than all the crafty books that are circulated in their interest. This is the peril against which the Church has been warned from the very beginning; and it is a peril into which the use of revival machinery is aiding to plunge us.

Once more: this machinery is not only unauthorised of God, and is, therefore, a sheer addition to his ordinances, as much so as the so-called sacraments of "penance" or "extreme unction"

in the Roman apostasy, but they virtually sanction the *opus operatum* principle. Sinners are encouraged to believe that if they will only put themselves under the operation of the machine, they will get through and be saved.

Finally, there is one argument which ought to prevail with all faithful Presbyterians against the use of these "measures," even if they are not convinced that the measures are in themselves wrong; and that is, that they are a clear addition to the covenant which has been made with one another by the congregations constituting the Presbyterian Church in the United States. This covenant is contained in our standards. We have agreed as to "what the ordinances in a particular church" shall be (Form of Gov., Ch. VII.), and in the "Directory for Worship," the features of the worship to be observed in all our congregations are described. No congregation has the right to introduce any other form of worship and at the same time remain a constituent part of that Church to which these standards belong. It is not improbable that many machinery-using churches in our communion would be scandalised by the introduction into our non-machinery-using churches of a liturgy. But why should they? The covenant is violated, it is true; but the machinery has also broken it. We do not hesitate to say, that if the covenant had to be broken in one way or the other, we should consider the breach by liturgy much the least offensive and dangerous of the two.

The other abuse upon which we propose to expend a paragraph or two, is one connected with another ordinance of God—the ordinance of giving of our substance to him. It is another clear instance of the substitution of "the wisdom of man" for "the power of God," as the ground of faith.

Let us recall, first, what the ordinance of God is, and what his design in it. From the very beginning, God has ordained that he should be worshipped by the offering of that which cost the worshipper something. The first recorded act of solemn worship, that of Cain and Abel, was an act of this sort. Both of these persons made an offering of their property. Under the institute of Moses, not only were offerings of this sort continued on the

largest scale, but the tabernacle, and afterwards the temple, the symbol of the presence of God and of his conversableness with his people, were built of materials furnished by the free gifts of the people. One of the grandest acts of worship ever performed by the Church on earth was that which is recorded of the King of Israel and his people in the last chapter of the first book of Chronicles. Those who deny that "giving" is of the nature of worship must admit that at least *this* act of giving was worship. It is no part of our purpose, however, to discuss this question now. It is enough, if "giving" be conceded to be an ordinance of God, both under the Old Testament and the New, and the essence of it to be the voluntary surrender of a portion of our substance to him.

As to the design of God in establishing it, it may be remarked, first, that it is perfectly clear it was not because he needed the property of his people. "All things come of thee," says David in the chapter just referred to, "and of thine own have we given thee." And in the fiftieth Psalm, God himself asserts, against the preposterous error of the people, that he has no need of anything that they can give, because "the world is his, and the fulness thereof." Secondly, one part of his design is to furnish an appropriate method of acknowledging our dependence upon him as the Sovereign Proprietor of all, the Giver of every good and perfect gift, and of expressing our gratitude to him for what we have received. Thirdly, as such an acknowledgment and expression, it would serve and was designed as an instrument of communion with him and so of a growing conformity to him. Fourthly, in all social and public acts of giving, it was designed to be the means of communion with one another to the people of God, as in acts of social prayer or praise; and thereby to confirm their love one to another. Fifthly, it was designed as a means of grace. This is implied in the uses already mentioned, but deserves an articulate statement. Faith, love, gratitude, and devotion are strengthened by a proper observance of this ordinance, as by the proper observance of the ordinances of prayer, singing, hearing the word, Baptism, and the Supper. But the ordinance of giving is a specific medicine for that most fatal and

insidious disease of the soul, "the love of money," "the insatiable desire for more," covetousness. This is a view particularly insisted upon by Paul.

Now, let it be noted that, according to this view of the nature and ends of the ordinance, its whole value and efficacy depend upon its being an ordinance of GIVING. The very moment that the element of a *quid pro quo* is introduced into it, its whole nature is changed, and of course its whole tendency and effect also. It ceases to be the beneficent ordinance of God, and becomes the pernicious contrivance of man. Hence "fairs" and all other methods of raising money for the Church, which appeal to people to help the Church in the way of helping themselves first to something which is offered to their appetites—bodily appetite or otherwise—are wrong in principle. A great deal might be said—it would require a much longer article than this to say it—upon the pernicious and disgusting "abuses" of these methods, abuses which in some places have almost equalled the licentious and frantic excesses of the heathen temples. It might be easily shown that these abuses are the natural results of the maxim that "the end sanctifies the means," and that the only natural limit to the application of the maxim is the limit of a human being's capacity and power to do evil. The descent to hell is easy. All that one has to do is to put one's self on the inclined plane, and make no resistance; and the business is done. But instead of launching out upon such a sea, we content ourselves with pointing out the wrongness of the principle. If the principle be false, its working will be pernicious. Accidental circumstances may modify the manifestations of the evil, but the evil is there, and must in due time manifest itself.

But it is said, that the persons who "get up" a fair, or deliver lectures for the benefit of a church, are real givers, and, it is contended, are the only givers. Surely, there is no harm in pious men and women selling their wares and giving the proceeds to the Church. This is plausible; and we are not disposed to withhold the credit or even the admiration which is due to the zeal, the self-denying zeal of the Tryphenas and Tryphosas, the Eudiasas and Syntyches, who wear out their health and their lives

in these labors. We doubt not that their good motives, their love to the Saviour, will be suitably rewarded by him. But we think a little consideration will be sufficient to show that their plea will not stand. Why do they not sell their wares as their sisters, who make an honest livelihood by buying and selling, sell theirs? Why do they publish to the world that the proceeds are to be given to the Church, and persuade the buyers that in indulging themselves in ice cream and strawberries at a fair they are doing a pious act, and glorifying God? Why such a display of the charms of their daughters or other young women at the tables? Is not this severe trial of that shrinking modesty which is the great charm of the virgin, a trial to which these noble women would not dream of exposing their young friends for mere gain to themselves? Does God require, can he be pleased with, the sacrifice of that which stands so near to the purity of character in women? We say nothing of the monstrosities of pious women selling themselves, for a promenade to the highest male bidder, and outrages even worse than these which have been reported. We have in our mind, in this argument, the best regulated fair of which we have had any knowledge; and we affirm that our women allow themselves to do things, "for the glory of God," which they could scarcely do for themselves without a blush. It is plain that a fair is not a mere method of getting money by a few persons in order to contribute the money as their money, to the Church. It is a different thing altogether; different in its nature and different in its moral consequences. Then, too, it must be acknowledged by every candid observer of these fairs, and by every pious person who has taken part in the management of them, that there is a strong temptation to unfairness, much stronger than in any ordinary affair of buying and selling, too strong in general to be resisted even by those who could easily resist them, who would scarcely feel the temptation, where only their own private interests were concerned.

It is said again that the money must be gotten, and it cannot be gotten in the way of a free gift. There is no other way. Our first answer to this plea is, that it sounds too much like the maxim, "make money; honestly if you can, but by all means make

money"—a maxim which has drowned multitudes of souls in destruction and perdition. Dr. Johnson once rebuked a man for his dishonest ways, and the man's defence was, "Doctor, you know I must live." "I see no necessity for your living," was the blunt moralist's reply. The end of living is the perfecting of the man in righteousness, and to do unrighteousness in order to live, is to sacrifice the end to the means. A Church, above all, has no *raison d'être* but the promotion of righteousness; and to build or maintain it by unrighteousness, or even by questionable means, is to defeat its only end.* We answer, again, that the meaning of this plea is too often simply and nakedly this: a congregation in a city needs a house of worship; it has the means within itself to build one of a moderate cost, say \$5,000; but a house as handsome and attractive as its neighbors cannot be built for less than \$40,000. What is to be done? Honesty says, "Build a \$5,000 house, and wait until you can build a \$40,000 house." Vanity and unbelief say, "Build your costly house at once, go heavily in debt, and trust to your wits to pay for it." The counsels of vanity and unbelief prevail, the costly house is built, and the congregation enters upon a course of folly and worry which makes many a good man or woman in it wish that the foundation had never been laid. How different the building of the tabernacle and the temple of old! They could not have been built without an extraordinary spirit of liberality among the people, it is true; but whence did that spirit of liberality come? From God; it was the power of his Holy Spirit which moved the hearts of the people to give back to him what they had received from him. This is David's own account of the matter as to the temple. See 1 Chron. xxix. 10-18. Are the gifts of the Spirit

*This plea proceeds also on the supposition that a dollar is a dollar in the kingdom of God. This is a great and grievous error. The widow's mites, our Saviour says, were more than all that the rich men cast into the treasury of their abundance. They were more, not merely in proportion to the property possessed, but because there was expressed in her gift more of the grace which constitutes the kingdom of God—more of faith and of self-denying love. What immense sums have been cast into the Lord's treasury, through the ages, in consequence of that one act of the nameless widow!

less abundant under this dispensation than under the old? The Scriptures are a very clear directory in every case where the means are in the congregation, but the people have not the heart to give. The power of God can give them the heart, and that power will be vouchsafed in answer to prayer—if the proposed work be for the glory of God and the good of the Church. The wisdom of man may devise other means, and the means may be successful after their kind (for even the ostentatious righteousness of the Pharisees had its “reward,” Matt. vi. 2, 5, 16); but no other faith than that which stands in the power of God can glorify him, or be of any real benefit to his Church. The very fact that man’s contrivances to get money for the Church can be worked successfully without the power of God, is against them, as we have already argued against the machinery used in “revivals.” God’s ordinances cannot be worked successfully without his Spirit, and, for this reason, unbelief does not relish them. They require faith, repentance, humility, prayer on the part of those who use them. These graces, again, are the gifts of God, and have to be sought for. God’s way is troublesome to follow, and men prefer to follow their own. When his ordinances fail because they have not been observed in faith and prayer, then something must be substituted for them which will not fail, although faith and prayer be absent.

The use of all these methods of man’s device must, for the reasons just assigned, tend to defeat the very ends for which God instituted the ordinance of giving. His people are not edified. Their sense of dependence upon his power and grace is diminished. Their covetousness is increased. They get so much into the habit of relying upon methods by which others may be induced for “a valuable consideration” to part with their money, that they almost cease to expect gifts. With the decay of faith in God’s power as to the revenues of his kingdom is associated inevitably a decay of faith in his power to convert and sanctify the soul. Behold, on the other hand, the concomitants of “giving”: “and the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and one soul; neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common.

And with great power gave the apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus; and great grace was upon them all. *For* [see the Greek] there was not any among them that lacked," etc. (Acts iv. 32-34). Here is a case of genuine revival by the power of the Holy Ghost. An entire absence of machinery, an entire absence of the *quid pro quo* methods! A fair seldom ends without heart-burnings or divisions. Here all that believed were of one heart and one soul. Oh for a return of such blessed days to God's Church!

In conclusion, let us never forget that the only source of the Church's genuine life is the Holy Ghost. It is by his power that every sinner begins to live; it is by the same power that he continues to live. It is he who seals us unto the day of redemption. Let us not grieve him and so forsake our own mercies. We do grieve him, when we cease to look to him for every spiritual blessing, and for every "temporal blessing" which is needful for the being or well-being of the Church. We grieve him when we substitute our own inventions for his ordinances. We grieve him when we so act as to seem to say to the world that our God will not give us the things that are needed for the glory of his name and the prosperity of his cause; that our Rock is no greater than the world's Rock. The Holy Ghost is the glory of the Church; and when he departs, Ichabod may be in truth written upon her walls—the glory is departed.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Jesus. By CHARLES F. DEEMS, Pastor of the Church of the Strangers, New York. United States Publishing Company, 411 Broome Street, New York. Pp. 756, 8vo.

This is an elegant and portly volume, richly and splendidly illustrated. All Southern people of intelligence know that Dr. Deems is an eloquent, earnest, zealous, and popular minister of the Southern Methodist Church, who established himself in New York city immediately after the war, and has been an indefatigable Christian worker there ever since. It was through his influence, we suppose, that Mr. Vanderbilt was led to endow so largely a Methodist University bearing his name in Tennessee.

This journal has criticised with just severity several of what are called "Lives of Christ." It gives us pleasure to state that we find much less to say against Dr. Deems's work and much more in its favor. We like what he says after telling his readers of his wading painfully through much of the immense amount there is of literature on the subject of the Temptation, viz., "that the simplest way is to read the history in the light of common sense and derive what lessons our present scientific culture may enable us to educe." But the immediately succeeding paragraph declares: "It is obvious that the narrative is substantially made by Jesus. The historians could have gathered it from no other source. Unless they made great blunders in understanding his statements or in recording them, we have the whole affair before us as it appeared to the mind of Jesus," etc. Now this must strike the ordinary reader of this journal very painfully as sounding very much like a denial of the Spirit's authorship of the inspired narrative. But let the reader notice what Dr. Deems says in his preface as to its being a "most grievous misapprehension of the volume and its author" to suppose that he has "attempted a Life of *Christ*." "It is no more such a book than it is a volume of sermons or of poems. It carefully abstains from being a Life of *Christ*. A Life of *Christ* necessarily starts

with the assumption that Jesus *was* Christ. It must be dogmatic, and can be useful mainly to Christians. I have assumed no such thing. Nor have I assumed in this book that the original biographers, the four Evangelists and Paul, were inspired. I simply assume that their books are as trustworthy as those of Herodotus and Xenophon, of Tacitus and Cæsar."

It appears to us that no one can object to the author's choosing for himself in this manner the ground on which he will make his defence of Christianity. Very touchingly he says in one of the concluding paragraphs of his preface:

"As far as practicable I have laid aside all dogmatic prepossessions. But in writing this book I have been preparing a memoir of my dearest friend; and if for that Friend's sake, and in the spirit of that Friend, I have dealt with all the records most honestly, it is also fair to state that I have treated them with the reverence of manly love; and whatever may be the decision of my readers, I conclude this work with a love for Jesus, deeper and better than that which I feel for any other man dead or living.

Let us now state how the author closes his book. On the last page he asks: "Who is this Jesus?" Declaring that he has simply and conscientiously and honestly set forth the facts of the history, he says it is for each reader to determine for himself who Jesus is.

"All agree that he was a man. The finest and best intellects of eighteen centuries have believed that he was the greatest and best man that ever lived. All who have so believed have become better men therefore. We have seen that he never performed an act or spoke a word which would have been unbecoming in the Creator of the universe, if the Creator should ever clothe himself with human flesh. Millions of men—kings and poets and historians and philosophers and busy merchants and rude mechanics and purest women and simple children—have believed that he is God. And all who have devoutly believed this and lived by this as a truth, have become exemplary for all that is beautiful in holiness."

"What is he who can so live and so die as to produce such intellectual and moral results?"

"Reader you must answer."

It is evident therefore that the author has aimed to conduct his readers to a very lofty height of true doctrine by consenting to begin his march with them at the lowest possible position. And

we have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that he has achieved a highly creditable success. Saying this, we do not mean to declare that we approve of all the particular statements made or opinions expressed by Dr. Deems. Sometimes we consider these to be unwarranted. But it must be just impossible for as busy a man as he to write so large a book and not put into it occasionally what had been better omitted. Many, very many, passages are of singular beauty and sweetness. We set up the volume on our shelves resolved to repair to it frequently for the solace of our heart-sorrows and for suggestive views of difficult passages in the Gospels.

J. B. A.

The Revision of the English Version of the New Testament.

By J. B. LIGHTFOOT, D. D., Canon of St. Paul's, and Hulsean Professor of Divinity, Cambridge; RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin; C. J. ELLICOTT, D. D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Introduction by Professor PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D. Reprint of Harper & Brothers, New York. 12mo.

The Revision of the English Version of the Holy Scriptures, by Coöperative Committees of British and American Scholars of different Denominations. By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D. Harper & Bros., New York, 1877. 12mo., pp. 50.

The "Revision Movement," as our readers are aware, first took form in the appointment of certain dignitaries of the Anglican Church a Revision Committee, by the Convocation of Canterbury in 1870. The rules enjoined by Convocation authorised them to associate in the work eminent scholars of other denominations. This was done; and the actual Committee includes Presbyterians of Scotland, Baptists, Methodists, and Congregationalists. It divided itself into two bodies, each of which meets monthly in Westminster Abbey, (usually about four days,) and makes its amendments in the authorised version upon careful comparison of views.

In 1871 an invitation to American scholars to coöperate was extended through Dr. Philip Schaff. He was empowered to select the American revisers, according to his own ideas. He

tells us: "In the delicate task of selection, reference was had, first of all, to ability, experience, and reputation in Biblical learning and criticism; next, to denominational connexion and standing, so as to have a fair representation of the leading Churches and theological institutions; and last, to local convenience, in order to secure regular attendance." Inspection of his list, under the light of these sentences, discloses very clearly Dr. Schaff's estimate of the "ability, experience, and reputation in Biblical learning" to be found in America. It is evident that he thinks it is all at the North. He has included but one man south of the Potomac or west of the Susquehanna, Dr. Packard of the Episcopal Seminary in Alexandria, Va., and him doubtless because he felt constrained to have one representative of that great Church, and could find one no where else. Dr. Schaff could find no reputation for Biblical learning at all in that great community, the Southern Baptist Church, nor in that equally great one, the Southern Methodist Church, nor in the Southern Presbyterian, or Cumberland Presbyterian Churches. He knew nothing of such scholars as Dr. Broadus, Dr. Summers, Dr. Gildersleeve, Dr. Baird of Tennessee. Or will it be said that all these were excluded by the third consideration, the wish to "secure regular attendance"? The answers are: that he has himself made this the third and least consideration; that the railroads have practically annihilated space for many of these gentlemen; and that they are all a little nearer than C. Van Dyck, M. D., of Beyrout in Syria, who is included. His appointment is explained by saying that he could be consulted by letter on important points. Could not Southern scholars and institutions have been thus consulted also, and a decent show, at least, of regard for their rights, have been thus made? This is only one case among many, showing that even good men in the North are hopelessly ignorant and contemptuous of the people of the South; ignorant, because contemptuous. The attention of Dr. John Hall of New York was once called to this injustice. His answer was, that the South had itself to blame, *because it did not publish its own views and thus command respect by creating a literature representative of itself.* This statement, which is precisely the

opposite of truth, was but an aggravated renewal of the injury. The fact is, that the South does publish, and *has its own literature, honorably representative of itself*, (notwithstanding the almost crushing *incubus* of commercial and political impositions,) but Northern men, like Drs. Hall and Schaff, have always been too supercilious to acquaint themselves with it. In fact, cultivated men in the South, with that liberalised spirit which the highest culture produces, read the literature of the North (and of Europe) along with their own; while Northern scholars, with the narrowness of a more local and sectional culture, read only their own. In conclusion of this point, it must be known that Dr. Schaff was not left to perpetrate this slight without admonition. His answer was, what it will be again: a very polite disclaimer. *But the slight is not repaired.* The American revisers, therefore, have no right to expect any other reception for their work, by the country at large, than that of a clique limited to one very small corner of the land, and representing only a fraction of its religious and literary interests.

The works before us claim that the authorised version needs improvement under the following heads: the Greek text translated from; actual errors of translation; inaccuracies; inconsistencies; archaisms; spelling of proper names; accessories; and arrangement.

As to the text to be followed, the revisers in both countries evidently design to give effect to that spirit of depreciation of the "*Textus Receptus*" which happens to be now fashionable among German critics. The revisers choose to assume that the text as modified by recent critics (as Tischendorf and Tregelles), is *ante-Nicene*; while the MSS. from which the *Textus Receptus* was drawn are assumed to represent a text long post-Nicene, and almost worthless for authority. They choose to accept the assumption that the Uncial MSS. are much older than the cursive as a matter of course. Yet Tischendorf himself does not dare to surmise that his MSS. is older than the later reign of Constantine! They ought to know that the most recent researches explode the assumption of the comparative recency of cursive Greek writing. They ought to know that many of the most

judicious critics utterly reject that maxim of Bengel, "*Præstat lectio ardua,*" and its supposed grounds, by the use of which most of their innovations on the received text are made.

Under the other heads, many of their emendations are sensible. They propose literally *a revision* only. They promise to leave the main body of the authorised version untouched, and to preserve the whole of its spirit and idiom. Under the head of *archaisms*, they propose to substitute the correct phrase where the rendering of the authorised version, once exact, has ceased to be understood correctly by the popular reader, because of the *flux* in the meaning of English words in the lapse of two and a half centuries. Thus, the Greek *μέριμνα* is rendered "thought," which then meant inordinate anxiety. That meaning is now antiquated, and the word needs a new translation to avoid the perpetual need for pastoral explanation. On these grounds both Committees will of course concur in rendering *δοῦλος* throughout the New Testament "slave." The authorised version in 1611 rendered it "servant," which was then used in its classic sense, as the equivalent of *servus*, "slave." But the British people, having chosen since then to substitute the old system of domestic bondage by the new one, so much more convenient for the capitalist and grinding for the laborer, have slidden into the common use of their word "*servant*" as the equivalent of *μισθωτός*, "hireling," which is totally another thing. This is therefore the clearest possible case for the Committees under their own rule for removing obsolete renderings.

The revisers have a narrow path to tread, if they would avoid doing mischief in the attempt to do good. To reconcile the English world to revision, they are prompted to say many things depreciatory of our existing version. But this, practically, is the only Bible of the people; and unless they are guided by the most cautious wisdom in their modifications, the final rejection of their work by the religious world will leave this present version permanently in possession of the field. Then the only result will be that an overweening attempt to amend will have undermined the confidence of the people in the only version they have to use.

In conclusion: the most important rule for the revisers is to

to make their changes few. Let them be satisfied with inserting only such changes as will *certainly* command the assent of *all* scholars, and leave the rest, if suggested at all, in the margin. If the pet ideas of men or cliques of scholars, are admitted, the work will be doomed.

R. L. D.

The Bible Doctrine of the Soul; or, Man's Nature and Destiny as Revealed. By CHARLES L. IVES, M. D., late Professor of Theory and Practice of Medicine in Yale College. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 624, 626 and 628 Market Street. 1878. Pp. 334. 12mo.

The Theological Trilemma. The Threefold Question of Endless Misery, Universal Salvation, or Conditional Immortality, (i. e. The Survival of the Fittest,) Considered in the Light of Reason, Nature, and Revelation. By Rev. J. H. PETTINGELL, M. A. New York: Sherwood & Co., Publishers, 76 East Ninth Street. 1878. Pp. 285. 12mo.

The recent agitation of the public mind in regard to the question of the endless misery of the wicked, which was induced by the preaching of Canon Farrar at Westminster Abbey, has issued, as we anticipated, in the writing of books on the subject. These two works have a common purpose, and in the main advocate similar views. They were written to disprove the doctrine of endless misery, and to prove the destruction of the existence of the wicked. It would seem that the old tenet of Universalism is losing ground, and in its room, as a candidate for popular favor we have the doctrine of Annihilationism in a new dress. The authors of the books mentioned above vehemently protest against being characterised as Annihilationists. Oh no; they do not contend for the annihilation of any substance or any elemental particle. They very modestly profess ignorance upon that abstruse point. They do not hold that the soul will be annihilated. To impute that hypothesis to them is to do them grievous injustice. They are only Destructionists. All that they maintain is that the being—the existence of the wicked will be totally destroyed. They will entirely cease to be, but they will not be annihilated. They will be eradicated, exterminated, so that nothing will be left of them, but that is a fate very dif-

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ferent from annihilation. All this is the more extraordinary in view of the fact that they hold that the soul is not an immaterial substance, but an organism—a congeries of material organs. This organism is to be completely destroyed in the consuming fire of penal wrath. What then remains? Not an immaterial and indestructible substance, for the soul has no such substance. The ultimate and dissevered particles of the material organism may continue to float somewhere in the infinity of space—they are not annihilated perhaps; therefore the organised whole, as such, is not to be supposed to be annihilated. The man is totally destroyed, but something of him remains! Now we submit that it is idle for these writers to disclaim the appellation of Annihilationists and to berate those who notwithstanding their protests insist upon so designating them. What difference worth speaking of is there between annihilation and the total destruction of existence? The whole thing, in their philosophy, amounts to the distinction between the destruction of a man's elementary atoms and the destruction of himself. "It is sufficient," says Mr. Pettingell, "for him [the author] to know that He who gave it [the soul] all the life it has, of whatever kind, can take it away, and that he will take it, as he himself declares, from all who will not submit to his law and government." Even physical life will be taken from the soul, it will cease to be an existing thing, but in some sense will still continue to exist. For, if in no sense its existence continues, it is certainly annihilated. If these are not contradictions, they savour of them strongly. The cap of the Annihilationist fits them, and we opine they will have to wear it whether they like it or no. Dr. Ives admits that there is a biblical sense of annihilation which is applicable to his doctrine. The hypothesis is but the old one of Annihilationism presented in a modified form.

The view which is held in common by these two writers is, that immortality was not essential to man as he was created, but was held out as a reward, the enjoyment of which was conditioned upon the maintenance of integrity. As man sinned he forfeited the promised boon, and it is recoverable only through the redeeming work of Christ. The great office which the

Saviour discharges is to confer physical immortality upon man, to redeem the natural life of the soul from the utter extinction with which it is threatened. Salvation—the great burden of the gospel—is in the dialect of these foreigners to Zion chiefly the preservation of the physical or natural existence of man. It is thus that life and immortality are brought to light! Those who accept the Saviour will live immortally in this sense; those who reject him are destined to the utter destruction of their being.

What is peculiar to the hypothesis of Dr. Ives is the doctrine that the souls of believers die with their bodies and with them will be raised at the last day. And yet this modern Sadducee, who contends for the mortality of the soul, says that the passage of Scripture which convinced him of the truth of his views was that which contains the Saviour's conclusive argument against the Sadducees. It settled him in the faith of the resurrection of the dead soul. This is perhaps not extraordinary in one who holds that absence from the body and presence with the body are one and the same; that Paul's desire to depart from the body was only his longing to rejoin the body in the resurrection morning; and that the parable of the rich man and Lazarus was nothing more than a fable, in which the former is imagined as if experiencing torments, although dead, soul and body, and lying in his grave, and as there entreating with a missionary zeal that his living brethren might be warned against the danger of meeting his doom.

It would not be possible in a brief notice like this to discuss the questions which have been raised by these writers, although we trust that their arguments will be fully met by other hands. We content ourselves with a few comments. First, the zeal and industry which they have displayed in searching the Scriptures for supports to their opinions are worthy of what we regard a better cause. Yet the slightest examination of their books will be sufficient to show that they have dealt with the word of God in neither a philosophical nor a spiritual manner. One of them contends, for example, that the Hebrew word *nephesh* signifies the animal soul. Opening the Psalms which we were reading, we encountered the first verse of the 103d: Bless the Lord, O

my soul. The word for soul here is the one which has been mentioned. The rendering, according to Dr. Ives's construction would be: Bless the Lord, O my animal soul! As a signal proof of the unspiritual manner in which they have handled the Scriptures it is enough to mention their utter degradation of the term *life*, which they have stripped of its grand and exalted meaning as designative of the highest well-being—the confirmed holiness and happiness of the soul, and reduced to the signification of mere continued natural existence. They may be scholars, but not in the school of the Spirit. That great, critical word *life* has a volume of meaning which only those who have been taught of God attain, and of which these clever jugglers with language appear not to have dreamed.

Secondly, the coolness is something wonderful with which they sneer at the presumption in favor of the native immortality of the soul derived from the common consent, not of the Christian Church alone in all its branches, but of Pagans, Mohammedans, and Jews. A testimony rolling up in thunder from the human race is a despicable "tradition;" a doctrine enforced by its fundamental beliefs is no more than "a Satanic lie." We insist not on submission, without evidence, to the mere traditions of men, but we cannot refrain from thinking that a doctrine of natural religion might be treated with some respect, to which the celebrated maxim of Vincentius may be legitimately and emphatically applied.

Thirdly, the devout reader of the Scriptures will not fail to discover in these works, beneath a veil of pious and evangelical phraseology, a positive revolt against the whole genius and spirit of the gospel. The doctrines which the Church of Christ has ever embraced and clung to are scouted with the same scorn which is visited upon the catholic sentiments of the race. These writers are wiser than "the children of light" and "the children of this world."

Fourthly, the temper of these volumes is scarcely better than their doctrinal matter. The authors have a peculiar spite against those inoffensive persons who teach theology, and those unfortunate people who have been compelled to be called doctors of di-

vinity. They are the legitimate successors of the Pharisees, narrow bigots and tyrants over the human intelligence. As to creeds, these young Samsons snap them from the free limbs of their disenthralled souls like green withes. We are afraid of them.

J. L. G.

The Faith of our Fathers: Being a Plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church Founded by our Lord Jesus Christ.
By Rt. Revd. JAMES GIBBONS, D. D., Archbishop, etc. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 18mo. Pp. 433.

This book will not teach the intelligent Protestant anything he knew before, except the growing urgency of constant resistance to Popery. Its publication is doubtless one of the things for which its astute author has lately been rewarded with an archbishopric. The title is expressive of the cool and unscrupulous audacity of the trained, popish proselyter; and everything else is "of a piece." On the fly-leaf is a label pasted, which says that the book is a present to its owner, "with compliments of the Rt. Revd. James Gibbons, D. D." The explanation of these very discriminating "compliments" is, that Bishop Gibbons's priests are furnished with copies of the book, to be bestowed upon any gullible or disaffected Protestant whom he may surmise to be in a state of mind to bite at a very small bait; with the label ready to paste in, the "holy Father in God" meantime as ignorant of the recipient's existence as though he did not adhere to the infallibility.

The author prepares the way for his plea, by coolly setting aside all those refutations of Popery, which convicted and condemned it, after a century of thorough discussion before the general mind of the English race, as "the foulest slanders," the effusions of unscrupulous ignorance and vulgar spite. He must have a low estimate, indeed, of the intelligence of Americans, if he supposes that he can thus dispose of the immortal refutations of a Calvin, a Daillé, a Chillingworth, and a Barrow, supported with equal learning and fairness upon an exhaustive knowledge of and reference to the standards and teachings of the Romish Church itself.

The plan of the book is to touch a multitude of points briefly and with audacity, to make a multitude of assertions, and to wrest a multitude of Scriptures, imposing, all the time, upon ignorant readers, with an unblushing dogmatism, in the confidence that, should any Protestant take the trouble of a thorough refutation, this would demand of the reader more diligence and attention than such persons would bestow.

In this land, where it is the fashion to laud and to profess value for spiritual liberty, our author has, of course, a hard task in dealing with Rome's history as a murderous persecutor. His rôle, of course, is, to say that the Reformers persecuted as well as Romanists, and to ascribe the bloody history of Popery to the roughness of the times, and not to the genius of that false religion. Of course we have Calvin and Servetus. Now, Bishop Gibbons knows perfectly well the true and complete answer to this suggested argument. Will he say of his "infallible" murderers, an Innocent III., a Gregory IX., what he knows every Protestant says of Calvin: That here *this Reformer was wrong; and that he acted against his own free principles?* Dare Bishop Gibbons say that of his immutable masters? He knows that he dare not, and he knows that his use of these blemishes on Protestantism is therefore dishonest. Professing a thorough devotion to the Protestant doctrine of liberty of opinion, he says (p. 241): "I am expressing not only my own sentiments, but those of every Catholic priest and layman in the land." Did he ever hear of his brother, the editor of the Popish "Shepherd of the Valley"?

He says that the Spanish Inquisition was exclusively a royal and a political affair, with which popes had nothing to do, except remonstrate against its cruelties! One little fact is rather unlucky for this nice subterfuge: that *the popes had their own Inquisition* for the States of the Church to which they held on long after Napoleon destroyed the Spanish Inquisition. His answer to the crimes of bloody Mary is, that Elizabeth persecuted Romanists, and hung more of them than Mary burned of Protestants. He leaves out this little difference: that Elizabeth was anathematized, deposed, damned, and outlawed by his excellent popes; and that the fanatics she hung at Tyburn were hung as

assassins and traitors. which the popes commanded them to be. But Mary burned her most righteous and peaceable subjects, because they could not see how her priests could make a God out of a piece of paste, and then eat him.

On page 253, our author has the hardihood to say: "I can find no authenticated instance of any pope putting to death, in his own dominions, a single individual for his religious belief." To appreciate this amazing assertion, let the reader ask himself: What difference does it make as to the tyranny of the popes, whether they murdered people for their conscientious convictions within the "States of the Church," or whether they signalled their atrocity as more active and meddlesome, by having Christians put to death in the States of other princes? Let Bishop Gibbons remember John Hus; and as one well known instance of persecution unto death in the Papal States, let him remember Jerome Savonarola. As John XXIII., in 1412, laid Prague under edict for sheltering Hus, so Alexander VI., in 1497, laid Florence under the same infliction for sheltering the Italian Reformer. And so, as Hus expired at the stake amid prayer and praise, joyously and confidently, so did Savonarola submit to his doom in childlike confidence in Him who died on the cross. And amongst the heresies laid to his charge was that of having taught the doctrine Rome hates so much—the doctrine of justification by faith. Archbishop Gibbons would do well to moderate the audacity of his assertions.

R. L. D.

All-Saints' Day and Other Sermons. By the Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY, M. A., late Rector of Eversley and Canon of Westminster. Edited by the Rev. W. HARRISON, M. A., Rector of Brighton. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Company, 1878. Pp. 410. 12mo.

The first remark we are prompted to make respecting this volume is, that on its title page we see at once marks of the Church of England and of a more ancient Church, even the Primitive and Apostolic. The case appears in the reference to that keeping of "days" which Paul said he was *afraid of*. The other, in those titles of office—"rector" and "canon"—

both of which are clearly traceable to the ruling elder of the beginning.

It is not often we read a volume of sermons straight through from beginning to end; but these sermons are remarkable ones and they charmed and held us fast. The publishers have our thanks—we are glad to possess them. And we think they would form a good study for all young ministers. Their vivacity and their simplicity are both admirable. A finished scholar, Canon Kingsley was not above preaching so that his most unlearned hearers could understand him perfectly. And there is not a particle of formal stiffness—not an atom of clerical starch in them all. We have been forcibly reminded many times in reading these discourses of our late brother and friend, the Rev. Dr. Edward T. Buist, of Greenville, when in his happiest vein of preaching or speaking at Presbytery or Synod.

And yet Canon Kingsley was no theologian at all, and his sermons make this manifest continually. He was a poet; and we might say he was in some sense an orator and could powerfully impress and also instruct all classes alike; but his ideas of theology were the shallowest. Nay, these sermons contain a good deal of very doubtful orthodoxy. Witness, pages 157, 158, where the preacher declares that when we “love the kindness and the honesty and the helpfulness of our neighbor,” it is necessarily “God in them and Christ in them” whom we love; and that any old married couple tottering on hand in hand to the grave, who truly and tenderly love one another as in the days of their youth, may not know why, but “God knows why—it is Christ in each other whom they love.” Witness again the sermon on Grace, pages 180–189, where he makes it mean (at least so a large part of the discourse must impress the reader) courtesy and civility, lovingness and amiableness, truth and honor. And that sermon is on the text: “The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Witness again, pages 195, 196, 197, where he hoots at preaching the law as preparatory to preaching the gospel. Witness, page 230, where he describes “old Epictetus, the heroic slave, who, heathen though he was, sought God and the peace of God, and found them, doubt

it not, long, long ago." This sermon is on "the peace of God." And once again, witness, page 263, where the Canon says : "The true repentance, the true conversion, the true deliverance from the wrath to come, the true entrance into the kingdom of heaven, the true way to Christ and to God, is common morality."

And yet the volume contains many striking, just, and valuable thoughts, and many, very many, passages of great force and exquisite beauty. The whole sermon on Worship (pages 217-227) we should like to have every Presbyterian congregation hear and every Presbyterian minister read and digest. J. B. A.

Visions of Heaven for the Life on Earth. By ROBERT M. PATTERSON, author of "Paradise: the Place and State of saved Souls between Death and the Resurrection," etc. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1334 Chestnut Street, Pp. 364. 12mo.

This is by no means a bad book. It is full of good things, written by its author or copied by him from a great variety of writers. And it is accompanied with numerous notes and references; adorned with them or disfigured by them, as the varying tastes of readers may decide. For ourselves we confess to being not a little annoyed by these endless interruptions of the continuous thread of the writer's discourse. If the truth must be spoken, however, the lack of continuity is one great fault of this production. No doubt many Christian people, sick and delicate ones especially, will be pleased, comforted, and refreshed from time to time with bits read or heard by them out of this nice sort of book. And such books must be useful, we suppose, or people would not write them and others publish and others again buy. But we are thankful that there are some other sorts of religious books, and that we are not shut up to this kind. This is, in short, a nineteenth century sort of religious book, a whole bushel of which would be easily outweighed by any one of several of John Owen's writings, or Marshall's famous treatise on Sanctification; and which will probably be dead and buried and forgotten long before the century which produced it shall come to its end, while Owen and Marshall and Bunyan and other religious writers of a

bygone day shall still be flourishing immortally. The wise man said, "Of making many books there is no end." It is a serious responsibility the Presbyterian Publishing House of the Northern or of the Southern Church takes, when it thrusts forth a new religious book upon us. We often feel that we should much prefer to be let alone that we might once more read over some of the old ones again.

It is due to this book now to state the topics it discusses. They are as follows:

1. The Rainbow in Heaven: The Redemption Work.
2. The Great City: The Number of the Redeemed.
3. Christ's Transfiguration: The Devotional Life.
4. Heavenly Recognition: The Social Life.
5. Out of Great Tribulation: The Suffering Life.
6. Heavenly Degrees: The Active Life.
7. The Beauty of Heaven: The Æsthetic Life.

The reader will be apt to infer justly that this is a book which its author has *made*. It by no means equals, in our judgment, his first book entitled "Paradise." J. B. A.

Weights and Wings. By CHARLES F. DEEMS, LL. D., author of "The Home Altar," "Jesus," etc. "Let us lay aside every weight." Hebrews xii. 1. "They shall mount up with wings as eagles." Isaiah xi. 31. New York: Wm. B. Mucklow, Publisher, Forty-second Street and Madison Avenue. 1878. Pp. 272. 16mo.

Dr. Deems very modestly states in his little preface, that the publisher "desired him to prepare a small book on practical subjects." The result is this unpretending work which we have read with very great delight all the way through. It is full of sound and healthy sentiment on a great variety of important practical subjects. And this sound and healthy sentiment is very admirably expressed. The volume is as piquant and interesting as any story book, and yet there is not so far as we noticed one unseemly word or thought in it. We think its author has achieved a complete success; and we have only one thing to criticise in the whole production and that is, that on page 51, speaking of the "attrac-

tions in different places" which make people in this country "go from place to place seeking to improve their fortunes," he should have said, by way of rounding off his sentence, "and there is a great West to be filled up." Why did he fail to put in "*the great South*," either instead of, or along side of, the great West?—and he a Southern man too!

J. B. A.

Reflections of a Recluse. By the Rev. R. W. MEMMINGER, A. M.. Author of "What is Religion," and "Present Issues." Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 624, 626, and 628, Market Street. 1878.

This volume, though entirely different in matter from the former works of this author, bears the same impress of profound, original, independent thought, and the same adventurous departure from the beaten track of the philosophy and theology of the ages. These philosophic meditations purport to be the substance of the conversations, or monologues, of a recluse, whom our author accidentally meets during his rambles among the mountains of North Carolina. The character and personal appearance of this strange personage are so vividly described, and his mournful history so minutely and pathetically related, as to produce the irresistible conviction of reality. We apprehend that the majority of readers will be ensnared, by this literary artifice, into the belief that they are listening to the voice of a veritable recluse; and when they read the touching account of his death and burial, they will drop a tear of sympathy over the lonely grave in the mountain solitude.

We would not break the spell of this fascinating illusion, did we not feel that it would add more than a romantic interest to these "Reflections," to reveal the secret that the modest author has embodied, in this imaginary recluse, his own personal experience and mental history; who was compelled, through loss of health, to retire from the active duties of his profession to recruit his exhausted energies in the bracing atmosphere of the mountains. It was during these years of solitude that he, who had "gone out into the world with a buoyant and trustful spirit," was to learn that the temporary "disappointment" of human

plans is not a "sad failure" of life's great end, but the only sure road to success for those who have wisdom to interpret the providential significance of life. Blessed is the man, signally favored of heaven, who is "led by the Spirit into the wilderness," where, in solitary communion with God and nature, all great souls have been developed and disciplined for their divine mission.

Each chapter of these "Reflections" is prefaced with descriptions of the mountain scenery of western North Carolina, which the writer styles the "Switzerland of the United States." These delineations are exceedingly graphic and picturesque. The imagination of our "Recluse" gushes like the mountain spring, and dashes like a mountain torrent, in a kind of natural rhetoric, which reflects the careless elegance and rugged grandeur of nature. The effect of natural scenery upon the intellectual and moral character, would furnish a suggestive and profitable theme for our philosophical hermit. It would be interesting to learn the result to his own conscious experience of protracted communion with those "huge telluric pyramids" that look down upon us from more than thirty centuries. Their stimulating effect upon his imagination is clearly evident in that delicate sense of beauty and lofty appreciation of the sublime, which do not appear in his former writings, and which we are not accustomed to look for in one of a philosophic and speculative habit of mind.

The Monologues embrace three general topics: "The Great," "Self-culture," and "The Art of Thinking."

Human greatness is defined as the infinite in process of realization. Man's capacities of intellect, sensibility, and conscience, are infinite in their possibilities. Hence greatness is a mystery, producing admiration and awe, and kindling a desire to solve the mystery. The emotions of curiosity, admiration, and reverence increase in intensity as we ascend the scale in nature, humanity, and God.

Hence, too, "the popular nature of biographies, when they relate to the great in history." Literature appears under two aspects: that which treats of great men who are originators and creators in thought and action; and that which observes, criticises, and discusses great men and their deeds. As the mystery

of greatness cannot be solved, we may, to a certain extent, indicate its essential conditions. The first is *pneumatic* energy, which has its seat, not in the impulses or the reason, but in the consciousness, and is analogous to force in matter, to life in the animal, and steam in mechanics. "It is the spiritual steam of human nature." Without it, man, with all other gifts, is but a splendid system of machinery.

This remarkable potentiality is original, not acquired. It is constant, never flagging. It is unequally distributed. The Westerns are more gifted than the Easterns. The Africans are almost devoid of this energy, and, therefore, incapable of progress as a race, inasmuch as it cannot be acquired. It is conditioned by the natural faculties, as steam is by the strength and perfection of the machinery of the engine it drives.

The question is then discussed. "How can a low pressure of pneumatic energy be raised to a high one?" Not by artificial stimulants—opium and alcohol—which increase mental activity for a time—"a spasmodic, remitting energy"—but terminate in exhaustion and loss of self-control.

Nor is this force identical with that of the will. The former is involuntary and instinctive; the latter a conscious act of volition. The will is concerned with the end, which conscience enjoins, and the means, which the judgment indicates; pneumatic energy urges to action, but in no definite direction.

The low pressure of this energy, therefore, is not to be raised by stimulants, or mere efforts of the will, but by immediate action after resolve. Delay is fatal to all great designs. Again, this energy must be prudently economised; expended only as occasion demands. It is also weakened by a "premature disclosure of one's plans." The great man is reticent. The great talker is never a great actor. He lets off half his steam before the time for action arrives. The habit of revery and castle-building is equally debilitating.

"The direction which that activity which is the result a pneumatic energy will take, is determined invariably by specific constitutional characteristics, and the plastic influence of attendant circumstances." This brings us to the second essential condition

of greatness, which the author calls the *psychical* element; viz., a strong will, which never wavers in the use of means to accomplish the end to which pneumatic energy urges it. The third element is the intellectual furniture of the great man. Imagination, sensitive, vivid, and controlled. This feature is clearly analysed and eloquently enforced. Memory, at once retentive, generous, and available, enabling one to use his knowledge when it is needed. And overlapping and underlying all other elements, there must be self-confidence. "The man must clearly know what he is about to do, and must feel that he is able to do it."

The possession of this pneumatic energy, with its infinite tendencies, without a proper end, or without the means for attaining the end, leads to a melancholy dissatisfaction or to a gloomy despair, which is relieved only by intemperance, madness, or suicide. Just here we must express our surprise that our author has omitted in this beautiful and almost exhaustive analysis the most important of all elements of greatness—moral goodness; to which Emerson gives so much prominence in his essay on Greatness. "And the greatest of these is Charity." Without the all-pervading presence and all-controlling energy of Christian love, all greatness were Satanic. The great fallen archangel has more pneumatic energy, psychical force of will, a grander intellectual apparatus, imagination, memory, and self-confidence, than a nation of great men. Would not St. Paul put our hero-worship in the same category with the heathen sacrifices, and characterise it as devil-worship? We believe that there is nothing in greatness which commands our respect or admiration, much less our reverence and worship, whether finite or infinite, of which goodness is not the foundation and crown. With this doctrine, we are sure our author will fully agree. We only regret that the one essential element of true greatness should have found no place in his analysis, and that what we know he so cordially believes, should not have appeared necessary to complete and crown his otherwise grand ideal.

The second topic discussed is "*Self-Culture*." Adopting the definition of genius given by Coleridge, the prime characteristic of which is its impressibility—"the vivacity and sensibility of

youth united with the intellectual development of maturity"—he discusses the question of the possibility of retaining this impressibility as we advance in years and culture. It seems to be the common experience, that familiarity begets indifference. The traveller who has compassed sea and land, will at length lose the interest that comes from novelty. There is a great diversity of constitution, both as respects the degree of impressibility, and the capacity for giving it expression. Its continued existence depends upon a constant change of scene and society. It is not the exclusive property of genius, which is independent of outward circumstances, and can "draw its inspiration from the most commonplace surroundings." This inward principle of enthusiasm and sensibility can be known and understood only in its outward manifestations, in poetry, art, music, and literature; though one may possess sensibility without the art of expression. Now, the mournful fact which everywhere confronts us is the tendency of the mind to become insensible to the familiar. Nature, with all her charms, loses her attractions. Our religious belief, to which the youthful soul was so impressible, become devoid of all practical influence. Even death, once a terrible and appalling reality, ceases to move our deadening sensibilities.

Again, all our mental and moral experiences are subject to the law of change. Our opinions, feelings, and literary tastes, are continually modified with the rolling years. Society, as well as the individual, is subject to the same phases. Nor does it appear possible to determine whether these changes are regulated by any law. Comte, following Cousin, made his own experience the exponent of that of the race, and propounds a theory explaining the succession of the various schools and sects of philosophical opinion. But this theory, though embodying much truth, is by no means satisfactory. "We know that we are drifting, that is all; and it would seem as though we can exercise no control over the current. True, there are minor currents which, apparently, we can successfully stem; but the grand oceanic gulf-stream of our existence in thought and feeling is beyond our control."

Now the problem of self-culture is, How can these two tendencies be counteracted? Can sensibility lost by age be reacquired?

Can the law of change be made to work for our ultimate good? Our author does not question the possibility of considerable attainments in these respects, by proper discipline and culture. The real difficulty is a practical one. With the exception of men of genius, there are but few elect spirits who rise from their mental and moral degradation, and aspire to a higher and nobler life. The condition of the masses is hopeless. Precisely how one should proceed in this process of self-culture it is difficult to gather from the desultory and discursive meditations of the Recluse. The following point, however, is indicated with sufficient clearness: "We must emancipate ourselves from the intellectual bondage of systems. All systems cramp the mind. There is no progress in knowledge so long as we are choked by a halter. The crazy hypotheses of modern science are placed in the same category with religious creeds that have stood the test of the ages. Calvinism and Arminianism have had their day and are rapidly vanishing away. Calvinism is a theosophy, not a philosophy. It resembles Gnosticism rather than Platonism. It is of Persian extraction, and resembles Manichæism. It is a despotic, tyrannical system, totally inadequate to meet the main facts in the case. Calvin was a Frenchman, and a Frenchman sacrifices everything to system."

We cannot suffer such audacity as this to pass unchallenged. We confront him with the laws of nature, the established principles of sound philosophy, the facts of history, and "the sword of the Spirit." Liberty is obedience to law, and the mightiest intellects of all ages have adopted the Calvinistic system, precisely because they found within this enclosure the largest mental freedom consistent with loyalty to the laws of thought and belief. It is a notorious fact that the very men who have been most jealous of liberty of conscience, and who have been most ready to go to the stake for the "right of private judgment," have been those who have been the most earnest adherents to the Calvinistic creed. Nor is the Calvinistic system a foe to true progress. It puts no "halter" around our necks. The only barrier which obstructs the courageous march of a true Calvinist is *law*—the limits of human thought, and the boundaries of divine revelation—

the only rule of faith. The Calvinist moves in the orbit of law, and therefore enjoys true freedom. The "Recluse," in breaking away from this orbit, has done violence to his own nature, rebelled against the word of God—the law of the intellect—and is now pursuing the erratic course of a comet, as he himself acknowledges, "drifting"—drifting on the wide sea of speculation, without a chart, compass, or anchor. If, after the lapse of eighteen centuries, nothing is settled or formulated, we may well ask with Pilate, and with a sneer upon our lips, "What is truth?" Calvinism we regard as the conservative element essential to a regular and healthy progress. Who wants "anything *new*" unless it be *true*? History will show that some of the greatest and most successful explorers in science and philosophy have been Calvinists. Who is expecting or needing anything new in respect to essential Christian truth? Let those who complain of bondage take care lest they are the willing and unconscious slaves of pride, prejudice, and sensibility.

The last Monologue, on the "Art of Thinking," is replete with valuable suggestions on the processes of thought: on analysis and synthesis; *voluntary* mental efforts; the habit of continuous and connected thinking; perfection through tribulation and severe discipline; self-control. It contains, also, interesting observations on the process of thinking as affected by bodily positions, local associations, moods and tenses, and other external circumstances. The conversation concludes with judicious remarks on accumulation and expenditure of material, and the advantages of solitude.

The young student will find much interesting and profitable matter in these reflections. The author is a vigorous thinker, but it is to be regretted that he has not devoted more study to the art of expression and logical arrangement. G. R. B.

Concessions of Liberalists to Orthodoxy. By DANIEL DORCHES-
TER, D. D. Boston: D. Lothrop & Company, corner Franklin
and Hawley Streets. 1878. Pp. 343.

This work consists of three lectures delivered before the School of Theology of Boston University, and the publication of which

was advised by the Faculty and requested by the students of that institution. The design of the author is, by a collection of extracts from the writings of prominent liberalist opponents of evangelical theology, to show that their own systems are confessedly inadequate to meet the deepest spiritual needs of the human soul; and that the most earnest spirits among them, while rejecting the formulas of the orthodox faith, make striking and valuable concessions to the fact that the doctrines which it embraces are precisely those best suited to the exigencies of a fallen race. He selects three of the fundamental tenets of the evangelical theology as affording scope for the execution of this purpose—the Deity of Christ, the Atonement, and Endless Punishment. His quotations are made from the *Unitarian Review*, the *Christian Examiner*, the *Monthly Religious Magazine*, the *Liberal Christian*, and from the published writings of distinguished men whose names are given—men of marked ability and the finest scholarly culture. These citations, interspersed with remarks of the author, make up the bulk of the volume, to which some “Inferences” are appended, from which we give the following extracts, as furnishing in brief the gist of the preceding concessions:

“Of the doctrine of Christ’s Deity, that ‘it is wonderfully sweet to the heart’; that ‘it somehow feeds the soul, and gives it the fulness of the divine nature’; that ‘millions of beings are using it every day and find it gives them grandest health and strength’; that ‘it gives the soul a centre to tell its aspirations and loves’; that ‘it has been the renewing power of Christianity, and wrought all the graces and the righteousness and the zeal and the piety distinctively Christian’; that ‘it gives the Christian Church all the efficiency it has for positive good in society’; that ‘the soul is made, in its very nature, to want in its worship the whole circle of the divine perfections’; that the Trinity, ‘the chief point in which is the Deity of Christ’, ‘is one of the oldest doctrines of the Church’; that ‘nine-tenths of the strongest and best Christians that have ever lived have believed it’; that ‘it is as prominent in all the light of modern science as in the darkest night of the Middle Ages’; that ‘it is held by the whole Christian world, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, except a mere handful of liberals, as the most vital part of its religious faith’; and that ‘Jesus is the centre of the eternal religion of humanity’.

“And of the Expiatory Atonement, that ‘it affords a profounder peace to the heart than the moral influence scheme’; that ‘it becomes most natural and unquestionable in the purest and highest devotional moods’:

that 'it appeals to the deepest emotions'; that 'any faith less comprehensive must ultimately prove unsatisfying to the mind'; that 'no other scheme ever awakened in the human soul religious emotions so original, so strong and pure'; that 'the meanest souls under the expiatory system are conscious of an experience no others can know, and which language is too feeble to express'; that 'expiatory sacrifices have existed among all people, in all ages'; that 'the principle of vicariousness, or the acceptance of the sufferings and death of the innocent in the place of the guilty, is a wide-spread idea, founded upon what seems to be an elementary form of religious sentiment'; that 'the various creeds which set forth peculiar theories of this sacrificial redemption are only light specific discussions of one grand and unifying type'; and that 'it is venerable for its age and the long list of splendid minds which it has educated, and which are still the ornaments of the Church'.

"And of the doctrine of Endless Punishment, that it gives a 'background' of inexpressible worth to the moral world; that 'it imparts peculiar significance to the doctrine of expiation'; that 'it impressively sets forth the need of a Redeemer infinitely exalted above the range of mere humanity'; that it inspires with a loftier joy those who are 'confident that their names are written in the Book of Life'; that 'its denial is a fatal element of weakness in the liberal bodies'; that it is sustained by 'the universal voice of mankind'; that, 'not to speak of the Christian Church and the Christian Scriptures, all nations and religions hold the opinion of future endless retribution'; all nations and religions divide the hereafter into heaven and hell, and contemplate the permanent conditions in that antithesis'; that 'the weightiest names in the realm of speculation, both within and without the Christian Church, are found on the side of eternal retributions'; and that to claim the universal triumph of almighty love, as an original intuition, is absurd, for 'we cannot help suspecting an intuition which arises at this late time in a field of inquiry explored for so many ages, and which contradicts what the seers of all ages, with scarcely an exception, have seen and proclaimed.'"

That these concessions to the principles of the orthodox faith are striking, as proceeding from their professed opponents, will be readily granted; and they furnish some ground for the hope so fervently expressed by the author for a still closer approximation to evangelical religion on the part of earnest minds in the ranks of the liberalist party. In such a hope we cannot but heartily concur; but we have some doubts as to the value and the significance of these indications. The author has not employed as a test doctrine that of the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit

as sovereignly and supernaturally changing the heart; and we have been somewhat struck by the absence from these concessions of anything tending to its admission. On the contrary, there is apparently a steadfast adherence to the hypothesis of self-culture, of a religion evolved from within the soul by its own energies under the suasive influence of the Spirit. The gospel is not apprehended as God's "faithful saying"—an inspired, external, authoritative report to be received by faith nakedly on the ground of the divine veracity; nor is the grace of the Holy Ghost conceived as necessary to the new creation of the soul, but merely as an adjuvant to its own efforts to recover itself from sin. So long as these views prevail in regard to the very nature of religion and the office and work of the divine Spirit, it is to be feared that the breach will continue like a sea between liberalism at its best estate and the gospel of the grace of God.

Of the theological views expressed by the author himself, the only one from which we feel called upon to utter a dissent is that in reference to the necessity of the atonement. He employs the terms, but unless we have misunderstood him, adopts the governmental theory, which resolves the necessity of the atonement into expediency, as a measure demanded by state policy and the exigencies of government, and not by the intrinsic perfections of God. With this exception, we are free to commend his work, not only on account of the interest of its contents, but as furnishing valuable information in regard to the state of theological opinion in New England.

J. L. G.

Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute. Vol. I., 8vo., pp. 486. Robert Hardwicke, Piccadilly, London. 1867.

The "Victoria Institute" is a literary association, whose incipency dates from 1866. Its President is the well known Christian statesman, Earl Shaftesbury; the Archbishop of Canterbury heads its council; and its membership embraces several hundred of the distinguished scholars of Great Britain and Ireland. It has also a few members in America, including such names as those of Dr. Charles Hodge of Princeton, and Principal Dawson of Montreal, with some of lesser note. Its methods

VOL. XXIX., NO. 4—24.

of proceeding are to hold monthly meetings for discussion and the reading of scientific discourses; to print and circulate these as widely as possible; to publish its transactions in an annual volume: to create a library and reading-room of scientific and philosophical works for its members: and to interchange such literature with other associations. The volume before us is the first of its Transactions which has reached us in this form. It contains, in beautiful type, besides an outline of the history and constitution of the "Institute," eleven essays, followed by discussions on the relations between current geologic and ethnologic science and the authenticity of Scripture. These, while reverential towards Christianity, are scientific in tone and thorough in research.

The objects which the constitution of the "Institute" proposes are, 1st. To offer a fair *arena* for the discussion of such supposed parts of physics and philosophy as bear on the Christian Evidences. 2d. To associate authors and men of science friendly to the Bible, so as to gain for them and their views currency and mutual support. 3d. To do what the fondness for specialties, so characteristic of recent physics, is prone to neglect: study and exhibit the relations and effects on each other, of supposed discoveries in physics. And last, to print and circulate useful treatises, already existing or original, and to create a library of Christian science.

The existence of the Victoria Institute arose out of two things: the antagonism between much of the current physical science of the day and Christianity, and the unjust domination of leading men and tyrannical cliques in the existing associations, suppressing candid inquiry and the free expression of scientific dissent from the godless science (falsely so called) now in the ascendant. Earl Shaftesbury, at the inauguration dinner, stated the matter thus:

"It should fill up a gap for men of science, and men of principle, and men of intelligence, and men of research, who would watch the various publications as they came out—some conceived in malignity, some in ignorance, and some in mistaken notions that they were adding to the general science of mankind—and point out where mistakes arose, and put facts in their true light, or at any rate induce people to pause before they pronounced an opinion upon the discovery of anything which seemed

to be opposed to the truths of revelation." . . . "Let this Society be a refuge for all the Cassandras of false science—for those who were never believed, although they always spoke the truth."

The history of the other great societies justifies the sarcasm of the last sentence. They have been Troys, refusing to hear the importunate voice of Truth, which did not jump with the fashion and the prejudice of the hour. In 1844, for instance, at the meeting of the "British Association," Dr. Cockburn, the late Dean of York, a practical geologist, asserted that Buckland's nebular hypothesis would not account for all the geologic facts, and that another hypothesis, thoroughly consistent with Moses, did embrace all the facts, and was, for the last reason, entitled to the scientific preference. Prof. Sedgwick, President of the geological section for the year, attempted to reply, but only dwelt upon the Dean's geological ignorance. After the Association adjourned, he printed his essay, and invited Sedgwick to refute it through the press. He got no answer. He then requested that the subject might have a second discussion, at a subsequent meeting. He was answered, through Prof. Ansted, that "precedent" forbade this! And this in a Society then only fourteen years old, and one established "for the *advancement* of science!" The Dean at last extracted a letter from Prof. Sedgwick, in which the latter declined to repudiate or defend the nebular hypotheses, and confessed that "it was first put forth by *astronomers* and *adopted* by geologists, as a *matter of indifference* to them whether *true or false*." But this letter he declined to have published. Well, the scientific Pope stood for a time upon this pedestal of lofty indifference, which could not condescend to notice the sciolism of a *clerical* geologist, until, in 1864, when the British Association met in Bath, and Sir Charles Lyell was its President, he admitted that the origin and constitution of the granites was now proved, by later researches, to have been misunderstood, and that they had been crystallised from liquid solutions (in water), and that the old view as to azoic rocks must be surrendered, as founded only on negative evidence. Thus the coryphaeus, after twenty years, squarely admits what this naughty clerical geologist had dared to assert. It is easy to see that with

these admissions, all geologic evidence, at least, for the nebular theory, or even for the Plutonic theory, is gone. (The astronomical never was anything but a guess.) This is one instance among many. They confirm the assertion made in these pages a year ago: that while the irreligious physicists declaim against "superstition," they really practise a scientific priestcraft, and require of us, the laity, an "implicit faith," as blind as that of mediæval popery. This disgraceful fact was, years ago, avowed by the *Saturday Review*. It said: "If any new proposition comes with the authority of an established professor of the science, we accept it with the confidence with which a Roman Catholic might take the decision of an infallible Church."

But do we see the "scientists" honestly correcting the erroneous popular opinion they had created, when the supposed facts or theories on which they had proceeded are discredited by science itself? *We do not*. They continue to speak of "established science," as though the Bible alone could be a rational object of scepticism, and "science" were infallible, although knowing how constantly it is refuting and correcting itself. Not the most dignified of the learned societies, the "British Association," the "Geological Society" of London, "The Anthropological Society," nor the "Royal Society" itself, can be trusted to do this self-denying work. It is now more than ten years since the leading geologists of England admitted the facts which show that (in the deceitful euphemism of Sir Charles Lyell) the igneous theory of the earth's *nucleus* "may be dispensed with;" that is to say, in plain English, has no evidence. But is there a text-book of popular geology now current, or a chart of geologic sections, which does not assume it? Bishop Colenso whines, that "established science" left it indisputable the first chapters of Moses are fiction; and he feels bound as an honest man to teach his black converts in Natal so. But he is personally present in the British Association when the highest authorities make a surrender of supposed facts, which utterly *disestablish* his science: and he does not trouble himself to undeceive his blacks in the interests of the Bible he had wantonly dishonored! Not he! Now all this is simply unprincipled. It is due to injured truth that it shall no

longer go unwhipped of justice. Thus, one useful function of the Victoria Institute will be to watch the enemies of revelation, and compel them to "face the music" of their own vacillations and self-contradictions before an abused public. R. L. D.

The Science of Revealed Truth Impregnable. The Vedder Lectures for 1877. By the Rev. W. R. GORDON, S. T. D. New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. 1878. 12mo. Pp. 307.

This vigorous book is an expansion of five Lectures delivered by the author on the Vedder foundation at New Brunswick, in 1877, and presented to the public recently in this form. It has many traits which should commend it to the staunch friends of the Bible, as against those infidel tendencies of science (so called) which the author resists. One of these traits is suggested by the title itself. It is firmly asserted that the evidences of revealed truth are as truly science, as any science of matter. Hence, when the enemies of the Bible speak of "the warfare of science with religion," they use deceptive language. While theology is not physical science, it is as truly scientific as any other. Why then did not they phrase it: "The warfare of science with science"? They knew that the thing which wars with true science is not science, but error; and hence their assumption that revealed truth does not exist as a science is but an unworthy artifice to prejudice the debate and beg the question.

Accordingly, Dr. Gordon devotes the first three Lectures to a powerful restatement of certain branches of the Christian evidences, (the internal and moral, the prophetic, the miraculous, the spread of the gospel,) in which he shows that these evidences are a conclusive science, constructed on principles at least as rigid as our best legal science, and leading to the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture as a positive conclusion.

Another marked and exceedingly valuable trait of his work is that he insists on throwing the "burden of proof" where it justly belongs. Revealed truth is no longer in question among any who honestly understand its science. There may be among them minor differences of exposition of details; but they all know that

this truth is already established by its own independent evidences, rigidly logical and conclusive. It is in possession of the field of belief. Hence any later comer who would impugn it, must assume the burden of proof; and until he has established his opposing propositions *by an absolute and exclusive demonstration*, he has done nothing. The fact that his opposing hypothesis is plausible, is ingenious, may satisfy a number of the circumstances as made known by physical observation—all this effects nothing. The new comer must absolutely demonstrate that the established conclusion (that of the Bible) cannot be true, and that his new theory alone can be true. That such are the conditions of the debate no reflecting mind can deny.

But have those scientists, geologists and others, who dispute the old construction of the Mosaic record, as teaching the almighty creation of the earth in six natural days, complied with this logical obligation? Notoriously they have not. The author then devotes the remainder of the fourth and the fifth lectures to the proof of their failure. He points out the amazing chasm between the ascertained facts of "practical geology," and the hypotheses of "theoretic geology." To the former he does all honor; on the latter he inflicts deserved exposure. We have held that such exposure is not positively necessary to the integrity of the position we assign to Scripture; that, just as the defenders of a citizen indicted for crime, who is entitled to be held innocent until positively proved guilty, content themselves with showing the prosecutor's evidences incomplete, so we need really do nothing more than stand still and demand of geologists an exclusive demonstration that theirs is the only possible way of world-making, even in the presence of an Almighty Creator. But Dr. Gordon has attempted more: he has "carried the war into Africa." Taking the igneous theory of the earth's formation, now most popular in connexion with the "nebular hypothesis," he has posed its friends with such hard questions as these: Is it according to that "natural law" they so much boast, to assign the volatilised state as the initial state of all matter, solid and liquid, as well as gaseous? According to that law, is not vapor a *result* of evaporation? When all was vapor (the nebular hypothesis).

from what was the evaporation? Again, can they be sure that, amidst the tremendous atmospheric movements which must have attended changes of calorific condition so great as to cool down vapor of granite into solid rock, the thin crust first forming on the liquid globe would not be continually broken up? Have they proved that all the igneous rocks expand a little in solidifying, like ice and cast-iron? If not, would not the solid crust continually sink into the liquid mass and be re-melted? Must not the liquid globe, only coated with this thin crust, experience much more certainly and largely than our shallow oceans, *tidal* influences from both the moon and sun? But our geometers do not detect any such tides beneath the crust; and besides, what would become of the crust? Again, according to the theory, all the material of the later and fossiliferous strata must have been the *detritus* of the first crust. But all that first crust was, of course, igneous rock. Now, have they proved that those igneous rocks contain all the primitive substances now composing all the later strata; and enough of all? For instance: *calcium* is a simple substance and a metal. In the later *strata* and earths, *calcium* exists in vast quantities, as limestone, chalk, calcareous clay, marble, alabaster, gypsum. Would the small *per cent. of calcium* found in the igneous rocks (some of them), so far as these have been subjected near the earth's surface to disintegration, have furnished all that vast aggregate of carbonized masses? There is a question which needs exact calculation before a proof is even begun! Again, according to the hypothesis, *all the calcium* ought to have come from these igneous rocks by the processes of disintegration and sedimentary action. But the Italian geologist, Ferrera, verified an extensive mass of pure calcareous matter thrown directly out of the abyss of a volcano! Once more, *strata* formed by sedimentary action must have been formed horizontally and there hardened. But many of them are now curved and tilted! "Oh," says the theorist, "this was done by upheaval from beneath." Then asks Dr. Gordon, how comes it that the upheaved sedimentary *strata* are not always found dislocated, and with spaces between the edges of the dislocations wide enough to account for the difference between the

extent of the chords, which measured the horizontal breadth, and the longer arc now measuring the curved breadth?

The theologian, who has already proved the inspiration and infallible truth of the Bible by an independent argument, is not bound to present any counter-hypothesis of his own as to the way in which natural forces combined with almighty power in forming the present crust of the earth. Having shown that the unbelieving "scientist's" hypothesis is not demonstrated, he has a right to take this ground: God knew how to do it, being omniscient and almighty; although I do not know how it was done. But Dr. Gordon again argues here *ex abundantia*, and suggests a hypothesis of his own. It is, that the fossiliferous *strata* were in large part formed in the earlier ages of the earth's history far more rapidly than sedimentary action could form them, by volcanic and other emissions of their matter from within the earth, in a plastic or pulverulent condition, thus rapidly entombing, or else destroying by their gaseous fumes those teeming multitudes of living creatures and vegetable structures which characterised the first ages. This hypothesis finds support in the multitude of extinct craters, and yet more, fissures, still observed, and in the state of a multitude of the fossils as now found, suggesting a sudden entombment. Grant him this, and with the help of Noah's flood, which he asserts to have been, *quicumque vult*, universal, he thinks the geologist has no need to push back any part of the terrestrial creation behind the era of Adam.

One of the most meritorious parts of his work is that in which he so boldly and faithfully exposes the mischief done Christ's cause in the house of his friends, by those so-called "Christian geologists," who, conceding the assumptions of the scientists against Moses, set to work, by one exegetical torture or another, to "reconcile geology and Genesis." He shows, by the pungent declarations of avowed infidels, that it is always inspiration which suffers by these manipulations. The candid enemy, like Huxley and Denton, sneers at the new translations of Moses as dishonest. The doubting young student rises from them with an impression of the painful instability of the truth he had been taught to regard as divine. One "Christian geologist" demol-

ishes the translation of another in order to advance his own, which is soon denounced in turn. Thus Moses has good cause to cry, "Save me from my friends."

On page 24th the author defines *à priori* and *à posteriori* reasonings in a way which seems to lack perspicuity and to be out of accord with the nomenclature of philosophy. He says: "By the *à priori* reason is meant the reason as it starts upon its work from perceptions and intuitions ingrained within itself." . . . "The process by which reason works out an argument from its own resources." "By the *à posteriori* reason is meant the reason as it starts upon its work from facts and things presenting themselves outside of itself." We ask, Can the reason logically construe the observed facts outside itself, without appealing to its own intuitions? Surely not. Then this method of pursuing truth is also *à priori* in the author's sense. In strictness of speech, *à priori* reasoning should mean reasoning from cause to effect, and the *à posteriori* reasoning from effect back to cause. But both proceed upon the all-important rational intuition or first truth, which asserts the necessary connexion of cause and effect. The phrase, *à priori* reasoning, however, has been used in philosophy and theology for still another mental process, that by which we ascertain the validity and the rank of a judgment simply by the conditions in which it arises in the mind. What the author calls his *à priori* proofs of the divine origin of Scripture, we should rather call internal proofs. But this, after all, is a difference about words, not affecting the solidity of his argument.

In style, our author will be found bold, dogmatic, candid, even sometimes to roughness, and evincing always the heartiness of his convictions. We see in this book another sign of a turning tide. "Practical geology" is beginning to outgrow the pruriency of its rampant sister "Theoretic geology." Men are beginning to awaken from the fascinations of romantic hypotheses, and to see that their ingenious beauty is not proof. We therefore welcome Dr. Gordon, not because we adopt all his arguments or conclusions, but because we recognise his work as a strong blow towards the healthy reaction.

R. L. D.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The author of the "Pensées" is so well known that he needs no introduction¹ to the bulk of readers of all opinions on literature and religion. To those, however, who constitute the minority, perhaps increasing, in these days of "many books," Prof. Tulloch's little work will prove as profitable as interesting.

Though the chief interest of Breck's² Biography may by some be associated with his longevity (B. 1771—D. 1862), still it must be a matter of special attraction, that the Biography introduces us to one, who, in his nurse's arms, saw the Battle of Bunker Hill, in youth heard Mirabeau and Burke, in maturer life was personally acquainted with Joseph Bonaparte, Talleyrand, and Louis Philippe, and closed his days amidst the convulsive struggles for existence of the nation whose birth synchronised with his infancy.

That the people of Venezuela, the land of Bolivar,³ with a country of great natural advantages of soil and climate, are not more prosperous, is doubtless due, according to Mr. Spence's notices, to the low grade of morality prevalent.

Here follows a notice of Russia,⁴ an historical contribution from Germany, the third volume covering the period 1815—1818, the latter year that of the present Emperor's birth. The comprehensive plan of the author, which allows one volume for *three years*, is due to the fact that he proposes entering very fully into the affairs of nations connected with Russia. At his rate of progress and on his plan, the work is likely to grow into an "Encyclopædia" of History. Twenty volumes will bring him to our day, and as

¹Pascal. By Principal Tulloch. Blackwood & Son.

²Recollections of Samuel Breck: with passages from his Note Books. Edited by H. G. Scudder. Sampson Low & Co.

³The Land of Bolivar; or War, Peace, and Adventure in the Republic of Venezuela. By J. M. Spence, F. R. G. S. *Ibid.*

⁴Geschichte Russlands und der europäischen Politik in den Jahren 1814 bis 1831. Von Theodor von Bernhardt. Dritter Theil. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.

events occur in accelerated speed, by that time a year to a volume will not more than suffice. As the author is a German, however startling all this appears, it need excite no wonder.

All Englishmen are not enamored of the Turk or misled by "British interests." Mr. Sinclair,¹ with much egotism, a sprinkling of self-conceit, and no very well conceived and definite plan, has made some contributions to a defence of Russia, mostly consisting of disconnected chapters on Russian virtue, Jewish and Turkish vices, and the weakness of Beaconsfield. But we judge his effort will do as little to pacificate the English feeling as to Russia, as to redeem his own character from the charge of absurd eccentricity.

The public generally in Europe and America has become much interested in the affairs of Turkey and Russia during the last few years. Many contributions to gratify the desire for knowledge of these nations have issued from the press. Among them the work² of Mr. Freeman, besides presenting matter entitling his book to a place among authoritative historical writings, has evidently set forth the true ground of the isolation of Turkey among European nations, and the utter hopelessness of a change. That ground is that the Mohammedan faith binds its votaries to their "strong delusion," and also to extend it by the sword.

Personal observation of the true character of the Turk and his tyranny has served to relieve Capt. Norman³ of his preëxisting prejudice in favor of the Mahometan ally of Christian England, though it has not modified materially his unfavorable estimate of Russia, both as to motives and conduct.

A history of Italy,⁴ even for the mediæval period, strikes the

¹A Defence of Russia and the Christians of Turkey, etc. By Sir Tolle-mache Sinclair, M. P. "What will this babbler say?" Two vols. London.

²The Ottoman Power in Europe: its Nature, Growth, and Decline. By Edward A. Freeman, D.C.L., LL.D., etc. With three colored maps. Macmillan & Co.

³Armenia and the Campaign of 1877. By C. B. Norman, correspondent of the *Times* at the seat of war. Cassell, Petter & Galpin.

⁴Sketches of the Historical Past of Italy, from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Earliest Revival of Letters and Art. By Margaret Albana Mignaty. London: R. Bentley & Son.

mind as much of a novelty as the "Kingdom of Italy" did a few years ago. The author, a Greek lady educated in England, has executed her task so as to reflect great honor on herself and impart most valuable and interesting historical matter to our generation.

Tacitus' works¹ need no commendation. But a successful translation, such as Messrs. Church and Brodribb have presented, ought to meet a patronage and increase the reading of this standard historian, so as most agreeably to disappoint their anticipations of neither profit nor fame.

Archbishop Trench places the public under additional obligation by a Church History² of a very obscure portion of English annals. Though originally delivered to a class of young ladies, and having the merit rather of "correct sketches" than of profound study, they may serve an excellent purpose in giving popularity to a kind of reading improperly regarded as only suited to professional scholars.

The great historic period of A. D. 1500-1700, is so replete with instruction to all after-generations that we welcome a contribution to the illustration of some of its most stirring events in Southern Europe. The work below named³ is an enlarged edition of the author's "Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa." The more men know of the misrule of papal princes and the sufferings of their subjects, the less danger exists that Rome will again reduce the world to her sway. There are only ninety pages occupied by a notice of the Osmanli power.

Mr. Bright's work,⁴ though somewhat like that of Trench, a

¹The History of Tacitus: The Annals of Tacitus: The Minor Works of Tacitus. Translated into English, with notes and maps, by Alfred John Church, M. A., and William Jackson Brodribb, M. A. London: Macmillan & Co.

²Lectures on Mediæval Church History. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. *Ibid.*

³Die Osmanen und die Spanische Monarchie, im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert. Von Leopold von Ranke. 4te Auflage. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.

⁴Chapters of Early English Church History. By Wm. Bright, D. D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

collection of lectures, and rather sketches than continuous history, covers the period of the infancy and childhood of the British Church. It has enough of the legendary to give vividness to the narrative, without impairing its general credibility; and may well be regarded as appropriately introducing the work of Archbishop Trench, noticed above.

Under the principle of "division of labor," we have, as a sort of companion for "Green's History of the English People," (which shews the personal influences affecting the formation of national character,) a History¹ of those principles of government which so essentially coöperated to produce that result.

It will truly be a blessing of wide-spread power if Mr. Sullivan's book² promotes a kindlier feeling between new Ireland and new England. Whether such a result will follow his plan of dissolving the Act of Union and establishing "Home Rule," the future alone can decide.

It is a testimony to the intrinsic value of Milton's character and writings that his life³ and times so often renewedly call our notice. Milton's life, his opinions, and his writings, reflect the character of his times. The portion of that life covered by the volumes before us, was crowded with events of the most stupendous kind, the influence of which, with the principles they illustrated, are still moving in widening circle over the world. With all the revolutionary violence and fanaticism of the rise and rule of the Protectorate, that which remained when the storm and flood had subsided has proved a soil of perpetual fruitfulness to the nations.

A similar period of the great century in English history is filled with other though lesser lights of the Calvinistic firmament, whose character and influence are set forth by P. Bayne⁴ with a

¹The Constitutional History of England: its Origin and Development. By William Stubbs, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

²New Ireland. By A. M. Sullivan, M. P. 2 vols. Sampson Low, Marston & Co.

³The Life of John Milton, with the History of his Time. By David Masson, M. A., LL.D. Vols. IV. and V., 1649-1660. Macmillan & Co.

⁴The Chief Actors in the Puritan Revolution. By Peter Bayne, M. A. Jas. Clarke & Co.

power, fairness, and fulness likely as well to increase the significance of that memorable period as advance the fame of the distinguished author.

The years 1840-1865 of our own history have been remarkable as those of 1649-1660 in English for revolutionary purposes and results; but the illustration afforded in such a character as that of Charles Sumner¹ does not by any means suggest equally right purposes or equally glorious results. In the English period, sound principles of religion and government in the turbulence of the times, brought forth much evil fruit for a time; but in the American period, the sentiments of a false philanthropy and the bitter hate of sectionalism, worked out a legitimate result of corruption and tyranny, to be felt for a generation.

Mr. Green² gives us another volume of the "History of the English People," as it may be presented apart from that of the government. The years covered by this volume, A. D. 1461-1603, embrace the three most important periods in the formation of English national character—that of the rapid and substantial growth of military and naval power, that of the reformation in religion, and that of the literary renaissance. The subsequent glorious career both of England, her trans-Atlantic daughter, and her colonial States, is but the outgrowth of the events here delineated.

With a vigorous pen, we have in Mr. Dixon's³ work the delineation of a portion of the period and the events presented by Green. Both works are well-timed. We welcome everything which will tend to waken in the minds of English-speaking people a right apprehension of the blessings of that true Christian civilisation which they inherit from the men of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and warn them against the priestly tyranny and Papal abomination to which so many now seek to make ourselves and our posterity the willing slaves.

¹Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, 1811-1845. By Edward L. Pierce. 2 vols. Sampson Low & Co.

²History of the English People. By John Richard Green, M. A. Vol. II. Harper & Bros.

³History of the Church of England from the Abolition of the Roman Jurisdiction. By R. Watson Dixon, M. A. Vol. I. Henry VIII.. A. D., 1529-1537.

Roberts Brothers have presented a very unique and interesting volume by Landor¹, in which the reader is introduced to characteristic conversations of eminent personages, *e. g.*, Henry VIII. and Anna Boleyn, Milton and Galileo, Calvin and Melanchthon—a new style of picturing, not men's forms or features, but mind and thoughts. Though "imaginary" they "body forth" the "forms" of words consonant with the characters of those who are represented as employing them. Thus we are thrown back to the years and men of other times, in a manner even more engaging than that so efficiently employed by the authors of such works as "The Maiden and Married Life of Mary Powell the Wife of John Milton," and "The Life of Sir Thomas More," by his daughter, Mrs. Roper.

Philological and ethnographical, as well as historical, is a work² contending, on some plausible and some fanciful grounds, that the origin of the Polynesian race is to be traced to the region north of the Persian Gulf. It is suggestive of the author's opportunities for investigating his subject, that he dedicates the book "To my daughter Catherine Kaonohiulaokalani Fornander, as a reminder of her mother's ancestors and a token of her father's love."

Mr. Huxley introduces a new term in science, *Physiography*,³ which is equal to the two words "physical geography" "rolled into one." It means nature interpreted by physics; while the other rather denotes physics applied to interpretation of nature. Mr. Huxley is well and appropriately employed in preparing this interesting volume for the instruction of the young, introducing them to the study of nature, in most interesting aspects, as its wonders are spread around them. This is surely better than efforts to sap the foundations of the Christian faith.

We may be wrong, but it really seems to us that too much

¹Imaginary Conversations. By Walter Savage Landor. First, second, third, fourth, and fifth series. Boston: Roberts Brothers.

²An Account of the Polynesian Race: its Origin and Migrations. By Abraham Fornander, Circuit Judge of the Island of Mani. H. I. Vol. I. London: Trübner & Co.

³Physiography: an Introduction to the Study of Nature. By T. H. Huxley. F. R. S. London: Macmillan & Co. 1877.

importance has been assigned to the publications of Dean Farrar and others on the question of the "Future and Endless Punishment of the Wicked." The denial of God's explicit declarations is as old as the devil's interview with Eve. The subject had been already discussed in the line of Farrar's positions by as able or abler men; and such positions over and over demonstrated to be untenable by clear scriptural teaching. The summary of "opinions"¹ and the new phase of Universalism presented in the books below named, may do as interesting "curiosities in literature." Error is variant, but truth is one. Pettingell² may use new names and distinctions, but reduced to the ultimate analysis, all such works are but echoes of the Tempter's bold assertion—"Ye shall not die."

¹History of Opinions on the Scriptural Doctrine of Retribution. By Edward Beecher, D. D. D. Appleton & Co.

²The Theological Tri-lemma—Endless Misery, Universal Salvation, and Conditional Immortality; considered in the light of Reason, Nature, and Revelation, etc. By J. H. Pettingell, M. A. Sherwood & Co.

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CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. THORNWELL'S WRITINGS. By the Rev. THOMAS E. PECK, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, Virginia,	413
II. THE MAINE LAW. By the Rev. CYRUS HAMLIN, D. D., Bangor, Maine,	449
III. THE DOCTRINE OF HELL. By the Rev. JOSEPH R. WILSON, D. D., Wilmington, N. C.,	459
IV. CAIN: A SPECULATION. By the Rev. JOHN W. PRATT, D. D., Richmond, Kentucky,	475
V. A NEW "TESTIMONY OF THE ROCKS;" OR, THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS AND BIBLICAL HISTORY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the Rev. B. M. SMITH, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, Virginia,	490
VI. GAMBLING. By the Rev. E. C. GORDON, Savannah, Georgia,	523
VII. THE PHILANTHROPIC ARGUMENT FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS. By the Rev. J. L. GIRARDEAU, D. D., Columbia, S. C.,	547
VIII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,	575

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